Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.

Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to
the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of
respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not
in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent
by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from any
provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be construed
consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of expression,
much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case
was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we issued a minute
resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our
decision.

In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his
being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him
five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited
him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order
which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech."1 There being
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at
the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution
requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than November 2, 1970, at the
same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was
issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual
allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision
of the Constitutional Convention Act,2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."3 It was its contention that the jingle
proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be
denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his
behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent.

This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a
week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a
ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed
on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity,
considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded
thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and
prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning
the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately executory."4

ISSUE-WON THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS WAS CORRECT IN ORDERING THE BAN OF USE OF
RECORDED POLITICAL JINGLE

1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power.
Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and
the like."5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view
the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of
ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the
same kind or class as those specifically referred to.6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in
the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to manifest
fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription.7 Thus, certain
Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should be more in harmony with the
tenets of the fundamental law."8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional
infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the
ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and what the
Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional
defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only
that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.9

2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a
cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional Convention
Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the
challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the
Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding
that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What
respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this
constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that
petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to
use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by
confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or
other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect
would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate
indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10

3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a
postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of
statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be
transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In
its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to
maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass
upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical
corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental
measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by the
present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although independent
of the President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission
is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it
could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict
with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which
liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility
under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There
could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent
Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech.
Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.

WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is

permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with
its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.