BORROMEO 

vs.  MINA
G.R. No. 193747, June 05, 2013

FACTS:
Subject of this case is a parcel of agricultural land registered in the name of respondent. It
appears from the TCT that respondent’s title over the said property is based on Emancipation
Patent 77 issued by the DAR.

Petitioner filed a Petition seeking that: (a) his landholding over the subject property (subject
landholding) be exempted from the coverage of the government’s OLT program under
Presidential Decree No. 27; and (b) respondent’s emancipation patent over the subject
property be consequently revoked and cancelled. He alleged that he purchased the aforesaid
property from its previous owner as evidenced by a deed of sale. However, he was not able to
effect the transfer of title in his name. He filed a subsequent Petition also with the PARO which
contained identical allegations as those stated in his first Petition.

Records show that petitioner changed his theory on appeal with respect to two (2) matters:
first, the actual basis of his ownership rights over the subject property, wherein he now claims
that his ownership was actually based on a certain oral sale in 1976 which was merely
formalized by the 1982 deed of sale; and second, the status of respondent as tenant of the
subject property, which he never questioned during the earlier stages of the proceedings
before the DAR but presently disputes before the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an oral sale can be admitted as evidence?

RULING:

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

A. Petitioner’s change of theory on appeal

The Court first resolves the procedural matter.

Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
not because of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic
considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except
when their factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable him to properly meet the issue raised, such as when the factual bases
of such novel theory, issue or argument is (a) subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already been
judicially admitted, which do not obtain in this case.

Records show that petitioner changed his theory on appeal with respect to two (2) matters:

First, the actual basis of his ownership rights over the subject property, wherein he now claims
that his ownership was actually based on a certain oral sale in 1976 which was merely
formalized by the 1982 deed of sale;35 and

Second, the status of respondent as tenant of the subject property, which he never questioned
during the earlier stages of the proceedings before the DAR but presently disputes before the
Court.

Clearly, the factual bases of the foregoing theories require the presentation of proof as neither
of them had been judicially admitted by respondent nor subject of judicial notice. Therefore,
the Court cannot entertain petitioner’s novel arguments raised in the instant petition.
Accordingly, he must rely on his previous positions that (a) his basis of ownership over the
subject property rests on the 1982 deed of sale; and (b) that respondent’s status as the tenant
of the subject property remains undisputed.

Having settled the foregoing procedural issue, the Court now proceeds to resolve the
substantive issue in this case.

In other words, transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21,
1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon . Hence, the sale executed by
Philbanking on January 11, 1985 in favor of petitioner was in violation of the aforequoted
provision of P.D. 27 and its implementing guidelines, and must thus be declared null and
void. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Records reveal that the subject landholding fell under the coverage of PD 27 on October 21,
197238 and as such, could have been subsequently sold only to the tenant thereof, i.e., the
respondent. Notably, the status of respondent as tenant is now beyond dispute considering
petitioner’s admission of such fact.39  Likewise, as earlier discussed, petitioner is tied down to
his initial theory that his claim of ownership over the subject property was based on the 1982
deed of sale. Therefore, as Garcia sold the property in 1982 to the petitioner who is evidently
not the tenant-beneficiary of the same, the said transaction is null and void for being contrary
to law.40

In consequence, petitioner cannot assert any right over the subject landholding, such as his
present claim for landholding exemption, because his title springs from a null and void source.
A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create,
modify or extinguish a juridical relation.41 Hence, notwithstanding the erroneous identification
of the subject landholding by the MARO as owned by Cipriano Borromeo, the fact remains that
petitioner had no right to file a petition for landholding exemption since the sale of the said
property to him by Garcia in 1982 is null and void.  Proceeding from this, the finding that
petitioner’s total agricultural landholdings is way below the retention limits set forth by law
thus, becomes irrelevant to his claim for landholding exemption precisely because he has no
right over the aforementioned landholding.

In view of the foregoing disquisition, the Court sees no reason to delve on the issue regarding
the cancellation of respondent’s emancipation patent, without prejudice to petitioner’s right to
raise his other claims and objections thereto through the appropriate action filed before the
proper forum.42

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed April 30, 2010 Decision and September 13,
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101185 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Subject of this case is a parcel of agricultural land registered in the name of respondent. It
appears from the TCT that respondent’s title over the said property is based on Emancipation
Patent 77 issued by the DAR.

Petitioner filed a Petition before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) seeking that: (a)
his landholding over the subject property (subject landholding) be exempted from the coverage
of the government’s OLT program under Presidential Decree No. 27; and (b) respondent’s
emancipation patent over the subject property be consequently revoked and cancelled.
Petitioner alleged that he purchased the aforesaid property from its previous owner as
evidenced by a deed of sale. However, he was not able to effect the transfer of title in his name.
Subsequently, he learned that an emancipation patent was issued in respondent’s favor
without any notice to him. He equally maintained that his total agricultural landholdings was
only 3.3635 hectares and thus, within the landowner's retention limits under both PD 27 and
RA 6647. He claimed that the subject landholding should have been excluded from the
coverage of the government’s OLT program.

Petitioner filed a subsequent Petition also with the PARO which contained identical allegations
as those stated in his first Petition and similarly prayed for the cancellation of respondent’s
emancipation patent.

After due investigation, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) found that the subject
property was erroneously identified by the same office as the property of petitioner’s father.
However, the subject property was never owned by his father as its true owner was Garcia —
notably, a perennial PD 27 landowner12 — who later sold the same to petitioner.

Based on these findings, the MARO recommended that: (a) the subject landholding be
exempted from the coverage of the OLT; and (b) petitioner be allowed to withdraw any
amortizations deposited by respondent with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to serve as
rental payments for the latter’s use of the subject property. 

The Ruling of the PARO

In an undated Resolution, the PARO adopted the recommendation of the MARO and
accordingly (a) cancelled respondent's emancipation patent; (b) directed petitioner to allow
respondent to continue in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property and
to execute a leasehold contract over the same pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
3844 (RA 3844), otherwise known as the "Agricultural Land Reform Code"; and (c) authorized
petitioner to withdraw from the LBP all amortizations deposited by respondent as rental
payments for the latter's use of the said property.14

Aggrieved, respondent filed an administrative appeal to the DAR Regional Director.

The Ruling of the DAR Regional Director

On November 30, 2004, DAR Regional Director Renato R. Navata issued an Order, finding that
petitioner, being the true owner of the subject property, had the right to impugn its coverage
from the government’s OLT program. Further, considering that the subject property was
erroneously identified as owned by Cipriano Borromeo, coupled with the fact that petitioner's
total agricultural landholdings was way below the retention limits prescribed under existing
agrarian laws, he declared the subject landholding to be exempt from OLT coverage.

While affirming the PARO's Decision, the DAR Regional Director did not, however, order the
cancellation of respondent’s emancipation patent. He merely directed petitioner to institute
the proper proceedings for such purpose before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Consequently, respondent moved for reconsideration,16 challenging petitioner's ownership of
the subject property for lack of sufficient basis to show that his averred predecessor-in-interest,
Garcia, was its actual owner. In addition, respondent pointed out that petitioner never filed a
protest against the issuance of an emancipation patent in his favor. Hence, petitioner should be
deemed to have slept on his rights on account of his inaction for 21 years.

The aforesaid motion was, however, denied in the Resolution dated February 10,
2006,17 prompting respondent to elevate the matter to the DAR Secretary.

The Ruling of the DAR Secretary

On September 12, 2007, then DAR Secretary Nasser C. Pagandaman issued DARCO Order No.
EXC-0709-333, series of 2007,18 affirming in toto the DAR Regional Director’s ruling. It upheld
the latter’s findings that the subject landholding was improperly placed under the coverage of
the government’s OLT program on account of the erroneous identification of the
landowner,19 considering as well the fact that petitioner’s total agricultural landholdings, i.e.,
3.3635 hectares, was way below the retention limits under existing agrarian laws. 20

Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In a Decision dated April 30, 2010,21 the CA reversed and set aside the DAR Secretary's ruling. It
doubted petitioner’s claim of ownership based on the 1982 deed of sale due to the
inconsistent allegations regarding the dates of its notarization divergently stated in the two
(2) PARO Petitions, this alongside the fact that a copy of the same was not even attached to
the records of the case for its examination. In any case, the CA found the said sale to be null
and void for being a prohibited transaction under PD 27 which forbids the transfers or
alienation of covered agricultural lands after October 21, 1972 except to the tenant-
beneficiaries thereof, of which petitioner was not.22 It also held23 that petitioner cannot mount
any collateral attack against respondent’s title to the subject property as the same is prohibited
under Section 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529), otherwise known as the
"Property Registration Decree."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated
September 13, 2010.24

Hence, this petition.

The Petition

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in declaring the sale between him and Garcia as null and
void. In this connection, he avers that there was actually an oral sale entered into by him and
Garcia (through his son Lorenzo Garcia) in 1976. The said oral sale was consummated on the
same year as petitioner had already occupied and tilled the subject property and started paying
real estate taxes thereon. He further alleges that he allowed respondent to cultivate and
possess the subject property in 1976 only out of mercy and compassion since the latter begged
him for work. The existing sale agreement had been merely formalized by virtue of the 1982
deed of sale which in fact, expressly provided that the subject property was not tenanted and
that the provisions of law on pre-emption had been complied with.25 In this regard, petitioner
claims that respondent cannot be considered as a tenant and as such, the issuance of an
emancipation patent in his favor was erroneous. Likewise, petitioner claims that his right to due
process was violated by the issuance of the aforesaid emancipation patent without any notice
on his part.

In his Comment,26 respondent counters that petitioner cannot change his theory regarding the
date of sale between him and Garcia nor even raise the same factual issue on appeal before the
Court.[27] Moreover, he asserts that the 1982 deed of sale was not registered and therefore,
does not bind him. In any event, he posits that the sale between petitioner and Garcia was null
and void.28 Finally, he argues that petitioner’s PARO petitions constitute collateral attacks to his
title to the subject property which are disallowed under PD 1529. 29

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

A. Petitioner’s change of theory on appeal

The Court first resolves the procedural matter.

Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
not because of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic
considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except
when their factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable him to properly meet the issue raised, such as when the factual bases
of such novel theory, issue or argument is (a) subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already been
judicially admitted, which do not obtain in this case.

Records show that petitioner changed his theory on appeal with respect to two (2)
matters:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

First, the actual basis of his ownership rights over the subject property, wherein he now claims
that his ownership was actually based on a certain oral sale in 1976 which was merely
formalized by the 1982 deed of sale;35 and

Second, the status of respondent as tenant of the subject property, which he never questioned
during the earlier stages of the proceedings before the DAR but presently disputes before the
Court.

Clearly, the factual bases of the foregoing theories require the presentation of proof as neither
of them had been judicially admitted by respondent nor subject of judicial notice. Therefore,
the Court cannot entertain petitioner’s novel arguments raised in the instant petition.
Accordingly, he must rely on his previous positions that (a) his basis of ownership over the
subject property rests on the 1982 deed of sale; and (b) that respondent’s status as the tenant
of the subject property remains undisputed.

Having settled the foregoing procedural issue, the Court now proceeds to resolve the
substantive issue in this case.

B. Validity of the sale of the subject property to petitioner

PD 27 prohibits the transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October
21, 1972 except only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon. As held in the case of Sta.
Monica Industrial and Development Corporation v. DAR Regional Director for Region
III,36 citing Heirs of Batongbacal v. CA:37
x x x P.D. No. 27, as amended, forbids the transfer or alienation of covered agricultural lands
after October 21, 1972 except to the tenant-beneficiary.  x x x.

In Heirs of Batongbacal v. Court of Appeals, involving the similar issue of sale of a covered

Clearly, therefore, Philbanking committed breach of obligation as an agricultural lessor. As the

xxxx

In other words, transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21,
1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon . Hence, the sale executed by
Philbanking on January 11, 1985 in favor of petitioner was in violation of the aforequoted
provision of P.D. 27 and its implementing guidelines, and must thus be declared null and
void. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Records reveal that the subject landholding fell under the coverage of PD 27 on October 21,
197238 and as such, could have been subsequently sold only to the tenant thereof, i.e., the
respondent. Notably, the status of respondent as tenant is now beyond dispute considering
petitioner’s admission of such fact.39  Likewise, as earlier discussed, petitioner is tied down to
his initial theory that his claim of ownership over the subject property was based on the 1982
deed of sale. Therefore, as Garcia sold the property in 1982 to the petitioner who is evidently
not the tenant-beneficiary of the same, the said transaction is null and void for being contrary
to law.40

In consequence, petitioner cannot assert any right over the subject landholding, such as his
present claim for landholding exemption, because his title springs from a null and void source.
A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create,
modify or extinguish a juridical relation.41 Hence, notwithstanding the erroneous identification
of the subject landholding by the MARO as owned by Cipriano Borromeo, the fact remains that
petitioner had no right to file a petition for landholding exemption since the sale of the said
property to him by Garcia in 1982 is null and void.  Proceeding from this, the finding that
petitioner’s total agricultural landholdings is way below the retention limits set forth by law
thus, becomes irrelevant to his claim for landholding exemption precisely because he has no
right over the aforementioned landholding.

In view of the foregoing disquisition, the Court sees no reason to delve on the issue regarding
the cancellation of respondent’s emancipation patent, without prejudice to petitioner’s right to
raise his other claims and objections thereto through the appropriate action filed before the
proper forum.42

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed April 30, 2010 Decision and September 13,
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101185 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, (Acting Chairperson)* Del Castillo, Perez, and Leonen,** JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
*
 Designated Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 1460
dated May 29, 2013.cralawlibrary

**
 Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1461 dated May 29, 2013.cralawlibrary

1
Rollo, pp. 4-20.cralawlibrary

2
 Id. at 69-82.  Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, with Associate Justices
Romeo F. Barza and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurring.cralawlibrary

3
 Id. at 28-30.cralawlibrary

4
 CA rollo, pp. 45-46.cralawlibrary

5
Rollo, p. 70.cralawlibrary

6
 CA rollo, p. 42.cralawlibrary

7
 "DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL,
TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE
INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR."

8
 Docketed as Adm. Case No. A-0204-0113-03.cralawlibrary

9
 Supra note 6.cralawlibrary

10
 CA rollo, p. 43.cralawlibrary

11
Rollo, pp. 31-32.cralawlibrary

12
 Id. at 31.cralawlibrary

13
 Id. at 31-32.cralawlibrary

14
 See Order dated November 30, 2004. CA rollo, pp. 48-49.cralawlibrary

15
 Id. at 47-51.cralawlibrary

16
 Id. at 52-55.cralawlibrary

17
 Id. at 67-69.  Penned by DAR OIC-Regional Director Araceli A. Follante, CESO IV.cralawlibrary

18
 Id. at 77-80.cralawlibrary

19
 Id. at 78.cralawlibrary

20
 Id. at 79.cralawlibrary

21
Rollo, pp. 69-82.cralawlibrary

22
 Id. at 78-80.cralawlibrary

23
Rollo, p. 80.cralawlibrary
24
 Supra note 3.cralawlibrary

25
Rollo, pp. 9-10.cralawlibrary

26
 Id. at 97-117.cralawlibrary

27
 Id. at 100-103.cralawlibrary

28
 Id. at 106-109.cralawlibrary

29
 Id. at 113-115.cralawlibrary

30
Kings Properties Corporation v. Galido, G.R. No. 170023, November 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 137,
154, citing Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo, 453 Phil. 927, 934 (2003).cralawlibrary

31
Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc. v. Tria, G.R. No. 174809, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 222,
231.cralawlibrary

32
Jarcia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 187926, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 336, 359.cralawlibrary

33
Bote v. Veloso, G.R. No. 194270, December 3, 2012.cralawlibrary

34
 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court enumerates what matters need not be proved, to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
RULE 129
What Need Not Be Proved

SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

SEC. 2 . Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

SEC. 4 . Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.

35
Rollo, pp. 9, 122-123.cralawlibrary
36
 G.R. No. 164846, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 97, 105.cralawlibrary

37
 438 Phil. 283, 295 (2002).cralawlibrary

38
 To note, based on the MARO’s findings, Garcia is a "perennial P.D. No. 27 landowner."
See rollo, p. 31.cralawlibrary

39
 Id. at 78.cralawlibrary

40
 Article 1409 of the Civil Code provides as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

xxxx

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be
waived.cralawlibrary

41
Menchavez v. Teves, Jr., 490 Phil. 268, 280 (2005).cralawlibrary

42
 To note, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9700 (which took effect in 2009), amending Section 24
of Republic Act No. 6657, partly reads as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Section 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiaries shall
commence from their receipt of a duly registered emancipation patent or certificate of land
ownership award and their actual physical possession of the awarded land.

xxxx

"All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land