Dividends As Substitute

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Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law:
The Separation of Ownership and Control in
the United Kingdom
Brian R. Cheffins*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................................ 1274

II. The "Law M atters" Thesis .......................................................... 1276
A . T he Theory .......................................................................... 1276
B. The Evidence ....................................................................... 1281
C. The Implications for Academic Corporate Lawyers ............ 1283
III. The "Law Matters" Thesis in a British Context .......................... 1284
A. Setting the Scene ................................................................. 1284
B . Com pany Law ...................................................................... 1288
C . Securities Law ..................................................................... 1292
IV. The Relevance of Dividends ....................................................... 1299
V. Dividends and the Private Benefits of Control ........................... 1305
A. The Agency Cost Theory of Dividends ............................... 1305
B. The Propensity of U.K. Public Companies to Pay
D ividends ............................................................................. 1306
C. Com pany Law ...................................................................... 1309
D. Retaining the Option to Issue New Shares ........................... 1311
E . L iquidity .............................................................................. 13 13
F. Takeover B ids ...................................................................... 1318
* S.J. Berwin Professor of Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. I

am grateful for feedback received at the "Understanding Corporate Law Through History"
symposium and particularly for the remarks of the commentators on the paper (Lynne Dallas
and Adam Pritchard). Thanks as well to John Armour, Steven Bank, Sir Adrian Cadbury, Eilis
Ferran, Marc Goergen, Richard Nolan, and Matthias Siems for helpful comments and other
assistance. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at a faculty workshop at Cornell Law
School and a seminar in Cambridge (U.K.) jointly organized by the Centre for Corporate and
Commercial Law and the Centre for Business Research.
1273
1274 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
G. Drawing M atters Together ................................................... 1320

VI. Dividends and "Signaling" ......................................................... 1321
A . The Theory ............................................... 1321
B. The Pervasiveness of Dividends .......................................... 1323
C. Companies Feared Adverse Consequences if They Failed
to Pay Dividends in Accordance with Investor
Expectations ........................................................................ 1324
D. Dividends and Share Prices ................................................. 1327
E . Sum m ary ................................................. 1332
VII. A Potential Caveat: Dividends Could Be Costly to
Shareholders ............................................................................... 1332
V III. C onclusion .................................................................................. 1335
L Introduction
As the twentieth century drew to a close, corporate law scholarship "found

the market" as "contractarian" analysis became the dominant mode of analysis.
A key underlying presumption of this economically oriented school of thought
was that market dynamics define primarily how directors, shareholders, and
others associated with companies interact. Corporate law, the thinking went,
had only a supplementary and supportive role to play, namely facilitating
efficient contracting. No sooner had legal academics started to push law to the
margins when economists began to assert that the extent to which law provides
protection for investors is a key determinant of the configuration of corporate
governance structures around the world. The claim made was that the "quality"
of corporate and securities law does much to determine whether a country will
have strong securities markets and a corporate economy dominated by firms
with widely dispersed share ownership.
The "law matters" thesis economists have advanced has important
normative implications because it suggests countries will not develop a robust
stock market or escape from potentially backward family capitalism unless laws
are in place that provide suitable protection for investors. Not surprisingly, the
thesis has attracted much attention from legal academics.' But is "investor
1. To illustrate, a search carried out in May 2006 to find articles mentioning economist
Rafael La Porta and "corporate law" on the Westlaw "JLR" database yielded 212 "hits." Rafael
La Porta is one of a number of co-authors whose work provides the foundation of the law
matters thesis. See infra notes 22-28 and related discussion (discussing La Porta's work with
Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer).
DIVIDENDS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE LAW 1275
friendly" corporate and securities law in fact a necessary condition for a country
to develop strong securities markets and a corporate economy where large firms
are generally widely held? The experience in the United Kingdom suggests
not.
Currently, Britain has an "outsider/arm's-length" system of ownership and
control, so called because most U.K. public companies lack a shareholder
owning a large block of equity, and those owning shares (typically institutional
investors) generally refrain from taking a "hands-on" approach to the
management of companies. This system became entrenched between the 1940s
and the 1980s, as company founders and their heirs exited and institutional
investors rose to prominence. By the end of this period, the widely held
company so often identified as the hallmark of corporate arrangements in the
United States had moved to the forefront in the United Kingdom. The law
matters thesis implies that Britain should have had laws in place that were
highly protective of shareholders as the transition occurred. In fact, from the
perspective of investor protection, Britain had "mediocre" corporate and
securities legislation during the relevant period.
If corporate and securities law did not provide the foundation for the
separation of ownership and control in U.K. public companies, what did? A
number of possibilities have been canvassed in the literature, including
regulation by the privately run London Stock Exchange, which supplemented
the protection investors had under corporate and securities legislation, and
takeover activity, which acted as a catalyst for the reconfiguration of existing
ownership patterns.2 This paper identifies a new candidate: the dividend
policy of publicly quoted firms.
Essentially, dividends contributed to the unwinding of share ownership
structures in U.K. public companies by mimicking the role that the law matters
thesis attributes to corporate and securities law, namely, constraining corporate
insiders and providing investors with information flow about companies with
publicly traded shares. Regulation of dividend policy by corporate law was
minimal in the United Kingdom as ownership separated from control. Hence,
while economists have been stressing the importance of law as a determinant of
corporate governance systems, at least in Britain, corporate behavior lightly
2. On the role of regulation by the London Stock Exchange, see Brian R. Cheffins, Does
Law Matter? The Separationof Ownership andControl in the UnitedKingdom, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 459, 473-76, 481-82 (2001) [hereinafter Cheffins, Does Law Matter?]. On takeovers,
see Brian R. Cheffins, Mergersand the Evolution ofPatternsof Ownershipand Control: The
British Experience, 46 Bus. HIST. 256, 259-62 (2004) [hereinafter Cheffins, Mergers];Julian
Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time With the Family: The Decline of
FamilyOwnership in the U.K., in A HISTORY OF COmORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD
581, 601-05 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005).
1276 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
constrained by legal rules played a significant role. The paper does not claim
that the payment of dividends by U.K. public companies was a sufficient
condition for a separation of ownership and control to occur because it was the
norm for publicly traded firms to pay dividends in the decades before dispersed
ownership became standard. Nevertheless, with other conditions being
favorable, dividends were an important supplementary factor.
The paper proceeds as follows: Part II outlines the law matters thesis,
using a simple hypothetical involving a family-dominated public company to
illustrate the key dynamics. Part HI assesses the extent to which the law matters
story accounts for developments in the United Kingdom, primarily by tracing
back through history how Britain would have scored on corporate and securities
law indices that economists advancing the law matters thesis have constructed.
Part IV discusses in general terms how dividends might have helped to
reconfigure ownership patterns in U.K. public companies despite financial
economics precepts that imply dividends are a "mere detail." Part V outlines
how the pattern of dividend payments by U.K. public companies imposed
discipline on the use of corporate earnings by those in a controlling position.
Part VI explains how dividends, by performing a "signaling" function, helped
to supply the informational foundation investors would have required to buy
shares in sufficient volume for diffuse share ownership to evolve. Part VII
assesses a potential objection to the thesis that dividend policy helped to
prompt the unwinding of ownership patterns in U.K. public companies, namely
that, due to tax, dividends were too "expensive" to function as a shareholder-
friendly substitute for corporate and securities law. Part VIII concludes with
some general remarks on the need to take into account both law and the market
to understand fully the evolution and operation of systems of corporate
governance.
II. The "Law Matters" Thesis
A. The Theory
Assume, by way of a highly stylized example, ABC Co. has 100 shares
and became a public company under the leadership of its founder.3 The
founder's son is now chief executive, the family continues to own 50 of the
shares, and the remainder are widely held. The total value of the company's
3. The departure point for this example is a scenario set out by Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Mark J. Roe, A Theory of PathDependencein CorporateOwnershipand Governance,52 STAN.
L. REv. 127, 143-46 (1999).
shares is $100, but a key differential exists. The controllers' equity is worth
$60, or $1.20 per share. The outsiders' shares-the ones traded publicly-
fetch a price of $0.80 per share, meaning their equity is worth $40 collectively.
The $0.40 differential per share constitutes the "control premium," partly
reflecting the private benefits of control that the dominant faction can extract at
the expense of outside investors.4
Assume further the chief executive of ABC Co. is a poor manager and the
company's performance is suffering accordingly. Correspondingly, if the
family's control block was completely unwound and he was replaced by a
competent successor, the company would be worth $1.10 per share, or $110
overall.5 A move to diffuse share ownership would therefore increase firm
value.6 Will this happen?
To sharpen the analysis, assume the family has two choices, one being the
status quo and the other being for the family to exit by selling its shares in a
public offering to dispersed investors.7 Assuming a sale price of $1.10 per
share, the total proceeds the family would receive would be $55 (50 x $1.10).
A sale would therefore yield the family $5 less than the value of its shares
under current arrangements. The move to diffuse share ownership would
increase the value of the equity that was already publicly held from $40 to $55.
Still, this would not be a benefit the family would capture, so it would refrain
from unwinding its stake. This "controller's roadblock"8 would thus preclude a
shift towards a more efficient ownership structure.
The controller's roadblock would not be the only obstacle to a value-
enhancing transition to diffuse share ownership. There could be problems on
the investors' side, too. The point can be illustrated by changing the facts
4. On the contribution that extracting private value makes to the control premium, see
Diane K. Denis & John J. McConnell, InternationalCorporate Governance, 38 J.FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1,24-25 (2003); Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, PrivateBenefits
ofControl: An InternationalComparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 540-41 (2004).
5. A pro rata valuation of $1per share is appropriate because each would have one vote
attached and would thus benefit equally from a control premium. On this, see Tatiana Nenova,
The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-CountryAnalysis, 68 J. FIN.
ECON. 325, 330 (2003).
6. It should not be taken for granted that diffuse ownership is in fact more efficient than
concentrated ownership. See Brian R. Cheffins, CorporateLaw and OwnershipStructure: A
Darwinian Link?, 25 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 346, 356-67 (2002) (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of diffuse ownership).
7. In practice, there may well be other options. One would be for the family to retain its
stake, persuade the current chief executive to resign, and hire a talented outsider to manage the
company. Another would be for the family to try to sell its stake to a purchaser willing to pay a
control premium.
8. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 3, at 143.
1278 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
slightly. Assume the market value of ABC Co. is, as before, $100, but that the
private benefits of control that ABC Co. yields are no longer as lucrative. As a
result, the family's shares are worth $55, or $1.10 per share. The publicly
quoted shares trade at $0.90 per share, meaning the equity of the outside
shareholders is worth $45 collectively. Under these facts, the controller's
roadblock should not deter a transition to the more efficient diffuse ownership
structure because the sale price the controlling faction would receive-$ 1.10
per share-would be equal to the value of its stake. Correspondingly, the
family might well decide it was time to obtain the benefits of risk-spreading and
unwind its holding.
The potential hitch would be on the other side of the equation-
convincing investors to buy the shares. The scenario we have been considering
will be characterized by asymmetric information, in the sense that the family
will know more about ABC Co.'s assets, risks, and prospects than outside
investors. 9 The family, or the investment bankers acting on the family's behalf,
would assert that the additional profits generated by a change of ownership
justified a sale price of$110, or $1.10 per share. Investor reaction would likely
be sceptical. Buyers who realize that a seller knows more about the quality of
an asset than they do and who cannot readily verify assertions offered can only
safely assume that what is on offer is a sub-standard "lemon."' 0 By analogy,
with respect to ABC Co., investors might well interpret the family's decision to
sell as a panicky bailout on a failing business. A widespread reaction of this
sort would drive down the price of ABC Co. shares already trading well below
the existing $0.90 level. The family's plan to sell out at $1.10 would then
collapse, and the status quo would be maintained even though net overall
benefits would have been generated if a change in ownership structure had
taken place.
Currently, a widely held belief is that corporate law-the rules governing
the rights and duties of directors, senior executives, and shareholders-is a
variable that does much to explain how strong securities markets and diffuse
share ownership can emerge in the face of possible rent extraction, information
asymmetries, and the potential inefficiencies of family-oriented management."
9. On asymmetric information and the issuance of shares, see RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 412, 511-13 (7th ed. 2003).
10. The intuition here is what drives the well-known "market for lemons," first described
by George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
11. On the popularity of this line of thinking, see Luca Enriques, Do CorporateLaw
Judges Matter? Some Evidencefrom Milan, 3 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 765, 766-67 (2002);
Mark J.Roe, CorporateLaw's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 236-37 (2002) [hereinafter
CorporateLaw's Limits].
The basic logic underlying the law matters thesis is that where corporate law is
deficient, potential outside investors will be hesitant about buying shares because
of fear that corporate "insiders" (large shareholders and/or senior executives) will
skim or squander firm profits.' 2 Corporate insiders, being aware of such
scepticism, will refrain from using the stock market to exit and will opt instead to
retain the potentially ample private benefits of control available due to weak
regulation. The widely held corporation will therefore not become dominant,
regardless of whatever inherent economic virtues it might offer.
The law matters thesis implies that things might well unfold differently if a
country has "quality" corporate law.' 3 Outside investors, cognizant that the law
constrains rent extraction by corporate insiders, will be reassured about the logic
of owning tiny holdings in publicly traded companies. Concomitantly,
controlling shareholders, aware that the law largely precludes them from
exploiting14their position, will be favourably disposed towards unwinding their
holdings.
Securities law and, more precisely, disclosure regulation are also potentially
important.' 5 In an unregulated environment, by virtue of information
asymmetries, potential investors may well shun corporate equity because they
cannot distinguish "high-quality" companies from their less meritorious
counterparts.' 6 With compulsory disclosure rules in place, investors will find it
easier to separate the good firms from the "lemons." As deserving companies
begin to receive support from the market, they will begin to carry out public
offerings with increasing regularity. As the process continues, a country's
12. For summaries of the thesis, see CorporateLaw's Limits, supranote 11, at 236-39;
Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to CorporateGovernanceReform: Why Importing U.S.
CorporateLaw Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1063-64 (2004). The "law
matters" terminology was coined by John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future asHistory: The Prospects
for Global Convergence in CorporateGovernanceandIts Implications,93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641,
644 (1999).
13. The phrase is borrowed from Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate
Governance Regulation, 112 YALE L.J. 1829, 1830 (2003) (referring to the "quality of corporate
law").
14. For a mathematically oriented version of this proposition, see Andrei Shleifer &
Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protectionand Equity Markets, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2002).
15. On the contribution disclosure regulation can make to the growth of stock markets,
see Bernard Black, The CoreInstitutions that Support Strong SecuritiesMarkets, 55 Bus. LAW.
1565, 1567-68, 1571-73 (2000).
16. On how information asymmetries can deter investment in shares, see Peter Blair Henry &
Peter Lombard Lorentzen, Domestic Capital Market Reform and Access to Global Finance:
Making Markets Work, in THE FuTuRE OF DOMESTIC CAPTAL MARKETS INDEVELOPING CouNTRIEs
179, 197 (Robert E. Litan et al. eds., 2003).
1280 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
securities market will become stronger, and a suitable economic platform will
have been established to allow the widely held company to become dominant.
Disclosure regulation can also potentially help to foster ownership
dispersion by encouraging dominant shareholders to exit.17 If the law requires
substantial transparency, the odds of detection of improper diversion of
corporate assets grow. If corporate insiders are in fact discovered exploiting
minority shareholders, adverse publicity, lawsuits, and regulatory sanctions
could follow. Apprehension about such outcomes should discourage dominant
shareholders from extracting private benefits of control and lead them to
contemplate unwinding their holdings.
The law matters thesis offers a message that policymakers potentially
ignore at their peril: Countries will struggle to reach their full economic8
potential unless laws that protect minority shareholders are in place.'
America's rich and deep securities markets are frequently cited as a key source
of innovation and economic dynamism.19 The law matters thesis suggests that
such benefits are only likely to be secured if the correct regulatory environment
is in place. Leading proponents of the law matters thesis have acted as
consultants for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which in
turn have promoted corporate law reform globally with a particular emphasis on
protection of minority shareholders.2 0 The message has seemingly been heard
by policymakers, because governments around the world over the past decade
have been strengthening regulations affecting outside investors.2 '
17. See Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation
Around the World 14-15 (Harv. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Faculty Discussion Paper No.
492, 2004) (stating that "an increase in mandatory disclosure requirements in a country is
associated with a substantial lower level of private benefit of control for firms in that country"),
availableat http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin center/papers/pdf/Ferrell_492.pdf.
18. On the policy implications of the law matters thesis, see Brian R. Cheffins, Law as
Bedrock: The Foundationsof an Economy Dominatedby Widely Held Public Companies, 23
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (2003); Paredes, supra note 12, at 1067.
19. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
CorporateControl,53 STAN. L. REv. 539, 542 (2000) (stating that "European policymakers and
academics... see Europe's inability to develop rich and deep securities markets as stymieing
innovation and reducing competition").
20. See New Twist on Corporate Governance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at A18
(identifying Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes as a consultant to the World Bank); Rafael La Porta,
Professor of Finance, Dartmouth College, Curriculum Vitae, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications/La%20Porta%20CV.pdf (last visited September 26,
2006) (identifying him as an International Monetary Fund consultant) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). On the activities of the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank, see CorporateLaw's Limits, supra note 11, at 237.
21. On the trend in favor of stronger minority shareholder protection, see Henrik
Cronqvist & Mattias Nilsson, Agency Costs of ControllingMinority Shareholders,38 J. FiN. &
DIVIDENDS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE LA W 1281
B. The Evidence
Economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes, and Andrei

Shleifer have, in various studies, tested whether corporate and securities law in
fact constitutes a determinant of ownership structure. In a 1998 paper
published together with Robert Vishny, they constructed an index of "anti-
director rights" designed to measure how strongly the corporate legislation of
forty-nine countries favoured minority shareholders over managers.2 z
Regressions they ran yielded statistically significant correlations between their
index and various indicators of stock market development, including the
percentage of large public companies with diffuse share ownership. 23 A
follow-up 1999 study, focusing on fewer countries and using a richer set of data
on ownership patterns, did the same.2 4 According to La Porta, L6pez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, their "results suggest[ed] that dispersion of ownership
goes together with good shareholder protection,
25
which enables controlling
shareholders to divest at attractive prices.
La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer did not treat disclosure regulation
as an aspect of shareholder protection when calculating the quality of corporate
law. 26 In a follow-up study, however, they examined securities law in forty-
nine countries to determine whether laws governing prospectuses-
documentation circulated to prospective investors by those organizing public
offerings of securities-were a determinant ofthe size of national stock markets
and corporate ownership structures.27 They found that private enforcement of
prospectus regulation, as measured by the strictness of disclosure requirements
and the burden of proof private investors had to meet to sue successfully in the
event of misdisclosure, was strongly associated with the configuration of
securities markets and the diffusion of share ownership.28
La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's efforts have been criticized
from various angles. One objection has been that law simply is too complex to
QUANTITATIVE ANALYsIs 695, 696 (2003).

22. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
23. Id.at 1145-51.
24. Rafael La Porta et al., CorporateOwnershipAround the World,54 J. FiN. 471 (1999).
25. Id. at 496.
26. See id. at 512 (justifying the choice on the basis that improved disclosure is not
essential to preventing expropriation of minority shareholders).
27. Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006).
28. Id. at 20. They also tested the impact of"public enforcement," as determined by the
powers government regulators had to investigate and sanction misdisclosure, but found this
variable had little explanatory power. Id. at 21-23.
1282 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1273 (2006)
be reduced to numbers. 29 Another is that La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and

Shleifer, due to relying on a few seemingly random proxies, may not have
captured properly variations in the quality of corporate and securities law. 30 It
has also been suggested that various mistakes were made in the coding of
countries, a problem compounded with their study of corporate law because
they did not
31
explain in any detail how countries were scored on particular
variables.
La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer responded to their critics in a
2005 working paper co-written with Simeon Djankov. 32 They acknowledged
their original index had been criticized for its "ad hoc nature" and for mistakes
in coding. 33 One response they offered was to present and test a revised anti-
director index they said was constructed with greater precision. 34 With the
revised index, a number of the correlations that La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer found previously with their proxies for stock market development
remained statistically significant, but some disappeared, including the one
involving ownership concentration. 35 A paper by Holger Spamann casts
29. On this line of criticism, see Mathias M. Siems, Numerical ComparativeLaw: Do We

Need StatisticalEvidence in Law in Order to Reduce Complexity?, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 521, 529-30 (2005) [hereinafter Numerical Comparative Law]; Mathias M. Siems,
What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al.'s
Methodology, 16 INT'L COMPANY & COM. L. REv. 300,301-03 (2005) [hereinafter Critique on
La Portal.
30. On the argument that La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's anti-director index is
underinclusive, see Corporate Law's Limits, supra note 11, at 252; Josd M. Garrido Garcia,
Company Law and Capital Markets Law, 69 RABELS ZEITScHRIFr 761,766-67 (2005); Detlev
Vagts, Comparative Company Law-The New Wave, in FESTSCHRiFr FOR JEAN NIcoLAS DRUEY
ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 595, 601-02 (Rainer J. Schweizer et al. eds., 2002).
31. On the lack of transparency with the anti-director index research, see Numerical
ComparativeLaw, supra note 29, at 539. The study done on securities law is less vulnerable to
criticism on this ground because the authors made available extensive background information
on the internet. See Harvard University, Securities Law Research Project, Securities Data,
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/securitiesdata.xls (providing the raw
data La Porta et al. used for their securities law index); Harvard University, Securities Law
Research Project, Securities Documentation, http://econweb.fas.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/
data/securitiesdocumentation.pdf (providing expert reports on securities law, organized by
country).
32. See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes &Andrei Shleifer,
The Law andEconomics ofSelf-Dealing (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11883, 2005), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 1883.
33. See id. at 4.
34. On how the anti-director index was revised, see id, at 27-31.
35. On the results, see id. at 31. For the purposes of the paper, Djankov, La Porta, L6pez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer also constructed and ran regressions using a new index of corporate law
that focused specifically on self-dealing. The self-dealing index, which was designed to
measure on a cross-border basis how a hypothetical self-dealing contract was regulated, has
additional doubt on the initial results, as he found that after recoding the anti-
director rights index with the help of local lawyers and rerunning the relevant
regressions, most of the statistically significant outcomes had disappeared.36
While the follow-up research on the anti-director index casts doubt on at least
some of the initial findings, the law matters research remains important,
particularly because, as of yet, La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's
findings on securities law remain unchallenged. At the very least, their work
constitutes ground-breaking comparative research that has put corporate law in
the spotlight in a manner that has not occurred before and is not likely to be
replicated soon.37
C. The Implications for Academic Corporate Lawyers
The law matters story offers a potentially reassuring message to corporate

law scholars who might be wondering whether the rules they teach in class and
write about are more than a side-show. The economically oriented
"contractarian" model of the corporation emerged as the dominant school of
thought among academic corporate lawyers during the 1980s and 1990s,
particularly in the United States.38 The contractarian model treats the
corporation as a set of consensual transactions with relations being driven
primarily by market dynamics, supported at various key junctures by norm-
based governance. 39 From this perspective corporate law seemingly has only a
three dimensions: (1) public enforcement (fines and other criminal sanctions); (2) private
enforcement ex ante (regulation of the approval process by which the hypothetical transaction
could be validated); and (3) private enforcement ex post (the ease with which aggrieved
minority shareholders could prove wrongdoing). The authors found with regressions they ran
that there were statistically significant correlations between all three of their self-dealing
measures and various indicators of the development of stock markets. However, only expost
private control of self-dealing correlated with the topic of primary concern here, namely
ownership concentration. Id. at 25. As a result, this paper does not subject the self-dealing
index to the same scrutiny as the anti-director rights and securities law indices.
36. On the key results, see Holger Spamann, On the Insignificanceand/orEndogeneityof
La Portaet al. 's "Anti-DirectorRights Index" Under ConsistentCoding 67 (Harv. Olin Ctr. for
Law, Econ. & Bus., Fellows Discussion Paper No. 7, 2006), available at http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/fellows-papers/pdf/Spamann_7.pdf.
37. On the innovative nature of the work done, see CorporateLaw's Limits, supra note
11, at 252. For examples of studies using the anti-director index as a departure point, see those
cited by Siems, Numerical Comparative Law, supra note 29, at 525-26, as well as Marco
Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The PoliticalEconomy of Corporate Governance,95 AM. ECON.
REv. 1005 (2005).
38. See BRiAN R. CHEFFINs, THE TRAJECTORY OF (CORPORATE LAW) SCHOLARSHip 44-49
(2004) (discussing the history of the contractarian model of the corporation).
39. For various papers where authors use norms-driven analysis to supplement
1284 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
modest supplementary role to play, this ideally being to help private parties
"effectuate their preferred goals. 40 Put more strongly, from an economic
perspective, corporate law, at least in the United States, might 41
only be "an
empty shell that has form but no content"; in a word "trivial.",
Corporate law academics understandably might be troubled that the
subject matter of their research is "trivial., 42 For those worried on this count,
the law matters thesis is welcome news. To the extent the empirical work of La
Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer verifies a link between law and the
strength of securities markets, the quality of corporate law does not simply
influence how those associated with individual companies conduct themselves
but dictates the configuration of national corporate governance arrangements.
Hence, at a more fundamental level than most corporate law academics would
have likely envisaged, law seemingly does "matter."
III The "Law Matters" Thesis in a British Context
A. Setting the Scene
The intuition underlying the law matters thesis is easy to grasp, and there
is empirical evidence that supports the claims made. Still, while the law
matters thesis provides a good "story," at least with respect to Britain, history
casts doubt on its persuasiveness. The United Kingdom, uniquely within
Europe, has an "outsider/arm's-length" system of ownership and control akin to
that in the United States.4 3 Ownership is diffuse in the sense that most large
companies are publicly quoted and lack an "insider" shareholder who owns a
contractarian insights, see Symposium, Norms & CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607
(2001).
40. Thomas W. Joo, Corporations and the Role of the State: Puttingthe "Law"BackInto
"PrivateLaw," 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 523, 523 (2002).
41. Bernard S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial? A Politicaland Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 544 (1990).
42. For an example of a corporate law academic seeking to establish that contractarian
analysis fails to recognize sufficiently law's contribution to the functioning of corporations, see
Therese H. Maynard, Law Matters. Lawyers Matter, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1506-07 (2002).
43. On the nature of the outsider/arm's-length system of ownership and control, see Erik
Bergl6f, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 151, 157-64 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds.,
1997). On the fact that the United Kingdom has such a system and is largely unique in so
doing, see John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership
Structure and the Evolution ofBankruptcy Law: Lessonsfrom the United Kingdom, 55 VAND.
L. REv. 1699, 1704, 1715, 1750-52 (2002).
large block of equity.' Share ownership is institutionally dominated, with

domestic institutional investors (primarily pension funds, insurance companies
and collective investment vehicles known as unit trusts and investment trusts)
owning 49% of the shares in U.K. public companies as of 2004 and
foreigners-again primarily institutional investors--owning 33%.45 Though
there are instances of activism, 46 institutional shareholders tend to be passive
investors. As a 2001 review of institutional investment commissioned by the
U.K. government said, "[i]t remains widely acknowledged that concerns about
the management and strategy of major companies can persist among [company] 47
analysts and fund managers for long periods of time before action is taken.'
The "outsider/arm's-length" nomenclature thus is apt for the United Kingdom.
How did this system of ownership and control take shape? The law
matters thesis implies that the law would have offered a protective environment
to potentially vulnerable outside investors
48
as control structures unwound. In
fact, matters developed differently.
Larger British industrial and commercial firms first began to join the stock
market in the late nineteenth century. Prior to World War I, however, the
original proprietors retained large blocks of shares, and the companies
continued to be managed and owned on a local basis. 49 Between World War I
44. Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, Strong Managers and Passive Institutional
Investors in the U.K., in THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 259, 280 (Fabrizio Barca &
Marco Becht eds., 2001) (providing empirical evidence indicating that "[t]he ownership
structure of British listed companies differs radically from that found on the Continent"); see
also Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European
Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365,378 (2002) (finding that "[w]idely held firms compromise
63.08% of U.K. firms").
45. National Statistics Online Database, available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/stat
baseiTSDTimezone.asp (select "Share Ownership" on the menu and click "Go"; then select
"Table A" and click "Go"; then select all menu options and click "Go"; then from the drop-down
menu select "Download" and click "Go"; then from the drop-down menu select "View On-
Screen" and click "Go"). Among U.K.-based institutional investors, the breakdown as of 2004
was: insurance companies 17.2%, pension funds 15.7%, investment trusts 3.3%, unit trusts
1.9%, and other financial institutions 10.7%. For additional background on recent growth in the
percentage of shares owned by foreign investors, see Lina Saigol & Tony Tassell, International
Investors in the UK are Buying Up the Keys to the Kingdom, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 2005, at 2 1.
46. See PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UK: A REvIEw 89 (2001)
("There has been considerable movement in recent years... towards an activist stance on
certain corporate governance issues by institutional investors.").
47. Id.
48. For a more detailed account of the chronology than is provided here, see Brian R.
Cheffins, History and the Global CorporateGovernanceRevolution: The UK Perspective,43
Bus. HIST. 87, 89-90 (2001).
49. On the basic configuration of ownership and control in U.K. public companies prior
to World War I, see LANCE E. DAvis & ROBERT E. GALLMAN, EVOLVING FINANCIAL MARKETS
1286 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
and World War II, share ownership became commonplace among a

considerably wider circle of investors, in particular the middle classes. 50 Still,
as of the mid-I 930s, even among the largest companies in the United Kingdom,
a majority continued to have a "dominant ownership interest."5'
By the beginning of the 1950s, family control of some form remained the
norm in major U.K. companies.5 2 Nevertheless, among the very largest firms, a
trend towards a divorce between control and ownership was becoming clear.53
The unwinding of voting control in U.K. public companies continued apace,
and by the end of the 1970s, family owners had been largely marginalized. A
study of British business carried out in 1969 remarked upon the "steady decline
of family power in British industry"' 4 and suggested that "the family empire"
was "being steadily swept away by the forces of nature."5 5 Business historian
Geoffrey Jones, in a 1999 paper, concurred, saying of the decades following
World War II: "Personal capitalism and family ownership was swept away in
these decades. Britain became the classic Big Business economy, with an
unusually unimportant small
56
and medium-sized sector, and with ownership
separated from control.
AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS: BRITAIN, THE AMERICAS, AND AUSTRALIA, 1865-1914
162-63 (2001). See also Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Ownership: Evolution
and Regulation, 30-31, tbl.4, tbl.10 (ECGI Fin. Working Paper No. 09/2003,2005) (reporting
from a sample of forty companies incorporated around 1900, many of which were publicly
traded by 1920, that the directors owned 54% of the shares as of 1910 and 49% as of 1920, and
that, based on a sample of 26 of the 40 companies, the proportion of ordinary shareholders
living within six miles of the city of incorporation as of 1910 was 56%).
50. G.D.H. Cole, The Evolution ofJoint Stock Enterprise,in STUDIES INCAPITAL AND
INVESTMENT 51, 89-90 (G.D.H. Cole ed., 1935).
51. P. SARGANT FLORENCE, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND SUCCESS OF LARGE COMPANIES:
AN ANALYSIS OF ENGLISH INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND POLICY 1936-1951 240-41 (1961).
Florence was summarizing the results of his study of ownership patterns in eighty-two "very
large" manufacturing and commercial (e.g., shipping and newspapers) companies as of 1936.
He categorized these as "very large" on the basis they had issued share capital with a par value
of£3 million or over. Id. at 36.
52. See DEREK F. CHANNON, THE STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE OF BRITISH ENTERPRISE 75
(1973) (finding in a study of the largest 100 manufacturing companies in the United Kingdom
as of 1970 that ninety-two were carrying on business as of 1950 and that fifty of the ninety-two
were under family control at that point); Leslie Hannah, Visible and Invisible Hands in Great
Britain, in MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF THE
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 41, 53 (Alfred D. Chandler & Herman Daems eds., 1980)
(stating that 119 of the largest 200 British firms had family board members in 1948).
53. See FLORENCE, supranote 51, at 186-87 (comparing share ownership in "very large"
manufacturing and commercial companies as of 1936 and 1951).
54. GRAHAM TURNER, BUSINESS IN BRITAIN 221 (1969).
55. Id. at 239.
56. G.G. Jones, CorporateGovernanceandBritishIndustry 14 (Univ. of Reading Dep't
The decline of family capitalism was accompanied by the rise of

institutional investment. As of 1957, United Kingdom-based institutional
investors owned between them 21 % of all U.K. quoted equities. This figure
rose to 30% in 1963, 48% in 1975, and 60% in 1991.57 Over the same period,
the percentage of shares owned directly by individuals dropped from 66% in
1957 to 54% in 1963, 38% in 1975, and 20% in 1991.58
If institutional shareholders had chosen to work together to dictate to
managers how firms should be run, the institutions could have replaced family
owners as "hands on" controllers of Britain's public companies. This potential
for control was not turned into reality.5 9 According to a 1978 report prepared
for the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales,
"[i]nstitutional participation in managerial decision-making has been favoured
generally," but "[f]inancial institutions have generally been unwilling to act
collectively in the use of their voting strength, or to accept those responsibilities
which others would assign to them. 60 With institutional investors shying away
from direct involvement in the management of U.K. public companies,
Britain's version of an "outsider/arm's-length" system of corporate governance
was firmly entrenched by the end of the 1970s.6'
of Econ. Discussion Paper in Econ. & Mgmt., No. 399, 1998-99).

57. For 1957, see John Moyle, The Pattern of OrdinaryShare Ownership 1957-1970 18
(Univ. of Cambridge Dept. of Applied Econ., Occasional Paper #31, 1971). Otherwise, see
National Statistics Online, supra note 45.
58. National Statistics Online, supra note 45.
59. On the distinction between potential and reality in this instance, see Paul Davies,
Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 69, 82 (D.D. Prentice & P.R.J. Hollard eds., 1993).
60. RcHARD J. BRISTON & RICHARD DOBBINS, THE GROWTH AND IMPACT OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 54 (1978). Similarly, Jack Coffee and Bernard Black noted in a 1994
article on British institutional investors that "complete passivity" was absent but remarked upon
"the reluctance of even large shareholders to intervene." Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee,
Hail Britannia? InstitutionalInvestor Behavior UnderLimited Regulation,92 MICH. L. REv.
1997, 2086 (1994).
61. The evidence on this point is not entirely clear-cut. See Steve Nyman & Aubrey
Silberston, The Ownershipand ControlofIndustry, 30 OxFORD ECON. PAPERS (NS), 74 (1978)
(finding that 56.3 % of 224 of the largest U.K. companies, by either net assets or sales as of
1975, were "owner-controlled"). Nyman and Silberston, however, relied on an expansive
definition of "owner-controlled," bringing into this category not only any company with a
shareholder having a stake of 5%or more of the equity, but also any firm with a family
chairman or managing director. According to their data, if "owner-controlled" was simply
defined to include only those companies where a shareholder owned 10% of the equity, only
42.4% would have qualified and only 30.8% would have done so with a 20% cut-off. Id.at 85.
1288 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
B. Company Law
Given the chronology, in order for events occurring in Britain to fall into
line with the law matters thesis, the country should have had "quality" corporate
and securities law in the decades following World War II. In fact, U.K.
company law did not provide extensive protection for outside investors during
this period.62 Contemporaries generally recognized this. Some did suggest that
outside shareholders were, in fact, well protected. For instance, L.C.B. Gower
observed in the 1969 edition of his well-known text on company law that a
shareholder "now has an impressive array ofremedies at his disposal, especially
where fraud or unfairness is alleged., 63 On the other hand, Tom Hadden
remarked in the 1972 edition of his company law text on the "relative
impotence of shareholders, and especially minority shareholders" and suggested
"the minority shareholder's effective powers of intervention are insufficient to
allow him to protect his legitimate interests." 64 Economist J.F. Wright observed
similarly in a 1962 chapter on the finance of industry that "[a]lthough
shareholders have certain legal rights, these are little more than minimal
requirements of good faith from directors. 6 5 R.R. Pennington concurred in his
1968 text on investors and the law, explaining the reluctance of shareholders to
intervene in corporate affairs in the following terms:
[I]t is worth asking whether the history of company law over the last
hundred years with its tolerance of voteless shares, the exclusion of
minority shareholders' representatives from boards of directors, and the
obstacles placed in the way of shareholders seeking legal remedies, is not
largely responsible for the apathy.6
62. See Cheffins, Does Law Matter?,supra note 2, at 468-72,476-81 (highlighting the
lack of significant companies' legislation or common law principles that afforded explicit
protection to minority shareholders).
63. L.C.B. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 614 (3d ed., 1969).
64.TOM HADDEN, COMPANY LAW AND CAPTAISM 278 (1972).
65.J.F. Wright, The Capital Market and the Finance of Industry, in THE BRITISH
ECONOMY IN THE NNETEEN-FIFTIES 461, 463 (G.D.N. Worswick & P.H. Ady eds., 1962).
66. R.R. PENNINGTON, THE INVESTOR AND THE LAW 502 (1968). Pennington also said
about shareholder voting:
[Tjhe law should provide minimum guarantees for shareholders so that they may
exercise their voting rights freely and not be overborne by controlling groups acting
against the interests of the average shareholder, either out of self-interest or
otherwise improperly. At present the laisser-faireattitude of the mid-nineteenth
century still permeates the case law, and ...controlling shareholders are permitted
to vote without restraint in their own self-interest and to the detriment of the
minority shareholders.
Id. at 477.
It is understandable why contemporaries generally asserted that U.K.

company law was not highly protective of outside investors in the decades
following World War II. Minority shareholders in U.K. public companies,
unlike their counterparts in the United States, had little chance of gaining
standing to sue directors for breaches of duty or relying on an "appraisal
remedy" (the right of shareholders to demand a buy-out of their shares after
dissenting on specified fundamental issues).6 7 Moreover, insider dealing was
not made illegal until 1980.68
Scoring U.K. company law over time on the anti-director index compiled
by La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer offers further confirmation that
outside investors in Britain were not afforded extensive legal protection as
ownership structures unwound. La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's
anti-director rights index was composed of six elements. These were: (1) the
ability of a shareholder to cast votes at a shareholder meeting by mailing in a
proxy form; (2) a possible requirement to deposit shares before a proxy vote;
(3) the availability of cumulative voting, which permits minority shareholders
to "bundle" their votes and thereby increases the likelihood they can elect their
representatives to the board of directors; (4) mechanisms offering relief to
oppressed minority shareholders; (5) rules obliging a company to give existing
shareholders a right of first refusal when new shares are issued ("pre-emptive"
rights); and (6) the ability of shareholders owning up to 10% of the shares to
call, on their own initiative, a shareholders' meeting. 69 Currently, according to
the index La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny compiled, Britain
scores "5" out of "6," with the only "0" occurring because U.K. companies
legislation does not provide for cumulative voting.7 ° As Table I indicates,
however, historically matters were much different.7
67. On the law governing minority shareholder litigation and appraisal rights, see
Cheffins, Does Law Matter?, supra note 2, at 469-70, 477.
68. On the legal status of insider dealing, see id. at 470-71, 478.
69. On the elements of the anti-director rights index, see La Porta et al., supranote 22, at
1127-28.
70. Id.at 1130. The United Kingdom's score remains the same under the revised anti-
director index compiled by Djankov et al. See Djankov et al., supra note 32, tbl.XII (showing
Britain's score as a "5" out of "6").
71. For others who have examined the evolution of U.K. corporate law by reference to La
Porta et al.'s anti-director index, see Franks, Mayer & Rossi, supranote 49, at 14,41 tbl. 1, 54;
Kathrina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, The Evolution of
CorporateLaw: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J.INT'L ECON. L. 791, 802-03
(2002).
1290 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
Table I: Historical Evolution of U.K. Company Law, as Measured by La Porta,

L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's Anti-Director Index
Anti-Director Explanation
Index Score
Mid 19C-1900 1 British companies legislation has never

required shareholders to deposit their
shares with the company or a financial
intermediary prior to a shareholder
meeting and thus has always scored at
least one out of six on the anti-director
index.72
1900-1948 2 A 1900 amendment authorized

shareholders owning 10% of the 73
shares
to call a shareholders meeting.
1948-1980 3 The Companies Act 1948 created a

statutory right for shareholders to vote
by proxy. 74
72. Deducing how a country's company law should be scored on this issue is not fully
straightforward. La Porta et al. indicated a country would receive a "1"on the proxy deposit
variable "if the company law ... does not allow firms to require that shareholders deposit their
shares prior to a general shareholders meeting." La Porta et al., supra note 22, at 1122. The
authors also said, however, that a "1"would be appropriate so long as the depositing of shares
was not required. Id. at 1127. Presumably because U.K. companies legislation was silent on
the issue, they gave Britain a "1"on this count.
73. The relevant provision was the Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48, § 13
(Eng.). Others tracing the United Kingdom's anti-director index score over time erroneously
cite different dates for the introduction of the change to the law. See, e.g., Franks, Mayer &
Rossi, supra note 49, at 14, 41 tbl.1 (citing 1948 as the date for the introduction of the change
to the law); Pistor et al., supranote 71, at 803 (citing 1909 as the date for the change to the law
and incorrectly stating that the percent dropped to 5%in 1948).
74. On the right to vote by proxy, see Companies Act, 1948, § 136 (Eng.). Section 210 of
the Companies Act, 1948 was addressed specifically to the protection of oppressed
shareholders, which is one of the criteria upon which the La Porta et al. anti-director index is
based. Supra note 69 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the protection afforded was so
weak that a "0" score is more appropriate than "1." See HADDEN, supra note 64, at 260 (saying
that "it is clear that the restrictive interpretation of § 210 adopted by the courts has largely
destroyed its efficacy as a genuine protection for minority interests"). Pistor, Keinan,
Kleinheisterkamp, and West give U.K. company law a "1"on the protection of minority
shareholder count all the way back to 1844, saying a "direct shareholder suit" was authorized by
companies legislation enacted in that year. Pistor, et al., supra note 71, at 803. It is not clear
what shareholder rights the authors had in mind, since La Porta et al. focused on "oppression" in
DIVIDENDS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE LAW1 1291
1980-present 5 Companies issuing new shares were

required to make the equity available on
a pro-rata basis to existing shareholders
in accordance with the percentage of
shares already owned.75
The judiciary was authorized to grant a

remedy to a shareholder who had been
unfairly 76prejudiced by a company's
actions.
For present purposes, the aspect of the table that deserves the closest
attention is 1948-80, because it was during this period that Britain's
outsider/arm's-length system of corporate governance became entrenched.
During this period, one major piece of corporate legislation was passed, the
Companies Act, 1967. 77 This legislation made various changes to the existing
statutory scheme, including the introduction of more rigorous disclosure
requirements for large blocks of shares, director shareholdings, and contracts
between directors and their companies. 78 Nevertheless, since the changes did
not relate to any of the variables in La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's
anti-director index, the U.K.'s score would have remained unchanged.79
Hence, during the decades Britain's outsider/arm's-length system of control
their anti-director index rather than the possibility of bringing a "shareholder suit." Pistor,
Keinan, Kleinheisterkamp, and West state erroneously that the right of shareholders to bring a
derivative suit was only recognized in 1975. The right to do so-which U.K. company law
tightly circumscribed-had in fact been recognized since Foss v. Harbottle(1843), 67 Eng.
Rep. 189.
75. The relevant provision was Companies Act, 1980, c. 22, § 17 (Eng.).
76. The relevant provision was Companies Act, 1980, § 75 (Eng.); now Companies Act,
1985, § 459 (Eng.). Franks, Mayer, and Rossi erroneously date the change for oppression of
minority shareholders as 1985. Franks, Mayer & Rossi, supra note 49, at 14, 41 tbl. 1.
77. Companies Act, 1967, c. 81 (Eng.).
78. See Companies Act, 1967, § 16 (Eng.) (requiring companies, via annual directors'
reports, to disclose publicly directors' interests in contracts with the company and details of
directors' holdings of shares); id. §§ 33-34 (requiring companies to maintain a register of
shareholders owning 10% or more of the outstanding shares that was to be open for inspection
by the public).
79. The changes in 1967 would have improved the United Kingdom's score on Djankov,
La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's private enforcement ex post self-dealing index
because with this index, a country's score is governed partly by whether its corporate legislation
obliges companies to divulge publicly the existence of large share blocks and report material
facts about transactions in which directors have a personal interest. On the elements, see supra
note 35.
1292 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
became locked in, the country's company law simply equalled the average
(3.00) for the forty-nine countries upon which La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer focused when constructing the 1990s version of their anti-director rights
index.
Only in 1980 did Britain's score become "5." This pushed the United
Kingdom ahead of the anti-director index average for common law countries (4.00)
and into line with countries such as the United States and Canada.80 By this point,
however, the United Kingdom's outsider/arm's-length system of ownership and
control was firmly in place, meaning, contrary to what the law matters thesis
implies, the quality of corporate law (at least as La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer measure it) did not prompt the separation of ownership and control.
C. Securities Law
Given the correlations La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer found between

private enforcement of prospectus regulation on the one hand and the size of
national stock markets and the configuration of share ownership on the other, one
would expect that the United Kingdom would have scored well on this count as
control structures unravelled. As with company law, however, this was not the case.
Again, La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer measured private enforcement with
two components, the extent of disclosure required in prospectuses and the burden of
proof an investor was required to meet when suing a company, its directors, and its
accountants for misdisclosure. With both, for the period when ownership separated
from control, the United Kingdom's scores were lower than would have been
anticipated if law was the catalyst for the unwinding of control blocks.
La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer focused on six variables when
calculating their private enforcement disclosure scores. One was the presence or
absence of a legal requirement that a company deliver a copy of a prospectus to
those contemplating buying shares in a public offering. The other five were matters
to be discussed in prospectuses companies issued, namely executive compensation,
equity ownership structure, share ownership by directors, "irregular" contracts, and
"related party" transactions. 8' La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer give Britain
a 0.83 disclosure rating (five "l"s out of a possible six), with the gap being that
companies are not required to deliver prospectuses to prospective investors.8 2 This
80. Under the revised anti-director index compiled by Djankov et al., the United States
scored only a "3." Djankov et al., supra note 32, at tbl.XII.
81. For background on the variables, see La Porta et al., supranote 27, at 6.
82. For a detailed breakdown of the United Kingdom's score, see Harvard University,
Securities Law Research Project, Securities Data, http://post.economics.harvard.edu/
figure is only slightly above average for common law countries (0.78) but is well
ahead of the norm for countries ofFrench legal origin (0.45) and German legal origin
(0.60).
In a sense, the United Kingdom's high disclosure regulation score should not be
surprising because Britain was a pioneer with respect to the regulation of
prospectuses.83 Nevertheless, as Table It shows, in historical terms Britain's disclosure
requirement rating was not very flattering. To put the United Kingdom's disclosure
score into proper context, it is essential to bear in mind the status of the London Stock
Exchange's Listing Rules. Through its Listing Rules, the Exchange regulated
corporate disclosure and obliged listed companies to provide more information than
was required by U.K. companies legislation. 4 Particularly from the 1960s onwards,
the London Stock Exchange imposed tough disclosure requirements on listed
companies. 85 These reforms, however, would not have affected the United
Kingdom's disclosure regulation score.
In grading the quality of securities law, La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
focused on "actual laws, statutes ... and any other rule with force of law."8 6 Before the
mid- 1980s, the Listing Rules did not fall into this category because the obligations they
imposed on companies listed on the London Stock Exchange were at most contractual
in orientation.87 The Financial Services Act of 1986, gave the London Stock
Exchange's listing rules the status of subordinate legislation, which would have
qualified the relevant provisions for inclusion in the United Kingdom's disclosure
faculty/shleifer/papers/Securitiesdata.xls (United Kingdom entry) (on file with the Washington

and Lee Law Review). La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, in compiling their securities
law scores, relied on reports of local experts. Professor Alistair Alcock prepared the expert
report on the United Kingdom. Harvard University, Securities Law Research Project, Securities
Documentation, 275 available at http://econweb.fas.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data/secure
tiesdocumentation.pdf.
83. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosureas a Solution to Agency Problems, 62
U. CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1063 (1995) (citing the Companies Act of 1900 as the first statute in
Anglo-American law to impose comprehensive disclosure requirements on companies selling
securities to the public).
84. On the relationship between the Stock Exchange Listing Rules and statutory measures
over time, see Douglas M. Branson, Some Suggestions from a Comparison of British and
American Tender Offer Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 685, 710 & n.122 (1971); Cheffins,
supra note 48, at 98.
85. On the reforms the London Stock Exchange made in 1964 to bolster disclosure
requirements, see HAROLD ROSE, DIscLOsuRE INCOMPANY AccouNTS 57-58 (2d ed., Institute of
Economic Affairs Ltd. 1965); Charles Anderson, The Stock Exchange andDisclosure,BANKER,
Oct. 1964, at 619.
86. La Porta et al., supranote 27, at 5.
87. On the legal status of the London Stock Exchange's listing rules before the mid-
1980s, see L.C.B. GOWER, J.B. CRONIN, A.J. EASSON & LORD WEDDERBURN OF CHARLTON,
GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 506 n.90 (4th ed. 1979).
1294 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
regulation score and, therefore, accounts for a dramatic 1986 improvement from 0.33
to 0.75, as shown in Table II below. 8
Table II-Historical Evolution of Disclosure Requirements for Prospectuses Under U.K. Law
E C
1867-1986 0 089 0 1.0090 0 1.0091 0.33
88. See Financial Services Act, 1986, § 142(6) (Eng.) (designating the Stock Exchange as
the "competent authority" for the part of the Act dealing with the official listing of securities);
id. § 144(2) (authorizing "the competent authority" to require the submission of listing
particulars-essentially equivalent to a prospectus-as a condition of listing). Franks, Mayer,
and Rossi offer some historical information on how the United Kingdom's disclosure regulation
score would have evolved over time and generally find Britain's score would have improved
earlier than is set out here. Franks, Mayer & Rossi, supra note 49, at 55 panel B. They do not
explain in the text or supporting tables the scores they give over time and simply refer the reader
to a general chronology of company law and financial regulation they have prepared. Id. at 14,
53 tbl.A.3. As a result, there is insufficient detail available to account properly for the
discrepancies between the version of events they provide and the one offered here. For a
particular instance where Franks, Mayer, and Rossi's lack of documentation is problematic, see
infra note 89.
89. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi say that the appropriate score for director share ownership
should be "1" from 1929 onwards. Franks, Mayer & Rossi, supra note 49, at 55 panel B. This
is incorrect. The statutory rules governing the content of prospectuses in the Companies Act,
1929 were set out in Part I of the Fourth Schedule to the Act. The only potentially relevant
provision in Part I (paragraph 2) stipulated that a prospectus must specify "[t]he number of
founders or management or deferred shares, if any" and "[t]he number of shares, if any, fixed by
the Articles as the qualification of a director." "Founders shares" were a special class of stock
that would be issued to the promoter of a public offering in consideration for the promoter's
services and typically were entitled to the lion's share of the profits distributed as dividends
after the preference shares and common shares had been paid a fixed amount. By the 1950s,
founder's shares were rarely used. L.C.B. Gower, MODERN COMPANY LAw 281-82 (1956).
Hence, a requirement to disclose "founders shares" would have revealed little, if anything, about
the share ownership of a company's directors. The "qualification" requirement meant that if a
company's articles of association (equivalent to the bylaws in a U.S. corporation) stipulated that
an individual had to own a specified number of shares to qualify as a director, the prospectus
had to identify this. Frequently, individual directors' shareholdings were many times the
nominal qualification. Hargreaves Parkinson, ScIENTIFIC INVESTMENT 142 (1932). As a result,
disclosure of qualification requirements in a prospectus would have provided few clues on how
many shares a company's directors actually owned.
90. See Companies Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 131, § 38 (Eng.) (requiring companies
issuing a prospectus to disclose contracts that would influence whether an applicant would take
up shares).
91. See id.(requiring companies issuing a prospectus to disclose corporate transactions to
which its directors were parties); see also PALMER'S COMPANY LAW 350-51 (A.F. Topham ed.,
I 1986-19959' 0 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75

1995-present 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83
With the burden of proof investors are required to meet in civil suits
involving allegations of misdisclosure, La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
award Britain a grade of 0.66. This is only slightly above average for common
law countries (0.60) but again is well ahead of the norm for countries of French
(0.39) and German legal origin (0.42). The 0.66 mark is based on an average
of three components, these being identical 0.66 burden of proof grades for suits
brought against a company, its directors, and its accountants. 94 As Table III
19th ed. 1949) (indicating that due to judicial interpretation of the relevant provision, the
contracts in question also had to be material to a potential purchaser of shares).
92. With the version of the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules that was in effect when
the Listing Rules were transformed into subordinate legislation, four of the five topics specified
by La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer were dealt with in a manner where a score of"I "
was appropriate. See COUNCIL OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE, ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO LISTING
Section 3, chapter 1, 3.9 (1984) (addressing equity ownership structure); id. 4.8 (addressing
fundamental/irregular contracts); id. 6.5 (addressing related party transactions); id. 6.6
(addressing director share ownership). With the fifth topic, executive pay, the score would have
been ".50" rather than "1" because the Listing Rules only required that aggregate figures be
divulged. Id. 6.3. On a "1" only being appropriate when the executive pay arrangements of
individual executives have to be disclosed, see La Porta et al., supra note 27, at 6. The
chronology provided here glosses over a complex situation existing during 1985 and 1986.
During these years, certain items in the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules would have
qualified as "rules of law" and other provisions would not have. For background, see PALMER'S
COMPANY LAW 272, 276-77, 297-98 (Clive M. Schmitthoffed., 24th ed., 1987).
93. La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer give the United Kingdom a "l" on executive
compensation disclosure. In so doing, they rely on § 80 of the Financial Services and Markets
Act, 2000, which stipulates that listing particulars must include all information investors would
reasonably require. On this reasoning, see Harvard University, Securities Documentation, supra
note 82, at 275-76, saying regulators in the United Kingdom would expect companies to
provide detailed remuneration data for senior executives in listing particulars. Accepting, for
the sake of argument, that La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's analysis is correct, it is
unclear when companies carrying out public offerings would reasonably have been expected to
divulge information on the remuneration arrangements of individual executives. The Financial
Services Act, 1986 contained a provision (§ 146) equivalent to § 80 of the Financial Services
Markets Act, 2000. However, 1995 has been selected for present purposes rather than 1986,
with the rationale being that until the London Stock Exchange's Listing Rules were amended
that year to require listed companies to disclose annually on an individualized basis the pay
arrangements of their directors, there was no expectation that companies should engage in
disclosure of this sort. On the 1995 changes, see BRLAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY,
STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 663 (1997). The United Kingdom's score with executive pay now
has a firmer foundation due to the Prospectus Regulation, a European Union measure that came
into force in 2005 and is directly applicable as law in Member States such as the United
Kingdom. Commission Regulation (E.C.) 809/2004 O.J. 2004 L149/1, Annex 1, 16.2
stipulates that information on the service contracts of directors must be provided in a
prospectus.
94. See Harvard University, Securities Data, supra note 82 (detailing the United Kingdom
1296 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
indicates, however, between 1948 and 1986, which again encompasses the
period when the United Kingdom's outsider/arm's-length system of ownership
and control became entrenched, Britain's score was only 0.44. The Financial
Services Act, 1986, boosted the United Kingdom's score to its current level.
The relevant statutory provisions were revised as part of an overhaul of
financial services
95
regulation occurring in 2000, but the United Kingdom's score
did not change.
Table III-Historical Evolution of the Burden of Proof for Prospectus Misdisclosure
Under U.K. Law
Suing the Suing Suing Burden of
Company Directors Accountants Proof Score
Mid 19C-1890 0.6696 097 098 0.22
entry).
95. See Harvard University, Securities Documentation, supra note 82, at 278-80
(discussing the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8. (Eng.)). Franks, Mayer, and
Rossi offer some historical background on how the burden of proof index evolved over time and
identify 1929 and 1948 as important dates. Franks, Mayer & Rossi, supranote 49, at 55 panel
B. As with the U.K. disclosure regulation score they provide (see supranote 88), they do not
explain in the text or supporting tables the scores they give over time and simply refer the reader
to a general chronology of company law and financial regulation they have prepared. Id. at 14,
53 tbl.A.3. As a result, there is insufficient detail available to account properly for the
discrepancies between the version of events they provide and the one offered here.
96. Under the common law, those allotted shares as part of a public offering could sue the
company for recission of the purchase if there was misdisclosure in the prospectus. Lynde v.
Anglo-Italian Hemp Spinning Co. [1896] 1 Ch. 1789; Collins v. Associated Greyhound
Racecourses [1930] 1 Ch. 1. The plaintiff could do so without proving that the
misrepresentations were made knowingly or recklessly. Smith's Case (1867) 2 Ch. App. 604,
615, aff'd Reese River Silver Mining Co. v. Smith (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 79. The plaintiff,
however, had to establish the materiality of the misrepresentation and reliance upon it. Harvard
University, Securities Documentation, supranote 82, at 280. According to La Porta, L6pez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer's methodology, this means a score of 0.66 is appropriate, not 1.00. On
how they measure the liability standard for companies issuing shares, see La Porta et al., supra
note 27, at 7.
97. See Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(providing case law authority for the proposition that investors could only sue directors on the
basis of a misleading prospectus by showing that the directors made the misstatement with
knowledge of its falsity or did so recklessly). La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer say a "0"
should be awarded in this context if a plaintiff can only sue directors successfully when
misdisclosure in a prospectus is intentional or characterized by gross negligence. On how they
measure the liability standard of directors, see La Porta et al., supranote 27, at 7.
98. Under the common law, an investor buying equity in a public offering could only
succeed in a suit against a company's accountants if they were part of a conspiracy to defraud
potential investors. On the common law position, see Committee on Company Law
Amendment (Mr. Justice Cohen, chair), Report, Cmnd. Paper 6659, 24 (1945). This meant that
the standard of proof score should be "0," which La Porta et al. say is correct if a plaintiff can
1890-1948 0.66 0.3399 0 0.33

1948-1986 0.66 0.33 0.33 I °° 0.44
1986-present 0.66.. 0.66 I1 2 0.66 I1 3 0.66
A way of synthesizing the historical trends for U.K. securities law is to use
the disclosure and burden of proof figures to formulate an overall private
only win a suit against accountants if misdisclosure in a prospectus is intentional or

characterized by gross negligence. On how they measure the liability standard of accountants,
see La Porta et al., supranote 27, at 7.
99. As a result of the Directors' Liability Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64, a person who
subscribed to purchase shares in a public offering supported by a misleading prospectus had a
statutory right to sue the directors of the company in question. Liability existed regardless of
the absence of fraud or recklessness, but investor reliance on the misstatement was explicitly
required. The relevant phrase was "on the faith of the prospectus." Directors' Liability Act,
1890, § 3(1). Also, by virtue of Director's Liability Act, 1890, § 3(1)(a), directors could escape
liability by establishing that they believed on reasonable grounds that what was said was true.
The United Kingdom's burden of proof score for suing directors thus would have been 0.33,
which La Porta et al. stipulate is appropriate if investors can only bring a successful suit if they
prove that a director acted with negligence and that there was reliance on the prospectus.
100. The Companies Act, 1948, § 43(1) stipulated that experts (e.g., accountants) who
consented to a report being included as part of a prospectus could be liable to compensate for
losses sustained by reason of untrue statements in the report. Companies Act, 1948, § 40
governed when experts were deemed to consent. Companies Act 1948, § 46 deemed statements
made in supporting reports to be part of a prospectus. The legislative change would have moved
the burden of proof score concerning accountants from 0.00 to 0.33, but no higher because a
plaintiff still had to establish reliance on the misdisclosure, and accountants were absolved of
responsibility if they were not negligent (i.e., they reasonably believed the statements made were
true).
101. Since the mid- 1980s investors have had a statutory option for suing a company on the
basis of misdisclosure in listing particulars. The statutory remedy does not qualify for a "1"
score because the issuer can rely on a reasonable belief defense. On the logic involved,
discussed in terms of current legislation, see Harvard University, Securities Documentation,
102. The Financial Services Act, 1986 repealed the rules in U.K. companies legislation
regulating civil liability for misleading prospectuses and introduced a regime authorizing suits
against "persons responsible for any listing particulars." Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60
§§ 150-52. The 1986 legislation deemed company directors to be "persons responsible" for
listing particulars. Id. § 152(1)(b). A 0.66 score is appropriate for directors because an
aggrieved investor could bring a successful claim against "persons responsible" without proving
reliance, but defendants had a defense if they had reasonable grounds for believing listing
particulars were accurate. Id. §§ 150-52. On the justification for a 0.66 score under the
Financial Securities and Markets Act, 2000 c.8, see Harvard University, Securities
Documentation, supra note 82, at 278-80.
103. "Persons responsible for listing particulars" was defined to include those accepting
responsibility for any part of the particulars. Id. § 152(1)(b). On the fact that this would have
encompassed an accountant whose report appeared in listing particulars with his consent, see
PALMER'S, supra note 91, at 312. On the justification for a 0.66 score under the Financial
Securities and Markets Act, 2000, see Harvard University, Securities Documentation, supra
note 82, at 279-80.
1298 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1273 (2006)
enforcement index score.1°4 Extrapolating from La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes,

and Shleifer's data, Britain would currently have a score of 0.75, calculated on
the basis of an average of its disclosure requirement (0.83) and burden of proof
(0.66) figures. Britain's score exceeds the common law average (0.69), if only
modestly, but is considerably higher than the French legal origin average (0.42)
and the German legal origin average (0.51). As Table IV indicates, however,
matters were much different historically, with Britain's private enforcement
score being much lower during the decades when ownership separated from
control than it is currently. Of particular note is the 0.39 score for 1948-1986,
which covers the decades when the United Kingdom's outsider/arm's-length
system of ownership and control became entrenched.
Table IV-Historical Evolution of Prospectus Regulation, as Measured by a
Cumulative Private Enforcement Index
Disclosure Burden Private
Requirements of Proof Enforcement
Score" °5
1867-1890 0.33 0.22 0.28
1890-1948 0.33 0.33 0.33
1948-1986 0.33 0.44 0.39
1986-1995 0.75 0.66 0.71
1995-present 0.83 0.66 0.75
English legal origin 0.78 0.60 0.69
(average)
French legal origin 0.45 0.39 0.42
(average)
German legal origin 0.60 0.42 0.51
(average) I
As Table IV shows, in historical terms, the pattern with securities law is
much the same as it is for company law. Currently, as is the case with company
law, the United Kingdom scores highly with respect to private enforcement of
securities law, but the score can be attributed primarily to legislation enacted
after the transition to outsider/arm's-length corporate governance was complete.
104. La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer took this step in the version of "What
Works" they circulated as a National Bureau of Economics Research working paper but did not
do so in the published version. See Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws? tbl.2
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9982,2003) (averaging the disclosure and
burden of proof scores to formulate a private enforcement score for each country).
105. See id.(providing the "private enforcement scores" for the United Kingdom currently,
English legal origin, French legal origin, and German legal origin).
Pivotally, during the decades when ownership structures of larger public

companies decisively unwound, Britain's private enforcement rating was
inferior to the current average score for common law countries, countries of
German legal origin and even countries of French legal origin. Thus, as with
company law, the legal protection afforded to investors was considerably below
the standard that the law matters story would predict. To the extent La Porta,
L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's anti-director and prospectus disclosure indices
constitute reliable proxies for the quality of protection afforded to outside
investors, factors other than corporate and securities law must have accounted
for the unwinding of control blocks in publicly quoted companies in the United
Kingdom.
IV. The Relevance of Dividends
As the highly stylized example outlined in Part II illustrates, the widely

held company might not become dominant in a country even if it enjoys
inherent economic advantages. One obstacle is the "controller's roadblock":
The dominant shareholders in companies might not capture a sufficient portion
of the gains available from a transition to dispersed ownership to compensate
them for the loss of private benefits of control. Investor scepticism is another:
Potential buyers of shares for sale would reason logically-if incorrectly--that
optimistic claims made about future shareholder returns were implausible.
Given that corporate law in the United Kingdom was not highly protective of
minority shareholders, what eroded the private benefits ofcontrol sufficiently to
motivate blockholders to exit? And how were the information asymmetries
affecting potential investors addressed?
Various factors played a role. For instance, the profitability of U.K.
companies began to decline in the 1960s and fell precipitously in the 1970s.10 6
This should have diminished the private benefits of control eligible for
extraction, which would have provided those owning large blocks of shares in
U.K. companies with an incentive to exit. In addition, particularly beginning in
106. See Christine Oughton, Profitability of UK. Firms, in THE FuTuRE OF U.K.
COMPETITIVENESS AND THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 55, 59 (Kirsty Hughes ed., 1993)
(providing annual data on gross and net profit rates between 1954 and 1991 for companies in
the manufacturing and services sectors); see also Committee to Review the Functioning of
Financial Institutions (Chairman, Sir Harold Wilson), 3 EVIDENCE ON THE FINANCING OF TRADE
AND INDUSTRY 230 (1977) (showing that the pre-tax, inflation-adjusted rate of returns for
companies fell from 13% in 1960 to 9% in 1969 and again to 3.5% in 1976); W.A. THOMAS,
THE FINANCE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 218, 310 (1978) (providing data indicating that gross trading
profits, as a percentage of total source of company funds, fell from 72% in 1952-1955 to 69%
in 1956-1960, to 64% in 1961-1965, and again to 59% in 1966-1970).
1300 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
the mid-1960s, the London Stock Exchange regulated disclosure by listed

companies and transactions potentially tainted by conflicts of interest with
increasing strictness.10 7 This should have simultaneously reduced the scope for
"skimming" by dominant shareholders and fostered confidence among investors
contemplating buying shares. Additionally, the financial intermediaries who
organized public offerings of shares had, due to concerns about building up and
retaining highly valued reputations for competence and propriety, strong
incentives to ensure that when companies sold equity to the public,
arrangements were attractive to potential investors. Such "quality control"
would have deterred to some degree sharp practice by controlling shareholders
and would have been reassuring to investors.'0 °
Merger activity further hastened the unwinding of incumbent ownership
structures, as numerous family owners sold out and many of the companies
carrying out acquisitions issued shares publicly to finance the deals involved.10 9
Also important was a demography and tax-driven "wall of money," namely a
massive flow of funds to insurance companies and pension funds that had to be
invested somewhere. 0 Shares in U.K. public companies stood out, if only by
process of elimination, as a promising potential candidate. Due to inflation,
government bonds ("gilts") were generally a bad investment."' Exchange
controls tightly constrained investing abroad." 2 Thus, if only by default, shares
of United Kingdom-based public companies deserved serious consideration by
investors.
107. On disclosure, see Anderson, supranote 85, at 619. On related party transactions, see
Federation of Stock Exchanges in Great Britain and Ireland, Admission of Securities to
Quotation sched. II, Pt. A, 1 29, Pt. B, 26 (1966), Memoranda of Guidance, Acquisitions and
Realisations of Subsidiary Companies, Businesses or Fixed Assets by Quoted Companies, and
Bids and Offers for Securities of a Company, 6.
108. See Cheffins, Does Law Matter?, supra note 2, at 472-73 (describing the increased
importance of screening by financial intermediaries of public offerings following World War I).
109. On the contribution mergers made to the unwinding of share blocks, see Cheffins,
Mergers, supra note 2, at 261.
110. On the post-World War II increase in funds available for investment by insurance
companies and pension funds, see JOHN L1TTLEWOOD, THE STOCK MARKET: 50 YEARS OF
CAPITALISM AT WORK 255 (1998); JOHN PLENDER, THAT'S THE WAY THE MONEY GOES: THE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATIONS SAVINGS 26 (1982); Brian R. Cheffins, Are Good
Managers Requiredfora Separationof Ownership and Control?, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
591, 604 (2004).
111. See Cheffins, supranote 110, at 605 (stating that returns on government bonds were
substantially less than the inflation rate).
112. On the post-World War II exchange controls and their impact on investment patterns,
see id. at 607-09.
While these various factors no doubt contributed to the separation of

ownership and control in Britain, the story remains incomplete. For instance,
though declining profitability in the U.K. corporate sector would have eroded
private benefits of control, the situation only became chronic in the 1970s.
Similarly, prior to the reforms of the mid-I 960s, the requirements the London
Stock Exchange imposed on listed companies were not particularly onerous,
meaning there was scant information available on public companies. 1 3 As for
scrutiny by financial intermediaries, because this hinged on public offerings
occurring, this was only an episodic constraint on those controlling U.K. public
companies. Moreover, there was a bias against tapping equity markets. In
Britain, as in all major economies, retained earnings have traditionally
constituted the dominant source of corporate finance, and the contribution of
equity has been, in comparison, modest. 114 An abrupt decline in new issues
during the mid-1960s even led the Economist to remark '
upon "how
unimportant economically is the London equity market." 15
While constrained choices dictated that institutional investors consider
seriously buying shares in public companies, they had good reason to pause.
Throughout the 20th century, the real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) return investors
obtained by way of capital gains on U.K. shares was, on average, only 1%
annually. 16 Moreover, U.K. companies did not seem promising targets for
investment during the decades following World War II. A 1956 report on
management succession in British companies bemoaned "[t]he shortage of good
managers, particularly at the top." 7 Critics in the early 1970s said there was8
"a certain claret-grouse-and-port induced somnolence in British boardrooms""
with "the unconscious ambition of most directors [being] to retire and become a
113. On disclosure gaps prior to the mid-i 960s, see British CompaniesUrgedto Disclose
More, TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 1964, at 16; Clyde H. Farnsworth, CorporateData Scarce in
Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1963, at 28; U.S. Analysts' Views of British Industry, TIMES
(London), Apr. 13, 1959, at 17.
114. On the bias in favor of internal finance, see Colin Mayer, Financial Systems,
CorporateFinance,and Economic Development, in ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, CORPORATE
FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT 307, 310-12 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1990); Jenny Corbett & Tim
Jenkinson, How is Investment Financed?A Study of Germany,Japan,the UnitedKingdom and
the UnitedStates, 65 THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL 69, 74-75 (Supp. 1997).
115. New Issues-LessImportantand Much Less Fun, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1968, at 107.
116. ELROY DIMSON, PAUL MARSH & MIKE STAUNTON, TRIUMPH OF THE OPTIMISTS: 101
YEARS OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS 151 (2002).
117. ACTON SOCIETY TRUST, MANAGEMENT SUCCESSION: THE RECRUITMENT, SELECTION,
TRAINING AND PROMOTION OF MANAGERS 1 (1956).
118. Robert Ball, Jim Slater's Global Chess Game, FORTUNE, June 1973, at 188, quotedin
CHARLES RAW, SLATER WALKER: AN INVESTIGATION OF A FINANCIAL PHENOMENON 170 (1977).
1302 63 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 1273 (2006)
country squire."' 19 Indeed, as Britain lost ground relative to its major industrial
rivals in the decades following World War II, inferior corporate leadership was
identified by many as the single most important cause. 20 As Robin Marris, a
noted economist, said in a 1979 essay, "[t]he principal source of British
decline.., is its managerial malaise.' 2' To the extent such criticism of the
executives running U.K. public companies was on the mark, institutional
investors had a plausible justification for forsaking corporate equity in favour of
other asset classes.
Since the explanations for the unwinding of ownership in U.K. public
companies summarized thus far each suffer from notable limitations, there is
scope for decisions companies made about distributing cash to shareholders by
way of dividends-doing so by repurchasing shares was prohibited until the
early 1980s and was irrelevant for tax reasons until the mid-i 990s 1 22 -to
constitute an important supplementary variable. The contribution dividends
made to investment returns is one point that must be borne in mind. While
purely from a capital gains perspective, U.K. shares delivered only a 1%
average annual real return during the 20th century, with dividends taken into
account the annualized real return improved to 5.8%.123 Thus, dividends were
a key "sweetener" that would have given investors an incentive to buy equity.
The dividend policy U.K. public companies adopted also operated in ways
more directly relevant to the unwinding of control blocks. Dividends served as
a check on the squandering of corporate assets by those running public
companies and generated information that should have addressed, at least
partially, apprehension among investors concerned about lack of knowledge of
the companies involved. Dividends thus mimicked the role attributed to
companies legislation by the law matters thesis, and in so doing, acted as at
least a partial substitute in fostering the unwinding of control blocks.
119. George Norman, The English Sickness, BANKERS' MAG., Nov. 1973, at 192, 195.
120. On the contribution the alleged inadequacies of British managers made to Britain's
economic decline, see GEOFFREY OWEN, FROM EMPIRE TO EUROPE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL
OF BRITSH INDUSTRY SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 418 (1999); Derek H. Aldcroft, The
MissingDimension: Management EducationandTraining in PostwarBritain,in ENTERPRISE
AND MANAGEMENT 93, 93, 110-11 (Derek Aldcroft & Anthony Slaven eds., 1995).
121. Robin Marris, Britain'sRelative Economic Decline: A Reply to Stephen Blank, in Is
BRITAIN DYING? PERSPECTIVES ON THE CURRENT CRISIS 89, 93 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1979).
122. See Companies Act, 1981, c. 62, §§ 45-62 (authorizing share buybacks under
prescribed circumstances); Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 409 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (establishing the common law rule prohibiting the repurchase of shares); P.
Raghavendra Rau & Theo Vermaelen, Regulation, Taxes and ShareRepurchases in the United
Kingdom, 75 J. Bus. 245, 251-59 (2002) (describing the tax position from 1981 onwards).
123. DIMSON, MARSH& STAUNTON, supra note 116, at 151 (assuming dividends were fully
reinvested in the stock market).
Especially for those familiar with the basic tenets of modem corporate
finance theory, the proposition that dividends "mattered" in the mannerjust
described requires elaboration and justification. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s, economists Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani formulated a
series of "irrelevance" propositions that effectively launched financial
economics as a body of knowledge. 124 Their propositions were offered
under a deliberately restrictive set of assumptions, such as tax neutrality
between dividends and capital gains, full symmetry of information, the
absence of managerial agency costs, perfectly competitive capital markets,
and no transaction costs. 125 From this departure point, Miller and
Modigliani characterized decisions about corporate finance, including
decisions about dividend policy, as nothing more than ways of dividing up
and repackaging
26
for distribution to investors the net cash flow companies
generated. 1
Of particular relevance in the present context, under the assumptions
Miller and Modigliani made, a company's market value will be determined
by "real" economic considerations such as its investment policy and the
earning power of its assets rather than by any sort of balance between
dividends and retained earnings.127 Dividend policy will thus be nothing
more than packaging of a company's real value; "a mere detail." 28 A
corollary is that, assuming a company has settled upon its business strategy
and its choice of ventures to pursue and exploit, dividends will not affect
returns to investors. 29 This is because the higher (lower) the dividend, the
124. See generally Merton H. Miller& Franco Modigliani, DividendPolicy,Growth and

the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961) [hereinafter Miller & Modgliani, Dividend
Policy];Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost ofCapital,CorporationFinanceand
the Theory oflnvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261 (1958) [hereinafter Modigliani & Miller, Cost
of Capital]. On the significance of Miller and Modigliani's contribution to the study of
corporate finance, see JONATHAN B. BASKIN & PAUL J. MRANT, A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 12, 18 (1997); Alan J. Auerbach, Taxation and CorporateFinancialPolicy, in 3
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1250, 1252 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,
2002).
125. For a summary, see RONALD C. LEASE, KOSEJOHN, AVNERKALAY, URI LOEWENSTEIN,
& ODED H. SARIG, DIVIDEND POLICY: ITS IMPACT ON FIRM VALUE 36-37 (2000).
126. On this characterization of Miller and Modigliani's arguments, see Donald H. Chew,
Introduction: FinancialInnovation in the 1980s, in THE NEW CORPORATE FINANCE: WHERE
THEORY MEETS PRACTICE ix, xii (Donald H. Chew ed., 1993).
127. On the dividend policy and a company's stock market value under the relevant
assumptions, see Daniel R. Fischel, The Law and EconomicsofDividendPolicy,67 VA. L. REV.
699, 701 (1981); Miller & Modigliani, DividendPolicy, supranote 124, at 430.
128. On this characterization of dividend policy, see Modigliani and Miller, Cost of
Capital,supranote 124, at 266.
129. On the importance of holding investment policy constant for the purpose of analysis,
1304 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
less (more) an investor will receive in capital appreciation. Moreover,

since investors can always create a "homemade dividend" by selling some
of their own shares, a company's decision to 3
pay or withhold a dividend
should be a matter of indifference to them.1 '
While, as a matter of pure theory, dividends might be a "mere detail,"
real-world conditions in the United Kingdom diverged substantially from
Miller and Modigliani's assumptions during the period when ownership
separated from control. 132 For instance, during the decades following
World War II, transaction costs were hefty. 133 This meant that, for
investors seeking a regular cash flow, receiving dividends from the
companies in which they owned shares could well be preferable to creating
a "homemade dividend" by selling equity. Tax was anything but neutral,
with individual investors usually having a strong tax bias in favor of
retained earnings, institutional investors, and particularly pension funds,
the converse. 134 Also, capital markets were not perfectly competitive. For
instance, the system of dealing in corporate equity, involving "brokers" on
the "buy" side and "jobbers" on the "sell" side, was subject to anti-
competitive practices that attracted the attention of U.K. antitrust regulators
in the 1980s. 135 Given the manner in which markets operated in practice,
dividends potentially could function as a substitute for corporate law in a
way that would have been impossible under Miller and Modigliani's
restrictive assumptions.
see Jeremy Edwards, Does DividendPolicy Matter?, 5 FISCAL STUD. 1, 1 (1984).

130. On this point, see Fischer Black, The Dividend Puzzle, 2 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 5, 5
(1976); Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 YALE L.J. 881, 885-86 (1995).
131. On how investors can generate cash from shares in the absence of dividends, see
Fischel, supranote 127, at 701-02.
132. Those who derive insights from Miller and Modigliani's work in fact generally
acknowledge that their assumptions were not realistic. See Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll,
Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and Finance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 178-79
(2000) (noting that the precepts in question are treated as a valuable intellectual departure point,
with real world frictions then being introduced and inferences drawn about the contributions of
theoretically irrelevant financial practices).
133. On estimates of the profits investors had to make to cover transaction costs, see
ADRIENNE GLEESON, PEOPLE AND THEIR MONEY: 50 YEARS OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT 136 (1981)
(estimating "at least 10 percent"); P.J. NAISH, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO PERSONAL INVESTMENT
25 (1962) (estimating that investors require "10 per cent"); HAROLD WrNCOTT, THE STOCK
EXCHANGE 141 (1946) (estimating 19 percent).
134. See infra notes 283-84, 291-92 and accompanying text (discussing taxation of
dividends in the hands of individual investors and pension funds).
135. For background, see RANALD MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY
483, 486, 544-55 (2000).
V, Dividends and the PrivateBenefits of Control
A. The Agency Cost Theory of Dividends
The managing director of a leading U.K. fund manager said in a 1994

article in the FinancialTimes newspaper that dividend policy imposes "vital
discipline on company boards."' 36 What is known as the "agency cost" theory
of dividends formalizes the logic involved, ascribing to dividends an important
role in curbing the potential excesses of insiders controlling public
companies. 137 The theory, in turn, offers clues as to how ownership separated
from control in U.K. public companies when the law did not offer substantial
protection to outside investors.
The agency cost theory of dividends is conventionally discussed with the
widely held company as the reference point, with the thinking being that
dividends impose constraints on managers otherwise liable to act contrary to the
interests of arm's-length shareholders. 38 The theory is also relevant, however,
for companies where a shareholder owns a sufficiently large block of shares to
exercise defacto control. 139 In a company of this sort, the blockholder should
be both able and willing to keep management in line. On the other hand, there
is potential for blockholders to exercise their influence in a manner that is
contrary to the interests of outside investors. Dividends can act as a potential
check, since the regular distribution of earnings to investors reduces0 the scope a
dominant shareholder has to skim or squander corporate profits.14
To elaborate, corporate insiders will generally have a bias against
dividends because the retention of earnings increases the size of the assets
under their control and reduces the need to turn to capital markets for additional
finance.' 4 1 Companies, however, with leftover income (cash flow in excess of
that required to fund economically worthwhile projects) may well fail to
136. Paddy Linaker, City Must Defend its CapitalPosition, Fin. TmEs, Apr. 19, 1994, at
17. Linaker was the managing director of the Prudential, a major insurance company and fund
manager.
137. For the label, and original statement of the theory, see generally Frank Easterbrook,
Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 650 (1984).
138. For an overview of agency cost theory in this context, see LEASE ET AL., supra note
125, at 80-81.
139. On the agency cost theory of dividends in the context of companies with blockholders,
see Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Agency
Problemsand Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1, 4-6 (2000).
140. On the check dividends potentially impose, see id.at 4; Mara Faccio, Larry H.P. Lang
& Leslie Young, Dividends and Expropriation,91 AM. EcoN. REv. 54, 55 (2001).
141. For background, see Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs ofFree Cash Flow, Corporate
Financeand Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. (PAPERS & PRoc.) 323, 323 (1986).
1306 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
maximize shareholder value.142 Self-serving behavior is one danger. For

instance, "sweetheart" deals might be engineered to siphon off a
disproportionate share of accumulated earnings to firms the large shareholder
controls. 143 Also, because blockholders of public companies will generally
have most of their wealth tied up in their own firms, they might drive their
companies to pursue value-destroying diversification strategies in the interests
of spreading risk.' 44 Another possibility, at least in companies dominated by
families, is that amateurish family management will squander accumulated
profits through a combination of bad business decisions and policy errors. 14
When companies make regular dividend payments, corporate insiders have less
discretionary cash to dissipate in these various ways.
An ongoing commitment to pay dividends also places inherent limits on
the ability of a company to finance its business plans from retained earnings
and thus can compel a return to the capital markets to obtain needed funds.
Raising capital exposes those running a company to "screening" by investors
and scrutiny by financial intermediaries (e.g., investment banks, often referred
to in the United Kingdom as merchant banks). Hence, dividends can activate
beneficial capital market discipline on companies with de facto controlling
shareholders. 46 In sum, the payment of dividends potentially acts as a check
on the skimming or squandering of corporate profits that should simultaneously
give blockholders an incentive to exit and encourage outside investors to buy
shares.
B. The Propensityof U.K. Public Companies to PayDividends
There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that is consistent with

the agency cost characterization of dividends. 147 Nevertheless, the discipline
dividends can impose is potentially illusory because corporate insiders might
142. On the risks involved where there is "free cash flow," see id.; Randall Morck &
Bernard Yeung, Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2005,
at 163, 170.
143. On this danger, see Ronald J. Daniels & Jeffrey G. Macintosh, Toward a Distinctive
Canadian Corporate Law Regime, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 863, 885 (1991).
144. See Easterbrook, supra note 137, at 653 (making a similar point with respect to
managers of widely held companies).
145. On the risk of incompetent management in family dominated companies, see Cheffins,
146. On dividends and capital market discipline, see Easterbrook, supra note 137, at 653.
147. For a summary, see LEASE ET AL., supra note 125, at 89-91.
reverse field and stop distributing cash to shareholders. 48 Dividends can

therefore only play the role ascribed to them by agency cost theory if those
controlling a company are bound in a credible way to continue to make
regular, ongoing dividend payments.149 The available evidence suggests
U.K. public companies conducted themselves as if they were operating
under such constraints.
The dividend payouts of public companies were not strikingly large
when the United Kingdom's outsider/arm's-length system of ownership and
control took shape. The ratio of dividends to profits in such firms was
approximately 40% in the 1950s, 45% in the 1960s, and 30% in the
1970s.150 Dividend/payout ratios in the United States were similar, and
indeed moderately higher, over the same period (48% in the 1950s, 42% in
the 1960s, and 42% in the 1970s). l ' Moreover, U.K. companies paid out a
considerably higher percentage of their reported net profits in the form of
dividends during the 1920s and 1930s than was the case from the 1940s
onwards. 52 This discrepancy, however, was not generally due to the
adoption of a markedly more conservative dividend policy. ' 3 Instead, the
declining ratio of dividends to profits was primarily a result of changes in
54
accounting practice that led companies to report earnings more fully.1
148. On the possibility that managers might reverse field, see Franklin Allen & Roni
Michaely, Payout Policy, in I A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE, CORPORATE
FINANCE 337, 384 (George M. Constandines, Milton Harris & Rene M. Stulz eds., 2003);
Goshen, supra note 130, at 889.
149. On why the agency cost theory of dividends only works under such circumstances, see
Goshen, supra note 130, at 881, 890.
150. For the 1950s, the average for the decade was calculated on the basis of annual figures
set out in ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND WEALTH, REPORT No. 2:
INCOME FROM COMPANIES AND ITS DISTRIBUTION, 1975 Cmnd. 6172, at 161 tbl.P7. On the
1960s and 1970s, see Steve Toms & Mike Wright, Corporate Governance, Strategy and
Structurein British Business History, 1950-2000, Bus. HIST., July 2002, at 91, 105. The report
by the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Wealth and Income also provided annual
figures for the 1960s, and the average for these was 53.9%, slightly higher than the figure Toms
and Wright offer.
151. MARY O'SULLIVAN, CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 192 (2000).
152. See Steven A. Bank, The DividendDividein Anglo-American CorporateTaxation, 30
J. CORP. L. 1, 11-12 (2004) (finding that U.K. companies paid out 80% of their earnings in
dividends in the 1920s). Figures on retained earnings compiled by Thomas imply that during
the 1920s and 1930s, the dividend/profit ratio typically ranged between 70% and 85%, with
companies apparently paying more in dividends than they generated in profits in 1921.
THOMAS, supra note 106, at 89 tbl.4.2.
153. See THOMAS, supranote 106, at 108 (identifying continuity between dividend policies
adopted in the 1930s and the years after World War II).
154. See A.J. Arnold & D.R. Matthews, Corporate FinancialDisclosures in the U.K,
1308 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
Though dividend payments were not inordinately generous, U.K.

public companies did act as if they felt compelled to make regular cash
distributions to shareholders as ownership separated from control.
According to empirical evidence from the 1970s, only a tiny minority of
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange refrained from paying
dividends and, of the companies that paid dividends, very few reduced the
payout level from the previous year.' 5 During the decades following
World War II, most U.K. public companies set their dividend policies at
least partially by reference to profits and, as mentioned, earnings declined
markedly during the 1970s. 156 The percentage of companies failing to pay
dividends therefore was probably smaller during the 1950s and 1960s than
it was during the 1970s.
Why did U.K. public companies nearly universally pay dividends and
generally refrain from cutting payout levels? A 1966 text on share
valuations provides a hint.I5 7 As the author acknowledged, some boards
were tempted to settle dividend policy by asking, "'How little can we pay
in order to keep the shareholders quiet?"' 158 Directors generally refrained,
however, from departing from past practice because they were 59
"aware of
hardships that might be caused by reduction of dividend."
1920-50: The Effects ofLegislative Changeand ManagerialDiscretion,32 ACCT. & Bus. RES.
3, 9 (2002) (finding, based on a study of the accounts of fifty large U.K. public companies as of
1920, 1935, and 1950, that profits were significantly higher in 1950, while dividend payments
remained largely constant, and attributing the pattern primarily to accounting reforms
introduced by the 1948 Companies Act).
155. See G. Chowdhury & D.K. Miles, An Empirical Model of Companies'Debtand
DividendDecisions: Evidence from Company Accounts Data tbl.4 (Bank of Eng., Discussion
Paper No. 28, 1987) (finding with a sample of 653 U.K. public companies for the years 1970 to
1979, the percentage of companies failing to pay a dividend ranged from 0.9% to 3.5% annually
and the percentage of companies cutting their dividend payment ranged from 9% to 33.8%, with
the exception of 1974 at 47.2%); see also Andrew Benito & Garry Young, HardTimes or Great
Expectations?: DividendOmissions and Dividend Cuts by U.K. Firms 18-21 (Bank of Eng.,
Working Paper No. 147, 2001) (finding, on the basis of a somewhat larger sample, that the
percentage of non-payers ranged between 5% and 7% annually between 1974 and 1979 and that
the proportion of companies cutting their dividends varied from 6% to 15%).
156. For evidence on how U.K. companies determined dividend payouts partially by
reference to profits, see infra note 242 and accompanying text. On declining profits in the
1970s, see supra note 106 and related discussion.
157. T.A. HAMILTON BAYNES, SHARE VALUATIONS 84 (1966).
158. Id.(quoting a pamphlet entitled StandardBoardroomPractice);see also F.R. JERVIS,
THE ECONOMICS OF MERGERS 74 (1971) (characterizing the philosophy of U.K. managers in
very similar terms).
159. BAYNES, supra note 157, at 84.
C. Company Law
What "hardships" might have come into play for publicly quoted firms that
reduced dividends or suspended dividend payments entirely? Company law is
one possibility that needs to be taken into account. There was no common law
or statutory rule directing those in control of a company to declare a dividend,
and company law placed few restrictions on the dividend policy companies
adopted.160 However, according to a 2000 study by La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, company law can induce firms to pay dividends even if
there are no rules directly compelling companies to make dividend payments.1 6'
La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny hypothesized that if
corporate law provides strong investor protection, shareholders will be able to
use their legal powers to force companies to disgorge cash and thereby preclude
corporate insiders from using company earnings in a self-serving or misguided
way. 162 They tested their conjectures by conducting a study of dividend
policies adopted by large firms in thirty-three countries, grouping those
countries that scored between 0 and 3 on their anti-director index into a "low
protection" category and grouping those with a score of 4 or above into a "high
protection" category. 163 They found, consistent with their dividend/company
law hypothesis, that companies from countries with good shareholder
protection paid higher dividends, all else being equal, than companies from
countries where investors were poorly protected. 164 However, at least for the
decades when ownership separated from control in the United Kingdom, their
analysis lacks explanatory power. Again, between 1948 and 1980, U.K.
company law scored a 3 on La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny's
anti-director index, thus relegating Britain to the "low protection" category.
Following their logic, company law rules should not have been a source of
160. The only legal constraints in place were common law rules, supplanted largely by
statute in 1980, that restrained a company from prejudicing creditors by paying dividends when
it lacked the financial wherewithal to distribute the cash. On the common law, see In re
Exchange Banking Co., Flitcroft's Case (1882) 21 Ch. D. 519, 533-34. On statutory reform,
see Companies Act, 1980, c. 22, §§ 39-45. On the fact that there were no rules compelling
companies to declare dividends, see ALEX RUBNER, THE ENSNARED SHAREHOLDER: DIRECTORS
AND THE MODERN CORPORATION 22 (1965); HORACE B. SAMUEL, SHAREHOLDERS' MONEY: AN
ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN DEFECTS IN COMPANY LEGISLATION WITH PROPOSALS FOR THEIR REFORM
145 (1933).
161. La Porta et al., supra note 139, at 4-6.
162. For a summary of the theory, see id. at 5.
163. Id. at 12.
164. See id. at 27 (summarizing the results of the tests run).
1310 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1273 (2006)
"hardship" for corporate insiders contemplating cutting or passing on dividend

payments.
While La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny's analysis
suggests company law did little to compel U.K. public companies to pay
dividends, the corporate constitutions of such firms conceivably could have
played a role. It was standard practice for a public company's articles of
association to provide shareholders with the right to veto the dividend policy
proposed by the board of directors, though not to vary the size of the
dividend. 65 This qualified right served to distinguish Britain from the United
States, 66 and Graham and Dodd took the view that that distinction was
potentially important in the 1940 edition of their well-known text on securities
analysis, saying, "[T]he mere fact that the dividend policy is submitted to the
stockholders for their specific approval or criticism carries an exceedingly
valuable reminder to the management of its responsibilities,
67
and to the owners
of their rights, on this important question."'
While shareholders in the United Kingdom theoretically could influence
dividend policy in a way that was unavailable to their U.S. counterparts, in
practice, the additional rights they had were largely irrelevant. A 1950 British
text on investment acknowledged that the dividend decision was "not... at the
unfettered discretion of the directors" but indicated that "[shareholder]
confirmation [was] normally a mere formality." 68 A study based on a 1984
survey of senior managers of fifty of the United Kingdom's largest companies
confirmed the irrelevance of shareholder voting on dividends. Respondents
said that even if a dividend cut was proposed, they were not concerned
shareholders would veto what was proposed. 169 Hence, U.K. company law
apparently did not impose serious constraints on the dividend policy public
165. On what the articles of association of U.K. companies typically provided on this issue,
see GOWER, supra note 63, at 353; PENNINGTON, supra note 66, at 440; Bank, supranote 152, at
13.
166. On the differences between the legal positions in the United States and the United
Kingdom, see Bank, supra note 152, at 13.
167. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUE 383 n.l (2d ed. 1940) (quoted in Bank, supra note 152, at 14).
168. LEWIS G. WHYTE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 91 (1950); see also
GOWER ET AL., supra note 87, at 408 (arguing that the control that shareholders had was merely
"theoretical," citing the fact that shareholders had no say over interim dividends the directors
might opt to declare).
169. See Jeremy Edwards & Colin Mayer, An Investigation into the Dividend and New
Equity Issue Practicesof Firms: Evidence from Survey Information tbl.2 (Inst. for Fiscal
Studies, Working Paper No. 80, 1985) (indicating that when respondents were asked about the
adverse consequences of cutting dividends, they were more concerned the share price might
decrease than they were that the shareholders would vote to disapprove the proposed dividend).
companies adopted during the period when ownership was separating from
control. Other "hardships" must therefore have come into play.
D. Retaining the Option to Issue New Shares
While company law did little to deter managers from reneging on a policy
to make expected and continuing dividend payments, a desire to retain the
option to raise capital by issuing new shares likely had such an effect. A 1933
book dealing with the position of the British private investor vis-A-vis the
public company described the dynamics involved as follows:
Most Companies hope to extend their business, and in fact do so from time
to time. For this purpose, fresh money is necessary. Fresh money is
usually raised by new issues. But the success and attractiveness of a new
issue are to a large extent determined by the earnings and dividend record
of the Company during previous years.
Matters changed little over time. Typically, when U.K. publicly quoted
companies offered new shares for sale, they did so by way of a rights issue,
meaning that the company offered to current shareholders the right to subscribe
for new shares in proportion to their existing holdings.171 With this practice in
mind, the author of a 1979 text on U.K. business finance observed that
"[d]irectors should always try to keep shareholders satisfied because then they
represent a very good source of new capital."' 172 This in turn made dividends
important:
[Directors'] dividend policy will be influenced by the knowledge that at
some future time they may have to encourage the investing public to
provide their company with more funds. This will only be possible if the
profits earned and dividends paid by the
73 company in past years have been
adequate to reward the risk involved.1
The 1984 survey of senior managers on dividend policy just cited confirms that
those running public companies thought precisely along these lines, with
170. SAMUEL, supra note 160, at 145-46.

171. On the fact that rights issues have traditionally been standard practice in the United
Kingdom, see DAVID BLAKE, PENSION SCHEMES AND PENSION FUNDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
580 (2d ed. 2003); Martin Dickson, Last Rites are Premature for the British Rights Issue, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2000, at 13.
172. KENNETH MIDGLEY & RONALD G. BURNS, BUSINESS FINANCE AND THE CAPrrAL
MARKET 253 (3d ed. 1979).
173. Id.
1312 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
executives saying that they feared dividend17 4cuts would make it more difficult to
raise cash by selling newly issued equity.
Because, as previously discussed, there is a managerial bias in favour of
financing companies by way of retained earnings, it may seem surprising that
retaining the option to obtain external finance by issuing shares would have
influenced the dividend policy of U.K. companies. Empirical studies are
lacking on the relationship between dividends and the issuance of shares in
British public companies during the decades following World War 11.175
Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that keeping open the option of
carrying out a public offering was sufficiently important to give public
companies a meaningful incentive to refrain from reducing or eliminating
dividends.
Consider the 1950s. Between 1949 and 1953, one in three companies
quoted on the London Stock Exchange carried out a public offering; for larger
firms, this figure was nearly three out of five. 17 6 The Radcliffe Committee, a
committee struck by the U.K. government to examine the workings of the
monetary system, observed in its 1959 report that "the new issue market has
been a far from marginal source of capital in the calculations of most of the
larger British firms."'17 7 Reliance on public offerings in turn influenced
dividend policy. In his 1978 history of the finance of British industry in the
twentieth century, economist W.A. Thomas said of the late 1950s that "with an
increased volume of new issues companies wanting to come to the market
frequently sought to maintain the status of their shares by dividend
'sweeteners."" 78 A press report from 1962 echoed the theme, saying:
"Shareholders' dividends are limited to 79rates which will enable the concern to
raise fresh capital at reasonable rates.'
174. See Edwards & Mayer, supra note 169, at 8-10 (finding that the second greatest
concern of firm managers following a dividend cut was the difficulty of raising additional
money).
175. On the difficulties associated with using aggregate evidence on dividend payouts and
the issuance of shares to test the relationship between the two, see Geoffrey Meeks & Geoffrey
Whittington, The Financingof Quoted Companies in the United Kingdom, 32-33 (Royal
Comm'n on the Distribution of Income & Wealth, Background Paper No. 1, 1976).
176. On the data, see R.F. Henderson, CapitalIssues, in STuDIES INCOMPANY FINANCE: A
SYMPOSIUM ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF BRITsH COMPANY AccouNTs
64, 69-70 (Brian Tew & R.F. Henderson eds., 1959).
177. COMMITrEE ON THE WORKING OF THE MONETARY SYSTEM, REPORT, 1959, Cmnd. 827,
at 80. For additional evidence on share offerings by U.K. public companies during the 1950s,
see Wright, supra note 65, at 478-79.
178. THOMAs, supra note 106, at 241.
179. Margot Naylor, The Merger Crunch, STATIST, Jan. 26, 1962 at 289-90. For
additional background, see RUBNER, supra note 160, at 97, 151.
Primarily due to increased borrowing from banks, the percentage of

externally raised funds that U.K. public companies derived from the issuance of
shares dropped markedly through much of the 1960s and the first half of the
1970s.180 On the other hand, because external funds were growing steadily as a
percentage of the total internal and external sources of finance,' 8 1 the
proportion of finance generated from the issuance of shares remained more or
less constant over time.18 2 The evidence also confirms that public offerings of
shares retained practical significance after the 1950s.18 3 In a number of
individual years between 1960 and the mid-i 970s, new issues surged markedly,
with the purpose primarily being to finance acquisition activity.184 Indeed,
during the latter half of the 1960s, the United Kingdom's largest companies
(the top 100, calculated by net assets) financed more of their growth by public
offerings than by retained earnings, with the driver again being the need to pay
for mergers.18 5 Also, when, as a result of a dramatic rise in inflation, the market
for corporate bonds collapsed in the latter half of the 1970s, the percentage of
external funds raised by way of the issuance of equity rose substantially. 8 6 In
sum, a desire to retain the option to return to equity markets helped to deter
corporate insiders from abandoning dividends as dispersed share ownership
became the norm in larger U.K. public companies.
E. Liquidity
Keeping open the option to raise capital was not the only factor that would
have discouraged the reduction or elimination of dividend payments. A desire
180. On the surge in bank borrowing in comparison with the issuance of shares, see
MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 209 (1977); THOMAS, supranote 106, at
326.
181. For data, see THOMAS, supranote 106, at 310, 315.
182. See Meeks & Whittington, supra note 175, at 4-5 (providing data for U.K. public
companies from 1948 to 1971).
183. See id. at 4 (referring to equity issuance as playing a "not trivial" but "subsidiary" role
in the financing of growth).
184. See S.J. PRAIS, THE EVOLUTION OF GIANT FIRMs IN BRITAIN: A STUDY OF THE GROwTH
OF CONCENTRATION IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN BRITAIN 1909-70 130 (1976) (discussing
the pivotal role that the issuance of shares played with takeovers); THOMAS, supranote 106, at
155, 326 (providing annual data on the issuance of ordinary shares indicating that 1960, 1961,
1968, and 1972 were years when the volume of issues surged substantially).
185. For data, see Geoffrey Meeks & Geoffrey Whittington, Giant Companies in the
United Kingdom 1948-69, 85 ECoN. J. 824, 831-32 (1975).
186. On inflation and corporate borrowing in the 1970s, see The UK. CorporateBond
Market, BANK ENG. Q. BULL., Mar. 1981, at 54, 56-57.
1314 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1273 (2006)
to create and preserve a liquid market for shares also would have come into
play. Large shareholders will generally be badly diversified because most of
their wealth will be tied up in the company in which they own the dominant
stake.'87 One way for a blockholder to address this problem is to partially
unwind their equity stake so as to spread some of the risk.188 For shareholders
who treat this as a priority, the stock market will be thought of primarily as a
source of liquidity rather than capital.18 9 Many companies going public in the
United Kingdom following World War II apparently fell into this category.
Only a minority of initial public offerings actually raised new money for the
company concerned, meaning the objective of going public often was to allow
the incumbent shareholders to at least partially cash out. 190
When creating liquidity is a priority, a blockholder will be keen to ensure
that there will be buyers for the company's equity at an acceptable price as and
when a partial unwinding of the block occurs. Investors, in turn, will be
looking for evidence that the shares will deliver sufficiently good value over
time to make a purchase worthwhile. Dividends can then come into play.
Once a company has gone public, the blockholder's continuing interest in
liquidity can serve as an implicit bond to investors that the company will be run
so that dividends will continue to be paid at a rate sufficient to maintain an
active market in the company's shares. A collateral benefit for investors will be
that paying dividends will erode excess cash building up in the firm that a
dominant shareholder might otherwise squander or expropriate.' 9'
In the decades following World War II, dividends plausibly performed
these functions in British public companies with a dominant shareholder. Due
in large part to the financial intermediaries orchestrating public offerings of
shares (generally merchant banks operating as "issuing houses"),' 92 companies
187. For prior discussion of this point, see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
188. For instance, after the family foundations that had been the dominant shareholders in
the Rank Organisation entertainment group lost majority control due to a decision by the
company to enfranchise the company's non-voting shares, they announced that they would
begin selling out. The explanation was that under the new circumstances "it made little sense
for them to keep all their eggs in one basket." Compensation for the Voters, TIMES (London),
Jan. 26, 1976, at 19.
189. For more detail on this characterization, see Armando Gomes, Going Public Without
Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects, 55 J. FIN. 615, 634 (2000).
190. On the fact that permitting blockholders to cash out frequently was the motive for
initial public offerings, see JERVis, supra note 158, at 73. For data indicating that public
offerings often did not raise fresh capital for the company, see A.J. MERTrr, M. HOWE &G.D.
NEWBOULD, EQUITY ISSUES AND THE LONDON C'rrALMARKET 84-85 (1967); G.D. Newbould,
The Benefits and Costs ofa Stock Exchange Quotation, BANKER'S MAG., June 1967, at 359-60.
191. On dividends and the erosion of "excess" cash, see La Porta et al, supra note 139, at 7.
192. On how issuing houses captured the new issue market from stockbrokers in the
that went public faced immediate pressure to pay dividends. For an issuing
house organizing a "flotation" (an initial public offering), the company's
prospective dividend yield, calculated by dividing the dividend per share by the
share price, was an important factor in setting the price of the issue.
Accordingly, the issuing house would advise the company on the proportion of3
earnings that the company should propose to distribute by way of dividends.19
The issuing house would do its best to get this right because the dividend yield
ascribed to shares when a company was seeking to go public did much to fix
the price at which the shares would be accepted by the market.194
It was also understood that once a company had carried out a public
offering, refraining from paying dividends could cause the market for its shares
to decline. 195 Correspondingly, so long as family owners and other
blockholders were concerned about taking advantage of the liquidity the stock
market provided, they were under an onus to ensure that their company
continued to pay dividends to outside investors. This likely helps to explain
why a 1962 text on personal investment offering guidance on how to choose
shares for income recommended "medium-sized provincial [i.e., regional rather
than national] companies with family management and a reasonably secure
market for their products," reasoning that their dividend policy tended to be
"unexciting but.., gently progressive." 96
While a desire to maintain liquidity can motivate those running a company
to arrange for a meaningful annual dividend to be paid, retaining the option to
exit will not necessarily remain important after a company has gone public. For
those owning a substantial percentage of shares in a public company, the
opportunities that exist to extract private benefits of control will help to
determine the priority they attach to liquidity. If such opportunities are meagre,
diversification will look attractive and preservation of an exit option will be
important. On the other hand, if there is much to gain from exploiting control,
liquidity will not be a serious concern. A blockholder who has taken a
company public will instead forsake unwinding his or her ownership stake and
focus fully on skimming private benefits. As part of the strategy, with those
decades following World War II, see MICHIE, supra note 135, at 354-55, 412-15.
193. On issuing houses offering advice on this point, see BAYNES, supra note 157, at 31.
194. On the dividend yield as a key determinant of the pricing of shares in a public
offering, see BAYNES, supra note 157, at 106-09; MERREirT ET AL., supranote 190, at 97.
195. On dividends and investor loyalty, see A.R. ENGLISH, FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE
FAMILY COMPANY 62-63 (1958); SAMUEL, supra note 160, at 145-46.
196. NAISH, supra note 133, at 128.
1316 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1273 (2006)
running the company no longer under any compunction 97 to maintain liquidity,

the company might simply stop paying dividends. 1
Though in theory a dominant shareholder might forsake liquidity to
exploit potential private benefits of control, in the decades following World
War II, owning a large interest in a U.K. public company was not a particularly
attractive proposition. Corporate profits began declining steadily in the
1960s.198 Taxes on income and accumulated wealth were punishing. 199
Owning a large business offered little in the way of "psychic income," with
businessmen generally being held in low esteem and not being major players on
the national political scene. 200 Given all of this, preserving liquidity likely was
a higher priority for owners of large blocks of shares than exploiting their
position as major shareholders.
The tax system, as well as penalizing wealth and high incomes, provided
those running U.K. public companies with an additional and more direct
incentive to refrain from forsaking liquidity by eliminating dividends. In the
decades following World War II, for individuals in higher income brackets,
dividends were usually taxed much more severely than retained and
accumulated earnings. 20 ' This gave families with a large stake in a public
company a tax incentive to prefer that no dividends be paid. U.K. tax
legislation provided, however, that if a company controlled by not more than
five persons failed to distribute a reasonable amount of its profits, tax officials
could allocate the company's earnings to the shareholders personally and
thereby deem the profits to be taxable at the punishing personal rates standard
following World War 11.202
197. On this possibility, see La Porta et al., supra note 139, at 7.

198. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing profit trends after World War
II).
199. See Steven Bank, Brian Cheffins & Marc Goergen, Dividends and Politics, tbl.3
(ECGI Working Paper, No. 24/2004, 2004) (original version on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review) (listing 98% as the top tax rate on dividends between April 1974 and April
1979). On taxes on inheritance, see DAVID J. JEREMY, A BusINEss HISTORY OF BRITAIN, 1900-
1990s 118 (1998).
200. See JOHN FIDLER, THE BRITISH BUSINESS ELITE: ITS AITrUDES TO CLASS, STATUS AND
POWER 183-86 (1981) (discussing a survey of 130 directors in large U.K. companies conducted
in the mid-1970s, which included founding entrepreneurs and family businessmen, and
reporting that many respondents felt they were held in low esteem); KErH ROBBINS, British
Culture Versus British Industry, in BRITISH CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DECLINE 1, 12-13 (Bruce
Collins & Keith Robbins eds., 1990) (saying senior business leaders could not achieve high
political office in Britain because being a successful politician was a full-time occupation
incompatible with being a business leader).
201. See infra Part VII (discussing the tax treatment of dividends and retained earnings).
202. On the powers of tax officials under such circumstances, see Finance Act, 1965, c. 25,
§ 78; H.G.S. PLUNKETT, THE INCOME TAX ACT 1952 (1952), § 245 (discussing Income Tax Act,
The definition of a company potentially subject to this sort of direction-

referred to as a "close company" from 1965 onwards 203-was ultimately cast
very broadly. As a practical matter, most every family-owned company
qualified. 204 Almost the only way out was to take advantage of an exemption
created for companies that obtained a stock market quotation and ensured that
at least 25% (later 35%) of the ordinary shares were publicly held.2 °5 L.C.B.
Gower observed in the 1969 edition of his company law text that "this is
undoubtedly a very strong factor in impelling substantial private companies to
2 06
convert themselves into public companies.
Continued protection from being designated as a "close company" hinged
not merely on maintaining a stock market listing and a "free float" of 25% but
on dealings in the shares occurring during the year for which tax officials were
seeking to impose additional income tax.20 7 The problem was not merely an
academic one because thinness of trading was quite common for U.K. public
companies of the time, even among those listed on the London Stock Exchange
rather than provincial stock markets. 20 8 It was in this context that dividends
came into play. The maintenance of a reasonable dividend policy was an
important step companies could take to ensure that trading activity would
occur.209 Ifa company refrained entirely from paying dividends, the market for
the shares might wither away completely, and the tax advantages of being
publicly quoted would disappear. Hence, while U.K. tax law for individuals
was generally biased strongly against dividends, once a company with a family
1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6/1 Eliz. 2, c. 10, §§ 245, 256).

203. Finance Act, 1965, c. 27, § 79, sched. 18, § 1(1).
204. On family companies typically being "close companies," see GOWER, supranote 63, at
177. On the position prior to 1965, see DAVID R. STANFORD, TAX PLANNING AND THE FAMILY
COMPANY 106 (2d ed. 1964).
205. The 25% threshold was introduced in 1940. See Finance Act, 1940 3 & 4 Geo. 6, c.
29, § 55(4). On the 35% threshold, see GOWER, supranote 63, at 177 (discussing Finance Act,
1965, c. 25, § 79, sched. 18, § 1(3) (Eng.)).
206. GOWER, supra note 63, at 177; see also Wright, supra note 65, at 467 (making the
same point).
207. On the need for dealings on the stock exchange to occur, see Income Tax Act, 1952, c.
10, § 256(5); Finance Act, 1965, c. 25, § 79, sched. 18, § 1(3).
208. See Is New Issue Procedurein Keeping with 1966?, TIMEs (London), Jan. 10, 1966, at
14 (saying of smaller companies listed on the London Stock Exchange: "Frequently, after the
initial opening flurry, dealings in these stocks slow down to an extent that barely justifies
official listing"); see also J.R. Franks, J.E. Broyles & M.J. Hercht, An Industry Study of the
ProfitabilityofMergers in the UnitedKingdom, 32 J. FIN. 1513, 1519 (1977) (finding in a study
of mergers in the Breweries and Distilleries sector of the Official List of the London Stock
Exchange that 14% of recorded prices were more than thirty days old).
209. See ENGLISH, supra note 195, at 62-63 (noting that a "reasonable dividend policy"
prevents shareholders from having to "dispose of their shares at uneconomic prices").
1318 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
owner had gone public, tax-driven concerns about share liquidity provided an
incentive for the company to continue making dividend payments to
shareholders.
F. Takeover Bids
In circumstances where a public company has a family blockholder that

has unwound its holding to the point where the percentage of shares the family
owns is insufficient to block an unsolicited offer to obtain control through the
purchase of shares held by outside investors, fear of an unwelcome bid can
motivate those running the company not only to make regular dividend
payments but to increase payout levels. It is well known that takeovers have a
disciplinary aspect: If a company's share price is depressed because a company
is failing to maximize shareholder return, prospective bidders may begin to
contemplate unlocking shareholder value by acquiring the company and
replacing the incumbent managers. 2 0 This is contingent, however, upon the
ownership structure of potential targets.
So long as a family owns a majority of the shares in a public company or
close to it, a bidder who cannot persuade the family to sell will not be able to
force the issue.21' On the other hand, as a family's stake becomes too small
(perhaps at 20% to 25% of the shares) to provide a de facto veto, a "hostile"
takeover bid emerges as a realistic and-for the family-a worrying
possibility. 212 Bidders, aware of the family's weak position, will be able to
210. On the disciplinary role of takeovers, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 172-73 (1991).
211. On the de facto veto held by a controlling shareholder in a takeover context, see Les
Hannah, Takeover Bids in Britain Before 1950: An Exercise in Business 'Pre-History',16 Bus.
HIST. 65, 67-68 (1974). For a post-World War II example, see Warwick Brophy, Trustees
Reject New GeneralFoods Bidfor Rowntree, TIMES (London), Apr. 21, 1969, at 17 (discussing
how the managing trustee of three trusts, which together controlled 56% of publicly quoted
chocolate manufacturer Rowntree, rejected a takeover offer from General Foods of the United
States in favor of a bid by another British company, even though the General Foods bid was
approximately 50% higher). On the fact that it was controversial for controlling shareholders to
deny minority shareholders a large premium by rejecting a bid, see John Gilmore, Gloves Offin
the Bids Game, TIMES (London), June 21, 1967, at 25; Guardingthe Rights of the Minority,
TIMES (London), Apr. 23, 1969, at 29.
212. For example, see GEORGE BULL & ANTHONY VICE, BID FOR POWER 158-60 (3d ed.
1961) for a description of the House of Fraser's successful hostile takeover ofBinns, a retailer,
even though the directors of Binns and their families owned 29% of Binns's ordinary shares and
opposed the bid. See also Take-over FeverMounting to High Pitch, TIMES (London), Oct. 12,
1965, at 16 (describing a 1965 bid by British Shoe, part of a conglomerate controlled by Charles
Clore, for Lewis Investment Trust, owner of a number of department stores). The article noted:
The key to the success of the Clore bid will rest largely with the Cohen family, who
structure their offers to acquire the company so that little, if any, control
premium is made available. Also, if family members have been exercising
managerial prerogatives, the chances of this continuing will be nil if the
hostile takeover succeeds because the bidder will put in a new executive
team.
In a milieu where dividends are popular with investors, blockholders
fearing takeover bids have an incentive to adopt dividend policies that are
sufficiently generous to keep share prices high enough to discourage
prospective bidders.1 3 Corporate Britain first experienced hostile
takeovers in the early 1950s, and contemporaries quickly surmised that the
trend might prompt U.K. companies to pay more generous dividends than
had been the norm previously. 2 14 For instance, in 1954 Labour politician
Roy Jenkins proposed a motion in the House of Commons that "this House
deplores recent manifestations of the technique of takeover bids in so far as
they have ... seriously undermined the policy of dividend restraint"
(Britain had a "voluntary" system of dividend controls in place between
1949 and 195 1).215 Subsequently, there was much speculation that fears of
an unwelcome bid were indeed inducing U.K. public companies to adopt
increasingly liberal dividend policies.21 6 The 1961 edition of a book on
takeovers concurred with this logic, saying of the mid-1950s that it was
"clear that take-over bids in general ... roused boards of directors to the
risks of a conservative dividend policy. They were impressed by how
easily companies which had been following a conservative dividend policy
fell to the take-over bidder .. .
control at least 20 per cent and possibly 30 or 40 per cent of the Lewis's
shares ....
British Shoe [is] geared to go ahead and try to wrest control of the company, even
if the Cohen family are unwilling to sell out.
Id.On the fact that that Clore's bid succeeded, see JERVIS, supra note 158, at 84-85.
213. On the incentives that the threat of a takeover bid provides to those running a
company to increase dividend payouts, see Fischel, supra note 127, at 713; M.A. King,
Corporate Taxation and Dividend Behaviour-A Comment, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 377, 379
(1971).
214. For an example, see Anthony Crosland, The CaseAgainst Take-over Bids, LISTENER,
Sept. 2, 1954, at 347.
215. LrrTLEWOOD,supra note 110, at 86 (quoting Roy Jenkins' motion).
216. For examples of observers who speculated that the threat of a takeover bid had
prompted companies to make generous dividend payments, see Wu.LAM MENNELL, TAKEOVER:
THE GROWTH OF MONOPOLY INBRITAIN, 1951-61, at 34 (1962); MIDGLEY &BURNS, supranote
172, at 254-55, 314-15; H.B. ROSE, THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND TO INVESTMENT 231 (1960).
217. BULL& VICE, supra note 212, at 35; see also id.at 11 (noting that company directors
feared their "cautious dividend policies made their companies tempting targets for the bidder").
1320 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
Though the evidence on point is not entirely clear cut, from the 1940s
to the 1970s, U.K. public companies that paid high dividends, given levels
of profits and investment, apparently did face a reduced risk of a
takeover.21 8 It is less clear whether takeover activity in fact prompted the
adoption of more liberal dividend policies. Empirical studies based on tests
for a correlation between the level of acquisition activity and aggregate 21 9
dividend payouts by U.K. public companies have yielded mixed results.
Nevertheless, it is plausible that, at least in companies where blockholders
failed to own a sufficiently large percentage of shares to veto a takeover
offer, the threat of a hostile takeover bid provided companies with an
incentive to continue to pay, and perhaps increase, dividend payments.22 °
G. Drawing Matters Together
To sum up, U.K. companies were not obliged by law to pay dividends,
so in theory, they could renege and stop distributing cash to shareholders.
Despite this, for reasons largely, if not entirely, unrelated to company law,
the vast majority of public companies in fact did pay dividends, and most
shied away from cutting the payout level from the previous year. The cash
distributions being made would, all else being equal, have reduced the
scope for blockholders to skim or squander profits that their companies
were generating. This would have given large shareholders an incentive to
exit and should have fostered, in some measure, investor confidence in
shares. As this paper next discusses, the dividend policy of U.K. public
companies would have helped to underpin demand for shares in another
way, namely by playing a "signaling" function.
218. See Andrew P. Dickerson, Heather D. Gibson & Euclid Tsakalotos, Takeover Risk
and Dividend Strategy: A Study of U.K. Firms, 46 J. INDus. ECON. 281, 281 (1998) (finding
that between 1948 and 1970, higher dividend payments were associated with a significantly
lower probability of a takeover). But see DOUGLAS KUEHN, TAKEOVERS AND THE THEORY OF THE
FIRM 103-04, 122, 127 (1975) (failing to find, between 1959 and 1967, a strong correlation
between dividend policy and the likelihood of takeover).
219. Compare King, supra note 213, at 379-80 (finding, using data from 1950-1971, a
statistically significant link), with Steven Bank, Brian Cheffins & Marc Goergen, Dividends and
Politics(Revised) 40-41 (ECGI Working Paper, No. 24/2004, 2006) (finding, using data from
1949-2002, that takeover activity was inversely correlated with dividend payouts).
220. If only a small sub-set of such U.K. companies in fact felt under direct pressure to
raise dividends in response to takeover fears, studies based on aggregate data may well fail to
capture the effect because figures for other companies would wash out the effect.
VI. Dividends and "Signaling"
A. The Theory
The work done by La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer on securities

law suggests that strong disclosure rules are associated with robust stock
markets and diffuse share ownership. 22' Between the 1940s and the 1980s,
though, the law in the United Kingdom was not particularly rigorous in
comparison with modem legal standards.222 How, then, did investors acquire
sufficient knowledge about companies to feel confident enough to buy shares in
the volume required to provide a platform for the dispersion of share
ownership? Dividends likely played a key role.
Corporate insiders are apt to know much more about a company's future
prospects than do investors. 223 Dividend payout policy constitutes a potential
means for those controlling a company to "signal" such private information.224
The process will not operate under all circumstances. In order for dividends to
perform a signaling function, dividend payments ultimately must impose costs 22
on firms that perform poorly in a way they do not for successful firms.
Otherwise, companies lacking a promising future could adopt a generous
dividend policy and deceive investors with impunity, thereby devaluing the
dividend signal completely.
In contrast, if those responsible for setting dividend policy know a penalty
is associated with sending a false signal they will refrain from doing so, at least
when the anticipated costs exceed the likely benefit. 226 Decisions to raise, cut,
or maintain dividend payments can then potentially communicate information
about a company's prospects over and above that provided by publicly filed
accounting data and other corporate announcements. In other words, dividends
221. For a summary of La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer's work on point, see supra
notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
222. For evidence on point, see supranotes 89-93 and infranote 278 and accompanying
text.
223. On the information asymmetries in this context, see ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 6-7 (2000).
224. For summaries of formal models of dividend "signaling," see LEASE ETAL., supranote
125, at 102-06.
225. On the fact that signaling theory presupposes that dividend payments must have
adverse consequences for firms with bad prospects, see Luis CORREIA DA SILVA, MARC
GOERGEN & Luc RENNEBOOG, DIVIDEND POLICY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 38-39 (2003);
LEASE ET AL., supranote 125, at 97; Edwards, supra note 129, at 12-13.
226. See Avner Kalay, Signaling, Information Content, and the Reluctance to Cut
Dividends, 15 J.FIN. &QUANTITATIVEANALYSIS 855,858 (1980) (noting that companies "signal
correctly... if the benefit from a false signal.., is less than the cost of dividend reduction").
1322 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
can function as a "peacock's 227

tail," a signal "only profitable, well-managed
companies can afford to pay.
It can in fact be "dangerous to lie with dividends. 2 28 A company that
chooses and adheres to a generous dividend policy without the cash flow to
back it up will, over time, have to resort to the capital markets to raise the cash
required to continue to pay dividends to shareholders and finance day-to-day
operations. Investment bankers and investors, aware of the company's
disappointing track record, will be difficult to win over. If the efforts to raise
fresh capital fail and the company continues to pay dividends at the same rate,
the company could end up in serious financial difficulty in short order.
Assuming that lying with dividends is likely to result in this sort of fate,
investors can infer sensibly from a company's decision to maintain or increase
gradually its dividend payout that those setting dividend policy believe the
company's prospects are good enough to support current payout levels for some
time to come.
By the same token, a sizeable dividend increase will plausibly constitute
good news. Companies lacking a promising future can fairly readily mimic
public announcements offering optimistic forecasts. 229 In contrast, given the
downside associated with the adoption of an untenably generous dividend
policy, companies are unlikely to opt to boost their dividend payout
substantially unless those in charge are confident that the company's future is
sufficiently bright to sustain matters over time.23 ° Conversely, a dividend cut
can reasonably be taken to represent bad news because the decision implies that
those running a company are apprehensive about the future and thus are
conserving cash to avoid a problematic effort to rely on capital markets to raise
fresh capital.23' In sum, dividends can, as signaling theory implies, offer a
valuable profit forecast.
There is little empirical U.K. data on the signaling theory of dividends,
and that which is available only covers from the late 1980s onwards.232
227. Dividends'End,ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2002, at 68.

228. David Davies, Upending Some Sacred Cows, FIN. TIMES, June 3, 1985, at 21. For
background on the theory involved, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 9, at 438-41.
229. On the potential for all firms to make optimistic forecasts, see LEASE ET AL., supra
note 125, at 98.
230. On the reluctance of managers to increase dividends when they are not optimistic
about the company's prospects, see Black, supra note 130, at 6.
231. For background on why investors imply dividend cuts are bad news, see Harry
DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Douglas J. Skinner, Dividends and Losses, 47 J. FiN. 1837,
1838-39 (1992).
232. The first study, which tested dividend announcements made between 1989-1992, was
carried out by economist Paul Marsh. For background on this study, see Paul Marsh, Why
Nevertheless, as we will see now, there is ample circumstantial evidence

indicating that during the decades when the separation of ownership and
control became entrenched in the United Kingdom, dividends were conveying
information valued by shareholders. Thus, for investors who could not count
on corporate and securities legislation to induce companies to divulge a
sufficient volume of reliable information to provide a foundation for investing,
the dividend policies companies adopted likely served as a viable substitute.
B. The Pervasivenessof Dividends
During the decades following World War 11 the vast majority of U.K.
public companies paid annual dividends, and only a small number reduced their
payouts from the previous year. 33 This pattern would have helped to ensure
that dividend policy could perform a signaling function. Decisions companies
make concerning dividends are only apt to convey useful information when a
change in policy is likely to cause a company to stand out from the crowd. 34
Hence, when the proportion of U.S. publicly quoted companies that paid
dividends fell from 67% in 1978 to 21% in 1999,235 investors were much less
likely to interpret cutting or suspending dividend payments as a confession of
failure. 36 The available evidence suggests that signals conveyed by dividend
announcements of U.S. public companies indeed were considerably weaker in
the 1990s than they had been in previous decades.237 The declining percentage
of dividend payers is a plausible explanation why.
The situation was considerably different in Britain during the decades
following World War II. In contrast with the United States in the 1990s, there
was nowhere to hide. Given the dividend policies adopted almost universally
by U.K. public companies, a firm that omitted to pay dividends or reduced its
Dividend Cuts are a Last Resort, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1992, at 16; Revisiting the Dividend
Controversy, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1992, at 69.
233. On the prevalence of dividends and the reluctance to cut payouts, see supra notes
155-56 and related discussion.
234. On this point, see Chowdhury and Miles, supra note 155, at 8.
235. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, DisappearingDividends: ChangingFirm
Characteristicsor Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 J. FIN. EcoN. 3, 4 (2001).
236. See Shares Without the Other Bit, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 93 (describing the
changing attitudes towards dividends).
237. See Yakov Amihud & Kefei Li, The Declining Information Content of Dividend
Announcements and the Effect of InstitutionalHoldings, 41 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIvE ANALYSIS
637 (2006) (finding that by the end of the 1990s, the U.S. stock market reacted less strongly to
dividend changes than before).
1324 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
dividend payment from the previous year would have stood out as an exception
from the norm. This would have served to reinforce the message its dividend
policy communicated to investors.
C. Companies FearedAdverse Consequences if They Failedto Pay

Dividends in Accordance with Investor Expectations
Signaling theory again presupposes that for dividends to convey

meaningful information to shareholders, those running companies need to fear
penalties for adopting dividend policies inconsistent with long-term corporate
prospects. During the period when ownership separated from control in the
United Kingdom, dividend policy in fact was set as if there was apprehension
about creating a misleading impression when distributing cash to shareholders.
More precisely, there was a marked tendency among companies to treat stability
as a high priority and to refrain from significantly adjusting payout levels
absent exceptional circumstances.
A study of aggregate dividend payouts by U.K. public companies by
Steven Bank, Brian Cheffins, and Marc Goergen illustrates that caution was
indeed the watchword with decisions about dividend policy. 238 Work done by
economist John Lintner in the 1950s puts the findings of this study into
context. 239 Lintner gleaned from interviews with managers of U.S. public
companies that such firms had long-term target dividend payout/earnings ratios
in mind but avoided altering the payout rate if the change might need to be
240
reversed in the short term. Managers instead engaged in "dividend
smoothing," meaning they only adjusted dividend policy in response to
substantial and persistent changes in earnings. Lintner in turn used his findings
to formulate an empirically testable "partial adjustment" model of dividends,
with the foundations being the notion of a target dividend/profit ratio, changes
in current earnings, and the dividend level in the previous year.
Subsequent empirical tests of the Lintner model and variations upon it
designed to incorporate explicitly past financial performance and future
earnings potential verified that the model had considerable explanatory
power. 24' Thus, the evidence suggests public companies have generally
238. Bank, Cheffins & Goergen, supra note 219.

239. His leading paper on point is John Lintner, DistributionofIncomes of Corporations
Among Dividends, Retained Earnings,and Taxes, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 97 (1956).
240. On Lintner's interview evidence, see id. at 99-102.
241. For overviews of subsequent empirical tests of the Lintner model, see DA SILVA,
GOERGEN & RENNEBOOG, supra note 225, at 41-42; LEASE ET AL., supra note 125, at 128-29;
Terry A. Marsh & Robert C. Merton, DividendBehaviorfor the Aggregate Stock Market, 60 J.
aimed to provide shareholders with a dependable flow of cash payments,

have resisted cutting dividends in response to a temporary decline in
earnings, and have only increased distributions to shareholders when
management was confident the higher payments could be maintained. The
Bank/Cheffins/Goergen study of dividend payouts by U.K. public companies
between 1949 and 2002 falls into line with this pattern, as a partial adjustment
model based on Lintner's work performed well in explaining the data.2 4 2 Those
setting dividend policy for U.K. public companies thus were apparently using
earnings as a key reference point in determining dividend policy but also
smoothed dividends rather than adjusting cash distributions purely in response
to annual financial results.
U.K. public companies likely smoothed their dividends because of
concerns about a negative investor reaction if they set dividend policy
differently. In the decades immediately following World War II, it was widely
known that the stock market implied a very bleak future from dividend cuts,
and companies therefore strongly resisted them.24 3 The authors of the 1979
edition of a text on U.K. business finance described the implications as follows:
"[S]hareholders value steadily increasing dividends very highly because they
think such a rise would not be implemented unless directors had confidence in
being able to maintain it. Hence... [d]irectors try hard not to reduce
dividends, resorting if necessary to past undistributed profits to maintain
them." 244 The 1984 survey of senior managers cited earlier also illustrates that
those running U.K. public companies feared a share price "hit" if they failed to
smooth dividends. 45 Respondents said a dividend cut would be perceived as
an indicator that current earnings were suffering and as a signal that longer-
term profitability was in jeopardy. They acknowledged, moreover, that the
manner in which they were setting dividend policy constituted an important
method of conveying information to investors.246
A study of the financial performance of quoted and unquoted companies
during the 1980s confirms that among British publicly quoted companies,
Bus. 1, 3 (1987).
242. On the results of the Lintner model test, see Bank, Cheffins & Goergen, supra note
219, at 28-30.
243. On investor reaction to dividend cuts, see ANDREW GLYN & BOB SUTCLIFFE, BRITISH
CAPITALISM, WORKERS AND THE PROFITS SQUEEZE 118 (1972).
244. MIDGLEY & BURNS, supranote 172, at 253.
245. See Edwards & Mayer, supra note 169, at 8 (stating that "by far the most adverse
consequence of a cut in dividends is seen to be a fall in share prices"); see also Peter Martin, A
CorporateConundrum, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at 8 (quoting a U.K. investment manager as
saying "[m]ost major companies that cut their dividend for short-term reasons live to regret it").
246. On the survey results in this context, see Edwards & Mayer, supra note 169, at 10.
1326 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
concerns about investor reactions prompted dividend smoothing.147 Drawing

upon a list of the 1,000 largest U.K. firms as of 1980, the study matched private
companies with publicly quoted firms on the basis of size and industry and
compared the financial results over the next seven years. One finding was that
private companies were more likely to cut dividends in the face of deteriorating
financial conditions than their stock market counterparts. This result can be
explained on the basis that the privately held companies, lacking an investor
base equivalent to those of the publicly quoted firms, failed to attribute to
dividends a signaling function and thus felt free to adjust payouts promptly in
accordance with short-term changes in earnings.248 The evidence suggests, in
sum, that U.K. companies in fact were sufficiently apprehensive of investor
reactions for dividends to perform a signaling function.
While investors generally would have reacted negatively to a reduction in
dividend payouts, a key category of investor-pension funds-had a particular
reason to discourage dividend cuts during the period when the U.K.'s
outsider/arm's-length system of ownership and control became entrenched.
Statistics illustrate just how important pension funds were becoming. The
percentage of shares of U.K. public companies they owned rose from 3% in
1957 to 9% in 1969, to 17% in 1975, and to 31% in 1991, by which point
pension funds owned a higher percentage of shares than any other category of
investor.249
Until the mid- 1960s, U.K. pension funds conventionally valued assets in
which they invested at book value. 250 Since book value is an accounting measure
focusing on the position at the date of purchase, this produced the odd result that
identical investments were attributed different values depending on when they
were bought. To improve matters, pension fund actuaries began valuing assets on
the basis of the expected future income stream, which, with equities, involved
using a "dividend discount model" based on dividend payouts.25'
Pension fund managers, being aware of how shares were valued under the
dividend discount model, took a dim view of dividend cuts. 25 2 Because pension
247. See Colin P. Mayer & Ian Alexander, Stock Markets and CorporatePerformance: A
Comparisonof Quoted and Unquoted Companies, Centrefor Economic Policy andResearch
(Discussion Paper No. 571, 1991).
248. See id. at 45 (explaining private companies' willingness to cut dividends in hard
times).
249. On sources, see National Statistics Online, supra note 45; Moyle, supra note 57.
250. On the history, see S.J. Head et al., Pension Fund Valuations and Market Values, 6
BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 55, 60 (2000).
251. On the change in practice, see id.
252. On the attitude of pension fund managers, see Barry Riley, Survey ofPension Fund
Investment, FIN. TIMES, May 6, 1993, at I.
contributions a corporate employer was obliged to make were determined in

part by the match of assets and liabilities, if the value ascribed to shares
held by company pension plans fell significantly, the companies would be
under pressure to correct matters by making additional contributions.
Pension funds therefore generally discouraged companies in which they
owned shares from cutting dividends and welcomed sustainable increases
in dividend payments.253 With pension funds moving to the forefront as
investors in U.K. shares from the 1950s through to the 1980s, those
deciding dividend policy on behalf of public companies had to be mindful
of this bias because they could lose crucial institutional support if they
failed to do so. This would have reinforced any signaling-driven bias
against cutting dividends.
D. Dividends and Share Prices
While the pervasiveness of dividends and the prevalence of dividend

smoothing both suggest that dividends were performing a signaling
function in the decades following World War 1I, a strong link between
dividend payouts and share prices is perhaps the strongest evidence that
dividends were conveying information valued by investors. In purely
theoretical terms, dividend policy should not be a determinant of share
prices. According to corporate finance theory, the return shares offer to
investors over time is a risk-adjusted function of what a company will pay
out to shareholders throughout its existence, whether as cash distributions
or a final payment upon liquidation. Correspondingly, ascertaining the
value of a company's shares at any one time should involve estimating
what the company's net cash flow will be throughout the remaining life of
the business.254
Assuming, as did Miller and Modigliani, full symmetry of information
between managers and investors, market participants should immediately
digest any new data on future profitability that becomes available, and a
company's share price will reflect fully the information "in the market." If
the stock market in fact prices information in this manner, then, as Miller
and Modigliani hypothesized, there will be no scope for a company's
dividend policy to convey anything meaningful to investors. With
dividends failing to play any sort of signaling role, the size and pattern of
253. On the approach pension funds took, see id.

254. On the variables that should logically determine share prices, see CHEFFINS, supra
note 93, at 55.
1328 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
annual cash distributions will be irrelevant to a company's stock market

valuation. 5
Matters generally worked much differently in practice in the United
Kingdom during the decades following World War II, with dividends in
fact constituting a key determinant of share prices. According to a 1955
report issued by the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and
Income, "[i]t is the distributed profits that tend most directly to influence
the market value of a share."25 6 A study based on 1949-1957 data derived
from a sample of 165 companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange
confirmed that the value of shares of U.K. public companies depended far
more on dividend payments than reported earnings. 257 According to this
study, variations in the last declared dividend per share and the most recent
published data on retained earnings combined to explain much about share
price fluctuations. Dividends and undistributed profits were not treated
equally, however. Instead, cash distributions were capitalized in the share
price at a much higher rate.258
In this milieu, dividend announcements made by public companies
captured considerable attention. For investors and stockbrokers, private
knowledge of the dividend a company would declare was prized
information that could induce heavy buying and selling of shares.25 9
Hence, as early as 1939 the London Stock Exchange had set up "Trans
Lux," which used a large screen to convey dividend announcements and
other news simultaneously to all members of the London Stock
Exchange. 260 By the mid-1960s, the London Stock Exchange's Listing
Rules required that a company not only notify the Stock Exchange
255. On the implications of Miller and Modigliani's corporate finance insights in this
context, see LEASE ET AL., supra note 125, at 29-35.
256. Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, FiNAL REPORT, Cmd. 9474
(London: HMSO, 1955), 17 (majority report); see also id. at 386-87 (minority report)
(exploring the point in more detail).
257. See G.R. Fisher, Some FactorsInfluencing SharePrices,71 ECON. J. 121,141 (1961)
(finding that "[v]ariations in the last declared dividend per share explain a considerable
proportion of the variation in corresponding share prices between companies").
258. For additional empirical evidence supporting the same conclusion, see ROSE, supra
note 216, at 459-60; P. Sargent Florence, New Measuresof the Growth of Firms,67 ECON. J.
244, 246 (1957).
259. On dividend policy as an example of inside information that could be exploited
successfully, see RICHARD SPIEGELBERG, THE Crry: POWER WrrHouT AccouNTABILITY 48
(1973). On the legal status of insider dealing in the United Kingdom, see supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
260. For background on TransLux, see F.E. ARMSTRONG, THE BOOK OF THE STOCK
EXCHANGE 123 (5th ed., Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd.) (1957).
DIVIDENDS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CORPORA TE LAW 1329
immediately of a decision by the board concerning the declaration or

omission of a dividend payment but also provide advance notice of board
meetings where such matters would be considered. 6' Press coverage also
reflected the interest in dividends. Newspapers that dealt with business issues
in detail routinely reported on the dividend announcements of public companies
and offered a comparative figure for the previous year, perhaps supplemented
by supporting analysis. 62
Contemporaries were well aware of the attention investors paid to
dividends and of the impact that dividend policy had on share prices. A 1957
edition of a book on the London Stock Exchange characterized dividend
announcements as being of "great importance," saying:
Frequently they mean a reconstruction of yield shown on a share, based on
a distribution which it is deemed by directors unwise to continue, on which
it is decided to improve. This alteration of yield frequently leads to
realisations or further buying, which quickly brings in its train a price
adjustment as a natural consequence.
A 1960 text on investment characterized the price readjustment process as
follows:
If a change in dividend has been fully anticipated, the news of the change
will leave the price ofthe share concerned more or less unaltered .... If an
increase in dividends proves to have disappointed a sufficient number of
investors, its announcement will be accompanied by a fall in share prices;
and the failure of dividends declared to be reduced as much as had been
feared will be accompanied by a rise. 2 "
Dividends admittedly are a coarse method of conveying information to
investors. One source of potential misapprehension is that a dividend cut
conceivably could be good rather than bad news because the reduction could
signify that a company is conserving capital to exploit valuable growth
opportunities. Similarly, a dividend increase could be bad rather than good
news, as the decision might be an implicit concession by management that the
company is struggling and thus is disinvesting by returning money to
shareholders.265
261. See Federation of Stock Exchanges in Great Britain and Ireland, Admission of
Securities to Quotation, supra note 107, at 42 (Communication of Announcements).
262. On newspaper coverage of dividend announcements, see NAISH, supra note 133, at
141-42.
263. ARMSTRONG, supra note 260, at 123-24.
264. ROSE, supra note 216, at 456; see also NAISH, supra note 133, at 41-43 (offering a
description of the process based on hypothetical facts).
265. On the potentially contradictory messages that changes in dividend policy can send,
1330 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
Despite the potential ambiguities or contradictions of dividend action, the

language may in fact be clear to those to whom it matters. 266 Certainly, in
Britain, the fact that dividends were strongly correlated with share prices in the
decades following World War II suggests that decisions companies made on the
distribution of profits conveyed information investors relied upon. This does
not mean that the signaling effect remained equally strong as time progressed.
Instead, it likely diminished as investors increasingly relied on additional
sources of information to assess the prospects of companies.2 67 The rise of
investment analysts, who specialize in the researching of companies and the
offering of recommendations on the buying and selling of shares, illustrates
how additional information was becoming available to investors.
Investment analysts, a U.S. export, first arrived in Britain during the mid-
1950s, and by the 1960s, the detailed study of companies and industries had 268
become a widely adopted practice in the London financial community.
Nevertheless, the efforts undertaken were rudimentary by today's standards, in
part because investment analysts generally lacked direct access to the
executives managing companies.269 Over time, matters improved considerably.
A 1998 history of the stock market makes the point, remarking on how things
had changed since the 1960s:
[The 1960s] were exciting, pioneering days for investment analysts. With
no apparent limit to their horizons, they enjoyed the satisfaction of pure
research and discovery in a competitive search for basic information. It
was very different from the prospect today for the trainee 27
analyst
0
entering a
mature business with a high level of shared information.
see Victor Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REV. 85, 110 (1980);
Easterbrook, supra note 137, at 651-52.
266. On investors being able to sort out potentially ambiguous dividend signals, see
Brudney, supra note 265, at 112.
267. On the fact that the dividend signal will weaken as the quality of other forms of
disclosure improves, see Nils H. Hakansson, To Pay or Not to PayDividends, 37 J. FIN. 415
(1982); see also Amihud & Li, supranote 237 (arguing that as institutional ownership of U.S.
public companies increased, dividends became a less meaningful signal because the institutional
investors had better access to other sources of information on companies than did individuals).
268. On the emergence of investment analysts in the United Kingdom, see Walter A.
Eberstadt, Investment Ties Across the Atlantic, TIMES (London), July 17, 1967, Wall Street
(special section), at VIII; see also InvestmentAnalysts' Society, TiMES (London), May 2, 1955,
at 19 (announcing the establishment of the United Kingdom's Society of Investment Analysts).
269. See Eberstadt, supra note 268, at VIII (saying British managers were generally
reluctant to talk to analysts).
270. LITrLEWOOD, supra note 110, at 126.
As better sources of information became available, U.K. investors placed

increasing emphasis on annual and interim earnings figures and company profit
forecasts when valuing shares. 271 This in turn meant that investors paid less
attention to dividends. For instance, during 1968, the share price of retailer and
market favourite Tesco Ltd. doubled despite a dividend yield of 0.9%, which
was considerably lower than the yield on government bonds. 272 While the
signaling effect of dividends did diminish over time, investors nevertheless
continued to treat dividend policy as an important barometer of corporate
performance. Economist Mervyn King (later governor of the Bank of England)
said in his 1977 book Public Policyand the Corporationthat "the payment of
the dividend 2is73the principal direct line of communication from management to
shareholder.
Others concurred. A 1975 text on analysis of the British stock market
said, "Dividend forecasts are needed as they are an important factor in share
price determination; indeed they form the basis used [for an investment analysis
technique known as] the intrinsic value approach and in many computer-based
stock evaluation models. 2 74 Similarly, the Economist observed in 1979 that
the "preoccupation with (dividend) yields can reduce investment analysis to a
simple question of whether a dividend is likely to be held or not."275 Moreover,
an empirical study covering 1962 to 1986 found that dividend payouts of the
United Kingdom's 500 largest publicly-quoted companies correlated in a
statistically significant manner with fluctuations in the aggregate market
capitalization of those firms. 276 Thus, even if the attention that investors paid to
dividend announcements waned somewhat over time, dividends continued to be
a significant determinant of share prices through to the 1980s.
271. On how the investment community's approach began to change, see ROBERT HELLER,
THE NAKED INVESTOR 223-24 (1976); LrITLEWOOD, supra note 110, at 159; WILLIAM G.
NURSAW, THE ART AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 38 (1963). On the emergence of the
price/earnings ratio as a particularly popular way of measuring how highly investors valued
earnings companies were producing, see Janette Rutterford, From DividendYield to Discounted
Cash Flow: A History of U.K and U.S. Equity Valuation Techniques, 14 ACCT., Bus. & FIN.
HIST. 115, 138 (2004).
272. R.J. BRISTON, THE STOCK EXCHANGE AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 372 (3d ed. 1975).
273. KING, supra note 180, at 175.
274. MICHAEL FIRTH, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS: TECHNIQUES OF APPRAISING THE BRITISH
STOCK MARKET 117 (1975).
275. To Cut or Not to Cut, ECONOMIST, June 9, 1979, at 119.
276. See Stephen Leithner & Heinz Zimmerman, Market Value andAggregateDividends:
A Reappraisalof Recent Tests, and Evidencefrom European Markets, 129 Swiss J. ECON. &
STAT. 99, 111-12 (1993) (finding that the correlation between dividends and market
capitalization was statistically significant for data from the United Kingdom but not for data
from France, Germany, Switzerland, or the United States).
1332 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
E. Summary
In the United Kingdom, the signaling effect of dividends continued to

diminish after outsider/arm's-length corporate governance was firmly
entrenched. For instance, in 1992, the Economist acknowledged that, while a
dividend cut was taken far more seriously by the markets than "glossy hand-
outs and analysts' briefings," "investors are increasingly clear-eyed... looking
less to the dividend and more to the profits covering it."'277 Nevertheless,
during the period when ownership separated from control, there was an
informational feedback loop between investors and companies operating via
dividend policy. In the decades immediately following World War II, U.K.
legislation did not impose extensive disclosure requirements on publicly quoted
firms, with the only periodic disclosure obligation imposed by statute being a
requirement to file annually audited financial statements. 7 8 In this milieu, the
dividend policy adopted by U.K. companies would have acted as at least a
partial substitute for investors seeking information on which shares to buy and
sell. Thus, to the extent that standards of corporate disclosure influence
demand for shares among outside investors, the payout policy adopted by U.K.
companies would have helped to provide the foundation for the unwinding of
ownership and control.
VII. A PotentialCaveat: Dividends Could Be Costly to Shareholders
The signaling and agency cost characterizations of dividends both imply

that those owning equity benefit from dividend payments, either from the
transmission of information or the disciplining of management.2 7 9 For
shareholders, however, the virtues of dividends can be illusory.28 ° More
particularly, even if dividends do convey information to shareholders and serve
to constrain to some degree those in control of companies, if there are
substantial costs involved with the paying and receipt of dividends,
277. DividendDilemmas, EcONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1992, at 14-15; see alsoA Modest Sort of
Problem,Made Powerful by Myth, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1992, at 73-74 (saying "the value of
dividends as signals may be fading...").
278. The key statutory provisions governing the preparation and filing of annual financial
statements were Companies Act, 1948, §§ 38, 126(1), 127, 149, 156, sched. 4, sched. 8.
279. See Francisco Pdrez-Gonzilez, Large Shareholdersand Dividends: Evidencefrom
US. Tax Reforms 4-5 (Colum. Univ. Bus. Sch., Working Paper, 2003).
280. See, e.g., Benito & Young, supra note 155, at 10 (describing how tax can affect
matters).
shareholders may fail to benefit overall. 28 Applying this reasoning to

circumstances in Britain, if dividends were subject to tax penalties as compared
with retained earnings, the dividend policies that U.K. public companies
adopted may have been a net deterrent to investment in shares. If this were the
case, dividends logically would not have contributed in a meaningful way to the
unwinding of ownership structures.
U.K. tax rules in fact did penalize certain recipients of dividends, these
being individuals with high incomes who owned shares directly rather than via
an investment intermediary. The point can be illustrated by calculations taking
into account the relevant tax variables (e.g., taxations of corporate profits,
taxation of investment income, and taxation of capital gains) where a score of 1
implies indifference between dividends and retained earnings, a score of less
than 1 represents a tax bias in favor of retained earnings, and a score of greater
than 1 signals the converse.282 The "tax preference ratio" for individuals paying
the top marginal rate of tax ranged between 0.03 and 0.18 between 1949 and
1979, largely due to very high rates of tax on high incomes, and an absence of
capital gains tax up to 1965 and taxation of capital gains at a considerably
lower rate than income thereafter.28 3 Hence, when U.K. public companies in
this era paid a dividend rather than retaining earnings, they were essentially
imposing a substantial tax penalty on a major group of investors.M
While for individuals owning shares the tax system was biased against
dividends, U.K. companies that were paying dividends were not imposing a
meaningful tax penalty on institutional investors, the constituency that was
moving to the forefront as the United Kingdom's outsider/arm's-length system
of ownership and control became entrenched. From the end of World War II
onwards, ownership of shares by individuals dropped quickly. As the
Economist noted in 1953, "In the last five years there has been no net personal
281. On the potential trade-off, see Jean Crockett & Irwin Friend, Dividend Policy in
Perspective: Can Theory Explain Behavior?, 70 REv. ECON. & STAT. 603, 603-04 (1988).
282. On the methodology, see JAMES POTERBA & LAWRENCE SUMMERS, The Economic
Effect ofDividend Taxation, in RECENT ADVANCES INCoRPoRAT FINANCE 227 (Edward Altman
& Marti Subrahmanyan eds., 1985). Their model, in turn, was based upon parameters
developed in KING, supra note 180, at 75-77.
283. Bank, Cheffins & Goergen, supra note 199, at 55-57, tbl.3. Also relevant was a tax
on corporate profits in place between 1947 and 1965, under which the tax rate was higher for
distributed earnings than for retained earnings between 1947 and 1958. The tax preference ratio
rose to 0.51 in 1980 due to a cut in the top rate of income tax.
284. Managers indeed sometimes sought to resist pressure to pay out more dividends with
the argument that "ifwe increase your dividends, we increase your taxes." Clive Wolman, Why
it Pays Dividends to Passon Profits, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 1985, at 26.
1334 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
investment on the Stock Exchange. Sales of securities from private portfolios 28 5

seem to have clearly exceeded the purchases that individuals have made."
A 1980 survey of U.K. financial markets, relying on data from a study of
the flow of funds prepared by the Bank of England, confirmed that individuals
were net sellers of corporate equity. Each year between 1963 and 1977
individuals sold more shares than they bought, with the amounts involved
varying from a low of £1.22 billion in 1969 to a high of £3.79 billion in
1973.286 The proportion of shares of U.K. public 287
companies owned by
individuals correspondingly declined dramatically.
As private investors exited, the "buy" side of the market for shares in U.K.
public companies became thoroughly dominated by institutional investors, with
pension funds and insurance companies taking the lead role.288 As the London
Stock Exchange said in written evidence submitted in 1977 to a committee
struck by the U.K. government to review the functioning of financial
institutions, "[t]he personal sector has been for over twenty years a consistent
net seller of securities at a fairly steady rate in constant price terms" and "[t]he
289
institutions... have been absorbing the sales by the private individuals.,
Data compiled for a 1978 study of the growth of institutional investors
confirmed the point, indicating that, collectively, key British institutional
investors were net290purchasers of shares in each and every year through the
1960s and 1970s.
Insurance companies paid tax on income received-including dividends
paid out by companies in which they owned shares-at a rate much lower than
285. Corpse in the CapitalMarket, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1953, at 375.

286. Marshall E. Blume, The FinancialMarkets, in BRrrAIN'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
276-77,294 (Richard E. Caves & Lawrence B. Drause eds., 1980) (citing precise amounts for
1966 to 1977 only).
287. For statistics illustrating the trend, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
288. The percentage of shares of U.K. public companies owned by unit trusts consistently
trailed far behind those for insurance companies and pension funds. For instance, as of 1975,
unit trusts owned 4.1%, insurance companies owned 15.9%, and pension funds owned 16.8%.
National Statistics Online database, supra note 45. Investment trusts generally owned more
shares than unit trusts in the decades following World War II but they struggled to raise new
funds and thus were the "weakest of the four legs of the institutional market." LriTLEWOOD,
supra note 110, at 262; see also BRISTON & DOBBINS, supranote 60, at 17 (saying investment
trusts remained a "non-growth sector").
289. Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (Chairman, Sir Harold
Wilson), 3 EVIDENCE ON THE FINANCING OF TRADE AND INDUsTRY 208, 214 (1977).
290. See BRISTON & DOBBINS, supra note 60, at 189 exhibit 51 (showing the total
acquisition of equities by institutional investors); see also Blume, supra note 286, at 286 tbl. 10
(showing net purchases of shares by institutional investors in the United Kingdom).
that imposed on individuals paying the top rate of tax.29 ' This meant that the
tax penalty associated with dividends-if any-was much less substantial than
it was for highly paid individuals. Up to the late 1990s, pension funds, which
were essentially exempt from both income tax and capital gains tax, typically
had a strong tax preference in favor of dividends.2 92 The upshot is that for
those buying shares in any volume during the period when ownership separated
from control, the tax "downside" of dividend payments should not have
detracted substantially from whatever disciplinary and signaling benefits there
in fact were. Tax, therefore, should not have disrupted the momentum in favor
of diffuse share ownership that dividends created.
VIII. Conclusion
As we have seen, via a highly stylized example involving a single publicly

quoted firm, the widely held company might not become dominant in a country
even if it enjoys inherent economic advantages. If dominant shareholders
expect that they will fail to capture a sufficient portion of the gains available
from a transition to diffuse share ownership to compensate them for the loss of
private benefits of control, they are unlikely to exit. Also, potential buyers of
shares for sale may deduce logically, if incorrectly, that optimistic claims made
about future shareholder returns are implausible. The law matters thesis
hypothesizes that corporate and securities law can address both obstacles to
diffuse share ownership. In the United Kingdom, however, law was not highly
protective of outside shareholders as ownership separated from control. What
constraints, then, induced blockholders to exit? And what motivated outside
investors to buy shares?
This paper has argued that dividend policy played a significant role. The
payment of dividends was not a sufficient condition for the separation of
ownership and control. The fact that separation of ownership and control in
United Kingdom public companies did not crystallize until after World War II,
291. On taxation of investments held by insurance companies, see BRISTON, supra note
272, at 199-200. According to economist Mervyn King the effective dividend income tax rate
for insurance companies ranged between 22.8% and 27.8% between 1947 and 1975, which was
far below the tax rates that individuals paid on investment income. KING, supra note 180, at
266 tbl.A.4.
292. Between 1965 and 1973 the pension funds' tax preference ratio was 1 (i.e., the
indifference between capital gains and dividends). Otherwise, until 1997, the score was always
above 1, ranging from a low of 1.18 (April 1956 to April 1958) to a high of 1.70 (April 1964 to
April 1965). From 1997 onwards, the tax preference ratio again was 1. Bank, Cheffins &
Goergen, supra note 199, at 58-60, tbl.4.
1336 63 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
despite companies having a penchant for paying dividends in prior decades,

illustrates the point.293 Nevertheless, as other factors contributed to the
reconfiguration of the corporate economy in the United Kingdom, dividend
policy played an important supplementary role.
For instance, although declining profitability in the United Kingdom
corporate sector during the post-World War II period likely would have only
motivated blockholders to begin to think of exit during the 1960s, the implicit
commitment to pay dividends would have imposed discipline on public
companies throughout the entire period when ownership separated from
control. Similarly, while stock exchange rules imposed various new disclosure
requirements on listed companies during the 1960s, the manner in which share
prices were determined indicates that prior to this point, investors could and did
rely heavily on dividend payouts to gauge how to proceed. 294 Hence, while
other factors contributed to the separation of ownership and control in the
United Kingdom, dividend policy constituted an important variable that helped
to substitute for the lack of protection offered to minority shareholders under
Britain's corporate and securities laws.
Does this mean, as contractarian analysis might be taken to imply, that the
law is trivial? That would read too much into what occurred in the United
Kingdom. The analysis presented here does illustrate that the market can
contribute significantly to the rise of a system of corporate governance oriented
around the widely held company. Nevertheless, the law's role should not be
ignored. Jack Coffee has made this point with respect to the United States.295
Share ownership unwound sufficiently before the enactment of federal
securities legislation in the early 1930s for Berle and Means to make their well-
known claim that ownership had separated from control in many large U.S.
29
companies. 296 Coffee acknowledges, accordingly, that robust securities markets
can arise when statutory protection offered to outside investors is minimal but
293. On the dividend policy of U.K. public companies prior to World War II, see supra
note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the 1920s and the 1930s); see also BASKIN &
MIRAN'n, supra note 124, at 192 (going further back in history).
294. See supra notes 256-64 and accompanying text (discussing the strong influence
dividend policy had on share prices prior to the mid-1960s).
295. See John C. Coffee, The Rise ofDispersedOwnership: The Roles ofLaw andState in
the Separationof Ownershipand Control, 11l YALE L.J. 1, 64-71 (2001) (discussing how a
strong legal framework is still necessary even when the market is self-regulatory).
296. See Cheffins, supra note 18, at 8 (discussing how AdolfBerle and Gardiner Means set
out their separation of ownership and control thesis before the enactment of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
argues that regulation might be required subsequently to sustain matters,

particularly since market shocks can batter investor confidence.29 7
This insight could be pertinent for the United Kingdom. A case could be
made that a shift in favour of formalized regulation occurring during the 1980s
made the stock market orientation of U.K. corporate governance more durable
than otherwise might have been the case. As we have seen, statutory reforms
carried out in the 1980s-after diffuse share ownership had gained a firm
foothold-served to increase significantly the protection of outside investors.298
A key reason why the United Kingdom's score on La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer's securities law index improved substantially was that the London
Stock Exchange's listing rules were vested with the status of subordinate
legislation. 299 The change was part of a broader trend in favour of greater
regulation of U.K. capital markets during the mid-1980s.
Prior to this point, Britain's equity markets and important components of
the country's financial services sector were governed by a system where self-
regulation was integral. A series of privately operated organizations, with the
London Stock Exchange being among the most prominent, supervised the
relevant activities without drawing upon statutory powers and without being
directly accountable or answerable to government officials.300 Serious doubts
arose about the viability of self-regulation in the early 1980s in the wake of
increasing globalization of financial markets, a series of scandals affecting the
London financial community and an investigation of the London Stock
Exchange's share dealing system by antitrust regulators. 30 1 The government
responded with legislative reform oriented primarily around the Financial
Services Act 1986, which was designed to create "self-regulation within a
statutory framework. 3 02 The United Kingdom's outsider/arm's-length system
of ownership and control retained its vitality despite a stock market crash in
1987 and a series of corporate governance scandals in the early 1990s, and the
297. See Coffee, supra note 295, at 66 (suggesting that governmental regulation can
mitigatethe "risks and consequences" of market crashes).
298. See supra notes 75-76, 80, 88, 92 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
changes occurring in the 1980s).
299. Supra note 88 and accompanying text.
300. For an overview of the system, see MICHAEL MORAN, THE POLITICS OF THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES REVOLUTION 61-68 (1991).
301. See J.J. FISHMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THREADNEEDLE STREET: THE
DEREGULATION AND REREGULATION OF BRITAIN'S FINANCIAL SERVICES 31-40 (1993) (discussing
the increase in public concern about financial scandals and the government response); MICHIE,
supra note 135, at 483, 486, 544-55 (discussing the antitrust investigation).
302. Department of Trade and Industry, FINANCIAL SERVICES INTHE UNITED KINGDOM: A
NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION, 1985, Cm. 9432, at 13.
1338 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273 (2006)
shift in favour of formal legal regulation might be part of the reason why.303 To
the extent this is correct, and to the extent dividends contributed to the
separation of ownership and control in Britain, developments in the United
Kingdom illustrate that it is necessary to take into account both the market and
law to understand fully how systems of corporate governance evolve and
operate.
303. There also was a prompt and effective self-regulatory response to the corporate
governance scandals of the early 1990s, see CHEFFINS, supra note 93, at 372, 611-13, but
remaining self-regulatory aspects of financial services regulation in the United Kingdom were
largely swept away in the wake of the enactment of the Financial Services and Markets Act,
2000.

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I. Introduction ................................................................................ 1274

* S.J. Berwin Professor of Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. I

G. Drawing M atters Together ................................................... 1320

As the twentieth century drew to a close, corporate law scholarship "found

II. The "Law Matters" Thesis

Economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes, and Andrei

QUANTITATIVE ANALYsIs 695, 696 (2003).

be reduced to numbers. 29 Another is that La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and

29. On this line of criticism, see Mathias M. Siems, Numerical ComparativeLaw: Do We

C. The Implications for Academic Corporate Lawyers

The law matters story offers a potentially reassuring message to corporate

III The "Law Matters" Thesis in a British Context

A. Setting the Scene

large block of equity.' Share ownership is institutionally dominated, with

and World War II, share ownership became commonplace among a

The decline of family capitalism was accompanied by the rise of

of Econ. Discussion Paper in Econ. & Mgmt., No. 399, 1998-99).

It is understandable why contemporaries generally asserted that U.K.

Table I: Historical Evolution of U.K. Company Law, as Measured by La Porta,

Mid 19C-1900 1 British companies legislation has never

1900-1948 2 A 1900 amendment authorized

1948-1980 3 The Companies Act 1948 created a

1980-present 5 Companies issuing new shares were

The judiciary was authorized to grant a

Given the correlations La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer found between

faculty/shleifer/papers/Securitiesdata.xls (United Kingdom entry) (on file with the Washington

1867-1986 0 089 0 1.0090 0 1.0091 0.33

I 1986-19959' 0 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75

1890-1948 0.66 0.3399 0 0.33

only win a suit against accountants if misdisclosure in a prospectus is intentional or

enforcement index score.1°4 Extrapolating from La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes,

Pivotally, during the decades when ownership structures of larger public

IV. The Relevance of Dividends

As the highly stylized example outlined in Part II illustrates, the widely

the mid-1960s, the London Stock Exchange regulated disclosure by listed

While these various factors no doubt contributed to the separation of

124. See generally Merton H. Miller& Franco Modigliani, DividendPolicy,Growth and

less (more) an investor will receive in capital appreciation. Moreover,

see Jeremy Edwards, Does DividendPolicy Matter?, 5 FISCAL STUD. 1, 1 (1984).

V, Dividends and the PrivateBenefits of Control

A. The Agency Cost Theory of Dividends

The managing director of a leading U.K. fund manager said in a 1994

maximize shareholder value.142 Self-serving behavior is one danger. For

B. The Propensityof U.K. Public Companies to PayDividends

There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that is consistent with

reverse field and stop distributing cash to shareholders. 48 Dividends can

Though dividend payments were not inordinately generous, U.K.

"hardship" for corporate insiders contemplating cutting or passing on dividend

D. Retaining the Option to Issue New Shares