ddd 845 Phil.

129

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 226991. December 10, 2018 ]
ERLINDA ESCOLANO Y IGNACIO, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
This appeal by certiorari[1] seeks to reverse and set aside the June 15, 2016 Decision[2] and August 12, 2016
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 37239. The CA affirmed the December 5, 2014
Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 (RTC), finding Erlinda Escolano y Ignacio
(petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,
otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
Antecedents
In an Information, dated January 13, 2011, petitioner was charged with violation of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
The accusatory portion of the information states:

That on or about the 30th day of May 2009 in [XXX],[5] Philippines, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously commit an act of child abuse/cruelty against [AAA],[6] 11 years old; [BBB], 9
years old; [CCC], 8 years old, all minors, by then and there making hacking gestures with a bolo and uttering
insults and invectives at them, which act debases, demeans and degrades the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
said minors as human being[s], to the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Upon arraignment on February 28, 2011, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, BBB, and CCC, private complainants; DDD,[8] mother of
complainants; and Barangay Peace and Security Officer Wilfredo Lim (BPSO Lim). Their testimony tended to
establish the following:
AAA testified that he was 11 years old at the time of the incident; that on May 29, 2009, at around eleven o'clock
in the morning, he and his two brothers: BBB, 9 years old, and CCC, 8 years old, were flying paper planes from
the third floor of their house when the planes landed in front of the house of Perlin Escolano (Perlin),[9] the
daughter of petitioner. Perlin uttered "putang ina" directed at CCC.
The following day, the siblings saw Perlin in front of their house. Private complainants got three ketchup sachets
from their refrigerator and threw these at her. However, Perlin went inside their house so it was petitioner who
was twice hit instead by the sachets. Petitioner exclaimed, "Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-
aralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso
ko."[10] Private complainants reported the incident to their mother DDD when she arrived from the market.
When DDD confronted petitioner, the latter uttered "nagpuputa ka, puta-puta ka. " Petitioner then went inside her
house, came out with a bolo, and threatened DDD, "walang demanda demanda sa akin, basta bumaba kayo dito
lahat, papatayin ko kayong lahat. Tatagain ko kayo, papatayin ko kayo." The incident left private complainants
terrified. They only went downstairs when they had a companion; and they no longer played as they usually did.
BBB and CCC corroborated AAA's testimony that they threw ketchup sachets at Perlin because she uttered bad
words against CCC.
On the other hand, DDD testified that on May 30, 2009, private complainants told her about the incident, thus,
she confronted petitioner. The latter pointed her finger at her and uttered, "Hoy, putang ina mo," got a bolo, and
yelled "Kaya ninyo ito? Pagtatatagain ko kayo."[11] Thereafter, DDD noticed a change in the behavior of private
complainants as they no longer played downstairs and they even transferred residence because of the incident.
DDD averred that her children were traumatized, and they were in constant fear because of petitioner's threat.
BPSO Lim corroborated the testimony of private complainants that he heard petitioner utter, "Putang-ina ninyo,
wala ng dimandemanda, papatayin ko na lang kayo, lalaban na lang ako ng patayan." He tried to pacify the
parties. He stated that petitioner was being held by his co-BPSO Rolando Estrella as she was shouting invectives
while brandishing a bolo. After the incident, he brought petitioner inside the latter's house and the bolo was
confiscated by his fellow BPSO.
Version of the Defense
The defense offered the testimonies of Rosario Bondoc (Bondoc), Rodolfo Niebres (Niebres), and petitioner.
Bondoc testified that petitioner and DDD had been neighbors since 1992. Sometime on May 30, 2009, she saw
petitioner sweeping her house premises. Then, she heard petitioner warning private complainants that she would
report them to their mother DDD. Thereafter, DDD approached petitioner's house yelling at her, "Poñeta ka,
putang ina mo, bobo, wala kang pinag-aralan." Bondoc also said that a BPSO accompanied DDD to her house to
pacify her since DDD had started the quarrel. Bondoc also averred that petitioner did not brandish a bolo against
DDD and private complainants. She added that the parties had a previous disagreement or misunderstanding
involving DDD's construction of a high-rise home.
In his testimony, Niebres averred that at around eleven o'clock in the morning of May 30, 2009, he heard
petitioner arguing only with DDD and not with private complainants; that he did not see the petitioner brandishing
a bolo; and that petitioner merely lightly reprimanded private complainants for throwing stones that hit petitioner's
roof.

Petitioner, on her part, testified that in the morning of May 30, 2009, while she was sitting beside the gate of her
house, AAA threw a sachet of ketchup at her. She scolded AAA saying, "Huwag kang mamamato." Instead of
desisting, AAA and his brothers BBB and CCC continued to throw ketchup sachets. Thereafter, AAA shouted,
"Linda, putang ina mo, wala kang kwenta." Petitioner warned that she would report them to DDD, their mother.
DDD suddenly arrived uttering invectives and pointing her finger at petitioner while uttering, "Linda, putang ina
mo! Bobo ka! Wala kang pinag aralan!"
The RTC Ruling
In its December 5, 2014 decision, the RTC found petitioner guilty of violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. It gave
credence to the clear testimony of private complainants. The RTC noted the gravity of petitioner's act of
threatening private complainants by wielding and making hacking gestures with a bolo while uttering invectives. It
took into account the negative effect of petitioner's act that resulted in private complainants' transfer of residence
because they were in constant fear. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds accused Erlinda Escolano y Ignacio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act and she is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision
correccional as minimum, to Six (6) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as maximum and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA. On February 7, 2011, the RTC issued a Commitment
Order [13] against petitioner; hence, she was imprisoned pending appeal.
The CA Ruling
In its June 15, 2016 decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It held that the acts of petitioner caused
untoward repercussions in the life and dignity of private complainants. The incident made hostile the environment
for private complainants where they could no longer freely live and enjoy their childhood and were forced to move
out. Private complainants were even deprived of their chance to play games and enjoy leisure time within their
own home.[14] The CA ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated December 5,
2014 of the RTC, Branch 94, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-11-168269 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(A)
OF R.A. NO. 7610.

Petitioner averred that private complainants' inconsistencies could only have come from prevaricated testimonies
and judicial admissions which engender reasonable doubt in her favor.[16] Also, the bolo allegedly used by
petitioner to make hacking gestures while uttering invectives against private complainants should be disregarded
in light of the unrelenting disavowals in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC.[17] Aside from the point that the
existence of the bolo was not established, petitioner averred that the testimony of DDD had no probative value to
support the alleged threatening remarks against her children. The testimony of DDD that she did not exactly hear
the statements made by the petitioner and the "sumbong" of her children constitute hearsay evidence.
[18]
 Petitioner also argued that the purported hacking gesture with a bolo was actually geared towards DDD.[19]
In its Comment,[20] dated March 22, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses are consistent on all material points showing that petitioner's words, demeanor, and
actions towards them constitute the crime as charged. The OSG maintained that the incident caused the children
to become frantic due to such threat; and it affected them so much that they had to move as far away as possible
from the petitioner. Further, the OSG posits that the non-presentation of the "bolo" used by petitioner to threaten
the children does not offset the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding its existence.[21]
THE COURT'S RULING
The petition is partially meritorious.

Generally, a question of fact cannot

be entertained by the Court.
Petitioner essentially raises the issue of whether the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses were consistent
and credible. The question posited is evidently factual because it requires an examination of the evidence on
record. Well settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The function of the Court in petitions
for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[22]
Exceptions
Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule: (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of
absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of
Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
[23]

Here, one of the exceptions exists – that the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. To finally resolve
the factual dispute, the Court deems it proper to tackle the factual question presented.

Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610

requires an intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic
worth of a child victim
Sec. 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. —

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to
be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, child abuse is defined by Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms. —

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
     
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
     
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
     
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
     
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.[24]
 (Emphasis supplied) Section 3(b), Article I, Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act, Republic Act No. 7610, June 17, 1992.

Verily, Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, in relation thereto, Sec. 3(b) of the same law, highlights that in child abuse,
the act by deeds or words must debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being. Debasement is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something; degradation, on
the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality; while demean means to lower in
status, condition, reputation or character.[25] Jabalde v. People, 787 Phil. 255, 269-270 (2016), citing Black's Law
Dictionary 430 (8th ed. 2004) and Webster's Third New International Dictionary 599 (1986).

When this element of intent to debase, degrade or demean is present, the accused shall be convicted of violating
Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, which carries a heavier penalty compared to that of slight physical injuries or other
light threats under the RPC.[26]3 Under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, the offender shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor  in its minimum period; while under the RPC, if the offender commits slight physical injuries or other light
threats, he shall suffer the penalty of arresto menor.

In Bongalon v. People, 707 Phil. 11 (2013). [27] the petitioner therein was charged under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610 because he struck and slapped the face of a minor, done at the spur of the moment and in the heat of
anger. The Court ruled that only when the accused intends to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of
the child as a human being should the act be punished with child abuse under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
Otherwise, the act must be punished for physical injuries under the RPC. It was emphasized therein that the
records must establish that there must be a specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being, being the essential element in child abuse. [28]! Id.  Bongalon v. People, 707
Phil. 11 (2013). [27] Since the prosecution failed to establish the said intent, the petitioner in that case was
convicted only of slight physical injuries.

Similarly, in Jabalde v. People,[29] !SUPRA Jabalde v. People, 787 Phil. 255, 269-270 (2016), citing Black's Law
Dictionary 430 (8th ed. 2004) and Webster's Third New International Dictionary 599 (1986).
 the petitioner therein slapped, struck, and choked a minor as a result of the former's emotional rage. The Court
declared that the absence of any intention to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of a child victim, the
petitioner's act was merely slight physical injuries punishable under the RPC since there is no evidence of actual
incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance. Underscored is that the essential
element of intent must be established with the prescribed degree of proof required for a successful prosecution
under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. [30] ] !SUPRA Jabalde v. People, 787 Phil. 255, 269-270 (2016), citing Black's Law
Dictionary 430 (8th ed. 2004) and Webster's Third New International Dictionary 599 (1986).

In contrast, in Lucido v. People,[31] the petitioner strangled, severely pinched, and beat an eight-year-old child,
causing her to limp. The Court held that these abusive acts are intrinsically cruel and excessive as they impair
the child's dignity and worth as a human being and infringe upon her right to grow up in a safe, wholesome, and
harmonious place. It was also highlighted that these abusive acts are extreme measures of punishment not
commensurate with the discipline of an eight-year-old child.

In this case, the Court finds that the act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private complainants does not
constitute child abuse under the foregoing provisions of R.A. No. 7610. Petitioner had no intention to debase the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was rather an act carelessly done out of anger. The circumstances
surrounding the incident proved that petitioner's act of uttering invectives against the minors AAA, BBB, and CCC
was done in the heat of anger.

It is clear that petitioner's utterances against private complainants were made because there was provocation
from the latter. AAA, BBB, and CCC were throwing ketchup sachets at petitioner's daughter Perlin. The latter
evaded this by getting inside their house, so that private complainants hit petitioner on the head and feet, instead.
The complainants continued to throw these sachets which angered petitioner. Evidently, petitioner's statements
"bobo, walang utak, putang ina" and the threat to "ipahabol" and "ipakagat sa aso" were all said out of frustration
or annoyance. Petitioner merely intended that the children stop their unruly behavior.

On the other hand, the prosecution failed to present any iota of evidence to prove petitioner's intention to debase,
degrade or demean the child victims. The record does not show that petitioner's act of threatening the private
complainants was intended to place the latter in an embarrassing and shameful situation before the public. There
was no indication that petitioner had any specific intent to humiliate AAA, BBB, and CCC; her threats resulted
from the private complainants' vexation.
Verily, as the prosecution failed to specify any intent to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of complainants
as human beings, or that she had intended to humiliate or embarrass AAA, BBB, and CCC; thus, petitioner
cannot be held criminally liable under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.[32]
The subsequent profanities and
alleged hacking gestures were not
directed against private
complainants.
When private complainants threw ketchup sachets at petitioner, it was only at that moment that she hurled
invectives against them, particularly "bobo, walang utak, putang ina," and "ipahabol at ipakagat sa aso."
After petitioner had uttered those words, it was not shown that she continued her slurs. Private complainants
reported the incident to their mother DDD when s he arrived from the market. It was only when DDD confronted
petitioner that the latter uttered profanities, particularly, "putang ina mo" and made hacking gestures with a bolo.
It must also be emphasized that the alleged hacking gestures and the expression "putang ina mo" were
not specifically directed to the children; rather, these were made against DDD, their mother. DDD testified
as follows:
Q: I am asking when this case was referred to the Barangay, I was asking what action did the
Barangay do?
A: Nag-statement po ako doon na ganoon ang nangyari sa aking mga anak.
   
Q: What specific action or what specific act did the barangay do?
 
FISCAL
May we know the materiality because the Grave Threat[s] is not connected with this case,
your honor?
 
COUNSEL
I am trying to prove in the case of Grave Threat[s] the accusation of the private
complainant that the accused brandished a knife against her in that case. She is telling here
that the bolo was brandished towards the children which is totally inconsistent with her
claim in the case of Grave Threat[s]. We are trying to prove that if the hacking gesture
was indeed made by Escolano, it was directed against this witness, the mother and not
against the children and that is also the allegation of the witness in the other case.
 
COURT
All right, witness may answer.
 
COUNSEL
Madam witness, what specific act did the accused do which comprised your charge or
which was the subject matter of the case for Grave Threat[s] which you filed against her?
 
WITNESS
"Acts ng bolo sa aming mag-iina, nandoon kaming lahat mag-iina. Bumaba ako ng
magsumbong sila sa akin, galit na galit siya." I heard that the accused was uttering
invective words to my children together with me, and then, the accused went inside her
 house and took a bolo and when she went out from her house, she was holding a bolo and
uttering the words "kaya ninyo ito, pagtatatagain ko kayo."
   
Q: But you will agree with me, Madam Witness, that during that point in time, the accused
was already quarrelling with you. In fact, prior to that hacking incident, based from your
Affidavit or Sinumpaang Salaysay, she told you "putang ina mo," is it not and she is
referring to you, and when she mentioned that, she was quarrelling with you and not to
your children, is it not?
A: "Lahat kami, inaaway niya at that time."
   
Q: That's what you felt but the fact was that the word is directed to you only?
A: "Kayo." That is "Kayo, marami. Kayo. Pagtatatagain ko kayo. Kaya ninyo ito. Bumaba
kayo dito."
   
Q: But it was you to whom she was talking?
 
FISCAL
She said "kayo." Already answered. We leave that to the appreciation of the Court.
 
COUNSEL
Q: When she mentioned "putang ina mo", to whom was she referring?
A: "Ako."
   
Q: And during that time, she was stating that word to you?
A: Yes, sir.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
 
xxxx
Also, the testimony of AAA revealed that the statements made by petitioner were indeed directed to his mother
DDD, viz.:
Q: Aside from telling you that she will release the dog, what else did she do?
A: After I told my mother that, my mother told us that she will confront Erlinda Escolano.
Then, "dinuro po ni Erlinda Escolano iyong Nanay ko po, tapos sabi niya, nagpuputa ka,
puta-puta ka, tapos binabaan po siya sabi niya wala kayong mga utak kasi ikaw
nagpuputa ka, puta-puta ka."
 
COURT
"Kanino sinabi iyon?"
A: "Sa Nanay ko. Tapos pumasok ng bahay si Erlinda Escolano, tapos pagkalabas
niya, meron siyang itak po."[34] (Emphasis supplied)
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the alleged hacking gestures and profanities
subsequently hurled by petitioner were not directed against private complainants but towards DDD.
Petitioner's ensuing outbursts were due to DDD's confronting her. AAA clearly testified that the threats
stated by petitioner were aimed towards DDD.

Notably, DDD filed a separate criminal complaint for grave threats against petitioner because petitioner
brandished a bolo against her. The present case is only concerned with the acts committed by petitioner against
private complainants; and not those committed against DDD which purportedly constituted grave threats.

Further, DDD conceded that the profanity hurled by petitioner was directed at her. The expression
"putang ina mo" is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but
rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression
of profanity.[35]

Thus, it cannot be held with moral certainty that the purported hacking gestures and profanities
subsequently hurled by petitioner were intended for private complainants.

Petitioner committed the crime of

other light threats.
Nevertheless, though the prosecution failed to prove the intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
of private complainants, petitioner still uttered insults and invectives at them. Specifically, petitioner's
statement "Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinagaralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba
dito, pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko," were directed against private complainants. In
this regard, AAA testified that this particular utterance from petitioner was scary.[36] DDD also corroborated said
claim that private complainants were too traumatized even to go downstairs because of their fear that petitioner
might release her dog to chase and bite them.[37]
However, it must also be emphasized that, as discussed, petitioner's utterances were made in the heat of her
anger because private complainants had thrown ketchup sachets at her. Petitioner merely intended that private
complainants stop their rude behavior. Thus, petitioner committed the crime of Other Light Threats under Article
285(2) of the RPC, to wit:

Art. 285. Other light threats. — The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article,
shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in
lawful self-defense.
   
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm
not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts show that he did not persist in
the idea involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the offense shall
not bring it within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx

In grave threats, the wrong threatened to be committed amounts to a crime which may or may not be
accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always
accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is
no condition.[38]

Here, the threat made by petitioner of releasing her dogs to chase private complainants was expressed in the
heat of anger. Petitioner was merely trying to make private complainants stop throwing ketchup sachets at her.
However, instead of doing so, private complainants still continued to throw ketchup sachets against petitioner,
which infuriated the latter causing her to utter invectives against private complainants.

Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 285, par. 2 (other light threats)
since: (1) threat does not amount to a crime, and (2) the prosecution did not establish that petitioner persisted in
the idea involved in her threat.[39]
Assuming arguendo that private complainants were also affected and distressed by the threat made by petitioner
against DDD in brandishing a bolo, such act is still within the ambit of Other Light Threats under Article 285 (1).
Insofar as private complainants are concerned, petitioner committed an act of threatening their mother with a
weapon in a quarrel. As discussed earlier, the present case is only concerned with the threats that affected
private complainants; it should not refer to the threats specifically aimed towards DDD. The criminal complaint for
grave threats against petitioner filed by DDD should be resolved in a separate action.
Thus, for threatening private complainants, petitioner is criminally liable for Other Light Threats under Article 285
of the Revised Penal Code. She must suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of 10 days of arresto menor and
to pay the costs of suit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 15, 2016 Decision and August 12, 2016
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 37239 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that Erlinda
Escolano y Ignacio is GUILTY of Other Light Threats under Article 285 of the Revised Penal Code. She is hereby
sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) days of arresto menor and to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta (Chairperson), Leonen, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur.

February 13, 2019

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on December 10, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme
Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on February 13, 2019 at 10:40
a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V.
 
LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
[1]
 Rollo, pp. 12-35.
[2]
 Id. at 40-59; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Socorro B. Inting.
[3]
 Id. at 61-62.
[4]
 CA rollo, pp. 51-56; penned by Presiding Judge Roslyn M. Rabara-Tria.
[5]
 The city where the crime was committed is blotted to protect the identity of the victim pursuant to Administrative
Circular No. 83-2015 issued on 27 July 2015.
[6]
 The true name of the victim has been replaced with fictitious initials in conformity with Administrative Circular
No. 83-2015 (Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites
of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances). The
confidentiality of the identity of the victim is mandated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act); R.A. No. 8505 (Rape Victim Assistance and
Protection Act of 1998); R.A. No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003); R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004); and R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006).
[7]
 Rollo, pp. 85-86.
[8]
 The complete names and personal circumstances of the victim's family members or relatives, who may be
mentioned in the court's decision or resolution have been replaced with fictitious initials in conformity with
Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 (Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and
Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal
Circumstances).
[9]
 Also referred to as "Ferlin Escolano" which appears in some parts of the records, particulary, in Kontra
Salaysay (Records, p. 128); Testigo (Records, p. 129); Formal Offer of Evidence (Records, pp. 135-136); and
RTC Decision (Records, p. 144).
[10]
 Rollo, p. 42; TSN, September 5, 2011, p. 14; and TSN, October 25, 2011, p. 4.
[11]
 Id. at 44; TSN, November 12, 2012, pp. 12-13.
[12]
 Id. at 89-90.
[13]
 Records, p. 27.
[14]
 Rollo, p. 57.
[15]
 Id. at 59.
[16]
 Id. at 20.
[17]
 Id.
[18]
 Id. at 27.
[19]
 Id. at 24-25.
[20]
 Id. at 127-132.
[21]
 Id. at 129.
[22]
 Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, et al., 750 Phil. 846, 854-855 (2015).
[23]
 Carbonell v. Carbonell-Mendes, 762 Phil. 529, 537 (2015).
[24]
 Section 3(b), Article I, Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,
Republic Act No. 7610, June 17, 1992.
[25]
 Jabalde v. People, 787 Phil. 255, 269-270 (2016), citing Black's Law Dictionary 430 (8th ed. 2004) and
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 599 (1986).
[26]
 Under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, the offender shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor  in its minimum
period; while under the RPC, if the offender commits slight physical injuries or other light threats, he shall suffer
the penalty of arresto menor.
[27]
 707 Phil. 11 (2013).
[28]
 See Id. at 21.
[29]
 Supra note 25.
[30]
 See Id. at 271.
[31]
 G.R. No. 217764, August 7, 2017.
[32]
 Jabalde v. People, supra note 25, at 269-270.
[33]
 TSN, November 12, 2012, pp. 11-14.
[34]
 TSN, September 5, 2011, p. 15.
[35]
 Pader v. People, 381 Phil. 932, 936 (2000), citing Reyes v. People, 131 Phil. 112, 120 (1969).
[36]
 Rollo, p. 50.
[37]
 Id. at 57.
[38]
 Caluag v. People, 599 Phil. 717, 727 (2009).
[39]
 Id. at 728.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 250671, October 07, 2020 ]

LINA TALOCOD, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

 DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated July 30, 2019 and the
Resolution3 dated November 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 40871,
which affirmed the Decision4 dated October 6, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court
of ██████████ (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 1169-V-12 finding petitioner Lina Talocod
(petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7610,5 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information6 dated October 23, 2012 filed before the RTC accusing
petitioner of committing acts of child abuse, defined and penalized under Section 10 (a), Article
VI of RA 7610, the accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about November 5, 2011, in ██████████   and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully committed
(sic) acts of child abuse against one [AAA], 11 years old (DOB: September 9, 2000), by uttering
the following words "Huwag Mong Pansinin Yan. At Putang Ina Yan (while angrily pointing her
finger at him)...Mga Walang Kwenta Yan, Mana-Mana Lang Yan!", thereby subjecting said minor
to psychological abuse, cruelty and emotional maltreatment prejudicial to his natural
development.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7 (Emphasis in the original)

The prosecution alleged that, in the morning of November 5, 2011, AAA,8 an 11-year old with
other children along the road near his residence in ██████████. As his playmates were
bothering passing motorists by throwing sand and gravel on the road, AAA berated and told them
to stop. Upset by AAA's reprimand, one of the children, EEE, reported the incident to her mother,
herein petitioner.  Together with EEE, petitioner immediately confronted AAA about his behavior,
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

and while pointing a finger at the latter, furiously shouted: "Huwag mong pansinin yan. At putang
ina yan. Mga walang kwenta yan. Mana-mana lang yan!" Upset by what petitioner said, AAA ran
home and cried, later relaying the incident to his mother, BBB. Allegedly, AAA was traumatized
as a result of petitioner's utterance of harsh words and expletives, since after the purported
incident, he no longer went out to play with other children and started to suffer from nightmares.9

In defense, petitioner claimed that the words she actually uttered were: "anak wag mo na patulan
yan walang kwenta makipag-away," and that the same were addressed to EEE, not to AAA.10

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision11 dated October 6, 2017, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. The RTC also ordered petitioner to pay AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as moral
damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of its
decision until full payment.12 The trial court ruled that the prosecution had successfully
established all the elements of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, as it was shown that
petitioner's harsh words and expletives caused AAA, an 11-year old child, to suffer from
nightmares and compulsive fear.13
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing that she should be acquitted on account of: (a)
her lack of specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA
as a human being, as the words she allegedly uttered were mere expressions of common usage;
and (b) the absence of evidence showing that AAA suffered psychological injury, since an expert
witness was not presented in court.14

The CA Ruling

In a Decision15 dated July 30, 2019, the CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner in toto.16 The

CA ruled that petitioner's utterance of harsh words and expletives at AAA, while simultaneously
pointing a finger at him, were indicative of an intent to debase, degrade, or demean the latter's
intrinsic worth and dignity as a child. In any case, the CA found petitioner's intent immaterial,
observing that the crime of Child Abuse under Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610 is
considered malum prohibitum and thus, mere acts or words which debase, degrade, or demean
a minor were already constitutive of the offense. Moreover, it found the presentation of an expert
witness to prove the existence of psychological injury unnecessary, holding that such element
had been sufficiently established by the testimony of AAA himself.17

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,18 which was denied in a Resolution19 dated

November 28, 2019.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming
petitioner's conviction for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment, whether they are assigned or unassigned.20 The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine the
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision
of the penal law.21 Guided by the foregoing considerations, and as will be explained hereunder,
the Court finds that the acquittal of petitioner for the crime charged is in order.

It is well to point out that the enactment of RA 7610 "was meant to advance the state policy of
affording 'special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation[,]
discrimination[,] and other conditions prejudicial to their development' and in such regard,
'provide sanctions for their commission.' It also furthers the 'best interests of children' and as
such, its provisions are guided by this standard."22 The term "child abuse" is defined under
Section 3 (b), Article I of the same law, as follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms.-

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
any of the following:
 (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

RA 7610 defines and penalizes various acts constituting child abuse as defined in the
aforementioned provision. It further provides a "catch-all" provision which penalizes other acts of
child abuse not specifically addressed by the law, particularly Section 10 (a), Article VI23 thereof,
to wit:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial
to the Child's Development. -

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, case law qualifies that for one to be held criminally liable for the commission of acts of
Child Abuse under Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, "the prosecution [must] prove a specific
intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child; otherwise, the accused
cannot be convicted [for the said offense]."24 The foregoing requirement was first established in
the case of Bongalon v. People25 (Bongalon), where it was held that the laying of hands against
a child, when done in the spur of the moment and in anger, cannot be deemed as an act of child
abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610, absent the essential element of intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being on the part of
the offender, viz.:

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. x x x

xxxx

x x x The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson
had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or
that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying
of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his
being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his
self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child
abuse.26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Bongalon ruling was then reiterated and applied in the subsequent cases of Jabalde v.
People27 and Calaoagan v. People,28 wherein the Court emphasized that "when the infliction of
physical injuries against a minor is done at the spur of the moment, it is imperative (or the
prosecution to prove a specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the
child x x x."29 "Debasement is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of
something; degradation, on the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character or
quality; while demean means to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character."30 "[Such]
intention x x x can be inferred from the manner in which [the offender] committed the act
complained of[,]"31 as when the offender's use of force against the child was calculated, violent,
excessive, or done without any provocation.32

While the aforementioned cases pertain to the commission of child abuse by physical deeds, i.e.,
the laying of hands against a child, the same treatment has also been extended to the utterance
of harsh words, invectives, or expletives against minors. In Escolano v. People,33 G.R. No.
226991, December 10, 2018. which involved facts similar to the instant case,34 The accused
there in shouted the phrase "[p]utang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-aralan, wala
kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa
aso ko" at children. (See id.) the Court held that the mere shouting of invectives at a child,
when carelessly done out of anger, frustration, or annoyance, does not constitute Child Abuse
under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610, absent evidence that the utterance of such words
were specifically intended to debase, degrade. or demean the victim's intrinsic worth and dignity,
to wit:

[T]he Court finds that the act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private complainants
does not constitute child abuse under the foregoing provisions of R.A. No. 7610 Petitioner had no
intention to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was rather an act
carelessly done out of anger. The circumstances surrounding the incident proved that petitioner's
act of uttering invectives against the minors AAA, BBB, and CCC was done in the heat of anger.

x x x Evidently, petitioner's statements "bobo, walang utak, putang ina" and the threat to
"ipahabol" and "ipakagat sa aso" were all said out of frustration or annoyance. Petitioner merely
intended that the children stop their unruly behavior.

On the other hand, the prosecution failed to present any iota of evidence to prove petitioner's
intention to debase, degrade or demean the child victims. The record does not show that
petitioner's act of threatening the private complainants was intended to place the latter in an
embarrassing and shameful situation before the public. There was no indication that petitioner
had any specific intent to humiliate AAA, BBB, and CCC; her threats resulted from the private
complainants' vexation.35 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that petitioner's utterance of the
phrase: "Huwag mong pansinin yan. At putang ina yan. Mga walang kwenta yan. Mana-mana
lang yan!" was specifically intended to debase, degrade, or demean AAA's intrinsic worth and
dignity as a human being. To the contrary, it appears that petitioner's harsh utterances were
brought about by the spur of the moment, particularly, out of her anger and annoyance at AAA's
reprimand of EEE. This may be gathered from the testimony of the victim himself on direct and
cross-examination, where it was recounted that:

Direct Examination

[Atty. Arthur Coroza]: Now, on November 5, 2011 in the morning, do you recall where were you?

[AAA]: I was outside and we were playing with my friends.

Q: Please tell us the names of your friends.

A: x x x, [EEE].

xxxx

Q: Now, while play in g with [EEE] and [another friend], do you recall if anything happened?

A: [EEE] and [another friend] were playing with gravel and sand and they were scattering it, so I
just berated them (pinagsabihan ko sila).

xxxx

Q: Then after that what happened, Mr. Witness?

A: [EEE] told the incident to [his] mother.

Q: And who is the mother?

A: Lina Talocod.

Q: Then after that what happened, Mr. Witness?

A: She told me ["]wag nyong pansinin yan, walang kwenta yan, mga putang-ina yan, mana-mana
lang yan.["]

Q: Who told you that?

A: Lina Talocod.

xxxx

Q: x x x Now, what did you notice on Lina Talocod when she uttered those words?

A: She was very angry.36

Cross-Examination

[Atty. Ma. Cristina Favis]: On November 5, 2011 how old were you?

[AAA]: 11 years old, ma'am.

Q: And you were then playing with 3 children, am I right?

A: Yes, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: You mentioned that you reprimanded them for playing [with] the gravel and sand? How did
you reprimand them?

A: I was telling them not to scatter the gravel and sand because it was scattered on the road. Ꮮαwρhi ৷

Q: You testified that [EEE] went to his mother to tell her that you reprimanded them, is that
correct?
A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Could you demonstrate how you reprimanded them?

A:1 just did a "simpleng pasaway."

Q: But [EEE] was offended at that time?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Aside from the 4 of you playing at the time who were the persons present?

A: The mother of [EEE].

xxxx

Q: How long did it take for Lina Talocod to confront you?

A: Right after [EEE] told his mother.

Q: Am I correct to say that Lina Talocod confronted you immediately after [EEE] ran to her?

A: Yes. ma'am.

Q: And what did Lina Talocod tell you?

A: She cursed me "Putang-Ina Mo" and she was very angry and told me, "nagmana daw talaga
ako sa magulang ko."

Q: Didn't she say "Huwag mong pansinin 'yan, Putang-Ina 'yan. Mga walang kuwenta 'yan,
Manamana lang 'yan."? Is that what she told you exactly?

A: Yes, ma'am and she was very angry.37

Verily, based on the foregoing narration, there appears no indication that petitioner deliberately
intended to shame or humiliate AAA's dignity in front of his playmates. On the contrary, it is
rather apparent that petitioner merely voiced the alleged utterances as offhand remarks out of
parental concern for her child. Hence, in view of the absence of a specific intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the victim's intrinsic worth and dignity in this case, the Court finds that
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable for committing acts of Child Abuse under Section 10
(a), Article VI of RA 7610.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 30, 2019 and the Resolution
dated November 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40871 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Lina Talocod is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Hernando, Inting, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.

Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.

Footnotes

1 Dated January 17, 2020. Rollo, pp. 10-23.

2 Id. at 30-49. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos with Associate
Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring.

3 Id. at 52-54.

4 Id. at 71-77. Penned by Judge Nancy Rivas-Palmones.

5 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL

PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992.

6 Records, p. 1.

7 Id.

8 The identity of the minor victim or any information which could establish or compromise
his identity, as well as those of his immediate family or household members, shall be
withheld pursuant to RA 7610; RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-
11-SC, otherwise known as the "RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN" (November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil.
576, 578 2014, citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 2013. See also Amended
Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN
THE PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF
DECISIONS, FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS
NAMES/PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017.) See
further People v. Ejercito, G.R. No. 229861, July 2, 2018.

9 See rollo, pp. 31-33. See also id. at 72-74.

10 See id. at 33. See also id. at 74-75.

11 Id. at 71-77.

12 Id. at 77.

13 Id. at 76-77.

14 See Brief of the Accused-Appellant dated January 21, 2019; id. at 55-70.

15 Id. at 30-49.

16 Id. at 48.

17 See id. at 36-48.

18 See motion for reconsideration dated August 23, 2019; id. at 99-103.

19 Id. at 52-54.

20 See People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 225 (2015).

21 People v. Comboy, 782 Phil. 187, 196 (2016).

22 Caballo v. People, 71 0 Phil. 792, 801-802 (2013).

23  Section 10 (a) of R A 7610 punishes "four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child
cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the
child's development." (Araneta v. People, 578 Phil. 876, 885 [2008]; emphasis supplied.)

24 Calaoagan v. People, G.R. No. 222974, March 20, 2019.

25 707 Phil. 11 (2013).

26 Id. at 14 and 20-21.

27 787 Phil. 255 (2016).

28 Supra note 24.

29 See id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

30 See id., citing Jabalde v. People, supra note 27 at 270.

31 Torres v. People, 803 Phil. 480, 490-491 (2017).

32 See Torres v. People, id.; Rosaldes v. People, 745 Phil. 77 (2014); and De Vega v.

People, G.R. No. 240476, October 3, 2018.

33 G.R. No. 226991, December 10, 2018.

34 The accused there in shouted the phrase "[p]utang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong
pinag-aralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko ang aso
ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko" at children. (See id.)

35 See id.

36 TSN, June 7, 2013, pp. 12-16.

37 TSN, April 4, 2014, pp. 3-4.

 THIRD DIVISION

January 7, 2019

G.R. No. 235071

EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision   dated July 13, 2017 and the Resolution  dated September
1 2

25, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 37385 which affirmed with modification
the Decision  dated November 19, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
3

163, Taguig City Station, finding Evangeline Patulot y Galia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) charges of child abuse.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

In two (2) separate Informations, Patulot was charged with child abuse, defined and penalized
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,  the accusatory portions of which read:
4

(Criminal Case No. 149971)

That on or about the 14th day of November 2012, in the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously commit acts of child abuse upon one AAA,  a three (3) year old minor,
5

by throwing on him a boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which
acts are inimical and prejudicial to the child's normal growth and development.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(Criminal Case No. 149972)

That on or about the 14th day of November 2012, in the City of Taguig, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of child abuse upon one BBB, a two (2) month old baby,
by throwing on her a boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which
acts are inimical and prejudicial to the child's normal growth and development. CONTRARY TO
LAW. 6
During arraignment, Patulot, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued wherein the prosecution presented CCC, mother of
minors AAA and BBB, three (3) years old and two (2) months old, respectively; DDD, father of
the minors; and Dr. Francis Jerome Vitales as its witnesses and offered documentary
evidence   to establish the following facts:
7

At around 2:00 p.m. of November 14, 2012, CCC gathered clothes from the clothesline outside
her house. As she was about to enter the house, she was surprised to see Patulot who was
holding a casserole. Without warning, Patulot poured the contents of the casserole - hot cooking
oil - on her. CCC tried to dodge, but to no avail. AAA and BBB, who were nearby, suddenly cried
because they were likewise hit by the hot cooking oil. CCC hurriedly brought AAA and BBB to
her three neighbors who volunteered to bring the children to the Polyclinic at South Signal,
Taguig City, for treatment. She then went to the barangay hall also at South Signal, Taguig City,
to report the incident. Accompanied by barangay personnel, she went to Patulot's house, but
Patulot was not there. She instead returned to her children at the Polyclinic. While there, she
learned from a neighbor that Patulot had been arrested. Consequently, having been assured that
her children were all right and that medication had already been given, they returned to the
barangay hall, where DDD met them. At the barangay hall, CCC noticed that her children were
shivering. Thus, she asked her neighbors to bring them to Pateros-Taguig District Hospital while
she stayed behind to give her statement. Afterwards, she proceeded to the hospital where she
was likewise treated for injuries. While she and BBB were able to go home, AAA needed to be
confined but was discharged the next morning. Before going home, however, CCC proceeded to
the Taguig Police Station where she executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay.  Subsequently, Dr.
8

Vitales of the Pateros-Taguig District Hospital, who examined and treated CCC and her children,
testified that the injuries suffered by AAA and BBB would heal for an average period of thirty (30)
days. Next, DDD testified that he incurred ₱7,440.00 in medical expenses for his wife and
children.
9

Solely testifying in her defense, Patulot denied the allegations against her. She recounted that
prior to the alleged incident, she was on her way to the market to sell her merchandise when
CCC bumped her on the arm, uttering foul words against her. Due to the impact, Patulot's
merchandise fell. Because of this, she cursed CCC back who, in turn, merely laughed and
repeated the invectives as she moved away. Then, from 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. on November
14, 2012, she was repacking black pepper at her house when she heard CCC taunt her in a loud
voice, "Bakit hindi ka pa sumama sa asawa mo? Dapat sumama ka na para pareha kayong
paglamayan." Because of this, Patulot proceeded to Barangay Central Signal, Taguig City, to file
a complaint against CCC, but she was ignored. So she went instead to the Barangay South
Signal, Taguig City. But upon reaching said location, she was apprehended by the Barangay
Tanod and brought to the Barangay Hall of South Signal, Taguig City for questioning.  10

On November 19, 2014, the RTC found Patulot guilty of child abuse and disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. 149971, the Court finds accused Evangeline Patulot y Galia GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven
(7) years and four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum. Accused is further ordered to pay
the offended party the amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (₱3,702), as
actual damages, and Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l 0,000) by way of moral damages;

2) In Criminal Case No. 149972, the Court finds accused Evangeline Patulot y Galia GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to seven
(7) years and four (4) months of pris[i]on mayor, as maximum. Accused is fm1her ordered to pay
the offended party the amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (₱3,702), as
actual damages, and Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l 0,000) by way of moral damages; and

3) Finally, accused is ordered to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000) in each case,
conformably with section 31 (f) of R.A. 7610.

SO ORDERED.   (Italics supplied.)

11

The RTC found that while Patulot may not have intended to cause harm on AAA and BBB, her
negligence nonetheless caused injury on them, which left visible scars that are most likely to stay
on their faces and bodies for the rest of their lives. Besides, the trial court added that R.A. No.
7610 is a special law such that intent is not necessary for its violator to be liable. 
12

In a Decision dated July 13, 2017, the CA affirmed Patulot's conviction, but modified the penalty
imposed by the RTC in the following wise:

WHEREFORE, the 19 November 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
163 (Taguig City Station) is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that:

1) in Criminal Case No. 149971, Evangeline Patulot y Galia is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of  prision
correccional, as minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as
maximum; and

2) in Criminal Case No. 149972, Evangeline Patulot y Galia is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of  prision
correccional, as minimum[,] to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.   (Italics supplied, underscoring in the original.)

13

According to the appellate court, there was no reason to deviate from the trial court's findings of
guilt for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and their
deportment on the witness stand. It, however, ruled that the RTC was amiss in finding it
unnecessary to determine intent merely because the act for which Patulot stood charged is
punishable by a special law. The CA clarified that the index of whether a crime is malum
prohibitum is not its form, that is, whether or not it is found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or
in a special penal statute, but the legislative intent. Nevertheless, this reasoning still cannot help
Patulot's case because even if she did not intend on inflicting harm on the children, there was still
intent to harm CCC. Thus, criminal liability is incurred although the wrongful act done be different
from that which Patulot intended. For the same reason, the mitigating circumstance of "no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" cannot be appreciated in Patulot's favor.
Thus, Patulot must still be held guilty of the offense charged. 14

Aggrieved by the CA's denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Patulot filed the instant petition
on January 4, 2018, invoking the following arguments:

I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S

CONVICTION OF VIOLATING SEC. 10(A) R.A. 7610 DESPITE THE FACT THAT SHE HAD NO
INTENT TO DEGRADE AND DEMEAN THE INTRINSIC WORTH AND DIGNITY OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S CHILDREN.

II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY ARTICLE 49
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WITH REGARD TO THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY.  15

According to Patulot, she can only be convicted of physical injuries and not child abuse. Citing
our pronouncement in Bongalon v. People,   she submits that not every instance of laying hands
16

on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when
the laying of hands is shown to be intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the RPC. Thus, in the absence of such intention on the part of Patulot, her true
intention being to pour hot oil only on CCC with AAA and BBB being merely accidentally hit, she
cannot be convicted of child abuse.

Patulot adds that even considering her to have committed child abuse, the CA erred in
determining the imposable penalty for failing to apply Article 49  of the RPC. According to
17

Patulot, there was error in personae as the oil that was intended for CCC accidentally hit the
children. She intended to commit physical injuries, but ended up committing child abuse.
Applying Article 49, since the penalty of the intended crime (physical injuries) is less than the
crime committed (child abuse), the imposable penalty is that which refers to physical injuries, in
its maximum period. As to the extent of the physical injuries intended, based on the finding of Dr.
Vitales that the injuries suffered by AAA and BBB would heal for an average period of thirty (30)
days, the offense Patulot intended to commit is only Less Serious Physical Injuries under the first
paragraph of Article 265  of the RPC. Thus, the proper penalty should only be arresto mayor in
18

its maximum or four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months for each count. 19

We deny the petition.

Under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual
or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) psychological and physical
abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) any act by deeds or words
which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4)
failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of
his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

In conjunction with this, Section 10(a) of the same Act provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.

----

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.  (Italics
1âшphi1

supplied.)

Corollarily, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases defines the term "child abuse" as the infliction of physical or psychological injury,
cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. In turn, the same Section defines
"physical injury" as those that include but are not limited to lacerations, fractured
bones, burns, internal injuries, severe injury or serious bodily harm suffered by a child.

In view of these provisions, the Court, in Araneta v. People,  discussed the distinct acts
20

punishable under R.A. No. 7610, to wit:

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article
59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child
cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's
development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately
defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from
one another and from the act prejudicial to the child's development. Contrary to petitioner's
assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove
that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of
the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former
acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule,
be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child
abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as
petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the
entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.  (Italics supplied,
21

citations omitted.)

It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that when a child is subjected to physical abuse or injury,
the person responsible therefor can be held liable under R.A. No. 7610 by establishing the
essential facts above. Here, the prosecution duly proved the following allegations in the
Information charging Patulot of child abuse: (1) the minority of both AAA and BBB; (2) the acts
committed by Patulot constituting physical abuse against AAA and BBB; and (3) the fact that said
acts are punishable under R.A. No. 7610. In particular, it was clearly established that at the time
of the incident, AAA and BBB were merely three (3) years old and two (2) months old,
respectively; that Patulot consciously poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on CCC,
consequently injuring AAA and BBB; and that said act constitutes physical abuse specified in
Section 3(b)(1) of R.A. No. 7610.

On this score, Patulot contends that on the basis of our pronouncement in Bongalon, she cannot
be convicted of child abuse because it was not proven that she intended to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. Her reliance on said
ruling, however, is misplaced. In Bongalon, the Information specifically charged George
Bongalon, petitioner therein, of committing acts which "are prejudicial to the child's development
and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human being."  Thus, we
22

ruled that he can only be held liable for slight physical injuries instead of child abuse in the
absence of proof that he intended to humiliate or "debase the 'intrinsic worth and dignity"'   of the
23

victim.

A cursory review of the Informations in the instant case, however, reveals no similar allegation
that Patulot's acts debased, degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and
BBB as human beings. Instead, they charged Patulot for willfully committing acts of child abuse
on AAA and BBB "by throwing on [them] a (sic) boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-
minor physical injuries, which acts are inimical and prejudicial to the child's normal growth and
development."  Accordingly, the RTC and the CA duly found that this allegation in the
24

Informations was adequately established by the prosecution. It bears stressing that Patulot did
not even deny the fact that she threw boiling oil on CCC which likewise fell on AAA and BBB.
Clearly, her actuations causing physical injuries on babies, who were merely three (3) years old
and two (2) months old at the time, are undeniably prejudicial to their development. In the words
of the trial court, Patulot's acts, which practically burned the skin of AAA and BBB, left visible
scars that are most likely to stay on their faces and bodies for the rest of their lives. She cannot,
therefore, be allowed to escape liability arising from her actions.1âшphi1
Neither can Patulot argue that in the absence of intention on her part to harm AAA and BBB, she
cannot be convicted of child abuse because she merely intended on committing physical injuries
against CCC. Our pronouncement in Mabunot v. People  is squarely on point. There, petitioner
25

Jester Mabunot accidentally shoved a female minor child consequently fracturing her rib while he
was engaged in a fistfight with another boy. But he points out that the injury sustained by the
minor victim was unintentional. Thus, according to Mabunot, this single and unintended act of
shoving the child while trading punches with another can hardly be considered as within the
definition of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Assuming, therefore, that he was
the cause of the injury, Mabunot insists that he should only be held liable for slight physical
injuries under Section 265 of the RPC. The Court, however, rejected Mabunot's contention and
held him liable not for slight physical injuries, but for child abuse. We explained:

The petitioner also posits that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches then, he could not
have made a deliberate design to injure Shiva. Without intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insists
that he deserves an acquittal.

The foregoing argument is untenable.

"When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they
are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed."

The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special
law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a
criminal intent on the part of the offender.

In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court were to consider for
argument's sake the petitioner's claim that he had no design to harm Shiva, when he swang his
arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He clearly intended to injure another person. However,
it was not Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a fractured rib. Nonetheless, the petitioner
cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.  (Citations omitted.)
26

Similarly, in the instant case, Patulot's criminal intent is not wanting for as she expressly
admitted, she intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC. As such, even granting that it was not
her intention to harm AAA and BBB, she was performing an unlawful act when she threw the hot
oil from her casserole on CCC. She cannot, therefore, escape liability from the same in view of
the settled doctrine mentioned in Mabunot that a person incurs criminal liability although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. As defined in the law, child abuse
charged against Patulot is physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. To
the Court, her act of pouring hot oil on AAA and BBB falls squarely within this definition. Thus, in
view of the fact that her acts were proven to constitute child abuse under the pertinent provisions
of the law, she must be held liable therefor.

Indeed, it cannot be denied that AAA and BBB are children entitled to protection extended by
R.A. No. 7610. Time and again, the Court has stressed that R.A. No. 7610 is a measure geared
towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of the most
vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional
mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "[t]he State shall defend the right of the
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."  This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating
27

crimes committed against children, namely, the RPC and Presidential Decree No. 603 or The
Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence
against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their
commission, and a means by which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.
Also, the definition of child abuse is expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child
abuse under existing laws but includes also "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to the child's development." 28

As regards the penalties imposed by the courts a quo, we find no compelling reason to modify
the same for being within the allowable range. To conform to recent jurisprudence, however, the
Court deems it proper to impose an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the actual
damages in the amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Two Pesos (₱3,702) and moral
damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000), to be computed from the date of the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision

dated July 13, 2017 and Resolution dated September 25, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 37385 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the ₱3,702.00 actual damages
and P10,000.00 moral damages awarded in each Criminal Case No. 149971 and Criminal Case
No. 149972 shall be subject to an interest of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the
finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, Hernando, and Carandang,  JJ., concur.

*

A. Reyes, Jr., J., on leave.

Footnotes

 Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28,
*

2018.

 Rollo, pp. 32-41. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with the concurrence
1

of Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and Maria Filomena D. Singh.

2
 Id. at 53.

3
 Id. at 73-79. Penned by Judge Leili Cruz Suarez.

 An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse,
4

Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes (approved on June l 7, 1992).

5
 The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as
well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant
to R.A. No. 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes"; R.A. No.
9262, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes"; Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children," effective November 5, 2004; People v. Cabalquinto, 533
Phil. 703, 709 (2006); and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated
September 5, 2017, Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication,
and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using
Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.
6
 Rollo, pp. 32-33.

 Id. at 33. Salaysay of CCC; Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-aresto; Certificates of Live

7

Birth of BBB and AAA; Medico-Legal Certificate of CCC, BBB, and AAA; photographs of
BBB and AAA; and medical receipts (cited in the CA Decision).

8
 Id. at 33-34.

9
 Id. at 34.

10
 Id. at 34-35.

11
 Id. at 79.

12
 Id. at 78.

13
 Id. at 40-41.

14
 Id. at 38-40.

15
 Id. at 19.

16
 707 Phil. 11 (2013).

17
 Article 49 of the RPC provides:

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is
different from that intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different
from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be
observed:

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that
corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty
corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that
corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for
the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.

3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if
the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or
frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the
latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the
frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.

 Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. - Any person who shall inflict upon another
18

physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the
same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor. (Italics supplied.)

19
 Rollo, pp. 19-24.

20
 578 Phil. 876 (2008).
  Id. at 333-335.
21

 Bongalon v. People, supra note 16, at 15.

22

 Id at 20.
23

 Rollo, pp. 32-33.
24

 795 Phil. 453 (2016).

25

 Id. at 463-464.
26

 Torres v. People, 803 Phil. 480, 490, citing Araneta v. People, supra note 20.

27

 Araneta v. People, id. at 884.

28

 Mabunot v. People, supra note 25.

29