HEADQUARTERS

MULTINATIONAL PEACE FORCE

MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
SOUTH – EASTERN EUROPE BRIGADE

PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS
HANDBOOK

PART 1

1
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

SEEBRIG HANDBOOK for PEACE SUPPORT

OPERATIONS:

The first draft of the SEEBRIG HANDBOOK for PEACE

SUPPORT OPERATIONS (part 1) has been prepared, printed and
distributed by the SEEBRIG HQ.
The MPFSEE participating states authorities may freely
photocopy this Handbook for exclusive use. However, no portion of
this book may be reproduced for resale or mass publications nor it
may be stored in a retrieval system without prior authorization by
the SEEBRIG HQ.
Inquires concerning these materials, including requests for
copies, should be addressed to the SEEBRIG HQ.
Recommendations for improvements of this handbook are
encouraged.
Plovdiv, December 2000.
Fax: 00359 32 634312
e – mail: seebrig@seebrig.pims.org
First Draft December 2000

1
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Intentionally Blank

2
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

PREFACE

Nowadays, Peace Support Operations (PSO) encompass

operations and activities of all civil and military organisations
deployed to restore actions, traditional peacekeeping and the more
forceful, military actions required to establish peaceful conditions.
United Nations Peace Support Operations are growing in
importance and in recent years there has been more PSO than
ever before and the range of tasks has increased enormously. This
increase in numbers and complexity makes preparations for future
peacekeepers at all ranks more important.
In this handbook you will find information on the United Nations
(UN), other organisations and agencies as well as their rules and
guidelines in regard to PSO. For the purpose of preparation and
training SEEBRIG will conduct its activities according to the
Standardisation directives in order to gain and maintain a balanced
profile of professionalism and operational efficiency. It will also
provide framework for your behavior in general.
This handbook is for all members of the SEEBRIG who are
involved at the ground level to establish peace and relieve human
suffering. The present handbook is also designed for practitioners
working in other headquarters or in the fields.
Its purpose is to promote better understanding of the PSO in
general and to give military staff working outline of the specific
issues in accordance with the responsibilities and tasks of all
organic structural elements of the SEEBRIG.
The main segment of the book provides details on subjects
which are considered as important for the field performance, such
as headquarters duties, sections, the Rules of Engagement (ROE),
negotiation, patrol duty etc.
This handbook is also intended to be adaptable for education
and training of individuals and separate sections and units in the
SEEBRIG.

3
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

On my behalf and on behalf of the SEEBRIG HQ I would like to

express appreciation for the conceptual and professional efforts by
all staff members who contributed so greatly to creation of this
Handbook.

Hilmi Akın Zorlu

Brigadier Gen., Nation 7 Army
The Commander of SEEBRIG

4
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

SEEBRIG HANDBOOK 1

PREFACE 3
CONTENTS 5

CHAPTER 1 - PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. The nature of Peace Support Operations (PSO) 9

a. General 9
b. Background 13
2. The UN and PSO 15
a. The United Nations (UN) 15
(1) General 15
(2) Security Council (SC) 17
(3) Summary of UN Charter-Chapters VI, VII and VIII 18
(4) UN Planning Process for PSO 20
b. Basic documents 22
(1) Mandate 22
(2) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 23
(3) Terms of Reference (TOR) 24
(4) Rules of Engagement (ROE) 25
(5) 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations
and Associated Personnel 26
(6) PSO and the Law of War 26

5
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

3. PSO and Regional and International Organisations 28

a. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and PSO 28
b. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and PSO 30
c. Western European Union and PSO 31

CHAPTER 2 - CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO PSO

1. The approach to the conduct of PSO 33

2. Consent 42
3. Principles and techniques 45
4. PSO and the environment 63

CHAPTER 3 - TYPES OF PSO AND PSO TASKS

1. Types of PSO 67
a. Peacemaking (PM) 67
b. Peacebuilding (PB) 67
c. Peacekeeping (PK) 68
d. Peace enforcement (PE) 69
e. Conflict prevention (CP) 70
f. Humanitarian operations (HO) 70
2. PSO tasks 71

6
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER 4 - PSO AND ORGANIZATIONS AND AGENCIES

1. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private

Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) 75
2. Governmental Organisations (GOs) and International
Organisations (IO) 78
3. UN Agencies and Civil Agencies 81

ANNEXES

Annex A The United Nations System 85

Annex B Organizational Structure of the Department of Peace-
Keeping Operations 86
Annex C Department of Humanitarian Affairs 87
Annex D WEU Organization 88
Annex E Elements of Consent 89
Annex F Civil-Military Operations Center 90
Annex G Universal Declaration of Human Rights 91

GLOSSARY

1. Terms and Definitions 94

2. Abbreviations and Acronyms 103

REFERENCES 107

7
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Intentionally Blank

8
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER 1

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. THE NATURE OF PEACE SUPPORT

OPERATIONS
General
Peace Support Operations (PSO) is a military term used to
denote multi-functional and multinational operations conducted
impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate involving diplomatic
efforts, humanitarian organization/agencies and military forces.
They are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or
other conditions specified in the mandate. They include conflict
prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peace
enforcement and humanitarian operations.
PSO differ from a war because they are complex operations
that do not have a designated enemy but are designated as part
of a composite approach involving diplomatic efforts and
generally humanitarian agencies to achieve a long-term peace
settlement.
Today’s world, (with changing patterns of conflict and threats
to UN interest) presents new political and military challenges. The
existence of instability and potential threats requires a wider and
different military capability sufficiently versatile to execute UN
peace strategy (across the full range of peace support
operations).
Under the UN CHARTER, member countries shall “maintain
international peace and security, and for that purpose, take
effective collective measures for prevention and removal of
threats to peace, as well as for suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of peace”. Moreover they are obligated to bring
about adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of peace by peaceful

9
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

means and in conformity with the principles of justice and

international law.
PSO are increasing in response to complex intra-state
conflicts involving widespread human rights violations. Peace
force must deal with deadly and complex strife between ethnic,
religious, political and socioeconomic groups within a country or a
region. This reality has significant implications to PSO. Without
the active and willing involvement of diplomatic, humanitarian
agencies, civil police, host nation or government, there can be no
self-sustaining peace.
In (the conduct of complex) PSO, military activities should be
viewed as only one of several lines of operation within a wider
strategy directed towards an agreed and-state. Military activities
will be, without exception, part of a wider strategy in support of
political goals. PSO, conducted by coalitions, are not thoroughly
considered, well planned and tightly controlled.

•Political Considerations
•Language Barriers
•Cultural Backgrounds
•Military Capabilities and
Training
•Equipment Interoperability
•Logistic Support System
Coordination

Figure 1 – 1. Multinational operations considerations

A key characteristic of PSO is the link between mandate and

tactical execution. Indeed, the exact words of UN Security Council
Mandate are interpreted and applied down to the battalion level,
but on the other hand, given the often tense and unstable tactical
situation, a solder or commander is in such a position that his

10
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

wrong doing can jeopardize an entire political process or lead to an

uncontrollable conflict escalation.
A wide range of International organizations with different aims
and requests will be active in the theatre. They will play a crucial
role and consequently Peace Force may have much to learn from
them in co-ordinating its activities to accomplish the mission.
Sometimes, a strict mandate and ROE may render Peace Force
to intervene when confronted by actions that are out of the settled
limits and could find itself unable to stop any kinds of violation
despite the emergency of the situation.
Multinationality of a Peace Force must be balanced against the
fact that at the tactical level there are many differences, which can
and should be used to increase the overall operations
effectiveness.
PSO are designed to give an end to a conflict by conciliation
among the belligerents parties, by helping to overcome the
situation peacefully rather than termination of the conflict by
force.(thus, a stable settlement, not military victory, is the ultimate
measure of success).
The Armed Forces conduct various international and
multinational operations where Military Aid and cooperation with
Civilian Elements and Agencies have given them extensive
experience in conducting PSO. This experience has provided
many practical lessons.
Each Peace Support Operation is conducted in a unique way
with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural
and military characteristics and in a dynamic environment shaped
by a number of factors and variables that strongly influence the
manner in which operations can be conducted.
Because PSO are usually conducted in the full glare of
worldwide media attention, their strategic context must be
communicated and understood by all involved in the operations.
In addition to the overall strategic and political context of the
operation, peacekeepers should be aware of the area's history,
economy, culture and other significant factors. Failure to fully
understand the mission and operational environment can quickly
lead to incidents and misunderstandings that will reduce the
legitimacy and the consent and result in actions that are
inconsistent with the overall political objective.
The critical variables of the Peace Support Operations are the
level of consent, the level of force, and the degree of impartiality.

11
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

The degree up to which these three variables are present plays a

major role in determining the nature of the PSO and the force
tailoring mix. They are not constant and may individually or
collectively shift during the course of an operation. Commanders
who are aware of these variables and the direction in which they
tend to move may be more successful in influencing them and
thereby controlling the operational setting.

Figure 1 – 2. Characteristics of complex contingencies

What is new is the number, pace, scope, and complexity of

recent operations. For example, in 1993, six separate Peace
Support Operations were conducted or authorized by the UN in the
former Yugoslavia. They included missions to enforce sanctions
against all belligerent parties, to deny aerial movement, to protect
humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and to establish protected
zones.

12
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Background

In the aftermath of the First World War, many nations formed

the League of Nations to promote global peace through mediation,
conciliation and diplomacy. Although the League of Nations was an
idea before its time and did not last, it left as its legacy the concept
that the nations of the world had the authority, the moral right and
the legal competence to discuss, judge and react to the conduct of
other nations.
At the end of The Second World War, the international
community created the United Nations (UN) in 1945.
Peacekeeping was an innovation not foreseen by the drafters of
the UN Charter, as the world was still thinking in terms of standing
armies. Therefore, there was no specific language in the Charter
on peacekeeping. Moreover, during the Cold War the polarization
between east and west prevented the UN Security Council (SC)
from effective use of its enforcement powers. As a result,
peacekeeping operations were generally limited to military efforts
to keep peace after a cease-fire or to assist in supporting solution.
Today, PSO involve a wide range of missions, all for the
ultimate purpose of promoting peace and global stability. PSO as a
tool of UN was not visualized in the UN Charter.
The first true UN “peacekeeping” Force, composed of armed
military units, was the UN Emergency Force, launched after the
Suez crisis in 1956. The peacekeeping formula was perceived as
an acceptable temporary “solution” to the crisis and, for certain
parties to the conflict, the only possible face-saving option.
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold codified the principles of
the Peace Support Operations. These complete principles were
first prescribed on November 6, 1956, just two days after the
General Assembly’s Resolution 998 calling for establishment of the
Emergency Force (UNEF).
The only guideline, as the General Assembly had indicated,
was that “the Force would be set up on the basis of principles
reflected in the structure of the Charter of the UN”. The guiding
principles for the UNEF were approved by the General Assembly
and complemented with various follow-up reports by the Secretary
General.
The core aims and principles of the Force, as dictated by the
Secretary-General, were the following with regard to deployment
prerequisites and Force composition:

13
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

♦ The force had to have the consent of the governments of the

state in dispute and these active support.
♦ The international Community had to support the mission.
♦ The mission was a temporary operation.
♦ The units provided by Troop Contributing Nations were to be
self-contained and together the Force was to have a
balanced composition.
♦ Neither the UN Security Council’s 5 permanent members,
nor states with special interest in the conflict, could
contribute Force.
♦ Personnel from existing missions would help build up the
new mission.
♦ The UNEF HQ was to be a joint civilian-military organization
and the mission had to have a strong diplomatic component
lead by UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative.

In both the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and

United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUC)
instances, deployment was impressively rapid. Unfortunately, that
has rarely been the norm. Operations in Somalia and Bosnia in

14
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

1992 and Rwanda in 1994 have showed that international reaction

and deployment have been far too slow. The problem of slow
reaction time was exacerbated by the fact that some member
states do not have professional standing forces and not to recruit,
equip and train the soldiers before deployment. Other member
states could only deploy troops, without weapons, vehicles,
support elements, etc.

The following statistics illustrate the exploding demand for

Peace Support Operations:
♦ As of 1988, the Security Council adopted an average of
15 resolutions per year. By 1994, that number was up to 78.
♦ In 1987, the UN was actively involved in peacekeeping in
11 disputes and conflicts. In 1994, it was involved in 28
disputes and conflicts.
♦ In 1987, the UN deployed 9,570 military personnel. In
1994, that numbers rose to 73,193.
♦ As of 1988, only 26 countries contributed military and
police personnel to UN operations. By 1994, 76 nations
contributed personnel.
♦ In 1988, the budget for UN Peace Support Operations
was 230.4 million dollars. In 1994, the budget was 3.61
billion dollars.

2. THE UNITED NATIONS AND PSO

The United Nations (UN)
General
The UN Charter was drafted at the San Francisco Conference
in 1945 and was designed to deal with disputes and conflicts
between sovereign states, inter-state conflicts, rather than the
intra-state conflicts more prevalent during the post-Cold War
period.
The first article of the Charter states that a main purpose of
the UN is “to maintain international peace and security”. The
Charter provides the terms of reference for the various elements of
the UN in fulfilling this responsibility. The three chapters of the

15
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Charter most relevant to the conduct of PSO are Chapters VI, VII
and VIII.
The UN will normally conduct Peace Support Operations or
humanitarian assistance under the provisions of a resolution or
mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly.
At the headquarters, the Secretariat plans and directs missions.
Either the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)
or the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) serves as
the headquarters component during emergencies. Additional
support by temporary augmentation from the Joint Staff and
Service headquarters staffs may be provided for specific
requirements. UN special missions, such as the UN Protection
Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under the direction of the
UN Secretary General (SG).
Field-level organization is often based on the Resident
Coordinator system administered by the UN Development Program
(UNDP) in conjunction with the UNDHA. The Resident Coordinator
mobilizes and manages the local UN humanitarian resources and
provides direction for the field relief effort.
In serious emergencies, the UN SG may appoint a Special
Representative who reports to both the SG directly and advises
UNDPKO and UNDHA at UN headquarters. The Special
Representative may direct day-to-day operations, as was the case
in the UN operation in Cambodia.
The Peace Force deploying to a contingency site may discover
the need for a direct channel to either the Resident Coordinator,
the Special Representative of the Secretary General, or both.
UN-sponsored operations normally employ a force under a
single commander. The force commander is appointed by the SG
with the consent of the UN Security Council and reports directly to
the SG’s Special Representative or to the SG.
UNDPKO – Serves as an operational arm of the SG for all
United Nations field operations, providing planning, preparation,
conduct and direction. DPKO Mandate:

1. Provides management and direction.

2. Formulates policies and procedures.
3. Secures personnel, military units and equipment.
4. Develops operational plans and methodologies.
5. Undertakes continency planning.
6. Proposes resource requirements.

16
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

7. Monitors and controls budgets and funds.

8. Provides logistic and administrative support.
9. Maintains contact with parties in the conflicts.
10. Liaises with Member States and agencies.
11. Prepares the Secretary-General reports.

Security Council (SC)

SC is the focal point in the efforts to organize collective security,

and it is composed of 15 members. Five (China, France, Russian
Federation, United Kingdom and the United States) are permanent
members, and ten others are elected by the General Assembly to
serve 2-years terms.

17
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

The UN Security Council (SC) is vested with the primary

responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.
In discharging these duties the SC shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
The specific powers granted to the SC for discharge of these
duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII and VIII.
The UN Security Council is vested with the primary
responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.
Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter are the vehicles used to
achieve this purpose. Below is a brief summary of these chapters.

Summary of UN CHARTER - Chapters VI, VII and VIII

a. CHAPTER VI: “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”

This chapter provides those international disputes likely to

endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to
be brought to the attention of the UN Security Council or the
General Assembly. The Security Council is expressly mandated to
call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment and,
in addition, to propose actual terms of a settlement.
The action of the Security Council in this context is limited to
making recommendations; essentially, the parties themselves,
acting on a voluntary basis to carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with the Charter must achieve
peaceful settlement of international disputes.
It focuses on using negotiations, mediation, arbitration and
judicial means, traditional peacekeeping operations, and on the UN
observer missions.

b. CHAPTER VII: “Action with respect to threats to the peace

breaches of the peace and acts of aggression”
If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression exists, the Security
Council may employ the broad powers given it in Chapter VII of the
Charter. In order to prevent aggravation to the situation, the
Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply
with such provisional measures, as it deems necessary or

18
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

desirable. Next, it may decide, under Article 42, that such action by
air, sea, and land forces may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. For this purpose, all members of
the UN agree to make available to the Security Council, on its call
and in accordance with special agreements, the necessary armed
forces, assistance and facilities. Plans for the use of armed force
are to be made by the Security Council with the assistance of a
military staff committee.

Figure 1 – 3. Extract from the Charter of the United Nations

c. CHAPTER VIII: “Regional Arrangements”

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows for the creation of
“regional organizations” or agencies to deal with such matters
related to the maintenance of international peace and security as
appropriate for regional actions (see Article 52). Regional
organizations are required to encourage peaceful settlement of
international disputes, and must prohibit aggressive use or threat

19
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

of force in international relations. Additionally, Article 53 of the UN

Charter requires that enforcement action may be carried out by a
regional organization only if sanctioned by the UN Security Council
and that such enforcement actions must always be consistent with
the principles of the Charter. Finally, the Security Council may use
regional organizations for enforcement actions under its own
authority.

UN Planning Process for PSO

The theory of the UN’s planning and mission development

process is described below, although, in practice it rarely happens
in exactly the same fashion and can be the cause of considerable
frustration at all levels. Practitioners have to be aware that a
process which depends upon the consent of UN member states
will be a political compromise and generally less timely and precise
than it is operationally desirable.
The Secretary General is responsible, under Article 99, for
bringing matters before the SC for its consideration. However, any
state may also bring before the Council matters related to
questions of international peace and security. Items are
subsequently debated by the SC and draft resolutions discussed.
Most resolutions are now passed by consensus.
When operations are delegated to regional or military alliance, it
is essential that there is close political co-operation in order to
ensure focused operational planning and that military operations
do not stray beyond political guidelines or undergo “mission creep”.
The establishment of a UN mandated mission will generally
begin with authorization in principle from the SC and a subsequent
request to the Secretary General to submit a detailed plan,
together with a rough cost estimate. The DPKO, and in particular
the Mission Planning Service, will be the focus of this planning.
Time permitting, the Secretary General will then dispatch one or
more reconnaissance missions and produce a report to the Council
with options and recommendations as appropriate. The Council
then passes a second resolution approving all or a part of the
Secretary-General’s plan and formally authorizes the operation and
the mandate.
The mandate should establish broad strategic guidance for the
mission including those conditions, which define the operational
“end-state”.

20
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

A detailed budget is prepared by the Secretariat and submitted

to the plenary of the General Assembly for decision
Following the broad strategic guidance provided in the
mandate, the mission Planning Service should draw up the outline
operational directive for the Head of Mission (HoM), who is in effect
the Mission Commander, normally a Special Representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG). This should include a concept of
operations, reflecting realities in theatre, the availability of forces,
and the operational objectives. This should be developed into the
mission plan, and produced in theatre by the Head of Mission and
the core elements of his planning staff, both military and civilian.
This mission plan should reflect international consensus on such
issues as force profile and ROE, and should be continually
reviewed against the mission objectives and the changing situation
on the ground.
The Secretary General will usually, but not always, select the
key appointments for the force. In most current missions, because
of their complexity, the Secretary General will appoint an SRSG as
overall HoM supported by a Force Commander (a military officer
from a nation not involved in the conflict).
Prior to deployment, a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA)
should theoretically be agreed with the host nation. The SOFA
should establish the legal position of a PSO force and its members
with the government and citizens of the host country.
Deployment is a UN responsibility but may be delegated to
member states. Upon arrival in the area of operations national
military contingents will generally be placed under the operational
control of the Force Commander.
The chain of command for UN operations will be from the SC,
via the Secretary General, to the HoM (if not himself the Force
Commander).

21
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Basic documents
The Mandate

All military PSO activities are normally based on a mandate

developed by the UN SC. The mandate will give broad strategic
guidance for the mission and should express the political objective
and international support for the operation and define the desired
End State. Changes in the mandate during a mission need through
reassessment, taking account of advice as to the implications on
the ground for both civil and military components. An essential
precondition in establishment of the mandate must be a clear
understanding by the SC and participating nations of the
implications of the use of the military and the projection and use of
force. The SC in particular must be made aware of what can
realistically be achieved by those Forces likely to be made
available in a given situation.

Military commanders with unclear mandates should take

initiative to redefine, refine, or restate the mandate for
consideration by higher authority. The mandate and tasks of the
unit must be defined to local population and parties in order to

22
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

avoid preposterous expectations and disappointments. In any

case, the resolution and Terms of Reference (TOR) delineate the
role and tasks for the force as well as the resources to be used.

The mandate may:

a. Nominate the Force Commander.

b. Recommend the size of Force.
c. List those countries that are prepared to provide contingents
immediately and those with which negotiations are still
proceeding.
d. Outline proposals for the movement and maintenance of the
Force, including countries that might provide transport airlift,
shipping, and logistic units.
e. Propose a time limit for the operation.
f. Make recommendations concerning the financing of the
Force.

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

The SOFA proceeds from the mandate. With the advice of the
military commander concerned, the diplomatic elements establish
stationing agreements that are often referred to as SOFAs. These
agreements have normally been concluded between the UN and
the host nation. The SOFA establishes legal rights and duties of
PSO Forces and personnel in the host nation. SOFA may include
the following main points:

1. Protected status of the PSO Force and its members.

2. Entry and departure permits to and from the host nations.
3. The right of ingress and egress (exemption from passport
and visa requirements) use of ID card only.
4. The right to use force in self-defense and defense of
others; the right to carry weapons and ammunition; and the
relation with local military police, and internal security units.
5. Responsibility for intergovernmental and third party claims.
6. The right to carry arms as well as the authorized type of
weapons.
7. Freedom of movement, both on and off duty, for members
of the PSO.
8. Legal jurisdiction over members of the PSO.

23
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

9. The right to operate postal and communication systems.-

i.e., radio, TV (AFN), plus military communications equipment.
10. The right to operate on highways and airways, and use
ports and airports. licenses, user fees, inspection requirements,
landing fees.
11. Postal regulations and customs clearance procedures.
12. Authority to display UN and nation flags.
13. Uniform regulations.
14. Permission to operate vehicles without special registration.
15. Applicability of “The Convention of the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations”.
16. Military police actions and authority.
17. Tax and duty regulations.
18. General supply and maintenance matters (imports of
equipment; commodities, local procurement of provisions; and
petroleum, oils and lubricants).
19. Matters of compensation (with respect to the host nation’s
property).
20. The Force has authority to gather, record and report such
information as is necessary to ensure protection and security of
the Force, to monitor all regional Forces and/or activities in
order to record and evaluate their compliance and non-
compliance with the mandates or agreements being monitored
by the Force.

Terms of Reference (TOR)

Based on analysis of the mandate and the situation. The TOR

are developed to govern implementation of UN participation in the
PSO. TOR, which may be subject to approval by the parties in a
conflict, describe the mission, command relationships,
organization, logistics, accounting, procedures, co-ordination and
liaison, and responsibilities of the military units and personnel
assigned to the PSO Force.
Although the parties in the conflict may agree on both the
mandate and the truce, they may have different hidden agendas.
They may interpret the TOR to suit their own purposes. This point
is important because the PSO Force may find itself deployed in a
situation where the TOR are far less precise than is desirable from
a military point of view; therefore PSO Force Commanders should

24
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

ensure that the Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) provide

sufficient detail to augment the TOR.

Rules of Engagement (ROE).

ROE regulate use of force in a specific mission, and provide

direction and guidance to commanders concerning the use of
force. They will therefore be issued on the basis of operational
needs and must be strictly adhered to. Their function is mainly to
restrain the use of force in order to avoid escalations, in situations
where escalations otherwise would be legally permissible.
Commanders must assess the threat, including all possibilities, and
make recommendations for specific ROE through the chain of
command. The PSO ROE must be clearly stated in simple
language. The ROE should also provide the commander with
flexibility to ensure accomplishment of the mandate or mission. If
the mission is to deliver humanitarian supplies, the commander
may have to use force to clear the roadblocks rather than turn
back. Depending on the nature of the operation (PK or PE) the
ROE will be different. The use of force is usually justified in self-
defense only, when members of the PSO are threatened with
death or body injury.

Figure 1 – 4. Basis of Rules of Engagement

25
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

While the PSO Force is using negotiations to gain consent of

the parties in the conflict for interposition, care must be taken to
ensure that all parties understand the conditions under which the
PSO Force may use force.

1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated

Personnel

The 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and

Associated Personnel has been developed in order to provide
basic protection for personnel taking part in PSO. It contains many
of the provisions normally found in a SOFA. The Convention also
stipulates, among other things, that PSO personnel shall not be
made the object of an armed attack and that the States which are
party to the convention shall take appropriate measures to ensure
the safety and security of PSO personnel.
The Convention is designed to apply to situations where the UN
has decided to establish an operation for the purpose of
maintaining or restoring international peace and security. Also, in
situations where the SC or the General Assembly has declared
that there exists an exceptional risk exists to the safety of the
personnel taking part in the PSO.
26 countries signed the Convention, on 9 December 1994. Main
goal of the convention is to provide for universal criminal
jurisdiction for those committing serious offenses against these
personnel. Consequently, this convention and the grave breach
provisions of the Geneva conventions provide seamless protection
to the participants. Crimes enumerated in the convention include
murder, kidnapping, or other attacks on the person or premises of
UN and associated personnel. If captured, these personnel are not
to be interrogated and are to be promptly released. Pending their
return, they are to be treated consistently with principles and spirit
of the Geneva Convention. UN and associated personnel always
retain their right of self-defense.

PSO and the Law of War

The UN has never recognized its ability to actually become a

party to the Geneva Conventions. Legal questions continue as to
whether the UN is considered a "Power" capable of acceding to the

26
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Conventions and if it is capable of carrying out the provisions of the

Geneva Conventions, particularly the Civilians Convention.
However, at least in the case of traditional peacekeeping
operations (Chapter VI), the UN does consider such forces to be
subsidiary organs of the UN and subject to their authority. Thus,
the fact that the individual nations may have declared their intent to
comply with the conventions may not be sufficient.
During the Korean War UN organizations made no statements
regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, although
the UN commander stated that he directed his forces to abide by
the humanitarian principles of the Law of War and Peace Support
Operations the conventions and the detailed provisions of the PW
convention.

•Refugees
•Displaced and detained
civilians
•Fiscal law
•Rules of engagement
•Psychological operations
•Civil affairs
•Medical support
•Local culture, customs,
and government
•International law and
agreements (such as Status
of Forces Agreements and
environmental initiatives)
•Military and political liaison
•Claims

Figure 1 – 5. Areas requiring legal expertise

What has become clear, however, is that once UN forces are

engaged in hostilities, the Geneva Conventions do become

27
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

applicable by virtue of the fact that the vast majority of their

provisions are considered customary international law. Thus, the
conventions become binding on the UN even without any formal
accession or declaration. It would be illogical not to apply rules
applicable to states to what is a universal organization of states.
In Peace Support Operations,( e.g. peacekeeping operations),
the UN position is that their forces will comply with the "principles
and spirit" of International Humanitarian Law (Law of War).
As an example is the SOFA between the UN and Haiti for the
UN Mission in Haiti "The UN will ensure that UNMIH carries out its
mission in Haiti in such a manner as to respect fully the principles
and spirit of the general international conventions on the conduct of
military personnel. These international conventions include the four
Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, and the 1954
Hague Cultural Property Convention."

3. PSO AND REGIONAL AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and
PSO
The NATO experience exemplifies the interagency process on a
regional level. Its evolution has been propelled, often in the face of
crisis, by the demands for cooperation that characterize every
regional effort.
Today, NATO members continue to share the burdens, risks,
and responsibilities as well as the benefits of collective security.
They uphold the individual rights of member nations and their
obligations in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
On 4 June 1992 the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to
support in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping
operations under the authority of either the UN or the OSCE.
During the Athens Ministerial in 1993, Ministers confirmed the
principles for Alliance support of Peace Support Operations. On 30
May 1997 Ministers decided to establish the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) in place of the NACC. The respective

28
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

documents allow meetings in a limited format between Alliance and

groups of Partners who participate with NATO in a PSO and
provide Partners with opportunity to consult on issues related to
PSO.
The Bi-Major NATO Commanders (MNC) Directive is the base
of the military concepts for Peace Support Operations and the
purpose is to establish a common doctrine for PSO within NATO
commands. It will serve as the overarching framework for PSO
activities within NATO, the WEU and with PfP and when working
with other Non NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCN) and
International Civil Organisations.
NATO definition of PSO is “PSO are multi-functional operations
conducted impartially in support of a UN or OSCE mandate
involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies
and are designed to achieve a long term political settlement or
other conditions specified in the mandate”.
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will approve Alliance support
of any PSO. UN and OSCE can state by a member-state or by the
General Secretary of NATO the request for Alliance intervention on
the basis of a request.
A Mandate will be based upon one or more UN SC Resolutions
or OSCE Equivalent. The NATO planning process includes:

1. Preliminary Planning and Mandate Development.

2. Initiating Directive and Campaign Plan.
3. Campaign Information Plan.
4. Liaison and Reconnaissance.
5. Force Structure and Composition.
6. Writing and Approving PSO Plans.

The corner stones of the Alliance strengths are:

1. Common Doctrine and Procedures.

2. Multinational Command and Control Structure.
3. Alliance Infrastructure and Communications Systems.
4. Readily Available Forces.
5. NATO Exercises and Training.

29
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

The conditions for Alliance involvement in PSO are:

1. Alliance Assessment.
2. Legitimacy.
3. Clear and Precise Mandate.
4. Consent and Request of the Host Nation.
5. Voluntary Participation by Member States.
6. Force Contributions.
7. Conditions for Terminating the Operation.

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

(OSCE) and PSO
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) is currently composed of 54 states. The Chairman-in-office
(CIO), assisted by a Secretary General (SG), is responsible for the
co-ordination and consultation on current OSCE business.

Primary decision - making bodies:

1. Summit of Heads of States or Government – every two

years meeting.
2. Ministerial Council – meets in non-summit years. Sets
priorities and provides orientation at the highest political level.
Composed of the MFAs of the OSCE participating States. The
central decision-making and governing body.
3. The Permanent Council – responsible for the day-to-day
operational work. Comprised of the head of national
delegations.

There is no Security Council equivalent body in the OSCE. The

decision to initiate and dispatch a PSO would be taken either by
the Senior Council, or the Permanent Council acting on its behalf,
and would need to be unanimous. The decision would also include
the adoption of a mandate, which will form the basis of the
operation.

30
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Western European Union (WEU) and PSO

1. The Council. The Council is WEU’s main body. Its task, set
out in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, is to consider
all matters concerning the application of the Treaty and of its
Protocols and Annexes.
2. The Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers is
composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and
usually meets every six months, in the country holding the WEU
Presidency.
3. The Permanent Council. Permanent Council is WEU’s
central body in the day-to-day management of the Organization.
It tasks and co-ordinates the activity of its Working Groups.
4. The Chiefs of Defence Staff. The Chiefs of Defence Staff
(CHODs) meet twice a year prior to WEU Ministerial Councils,
or on ad hoc basis whenever necessary.
5. The working groups. The Permanent Council is supported in
its work by a number of working groups. Some have standing
missions and are assigned a particular role in times of
operations.
6. The WEU involvement in a Peace Support Operation can
take place as a result of:
a. UN resolution.
b. OSCE decision.
c. European Union proposal.
d. Request made by one or more of the WEU countries.

In any case, the command and control structure is headed by:

a. WEU Council, which is responsible for political control of

the operation.
b. The Operation Commander who is designated by the
Council. He is based outside the area of operations and is in
contact with the Council and the participating countries. As a
rule, he exercises the operational control over the forces.
c. The Force Commander, who is responsible for conduct of
the operations in the concerned area and as a rule,
exercises tactical control over the units.

31
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Intentionally Blank

32
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO PSO

1. THE APPROACH TO THE CONDUCT OF

PSO
Peace Support Operations are conducted in dynamic
environment, shaped by a number of factors that strongly influence
the manner in which operations can be conducted. Successful
commanders must grasp the importance of these factors.
Figure 2-1 illustrates the critical variables of Peace Support
Operations—the level of consent, the level of force, and the degree
of impartiality. The degree to which these three variables are
present will play a major role in determining the nature of the
operation and force tailoring mix. They are not constant and may
individually or collectively shift over the course of an operation.

Figure 2 – 1. Peace Support Operations variables

33
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

In the conduct of PSO, the most appropriate contribution to

achieve the long-term resolution of the emergency will generally
not be military Forces. Military Forces will normally provide secure
and stable environment in which the activities of other agencies
may be used to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict.
The descriptions of military activities as deep close and rear
operations provide as useful a conceptual framework for the
conduct of PSO as for other operations. In PSO, which involve
many different organisations and agencies, this framework can
provide a useful reference against which to coordinate, direct and
synchronize various agencies to their separate tasks in the
campaign plan.
At the tactical level the management of an incident will generally
restore control of the immediate environment around the incident,
while some form of leverage to resolve the crisis. Perhaps in the
form of negotiation, it is applied elsewhere. In this way the
framework of deep, close and rear operations can provide the
basis so critical to both the successful conduct of a campaign and
the resolution of incidents at the tactical level.
At the operational level, “deep operations” are generally
directed at the underlying causes of the emergency and are thus
focused on political and humanitarian concerns. At a tactical level,
deep operations may involve physical maneuvers to deter, compel
or coerce, or conduct of negotiation at a higher level up the
opposition’s chain of command from the site of any incident. At all
levels deep operations generally will be directed at the perceptions
of the belligerent parties and also at international opinion. Hence in
PSO, deep operations will generally be designed to promote
cooperation and consent and therefore, should be conducted over
a protracted time scale.
“Close operations” are those which involve immediate and
intimate control of the operational environment. Close operations in
PSO rely more on tactical techniques designed to control activities
in the operation than those designed to promote cooperation and
consent. Close operations have to be timely to be effective.
In PSO, “rear operations” will concern Force protection activities
and the maintenance and sustaining of the Force. This will include
national support to the operations and hence media support to
inform national public opinion. Force protection activities will
depend on the mission, threat and the level of casualties the
authorizing body will bear. They may range from the provision of

34
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

defence works, training, mine awareness, and measures to reduce

damage caused by traffic accidents. Force protection, maintenance
and sustaining activities are inherent in all military operations.
However, in PSO these functions normally need to be extended to
include support to other agencies.
A maneuver approach, which aims to deal with will and
cohesion and focuses on perceptions and attitudes, is more likely
to meet the diverse demands of the conduct of PSO than an
approach which focuses exclusively on the material or immediate
elements.
Mission Command describes what is to be achieved (what), the
commander’s intent (why), specifies a time frame (when) and the
allocation of the necessary resources (with what). It does not
dictate how the end-state should be achieved (how), but allows
subordinate commanders to use their initiative to control and
develop the mission in a coherent and positive manner.
In PSO, such a flexible and responsive method of command is
necessary to manage the interactions of the many organisations
and agencies involved, and to ensure that the mission develops
coherently towards achievement of the conditions which define the
end-state. Mission development, which should be encouraged,
should not be confused with “mission creep”. “Mission creep” is a
term used to describe taking on new tasks beyond the original
intent, or allocating them without the necessary resources. In PSO
“mission creep” normally results from incoherent direction.
Changes of mission can be wrongly made when the full breadth of
implied tasks, particularly that concerned with deep operations, is
not properly appreciated in the estimate process.
One of the most important tasks is to conduct a detailed mission
analysis. The staff in analyzing the mission should use normal
procedures. An example is a staff planning procedure that the
Peace Forces commonly use to help them in mission analysis. In
peacekeeping operations, the term “parties to the dispute” should
be substituted for “enemy”.
Throughout the mission analysis, if a mandate or parts of a
mandate are unclear, you should take the necessary steps via
higher authority to have it explained or redefined.
A means available to influence a rewrite of the mandate is to
develop your own mission statement and coordinate it with higher
authority prior to issuance of the mandate. This also may provide
you with opportunity to clarify force structure requirements, end

35
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

state(s), and “commander’s intent” with the supported combatant

commander.
It is important to remember that political issues often affect all
aspects of your military mission. It is not uncommon for political
decisions to take precedence over military requirements. Normally,
political issues are beyond your scope of authority, but when
possible you should try to influence them if they affect mission
accomplishment.
Continuous mission analysis is vital to understand the mission
and situation. For instance, are you to disarm civilians, establish
lines of communications, monitor the collection and storage of
heavy weapons, and/or perform other unique tasks?

The Challenge of PSO

PSO are to achieve a well-defined objective as described in the
mandate. This may be limited in nature, but may also be
multifaceted and complex. When conflict occurs between states
the problems of conflict resolution are relatively cleared out. In
intra-state conflicts, the grievance of the belligerent parties and the
causes of the emergency, may be extremely complex and difficult
to identify. In both cases, PSO may involve a wide range of
Government agencies, military and civilian authorities, regular and
irregular armed forces and local, sub-regional and regional
organizations in addition to the UN organizations as well as Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Voluntary
Organizations (PVOs). They all have to co-operate closely in order
to carry out a PSO effectively and successfully according to its
mandate. While not exhaustive the following characteristics apply
to PSO:

Political primacy

As PSO are authorized by a political mandate, the overall

authority will be political. In UN-led PSO it may be a Special
Representative to the UN Secretary General while in OSCE-led
PSO a Head of Mission may be appointed.

36
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Objective

The objective of a PSO should be defined in the mandate as

clearly as possible in order to be translated into implementing
policy and instructions. It is important that implementing authorities
translate the mandate into clear and achievable tasks that could
form the basis for terms of reference for all parties involved in a
PSO and for operational order for Peace Forces. Commanders
should understand the strategic goals to allow appropriate
objectives to be set and ensure that they contribute to the unity of
effort.

Composite Response

Complex emergencies require a response which co-ordinates

the actions of military, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies
involved. As the PSO is multi-dimensional in tasks and
participation, co-operation between all participating elements and
co-ordination of all efforts is essential for achieving the mandate.
Such a composite response should be designed to control, contain
and redress the immediate and underlying causes and symptoms
of the problem, so that the operation can progress towards a
lasting settlement. Civil-military mechanisms should be established
at all levels providing for a structure that will permit military and
political authorities to express and implement their intentions.

Co-ordination Mechanisms

The Special Representative / Head of Mission should develop a

plan to coordinate the actions of all involved agencies, including
the military force to ensure unity of purpose and effort. This plan
should, inter alia, specify those mechanisms required for detailed
co-ordination, such as the establishment of communication
networks and exchange of liaison officers. Within this framework
PF will co-operate with civil authorities.

Exit Criteria

For most PSO, the determination of exit criteria may be difficult,

but it is essential to have a clear mandate. The exit criteria will then
be those condition which, when achieved, will constitute successful

37
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

military contribution to the political process of achieving a lasting

settlement. These conditions should be determined in advance.
When the PSF is withdrawn the peace building process can be
sustained militarily by “stand off deterrence”.

The Measure of Success

As with any mission, all members of the Peace Force, at all
levels, must have a common understanding of the end state and
the conditions that constitute success prior to initiating operations.

Figure 2 – 2. Mission success

38
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

In Peace Support Operations, settlement, not victory, is the

ultimate measure of success, though settlement is rarely
achievable through military efforts alone. Peace Support
Operations are conducted to reach a resolution by conciliation
among the competing parties, rather than termination by force.
Peace Support Operations are designed principally to create or
sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities
may proceed. In Peace Support Operations, military action must
complement diplomatic, economic, informational and humanitarian
efforts in pursuing overarching political objective. The concept of
traditional military victory or defeat is inappropriate in Peace
Support Operations.
Peace Support Operations are conducted to reach a resolution
by conciliation among the competing parties rather than
termination by force. Principally, Peace Support Operations are
designed to create or sustain the conditions in which political and
diplomatic activities may proceed.

The principles of the Success

These basic principles describe the successful characteristics of
Peace Support Operations and are fundamental to success:

Versatility

Versatility is an essential quality of Peace Support Operations.

Commanders must be able to shift focus, tailor forces, and move
rapidly and effectively from one role or mission to another.
However, versatility does not imply an inadvertent shifting of
missions between Peacekeeping (PK) and Peace Enforcement
(PE). Versatility implies the capacity to be multifunctional.
Versatility requires competence in a variety of functions and skills.
It ensures that units are capable of conducting the full range of
Peace Support Operations tasks with the same degree of success.

Initiative

In Peace Support Operations, initiative implies that the Peace

Support Operations force controls events rather than letting the
environment control events. Commanders must ensure that the
belligerent parties do not exercise control over the flow of events to

39
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

the detriment of one or the other. Within the limits of the mandate,
commanders must further the process of conciliation. Commanders
must anticipate belligerent actions and use the means available to
forestall, preempt, or negate acts that do not further the process.

Agility

In Peace Support Operations, agility is the ability to react faster

than other parties and is essential for holding the initiative. As
commanders perceive changes to their environment, they devise
imaginative methods of applying their resources to those changes
and act quickly to gain control of the events. For example, in PK,
Army forces might attempt to defuse conditions that could
otherwise lead to a resumption of fighting by recognizing the
inherent dangers and by resolving grievances before they ignite
into open combat. A situational awareness that perceives and
anticipates changes in the environment, combined with the ability
to act quickly within the intent of higher commanders, leads to an
agility in Peace Support Operations that is vital to successful out-
comes.

Depth

Depth extends Peace Support Operations activities in time,

space, resources, and purpose to affect the environment and the
conditions to be resolved. In their campaign planning, commanders
envision simultaneous activities and sequential stages that lead to
solutions. PK may begin with an initial objective of observing a
cease-fire, move to post conflict activities such as peace building,
and involve many resources military but also diplomatic,
humanitarian, and informational.

Synchronization

Synchronization implies maximum use of every resource to

make the greatest contribution to success. In Peace Support
Operations, the many players involved and increased emphasis on
use of Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
assets will be important considerations.

40
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Achieving this requires anticipation that comes from thinking in

depth, mastery of time-space-purpose relationships, and a
complete understanding of the ways in which the belligerent

Parties in Peace Support Operations interact. Commanders must

understand how all parties will view their actions. Synchronization
is essential to sustaining legitimacy by maintaining the perception
of impartiality.

Figure 2 – 3. Planning to succeed

41
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

2. CONSENT

General
Promotion of co-operation and consent is fundamental to
success in all PSO. Without active co-operation and consent of the
parties and the indigenous population there can only be
subservience and dependency culture, not self-sustaining peace.
This requirement and the long-term demands of peace will
constrain the use of all military techniques and not just the use of
force. This should not be confused with a minimalist approach but
is the basis of a philosophical approach to the use of force, which
limits its application to what is necessary to achieve the desired
outcome.
In war, consent is not an issue of concern for the military
commander. In Peace Support Operations, however, the level of
consent determines fundamentals of the operation. One side may
consent completely or partly, multiple parties may consent, there
may be no consent, or the consent may vary dramatically over
time.
There are various ways that a PSO force might lose consent. A
belligerent faction may simply decide to remove consent and
compliance unilaterally. Consent may also be lost if a PSO force is
perceived as taking sides or if it uses excessive force in what is
considered an inappropriate or illegal manner. Credibility, and thus
consent, may also be lost if the PSO force does not respond to
breaches of the mandate to enforce international laws and protect
human rights.

It is helpful if consent is viewed from two perspectives. First, as

a determinant of the conduct of the PSO force itself – the emphasis
that the PSO force gives to promotion and maintenance of
consent, and second from the perception of indigenous population.
Judgements concerning the level of consent in the potential theatre
of operations should be made with reference to time and space:
time as in the permanence of fragility of consent, and in space,
both horizontally across all elements of the population and
vertically within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict. The
consent of the parties will usually derive from local events and
prevailing popular opinion. Whilst there may be consent at the
strategic level (by virtue of national or party commitments to a

42
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

peace agreement, for example), at the tactical level there may be

renegade local groups who disagree violently with that higher level
of consent, and who may be attempting to foster opposition to the
PSO.

CREDIBILITY

Figure 2 – 4. Consent

43
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Closely linked to consent are assessments concerning the

projected levels of compliance with the PSO. Compliance may
already exist or may need to be encouraged by inducements and
rewards or enforced by coercion. The enforcement of compliance
may be a necessary precursor or adjunct to the promotion of co-
operation and consent. The creation of a long-term peace
settlement requires that commanders do not focus their activities
exclusively on those involved in the fighting but work to promote
co-operation and consent of those already engaged in peaceful
activities.
In addition to the promotion of co-operation of the local people,
much of the conduct of a PSO force will be designated to
manipulate the threshold of consent, in order to create more
operational space and greater freedom of action for the PSO force.
Experience has shown the need for continued effort, not only to
expand areas of general consent but also to transmit consent up
and down a party’s chain of command.
Consent will be further promoted if it can be shown to the
parties that their status and authority will increase if they are
successful in resolving their own dispute. If the people and parties
can be made shareholders in the peace process, then their
motivation to co-operate will be greatly increased. At the tactical
level, this possibility can be pursued by creating incentive-based
opportunities to co-operate together in jointly carrying out certain
tasks. Such action might be risky and difficult but deserves
consideration.

44
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

3. PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES

Principles
Consent

PSO under Chapter VI of the UN Charter are conducted with

the consent given by the Government (or equivalent) of the
involved nation(s). It is responsibility of that government to make
sure that national authorities comply with the conditions of the
PSO.
In PSO the level of consent determines fundamentals of the
operations. Consent may vary with level: at strategic level consent
is given by Parties in the conflict, at operational level by Military
organisations and Military Factions, and at tactical level by Local
Commanders and warlords.

Impartiality

Impartiality with respect to the belligerents is a prime doctrinal

interpretation of the consent criterion. Without impartiality, there
can be no prospect of preserving the confidence and cooperation
of conflicting factions. Impartiality is thus a vital characteristic of
those undertaking Peace Support Operations. The notion of
impartiality is as much a matter of perception as a practice. It is not
enough for Peace Support Operations to act impartiality – they
must be seen to be acting impartiality.
A Peace Support Operations is likewise influenced by the
degree to which the force acts in an impartial manner and the
degree to which the belligerent parties perceive the force to be
impartial. In circumstances where the required degree of
impartiality is unclear, the commander must press the authorizing
body for clarity since misunderstanding can be disastrous. Basic
understanding of PK missions is essential to differentiate PK from
PE missions. PK enjoys high levels of consent and impartiality and
low levels of force (generally only in self-defense).
The loss, perceived or real, of impartiality may have very
serious consequences. At worst, the loss of impartiality could
trigger an uncontrolled escalation to a peace enforcement scenario
leading to widespread and unrestrained violence, heavy civilian
and military casualties and failure of the mission.

45
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Minimum Force

Peace Support Operations cover a broad range of military

operations. The need to employ force may initiate a cycle of
increasing violence; therefore, commanders must be judicious in
employing forceful measures and must understand the relationship
between force and the desired End State. Of the three variables,
the level of force is usually the only one over which the commander
can exert dominant influence. Operational level commanders or
higher authorities will usually decide about the use of force in this
context (other than self-defense).
“Minimum force” describes the body of principles governing the
use of force. These principles will assist the commander in
decision-making concerning the use of force. Rules of Engagement
(ROE), international, domestic and host nation law are authoritative
and establish limits on the use of force. Minimum force principles
must therefore be considered and applied on a case-by-case
basis.
The way in which force is used will be a critical determinant of
the course that Peace Support Operations take. The use of force
tends in the long term to attract a response in kind and its use may
heighten tension, polarize opinion, foreclose negotiating
opportunities, prejudice the perceived impartiality of the Peace
Force contingent and escalate the overall level of violence.

Alternatives to the use of force include the following:

1. Deterrence.
2. Threats.
3. Negotiation and mediation.
4. Control measures.
5. Rewards and penalties.
6. Protection.
7. Warning.
8. Non-lethal use of force.

Legitimacy

“Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the

government to govern or a group or agency to make and carry out
decisions”.

46
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Legitimacy is a condition growing from the perception of a

specific audience of the legality, morality, and correctness of a set
of actions. It is initially derived from the mandate authorizing and
directing the conduct of operations. However, the perception of
legitimacy can only be sustained with the World public, Peace
Forces, indigenous parties, and the international community if
operations are conducted with scrupulous regard for international
norms on the use of military forces and regard for humanitarian
principles.
The higher degree of legitimacy ascribed to the Peace Force by
the international community and the parties to the conflict, the
greater is the likelihood of success. It is therefore essential that
military forces act and are seen to act within the domestic, national,
international and military law, as well as within the UN Mandate
and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Legitimacy will also
encourage the wider participation of the international community
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Commanders must be aware of the authority under which they
operate and the relationship between it and the other sources of
legitimacy that are present. During operations where a clearly
legitimate government does not exist, using extreme caution in
dealing with individuals and organizations will avoid inadvertently
legitimizing them.
Legitimacy is in some cases also a function of balance. Balance
refers to the geographic, political, and functional makeup or
composition of the Peace Support Operations force. Balance is a
function of consent and operational need.
In PSO, the impartiality of peacekeepers and the sponsoring
state, states, or inter-national organization is critical to success and
legitimacy of the operation. It must be demonstrated at all times, in
all dealings, and under all circumstances, whether operational,
social, or administrative. All activities must be conducted without
favor to either side or point of view.
Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to
by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate
to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions.
Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon
a government through the perception of the populace which it
governs. Because the populace perceives that the government has
genuine authority to govern and use proper agencies for valid
purposes, they consider that government as legitimate.

47
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Credibility

For the PSO to be effective it must be credible and the

credibility of the operations is a reflection of the parties’
assessment of the Force’s capability to accomplish the mission.
Establishing credibility will also create confidence in the operation.
Such credibility will depend on the force’s perceived capability
to carry out particular tasks. Only then will those concerned
(including the belligerents) have confidence in the force’s activities.
Credibility is a key psychological element of success and at the
tactical level, will derive from three elements, resources, execution
and Concept of operations.
The Peace Force must demonstrate effectiveness with the initial
deployment to the Area of responsibility (AOR) and with a sound
concept of operations and robust ROE, based upon the mandate.

Mutual Respect

The Peace Support Operations environmental is likely to create

friction between the recognized parties to a conflict and Peace
Force. Notwithstanding such friction, the force should always hold
the respect of the belligerent factions. If that respect has been lost,
action should be as a matter of priority to restore it.
Such respect should be mutual and whilst a Peace Force will
enjoy certain immunities, its members must respect the host
country’s laws, language, religion, culture and social customs and
show patience and respect for the problems and negotiating
positions of the belligerents wherever possible.
All personnel must consistently demonstrate highest standards
of disciplined, controlled and professional behavior, both on and off
duty.

Transparency

It is important that the parties to the conflict of the local

populace should not misinterpret the Peace Force’s action. Such
misunderstandings may prove dangerous in times of tension.
Force’s activities should therefore be manifestly “above-board”
and not be vulnerable to accusations of pursuing an illicit hidden
agenda. Consistent with the prevailing requirements for operational
security, therefore, the parties to a conflict in security environment

48
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

should be made as fully aware as possible of the motive, mission

and intentions of developing confidence and trust, thus prejudicing
prospects for future conciliation and cooperation.
Information should be gathered and communicated through
open sources wherever possible.
Transparency is therefore a highly desirable characteristic of
PSO and should be promoted whenever possible. It will influence
active management.

Coherence

The UN Mandate will determine the overall aim of the Peace

Force. At the tactical level this aim must be translated into clearly
defined, coherent and achievable objectives towards which all
military activity is directed so that unity of effort is achieved. These
objectives must be fully understood and consistently pursued by all
members of the Peace Forces at every level.
It is through the common pursuit of such objectives that
coherence will be achieved. Provided the security of the force is
not prejudiced, parties to the conflict should be fully appraised of
these objectives and if possible, be afforded opportunities of
contributing to their achievement.

Coordination and Liaison

1. Coordination

Peace Support Operations are likely to involve a wide range of

organizations including civil elements, UN relief agencies and
NGOs. Many of these agencies and individuals are highly sensitive
to perceive infringements to their independence and commanders
must appreciate that their coordination can only be by consent not
direction.
Commanders should therefore seek to establish coordination
mechanisms that take account of these sensitivities yet still impart
coherence to all elements of activity in their operational area.
Organisations and agencies can only be co-ordinated by
consensus and cooperation and not direction. As well as military
operations, the coordination mechanisms should embrace political,

49
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

diplomatic, civil, police, administrative representatives and ongoing

negotiations with parties to the conflict.

2. Liaison

Extensive liaison with all involved parties and communities

upward, downward and side ways should support coordination
mechanisms. To facilitate liaison, commanders should seek to
colocate their command posts with leading UN representatives in
the area.
Reliable communications are vital to coordination and liaison
and should be backed up by alternative systems. The demands of
liaison may slow the planning and execution of operations but will
prove a critical element of success.

Flexibility

PSO cover wide range of tasks of which there is potential for

rapid transit up and down the intensity spectrum. This
characteristic renders flexibility as a key attribute for those
undertaking such operations. The Peace Force should be able to
adapt and move from one activity to another as required – at short
notice and with the minimum of outside assistance.
Peace support teams should therefore, whenever possible, be
structured so as to be balanced and independent in terms of skills,
capabilities, equipment, self-defense and logistics.

Security

In Peace Support Operations, security deals with force

protection as a dynamic of combat power against virtually any
person, element, or hostile group. These could include terrorists, a
group opposed to the operation, criminals, and even looters. In
situations of chaos, the impartial and legitimate status of Peace
Forces may not provide the protection they deserve, either as
groups or individuals.
Commanders should be constantly ready to prevent, preempt,
or counter activity that could bring significant harms to units or
jeopardizes mission accomplishment. In Peace Support

50
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Operations, commanders should not be lulled into believing that

the non-hostile intent of their mission protects their force.
Self-defense is an essential right of UN-mandated activity and
commanders should ensure that adequate arrangements exist at
all times for protection of their forces. Requirements for protection
could also extend to civil agencies and NGO’s. The inherent right
of self-defense, from unit to individual level, applies in all Peace
Support Operations at all times.
Security, however, requires more than physical protective
measures. A force's security is significantly enhanced by its
perceived legitimacy and impartiality, the mutual respect built
between the force and the other parties involved in the Peace
Support Operations, and the force's credibility in the international
arena.
In a Peace Support Operations security and force protection
may extend beyond the commander's forces to civil agencies and
NGOs. Additionally, the transparency required for Peace Support
Operations may preclude the use of some force-protection
techniques such as camouflage.
The principle “never permit hostile factions to acquire a military,
political, or informational advantage” enhances freedom of action
by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The
protection “the inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or
hostile intent applies in all operations” may be exercised against
virtually any person, element, or group hostile to the operation.
Peace Forces should avoid complacency and be ready to
counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the
operation. All personnel should stay alert even in a non-hostile
operation with little or no perceived risk.
In addition to the right of self-defense, operations security is an
important component of this principle. Operations security planners
must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility
coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical
information. Security may also involve protection of civilians or
participating agencies and organizations. The perceived neutrality
of these protected elements may be a factor in their security.

Concentration of Force

A maximum presence of forces on the ground will often be

desirable for PSO, both for deterrence, credibility and information-

51
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

gathering purposes and for domination, albeit discreetly, of the

general environment. The deployment plans and daily routine of
Peace Forces should therefore take this factor into account.
The need to maintain a visible and confident presence,
however, should be balanced against the possibility of such
deployments being perceived as gratuitously provocative gestures.
The safety of troops and availability of reserves will also be
pertinent considerations. Commanders should develop the mobility
required to concentrate their forces quickly at the scenes of
potential incidents.

Freedom of Movement

Freedom of movement is essential to Peace Forces. A force,

which cannot move to and within its area of operations to conduct
its tasks, will fail to accomplish its mission. The force’s privileges
and rights relating to movement will be outlined in the Mandate and
SOFA. The fundamental facility of free movement should be
protected and exploited by tactical commanders at every
opportunity. Routes, for example, should be kept open even when
not in use.

Unity of Command

Unity of command over military forces is a non-negotiable

principle and is not to be compromised. For example, in case of
NATO involvement, prior to transfer of authority (TOA) of national
military components to NATO, the authorities of the Troop
Contributing Nations (TCNs) and the NAC must agree clear
command arrangements. In the theatre, the Force Commander
(FC) will be responsible for all aspects of the military mission in the
area of operations.

Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined,

decisive, and attainable objective. A clearly defined and attainable
objective with a precise understanding of what success presents-is
critical when the Peace Forces are involved in Peace Support
Operations. Military commanders should understand the tactical
aims clearly. It is necessary to be sure that setting appropriate

52
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

objectives and ensuring these aims and objectives will contribute to

unity of effort with other organisations and agencies.
The political objectives on which military objectives are based
may not specifically address the desired military end state. PF
commanders should, therefore, translate their political guidance
into appropriate military objectives through a rigorous and
continuous mission and threat analysis. PF commanders should
carefully explain to political authorities the implications of political
decisions on capabilities and risk to military forces. Care should be
taken to avoid misunderstandings stemming from a lack of
common terminology.

Unity of Effort

Unity of effort emphasizes the need for directing all means to a

common purpose. However, in Peace Support Operations,
achieving unity of effort is complicated by the numbers of
nonmilitary organizational participants (including NGOs and
PVOs), the lack of definitive command arrangements among them,
and varying views of the objective. These factors require that
commanders, or other designated directors of the operation, rely
heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.
Commanders may answer to a civilian chief or may themselves
employ resources of a civilian agency. Fundamental to the
successful execution of the Peace Support Operations is the timely
and effective coordination of the efforts of all agencies involved.
Commanders must seek atmosphere of cooperation to achieve
unity of effort.
Whenever possible, commanders should seek to establish a
control structure, such as a civil-military operations center, that
takes account of and provides coherence to the activities of all
elements in the area. As well as military operations, this structure
should include political, civil, administrative, legal, and
humanitarian activities involved in the Peace Support Operations.
Without such a structure, military commanders need to consider
how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic,
economic, and informational. This requirement necessitates
extensive liaison with all involved parties, as well as reliable
communications. Because Peace Support Operations often involve
small-unit activities, to avoid friction, all levels must understand the
military-civilian relationship.

53
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Restraint

“Apply appropriate military capability prudently.”

Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence

characterize the environment of PSO. The use of excessive force
may adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and
impede the attainment of both short-and long-term goals. These
restraints should be clearly spelled out in the ROE provided for the
operation by higher authority.
Commanders should always seek to de-escalate and not
inflame an incident or crisis whenever possible. Alternatives to
force should be fully explored before armed action is taken. They
include mediation and negotiation, which may be used to reconcile
opponents, both to one another and the Peace Support Operations
force.
Other alternatives to the use of force include deterrence; control
measures such as pre-planned or improvised roadblocks, cordons,
and checkpoints; warnings; and demonstrations or exercising
force. As a rule to limit escalation conciliatory, deterrent,
controlling, and warning actions should be carried out on the spot
and at the lowest possible level.
The unrestrained use of force will prejudice subsequent efforts
at achieving settlement. The principle of restraint will permit
considerations concerning ROE, choice of weapons and
equipment, and control measures such as weapons control status.
When force is used, it should be precise and overwhelming to
minimize friendly and noncombatant casualties and collateral
damage. Precision and high technology weaponry may help
reduce casualties.
The use of force should be a last resort and, whenever
possible, should be used when other means of persuasion are
exhausted.

Perseverance

Preparation for measured, protracted application of military

capability in support of tactical aims is a main goal of the
perseverance. Some PSO may require years to achieve the
desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive,
making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. It is important to

54
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option’s

impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective.
This assessment does not preclude decisive military action, but
frames it action within the larger context of tactical aims. Often, the
patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of national goals and
objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a
requirement for success. This will often involve political, diplomatic,
economic, and informational measures to supplement military
efforts.
While some Peace Support Operations may be of short
duration, most require long-term commitments that involve more
than military efforts alone.
Perseverance requires an information strategy that clearly
explains the goals, objectives, and desired end states. The long-
term nature of many Peace Support Operations must be
continually emphasized, without giving the impression of
permanency.

Techniques

The different operational approaches that are required by PSO

should not be muddled. The key to success will generally lie in
selection and use of combination of techniques designed to
promote cooperation and consent and which provide physical
control of the operational environment.
Techniques fall broadly into two categories, to promote consent
or to control the physical environment.

Consent techniques:

1. Civil – Military Operations.

a. Civil Affairs (CA).

Civil affairs have included a range of tasks which do not fall

neatly within the definition of the new term Civil-Military Co-
operation (CIMIC).
For example, the traditional “hearts and minds” approach
and the numerous small and discrete military projects aimed at
helping a local community have often been conducted without
close and formal civil-military liaison implied by the term CIMIC.

55
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

All elements of the PSO force should support programs in a

coherent and consistent way. CIMIC is a formally adopted
NATO term replacing Civil Affairs (although the latter still
continues to be used ).
Without a reasonable level of local support, PSO are likely to
be largely fruitless in a long term. Civil affairs campaigns thus
establish the basis for a longer-term, more integrated process,
which relies less on the explicit use of force and more on
fostering local support for the Peace Support Operations
objectives.

b. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

CIMIC is defined as “the resources and arrangements, which

support the relationship between commanders and national
authorities, civil and military, as well as civil population in an
area where military forces are, or planed to be, employed. Such
measures include cooperation with non-governmental or
international agencies, organizations and authorities"
Historically, this interface between military and civil
organizations has always existed, but in PSO it has become a
central feature.
CIMIC is concerned with harmonization of civilian and
military relations within a defined area of operations and with
co-ordinating the use of resources designed to redress the
deprivation and suffering of the populace.
CIMIC is also designed to enhance the credibility of the PSO
force, to promote co-operation and consent for the operation
and to persuade the parties to the conflict and the uncommitted
members of the Host Nation that their best interests lie in the
peace.
The immediate aim is to fully co-ordinate civilian and military
activities to support humanitarian projects and to achieve
maximum support for the operation. The longer-term aim of
generating sufficient stability and self-dependency is directly
linked to the desired end state and exit strategy. This activity
should reduce overall dependency on external aid. Civil-military
considerations should play a significant role in a commander’s
estimate and planning process, both to identify tasks and
operational constraints. It is a CIMIC staff responsibility to

56
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

advise the commander on all military activities, which may have

an impact on civilian activities.

2. Negotiation and Mediation.

Negotiation and mediation will be required at all stages of PSO

and will need to be exercised at every level. The necessary skills to
conduct both these activities must be taught to all PSO
practitioners.
a. Negotiation refers to direct dialogue between parties. If
negotiating itself, the Peace Forces will be playing an active role
to gain particular ends whilst protecting their own interests.
Such negotiations might take place to secure safe passage of
humanitarian relief supplies.
b. Mediation describes the activities of parties connected to a
dispute. In this role Peace Supporter has no position of his own
to guard – he acts as the means whereby opposing parties
communicate with each other and he encourages them to
identify and reach mutually agreed solutions.
c. Conciliation describes the reconciling effect wrought on
opposing parties to a conflict by agreements resulting from
successful negotiation and mediation. At the tactical level
conciliation will normally result in compromises between the
aims of the participants and the Peace Force.

d. Arbitration. In arbitration an authoritative third party provides

judgement by considering the opposing positions and
suggesting a settlement. There is less initial scope for
arbitration in most PSO environments. Arbitration requires a
degree of control, which may take some time to establish and
may not be within the capability of Peace Force.

3. Liaison.

The purpose of liaison is to ensure timely passage of

information, to notify intentions, lodge protests, coordinate
activities, manage crises and settle disputes. A liaison system is
therefore required to link the Peace Forces, the communities, the
civil authority (if it exists) and the parties in the conflict. The timely
passage of accurate information based on a trusting relationship is

57
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

a key method of combating uncertainty and promoting stability in a

conflict region. Liaison is therefore a vital tool of a PSO force.

4. Public Information.

Especially at the beginning, PSO are likely to attract intense

public scrutiny from the international and the local media. The aim
of Public Information (PI) activities is to inform the media more
accurately so as to create more reasonable and balanced
understanding of the mission and objectives and what it can be
expected to achieve.
Their reports will have significant impact on the direction and
the course of operations. An effective public information service is
therefore an essential element of PSO. The public information
organization should be treated into the mainstream command,
control and reporting systems of the PSO. An effective media
service is an essential element in the conduct of PSO and requires
personal attention of commanders.

5. Community Relations.

Community relations, being an element of both public

information and community information programs, refer to
deliberate fostering of social contact with the indigenous
population. The purpose of community relations is to create
favorable perceptions locally and to encourage cooperative
responses to the Peace Force’s activities. Community relations, by
its actions, seeks to convey implicitly simple but positive messages
such as: “Trust us”, “We are here to help you” and “Peace is the
only way ahead”.
Community relations may be developed through formally hosted
events or informal meetings during the normal course of military
operations. Community relations activities require careful
coordination to ensure that they are not perceived as being
blatantly manipulative or conducted in a way that might prejudice
the perceived impartiality of the Peace Force.

58
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

6. Community Information.

Community information therefore plays a vital role in PSO.

There is a clear distinction between community information and
public information.
The latter builds attitudes in a worldwide context and is
governed by the agenda of the media. Community information
targets selected audiences and is a direct tool of the commander. It
is, in effect, psychological operations (PSYOPS) under a gentler
and more acceptable name.

Figure 2 – 6. Psychological operations support requirements

59
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

The aim of a PSYOPS in PSO is to reassure, persuade and

influence the local community or communities within the
operational area and local region, to consent to the PSO and to
work with the Peace Force for peace.

Management techniques

1. Military Information.

The parties to a conflict in PSO will be suspicious of all

intelligence-related activities. They are likely to regard the
gathering of intelligence as a hostile act. The standard function of
intelligence in PSO is therefore termed “military information”. This
terminology seeks to accommodate local sensitivities as well as
those that may exist within multinational Peace Forces itself.
The significance of military information in PSO is no less than
that of intelligence in conventional operations. Military information
will drive the conduct of PSO and is a direct responsibility of the
commander. The information organization must be augmentation
to include specialists in a wide variety of fields. Military information
works through a continuos cyclical process of direction, collection,
interpretation, evaluation, collation and dissemination.
A well-developed information system is vital to the effectiveness
of PSO. Military information must be direct by the commander to
meet clearly defined requirements to satisfy operational needs.

2. Observation and Monitoring.

Observation and monitoring are fundamental techniques. Tasks

may range from observation of cease – fire lines by unarmed
individuals and/or small multinational teams in peacekeeping
operations, to the covert acquisition of intelligence by special force
teams in peace enforcement operations. Methods used by
observers might include manning of static observation posts and
checkpoints as well as foot and vehicle patrols. Effective liaison
with all parties involved is a critical element of most of these
methods. Success depends largely on accurate, timely reporting
using reliable communications.
Investigation and verification may be required, violations are
observed and reported, and could include gathering evidence on
human rights abuses.

60
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

The success of observation activities depends largely on

accurate, timely reporting using reliable communications.

3. Supervision.

Local civil authorities and PSO forces can conduct supervision

tasks. It may also be possible to delegate certain supervised tasks
jointly to the parties to a conflict; such action would encourage their
joint cooperation and contribute significantly to the conciliation of
the parties concerned. Investigation of complaints and alleged
breaches of agreement, as well as supervisory tasks, should be
conducted according to previously agreed procedures and
governed by the principles of objectivity, thoroughness, and
impartiality. Not all complaints will be dealt with as official
complaints. Those that are minor can be dealt with at a low level;
however, they must still be reported and recorded fully.

4. Control Measures.

Control measures will be designed to limit or deny access and

freedom of movement. Ideally, such measures in PSO should be
agreed to by the belligerent parties in a cease – fire agreement. In
a peace enforcement operation, such measures may be imposed,
possibly in a form of a curfew. Rather than Peace Forces being
directly responsible for control measures, local police forces should
be used at the interface with the local population.
Control may be achieved by use of guards and checkpoints.
Checkpoint requirements and the procedures and tactics they
employ will depend on the provisions and authority of the mandate,
the SOFA, and the PSO force Standing Operational Procedures
(SOPs). Guards and checkpoints may constitute major interface
between the military element and local populace, and it is very
important that they behave with good manners and respect local
customs.
In cases of military assistance the Peace Forces may be
required to support the civil authorities in controlling public
gatherings This is probably one of the most challenging tasks for a
junior commander, and small mistakes can have large
consequences. The armament, the number of troops deployed,
and the scale of reserves will depend on the situation.
Reconnaissance, deployment of reserves, liaison with civil

61
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

authorities, and minimum force will be critical factors guiding the

execution of such control measure.

5. Patrolling.

Patrolling is a key activity in PSO and may be used to collect

information, to provide additional security for guards and at
checkpoints and to escort representatives of the Peace Forces,
relief agencies, aid convoys, members of the civil authorities, and
threatened elements of the local populace. Patrolling can be used
also to carry out aspects of most PSO tasks, including mobile
checkpoints, investigation, interposition, supervision, liaison,
negotiation, and “flying the flag” to reassure and calm troubled
areas, deter lawbreakers, and promote the credibility and the
prestige of the Peace Forces.
Patrols may be carried out on foot by any alternative means that
might be available including “soft – skinned” and armored vehicles,
fixed or rotary wing aircraft, and sea vessels. Protection of the
patrol in the prevailing situation will be a key factor in determining
the means to be used.

6. Command and Control Warfare.

In the conduct of PSO Command and Control Warfare (C2W) it

should be linked to all political, civil and media related affairs and
those associated to the mission. C2W planning for PSO is likely to
emphasize the use of PSYOPS to protect the force and influence
the parties, by fostering cooperation and support for collaborative
projects to develop the mission.

7. Interposition.

The Interposition of Peace Forces remains one of the basic

military techniques in PSO and its purpose is to establish and
maintain cease-fires within the context of demobilization
operations. The interposition might be phased with advanced
groups deployed to provide a screen between withdrawing
factions.
Interposition may also be used as a short – term emergency
response to forestall or manage a local crisis.

62
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

4. PSO AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Changing security environment
PSO often take place in environment less well defined than in
war. The identity of belligerents may be uncertain and the
relationship between a specific operation and a campaign plan
may be more difficult to define than would normally be the case in
war. On the other hand, the relationship between specific Peace
Support Operations and political objectives may be more sensitive,
direct, and transparent.
Peace Forces involved in Peace Support Operations may not
encounter large, professional armies or even organized groups
responding to a chain of command. Instead, they may have to deal
with loosely organized groups of irregulars, terrorists, or other
conflicting segments of a population as predominant forces. These
elements will attempt to capitalize on perceptions of
disenfranchisement or disaffection within the population.
The close link desired by such elements and the civilian
population-at-large means the traditional elements of combat
power, such as massive firepower, may not apply to Peace
Support Operations. The nonviolent application of military
capabilities, such as civil-military information and psychological
operations (PSYOP) may be more important.
Overemphasis on firepower may be counterproductive.
Because of the potential link-ages between combatants and
noncombatants, the political and cultural dimensions of the Area of
Operation (AO) become more critical to the conflict. When force
must be used, its purpose is to protect life or compel, not to destroy
unnecessarily the conflict nor the belligerent parties.
Commanders will face ambiguous situations and uncertainty in
PSO. They are obligated to set clear objectives, define the mission,
firmly guide operations, and measure progress and success.
Commanders must understand the dynamics of Peace Support
Operations and how actions taken in one operation may affect the
success of another. In recent years, on any given day, thousands
of soldiers were deployed to conduct or support PSO in places
such as Somalia, Bosnia, the Sinai, Croatia and Kosovo.
The destruction and disorder found so often as Peace Forces
arrive also force military leaders to repair devastated infrastructure.
Terrain, weather, climate, demographics, culture, politics, threat

63
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

level, and existence and state of roads, airports usually require

repair or modification for the mission and will determine the
resources and the support the armed forces need to bring with
them. This, in turn, forces planners to provide a larger-than-normal
engineer contingent with deploying forces.
Since it is not unusual for local authority to be destroyed,
peacekeepers often find themselves forced to participate in the
policing of the area. Conducting searches, detaining criminals and
seizing weapons often become key elements in the military forces’
strategy for controlling their areas and protecting themselves.

Characteristics
The following considerations are of concern to all members of
the Peace Force in regard to the mandate and the follow-on TOR
for the operation:
1. Rules of engagement (ROE).
2. Force protection.
3. Limitations of geographical nature.
4. Limitations on the duration of the operation.
5. Relationships with belligerent parties.
6. Geopolitical situation.
7. Prevailing social conditions and cultures.
8. Scale of conflict or effectiveness of a cease-fire.
9. Number, discipline, and accountability of contending party.
10. Efficacy of local government.
11. Degree to which law and order exists.
12. Prevailing attitude and willingness of the population to
cooperate.
13. Relationships with others such as NGOs or PVOs.
14. Finance and personnel resources.

In Peace Support Operations, national and international news

media coverage plays a major role in quick framing of public
debate and shaping public opinion. The media serve as a forum for
analysis and critique of goals, objectives, and actions. It may
impact political, strategic, and operational planning; decisions; and
mission success and failure. Therefore, commanders should
involve themselves in information operations.
The End State describes the required conditions that, when
achieved, attain the strategic and political objectives or pass the

64
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

main effort to other national or international agencies to achieve

the final strategic End State. The End State describes what the
authorizing entity desires the situation to be when operations
conclude.
Since Peace Support Operations are intended to create or
support conditions conducive to a negotiated conflict resolution,
they always complement diplomatic, economic, informational, or
humanitarian efforts. The Peace Support Operations should not be
viewed as an end in itself, but as a part of a larger process that
must take place concurrently.

65
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Intentionally Blank

66
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER 3

TYPES OF PSO AND PSO TASKS

1. TYPES OF PSO
Peacemaking (PM)
Peacemaking is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation,
or other forms of peaceful settlement that end disputes and resolve
the issues that led to conflict under chapter VI of the UN Charter.
However, military support is possible either indirectly or in a
form of direct involvement of military assets. Military activities that
support peacemaking include military to military relations and
security assistance operations.
Other military activities, such as exercises and peacetime
deployments, may enhance the diplomatic process by
demonstrating the engagement of the Peace Forces. These
activities contribute to atmosphere of cooperation and assistance
with allies and friends, thus demonstrating resolve of the Peace
Forces with regard to its commitments.
Such demonstrations of resolve may assist diplomatic efforts at
conflict resolution.
Military-to-military contacts and security assistance
programs also serve to enhance diplomacy by influencing
important groups in regions of conflict and by promoting
stable environment necessary for the success of diplomacy.

Peacebuilding (PB)
PB consists of post conflict actions, primarily political, social,
diplomatic, economic and military measures, that strengthen and
rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to redress the
causes of a conflict and to avoid a return to conflict. It also includes

67
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

mechanisms that advance a sense of confidence and well-being

and support economic reconstruction.
PB activities include restoring civil authorities, rebuilding
physical infrastructures, and reestablishing commerce, schools,
and medical facilities.
Military support to diplomacy also includes assistance in
selected areas such as conduct of elections and plebiscites and
demobilization of former belligerent parties.
The military involvement will primarily be focused on the
provision of stable and secure environment. Other contributions by
the military to PB could be education and training of the regional
armed forces.

Peacekeeping (PK)
PK involves military operations that are undertaken with the
consent of all major belligerent parties. These operations are
designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce
agreement, to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian relief and support
diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.

68
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

PK operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the

UN Charter and have the following characteristics:

1. Success based on willingness of belligerents to abide by

truce.
2. Synonymous with truce keeping.
3. An interim step toward resolution of conflict.
4. All disputing parties must perceive peacekeeping force as
neutral.
5. Peacekeeping force must always be prepared for a quick
change of environment in which peace enforcement or combat
may occur.

Peace Enforcement (PE)

PE is application of military force or threat of its use, normally
pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with
generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of PE is
to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach
a long-term political settlement.
PE may include combat action. In such cases, missions must
be clear and end states defined. With the transition to combat
action comes the requirement for successful application of
warfighting skills. Thus, in a theater of operations both combat and
non-combat actions may occur simultaneously. Forces conducting
PE may, for example, be involved in the forcible separation of
belligerent parties or be engaged in combat with one or all parties
to the conflict.
PE may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for
enforcement is provided by Chapter VII of the Charter and has the
following characteristics:

1. Force may or may not be under the UN command.

2. Not necessarily ends in combat.
3. A subset of armed intervention.
4. Intervention force not perceived as neutral.
5. International mandate required.

PE includes use of armed force to maintain or restore

international peace and security in situations in which the Security

69
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace,

breach of the peace or act of aggression.

Joint forces support Peace Enforcement Operations to compel

compliance with measures designed to establish an environment
for truce or cease fire

Conflict Prevention (CP)

CP is an activity that seeks to anticipate and forestall conflicts.
CP includes different activities under Chapter VI of the UN Charter,
ranging from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of
troops, intended to prevent disputes from escalating into armed
conflicts or from spreading.
There are three principal military activities that contribute to
prevention of conflicts or any resurgence of hostilities. Those are
early warning, surveillance and stabilizing measures.

Humanitarian Operations (HO)

HO programs will be conducted simultaneously in almost every
Peace Support Operations. Normally limited in their scope and
duration, HO projects have a significant impact on resources
required and other aspects of Peace Support Operations. HO

70
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

includes programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of

complex emergencies involving natural or manmade disasters or
other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or
privation that might present a serious threat to life or may result in
great damage or loss of property. HO supplements or
complements the efforts of a host nation, civil authorities, or
agencies that may have primary responsibility for HO
HO is normally conducted by a joint task force and in concert
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary
organizations (PVOs). Normally, it is necessary to establish a base
of operations in the AO that includes both Combat Support (CS)
and Combat Service Support (CSS) units and logistics support
element (LSE) units.

2. PSO TASKS
Military tasks in a PSO cover a broad range of activities, but for
ease of definition may be grouped under the following headings,
reflecting the purpose for which PSO might be undertaken.

Peacemaking (PM)
1. Provision of good offices, liaison and negotiation.
2. Surveillance.
3. Sanctions and Embargoes.
4. Mediation.
5. Conciliation.
6. Diplomatic isolation.

Peacebuilding (PB)
1. Supervise the withdrawal.
2. Ensure withdrawal of heavy weapons to interim or final
locations.
3. Monitor external borders.
4. Supervise exchange of prisoners, movement of refugees
and displaced persons.
5. Classification.

71
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

6. Assist in the restoration of civil infrastructure.

7. Assist in de-mining and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
operations.
8. Support establishment of new political structures.
9. Assist in restoration or establishment of civil administration
and law and order.
10. Supervise relocation or demobilization of warring factions,
regular and irregular forces.

Peacekeeping (PK)
1. Observation.
a. Observing and monitoring truces.
b. Observing cease-fire and demarcation lines (as agreed
by the parties).
c. Confirming withdrawal of forces from the conflict area.
d. Monitoring conditions in a potential conflict area for signs
of increased tension or preparation for conflict.
e. Acting in conjunction with or in support of NGOs, for
activities such as monitoring human rights or electoral
organization and supervision.
f. Inspecting areas and facilities for compliance with terms
agreed between the parties to the conflict.

2. Interposition Force.
a. Establishing observation parties or posts.
b. Establishing control and supervision over the main routes
and key terrain to prevent either side from gaining an
advantage.
c. Marking and continually inspecting demarcation lines to
lessen the chances of misunderstanding and violations.
d. Opening routes for humanitarian aid.
e. Escorting humanitarian aid convoys.
f. Establishing Joint Military Commissions with the
legitimate authorities of the concerned parties to identify
criteria for a return to normality and to solve problems at the
lowest possible level.
g. Monitoring a cease-fire.
h. Establishing buffer zones and initiating demilitarization.

72
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

3. Transition Assistance.
a. Locating and confiscating weapons munitions and
supplies.
b. Providing temporary law enforcement authority or support
to the civil police.
c. Coordinating and protecting humanitarian aid efforts,
including providing or restoring critical infrastructure.
d. Assisting in processing / relocation / movement / handling
of refugees and displaced persons.
e. Creating government infrastructure, civil police forces,
and judicial institutions.

4. Supervision of Truces and Cease Fires.

a. Supervising withdrawal, relocation, demobilization and
disarming of the military and para-military forces of the
parties.
b. Supervising cease fire or demarcation lines.
c. Supervising or assisting in locating and identifying
minefields as well as undertaking de-mining operations as
appropriate.
d. Helping to provide or restore civilian administration
throughout the mission area.
e. Separation and demobilization of Forces.
f. Execution of the details of the agreement, such as
exchange of prisoners and bodies, conduct of elections and
arms control agreements.
g. Negotiation and Mediation.
h. Liaison.
i. Investigation of Complaints and Violations.
j. Refugee camps, collection points, and stations.
k. Censuses, referendums, plebiscites, and elections.

5. Military Assistance.
a. Law and Order.
b. Military Operations.
c. Supervision.
d. Administration.
e. Protection.
f. Reaction.
g. Control.
h. Coordination.
i. Timing force withdrawal.

73
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Conflict Prevention
1. Preventive Deployment.
2. Early Warning.
3. Surveillance.
4. Sanctions and Embargoes.
5. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations.
6. Stabilizing Measures.

Humanitarian Operations (HO)

1. Support and protect humanitarian aid convoys.
2. Transport humanitarian aid, to include, air drops.
3. Health and medical support.
4. Assisting in relocation or return of refugees and displaced
persons.
5. Protection of Human Rights.
6. Disaster Relief.
7. Humanitarian aid flow
8. Humanitarian De-mining.
9. Supervision of POW exchange and refugee movements.
10. Maintain, repair and even create routes and critical
infrastructure.

Peace Enforcement (PE)

1. Peace Restoration.
2. Protection of Humanitarian Operations.
3. Establishing and protecting “safe areas” or exclusion zones.
4. Enforcing sanctions.
5. Guarantee and Denial of Movement.
6. Establishing and enforcing No-Fly-Zone.
7. Protection of Human Rights.

74
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER 4

PSO AND ORGANIZATIONS AND

AGENCIES

1. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
(NGOs) AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY
ORGANIZATIONS (PVOs)
NGO is an official term used an Article 71 of the UN Charter to
describe a wide range of primarily non-profit organisations,
professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses,
or simply groups motivated by humanitarian and religious values
that are usually independent of governments, UN, and commercial
sectors. NGOs are set up and operated by private individuals each
with its own mission and charter.
NGOs and PVOs play an important role in providing PSO and
support to host nations. They can relieve a commander of the need
to resource some civil-military operations. Because of the extent of
their involvement or experience in various nations and because of
their local contacts, these organizations may be a valuable source
of information on local and regional governments, civilian attitudes
toward the Peace Support Operations, and local support or labor.
However, some organizations may prefer to avoid close affiliation
with military forces for fear of compromising their position with the
local populace.
NGOs and PVOs have the ability to respond quickly and
effectively to disaster relief, food distribution needs, and programs
aimed at addressing the root causes of poverty and vulnerability to
disaster. While continuing to be responsive to immediate human
needs, particularly in emergency situations, NGOs and PVOs
increasingly contribute to long-term development activities crucial
to improving conditions in the developing world.
NGOs and PVOs will be found managing a wide variety of field
operations, including food distribution; emergency health; transport

75
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

and logistics; family tracing for separated children; agricultural

rehabilitation; and water and infrastructure repair programs.
Both the Peace Forces and the NGOs tend to assume
antagonistic stereotypes of one another. To overcome this
unhelpful and counter-productive syndrome an emphasis should
be placed on regular liaison and communication. While the Peace
Forces should accept that NGOs often require their own space in
which to operate, some form co-ordination is required if only to
define exactly what that space is. Effective co-operation will have
major impact on the success of a mission.
In PSO, Peace Forces should be prepared to coordinate NGOs
and PVOs activities. One method to build unity of effort and
conduct this liaison is to establish Civil-Military Operational Center
(CMOC). There is no established structure for a CMOC; its size
and composition depend on the situation. Through a structure such
as a CMOC, the commanders can gain a greater understanding of
the roles of NGOs and PVOs and how they influence mission
accomplishment.

♦ DEFINE THE PROBLEM IN CLEAR AND

UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS AGREED TO BY ALL
PARTICIPANTS.
♦ DEFINE THE OBJECTIVE.
♦ ESTABLISH A COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE.
♦ DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION/OPTIONS.
♦ CAPITALIZE ON EXPERIENCE.
♦ ESTABLISH RESPONSIBILITY.
♦ PLAN FOR THE TRANSITION OF KEY
RESPONSIBILITIES, CAPABILITIES, AND
FUNCTIONS.
♦ DIRECT ALL MEANS TOWARD UNITY OF EFFORT.

Figure 4 – 1. Basic steps to building and maintaining

coordination

76
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Commanders must understand that NGOs and PVOs have valid

missions and concerns and that these may complicate the mission
of Peace Forces. The Peace Forces staff should meet with
representatives of the NGOs, PVOs and humanitarian assistance
community to define common objectives and courses of action that
are mutually supportive without compromising the roles of any of
the participants.
Because of the important role played by NGOs, PVOs, they or
their interests should be represented at every level of the chain of
command. NGO and PVO field workers are normally experts in
their working environment. These workers are guided by operating
principles of their parent organizations, which typically require
independence to do the job most effectively.
As complex as the interaction among the NGOs and between
the NGOs and the Peace Forces is in a humanitarian operation, it
is vital that the dynamics of military-NGO cooperation be
understood and the relationship be maximized for the success of
peace-support effort. Key participants must nurture this interaction
across the "communities" represented in the operation, and the
military must recognize they do not have a monopoly on courage
or risk-taking. In many instances, NGO and PVOs employees
precede and remain after the military intervention, and they
certainly have a degree of local knowledge and specialized
expertise that is necessary to tap. The military, for their part, bring
to the overall operation force protection, logistics, transport, and
communications capability and an organizational infrastructure
important to give some structure to the collective effort.
The Humanitarian Operation Center (HOC), CMOC, and
derivative structures have proven useful mechanisms to bring
various communities together, facilitate cooperation and
information sharing, and regulate interaction on a voluntary basis.
In this sense, all participants have something to gain from using
the mechanisms that attempt to harmonize the contributions of all
to achieve the goal of helping those in need.

77
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

2. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
(GOs) AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS (IOs)
Governmental Organisations
Governmental Organisations are the greatest source of funds
for a PSO. GOs support for the military response element trough
their defense budgets, and channel “official aid” to a large number
of PSO actors through their donor agencies (often simply referred
to as ”the donors”. The European Union (EU) has its own donor
agency that operates in much the same way. Over 90 percent of all
official aid comes from the 21 Organizations for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries that are
members of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
Donor organizations are often large and complex. Providing
emergency aid is only one of their functions; they may also provide
food aid, nonfood aid, and aid for refugees. In some countries, one
particular department in the donor organization may be responsible
for emergency aid.
Donor organizations are essentially non-operational. However,
they may have a presence in the field for gathering information on
which to base funding decisions, for managing the distribution of
funds, and for monitoring what has been achieved. Donors are
increasingly concerned to show that their funds are properly used.

Aid can be channeled to emergencies in various ways:

1. Core Multilateral Funding.

Donors fund PSO response elements indirectly through

regular, usually annual, contributions to the UN agencies.
Member states of the EU also give regular contributions to the
European Commission. In “core” funding, donors tend not to
micromanage resources, but concentrate on ensuring that
recipient agencies have an effective plan for resource allocation
and account for the use of funds.

78
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

2. Responsive Funding.

In addition to regular contributions, donor governments will

provide responsive funding for emergency needs arising on a
case – by – case basis.

a. Multilateral. Responsive funding may consist of

emergency – specific funding to the UN agencies and/or to
the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).
“Service packages” are standing arrangements between
donors and UNHCR to make certain assets available when
the need arises. Emergency specific funding is also made in
response to individual appeals launched by UN by the
Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). UN agencies
can have a role of donors themselves; for example UNHCR
plays a central role in funding NGOs and other organizations
in the field. UNICEF, WFP, and other UN agencies (well as
some large NGOs) also may be important donors.

b. Bilateral. Donors also may fund operational agents

directly. Organizations funded in this way include the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC), international non governmental
organizations (INGOs), local NGOs, and NGO umbrella
associations, and agents of the governments of the affected
states or private sectors that are available for
subcontracting. Bilateral funding gives donors greater
visibility, it may be faster, it can provide a wide choice of
outlets that increases the political and the operational
flexibility of donors, and allows responses to match to
different contexts. It also enables the donor, if it wishes, to
have greater control over how resources are used. However,
many donors do not have the resources for this kind of micro
management in emergencies.

International Organisations (IOs)

UN and Red Cross agencies were formed and operate under
international or national government mandates, conventions, and
legislation. UN agencies and the ICRC are therefore strictly
international organizations or IGOs.

79
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Three Red Cross\Crescent organizations make up the

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the
individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations.
The objective of the Movement is to coordinate an entire range of
humanitarian activities. For example, the Joint forces support
uncoordinated Peace Support Operations under the command
authority of the Field Commander (FC) forces to work together.
The ICRC is distinct from the rest of the Red Cross Movement by
having a protection mandate in addition to its relief assistance
work. It acts principally in cases of civil conflict, ensuring legal
protection for the victims and acting as a neutral, independent
humanitarian player in the most complex emergency situations. At
times the ICRC may get involved in strictly humanitarian
operations, but its mandate is to function during armed conflict.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies. (IFRC)

This organization consists of the National Red Cross or Red

Crescent Societies that normally operate within the borders of their
own countries, whose mandate is to provide humanitarian relief
during disasters. Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations may
provide assistance to other federation members through their
international alliance provisions.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Founded in 1863, this neutral Swiss association with

international influence applies the provisions of international
humanitarian law in armed conflicts. It undertakes its tasks and
derives its mandate from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
two additional Protocols of 1977, which the ICRC and advocates of
humanitarian law argue have gained universal application through
the formative custom of international law. Other nations that have
signed the Protocols consider themselves bound to them.
However, the United States has not ratified the 1977 Protocols and
does not always recognize ICRC actions that are based on these

80
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Protocols, which presents a major problem for the legal counsel in

the international arena because not all participants are similarly
bound on very basic matters of international law. Adherence or
non-adherence can make a mismatch of potential partners in
humanitarian ventures.

3. UN AGENCIES AND CIVIL AGENCIES

UN Agency
This part covers activities of different UN entities involved in
emergency response, recovery, and aid. For the sake of simplicity,
they are all referred to as UN agencies. In fact, they are programs,
organizations, funds, or agencies depending on their mandates or
organizational status within the United Nations. DHA, which works
closely with these agencies, is part of the UN secretariat. UN
agencies are present or represented in most developing countries
to help improving the social and economic well – being of the
populations. But they also provide humanitarian aid assistance in
emergencies and disasters especially when they are beyond the
means of the affected country. “Complex emergencies” in
particular require a response that goes beyond the mandates or
capacities of the UN agencies and also would involve other
international, intergovernmental, governmental, and non
governmental organizations.
The key UN response agencies are UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP,
FAO, WHO, and UND and they are operated, organized and
funded on the basis of their mandates. These agencies all have
emergency – related programs and small units specialized in
emergency planning and response. UN agencies will have acted
for some time between donors and aid recipients in the affected
country. They can adapt these relationships and mechanisms to
emergency and recovery assistance programs.

81
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

UNHCR is a field-oriented organization and is elected by the

General Assembly on the nomination of the secretary-general.
UNHCR’s principal functions and activities are:

1. Providing international protection to refugees and seeking

permanent solutions for the problem of refugees.
2. Promoting adoption of international standards for the
treatment of refugees in national law and procedures and
supervising their implementations.
3. Facilitating voluntary repatriation of refugees and
reintegration into their country of origin, or when this is not
feasible, facilitating integration in a country of asylum or a third
country.
4. Providing humanitarian assistance, counseling, education
and legal assistance.

UN agencies have had to find additional financial, human, and

material resources or redeploy them from development programs
to respond to the growing number of “complex emergencies”. They
also had to change policies and procedures and develop
relationships with new non-governmental and military partners. In
particular, they have had to strengthen interagency coordination
mechanisms.
With the nature and extent of involvement in emergencies
differing between agencies, their activities will concern:

1. Monitoring and early warning potential emergencies.

2. Contingency planning.
3. Damage assessment and determination of emergency and
recovery needs of affected areas and populations.
4. Mobilization of resources.
5. Coordination of response.
6. Information collection, exchange, analysis, and reporting.
7. Ensuring access to and protection of affected populations.
8. Procurement, transport, and delivery of supplies and
services.
9. Monitoring respect of humanitarian principles, human rights,
and related conventions and agreements; and
10. Transition to reconstruction and rehabilitation.

82
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Civil Agencies
Civil Agencies now constitute the major response element of
many PSO. Most of the agencies are directly or indirectly engaged
in “humanitarian assistance” or relief and recovery responses to
natural disasters and complex emergencies. The prospects for
peace are promoted through the considerable efforts of civilian
agencies focusing immediately on humanitarian assistance and
post-conflict recovery programs. Typical roles of Civilian agencies
in PSO are:

1. Camp construction and management.

2. Electoral activities and training.
3. Human rights protection and promotion.
4. Food aid distribution.
5. Water and sanitation engineering.
6. Epidemeiology.
7. Public and constitutional law.
8. Public information and telecommunication.

The control and organization of the agencies depends on the

extent of its mandate, which is determined at the beginning. The
UN Secretary General appoints a director of civil administration.
The civilian components must work in close liaison with all the
other elements including Peace Forces because much of its work
is interlined. In certain cases the Secretary General will designate
a lead agency to carry out or oversee functions that go beyond its
mandate, but for which it has the necessary capacity. The lead
agency also will have the primary responsibility for general
mobilization of resources and interagency coordination.
Realistic expectations of military support enable agencies to
fully capitalize on their interagency experiences. Within the bounds
of security, these organizations must know the following:
1. Capabilities and limitations of military forces.
2. Services (e.g., shelter, food, transport, communications,
security) that the force will or will not provide.
3. Varying circumstances that preclude assistance.
4. Types and scope of assistance that are appropriate.
5. Lessons learned at the conclusion of interagency operations.

83
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Intentionally Blank

84
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
Annex A

85
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Annex B

86
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
Annex C

87
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 WEU ORGANISATION

WEU PARLIAMENTARY THE COUNCIL

ASSEMBLY (PARIS)
Annex D

WEU HEADQUARTES
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PERMANENT COUNCIL SECRETARIAT-GENERAL

WEU INSTITUTE FOR
SECURITY STUDIES (PARIS)
WEU MILITARY
STAFF:
- 3 star General
Military Committee -Planning Cell
(CHODS) -Situation Centre
Politico- Military Politico- Council

88
Working SATELITE CENTRE
Working Group Military
Group Military Delegates Committee (Tarragon, SPAIN)
Group
MDWG
COUNCIL WORKING
GROUP ON THE

MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

TRANSATLANTIC
FORUM
Special Defiance Budget- Security CIS Space Mediterranean Open-Skies
Work. Repr. Org. Committee Group Group Group Verification
Group EUROLOGTERM
Group Committee Group

EUROCOM
WESTERN EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS GROUP (AT 13)
WE LOGISTICS
WESTERN EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS GROUP
ORGANIZATION (AT 13)
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Annex E

89
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Annex F

90
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Annex G
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 1 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a
spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2 Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms.
Without distinction of any kind, race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction on the basis of the
political, jurisdictional or international status of the
country or territory to which a person belongs.
Article 3 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.
Article 4 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
Article 5 No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 6 Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law.
Article 7 All are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to equal protection of the law...
Article 8 Everyone has the right of an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the

91
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or

by law.
Article 9 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention
or exile.
Article 13 Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.... to leave
any country, including his own ,and to return to his
country.
Article 14 Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution.
Article 17 Everyone has the right to own property ... No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 18 ... right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion...
Article 19 ... right to freedom of opinion and expression ... to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 20 ... right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association. No one may be compelled to belong to an
association.
Article 21 right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
... right of equal access to public service .. The will of
the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government... expressed in periodic and genuine
elections ... universal and equal suffrage... secret vote
or equivalent free voting procedures.

92
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Article 22 ... right to social security ... free development of his

personality.
Article 23 ... right to work, to free choice of employment, to just
and favorable conditions of work and to protection
against unemployment.
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work...

93
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

GLOSSARY

1. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Administrative control. The direction or exercise of authority

necessary to fulfill military department statutory responsibilities
for administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to
and exercised by service commanders at any echelon at or
below the service component command; the secretaries of
military departments are responsible for the administration and
support of their forces assigned or attached to unified
commands; secretaries fulfill this responsibility by exercising.
ADCON through the service component commander of the
unified command; ADCON is subject to the command authority
of the combatant commander
Alliance. The result of formal agreements between two or more
nations for broad, long-term objectives; see also multinational.
Armistice. In international law, a suspension or temporary cessation
of hostilities by agreement between belligerent powers.
Buffer zone. The space controlled by the Peace Support
Operations force that assures the specified parameters (as
determined by METT-T, ROE, range of the belligerent's direct
and indirect weapons systems, and commander's intent) and
degree of risk will not be exceeded.
Center of gravity. The hub of all power and movement upon which
everything depends; that characteristic, capability, or location
from which belligerents and friendly forces derive their freedom
of action, physical strength, or the will to fight.
Civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain,
influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil
authorities, both governmental and non governmental, and the
civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of
operations in order to facilitate military operations and
consolidate operational objectives; civil affairs may include
performance by military forces of activities and functions
normally the responsibility of local government; these activities

94
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military

operations.
Civil affairs agreement. An agreement, which governs the
relationship between allied armed forces, located in a friendly
country and the civil authorities and people of that country.
Civil-military operations. The complex of activities in support of
military operations embracing the interaction between the
military force and civilian authorities fostering the development
of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral,
friendly, or hostile groups.
Civil-military operations center (CMOC). An ad hoc organization,
normally established by the geographic combatant commander
or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the
coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other
United States Government agencies, non governmental
organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and
international organizations. There is no established structure,
and its size and composition are situation dependent.
Combat Service Support. The focus of logistics at the tactical level
of war; the synchronization of essential functions, activities, and
tasks necessary to sustain soldiers and their weapon systems
in an area of operations; includes but is not limited to that
support rendered by service support troops to arm, fuel, fix,
move, man, and sustain soldiers and their equipment.
Combat support. Operational assistance for combat elements.
Combatant command (COCOM). The command authority over
assigned forces vested in the commanders of unified
commands. COCOM provides full authority to organize and
employ commands and forces, as the combatant commander
considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. COCOM
is not transferable; the CINC uses COCOM to organize and
employ his commands and forces, assign tasks, designate
objectives, and give authoritative direction over all aspects of
military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to
accomplish the assigned missions. The CINC normally
exercises COCOM through his service component commanders
Combined arms. Application of several arms, such as infantry,
armor, artillery, and aviation.
Conflict. The period characterized by confrontation and the need to
engage in hostilities other than to secure strategic objectives.

95
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Constraint. Limitations placed on the command by a higher

command; constraints restrict freedom of action for planning a
mission by stating what must be done.
Counterintelligence Information gathered and activities conducted
to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities,
sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of
foreign powers, organizations, persons or international terrorist
activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or
communications security programs.
Demilitarized Zone. In contrast to buffer zones, demilitarized
zones are not normally occupied by third-party presence but are
patrolled by observer teams or surveyed from observation
posts; DMZs are created to neutralize certain areas from
military occupation and activity; generally speaking, they are
areas which are claimed by both sides and where control by
one could constitute a direct threat to the other.
Direct liaison authorized. The authority granted by a commander at
any level to a subordinate to directly coordinate an action with a
command or agency within or outside the command;
DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority
through which command is exercised.
Displaced person A person forced to leave their home but not
their parent country.
End State. Military end state includes the required conditions that,
when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main
effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the final
strategic end state; that end state describes what the NCA
wants the situation to be when operations conclude both
military operations, as well as those where the military is in
support of other instruments of national power; in the Peace
Support Operations context, end state includes the political and
military conditions described by the authorizing power as the
objective of Peace Support Operations.
Exclusion zone A zone established by a sanctioning body to
prohibit specific activities in a specific geographic area. The
purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their
behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face
continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force.
Force protection. Security program designed to protect soldiers,
civilians employees, family members, facilities, and equipment
in all locations and situations; accomplished through planned

96
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical

security, operations security, personal protective services;
supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other
security programs.
Foreign assistance. Assistance ranging from the sale of military
equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid
survivors of natural and man-made disasters.
Health services. All services performed, provided, or arranged by
the Army Medical Department to support, promote, improve,
conserve, or restore the mental or physical well being of military
personnel.
Host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of
allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to
operate in, or to transit through its territory.
Host nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by
a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime,
times of crisis, emergencies, or war; assistance provided during
war is based upon agreements mutually concluded between
nations.
Human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from
information collected and provided by human sources. Also
called HUMINT.
Intelligence. The product resulting from collection, processing,
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available
information are concerning foreign countries or areas.
International organizations. Organizations with global influence,
such as the United Nations and the International Committee of
the Red Cross. See also non-governmental organizations;
private voluntary organizations.
Joint tactics, techniques and procedures. Actions and methods
that implement joint doctrine and describe how forces are
employed in joint operations.
Joint task force. A force composed of assigned or attached
elements of two or more services and constituted by
appropriate authority for a specific or limited purpose or
missions of short duration.
Law of war. That part of international law that regulates the conduct
of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict.
Letter of assist. A contractual document issued by the UN to a
government, authorizing it to provide goods or services to a
peacekeeping operation; the UN agrees either to purchase the

97
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

goods or services or authorizes the government to supply them

subject to reimbursement by the UN.
Liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between
elements or military forces to ensure mutual understanding and
unity of purpose and action.
Logistic assessment. An evaluation of:
a. The logistic support required supporting particular military
operations in a theater of operations, country, or area.
b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for
the conduct of military operations either within the theater,
country, or area, or located elsewhere.
Logistics. The process of planning and executing the movement
and sustainment of forces to execute military operations;
includes the design, development, acquisition, storage,
movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and
disposition of materiel.
Logistics support element. A multifaceted logistical organization
that has a work force easily tailored to meet logistics
requirements and can control the inter-face among strategic,
operational, and tactical logistics.
Military operations other than war. Operations that encompass
the use of military capabilities across the range of military
operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to
complement any combination of the other instruments of
national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also
called MOOTW.
Mission creep. Occurs when armed forces take on broader
missions than initially planned.
Multinational. Pertaining to activities of both alliance and coalition
organizations.
Multinational operation. A collective term to describe military
actions conducted by forces of two or more nations; typically
conducted within structures of coalitions or alliances.
Nation assistance. Diplomatic, economic, informational, and
military cooperation between the two governments with the
objective of promoting internal development and the growth of
sustainable institutions within that nation; corrects conditions
that cause human suffering and improves the quality of life of
the nation's people.

98
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Non governmental organization. A professional association,

foundation, multinational business or other group with an
interest in improving the quality of life of people.
Operational command. Used to assign missions or tasks to
subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces,
and to retain or delegate OPCON and/or TACON as deemed
necessary; OPCOM does not include responsibility for
administration or logistics; OPCOM may denote the forces
assigned to a commander and delineate geographic AORs; the
CINC uses OPCON to delegate the most authority with which
subordinates can direct all aspects of military operations and
joint training needed to accomplish any assigned mission; a
commander with OPCON may control forces from one or more
services; OPCON does not normally include the authority to
direct logistics, administration, discipline, internal organization,
or unit training; during OPCON the service component
commander retains this service Authority.
Operational control. The authority delegated to a commander to
direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish
specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function,
time, or location; further includes the deployment of units
concerned and the retention or delegation of tactical control to
those units; does not include authority to assign separate
employment of components of concerned units; neither does it,
of itself, include administrative or logistical control.
Peace Support Operations. An umbrella term that encompasses
three types of activities; activities with predominantly diplomatic
lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace building) and
two complementary, predominately military, activities
(peacekeeping and peace-enforcement).
Peace-building. Post conflict actions, predominately diplomatic, that
strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in
order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
Peace-enforcement. The application of military force or the threat
of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to
compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to
maintain or restore peace and order.
Peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of
all major parties to the dispute designed to monitor and facilitate
implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, etc.) and

99
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political

settlement.
Peacemaking. A process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or
other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges ends to
disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict.
Preventive deployment. The deployment of military forces to deter
violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where
tension is rising among parties. Forces may be employed in
such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peacekeeping
force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities.
Preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a
predictable crisis and aimed at removing the sources of conflict
before violence erupts or to limit the spread of violence when it
occurs.
Private voluntary organizations. Private, nonprofit humanitarian
assistance organizations involved in development and relief
activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United
States-based. “Private Voluntary Organization” is often used
synonymously with the term “non governmental organizations.”
Also called PVO.
Procedures. A standard and detailed course of action that
describes how to perform a task.
Psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately,
the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
and individuals; the purpose is to induce or reinforce foreign
attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.
Recovery operations. Operations conducted to search for, locate,
identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains,
sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security.
Refugee. A person forced to leave their parent country.
Rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under
which peace forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other encountered forces.
Sanction enforcement operations. Operations, which employ
coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of,
designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.
Status of Forces Agreement. An international agreement that
demonstrates the legal relationship between the armed services

100
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

of sending states and the host nation; determines a standard

legal treatment and provides a basis for solving legal problems
required by the presence of foreign forces abroad.
Support. Relationships for one force to aid, assist, protect, or
logistically support another force; the supporting force gives the
needed support to the supported force; establishing supported
and supporting relationships among components is a useful
option to accomplish needed tasks; this concept applies equally
to all dimensions of the joint force organized by the CINC;
categories of support include.
Tactical command. The authority delegated to a commander to
assign tasks to forces under his command for the
accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority;
differs from TACON in that TACON involves only the necessary
control of movements and maneuvers to accomplish a
previously assigned mission.
Tactical control. The detailed and, usually, local direction and
control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish
missions or tasks assigned; in general, the delegation of tactical
control is only necessary when two or more units not under the
same operational control are combined to form a cohesive
tactical unit; a commander having tactical control is responsible
for formulating the plan and issuing the necessary orders to the
unit; the CINC uses TACON to limit the authority to direct the
tactical use of combat forces; TACON is normally detailed and
specifies local direction of movement and maneuver to
accomplish an assigned task; TACON does not provide
organizational authority or administration and support
responsibilities; the service component normally retains this
authority; both NATO and US joint doctrine share the same
definition for TACON.
Techniques. The general and detailed methods used by troops
and/or commanders to perform assigned missions and
functions, specifically, the methods of using equipment and
personnel; for example, a tactic of covering an obstacle with
direct and indirect fires may be executed by employing machine
guns on the flanks to fire down the length of the obstacle and
mortars firing on the obstacle initially then beyond it to cutoff
withdrawal of an opposing force.

101
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

Tenets. A basic truth held by an organization; the fundamental tenets

of Army operations doctrine describe the characteristics of
successful operations.
Total mission awareness. The ability of commanders at all levels
to consider everything that affects their operation; applies to
operations other than war and war.
Unified command. A command with a broad, continuing missions
under a single commander and composed of significant
assigned components of two or more services.
Versatility. The ability of units to meet diverse challenges, shift
focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to
another rapidly and efficiently.

102
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

2. ABBREVIATIONS and Acronyms

ADCON Administrative control
AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe
AFCS Army facilities component system
AO Area of operations
AOR Area of responsibility
ARFOR Army force
COS Chief of staff
C2 Command and control
CA Civil affairs
CADST Civil affairs direct support team
CAO Chief administrative officer
CCIR Commander’s critical information requirements
CFST Coalition forces support team
CI Counterintelligence
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
CINC Commander-in-chief
CIS Communication and Information System
CLO Chief logistics officer
CLPSB CINC Logistic Procurement Support Board
CMO Civil-military operations
CMOC Civil-military operations center
CNN Cable News Network
COA Course of action
COMSEC Communications security
CRS Community relations service
CS Combat support
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(former name of OSCE)
CSS Combat service support
CTC Combat training center
CTF Combined task force
DMZ Demilitarized zone
DPKO Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
FALD Field Administration and Logistics Division
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization
FLSG Force Logistics Support Group

103
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

FM Field manual
HA Humanitarian assistance
HAO Humanitarian assistance operations
HCA Humanitarian and civic assistance
HN Host nation
HNS Host-nation support
HoM Head of media
HQ Headquarters
HSS Health service support
HUMINT Human intelligence
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ID Identification
IDAD Internal defense and development
IFOR Implementation Force (Bosnia)
INGO International non governmental organization
IO International organization; Information operations
IRC International Rescue Committee
ISE Intelligence support element
JCMOTF Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC Joint force commander
JFSOCC Joint force special operations component commander
JIC Joint intelligence center
JISE Joint intelligence support element
JMC Joint movement center; Joint military commission
JOA Joint operations area
JOC Joint operations center
JOSE Joint operations support element
JPG Joint planning group
CJTF Joint Task Force Commander
LNO Liaison officer
LOA Letter of assist
LOC Line of communication
LOGSTAT Logistics status report
LPT Logistics-preparation-of-the-theater
LRC Logistics readiness center
LSE Logistics support element
MCC Movements control center
MEDCOM Medical command

104
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

METL Mission-essential task list

METT-T Mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and
time available
MFO Multinational Force and Observers
MIST Military information support team
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
MP Military police
MSCA Military support to civil authorities
MSF Medicines Sans Frontiers
MSR Main supply route
MTG Meeting
MTT Mobile training teams
MWR Morale, welfare, and recreation
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC Nuclear, biological, chemical
NCA National Command Authorities
NCO Noncommissioned officer
NEO Noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO Non governmental organization
NSC National Security Council
NSE National support element
OOTW Operations other than war
OPCOM Operational command
OPCON Operational control
OPLAN Operation plan
OPORD Operation order
OPSEC Operations security
OSCE Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe
PA Public affairs
PAO Public affairs office, public affairs officer
PE Peace enforcement
PEO Peace enforcement operations
PHS Public Health Service
PK Peacekeeping
PKO Peacekeeping operations
PM Provost marshal
PSO Peace Support Operations
POL Petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLAD Political advisor

105
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

PSYOP Psychological operations

PUB Publication
PVO Private voluntary organization
ROE Rules of engagement
SA Security assistance
SOF Special operations forces
SOFA Status of forces agreement
SOMA Status of missions agreement
SOP Standing operating procedures
SROE Standing rules of engagement
SRSG Special Representative to the Secretary General
STANAG Standardization agreement
TAACOM Theater Army Area Command
TACON Tactical control
TCC Transportation component command
TOR Terms of Reference
UN United Nations
UNCIVPOL United Nations civilian police
UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UN-DMT United Nations Disaster Management Team
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMO United Nations military observers
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USG Under Secretary General
VIP Very important person
WFP World Food Program (UN)
WHO World Health Organization

106
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

REFERENCES

1. Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Peace Support Operations.

2. MC-327, NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations.
3. Bengt Berlin: Peace support operations. Swedish Armed Forces,
MSK TOD, Stockholm, 1997.
4. Functional planning guide (FPG) For Peace Support Operations
(PSO).
5. NATO Doctrine foe Peace Support Operations. Peacekeeping
section SHAPE-NATO, 1995.
6. Nordic UN Tactical Manuals, Volumes 1 and 2, 1992.
7. Dealing with the Media.
8. John Mackinlay: A guide to Peace Support Operations. Thomas J.
Watsen Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University –
USA, 1996.
9. Peace Support Operations, The Permanent Joint HQ, UK.
10. "FM 100-23 Peace Support Operations". (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army) 1994.
11. Charter of United Nations.
12. Antohonu Zinni: Complex Humanitarian Emergencies.
13. John Hillen: Peace (keeping) in our Time: The UN as a
professional Military Menagerie.
14. Quand, W.B. (ed.): Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics,
Washington, DC: The Brooning Institution, 1986.
15. Rader S: NATO Doctrine foe Peace Support Operations.
16. Umesh Palwaukar: Applicability of International humanitarian law
to UN peacekeeping forces.
17. "An Agenda For Peace – Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
peace-keeping", Report of the Secretary general on the work of
the Organization Adopted by the Security Council, New York, The
United Nations, 1992.
18. "A peace keeping Training Manual" (2nd draft), United Nations,
1994.
19. Army Field Manual, Volume 5, Operations other than War, part 2,
Wider Peacekeeping. United Kingdom, 1994.
20. "A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian
Operations", (Geneva, UNHCR) 1995.
21. General Guidelines for peacekeeping operations, United Nations,
Department of peacekeeping operations, 1995.

107
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED
 MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED

22. Joint Handbook for Peace Support Operations, Italian Defence

rd
Staff, 3 Division-Plans and Operations Training and Doctrine
Branch, 1994.
23. Peacekeeping operations (volume 3), Authority of the Chief of
Defence Staff, 1995.
24. Peace Support Operations. NATO.
25. "Supplement to Agenda for Peace", United Nations, January
1995.
26. "The Blue Helmets", (New York, United Nations) 1990.
27. The ICRC and Internally Displaced Persons, International Review
of the Red Cross no 305, p.181-191, 1 march 1995.
28. United Nations Peacekeeping, (New York, United Nations) 1993.
29. United Nations Civilian Police Handbook, UN DPKO, October
1995.
30. United Nations General Guidelines for Peacekeeping operations,
UN DPKO, October 1995.
31. UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
32. Wider peacekeeping – army field Manual.

108
MPFSEE UNCLASSIFIED