Democratizing Public Management 2018 (US$119.99)

Marta Struminska-Kutra
Democratizing
Public Management
Towards Practice- Based Theory
This DIGITAL BOOK is a personal property of Dr. Frede G. Moreno (NOT FOR SALE, NOT for sharing & NOT for public use).
Democratizing Public Management
Abstract
.
This book argues that contemporary society in general, and public
administration specifically, can benefit from more reflexive learning
processes through democracy and public involvement. It identifies
the most central social practices, dilemmas, and challenges for public
management as well as the mechanisms needed to enact
institutional change. Offering a model of reflexivity and learning in
the face of public dispute, it explores phenomena such as problem
solving, democratization, public learning, and uncertainty to address
certain tensions in governance theory and practice. Through a range
of well-sourced case studies, this book demonstrates how
institutions can manage difficult situations by not only resolving the
conflict but addressing the underlying problem. It uses both
theoretical and practical approaches to observe the micro
foundations of political behavior and its institutional underpinnings,
and will be a valuable resource for public administration researchers,
practitioners, and graduate students seeking empirical studies of
learning processes in the public sphere.
Marta Strumińska-Kutra
Democratizing Public
Management
Towards Practice-Based Theory
Marta Strumińska-Kutra
Kozminski University
Warsaw, Poland
VID Specialized University
Oslo, Norway
ISBN 978-3-319-74590-9 ISBN 978-3-319-74591-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018944680
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Acknowledgement
As it usually is, I have developed ideas presented in the book over the
years. During that time, I have benefited from encouraging and critical
comments, reviews, and discussions with brilliant people, many of whom
I have not even met personally. I cannot possibly acknowledge all of
them. But the very fact that I was able to draw insights and inspirations
from so many individuals is significant, because it made me understand
in practice how important it is for an academic to function within a
community.
Putting this work together would not have been possible without
Robert Rządca, who was coordinating a research project on Public dis-
pute resolution in the years 2011–2013.1 A lot of ideas developed here
originated as results of our discussions. The first drafts of the book
emerged in 2014 during my stay at the University of Oxford, where I was
a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Science, Innovation and Society. The
comments and recommendations I received there from Steve Rayner and
Jerome Ravetz were invaluable and have shaped my thinking, particularly
in terms of relationships between knowledge, democracy, politics, and
policymaking.
Over the last four years the ideas expressed in this book have been
refined by the challenges and questions posed by participants of various
conferences and seminars. I would like to specially acknowledge the par-
ticipants of the seminar ‘Organizing for uncertain futures’ at Kozminski
v
vi Acknowledgement
University in Warsaw, a seminar on good governance at Małopolska

School of Public Administration of Cracow University of Economics,
and participants of research seminars at VID Specialized University in
Oslo. On different stages of the manuscript development, I have turned
for advice to great scholars, promoters of practice-based, pragmatic, and
critical approaches to public administration and management. Hereby I
shall especially thank Chris Ansell, John Forester, Bob Jessop, Geoff
Mulgan, Olav Eikeland, and Dvora Yanow for finding time to provide
spot on insight into my work. Having a great insight might not make me
immune to committing errors, using unclear expressions and being
inconsistent. And if so, that is my sole responsibility.
Research and preparation of the manuscript were financially supported
by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education2 and emotion-
ally supported by my family and friends to whom I am forever grateful.
Notes
1. Project funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education under
the grant number: 2011/01/B/HS4/04935
2. Apart from the research project already mentioned, also a research project
‘Learning in public administration’ financed by Kozminski University in
years 2016 and 2017 and supervised by prof. W. Morawski.
Contents
1 Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 1

1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Between Ideal Type of Governance, Governance Practice,
and Research on Governance 3
1.2.1 Prescriptive and Normative Considerations of
Governance 4
1.2.2 Descriptive and Explanatory Considerations 6
1.2.3 Practice Relevance of Research on Governance:
Methodological Considerations 11
References 12
2 Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 15

2.1 Governance in the Broad and in the Narrow Sense 17
2.2 Governance and Learning 20
2.3 Uncertainty and Lack of Consensus over Values 26
2.4 From an Idealized Model to a Practice-Based Description 29
References 30
vii
viii Contents
3 Governance Learning from an Institutional Perspective 33

3.1 Linking Individuals and Institutions 35
3.2 Public Dispute as a Trigger of Governance Learning 37
3.3 Institutional Context of Governance. An Empirical
Analysis of Governance Practice 38
References 44
4 How Framing Transforms Governance: Public Dispute over

the Closure of Three Small Schools in a Rural Community 49
4.1 Introduction 49
4.2 Description of Events 50
4.3 Governance and Framing: Managerialism, Legalism, and
Representative Democracy 52
4.4 Dynamics of the Decision-Making Process: Reducing
Uncertainty by Pushing Out Any Dissenting Voices 59
4.5 Conclusion 64
References 65
5 Public Administration Leaders as Institutional

Entrepreneurs: Dispute over the Location of a Marketplace 67
5.1 Introduction 67
5.3 Participation Experiments: Governance Learning and
Institutionalization at the Municipality Level 74
5.4 City-Level Processes of Governance Learning and
Participation: Fake Learning and Leadership for
Governance 78
5.5 How Does Change Happen? Looking for a Favourable
Configuration Between Leadership, Structure and
Environmental Pressures 82
5.6 Institutional Void as Governance Void: An Institutional
Entrepreneur Meets an Institutional Leader 84
References 87
Contents
ix
6 Institutionalization of Governance and the Transition

from ‘Fake’ Learning to ‘Real’ Learning: Dispute over
the Modernization of a Wastewater Treatment Plant
and an Incineration Plant 89
6.1 Introduction 89
6.3 Institutional Change and Local Governance Learning 93
6.4 Introducing Learning into an Institutional Perspective 100
References 102
7 Governance Failure and Social Trust: Dispute over Building

a Flood Prevention System 105
7.1 Introduction 105
7.2 Recount of Events 108
7.3 Organizational and Individual Level: The Encounter of
Old and New Ways of Governing 112
7.4 Institutional Result of the Encounter 115
7.5 Learning, Governance, and Social Trust 117
7.6 Epilogue 120
References 120
8 Towards a Practice-Based Theory of Governance Learning

and Institutionalization: A Cross-Case Analysis 121
8.1 From Legal Regulations Enabling Governance
to the Practice of Governance: The Complementary
Nature of Environmental Pressures for Governance 125
8.1.1 How Governance Learning Needs Both Force
and Enhancement130
8.2 Between Structure and Agency: On the Significance
of the Institutional Context for Individual Responses
to Disruption138
8.2.1 Entering Single-Loop Learning 140
8.2.2 Governance Void 145
x Contents
8.2.3 Entering Double-Loop Learning: From a

Reflexive Practitioner to an Institutional
Entrepreneur150
8.2.4 Practitioners’ Responses to Disruptions in the
Institutional Perspective 156
8.3 Three Patterns of Governance Institutionalization 160
8.3.1 Institutionalization and Learning as Different,
yet Coupled Processes 179
8.4 Conclusions 179
References 186
9 Making Social Sciences Matter for Public Administration

and Public Policy 191
9.1 Three Types of Research Relevant for Public
Management Practitioners 194
9.2 Models of the Science-Society Relationship: Towards the
Institutionalization of Engaged Methodology in Public
Management and Governance Studies 200
References 206
Methodological Annex 211
References 223
Author Index 225
Subject Index 229
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List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Governance in the broad sense. (Source: Own design based
on Jessop (2011)) 18
Fig. 2.2 Governance in the narrow sense. (Source: Own design based
on Bevir (2011)) 20
Fig. 8.1 Institutional pressures and governance learning 137
Fig. 8.2 Three patterns of governance institutionalization 178
xi
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Governance modes and their failures 22

Table 2.2 Levels of governance versus levels of learning 25
Table 2.3 Level of uncertainty and consensus over values as criteria for
determining whether to engage into collective and critical
reflection on governance 27
Table 3.1 Subject of the public dispute and local government levels
involved42
Table 4.1 Chronology of key events—dispute over the closure of three
small schools in a rural community 53
Table 5.1 Chronology of key events—dispute over the location of
Green Market 71
Table 6.1 Chronology of key events—dispute over the modernization
of WWTP 92
Table 7.1 Chronology of key events—dispute over building of a flood
prevention system 111
Table 8.1 Institutional pressures, learning, and institutionalization of
governance. Cross-case comparison 126
Table 8.2 Implementation of newly introduced governance institutions.
Practitioners’ responses to disruption in the institutional
perspective158
xiii
xiv List of Tables
Table 8.3 Institutional work around logic shifts 162

Table 9.1 Types of research relevant for developing a capacity for
learning and good governance in public administration 199
Table A.1 Data sources and methods 215
1
Practice-Oriented Reflection
on Governance
1.1 I ntroduction
Over the past few decades, patterns of governing in public administration
have evolved into more polycentric systems, with a variety of actors engaged
in local decision-making processes. This change is described as a shift from
government to governance (Denters 2011), or as the governance turn
(Gilardi and Radaelli 2012), defined as placing less emphasis on hierarchy
and the state, and giving more prominence to markets and networks (Bevir
2011; Rządca and Strumińska-Kutra 2016). A shift towards governance
implies the creation of new institutions that enable democratizing processes
(Ansell 2011; Bevir 2007). Governance, understood as a specific approach
to public management, supplements the traditional channels of representa-
tion built upon elections, with more direct and deliberative forms of con-
sent building focused on problem-solving (Ansell 2011). When performing
governance, public agencies build democratic consent through collabora-
tive and strategic problem-solving with stakeholders. Democracy here is
‘not just a moral value’ but is essential for a successful inquiry into the
complexity of the problems addressed. Ideally speaking, governance turn
makes public management both effective and democratic.
© The Author(s) 2018 1

M. Strumińska-Kutra, Democratizing Public Management,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6_1
2 M. Strumińska-Kutra
If governance turn is to bring democratizing change, public administra-

tion needs to learn to cooperate with citizens and organized interest
groups. The governance turn and attempts to design procedures, policies,
and legal regulations implementing the idea of inclusiveness and partici-
pation might be well-intentioned, but the process of learning and change
is refracted through practicalities embedded in existing institutions and
power struggles between diverse actors involved in governance processes.
The main aim of this book is to propose a theoretical framework eluci-
dating these changes through focusing on the many forms that the gov-
ernance turn takes at the level of public agencies. I inquire into perceptions
and practices of public officials and public agencies’ stakeholders strug-
gling to resolve diverse public disputes. Four case studies illustrate the
process of learning and institutionalization of governance as a complex
and messy phenomenon infiltrated by original, deeply embedded ways of
thinking and acting upon public issues, influenced by power asymmetries
between actors within and outside public agencies, and pushed forwards
by pressures from a wider organizational environment. Theoretical frame-
work emerging from the cases links structural and constructivist moments
of governance practice, explaining how structures are changed or main-
tained by consciously acting individuals (Rhodes 2012). The framework
delivers an epistemologically and practically useful method in which to
investigate the phenomenon of learning in the public sector, as it focuses
on core questions: Why and how does learning unfold? How does gover-
nance practice develop, as opposed to the ideal model? The framework
provides information on ‘critical junctures’, configurations of influences
making a difference in terms of how governance is learnt and institution-
alized. This knowledge can provide us (academics and practitioners) with
skills that allow turning spontaneous and adaptive practices based on
critical reflection and experimentation into a planned effort to institution-
alize learning, above all learning in its explorative, double-loop form. It is
claimed here that such an institutionalization is necessary in order to
ensure good governance, since governance learning is not about transi-
tion from traditional, bureaucratic approaches to public administration,
to market-based approaches, for example, New Public Management and,
eventually, to collaborative and participatory approaches such as New
Public Governance. It is about learning how to use and improve each
Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 3
mode and how to switch between these options and balance them in
response to problems that constantly evolve and reappear.
So, I claim that the practice-based framework is potentially useful for
academics and practitioners who wish to understand, design, and intro-
duce changes into public administration agencies. In particular, for those
who plan to transform the mode of cooperation that public agencies
apply with respect to external stakeholders in their attempt to manage
public issues and solve various problems of public life. However, I also
believe that a general, practice-oriented reflection on governance should
include two other areas—first, an area of prescriptive and normative con-
siderations and second, an area of methodological considerations. The
connections between the three areas are illuminated below.
1.2 B
etween Ideal Type of Governance,
Governance Practice, and Research
on Governance
It is argued here that practice-oriented reflection on governance, that is,
reflection-enhancing good governance in practice, needs to relate to the
three interconnected issues. First of them is of a prescriptive and normative
nature. If we want public management and governance to be effective
and democratic—what kind of governance models, institutional and
organizational designs can we deploy? Which of them deliver on the
promise of achieving these qualities? We need these models in order to
envision the desired change and discuss where we intend to go. They are
useful when thinking about institutional design and about the general
qualities of organizational structures and procedures enabling good gov-
ernance. The second aspect of the practice-oriented reflection is descriptive
and focuses on the question—how are the desired changes executed?
How do institutional conditions influence processes of change, in par-
ticular how do they enhance or impede governance learning processes?
This descriptive aspect of practice-oriented reflection on governance is
invaluable for illuminating realities of the implementation. Within these
realities institutions matter and power structures matter. They set the
stages on which governance practitioners act. History matters as well:

participants of governance processes will remember the failures of past
promises and past leaders. Within and outside public agencies, those
involved in governance processes will be plural and have diverse values
and interests, and hence diverse perceptions of good governance. Those
trying to implement ideal-type models while ignoring the complexity of
the setting will discover that reality does not listen. In order to resonate
with practitioners experience, research, and theoretical considerations on
governance needs to presume complexity, not hide it (Forester 2017;
Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011).
The third important aspect of practice-oriented reflection on gover-
nance is of methodological nature and can be encapsulated in a question:
How to make social research matter for public governance? What types of
research are useful and relevant for governance practitioners and why? In
the academia, the discussion about the relevance of social research for
practice naturally gravitates towards discussions of ontology, epistemol-
ogy and methodology. Without saying that it is redundant, it is suggested
here that the discussion could be reframed. In a practice-oriented reflec-
tion on governance, practitioner and his perceptions of utility should
play a primary role, while onto-epistemological issues take the back seat
as secondary and subordinated. Within such a frame, practitioner asks
academic community: if I need your help while planning, implementing,
and improving governance practices, what kinds of support could I get?
In this book I am attempting to address each of the three aspects: pre-
scriptive, descriptive, and methodological.
1.2.1 P
rescriptive and Normative Considerations
of Governance
Within the first, normative, and prescriptive part of considerations

(Chap. 2), it is argued that the governance turn1 has brought about the
need for greater flexibility in choosing the patterns of rule. The
traditionally dominant pattern—governing through hierarchy—has been
partially replaced by governing through market and governing through
networks and collaborative approaches. Hence, normative goals of
governance can be reduced to the following promises: greater effectiveness

in delivering public goods and increased inclusiveness of ruling processes.
If the governance turn is to fulfil its promises, ruling bodies need to learn
how and when to use new ways of governing. In prescriptive terms, the
following question arises: How should the process of learning be managed
in order to achieve the desired outcome, that is, more effective and inclu-
sive public management? In the quest for a prescriptive model of good
governance, I have recourse to concepts of metagovernance and organiza-
tional learning. Their combination provides a fruitful analytical perspective
for the inquiry of processes of governance learning and for emphasizing
that good governance should be a democratic, effective, and reflexive
activity, enabling evolutionary learning for public goals (Ansell 2011).
Metagovernance is understood as efforts aimed at improving specific modes
of governance (through hierarchy, markets or networks) and as attempts to
recompose proportions of governance modes used in a given field.
Therefore, the capacity to perform metagovernance is, in fact, tantamount
to the capacity to learn. The organizational learning perspective tradition-
ally underscores the difference between learning from past experiences and
using knowledge to experiment (Argyris and Schon 1978; March 1991).
Taken together, these theoretical lenses enable us to capture phenomena
considered here as crucial for the quality of good governance, namely:
–– the ability to reflect and learn from past experiences, associated with
the application of a specific mode of governing for example, through
networks (improving the practice through exploitation and single-
loop learning); and
–– the ability to re-examine knowledge and redeploy resources in previ-
ously unforeseen ways, including the search for new options and exper-
imenting for example, through changing the manner in which a given
problem is managed by combining networks with hierarchies (improv-
ing the practice through exploration and double-loop learning).
I regard these theories not as describing reality (explaining ‘how things

work’), but rather as analytical tools helping both academics and practi-
tioners in their attempts at answering the following questions: What
forms of learning should be used and further developed by public agencies?
Why and in which situations should these forms of learning be applied?
Although such deliberation will not shed light on ‘how things work’, I
consider it useful, as it prompts reflection over ‘how things should work’,
that is, over values (like inclusiveness, effectiveness) strived for in gover-
nance processes and over (participatory, reflexive) methods of their imple-
mentation. Knowing what we want and how we want to achieve it is the
first step forwards.
However, if we want to be realistic about the implementation of means
and ends, we need to know ‘how things work in practice’. If the gover-
nance turn is going to bring such desired changes as democratization and
increased effectiveness of public governance processes, we need to inves-
tigate practices and practitioners involved in these processes. Through
reflecting on field observations, we will understand which developments
facilitate, and which hinder the attainment of these goals.
1.2.2 Descriptive and Explanatory Considerations
The major part of the book presents reflection from field observations
(Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7). Here, the governance turn is perceived as an
opportunity to reflect on learning processes and the mechanisms of insti-
tutional change that take place ‘on the ground’. I adapt an interpretive,
micro perspective focused on social practices related to management.
This area remains relatively unexplored by public administration and
management scholars (Freeman 2008; Bryson et al. 2010; Peters 2011).
One of them points out: “[W]e know surprisingly little about what
bureaucrats and administrators do when they are doing their job, let
alone about the ways they think and learn” (Freeman 2008, p. 377). To a
certain extent, my attempts to reconstruct local perspectives and practices
follow interpretive approaches to governance, whose aim is to show how
governance arises from the bottom up as a set of conflicting beliefs and
competing traditions, and how various dilemmas trigger diverse practices
(Rhodes 2012). In contrast to the main representatives of this tradition
(Rhodes 2012), I endeavour to maintain a top-down perspec-
tive. Governance practices are analysed within the wider context of insti-
tutional structures consisting of both formal and informal rules, as well
as widely accepted norms that regulate public servants’ modes of thinking
and day-to-day practices (“indulgency patterns”, Gouldner 1954).
In my attempt to analyse the change, I focus on public administration

as the subject of learning, and on public dispute as the object of gover-
nance. A public dispute is a conflict “involving governmental entities and
other parties (individual citizens, business firms, organizations, etc.) over
policy priorities, standards, or resources they hope to share” (Susskind
2000, p. 130). Given its characteristics, such as the involvement of mul-
tiple and diverse stakeholders, and reference to public issues, it is an area
where the process of learning new patterns of governing can be empiri-
cally observed (Forester 1999). A public dispute is a political tension point
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2012) focused on the most central public management
dilemmas and challenges, for example, balancing group interests with
broader social interests, or managing public issues in a manner that would
be both effective and inclusive (democratic). Moreover, the conflictual
character of disputes allows for an inquiry into the role of power struggles
and diverse interests groups in the process of institutional change (Hallet
and Ventresca 2006). Owing to the focus on the abovementioned features,
public dispute is a perfect object of empirical observation, from which
theoretical conclusions can be drawn. The theoretical framework is based
on the pre-existent perspectives of institutional change and organizational
learning and developed in conversation with empirical data derived from
four in-depth case studies of public disputes within the Polish institutional
environment. Each of them illustrates different levels of complexity in
terms of the number of administrative levels involved as both planning
and decision-making bodies. Each of them tells a story of how governance
meets government, how old ways of thinking and acting are challenged,
and eventually, how new and old practices merge to create hybrids con-
taining elements of both. Yet each story has its own narrative and exempli-
fies a different governance-related problem.
The first dispute (Chap. 4) concerns the closing of a school in a small
rural community, where the solution is to be formulated and the decision
is to be taken at the lowest level of public administration, that is the
municipality. In this case, the narrative is built around local interpreta-
tions of governance and participatory practices. It illustrates how the
imposed market and legalist rhetoric turn governance into a top-down
exercise of power and prevents stakeholders from discussing their values
and defining the problem at hand; in the end, the number of possible
solutions is greatly reduced.
In the two subsequent cases (Chaps. 5 and 6)—disputes over the loca-
tion of a market place and of a waste water treatment plant in a large
city—the responsibility for planning and decision-making is split between
the municipality and the province level. Both cases show how pressure
from external stakeholders results in ‘fake’ governance learning whose
goal is not to gain excellence in the delivery of public goods and services,
but rather to gain new tools and arguments in the struggle for legitimacy
and control in a specific field of policy. Yet, even an instrumental and
superficial use of participatory tools, the questioning of a hierarchical
logic that has long been taken for granted, creates a powerful precedent
that forms the basis on which new governance institutions can be built
and opens up a space for negotiations involving all stakeholders. The
market place location case delivers interesting insights into the role of
public administration’s top management leadership. In the situation of
institutional void—lack of organizational structures, formal and infor-
mal procedures enabling multijurisdictional and multilevel coordination
(here referred as governance void)—an individual in a top management
position takes over the role of an institutional entrepreneur who initiates
changes and actively participates in their implementation (Battilana et al.
2009). This case also triggers reflection on the role of institutional leader-
ship (Selznick 1957) in the governance turn that heightens the complex-
ity of values and logics adopted by public administration.
The last case examined is a dispute over the construction of a flood
prevention facility and the risk of which is using parts of the land as a
polder (Chap. 7). This case illustrates how the inability to critically reflect
on the methods and goals of the planning process (i.e. inability to exert
double-loop learning), and inability to coordinate processes across
different jurisdictions and administration levels, results in a complete
failure of governance. It testifies to the force of institutional inertia
embedded in established ways of thinking and acting.
These cases are analysed and compared in an iterative process of theo-
retical reflection and empirical data gathering, eventually leading to the
construction of a model illustrating processes of governance learning and
institutionalization (Chap. 8). The analysis that shifts between structure
(formal and informal rules regulating behaviour) and agency (individual
strategic actions) enables us to capture phenomena central to the process
of institutional change and learning in public administration, that is (1)

the significance of original institutional environment into which change is
introduced; (2) the role of individuals, in particular leaders confronted
with pressures and demands for a change; and (3) institutionalization pro-
cesses, within which the new mode of governance is given a specific form
and is henceforth taken for granted. Building linkages between these three
levels (or spheres) is a major contribution this book makes to the public
management and governance literature. The linkage is visualized as a
Russian doll structure of individuals embedded in broader institutional
environments, or alternatively as Coleman-like (Coleman 1990) shifts
between three levels of analysis: micro, meso, and macro. On the one
hand, the framework illustrates how action is triggered and influenced by
the existing institutions and their coercive, mimetic and normative pres-
sures; and on the other hand, it depicts chains of interactions creating new
institutions and changing the wider organizational and institutional envi-
ronment. An important advantage of the framework is explicating the
difference between learning and institutional change, which is not obvious
in governance learning literature (Gilardi and Radaelli 2012).
The analysis moves from zooming in to zooming out. First significance
of environmental pressures for governance is explored. Among others, it
is argued that coercive pressures (from legal sources) for governance are
not likely to trigger learning, unless they are complemented with mimetic
and normative pressures, that is pressures stemming from uncertainty
and prompting organizations to copy what has proven effective (mimetic),
as well as pressures rooted in approaches and orientations of professional
groups (normative). As the pressure persist and intensify practitioners
experience governance void. The term of governance void draws on the
notion of institutional void (Mair et al. 2012) and is understood as a
space where institutional infrastructure supporting collaborative forms of
governance is absent or weak, for example, there are no ready-to-use tools
and procedures coordinating multilevel or multijurisdictional work or
public engagement in decision-making processes.
The analysis further zooms in to the individual (but institutionally
embedded) level of practitioners experiencing governance void while they
are trying to manage a public dispute, a phenomenon disrupting their
routine practices. Public servants are seen as reflexive practitioners
who face events that question the goals and methods of their professional
functioning (Yanow 2009; Yanow and Tsoukas 2011). Protests of unex-
pected intensiveness/scale or character prompt reflection and increase
uncertainty. Here, a theoretical category of surprize is introduced as a
prerequisite of reflection, as it begs the following question: What is not
working and why? In contrast to individualist accounts (Schön 1983;
Yanow and Tsoukas 2011), I am proposing to perceive surprize as a phe-
nomenon emerging in a collective setting and to define it as a cognitive
state caused by a disruption of institutionalized patterns of thinking and
behaving deployed by a (public) organization to deal with a specific
(social) problem (see also Rządca and Strumińska-Kutra 2016). It is an
individual-level phenomenon intrinsically embedded in meso-level orga-
nizational and institutional structures. The analysis shows how institu-
tionalized patterns of thinking result in the naturalization of protests
preventing public managers from reflection, and how power struggles
influence the learning process. In this sense, surprise may not occur at all,
may be followed by a radical change of perspective in terms of logic and
practice; it may also be followed by incremental forms of change, for
example, when new practices are being interpreted in old terms. Empirical
analysis illustrates all of these options and explains conditions within
which they are taking place. The analysis also allows perceiving gover-
nance practice in a much richer, fuller human endeavour engaging strong
emotions. Surprise and the experience of governance void may trigger feel-
ings of anxiety, fear, and powerlessness, as those responsible for action
discover that what they have thus far thought fails to deliver, while new
patterns of thinking and acting are either not there, or remain perplexing
and unfamiliar. Thus, fear also needs to be considered as an important
category for the analysis.
And eventually analysis zooms out by tracing institutionalization pro-
cess. Through the lenses of institutional entrepreneurship and institutional
work concepts, it is shown how double-loop learning and, subsequently,
institutional change are triggered by individuals. For some individuals,
governance voids and top-down institutional pressures create an oppor-
tunity to follow their values and to expand their resources. The analysis
illustrates how public organization leaders, as well as other actors repre-
senting public agencies resort to diverse institutional arrangements and
use bits and pieces from local organizational, political, and community
spheres to fill governance voids. I further describe how interactions of
diverse actors and their relationships (e.g. low levels of social trust) result
in specific patterns and forms of governance institutionalization.
1.2.3 P
ractice Relevance of Research on Governance:
Methodological Considerations
The third part of the book has the form of an epilogue. It offers reflection
upon the major challenges for governance and public management stud-
ies and, therefore, problems that must be solved by academics and not by
practitioners. The challenge is to translate theoretical reflections into
policy paradigms, as well as into the consultancy and administrative prac-
tice in the public sector. After establishing how processes of learning and
governance should follow in order to maximize democracy and effective-
ness (first part) and after describing how they follow in practice (second
part), I am exploring how social sciences can matter for public adminis-
tration and public policy. I argue that there are at least three types of
research that may be of great relevance for the public administration
community (i.e. consultants and practitioners) and for their capacity of
good governance. The first type, most classical, is model-driven research.
It delivers the description and explanation of conditions enabling and
impeding good governance of specific phenomena. The second type of
research is extrapolation-oriented case study. It investigates practices in
source sites to prepare the ground for disciplined and ingenious
(context-sensitive) extrapolation of practices from source to target sites
(extrapolation-based design, Barzley 2007). They embrace Hummel’s
assertion (1990, 1991) that objective analysis of a problem out of context
may not meet practitioners’ needs as much as a common understanding
by those “involved in a problem who must be brought along to constitute
a solution” (Flyvbjerg 2001; Hummel 1991, p. 33). The third type is
participatory research, assuming that any significant and valuable impact
of research requires cooperation with actors functioning within a given
environment, the recognition of people’s perspectives, values, interests
and, last but not least, relations of power.
I argue that all three types of research require practice-based approaches.

Grand theories are bound to fail in this respect, as far as they purport to
have universal applicability (Bevir 2007). Adopting the governance per-
spective imposes the acceptance of the view that there exists a structure
making social life predictable, at least to some extent. Nevertheless, I do
assume that the complexity of the world makes its governability ques-
tionable (the so-called ungovernability problem). Therefore, if social
research is to be relevant for politics and policy making, it must be con-
textual (Flyvbjerg 2001; Flyvbjerg et al. 2012) and needs to push for a
deliberate process of developing a diverse and flexible repertoire of
responses to social problems (Jessop 2011; Verweij and Thompson 2007).
Note
1. Governance and governance turn are contested terms; that is why an
important part of the chapter is devoted to clarifying the meaning attached
to the term within this book.
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2
Metagovernance, Governance,
and Learning
“Governance, governance everywhere”, complains one of the scholars

when analysing the use of the governance concept in public administra-
tion and public management studies (Frederickson 2007). He claims
that many of its applications bring nothing more than confusion, as they
result in a mere reiteration of perspectives established within the public
administration field, only in a different language. Yet another source of
confusion is the fact that governance is a term extensively used by both
practitioners and academics. The meaning might be similar but the field
of reference is different. For practitioners and some academics the term
‘governance’ designates a specific public management strategy, a toolbox
bearing the following label: ‘inclusion of external partners in the exercise
of public tasks’. For many governance scholars, it is a wider concept
describing the coordination of complex and interdependent social rela-
tionships. In the first case, the government is the main actor, and as
such, it can choose to involve external actors (NGOs, trade unions, citi-
zens) in the decision-making process, or to delegate the provision of
public services to them. In the second case, steering and coordination
are conceptualized as activities that can be performed by different actors
(the government, firms, networks of actors), or by the ‘invisible hand’
(for instance, in the case of market coordination).

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6_2
It seems that both practitioners and some academics would agree that
governance—understood as an approach to policymaking and public
management—has three distinctive features. First, it uses hybrid prac-
tices combining administrative systems with market mechanisms and
non-profit organizations. Second, governance is multijurisdictional,
because it combines people and institutions across different policy sectors
and different levels of government. Third, it encompasses an increasing
range and plurality of stakeholders linked together in networks (Bevir
2011, pp. 2–3). Yet some academics understand governance in broader
terms and define it as “the formal and informal processes through which
society and the economy are steered and problems are solved in accor-
dance with common objectives” (Torfing et al. 2012), “structures and
practices involved in coordinating social relations marked by complex
reciprocal interdependence” (Jessop 2011), “regimes, laws, rules, judicial
decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and
enable the provision of publicly supported goals and services” (Lynn et al.
2001, p. 7). The coexistence of these two types of definitions often leads
to confusion, especially when experts representing diverse backgrounds
engage in a discussion about the management of public matters.
In this book, both approaches are used which seems to make things
even more complicated. Yet, there is a valid reason to refer to both, that
is, the narrow understanding of governance as hybrid, multi-actor, multi-
jurisdictional, and multilevel public management practices (as discussed
by Bevir 2011) on the one hand, and a broader definition of governance,
understanding it as a way of coordinating complex social relationships.
The narrow definition is well established in the academic and professional
discourse.1 It designates a significant change in the perception of the role
of government in governing and in the general approach to the manage-
ment of public issues. However, it remains undertheorized.
It is argued here that a broader governance framework delivers useful
tools for the analysis of the narrowly understood governance as an
approach to public management. For conceptualizing governance as
steering and coordinating allows the narrowly understood concept to be
broken down in order to identify different levels and kinds of gover-
nance, and to link it more clearly to various concepts of learning outlined
Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 17
in organizational studies. I posit that this kind of approach opens a way

towards a more reflexive perception of what government and other public
bodies are doing when they are performing the ‘governance turn’.
2.1 G
overnance in the Broad
and in the Narrow Sense
Within a broad sense, governance is understood as structures and prac-
tices involved in steering and coordinating social relations marked by
complex reciprocal interdependence (Jessop 2011). The subject perform-
ing governance can be a company, a non-governmental organization, or
a public body—in other words, the concept of governance in its broad
sense is not restricted to public agencies as the performers of a steering
role. The three most commonly used modes of governance are: through
exchange (markets), through imperatives (e.g. the hierarchy of a firm, an
organization, or a state) and through reflexive self-coordination (e.g. hor-
izontal networking). Some scholars also identify the fourth mode, soli-
darity, typical of smaller communities and families, which will nevertheless
be omitted in this analysis as irrelevant to its subject, that is, public issues
and ways in which government and public bodies can manage the public
sector through various modes of governance.
Hierarchical (imperative) coordination follows a substantive rational-
ity. It is goal-oriented and prioritizes effective pursuit of successive orga-
nizational or policy goals. Governments and public agencies have
traditionally had recourse to this governance mode in order to manage
public issues. Market exchange is characterized by procedural rational-
ity, which is purely formal, impersonal and oriented towards an efficient
allocation of scarce resources to competing objectives. It prioritizes
profit maximization. This mode can also be used by the state, for exam-
ple, in order to create a new market, such as the market for CO2 emis-
sions. Reflexive self-organization is focused on identifying mutually
beneficial joint projects and coordinating them through an ongoing dia-
logue that lays the foundation for negotiated consent. It is reflexive,
because it requires monitoring the implementation of these projects,
and the (re)organization of material, social, and temporal conditions

deemed necessary and/or sufficient to implement them (Jessop 2011,
p. 113). The latter, self-reflexive governance mode is often equated with
‘governance’ in the narrow sense and can be exemplified by establishing
a ground for negotiated consent, resource sharing, and concerted action
to solve complex social problems while involving various stakeholders.
The government or another public agency can resort to this mode by
assuming the role of network organizer (Fig. 2.1).
If we use governance modes—hierarchy, markets, and networks—as
building blocks, we can analyse the governance turn as a process in which
public administration expands the traditional repertoire of coordination
MARKETS HIERARCHIES
oriented towards an goal oriented, prioritizing
efficient allocation of the effective pursuit of
scarce resources to successive organizational
competing ends; or policy goals
prioritizes profit
maximization
Governance as steering and

coordination
REFLEXIVE SELF
ORGANIZATION
solving problems on the basis of
commitment to a continuous dialogue
with a view to establishing the grounds
for negotiated consent, resource sharing
anc concerted action
Fig. 2.1 Governance in the broad sense. (Source: Own design based on Jessop
(2011))
practices from mainly hierarchical (as observed in the early 1980s) to prac-
tices combining all three modes in different proportions. This conceptual-
ization seems to be valid, especially when looking at the way narrowly
understood governance is defined and operationalized in research. First, the
definition of narrowly understood governance usually covers hybrid prac-
tices (combining hierarchies with markets and networks) together with
multi-actor, multijurisdictional, and multilevel public management prac-
tices. Second, when operationalized in the research conducted in the context
of European and North American countries ‘governance turn’ is exemplified
by (a) a widespread adoption of New Public Management and public-pri-
vate partnerships, (b) the involvement of local associations, interest
groups, and private actors in policy partnerships, and (c) the introduction
of new forms of citizen involvement (Denters and Rose 2005; Denters
2011; Torfing and Triantafillou 2013; Morgan and Cook 2014). The first
one entails coordinating pursuant to the market or quasi-market logics,
while the latter two mean introducing mechanisms of reflexive self-organi-
zation (Fig. 2.2).
Governance modes deliver a formal category according to which gov-
ernance as a phenomenon can be analysed. On the contrary to hardly
distinguishable categories like New Public Governance, collaborative
governance, participatory governance, public governance, and the like a
formal distinction based on modes coherently orders the phenomenon of
governance and offers a venue to explore this complex phenomenon. It
seems to be especially important because the complexity of governance
phenomenon has at least two dimensions: in terms of governance modes
and in terms of levels. If we agree that governance involves hybrid prac-
tices, a reflection is needed on what are the components of the hybrid and
how to switch between them, or combine them. The latter, level-based
dimension, builds a link to the issues of learning.
HYBRID MULTIJURISDI
PRACTICES CTIONAL
placing less combining people
emphasis on and institutions
hierarchies and across different
more on markets policy sectors and
and networks) different levels of
government
Governance as an approach to public

management and public policy making
PLURALITY OF
STAKEHOLDERS
a wider variety of non
governmental organizations
and citizens as an active
participants in governing
Fig. 2.2 Governance in the narrow sense. (Source: Own design based on Bevir
(2011))
2.2 Governance and Learning

A number of phenomena are regarded as triggers of the governance turn,
namely steering problems, complexity, uncertainty and legitimacy deficits
linked to the growing gap between government and society (Kooiman 1993;
Peters 1996; Klijn et al. 2012). Traditional coordination, that is, bureau-
cracy does not allow the government to gather and process information
effectively with a view to taking effective action in highly complex and
uncertain environments. These problems have arguably forced govern-
ments to explore new management patterns. Public administration schol-
ars tend to describe the search for solutions as a linear process within
which bureaucratic, hierarchical coordination was first replaced by mar-

ket-oriented and private sector-inspired managerialist approaches, such
as New Public Management (NPM), which was subsequently traded for
New Public Governance (NPG), or other more participatory governance
methods such as participatory governance, collaborative governance, and
so on (Sørensen and Torfing 2015; Osborne 2006, 2010; Ansell and
Torfing 2014). Disappointment with hierarchical coordination and its
failure, followed by the imperfection of NPM convinced scholars and
policy-makers to perceive self-reflexive governance as a ‘third way’. This
linear description seems to validly describe the subsequent dominance of
diverse paradigms (or passing fads) in public management discourse of
academic and professional circles.
Yet discussing market-based paradigms like NPM and network-based
paradigms like NPG (Sørensen and Torfing 2015) as subsequent, linearly
ordered responses to the failures of the hierarchical governance mode facil-
itates the ‘either-or’ perceptions. The drawback of this approach is that it
tends to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Bureaucracy or New
Public Management may be impuissant when it comes to solving complex
social problems, but this does not mean that we do not need them any
more (Ansell 2011; Sørensen and Torfing 2015). Linear thinking suggests
that there must be an optimum way in which to manage public issues; it
is simply yet to be found, or it has been found, only we are not trying hard
enough to implement it. Being where we are, disappointed with bureau-
cracy and New Public Management, we believe that well-performed gov-
ernance (narrowly defined) will rescue us. We only need to master it.
Learning how best to implement collaborative public administration
paradigms like New Public Governance is undoubtedly important.
However, it is just as important to be able to step aside and critically
reflect on whether, in a given situation, it would not be better to ‘revert’
to traditional ways of hierarchical governing, or to private sector-inspired
tools, such as performance measurement. Or, another possibility is to use
all three, or only two modes, adapting proportions to the situation. This
is where thinking in terms of forms and levels becomes useful. One can
learn how to improve a specific governance mode (form), how to better
use performance management in public services in order to increase the
effectiveness of service delivery and correct its deficiencies as they become
apparent. But one can also learn when it is better to leave one mode for
another. Each governance mode will lead to a specific type of failure;
none of them is a golden cure (see Table 2.1).
How can we identify the most appropriate mode for a given situation?
The ability to answer this question is assumed to be inherent in good
(effective) governance. Jessop argues that good governance requires
cultivating the capacity to reflect on, and rebalance, the mix among modes
in response to changes in the challenges and/or opportunities that exist at
the interface of market, state and civil society. Governing in modern soci-
ety requires an interactive perspective concerned to balance social interests
and facilitate the interaction of actors and systems through self-organization,
co-arrangements, or more interventionist forms of organization. (Jessop
2011, p. 114)
If we, therefore, embrace the broader understanding of governance

when thinking about governance as an approach to public management,
Table 2.1 Governance modes and their failures

Mode
Self-reflexive
Characteristics Hierarchy Market organization
Rationality Substantial Procedural Substantial &
procedural
Stylized mode of Homo Homo economicus Homo politicus
calculation hierarchicus
Criterion of success Effective goal Efficient Negotiated
attainment allocation of consent
resources
Primary criterion of Ineffectiveness Economic Noise, talking shop
failure (can be inefficiency
corrected within
the logic)
Secondary criterion Bureaucratism, Market Distorted
of failure (cannot red tape inadequacies communication
be corrected (e.g. excessive (e.g. negative (e.g. through
outside of the procedures) externalities, power
logic) information asymmetries)
failure)
Source: Jessop (2011, p. 114)
we must recognize the existence of two levels of governance. This in turn,

entails a smooth connection to learning: learning to master a particular
governance mode (e.g. hierarchy) and learning to reflect on governance
modes in order to choose the most suitable in a given situation. The first
is about learning from experience and following a single way of thinking
without questioning its appropriateness. The second is about the ability
to critically reflect on assumptions behind each of the modes and being
able to choose between them.
Discussions around ‘governance turn’ tend to focus on the network-
based, collaborative, and participatory nature of new approaches to pub-
lic management. Hence public agencies are expected to learn how to
organize collaborations and govern through networks. Yet the learning
does not take place in the vacuum. The new paradigm is layered upon the
existing one (hierarchical and market-based). In this sense, learning of
the new governance mode requires questioning of the old and embracing
the new. Moreover, the definition of governance includes hybrid prac-
tices. It means the public agencies along with learning of a new network-
based mode need to learn how and when to replace it with alternative
approaches (hierarchies or markets).
These two levels of governance learning—learning how to use a single
mode or how to change between the modes—correspond to theoretical
concepts of learning developed within organizational theory. Learning of
a specific governance mode can be based on experience and on the con-
sequences of previously taken actions. It is called single-loop learning
(Argyris and Schon 1978) and it allows one to refine a practice, based on
a specific logic without questioning the goal or the logic itself. It is similar
to exploitative learning, which uses existing knowledge and resources to
reap value from what is already known (March 1991). Although they
both require reflection on practices, they do not involve in-depth changes
to the logic of action or to the definition of the problem.
A change in the logic and in the definition is possible within double-
loop and explorative learning. Double-loop learning questions the appro-
priateness of previous behaviour, together with the underlying set of
assumptions, values, and risks. An organization employing double-loop
learning is reflexive and able to redefine itself and the problem that it is
striving to solve. It develops institutions enabling continuous learning. In

other words, it learns how to organize learning.
The concept of double-loop and exploratory learning is consistent with
the idea that a public body needs to choose between modes of governance
or, in fact, between different logics of defining and solving problems. In
order to capture the difference between those two levels of learning in the
context of governance, I introduce the theoretical concept of metagover-
nance (Jessop 2011). The prefix ‘meta’ refers to the reflection on or the
analysis of governance, which, analogous to learning, has two levels. This
is why metagovernance is understood as an undertaking to (level one)
improve specific modes of governance (e.g. changing the composition of
networks or redesigning markets), and (level two) to recompose propor-
tions of governance modes used within a given field.2 By definition, meta-
governance requires reflexivity—the capacity to detach from one’s practices
and make them the subject of critical inquiry (Table 2.2).
In the analysis, where the notion of learning plays a central role, it is
crucial to distinguish activities and practices from reflection on activities
and practices connected with interpretation, drawing of conclusions and
planning. If the governance turn and (narrowly defined) governance are
perceived within this framework, we can argue as follows: Practising gov-
ernance requires public administration (a) to learn how to use the self-
reflexive, network-based mode of governing that is, how to organize
spaces for dialogue about problems and solutions, engaging a wide range
of stakeholders; how to construct networks, also within its own struc-
tures; how to break down task-oriented silos structure and create
problem-oriented horizontal structures and so on and (b) to learn how to
choose among different governance modes and—as the process unfolds
and failures inevitably emerge—correct the imperfections of each mode
with the use of another. The first part (a) captures a portion of the defini-
tion bearing on the multijurisdictional and multilevel nature of governance,
whereas the latter part (b) refers to the hybrid character of governance
practices. Within this framework, governance is necessarily linked to
learning, because learning enables one to adapt to emerging environmen-
tal challenges. It is evolutionary learning for public goals (Ansell 2011).
Instead of the linear emergence of subsequent public administration par-
adigms (Sørensen and Torfing 2015), it is a reflexive, spiral-like process of
Table 2.2 Levels of governance versus levels of learning

Governance
practice Learning Reflection on governance
Level 1 Attempts to Refining practice Reflection on a given
improve a based on a specific governance mode within
specific logic without its own frames, directed at
governance questioning the goal improving practice without
mode or the logic itself attempts to change its
logic (e.g. refining or
Using experiential
adding new legal
knowledge and
procedures, redesigning
resources to benefit
markets, changing
from what is already
composition of networks)
known
Examples of related Examples of related
concepts: concepts:
Single-loop learning Second-order governance,
(Argyris and Schon first order metagovernance
1978), exploitative (Kooiman 1993; Jessop
learning (March 2011), first and second-
1991) order change (Hall 1993)
Level 2 Attempts to Questioning the Reflection on the
change appropriateness of applicability of governance
proportions of previous behaviour, modes to a specific
governance together with its situation and recomposition
modes applied underlying of governance modes in
in a given field assumptions, values response to emerging
and risks failures
Examples of related Examples of related
concepts: concepts:
Double-loop learning Third-order governance,
(Argyris and Schon second-order
1978), explorative metagovernance (Kooiman
learning (March 1993; Jessop 2011),
1991) third-order change, social
learning (Hall 1993)
reflection and action, where different logics are interchangeably used in

order to find most suitable answers to current problems.
But who decides what is best for whom, and what the problem is in the
first place? These considerations will be explored in the next section.
2.3 U
ncertainty and Lack of Consensus
over Values
Metagovernance, in particular when understood as efforts to recompose
proportions of various forms of governance, presents a huge challenge to
governing bodies and non-governmental actors. It entails an innovative
attitude of decision-makers in public administration. Public officials
should be committed to performing a task in a new way, for example, to
developing budgets in cooperation with external stakeholders (participa-
tory budgeting). They should be creative, willing to consider the use of
tools designed for solving specific problems in different situations and
sectors, for example, exercise design thinking when developing a public
service. They should consider experimenting with their own role: ‘Am I
a representative of the public with a mandate to take decisions? Or shall
I limit my responsibility to the role of facilitator in the process of
decision-making in which a wide range of actors from different sectors
are involved?’
The implementation of inventions always involves—at least to a cer-
tain extent—experimenting, exploring, and testing hypotheses (Browne
and Wildavsky 1983; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008), but it does not mean that
‘reflexive’ bureaucrats, administrators, and local government representa-
tives are expected to constantly innovate. Prescriptively speaking, there
is also a need for incremental change, exploitative learning (March
1991; Schreyögg et al. 2011), and learning based on feedback instead of
constant feed-forward thinking (Crossan et al. 1999). There are fields
where elasticity and incessantly innovative, participatory approach are
not a necessity—worse still, they could even result in wasting resources
(e.g. time, money, and social capital) through the endless process of
reinventing the wheel.
Drawing inspiration from complexity (Stacey 1993; Ansell and Gayer
2016) and Science Technology Society literature (Funtowicz and Ravetz
1993; Pielke 2007), I suggest that there are two critical conditions whose
simultaneous appearance requires innovative approaches to governance
engaging multiple stakeholders, namely lack of consensus over values and
uncertainty, which is due to the great complexity of the problem at hand
(Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Level of uncertainty and consensus over values as criteria for determin-
ing whether to engage into collective and critical reflection on governance
Low levels of
uncertainty and High uncertainty and lack
consensus over values of consensus over values
and governance goals and governance goals
Use of existing Application of old Threat of a lock-in
knowledge/use of old procedures as the
procedures most effective
method of solving
problems
Engaging a wide range of Waste of resources Use of an innovative and
stakeholders—acquiring and potential experimental approach
new knowledge/ decision paralysis as a most effective way
designing new of dealing with problems
procedures
These factors are symptoms of a situation in which no consensus has

been reached over the desired outcomes of actions (what is valued as an
outcome) and more than one outcome is consistent with expectations
(uncertainty). This definition of uncertainty encompasses such understand-
ing of the terms of ignorance, risk, and (uncertain) measurement and esti-
mation. People make decisions in an effort to manage uncertainty, yet the
presence of uncertainty both complicates and facilitates reaching political
consensus (Pielke 2007, p. 55). In many situations, uncertainty can be
reduced (e.g. through the acquisition of new knowledge). Characteristics of
the situation where collective and critical reflection over governance is
desirable do, in fact, match the definition of a wicked problem, featuring
substantial interdependencies among multiple systems and actors, have
redistributive implications for entrenched interests (Rayner 2003) and cre-
ate high levels of uncertainty and instability within socio-political systems.
A high level of uncertainty and the absence of consensus over values
are symptomatic of situations where participatory and reflexive approaches
to governance are needed for two reasons. On the one hand, because
democracy is about making sure that diverse interests and values are rep-
resented and have a chance of entering the bargaining process and, on the
other hand, because new and diverse types of knowledge need to be gen-
erated in order to solve the problem. In this sense, participation is per-
ceived as having democratic qualities and as a tool enhancing the

effectiveness and resilience of a solution, as a product that is an amalgam
of different kinds of knowledge (experts’ knowledge, users’ knowledge,
bureaucrats’ knowledge, etc.). In such cases, governance becomes a learn-
ing process where actors learn not only individually through reflecting on
their own experiences and values, but they also intentionally learn
together with others. This shift from individual reflective learning to
deliberative, joint work brings about results that, initially, nobody had in
mind (Forester 2018).
These two dimensions (uncertainty and consensus over values) allow
us to address concerns about both the means and the ends of gover-
nance, and to identify situations where the use of networks as the mode
of governance should prevail over, but not necessarily eliminate other
modes, for instance hierarchical or market governance. In such situa-
tions, solutions to a problem should emerge from conflicting voices,
which means that their participants do not need to agree on goals (due
to differences in value systems), but must be of the same mind when it
comes to action (e.g. do the same and think differently). Agreement over
goals and outcomes may sometimes prove impossible, because many
conflicts are rooted in non-negotiable issues, such as deeply held values
(Forester 2012). In the face of high complexity and uncertainty about
the results of actions, the prevailing method of governance should not
eliminate the possibility of altering future strategies but, instead, allow
for the rectification of insufficiencies characteristic of each mode of gov-
ernance (Verweij and Thompson 2007; Jessop 2011). Paying heed to a
variety of voices opens access to rich, local knowledge, which together
with maintaining a minimum level of diversity in the modes of gover-
nance, is conducive to effectively reducing uncertainty. The ambiguity of
the decision-making context is seen here as “generative and not paralyz-
ing, probing and reframing options rather than presuming relatively
uninformed problem definitions” (Forrester 2012, p. 2).
2.4 F rom an Idealized Model to a Practice-

Based Description
I argue here that considerations over metagovernance and learning are
normative and, to a certain extent, prescriptive tools prompting reflec-
tion on ‘how things should work’ that is, on values (inclusiveness, effec-
tiveness) which are strived for in governance processes, and on
(participatory, reflexive) methods of their realization. Knowing what we
want and how we want to achieve it is the first step forward.
Despite taking into account the complexity and the social construction
of reality, these considerations remain models guided by scientific logic
and rationality (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). They should not be treated
as a description of how it really works in practice, because these models are
focused on a selected management pattern in its ideal form and they
abstract away from the social context within which the pattern emerges.
Those using models as ready-to-wear plans for implementing gover-
nance will inevitably discover that ‘reality’ does not listen (Forester 2018).
When trying to implement governance models, we need knowledge
about on-the-ground governance and learning practices. These two types
of knowledge, that is, those based on rules and those based on the context
(Flyvbjerg 2006) have a potential to lead to context-sensitive implemen-
tation of new governance patterns.
Building a framework based on observation of practice and providing
context-based knowledge is a primary goal of this book. The focus is on
how and why practitioners implement new governance modes and how
the process of implementation is penetrated by institutions. Further on,
the concept of governance is understood narrowly, as an approach to pub-
lic management and policymaking. While researching public disputes I
am specifically focusing on how public administration practitioners learn
to collaborate with external actors and how they organize multijurisdictional
and multilevel collaborations within public administration in response to
external pressures. In this sense, my approach is selective. The research pre-
sented in the following chapters of the book illustrates an adaptive and
unplanned process of learning of a new, network-based governance mode,
the process which I call governance learning. It took place through incre-
mental changes in hierarchical and/or quasi-market-based logics of gover-
nance (single-loop) and then through the questioning of the latter two. In
all cases, the process was a rather unplanned ad hoc, adaptive activity. If
good governance means the ability to reflect and rebalance diverse gover-
nance modes, it would require public agencies to institutionalize reflection
and learning. Observation of a spontaneous learning process and distin-
guishing its critical moments delivers important knowledge for those who
not only want to understand the phenomenon of institutional change and
learning but also for those who want to effectively manage these processes.
Notes
1. See for example Oxford Handbook of Governance (2012) or Sage
Handbook of Governance (2011), where most of the entries conceptualize
governance as a specific approach to public policy and public management
(‘and’ is lacking).
2. In the literature, the former is sometimes called second-order governance,
or the first order of metagovernance, and the latter is referred to as the
third-order governance, second-order metagovernance, or collaboration
(Kooiman 1993; Jessop 2011, see Table 2.2).
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3
Governance Learning
from an Institutional Perspective
In the previous chapter I argue that, ideally speaking, the governance

turn implies learning on two levels: on the level of mastering a given gov-
ernance mode and on the meta-level of mastering the ability to question
the given mode in order to test how to do things differently, for example
use another governance mode or blend several governance modes. But
how do the processes of governance and learning look in practice, as
opposed to the ideal type? The question seems to be relevant, for the gov-
ernance turn means change in the manner in which public issues are
managed and every change is embedded in, and at least partially condi-
tioned by the prior order. The institutional perspective enables us to cap-
ture these influences through defining institutions as cognitive, normative,
and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning
to social behaviour (Scott 1995, p. 33). The ‘governance turn’ involves
changes in all three areas: cognitive, normative, and regulatory. Social
actors functioning within public administration need to change their
ways of thinking, reconfigure norms and values underlying decision-
making processes, and adopt to the evolving formal (law) and informal
rules (routines, habits) that guide their actions. What is more, they are
expected to institutionalize reflection and learning in order to be able to
question both long existing and emerging structures. Perceiving the latter

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6_3
challenge through the lens of the institutional theory reveals the core of
the problem: given that, as behavioural patterns and cognitive mecha-
nisms, institutions guarantee a significant degree of stability in social life,
is it possible to design an institution that would systematically question
its own assumptions?
Let us leave this paradox aside for the time being and focus on inter-
preting the governance turn through the prism of the institutional theory
framework. My approach to researching the governance turn is inspired
by Alvin Gouldner’s research on patterns of industrial bureaucracy
(1954). The question guiding an investigation is how new institutional
forms are introduced and what happens when they collide with the prior
institutional order. In his seminal work, Gouldner illustrates how organi-
zation members resist attempts to introduce new management proce-
dures resting on a different logic, different norms and values and how, as
a result, a range of hybrids is generated. These hybrids are a mixture of
elements of new and old arrangements, blended together in ways that are
unexpected, or even undesirable from the point of view of the initiator of
changes. The most dangerous hybrid, at least from the perspective of
well-intentioned designers trying to introduce industrial bureaucracy, is
mock bureaucracy, that is, an arrangement in which formally introduced
rules are tinkered with, eventually becoming nothing more than a façade.
An approach focusing on the micro level of public management practices
and on organizational responses to changes emerging within the institu-
tional environment may prove to be an answer to Rhodes’ critical assess-
ment of structural approaches to governance. Rhodes perceives the
structural approaches as incapable of explaining how structures are modi-
fied or maintained by consciously acting individuals (2012). I posit that
we ought to regard institutions as inhabited by people doing things
together (Scully and Creed 1997; Hallet and Ventresca 2006), and therefore
as maintained and changed by people. On the one hand, people are embed-
ded in existing institutional structures, which guide their thinking and
behaviour, and on the other hand, they are able to perform their agency
and undertake purposive actions aimed at change. This intertwined rela-
tionship between structure and agency is referred to as the paradox of
embedded agency (Seo and Creed 2002; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010), or
as the process of structuration (Giddens 1979). Following Hallet and
Governance Learning from an Institutional Perspective 35
Ventresca, I resort to the institutional perspective inspired by symbolic

interactionism, where “institutions provide the raw materials and guidelines
for social interactions and, on the other hand, the meanings of institutions
are constructed and propelled forward by social interactions” (2006, p. 213).
Summarizing the above considerations, the governance turn is perceived
here as a fine opportunity to ask questions about the micro foundation of
political behaviour within institutions and the linkage between individu-
als and institutions (Peters 2011). By getting closer to actors and actions,
we can capture both structural and constructivist moments, observe the
merging of agency and structure (Bourdieu 1990, p. 122; Hallett and
Ventresca 2006). I concur with Rhodes’ call for “bringing people back into
governance studies” (2012, p. 33), but contrary to his proposal to focus
on the practices of a group of people and on the unintended consequences
of their actions (Bevir and Rhodes 2010; Rhodes 2012), I argue that it is
useful to keep the structure metaphor in the theoretical framework.
3.1 L inking Individuals and Institutions

In order to investigate linkages between actors and institutions, the
inquiry focuses on particular public agencies of local government and on
specific public disputes, where original institutions are enacted and
changed in the processes of social interactions. In this sense, analysis
looks at actors’ embeddedness within a wider institutional system and at
the practices within which the actors are either maintaining the system or
trying to change it. The reconstruction of interactions between individu-
als and institutions is provided by Coleman’s logic of explanation. It looks
at (1) the influence of macro-level institutions on the meso (organiza-
tional) and micro (individual) levels, (2) interactions on the micro level,
where macro-influences are socially negotiated and transformed, and (3)
mechanisms that transform individual phenomena into meso- and
macro-level outcomes (Coleman 1990; Gilardi and Radaelli 2012).1 The
analysis presented below is a ‘journey’ through subsequent levels of analy-
sis, in an attempt to link macro processes with their local manifestations.
The framework presented below offers a tool for the interpretation of
empirical data discussed in the subsequent chapter. It also presents a scaf-
fold, which is revised and expanded on the basis of observations under-

taken in situ (Chap. 8).
From Macro to Meso and Micro Research suggests that no Western or

Central Eastern Europe country has dodged the governance turn. As
already mentioned in Chap. 1 the following three major changes have
been observed, in stark contrast with the situation of the early 1980s: (1)
a widespread adoption of New Public Management and public-private
partnerships, (2) the involvement of organized local associations, interest
groups, and private actors in policy partnerships, (3) the introduction of
new forms of citizen involvement (Denters 2011).
The simultaneous co-evolution of the above changes in different

European countries suggests that the diffusion of governance can be per-
ceived as a process of institutional isomorphism, which is evidenced by
the homogenization of public administration structures and governance-
enabling practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In the institutional
approach, macro-level factors are identified as influencing change on the
meso and micro level; these are the three types of institutional pressures
towards isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive pres-
sures originate mainly from legal sources. Mimetic pressures are present
in uncertain situations and evidenced by copying practices that have
proven successful. Normative pressures derive from approaches and
orientations of professional groups. Accordingly, governance learning can
take place through adaptation to legal changes, the observation of other
public agencies implementing governance practices, the intake of elected
and nominated public officials educated within the new tradition of gov-
ernance, communication in professional circles, or through the ongoing
education of ‘old’ officials (in the form of training and workshops).
Interactions at the Micro Level in the Context of an Organization and the

Organizational Field The explanation based on Powell and DiMaggio’s
framework is relevant mainly for the macro and meso levels, setting aside the
micro level of individual practices and perceptions. It also takes no account
of the process of transforming the micro level answers into meso- and macro-
level structures, which is of key importance for the analysis of organizational
learning processes. Therefore, I supplement it with institutional approaches

focusing on the role of actors in the processes of institutional change (e.g.
Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Halgrave and Van de Ven 2006; Hallet and
Ventresca 2006). These approaches emphasize that on the micro level, indi-
viduals interact with each other and it is in the course of interactions that
institutions can not only be redefined, but created or destroyed. Practices
from the individual level transform institutional structures at the meso and
macro level. Considered within this framework, a public organization
becomes an arena on which old and new ways of doing things meet. It is a
platform on which micro, meso and macro level engage in interplay. In the
course of interactions, individuals (local politicians, bureaucrats, and exter-
nal actors) create, transform, maintain, and disrupt institutions.
From Micro to Meso (and Macro) Learning, as a process of cognitive and

behavioural change, is simultaneously conditioned by institutions and
brings about the creation of new institutions. In this sense, new institu-
tions and the process of learning are path-dependent: they are embedded
in old structures (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) and influenced by past
decisions, limiting the scope of choices accessible to organizational actors
(Schreyögg et al. 2011). New institutions are also to be seen as the reflec-
tion of power struggles within organizations, which, as suggested by
Scott, can be perceived as “opportunistic collections of divergent interests”
(1967, p. 23, see also Binder 2007).
3.2 P
ublic Dispute as a Trigger of Governance
Learning
In order to observe the governance turn in practice, I have focused on two
aspects of the phenomenon: firstly, on the involvement of organized local
associations, interest groups, and private actors in policy partnerships, and
secondly, on changes in local public administration behaviour, including
new forms of citizen involvement. In order to capture the tension between
old and new practices, I have decided to research public disputes in which
local government and public administration officials are faced with the
pressure of implementing relatively new governance practices based on the

participatory logic. Public disputes are, in a sense, natural experiments
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1992) delivering an insight into day-to-day
practices. A conflict that challenges the goals and/or means of public man-
agement may lead to a temporary breakdown of the default setting, a
behaviour that has long been taken for granted, and, doing so, may shed
light on the logic behind it (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). Moreover, it
affords an opportunity to observe strategic, purposive responses, to trace
their links to existing institutions and to observe how these responses
diverge from the existing patterns and create alternatives. In this sense,
public dispute offers a glimpse into the structural and constructivist
moments of the governance practice (Hallet and Ventresca 2006).
3.3 Institutional Context of Governance.

An Empirical Analysis of Governance
Practice
To a certain extent, the evolution of public management patterns in
CEE countries in general, and in Poland in particular, has followed a
path that is similar to the path of Western countries, where New Public
Management (NPM) was hailed as an answer to the failures of hierarchi-
cal and bureaucratic approaches (the 1990s and the beginning of the
2000s); subsequently, New Public Governance (NPG) was increasingly
perceived as a third way and an answer to the imperfections of both
hierarchical and market-oriented patterns of rule. Until 1989, public
administration in CEE countries was operated under the central plan-
ning system, that is, a socialist version of the traditional government or
Public Administration (PA) marked by hierarchical resource allocation,
bureaucratic rule over policy making and reliance on rigid administra-
tive guidelines and budgets in policy implementation (Österle 2010).
During the postcommunist transition, public administration came
under growing pressure to adopt patterns of New Public Management
(Kordasiewicz and Sadura 2017). Just as in other countries, the private
sector became the key reference model for public administration. The
focus on management, performance, evaluation, and cost-effectiveness
analyses often led to the introduction of market-type mechanisms, that

is, recourse to private contractors and the delegation of public services
(Österle 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). These new trends became
visible both in the area of corporate governance (Dunn 2004) and pub-
lic administration (Verdery 2003, 1996). However, the situation started
changing at the beginning of the second decade of the post-communist
transformation. The international organizations, such as the World Bank
or the European Union, which previously insisted on the economic
effectiveness of public services, currently tend to promote “good gover-
nance”, “governance” (Peters and Pierre 1998; Greasley and Stoker 2008),
New Public Governance (Osborne 2010), or “collaborative governance”
(Ansell and Gash 2008). Many formal institutions enabling public par-
ticipation and consultation in decision-making have been created,
including access to public information, citizens’ right to participate in
environmental impact assessments and spatial planning. Importantly,
changes involving participatory institutions were accelerated in
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in anticipation of their
accession to the EU, which took place in 2004.
A significant difference when compared with Western countries is con-
nected with the fact that the resources at the disposal of local business are
more limited, as is the market of suppliers of contracted out services.
There is a relative weakness of non governmental organizations and civic
engagement (Swieniewicz 2008; Lewicka-Strzałecka 2006; Denters 2011,
p. 315). Some researchers hypothesize that the governance turn has cre-
ated an opportunity for the democratization of public management, fos-
tering public participation in decision-making processes that enables
management tailored to specific social needs (Lewenstein 2010). Others
warn that the relative financial weakness of local governments and their
dramatic need for resources are strengthening the position of businesses
in local politics. Some commentators refer to these changes as the “devel-
opment of private governance” (Dingwerth 2008). In some cases, the
development of networks and partnerships are more likely to pose a
threat to democracy than to strengthen it.
Thus far, research on Polish governance and public management pat-
terns tends to point to the latter kind of developments. According to
analyses based on statistical data, official documents and interviews with
elected officials, civil service bureaucrats, and NGO representatives, pub-

lic participation procedures often lead to “imposing particular develop-
ment goals by local administration or by interests groups abusing their
organizational or communication advantages” (Gąciarz and Bartkowski
2012, p. 58, see also Bober et al. 2013). It is argued that dialogue institu-
tions are a ‘foreign body’ to the tissue of Polish local governance arrange-
ments (Spławski and Zybertowicz 2005).
In 2002, a presidential model was introduced into the local govern-
ment system. Citizens’ control over the executive was significantly lim-
ited to acts of negative democracy and ex post control (Bober et al. 2013).
Researchers conclude: “Polish institutional order does not favour civic
engagement or the presence of citizens within the public sphere. Citizens
are rather pushed out of it. If they do step into the public sphere, they are
usually the clients of the public administration bodies, representatives of
individual or corporate interests” (Bober et al. 2013, p. 37).
Researchers analysing governance patterns in local units of public
administration (delegation of educational services and care services for
the elderly) have identified a common pattern across these sectors, namely
the predominance of Public Administration and New Public Management
elements with a hint of the New Public Governance rhetoric (Kordasiewicz
and Sadura 2017, p. 4).
Yet, most of these circumstances and developments are not unique to
CEE countries. Many local governments are in desperate need of
resources. The strengthening of the executive is observed in many coun-
tries as well. In some cases, it is accomplished through reinforcing the
position of collegial executive leadership (the UK, Sweden), whereas
other countries like Germany, the US, France have relied more on strong
mayoral leadership (Denters 2011). Such institutional context may prove
ineffective in enhancing participatory strategies in public management.
Public disputes are treated here as an opportunity to take a glimpse
into the way bureaucrats act, think, and learn (Freeman 2008). They have
been selected as an object of inquiry because they are instances of public
administration experiencing direct pressure to involve diverse stakehold-
ers in decision-making processes. Stakeholders demand that they be
included, question the manner in which public matters are managed, and
challenge the goals of governance. Theoretically speaking, they demand

that public agency enact problem-solving governance, organize dialogue
where all parties can express their preferences, and provide a space in
which they could exchange their knowledge in response to a given prob-
lem. The public demand that these values and knowledge be somehow
included in solutions devised to address a given policy dilemma. This
kind of situation provides an insight into default responses to protests,
the impact, if any, of environmental pressures on these responses, and the
manner in which these responses are negotiated within an organization.
Through observing the development of this process over time, we can
comprehend the extent to which new modes of governance are institu-
tionalized, and the process of their institutionalization itself.
For the sake of the research presented in this book I have adopted
Susskind’s definition of public dispute, as it tallies fairly well with the
governance phenomenon. Susskind defines public dispute as a conflict
“involving governmental entities and other parties (individual citizens,
business firms, organizations, etc.) over policy priorities, standards, or
resources they hope to share” (Susskind 2000, p. 130). It is, therefore,
about involving multiple and diverse stakeholders, which is consistent
with the plurality of stakeholders in governance, about negotiating the
goals and means of policy making, which is in tune with the discussion
about the selection of governance modes and hybridity, and it is about
public issues and the distribution of resources. The third important fea-
ture of governance is multijurisdictionality, combining people and insti-
tutions across different policy sectors and different levels of government
(Bevir 2011, pp. 2–3). In order to capture the latter, I have chosen exam-
ples of disputes including varying levels of complexity as far as the level
of government is concerned (see Chap. 2).
Given that an important feature of governance is multijurisdictionality
(Bevir 2011), understood as combining people and institutions across
different policy sectors and different levels of government, the selected
cases capture varying degrees of complexity in terms of the level of gov-
ernment and the involvement of diverse public agencies. The higher the
level the more actors are involved and the more coordination is necessary.
In Table 3.1, cases are classified according to the level of government at
which major decisions regarding the subject of the dispute are taken.
Table 3.1 Subject of the public dispute and local government levels involved
Level of local government
Province/city—
headed by the
Municipality— Starost (province) or Region—
headed by the by the President headed by
Case Mayor (city) the Marshal
Closing of rural X
schools
Mart modernization X X
Waste water X X
treatment plant
modernization
Building of anti-flood X X X
facilities
X involved and formally empowered to decide; X involved
Research is focused on public dispute perceived as interaction

between various types of actors. First, representatives of different levels
of state administration: from national, to regional, province, and
district/municipality level. Among them, there are elected officials
(politicians) and employees of public administration bodies represent-
ing different levels of the organizational structure: from top manage-
ment positions to street-level bureaucrats. The second group is formed by
investors, in many cases publicly owned companies responsible, inter
alia, for the technical design of a project, public communication about
the project and so on. There are representatives of non-governmental
associations, informal groups that come into being during protests, and
individual citizens. All of these actors create new and enact existing insti-
tutions, while negotiating their meaning through interactions.
In order to capture the emergence of the process of institutional change
and learning, I have adopted the extended case method (Burawoy 1998;
Wadham and Warren 2014). This choice was dictated by several factors:
the method is sensitive to the process of macro-meso-micro transitions;
involves the historical, political and social context; and has semi-inductive
design, that is, builds research on a pre-existing theory with a view to
modifying it on the basis of empirical research. All of the above fit the
research purposes of exploring the institutional conditions of the learning
process. I departed from organizational learning and institutional theory
as analytical tools organizing data collection and interpretation. Through
an iterative process of data analysis and theoretical considerations, I elab-
orate upon pre-existing theories to build a conceptual framework of local
governance learning and related institutional change.
Data Sources All cases draw on three main sources of data, namely (1)
archival sources: official documents (administrative decisions, complaints
filed in courts, local government resolutions, open letters, organizational
documents, minutes from meetings of district and provincial councils),
media reports (newspaper and TV releases, interviews), the Internet (web-
pages run by investors, protesters, public agencies); (2) interviews with
key actors; (3) observation (of public meetings, protests, open days, etc.)
The set of research methods applied includes content analysis, semi-
structured interviews, and participant observation. The process of data
collection was organized in three phases: (1) retrospective data collection
that coincided with the early days of the decision-making process; (2)
field work (taking place during protests, when the majority of data was
collected through interviews, observation, etc.); (3) retrospective data
collection once the main phase of protests was over (and when the bulk
of the systematic analysis was carried out).
A more detailed description of the research process of each case study

is presented in the Annex.
Note
1. Another and possibly even more appropriate approach would involve per-
ceiving actors and organizations as embedded in different fields, in con-
figurations resembling Russian dolls (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, also
see Chap. 8).
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4
How Framing Transforms Governance:
Public Dispute over the Closure of Three
Small Schools in a Rural Community
Why don’t we turn the gymnasium, into a supermarket, the eating

areas and part of the school building into a hotel? We could group the
children into remaining areas of the building. This will make the
school profitable and self-sufficient!
School principal, minutes of the Municipality Council Meeting,
February 2012
4.1 I ntroduction
The case illustrates a phenomenon that, theoretically speaking, stands at
the core of the governance turn, that is, the inclusion of non-governmental
actors in policy making and implementation (in this case, the provision
of education services) in order to gain more flexibility and responsiveness
towards the needs of individuals and local groups (Bellamy and Palambo
2010). Yet, in practice, the decision-making process leading to the hand-
ing over of schools to a non-governmental actor was an example of a
hierarchical style of policy execution, and an act of the top-down exercise
of power. Economic considerations were the sole basis on which the
problem was defined and solved.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6_4
In the interpretation that follows, emphasis is put on two phenomena.

The first is the framing of governance practices involving external stake-
holders. In the analysis of in-depth interviews, minutes of Council meet-
ings, and newspaper articles, three frames can be distinguished: a legalist
frame organizing the perception of participation around legal rules and
procedures, a managerialist frame using private sector-inspired rhetoric,
and a frame of representative democracy attributing responsibility for
decision-making and problem solving to elected officials and councillors.
These frames are rooted in a wider institutional context and, together,
justify the exclusion of external stakeholders from the dialogue on the
definition of the problem and possible solutions. The second phenome-
non highlighted by the analysis is that of the dynamics of the decision-
making process. It is shown how, with the use of abovementioned frames,
decision-makers systematically exclude dissenting voices, thus turning
the decision-making process into a linear procedure where everything is
known and planned beforehand. Within this process, there is no place for
reflection and governance learning—neither for public officials nor for
municipality councillors nor for external actors, such as the local com-
munity, teachers, principals, or parents.
4.2 Description of Events

Until 1989, all education was organized and provided by state-run public
institutions. After the political transformation, non-public schools were
established; following the subsequently introduced decentralization and
educational reform, upper secondary schools were delegated to county-
level administration, while elementary schools and lower-secondary
schools were delegated to municipality-level administration. Local gov-
ernment units were provided with subsidies originally designed to cover
all of their educational spending, while also granting a certain amount of
freedom in the planning of education budgets, as well as rights to seek
additional financing for education from their own income stream
(Kordasiewicz and Sadura 2017). The value of the subsidy is calculated
based on the decline in the number of students on roll from the begin-
ning of 2000 resulting from the demographic decline. Simultaneously, a
significant part of educational spending is determined by the 1982
How Framing Transforms Governance: Public Dispute… 51
‘Teacher’s Charter’, a document setting out relatively favourable employ-

ment conditions for teachers compared to other professionals whose con-
tracts are regulated by the general Labour Code. As a result, the gap
between the amount of subsidy and the actual educational costs incurred
by local government units has steadily grown wider. It proved particularly
costly to maintain a large number of small schools (e.g. in rural areas). In
2011, the subsidy covered on average 88% of ongoing expenses related to
running primary and lower-secondary schools and incurred by munici-
palities. It should be noted at this point that education is the major cost
item in their budgets. In 2011, it accounted for nearly 34% of spending
in rural municipalities and 36% in city municipalities (Kordasiewicz and
Sadura 2017). In theory, local government units were allowed to close
down schools whose running costs exceeded the amount of the subsidy
provided by the central government, but in practice every decision regard-
ing the closure of a school was met with social discontent at the local
level. In 2009, a new regulation was introduced: it became possible to
entrust the running of a small school (under 70 pupils) to a non-
governmental unit or a natural person. In such cases, subsidies—calcu-
lated on the basis of the number of students—were to be transferred
directly to schools; local authorities were no longer required to bear all
operating costs of schools.1 Importantly, schools run by non-public enti-
ties were exempt from the ‘Teacher’s Charter’, which made it possible to
‘save’ on employment costs.
For reasons listed above, discussions over the closure of some of the
schools in the rural municipality under analysis had extended over a
period of 15 years. Yet, on each occasion, the decision to close a school was
ultimately abandoned given the fierce objection of parents and teachers.
In January 2012, the Education Commission of the Municipality
Council was presented with a report on the economic aspects of the local
educational system. The Mayor, who had commissioned and overseen
the preparation of the report, concluded: “We have never experienced
such a desperate situation in the municipality. Spending on education
can ultimately lead to the collapse of our budget” (minutes of the
Council meeting). Councillors and school principals attending the meet-
ing were to consider two solutions: either to close down the smallest rural
schools, or to entrust the running of schools to non-governmental
entities. ‘A decision needs to be taken by the time the Council meeting is

held, i.e. within three weeks. We need to consider closing down one, two
or three schools’, the Mayor continued. Councillors have asked for more
background information enabling them to assess the possible financial
and social impacts of the decision.
During two meetings that followed, Education and Budgetary
Commissions accepted drafts of resolutions by virtue of which the run-
ning of schools would be entrusted to non-governmental entities. All
drafts were prepared by the Mayor. Eventually, the Municipality Council
accepted the plan to entrust the management of three schools to non-
governmental units or natural persons (seven votes in favour, two against,
three abstaining). As required by legal provisions in force, these plans
were presented to the local board of education and to trade union repre-
sentatives of the teachers. Despite the opposition expressed by the latter,
preparations continued with respect to two of three schools.2 Parents who
had expressed their concerns were reassured that nothing would change
with regard to the educational services provided to their children. In
September 2012, two out of three schools started the year as public enti-
ties run by private individuals. Table 4.1 illustrates the flow of key events.
4.3 Governance and Framing:

Managerialism, Legalism,
and Representative Democracy
The regulation introduced in 2009 afforded the possibility of finding a
middle-ground solution: keeping all schools within the municipality while
releasing the municipality from the financial obligations towards two of its
smallest schools. The Mayor, a graduate of Law and Public Administration,
strictly followed the legal guidelines set out in the regulation. Together
with the Treasurer and the legal advisor, she planned the process in advance.
During the Council meeting, she strictly rejected all propositions for an
alternative approach, including those suggesting public consultation. At
this point in time—that is, before the resolution was taken—public con-
sultations were considered irrelevant. The legal frame used by public
Table 4.1 Chronology of key events—dispute over the closure of three small
schools in a rural community
Date Events
2009 A new regulation enables municipalities to entrust the running of
a small school (under 70 pupils) to a non-governmental unit or a
natural person
November Municipality Council takes resolution on rules and procedures of
2011 public consultation
December Mayor commissioned municipality administration unit with
2011 preparation of ‘A report on the economic aspects of the local
educational system’
January Education Commission of the Municipality Council presented with
2012 the report
February Mayor met school principals and prepared resolution drafts
2012 Drafts of resolutions deciding to entrust of schools to a natural
person voted over in:
Budgetary commissions (for 2, against 0, abstained 2)
Education commission (for 5, against 0, abstained 0)
Council meeting (for 11, against 0, abstained 1)
Decision presented on rural meetings
Spring The local board of education issued a negative opinion on the
2012 plans to entrust the management of the third school to an
external entity, as the number of pupils (79) was greater than
permitted by the regulation (up to 70)
Mayor consulted teacher’s trade unions representatives
August Discussion of schools preparedness for a new year 2012/2013
2012
officials emphasized the importance of meeting certain formal require-

ments. A newspaper article prepared by the legal advisor of the municipal-
ity provides a good illustration. The article is devoted to the “pitfalls and
traps” involved in the closing of schools and in delegating the responsibility
for running them. “Most common mistakes committed by municipalities”
entering such processes are listed. Firstly, the draft of a resolution concern-
ing plans to close schools or entrust their management to external entities
are too often not being presented to the teachers’ trade unions. Secondly,
many municipalities do not respect the obligation to inform the parents
about the intention to close a particular school six months in advance. And
thirdly, some municipalities “fulfil the resolution about closing or delegat-
ing a school without fulfilling the resolution about the intention to close a
school or delegate its management” (newspaper article, April, 2011).
Within this narrative, communication with a diverse range of stakeholders

was reduced to the obligation to meet legal requirements without any
reflection on their actual purpose, such as the coordination of diverse
interests, for example, triggering discussion over different viewpoints,
broadening the scope of choices and so on. In this case, participation and
public consultation were part of the legal requirements that needed to be
met. And they were met in a manner that resembled a ritual. The main
danger of the ritual is to mess up the steps. This is how this reasoning was
enacted in practice:
Mayor: Let’s discuss all possible options in order to choose

what is best for the community.
Head of the Council: This is why I am proposing to reach out to the
community and discuss it with them. We can
make this decision next year. In the meantime, the
school will remain open, we can talk to parents
and prepare for the possible reorganization.
Mayor: I do not know what I ought to present to the com-
munity right now. We have no solution, and no
opinion regarding a possible solution issued either by
the regional authority or by trade unions (…) once
the resolution is adopted, I can officially consult peo-
ple. I do not know what the Council’s decision will
be and I do not know what to ask the community.
Shall we delegate the management? Shall we close the
school? Shall we establish a non-public school? By
reaching out to the community, we will know their
opinion and gain an insight into their line of think-
ing. We need to take a decision. I think this proce-
dure is consistent with the letter of the law. If anyone
wants to draw attention to him or herself for polit-
ical reasons and cause turmoil in the community,
then it will not be fair towards myself or towards the
Council. (minutes of the Council meeting)
There is, however, something more to the legal frame: the reference to
legal aspects represents a demonstration of symbolic power. The Mayor
was able to apply this kind of framing to discussions, which left council-
lors feeling confused and insecure. The majority of them did not take part
in discussions (see also the next section on the dynamics of the decision-
making process). The major opponent—the head of the Council—tried
to play according to the rules imposed by the Mayor. In order to make his
disagreement regarding such principles more convincing, he tried to
emulate the legal language by stating:
In my opinion, adopting the resolutions in this way is erroneous. We

should not adopt them. I think that decisions should be taken only after
public consultation and the solution should come into effect in 2013/2014.
Let’s not adopt resolutions which we know are inconsistent with the law.
(pp. 17, minutes of the Council meeting)
His point is of a general nature and touches upon the question concern-
ing the right way to make these kinds of decisions, as well as the question
of whether, how and when the public should become involved. There is
an important difference between asking about the right way to manage
public issues and establishing whether such an approach is consistent
with the law. By stepping into an imposed framing, he is setting himself
up to fail, because the Mayor’s proposal is consistent with established legal
regulations. Within this narrative, consistency with the letter of the law is
the supreme virtue. Reflecting on the possibilities offered by the law,
indeed its spirit does not emerge within this legalist line of thinking.
The managerial frame comes to the surface in the narrative used by the
Mayor during an interview. In her own words:
[in the municipality] everything works just like in a company. There is an

executive board responsible for the implementation, but also for making
the board of directors aware that something is going wrong, about the
threat of bankruptcy or imminent danger. (interview, July 2012)
Very much in line with this view, during a Council meeting held in
January, she signalled that “education can make the budget collapse” (January
2012, minutes from the Council meeting). Her perception of leadership was
individualistic, she felt personally responsible for turning attention to the
problem, diagnosing it (with the professional help of her office staff) and
proposing a solution that could later be subject to voting and an external
assessment. At the beginning of the interview, she stated: “I faced the follow-
ing dilemma: either we keep these schools, or we invest in the development
of the municipality” (July 2012). In the world of limited resources and fiscal
discipline introduced by new central regulations, and the fact that central
government decentralized the responsibility for managing schools (that
is shifted the burden of financing education to the local government level),
the Mayor perceived herself as the guardian of the budget and a person who
needed to be creative and entrepreneurial in order to be better able to deliver
public services. Each year, a specific sum from the central budget is set aside
to cover about 50% of the costs of running schools. In poor rural areas, there
are limited possibilities to make up the shortfall in the budget with revenue
generated through personal and corporate income taxes. In an interview, the
Mayor provided an outline of solutions she had used in order to make educa-
tion less costly (importantly, she often resorted to the first person narrative
e.g. “I decided…, I organized…”): establishing common school administra-
tion for all entities, employing teachers with several specializations, using a
church charity to help cover some of the infrastructural expenses, putting
together classes with small numbers of students (also across different age
groups e.g. the fourth grade together with the fifth grade), engaging parents
with regard to voluntary work and reparations. She expected the same, entre-
preneurial attitude from school principals.
The principal needs to be a good manager, he or she does not necessarily

need to be a teacher. The principal is supposed to manage the school, acquire
sponsors, engage in working relationships with the local environment, make
connections with parents who can support him/her through the delivery of
products and the provision of services. The principal needs to be entrepre-
neurial in his/her outlook and approach. (interview, July 2012)
The managerial frame provoked many objections within the com-

munity. In the interview, the Mayor mentioned that she had been
accused of trying to ‘make money on schools’. Indeed, during the
Council meeting, one of the school principals mocks the economically

motivated, managerialist approach:
Why don’t we turn a gymnasium into a supermarket, eating areas and other
parts of the school building into a hotel? We could group the children into
the remaining parts of the building. This will make schools profitable and
self-sufficient! (minutes of the Council Meeting, February 2012)
Importantly, within the managerialist frame used by the Mayor, citizens

are described as “clients” (interview, July 2013) who need to be provided
with public services. An important element of the line of argument in the
dispute over schools was that parents would not even feel the difference,
because their children would attend the same school and be taught by the
same teachers, and therefore they should not be alarmed by the
situation.
The third governance frame emerging from the analysis is the represen-
tative democracy frame. It is most comprehensively presented in the narra-
tive of the head of the budgetary commission, who is both a councillor
and a local entrepreneur. When asked about the post factum assessment of
the decision-making process, he answered:
Contacts with the local community could have been better, even though
they can also be risky. A meeting may veer out of control: it is enough that
someone shouts one of those popular phrases, such as <<thieves!!! everyone
is stealing!!!>> for the squabble to start. So the goal of explaining to people
what is going on will not be realized and a lot of unnecessary emotions are
generated (…). You need to present people with some kind of decision. And
this is not about being arrogant towards them (…). This is why elections
are held every four years: representatives are elected in order to make deci-
sions on the behalf of people whom they represent. Sometimes public con-
sultation is needed, but often it is not worth the hassle. (the councillor_1,
interview, July 2012)
Both the Mayor and the councillor emphasized the importance of

direct, face-to-face contacts with the local community. It is thanks to
meetings during local fests, open days, or office hours that they are
able to learn about local problems and needs. These meetings are not
treated as an opportunity to discuss problems and develop possible
solutions. The focus is very much on information gathering rather
than on ideas that stir up debate. Information gathering stays the
focus when formal regulations of public involvement are implemented
in the municipality. In November 2011, following central regulations,
the Municipality Council adopted a resolution on public consultation.
According to the resolution, consultations can be carried out in the
form of meetings or opinion surveys. In ten out of eleven consulta-
tions conducted in the municipality in the years 2014–2017, citizens
(or NGOs, depending on the subject matter) were asked whether they
agreed or not with certain solutions proposed by the local govern-
ment.3 Using a survey to acquire a yes/no opinion on an idea is in fact
a mini voting and as such replicates the logic of representative democ-
racy. Again (just as in face-to-face m eetings) consultation is about
gathering information based on the rules and modes of thinking
imposed by those in power, rather than about discovering new per-
spectives by opening up for dialogue and alternative solutions. The
logic here is as follows: when obtaining specific information from the
ground, public officials and councillors are able to better represent the
local community. When appropriately informed, people are more sat-
isfied with the performance of representatives. The importance of the
local newspaper published by local authorities is emphasized here. It
informs citizens about issues being discussed and decided upon within
the municipality. The major goal of the newspaper is to raise public
consciousness about the way in which the municipality is managed,
where the resources come from, and how they are (re)distributed.
Representative democracy implies a hierarchical relationship between
citizens and the local government. It assumes that the latter are enlight-
ened leaders, whose role is to “discuss and inform people using the
language that is easy for them to understand” (Mayor, interview, July
2012). Importantly, it is assumed in this frame that by improving
communication, they increase consensus over proposed solutions and
prevent people who “highly irresponsibly” misinterpret government
actions and “distort social order by inciting and agitating local resi-
dents” (the Councillor_1, interview, July 2012).
Each of these frames—managerialism, legalism and representative

democracy—supports a hierarchical, top-down approach to decision-
making and assumes that citizens’ control and engagement are expressed
through the act of voting. Within a legal frame, good governance means
governance consistent with the rule of law. The role of public officials is
to make sure that this is the case. The participation of citizens does not
appear as an independent value even if the law prescribes it. In the mana-
gerialist frame, the citizen is a client who needs to be provided with pub-
lic services. The quality of these services is guaranteed through the
acquisition of management system certificates (e.g. ISO certificate first
acquired by the municipality in 2009). Also in this case, participation
facilitating input (knowledge, ideas) from grass roots and the co-creation
of solutions for social problems seems to be an inadequate concept.4
Within the representative democracy framework, councillors and offi-
cials are elected in order to make decisions on behalf of those whom they
represent. In the case examined, this frame facilitates a paternalistic
approach to the relationship between local government, administration,
and citizens. The first mainly focuses on educating citizens on how the
municipality is managed and on informing them what is being done.
Whether this relationship is fruitful or not (according to this frame)
depends on the individual qualities of both, that is, citizens and elected
representatives. Citizens need to be educated, be receptive to information
(and, from time to time, engage in argument-based discussions), while
elected representatives need to enjoy the respect of those whom they
represent.
4.4 D
ynamics of the Decision-Making
Process: Reducing Uncertainty by Pushing
Out Any Dissenting Voices
The combination of two factors, namely the introduction of the system
of central financing of schools, and changes in the number of students
and processes responsible for diminishing the number of students in rural
areas (such as the demographic decline and the process of urbanization)
placed increasing pressure on municipal budgets. Also, in the analysed

municipality, pressures systematically rose from the early 2000s. Different
strategies were used in order to cope with this problem (see the previous
section), but eventually in the autumn and winter of 2011, while prepar-
ing a budget, the Treasurer and Mayor decided to propose a more radical
solution: either to close or to entrust the running of the schools to a non-
governmental entity. At this point, information gathering commenced.
Firstly, the Mayor commissioned the preparation of a report illustrating
economic aspects of the local educational system. The report was pre-
sented to the Council as a ready diagnosis of the problem (point to
education as a possible reason for the collapse of the budget) together
with the proposed solution: “We need to consider closing one, two or
three schools” the Mayor stated (minutes of the Council Meeting, January
2012), adding that delegation was another option. The stage during
which the nature of the problem was discussed and the search for possible
solutions took place was reduced to a minimum. Without any critical
comments, councillors accepted the definition of the problem and
focused on discussing the proposed solutions. Already at this initial stage
of the process, the “language of certainty” prevailed over “the language of
inquiry” (Yanow 2009).
The councillor requested the preparation of a simulation of “social and
economic costs of both scenarios” (closing and delegation). Two weeks
later, at the subsequent meeting of Budgetary and Education commis-
sions, councillors were presented with (a) a financial simulation (in which
the issue of social costs was not addressed), and (b) drafts of resolutions
covering each option (closing of schools or delegation). Drafts were pre-
pared by the Mayor. Importantly, in the meantime, she had also decided
on the form of delegation. Initially, she considered the creation of a
municipality-owned company to run the schools, but she abandoned the
idea after consulting a legal advisor. She then turned to the principals to
ask them to take over. When offered the choice to either close the school
or for it to be taken over, they chose the latter option.
The Head of the Municipality Council, present at both meetings (of
Education and Budgetary commissions), demanded expanding the
timeframe for making such decisions and the organization of public

consultation. Major concerns raised by him referred to the uncertainty
associated with the preferences and decisions of other stakeholders.
Parents and their choices were the greatest source of uncertainty. Many
inhabitants working in the nearby city decided to educate their children
close to their workplace. It was feared that, on hearing rumours about
plans to close smaller entities, those who sent children to municipality
schools might decide to enrol them in bigger schools. Another party
whose opinion and plans remained unknown were the teachers. Would
they stay at the school where conditions of work were at their worst (due
to being exempt from the Teachers’ Charter guaranteeing good working
conditions) and the future remained uncertain? Even principals decid-
ing to take over the schools were not able to discuss these issues directly
with the teachers, as the two weeks when decisions were taken coincided
with the winter holidays.
During the meeting, some ideas for the adoption of an alternative
approach were presented. Most often the idea of the redistribution of
pupils was raised—some schools in the municipality were over capacity,
with more than 35 pupils per class. Yet, the Mayor had already adopted
the language of certainty and she was able to impose it by pushing out
dissenting voices. During all three meetings (of Education and Budgetary
commissions and of the Council) she opened the discussion with a
strong, agenda-setting statement: “The closing of schools is the worst
option. I consider it best to entrust the management of schools” (min-
utes of Council meeting, February 2012). She was the person who most
often took the floor and her speeches were longest. She constantly referred
to legal procedures when developing counterarguments; for instance, she
rejected the idea of consulting external stakeholders, as the law requires
the consultation of resolutions that have already been taken (see the
quote below and the previous section). She emphasized the importance
of a legalist frame by submitting ‘self-corrections’, and explaining to
councillors why one particular legal wording used in a resolution draft
should be considered better than another one. The Mayor also decided
when the discussion would end and the voting would start:
I ask you to finish this discussion and vote on the drafts. I will respect your
decision. I cannot go to the people and ask for their opinion now. I will do
that once you have adopted the resolutions. Without having such decision
regarding the actions to be taken, I am unable to change anything within
the education policy. (minutes of Council meeting, February 2012)
Commissions accepted the drafts of resolutions concerning the entrust-

ing of school management to external entities with a majority of voices (the
Education commission unanimously, the Budgetary commission with two
voices in favour and two abstaining, while the draft on the closing of
schools was not voted on at all). The Municipality Council accepted the
resolution on the plan to delegate the school to non-governmental units
or private persons (seven votes in favour, two against, three abstaining).
These plans were further consulted, as legally required, with the county
educational office and with representatives of teachers’ trade unions.
Despite opposition expressed by the latter, work continued with respect
to two out of three schools.5 Parents who expressed their concerns were
reassured that nothing would change with regard to educational services
provided to their children. Voices of discontent among stakeholders were
classified under one of the following four categories of malevolence: (a)
politically motivated, (b) seeking individual interests at the expense of the
public good, (c) manipulated, (d) insistent.
Problems with the financing of education in the municipality inspired
reflection, which was rather individual than collective, and turned the
process into a linear, predictable, and controllable chain of events. The
appearance of dissenting voices did not distract the Mayor from follow-
ing a well-known path. She was not willing to re-think the way in which
different stakeholders, their values, interests, and knowledge were coordi-
nated. She took the usual course of action in searching for a solution.
When considering the general financial information on schools, she
referred to the municipal local education board and to the munici-
pal Treasurer. For information on legal aspects and possible legal actions,
she consulted the municipal legal advisor. Dissenting voices, in particular
those calling for involving a wider group of stakeholders in the process,

were ignored. As a result, she only reflected on the objects, and not on the
subjects of governance. By not allowing external stakeholders to become
a part of the process and fighting alternative voices within the Council,
she prevented any collective reflection on the problem and its possible
solution. Despite the fact that she eventually entrusted the management
of the school to a third party and, theoretically speaking, allowed external
actors to govern public issues, she did not share her authority, but exe-
cuted it by imposing her will on all actors involved.
In the current form of the decision-making process, Council meetings
are the only forum on which collective reflection may take place. It has
already been illustrated how dissenting voices are ‘naturalized’ and
dismissed based on the stereotypical assumption that people (including
councillors) will always oppose whatever is suggested to them, usually for
reasons that are neither rational nor well-intended. Formal and informal
institutional arrangements make it even easier to ignore these voices.
Over a period of time, councillors had gradually become accustomed to
the Mayor taking the initiative. An analysis of the minutes of meeting
that took place between September 2011 and August 2012 indicates that
16 statements made during the discussion held prior to the voting on
schools delegation were an exceptionally large number (even considering
that four of them were the Mayor’s statements). No comments are usually
expressed between the reading of a resolution project and it being put to
the vote. This informal rule was incidentally violated by two people: by
the Mayor herself, when she submitted self-corrections, and by one of the
councillors, who was an open and committed opponent of the Mayor.
However, these comments failed to incite any further discussion.
Summarizing, in comparison with other Council meetings, those
devoted to schools were relatively dynamic. Financial crises forced the
Mayor to reflect on the way education was managed within the munici-
pality. She knew it had become impossible to continue implementing old
strategies. Yet, the decision-making process was stifled, because it was
dominated by a single actor (the Mayor), who systematically eliminated
opportunities for any collective reflection on the goals and means of the
local educational policy.
4.5 Conclusion
Within the theoretical framework of governance—be it collaborative
governance, New Public Governance, or other related concepts—the
meaning of participation varies. Yet most of the time it is about making
public management more effective and democratic at the same time (see
Chap. 2). It is about using local resources, such as knowledge and experi-
ence, in order to design products and services effectively and, by doing so,
meeting social needs. It is about facilitating reflection through bringing
together diverse perspectives concerning a particular problem or issue,
about making sure that the process is just and the interests of diverse
parties are well represented. It is also about the process of evolutionary
learning, where diverse stakeholders “learn how to refine and improve
their values, knowledge, and practice in a continuous fashion” (Ansell
2011, p. 9). Theoretically speaking, legal regulations on public access to
information, consultation and participation could support this kind of
interpretation. However, when these regulations are permeated by legal-
ist, managerialist and representative democracy frames of interpretation, the
result is quite the opposite. In the best-case scenario, participation is
about acquiring feedback from citizens/clients. When this feedback takes
the form of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response it does not include opportunities for
discussion or open dialogue. As a result, no synergic effect of dialogue—
beyond a simple aggregation of opinions—is likely to occur. Learning
opportunities are scarce, as there is no place for questioning of assump-
tions, bringing alternative definitions, or different types of knowledge.
Public officials neither acquire nor are exposed to new perspectives.
Citizens do not learn how the local government really works nor have an
opportunity to understand the reality of the financial constraints of
decision-making.
Notes
1. Until 2009, the law did not allow for the possibility of transforming the
Local Government Unit—public schools run by local government units into
public schools run by non-public entities. However, there was a loophole.
It was possible to delegate the management of a school in two stages:

firstly, by closing down the public school, and then by establishing in its
place a public school run by a non-public entity.
2. The local board of education issued a negative opinion on the plans to
entrust the management of the third school to an external entity, as the
number of pupils (79) was greater than permitted by the regulation (up to
70). The board refuted the argument that 10 students lived outside of the
school’s catchment area.
3. Consultation processes have been documented since 2014. The most
recent one (the design of a developmental strategy for the municipality)
breaks the rule of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions and offers open-ended questions.
Citizens are asked to choose three areas of action where they would like
funds to be allocated, and incited to express their opinion about the
municipality’s strengths and weaknesses.
4. Although this frame can also have participatory versions, in which clients
as service users are encouraged to participate in the development of public
service (co-production in public sector reference).
5. Formal reasons presented in the explanation.
References
Bellamy, R., and A. Palambo. 2010. From Government to Governance. London:
Routledge.
785–801. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1210903.
Practice in Research and Research. The American Review of Public
5
Public Administration Leaders
as Institutional Entrepreneurs: Dispute
over the Location of a Marketplace
The authorities of this town do not talk to people. They are afraid of people
(…) I can see fear in their eyes when something like this happens: protests,
openly expressed dissatisfaction of certain groups. First, they never consult any
ideas either with us – lower level municipality administration – or with the
stakeholder groups, because they think we are stupid and have nothing to
contribute. When they eventually do something, they get lambasted. And then
they start fretting again: ‘What shall we do in order to reverse it’?
Municipality Mayor, interview, March 2013
5.1 I ntroduction
Interpretation of this case is built around the role of individuals and,
specifically, of intra-organizational leaders in the processes of institution-
alization and learning of new governance patterns. The actions of three
leaders are subject to analysis: the Mayor of the Municipality pushing for
inclusive management involving the public, the first Vice President of
the city, who represents top-down, traditional approach to public man-
agement, and the second Vice President who applies problem-centred,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6_5
collaborative governance. All three of them take action in response to the

same problem and within the same context, yet they make different
choices on whether and how to respond to pressure and involve relevant
actors and institutions in public management processes. The analysis
illustrates that even in the face of complex problems and public pressure,
the shift from government to governance is neither obvious nor neces-
sary; public agency, just as any other organization, may accommodate
practices according to different lines of reasoning and values. Tensions
and conflicts caused by this diversity affect the dynamics of governance
institutionalization (Selznick 1957; Washington et al. 2008) and the
dynamics of governance learning.

Green Market is one of the oldest markets in one of the largest Polish cit-
ies. It dates back to the early nineteenth century, when minor merchants
and farmers started flocking here to trade in their goods. In the early
1980s, a large market hall was built to accommodate some of the traders.
The remaining area was occupied by small stands and sheds, densely
squeezed one next to the other along narrow passages, creating a square-
shaped maze around the market hall. In 2008, when the city’s plans of
closing down the market were announced by the press, there were as
many as 300 officially registered stands.
It was not the first time that the market was threatened with—at least
partial—eradication. Seven years earlier, when the market was under the
administration of city authorities, half of the area was to be sold to a private
investor, with the intention to build a modern business centre. Due to the
protests of local merchants, these plans were abandoned. Municipality
administration together with city authorities and merchants developed
modernization plans for the market infrastructure. The planning process
stalled after general elections in 2006 and the subsequent political changes.
On the municipality level, the Mayor initially involved in the development
process was re-elected. Following the elections, he helped establish a tempo-
rary committee which was in charge of any issues related to the market and
operated along the Municipality Council. The discussion about the future
Public Administration Leaders as Institutional Entrepreneurs… 69
of the market continued. In 2008, two years after the elections, the admin-
istration of the market was delegated to municipality authorities, yet no
resources were earmarked for its modernization.
In the summer of 2008, a local newspaper published an article whose
author claimed that the City Hall, in cooperation with a city-owned
property developer, planned to build two blocks of flats on the plot cur-
rently occupied by the market. Some space on the ground floors was to
be allocated for merchants. Over the months that followed, merchants,
the temporary committee, and the local newspaper objected to the plan
and started to mobilize the public against it. However, city authorities
and the investor were not discouraged by these protests; they even invited
protesters to participate in the planning of residential complex.
Months that followed were marked with further mobilization. Three
new associations were established in order to defend the market, and new
measures were undertaken, including protests and administrative pro-
ceedings aimed at blocking the investment process.
In the summer of 2009, a momentous incident took place. After long
and unsuccessful negotiations, city administration decided to remove tem-
porary halls and small stalls from the another area of the city. The interven-
tion turned violent. Merchants barricaded the halls and tear gas was used to
force them out. Water cannons were used against those who remained
inside.1 One of the city’s major streets witnessed riots, as a consequence
of which 22 people were arrested and 100 people needed medical help.
Two months after following the event, the Vice President participated
in the Municipality Council assembly for the second time. He presented
a modified version of the investment plan: blocks of flats were to be con-
structed only in the northern part of the plot, while a modern market was
to be located in the southern part. The proposed solution gave rise to
concern, as it was clear that the space reduced by 50% and the shopping
area on the ground floor would not accommodate all merchants.
Early in 2011, a new actor entered the scene. The Polish Sociological
Association (PSA) embarked on a project aimed at ‘developing a systemic
infrastructure for dialogue between municipality authorities and munici-
pality inhabitants in the matters of spatial planning’. It had been provided
with the European Economic Area Grants (EEA Grants) and funds from
a city administration department responsible for public communication
(Social Communication Department, SCD). The idea of the project

emerged during discussions between the Mayor, municipality officials,
and researchers specializing in public participation and conflict media-
tion. According to the Mayor, the involvement of external researchers
was badly needed to solve the conflict over the Green Market. Although
researchers imagined the project rather as a tool for developing and
implementing a model of public dialogue about proposals, instead of one
for dialogue over already existing plans, they agreed that the case of Green
Market would provide an opportunity for a mediation experiment. The
Vice President of the city welcomed the idea and researchers designed the
mediation process, starting with desk research and interviews with key
stakeholders.
Over the months that followed, mediators were trying to determine
who should represent city authorities in the process. In October, the Vice
President of Warsaw was promoted to a state-level post. His successor, the
new Vice President, rejected the idea of mediation after having attended
a meeting held by the Municipality Council.
The new Vice President organized a series of meetings with merchants’
representatives, the Mayor of the Municipality, the management of the
market (municipality-level administration), and the company which had
been awarded the contract for the modernization of the southern part of
the market. During these meetings, all issues related to the moderniza-
tion of the southern part of the market were discussed, including the
design of a new market hall, the temporary relocation of the building and
so on. At that time, residential buildings were to be constructed in the
northern part of the plot. In June, merchants from the southern part were
relocated. Construction work began in winter, but slowed down and
eventually ceased several months later, following the bankruptcy of the
construction company. A new contractor took over in the autumn of
2013. Until the autumn of 2017, the northern part of the area remains
unchanged and serves the same purpose. Merchants resumed their activi-
ties in the modernized southern area and to the market hall in summer
2016. For a detailed chronology of events see Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Chronology of key events—dispute over the location of Green Market
Date Events
1983 Green Market hall is constructed in the area traditionally used
for small-scale trading activity. Some merchants move into the
building, while the majority remain in the neighbouring area
and continue selling goods from small stalls and booths
2002–2005 The market fails to generate the expected profits for the city.
City authorities consider selling the land occupied by the
market place (in order to construct an office building).
Eventually, following merchants’ protests, these plans are
abandoned
Municipality administration is entrusted with the management
of Green Market
In conjunction with the City Hall and merchants, municipality
authorities prepare a modernization plan
2005 City authorities are entrusted with the management of Green
Market
Autumn 2006 Local government elections. City-level officials who were
engaged in designing the modernization project and
negotiations with merchants are not re-elected. The Mayor of
the Municipality is re-elected. The new ruling party expresses
its willingness to modernize the market
2008 Managing of the market is delegated to municipality
authorities
Spring 2007 The Mayor continues the modernization dialogue with local
merchants. The Municipality Council establishes an ad hoc
market committee
July 2008 A local newspaper informs about the City Hall’s plans to build
blocks of flats. The investor is a company owned by the city
September A delegation of merchants meets:
2008 (a) The Mayor of the Municipality, who confirms that city
authorities plan to build a block of flats with retail space on
the ground floor
(b) Members of the municipality ad hoc committee declare
to be surprised by these plans
October 2008 The local newspaper draws up a petition to city authorities
City authorities and the investor announce an open call for
proposals for the ‘architectural concept of a residential
complex with retail facilities’. Representatives of local
stakeholders are invited to be members of the jury
(continued)
Table 5.1 (continued)
Date Events
November An extraordinary Municipality Council meeting is held; the Vice
2008 President of the city presents a spatial planning project to
transform the area
Municipality Council issues two official statements: (1) an
appeal to the President of the City and to the City Council
prompting them to discontinue the decision-making process
regarding market place until comprehensive development can
be subject to public consultation, (2) a rejection of the idea to
build residential buildings
December The City Council earmarks additional funds for housing
2008 investments despite the protests of market defenders at the
meeting
January 2009 The Mayor of the Municipality creates an advisory team that is
to act as a ‘social consultant’ with regard to changes planned
by the City Hall. The team is made up with a large and
diversified group of stakeholders. The majority of merchants’
representatives decline the invitation
First street protests opposing the liquidation of the market are
organized by ad hoc social committee
July 2009 City authorities decide to remove merchants from another
place in the city, namely the area around the City Hall. The
intervention become violent: 22 people are arrested, 100
provided with medical help
September The Vice President of the City presents a modified investment
2009 plan to the Municipality Council: Residential buildings are to
be constructed in the northern part of the plot. A modernized
market place is to be confined to the southern part. A
temporary location for the market is to be defined
June 2010 A special committee—a new participatory body coordinated by
the Mayor of the Municipality— issues a petition to City
authorities demanding new solutions that would enable all
merchants to resume their activity upon market place
modernisation
(continued)
Date Events
February 2011 ‘Local Model of Social Dialogue’ research project is launched. It
is coordinated by the PSA and financed with European
Economic Area (EEA) Grants and the Social Communication
Department (a unit within the City Hall)
The Mayor of the Municipality persuades researchers to use
Green Market as a case for analysis and to undertake
intervention in the form of a mediation process
The Vice President agrees to the mediation
February– Researchers prepare conflict analysis and meet stakeholders
June 2011 (separately)
July 2011 The first plenary meeting of all parties: The start of the
mediation process
August– Mediators look for a representative of the City Hall
September
2011
October 2011 The Vice President of the City is appointed to a national
government post
The new Vice President participates in a Municipality Council
meeting and meets mediators
December The polish sociological association decides to withdraw from
2011 the mediation
February–May City authorities organize a call for proposals regarding the
2012 modernization of the southern part of plot of land
The Vice President holds approximately eight meetings with
stakeholders
June 2012 Merchants from the southern part are moved to a temporary
location
September The decision about the future of the northern part is
2013 postponed until the subsequent term of office (2014–2018)
October 2014 Election to local government. No political changes in city and
municipality authorities
November Merchants move back into modernized facilities in the southern
2015 part of the market place
January 2016 City authorities entrust the management of the market to
municipality authorities
The Vice Mayor responsible for the market-related issues
declares that the northern part of the plot is to be
modernized
June 2016 Opening ceremony of the modernized southern part of the
market (the building and the surrounding area)
5.3 P
articipation Experiments: Governance
Learning and Institutionalization at the
Municipality Level
City Hall’s decision to put the lowest government level (municipality) in
charge of market management coincided with the first public participa-
tion experiments of local authorities. The Mayor recounts this period as
follows:
Around 2005, we participated in a city-wide park revitalization project. We

proceeded in the usual manner: we had some guidelines from the City’s
Environmental Department, we prepared all documents accordingly and
selected landscape architect in a call for proposals. We discussed everything
through and through with the appointed architect, who subsequently
developed a design that we decided to show to the inhabitants. I remember
it was an evening in November, and the meeting was attended by about 50
people. We were sat there proudly while the project was being presented:
what a great design we have managed to create! And then it started. We
were given a total dressing-down: because no public consultation was
organised, because it was Byzantine, why the fence, why the playground
there and not in another place…When we recovered from the shock, we
came to the conclusion that something needed to be done about it. It did
not make sense to proceed with the project in the face of such tremendous
disagreement. After several meetings, our approach and plans changed sub-
stantially: we ended up by basically implementing the ideas of local inhab-
itants. This was the start of this process. If we wish to do something
important, we need to talk to inhabitants first, before any plans are made.
(interview, March 2013)
The approach to the modernization of the market followed this logic.

The Mayor and municipality officials held several meetings with mer-
chants, during which they discussed together ‘what to do next’. Several
ideas were put forth. The process was managed by the Mayor himself,
with no particular organizational roles or procedures allowing him to
conduct a participatory decision-making process. Following local elec-
tions, a political change affected the City Hall, unlike municipality
authorities. The Municipality Council established a temporary commit-

tee in charge of the market issues. The Committee expressed its support
for solutions developed before elections and awaited acceptance, along
with financial support, from city authorities. After nearly two years of
silence, the latter suggested that the market be removed altogether and
replaced with blocks of flats. Failure to abide by local agreements had
dramatic consequences for relations between municipality authorities
and external stakeholders (merchants). The Mayor recalls:
it was a turning point in our relations (…) merchants were outraged, call-
ing us liars, thieves and accusing us of betrayal. Naturally, despite my
intentions, I found myself on the other side of the fence. We started to
painstakingly rebuild our totally ruined relations. In our attempt to do
this, we tried to explain to the Vice President responsible for the invest-
ment that such management methods might be suitable for business, could
be applied to banks for instance, but not within a local community. (inter-
view, March 2013)
The sudden removal of agency shattered the process within which all
sides were learning to participate in joint decision-making. Municipality rep-
resentatives tried to lobby for abandoning the plans of city authorities, but
external stakeholders remained unaware of these attempts. They under-
stood that municipality authorities were not a reliable partner and that
participatory decisions were not respected. Some suspected even that the
dialogue regarding the market was a fig leaf for real political plans of the
Mayor and the President (whatever they might be). One of the merchants
recalls:
my trust for municipality authorities and the President was destroyed. We

had an agreement on how we would proceed. It was signed by the Mayor,
with formal support of the President of the city (…) and [only two years]
later we were told by the Mayor that this document was worthless. I am
asking you: in a country where presidents change following regularly held
elections … [should such agreement not be binding for the successor]?!
(interview, April, 2013)
The Mayor was trying to rebuild the relationships by establishing a

new participatory body: an advisory team that was supposed to serve as a
‘social consultant’ in charge of changes planned by the City Hall.

However, municipality authorities did not own the process any more,
and therefore, the propositions of the Mayor remained symbolic gestures
of faith in participatory governance. The majority of merchants declined
invitations on the grounds of municipality authorities not being empow-
ered to implement any solutions.
The Mayor was not discouraged and actively looked for opportunities
to introduce participatory approaches into the management of public
matters. In an attempt that may be described as planned efforts to learn a
new participatory governance mode, he convinced researchers from the
Polish Sociological Association to prepare a project aimed at designing
and testing a systemic model of dialogue between the local government,
its administration and citizens regarding public space planning. The
planned result of the project was supposed to be the institutionalization
of participatory approaches within the structures of municipality author-
ities. The project received funding from EEA Grants and the Social
Communication Department (a city administration unit). Researchers
were initially planning to focus on developing new consultation processes
from scratch. Yet, the Mayor of the Municipality persuaded them to use
Green Market as a subject of analysis and subsequent intervention. His
reasoning (eventually adopted also by the researchers) was the following:
neither city authorities nor merchants and local NGOs were willing to
surrender. Municipality authorities are between a rock and a hard place,
totally helpless. Something needs to be done. Let us bring all parties to
the table and find a solution in the process of mediation. Yet, after several
months, several individual meetings with stakeholders and one general
meeting, the process ground to a halt. Mediators publicly announced and
explained the decision:
Since August [2011], we have made attempts to continue mediation and

organize a second meeting of local government representatives and mer-
chants. In our assessment, the primary difficulty was the appointment of
local government representation. (…) Protracted hesitation regarding the
subsequent meeting caused a feeling of disappointment and undermined
the purpose of mediation. Given the situation, we have decided to termi-
nate the process. (open letter, December 2011)
The decision was met with harsh criticism from the merchants. Users
of Internet forums boiled with rage and dozens of negative comments
were made in response to the letter. Mediators explained later that the
main principle of mediation requires it to be a voluntary process based on
coercion-free participation. This clarification was not received with much
understanding. Merchants’ representative comments on the mediation
process as follows:
The Mayor tried some weird stuff, some parley or mediation (…) The
Polish Sociological Association barged in and they taught us one thing –
before you sit at the table with someone you need to check who this person
is taking money from. Whatever happens, I will not talk to such people any
more. If I hear that someone receives subsidies directly from the city, I will
never sit at the table with them. We had high expectations of this process
(…) but then the Association stepped back at the most decisive moment.
Obviously, they were trying to persuade us that it was for our own good.
Supposedly, there was no support from the city. (interview, April 2013)
The experiment with mediation failed and merchants’ representative

interpreted it as a smoke screen used by city authorities that first financed
the process, and then distanced themselves from it. The analysis of learn-
ing and institutionalization process at the city level shows that this inter-
pretation was not valid (see the next section for the description of the
Social Communication Department, a unit that applied and promoted a
different institutional logic than city authorities in general).
Importantly, the Mayor of the Municipality assessed the mediation
experiment as ‘rather positive’. He claimed that the experience was ben-
eficial to all parties involved, as it ‘let off some steam from the conflict’.
His interpretation might be just an attempt to save his face. Nevertheless,
some of his decisions, such as the establishment of yet another advisory
board and participatory body can be interpreted as symptomatic of his
belief that openness and participation would always bring good results.
This non-reflexive attitude prevented him from understating the
limitations of this approach. Repeated attempts to include people in a
process that was not formally owned by the municipality, or within
which the municipality did not play a decisive role, deterred people from
any initiatives involving ‘participation’ or ‘dialogue’. In this particular

case, initial willingness to cooperate was misused: stakeholders learnt that
their voice did not count and participation was just apparent.
Simultaneously—in other, less conflict-ridden local political areas—the
Mayors’ experiments with participation, supported by experts from Polish
Sociological Association and by the Social Communication Department
resulted in the institutionalization of participatory approaches within
municipality. Research projects and further cooperation with the
Department, financed with EEA Grants, resulted in the development of
consultation procedures and an official post for a person in charge of pub-
lic participation and consultation. The new post was embedded within a
wider community of professionals practising participatory approaches in
public administration: those active within other municipalities of the city,
and in the city level administration, in academia and in non-governmental
organizations, primarily those functioning within the area of the so-called
city movements.
5.4 C
ity-Level Processes of Governance
Learning and Participation: Fake
Learning and Leadership for Governance
Protests organized by merchants and the local community were triggered
by a top-down, hierarchical decision that paid no heed to agreements pre-
viously adopted at the municipality level. When faced with protests, city
authorities decided to reframe their actions and turn towards somehow
more participatory and inclusive practices. They announced a call for pro-
posals to select a project and empowered external stakeholders to influence
its results through inviting them to be part of the jury. High-level city
representatives attended the extraordinary meetings of the Municipality
Council. During the first meeting held in 2008, the Vice President and
officials wanted to hear the opinions of local residents; during the second,
held a year later, they presented a project modified in accordance with
some of the requests made by merchants (though without their participa-
tion). According to the new plan, residential blocks were to be confined to
the northern part of the plot and a modernized market was to be con-
structed in the southern part. During construction and modernization
works, a temporary location for the market was to be designated. In the
meantime, after the violent events following the closing of a market in the
city centre, city authorities humbly declared that they were going through
“the process of learning” how to deal with public participation (first Vice
President, newspaper interview from September 2009).
At that time, stakeholders treated these initiatives and declarations as a
façade covering the fact that the decision had already been taken and
authorities were not willing to discuss any major issues anymore. When
invited to be a member of the jury of the open call for architectural proj-
ects of a residential complex, a local journalists wrote:
Accepting an invitation would mean that our newspaper agrees on the

implementation of this project. In fact, it is just the opposite. We are not
only opposing these plans, but also actively mobilizing public opinion
against it.
He added ironically:
Are we going to discuss complex solutions for the entire area, or is it about
the number of floors in the new blocks of flats? (March 2009)
Subsequent project modifications introduced in autumn 2009 did not

go down well either. A representative of the merchants recalls:
I did not participate in the process during which the solution to my prob-
lem was defined. Now I am presented with the solution that I am not satis-
fied with. It is as if someone gave me shoes two sizes too small and said:
“wear them and be grateful”, and I can only decide whether to cut of my
toes or my heels in order to be able to put them on! (interview, April 2013)
From the very beginning, protesters were using the language and val-
ues of participatory democracy in order to justify their position and to
reveal the inappropriateness of the attitudes and practices of local author-
ities. A journalist recounts the process:
It is my impression that the democracy ends after you place a ballot into
the ballot box. Apart from that, there is only the democracy of bureaucrats,
which means authorities know best what is good for the people (…) They
seem to see it like this: you can protest all you like: local councils, petitions,
what have you, we will do whatever we want anyway. (local newspaper,
June 2010)
One of the merchants’ representatives stated in an interview: “the city

and the state clearly communicate their agenda in such cases: we need you,
idiots, only two days before a referendum or elections” (interview, April
2013).
In mid-2009, merchants acquired a new pressure tool. It was a threat
of organizing an active, physical resistance, should the city be oblivious to
their opinion. A street-level bureaucrat directly involved in the manage-
ment of the market recalls:
After these experiences {riots caused by closing the market in the city cen-
tre}, authorities were too scared to move the market to a temporary loca-
tion. They did not want this scenario to repeat itself – it had a very negative
impact on the image of city authorities.
Three months after the violent crisis, the city presented the Municipality
Council and merchants with modified plans, and asked for their feed-
back. After that, no action was taken for nearly two years. When the
proposal of mediation emerged, city Vice President accepted it. In an
interview, the new Vice President claimed that the agreement was
a result of panic, of a desperate search for a solution [in a stalemate situa-

tion]. To a certain extent, it was also a result of a coincidence that munici-
pality authorities signed an agreement on this sociological project. (June
2013)
The new governance tool was applied because all options available in
old, hierarchical governance modes had been tested and proved unsuit-
able. Further developments indicate that decision-makers relied on medi-
ation neither as a results of a critical reflection on governance nor because
of the willingness to learn and experiment. They relied on mediation sim-
ply because they found themselves at a loss.
The first Vice President appointed one of the officials as a representa-

tive of the city in the process. However, when the first meeting of parties
eventually took place, all city officials present declared that they were not
entitled to take any decisions. During subsequent meetings, this time
with city officials only, mediators were trying to advance the process.
According to mediators:
Despite detailed explanations of mediation principles and goals, Director

X [appointed by the Vice President] stated that she could not act as an
actual representative of the city in the mediation process and that the pro-
cedure described by mediators was not defined in regulations governing the
work of city authorities (…) A serious obstacle in the process of dissemi-
nating dialogue and consultation is the lack of unambiguous legal and pro-
cedural regulations which would justify and explain to citizens their access
to civic dialogue. The City Council is still working on a resolution regard-
ing public consultation, as well as an ordinance of the President of the City
regarding participation and initiative-taking by city inhabitants in such
processes. (PSA report 2012)
The meeting with the Vice President was postponed several times,
until it was announced in the autumn of 2011 that he had been appointed
to a national-level position and would be leaving his office. The media-
tion experiment ended with Polish Sociological Association officially
announcing their abandonment of the process.
Alternative governance practices (in this case, mediation) were neither
actively supported by top-level management, nor by formal institutions
defining the code of conduct of officials. The latter was delivering the
content for a professional ethos confessed by city officials directly
involved in the process. They perceived mediation as an “inappropriate”
way in which to handle cases. This particular situation illustrates an issue
that is central for governance. The movement towards governance does
not mean the sidelining of the role of government, but rather increasing
public participation that will allow the government to achieve its goals
(Pierre and Peters 2000; McLaverty 2011). Government steers the pro-
cess, with participative decision-making by non-governmental actors
who implement strategic objectives (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). In the
case under consideration, the government representative (the Vice

President) stepped back from a steering role in order to hand it over to a
non-governmental actor (PSA). Two years later, the director of the Social
Communication Department critically reflected on this decision:
City authorities cannot act as a party [of a dispute], but rather they should
act as a mediator. They need to encourage mediation or consultation. In
this case, the PSA made a mistake, because they took over the role that
should have been performed by authorities. Those who take decision need
to invite and listen to the public. (interview, June 2013)
5.5 H
ow Does Change Happen? Looking
for a Favourable Configuration
Between Leadership, Structure
and Environmental Pressures
The new Vice President who entered the scene in the autumn of 2011 put
the above mentioned guideline into practice. Contrary to his predecessor,
he took over the responsibility for the process and was confident about the
steps to take. Within one month, he contacted the Municipality Council,
met merchants’ representatives and formed a working group whose task
was to develop a plan for the area. From the very beginning, he defined the
problem as requiring participatory approach, multijurisdictional and
multi-level governing. His actions were not a result of external or intra-
organizational pressures for participatory governance, or at least they were
not their main driving force. He felt confident when acting within and
through networks. This confidence had two sources: a strong conviction
that it was the right thing to do, combined with the knowledge and com-
petences necessary to overcome problems linked to governing the silos
structures of city authorities. His individual capabilities and way of thinking
could find support in the patterns of thinking and acting already present
(though not dominant) within the structures of city administration. An
interpretation below illustrates how the two elements—structure (institu-
tions understood as patterns of thinking and acting) and agency (individual
orientations)—made problem-solving possible.
First, the new Vice President’s agency was enhanced by his individual

capacity to ensure multijurisdiction and multi-level governance.
Before I became the Vice President, I was the head of a department whose
operation depended entirely on cooperation: it was responsible for acquiring
European funds. I can tell you that we went through hell. It was OK if I spoke
to someone and the person understood that I needed something from them
and they needed something from me. But if the head of the department
was …reluctant… a phone call to the President was necessary. The President
had to persuade the person to work with me. (interview, June 2013)
The practice of horizontal coordination and inclusion was enhanced

by his way of thinking about the governing processes. He actually believed
that participatory democracy was the right way to manage the city.
Interestingly, in his reasoning he does not refer as much to values behind
the concept as to the certainty that participation is the present and the
future of city governance.
The world is changing (…) even 10 years ago, no one would think about
participation [neither stakeholders nor officials]. The city is evolving, each
structure is becoming more civilised itself (emphasis added). I do not believe
this could be stopped. Whoever comes after cannot reverse this trend, as it is
more likely rather to deepen. It is like a historical necessity. If someone tries
to reverse it, they will fail. In 2008, we introduced the practice of document
consultation. Until then, nothing had been consulted. The iron rule of rep-
resentative democracy was enacted. Many would say “There are councillors
in municipalities and so on…they represent people” You could ask anyone
about it in 2006, and the answer would be “we have municipality council-
lors, why would we need to consult anyone?”. (interview, June 2013)
As testified by the above story about the decision-making process

regarding Green Market, participatory approaches to governance were
not deeply institutionalized within city organization, neither informally
(e.g. in ways of thinking) nor formally (e.g. in regulations). This is why
the Vice President’s ‘There-Is-No-Alternative’ narrative should rather be
treated as a strategic measure than as a description of reality. While resort-
ing to this narrative, the new Vice President performed a form of institu-
tional work. He questioned and, to a certain extent, ridiculed the old
(but still dominant) governing method as ‘uncivilized’ and obsolete,

while justifying and presenting as obvious new ways of thinking and act-
ing, which may be present in public administration, but not deeply
rooted. Interestingly, as an argumentative weapon, instead of having
recourse to values behind participatory democracy, he used the threat of
‘lagging behind’. He admitted that some officials and politicians contin-
ued to think that old ways and rules were better.
In 2006, you would hear such opinion everywhere. They would argue in
favour of the iron rule of representative democracy. They would mock par-
ticipatory approaches by saying “oh, yes, if we do direct participation why
should we even keep councillors?” I hear such voices now but no one dares
to say it aloud. (interview, June, 2013)
During the first phase of the conflict, when the first Vice President was
in charge, the ideals of participatory democracy were leveraged by public
administration officials in an instrumental way. These ideals were still
neither widely shared nor used as guidance and applied. Authorities even
used the ‘we have learnt’ mantra (Hood 2000), when trying to indicate
that they drew a lesson from a failure of not including the public into the
decision-making process. However, the inability to take any decisions for
over two years suggests that they might learn what not to do (single loop),
yet remain unable to learn what to do differently (double loop).
When the second Vice President was in charge, the participatory rhet-
oric was already in place. In this sense, what had previously been used as
a façade, started to be filled with relevant content. Fake learning opened
up a path for true learning.
5.6 Institutional Void as Governance Void:

An Institutional Entrepreneur Meets
an Institutional Leader
The case recounted above illustrates how the values and the rhetoric of par-
ticipatory approaches were (ab)used in order to regain legitimacy for hierar-
chical, top-down planning. Public agency (city administration) was perfectly
capable of accommodating these diverse approaches to governance.
Experiences of the head of Social Communication Department (SCD) are

a good example of how these different lines of reasoning coexist.
The creation of our department [in 2008] was a portent of change in the
approach to governing. Within the organizational structure, we [SCD]
were placed right beneath the President. It was a high rank. On the other
hand, no one would provide us with necessary resources to grow. (…) We
are an off department: internally we are not perceived as part of administra-
tion, rather as an extension of NGOs. (interview, June 2013)
Creating a department without providing it with the necessary resources is
a clear sign that its responsibilities are not perceived as crucial. Yet, the
department was able to grow very quickly, owing to the director’s ability to
get external funding (EEA grants) for project developing public consulta-
tion practices in the city and within individual municipalities. During the
interview the director stated: “You can write it explicitly: if the funding
from Norwegian grants [EEA grants] had not been provided, we would
have never accomplished so much in such a short period of time. Of course,
political will needs is crucial. There needs to be a leader who wants these
changes to happen.” (interview, June 2013)
As experience with the two Vice Presidents proves, both lines of rea-
soning (the one based on hierarchy and the one based on participation)
were fully operational. As the old, hierarchical ways remain the default
option, whether the new way of governing will be enacted depends solely
on the mobilization and purposive efforts of its supporters within the
organizational structures of the administration. Yet, until governance
practices are not codified in the form of procedures or regulations, or
expected ways of performing responsibilities defined for specific organi-
zational position, they take place within an institutional void. The Vice
President explains:
The problem is it is mainly the President, and Vice President only to a

lesser extent, can coordinate this caste-like structure [of city administra-
tion]. On the level of heads of departments, this capacity [to coordinate]
is not developed at all, because they are not used to coordinate, they are
not even held accountable for it. It depends upon individual knowledge
and skills whether the director recognizes that a certain situation requires
that a supervisor, or head of another department will be involved. But

most of the time, they are used to perform their particular tasks by
default. Reversing it today, after so many years, is very difficult. (inter-
view, June 2013)
The governance process is therefore hand-controlled and pushed for-

ward by an individual (the Vice President) who has both power and polit-
ical will. This individual becomes an institutional entrepreneur who: (1)
initiates various changes; and (2) actively participates in the implementa-
tion of these changes (Battilana et al. 2009), for example, by questioning
the old ways, providing justification for new ones and, above all, by
enacting the latter. Practicing a new governance mode forced other social
actors—both internal and external to public organization—to confront
these new methods and come up with their own responses. The position
of power made it possible for the new Vice President to force some of the
officials into the new governance mode. Others, who already tried to
work according to this new logic, received substantial support and could
further learn and improve their practice.
The situation described above provides an interesting counterpoint to
Philip Selznick’s (1957) idea of institutional leadership adopted to
describe leadership positions in public administration. Selznick sees lead-
ership in public administration as the promotion and protection of
values. He suggests that the process of institutionalization occurs as lead-
ers respond to internal and external forces that exert pressure on organi-
zations. The existence of multiple governance logics, and hence multiple
values represented by each mode splits the institutionalization process,
because in the process of governance the number of values that need pro-
motion and protection multiples. In the analysed case, the new Vice
President could be described as both an institutional entrepreneur using
future leaning vision, and an institutional leader promoting and protect-
ing values such as social justice and democracy. As the controversy indi-
cates, each of these values can be interpreted differently depending on the
governance mode adopted by authorities. The new Vice President pro-
motes them within a framework of collaborative and participatory gover-
nance modes (based on networks). Considerations on metagovernance
presented in Chap. 2 of this book suggest that the concept of institutional
leadership within public administration could be extended to include the

promotion of reflexivity, the organization’s ability to critically assess the
act of problem-solving and, when necessary, switch between the lines of
reasoning and interpretations of values, blending them depending on the
situation.
Note
1. In terms of governance and delegation of public services to the non-public
organizations, it is interesting that the intervention was initially con-
ducted by a private security firm hired by a debt collector whose role was
to collect payments that merchants owed to the city. Tear gas inside the
halls was, in fact, used by the private security firm workers, not the police.
References
Hood, Christopher. 2000. The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public
Management. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McLaverty, P. 2011. Participation. In The Sage Handbook of Governance,
Osborne, Stephen, and T. Gaebler. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming Public Sector. New York: Plenum.
Pierre, Jon, and B. Guy Peters. 2000. Governance, Politics and the State.
New York: Macmillan.
Washington, M., Kimberly Boal, and John Davis. 2008. Institutional Leadership:
Past, Present, and Future. In The Sage Handbook of Organizational
Institutionalism, ed. R. Suddaby, K. Sahlin-Andersson, C. Oliver, and
R. Greenwood, 719–733. London: Sage.
6
Institutionalization of Governance
and the Transition from ‘Fake’ Learning
to ‘Real’ Learning: Dispute over
the Modernization of a Wastewater
Treatment Plant and an Incineration Plant
Once the project had been prepared, we held a meeting at the investors’
headquarters. The Mayor of the municipality was present. He made an
emotional speech, saying that ‘no’, that they [inhabitants and municipality
authorities] ‘do not agree [for the modernization]’. Back then I thought that
this person was from another planet. How can one disagree?!
Regional Agency representative, interview, July 2007
6.1 I ntroduction
The public dispute around the wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) is
closely connected to the conflict around the modernization of the market.
Both disputes took place in the same city and overlapped in time. Contrary
to the market case, in which focus shifted between municipality and city
authorities, this case concerns solely changes and processes taking place
A case described in this chapter was also subject of an analysis in a paper ‘Local government and
learning. In search of a conceptual framework’ (Rządca and Strumińska-Kutra 2016).

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6_6
within city administration. It illustrates the process during which new,

participatory governance mode was being institutionalized within the
organizational structures of the city and how it found its way through the
established ways of thinking and acting, eventually becoming part of for-
mal regulations at the city level. The interpretation of this case relies heav-
ily on the institutional concept of isomorphism, as public dispute is
rooted in environmental matters subject to relatively fresh and somewhat
revolutionary changes to national-level regulations. In essence, they were
to empower citizens to participate in environmental decision-making and
to give them access to information about the environment. Here, it is
shown how the conflict infuses these formal regulatory structures with
real-life content or, in other words, how abstract regulations become
inhabited by people (Hallet and Ventresca 2006) who begin to give them
meaning and enact them.

In the face of inadequate wastewater treatment infrastructure, one of
Poland’s largest cities was forced to take steps to expand and modernize
the local facility. The city had to meet environmental standards imposed
by the European Union, and this obligation created a strong pressure. In
1999, the City Council decided to modernize the old WWTP instead of
building an additional facility. From 2000 to 2004, an investor and local
authorities jointly developed the project. By the end of the process,
planners decided to expand the project by adding a waste incineration
plant (IP). The investor was a city-owned firm, in charge of providing
sewage services within the metropolis. The Regional Agency of
Environmental Protection and Water Management (RA) oversaw the
preparation of the project.
In the spring of 2005, the project was presented to the residents of the
neighbouring area. Protests began when the local community realized
that the old facility would not only be modernized, but also expanded in
order to process wastewater from the entire city, and that an IP would be
constructed nearby. The investor launched administrative procedures to
obtain all necessary permits from relevant city authorities (e.g. decision
Institutionalization of Governance and the Transition… 91
on the location of the plant, building permits, acceptance of an

Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA] report, etc.).
Simultaneously, protesters tried to become involved in the decision-
making process. As many participation claims were rejected by the
administration protesters took legal action against the investor and the
city on the grounds of their right to information and participation in
environmental and spatial decision-making process being violated. In the
meantime, the Regional Agency accepted the project, and authorities
applied for financial support from EU funds. By the end of 2005, the
European Commission (EC) approved the project. Any changes were
supposed to be included in the project by the end of September 2006.
The first major public meeting attended by all parties took place in May
2007 in the City Hall. Local authorities organized so-called administrator
trials and invited two experts to present their opinions on the planned
facilities and answer questions from the public. A month later, the
President issued an agreement on the construction of the IP which, in
consequence, escalated local protests. Municipality authorities also became
involved: not only did they express their support for the protesters, but
promised them legal assistance if they decided to claim damages.
In January 2008, city authorities broadened the scope of competences
of a small unit responsible for communication with the public (Social
Communication Department, SCD). With its new position within the
organizational structure, it became an independent unit subordinated
directly to the President. Its new tasks included building connections and
consultation structures with municipalities of the city.
In the summer of 2008, city authorities established the Social Council
in charge of monitoring the investment process (i.e. commissioning inde-
pendent expert opinions regarding projects developed by the contractor).
Members of the Council were stakeholders involved in the conflict, and
several scientists. The Protesters’ Committee (PC), the first organization
created by protesting inhabitants, refused to become involved in the
Council’s work.
Between 2009 and 2011, major construction works took place. The
facility became operational in early 2012. In the meantime, PC’s activi-
ties slowed down and, eventually, ceased altogether. In 2010, the Social
Communication Department established the Public Consultation
Platform, a register of all past (since 2008) and current consultation pro-
cesses, fully accessible to the public. In 2013, the President of the city
issued a decree defining public consultation; by virtue of this document,
each consultation process held by the city administration was to be
announced on the Public Consultation Platform. For a detailed chronol-
ogy of events see Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Chronology of key events—dispute over the modernization of WWTP

Date Developments in the Polish system of local government
relevant to the case
The 1990s Decentralization reform in 1999, introduction of a self-
and the government system: city (headed by a President) and
early 2000s municipality (headed by a Mayor)
Law adjustments in preparation for Poland’s accession to the EU:
laws regulating access to public information (2001), public
participation in environmental decision-making and spatial
planning (2001), environmental impact assessment reports
(2001 and 2008)
Date Case-specific events
1998 Establishment of the Centre for Communication and Social
Dialogue as an administration unit within city authorities
1999 The City Council decides to modernize the old WWTP
2000–2004 The city-owned sewage service firm (investor) and city
authorities prepare the project under the supervision of the
Regional Agency (RA)
2004 The investor integrates an additional facility (a waste IP) into
the project
Spring 2005 The investor and city authorities present the project to the
residents of the municipality
The residents and a local NGO establish Protesters’ Committee (PC)
RA approves the project
The investor applies for EU funding
Summer The investor initiates administrative procedures at the level of
2005 city administration. City authorities deny some of the
protesters the right to be participate in the decision-making
process
Autumn City authorities issue first construction permits for the project
2005 Protesters file lawsuits against the investor and the city
Winter The EU grants financial support to the project
2005/06 The Municipality Council issues an official letter demanding the
city to desist from implementing the project and calling for the
construction of a new facility elsewhere
(continued)
Autumn Local elections to city and municipality authorities. A PC

2006 representative becomes a member of the Municipality Council
The new President of the City—despite of initial support for
protesters—puts the project out for bidding
Winter The investor organizes an Open Day at the site of the project
2006/07
May 2007 Authorities organize a major public meeting (administrative
trial) in the City Hall
June 2007 The President signs a permit for the construction of the IP in the
unchanged form
Municipality authorities declare their support for the protesters
and sign an agreement with the President and the investor’s
representative regarding the development of sewage
infrastructure within the municipality
The investor hires a professional mediator
Jan 2008 Broadening of the competences of the Centre for
Communication and Social Dialogue (new name: Social
Communication Department, SCD). The ambit of the Centre’s
responsibilities now includes systematic documentation of all
public consultations
June 2008 The President puts the IP project out for bidding
July 2008 The Social Council is created by city authorities and the investor.
The PC refuses to join it
2009–2011 Major construction works at the WWTP. PC’s activities slow
down and eventually cease
2010 The CSC establishes the Public Consultation Platform, a register
of all past (since 2008), and current consultation processes
freely accessible to the public
2012 The project is finalized
2013 The President of the city issues an act defining public
consultation; each consultation process held by city authorities
is now required to be published on the Public Consultation
Platform
6.3 Institutional Change and Local

Governance Learning
The following analysis is structured according to Coleman’s logic of
explanation, although I begin from its middle step that is, I first focus
on the organizational level, where old and new ways of governing meet
through the interaction of public administration officials, company
representatives, and protesters. Then, the impact of macro-level cir-

cumstances (formal, national, or European institutions) on interactions
is explored. I subsequently investigate the institutional structure emerg-
ing from the process. Finally, I reflect on the process of institutional
change from the perspective of learning.
Interactions at the Micro and Meso Level in the Context of an Organization

and the Organizational Field In the early stages of the WWTP planning
process, public participation was not even considered; this approach was
in line with the common, hierarchical logic that used to govern the
administrative practice. An official from the Regional Agency supervising
the technical design of the project in 1999–2005 recalls that the two
conditions considered necessary for project development at the time were
met: ‘the company owned a plot of land; the City Council adopted a
resolution ratifying modernization and building plans’. When stakehold-
ers external to the formal process made their initial requests to participate
in the decision-making process, their demands were perceived not only as
illegitimate, they were surprising. The diagnosis formulated by the medi-
ator employed by the investment firm at a later stage of the process (in
June 2007) is consistent with this line of interpretation:
Consultations are supposed to be understood as participation at the very

beginning of the process. Here, no attempts were made to involve the
inhabitants of the municipality. Maybe (…) decision-makers thought that
nobody would oppose an investment of such importance for the city. (local
newspaper, September 2008)
At the beginning, when dealing with the protests, local authorities

used a legalist frame, i.e. had recourse solely to administrative and judi-
ciary procedures. First, they argued that the process took place in compli-
ance with legal requirements. Second, based on the results of the EIA
report regarding the investment, officials denied some of the stakeholders
the right to participate in administrative procedures. It significantly esca-
lated the conflict, as the right to become a party depended on a range of
externalities defined in the EIA report, which in this case was commis-
sioned and financed by the investor. Therefore, the right to become a

party potentially depended on the investor and, in this case, on the city.
At that point, inhabitants and their associations started filing lawsuits.
The intensity of the protest forced the local administration to imple-
ment formal national and European requirements regarding information
and public participation. Protesters would mercilessly point out regula-
tion breaches and mistakes made by city administrators. Officials respon-
sible for the process began to look for new solutions to the problem. By
that time, participatory institutional arrangements, already in place in
accordance with formal requirements, had hardly been applied. However,
in the new situation they became a potentially useful tool for contacts
with protesters.
The most important among these arrangements was the Centre for
Communication and Social Dialogue, created in 1998 as a small city
administration unit in charge of communication with NGOs. In January
2008, city authorities broadened the scope of competences of the Centre
and transformed it into an independent unit within the organizational
structure (subordinated directly to the President). The unit, now called
the Social Communication Department, was entrusted with new tasks,
inter alia, building connections and consultation structures with munici-
pality authorities.
Starting from 2007, the investor and city officials developed a compre-
hensive information and consultation policy. It involved press confer-
ences, open days at the WWTP, the publication of leaflets and brochures,
an interactive information platform, and opinion surveys. Residents
gained access to a plethora of participatory tools and mechanisms, many
of them introduced for the first time in the city’s history, for example, the
creation of a special post within the company’s executive board (the
Board’s Plenipotentiary for Social Obligations), the organization of meet-
ings with parties (like the administrative trial), the establishment of the
Social Council in charge of monitoring investment, and—last but not
least—the employment of a mediator.
However, none of the participatory mechanisms proved to function as
expected by city authorities and the company. The PC refused to delegate
a representative to the management board and to participate in the Social
Council. Any invitations to dialogue were regarded suspiciously, which is

best illustrated with the Committee’s response to an open letter from the
company:
An invitation directed to the residents of the area where the investment is

planned should be the very first step of a government who wishes to solve
the problem of wastewater management in the city. We still lack crucial
information about the investment. We do not and will not take part in an
investment that has not been accepted by the community. (March 2007,
the webpage of the Protesters’ Committee)
In addition to conflicts of interest, stakeholders were torn by stark

conflicts of values and divergent perceptions of good governance. The
protesting community referred to input legitimacy based on participa-
tory democracy:
Civil state is a state in which local communities feel as owners and manag-
ers. Their power to decide about their own habitat is a cornerstone of
democracy. Here, civil and self-governing activity of inhabitants was dis-
dained, their dignity and freedom crushed. (June 2007, an open letter in
response to the issuing of the building permit for the IP)
The output legitimacy of hanging on to arguments of cost efficiency

and environmental effects delivered by the city did not suffice. Protesters
felt deprived of agency and left alone with their concerns, mainly their
fear of the negative impact of the project on health. New participatory
methods and tools simply failed to deal with these problems.
From Macro to Meso and Micro: Macro-Level Institutions Influencing the

Process Institutions empowering stakeholders in decision-making played
a central role in the process. National regulations guarantee to citizens
the right to information and participation in matters regarding the envi-
ronment and spatial planning. They provide for the right to participate in
decision-making processes and any rights relating to claims for damages.
Protesters referred to the above in their strategic actions aimed at under-
mining the purpose and legitimacy of the investment. Pressure exerted by
stakeholders was further amplified by another institutional arrangement,

namely the requirement of public participation and consultation in rela-
tion to projects financed by the EU. A city official stated the following in
an interview in 2008:
In the case of projects financed by the EU, environmental impact assess-

ment procedures are slightly different than normal. We have implemented
a whole range of new instruments so, from the formal point of view, I do
think that a lot more has been done than in other investments of a compa-
rable size. (interview, March 2008)
The above quotation is an example of juxtaposing ordinary public

administration procedures with requirements imposed by formal regula-
tions on public information and participation. In addition to these types
of coercive pressures (i.e. coming from legal sources), examples of norma-
tive pressures (i.e. coming from normative orientations of professional
groups) have been identified in the available data. The same official
explained:
City authorities participated in a European project regarding commu-

nication problems related to large investments. Each of the many par-
ticipating cities presented a project that we subsequently discussed:
what could be done, how should communication with local residents
be organized, what mistakes had been committed. We shared our
experiences and tried to find optimum solutions for each project.
New impetus for the creation of the Social Communication

Department was given by the EEA Grants, which offered money for pub-
lic consultation processes. In 2013, the first SCD director stated:
It was a happy coincidence that just at the beginning of our operation,

money from EEA Grants became available. We would never get such fund-
ing from the city (…) back then, it was not considered a fundamental
need. (interview, June 2013)
Training for public administration professionals and financial support

for specific, innovative projects illustrate how macro-level institutions
organize learning of the new governance mode and provide opportunities
for the diffusion of new practices.
From Micro to Meso and Macro: Institutionalization The analysis of the

implementation of participatory methods by the local administration
and the company demonstrates that they were treated, above all, instru-
mentally, as actions aimed at regaining and defending the legitimacy of
the project. New ways of acting were accompanied by old ways of think-
ing. The emerging institutional hybrid was the outcome of both: strategic
actions undertaken in power struggles and inertia typical of institutional
structures.
Firstly, public administration and the investor strategically applied

participatory tools to regain legitimacy for decisions that had already
been taken. All core features of the project were designed in a hierarchical
and technocratic process by 2005. As a matter of fact, they were irrevers-
ible; administrative procedures were already in progress, the EU financ-
ing had been approved, and changes were no longer possible given the
approaching deadline for the modernization of the wastewater manage-
ment infrastructure set by the EU. Crucial decisions were made without
the participation of the public; as a result, the process entered a lock-in
phase almost directly, and the conflict itself became unresolvable
(Schreyögg et al. 2011). During the administrative trial at the City Hall,
a representative of regional authorities who supervised the project
addressed the problem in an inconveniently straightforward way:
The European Commission is not ready to accept any changes to the proj-

ect. The programme for 2004–2006 is closed. It is not legally possible [to
introduce changes]. For technical reasons, the IP needs to be located in the
vicinity of the WWTP. It is time to tell the truth to the inhabitants and
treat them seriously. (field notes, May 2007)
As the public agency and the investor could not regain legitimacy
through the incorporation of any substantial changes into the project,
they launched an advertising campaign, which included survey results

proving that “the majority of residents support the WWTP” (local news-
paper, July 2007) and reports from Open Days organized at the WWTP,
featuring the statements of visitors who expressed their positive impres-
sions: “I feel much more confident after visiting the plant. It’s so clean
and tidy” (investors’ webpage, February 2007).
Secondly, the emerging institutional hybrid was the result of institu-
tional inertia. Actors implementing new institutions were cognitively and
normatively embedded in old structures. A city official who actively par-
ticipated in training sessions and workshops on public participation criti-
cally summarized the process in an interview conducted in 2008:
Many mistakes were made (…) Decision-makers perceived it more as pro-

paganda than a tool for establishing real contacts with the locals.
In an interview sponsored by the investor and published in a local

newspaper, the Minister of Regional Development concluded:
Protests can usually be accounted for by the fact that people learn about an
investment, such as a road or an IP after a formal decision has been taken.
It should be the other way around. Education first, decisions next. (local
newspaper, March 2007)
Equating consultation or participation with education indicates that

some officials (and politicians) did not follow the logic of participatory
governance despite having adopted some of its practices.
The institutional form that emerged from the conflict was a hybrid
containing aspects of both new and old governing methods. In short,
adapting to external pressures was only superficial, new actions were
accompanied by old ways of thinking, and there was a gap between for-
mal policies and actual organizational practices. Eventually, protests were
marginalized and the investment drew to a close—with a two-year
delay—in 2012. Yet, changes introduced into the organizational struc-
ture of public agency, as well as the knowledge gained in the process and
practices adopted during the conflict, have left an important legacy in the
form of organizational background for further growth and the question-
ing of the logic of hierarchical governance, thus far taken for granted.
These opportunities were not wasted: in an interview held five years after

the establishment of the Social Communication Department, its first
director explained:
If someone had told me back then—in 2008—that in 2013, we would

have participatory budgets in all municipalities of the city, I would have
called him a lunatic. Currently, the SCD coordinates and facilitates public
consultation within the city and liaises with social communication depart-
ments of municipality authorities that have emerged in the meantime.
Officials come to us as soon as any problem comes to light, e.g. a potential
public protest. They also contact us about conflicts and we facilitate the
mediation process. (interview, June 2013)
The process of public consultation was gradually formalized. Since

2008, all public consultations have been documented. Reports, statistics,
as well as information on ongoing projects are publicly available on the
Public Consultation Platform (established in 2010 with financing from
EEA Grants). In 2013, the city’s President issued a decree defining public
consultation; pursuant to this act, any public consultation held by city or
municipality authorities had to be announced on the Platform.
6.4 Introducing Learning into an Institutional

Perspective
The process of institutionalization described in the previous section
occurred in parallel to the process of learning within public agency.
Stakeholders challenged the legitimacy of routine activities in investment
planning. The official from the RA described his first encounter with the
protesters as follows:
We held a meeting at the investors’ headquarters. The Mayor of the munici-

pality was present. He made an emotional speech, saying that “no”, that they
[inhabitants and municipality authorities acting as their representatives] ‘do
not agree for the modernization’. Back then I thought that this person was
from another planet. How can one disagree?! (interview, June, 2007)
The process of learning, therefore, began with a feeling of surprise pro-

voked by confrontation with alternative definitions of the situation and
with resulting claims. The new definition disrupted institutionalized pat-
terns of thinking and behaving deployed by the public agency to deal
with the problem, that is, wastewater management difficulties. In their
initial reaction, authorities followed the strategy of “more of the same”
(single-loop learning). Procedural and legal rules were used to legitimize
the exclusion of stakeholders from the decision-making process and to
prove that all legally required measures had been taken, that is all infor-
mation obligations had been complied with and the comments of those
entitled to participate in the administrative process were responded to.
Yet, stakeholders began to mobilize and organize. They defined the same
legal and procedural rules more broadly in terms of their participatory
and democratic aspects. They decided to fight for participation using the
media and courts but, above all, by referring to legal participatory
institutions.
Authorities gradually changed the logic behind their actions by imple-
menting a range of participatory mechanisms. Common, hierarchical
ways of decision-making were partially replaced with new, participatory
methods. This phenomenon can also be described as a learning process
directed at double-loop and explorative learning.
The analysis of the case suggests that the goal of learning is not neces-
sarily to gain excellence in the delivery of public goods and services, but
rather to acquire new tools and arguments in the struggle over legiti-
macy and control in a specific policy domain. Gilardi and Radaelli
(2012) call learning for the sake of legitimacy, not focused on improving
policy performance, ‘symbolic learning’, while learning aimed at main-
taining control is referred to as ‘political learning’. In the case analysed,
both forms of learning can be observed, as well as the emergence of an
institutional hybrid. The hybrid contains tension between the espoused
participatory theories and theories-in-use (Argyris and Schön 1978).
The hybrid nature displays through the blend of old and new. A new
practice like participation is framed as education, that is, stakeholders of
the process are educated on the advantages of decisions already taken.
Interestingly, political and symbolic learning triggered processes of dou-
ble-loop and exploratory learning as its side effects. New institutional
structures enabling participatory decision-making were introduced

(SCD, public meetings, information policy). Heads of different depart-
ments among the city authorities broadened the range of workshops and
training sessions available to their employees to include access to public
information and public participation. These structures induced mem-
bers of the organization to communicate with each other and with exter-
nal actors, and to reflect on a potential policy controversy.
The above developments illustrate that the process of institutionaliza-
tion is different and separate from the process of learning, which is not
clearly described in governance learning literature (Gilardi and Radaelli
2012). I propose to regard learning as an intentional activity undertaken
at the individual level, transformed to the meso level through social inter-
actions and the development of shared understanding and practices.
Negotiation and power struggle are parallel to this transition and there-
fore the meso-level effect rarely reflects the intentions of any particular
individual or interest group in an adequate manner. In our case, officials
learnt to use participatory tools for strategic reasons. Nevertheless, even
such ‘fake’ learning resulted in institutional changes, initially unintended
by the subjects of learning. In the case of double-loop learning, based on
the ability to question the appropriateness of originally adopted beliefs
and practices, motivation for learning (e.g. regaining legitimacy) is sec-
ondary. The questioning of the hierarchical logic that has been taken for
granted, and even the superficial introduction of participatory logic, cre-
ates a powerful precedent, forms a basis for building new institutions,
and opens up space for negotiation among all actors involved in the pro-
cess (Rządca, Strumińska-Kutra 2016).
References
Argyris, C., and Donald A. Schön. 1978. Organizational Learning: A Theory of
Action Perspective. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

42 (6): 916–937. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2016.1223632.
7
Governance Failure and Social Trust:
Dispute over Building a Flood
Prevention System
What happened there was the worst possible scenario. In the face of resistance,
they just dropped the issue of barriers. The area is at risk… we have not
drawn any lessons from those events.
A national agency representative, interview, October 2013
7.1 I ntroduction
The barriers, a main object of protests, were part of a larger flood pre-
vention system including for example, dredging of the river, monitoring
of embankments. Inhabitants of the valley were protesting against the
investment because they perceived it as a selective1 approach to the
problem, and as such endangering rather than protecting their liveli-
hoods. They demanded a more complex approach taking into account
the realities of public agencies functioning, which in this case included
budget cuts resulting in long years of negligence in dredging works and
Most of the data used for an analysis of this case were gathered by Robert Rządca (including
fieldwork and collecting of archival documents).

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6_7
maintenance of anti-flood infrastructure and broken promises about the

delivery of financial help after the most recent flood. In the face of pro-
tests, the Marshal called the investment off leaving the problem of secu-
rity unsolved.
Each party involved in the planning and decision-making process con-
siders it a complete failure. The director of the regional-level public
agency responsible for the investment blames it on the public’s propen-
sity to act emotionally rather rationally. During an interview he con-
cluded: “I often think about the valley. Demagogy prevailed instead of
support for the right idea” (interview, October 2013). An academic
expert who participated in the public meeting considered that one of the
main reasons for failure was the lack of understanding of economic con-
straints: “I agree the barrier does not suffice and other things ought to be
done, but we cannot do everything at the same time; it would require
money from the budget” (interview, November 2013). The Mayor who
issued the building permit and supported the investment expressed the
opinion that failure was due to the very organization of meetings.
“Preparation was inadequate. There were so many emotions… I think
experts should be present, but they need to be backed up by people who
have excellent communication skills” (interview, November 2013).
As one could expect, those who opposed the investment point out the
different reasons for the failure of the process. The Mayor of the protest-
ing municipality argues:
I think that the combination of two solutions might be acceptable (system-

atic dredging and barriers). Yet, if someone says it will be done (dredging)
and it is not, I do not believe him. Even when resources are scarce but some-
thing is being done, people see it and take it into consideration. The conflict
escalated, because everything was happening below the radar, without any-
one knowing. Consequently, the project failed. (interview, March 2014)
A local activist stated: “We did not believe them. We will be left to our
own devices. If there was a crisis and no money was available, no other
barriers would be built (except for this one)” (interview, March 2014). A
representative of the central-level public agency responsible for dredging
who attended the meetings but without being actively involved neither
into the investment process reflected:
Governance Failure and Social Trust: Dispute over Building… 107
This issue needs to be re-examined, but in a comprehensive manner. There

must be guarantees that the programme will receive financing (…); what
actually happened was the worst possible scenario. In the face of resistance,
they dropped the issue of barriers. The area is threatened…we have not
drawn any lessons from what has happened. (interview, March 2014)
Those responsible for the investment process still believe that they
either failed in their attempt to convince the public that barriers were
needed, or that the public is immune to rational arguments and the pro-
cess was doomed from the start. For those opposing the investment, the
discussion was not only about barriers, but also about the entire flood
prevention system and hollow promises made by various public agencies
about providing infrastructural and financial help to protect the area
from the flood. These perspectives could not converge in a constructive
discussion without redefining the problem, and therefore redefining the
goals of the public management process. In other words and according to
the theoretical frameworks of good governance, metagovernance, and
learning, some critical reflection was needed in order to question the
methods and goals of the planning process. The reflection did not take
place. The problem remained unsolved.
I attempt to offer an interpretation highlighting institutional and
social factors conditioning the flow of the process. I illustrate how rela-
tively new governance practices, such as the inclusion of the public into
decision-making processes, were infiltrated by traditional—hierarchical
and technocratic—ways of acting and thinking. I trace the significance of
institutional pressures nested in professional attitudes of experts and pub-
lic officials (normative pressures), pressures linked to formal regulations
and procedures (coercive pressures) and pressures related to the observa-
tion of comparable agents and similar cases (mimetic pressures). I try to
capture the result of the process: were governance institutions trans-
formed throughout the controversy? Eventually, I attempt to shed light
on learning processes.
The pre-established theoretical perspective of institutions and learning
seems to be useful in understanding what happened in the case analysed.
Yet, data analysis points to the notion of social trust and its relation to
governance, which emerge as significant. American economist Kenneth
Arrow called social trust “an important lubricant of the social system”.
The case shows that the same holds true for governance systems. In my
view, this case is about governance practices destroying social trust and
about the lack of social trust destroying governance.
7.2 Recount of Events

The Central Valley is located along the middle course of Poland’s longest
river, the Vistula. Flood risk in the area is high. The dam located in a
nearby city slows down the current, which causes increased sedimenta-
tion of materials carried by the river. Due to sedimentation, these stretches
of the river are shallower, and therefore the level of water is higher when
culmination waves arrive. The valley is 40 km long; its width ranges from
over 5 km to 250 m. Total area at risk of flooding exceeds 11,000 ha.
On 23 May, when anti-flood embankments could not hold any more
water, they burst and the valley was flooded. 1500 people—soldiers, fire-
men, and local inhabitants—worked for 30 hours and used 320,000
sandbags to erect a 1200-metre long temporary barrier in order to stop
the water and protect the areas located nearby. The second wave came
two weeks later. It flowed through a breach in the embankment and
flooded the area located ahead of the barrier. Nevertheless, the barrier
saved large areas of land, several small cities, villages, and stretches of
farmland located behind. The idea of constructing permanent flood bar-
riers was brought up again. Initial plans to divide the valley with barriers
perpendicular to the river dated back at least 30 years, to 1982 when
Vistula flooded the area in the winter. Eventually, barriers were not built,
but the Vistula was systematically dredged until the early 1990s, when
financing of the project ceased due to budgetary cuts.
Soon after the flood, many public and private agencies rushed to the
area to help. National authorities promised to buy out the land covered
with sand and no longer suitable for farming. The owner of the h ydropower
plant on the nearby dam cancelled local inhabitants’ energy bills. The
issue of flood prevention and measures taken to recover from the flood
were discussed on numerous occasions during meetings held by local
authorities. The construction of barriers was briefly discussed. In autumn,
one of the inhabitants came across a call for tenders for the construction
of barriers published on the Internet by the investor, a regional-level
agency responsible for flood prevention projects (Regional Agency for
Melioration and Water Management, hereinafter referred to as the
Regional Agency or the investor). When local inhabitants requested more
information, two meetings were held, one with the Mayor and another
with the director of the Regional Agency. During these meetings, it was
explained to the public why barriers were needed. At that time, the num-
ber of barriers to be constructed or the actual stage of the project and its
advancement remained unknown.
In November 2010, local (the central municipality), regional (Regional
Agency for Melioration and Water Management) and national
(Environmental Protection Agency) authorities decided that the first bar-
rier would be built by Central Village, in order to ensure greater flood
protection to the local pumping station. Until the spring of 2011, all
necessary permits were obtained, including the permit issued by the
Mayor of the central municipality where the Central Village is located.2
At that time, the post-flood situation was continually discussed during
Council meetings in the valley area, yet other municipalities were not
officially informed about the plans to build the first barrier. There were
rumours, but local inhabitants were mainly concerned about the lack of
financial support promised by central authorities a year earlier. Assistance
was not provided, as the assessments prepared by province authorities
were called into question. Those who could afford to insure at least part
of their land and crops found out that the procedure of claiming damages
was complicated and that the sums eventually paid out were disappoint-
ing. Nevertheless, in the winter of 2011, the local Municipality Council
in charge of the area located ahead of the planned barrier issued a resolu-
tion calling for the dredging of the Vistula instead of constructing the
barrier. Dredging works were conducted in the summer of 2011; the
inhabitants who carefully observed the process all agreed that the works
were not thorough enough.
Simultaneously, dissent about barriers was growing in local com-
munities. Eventually, one of the inhabitants informally representing
the local community wrote a letter to the Regional Agency protesting
against the idea of barriers, arguing that if the embankment broke,
the barrier would cause a more violent flood and turn the surrounding
area into a polder. An answer came several weeks later in the form of a
detailed description of the project. The Regional Agency also stated that
it was not responsible for the dredging, because national-level authori-
ties represented by the Central Water Management Authority are in
charge of any works related to the river.
A letter distributed among members of the local community triggered
immediate resistance. First, in November 2011, 100 people protested
against barrier construction in Central Village. The director of the
Regional Agency was present and, together with the Mayor of central
municipality, he strove to convince the protesters about the benefits of
the project. In early December, the Regional Agency—in conjunction
with local authorities—organized three meetings at local schools. They
followed the same pattern. Planners would present the project and,
together with the Mayor of central municipality and the director of the
Regional Agency, would try to convince participants that the construc-
tion of barriers would have a positive impact on their safety. Local inhab-
itants would protest, accuse authorities of manipulation, of acting in
their self-interest and lying. Eventually, the investor (the Regional
Agency) decided to organize what was referred to as ‘open consultation’
and ‘debate’. It was attended by over 700 participants: the gymnastic hall
of the local school was packed. The meeting was chaired by the Marshal,
that is, the head of regional authorities (and hence the supervisor of the
Regional Agency and of the investment process). Three experts were
invited to speak to the public. Two planners responsible for project prep-
aration outlined the general idea. None of them was able to finish his
speech. With the tumult and agitation in the hall, the Marshal himself
hardly managed to take the floor. Eventually, he declared: ‘I will not do
anything against the people. If you don’t want barriers, they will not be
built’. Two months later the planning process was discontinued, although
this decision was not officially announced to the local community.
The meeting marked the end of the dispute and of the planning pro-
cess itself. However, the interpretation of the case requires taking into
consideration two events that took place after 30 December. In March
2012, a local association was established in order to protect the Central
Valley. In January 2013, in southern municipality, the Marshal, the
representative of central authorities, and the Mayors held a meeting in

order to discuss the results of efforts taken following the flood and
exchange views on the centrally coordinated Programme for Flood
Prevention in the Region of Central Vistula, where the idea of barriers
reappeared. The Programme was to be subject to public consultation by
the end of 2013. Yet, in the spring of 2013, it was interrupted follow-
ing the suspension of EU grants that were to finance its implementa-
tion. In 2017, plans to build barriers were still sitting in the drawer.
Since 2010, water levels in winter and spring remain high, but are not
a threat to local areas (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 Chronology of key events—dispute over building of a flood prevention

system
Date Events
Winter 1981 Vistula flooded the Central Valley
Plans to divide the valley with barriers (abounded)
Systematic dredging starts (continues until the early 1990s)
Spring 2010 Vistula flooded the Central Valley
Financial and non-financial help promised by central
government
Summer and Flood prevention and measures taken to recover from the
Autumn 2010 flood discussed on numerous occasions during meetings
held by local authorities. The construction of barriers
briefly discussed
Local (the central municipality), regional (Regional Agency)
and central (Environmental Protection Agency)
authorities decided that the first barrier would be built
by Central Village
Spring 2011 The Municipality Council in charge of the area located
ahead of the planned barrier (southern municipality)
issued a resolution calling for the dredging of the Vistula
instead of constructing the barrier
All necessary permits for the investment obtained by the
investor (Regional Agency subordinated to the Marshal’s
office)
Summer 2011 Vice premier visited the area, promised financial help from
the central authorities
The assessments of financial losses prepared by the
province authorities were called into question by central
authorities. Money was not paid
Investment contractor awarded in the bidding
(continued)
Date Events
Autumn 2011 A letter of protest was sent to the Regional Agency
(investor) by an informal local community representative
Investor sends a detailed answer
About 100 inhabitants protest against the barrier at its
potential location
Winter 2011 Three public meetings at the local schools
The local Municipality Council in charge of the area located
ahead of the planned barrier (southern municipality)
issued a resolution opposing the barrier
Spring 2012 Establishing of a local association with the goal to protect
the Central Valley
Winter and Public meeting discussing the centrally coordinated
Spring 2013 Programme for Flood Prevention in the Region of Central
Vistula. Barriers are part of the programme. Organizers:
The Marshal, the Central Authority and the Mayor of
central municipality
Programme interrupted (EU suspends financing)
Autumn 2017 Responsibilities for water management shifted from local
governments to the centrally established agency (the
National Water Agency)
Autumn 2017 The treasury and the authorities of a region located south
from the Central Valley were sentenced to pay damages
for losses caused by the 2010 flood
7.3 O
rganizational and Individual Level:
The Encounter of Old and New Ways
of Governing
The decision to build barriers was taken in a moment of crisis, during the
2010 flood. At that time, a temporary barrier erected by a group of over
1500 people saved large areas from demolition. Once the decision was
taken, the process was set in motion. The public agency acted systemati-
cally: it consulted relevant agencies and obtained all required permits.
According to legal provisions in force in Poland, neither the public nor local
communities need to be consulted or informed until the project is ready.
This is why, when in August 2011 the Mayor of southern municipality was
asked about the barriers by one of the councillors, he answered “I have not
been approach by regional or central authorities. I have heard nothing
about the barriers” (minutes of the Council meeting, August 2011).
The director of the public agency responsible for the investment saw
himself and the agency as reacting in a most transparent and cooperative
manner. They did not hide anything and when asked, they delivered an
in-depth, detailed account; for instance, in the autumn of 2011, in
response to a protest letter sent by a local activist, the public agency
replied with a long description of the project. The letter explicitly stated
that the project and necessary documentation was 70% ready. What one
side saw as cooperation, the other considered manipulation. ‘They did it
in secret’, said the Mayor of the southern municipality during an inter-
view, reiterating accusations that were repeatedly raised during public
meetings.
In the face of public protests, the agency decided to launch the consulta-
tion process. The director of the public agency responsible for the invest-
ment process sees consultation as a way of providing local communities
with knowledge about floods and melioration systems, which allows them
to understand that the proposed solution is suitable. “We have done it as
usual: calmly, argumentatively, providing technical and professional infor-
mation (…) We wanted to explain that we were doing the right thing”
(interview, October 2013). By the end of the interview, apparently irritated
by the memories, he stated: “it is simple: human stupidity is accepted in
order to get some peace, and peace becomes far more important than sup-
port for the idea that could turn out to be right” (interview, October 2013).
Similarly, an expert invited to participate in the public debate regarded
consultation as counterproductive. When describing the formal proce-
dures of infrastructure planning, he stated: “these… public meetings and
discussions, striving towards agreement, it is often the greatest obstacle to
getting things done” (interview, November 2013). Both professionals
accept consultation as yet another obligation that needs to be met. The
public agency director seemed rather confident about how the process
was supposed to be handled: one simply needs to be systematic, organize
meetings with all communities concerned and present the issue in an
argumentative manner. He was upset about the process eventually getting
out of hand: the discussion became emotional and meetings concerning
a particular area were attended by the inhabitants of neighbouring com-
munes, despite clear instructions of the organizers: “we organized meet-
ings, but often outsiders would come to protest” (interview, October 2013).
The second expert—a university professor—complained that regulations

governing public consultation were somewhat confusing, as legal provi-
sions in force do not define the organization of the process.
In the analysed case, although formally conducted, public consultation
was not institutionalized. It is true in particular when values behind the
idea of inclusion are considered. Nobody regarded stakeholders as indi-
viduals who were able to express their opinion and interests in a respon-
sible and informed manner, not to mention admitting that the opinions
and knowledge of some participants might have been used to improve
the project. Formal regulations requiring inclusion, which could theo-
retically be construed as an indicator of the governance approach, were
enacted and interpreted through the traditional lens of a hierarchical and
technocratic approach. In this particular case, the embeddedness of hier-
archical logic made public agency immune to change. Immunity to
change is in this case particularly striking when we consider the intensity
and number of interactions with actors questioning both goals and meth-
ods of the governance process. It became obvious that the problem would
not be solved without changes to process management. However, instead
of looking for new solutions, the public agency decided to withdraw
from the project.
The actors on the opposing side have remained engaged. Even after it
was decided that the barriers would not be built, they continued to fight
for their place in the process of designing and implementing the flood
prevention system. Association members monitor all plans and activities
related to the regional flood prevention policy. They monitor water levels
and regularly check the state of anti-flood embankments and drainage
ditches. Whenever possible, they push local authorities and the central
water management agency for dredging works. They tried to maintain
permanent contacts with all public agencies and non-governmental orga-
nizations involved in flood protection operations. However, their engage-
ment was regarded as inappropriate at each level. The leader of the
association claimed that they were criticized for their “attempts to stick
their nose into everything” (interview, March 2014). She adds: “we (the
association) are not informed about so many things, even though we have
requested it on numerous occasions… Shall I say what I think? I get
information because I do not give up. I am just stubborn”.
Professionals working for the public agency were not able to accommo-
date stakeholders’ engagement because, in institutional terms, they did not
have any ready-made formal or informal procedure (pattern) that would
govern the cooperation. On the one hand, in the absence of general con-
viction about the validity of cooperation with external stakeholders and
solving problems together, there was no motivation to experiment with
new arrangements. On the other hand, it turned the legally required public
consultation into a ritual; it was a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you think it is
counterproductive, this is what it will turn out to be. The case illustrates
the interdependence of formal and informal aspects of an institution.
Without relevant value-based infrastructure, new procedures are at risk of
an inertial drift towards long-established ways of thinking and acting.
7.4 Institutional Result of the Encounter

The public dispute over barriers proves an excellent example of discuss-
ing the benefits of problem-centred governance as opposed to task-focus
public management (Ansell 2011). From the point of view of relevant
regulations, at least three subjects are directly responsible for the man-
agement of flood-related issues in the area. First, on the country level,
there is the Central Water Management Agency responsible for anything
that may happen throughout the course of the river. This agency is
responsible for dredging. Second, there is the Regional Agency for
Melioration and Water Facilities subordinated to the Marshal (head of
the region, the highest level of self-government in Poland) responsible
for major flood prevention facilities, such as embankments and barriers.
Third, there is the municipality responsible for general safety and the
organization of municipality crisis teams, as well as minor water manage-
ment facilities, for example, drainage ditches. This task-based structure
resulted in path dependency of the process (Laws and Forester 2015).
Given that the project involves the construction of barriers, the respon-
sible party is the Regional Agency. They commission the preparation of
the project and, subsequently, submit the project to consultation. Other
tasks related to anti-flood security are left out of the process because they
are someone else’s responsibility. Despite the protests related to the whole
anti-flood system, the agencies were not able to start cooperation. In the
absence of agreement, the Regional Agency called the project off.
However, the analysis of empirical evidence indicates that the public
protest was not so much against barriers as it was against the selective
approach to the flood prevention system. The Mayor says: “if we consid-
ered both…” (interview, March, 2014), the leader of the local commu-
nity claims: “they would just build one barrier and we would be threatened
with an even greater danger than ever before” (interview, March 2014).
In terms of the general idea, planners and experts agree that the problem
required a complex approach. When it comes to management, they sin-
gle out specific security measures. The Regional authority representative
claims that dredging was not their responsibility and points to serious
negligence in this respect over the years, mainly due to the lack of fund-
ing. The professor agrees that dredging was necessary, yet due to insuffi-
cient funds, it was impossible to address all problems at the same time.
The representative of the national agency (responsible for dredging works)
and the Mayor who was in favour of constructing barriers suggested that
a complex programme needed to be designed, even though neither of
them stated who could lead the project.
Thus far, the reaction of public administration to the dissatisfactory
results of flood prevention management is rather typical (see Ansell 2011).
Instead of adopting multijurisdictional solutions based on the governance
idea, they opted for ‘more of the same’, that is, centralization. In 2013, the
competent ministry commissioned the development of a national flood
prevention plan. It was not implemented, as the project did not receive
funding from the EU. In 2017, the national government decided to create
the National Water Agency in charge of water management, which had,
thus far, been the responsibility of local government agencies.
In the meantime, the inhabitants of the area which was flooded in
2010 feel that their safety is nobody’s concern. The association estab-
lished by the local community takes every opportunity to approach the
national agency about dredging works. Its members monitor embank-
ments that from the formal viewpoint fall within the responsibility of the
regional government. Association representatives clear drainage ditches
that, technically speaking, are managed by the municipality. When water
levels are high, they communicate with the crisis management centre in
the municipality, with the fire department, and the meteorological
agency; they act as an information point for the inhabitants. In a sense

they took over the responsibilities of public agencies because they did
not trust that the latter are able to perform the responsibilities well. At
the same time, the feeling of anxiety is constant. The leader of the asso-
ciation recalls a situation when, one Sunday, the Vistula reached alarm-
ing levels.
I received phone calls from people walking along the embankments. They
reported that the water level was very high and asked what they should do,
whether they should prepare for evacuation or not, I called the crisis unit
at the regional agency and was told to call the municipality crisis depart-
ment. Nobody in the municipality answered. I rang the regional agency
unit once again and asked what we should do. The guy did not know, he
told me that he could provide me with information on water levels in the
area. “I know the water level in the area, you need to tell me what we
should do!”. Eventually, he gave me the number of the meteorological
institute in Warsaw. A very nice lady told me that they were monitoring the
situation and she would call me if there was something we needed to do.
Within the association, I am responsible for two municipalities, but this
situation…I cannot be responsible for all of that, you know what I mean?
Institutions regulating flood prevention systems proved to be unable

to solve the problem, because they failed to involve local stakeholders and
to break through the silos structure of public agencies responsible for
different aspects of the problem. Agencies stepped back leaving a void: an
ungoverned space. This space was of great importance for the local com-
munity, and therefore they tried to fill it with their own actions and
attempts to involve responsible public agencies.
7.5 L earning, Governance, and Social Trust

Representatives of the regional agency involved in the process were not
surprised by the protests. They had encountered a similar situation in
2005, when they prepared a plan for a “tiny barrier” (Regional Agency
Representative, interview, October 2013) in the same valley; the
Municipality Council accepted it, but the project was abandoned due to
protests that subsequently broke out. Officials are convinced that—both
in these past events, and in the present situation—local inhabitants have
fallen victim to demagogy. They believe that demagogy should be fought
with reason. First, detailed information was sent in the form of a letter.
Subsequently, meetings were organized and attended by the director him-
self and by planners responsible for the investment to explain the plan to
the public. When this failed, an external expert was invited and sponta-
neous explanations were replaced with structured PowerPoint presenta-
tions. A geology professor delivered a lecture on the role of valley barriers
in limiting the impact of flood. Those responsible for project design pre-
sented as well. The presentation made by one of the planners was entitled
‘Variant macro-levelling of Wloclawek reservoir basin as an essential
flood prevention measure’. The second came up with a more straightfor-
ward title: ‘Rationale behind the barrier project in Central Village’. The
Marshal of the region was asked to host the meeting. Planners hoped that
his authority and reputation would help advance the project. However,
neither expert knowledge nor the Marshal’s authority proved effective.
The professor who participated in the debate recalls:
The marshal used to be a doctor in the local clinic. Locals respect him tre-
mendously and he has done a lot for the area. He hardly managed to get a
word in edgeways! He was almost swearing ‘I would not lie to you, you
know me! I am your man!’ Even he failed to convince them. Then he
wanted us to speak, but people were screaming that they did not want to
hear anything. (interview, November 2013)
When all the improvements did not work the responsible parties were
clueless and eventually stepped back. The Marshal said: “Nothing will be
done against your will: if you do not want barriers, there will be none”
(newspaper article, January 2013). When recounting the meeting, the
professor said he was not surprised by the protest itself, but by its emo-
tional charge. He added:
after the meeting, the director said to me ‘you know what…’ – we know
each other quite well – ‘…it is time to retire. It is not worth trying to con-
vince them, it is not worth doing anything. Trying will only make you sick
and they will not be convinced anyway.’ (interview, October 2013)
Even when reflecting on the situation later on, the regional public
agency director claims that there is only one solution: “Education.
Education for future generations. Youth need to be aware of the flood
risk, of counteracting it and of measures that need to be taken” (inter-
view, October 2013).
At the beginning of the consultation process, when public officials
concluded that they were not able to convince local inhabitants, they
experienced a temporary breakdown, which triggered reflection on action
(Yanow and Tsoukas 2011). Yet, when looking for solutions they reverted
to the most accessible and firmly embedded logic: the logic of top-down
communication. They had a solution (barrier) to the problem (flood) and
what was needed—according to this assumption—was an informed con-
sent of the stakeholders. What they felt they needed to learn was how to
more effectively convince stakeholders that barriers were the right solu-
tion. When closing the discussion about the essence of the problem and
other potential solutions they transformed consultation into a path-
dependent process; its result was a lock in phase (Schreyögg et al. 2011).
Local stakeholders had extensive knowledge about the context in which
the barrier-building project would be implemented. Plans and promises
are made, but often they are not implemented in full; sometimes they are
abandoned altogether. The Vistula was systematically dredged over a
period of 10 years following the 1982 flood, but dredging works were
eventually discontinued after budgetary cuts. Even after the 2010 flood,
funds for dragging have been scarce and the 20-year backlog became so
great that dragging alone would not be enough. Compensation had been
promised, but two years after the flood, it was still not paid and damage
claims were called into question. The state of flood prevention facilities,
such as embankments and drilling ditches, is unsatisfactory. Relevant ser-
vices might not be able to react immediately in case of a future flood. Yet
the stakeholders are expected to trust the planners and believe that the
construction of the first barrier will be followed by subsequent structures
protecting the area. They are expected to trust that a potential evacuation
will be organized immediately and run smoothly. They are asked to trust
that barriers will not be the only flood prevention measure. The Mayor
opposing the construction of barriers asks rhetorically “if someone prom-
ises to do this or that, but is not doing anything, we don’t believe him.
Would you?” (interview, March 2014).
7.6 Epilogue
In October 2017, following a collective lawsuit, the treasury and the
region were sentenced to pay damages for losses caused by the 2010 flood.
They were obliged to pay damages to the inhabitants of the municipality
that suffered most. Similarly, inhabitants of the Central Valley were
promised financial assistance by the government, but they have never
received it. The court found state agencies guilty of neglecting several
types of works (dredging, clearing of the space between the river and
embankments, embankment maintenance and reconstruction) over a
period of one year.
Notes
1. The highest level of local government in Poland. The levels from lowest to
highest are: municipality-province-region.
2. The Central Village, where barriers were planned is located in the central
municipality. The Mayor of the latter supported the project. Little Village
is located in southern municipality. The Mayor of the latter opposed the
project.
References
Laws, David, and John Forester. 2015. Conflict, Improvisation, Governance Street
Level Practices for Urban Democracy. London: Routledge.
1339–1364.
8
Towards a Practice-Based Theory
of Governance Learning
and Institutionalization: A Cross-Case
Analysis
An open form of inquiry, combining pre-existent theoretical perspectives

with detailed investigation and cross-case comparison of real-life public
management processes resulted in the development of a holistic practice-
based framework. The framework illustrates learning of a new governance
mode and the subsequent institutional change. The analysis is grounded
in the new institutionalism in organizational theory and supplemented
with organizational learning concepts and new theoretical insights emerg-
ing from research. Insights are organized as theoretical propositions and
definitions of new theoretical concepts.
Building the linkage between micro, meso and macro levels of analysis is,
among others, a major contribution to the existent body of literature on
public management, governance, and governance learning. Governance
practice is perceived here as a combination of top-down environmental pres-
sures and bottom-up creative responses which, following an initial phase of
relative diversity, gradually become organized into more predictive patterns.
The analysis that shifts between structure (formal and informal rules regulat-
ing behaviour) and agency (individual strategic actions) enables us to capture

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6_8
phenomena central to the process of institutional change and learning in

public administration, that is, (1) the significance of original institutional
environment into which change is introduced; (2) the role of individuals in
particular leaders confronted with pressures and demands for a change; and
(3) institutionalization processes, within which the new mode of governance
is given a specific form and is henceforth taken for granted.
The analysis of cases resulted in the development of theoretical con-
cepts within each of these three areas. In the first area (significance of
original institutional environment), it is argued that coercive pressures
(from legal sources) for governance are not likely to trigger learning,
unless they are complemented with mimetic and normative pressures, that is,
pressures stemming from uncertainty and prompting organizations to
copy what has proven effective, as well as pressures rooted in approaches
and orientations of professional groups. Also within the first area related
to the original institutional environment, the concept of governance void
is introduced. The term draws on the notion of institutional void (Mair
et al. 2012) and is understood as a space where institutional infrastruc-
ture supporting collaborative forms of governance is absent or weak, for
example, there are no ready-to-use tools and procedures coordinating
multilevel or multijurisdictional work or public engagement in
decision-making processes.1 Polish institutional context characterized by
the dominance of hierarchical relationships and high deficits of social
trust provides a useful example of governance void.
Voids become apparent to actors on the ground while they are trying to
manage a public dispute, a phenomenon disrupting their routine practices.
It happens when public officials discover that standard, traditional ways of
proceeding do not get results. The resistance or “backtalk” (Schön 1983,
1987; Yanow and Tsoukas 2009) of material and human environment
causes a range of emotional and cognitive reactions like fear, puzzlement,
and frustration; for comparison see John Forester’s work on practice of plan-
ning and conflict resolution (Forester 2009, 2013). This is where the role of
individuals and leaders is explored. Public officials’ reactions to disruption
are analysed through the concept of reflexive practice and the phenomenon
of surprise (Schön 1983, 1987; Yanow and Tsoukas 2009), closely linked to
the organizational learning perspective. Following an analysis of surprise phe-
nomenon in a collective setting, I suggest that surprise can be understood as a
Towards a Practice-Based Theory of Governance Learning… 123
cognitive state caused by a disruption of institutionalized patterns of think-

ing and behaviour deployed by a (public) organization in order to deal with
a specific (social) problem.2 Surprise is regarded as a prerequisite of gover-
nance learning, a trigger for innovation with new roles and new procedures
in managing the dispute and the social problem behind it (Rządca and
Strumińska-Kutra 2016). Yanow and Tsoukas’ theorizing of practitioners’
response to surprise is supplemented with withdrawal from problem-solving.
This type of response is likely to emerge when the community of practitio-
ners and experts is homogenous in their professional orientations, which
here are either hierarchical, quasi-market, or New Public Management-like
approaches to governance. This kind of homogeneity reinforces the lan-
guage of certainty (Yanow 2009) about the way in which to manage a cer-
tain problem, inhibits learning based on critical inquiry into practice, and
limits motivation to improvise and experiment.
Further on, through reference to concepts of institutional entrepreneur-
ship and institutional work, it is shown how double-loop learning and
subsequently institutional change are triggered by individuals. For some
individuals, governance voids and top-down institutional pressures create
an opportunity to follow their values and expand their resources. The
analysis illustrates how public organization leaders, as well as other actors
representing public agencies resort to diverse institutional arrangements
and use bits and pieces from local organizational, political, and commu-
nity spheres to fill governance voids. I further describe how interactions
of diverse actors and their relationships (e.g. low levels of social trust)
result in specific patterns and forms of governance institutionalization.
In this chapter, the interpretation of cases is organized as follows. It
starts with examining the role environmental pressures played in learning
and in the institutionalization of a new governance mode within public
agencies under consideration. Using the analytical tools of institutional
perspective, I investigate the significance of changes in international and
national milieus (e.g. the World Bank or the European Union, national
government and its experts), which previously insisted on the economic
effectiveness of public services and currently tend to promote inclusive-
ness and “good governance” (Kordasiewicz and Sadura 2017). I observe
how these changes are translated into the level of local governance prac-
tices through legal acts (coercive pressures), educational institutions
shaping knowledge and attitudes of professionals (normative pressures),

and through observing the examples of other public administration enti-
ties enacting public governance rules (mimetic pressures).
Then I link these pressures to the micro-level individual learning pro-
cesses. The analysis illustrates how public administration workers couple
their practices with environmental pressures, how they learn to practice
governance and how the type of learning adopted by an individual is
grounded in diverse configurations of institutional pressures. It is argued
that workers use diverse institutional logics and local meanings creatively,
depending on their professional commitments, location within the orga-
nizational structure, personal interests, power position, and interactional,
on-the-ground decision-making (Binder 2007).
In the next phase of the analysis, the attention shifts from individuals
per se to their interactions, within which new approaches to governance
are negotiated and become gradually grounded in professional practice,
organizational procedures and structures, as well as legal provisions in
place. Following the ‘inhabited institutions’ approach, I picture the meso-
level organizational order as emerging from social interactions, and orga-
nizations as places where people and groups make sense of, and interpret
institutional vocabularies (Binder 2007).
Throughout the analysis, the meso-organizational level is the focus of
attention. Yet, the analytical practice could be compared to alternating pro-
cesses of zooming in and zooming out. For the analysis, it is crucial that
organizations are embedded in a specific field where new governance prac-
tices are shaped in the process of interactions with external stakeholders:
citizens, politicians, community representatives, NGOs, businesses, and
other public agencies operating at different administration levels. All actors
creatively enact new and old institutions that constitute a given field.
Therefore, I begin by tracing environmental influences on the organization.
The process of gradually zooming in leads to individuals and their everyday
practices. I then zoom out in an attempt to capture the institutionalization
process within which an activity that belongs to the individual level (such
as learning) is transformed to reach the meso level through social interac-
tions and development of shared understanding and practices.
8.1 F rom Legal Regulations Enabling

Governance to the Practice
of Governance: The Complementary
Nature of Environmental Pressures
for Governance
In Chap. 2, I argue that pursuant to empirical research, the governance
turn is observed in many Western and CEE countries (Denters 2011)
and that this simultaneous co-evolution of similar patterns of rule in
public administration can be perceived as a process of institutional
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The new institutionalism
approach identifies general environmental factors influencing similarities
in changes adopted on the organizational level. These factors, influencing
change and homogenization, are grouped into three types of institutional
pressures towards isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative.
Pressures are vehicles through which the disjunction between the values
held by society and the behaviour of an organization is erased. In other
words, within the perspective of new institutionalism, changes in pat-
terns of rule can be interpreted as a result of growing expectations for
more responsive and inclusive public governance. In the following con-
siderations, I investigate the impact of these pressures on governance
learning processes.
Table 8.1 presents a general overview of cases with the use of four
categories central to the overall analysis: inclusiveness and effectiveness
of the public management process, presence of learning, presence of dif-
ferent types of pressures, and institutionalization of a new collaborative
governance mode. As the analysis will demonstrate, the sole existence of
coercive pressure for new governance modes does not guarantee an effec-
tive learning of new governance practices. Absence of mimetic and nor-
mative pressures effectively blocks learning processes and—in the long
run—hinders institutionalization of new public governance as a practice
implementing effectiveness and inclusiveness. When positive examples
in the organizational field are lacking (mimetic pressures), and there are
no professionals who would be (at least partially) socialized within the
governance framework (normative pressures), the new governance mode
126
Table 8.1 Institutional pressures, learning, and institutionalization of governance. Cross-case comparison
Case 4: anti-flood
Case 1: schools Case 2: market Case 3: WWTP facilities
Effectiveness Was the problem solved Yes Yes Yes No
M. Strumińska-Kutra
(service or product
delivered)?
What was the overall Medium High Medium Low
satisfaction with the
solution (H-M-L)?
Inclusiveness Were stakeholders Yes Yes Yes Yes
involved in decision-
making process?
Was their voice No Yes No No
respected and were
they invited to work
out solutions?
Coercive pressure Presence of legal Yes Yes Yes Yes
regulations requiring/
enabling the inclusion
of various actors into
policy-making and
policy
implementation?
Normative Presence of No Yes Yes No
pressure professionals educated
‘in the spirit’ of
inclusive approaches to
public governance?
Mimetic pressure Examples of new Yes Yes
No No
governance practices
in the organizational
field?
Learning Presence of reflexive No Yes Yes No
practitioners (public
agency rep)
performing double-
loop learning?
Institutionalization Outcomes for Institutionalized Advancing institutionalization that Institutionalized as a

governance as a top-down integrates top-down and top-down ruling
ruling mode bottom-up coordination. Low mode. Lack of
Towards a Practice-Based Theory of Governance Learning…
with incidental institutionalization of horizontal institutionalization

bottom-up coordination (multijurisdictional) of horizontal
elements coordination
127
drifts into the direction of already established patterns of hierarchical or

quasi-market patterns of rule. The tendency is illustrated by the arrows
in the table (see Table 8.1).
The first two categories included in the table relate to the value-based
promise of public governance to make public management both effective
and inclusive (democratic). By using simple indicators combining objec-
tive and subjective aspects, I assess the effectiveness and inclusiveness of
public dispute resolution and accompanying attempts to solve the social
problem that forms the backdrop of the dispute. Effectiveness is assessed
on the basis of whether a public service and/or product were eventually
delivered and through measuring the overall satisfaction of the parties
involved. Low satisfaction means that none of the parties was satisfied
with the solution. This was a case of anti-flood facilities, where all stake-
holders, including public officials, perceived the process and its outcomes
as a complete fiasco. Medium satisfaction means that the degree of satis-
faction varies between parties. Examples are the cases of schools and the
WWTP, where public officials were satisfied, but some of the stakehold-
ers felt harsh disappointment with the way the process was handled and
with its outcomes. High satisfaction means the contentment of all parties
involved. This was the case of the dispute over the location of the market.
The inclusiveness of the process was assessed on the basis of two dimen-
sions. The first is involvement of stakeholders in decision-making (e.g.
inviting them to meetings, seeking their opinion); the second dimension
is about openness of the process towards the inclusion of the stakehold-
ers’ perspective and their voice in relation to the definition of the prob-
lem and the development of a solution. In all cases, stakeholders
took part in the decision-making process. However, in most cases, the
stakeholders’ views neither changed the way in which the problem was
perceived by public officials, nor did their perspective matter for solu-
tions eventually proposed within the process. The exception was the mar-
ket case, where merchants and local community representatives were
eventually invited to join a collaborative process of working out a solu-
tion development.
Learning is the next category of utmost importance for the overall
analysis. Only the double-loop learning is taken into account in the table,
as it combines critical reflection with experimenting and enables the
development and design of governance patterns that are both new and
most suitable for a given policy problem. The presence of double-loop
learning is hence a precondition of good (reflexive) governance, which is
understood here as the capacity to reflect on, and rebalance the mix
among modes in response to changes in terms of challenges and/or
opportunities that exist at the interface of market, state, and civil society
(Jessop 2011, see Chap. 2). Double-loop learning is considered as present
in cases where public officials responsible for managing a specific prob-
lem bear the traits of reflexive practitioners, that is, practitioners willing
to reflect on one’s action and change its objectives or strategies in order to
adopt to (re)emerging governance problems, for example, disagreement
of an unexpected form and/or intensiveness.
The latter category explicated in the table is linked to institutionaliza-
tion, a process within which a structure becomes to be taken for granted
by members of a social group as efficacious and necessary; thus it serves
as an important causal source of stable patterns of behaviour (Tolbert and
Zucker 1996; Surachaikulwattana and Philipps 2017). Each case presents
dispute as embedded within a rich history of events taking place before
and after the most intense phase of the conflict. The time span covered by
the investigation ranges from 6 to 15 years (see the methodological
appendix). During this period, collaborative approaches to public man-
agement went a long way from relatively new, often contested practices
requiring exploration and experimenting to relatively well-structured and
obvious practices.
Yet these cases differ significantly in terms of the ‘final’3 form of
governance approaches adopted. In the rural municipality (first
case), collaborative policy making practices are reduced to something
resembling an opinion survey. In the two subsequent cases, that is,
disputes over the location of a market and that of a WWTP (both cases
from the same large city), the idea of participatory approaches to
public management became relatively well established. Public admin-
istration is equipped with regulatory and organizational procedures
enabling top-down and bottom-up processes of spatial planning,
including consultation about diverse investments, especially those
with a high environmental impact, budget planning and conflict
resolution. Yet the horizontal coordination, linking different depart-
ments and agencies, still relies more on individual social skills of

public managers responsible for a given issue than on ‘ready-to-wear’
organizational solutions, for example, established patterns of com-
munication, explicit inclusion of the horizontal cooperation require-
ment into the scope of employee duties, and incentives for such
cooperation. In the latter case—the dispute over the anti-flood facil-
ity—horizontal coordination was a necessity, yet the agency respon-
sible for the investment failed to establish it. Participatory practices
were framed, and subsequently institutionalized, as a top-down rul-
ing mode, that is, education about already adopted solutions. Public
officials’ persistent inability to respond to the expectations and anxi-
eties of the public, as well as their failure to manage the consultation
process, led to the rejection and degradation of the idea of collabora-
tive approaches. Public officials perceive these approaches as expos-
ing public management to the risk of demagogy, while in the eyes of
the local community they are a smoke screen enabling public agen-
cies to pretend they care about citizens’ needs and opinions.
The analysis below focuses on the relationship between institutional
pressures and learning. Patterns of learning and institutionalization are
subject of analysis in subsequent parts of the chapter.
8.1.1 H
ow Governance Learning Needs Both Force
and Enhancement
To a varying degree, coercive pressure, originating from newly introduced

legal regulations, was detectable in cases under consideration. In all of
them public officials were required to inform, consult, or involve external
stakeholders in the decision-making processes or in the implementation
of policies. In each of these cases, officials responsible for the process were
taking these regulations into account. Yet in each case, they were accused
of violating some regulation, of advancing false interpretations, and more
generally of ignoring the perspective, values, and interests of the public.
This kind of accusation became part of public disputes. Under the pres-
sure of protests regarding goals and/or means of public management,
public administration officials experienced uncertainty. They realized
that something could impede or even prevent resolution based on old
ways and procedures. Bureaucrats and elected officials were facing the
challenge of proposing and learning new ways of organizing decision-
making processes.
In two cases no double-loop learning processes were observed, that is,
cases were solutions proposed by public officials were not able to break
through established, mainly hierarchical, approaches and to propose
substantially new ways of developing solutions, based on collaborative and
participatory approaches. In the case of schools, the Mayor turned regula-
tions potentially promoting collaborative forms of governance into a
‘business-as-usual’, top-down management process focused around the
efficiency of services provided and consistency with legal regulations.
Strong emphasis on the latter translated the idea of consultation into the
ritual practice of ticking the boxes (meeting with trade unions—check.
With school principals—check, getting the approval of the educational
bureau approval—check, parents, community—not mentioned in the
regulation, they can therefore be informed about the solution later on). In
other words, the original institutional context regulating daily operations
of public officials penetrated the learning process by delivering cognitive
and normative guidelines on how to adopt a new governance mode. In the
case of schools, pressures for inclusion were not intense. Formal institu-
tional structures of local government promoting a strong executive, to the
detriment of the legislative, reinforced the dominant position of the Mayor
and limited other actors’ possibilities to mobilize around the development
of alternative interpretations. This configuration of relatively weak pres-
sures for alternatives and institutional structures maintaining power asym-
metries enabled a dominant actor to successfully push out dissenting
voices and turn the process into a linear procedure where everything is
known and planned beforehand. Within such a process, opportunities for
learning are scarce, because there is no place for questioning assumptions,
bringing alternative definitions, and diverse types of knowledge.
One could assume that learning opportunities would be better if only
pressures for participation were greater and power asymmetry less strik-
ing. However, the second case, where the double-loop learning was also
lacking, forces us to question this hypothesis. Protests over flood-
prevention infrastructure were intense, took years and ended up in a
spectacular fiasco, namely public agencies’ withdrawal from investments
and leaving the entire area at a high risk of inundation. Yet, throughout
the long-lasting conflict, public agency was unable to design new
approaches to governance with a view to effectively respond to social
discontent and mistrust. Public managers’ attempts to overcome resis-
tance towards flood barriers were based on a single-loop learning
mechanism. The goal they pursued through their actions was neither
changed nor questioned from the very start and is aptly expressed in the
following statement made by the director responsible for the process: “the
goal was to show that what we proposed was right” (interview, October
2013). Attempts to improve were therefore focused on manners in which
to communicate more effectively and educate people about plans to build
anti-flood barriers. First, the community was informed about the project
in a letter. Information was detailed, technical and—according to offi-
cials—transparent. It was not received well by the local community. In
response to the letter, several public meetings with officials were orga-
nized. When face-to-face communication failed, officials decided to
invite respected individuals equipped with diverse forms of authority: a
university professor as a representative of the academic community, the
charismatic and respected marshal of the region, and experts, who had
prepared the project—officials believed they were compelling due to their
professionalism and academic degrees held. None of these improvements
brought expected results—quite the opposite. The level of anger and frus-
tration among the protesters was rising. At this point, officials were clue-
less and eventually decided to withdraw from the process, leaving both
the dispute and the problem of flood prevention unsolved. Moreover,
those responsible for the investment process still believe that they either
failed in their attempt to convince the public that barriers were needed,
or that the public is immune to rational arguments and the process was
doomed from the start. Yet, as I argue in the case analysis, for those
opposing the investment, the discussion should not have related only to
barriers, but also the entire flood-prevention system and public agencies’
unreliable performance in the past. These perspectives could not con-
verge in a constructive discussion without redefining the problem, and
therefore redefining the goals of public management in this particular
case. All those involved in the process knew something should have been
done differently. But how? Not knowing what to do, those responsible
for the investment where first running in circles of single-loop learning,

and eventually stepped back.
It is not enough to prescribe legally what needs to be done; there need
to be people who understand and/or share original values behind legal
guidelines, as well as practical examples of such new practices within the
organizational field. These two conditions correspond to two remaining
types of institutional pressures, that is, normative and mimetic. Their
meaning and role in the learning processes are explained through the
analysis of cases where double-loop learning eventually took place.
Initial stages of dispute in the case of market location and WWTP fol-
lowed a similar single-loop learning path. In the case of the market, city
authorities tried, over and over again, to win over the communities and
municipalities by inviting them to discuss the project whose basic assump-
tions were non-negotiable. Eventually, the process slowed down and
ground to a halt. For a period of almost two years, city administration
took no action. In the case of WWTP, authorities strove to inform the
public about the project, just as in the case of flood-prevention facilities.
While learning new practices of participatory governing, they were still
using old hierarchical reasoning. Stakeholders were invited to participate
so that they could be convinced about the validity of the proposed solu-
tions, not to contribute to them.
In both cases (market and WWTP) findings suggest that the goal of learn-
ing did not need to be attained in order to ensure excellence in the delivery of
public goods and services; rather, it was necessary to gain new tools and argu-
ments in the struggle over regaining legitimacy and over control in a policy
domain. Gilardi and Radaelli (2012) call learning for legitimacy, which does
not improve policy performance, ‘symbolic learning’, while learning for
maintaining control is referred to as ‘political learning’. In these two cases,
both forms of learning were observed.
The breakthrough was possible, because normative and mimetic pres-
sures complemented coercive pressures. Crucially, in both cases in which
double-loop learning took place, professionals whose approaches and ori-
entations were, at least partially, formed by collaborative and participatory
governance ideas. They were both employees of public administration and
external experts. In a dispute over the market location, a central role was
played by the new Vice President, whose appearance brought an end to a
two-year impasse and initiated a new, collaborative process of market

planning. In addition, the presence of a number of other important figures
brought to light the participatory logic in the dispute. One of them was
the municipality Mayor, a tireless, though sometimes counterproductive,
supporter of public participation.4 There were researchers from the Polish
Sociological Association, who experimented with mediation in order to
solve the dispute. In the case of WWTP, the most intense and long dispute
among those under analysis, there were two directors of city administra-
tion departments and the director of a regional agency lobbying for par-
ticipatory approaches, as well as a professional mediator eventually
employed by the investor. Importantly, all individuals mentioned, with
the exception of the Vice President in the market case, failed in their
attempts to solve the dispute. Their strategic actions were however signifi-
cant in the long run, because they paved the way for the institutionaliza-
tion of participatory approaches to governance (the issue explored in the
following sections).
All of these individuals were ‘carriers’ of normative pressures towards a
new participatory governance mode percolating into various institutions
training public administration employees and those in related profes-
sions. Some of them participated in externally funded workshops orga-
nized at the local, national, and international level devoted to public
dispute resolution, participatory planning, and public consultation.
Others were relatively fresh graduates of social sciences (e.g. political sci-
ences, sociology, social policy), or had done post-graduate studies in pub-
lic management, where they became familiar with various concepts of
participatory democracy.
Membership in various, often cross-sectoral professional networks
exposed them, as well as other public officials, to mimetic pressures.
When talking about the gradual dissemination of participatory practice,
a director within the city administration said
There is a competition between local governments. We have this associa-

tion called the Union of Polish Cities. Representatives of local administra-
tion meet there and exchange their experiences. Then people come back
and say “What an interesting thing they have done there! We are going to
do the same, only better”. (Social Communication Department, interview,
June 2013)
Being embedded in communities of practitioners, permeated at least

to certain degree with ideas of participatory democracy, alternative dis-
pute resolutions, collaborative planning and the like, nurtures individuals
with practical ideas about ways in which to implement regulations and
solve emerging problems. Finally yet importantly, it incentivises and
legitimizes experimentation.
While coercive pressures derive from legal sources, normative and mimetic
pressures are rooted in diverse educational institutions (e.g. university curri-
cula), research and policy programmes (e.g. financed by the EU or the
European Economic Area grants), professional networks, and communities
(e.g. local governments, partnerships, associations). It is an institutional infra-
structure supporting the creation of leaders skilful in managing multi-stake-
holder collaborations for public goals (Sørensen and Torfing 2015), educating
new professionals or preparing those who have exerted the profession of a
mediator or facilitator to support the transformation of governance.
Taking the above into account, how do the three institutional pres-
sures influence governance learning processes? Coercive pressures legally
bind public officials to include participatory tools into certain types of
decision-making processes. New regulations challenge them to do things
differently and potentially trigger learning process. The process of learn-
ing is accelerated through indirect coercive pressures, namely: regulations
empower stakeholders to legitimately claim their right to be heard and
involved in governance processes. The indirect pressure exerted by
empowered stakeholders accelerates the learning process, because it helps
public officials to identify a given situation as potentially requiring the
adoption of a new governance approach. Protests and claims come across
as a surprise (Schön 1983)—a routine-breaking phenomenon.
The following figure illustrates the relationship between institutional
pressures and governance learning. Figure’s nested, Russian doll-like
structure suggests that public organization is embedded in a number of
larger fields; here, within a local field where other public and non-public
organizations interact following institutionalized rules of the game, and
larger, national and international field with its own actors, for example,
governments, international organizations and the like. The figure illus-
trates a situation where all pressures making learning possible are present.
In the following sections, the nested structure will be explored: we will
open up/dissect an organization and look at it as a ‘nest’ and an immedi-

ate context for collective action, as the subsequent services and depart-
ments provide a ‘nest’ for individuals (Fig. 8.1).
To sum up, legal regulations introducing collaborative patterns of gov-
ernance in public administration create direct and indirect pressure on
local practices. Direct pressures mean that public officials are legally
bound to include certain steps into decision-making processes. In terms
of learning, indirect pressures seem to be far more important. Legal
changes towards governance create legitimate pressure groups, who can
claim their right to be involved in governance. The more powerful the
pressure groups are, the greater the probability that their alternative per-
spectives and knowledge will open up space for critical reflection on gov-
ernance. Yet a coercive pressure, even if accelerated by a dispute potentially
triggering critical reflection, does not suffice to push the learning process
forward. Therefore, I propose:
Proposition 1 Coercive pressures trigger governance learning processes

and provide reasons for governance learning, but as such do not guaran-
tee double-loop learning.
In all analysed cases, initial stages of public dispute were characterized

by single-loop learning mechanisms at best. Yet, the change in practices
was accompanied by old ways of thinking and/or directed rather at
maintaining control over policy issues and not necessarily at improving
performance. A qualitative change in approach was possible, because
coercive pressures were accompanied by mimetic and normative pres-
sures that delivered instruction defining how things could be done. It is
through these pressures that officials learn to think differently.
Proposition 2 Mimetic and normative pressures push learning processes

forward through delivering examples of new practices in the organiza-
tional field and by shaping professional orientations and attitudes consis-
tent with the new governance mode.
Proposition 3 Without the support of normative and mimetic pressures,

governance learning tends to be performed as ‘fake learning’ (political,
Coercive pressures
(e.g. regulations governing the
right to information, Mimetic pressures
participation, delegation of Coercive pressures (e.g. popularization of the
public tasks to non- (e.g. local governance concept by
governmental entities etc.) regulations: OECD, the World Bank, the
implementation EU etc.)
and enforcement)
Public organization
Pressure
Learning
Institutionalization
Normative
pressures Mimetic
(locally active pressures
professionals, (e.g. best practices)
epistemic
communities)
Normative pressures:
- educational institutions (e.g.
university curricula; training
programmes promoted by the EU,
national and international
organizations)
Fig. 8.1 Institutional pressures and governance learning

137
symbolic learning) that is, learning oriented not towards gaining excel-
lence in the delivery of public goods and services, but towards regaining
legitimacy and maintaining control over a given policy field.
8.2 B
etween Structure and Agency:
On the Significance of the Institutional
Context for Individual Responses
to Disruption
As argued in Chap. 3, the explanation of the governance turn and learning
based on Powell and DiMaggio’s framework of institutional pressures is
relevant mainly on the macro and meso levels of analysis. However, it fails
to take into account the micro level of individual practices and percep-
tions. It also ignores the process of transforming the micro-level answers
into meso- and macro-level structures, which is of key importance for the
analysis of organizational learning and institutionalization processes. This
is why the top-down approach of new institutionalism is complemented
here with the bottom-up approach focusing on the role of actors in creat-
ing, maintaining, transforming, and disrupting institutions.
First, I propose to interpret the phenomenon of public dispute from
the perspective of professional and reflexive practice (Yanow and Tsoukas
2009; Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). Disputes have the potential of
delivering a breakdown of a default activity, thus far taken for granted,
and illuminate the logic behind it. Disagreement forces professionals to
reflect on their own practices and to improvise responses (Yanow and
Tsoukas 2009; Laws and Forester 2015). I am interested in extending
the concept of reflexive practice into a collective setting by investigating
how original patterns of action and responses to a disruption can be
linked to normative and cognitive pillars of institutions. What happens
when responses enter into interaction with the environment?
Yanow and Tsoukas distinguish different types of responses to distur-
bances interrupting routine practice (2009). Routine practice—marked
by an absence of disturbances (surprises)—is characterized by absorbed
coping, that is, performing a set of established activities based on tacit,
experiential knowledge. Routine is not mindless, yet it is too close and

too familiar to compel attention. Developing Donald Schöns’ concept of
surprise (Schön 1983, 1987) and Dreyfus’ model of knowledge-based
work (Dreyfus 1991), Yanow and Tsoukas argue that there are different
kinds of disturbances (surprises), ranging from ‘malfunction’, to ‘tempo-
rary breakdown’, to ‘total breakdown’. Each one elicits a different type of
improvisational response, ranging from ‘non-deliberate’ (spontaneous
readjustments), to ‘deliberate’, to ‘thematic’ (explicitly intentional).
When routine is disrupted by malfunction (first type of disturbance), the
practitioner shifts her attention to what she is doing, corrects the action
and returns to routine practice. This kind of response is called reconsti-
tuted absorbed copying. The second type of disturbance, that is, a tempo-
rary breakdown results in deliberate coping: the practitioner is now paying
careful attention to the task at hand. An involved deliberation is an alter-
native response to temporary breakdown and entails a more focused con-
sideration of what is being done. Practitioner “stops and considers what
is going on and plans what to do, all in a context of involved activity”
(Dreyfus 1991, p. 72). Difference between deliberate coping and involved
deliberation is a matter of degree, not of quality. Both responses still take
place against the background of absorption in the world and, in this
sense, are not a detached cognitive reflection (Yanow and Tsoukas 2009,
p. 1352). At this point, however, the availability of tools enabling practice
becomes questionable and a subject of reflection. Total breakdown is the
third type of surprise. It results in a response called thematic intentional-
ity, a more analytic or theoretical reflection. This kind of response enters
the scene when “involved deliberation is no longer effective or operative,
we need to move to a detached analytic (cognitive, theoretical) stance on
the problem as we try to comprehend the underlying mechanisms
involved” (2009: 1352).
The first three types of responses (reconstituted absorbed copying,
involved deliberation, detached intentionality) correspond to single-loop
learning. The last type (thematic intentionality) resonates with the
double-loop learning concept, because analytical reflection is needed in
order to uncover hidden assumption of own practice, question them and
design new goals and means of practice. How does this theoretical fram-
ing help us to understand responses to public protests, institutional

change, and learning processes accompanying the ‘governance turn’?
And, how can this framing be modified in order to capture the structural-
ist moments of responses, that is, moments where improvised responses are
infiltrated by institutionalized patterns of thinking and acting?
8.2.1 Entering Single-Loop Learning
Let us try to classify public officials’ responses to protests according to

Yanow and Tsoukas’ typology ranging from spontaneous readjustments
to detached, analytical reflection. Already at the very beginning of the
analysis, it turns out that a collective setting emphasizes an important
quality of surprise, that is, its openness to social construction processes.
What might be surprising for some is not a surprise for others. The obser-
vation is not new; Yanow and Tsoukas admit that surprise “requires a
degree of mindful openness or ‘permeability’ that enables perceiving an
‘event’ as surprising” (Yanow and Tsoukas 2009). Here I argue that mind-
ful openness can be influenced by institutions.
In cases under consideration, a continuum of responses is opened by a
situation in which a protest—a phenomenon perceived in the research as
the incarnation of disruption—was not perceived as a disruption by
actors in the field/the stakeholders. When deciding about the delegation
of schools, the Mayor and her supporters were not surprised by the pro-
tests and they proceeded without taking the dissenting voices into
account. The use of institutionalized (routine) patterns of rules grounded
in the concepts of representative democracy, New Public Management,
and bureaucratic rule of law enabled them to ‘naturalize’ protests as a
normal reaction to an unpopular policy decision. One of the councillors,
supporting the Mayors’ strategy, stated in an interview:
We were able to work out an optimal solution. Currently, the general mood here
is not as bad as you could expect. The municipality had anticipated a far worse
situation, including calls for a referendum or for the dismissal of the local gov-
ernment. (June 2013)
The dispute forced the Mayor to articulate the logic behind the prac-
tice, but not to change the practice itself. Actors questioning goals and
means of governance were able to neither mobilize wider support nor
refer to an alternative framing of the decision-making process. In fact,
when questioning the adopted patterns of management, dissidents tried
to use the logic imposed by the Mayor, and hence their attempts were
doomed to failure.
Proposition 4 Since old (original) institutions penetrate practitioners’

thinking and acting, they can also prevent practitioners from recognizing
a phenomenon as a surprise, and hence prevent the learning of a new
governance mode.
In the remaining cases (market, WWTP, barrier), at first, practitioners

regarded protests as a malfunction. Initial reactions of authorities fol-
lowed the strategy of ‘more of the same’ (single-loop learning and recon-
stituted copying) or, in other words, the implementation of minor
changes. They used the bureaucratic logic based on the rule of law to
legitimize the exclusion of stakeholders’ from the decision-making pro-
cess and to prove that all measures required by the law had been taken.
That is, all informing procedures were conducted and the comments of
those entitled to be party in the administrative process were answered.
Despite these attempts, protests endured. Importantly, in all four cases
protesters used a framework of different institutional logics to interpret
the same legal and procedural rules. While officials focused on following
the letter of law, protesters reasoned in terms of collaborative and partici-
patory logic.
Gradually, disruptions started to present themselves to practitioners as
a temporary breakdown. Officials enacted involved deliberation by pay-
ing more and more attention to their actions, which they modified in
order to accommodate at least some of the protesters’ voices. Still, new
practices were permeated with old institutional logics, for example, in the
cases of WWTP and barriers, where decision-makers perceived
consultation as education. Involved deliberation also included an instru-
mental use of participatory practices to restore legitimacy, for instance in
the WWTP case, where the President of the city first ordered an admin-
istrator trial, opening a public discussion about the project and then
issued a building permission an unchanged form, or in the market case,
where officials enabled the consultation of the project whose very exis-
tence was contested.
Proposition 5 Initial responses to a surprise tend to follow adjustments

prompted by the most accessible, dominating institutional logic regulat-
ing the practice of governance. Modified and new practices are pervaded
by original patterns of thinking and acting.
Over time, enduring exposure to conflict and exposure to the alterna-

tive definitions of the problem made practitioners aware of the fact that
tools they had at their disposal might be inadequate and would not let
them solve the problem. Detached cognitive reflection and a total break-
down seem to be at arm’s length. Since an involved deliberation is no
longer operative, the only remaining option is experimenting with new
approaches. Or is it? Analysis shows that the logic of a logician is not the
logic of a practitioner (Bourdieu 1990; Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011).
The case of barriers and—to a certain extent—also the case of market
location, are examples of a situation where, faced with the inability to
solve the problem, practitioners decide to step back and redirect their
attention towards other problems. The complexity of the context in which
they function (Weick 2003) makes this option feasible. In the case of the
market, the first Vice President did not risk any significant losses in terms
of legitimacy when he decided to abstain from action for almost two years.
Merchants and local community representatives were just one of many
groups involved in the many decision-making processes he had supervised
over the years. To a lesser extent, the same holds true in the case of officials
involved in the barrier-planning process, since their accountability for this
particular exercise was clearer. Yet they had been quite successful in play-
ing the “blame game” (Hood 2011). Through attributing the blame for
failure to protesters, and by insisting that dredging works demanded by
the inhabitants remained outside of agencies’ competence, they could
‘save the face’ while withdrawing from the investment.
A closer look at withdrawal reactions suggests that they can be inter-
preted as reactions to uncertainty, which is linked to the phenomenon of
surprise. Uncertainty is caused by the conviction that all ready-made pro-

cedures (patterns) that may be conducive to solving the problem, as well
as their modified variants, have already been exhausted. A practitioner
cannot think of any other ways in which the problem could be solved
under given circumstances, or they feel they lack the necessary compe-
tence, understood both formally and individually, to further engage in the
process. Conflict itself further contributes to this kind of uncertainty, as it
involves diverse stakeholders with divergent interests and values, whose
actions are, to a large extent, unpredictable and call for improvised answers
(Laws and Forester 2015). It is a situation radically different from the rela-
tively high predictability guaranteed by designing the process pursuant to
a legalist approach. At this point, emotional responses come to the surface,
including reactions of anxiety and fear. It is particularly evident in the
case of market location, where fear became a significant category organiz-
ing the narrative about old and new public management strategies.
Describing the governance practices enacted by city authorities in the initial
phases of the conflict, the Mayor of the district states: “City authorities do
not talk to people. They are afraid of people (…) I can see fear in their eyes
when something like this happens: protests, openly expressed dissatisfaction
of certain groups” (March 2013). The new Vice President, who eventually
solved the conflict, reflects “there is a moment where you just need to accept
the challenge and not be afraid to engage in a dialogue” (June 2013).
A mediator involved in managing the dispute remarks: “many of these
meetings are very unpleasant or even endangering. This experience accu-
mulates and creates fear among the representatives of authorities. They
fear direct interactions with inhabitants and avoid them” (January 2013).
The street-level bureaucrat who was responsible for organizing the tempo-
rary relocation of the market mentions: “The new Vice President comes to
the market himself! He is not afraid. You would not see the former Vice
President there! (laughs)” (September 2013).
The exploration of interlinkages between emotional and cognitive
dimensions of institutions is important for understanding the reaction of
withdrawal. Empirical data delivers an illustration of how efforts to chal-
lenge established expectations of governance practices “threaten the indi-
vidual’s sense of security” (Powell 1991, p. 194). The above considerations
are summarized in the following theoretical proposition:
Proposition 6 When gradually exhausting responses based on deliberate

copying and involved deliberation, practitioners (public officials) face
uncertainty of the decision-making context and, consequently, display
emotional reactions of anxiety. A possible reaction is withdrawal instead
of engagement into thematic intentionality.
Further on, I will argue that emotional reactions to uncertainty, includ-

ing reactions of anxiety and fear are the function of an institutional void.
After trying out all possibilities that appeared feasible and legitimate to
them, public officials find themselves in an almost physically experi-
enced emptiness. There are no other ready tools or procedures coordi-
nating multilevel or multijurisdictional work, or tools coordinating
public engagement in decision-making processes. In cases under analy-
sis, which refers to the Polish institutional environment, a collaborative,
network-based logic, which could inspire and justify further modifica-
tions of tools, is far from dominating in any arena of public life, be it a
workplace, a local community, or the political sphere (see Chap. 3).
Hence, this logic is not at hand, it is not built into the “habits of the
heart” (Bellah et al. 1985) or into long-lasting experiences of social actors
(Putnam et al. 1993) and, as a result, does not provide much inspiration.
In order to practice collaborative forms of governance in these cases, pub-
lic officials would have to take a leap of faith, start to construct new tools
or implement those already in use, yet according to a different logic.
Initiating new practices or redefining old ones would mean improvise,
performing “bricolage” or “making do” with whatever is at hand (Mair
and Marti 2009; Mair et al. 2012; Forester 2009, 2013; Laws and Forester
2015). It would involve critical reflection and double-loop learning.
Practitioners engaging in this kind of activities would work in and around
governance voids in order to eventually close them. Not all practitioners
are ready to do this. When faced with a void, many of them step back. In
Yanow and Tsoukas’ terms, the key question is: what makes practitioners
willing to perceive a disturbance as a total breakdown and, subsequently,
what makes them prone to respond with detached reflection upon mech-
anisms of the situation at hand, and what entices them to explore new
possibilities? Before we embark upon the analysis of the ‘bricoleurs of
governance’, let us take a closer look at the void that is the object of their
engagement.
8.2.2 Governance Void
First of all, I argue that the void that practitioners are facing is of institu-
tional nature. Mair, Marti, and Ventresca suggest that institutional voids
occur “amidst institutional plurality and are the intermediate outcome of
conflict and contradictions among local political, community, and reli-
gious spheres” (Mair et al. 2012, p. 820). This perspective seems to be
more suitable then perceiving voids only as spaces where certain institu-
tions are absent or weak. It is because governance, as a certain idealized
concept and approach to public management, is introduced into a field
that is already governed by diverse political and community institutions.
Even when certain institutions of governance are non-existent or weak
(e.g. patterns for multijurisdictional coordination and inclusion of the
public into decision-making processes), a given field (e.g. anti-flood facil-
ities) is being regulated within complex local arrangements and interde-
pendences, with formal and informal institutions influencing individual
practices, as it is already shown in the analysis above.
Definition Governance void is a space where direct and/or indirect insti-

tutional infrastructure supporting collaborative forms of governance is
absent or weak (underdeveloped), and where the contradiction of institu-
tional logics provides inspiration on how to manage a given public issue.
Two examples of the governance void are outlined below. The first
example relates to an explicit lack of institutionalized tools that officials
could use in order to enact a new governance mode. The second example
illustrates the existence of the void within a larger institutional infrastruc-
ture regulating collective action within the Polish context.
Governance understood in a narrow sense (as a governance mode
based on mainly networks, see Chap. 1) by definition involves the coor-
dination of diverse stakeholders: across levels of administration, across
diverse departments of the same public organization, as well as across
diverse organizations. To a large extent it requires an approach that is

problem-centred and not task-centred (Ansell 2011). Yet, those formally
responsible for the planning process in the case of the market and in the
case of anti-flood facilities had neither legal and organizational tools nor
enough power to implement this approach. In the first case, the planning
process should have been coordinated by the Mayor. According to formal
regulations, it was the Mayor’s task to coordinate the four entities across
different government levels and jurisdictions, with the actions of external
stakeholders. These were real estate departments at municipality and city
level, the bureau of architecture (city), the investor (city-owned construc-
tion company), and the merchants and local community representatives.
The new Vice President, who eventually took over the responsibility and
successfully finalized the process, admits that despite of the fact that the
Mayor was formally accountable for the process, he did not have the
necessary tools (e.g. procedures) to secure and enforce cooperation of the
four public administration entities listed above. He mentions that depart-
ment directors within the city and municipality administration are nei-
ther used to coordinating their actions nor are they held accountable for
that (see Chap. 5 for details), and that the competence of coordinating
the processes rests with the highest levels of organizational structure
occupied by the President or Vice President. After stating this generalized
observation, he continues with an example from his own professional
experience.
Before I became the Vice President, I was the head of a department whose
operation depended entirely on cooperation: it was responsible for acquir-
ing European funds. I can tell you that we went through hell. It was OK if
I spoke to someone and the person understood that I needed something
from them, and they needed something from me. But if the head of the
department was… reluctant… a phone call to the President was necessary.
The President had to persuade the person to work with me.5 (interview,
June 2013)
In other words organizational structures (procedures, motivation sys-

tems) enabling horizontal and vertical coordination were lacking and the
successful coordination was dependent on individual skills and the posi-
tion of power, observation that will be further explored later on in the

analysis (see considerations on institutional entrepreneurship, Sect. 8.3).
In the case of anti-flood facilities, problem-centred approach would
require ‘the owner of the process’ (regional agency) to coordinate action
with municipalities, a national-level agency and external stakeholders,
such as local community organizations and individual citizens. In both
cases (the market and anti-flood facilities), further action would require
from those formally responsible to go beyond their competences—an act
involving high individual and organizational risks. In these kinds of situ-
ations, practitioners face a paradox described by Chris Ansell as a large
gap between low discretion, that is, what public officials are legally
allowed to do, and high responsibility that is, being responsible for effec-
tively solving public problems (Ansell 2011). This gap is one of the mani-
festations of the governance void.
Even if network-based coordination of relationships between different
actors within and outside of public administration is not explicitly built
into its organizational structures, the institutional environment may
deliver a more or less productive ground for establishing such ways of
coordination. As already mentioned (see Chap. 3), traditionally speaking,
horizontal ways of governing are not typical of the Polish institutional
environment. As a result, new collaborative and participatory approaches
to governance are interpreted according to the traditionally adopted hier-
archical logic, or to relatively new, but firmly embedded quasi-market
logic of New Public Management. Lack of examples proving that hori-
zontal coordination and partnerships may bring desired outcomes not
only confines imagination about the realm of the possible, but also
reduces resources necessary to initiate cooperation, most prominently
social trust (Ostrom 1990; Putnam et al. 1993). The latter is built in the
course of collective actions, for instance within civil society initiatives
aimed at solving local problems, or ‘only’ at organizing collective leisure,
or within citizens-government interactions taking place during gather-
ings in local communities. Practising cooperation turns it into a value
worth pursuing. In this sense, each attempt to solve local problems is
path-dependent, influenced by the history of mutual relationships and
past decisions (Forester 2017; Schreyögg et al. 2011), which determines
the scope of choices accessible to actors involved in the governance

process.
The path-dependency of the governance process and the significance
of social trust as a factor affecting its success are most clearly visible in the
case of the dispute around anti-flood facilities. Officials did not have any
good experiences with participatory processes (rather the opposite), they
did not value cooperation with stakeholders per se, and they did not
expect to learn anything from them. As a result, they were not motivated
to experiment further with consultation. Once they had come to the
conclusion that it was impossible to convince the local community, they
stepped back. Regional agency officials and experts involved in the plan-
ning process had a solution (barrier) to the problem (flood), and what
they thought they needed to proceed was an informed consent of the
stakeholders. What they felt they needed to learn was how to convince
the stakeholders more effectively that the barrier was the right solution.
The contested barrier was an important part of a wider system. Several
new barriers were to be constructed in the following years. The regional
agency was supposed to perform additional services, namely dredging of
the bottom of the Vistula River.
For the local community the problem was not the flood or even the
barrier itself, but the unreliability of public agencies. As one of local activ-
ists put it: “We did not believe them. We will be left to our own devices.
If there was a crisis and no money was available, no other barriers would
be built (except for this one)”6 (interview, March 2014). Over the years,
local stakeholders learnt that plans and promises are made, but they are
often not implemented in their entirety; sometimes they are abandoned
altogether. Dredging was supposed to be conducted on a regular basis, yet
it was discontinued for 20 years because of budgetary cuts. After the
disaster of 2010, national authorities promised compensation to those
affected by the flood, but no money was paid and claims for damages
were challenged. The state of existent flood-prevention facilities, such as
embankments and drilling ditches, was unsatisfactory.7 Critically, barriers
would require an immediate and efficient evacuation in case of a flood. A
statement of the Mayor who opposed the barrier deserves reiteration: “if
someone promises to do this or that, but does nothing, we don’t believe

him. Would you?” (interview, March 2013).
In the analysis of the case (see Chap. 7), I argue that the perspective of
these two parties, that is, the local community and public officials could
not converge into a constructive discussion of the problem and, there-
fore, the goals of governance in this particular case are not redefined. In
other words and according to the theoretical frameworks of good gover-
nance, metagovernance, and learning, critical reflection was needed in
order to question the methods and goals of the planning process. No
reflection took place. The problem remained unsolved. Yet, even if reflec-
tion had occurred, restoring the trust among the stakeholders of the pro-
cess would require great facilitation and mediation efforts.
Paraphrasing Kenneth Arrow, one can say that social trust is an impor-
tant lubricant of the governance system. Its absence, as well as the absence
of institutions incentivising network-based cooperation in diverse areas
of social life, constitutes deeper levels of the governance void. Here we
should emphasize that it is not only officials who need to learn collabora-
tive approaches. Since the idea of public governance is the inclusion of
external actors into governance processes, these external actors also need
to learn how to function within this new context and to perceive partici-
pation not only as a right, but also as responsibility. In the process of
participation, external stakeholders can learn about both possibilities and
limitations of designing public policy and public services. If their
participation is not treated seriously, like in the case of barriers, they are
only learning that if they protest intensively enough, they can stop any
government initiative. Blocking an initiative does not, however, solve the
problem. This kind of result is suboptimal, since the goal behind collab-
orative approaches to governance, and behind participation in decision-
making in particular, is to design possible solutions to a problem using
diverse sources of knowledge and exploring different needs and perspec-
tives. The aim should be to expand the scope of choices for those partici-
pating in the decision-making process, not to reduce the choice to
accepting or rejecting a pre-given solution.
8.2.3 E
ntering Double-Loop Learning:
From a Reflexive Practitioner to an Institutional
Entrepreneur
After having delineated the institutional background of practitioners’

withdrawal from problem-solving, I now come back to the question:
what makes practitioners willing to perceive a disturbance as a total
breakdown and, subsequently, what induces them to engage in detached,
critical reflection upon the mechanisms governing the given situation,
and in an active exploration of new possibilities?
Analysis of the cases suggests that critical reflection and experimentation
emerged in contexts where practitioners responsible for a given governance
process were exposed to institutional ambiguity, that is, the existence of
conflicting frames of interpretation suggesting the manner in which to
manage the problem and the goals of the management process. Importantly,
sources of ambiguity triggering double-loop learning were located within
public organization, or at least within the epistemic community of profes-
sional and academic experts, sharing normative orientations and knowl-
edge on possible actions and desired outcomes (Haas 1992). As literature
on institutional change suggests, shared understandings of institutional
assumptions may exist to differing degrees and may shift over time
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010). In the situation of a protracted dispute and
inability to solve the problem on the basis of old approaches to governing
processes, the responsibility for the process will more probably be delegated
to alternatively oriented actors. For the authorities, the existence of alterna-
tively oriented actors becomes an opportunity for regaining the effective-
ness of action, restoring the legitimacy of public agency, and getting things
done.
At this point of the analysis, the use of the reflexive practice model as
describing an individual experience becomes even more challenging than
before. It is because the most striking observation is that together with a
change of logic, a constellation of actors involved in the governance learning
process is shifting. On the operational level, those who have failed to solve
the problem with the use of a specific logic are not those who have intro-
duced the practice rooted in the new logic. Top decision-makers implicitly
commission the change of logic by allowing new actors to enter the stage. In
the cases under consideration, they commission the change not because they
think or believe that this problem should be dealt with in a collaborative
way, but because all accessible alternatives have been exhausted.
The process of perceiving a disturbance (public dispute) as a total
breakdown and responding with detached reflection is extended in time
and takes place rather on the meso level of social interactions than on the
micro (individual) level. It is not so much about individuals experiencing
an “aha moment” and altering their own practices, as it is about individu-
als discovering their own limitations and realizing that it is necessary to
engage actors who think differently. The observation of double-loop
learning—to a greater extent than single-loop learning—allows us to
understand that learning is a social process. Actors learn new approaches
through interaction. Within interaction, they challenge each other’s views
instead of supporting and reinforcing them, as it is the case in single-loop
learning.
The two cases in which double-loop learning took place illustrate the
social nature of the learning process and, in particular, how double-loop
learning is facilitated by the heterogeneity of actors’ orientations within public
organization and, more generally, within networks of practitioners and aca-
demic experts. In the case of market location, there were two moments in
which traditional, hierarchical logic was replaced with the new collabora-
tive logic and the process of double-loop learning began. The first was the
moment when the first Vice President allowed academic researchers from
the PSA to take control of the process. The second was the appointment of
the new Vice President, whose professional orientation, just as the orienta-
tion of academics from the PSA, was aligned with the ideological orienta-
tion of the concept of collaborative and participatory approaches
to governance.
Importantly, the first attempt to introduce alternative logic into the
governance system proved a failure. The first Vice President allowed the
PSA to take control of the process, assigned an official representing the
city in the mediation, and stepped back. The disappearance of a major
decision-maker impeded the learning process, because it was a signal that
alternative governance practices were not actively supported by the top
manager who, in this case, was also a decision-maker. Public officials,
including the person assigned to take part in the mediation as a represen-

tative of the city, felt insecure and irritated by the new situation and
persistently reverted to the original logic by arguing that “the procedure
described by mediators was not defined in regulations governing the
work of city authorities” (an open report prepared by the researchers,
2012). This particular situation helps us to pinpoint the issue considered
central to the “governance turn” (Gilardi and Radaelli 2012). It involves
experimenting with the roles of diverse actors in decision-making. Yet
there are important limitations when the role of the government is con-
cerned. Even if participative decision-making takes place, and even if
non-governmental actors implement strategic public objectives, the gov-
ernment still should have a steering role (Pierre and Peters 2000;
McLaverty 2011; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). The director of the Social
Communication Department, who was implicitly involved in the pro-
cess,8 summarizes the lesson from this experience by saying that city
authorities should not have withdrawn and taken the role of a party in
the mediation process, “instead, they should have played the role of the
host” (interview, June 2013) who invites the public to participate and
listens to its opinions, and eventually makes a decision.
The new Vice President entered the scene when the experiment with
mediation was still ongoing. He refused, however, to step into the former
Vice President’s shoes, and took back control of the process. He
constructed a new temporary structure (a working group) on the inter-
face of city administration, municipality administration, and external
stakeholders’ organizations. He established communication channels
between all relevant officials, councillors, politicians, and the working
group. The process of designing solutions for the market was personally
coordinated by the Vice President. Importantly, although the new Vice
President shared the ideological orientation of collaborative and partici-
patory approaches to governance, at that time, he had had no experience
in governing multi-stakeholder processes. This is how he describes the
encounter with protesters:
There were eight meetings and, to be honest, the first two were totally
wasted in terms of any work on the design. These meetings ended very
emotionally. I must admit, I have learnt that it makes no sense to expect
that in a conflict situation parties just meet, talk and solve the problem. It
does not work this way. These are strenuous processes; you really need to
bleed and sweat in order to arrive at something. For me it really is a personal
success that we were able to peacefully move the merchants to a temporary
location and start modernization works. (interview, June 2013)
What makes the new Vice President prone to learn new governance
mode and experiment are social skills9 (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and
McAdam 2012) and a strong conviction that involving external stake-
holders is the right thing to do (individual conditions). His formal posi-
tion of power accelerates his agency, because it makes other people follow
him (structural condition). The institutional and organizational context
of his actions makes him something more than a reflexive practitioner, he
becomes an institutional entrepreneur who fills the governance void by:
(1) initiating divergent changes (here: changes following an alternative
governance logic); and (2) actively participating in the implementation
of these changes (Battilana et al. 2009).
The WWTP case provides yet another example, illustrating how ambi-
guity of new governance institutions and the presence of actors delivering
alternative framings open up a space for double-loop learning (and subse-
quent institutional change, as will be argued in the next section). Governance
mode enacted by public officials responsible for the planning process did
not serve ideas, needs, and interests of individual citizens, local communi-
ties, and civil organizations and—most importantly—some of the indi-
viduals and departments within the city administration.
In a response to coercive pressures (changes in law) taking place in the
late 1990s and early 2000s, some organizational structures were created,
whose role was to maintain communication channels with general public
and non-governmental organizations. These structures involved a small
department for public dialogue and certain new responsibilities regarding
information and consultation were delegated to existing departments.
The conflict around the WWTP, one of the longest and most intensive
public disputes in the city’s recent history, infused these structures with
new energy. The ‘inhabitants’ of these structures, that is, public officials
employed within new departments and officials equipped with new
responsibilities had an opportunity to justify their own existence and

increase resources at their disposal. As introduced in the case description
(Chap. 6), the investor, that is, a city-owned company supported by some
of the officials, tried out many novel participatory tools and mechanisms,
such as a special position on the company’s executive board (i.e. the
board’s plenipotentiary for social obligations), the organization of meet-
ings with the parties in the administrative trial, the creation of the Social
Council with the purpose of investment monitoring and, last but not
least, the employment of a mediator. Public officials and professionals
involved in the process were learning how to use new, participatory gov-
ernance tools, yet they were not successful in resolving the dispute. Crucial
decisions were made without public participation, and despite being con-
tested by the public, they proved irreversible. In this sense, the process
was locked in through past decisions, and even participatory practices
conducted along with participatory values and intentions failed to sub-
stantially improve the situation. Yet, failure to solve a problem is not
tantamount to one’s failure to learn or to institutionalize (see the subse-
quent section, the second institutionalization pattern).
Cases in which no double-loop learning emerged deliver an important
counterpoint to the argument, highlighting the importance of institu-
tional ambiguity and actors’ heterogeneity. In the discussion on the del-
egation of schools, opposing voices coming from the local community,
trade unions, and certain councillors were systematically set aside by
decision-makers, who proceeded in accordance with hierarchical and
quasi-market logic. Their dominating position enabled them to either
dismiss or ignore alternative approaches proposed by external actors. The
homogeneity of perspectives among those in control over the process
reinforced the conviction that the right way to handle disagreement had
been chosen. The Mayor’s conviction that people protest because they are
excessively demanding or manipulated tallies with councillors’ belief that
the public do not understand internal governance processes and, there-
fore, should delegate decision to democratically elected representatives.
The emphasis put by the legal advisor of the municipality on the necessity
to exactly follow the rule of law makes experiments with participation
redundant and reduces them to documenting the fact that public consul-
tation has indeed taken place. Although different, these perspectives have
at least one important thing in common: they do not regard external

actors as either capable or legitimate partners in the governance processes.
In an interaction, these views reinforce each other and minimize chances
for any critical inquiry and entering the double-loop learning process.
The barrier case represents a similar pattern. Here, the mutually rein-
forcing perspectives are those of public officials, and academic and non-
academic experts involved in the process. They all agree on one thing:
people need to be convinced that “what we are proposing is right” (regional
agency representative, interview, March 2014). They all perceive partici-
patory approaches to governance through the paternalistic lens of educa-
tion. Within their community of practitioners there is no one who could
challenge their view and propose an alternative framing, suggesting that
there is some important, context-based and local knowledge to be gained
from those opposing the investment. Despite their emotional engagement
in the process, they were not able to think outside the hierarchical logics.
Here, officials did not make an instrumental use of participatory tools, as
it was the case in the dispute over the WWTP. They believed that the aim
of the process was to educate people on the benefits of the solution and to
gain acceptance for the project. Inability to reach this goal despite multi-
ple attempts and modifications in the form of meetings exposed officials
and experts to a great deal of stress. The latter is exemplified in an expres-
sion used in a conversation between a professor invited to a meeting and a
representative of the regional agency: “it’s time to retire (…) it is not worth
trying to convince them, it will only make you sick.” (academic expert,
interview, November 2013). Homogenized and technocratic orientations
regarding participation and governance modes directed all their efforts
and resources towards single-loop learning and prevented the questioning
of the goal they were trying to reach.
The above considerations focused on governance double-loop learning
are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Critical reflection on governance and double-loop gover-

nance learning is more likely when public administration practitioners
are exposed to conflicting interpretations of governance institutions
(institutional ambiguity) within their own organization or, more broadly,
within their own epistemic community.10
8.2.4 P
ractitioners’ Responses to Disruptions
in the Institutional Perspective
Observing decision-making processes in a collective setting draws atten-

tion to how institutional and political context influences practitioners’
responses to disruption. Sociological accounts of institutions focus on
non-codified, informal conventions and collective scripts that regulate
human behaviour (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This perspective enables
capturing the cognitive significance of institutional structures and recog-
nizing the fact that actors may reproduce institutional logic without any
conscious scrutiny—a conclusion of central importance for the gover-
nance learning phenomenon. Through the analysis of public dispute
resolution, the working of cognitive pillar of institutions could be identi-
fied. I have developed propositions supplementing the typology of
responses to surprise (disruption), which indicate how institutions
penetrate thinking and acting, and how they prevent practitioners from
being surprised, induce them to perpetuate a given mode of governance
despite the occurrence of disturbances, even when doing so is not “effi-
cient” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Powell 1991). In this sense, an “insti-
tutionally sensitive” definition of surprise could read as follows11:
Definition Surprise is a cognitive state caused by a disruption of institu-

tionalized patterns of thinking and behaviour deployed by an (public)
organization to deal with a specific (social) problem.
Proposition 8 The experience of surprise is crucial for governance learn-

ing because it triggers reflection in action and on action.
Importantly, in cases under consideration, detached reflection and dou-

ble-loop learning were not the result of a planned organizational effort.
Rather they occurred thanks to the favouring configuration of specific
structural and individual conditions, in particular the diversity of perspec-
tives on goals and means of governance within public agency itself. It
should be emphasized that this diversity is, in fact, a manifestation of
coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures. If legal regulations had not

been amended, protesters’ claims would not have been legitimate; if pro-
fessional education of diverse kinds had not transmitted certain values and
concepts of participatory approaches, officials willing to engage the public
would have been hard to find, and it would have been even harder to find
skilled mediators and facilitators. Last but not least, if examples of collab-
orative approaches had not been accessible to practitioners, it would have
proven extremely challenging to enhance and justify experimentation.
The table below illustrates linking the perceptions of surprise with
responses to surprise, as well as institutional and political influences. The
latter refers to the existence of parties whose needs and perspectives,
including value-based perspectives, are not well served by the dominant
institutional arrangement. Here, parties are divided into two groups: (a)
a group of external stakeholders of the decision-making process, who
actively oppose the means and goals of governance performed by public
administration representatives; and (b) a group of internal stakeholders
who—albeit to a varying degree—share understanding of goals and
means of governance (Table 8.2).
The table summarizes considerations on how practitioners’ experiences
are grounded in institutions, and how institutions are inhabited and
enacted by individuals. These conclusions should be perceived through
the lens of considerations on metagovernance and learning presented in
Chap. 1. If good governance means the ability to reflect and rebalance
diverse governance modes, it would require public agencies to institu-
tionalize reflection and learning. What is described here on the basis of
case studies was an adaptive and unplanned process of learning of a new,
network-based governance mode. It took place through incremental
changes in hierarchical and/or quasi-market-based logics of governance
(single-loop) and then through the questioning of the last two.
Even if the new governance mode based on participation had been
learnt by practitioners and institutionalized within public administra-
tion, it does not mean that public administration is ready to perform
good governance. Ideally speaking, public agencies should be able to gain
excellence in using all three logics of governing and be able to detect
when a different logic is needed as a supplement, or when a diametrical
change of the logic proves necessary. In this sense, the most important
158
Table 8.2 Implementation of newly introduced governance institutions. Practitioners’ responses to disruption in the insti-
tutional perspective
Practitioners’ exposition to conflicting
interpretations of formally codified
collaborative governance institutions within or
outside an organization/epistemic community Perceptions of Responses to Institutionalized
Within Outside disruption/surprise disruption pattern of thinking Learning
No—practitioners Yes— Disruption not Articulating the Reproduced—self No learning

homogenous in their challengers perceived as logic behind reinforcing
professional orientations relatively surprising the practice mechanism
towards governance weak
(domination of hierarchy and
quasi-market orientation)
No—practitioners Yes— Malfunction Reconstituted Reproduced—self Single-loop
homogenous in their challengers absorbed reinforcing learning
professional orientations relatively copying mechanism
towards governance powerful
No—practitioners Yes— Temporary Deliberate Strategically Single-loop
homogenous in their challengers breakdown copying reproduced learning/
professional orientations powerful fake
towards governance learning
No—practitioners Yes— Involved
homogenous in their challengers deliberation
professional orientations powerful
towards governance
No—practitioners Yes— Withdrawal Abandoned in the
homogenous in their challengers particular
professional orientations powerful situation,
towards governance continued
(domination of hierarchy and elsewhere
Yes—practitioners confronted Yes— Total breakdown Thematic Questioned Double-loop
with diverse professional challengers intentionality learning
orientations towards powerful
governance
159
challenge for public agencies is to find an answer to the following ques-

tion: how to institutionalize double-loop learning?
8.3 T
hree Patterns of Governance
Institutionalization
By highlighting the importance of (a) institutional ambiguity; (b) the
agency of actors who, while enacting institutions, can maintain or trans-
form them; and (c) drive the influencing actors’ ability to challenge exis-
tent institutions, the previous section has set the stage for a description of
how new governance mode is not only learned, but also institutionalized
within public agencies.12 As the analysis of empirical data suggests, insti-
tutionalization of new governance mode follows diverse patterns and
results in hybrids containing original and new institutional arrangements
in various proportions. As illustrated in Table 8.1 at the beginning of the
chapter, three results are observed in cases under scrutiny. Within two of
them (the case of schools and anti-flood facilities), a new governance
mode was institutionalized as a top-down approach. Within another two
(market location and WWTP), the institutionalization of coordination
between bottom-up and top-down governing mode was advanced. In all
cases, the institutionalization of horizontal coordination lagged behind.
As a result of cross-case analysis, three institutionalization patterns can be
distinguished. The first pattern is marked by the reinforcement of the
original institutional logic into new patterns of rule and is marked by the
absence of challengers who would question the dominant logic and initi-
ate changes. The second pattern develops through interactions between
actors representing the dominant logic and challengers occupying periph-
eral positions within the organization or the epistemic community
(Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; Battilana et al. 2009). The third pattern
evolves through the encounter of actors representing the dominant logic
with challengers occupying a central position in the organization or the
epistemic community.
In each of these three patterns, exogenous shock displaying within a
larger field (political and legal changes described as the ‘governance turn’)
are translated into field-level changes through the interplay of public and
non-public actors. In each of them ambiguity, agency, and power play an
important role. Below, I describe these patterns and reflect on how learn-
ing is connected to, and yet decoupled from, the institutionalization
process.
As already argued at the level of practice, the governance turn necessar-
ily takes place within a governance void, a relative weakness or lack of
institutional infrastructure enabling an effective implementation of new
modes of governance. The new institutional logic—and a new set of
institutions—need to be operationalized on the ground. New practices
have to be introduced and, within these practices, new roles assigned to
public officials, politicians, citizens, NGOs, and businesses. When the
process starts, new institutions attached to the governance turn are
ambiguous—they have a high degree of openness in interpretation and
implementation. Because they are new, they disrupt routines and are
enacted in a more reflexive, intentional way.
In the previous section, I argue that the degree and quality of reflec-
tion upon disruptions varies depending on how original institutions
impact professional orientations, and on the constellation of different
groups of actors: those reproducing and those challenging the status quo.
Here, I shall extend this line of argumentation by indicating how these
phenomena (original institutions and constellation of actors) continue
to affect the process of institutionalization of the new governance mode,
that is, the process within which network-based and participatory
approaches become valued, formalized, and established within public
administration. Specifically, I suggest that the reflexive and intentional
way of acting in the process of interpreting and implementing new regu-
lations means that actors on the ground perform institutional work, prac-
tice that is to intentionally affect institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby
2006; Lawrence et al. 2009; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). In this case, it
is about affecting governance institutions enabling public administration
to coordinate multi-stakeholder, multijurisdictional, and multilevel pro-
cesses. The work of actors who intend to affect institutions may involve
projective, future-oriented agency, as well as habitual agency, selecting
among sets of established routines (DiMaggio 1988; Maguire et al. 2004;
Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). While the latter replicates existing patterns
of thinking and acting, the first requires institutional innovation and
entrepreneurship (DiMaggio 1988; Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Mair
and Marti 2009).
For at least two decades, institution studies have focused on untan-
gling the paradox of embedded agency: how those subject to institutions
in a field can effect changes within them. Such a frame put the emphasis
on the active creation of new practices. Here, I am interested in both:
how those subject to institutions in the field can both effect changes and
resist them. The balancing of these two angles brings me closer to
approaches that put power struggles and institutional inertia at a promi-
nent place in the analysis (Becker 1995; Hallet and Ventresca 2006;
Mahoney and Thelen 2010). In this vein and in the course of empirical
analysis, I have combined two types of institutional work: practice work,
understood as developing and legitimizing practices, and identity work13
understood as developing and legitimizing roles and identities
(Svenningsson and Alvesson 2003; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; Gawer
and Phillips 2013) with habitual and projective agency. This analytical
exercise enables capturing actions oriented to the creation of qualitatively
new solutions (following a new logic) from actions oriented to proposing
“the same but in a new wrapping” (following the original, old logic)
(Table 8.3).
The governance turn exemplifies the logic shift in organizational fields
of public administration agencies. These pressures generate tensions
between the established and new practices and identities. In such
instances, organization members couple environmental pressures for
change with their daily practices (Binder 2007). Following Scott’s insight
Table 8.3 Institutional work around logic shifts

Habitual agency Projective agency
Identity Developing and legitimizing Striving to develop and legitimize
work new identities within the new roles and identities within
framework of the old logic the framework of the new logic
Practice Developing and legitimizing Striving to develop and legitimize
work new practices within the new practices within the
framework of the old logic framework of the new logic
that organizations are opportunistic collections of divergent interests (Scott

1967, p. 23), we must bear in mind that practitioners might respond to
environmental pressures differently, with disruptive and incremental
changes to be introduced to existing practices, or with an active resistance
to change. The latter might take the form of persistent reference to the
established logics, reiterating its assumptions and legitimizing attempts
to preserve the status quo. As demonstrated by the analysis of cases, these
reactions represent a combination of strategic and self-activating
responses.
A major feature of the first institutionalization pattern observed in the
empirical data is the (re)enforcement of original institutional logic into
new patterns of rule, and hence a process evolving through habitual
agency. The case of schools and the case of the anti-flood facility are exem-
plifications thereof. Actors resorted to habitual agency, reaching to cogni-
tive and behavioural scripts encoded in old institutions in order to make
sense of new regulations. Importantly, in both cases their actions were not
purely strategic in the sense that decision-makers did not fight to maintain
original power arrangements and protect their own interests (at least this
was not the driving force behind their actions). This remark makes the
label ‘habitual’ even more accurate. Following the collaborative logic when
designing and implementing solutions for the problem of schools and
anti-flood facilities would not diminish resources at the disposal of
dominating actors (the Mayor and ‘her’ administration in the case of
schools and the Regional agency in the case of anti-flood facilities). The
major obstacle in practising new rules was that its logic was contradictory
to their belief system, in particular convictions about professional identi-
ties, and about the kind of relationship between professionals (public offi-
cials and experts) and the field in which they operate.
Importantly, officials and experts seemed oblivious to this contradic-
tion, as they looked at the new rules through an old frame. The institu-
tional work they performed was, in principle, an intentional readjusting of
new rules to fit old ways of thinking and acting. The more visible the dis-
agreement of challengers outside an organization would be, the more
intentional the readjustment would become. The identities of parties
involved in public disputes were reconstructed according to well-
established institutional logics: citizens and non-public organizations as

those who listen and vote, or possibly deliver feedback on their level of
satisfaction with services and products they have been provided with, and
identities of public officials (especially those who have been elected) as
solely responsible for the development of ideas and their implementa-
tion. Institutional work directed at developing and legitimizing new roles
within an old logic reinforced and partially overlapped with the work
directed at developing and legitimizing new practices: the Mayor could
not imagine that citizens might contribute to the development of ideas.
This is why she advanced the solution herself, and then argued for the
need to vote over the proposed solution at Council meetings; and eventu-
ally, having a ready resolution accepted by the Council, she considered it
ready for public consultation. The particular perception of the role played
by citizens and officials also contributed to the creation of a bulletin that
was to educate citizens on how public management processes work and
why certain decisions, even if unpopular, need to be made.
A similar mechanism of mutual reinforcement of practice and identity
work was observed in the case of barriers, where the perception of identi-
ties influenced practice work, for example, the manner in which meetings
were organized and presented to people: rather as lectures than as spaces
for an open exchange of information and discussion.
Institutional work performed by public officials precipitated responses
from the field. In the case of schools, local protesters, as well as some
insiders, for example, councillors lacked adequate social and organiza-
tional skills to perform institutional work effectively, or to challenge the
dominant patterns of interpretation and implementation of a new gover-
nance mode. Attempts to challenge the dominant actor took place within
the dominant frame, for example, councillors were trying to enter the
discussion by questioning the legality of the proposed resolutions and not
the logic of the operation itself. External actors who were not invited to
take part in discussions did not have a chance to learn to participate and
their passive attitude was further reinforced by the paternalistic attitudes
of municipality authorities (for more a detailed description, see Chap. 4).
As a result, the original, dominant pattern infiltrated new institutions,
shaping mutual expectations and relationships. Over the following years,
collaborative ways of governance were practised and refined, becoming

quasi-surveys.
In the case of the barrier (anti-flood system), the response from the
field was far more active and focused on resistance. Yet again, although
more active, it remained resistance within an imposed frame. The local
community participated in the process presented to them as participatory
and as seeking their opinion and agreement. Within this process, officials
were educating the local community on the advantages of the barrier,
while the inhabitants continued to oppose the barrier and demanded a
different solution. Data from interviews with professionals and experts
involved in the process allow to speculate that despite this failure, their
way of thinking about the participatory governance process remained
unchanged. If we stick to Selznick’s definition of institutionalization,
according to which “to institutionalize” means to “infuse the task with
value” (Selznick 1957, p. 17), we are forced to assert that, in this particu-
lar field, participatory governance was not institutionalized at all, and
that the very idea of governance and participation was degraded. None of
the actors involved in the process could see any value in participation. As
already mentioned, public officials perceive these approaches as exposing
public management to the risk of demagogy, while local community sees
them as a smoke screen enabling public agencies to pretend they care
about citizens’ needs and opinions.
Proposition 9 In the absence of internal actors displaying projective

agency, the process of interactions between actors within and outside the
organization reinforces the well-established (old) institutional logic in
practices and identities proposed by a new governance mode.
The second pattern of institutionalizing a new governance mode devel-

ops through interactions between actors representing the dominant logic and
challengers occupying peripheral positions in the organization or epistemic
community (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; Battilana et al. 2009). This pat-
tern is best exemplified by the case of WWTP. The long-lasting conflict
over the investment opened a space for alternatively oriented actors within
an organization and, more broadly, within an epistemic community. In

their attempts to maintain control and regain legitimacy questioned by
the protesters, top-level public officials commissioned the use of participa-
tory practices. Empirical data indicate that this decision was based on an
instrumental approach to these practices and that new, participatory prac-
tices were accompanied by old ways of thinking (see case description for
details). In this case, however, political and symbolic governance learn-
ing—as an intentional activity aimed at controlling policy spaces, not at
improving governance itself—produced unintended meso-level outcomes.
Despite their initially ritual character, participatory modes of governance
started to penetrate organizational spaces, because certain actors found
them right and/or beneficial. These actors performed both identity and
practice work by developing and legitimizing new practices and identities
within a new, collaborative and participatory logic. In the case of WWTP,
several actors advocated the adoption of a new logic. Here, I shall focus on
the Social Communication Department, which over the course of the
conflict grew from a small unit at the bottom of the city administration
pyramid to become an important department reporting directly to the
President and be responsible for public consultation throughout the city
(for a description of other actors who built their position by ‘riding the
participatory wave’, see a more detailed description in Chap. 6).
In 2008, when the conflict escalated, the symbolic importance of the
Department was strengthened by the President, who elevated its position
within the organizational hierarchy. Importantly, this symbolic gesture
was not followed by any decisions about providing the Department with
additional resources. Nevertheless, it proved to be enough to trigger an
institutionally entrepreneurial action. The director, a former NGO
employee, used his knowledge and embeddedness in the non-
governmental sector to mobilize external resources. The Department
developed a project of public consultations in the municipalities of the
city and received financing from EEA Grants. Having secured the neces-
sary resources, the director employed new professionals with a back-
ground and orientations similar to his. All of them had had experience in
the field of conflict resolution and facilitation of public meetings.
Over the years, the Department, its director and employees were a
driving force behind the development and experimentation with partici-
pation, as well as the institutionalizing participatory logic in organiza-
tional structures and procedures of the City Hall. It does not mean,
however, that the Department changed the way of thinking about and
practising public management throughout the city administration struc-
ture. Instead, they accustomed the administration to the new participatory
logic of governance through building a narrative justifying the need for a
new approach, while at the same time allowing other organization mem-
bers to keep some (or even most) of their original identity. This is an example
of such an ‘inclusive’ frame, reducing internal tensions between a hierar-
chically oriented organizational identity and new practices associated
with the new logic:
We need to combine the knowledge of experts representing different par-

ties: those who use the city, those who manage it (officials), and experts in
a given domain (for example architects). Each of them thinks she knows
best, but they know different things. Officials have a vast knowledge of
procedures, they know what is allowed, and happens elsewhere. The experts
know what can be done from the technical point of view. Citizens know,
because they use the city every day. We facilitate the coordination of these
perspectives, we make them respect each other to see the complementarity
of their knowledge. (interview, June 2013)
The strategy adopted here is based on avoiding any open confrontation and
the direct questioning of original identities and practices. The staff of SCD
do not push organization members to change, rather they try to exploit a void
(governance void), that is, a space to which no one in the organization has any
claims—on the contrary, it is a space that inspires feelings of uncertainty and
fear.
SCD employees coupled this inclusive and non-confrontational identity
work with similar practice work. This is how the director recalls the first
attempts to implement public consultation practices within the city’s
municipalities:
when we approached the mayors of municipalities with a ready project and

the money to implement it (EEA Grants), the dialogue was different and
much easier. Only one mayor was reluctant, he did not want any consulta-
tion, he told us it was a total waste of money. We were unable to convince
him. Eventually, I told him: ‘come on, if you don’t agree, we won’t be able
to settle the project’; it was only then that he finally agreed. In the end, he
liked it so much that at the moment, he is constantly looking around for
consultation opportunities. These (consultation) processes really show you
a different perspective. It triggered learning processes … (interview, June
2013)
The core features of a strategy employed by an institutional entrepre-

neur with a peripheral position are: avoiding confrontation by showing
the space in which new practices can be implemented along with old
practices, by increasing the amount of resources to be shared, hence creat-
ing a situation of ‘a cheap try’,14 where all actors get a chance to experi-
ment with the new logic, and learning in action, without risking too
much. SCD employees skilfully built the Department’s identity as com-
plementary to more established identities. They built their image as those
capable of reducing tensions internally, between the organizational iden-
tity and new practices associated with the new logic (Svenningsson and
Alvesson 2003). The following quote is a good illustration of this
tension:
they [officials from different departments] come to us when they face a

conflict, because they are afraid and do not know how to deal with it. We
are an entity that stands out from the rest. Officials do not perceive us as
part of the city administration, but rather as an extension of NGOs. To the
outsiders, though, we are perceived as part of the administration. (SCD
director, interview, July 2013)
SCD employees invested significant amounts of effort into building an

institutional infrastructure within the governance void. They pushed for
creating procedures, organizational positions and spaces designated for
facilitating participatory processes. Thanks to their activities, district
offices were equipped with a position formally responsible for organizing
dialogue with the public. They established the Public Consultation
Platform, a register of all past (since 2008) and current consultation pro-
cesses freely accessible to the public. Eventually, with their help and
advice, the city President issued an act defining public consultation and
making it compulsory to announce each consultation process held by the
city administration authorities on the Public Consultation Platform.
An important condition for this successful institutional work was the
position occupied by the SCD in relation to diverse actors involved in the
process of institutionalization of the new governance mode. The posi-
tion bridged multiple fields representing different logics (Greenwood and
Suddaby 2006; Kostova et al. 2008). This position of ‘in-betweenness’
increased the resources at their disposal—they were able to combine the
support of social movements and local organizations (Hargraves and Van
De Ven 2006) with an internal (yet instrumental) support of top-level
management. Both kinds of support build their legitimacy inside an
organization, yet if only the latter existed, their agency would be signifi-
cantly weaker. The last quote from the interview with the SCD director:
There is no doubt that external financial resources leveraged change. You

can write it explicitly: if it had not been for EEA Grants, we would have
never accomplished so much in such a short time. Of course, political will
is also necessary and there must be a leader who wants this kind of change.
As for myself, I have drawn a lot of my strength from my background,
from the NGO environment. It gave me a lot clout here within the admin-
istration, I felt supported in what I endeavoured. (interview, June 2013)
The ability to combine both: support from the outside and the support
of top-level management seems to be crucial, especially when we compare
SCD actions with those of another institutional entrepreneur attempting
to affect institutions from a peripheral position. In the market location
case, the Polish Sociological Association was such an institutional entre-
preneur. Sociologists who implemented the participatory research project
and conducted mediation between city officials on the one hand, and
merchants and local community representatives on the other hand, were
actors from outside city administration, yet closely connected to it through
participation in the local epistemic community of academics and experts,
who occasionally cooperated with city administration officials when devel-

oping local policies, organizing conferences and public meetings. Within
this community, they developed particularly close relationships with SCD
employees. Some of the researchers participated in abovementioned pub-
lic consultation projects financed by EEA Grants. Researchers’ entrance
into the conflict scene was preceded by the withdrawal of top-level man-
agement from the steering role. As described in a previous section (see
Sect. 8.2), when not provided with a signal that experimenting is wel-
come, officials locked in the well-established logics. This observation is
crucial since without the leading and supportive role of authorities, the
new institution can easily slide into the path of degradation, as it was illus-
trated in the case of anti-flood facilities. When the mediation process
ended, the majority of its participants15 were disappointed and angry and
they started to contest the new mode of governance. Merchants had
already been sceptical towards participatory approaches after observing
that all collective bodies established by the municipality Mayor had been
ignored by the city administration. The fiasco of the mediation process
only reinforced their scepticism; they started to perceive mediation as an
attempt to deceive them. Confusion about the role of mediators and city
administration emerged and undermined their trust towards the institu-
tion of mediation and dialogue itself. In the interview, a representative of
merchants stated: “I have learnt that before you start a dialogue you need
to check who is financing the initiative, and if I hear that the city is paying
for it, you will not see me at the table anymore” (interview, July 2014).
To sum up, the crucial characteristic of the second institutionalization
pattern is institutional work performed by institutional entrepreneurs
occupying a peripheral position within the organization. With their
peripheral position, they tend to avoid direct questioning of the original,
well-established logics. Disturbance in the organizational environment
seems to them as an opportunity to act upon their values and increase
resources they have at their disposal. They begin to develop new practices
and identities within the governance void—a space that is unfamiliar and
strange for other members of the organization. They use the frame of the
new participatory logic, which resonates with expectations from the out-
side, expressed during the public dispute. The ability to mobilize the sup-
port of actors external to the organization, functioning according to the
alternative, network-based logic provides them with tangible (money)

and intangible resources (legitimacy). Hence, what makes their position
special is not only peripheral, but also boundary bridging location. As a
result they are able to fill the governance void with the institutional infra-
structure (like formal and informal patterns of action, the creation of new
roles and positions, and building narratives that legitimize them) from the
bottom upwards and from the borders towards the centre of the
organization.
Proposition 10 Institutional entrepreneurs occupying peripheral posi-

tions within an organization are more likely to succeed when developing
and legitimizing practices and identities linked to a new governance
mode if they are able to mobilize support from outside the organization,
and use non-confrontational, inclusive strategies while negotiating the
meaning of new identities and practices with organizational members.
The third institutionalization pattern evolves through the encounter of

actors representing the dominant logic with challengers occupying a central
position within the organization or epistemic community. This pattern was
observed in the market location case, where a newly appointed Vice
President “switched the cognitive gear” (Louis and Sutton 1991) from
hierarchical to collaborative, and actively engaged in collaborative
attempts to solve the dispute. His actions have already been described
before (see Sect. 8.2 and Chap. 5); here, the analysis shall focus on the
qualities of his interactions with other organizational actors and on the
manner in which he negotiated the meaning of practices and identities
within participatory approaches to public management.
As I argue in the case description, the new Vice President entered into
a space that was already prepared for the adoption of the new logic. As a
response to the conflict, authorities had resorted to participatory rhetoric
in order to regain legitimacy. The previous Vice President went as far as
having recourse to the use of ‘we have learnt, mantra (Hood 2000), when
he declared in the local newspaper that authorities were in the process of
‘learning’ to organize dialogue (local newspaper interview, September
2009). Although the use of participatory approaches was instrumental
and learning ‘fake’, a space for change opened up, as the hierarchical logic
was officially questioned, and because it became obvious that old ways of
thinking and acting fail in solving the problem. In other words, the gov-
ernance void revealed itself and waited for someone to fill it.
Contrary to institutional entrepreneurs occupying a peripheral posi-
tion within the organization, an institutional entrepreneur holding a cen-
tral position can afford to adopt a confrontational strategy when performing
institutional work. Having a formal position of power, the new Vice
President was able to design new practices and make his subordinates fol-
low them, even if it meant going against procedural and habitual meth-
ods. He initiated new collaborative practices and convinced organizational
members across departments and levels of public administration to adopt
them. Within these processes, the role of the members of administration
was to discuss different solutions with the community and merchants’
representatives, and to provide them, as well as decision-makers, with
information about any procedural and material aspects of the process.
One of the merchants recalls:
he was always there during meetings. We did not need any mediators any-
more. We spoke directly to the Vice President. He was even able to call for
someone if some additional information was needed, and the person would
come and report to all of us directly, e.g. about what had been done about
a certain issue. (interview, April 2013)
Importantly, the employees who tried to work according to the new

collaborative logic, received substantial support and could further learn
and improve their practice. In this particular case, these were street-level
bureaucrats, directly responsible for managing the market area, who were
in a touch with the merchants on a daily basis.
Apart from collaborative practices involving external stakeholders,
new practices introduced by the new Vice President were linked to mul-
tilevel and multijurisdictional coordination practices taking place within
public administration (see Sect. 8.2.2 on governance void). In terms of
institutionalization, it is important to emphasize that despite significant
amounts of institutional work that the Vice President put into bridging
silos structures, this kind of coordination remained hand-controlled and
was pushed forward by an individual. No formal structures were in place

to coordinate processes horizontally, around problems, instead of
vertically, that is, around tasks (Ansell 2011). In order to put this coordi-
nation in place, the Vice President used his position of power either by
ordering coordination directly, or by having a powerful ally—the city
President—to convince a reluctant employee (see Sect. 8.2.2—the ‘phone
call to the President’ scenario mentioned in an interview).
Along with introducing new practices, the new Vice President per-
formed institutional work by building narratives justifying the new ways
of acting, as well as the new roles adopted by the actors involved. The
most prominent example is the ‘there-is-no-alternative’ narrative he pro-
vides when talking about replacing the hierarchical approach to public
management with a participatory approach. First, he claims that such
replacement is a fact and, second, that it is a historical necessity, a sign
that a public management structure is becoming “civilized” (an original
expression used by the Vice President). When describing the hierarchical
approach, he directly questions the assumption of representative democ-
racy in which citizens delegate power to politicians, who then solve pub-
lic problems through public administration. He frames this approach as
obsolete and old-fashioned, even shameful.
In 2006, you would hear such opinion everywhere. They would argue in
favour of the iron rule of representative democracy and ask: if we should
have direct participation and consultation, what are the councillors for? I
hear such voices now, but no one dares say it out loud.
The major line of his argumentation is very different from the one used
by the director of the Social Communication Department. Both of them
believed in participatory approaches and promoted them, but the SCD
director used to work with a more inclusive, conciliatory strategy. The
Vice President could afford to be confrontational because of his formal
position of power.
Yet, it was not only the structural condition of power that made the
Vice President’s experiments with new practices so effective. He was
equipped with social skills, above all the ability to conduct a respectful
conversation and discuss conflicting interests and values in an open man-
ner. During an interview, one of the merchants related the moment when
the new Vice President replaced the old one; he began by saying:
It is a different kind of person. You can actually talk to him. (…) the previ-
ous Vice President was talking with us and, at the same time, looking at the
documents, consulting something with his officials and checking his
phone. (interview, April 2013)
These individual conditions (social skills), the ability to talk to people

and make alliances, were a significant supplement to the structural condi-
tion (formal position of power). An employee of the city administration
mentioned that the Vice President liked to say that he worked like a
plumber.
It is because when he cannot come to an agreement with one person (usu-

ally a department director), and hence ‘the pipe of the decision making-
process gets clogged’, he tries to work out a solution by bypassing the
person and, thus, restores the flow. (SCD employee, interview, February
2016)
Good social skills is what makes both institutional entrepreneurs—the

new Vice President and the CSC director—very similar. Again, juxtapos-
ing them with other highly skilful institutional entrepreneurs, that is,
PSA researchers and mediators, indicates that this feature does not suffice
to trigger the process of institutional change, or even the process of learn-
ing within a (public) organization. The support of top-level organizational
leaders remains necessary.
In terms of the institutionalization of the new governance mode within
city administration structures, the results are mixed. On the one hand,
the Vice President successfully solved the problem and he accomplished
it using the practices and logic of the new governance mode. When focus-
ing on the inclusion of external stakeholders, one can say that the institu-
tionalization process proved a success. Nevertheless, issues of
multijurisdictional and multilevel coordination lagged behind. As the
Vice President himself admits, heads of departments are still neither
expected to reach out to different departments and levels of organiza-

tional structures, nor held accountable for coordination. In this sense,
breaking the silos structure emerges as a greater challenge than, for
instance, the inclusion of an external stakeholder into governance
processes.
This imbalance in the degree of institutionalization of two governance-
related areas can be explained through reference to three issues. First of
all, in the area of organizing dialogue and participation, top-down insti-
tutionalization efforts of the Vice President complemented bottom-up
efforts of the SCD, and these two processes mutually increased their
impact. Second, this area was an explicit subject of pressures from outside
the organization, and both institutional entrepreneurs could relate to
these pressures and draw legitimacy from them. Such external pressures
were lacking in the case of multilevel and multijurisdictional coordina-
tion. And third, the area of dialogue and participation benefited from the
institutional work performed by the SCD, directed at building infrastruc-
ture (procedures, positions) for inclusion, while institutional work per-
formed by the Vice President focused on organizing ad hoc solutions.
Practices proposed within these ad hoc solutions followed the new insti-
tutional logic and questioned the old one. They could have proven inspi-
rational, but failed to provide clear rules that would govern future action.
In other words, the new Vice President’s actions were, to a large extent,
less sustainable. If he had been replaced with someone representing a dif-
ferent outlook and having lower social skills, practices coordinating mul-
tijurisdictional and multilevel collaborations might have been abandoned.
Paradoxically, despite the fact that the Vice President’s strategy was far
more successful when a particular problem needed to be solved, it is the
SCD strategy that seems more effective when it comes to the institution-
alization of governance.
Proposition 11 Institutional entrepreneurs’ success in pushing forward

institutional change towards a new governance mode is more probable if
they combine social skills with attempts directed at building formal
structures enabling governance.
Proposition 12 The institutionalization of governance is most likely to

succeed when bottom-up and top-down institutional processes are linked
to each other and coupled with external institutional pressures.
Proposition 13 The institutionalization of governance is most likely to

succeed if institutional work performed by an institutional entrepreneur
contains critical elements, that is, directed at confrontation and question-
ing the dominating logic, as well as constructive, that is, focused on
building formal and informal patterns of acting.
The following figure illustrates the three patterns of institutionaliza-

tion. Each of them is triggered as a response to disruption in public man-
agement processes and the ‘discovery’ of the governance void—the
absence or weakness of the institutional infrastructure enabling the prac-
tice of participatory and collaborative governance approaches. Even
though the rules on public access to information and participation are
formalized, these institutions are new and open with regard to interpreta-
tion and implementation, that is, they are marked by a degree of ambigu-
ity. Whether new approaches to governance will be institutionalized
along with the new logic depends on the presence of institutional entre-
preneurs who engage in institutional work, developing and legitimizing
new practices and identities within the framework of new logic. In the
absence of such an innovator, frameworks typical for the old logic perme-
ate new practices and identities imposed by formal rules (i.e. national
legislation). Within this process, old ways of thinking and acting are rein-
forced—the new governance mode which, according to the idealized
form, follows network-based, collaborative and participatory approaches,
is institutionalized according to the old, well-established top-down hier-
archical or quasi-market logic.
If the institutionalization of the new governance mode is infiltrated
with a strong opposition from actors outside the public organization
whose interests and orientations are not well served by the emerging
institutional arrangement, a probable institutional result is a compromise
and degradation of collaborative and participatory approaches to gover-
nance. Here, compromise means that none of the actors involved in the
process believes these kinds of approaches to be useful or valuable. If the
first institutionalization pattern is accompanied with a moderate or weak
opposition from the outside, the definition of participation and collabo-
ration designed according to the well-established (hierarchical or quasi-
market) logic is accepted and further reinforced in interactions in the
local public sphere. In both cases the institutionalization does not happen
on its own as a result of institutional inertia. It is enacted by social actors,
who actively create meaning and interpret new regulations in the process
of social interactions (Fig. 8.2).
The presence of institutional entrepreneurs within an organization16
challenges the status quo, it introduces an alternative interpretation of
practices and identities. The entrepreneur (intrapreneur) initiates changes
and actively participates in the implementation. Depending on the posi-
tion (central, peripheral), she may: (a) adopt more or less confrontational
strategies of institutional work; (b) draw on external rather than internal
support for material and non-material resources. Independently from the
position within an organization, the effectiveness of intrapreneurs
depends on their social skills and support from the top-level manage-
ment. Social skills enable her to effectively communicate and build coali-
tions. Support from top-level management provides her actions with
legitimacy towards other employees of the organization. As a result, the
process of institutionalization advances from the bottom upwards, and
from the borders to the centre of the organization (intrapreneur in a periph-
eral location), and from the top to downwards (intrapreneur in a central
position). Regardless of their peripheral or central location, actions of
intrapreneurs are facilitated by outside pressures that intensify the sense
of urgency and relevance to experiments undertaken by institutional
entrepreneurs.
In cases under empirical analysis, the latter two institutionalization pat-
terns were complementary and mutually reinforcing. The area of multilevel
and multijurisdictional coordination, where this complementarity was rela-
tively less visible, is also the area where the governance void remains.
AMBIGUITY AGENCY & POWER INSTITUTIONAL WORK & AGENCY & POWER INSTITUTIONAL
178
WITHIN PUBLIC ORG. COALITION BUILDING OUTSIDE RESULT
Maintaining the status quo: Powerful challengers, Degradation of the

No institutional developing and legitimizing new rejecting the old logic new governance
entrepreneurs identities and practices within the
framework of the old logic
Agency: habitual
(practice work and identity work)
agency Relatively weak
challengers, following Institutionalization of
No need to reconfigure coalitions. the new according to
the old logic
old rules
Institutional Challenging the status quo:
entrepreneurs in developing and legitimizing
peripheral and new identities and practices
within the framework of the
boundary bridging
new logic (practice work and Institutionalization:
location.
Governance identity work) Powerful challengers, from the bottom
void rejecting the old logic upwards, and from
Agency: ‘projective’, Strategy: inclusive and non- the borders towards
future oriented, confrontational. the centre of the
accelerated by social organization
skills and support of Reconfiguring coalitions,
top-level officials mobilizing support from the
outside
Institutional Challenging the status quo:

entrepreneurs in developing and legitimizing
central positions new identities and practices
within the framework of the
Agency: ‘projective’, new logic (practice work and Powerful challengers, Institutionalization:
future-oriented, identity work) rejecting the old logic. top down
accelerated by social
skills and the support Strategy: confrontational.
of top-level officials Reconfiguring coalitions,
mobilizing support from the
inside.
Fig. 8.2 Three patterns of governance institutionalization

8.3.1 Institutionalization and Learning as Different,

yet Coupled Processes
Case studies documenting processes evolving over time and focusing on

diverse actors and their interactions demonstrate that the process of insti-
tutionalization is different and, to a certain extent, separate from the pro-
cess of learning. I propose to regard learning as an intentional activity
undertaken at the individual level, transformed to the meso level of insti-
tutional structures through social interactions and the development of
shared understanding and practices. Negotiation and power struggle per-
meate this transition; consequently, the meso-level effect rarely reflects
the intentions of any particular individual or interest group in an ade-
quate manner (Rządca and Strumińska-Kutra 2016). In some of the cases
under consideration, officials learnt to use participatory tools for strategic
reasons. Nevertheless, even such ‘fake’ learning resulted in institutional
changes, initially unintended by the subjects of learning. I argue that
motivation for learning (e.g. regaining legitimacy) is secondary. It holds
particularly true for double-loop learning, whose core characteristic is the
ability to question the appropriateness of originally adopted beliefs and
practices. Once the established practice and its taken-for-grantedness has
been questioned, you cannot “unthink it”. The questioning of the hierar-
chical or managerial logic that has been taken for granted, or even a
superficial introduction of the participatory logic creates a powerful prec-
edent, forms the basis for building new institutions, opens up space for
negotiation among all actors involved in the process.
8.4 C
onclusions
Patterns of institutionalization delineated above form part of a larger
framework developed here within the frame of ‘practice-based theory of
governance learning and institutionalization’. Practitioners maintaining
and challenging the status quo as well as engaging institutional ambigui-
ties are, to a certain extent, ‘products’ of larger institutional environments
and, specifically, institutional pressures (see Sect. 4.2). If diverse ‘products’
of these pressures are present at a certain point defined by space and time,
a critical reflection upon action (see Sect. 8.2) as well as the process of
double-loop governance learning are more likely. Actors learning new
approaches to governance engage in interactions influenced by local and
extra local institutions and by power struggles. In the process of interac-
tions, individual attempts to learn are transformed into a meso-level phe-
nomenon, as shared understandings and practices are negotiated and
developed through social interaction. New patterns of thinking and act-
ing emerge and gradually accumulate in an organization as a generally
accepted option. In other words, new patterns of governing become
institutionalized.
The three sections above provide a comprehensive theoretical frame-
work linking structural and constructivist moments of governance prac-
tice, explaining how structures are changed or maintained by consciously
acting individuals (Rhodes 2012). It might be wrong or inadequate in
many ways, but it delivers an epistemologically and practically useful
method in which to investigate the phenomenon of learning in the pub-
lic sector, as it focuses on core questions: Why and how does learning
unfold? How does governance practice develop, as opposed to the ideal
model? Eventually, it provides information on ‘critical junctures’ and
configurations of influences making a difference in terms of how gover-
nance is learnt and institutionalized. This knowledge can provide us (aca-
demics and practitioners) with skills that allow turning spontaneous and
accidental practices based on critical reflection and experimentation into
a planned effort to institutionalize learning, above all learning in its explor-
ative, double-loop form. Such institutionalization is necessary in order to
ensure good governance, since governance learning is not about transi-
tion from traditional approaches, to public administration, to market-
based approaches, for example, New Public Management and, eventually,
to collaborative and participatory approaches such as New Public
Governance. It is about learning how to use and improve each mode and
how to switch between these options and balance them in response to
problems that constantly evolve and reappear.
As the cases show, the diversity of actors’ orientations is crucial for trig-
gering both learning processes and institutionalization processes. On the
individual level, confrontation with the alternative logics of thinking and
acting potentially triggers critical reflection and double-loop learning.

Yet, in order to trigger institutional work directed at developing and legit-
imizing new practices and identities linked to the new logic, this diversity
needs to be present within an organization (or at least within the com-
munity of practitioners).
Cases in which double-loop learning and institutionalization of the
new governance mode took place deliver an illustration of how public
organizations are able to accommodate contradictory institutional logics
coupled with different governance modes. The diversity of institutional
arrangements within an organization builds up in time in response to
shifts within a wider institutional context. In literature, these shifts are
referred to as changes in paradigms of public administration: from
Weberian bureaucracy, institutional logic dominated by hierarchy, to
quasi-market approaches, such as New Public Management, institutional
logic seeking market-based solutions and, most recently, the ‘governance
turn’ manifest in praising such concepts as New Public Governance,
guided by institutional logic that refers to networks (Barzley 1992;
Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Lynn 2001; Ansell 2011). The process in
which shifts in the institutional context alter the interpretation of organi-
zational structures represents sedimentation rather than replacement
(Cooper et al. 1996; Seo and Creed 2002). Subsequent layers of institu-
tional logic add up, and each of them produces its own structures and
ideologies that provide resources for competing interests and values in
institutionalization processes (reproduction and reconstruction).
Public administration deals with problems characterized by different
degrees of complexity, and therefore needs to use different governance
modes and institutional logics to respond to them (see Chap. 2). This is why
all three modes of governance are needed and institutional contradictions
mentioned above can be productive and create an opportunity for—and
not a threat to—good governance. Internal inconsistencies that are the
result of spontaneous, evolutionary process of adaptation to external pres-
sures should be cultivated and institutionalized. In this sense, a linear nar-
rative suggesting evolution from bureaucracy through markets to networks
ought to be abandoned. Keeping the minimum level of variety (Jessop
2011) or, in other words, a minimum level of inconsistency, is what enables
metagovernance—improving a specific governance mode and recompos-
ing proportions of governance modes used in a given policy field. Having

the diversity of governance modes institutionalized within public organi-
zation enables leaders to choose which governance mode needs to be acti-
vated, or decide when to engage in a collective, critical, and creative
inquiry about handling a given problem. Embedding opportunities for
such a collective critical reflection into organizational structures would be
conducive to gaining excellence in practising a given governance mode, as
well as mastering the art of switching between the modes and experiment-
ing with new solutions. Within these kinds of structures, single-loop
learning and double-loop learning are institutionalized, and public admin-
istration officials are turned into reflexive practitioners.
Along with institutionalizing the diversity of governance modes, the insti-
tutionalization of multilevel coordination is necessary. Top-level hierarchy
leaders should take decisions regarding governance modes through close
engagement in concrete problem-solving dilemmas of street-level bureau-
crats. Within this model, top executives are freed from thorough opera-
tional control and can engage in strategic planning and provide the
organization with a clear policy direction. They form a constitutional
level focused on the overall policy direction and defining the goals of the
organization (Ansell 2011, p. 119; Sabel 1999). Importantly, within this
kind of hierarchy (called pragmatist hierarchy, Ansell 2011, p. 119),
organizational levels are loosely connected and semiautonomous.
Autonomy allows officials to engage in problem-solving, while the cou-
pling of different levels prevents planning from being confined to a lofty
and isolated position.
Ruminations on metagovernance and learning have consequences for
the discussion on leadership in public organizations. Denis et al. (2009)
argue that in order to enrich our thinking about leadership in public
administration, we need to recognize the pluralistic nature of the organi-
zational context within which leaders of public sector organizations oper-
ate, as well as the dynamic and collective nature of leadership processes in
these settings. The analysis presented above strongly supports this conclu-
sion and puts it forward by indicating how this plurality should be strate-
gically used in order to enhance critical reflection and pursue governance
learning. Among others, it calls for the reconceptualization of institutional
leadership (Selznick 1957), which has thus far focused on managing the
internal consistency of an organization (commitment to the values and

mission of the organization), and hence has been perceived as leadership
based on a backward-leaning vision, which means that the vision is there
to remind the organization of its core values (Washington et al. 2008).
Institutional leadership is perceived by Selznick as a process in which
values are promoted and protected. An institutional leader is a major
actor of institutionalization process within which organizations are
infused “with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at
hand” (1957, p. 17). He suggests that the process of institutionalization
takes place as leaders respond to internal and external forces that exert
pressure on organizations. Yet the existence of multiple governance log-
ics, and hence multiple values represented by each mode split the institu-
tionalization process, as in the process of governance, the number of
values that need promotion and protection multiplies.
As illustrated in the analysed cases, the value of social justice and
democracy pursued by public administration can be understood differ-
ently depending on the governance mode and institutional logic that
accompany it. For instance, within the hierarchical logic, public agen-
cies are the final link in a chain of democratic representation that begins
with the electorate, moves on to the legislature, then to appointed
agency officials, and finally reaches street-level bureaucrats. Network-
based logic proposes building up societal and democratic consent
through collaborative problem-solving (Ansell 2011, pp. 17–18).
Market-based logic would build consent around the quality and costs
of public services. Considerations on metagovernance presented here
and in the Chap. 2 of this book suggest that the concept of institutional
leadership within public administration should be extended to include
reflexivity, the leaders’ ability to work with different governance modes
(or ways of organizing, Alvesson et al. 2017), critical assessment of the
act of problem-solving and, when necessary, the ability to switch
between the logics of governance and interpretations of values and to
blend them depending on the situation. As the empirical analysis indi-
cates and theoretical insights suggest, reflexivity is practised above all
collectively and remains closely connected to acting upon the problem.
In decision-making settings characterized by high uncertainty and a
lack of consensus on values, institutional leadership requires balancing
the backward-leaning position (Washington et al. 2008), promoting

and protecting values such as social justice and democracy, with a for-
ward-leaning vision of an institutional entrepreneur, focused on chang-
ing practices within public organizations.
Notes
1. Theoretically speaking, governance void could refer to each of the gover-
nance modes (through hierarchies, markets, or networks).
2. In the paper on governance learning Robert Rządca and I use the term
“astonishment” in order to emphasize the distinctive character of the
collective context (Rządca and Strumińska-Kutra 2016). Describing the
surprise through the lens of the collective context reveals a new (addi-
tional) meaning of this term. However, as I currently see it, it does not
describe a substantially different phenomenon. Hereby, I thank Dvora
Yanow for very useful remarks on the collective context of surprize.
3. Since the structures are all the time enacted, there still is room for change
and negotiation and in this sense there is no ‘final’ structure. The expres-
sion is used here to refer to certain points in time, where collaborative
and participatory practices became relatively well known and frequently
adopted (and empirical research was finished).
4. District mayor continued establishing social advisory bodies at different
stages of the process, despite the fact that he did not have any decision-
making power. As a result, ideas like dialogue and participation become
contested among local community and merchants (see Sect. 3.2).
5. A quote already used in the case study description (see Sect. 3.2).
6. Barriers protect large areas of land located behind them. However, in
case of a flood water levels rise quicker in front of barriers. If only one
barrier is built, the inhabitants of this particular village are exposed to
risk in case of a flood, as they are not protected by another barrier.
7. These concerns were not unfounded, as proven by the court sentence issued
in late 2017, pursuant to which the Regional Agency of a neighbouring
region and a national agency responsible for dredging were found guilty of
neglecting several types of works. The case was brought to the court by a
local community.
8. His department co-funded the PSA project.
9. Fliegstein and McAdam define social skills as a complex mix of cogni-

tive, affective, and linguistic facilities that render individuals more or less
effective as skilled strategic actors supremely well adapted to the demands
of collective action (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, p. 47). All these facili-
ties rest on our ability to “take the role of the other”.
10. Since epistemic communities by definitions are highly homogenous the
expression might be replaced by epistemic networks (Rommetveit et al.
2018).
11. In the paper on governance learning Robert Rządca and we use the term
“astonishment” in order to emphasize the distinctive character of the
collective context (Rządca and Strumińska-Kutra 2016). Describing the
surprise through the lens of the collective context reveals a new (addi-
tional) meaning of this term. However, as I currently see it, it does not
describe a substantially different phenomenon. Hereby, I thank Dvora
Yanow for very useful remarks on the collective context of surprise.
12. Distinguishing ambiguity, agency and power as significant actors draws
on Mahoney and Thelen’s framework of gradual institutional change
introduced in the book titled “Explaining institutional change.
Ambiguity, Agency, Power” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Importantly
the framework relates to endogenous institutional change; here it proved
to be useful in explaining changes triggered by exogenous shocks (legal
change).
13. I use the term “identity work” (Svenningsson and Alvesson 2003; Gawer
and Phillips 2013), not “boundary work” (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010),
as it better reflects the dilemmas faced by the practitioners whom I have
observed. They were concerned with the question about their roles and
responsibilities as public officers, rather than understanding what dif-
ferentiates them from other groups taking part in the process. These are
two sides of the same coin, since boundaries are understood as the differ-
ences between people and groups (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010).
14. A label proposed by Robert Rządca.
15. The exceptions were street-level bureaucrats engaged in direct interactions
with merchants on a daily basis. They explicitly mention that mediation
enabled them to “step back, observe the process from the distance and see
things they have not noticed previously” (interview, September 2013).
16. The word institutional ‘intrapreneur’ might be more adequate.
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9
Making Social Sciences Matter for Public
Administration and Public Policy
So, you represent the academia. That is great! You might be of help for us,
because we have a real problem here.
Municipality Mayor, interview, case 4 (anti flood facility), March 2013
Bridging the gap between theory and practice is a core challenge for pub-
lic management and governance scholars (Rhodes 2012; Jessop 2011;
Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011; Forester 2017). In the academia, the discus-
sion about the relevance of social research for practice naturally gravitates
towards ontology, epistemology, and methodology. In the light of grow-
ing concerns that management theories are not relevant for practice,
Sandber and Tsoukas ask:
Could it be that the onto-epistemological assumptions we make about the

phenomena we investigate “artificialize” (Bruner, 1990: xiii) our objects of
study, “strip out most of what matters” (Weick, 2007: 18), and lead to
sterile research outcomes, typically in the form of “mainstream journal
articles [that] are written as if they apply to some disembodied abstracted
realm” (Zald, 1996: 256; see also Starbuck 2006)? (Sandberg and Tsoukas
2011, p. 339)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6_9
In a similar vein, Rhodes argues that modernist-empiricist approaches

based on top-down narratives of state regulation and control, or on aggre-
gated models illustrating the shift from government to governance should
be replaced with interpretive approaches. The latter are more valid because
they put people, their practices, and perspectives back into governance,
and hence help to understand how governance “arises from the bottom
up as conflicting beliefs, competing traditions, and varied dilemmas cause
diverse practices” (Rhodes 2012, p. 48). When discussing the relation-
ship between social research, governance, and policy, proponents of inter-
pretive approaches question the generalizability of research results from
one context to the other. Also, they emphasize that policy analysis would
benefit from recognizing the fact that problems to be solved and crises to
be managed are not objective and shared, but rather socially and discur-
sively constructed (Yanow 2009; Jessop 2011; Gustavsen and Pålshaugen
2015). A modernist tendency to focus on goal attainment instead of ask-
ing who defines problems and sets goals results in neglecting problems
generated through asymmetric power relations and domination (Mayntz
2001; Jessop 2011; Denzin 2011; Torrance 2011). At the background of
this discussion, there are questions central for the philosophy of science:
does reality exist independently from human cognition? Are facts sepa-
rable from values?
I am not suggesting that this discussion is unimportant for bridging
the gap between theory and practice. On the contrary, I am convinced
that a discussion on paradigms is relevant and necessary, especially in the
context of politics and policy making (Denzin 2011; Torrance 2011). It
sheds light on how power relationships and ideologies potentially influ-
ence the way policy problems are conceptualized and solved—a question
that is of central importance for democracy. In this sense, such discussion
supports reflection about the goals and means of governance processes,
and hence reflection about their effectiveness and inclusiveness. Within
this book I have taken a stance in the debate when I have argued it is
necessary to inquire into governance processes from an interpretive and
critical perspective.
Nevertheless, this meta-theoretical debate is dominated by academics,
their language and their perceptions. One can have doubts whether and
how this dispute percolates into the practice of politics and policy mak-
Making Social Sciences Matter for Public Administration… 193
ing and, in particular, whether it influences the way practitioners perceive

and use scientific research when enacting public management and experi-
menting with different governance modes.
This is why I suggest reframing the discussion and focusing on the fol-
lowing practice-driven question: How could science matter for practitioners
in public administration, policy and politics? Within such alternative fram-
ing, the practitioner becomes the focus of considerations, while onto-
epistemological issues take the back seat as secondary and subordinated
to practitioners’ perceptions of utility. Just as in the quote opening this
chapter, the practitioner asks the academic: how can you help me? Or
even more directly: what do I get in exchange for helping you with your
research? Below I present three types of research that can be useful for a
practitioner trying to learn and improve governance processes: model-
driven research, research based on interpretive approach (extrapolation-
based research in particular) and collaborative research (with a special
focus on action research). Each of them offers a different answer to the
question about bridging the theory-practice gap.
In the last section, I argue that the discussion about the relationship
between theory and practice could benefit from considerations developed
within Science Technology Society studies (STS studies). Analysis of the
relationships between science, politics, and policy making is the major
concern of this discipline. Frameworks developed in STS studies, such as
linear and stakeholder models of science, facilitate reflecting and theoriz-
ing about diverse possible configurations in relationships between aca-
demics and practitioners. In this chapter, I am focusing solely on the
utility of social research for public management and governance practi-
tioners. Nevertheless, wider reflection on these issues is necessary as, on
the one hand, science-based knowledge is the key to managing today’s
societal challenges and, on the other hand, social trust in science appears
to be decreasing. It has become clear that science cannot straightforwardly
predict and control risk (Beck 1992) and expert knowledge is often used
for rationalization and persuasion in politics and policy making (Rayner
and Malone 1998; Pielke 2007). Saltelli et al. (2016) speak of a “general-
ized crisis in the epistemic governance of science” (p. 14), mentioning
such issues as the ineffective use of scientific evidence for policy, or the
industrialisation and commodification of science. In this sense the ques-
tion about using science in politics and policy making becomes critical
for the sustainability of the scientific enterprise. Considerations aimed at
diversifying and describing different roles of academics in politics and
policy making, depending on the circumstances (e.g. uncertainty, con-
sensus over values see Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; Pielke 2007; Ansell
and Geyer 2016) present an important way forward.
9.1 T
hree Types of Research Relevant
for Public Management Practitioners
The first way a practitioner can make sense of academic research in order
to advance her ability to learn and perform good governance is through
model-driven research. Model-driven research develops rule-based knowl-
edge on public management and governance practices. Within the
model, significant variables are extracted from a specific context in order
to establish a set of factors responsible for a given result (e.g. success or
failure of management processes). Classic Elinor Ostrom studies on
managing commons in Africa and Nepal (Ostrom 1990) or Robert
Putnam’s inquiry about the functioning of local government in Italy
(Putnam et al. 1993) are examples of such research. When policy-makers
and public officials are familiar with the model that contains a set of
factors responsible for the success of self-organized governance systems
or effective functioning of the local government, they gain ideas about
organizing similar systems within the social, organizational, and insti-
tutional context of their own practice. Importantly, although deprived
of contextual information, these models are grounded in the observa-
tion of practice, and are hence supposed to be relevant for the advance-
ment of governance practices within public spaces. Practice grounding,
as well as the willingness to challenge social and economic theories via
conclusions drawn from the observation of practice, is an important
part of the model-driven research endeavour. Even a brief look at the
titles of books co-authored and edited by Elinor Ostrom clearly testifies
to this intention, see for example, Working Together: Collective Action,
the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice (Poteete et al. 2010) or
Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice (Hess

and Ostrom 2007).
The second type of research that can be useful for practitioners is inter-
pretive research design delivering context-based knowledge, which is not
concerned with the significance of abstract variables, but is only con-
cerned with context-sensitive descriptions of how practitioners experi-
ence reality. This kind of research reflects the complexity of
decision-making processes evolving within the public policy and public
management practice, and is therefore well-equipped to incentivize
reflexive, critical attitudes towards action and learning processes. As
Dvora Yanow puts it, modernist, model-driven approaches are ‘the right
answer’ approaches, suggesting that the implementation of a given set of
principles will trigger a specific result. The modernist model originates
from the assumption that the perception of the problem is accurate,
whereas the interpretive perspective is an ‘inquiry’ approach, which prob-
lematizes the very definition of the problem, for example, through illus-
trating the significance of framing (Yanow 1996, 2009, see also Schon
and Rein 1994; Forester 2018).
Directly referring to the issues of research practical utility, some
researchers point out that an objective analysis of a problem out of the
context may not meet practitioners’ needs. At least not as much as learn-
ing about specific experiences, perspectives and contexts of action
(Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011); some of them argue that managers learn
mainly through storytelling (Hummel 1990, 1991). A detailed descrip-
tion of practices embedded in a specific organizational and institutional
environment facilitates understanding governance processes, as it tells a
story of what happens when you try to implement change into public
management strategies. The story illustrates how the practitioner is
immersed in a rich and complex context, which may limit her possibili-
ties of action, but also creates opportunities. An investigator who presents
a case in a detailed and naturalistic manner provides readers with a vicari-
ous experience. When faced with a fine case study, readers have the
impression of a first-hand observation of the events described, they can
make generalizations when encountering a similar case and, subsequently,
confirm or modify any conclusions drawn from it. Stake and Trumbull
(1982) term this process “naturalistic generalization”, while Lincoln and
Guba (1985) relinquish any generalization and suggest replacing it with

“transferability” and “fittingness” (Strumińska-Kutra and Koładkiewicz
2018). Practitioners need to judge and/or practically verify whether a
hypothesis developed in one context ‘fits’ or can be transferred into
another. Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 238) describes the research construction
enhancing the possibility of this type of generalization as follows:
I avoid linking the case with the theories of any one academic specializa-
tion. Instead I relate the case to broader philosophical positions that cut
across specializations. In this way I try to leave scope for readers of different
backgrounds to make different interpretations and draw diverse conclu-
sions regarding the question of what the case is a case of. (…) The goal is
to allow the study to be different things to different people. I try to achieve
this by describing the case with so many facets – like life itself – that differ-
ent readers may be attracted, or repelled, by different things in the case.
Michael Barzley (2007) suggests that case-based research can use

extrapolation-based design in order to facilitate practitioners’ attempts to
introduce research-based knowledge into practice. This design focuses on
investigating practices in source sites and prepares the ground for a disci-
plined and ingenious (context-sensitive) extrapolation of practices from
source to target sites, for example, by delivering a framework highlighting
the phenomena, processes and relationships crucial for the development
of a given practice. While getting to know someone else’s successes and
mistakes, practitioner learns from them (second-hand learning, Barzley
2007). Research presented in this book was inspired by this approach;
this is why it begins with a recount of contextualized stories of gover-
nance learning and institutional change, in order to facilitate the under-
standing1 of a phenomenon in all its complexity. It is followed by a
cross-cutting analysis of phenomena and patterns significant for the fail-
ure and/or success of governance processes. The demonstration of the
spontaneous processes of single-and double-loop learning provides a
background for performing an effective institutional design, mimicking
naturally occurring processes, yet ‘superficially’ accelerating their func-
tioning. Here, this design would include building an institutional and
organizational infrastructure enabling single-loop learning, that is,
advancing a particular governance mode, and double-loop learning, that

is, advancing the ability to question a given mode and switch or balance
between modes.
Representatives of the interpretive tradition and “practice turn”
(Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011) in research on management and in organi-
zational studies claim that they bridge the theory-practice gap, because
they make theory a derivate of practice and, by doing so, they make the-
ory more reflective of the “richness” of practice (Weick 2003, p. 14,
Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). Therefore, their theories resonate better
with practitioners’ experience than model-driven research producing
rule-based knowledge. Even if it is so, both types of research, that is,
model-driven, producing rule-based knowledge and interpretive, and
extrapolation-driven, producing context-based knowledge, can only be
relevant for practitioners if results are communicated in the right way. In
both cases, making research on public administration and public man-
agement a matter for practitioners would mean improving its accessibility
to practitioners in terms of language and in terms of methods and chan-
nels of communication (Flyvbjerg 2001, 2012; Alvesson et al. 2009).
This requires institutional support and change within the current systems
of science and research management, including career incentives. Despite
long-lived criticism, research impact is measured rather by citations than
by activities that would indicate relevance to practice.
Within both types of research—model-driven and interpretive,
extrapolation-based—knowledge production and knowledge implemen-
tation are separated from each other. Practitioners have no impact on
what is researched and how it is done. They are the end-users of scientific
research; it is up to them to translate knowledge into practice. A different
approach to the matter is proposed in the third type of inquiry useful for
advancing learning and good governance capabilities. In the collaborative
form of research practitioners no longer ‘wait in a line’ for scientific results
to be transformed into applied research and implemented, or translated
into the ‘lay language’. They become involved in a collaborative inquiry
generating both scientific knowledge and democratic social change
(Greenwood 2007). The goal of such a pragmatically oriented inquiry is
to advance the workability of human praxis; hence, participation is here
‘not just a moral value’ but essential for a successful inquiry into the com-
plexity of the problems addressed (Greenwood 2007, p. 131). The
assumption of the pragmatic approach is that complexity of the reality we
are trying to comprehend requires the knowledge and expertise of a broad
and diverse array of stakeholders.
From the perspective of the practical utility of social research for pub-
lic management practitioners, it is especially important that the pragma-
tist approach is problem-oriented (Greenwood 2007; Ansell 2011). It is
joint action in response to the problem that enables academics and
practitioners to gain valid knowledge and seek an effective solution
(Strumińska-Kutra 2016). In this sense, engaging into participatory
inquiry seems a very promising activity for both practitioners and aca-
demics. Given research conclusions presented in this book, a research
process in which collective reflection and action in response to the prob-
lem are intertwined seems to deliver a perfect framework for advancing
and developing the capacity to learn and perform good governance.
Within this research framework, “researchers, policymakers, and the pub-
lic form mutual learning systems” (Robinson 1992) and collaborative
research can become an instrument of metagovernance—understood as
activities aimed at reflecting on governance and rebalancing the mix of
governance modes (Jessop 2011).
Some researchers explicitly suggest that participatory research
approaches deliver useful patterns for the governance of sustainability
problems (the idea known as ‘transdisciplinarity’ in the field of sustain-
ability research Popa et al. 2015; Ansell and Geyer 2016). They claim
that this kind of research (and governance, as the author of this book
believes) becomes reflexive and turns into a “socially-mediated process of
problem-solving based on experimentation, learning and context specific-
ity” (2015, p. 48). Promoting this kind of research may be the most rel-
evant answer to the question about the way in which we can ensure that
social research matters for public administration and, more specifically
for the institutionalization of continuous learning within public admin-
istration structures.
Table 9.1 summarizes the above considerations. It begins by addressing
the question on the relevance of particular research for practitioners fac-
ing a specific problem in a given context. When using knowledge from
Table 9.1 Types of research relevant for developing a capacity for learning and good governance in public
administration
Context Knowledge
sensitivity production Answer to the
Type of (practitioners Type of Role of Role of and theory-practice
research perspective) knowledge researcher practitioner application gap
Model-driven Low Rule-based Knowledge Knowledge Separate Communication
producer user
Extrapolation Middle Context- Knowledge Knowledge Separate Communication
based based producer user
Collaborative High Context- Knowledge Knowledge Intertwine Research design
based and producer and user and
action- knowledge producer
based user
Making Social Sciences Matter for Public Administration…
199
model-driven research, practitioner gains general information about what

might be important for performing good governance. She is provided
with an explanation of mutual connections between phenomena, for
example, that good governance and governance learning are influenced
by social trust, the diversity of professional orientations reflecting differ-
ent governance modes, the existence of organizational and institutional
solutions enabling multilevel and multijurisdictional collaborations, and
so on. Familiarity with these rules equips the practitioner with ‘design
principles’. Yet the rules are abstract and the practitioner will need to
learn whether and how they work in practice. Ethnographies and case
studies deliver knowledge enabling practitioners to understand how
things work in actual situations and how are they interconnected. In
other words, this kind of research helps them to develop context-sensitive
knowledge, which is of crucial importance for the implementation of any
idea. It stimulates their imagination and prepares them for the inevitable
failures. Collaborative research is the only design directly engaged into
the development of the capacity for learning and good governance. This
is why, from the perspective of a practitioner participating in the collab-
orative process, its context sensitivity (and utility) is highest. Importantly,
this kind of research still enables the development of narrative descrip-
tions, as well as theoretical generalization, meaningful for both academics
and practitioners.
9.2 Models of the Science-Society

Relationship: Towards the
Institutionalization of Engaged
Methodology in Public Management
and Governance Studies
Despite this perfect match, collaborative research methods and action
research specifically are rarely applied in public management and gover-
nance studies and still are described as ‘emerging’ and outside the main-
stream’ (Bartels and Wittmayer 2018). It is not uncommon for action
research to be accused of too much action and not enough research,
which creates an impression that it is performed rather on the fringes of

the academia, or even beyond (Levin and Greenwood 2011). The prob-
lem of ‘action bias’ at the expense of knowledge production is not inher-
ent in action research or in any other collaborative research approaches.
Rather it is a consequence of how we, academics and practitioners, tend
to conceive the science-society relationship.
When implementing collaborative research, one stumbles on major
obstacles in both academic and non-academic environments. Among the
academia, engaged scientists are regarded with confusion (Levin and
Greenwood 2011; Hale 2008), financing and professional assessment
schemes do not promote this kind of research and involvement into prac-
tice. Public imagination of social research often leaves the participants of
Action Research puzzled about the ‘democratic role’ adopted by the
researcher. Non-academic participants face the consequences of challeng-
ing “the divisions of labor between knower-researchers and the known-
researched” (Eikeland 2012), but their visions of social (scientific) research
are incongruent with the visions of either the Action Research c ommunity
or the broader community of engaged scholars. This state of affairs contin-
ues despite the growing fascination with collaborative approaches to gover-
nance: collaborative governance itself, coproduction of public services, and
so on. Strangely enough, most of the time researchers remain excluded
from collaborative communities they make research on, and not with them.
In other words, action research as well as other forms of collaborative
research (like Participatory Action Research; Grant et al. 2013, critical
participatory action research CPAR; Kemmis, 2013, interactive research;
Ansell 2007) remains under-institutionalized within the public and the
academic sphere. Confusion around the Action Research project designed
to find an answer to the public dispute and solve the problem of market
location provides a good example (see Chaps. 5 and 8). Academics from
the Polish Sociological Association responded when addressed directly by
a practitioner, that is, the municipality Mayor, asking for their help. They
prepared a project whose aim was to ‘develop a systemic infrastructure for
dialogue between district authorities and district inhabitants in the mat-
ters of spatial planning’. They proposed an Action Research approach
engaging participants into a process directly linking knowledge produc-
tion to problem-solving action. Practical and theoretical knowledge on
public dispute resolution was to be gained. Yet, for some of the officials,
including the former and the new Vice President, the role adopted by
academics was rather confusing and out of place. They did not know how
to engage into this collaborative project. The former Vice President del-
egated the steering of the process to researchers, without—obviously del-
egating to them the decision-making power. In this new situation,
participants—researchers, external stakeholders and officials them-
selves—were not sure of the framework within which they were acting
and, above all, whether and how their actions relate to practical imple-
mentation. After an entire year of attempts at defining the rights and
responsibilities of those engaged, the project was closed, because the
newly appointed Vice President was not interested in participating. He
could not imagine any use for researchers in this particular situation.
According to him, researchers’ work involves mainly the gathering of
information (preferably with the use of a questionnaire),2 and providing
ready results to the public or to practitioners (for a discussion of practi-
tioners, responses towards participatory approaches to research also see
Meyerson and Kolb 2000; Pedersen and Olesen 2008; Arieli et al. 2009).
Despite the fact that the new Vice President was able to solve this particu-
lar dispute, a valuable opportunity was lost. As the analysis shows (see
Chaps. 5 and 8), the Vice President was focused on ad hoc problem-
solving, not taking into consideration a long-term perspective aimed at
building an institutional and organizational infrastructure for dialogue,
multijurisdictional and multilevel management. This infrastructure
would enhance the capacity for good governance and learning even when
the new Vice President leaves the office. In this sense, research goals
developed by the PSA project would complement the approach adopted
by the Vice President.
General public perceptions of plausible social research are deeply rooted
in the non-dialogical, linear model of science, which is not able to give
legitimacy to a research enterprise that treats Action Research as method-
ology (Greenwood and Levin 2007). The ‘non-traditional’ ways of doing
research are unpopular (Gaventa and Cornwall 2013), not merely because
they are new, and therefore not yet rooted in public imagination, but
because they contradict the legitimized method of scientific research. AR
seen as a scientific tool for enhancing reflexive management or policy mak-
ing will never gain sufficient legitimacy under the linear paradigm of sci-
ence. The linear model justifies the social utility of science by assuring
fluent transition from basic research and applied research undertaken by
scientists, to the implementation of results by practitioners (e.g. politi-
cians, officials, managers). Science should be simultaneously useful for and
separate from politics and policy (Pielke 2007). In this model, the produc-
tion of scientific knowledge is separated from action (Greenwood 2007).
Activities aimed at sustaining these assumptions lead to various patholo-
gies, that is, instrumentalization of science in public debate, especially
through the (ab)use of ‘objective’ scientific arguments in value-laden dis-
cussions. Yet, the source of this pathology is not the mere engagement of a
scientist, but pretending that engagement is unusual for a scientist. In fact,
the linear model enhances such pathological tendencies; they are linked to
the conviction that scientific resolutions are an answer to political and
policy dilemmas. This leads us to the conclusion that if science is able to
resolve disputes, politics becomes obsolete. What legitimacy do scientists
have to make decisions on behalf of society? The answer to this question
sets the limits of the role of (social) science within the political debate.
This does not mean that science does not have a place in a debate in
which values are involved. The stakeholder model of science encompasses
value-related matters, allowing the identification of additional roles that
scientists can play in the decision-making processes (Pielke 2007). It
encompasses concepts like Mode 2 knowledge (Nowotny, Scott, and
Gibbons 2001), use-inspired research (Stokes 1995), well-ordered science
(Kitcher 2001), and post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993).
Within these approaches, production of knowledge is connected to the
social need and, hence, integrates value issues. In contrast to the tradi-
tional model of science-society relationship, knowledge production and
knowledge use are not connected linearly but are intertwined. This debate
would help to solve important problems of relations between science and
society. What is more, this debate is necessary to produce legitimacy for
collaborative research approaches. Performing this debate means per-
forming institutional work in favour of an alternative framing of the pub-
lic role of science. It has been recognized by a number of social scientists,
for example, Levin and Greenwood, who call for reforming the relation-
ship between researchers, universities, and societies (Levin and Greenwood
2011). They indicate politically informed AR, inquiry committed to

praxis and social change, as a vehicle that will allow this transformation
to take place. My point of view is similar, even though I suggest that the
discussion could be reframed around the core problem: the relation
between scientists and politics and policy making, and the systemic
aspects preventing the adaptation of alternative perspectives.
Adopting the stakeholder model of science has yet another advantage
when compared to the linear model. Abandoning the image of a one-way
flow of knowledge from science to society, politics or policy communities
renders the alternative model more resilient in the face of power a symmetries.
Neither modernist-empiricist, not interpretive approaches address the
fact that scientific results may be used not for enlightenment and learning,
but as a tool in the political fight for power (Strumińska-Kutra 2016).
Even if researchers, for example, those representing the interpretive and
critical tradition, are aware of this danger, they have very limited tools to
counteract the abuse or mitigate ethical risks connected to their project.
It is primarily due to the fact that the phase of research and knowledge
production is separated from the phase of action, while it is precisely that
part that reveals power asymmetries (Strumińska-Kutra 2016).
To sum up, attempts to bring Action Research into public manage-
ment and related disciplines go hand in hand with claims that social sci-
ence should be closely related to real needs and problems of society
(Burawoy 2004; Hale 2008; Greenwood 2007; Van de Ven 2007). This
trend resulted in the development of engaged versions of sociology or
anthropology. Public sociology and anthropology seek to bring these dis-
ciplines to the public, so that they reach beyond the academia, in order to
promote dialogue about issues that affect the fate of society and to trans-
form them into a vehicle empowering non-elites (Burawoy 2004).
I argue here that an engaged version of public management studies
may be capable of an original input into the enterprise of building public
(engaged) social science; thus far, it has mostly taken the form of advocacy
in relation to a specific issue or a (disadvantaged) group. In this frame-
work, which I shall call Public Action Research, the researcher does not
affiliate with any interest group.3 Instead she or he enhances the demo-
cratic process of bargaining between different value-based, and thus inevi-

tably conflicting perspectives present within a local community (Rayner
2003). This, in turn, should result in broadening the scope of choices for
those participating in the decision-making process, and in the creation of
new and innovative policy alternatives. Such alternatives have the poten-
tial to reshape political dynamics and enable action (Pielke 2007).
A research methodology triggering and enacting such collaborative
process would facilitate governance learning and produce knowledge on
governance learning. This kind of research may support and contribute to
developing inclusive and reflexive decision-making institutions. Any
project designed within the framework of Public Action Research in pub-
lic management or governance studies would help to explore:
–– the relations of power in action and their significance for both pro-
cesses and outcomes of governance;
–– how individuals, institutions and public organizations continually
refine and improve their values, knowledge and practice;
–– the processes of designing inclusive decision-making institutions and
their role in solving complex governance problems.
Yet for this kind of research to be instrumental in institutionalizing

learning and reflection, it needs to be institutionalized first within the
public and academic space. If, as a scientist, you are looking for a trans-
formative change, you cannot shy away from action—you cannot learn
to swim without getting wet.
Notes
1. In the sense of Weberian Verstehen.
2. When talking to his assistant, he described my research as ‘weird’ because
I was not using a questionnaire.
3. Which does not mean she is neutral—performing this role is challenging
and requires a reflective attitude towards one’s own ideologies and values,
as well as mindful engagement with others.
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Methodological Annex
Methodological Approach
Just as in other fields, public management and governance studies oscillate
between two methodological approaches: positivist—modernist empiri-
cist, and postmodern—interpretive. In the first, researchers cease their
participation in the world they study, avoid affecting the situation they
enquire, standardize the collection of data, bracket external conditions,
and make samples representative (Burawoy 1998, p. 5). Although descrip-
tion is important for them, most ‘positivist’ researchers aim to develop an
explanation of a particular sort, one that identifies the causes of a phenom-
enon. Typically it is done through testing causal hypotheses. The goal of
interpretive research, by contrast, is to provide reasons for a phenomenon
(Haverland and Yanow 2012) by illuminating its local context and mean-
ings attached to it. When describing the difference, Haverland and Yanow
refer to the famous anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who claimed that such
a meaning-focused research approach is driven by a desire to gain “access
to the conceptual world in which our subjects live so that we can, in some
extended sense of the term, converse with them” (Geertz 1973). The trans-
lation of interpretive approach into research method resulted in a wide-

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6
212 Methodological Annex
spread use of inductive approaches, that is, generating theories grounded

in empirical data. Grounded theory (despite of its positivists roots, Glaser
and Strauss 1967) and case studies used for theory development became
flagships of the interpretive enterprise (Eisenhardt 1989, 1991; Eisenhardt
and Graebner 2007; Flyvbjerg 2006; Gerring 2007; Silvermann 2005;
Stake 2005; Hijmans and Wester 2010).
Yet inductive approaches1 do not rise up to an important challenge that
lies in casting beyond the specific and unique ethnographic context to
anchor individual micro studies, to the wider macro-social relations within
which they are embedded (Wadham and Warren 2014). I saw this chal-
lenge as particularly relevant to inquiring into the governance turn, which
emerges on the international and national level and infiltrates specific pub-
lic organizations and local micro-management practices. I was interested in
capturing both “structuralist moments” (Hallet and Ventresca 2006) i.e.
top-down processes of structures influencing local practices, and bottom-
up, “constructivist moments” (Hallet and Ventresca 2006), within which
structures are maintained, modified, and disrupted by local practices.
Institutional theory delivered an analytical tool for the exploration of these
two intertwined processes, and it was adopted at the very start of the
research process. In this sense, case study was used not in order to generate
a theory but in order to supplement and modify it. The methodological
approach that best suited this endeavour was the extended case method.
First of all, the extended case method is by definition rooted in pre-
existing theories. It aims to rebuild theory by comparing it to what ‘actu-
ally happens’. Engagement in the field is important for a reflexive2
development and refinement of theory, which is capable of accommodat-
ing anomalies (Kuhn 1962)—in this case, events that actually occur, but
have not been anticipated by a given theory. In other words, the theory is
a flexible tool which guides the researcher’s dialogue with participants
about what is happening in practice.
The assumption that practice can inform theory fits my original goal of
building a practice-based theory of governance learning and institutional-
ization. There were some theoretical concepts, like single-loop and double-
loop learning, institutional isomorphism or structure agency interaction
that guided the analysis from the very start. Yet the observation of gover-
nance practice filled the framework with the new content and supple-
mented it with new or modified theoretical concepts. The concept of
213
governance void or modified understanding of surprise, as a collective

phenomenon penetrated by institutions, are the examples. Observation of
practice also guided the researcher to reach out for established theoretical
concepts, for example institutional entrepreneurship and innovation or
institutional leadership. Processes and phenomena emerging from the
analysis prompted integration of these concepts into the practice-based
framework of governance learning and institutional change. Last but not
least, through the observation of practice, the focus of research was shifted
towards questions relatively under-researched in public management and
governance studies literature, although significant from both theoretical
and practical point of view: Why do organization members learn? Is learn-
ing always performed for the public good? How are the processes of learn-
ing and institutionalization permeated by power? How does institutions
influence learning and, eventually, how can learning be institutionalized?
Another advantage of the extended case method important for the
inquiry was its sensitivity to the process of macro–meso–micro transitions.
Within this approach, ‘a case’ is rooted in a particular historical, political
and social context, and retracing these linkages forms an important part
of the inquiry. This assumption was in line with my intent to interpret
the phenomena of governance turn and governance learning by linking
micro level practices to organizational structures and institutional
arrangements pervading the organizational environment.
The practice-based framework of governance learning and institution-
alization has limitations in terms of generalisability. Although it focuses on
institutional change and learning, it retraces processes of learning influ-
enced and triggered by forces outside the organisation (by external stake-
holders, external institutions), to a large extent coercive. Second, it is based
on research conducted within a specific institutional environment, where
participatory governance institutions are introduced into an environment
characterized by weak state institutions, underdeveloped civil society, and
the domination of the executive that disrupts the equilibrium of the checks
and balances mechanisms (Rządca and Strumińska-Kutra 2016).
Addressing the above limitations, any future research aimed at an elabo-
ration and modification of the proposed model should investigate any
external pressure mechanisms of normative and mimetic nature, as well as
internal organisational processes. It would also be necessary to introduce
variation into institutional contexts; for example, multiple and effective

institutions empowering stakeholders versus the few and ineffective, mul-
tiple and effective institutions, and actors delivering mimetic and norma-
tive pressures versus the few and ineffective, and so on.
Research Methods, Data Sources, and Analysis

The selection of cases followed the logic of theoretical sampling (Silverman
2005). Its goal was to capture theoretically important qualities of gover-
nance that is, multijurisdictionality and multilevel character and inclu-
sion of non-governmental actors (Bevir 2011). Public disputes around
local problems were selected as the subject of analysis, because they
require collaborative governance strategies and challenge public agencies
to learn and institutionalize new, collaborative governance modes. A
detailed explanation of the relationship between public disputes and the-
oretical concepts of institutions and learning provided given in Chap. 3.
Within this section, the focus is research methods and data sources only
briefly mentioned in the main text of the book.
As mentioned in Chap. 3, all cases draw on three main sources of data,
namely: (1) archival sources: official documents (administrative deci-
sions, lawsuits, local government resolutions, open letters, organizational
documents, minutes from meetings of municipal and provincial coun-
cils), media reports (newspaper and TV releases, interviews), the
Internet (webpages of public agencies, protesters committees, etc.); (2)
interviews with key actors; (3) observation (of public meetings, protests,
open days, etc.) The set of research methods applied includes content
analysis, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. Table
A.1 presents detailed information about data sources and research meth-
ods used in each case.
Interviews The interviewees were selected owing to their involvement in

the public dispute and problem management. On the public administra-
tion side, these were usually elected officials and civil service bureaucrats
who participated either in public meetings or in internal public adminis-
tration meetings devoted to a given problem. These officials were respon-
Table A.1 Data sources and methods
Case Methods and data sources Timespan covered by
empirical data and field
work
interviews Archival sources Observation
Schools The Mayor, a municipality official, Official documents (minutes Council Autumn 2011–
two councillors, a local from council meetings, meeting Autumn 2017
community representative, the resolutions taken by the (approx. Field work:
principal Council etc.) 4 hours) Summer 2012
(6 interviewees, 4 interviews)a Newspaper articles
Internet platform devoted to
local issues
Market The Vice President, the head of Official documents, e.g. – Summer 2008–
location the Social Communication minutes from Council Summer 2016
Department (SCD), an employee meetings Field work: Spring
of the SCD, the Mayor, a Newspaper articles 2013–Autumn 2013
municipality councillor, a Organizational documents
mediator, a representative of (report on the PSA project,
merchants, a representative of minutes from mediation
the local community, two meetings, open letters)
municipality officials
(10 interviewees, 6 interviews)
(continued)
215
Table A.1 (continued)
216
Case Methods and data sources Timespan covered by

empirical data and field
work
interviews Archival sources Observation
WWTP A regional agency representative, Official documents (minutes Public Winter 1998–Autumn
the head of the SCDb, the from public meetings, meetings, 2013
Infrastructure Department administrative decisions, open days at Field work: Summer
director, a representative of the lawsuits, local government the WWTP 2007–Autumn 2009
investor, a representative of an resolutions, investment (approx.
environmental NGO, a documents e.g. the 15 hours)
representative of the property Environmental Impact
owners’ associationc Assessment report)

(5 interviews) Protesters’ Committee’s website
(news, open letters),
Newspaper articles
Anti- A central agency representative, a Official documents (minutes – Spring 2010–Autumn
flood representative of the investor from Council meetings and 2017
facilities (Regional Agency), an academic Council resolutions) Field work: Autumn
expert (professor invited to Newspaper articles, 2013–Spring 2014
participate in a public meeting), Organizational documents (e.g.
two Mayors, a councillor, a PowerPoint presentations on
representative of the local the flood prevention system,
community flood prevention programme)
(7 interviews)
a
In some situations two people were interviewed within the same meeting
b
SCD director was interviewed once; the interview scenario covered both disputes (about the market location and about
the WWTP)
c
A non-profit organization helping property owners to secure their rights, for example, when claiming compensations in
cases where the value of property diminishes due to public investments in the area
217
sible for the decision-making process or for providing information used

in the decision-making process. Depending on the case, representatives
of different levels of local government were interviewed, as well as repre-
sentatives of central public agencies. The latter are typically involved
when decisions regarding the environment are made (here: the WWTP
and anti-flood facilities). Similarly, within a given public organization
responsible for ‘handling a dispute’, representatives of different hierarchi-
cal levels were interviewed, ranging from elected officials, to department
heads, to ‘regular’ civil service bureaucrats.
As for non-governmental actors involved in the dispute, those inter-

viewed represented formal and informal groups organizing local commu-
nity members, interest groups (e.g. merchants), or other NGOs operating
locally and involved in the conflict. In two cases (market location and
anti-flood facilities), external experts involved in the dispute were inter-
viewed (in the WWTP case, experts’ perspectives were captured during
participant observation and document analysis).
The semi-structured, open interviews consisted of four sections: (1) the
history of the dispute; (2) major actors involved, their actions and lines of
argument; (3) the role different actors played in the process, (4) the evalua-
tion of the process. Interview took on average 60 minutes; all were recorded
and transcribed. The purpose of interviews was neither to reconstruct the
history of the process nor to evaluate whether it was successful or not, but
rather to learn about participants’ perspective, find out what they found
reasonable or unjustified, what they saw as success or failure, natural or
odd. What interviewees were taking for granted and thought valuable and
what they considered weird and outrageous were important indicators of
whether or not certain governance practices are institutionalized. All inter-
viewees expressed their consent to be interviewed, recorded, and agreed for
the transcribed interviews to be analyzed. All cases are anonymized—the
names of locations and organizations have been changed. Those who were
interviewed or whose names appear in archival documents are referred to
by their position within a given social setting (councilor, mayor, depart-
ment director, local community representative).
Archival sources, such as official documents, administrative decisions or
newspaper articles were treated as the emanation of certain ways of
thinking about public management and governance; they also played an
important role in reconstructing the chronology of events. Minutes of

Council meetings—that is, general meetings and meetings of special com-
mittees—were among the most important documents used as data sources.
These 30–40-page publicly accessible documents provide researchers (or
anyone else interested) with relatively accurate descriptions of discussions
and the course of meetings. Although minutes are not literal transcripts,
they reflect the original language of discussion, including jokes, irony (e.g.
see the quote opening Chap. 4). First, all minutes from Council meetings
that took place during disputes were scanned in search of key words refer-
ring to the dispute (school, market, WWTP, IP, barriers, flood). An in-
depth analysis was carried out only with respect to those parts in which
issues pertaining to the dispute and the problem behind it. Council meet-
ings take place once a month. Minutes from the meetings of Council
committees were taken into account only when it was ascertained that an
issue related to the dispute was discussed—for example, minutes of com-
mittee meetings were an important source of data in the case of schools, as
it was during the meetings that solutions were initially accepted. The
WWTP case was an exception in this respect, as the City Council was less
involved and the major scene of the dispute were public meetings and
direct interactions between city officials and protesters.
Another important category of documents used as data sources were news-
paper articles and websites, including Internet platforms created by local
communities. The latter in particular proved an invaluable source of data. In
the case of the WWTP, they actually substituted interviews with representa-
tives of the Protesters’ Committee. After an initial attempt at contacting a
committee representative, I decided against an interview. During our tele-
phone conversation, the representative said: “I have googled you. I saw that
you deal with sustainable development and environmental justice issues. This
is very good, you can be of a great help for us!” He expected me to become
an Issue Advocate (Pielke 2007), an expectation I could not fulfil given my
plan to reconstruct the process rather than to intervene into it3 (see Chap. 9
for some reflections on how power struggle infiltrates the research act).
Participatory observation was only used in two cases. In the school case,
I participated in a Council meeting. In the WWTP case, I took part in a
large (approx. 700 participants) public meeting held in the City Hall and
in Open Days organized in the plant. Observation time covered by field
219
notes ranged between two hours (Council meeting and the visit to the
plant) and eight hours (the public meeting).
Summarizing, combining various methods (methodological triangula-
tion) and data sources (data triangulation) within a complex research
process enabled a more complete description and comprehensive under-
standing of the cases. The process of data collection and interpretation
was discussed within a team of two researchers.
In each case, the research process itself took place in three phases: (1)
retrospective data collection preparing for the field work; (2) field work
either during the public dispute or following the dispute (although no
later than with a year); (3) retrospective data collection after the main
protests had ceased. In the latter phase, data gathering overlapped with
data analysis. The last empirical data were collected in the autumn of
2017.
Data Analysis Time series analysis was used in order to analyse each case.
It helped to develop sequences of actions that could be turned into a
historical narrative, further enabling the identification of changes in
convictions and practices that took place over time. The decision-making
process about the way in which to manage a given public problem and
the public dispute it has sparked off (e.g. how to manage flood security
and deal with protests against barriers) was at the core of the analysis.
Subsequent phases of the process were distinguished according to the
existence of continuity in the context and actions being pursued within
them, but discontinuities at their frontiers (Denis and Langley 2001).
Time frames of events were defined either on the basis of change of atti-
tudes of key participants, or by major shifts in the actors’ perception of
the problem and/or public management practice. Four main categories
for analysis were identified within each period. The first consisted of cap-
turing pressure for change within governance patterns experienced by the
public organization (sources of pressures, their perception in the organi-
zation). The second category consisted of the constellation of actors—
both from the public organisation and outside of it—involved in the
decision-making process (identification of important actors and their
position in terms of power, their roles, and degree of complementarity in
terms of governance perceptions). The third category referred to actions
taken by actors and their framings (what was done, kinds of strategies
used and how they were framed by actors). Within this category the cen-
tral phenomenon was the one of single-and double-loop learning (using
and advancing a given governance mode, a critical reflection upon it, and
replacing it for another). The fourth category focused on the effects of
actions and tactics used by actors (prevailing kinds of actions and ways of
thinking, signs of this prevalence, e.g. new organizational procedures,
structures, redefinition of the old etc.). Here, the phenomenon of institu-
tionalization was of crucial importance.
Subsequent periods involved not only building a narrative of a case,

but they were used to compare the cases under examination. Through the
comparison of periods across the cases, process models emerged, for
example, describing the reflexive practice of governance (see Sect. 8.2 and
Table 8.2), or the model illustrating the role of institutional entrepre-
neurship in the process of governance institutionalization (see Sect. 8.3
and Fig. 8.2).
Notes
1. Another unexplored issue is how these ‘inductive’ approaches deal with
the existing theories at the outset of research. A pure induction is non-
existent; our perception is possible because we categorize observations.
Karl Popper used to say to his students: “Take pencil and paper; carefully
observe, and write down what you have observed!” “They asked, of course,
what I wanted them to observe. Clearly, the instruction, ‘Observe!’ is
absurd. (…) Observation is always selective It needs a chosen object, a
definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. And its description
presupposes a descriptive language, with property words; it presupposes
similarity and classification, which in their turn presuppose interests,
points of view, and problems.” (Popper 1963, p. 61). That is why the use
of theoretical concepts at the beginning of the research process should be
problematized even within inductive studies (see Charmaz 2005;
Silvermann 2005).
221
2. Burawoy calls it the reflexive model of science (1998, p. 5).

3. It is an important reminder that regardless of the researcher’s intention, a
research act can be and often is used in the political struggle (Strumińska-
Kutra 2016). This is why the question about ways in which science can be
used in politics and policy making in order to advance the common good
without compromising the scientific ethos is of crucial importance. I
attempt to initiate this discussion in the last chapter of this book.
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Author Index1
A Bellamy, Richard, 49
Alvesson, Matt, 162, 168, 183, Bevir, Marc, 1, 12, 16, 20, 35,
185n13, 197 41, 214
Ansell, Christopher, 1, 5, 21, 24, 26, Binder, Amy, 37, 124, 162
39, 64, 116, 146, 147, 173, Bober, Jarosław, 40
181–183, 194, 198 Bouckaert, Geert, 39
Argyris, Chris, 5, 23, 25, 101 Bourdieu, Paul, 35, 142
Arrow, Kenneth, 107, 149 Browne, Angela, 26
Atkinson, Paul, 38 Bruner, J., 191
Bryson, John M., 6
Burawoy, Micheal, 42, 204,
B 211, 221n2
Bartkowski, Jerzy, 40
Barzley, Michael, 11, 181, 196
Battilana, Julie, 8, 86, 153, C
160, 165 Charmaz, Kathy, 220n1
Beck, Ulrich, 193 Coleman, John, 9, 35, 93
Becker, Howard, 162 Cook, J., 19
Bellah, Robert, 144 Cooper, David, 181
1
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6
226 Author Index
Cornwall, Andrea, 202 Gerring, John, 212

Creed, W.E. Douglas, 34, 181 Geyer, Robert, 194, 198
Crossan, Mary, 26 Giddens, Anthony, 34
Gilardi, Fabrizio, 1, 9, 35, 101,
102, 133, 152
D Glaser, Barney G., 212
Denis, Jean-Louis, 182, 219 Gouldner, Alvin, 6, 34
Denters, Bas, 1, 19, 36, 39, 40, 125 Graebner, Melissa, 212
Denzin, Norman, 192 Greasley, Stephen, 39
DiMaggio, Paul, 36, 125, 138, Greenwood, Davydd, 197, 198,
161, 162 201–204
Dingwerth, Klaus, 39 Greenwood, Royston, 169
Dreyfus, Hubert, 139 Guba, Egon, 196
Dunn, Elizabeth, 39 Gustavsen, Bjørn, 192
E H
Eikeland, Olav, 201 Haas, Peter, 150
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M., 212 Hale, Charles R., 201, 204
Hallet, Tim, 7, 34, 35, 37, 90,
162, 212
F Hammersley, Martyn, 38
Fligstein, Neil, 153, 185n9 Hargrave, Timothy, 162, 169
Flyvbjerg, Bent, 7, 11, 12, 29, 196, Haverland, Markus, 211
197, 212 Hijmans, Ellen, 212
Forester, John, 4, 7, 28, 29, 115, Hood, Christopher, 84, 142, 171
138, 143, 147, 191, 195 Hummel, Ralph, 11, 195
Frederickson, H. George, 15
Freeman, Richard, 6, 40
Funtowicz, Silvio O., 26, 194 J
Jessop, Bob, 12, 16–18, 22, 24, 25,
28, 30n2, 129, 181, 191,
G 192, 198
Gąciarz, Barbara, 40
Gaebler, Ted, 82, 152, 181
Gash, Alison, 39 K
Gaventa, John, 202 Klijin, Erik Hans, 20
Gawer, Annabelle, 162, 185n13 Koładkiewicz, Izabela, 196
Geertz, Clifford, 211 Kooiman, Jan, 20, 25, 30n2
Author Index
227
Kordasiewicz, Anna, 38, 40, 50, P

51, 123 Pålshaugen, Øyvind, 192
Kostova, Tatiana, 169 Peters, B. Guy, 6, 20, 35, 39, 81, 152
Kuhn, Thomas, 212 Phillips, Nelson, 162, 185n13
Pielke, Roger Jr, 26, 27, 193, 194,
203, 205, 218
L Pierre, Jon, 39, 81, 152
Langley, Ann, 219 Pollitt, Christopher, 39
Lawrence, Thomas B., 37, 160–162, Popa, Florin, 198
165, 185n13 Popper, Karl, 220n1
Laws, David, 115, 138, 143 Powell, Walter, 36, 125, 138,
Levin, Martin, 201–203 143, 156
Lewenstein, Barbara, 39 Putnam, Robert, 144, 147, 194
Lewicka-Strzałecka, Anna, 39
Lincoln, Yvonna, 195
Louis, Meryl Reis, 171 R
Lynn, Laurence E., 16, 181 Radaelli, Claudio M., 1, 9, 35, 101,
102, 133, 152
Ravetz, Jerome R., 26, 194
M Rayner, Steve, 27, 193, 205
Maguire, Steve, 161 Rein, Martin, 195
Mahoney, James, 150, 156, Rhodes, Roderick A.W., 2, 6, 34, 35,
162, 185n12 180, 191, 192
Mair, Johanna, 9, 122, 144, Robinson, John B., 198
145, 162 Rose, Lawrence E., 19
Malone, Elizabeth, 193 Rządca, Robert, 1, 10, 123, 179,
Marti, Ignasi, 144, 162 185n14, 213
Mayntz, Renate, 192
McAdam, Doug, 43n1, 153, 185n9
McLaverty, Peter, 81, 152 S
Morgan, D.F., 19 Sabel, Charles, 26, 182
Sadura, Przemysław, 38, 40, 50,
51, 123
O Saltelli, Andrea, 193
Osborne, Stephen, 21, 39, 81, Sandberg, Jörgen, 29, 38, 138, 142,
152, 181 191, 195, 197
Österle, August, 38, 39 Schön, Donald, 5, 10, 23, 25, 101,
Ostrom, Elinor, 147, 194, 195 122, 135, 139, 195
228 Author Index
Schreyögg, Georg, 26, 37, 98, Tsoukas, Haridimos, 4, 10, 29, 38,
119, 147 119, 122, 123, 138–140, 142,
Scott, Peter, 33 144, 191, 195, 197
Scott, Robert A., 37, 162, 163
Scully, Maureen A., 34
Selznick, Philip, 8, 68, 86, 165, V
182, 183 Van de Ven, Andrew, 37, 162,
Seo, Myeong-gu, 34, 181 169, 204
Silvermann, David, 212, 220n1 Ventresca, Marc, 7, 34, 35, 37, 38,
Sørensen, Eva, 21, 24, 135 90, 145, 212
Spławski, Marcin, 40 Verdery, Katherine, 39
Stacey, Robert, 26 Verweij, Mark, 12, 28
Stake, Robert, 212
Stoker, Gerry, 39
Strauss, Anselm L., 212 W
Strumińska-Kutra, Marta, 1, 10, Wadham, Helen, 42, 212
123, 179, 196, 198, 204, Warren, Richard, 42, 212
213, 221n3 Washington, Marvin, 68, 183, 184
Suddaby, Roy, 37, 161, 169 Weick, Karl E., 142, 191, 197
Surachaikulwattana, Panita, 129 Wester, Fred, 212
Susskind, Lawrence, 7, 41 Wildavsky, Aaron, 26
Sutton, Robert I., 171
Svenningsson, Stefan,
162, 168, 185n13 Y
Swieniewicz, Pawel, 39 Yanow, Dvora, 10, 60, 119, 122,
123, 138–140, 144, 184n2,
192, 195, 211
T
Thelen, Kathleen, 150, 156,
162, 185n12 Z
Thompson, Micheal, 12, 28 Zald, Mayer N., 191
Tolbert, Pamela, 129 Zeitlin, Jonathan, 26
Torfing, Jacob, 16, 19, 21, 24, 135 Zietsma, Charlene, 34, 160–162,
Torrance, Harry, 192 165, 185n13
Triantafillou, P., 19 Zucker, Lynne G., 129
Trumbull, David, 195 Zybertowicz, Andrzej, 40
Subject Index1
A Collaborative governance, 19, 21,

Action research, 200, 201, 204, 205 39, 64, 68, 125, 176,
Administration, 1–3, 6–9, 11, 15, 201, 214
18, 20, 21, 24, 26, 29, 33, Collaborative research, 193, 198,
36–40, 42, 50, 53, 56, 59, 200, 201, 203
67–87, 90, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, Complexity, 1, 4, 7, 8, 12, 19, 20,
116, 122, 124, 125, 129, 133, 26, 28, 29, 41, 142, 181, 195,
134, 136, 145–147, 152, 153, 196, 198
155, 157, 161–163, 166–170, Consensus over values, 26, 194
172–174, 180–183, 214 Consultation, 39, 52–55, 57, 58,
61, 64, 65n3, 74, 76, 78,
81–83, 85, 91–95, 97, 99,
C 100, 110, 111, 113–115,
Case studies, 2, 7, 11, 43, 157, 179, 119, 129–131, 134, 141,
184n5, 195, 200, 212 142, 148, 153, 154, 164,
Coercive pressures, 9, 36, 97, 107, 166–170, 173
122, 123, 125, 127, 130, 133, Context-based knowledge,
135, 136, 153 29, 195, 197
1
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74591-6
230 Subject Index
Coordination, 8, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, Forms of governance, 9, 11, 26, 122,
41, 54, 83, 127, 129, 130, 123, 144, 145
145–147, 160, 167, Forms of learning, 101, 133
172–175, 177
Critical reflection (on governance),
27, 80, 136, 155 G
Good governance, 2–5, 11, 22,
30, 39, 59, 96, 107, 123,
D 149, 157, 180, 181, 194,
Decision making processes, 1, 9, 33, 197–200, 202
39, 40, 43, 49, 50, 55, 57, Governance, 1–12, 12n1, 49–64, 67,
59–63, 72, 74, 83, 91, 92, 94, 68, 74–87, 89–102, 106–120,
96, 101, 107, 122, 128, 130, 191–198, 200, 211–214, 217,
131, 135, 136, 141, 142, 145, 219, 220
149, 156, 157, 174, 195, 203, Governance learning, 2, 3, 5,
205, 217, 219 8, 9, 50, 68, 74–82,
Democracy, 1, 11, 27, 39, 40, 50, 93–100, 102, 196, 200,
52–59, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 205, 212, 213
96, 134, 135, 140, 173, 183, Governance mode/modes, 5, 17–19,
184, 192 21–25, 29, 30, 33, 41, 76, 80,
Double-loop learning, 5, 8, 23, 25, 86, 90, 98, 121, 123, 125,
102, 123, 127–129, 131, 133, 131, 134, 136, 141, 145,
136, 139, 144, 150, 156, 179, 153, 155, 157, 160, 161,
181, 182, 196, 197, 212, 220 164, 165, 169, 171, 174–176,
181–183, 193, 197, 198,
200, 214, 220
E Governance practice, 2–12, 24, 36,
Environmental pressures, 9, 41, 38, 50, 81, 85, 107, 108, 121,
82–84, 121, 123–125, 162, 163 123–125, 127, 143, 151, 180,
Extended case, 42, 212, 213 194, 212
Extrapolation, 11, 193, 196, 197 Governance turn, 1, 2, 4–6, 8, 12n1,
17–20, 23, 24, 33–37, 39, 49,
125, 138, 140, 152, 160–162,
F 181, 212, 213
Fake learning, 78–82, 84, 89–102, Governance void, 8–11, 84–87, 122,
136, 179 123, 144, 145, 153, 161, 167,
Flood prevention, 8, 106–120, 131, 168, 170–172, 176, 177,
132, 148, 216 184n1, 213
Subject Index
231
Government, 1, 7, 15–18, 20, 26, Institutional logic, 77, 124, 141,

35, 37–43, 50, 51, 56, 58, 59, 142, 145, 156, 160, 161,
64, 68, 71, 73, 74, 76, 81, 82, 163–165, 175, 181, 183
96, 111, 112, 116, 120, Institutional perspective/context, 6,
120n1, 123, 131, 134, 135, 38, 50, 100–102, 122, 131,
140, 146, 149, 152, 192, 138, 156, 158–159, 181,
194, 214, 216, 217 194, 214
Institutional pressures, 10, 36, 107,
123–127, 130, 133, 135, 137,
I 138, 179
Implementation, 3, 6, 8, 17, 26, 29, Institutional theory, 34, 43, 212
38, 49, 55, 79, 86, 98, 111, Institutional void, 8, 9, 84–87, 122,
127, 130, 141, 153, 158–159, 144, 145
161, 164, 176, 177, 195, 197, Institutional work, 10, 83, 123,
200, 202, 203 161–164, 169, 170, 172, 173,
Incineration plant (IP), 89–102 175–177, 181, 203
Inhabitants, 61, 69, 74, 81, 91, Institutions, 1–3, 8, 9, 16, 24, 29,
94–96, 98, 100, 105, 33–35, 37–42, 50, 68, 81, 94,
108–110, 112, 113, 116–120, 96–99, 101, 102, 107, 115,
142, 153, 165, 184n6, 201 117, 123, 124, 134, 135, 138,
Institutional change, 6, 7, 9, 10, 30, 140, 141, 143, 145, 149, 153,
37, 42, 43, 93–100, 102, 155–164, 169, 170, 176, 179,
121–123, 140, 150, 153, 174, 180, 205, 213, 214
175, 179, 185n12, 196, 213 Investment process, 69, 91, 106,
Institutional entrepreneurship/ 107, 110, 113, 132
entrepreneurs, 8, 10, 67–87, Isomorphism/institutional
123, 147, 150, 162, 168–172, isomorphism, 36, 90, 125, 212
174–177, 184, 213, 220
Institutionalization, 2, 8–10, 41,
74–78, 86, 98–100, 102, 198, L
200, 212, 220 Lack/absence of consensus, 8, 26, 81,
Institutionalization of governance, 96, 106, 108, 109, 116, 127,
2, 11, 68, 89–102, 123, 143, 145, 147, 161, 183
126–127, 160, 175, 176, 220 Learning, 2, 64, 75, 94, 100–102,
Institutionalization of learning, 2, 107, 117–119, 121, 213
67, 77, 130, 138, 179, 213 Legalism/legalist frame/legal frame,
Institutional leadership, 8, 86, 182, 50, 52–59, 61
183, 213 Levels of governance, 23, 25
232 Subject Index
Levels of learning, 24, 25 Micro level, 9, 34–36, 94–98, 121,

Local community, 50, 57, 58, 75, 124, 138, 151, 213
78, 90, 96, 109, 110, 112, Mimetic pressures, 36, 107, 124,
113, 116, 117, 128, 130, 132, 125, 127, 133–136, 157
142, 144, 146–149, 153, 154, Model-driven research, 11, 194,
165, 169, 184n4, 184n7, 205, 197, 200
215–218 Municipality, 7, 8, 42, 50–53, 55,
Local governance, 40, 43, 56, 58–63, 65n3, 68–71,
93–100, 123 73–78, 80, 83, 85, 89, 91–95,
Local government, 26, 35, 37, 39, 100, 106, 109–111, 115–117,
40, 42, 43, 50, 51, 56, 58, 59, 120, 129, 133, 134, 140, 146,
64, 71, 73, 76, 92, 112, 116, 147, 152, 154, 164, 166–168,
131, 134, 135, 140, 194, 214, 201, 215
216, 217
N
M New public governance (NPG), 2,
Macro level, 9, 35–37, 94, 96–98, 19, 21, 39, 40, 64, 125, 131,
121, 138 180, 181
Management, 6, 16, 34, 52, 67, 95, New Public Management (NPM), 2,
112, 131, 191, 211 19, 21, 36, 38, 123, 140, 143,
Managerialism/managerialist 147, 180, 181
frame/managerial frame, Normative pressures, 9, 36, 97,
50, 52–59 107, 122, 124, 125, 127,
Market, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15–19, 22–25, 134, 136, 214
28, 39, 68–75, 79, 80, 89,
126, 128, 129, 133, 134,
141–143, 146, 147, 151, 152, O
160, 169, 171, 172, 181, 201, Officials, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 50,
215, 217, 218 59, 70–72, 74, 78, 81, 83, 84,
Mediation process, 70, 73, 77, 81, 86, 92–95, 97, 99, 100, 102,
100, 152, 170 118, 130–132, 136, 141,
Meso level, 9, 10, 35, 94–98, 102, 142, 145, 148, 149, 151–155,
121, 124, 138, 151, 166, 157, 163–165, 167–170,
179, 180 174, 179, 182, 183, 202,
Metagovernance, 5, 86, 107, 149, 203, 214–218
157, 181–183, 198 Organizational learning, 5, 7, 36, 43,
Methodology, 4, 191, 200 121, 122, 138
Subject Index
233
Organizational structure, 3, 8, 42, 85, 117, 119, 123, 124, 127,

90, 91, 95, 99, 124, 146, 147, 130–132, 148, 150, 156, 157,
153, 167, 175, 181, 182, 213 160, 165, 183, 214, 217
Public consultation, 52–55, 57, 58,
61, 72, 74, 81, 85, 92, 93, 97,
P 100, 111, 114, 115, 134, 154,
Participation, 2, 27, 50, 54, 59, 64, 164, 166, 167, 169, 170
74–85, 91, 94, 96–99, 101, Public dispute, 2, 7, 9, 29, 35, 37,
131, 149, 154, 155, 157, 165, 40–42, 49–64, 90, 122, 128,
167, 169, 173, 175–177, 130, 136, 138, 153, 156, 163,
184n4, 197, 211 170, 201, 202, 214, 219
Participatory approaches, 2, 26, 76, Public governance, 4, 6, 19, 122,
78, 82–84, 129, 131, 134, 124, 125, 131, 145, 149, 165
147, 152, 155, 157, 161, 170, Public management, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11,
171, 173, 176, 180 15, 16, 19, 21–23, 29, 34,
Participatory democracy, 79, 83, 84, 38–40, 64, 67, 68, 107, 115,
96, 134, 135 121, 125, 128–130, 132, 134,
Participatory governance, 19, 21, 76, 143, 164, 165, 167, 171, 173,
82, 86, 90, 99, 129, 133, 134, 176, 191, 193, 194, 200, 211,
151, 154, 165, 213 213, 217, 219
Power, 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 22, 37, 49, Public management patterns, 38, 39
54, 58, 86, 96, 98, 102, 124, Public officials, 2, 26, 36, 50, 52, 58,
131, 146, 147, 153, 161–163, 59, 64, 107, 119, 122,
172–174, 179, 180, 185n12, 128–131, 134–136, 140, 144,
192, 202, 204, 205, 213, 147, 149, 151, 153–155, 161,
218, 219 163–166, 194
Practice/practices, 2, 16, 49, 68, 94, Public participation, 39, 40, 70, 74,
191, 212 78, 79, 81, 92, 94, 95, 97, 99,
Public Action Research, 204, 205 102, 134, 154
Public administration, 1–3, 6–9, 11,
15, 18, 20, 21, 24, 26, 29, 33,
36–40, 42, 67–87, 93, 97, 98, R
116, 122, 124, 125, 129, 130, Real learning, 89–102
133, 134, 136, 146, 147, 155, Reflective practice, 122, 138, 150, 220
157, 161, 162, 172, 173, Reflexive governance, 129
180–183, 214 Representative democracy/democracy
Public agencies, 1–5, 10, 17, 18, 23, frame, 50, 52–59, 64, 83, 84,
30, 35, 36, 41, 68, 84, 140, 173
98–101, 105–107, 112–115, Rule-based knowledge, 194, 197
234 Subject Index
S U
Science-society relationship, 200 Uncertainty, 9, 10, 20, 26, 59–63,
Single-loop learning, 5, 23, 25, 101, 122, 130, 142–144, 167, 183,
132, 133, 136, 139, 140, 151, 194
155, 158, 159, 182, 196
Surprise, 10, 101, 123, 135,
139–143, 156–158, 184n2 W
Wastewater treatment plant
(WWTP), 89–102, 126, 128,
T 129, 133, 134, 141, 153, 155,
Theory-practice gap, 193, 199 160, 165, 166, 216–218
Transition from government to Withdrawal, 123, 131, 142–144,
governance, 2, 38 150, 159, 170

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Marta Struminska-Kutra

Democratizing Public Management

ISBN 978-3-319-74590-9 ISBN 978-3-319-74591-6 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018944680

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover illustration: Lorerock81 / iStock / Getty Images Plus

University in Warsaw, a seminar on good governance at Małopolska

1 Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 1

2 Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 15

3 Governance Learning from an Institutional Perspective 33

4 How Framing Transforms Governance: Public Dispute over

5 Public Administration Leaders as Institutional

6 Institutionalization of Governance and the Transition

7 Governance Failure and Social Trust: Dispute over Building

8 Towards a Practice-Based Theory of Governance Learning

8.2.3 Entering Double-Loop Learning: From a

9 Making Social Sciences Matter for Public Administration

Table 2.1 Governance modes and their failures 22

xiv List of Tables

Table 8.3 Institutional work around logic shifts 162

© The Author(s) 2018 1

If governance turn is to bring democratizing change, public administra-

Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 3

stages on which governance practitioners act. History matters as well:

Within the first, normative, and prescriptive part of considerations

Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 5

governance can be reduced to the following promises: greater effectiveness

I regard these theories not as describing reality (explaining ‘how things

1.2.2 Descriptive and Explanatory Considerations

Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 7

In my attempt to analyse the change, I focus on public administration

Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 9

of institutional change and learning in public administration, that is (1)

Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 11

I argue that all three types of research require practice-based approaches.

Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 13

Coleman, J. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap

Rządca, Robert, and Marta Strumińska-Kutra. 2016. Local Governance and

“Governance, governance everywhere”, complains one of the scholars

© The Author(s) 2018 15

Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 17

in organizational studies. I posit that this kind of approach opens a way

and the (re)organization of material, social, and temporal conditions

Governance as steering and

Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 19

Governance as an approach to public

2.2 Governance and Learning

Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 21

which bureaucratic, hierarchical coordination was first replaced by mar-

If we, therefore, embrace the broader understanding of governance

Table 2.1 Governance modes and their failures

Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 23

we must recognize the existence of two levels of governance. This in turn,

striving to solve. It develops institutions enabling continuous learning. In

Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 25

Table 2.2 Levels of governance versus levels of learning

reflection and action, where different logics are interchangeably used in

Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 27

These factors are symptoms of a situation in which no consensus has

1 Practice-Oriented Reflection on Governance 1

2 Metagovernance, Governance, and Learning 15

3 Governance Learning from an Institutional Perspective 33

4 How Framing Transforms Governance: Public Dispute over

5 Public Administration Leaders as Institutional

6 Institutionalization of Governance and the Transition

7 Governance Failure and Social Trust: Dispute over Building

8 Towards a Practice-Based Theory of Governance Learning

8.2.3 Entering Double-Loop Learning: From a

9 Making Social Sciences Matter for Public Administration

Table 2.1 Governance modes and their failures 22

Table 8.3 Institutional work around logic shifts 162

1.2.2 Descriptive and Explanatory Considerations

2.2 Governance and Learning

2.4 F rom an Idealized Model to a Practice-

3.1 L inking Individuals and Institutions

3.3 Institutional Context of Governance.

4.2 Description of Events

4.3 Governance and Framing:

5.2 Description of Events