Remedial 80 GRNo198241
Remedial 80 GRNo198241
OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, ROSELLER DE LA PEÑA, ERNESTO ADOBO,
JR., FELICITAS MANAHAN, AND ROSENDO MANAHAN,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 198241, February 24, 2020
FACTS:
Adobo sought the opinion of De la Peña, then Undersecretary for Legal Affairs of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), on the matter. In
response, De la Peña issued a Memorandum dated July 6, 2000 (Memorandum), stating,
among other matters, that the Office of the DENR Undersecretary was not in a position to
question Adobo's factual conclusions as to the validity of Felicitas Manahan's claims of
ownership over Lot 823, that the government no longer retains ownership thereof, and that
the title to the said property supposedly held by Dormido's family, the Manotoks, was void
ab initio. De la Peña also recommended in his Memorandum that it was ministerial upon
the LMB to issue a deed of conveyance in favor of the spouses Manahan.
On August 16, 2010, aggrieved by the issuance of the Deed of Conveyance No. V-
200022, Dormido filed a Complaint before the Ombudsman charging the respondents with
conspiracy and violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(b) of RA 3019. She
alleged that respondents disregarded the basis of her claims on Lot 823, particularly the
existence of the Manotoks' titles thereto. She also posited that the validity of a Torrens title
may only be questioned in a direct proceeding before the trial courts.
In its October 15, 2010 Order, the Ombudsman dismissed Dormido's Complaint,
holding that while the Complaint charged respondents with violation of RA 3019, the
main issue therein was who between the Manotoks and the spouses Manahan hold a valid
title over the disputed property. Citing Section 19 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129) and Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 or RA 6770, the Ombudsman held that the regional trial courts and not the
Ombudsman had jurisdiction over such civil actions involving the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein.
ISSUE:
1. Remedial Law
1. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Dormido's criminal complaint against
respondents for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
RULING:
1. Higher tribunals may disturb the findings of a fact-finding body and its ensuing
conclusions upon a determination of grave abuse of discretion through the writ of
certiorari. For certiorari to issue against the public officer, court, or tribunal complained
of, the standard is:
The very basic prerequisite of a petition for certiorari is to allege the acts
constituting grave abuse purportedly committed by the public officer, tribunal, or court.
Also:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem — beyond the
ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine
and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed
in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court
in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evi-
dence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the
court a quo.
The term grave abuse of discretion has, ironically, fallen victim to procedural
abuse. As a last-ditch remedy to tum the odds to their favor, vengeful litigants resort to
indiscriminate imputation of the term to the public officer that issued a verdict adverse to
them, in manifest indifference to the soundness of its exercise or the frailty of their cause.
Rules must not be stretched for personal retribution, or even if such purpose be pursued, it
must have a solid grounding in fact and law. Such situation is not the case at hand.