SBA VS UOI Final Synopsis PDF
SBA VS UOI Final Synopsis PDF
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr., 1998
Contempt of court, often referred to simply as "contempt," is the offence of being disobedient
or disrespectful toward a court of law and its officers in the form of behaviour that opposes or
defies the authority, justice, and dignity of the court. There are two types of contempt: civil
contempt and criminal contempt.
•Civil Contempt: Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 provides that the
under-mentioned action would result in civil contempt :
(i) Willful disobedience to any judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other court process
(ii) willful breach of an undertaking to a court.
•Criminal Contempt: Section 2(c) of the Act provides that the following acts would result in
criminal contempt of court:
(i) Publication in words, which may be spoken or returned, or through signs or visible
representations of any matter
(ii) Any other act whatsoever that scandalises, lowers, or tends to lower the authority of any
court; or prejudices, interferes with or tends to interfere with all, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct the administration of justice.
According to Section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act 1971, contempt of court can be
punished with simple imprisonment for a term that may extend to 6 weeks, with a fine that
may extend to ₹2,000 or with both. But there is no provision to punish the defendant by
suspending the licence of a professional lawyer. The court made such a judgement by
referring to Article 142, which is not sufficient to suspend the licence of an advocate.
CASE DETAILS :
In the case of Re. Vinay Chandra Mishra, an advocate was found guilty of criminal contempt
and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for six weeks and was
suspended from practising as an advocate for three years. It was held that if an advocate is
found guilty of criminal contempt, then the High Court or Supreme Court can suspend his or
her licence to practise law. This decision of the Supreme Court in Re : VC Mishra has been
overruled in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union of India. It was made clear
that in the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction, the licence of an advocate could not be
suspended or cancelled.
FACTS:
•In the Vinay Chandra case, the Supreme Court found the defendant guilty of criminal
contempt for trying to threaten, overwave and overhear the Court by using insulting,
disrespectful and threatening language. The Supreme Court held that the power of the
Supreme Court to take cognizance of the contempt and to award punishment for it under
Articles 129 and 149(2) is independent of any statute because such power is "sui generis."
•Aggrieved by the direction of suspension from practice given by the Supreme Court, the Bar
Association, through its Hon. Secretary , filed a petition under Article 32 seeking relief by
saying only the disciplinary committee under the Bar Council of India, after an inquiry, can
suspend the licence of an advocate. The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to suspend an
advocate from practising, as this is the exclusive domain of the Bar Council of India.
The learned Solicitor General submitted that the power to punish an advocate by suspending
his licence vests exclusively on a statutory body constituted under the Advocates Act, and a
court cannot assume that jurisdiction under Article 142, Article 129, or even Section 38 of the
Advocate Act of 1961.
JUDGEMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT :
•In the judgement, it is mentioned that Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1971
provides that in cases of established contempt, the contemner may be punished with simple
imprisonment, a fine, or both. The judgement also reveals that suspending a licence to
practise any professional duty when found guilty of contempt of court is not recognised or
accepted. If the contempt of court proceedings is conducted by an advocate, the suspension
of the licence to practise can only be done by the Bar Council of India under the Advocate
Act of 1961.
•While the court was acting under Article 129 of the Indian Constitution, the only matter
before it was contempt of court. Therefore, the court has no right to suspend the licence of
an advocate under Article 129. In addition to that, a court cannot take over the jurisdiction of
the Bar Council of India to punish or suspend the licence of an advocate.
The Supreme Court has the power to punish for the misconduct or contempt of the court, but
it has no authority to suspend the licence of an advocate under any law. It was also added
that no court can use Article 142 of the Indian Constitution to deprive any professional
lawyer of their licence using the process contained in the Advocate Act 1961 by suspending
the lawyer's licence to practise in the court while dealing with the contempt case.
•After hearing both sides, the court ruled that the Supreme Court has the authority to punish
but not suspend any professional worker from doing his job while dealing with a contempt
case. The Supreme Court Bar Association won the case, and the suspension of advocate
Vinay Chandra Mishra's licence was cancelled.
ANALYSIS:
In this judgement, it is said that for imposing imprisonment, the contempt has to be serious
enough that it must consider the likelihood of interference with the administration of justice.
The culpability of the offender and the intention behind the act of contempt are crucial factors
when considering imprisonment as a punishment for contempt.I support the judgement since
the court held that suspending the licence to practise any profession, including the legal
profession, is not an accepted punishment that a court of record can give. Suspension of the
licence can be conducted by different acts under different professions. As an apex court, the
Supreme Court should have refrained from taking action beyond its jurisdiction. The most
important clarification done by the Supreme Court during the judgement is also the same.
Only the Bar Council of India can suspend the licence of an advocate if they are found guilty
of misconduct. The judgement is appropriate as it restricts the apex court from unnecessarily
exercising its "sui generis" powers.