After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein

253 Phil. 425

[ G.R. No. 80194. March 21, 1989 ] On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals[13] affirmed the decision of the lower
court except as to the award for moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to
P18,000.00.  A motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court on September
EDGAR JARANTILLA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND 18, 1987. [14]
JOSE KUAN SING, RESPONDENTS.
The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the private
DE CIS ION respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the
civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a separate action for
REGALADO, J.: civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was
acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or
awarded in the judgment of acquittal.
The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was “sideswiped by a vehicle in
the evening of July 7, 1971 in Iznart Street, Iloilo City”. [1] The respondent Court of Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the respondent court
Appeals concurred in the findings of the court a quo that the said vehicle which figured in for refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his appeal therein, said respondent court
the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla holding that the main issue had been passed upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992
along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol, and that private respondent hereinbefore mentioned.  It is petitioner's position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the
sustained physical injuries as a consequence. [2] Court in said case, the first dismissing the petition and the second denying the motion for
reconsideration, do not constitute the “law of the case” which would control the
Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical subsequent proceedings in this controversy.
injuries thru reckless jurisprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. [3] Private
respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not reserve his right to institute a 1.  We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.
separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a
private prosecutor. [4] Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case on reasonable doubt. [5] The “doctrine of the law of the case” has no application at the aforesaid posture of the
proceedings when the two resolutions were handed down.  While it may be true that G.R.
On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in this No. L-40992 may have involved some of the issues which were thereafter submitted for
former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, [6] docketed therein as Civil Case No. resolution on the merits by the two lower courts, the proceedings involved there was one
9976, and which civil action involved the same subject matter and act complained of in for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of the court a
Criminal Case No. 47027. [7] In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and quo, specifically, its order denying therein defendant's motion to dismiss.  This Court,
affirmative defenses that the private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, without rendering a specific opinion or explanation as to the legal and factual bases on
that the latter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case which its two resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil action on that
No. 47207 inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also incident for lack of merit.  It may very well be that such resolution was premised on the
deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively fact that the Court, at that stage and on the basis of the facts then presented, did not
consider that the denial order of the court a quo was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
participated in the criminal case. [8] [15]
To repeat, no rationale for such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that
Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on action, no law of the case may be said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to
April 3, 1975 an order of denial, with the suggestion that “(t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it justify the respondent court's refusal to consider petitioner's claim that his former acquittal
is suggested that the defendant brings (sic) this ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari barred the separate action.
or other appropriate remedy, to review the ruling of the court”. [9] "'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former
appeal.  More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably
On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in
mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, [10] assailing the aforesaid order of the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
the trial court.  Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Court's resolution of
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in
continue to be the facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S. 330)."
a resolution of October 28, 1975. [11]
(Underscoring supplied). [16]
 "It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil action after such acquittal.  This
the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code.  We have ruled in the relatively recent case
decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case.  x x x" of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. [25] that:
(Emphasis supplied). [17]
"In view of the fact that the defendant- appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the
"It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a ground that 'his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt’ the plaintiff-
case is the law of the case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action to recover damages
proceedings in the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, and no from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113).  The
question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be
second appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues civilly liable.  'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
are substantially the same as those on which the first question rested and, accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
according to some authorities, provided the decision is on the merits.  x x x"[18] liability might arise did not exist'.  (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558
cited in People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987;
2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the principal plaint Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7,
of petitioner. 1988).  The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the 'When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act
the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto.  Since the or omission may be instituted.  Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.' x x
same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of x"[26]
these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the
both types of liability. [19] court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the
accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and
We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al., [20] it was held that determined in a separate action.  The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to
where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. [27]
criminal case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered
therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause.  It is Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the
meet, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein was for application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. 
serious oral defamation which, while within the contemplation of an independent civil There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, constitutes only a penal offense and cannot accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2176 and 2177 presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense
of the Civil Code.  And while petitioner draws attention to the supposed reiteration of the charged.  Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission
Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena vs. Potenciano, et al., [21] this time involving becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted
damage to property through negligence as to make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence.
[28] Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated,
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, such secondary reliance is misplaced since the therein
plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal action against defendant Potenciano.  that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the
The citation of Roa in the later case of Azucena was, therefore, clearly obiter and affords same criminal act or omission.
no comfort to petitioner.
The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive
These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even statutory, [22] changes of a case for a quasi-­delict committed by the petitioner, thus:
on the matter of civil action arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts.  We will
reserve our discussion on the statutory aspects for another case and time and, for the "3.  That in the evening of July 7, 1971 at about 7:00 o'clock, the plaintiff
nonce, We will consider the doctrinal developments on this issue. crossed Iznart Street from his restaurant situated at 220 Iznart St., Iloilo City,
Philippines, on his way to a meeting of the Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street,
In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the Iloilo City and while he was standing on the middle of the street as there were
prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner.  Under the present jurisprudential milieu, vehicles coming from the Provincial Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City,
where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a he was bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen car with plate No. B-25-08 W
pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused[23] and the complainant could file a which was on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo
petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the City, which car was being driven by the defendant in a reckless and negligent
manner, at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the provisions of the
judgment of acquittal. [24]
Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to the Land Transportation
 and Traffic Code as well as in violation of existing city ordinances, and by [4] Ibid., 23-24.
reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to act with due
negligence and by failing to take into cinsideration (sic) his degree of [5] Ibid., 49.
intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the place as well as the width, traffic,
visibility and other conditions of Iznart Street;"[29] [6] Presided over by Judge Valerio V. Rovira.

Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right [7] Rollo, 5-6, 50.
to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from
filing such separate civil action for damages. [30] The Court has also heretofore ruled in [8]
Ibid., 6, 51.
Elcano vs. Hill[31] that
[9]
Ibid., 51.
"x x x a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the [10]
Edgar Jarantilla, Petitioner, vs. Honorable Valerio v. Rovira, et al., Respondents.
offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to
recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only [11] Rollo, 52.
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary.  In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of [12] Ibid., 57.
Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a Fourteenth Division, Justice Jesus M. Elbinias, ponente, Justices Fidel P. Purisima and
[13]

quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in Emeterio C. Cui, concurring.
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.  x x x" [14] Rollo, 32, 34-36.

The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved virtually the See Moreno vs. Macadaeg, 7 SCRA 700 (1963); Espiritu, et al vs. Solidum, et al., 52
[15]

same factual situation.  The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, SCRA 131 (1973).
expressly declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a
separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him [16]
People vs. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 (1967), citing People vs. Pinuila, 55 O.G. 4228 (1958).
from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the accused
therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-15548, Oct. 20, 1962, cited in
[17]

two cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case being on a Gokongwei, Jr. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al., 89 SCRA 336 (1979).
violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for
damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil. 881, 913 (1924), citing 4
[18]

aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved.  Consequently, said civil case C.J. 1093-1096, sec. 8075.
may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code.
Berredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607 (1942); Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113
[19]
Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court aside, We (1979); Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 129 SCRA 558 (1984).
hold that on the issues decisive of this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a quo.
[20] 107 Phil. 8 (1960).
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs. [21] 5 SCRA 468 (1962).
SO ORDERED. [22]
The original provisions thereon in Sec. 1, Rule 107 of the 1940 Rules of Court were
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. revised in Secs. 1 to 5, Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court.  Amendments were thereafter
introduced by Secs. 1 to 6, Rule Ill of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which were
further amended in 1988 (see Footnote 26, infra).

Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; People vs. Jalandoni, 131 SCRA 454 (1984);
[23]
[1] Rollo, 24. Maximo vs. Gerochi, Jr., 144 SCRA 325 (1986).
[2] Ibid., 22-23. [24]
Maximo vs. Gerochi, Jr. supra; see also Sec. 2, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
[3] Ibid., 41. [25] G.R. No. L-48949, April 15, 1988.