2020 TZHC 3360
2020 TZHC 3360
2020 TZHC 3360
(MAIN REGISTRY)
AT PAR ES SALAAM
MISC. CIVIL CAUSE NO. 26 OF 2020
VERSUS
RULING
07/10/2020 & 22/10/2020
Masoud, J.
The applicant was aggrieved by a conciliation agreement in complaint
No. 503/2018 entertained by the first respondent between the applicant
and the second respondent. The complaint, as a result of which, the
conciliation agreement was entered, was filed by the second respondent
to the first respondent against the applicant. The total amount claimed in
the said complaint was Tshs 454,474,008.60.
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first respondent, through its mediator, only facilitated the applicant and
the second respondent to conclude an amicable settlement.
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It was on the basis of these provisions that the applicant's counsel
maintained that the first respondent acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it admitted and entertained the complaint by conciliation. As far as
the applicant is concerned, the determination of the Complaint by
conciliation by the first respondent was also subject to regulation 6(l)(a)
of the Regulations which requires the first respondent to administer
complaints with monetary value of maximum Tanzania Shillings forty
million.
It was the argument of the learned State Attorney for the respondents
that the ordinary meaning of the above provision is that the limit of the
first respondent is not in the admission of a complaint as purported by
regulation 6(l)(a) of the Regulations (supra), but in the amount she is
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It was accordingly submitted that the primary purpose of establishing
the office of the first respondent was, firstly, to enhance access to justice
to insurance consumer through alternative dispute settlement
mechanism; and secondly, enhancing insurance consumers confidence in
the insurance industry.
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1. Mr Joseph Werema - General Manager for the
Complainant
2. Mr Bosco J. Bugali - CEO- First Assurance; accompanied
by
Mr GodfreyNsebo- Claim Manager
Ms Saumu Abdi Sekuiu - Legal Officer
ISSUES CONSIDERED:
(1) Amount payable as benefits.
(2) Time within which to be discharged.
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enforcement of the amicable settlement reached had already started
prior to the filing of the above mentioned complaint. The agreed total
sum of Tshs 350,000,000/- payable to the second respondent in four
equal installments of Tshs 75,000,000/- is therefore less Tshs
50,000,000/- which had already been paid to the second respondent.
Needless to say, the record tells loud and clear that the conciliation was
a result of a decision of the parties on their own volition.
It is apparent that parties are in agreement that the applicant and the
second respondent through the first respondent concluded the
conciliation agreement requiring the applicant to pay the agreed sum of
money of 350,000,000/- of which Tshs 50,000,000/- had already been
paid prior to the conclusion of the agreement before the first
respondent. They only part company with each other on whether the
first respondent, violated rules of natural justice, acted ultra vires, and
did not act in accordance with the law, when it admitted the second
respondent's complaint (i.e Complaint No. 503 of 2018) which
subsequently culminated to a conciliation agreement between the
applicant and the second respondent.
I should point out that in resolving the above issue, I was guided by the
authoritative decision of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania in Sanai
Murumbe vs Mhere Chacha [1990] TLR 54. The decision laid down
guiding principles upon which an order of certiorari can issue against a
decision of a subordinate court, or a tribunal or a public authority. The
principles are; firstly, taking into account matters which it ought not to
have taken into account; two, not taking into account matters which it
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complaint cannot therefore support the issuance of the prerogative
orders sought. I need not go into the details as the reproduced extract
of the conciliation proceedings and the conciliation agreement provide a
clear testimony of what I have observed and found herein above.
I agree with the learned State Attorney that the above regulation, in so
far as it conflicts with the principal legislation, has to be interpreted in a
manner that is in harmony with the principal legislation and the objects
and reasons for its enactment. I was in this respect, admittedly, guided
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As to powers of the first respondent to grant an award, I was of a
considered view that the provision relates to a decision which was
arrived at by an inquiry and adjudication and not by the parties' own
volition as is the present application. My reasoning, partly, owes support
from the meaning of an award as defined by Black's Law Dictionary
(Abridged 6th Edition) and Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary (11th Edition
2009) which respectively define award as "to grant\ concede, or
adjudge...,The decision or determination rendered by arbitrators or
commissionersand "the finding or decision o f an arbitrator....
Decision o f arbitrator is called an award..”.
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Court
Ruling delivered in the presence of Mr Yohana Marco, learned State
Attorney for the first and third respondents this 22nd October 2020.
B. S. Masoud
Judge
22/ 10/2020
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