4 Do young people still need democracy in Poland?

Introduction
Poland boasts a long democratic tradition. It was one of the first countries in the world to adopt a constitution which was
enacted in 1791. In the 20th century, the “Solidarity” pro-independence movement emerged in Poland after 40 years of
dependence on the Soviet Union. The movement spread to other Eastern Bloc countries and led to the independence of states
in Central-Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Soviet satellite states began to build a democratic
system of governance and a free market. In the first period of transformation, Poles focused primarily on improving their
livelihoods. As democracy took root, however, their interest in public affairs and involvement in community life gradually
increased. Consequently, at the beginning of the 21st century, Poland became a model democracy with a thriving economy
emerging from the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 relatively unscathed. After 20 years of the liberal-left rule, a conserva-
tive, right-wing party took power in the democratic election of 2016.
Changes initiated by the new ruling party have covered many areas of political, social and economic life,
including education. A strong emphasis has been placed on national and religious content in the new curricula.
Civic education goals and policies have been modified. The state of democracy in Poland has been gradually
declining in international rankings ever since. These issues and their consequences for Poland’s democracy will
be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
Between two superpowers – historical, geographic and cultural context with a focus on citizenship
Poland is situated in the center of Europe. Its social characteristics and history are briefly presented below to shed
some light on the key factors that shape Poles’ attitudes and civic behavior.
Poland is the sixth largest (312,000 km2) and the fifth most populous (around 38 million) country in the
European Union. The size of the Polish economy in terms of GDP ranks 25th in the world and 5th in the EU. In
social terms, the country is uniquely monocultural, with 97% of its citizens 56 Beata Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz
 claiming Polish nationality and 94% declaring Catholic church membership (Census, 2011). This medium-sized, yet
economically significant, country had once been a multicultural power that lost and regained its statehood several times
over the course of centuries. Poland’s civic education and attitudes toward its own nation have been shaped by this
tumultuous experience.
Poland belongs to the Western (Latin) civilization. Both its legal system and culture, including the alphabet, are rooted in
the Roman law and the legacy of the Catholic Church. Geographically, Poland’s neighbors are two superpowers, Russia and
Germany, which have greatly influenced its history and set the foundations for Polish attitudes toward statehood. Poland was
a superpower state throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, particularly between the 16th and 18th centuries. Bound
by a union treaty with Lithuania, the Polish state covered the present-day territory of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus,
stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Democratic structures were in place during this period, with an established
parliament (the Sejm/the Diet), and an elected king. In practice, however, democratic processes were limited to one social
group, namely the nobility.
In 1791, Poland was one of the first countries in the world to adopt a constitution. At that time, the Catholic Church played
a significant role in governance, where even small town parishes laid down the law (for example, by registering births and
marriages) and shaped a common worldview. Internal conflicts within the aristocracy and the church corroded the state, and
led to three successive partitions which in the 18th century divided the country between three neighboring powers: Russia,
Germany and Austria-Hungary (Davies, 2005a). Poland disappeared from the map of the world for more than a century.
During this period, however, national identity was nurtured in literature, art and culture, and was preserved in storytelling,
songs and myths. These served to glorify Polish nationality, cultivate an image of a country that was a “Christ of Nations”, a
country that sacrificed its freedom to redeem all oppressed and enslaved nations.
Poland regained its independence after World War I. During the brief 20-year interwar period of sovereignty, Poland
rebuilt state structures, but it also experienced internal conflicts, power struggles and the emergence of deeply
entrenched xenophobic attitudes toward national minorities, mainly Jews (Davies, 2005b). Polish statehood was once
again destroyed at the end of World War II. Unlike many other countries, however, Poland created an underground state
responsible for education, the judiciary and the armed forces. Many Poles joined the Soviet and Allied war efforts.
After World War II, Poland fell under the political influence of the Soviet Union. Despite its formal
independence, Poland was reduced to being a puppet state with only a semblance of democratic legitimacy. Power
was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party which exerted control over the media, education and the
running of a centralized economy. Civil Do young people still need democracy in Poland? 57
 liberties were severely restricted during this period. Literature and cinematography were censored to ensure that they
promoted only state ideology. Access to foreign press was limited. Only Eastern Bloc newspapers or Western magazines
sympathetic to communism were distributed. Foreign travel was strictly controlled by the state; citizens needed a permit
to cross state borders, and their passports were requisitioned upon return to Poland. Economic cooperation with foreign
partners had to be approved by the state authorities. Private ownership was limited to farms, small trade or small
manufacturing businesses and services.
Despite these restrictions, there was an underground surge of patriotism within society, pushing for democracy
and liberation from Soviet control. Free market activity, mostly small-scale production and trade that were
sometimes confined to the black market, also flourished.
These undercurrents fueled the emergence of the pro-independence democratic “Solidarity” movement which
brought together intellectuals and workers. The movement spread to the Eastern Bloc countries and led to democratic
revolutions in eight Central-Eastern European states. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Soviet satellite states
regained their independence and began to build a democratic system of governance and a free market.
Poland has been a democratic country since 1989, but its history exerted a considerable influence on
contemporary civic attitudes. These attitudes are best characterized by four parameters.
The first parameter encompasses Polish attitudes toward freedom and democracy. For many decades, Poland was not
a sovereign state, and illegal support for freedom and independence taught Poles to cherish these values. Most Poles
identified with the grassroots “Solidarity” movement which aimed to restore democracy. At the same time, the
movement embodied the importance of democratic values for all social groups.
The second characteristic involved attitudes toward nationality and nationhood. The long underground struggle to
restore statehood fueled a sense of national identity that was embellished with a sense of pride and uniqueness. Polish
patriotism and readiness to defend the country remained strong, and they were reinforced through cinematography and
literature. Literature and history curricula in Polish schools placed a strong emphasis on national affairs and the fight
for independence.
The third factor is the Catholic Church which has always enjoyed a strong standing in the country. Historically, the
Church was regarded as Poland’s touchstone for Western culture and statehood. Despite the above, during the partitions
of Poland, the church, as an institution, was a hotbed of dissent and served as a hub for illegal national movements
targeting the partitioning powers and, later, the communist authorities. It also supported the activities of workers and
intellectuals. In communist times, the Church was synonymous with progress and freedom (Michnik, 2009).
The fourth parameter is entrepreneurship and attitudes toward statehood. Centuries of serfdom and the
subsequent collapse of statehood had instilled 58 Beata Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz
 a unique attitude toward authority. On the one hand, Poles’ relationships with the authorities were based on
superficial and formal subjugation, but on the other, illegal underground activities were undertaken to circumvent
the law. Decades-long restrictions on freedom generated attitudes that are best epitomized by the statement: “put
your interests first and take matters into your own hands”. For this reason, any attempts to circumvent the law
(dodge fines or evade taxes) are still regarded as an expression of cleverness and entrepreneurship. The way Poles
adapted to the free market and set about building democracy after regaining independence in 1989 have been
greatly influenced by this legacy. These circumstances also reflected on how the next generations, today’s youth
and young adults, were raised as future citizens (Leder, 2014).
Current and political contexts – main challenges for citizenship
Poland broke away from Soviet influence in 1989, and the Polish government was presented with similar challenges to those
faced by the other Eastern Bloc countries. The priority task was to create democratic structures and procedures. The
introduction of substantive citizenship, assuming responsibility for the common good, respecting the state and the law, pro-
moting non-governmental organizations, and self-governance were equally important, albeit more difficult challenges.
Education was regarded as the solution to filling the civic void. At the time, only 11% of Poles had a university degree, and
the educational system was reformed to create more equal access to higher education (Federowicz & Sitek, 2011). The reform
marked the beginning of Poland’s educational boom. This process was characterized by meritocratic trends and a long-standing
belief that education was a ticket to a better life ( Domalewski & Mikiewicz, 2004). The opening of Poland’s foreign and
economic policy helped fast-track the careers of many young and educated people. Family businesses and small enterprises
flourished.
In the first period of political and economic transformation, Poles focused primarily on improving their
livelihoods. From a societal point of view, this resulted in anomie and exclusion from public life (Grzelak, 2005;
Krzemiński, 2005). The society became wealthier, and the interest in public affairs and community involvement
increased as democracy took root. Modified school curricula promoting civic education also contributed to the
process. In consequence, at the beginning of the 21st century, Poland was a model democracy with a thriving
economy that helped it to emerge relatively unscathed even from the global financial crisis of 2008–2009.
Economic indicators showed steady growth (the GDP increased by 3.9% in 2009/2010 and by 4.3% in 2010/2011
(The World Bank, 2021). Purchasing power parity increased from USD 444.959 billion in 2000 to USD 801.599
billion in 2010 (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Poland emerged as a “green island of growth” on the
economic map of Europe (Gradzewicz, Growiec, Kolasa, Postek & Strzelecki, 2018, p. 21).Do young people still
need democracy in Poland? 59
 This success, however, came at a high social cost that created a favorable breeding ground for populist ideologies. A
combination of global trends and local conditions contributed to the above. One of them was the increase in the number of
university graduates on the labor market who could no longer hope for a stable and secure future. Graduate unemployment
soared throughout Europe (Global Employment Trends for Youth, 2010), which intensified frustration in the younger
generation. Economic transformation had created numerous opportunities for the rapid accumulation of wealth. While the
financial situation of most Poles had improved, increasing economic stratification heightened the general feeling of injustice.
These problems were exacerbated by the economic crisis of 2008/2009 which limited the opportunities for growth and career
development by blocking promotions and raises. Young people found it increasingly difficult to transition to independent
adulthood because they were unable to purchase property and leave their family homes.
The migration crisis of 2017 fueled these concerns. Migrants were perceived as competitors in the domestic labor market
that had been already destabilized by difficult economic conditions. Xenophobic attitudes (rooted and supported by the
government after World War II) intensified, and so did the idealization of the nation. The conservative opposition showered
criticism on liberal democratic rule. The conservative party relied on populist slogans that resonated with precarious audiences:
the lib-dems’ disconnection from reality, lack of concern and disregard for ordinary citizens, or living at their expense.
Conservatives continually pushed the belief that the Polish socio-economic system was unjust, income disparities were
illegitimate and the politicians were incompetent ( Skarżyńska, 2018).
Adverse global social trends, the economic crisis and dissatisfaction with the new socio-economic order that was largely
regarded as unfair spurred a general feeling of insecurity. This, in turn, prompted the search for safety and stability. Various
trends and movements focusing on the search for peace and serenity have emerged in Poland. The popularity of “detox” type
leisure activities (yoga, meditation, secluded holidays) has increased in the personal realm. A sense of homeliness and the
promotion of Polishness, including traditional cuisine, classic films and national symbols that adorn even swimsuits or
raincoats, were revived in the social dimension. This focus on “nativeness” has led to a revival of national traditions and
customs which promote conservative values (obedience, modesty, respect for authority) and the importance of society over
the individual (loyalty, helpfulness and solidarity) ( Skarżyńska & Radkiewicz, 2018). These values have been reinforced
by the church in its plight to reinstate traditional gender roles and promote distrust toward foreigners.
The victory of the Conservative-Christian party in the parliamentary elections of 2016 ended the 20-year rule
of the liberal-left. The new government adopted an authoritarian ruling style, and it continues to undertake active
measures to control the media and the judiciary (Supreme Court and Constitutional Court), limit the sovereignty
of local governments and 60 Beata Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz
 NGOs, and centralize power (Natanek, 2020). Since 2016, Poland’s democratic status has been declining steadily in
international rankings (Democracy Index, 2019; V-Dem Report by Lührmann et al., 2018, 2019). Despite the above,
43% of Poles continued to support the extreme right-wing camp which scored a victory in the 2019 parliamentary
elections (National Election Commission, 2019). At present, the support for the ruling party remains strong at 30–
40%.
During the five years of Conservative-Christian rule, communitarian and conservative values have been
systematically reinforced in the public arena by state propaganda in the media and the education system.
Current priorities in education for citizenship
For decades, the Polish educational system remained under the strong influence of the government that influenced the content
of school curricula and promoted the worship of national heroes who conformed to the ruling party’s agenda (Śliwerski,
2015). During the socialist era, Polish schools followed a national curriculum, including a mandatory reading list. Teachers
were unable to choose or modify educational content. Similar restrictions were placed on civic education which, in additional
to imparting actual knowledge, was an instrument of political indoctrination. Despite the above, civic education also promoted
social engagement, mutual support and community involvement. Considerable emphasis was placed on preparing young
people for participation in state and political ceremonies.
The democratic transformation of 1989 also reformed the Polish educational system (Zahorska, 2009). The system was
reorganized, new teaching content was introduced and two main objectives were formulated. The first one was to promote a
critical approach in teaching by incorporating various points of view in academic discussions that had been strictly regulated
by the political ideology (such as national uprisings), debunking the myths surrounding national heroes by showing a range of
motives behind their actions, or uncovering inconvenient truths that had been whitewashed to foster national pride, such as the
discrimination of national minorities, including Jews. The second objective was to increase the autonomy of teachers by
enabling them to choose educational content and methods of instruction.
The citizenship education curriculum was also reformed. The subject was introduced at all three levels of
education: primary, lower secondary and higher secondary. Polish students were taught to work in project mode
and collaborate with NGOs. Citizenship education was placed on the list of subjects for the matriculation exam,
and its main goal was to convey knowledge about the state, political system, structure of power and civic duties.
Teachers placed greater emphasis on the civic rather than the citizenship component of education to best prepare
the students for the final exams (Rymsza, 2009). Consequently, young Poles acquired substantial knowledge
relative to Do young people still need democracy in Poland? 61
 students in other countries, but they were not well prepared to participate in social life (Koseła, 2004).
As mentioned earlier, the victory of the right-wing national-conservative party in the parliamentary elections of 2016 led to
unprecedented changes in many areas of political, social and economic life. The reform of the educational system, including formal
and informal civic education, was one of these changes. Despite the government’s ardent claims that the overarching idea of education
is to create schools that are free of ideology and constitute a public good, these declarations have very little in common with d aily
school practice. Nationalist content, a Polish-centered perspective and national pride are strongly emphasized in the new core curricula
(Regulation of the Minister of National Education, 2017). According to the experts of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN), the
promoted teaching methods foster passive attitudes with no room for discussion or debate. In the core curriculum, the word <respect>
appears 51 times, usually in relation to respect for others, traditions, symbols, material goods and nature, but <courage> ap pears only
twice and <opposition> not even once. The term <disagree with opinions> can be found four times, and the term <resist> refers only
to the resistance of water or an electrical conductor. Children learn to write an apology, but not a complaint (Gazeta Prawna, 2019).
As regards the school culture, the promotion of civic attitudes, which have been reduced to patriotic attitudes, became an important
element of the ruling party’s program (Law and Justice Program, 2019). According to the authors of the ruling party’s political
program, “an appropriately selected reading list and curriculum content have not only educational and intellectual value, but they
strengthen the common cultural code and build a bridge between generations. Respect for tradition and national heroes, and ce lebrating
national holidays will be an important part the young generation’s education” (Law and Justice Program, 2019, p. 134). The experts
of the PAN claim that the current core curriculum clearly imposes only one “correct” interpretation of the world, and in this respect,
the present pedagogical approach does not differ significantly from that in the communist era.
To summarize the socio-political situation in Poland, recent political changes have paved the road to a hybrid
authoritarian regime. Admittedly, these processes are embedded within a democratic system which has a parlia-
ment, a senate and free elections. However, the government has taken visible steps to restrict democratic freedoms
by creating a ruling elite, taking control over the public media to boost one-sided propaganda, and stifling indepen-
dent media. In the course of just one year, between 2017 and 2018, Poland’s score plunged in three leading
democracy indices: (1) the Electoral Democracy Index (in particular: freedom of association), (2) the Liberal
Component Index (in particular: equality before the law and individual liberty) and (3) the Deliberative
Component Index (in particular: reasoned justification) (see: Lührmann, et al., 2018, pp. 71–94). The extent to
which 62 Beata Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz
 Poland’s democratic slide has been recognized by the young generation (people aged 18–26) and whether these
changes have influenced civic activity pose interesting research problems. Attempts were made to answer the
following three questions based on the results of a survey conducted in 2019–2020:

1) Do young people observe changes in the status of democracy in Poland and to what extent?
2) To what extent young people are citizenship active?
3) Is young people’s perception of democracy status correlated with their citizenship activity?

5 After 30 transitional years of democracy

Introduction
After World War II, Hungary was a Soviet satellite state for decades. The country became a socialist dictatorship
in which people had three options: cooperate with the regime, bear the consequences of resistance or be totally
ignorant of and passive regarding public affairs. Many Hungarians chose the last option: they acknowledged the
communist regime in return for the chance it offered them to be comfortably off. At the same time, the regime
transformed education. The overarching goal was to educate people who embrace the socialist worldview and are
loyal to the regime. At the end of the 1980s, East Central European countries witnessed the end of socialist rule
one after another. In Hungary, for example, 1989 marked the start of a democratic and pluralistic era. It gave a
new chance to people to freely express their political opinion. Education for democracy and civic participation
was pushed to the forefront in schools. Yet the political behaviour generations had learnt during the previous
decades did not disappear from one day to another. The outcomes of political socialization studies have revealed
that most Hungarians remained passive and refused to participate in politics and public affairs. In the last decade,
a new period of democracy started in Hungary. In many aspects, the political establishment has regressed to pre-
democratic transition conditions and has increasingly eroded the achievements of democracy. As in many of the
post-Soviet countries, a new model, so-called illiberal democracy, is emerging in Hungary. More than 30 years
after the democratic turn many questions arise. This chapter focuses on answering the following questions. How
do young Hungarians who were born after the regime change participate in society? Do they follow the passive
behaviour patterns of their parents, or are they more open to civic participation? How do they evaluate Hungarian
illiberal democracy? Is there any connection between their civic activity and evaluation of democracy?
History and cultural context
Hungary was a Soviet satellite state till 1989. The power of the governing socialist party was weakening in the
‘80s in central European countries, so its After 30 transitional years of democracy 75
opposition was gaining more influence and embarked on democratization. The revolutions of the Soviet satellite states
catalysed this process, and in 1989, the government of the Socialist Workers’ Party came to an end. The following year,
multi-party elections were held, and a pluralist and democratic era started. For a while, right- and left-wing parties
governed. After 2010, the right-wing Fidesz Party ruled the country winning its third election in a row in 2018. Viktor
Orbán, strongly criticized for transforming Hungary into an “illiberal democracy” has been the Prime Minister since
2010.
The regime change resulted in a market economy, a rapid rise in unemployment, as well as social inequality.
Not everyone benefitted equally from democratization – social groups with better backgrounds such as city
dwellers, holders of university degrees and entrepreneurs better leveraged the new opportunities. The growing
inequalities led to disappointment with the regime change, even if it brought a significant positive extension of
individual rights. Low level of trust in political institutions remained significant, and Hungarian society remained
strongly in favour of state intervention. Economic difficulties fuelled criticism towards democracy and capitalism.
The growing dissatisfaction with lowering standards of living and the political system contributed to the birth of
illiberal democracy in Hungary. The Fidesz government restructured the democratic system in the country: a new
Fundamental Law was passed, the power of the juridical system was cut back, a centralized media empire was
built and the electoral system was transformed too (Bíró-Nagy, 2017).
Priorities and challenges of citizenship education
Before the regime change in 1989, education had to face strong ideology-driven expectations. In 1961, the governing
socialist party declared that the main aim of education was to support the socialist worldview. Schools had to prepare
students to be good, patriotic citizens, who work on upholding socialism. This intention remained in the focus of
educational policy, but its intensity was declining in the 1980s (Dancs & Fülöp, 2020).
In 1989, the change of regime resulted in a democratic turn. Multi-party elections were held, pluralism and
ideology-free education were granted. While bad memories of the past lived on vividly in social consciousness,
the need for citizenship education was clearly declared in the first version of the National Core Curriculum
introduced in 1995 (Mátrai, 1999). The document emphasized the need for teaching about history, society and
social sciences. The late versions of the core curricula underlined the importance of citizenship education featuring
it among its general goals. Following Hungary’s accession to the European Union, European key competencies
were also integrated into the core curriculum as general educational goals alongside with social and civic
competencies. These advances demonstrated the increasing importance of citizenship education in Hungarian
schools. The implementation of the core curriculum, however, did not present an equally promising picture.
Traditional history education focusing on developing 76 Katinka Dancs and László Kinyó
 students’ national identity through learning about Hungarian history had a far bigger emphasis than citizenship
education with a special focus on the present, as well as the development of social science literacy. Furthermore,
citizenship education was integrated into several other subjects (e.g. history, geography, ethics) (Dancs & Fülöp, 2020).
This state of affairs can be interpreted in two different ways: on the one hand, it shows the importance of the domain.
On the other, its fragmented nature can also indicate its low prestige in schools.
Based on the outcomes of a representative study investigating students and teachers, Kaposi (2020) highlighted that
reported school and classroom practices are not in line with the curriculum. Teachers mainly use traditional face-to-face
teaching methods: they give a presentation and explain the learning materials, they rarely use active learning methods except
for group work, the importance of which is slightly growing. According to students, they mainly learn about the principles of
democracy, while the development of active civic participation gets less focus. The democratic climate and procedures in
schools are mostly formalities – student councils do not provide genuine opportunities for practising civic skills. Several
reasons are responsible for this situation: the youth’s interest in public affairs, and – at the same time – the autonomy of schools
is on the decline, which leaves teachers with less decision-making competence (Kaposi, 2020).
Several other factors hinder the successful school implementation of citizenship education. First, students’ experiences are
controversial. Schools try to promote democratic values and active participation, but everyday experiences send a reverse
signal to students encouraging their disinterest towards public affairs. Secondly, before the change of regime, the strong
ideology-driven expectations influenced not only the survival strategy of teachers but students’ approach as well – they learned
to ignore the central official political socialization message of the school and follow their family’s example of passivity and
ignorance towards politics. These survival strategies have been passed down by younger generations too ( Jakab, 2020).
The two-faceted nature of social science education including citizenship studies has been highlighted previously as are
declared educational goals. The proper implementation of the curriculum, however, is missing. There are various reasons for
this phenomenon. The cross-curricular nature of social science literacy makes citizenship education everyone’s and no one’s
business in schools. Secondly, teachers probably need more help to better understand and realize this educational goal in the
classroom. At the same time, history education, which is closely related to citizenship education, should be reformed with new
approaches being applied in teaching. This calls attention to the need for transforming teacher education. Finally, this situation
also highlights the need for more academic research related to citizenship education (Dancs & Fülöp, 2020).
Having been received with disapproval by a high number of professionals, the latest version of the National
Core Curriculum was published in 2020 (Nemzeti alaptanterv, 2020). The initial aim of the curriculum reform
was to After 30 transitional years of democracy 77
 reduce the lexical knowledge students must memorize, as well as to prepare students for the 21st century, with
a focus on cognitive, affective and soft skills. After the publication of the document, however, many professionals
criticized it for not reducing but occasionally even expanding the learning material rather than allowing more time
for practice and developing skills. In the 2020 version of the National Core Curriculum, there are promising shifts
towards the growing importance of citizenship education. A new school subject has been introduced in grade 8
and grade 12 called Civic Studies. Nevertheless, the training requirements for teachers have not been modified.
History and civic studies teachers hardly learn about the special teaching techniques of civics, so the new
curriculum is unlikely to bring about the desired paradigm shift.
Young Hungarians citizenship activity related to citizenship education
Most of the studies available in this topic are focusing on students’ citizenship attitudes – how they plan or how they
participate in public affairs. Rather than examining school and classroom practices, these investigations seek to increase
the efficiency of citizenship education. The departure point of these studies is Hungarian society’s unwillingness to
participate in citizenship activities.
Research conducted in the 1980s among 10- to 14-year-olds already showed that students have an ambivalent attitude
towards politics (Szabó & Csepeli, 1984). A few years later, it became clear that “dual socialization” is responsible for these
conflicting attitudes (Szabó & Falus, 2000). This can be explained by the fact that students did acquire the norms, values
and ideas that the school required of them, but they did not become genuine, interiorized beliefs. The experiences of everyda y
life made it clear to students quickly that proclaimed ideology is merely a social fiction and the ideas of social equality and
justice do not prevail (Zsolnai, Kinyó & Jámbori, 2012).
The results of international research among students have revealed that young people in post-Socialist countries were more
active at the very beginning of the democratic transformation than young people in stable democracies at the same time (Van
Hoorn, Komlósi, Suchar & Samelson, 2000). According to the findings of Hungarian studies, however, youth’s aversions
to and distrust of politics could not be dissipated either in the first years after the regime change, or in the period that followed.
A Hungarian study in the early 1990s found that the first years of the new political system did not meet the expectations of
many Hungarian young people (Csapó, 1995). The euphoria and optimistic expectations of the first years after the democratic
transition were followed by disappointment ( Csapó, 1994).
In summary, the Hungarian curriculum puts a strong emphasis on the role of the family during the process of
political socialization. In the transmission 78 Katinka Dancs and László Kinyó
 of political disillusionment, the role of adults and the processes taking place in the family proved to be pivotal.
Negative attitudes are mainly mediated to young people by adults and families, and the school cannot change
these unfavourable patterns (Csákó, 2004).
International surveys have also paid attention to a general lack of interest of young people in traditional forms of
politics (Flanagan, Jonsson, Botcheva, Csapó et al., 1999; Papanastasiou, Koutselini & Papanastasiou, 2003). The
results of the IEA Civic Education Study (CivEd) showed that Hungarian students were sceptical of traditional forms
of political activity (e.g. party membership, writing a letter to a newspaper) the only exceptions being participation in
parliamentary and municipal elections (Torney-Purta, Lehman, Oswald & Schultz, 2001).
The cognitive test of CivEd 1999 (Torney-Purta et al., 2001) assessed the depth of students’ civic knowledge and results
for Hungarian students were in line with the international average. The performance of Hungarian students fell short of
preliminary expectations in comparison with other Central European countries, as students from Slovakia, the Czech Republic
and Poland achieved significantly better than the international average. In the following 6 of the 11 sub-categories of civic
engagement and attitudes, the results for Hungarian students were significantly lower than the international average: (1)
expected participation in political activities, (2) confidence in participation at school, (3) society-related government
responsibilities, (4) students’ attitudes to immigrants, (5) support for women’s political rights and (6) assessing open classroom
climate for discussion (Torney-Purta, Lehman, Oswald, & Schultz, 2001). The problems identified in the CivED research
are no more than a decade old. There has been no practice-oriented, student participation-based civic education model been
developed to address this issue while other countries have implemented curriculum reforms. Hungary has not participated in
subsequent citizenship assessments, so there is not later data that can point to any improvements over time.
In 2018, Hungarian secondary and high school students’ citizenship activity was investigated in an international
context using the Citizenship Behaviour Questionnaire (CBQ) (Zalewska & Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz, 2018). Four
groups were identified in the sample: political activists (11%), apolitical activists (24%), alienated politicians
(24%) and alienated individualists (41%). The high ratio of alienated individualist, who scored low on all
citizenship activity dimensions, confirmed the low interest of young people in public affairs (Szabó & Dancs,
2017). The comparison with post-Soviet satellite states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic)
revealed that Hungarian students expressed generally lower engagement in citizenship activities than their Polish
and Slovak counterparts. The disappointment felt after the change of regime, as well as the unfavourable economic
circumstances have affected several generations including the parents of students investigated in the study
(Zalewska, Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz, & Szabó, 2017). These outcomes call attention to the political socialization
processes of Hungarian society, with the After 30 transitional years of democracy 79
 lack of interest towards politics and civic topics still characteristic of many young people.
A study of Hungarian university students emphasized the importance of distinguishing traditional (“offline”)
and online forms of participation. The outcomes of the investigation, however, did not confirm that the novel,
online forms of participation were widespread among university students. While 19% of them participated in
traditional activities (e.g. voting, participation in parties, campaigning), only 17% took part in online activities
(e.g. online campaigning, signing petitions, posting news and blogging about political topics). Furthermore, the
study revealed that nearly three-quarters of the participants were active at least occasionally in direct forms of
participation which required personal involvement and long-term commitment (Oross, Róna, & Szabó, 2017).
These outcomes demonstrated that the spread of internet and social media did not necessary lead to
increased involvement in online political activity. At the same time, the significant ratio of students
participating in direct activities is promising. It may suggest that the general political apathy of Hungarian
society is not as prevailing as was demonstrated by previous studies.

6 Citizenship activity and democracy perception among

young Czechs whose parents ‘jingled keys’ during the ‘Velvet
Revolution’
Introduction
The Czech Republic, founded in October 1918, has a quite turbulent history in terms of citizenship, experiencing
democracy, Nazism, a long period of socialism, and now democracy once again. The years after the 1989 Velvet
Revolution can be described as joyful, in which democracy and capitalism were idealized. Then, the early 2000s
brought a hangover. These are the years the group of university students (N = 303, 51.1% females) aged 18 to 30
participating in this study were brought up. They are the very first generation born into democracy, raised in the
democracy, and till today living in a democracy. The parents of these young adults are described as a generation
twice disappointed, first by communism, then by capitalism. Although citizenship education, or civic education,
has a long history in the Czech school curriculum, after the Velvet Revolution the emphasis was put elsewhere.
Only in the last years have there been efforts to make substantial changes in citizenship education because several
longitudinal and international studies pinpointed the passivity of Czech young people in citizenship and political
involvement. This chapter, therefore, is focused on a single question: How do Czech young adult university
students, who are the first ‘democratic generation’, perceive democracy, and to what extent are they active
citizens?
The way to the democracy through the ‘Velvet Revolution’ – historical, geographic, and
cultural context with a focus on citizenship
The Czech Republic is a relatively small country of 10 million inhabitants located in Central Europe surrounded
by Austria, Germany, Poland, and Slovakia. The Czech Republic has a very turbulent history in terms of citi-
zenship. It is not been so long since one person born in the Czech Republic could have throughout his/her life
experience monarchy, democracy, Nazism, rise of socialism and communism followed by democratization and
liberalization called ‘socialism with a human face’. This latter was disrupted by The Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968. It took 21 years 92 Nikola Doubková
until the fall of the Communist regime by what was known as the ‘Velvet Revolution’ that finally turned the state back
to democracy and capitalism. All this happened in less than 120 years. Only a single generation of young adults have
been born into Czech democracy, have been raised in that democracy, and continue to live in a democracy.
The First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938) was established after the First World War. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk
and his collaborators founded the republic with the idea of humanism and democracy in mind. Czechia and Slovakia
were ‘artificially’ connected into one state in the name of Pan-Slavism, the idea of Masaryk ( Heimann, 2011; Kosatík,
2010; Masaryk, 2005). The countries remained connected for 74 years until their ‘Velvet Divorce’ in 1992.
Existing democratic principles of the First Republic were severely disrupted in 1938 by the Munich Agreement that
resulted in the Sudetenland annexation (border region inhabited mainly by Germans) to Nazi Germany, followed by the
German occupation and the proclamation of Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939. After the Second World
War, the country was restored. Shortly after the Second World War, however, in February 1948, the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia gained undisputed control over the government and remained so for the next 40 years.
In November 1989, the non-violent transition of power, called ‘The Velvet Revolution’, took place. The street
protests, during which the jingling of keys symbolized the opening of the locked doors ( Tagliabue, 1989), started the
process of restoring the policy of freedom, democracy, and conversion to a parliamentary republic.
In December 1989, Václav Havel was elected president of Czechoslovakia. In June 1990, after more than four
decades, Czechoslovakia held its first democratic elections. The democratic state holding up to its democratic and
humanistic tradition, as reflected in Václav Havel’s quote: ‘Truth and love must prevail over lies and hatred’ (Holý,
1996), was restored.
Subsequent years after the Velvet Revolution at the beginning of the 1990s are described as a period of national
euphoria and joy (Trnka, 2012). Those protesting during the Velvet revolution, mainly (but not only) students, were
dissatisfied with the economic stagnation and frustrated by the lack of basic civil and political liberties (Ritter, 2012).
Nonetheless, they were not only critics of the socialist establishment but also felt hope and enthusiasm regarding the
future and consequent change (Šerek et al., 2014).
The unitary state of the Czechs and Slovaks turned to democratic development at last. After the 1992 elections,
however, the differences between both groups became visible. The split was inevitable. The Czech Republic and
Slovakia were established as two independent states on January 1, 1993. In the 1990s, during Václav Havel’s
presidency, the Czech Republic was considered a prosperous post-communist country with strong democratic
principles and a multiparty system (Pehe, 2018). The Czech Republic has been a member of NATO since 1998
and a member of the European Union since May 2004.Citizenship activity and democracy perception 93
 The joyful mood from the 1990s, however, has since changed, mainly in the early 2000s, due to the realization
of what this political change, newly gained freedom, and capitalism truly meant (Trnka, 2012). It can be assumed
that the hopeful future orientation and social perception after the Velvet Revolution evoked by a fast political-
economic change, newly gained freedom, and idealistic presentation of capitalism and democracy, which was
equated with Masaryk’s First Republic, clashed with the lived reality, slower change on the socio-psychological
level and unfulfilled dreams (Kučerová, 1998; Šerek et al., 2014). Kučerová (1998) called the generation of the
Velvet Revolution protesters as ‘twice disappointed’ – first, they were disappointed by socialism, then by
capitalism. Both these disappointments have something in common. Both systems were presented in a highly
idealized way as better than the other systems and with promises for a better future in the media and by politicians,
which in both cases turned out to be an exaggeration.
Current political situation – main challenges for citizenship
Since the 2013 general election and the presidential election, the country is undergoing political change. Miloš Zeman
has been the country’s president since March 2013 (re-elected in 2018). He is known as a man of coarse speech and
pro-Russian oriented populist. The leading figure of Czech politics is Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. Babiš is a part of
numerous political and financial scandals, most recently because of his conflict of interest ( Goeij & Santora, 2019;
Neslen, 2020; Santora, 2018; Staff, 2019). Since the 2013 general election and the presidential election, anti-
establishment rhetoric, populism, and immigration opposition are rising.
The depth of European integration is a long-lasting topic dividing the Czech political parties and the population as a whole
(Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2020). The polarization in the Czech population is becoming more and more visible
in recent years. For example, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2020) reports a growing gap between younger and
older generations in their political preferences and attitudes. The difference is also visible between the big cities (mainly the
capital Prague) and villages, and between people with lower and higher education. It seems that younger generations of people
with higher education levels who live in the big cities are more likely to support democracy and European integration, than
older generations of people living in villages. Finding a consensus is getting onerous.
Two latest reports of the Institute Varieties of Democracy Report (Lührmann et al., 2019, 2020) reflect the
aspects mentioned. The reports point out significant changes in democracy in recent years in the Czech Republic.
Prime minister Babiš is labeled as a ‘populist oligarch’. Moreover, his trust owns one of the most prominent
publishing houses in the country, a publisher of leading broadsheet newspapers. This significantly contributes to
the polarization of society, disinformation, autocratization, and slow abandonment of liberal democracy
(Lührmann et al., 2020; Pehe, 2018).94 Nikola Doubková
 However, several 2019 protests against the establishment (BBC News, 2019a, 2019b) showed a sizeable part
of Czech society, mainly young people, who are not satisfied with the recent development, who can organize and
activate themselves. That seems to be one of the protective factors to Czech democracy (Lührmann et al., 2019).
Citizenship education and civic education
A democratic society, as well as civic engagement, is not something that simply happens. It has to be cultivated. The First
Czechoslovak Republic, founded in 1918, was rooted in democratic principles. However, the population was brought up in an
utterly different state system – monarchy. Thus, T. G. Masaryk emphasized the role of schools and education in general in the
establishment of democratic principles in society ( Blížkovský, 1991; Urbanová, 2016). Since 1923, the school curriculum
includes citizenship education ( Urbanová, 2016). Communism severely disrupted the development of a democratic society.
Although citizenship and civic education remained part of the school curriculum, its aim was mainly indoctrination by Marxist-
Leninist ideology. After the 1989 Velvet Revolution, not so much attention was paid to citizenship education or civic
education, even though it was so needed in these times of political transformation of the Czech society just as it was in the
1920s. The development of democratic literacy, active citizenship, and political responsibility was hampered ( Horák, 2015).
In the Czech Republic, the emphasis was placed on theoretical knowledge, i.e., civic education. Moreover, the role of
participation and active citizenship was not nurtured enough, as the results of the International Civic and Citizenship Education
Study (ICCS) showed (Kerr et al., 2010). The civic knowledge and knowledge of European Union institutions is slightly
above the European average in the Czech students. Nevertheless, this indicator showed significant declination since 1999 when
a similar study CIVED took place ( Amadeo et al., 2002). The results also showed that Czech students are not interested in
political and social issues, they do not tend to civic participation, and the future voting expectation is low. Thus, the Czech
educational system is not preparing students for active participation in civic life in adulthood enough. It is worth mentioning
that the Czech Republic did not participate in the second cycle of the ICCS in 2016, and neither is participating in the third
cycle of the study in 2022.
In recent years, the Czech educational system is undergoing reform. The results of the ICCS were one of the impulses
to reform civic and citizenship education as well. The curriculum changes are incorporated even in civic and citizenship
education because, in its aim, the education of active citizens prone to participation is postulated.
The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports issued Framework Educational Programmes that are national
curricula defining objectives and content of general and vocational education (The Ministry of Education, Youth
and Sports, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). This document describes ten key Citizenship activity and democracy perception
95
 educational areas, one of which is Humans and Society. The main aim of this area is to promote active engagement in the
life of a democratic society. This area is mainly divided into fields of History and Civil Education. Civil Education introduces
matters such as the Czech Republic’s legal system, principles of democracy, international relations and European integration,
and cultural life and diversity. Moreover, citizenship education, civic education, democratic citizenship education,
multicultural education, etc., are so-called cross-curricular subjects that should be an essential part of various school subjects
leading young people and children to personal engagement and development of personal values and attitudes. It is important
to note that the educational area of Humans and Society is part of the first level and mainly of the second level education on
primary schools and also of the high school and vocational school curriculum.
According to International Civic and Citizenship Education Study ( Kerr et al., 2010), citizenship education in the Czech
Republic is taught mainly with the emphasis on discussions and group work. Nonetheless, the encouragement to get involved
in the activities connected with citizenship education is missing. According to Framework Educational Programmes, the
primary expected outcome is (theoretical) knowledge about the social structure and processes, state, ideologies, the European
Union, etc. Thanks to projects of numerous non-governmental organizations, there are now programs supporting active
citizenship in students. Such as ‘Students’ elections’ for high school students in times of general elections, ‘School for
Democracy’ project promoting and supporting the establishment of school parliaments, or educational program Varianty
offering courses and methodological support guiding students toward global responsibilities and respect for others.
The generation of today’s young adults’ parents played an important role in the Velvet Revolution. Many has changed since
then, not only in politics, but also several other changes are relevant for the new generation, such as the rise of informati onal
technologies, globalization, diversification of the society and the influence of demographic trends in general, and the ascent
of individualization and plurality of life paths ( Šerek et al., 2014). Unsurprisingly, due to these shifts, Czech adolescents and
young adults nowadays have more similarities with their peers from Western Europe than with the previous Czech generations
(Macek, 2011). Noticeably, compared to previous generations, they are more individualistic, materialistic, achievement-
oriented, they perceive society as a caring community, the influence of family is more evident in their perception of society
and values (Šerek et al., 2014).
However, not much is known about the perception of democracy and citizenship education of young adults
studying in university, because most of the studies conducted on this topic in the Czech Republic analyzed younger
age groups (Amadeo et al., 2002; Dahl et al., 2018; Kerr et al., 2010; Kudrnáč, 2017). And these studies showed
that Czech adolescents are politically disengaged, inactive, and not interested in public affairs (Kerr et al., 2010;
Kudrnáč, 2017), and it seems that for a long time the 96 Nikola Doubková
 Czech educational system was not doing enough to change these attitudes by teaching civic education rather
than citizenship education (Urbanová, 2016).
Reports of institutes monitoring democracy status and data on young people citizenship activity enhance
investigating whether and to what extent these two phenomena are related. The following question were asked:

1) Do young people observe changes in the status of democracy in Czech Republic and to what extent?
2) To what extent are young people citizenship active?
3) Is young people’s perception of democracy status correlated with their citizenship activity?

Conclusion
Overall, it seems that Czech young adults studying in university perceive some changes in the studied democracy
indicators, and these changes reflect the current political situation in the Czech Republic and the trends the inter-
national studies of democracy indicators warn about (Bertelsmann 104 Nikola Doubková
Transformation Index, 2020; Lührmann et al., 2020). Also, in contrast to the ICCS study (Kerr et al., 2010), there is
a substantial part of Czech university students who are willing to take action, who are aware of their civic rights, like
voting or protesting, and are interested in the current situation in their country. Nonetheless, there is also a part of the
university students who are alienated from the citizenship activity. This polarization is probably more visible in the
group of young adults with different education.
The data for this study were collected from the late summer to autumn of 2019. Since then, the worldwide
situation has noticeably changed because of the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic. The most recent opinion poll
from September 2020 showed relatively low trust in the Czech government and the president in the people
between 20 and 29 years old (Naše společnost, 2020). It is too early to say what this unprecedented situation
will bring to citizenship activity and perceptions of democracy.

7 Descriptive analysis of Estonian young adults’ evaluation

of democracy and citizenship engagement
Introduction
Estonia – a country in the Baltic region of northern East-Central Europe, is the smallest Baltic post-communist
state. Estonia regained its independence in 1991 after a national democratic movement organized the re-
registration of citizens, held free elections, and conducted a national referendum. Current social, political,
economic, and demographic characteristics of democratic, European-oriented Estonian society provided a context
in which the research question was posed: how have Estonian young adults constructed their citizenship behaviour
and perceived the democracy? This was the question guiding the descriptive research reported among Estonian
youngsters aged 18–30 years old. The results can be understood and interpreted in the context of young people’s
integration into the democratic processes. Estonian youth generally perceived a stable general status for
democracy and focussed mainly on semi-active (loyalty to laws and rules) and passive (national identity and
patriotism) citizenships activities. They seemed reluctant to engage in political conventional citizenship activities
with the majority being more personally oriented such as gaining independence and developing their own skills.
Estonia – basic characteristics and demographic context
Estonia, a relatively small country with approximately 1.3 million inhabitants, is situated in the north-eastern
periphery of the European Union, bordering Russia to the east and Latvia to the south located by the Baltic Sea
2
with a territory of 45,227 km (Statistics Estonia, 2019).
Estonia has been dominated by foreign powers throughout its history. The country has a long history as a nation,
while political independence has had a short history, initially from 1918 to 1940. In 1940, it was incorporated into
the Soviet Union as one of its constituent republics. Estonia remained a Soviet republic until 1991, when, along
with the other Baltic states, it declared its independence. Even under occupation by other states, Estonia has a
distinguished cultural history with an emphasis on arts, literature, and general and higher education.Descriptive
analysis of Estonian young adults’ evaluation 109
 After regaining independence in 1991, Estonia rapidly moved from communism and a socialist, centrally planned
economy to a market-oriented democracy with radical political, economic, and social reforms while becoming a member
of the United Nations. Estonia set about transforming its government into a parliamentary democracy and reorienting
its economy towards market capitalism. It sought integration with greater Europe and in 2004 joined the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the European Union (Tarmisto & Aruoja, 2021).
Since the restoration of independence in 1991, the government of Estonia has met the challenge of establishing a fully
functional, stable, modern state to undergo a radical transformation from a centralized, planned economy and insular state to
one of broad economic openness, solid democratic institutions, and integration with international political and economic
institutions (OECD, 2011). Estonia is nowadays a developed country with an advanced, high-income economy. It ranks very
highly in the Human Development Index –, 892 (Conceição, 2019). Estonia’s economy continues to perform well, even
though growth is slowing somewhat (OECD, 2019a).
Estonia held its first free and democratic elections in 1992 after the country restored independence. Since then, the
political party landscape and electoral system have stabilized regarding the levels of electoral turnout (Silva-Leander,
2019). Estonia’s fundamental democratic institutions continued to work well in 2019. The governmental system is
predominantly stable, electoral processes function efficiently, the media are largely free from political and corporate
influences, and the rule of law is applied effectively (Talving, 2020).
Estonia ranks already among the top countries in e-government with digitizing government services and boasts
several native ICT unicorns (OECD, 2019a). Being the first country to allow online voting in 2005, analysts coined the
expression e-Estonia because of how starkly democracy, nation building, and the internet revolution were interrelated
(Kaun, 2013).
According to the Freedom House’s report, Estonia is considered a free country and its score didn’t decline compared
with the previous year (Buyon et al., 2020). During last years, the most visible feature of democracy – elections –
remains strong, but threats to democracy affect non-electoral aspects of democracy such as media freedom, freedom of
expression, and the rule of law (Lührmann et al., 2018) with improving democracy scores in political participation and
in perceived confidence in the government and in political parties.
The current level of conventional political participation in Estonia is rather low (Kaun, 2013), especially among
the younger generation. The legal age of voting is 18 years with exception for local elections where the legal age
is 16. For example, according to Deželan (2015), voter absenteeism among 18- to 24-year-olds in the EU 2014
parliamentary elections was 87.5% compared to an average of 60% in Estonia and 56.9% in the EU. Voter
absenteeism in national parliamentary elections among 18- to 24-year-olds was 62.5% 110 Kristi Kõiv
 compared to an average of 32.8% in Estonia and 33.6% in the EU. In Estonia, 44% of 15- to 30-year-old young
people voted, which was lower than the EU average 56% with decreasing tendency when comparing the findings
with those from 2011 (European Youth, 2013).
To understand the demographic situation (include youth population) in Estonia, its post-communist past must be considered.
The Estonian heavily urbanized population shows the effects of two phenomena: a population decrease and the aging of the
population. After the end of World War II, the population of Estonia increased and reached its peak in 1990. Following
independence in 1991, a significant proportion of the people originally from other Soviet Republics left the country. Emigration
increased significantly after Estonia’s accession to the European Union in 2004, resulting in an important loss of young females
who, contrasting with men’s patterns, tend often not to return to the country. The size of the population has decreased
significantly in 20 years (12.6%) and keeps dropping ( Santiago, et al., 2016). There is considerable cultural and language
diversity among the population. Estonian speakers represent around 70% of the population, Russian speakers around 25%, and
other groups such as Ukrainian, Finnish, and Latvian speakers around 5% combined (Statistics Estonia, 2019).
Over the past years, employment in Estonia increased in 2018 and reached 79.5%, whereby 1.3% of the labour
force were long-term unemployed; and youth unemployment declined to 11.9% in 2018 (Youth Guarantee…,
2020).
Young persons (7- to 26-year-olds) in Estonia account for around a fifth of the total population of Estonia whereby nearly
three-quarters of 18-year-olds are at school and this number is increasing (Statistics Estonia, 2019). Young people’s
participation in youth work – the proportion of young people that took part in hobby education, camps, youth work camps, or
in the activities of national youth associations receiving annual support, or who participated in youth councils and active youth
groups – has increased. For example, in 2010, the respective indicator was 37%, but in 2018, it was 57% and the goal for 2020
is 60%. The number of organized participation opportunities to encourage young people take part in the activities of youth
councils is a key challenge in the current youth work ( Summary of the Ministry of Education, 2019).
According to data collected by Statistics Estonia (Statistics, 2019), most young people between the ages of 15 and 26
are engaged in learning (66%): nearly four per cent were completing their higher education, one-fourth were studying
towards a degree, and nearly six per cent had broken off their studies. Between 2000 and 2018, there was an overall
decline in the share of 25- to 34-year-olds in Estonia with at least upper secondary attainment, although this has
stabilized in recent years. In 2018, some 87.9% of 25- to 34-year-olds had attained at least upper secondary education
(OECD, 2019).
Higher education can lead to a doctorate and is accessible to graduates of general and vocational upper
secondary education. In 2018, 43.6% of 25- to 34-year-olds in Estonia had a tertiary-level qualification and
represented an Descriptive analysis of Estonian young adults’ evaluation 111
 increase of 8 percentage points since 2008. However, timely completion in higher education is a challenge for
Estonia; for example, in 2017, 59% of those who entered a bachelor’s degree programme had completed their
programme within three years of the theoretical duration, whereby students in Estonia tend more to work while
studying than students in other European countries. According to national forecasting data from 2018, the number
of graduates from university and professional higher education was insufficient to meet future labour market
demands that are the centre of youth policy (Kaplan et al., 2020). The proportion of youth ages 25–29 who were
only studying or studying and working is dropping and this change is linked with the changes in the life cycle of
young people who typically finish their education in their early twenties (Taru, 2011).
Current challenges and priorities for citizenship education
Trends in global contexts – financial crisis; debates about impact of human activity on environment; peaceful
coexistence within the school without abuse and bullying; integration of (young) people from different backgrounds
into the society and increase of social media using in civic participation, are challenging for educating young people
around the area of citizenship education and political and civic participation (Shultz et al., 2018).
Citizenship and citizenship education have had a high profile within European and also Estonian education
policies, focusing on the harmonious co-existence and mutually beneficial development of individuals and of their
communities (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2017).
Citizenship education (Kerr, 1999) is conceptualized as a continuum of approaches from a narrow approach through
the teaching of civics in content- and knowledge-based fashion to a broader interpretation through citizenship education
as active citizenship. The last-mentioned approach is one of the key educational goals for the new century competencies
for students (Almeida et al., 2017).
Since 1996, citizenship education in Estonia has been part of national curricula as an independent compulsory
subject. During the last decade with new curricula (National Curriculum for Basic Schools, 2011; National
Curriculum for Upper Secondary Schools, 2011), the learning and teaching content of citizenship education was
changed from a narrow to a broader interpretation and practice. A combined approach is used for citizenship
education in Estonia integrating citizenship education into the curriculum:

• as a separate subject during the second stage of basic education and general secondary education;
• as integrated part of another – into Personal, Social and Health Education, area subjects during the first stage of
basic education; and
• as a cross-curricular field of general competencies for students with a combination of social and citizenship
competencies: intrapersonal, interpersonal, and societal.112 Kristi Kõiv
Citizenship education supports students in becoming active, informed, and responsible citizens, who are willing and able to
take responsibility for themselves and for their communities at the local, regional, national, and international level. Emphasis
on a whole-school approach in citizenship education, however, allows schools to place emphases not just students’ academic
achievement, but also values and skills and to bring together the different actors involved in supporting students’ personal and
social development (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice, 2017). Estonia has participated in all three IEA
international civic and citizenship education studies since 1999 and study results have contributed to the curriculum
development by giving more legitimacy to the efforts to teach democratic values and citizenship skills and also have an impact
on the political participation of nowadays young adolescents (Toots & Oja, 2021).
The Civic Education Study (CIVED) was carried out in 1999 in 28 countries (Torney-Purta et al., 2001), the International
Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) in 2009 with 38 countries ( Schulz et al., 2010), and in 2016, 24 countries
(Schulz et al., 2018). All studies included Estonia with a focus on examining young people’s citizenship attitudes and behav-
iours and their knowledge within the context for this learning area. These international studies provided an opportunity for
international comparison as well as comparison with previous studies and have revealed that Estonian students were
significantly above the international average on the citizenship knowledge scale: Estonia was one of the few countries among
other countries where citizenship knowledge did not decrease and showed slight increase comparing years 1999 and 2009 and
2016 (Schulz et al., 2010; Schulz et al., 2018). Also, findings suggest that national and European identities can positively
coexist and do not contradict each other. Estonian students have a positive perception of their European identity as well as
positive attitudes towards their country (Schulz, et al., 2010, 2018). Although over three-quarters of Estonian youth consider
themselves citizens of the world, like the average ( OECD, 2019b).
Within the European Union countries context, young Estonians were found to be the least interested in politics and political
participation (Schulz et al., 2010; European Youth, 2013). Today’s Estonian youth’s interest in political issues decreased
in comparison to the ICCS 2016, whereby being least interested in politics among other countries ( Schulz et al., 2018).
Political activism among 16- to 25-year-old Estonian youth takes a less overt and more individualized approach, and young
people today were enthusiastic about online participation in social networks ( Allaste & Saari, 2019; Deželan, 2015).
Nowadays young 16- to 29-year-old youngsters in the Estonian sample were interested in voting online but have doubts and a
lack of trust in the reliability of e-voting systems (Leitner et al., 2020).
Attitudes towards democracy among young people were measured in different areas of democracy (Schulz, et
al., 2018) and across countries and results showed that youngster view free elections of political leaders, the
Descriptive analysis of Estonian young adults’ evaluation 113
 right to peaceful protest, and equal rights for all ethnic and racial groups in a country as good for democracy.
Estonian young people expressed more trust than their 2009 counterparts did in government and courts of justice
but less trust in media and people in general.
Satisfaction with democracy varied from country to country also among young 16- to 25-year-old people, whereby
Estonian young adults’ general satisfaction with democracy in their country compared with other European peers tends
to be around the middle with high evaluations to freedom of speech and respect of human rights; and young people with
higher education were more satisfied with democracy (Ellison, Goswami, & Pollock, 2014). It was shown that
Estonian youth facing problems evaluated protest as a factor in their political involvement more strongly while those
without problems emphasized more further rights and volunteer works (Kõiv, 2011).
The aim of the present study was to explore young Estonian adults’ evaluations of democracy and citizenship
engagement.
Two research questions were addressed: (1) How do young Estonians perceive different democracy indicators
(Election Honesty, Freedom Speech and Action, Media Independence, Repression and Intimidation) in their country;
(2) How do young Estonians evaluate their citizenship engagement in three areas – active, passive, and semi-passive?
It was hypothesized that Estonian youth: (1) evaluate more highly the speech and action freedom as indicators
of the democracy compared with other indicators of democracy; (2) are engaged more frequently with passive
citizenship behaviour compared with active citizenship (Social, Political, Action for Change, and Personal
Activity) behaviour.

8 Young people in Latvia

Forgotten humanism in citizenship development
Introduction
Latvia is a small multi-ethnic country at the intersection of Russian, Eurasian and European civilisations. Today, Latvia, like
other countries, is suffering greatly from the consequences of the economic, social, cultural and moral crises of the end of the
20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Latvia gained independence 31 years ago and has been a member of the
European Union (EU) for more than 16 years. The basic problem Latvia faces currently is the depopulation of the area. Over
the past 30 years, Latvia has lost more than 25% of its population, and the decline will continue. One could compare this
depopulation with the damages country experienced at the post- World War II period as the result of deportations of people
from Latvia.
The ambitiously advertised events of Latvia’s 100 years of statehood (2017–2021) anniversary are actually
1
ongoing, as they are aimed at strengthening the “will for state” in Latvian society, the sense of ownership of the
country and encouraging self-organisation processes and cooperation among citizens. The main message of
Latvia’s 100-year celebration highlights the fact that the main value of Latvia is its people who sacrificed their
lives and the people, who gave life to Latvia’s new generation, laying the groundwork for the future, in order to
highlight Latvia’s name and contribution to the world in the next century. In the context of national belonging, it
is most important to promote citizenship awareness and retain young people in Latvia. The gravity of the problem
will also need to be addressed by young people. The extent to which youth is aware and both responding to and
shaping the current situation, especially status of democracy in the country, is reflected in this chapter. History,
geography and cultural context with a focus on citizenship
Citizenship is a complex concept: contemporary social and scholarly perspectives conceptualise and problematise
the category of citizenship in numerous Young people in Latvia 125
ways. Definitions of citizenship in theory and practice are historically changeable, contextually relative and socially
differentiated. These definitions depend on geopolitical and macroeconomic changes and also on individual experience
and local contexts. These are particularly difficult issues in Latvia where the norms, forms and discourses of political
and social collectivities and individual life have been intensively defined and re-defined since the postsocialist period
(Haukanes & Trnka, 2013).
During social changes, the conditions of liberal democracy and market economy have developed purposefully
in Latvia. Enough time has passed to assess not only economic achievements but also the new generation’s attitude
towards the development of democratic principles and the quality of engagement in civil activity. The key issue
to be addressed in this chapter is the negative influence of neglecting humanism as a set of values, especially
intrinsic human dignity, while developing the sense of citizenship among youth. Among the criteria for humane
personality, one could emphasise following qualities: openness, trust, human dignity, tolerance, compassion,
solidarity, responsibility and collegiality in relations with others, and the ability to express itself positively. The
process of civic education should be organised in such a way that young people can make adequate use of their
capabilities, accept themselves and develop themselves. The authors conclude that, in the context of the
acquisition of civic education, the humanitarian factor described above in the educational process is either weak
or not at all covered.
Demographic forecasts, aspects of impact
Along with the demographic trends of other European and international countries, various sources provide information
on what changes are expected in Latvia’s demographic situation. The population has fallen significantly over the past
20 years. In 1990 Latvia’s population was 2.7 million people, in 2021 the population decreased by more than 30%
accounting to 1.89 million people (Meļ ihovs, 2014). The natural growth of the population over 20 years was negative.
All estimates foresee a decline in the population over the next 15–35 years. According to these forecasts, the
country’s population is likely to fall to 1.58–1.84 million by 2030 (Zvidriņš & Vı̄ toliņš, 2006).
Significant changes in population ageing are expected to benefit the older age cohort by 2030. The proportion of
school-age children has decreased almost twice since 2000 (by 47%), reaching the minimum in 2013, and was expected
to increase slightly by 2020 (by 3%), but will then fall again slowly (by 2030 – 4% below current level). The population
in the age group between 15 and 64 years is projected to fall by 10% by the year 2030 (European Commission, 2014).
It is understood that population issues are linked to the country’s economic development, emigration, the quality
of life of citizens and many other indicators. At the same time, the decisive factor of truly sustainable 126 Sandra
Rone and Mara Vidnere
 democratic development is the constant presence and shared understanding of humanitarian values.
The social and political activity of young people in Latvia has been declining for the last 20 years. Research shows
(Ekonomikas ministrija, 2015) that around 34% of young people (aged 15–25) are reluctant to engage in different activities
and are called very passive. 15% of young people are more likely to engage in different social activities, 16% of young people
are most likely to engage informal education activities offered by schools, consequently 19% of them are more eager to
participate in political activities. 17% of young people are highly active in different areas and are happy to participate in both
school activities and social and political events and projects. Young people themselves mention dissatisfaction with the current
situation (20%) and gaining experience (18%), as a reason for their peers to be involved in social, social or political activities,
etc.
Research findings have shown that Latvian youth are engaged in public activities is 85.1% of cases, while for Russian
youth, it is only 75% of cases (VARAM, 2014). Evidence from the same research suggests that Russian-speaking
young people participate more in public activities within their ethnic community and live with the same stereotypes as
their parents. These factors affect the participation of young people in social processes and the decision to emigrate.
Still, the actual prospect to emigrate is common both for ethnic Latvian and minority youth, as the evidence from a
qualitative study of the high school youth suggests (Laizāne, Putniņa & Mileiko, 2015).
Society is not an abstract group outside the space and time, but a reality rich in life and intensity of action. It is young
people who should form the future political and social elite of the country, but they are moving away. Shared public
discourse constantly emphasises that citizenship is one’s moral position, sense of duty related to one’s relationships
with the State, the Church and the Family. In addition, it provides for the capacity to perform duties in both our own
interests and for the public interest and to think and act nationally. Regardless of any official doctrine of citizenship, the
majority of young people in Latvia, by their upbringing, have immanent pride of their land, its culture, its history.
Looking at the Latvian parliamentary elections, the low turnout of voters can be observed especially among youth.
Low voter activity has been observed at 13 Saeima (Parliament) elections: only 844925 persons or 54.6% of the voting
population have voted, and this was a record-low voter turnout. 31946 persons voted abroad, which makes 23.7% of the
number of voters registered abroad on the election day (Semjonova, 2018).
In the recent municipal elections (2021), the low turnout (34.01%) also showed that political apathy was
widespread amongst Latvian citizens (CVK, 2021).
It is evident that the lack of involvement of Latvian people with voting rights in the elections signifies a serious
gap between political decision-makers and citizens. Many decisions made by policy makers are not clear and
acceptable to the majority of citizens, thus undermining the basic conditions for democracy: rule of people, by
people, for people.Young people in Latvia 127
 During social changes, the conditions of liberal democracy and market economy have developed purposefully
in Latvia. Enough time has passed to assess not only economic achievements but also the new generation’s attitude
towards the development of democratic principles and the quality of engagement in active citizenship. There is a
common understanding that democracy as culture and establishment and degree of its implementation is
determined by a set of meaningful criteria, for instance, socially shared humanitarian values, which plays the
decisive role in actual democratisation, regardless of the degree of development of different societies and the
specificities of cultural traditions. The current experience of democratic development in Latvia has shown that
there is no economic prosperity without humanitarian values. Unfortunately, the fact that many young people
choose emigration to the other countries of Western Europe instead of engagement into building their future within
Latvia state, leads to a shrinking population and lowering potential quality of Latvia’s citizenship.
Current contexts – main challenges for citizenship in the country
The New Millennium has witnessed a “renaissance” in the exploration of citizenship (Stevenson, Hopkins, Luyt &
Dixon, 2015; Reich, 2018) and an endorsement of citizenship as the realisation of democratic and humanistic
principles, which define the country’s clearly defined political, civic mix, social rights and accountability. Yet
globalisation, increased mobility and migration, the crisis in the “nation state” project has led to a questioning of the
meaning and responsibility of “being a citizen” in the modern world.
Youth is one of social groups where there is still a lot of confusion in understanding citizenship. Somehow young
people find themselves in a situation where they feel passive when it comes to citizenship. This is possibly because
socially shared values are already formalised, i.e., fixed in the forms of laws, rules and regulations embedded in the
very existence of social institutes, like family and community. It may seem like there is nothing to modify, change or
adapt. The space for personal activism may possibly seem limited.
Traditionally, the acquisition of the status of a citizen involves a transition from “incomplete” citizens, i.e., children and
adolescents, to the granting of the status of the citizen, i.e., the voter. There has been a re-interpretation of citizenship, which
takes it not as a limited stage but as a process that takes place throughout life, as practical experience of being active an d
committed participant in social life. Research evidence shows that young people themselves will determine the shape of their
social development, its functions and activities. It has been shown to be difficult to expect passive young people to become
active adult citizens and to engage in public life in the future and to be active in civil society (Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz,
Zalewska, & Kennedy, 2017).
Unfortunately, the principles and quality of democracy have little potential for automatic implementation and
are difficult to monitor in the social environment. The most powerful institution for the enforcement, 128 Sandra
Rone and Mara Vidnere
 management and monitoring of democratic processes, is most likely public administration.
An important focus of current research should be it should be on different conditions and mechanisms affecting the for mation of
citizenship attitudes and citizenship behaviour. For example, European citizenship is understood to be more general and is ac cepted
as a source of rights to which EU citizens can take ownership. It is precisely this aspect in the realisation of d emocracy that is often
based more on respect for economic, rather than humanitarian, ethnic and ethical principles. Young people are aware of and ar e
experiencing that the times of social change are also having negative effects: the property recovered after the Soviet rule – the forests
and land of their homeland are less and less owned by their owners, are being lost and becoming the property of other EU citi zens
and countries. For example, a young man decides to search for work abroad. His parents, consequently, decide to sell their land, forest
and country houses to buy him an apartment in the capital city Riga, so he works there, but the funds still turned out to be insufficient
for the apartment, and they had to take a loan from a bank. Parents hope, a son could help with the credit payments. Unfortunately,
he lost his job in Riga, and his earnings in a new workplace were no longer sufficient to help parents to cover credit paymen ts. The
apartment was lost as well, and his only option was to leave the country to work abroad. It is social inequality that has created
conditions for youth’s leaving the workforce and the country.
The majority of residents either do not trust or have a low level of trust in the government and political parties. Such a low
trust calls into question the legitimacy of the decisions taken and makes it considerably more difficult to implement public
policy even if the decisions are rational, balanced and objective. If only a small part of society is involved in national decision-
making, and if the decisions are inevitably taken that do not reflect the interests of the majority or adequately reflect the views
of the various social groups (ethnic, linguistic, economic, etc.). This, in turn, means a higher risk of corruption, an inefficient
decision-making process and a limited exploitation of the creative potential of the population.
In the context of the transformation of democratic institutions, the most important challenge of Latvia’s
governance is the ability to find new cooperation and participation mechanisms that would build and raise the
social capital of society. Democratisation is a continuous and endless process. In today’s globalised world, the
involvement of active, socially responsible and personal youth in social and political change is particularly needed
for the development of a just social state. For Latvia, studies on socially active youth with a balanced citizenship
position are very topical and timely.
Priorities in education for citizenship
Latvia started implementing Democracy Audits – a complex process monitoring the status of democratic
phenomena and processes – 20 years ago, Young people in Latvia 129
when the first systemic democracy assessment was released. (Ņikišins, Rozenvalds & Zepa, 2014). Since the mid-90s
IDEA methodology has been used as a basis for assessing the processes of democratisation in Latvia. In the research,
carried out more than 25 years ago, a study noted that the best feature of citizenship participation on a relatively slow
and uneven background of population activity and increased participation was the increasing confidence of citizens in
the possibilities of changing things to suit their individual and societal life (Ņikišins, Rozenvalds & Zepa, 2014).
In the last Democracy Audit of 2014, the methodology was supplemented with a political culture section,
focusing on values, attitudes and beliefs of individuals, based on the functioning of the political system. Authors
of the Audit emphasised, that

Democracy is not just democratic institutes and procedures. Democracy cannot function effectively if it is not
rooted in the confidence of citizens. In other words, democracy is not viable without Democrats, without people
convinced that they are capable of influencing political processes in society, prepared to respect the rights of other
individuals and to be prepared for reasonable compromise
(Rozenvalds, 2014, p. 16)

If in earlier times there was a serious problem of low levels of self-organisation, low self-assessment and
unawareness of collective capacity, then today the main problem is increasing alienation of the public from
democratic institutions.
From 1999, Latvia has participated in three cycles of the International Civic and Citizenship Education Studies
(ICCS – the initial study is referred to as CivEd), the second was in 2009 and the last was ICCS in 2016 including
23 countries (Ministry of Education and Science of Latvia, 2020). Current ICCS data collection for release in
2023 in Latvia already started in autumn 2020. Dr. Ireta Čekse, ICCS National Research Coordinator, suggests:

Latvia is already participating in the IEA ICCS study for the fourth time; it first took place in 1999. The study
provides Latvia an advantage in following the growth of civic knowledge among 15-year-old students and in
studying the dynamics of young peoples’ readiness to fulfill their civic duties. The average achievements of Latvian
pupils (492 points) are statistically significantly lower than the average achievements of OECD countries (517
points). Since the previous study cycle in 2009, the achievements of Latvian pupils have increased by 11 points,
but these changes are not statistically significant
(Čekse, Geske & Pole, 2016, pp. 26–27)

Since 2009, the number of pupils who have reached the first A and second B levels of competence has changed
(these levels of competence represent the 130 Sandra Rone and Mara Vidnere
possibility for pupils to successfully enter the life of a democratic society). In Latvia, this group of pupils has
grown from 51% to 59% and these changes are statistically significant. (Čekse, Geske & Pole, 2016; 28).
A positive trend is the fact that, comparing ICCS 2009 and ICCS 2016, the achievements of Latvian pupils in the
citizenship education knowledge test increased slightly. However, they cannot be classified as statistically significant.
A large proportion of 15-year-old Latvian pupils have low or very low citizenship competence (Schulz, Ainley,
Fraillon, Losito, Agrusti & Friedman, 2018).
Compared to the ICCS 2016 average, Latvian pupils have shown a lower level of confidence in political parties,
parliament and the media, while confidence in schools is high. When comparing pupils by the language of instruction
at school, political parties are more trusted by pupils in schools with Russian language of instruction, while pupils in
schools with Latvian language of instruction trust less in governmental institutions, but more, in the other people, in
general. In addition, the trust in people is higher in rural settings and small cities, but lower in Riga.
Latvian society has a common perception of the implementation of democracy as an asymmetric communication process in
which the public has wide opportunities to express its views, but with little feedback from the political elite. It may be the
reason why civic participation and citizenship teaching have not been emphasised enough in education policy planning
(Ministru kabineta noteikumi, 2021). This is very worrying because in a situation where the public does not see a
governmental, political response to its activities, its confidence in the government’s performance is likely to be diminished.
There is a widespread public orientation of sceptical alienation, with a typical view concerning the selfishness of the political
elite and the unpredictability of its actions. Such an orientation can contribute to society’s desire to separate itself from political
processes as something unfathomable and unpredictable. A sense of political powerlessness and mistrust creates a
counterproductive alienation from policies that undermine the prospect of an advanced democratic political culture. Besides,
the Latvian political elite groups use ethnic divisions between citizens to achieve their political objectives.
The cornerstone of the rights of EU citizens is freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Currently, there is an
obvious divide in Latvia in the realisation of democratic principles, between content and form, which now turns
into a conservative and social life-destroying force. One of these destructive forces, as has been identified in the
previous study, is passivity of citizens. The fundamental citizenship education principle is teaching of social
rights; therefore, this theme could be used as an instrument of fostering ideals of inclusive education and solidarity.
In the context of the transformation of democratic institutions, the most important challenge of Latvia’s
governance is the ability to find new cooperation and participation mechanisms that would build and raise social
capital of society. Democratisation is a continuous and endless process.Young people in Latvia 131
 In this context, it is worth remembering the thesis of an outstanding scientist, thinker and public figure, Vernadsky:
“Existential (material) experience shows, that state structures, which are isolated from spiritual and humanitarian values retreat,
erode, decay. Thus, there is a need to recode the basic structures of the spirit” (Вернадский, 2012, p. 503–508). As part of
the current process of societal erosion a common socially learned attitude among youth is avoiding attachment to the country,
pursuing a better life in the context the family rather than on the native land. Be where the burden is lighter, do what could be
done. This common attitude could be explained by the ignorance of the humanitarian factor in the curriculum. It is one of the
main reasons for the alienation of young people from the state. It is problematic if it could cause a moral crash, if the tension
between the social processes and actors has a devastating effect on the worldviews, spiritual, moral values and the formation
of civic position among the younger generations. Latvian poet Rainis reminds us that we are strong, if the nation’s spirit is
strong enough.
Thus, in today’s socio-economic circumstances, a pressing majority of school youth is thinking first of all about
their own interests, with little concern for their citizenship responsibilities. The acquisition of political inde-
pendence and the transformation that countries have faced have resulted in personal citizenship being valued
more highly than other forms of citizenship. The main question in the current study, therefore, is to investigate
how the status of democracy is perceived by young people and whether they currently observe that it is strong
or in decline. In addition, the study will explore the citizenship actions they favour, how their activity profiles
and the association between their perceptions of democracy and their citizenship activities

Conclusion
The aim of our study was to explore civic participation and the attitudes of young people to the status of democracy.
The target group of this study – youth from higher education establishments – were familiarised with the political
principles covered by the study and learnt about different perspectives that could shape Latvia’s future and the
development of the Latvian state. Hopefully this could activate its civic participation contributing to the growth in social
and economic life.
The lack of the humanitarian factor has not only created dissonance between the understanding and marketing
of democratic principles in the country. It has reinforced the signs of destructiveness both in society and in the
civil activities of young people
In this sense, for Latvian society the concept of “State” is distinguished from politics because politicians and
politics have a widely shared negative image. There is a high level of patriotism in Latvia at the same time and a
high level of discontent with socio-economic processes.
The process of sharing the social benefits of society reflects respect for the humanitarian need for social balance and
social equality. It also suggests the importance of participation in community life, civic attitudes and the love for their
national outcomes. However, the reality of actual national politics and governance makes many young people feel failed
by policy makers: their expectations for democratic political performance are rarely met. This causes the alienation from
national politics.
Average citizenship engagement is low. The involvement of young people in personal and individual activity
has been highlighted here. If you remove this indicator, the average score would fall further. The lowest indicators
refer to political and social factors. Membership in student boards and other forms of student organisation as a
form of civic activity is the weakest. The explanation of this phenomenon may be that these institutions are
working quite formally, but it should be noted that a student has a moderate political interest and a willingness to
vote.140 Sandra Rone and Mara Vidnere
 Citizenship education is an important contribution to the development of the country, including the strengthening of
democratic and social values. Based on the research data and the above, it is possible to identify the following problems
in youth citizenship activities in this area: in Latvia, young people’s willingness to engage in political activities in
different forms is weak, which is linked to a lack of confidence in political authorities and an inability to reveal their
place in a society that undermines the sense of belonging to Latvia, thereby undermining youth citizenship in politics,
youth NGOs and leisure activities at both national and EU level.
When evaluating youth in general, we can conclude that the highest average figures highlight partly active forms of
citizenship activity associated with voting and loyalty factors. The highest overall figure is in the 19-year-old youth
group, the lowest result in a group of 26-year-old young people likely to be associated with the males.
The study findings suggest that young people have distinct personal behaviour in terms of self-development and autonomy
because they have a high interest in personal growth and financial independence that can be attributed to the current
complicated social and economic situation in the country. Self-comparing relationships (uncertain sense of personal identity,
distinct level of heteronomy) are negatively linked to patriotism and freedom of speech, a self-priority relationship positively
correlates with social change and fair elections. Both correlations derived from the study results suggest, that social activity
performed by the youth could both serve to meeting their personal interests and self-realisation as such, but also could serve
to the sound and humanely oriented change management via participation in political activities. Here the individual and social
goals could merge.
Regardless of economic hardships and challenges in civic education, the authors are convinced: in general,
Latvian youth is prepared to participate in the process of social change and engage in political activities aimed at
the diminishing of social inequality and promotion of social recovery.
Participation in a joint transnational study with a common methodology has helped us to identify and assess
the results in Latvia and to compare with the same performance of other European countries. Study findings at
the national scale proves the disturbing effects of economic and political realities, which prevents active
participation by young people is social life, as well as emphasises lack of humanitarian factor, as described
before, in citizenship education. The authors conclude that defects of actual democratic governance in Latvia
cannot only be compensated by citizenship education, they consider the inner strengths of younger generation
as potential for positive social transformation towards participatory democracy in the future.

9 The workdays and weekends of democracy in Lithuanian

young adults’ calendar
Introduction
The Republic of Lithuania has been a sovereign, independent country since 1990, although international
recognition of its independence did not gain impetus for more than a year, when the standoff with Soviet
aggression on 13 January 1991 served as a signal to treat this small Baltic country’s fight for independence
seriously and with respect. Fourteen lives were lost that day, but hundreds of thousands died during the first Soviet
aggression in the mid-20th century. Many Lithuanian citizens were detained in Siberian camps for decades or
were killed during the anti-Soviet resistance. This study critically analyzes the literature and presents the findings
of an international survey, with special emphasis on the responses of nearly 400 Lithuanian youths. The
participants were born after 1990, and their impressions, experiences, perceptions and interpretations have been
shaped in an independent, sovereign and democratic country. To capture specificity of their citizenship
engagement, we used the metaphor of ‘workdays’ and ‘weekends’ activity. On workdays, activity engagement is
high. Weekends are most often used for relaxation and activities focused on personal pleasure. The traumatic
stories recounted by older family members may have had an underlying impact on the contemporary adults’
attitudes, but recent developments, including IT-assisted networking, expansion of human rights and global
awareness, probably exerted a more profound influence on young people’s experiences and perceptions of reality
as well as their everyday or incidental citizenship action.
Facing the giant: a brief overview of recent history and the cultural context
Lithuania is situated on the Baltic Sea. The country has a temperate climate with full four seasons. Lithuania
2
covers an area of around 65,000 km and has a population of less than 3 million (2.793 million) (Statistics
Lithuania, 2020a). The majority of Lithuanian citizens identify as Catholic. After 50 years of Soviet occupation,
Lithuania proclaimed its independence on 11 March 1990, and it has been an independent state for more than
three 144 Vaiva Zuzevič iūte ̇and Beata Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz
decades. In 2004, the Republic of Lithuania joined the European Union (EU) with nine other countries. Lithuania is a
democratic state, and the Constitution of 1992 provides checks and balances for the Lithuanian government through the
separation of legislative, executive and judiciary powers. The Constitution guarantees oversight over the government’s actions
and free elections to municipal and state bodies. Very few violations of the electoral system have been reported, and voter
turnout in the last parliamentary (Seimas) elections during the pandemic reached 47.2% ( LR Seimo rinkimai, 2020). In
2019, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was EUR 17,464, and pre-pandemic GDP reached 3.9% (Statistics
Lithuania 2020b, 2020d). When the COVID-19 outbreak reached pandemic proportions in the first three quarters of 2020,
GDP decreased to 1.4% (ibid) (relative to the corresponding period in 2019), which was the lowest decline in the EU.
Lithuania is a relatively young country. It was first mentioned by name in 1009, and its statehood evolved in typical stages:
Lithuania was a conqueror who was defeated, it was conquered, occupied and regained independence several times. Today,
Lithuania has a functional democracy and a thriving economy, and it is a member of the international community with a clear
voice and a solid reputation. The Lithuanian population, however, (especially the young population) has decreased markedly
due to emigration, although this negative trend was somewhat reversed during the pandemic (2.7937 million in September
2019 vs. 2.7953 in September 2020) (Statistics Lithuania, 2020c). Lithuanian students do not score impressive results in
PISA (OECD, 2019), and the suicide rate remains among the highest in the EU (24 per 100,000 in 2019 vs. the EU average
of 10 per 100,000; Andrukaitytė, 2020). Therefore, even though Lithuanian citizens have many reasons to be appreciative
and grateful, there are many problems and challenges that need to be addressed.
Young people’s attitudes toward democracy play a key role in the continuity of statehood, and therefore, attention
within the expected (associated to generational attitudes) and also unexpected (e.g. emergence of IT for communication)
domains needs to be fostered. These issues are discussed in detail further on.
In this chapter, we examine young people’s engagement with the public sphere, looking at two issues in
particular. First, we assume that young people’s attitudes to citizenship and democracy differ from those of older
adults, which is something that can be expected in a dynamic social system. Second, we think that the way in
which young adults exercise their civic rights can be influenced by both expected (generational) as well as
unexpected factors. These factors can explain, at least to some extent, contemporary youths’ ideas about
citizenship and democracy in general. To capture this specificity, we used the metaphor of ‘workdays’ and
‘weekends’ activity. On workdays, activity is high. Weekends are most often used for relaxation and activities
focused on personal pleasure. Therefore, we will consider whether the activity of young people in the public
sphere reflects a high level of engagement Lithuanian young adults’ calendar 145
 (workdays) or is characterized by withdrawal or is incidental (weekends). It is only logical that the workdays and weekends
in a citizen’s democracy calendar may differ between young and older adults, but in some cases, these differences are
astonishing. The way democracy is perceived or defended or the way citizens exercise their rights can be analyzed from a
generational perspective. This approach seems logical in view of the history of humankind: numerous examples indicate that
the things that attract the younger generation’s attention cause utter surprise or even dismay in the older generation. Anti-
Vietnam war demonstrations or the protests staged by French students in the late 1960s are among the most illustrative
examples of the above.
Generational differences are expected, however, IT-assisted social networking, a completely new phenomenon that emerged
less than 30 years ago, is an unexpected factor that is characteristic of the current generation of young people. It may be argued
that this factor may explain the specificity of the way young adults engage in democracy. The educational attainment of young
adults is yet another unexpected factor that may account for intergenerational differences. In Lithuania and countries with
similar levels of development, access to education (including higher education) is almost universal, and their populations are
highly educated. The right to education belongs to the group of second-generation human rights which encompass economic,
social and cultural rights. The right to education is embedded in various international documents ( Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1948) and in the constitutions of many democratic states, and thus is recognized as a universal and a
constitutional right.
These factors, namely the emergence of IT-assisted social networks and the application of second-generation
human rights to education, help in better understanding the specificity of young adults’ civic engagement. First,
IT-assisted social networks are not much older than young adults because the Internet itself has only recently
celebrated its 30th birthday (Butrimė, Zuzevic̄iūtė, 2014). Second, gigantic social media platforms such as
Facebook that presently dominate young adults’ lives were developed some 20 years ago (a note regarding the
research timeline: the survey was carried out in 2019, and this chapter was written in 2020). Third, ample data
exist for analyzing the educational attainment of different age groups in Lithuania. In 2018, 55.6% of Lithuanian
citizens were aged 24–35, but only 23.8% of the citizens aged 65–74 had attained ISCED education levels 5, 6, 7
and 8 (Statistics Lithuania, 2020d). The above indicates that young adults are characterized by potentially higher
competencies than older citizens.
Current contexts – main challenges for citizenship in Lithuania
Two more issues should be emphasized in the current political context. According to a recent V-Dem Annual
Democracy Report (Lührmann et al., 2019), Lithuania ranked 29th globally (top 10–20%) in the Liberal
Democracy Index (LDI = 0.730) (on a scale of 0to 1, where 1 denotes the 146 Vaiva Zuzevič iūte ̇and Beata
Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz
highest LDI score). Various arguments and counterarguments could be proposed to debate the research methodology, but the fact that
35% of the global population lived in democratic countries in 2018 (13% in liberal democracies and 22% in electoral democraci es in
56% of countries around the world) indicates that Lithuanian citizens enjoy a privileged status. Lithuania is an electoral rather than a
liberal democracy (Dahl, 1994) (with a high rank in international comparisons) due to the mutual relations between judiciary,
executive and legislative powers and the fact that all citizens are equal before the law. In the last decade, numerous attempts have
been made to increase the transparency and accountability of the judiciary system and eradicate political corruption, resulting in
several pre-trial investigations and trials. These factors, however, could have had an opposite effect on the citizens’ subjective
perceptions. These incidents attracted media attention, and they could have disproportionately sensitized the citizens to the extent of
judicial and political corruption. Several measures were implemented to minimize political corruption, including amendments to
existing legal stipulations regarding financing and control of political campaigns (see: The Act on Amendment of Financing Po litical
Parties and Campaigns: Lietuvos Respublikos politinių partijų ir politinių kampanijų finansavimo bei finansavimo
kontrolės įstatymo pakeitimo įstatymas, 2013). These amendments strictly prescribe the entities and amounts eligible for
contributions.
Anti-corruption measures cannot be discussed at greater length due to space constraints, but they have probably
contributed to positive perceptions of the state and the quality of democracy, as evidenced by Lithuania’s rank in
the Civic Empowerment Index (CEI).
The Civic Empowerment Index (CEI) was developed by the Civil Society Institute at the beginning of 2020 (Civil Society Institute,
2020). The CEI appears to be a logical construct, considering the breadth of legal and educative actions implemented in recent years.
The Civil Society Institute (CSI) is a foundation representing the third sector; therefore, its findings may be considered lo w-biased, if
not bias-free, because unlike a government organization, the CSI does not have agendas to defend or promote its policies and
strategies. In 2019, Lithuania scored 39.7 out of 100 points in the CEI, which was the highest value since the first survey h ad been
conducted in 2007. Voter turnout in national elections, including during the pandemic, the depth and coverage of national citizenship
education policies, strategies and actions indicate that Lithuanians are willing to exercise their civic rights and participa te in public
life. According to the authors of the CEI report, this result reflects the growing potential of civic engagement. Lithuanian citizens are
increasingly aware that community and civic organizations as well as individual citizens can significantly influence public d ecisions.
The CEI score in this dimension increased from 55.2 points in 2016 to 61.2 in 2019. The mean score measuring Lithuanian citizens’
readiness to solve societal problems increased from 34.3 points in 2016 to 36.8 in 2019.
Interestingly, an increase was also noted in the Teachers’ Civic Empowerment Index for 2019, which was
calculated separately based on the Lithuanian young adults’ calendar 147
 responses of 404 teachers. This observation is particularly important for our discussion. The mean CEI score
was much higher for teachers (53.7 points) than the general population (39.7 points). The teachers’ score was also
the highest in the history of the CEI, which could be attributed to the protests staged by the teachers’ union in
2018 and 2019, which led to the resignation of the Minister of Education and Science and received considerable
public support.
Education for citizenship: status and priorities
As previously mentioned, most social phenomena are influenced by numerous, sometimes opposing, factors, and citizenship
education is one of the factors responsible for the recent surge in citizenship activity in Lithuania. Article 3.1 of the Education
Act stipulates that the goal of education is to ‘instill values that enable each individual to grow as an ethical, independent and
responsible citizen, and to promote learning and patriotism’. Article 30.2 states that citizenship education is one of the main
areas of education, next to languages and sciences. The importance of citizenship education was further emphasized by the
National Strategy for Education 2013–2022. Article 7.1 stated that education in Lithuania should focus on strengthening
democracy, humanism, human rights, citizenship, respect for civil rights and dialogue.
On 19 September 2006, the Lithuanian Parliament adopted Long-term Citizenship Education Program
(Ilgalaikė pilietinio ir tautinio ugdymo programa, 2006). That document established detailed grounds for
citizenship education in formal and non-formal educational settings during the three main phases. Moreover, it
expanded the horizon of citizenship education beyond Lithuanian borders, by considering the educational needs
of Lithuanian families and children living abroad. The EU enlargement of 2004 enabled Lithuanian citizens to
take inventory of the status of democracy and respect for human rights, but it also resulted in huge wave of
emigration. The Citizenship Education Program set forth the actions and mechanisms for teaching Lithuanian
language, history and citizenship to citizens living abroad. Article 14.2 is of particular interest in this context
because it specifically identified the needs and rights of adults to language and citizenship education. Therefore,
the program offers a holistic approach to citizenship education. Moreover, it identified specific indicators of
success (Article 17.1), such as the turnout of young voters (aged 18–29) in elections and the percentage of
university students who belong to associations and self-governing institutions. Interestingly, there are 31
documents relating to the program in the official database of legal acts. These include the regulations of the
Minister of Education, Sports and Research regarding the organization of non-formal educational events, sports
and other events, which indicates that citizenship education is no longer constrained to the formal education
settings and is provided in various forms that may be more appealing for youths.148 Vaiva Zuzevič iūte ̇and Beata
Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz
 Interestingly, civic rights and citizenship activities involving young Lithuanians (and probably youth in other countries
around the world, in particular in the last decade) are initiated, planned and implemented using IT-assisted social networking
platforms. Lithuanian youths organized an event to support the BLM movement and joined the like-minded international
community (Šakytė, 2020). Numerous campaigns and protests for animal rights were staged throughout the country, and
some events clashed with the law ( Petkevic̄iūtė, 2020). These and other grassroots events were organized horizontally via
IT-assisted tools, without much, if any, centralized input. It may be argued that IT-assisted social networks have sufficient
impact to cause a paradigm shift. Decades ago, Kuhn (as cited by Mitchell, 2016) proposed the ‘paradigm shift’ concept to
describe the accumulation of incremental changes that lead to a profound change. The changes spill over the dam of existing
and recognized rules, understandings and theories; therefore, the established rules have to be abandoned and new ones have to
be formulated to understand and interpret the reality. IT-assisted social networks became deeply embedded in young people’s
lives, including in their citizenship activity.
According to Šlapkauskas (2006), well-informed citizens who are aware of their civic rights and show social initiative
are the building blocks of contemporary democracies because individuals are the smallest but crucial elements of a self-
governing society. Societal development hinges on individual development but democratic freedoms are intrinsically related
to mutual respect between individuals and society. The notion that societal and individual development is a reciprocal process
has also gained traction in Lithuania in recent years. The concept of a ‘well-informed’ citizen, however, requires further
analysis. Despite the fact that the educational attainment of Lithuanians is much higher than ever before, contemporary youth
build its reality based on the body of knowledge that is acquired in both formal and informal settings, often via IT-assisted
social networking.
Today, decentralized, non-institutional and peer-based decision making is more possible than ever before because
citizens and residents can communicate directly via IT-assisted social networking platforms. Due to the lack of informed
and balancing input, however, the resulting decisions can overreach and even overstep legal boundaries both
internationally and nationally, even if legal measures are undertaken to curtail these attempts.
The survey for our was designed and conducted by an international team of researchers in 2019, and it enabled
the identification of contemporary youths’ perceptions of democracy and citizenship (See Chapter 3 for details).
Attempts were made to answer the following three questions:

1) Do young people observe changes in the status of democracy in Lithuania and to what extent?
2) To what extent young people are citizenship active?
3) Is young people’s perception of democracy status correlated with their citizenship activity?

Conclusions
To sum up, it is worth noting that despite certain misgivings, the general score on citizenship and its dimensions indicates
that the majority of Lithuanian youths have an interest in being citizens, performing civic duties and exercising their
civic rights. This encouraging result could be attributed to the fact that a large proportion of the respondents were
university students or graduates majoring in social sciences, including the law. Individuals who choose professions that
are related to community service and the observance of rule of law may adopt a more sensitive and responsible approach
to public affairs.
The study also demonstrated, however, that the theoretical readiness (workdays) to become engaged in
citizenship activity differs from the willingness to initiate or at least support change (weekends). Most
respondents declared theoretical support for political and social issues. The youth in our survey, however, had
a more relaxed approach to direct ‘here and now’ involvement and action which received notably lower scores.
Therefore, while the results are somewhat encouraging and, as noted by the V-Dem Annual Democracy Report
(Lührmann et al., 2019), offer a glimpse of hope, many issues still need to be addressed. Due to the reversed
perspective of young Lithuanian’s citizenship calendar, where a workday denotes theoretical readiness and the
weekend-specific action, the challenges for democracy and, in particular, citizenship education remain at the
forefront of the educators’ democracy calendar.

10 Citizenship activity of young Ukrainians

Democracy and human rights challenges
Introduction
Ukraine is characterized by a long-lasting struggle for its independence and at the same time striving for democracy. The first
constitution of Ukraine was adopted in 1710. Modern citizenship activity in Ukraine is deeply rooted in the history of the state.
In modern Ukraine, escalation of protest revolutionary activity took place in 2004 without any territorial changes. In 2014
Crimea, a part of Ukraine was annexed by the Russian Federation and there was a loss of control over part of the territory in
the East of Ukraine. In 2022 Ukraine came under attack again from an unprovoked Russian invasion. These earlier revolutions
started with the violation of human rights values that can be considered as citizenship values. Youth striving for the
Eurointegration of Ukraine can use different citizenship actions, as happened in 2014, to influence the defense of democratic
principles. In this context, citizenship education is considered to play an important role in the formation of citizenship values
and citizenship activity skills among young people seeking to defend democracy.
Development of human rights awareness is described in the chapter as an essential component of citizenship
education. The rise of nationalism after the revolutions is reflected in the education system. At present, there are
two concepts which are in force at the same time: the concept of development of citizenship education and the
concept of national patriotic upbringing. A citizenship identity model containing citizenship values, citizenship
attitudes, citizenship activity and behavior in particular situation of interaction is presented in this chapter. The
chapter describes the results of empirical research related to the perception of democracy and citizenship activity
among young Ukrainians. The issues of gender and age are highlighted in the chapter. So too the role of informal
citizenship education programs that are described as necessary to accompany formal citizenship education
programs in modern Ukraine.
Geography, history and cultural context of Ukraine with focus on citizenship
Modern Ukraine is the second-largest country by area in Europe. In 2014, the population was 45.4 million;
however, it has declined dramatically in Citizenship activity of young Ukrainians 161
recent years. Today, as the population of Donbas and Crimea has been excluded the population has decreased. In
addition, since about 2015, there has been a growing number of workers migrating from Ukraine to the European
Union (Держстат України, 2020).
The history of Ukraine has been and continues to be devoted to the struggle for state independence. There are three periods
of history when the territory of Ukraine was independent. The Christian period involved the development of the state of Kyivan
Rus (from the 9th to 12th century), Zaporizhian Sich (the 16th and 18th century). The Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) and
West Ukrainian National Republic (WUNR) were established in 1918–1919. These are entities that pre-formed Ukrainian
national and culture and identification ( Hrushevsky, 2018). Flag as a symbol of Ukraine (the yellow–blue flag of the
Kingdom of Galicia–Volhynia) was used in the 12th century and then used by Zaporizhian Sich during the 16th – 18th
centuries. Tryzub as the Coat of arms (Sign of the Princely State of Volodymyr the Great in the 11th century) had its roots in
these periods.
There are several stages in the history of Ukraine that influenced the formation of citizenship activity and
freedoms.
First, the influence of the period of Kyivan Rus in historical sources is primarily associated with the formation of
documented civil and family law, property rights including inheritance (Hrushevsky, 2018; Кульчицький, Настюк,
Тищик, 1996). Thus, the relationship between inheritance and property has a long legal history.
Second, from the 13th century to the first half of the 20th century, the territory of Ukraine was divided between the
Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria-Hungary, the Crimean Khanate, the Ottoman Empire and Russia.
Therefore, the modern history of Ukraine emphasizes that the prototype of a modern independent state was the period
of 1648–1657: the uprising of the Cossacks against Polish rule and the foundation of the Hetmanate ( Hrushevsky,
2018). For modern citizenship consciousness, the period of Hetmanate is the basis for the structure of administrative
management and voting.
Third, the cultural concept of the Ukrainian nation and civil liberties was formed by the ideals of the Ukrainian
National Revival at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. The process of conceptualization
of the nation was connected to cultural and political events. These included the publication in 1798 of Eneyida by
Ivan Kotlyarevsky in the modern Ukrainian language by 1798 and the declaration by the Supreme Ruthenian
Council (1848) that Galician Ruthenians were part of the bigger Ukrainian nation (Одрехівський, 2018). From
the point of view of citizenship formation, the publication of Eneyida can be compared to plays of William
Shakespeare which contributed to the development of the English language. The manifestation of 10 May 1848
by the Supreme Ruthenian Council (1848) declared the unity of all 15 million Ukrainian people and that Galician
Ruthenians were part of the bigger Ukrainian nation (Odrekhivskyi, 2018).162 Irina Bondarevskaya et al.
 Fourth, the first part of the 20th century was a period of significant manifestations of citizenship activity and freedoms on
the territory of Ukraine. First, it was the period of the civil war after the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917 leading to the
creation of the people’s republics (UPR, WUPR), anarchist movements during the civil war of 1917–1921 and the formation
of the Bolshevik revolution committees. These political currents differed radically in their ideas regarding civil liberties,
electoral law, internal political structure and foreign policy relations ( Зозуля, 2017). At the same time, after 1920, the Soviet
period in Ukrainian history was marked by the policy of Ukrainization and the formation of Ukrainian identity. This period
features the rise of Ukrainian prose and poetry, translations into Ukrainian and formation of a Ukrainian avant-garde. It should
be emphasized, however, that by the end of the 1920s, the Soviet government began mass persecutions and repressions, called
the “Executed Renaissance” (Mace, 1983). Russian oppression is not a new feature of Ukrainian existence.
If the four periods are considered as the historical context for formation of citizenship activity, we might assume a cause-
and-effect relationship between rise of citizenship activity in the political and cultural context and subsequent repressions and
persecutions. On one hand, activists were persecuted for their citizenship activity but at the same time, oppositional citizenship
activity was considered as a realistic basis for statehood, law and culture. Long-lasting struggle for independence of the Ukraine
formed citizenship resistance behavior which can be observed among activists in all spheres till nowadays. The system of
education is considered as one the most important spheres through which citizenship consciousness is formed.
In the Soviet period of Ukrainian citizenship activity development, several milestones should be highlighted. The movement
of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Western Ukraine in the 1940–1950s, activity of Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
(UHHRU or Ukrainian Association of Civic Organizations “Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union”) and cultural dissidence
in the 1960–1980s. The first demonstrates an armed civil protest against the imposition of Soviet policy. Notwithstanding
persecution and punishment by the authorities, human rights advocates did not cease. The third testifies to the legal and cultural
protest against the hegemony of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of citizenship activity in this historical period.
In our opinion, the movements mentioned above formed the foundation of modern citizenship activity from the
period of Soviet perestroika to the present day. Мордовець (2014), following surveys by the Razumkov Center
emphasized cyclical ups and downs of citizenship activity. There was the upsurge cycle during the perestroika
period (late 1980s–early 1990s) followed by the upsurge cycle of politicization of discontent between 1991 and
1993. There was then a cycle of citizenship activity decline and a gap between protest potential and belief in
possibility to influence current government, 1993–2003. This was followed by a cycle of growing citizenship
activity of protest associated with the presidential electoral process of 2004, for example, actions such “Ukraine
without Kuchma”, “Rise up, Ukraine”, protests known as “Orange Revolution”. Citizenship activity of young
Ukrainians 163
 This was followed by a stage of the post-revolutionary cycle of decline in citizenship activity “as a reaction to
unfulfilled hopes” (2004–2008) a cycle of growth of citizenship activity in “a passive-democratic type of political
culture” (2008–2012), escalation of protest revolutionary activity (November 2013– February 2014). A new wave of
heightened citizenship activity continues to develop in opposition to the Russian invasion of 2022.
On the one hand, it should be emphasized that strikes and demonstrations had little influence on the government
resulting in the decline in citizenship protest activity in the modern history of Ukraine. On the other hand, the
mechanism that catalyzed citizenship protest activity is inconsistent internal and international policy and increased
level of expectations from the new government (Мордовець, 2014).
At the same time, during the term of the last two Presidents, Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelensk citizenship
activity of Ukrainians acquired a new form – online. According to Бойко (2018), the overwhelming majority of citizens
today engage in citizenship activity online: obtaining socio-political information, interaction with authorities (e-
services, e-requests), civic polemics on socially significant issues, public control of authorities (ProZorro, e-declarations
of officials). Transition to the digital format of citizenship activity has also transformed peculiarities of freedom of
speech and press, distribution of materials, formats of protests and citizenship activity.
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that the history of Ukraine has been used as a powerful tool of pro-Russian
propaganda for a very long period of time. Lack of interest in the history of Ukraine as a result of such propaganda
was demonstrated empirically in 2017 with a sample of pupils aged 11, 14 and 17 years old (Bondarevskaya,
Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz, Bondar, 2017). At present much work is done by Ukrainian historians and representatives
of NGOs to reconstruct historical narratives and popularize them not only in the education system but also by
means of multiple channels. Every message of pro-Russian propaganda is deeply analyzed and contradicted by
counter-arguments (Yermolenko, 2019).
Current challenges for citizenship activity and priorities for education
On 16 June 2015, the “Concept of national patriotic upbringing” was signed by the Minister of Education and
Science of Ukraine (Міністерство Освіти і Науки України, 2015). The current “Concept of development of
citizenship education in Ukraine” was adopted by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 3 October 2018, when
Ukraine joined global priorities in education for citizenship (Кабінет Міністрів України Розпорядження, 2018).
It is focused on citizenship learning based on national values and general human values:

Formation of responsible attitude toward the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, provision of
security and awareness of personal and state interests’ unity, formation of skills which are necessary for 164
Irina Bondarevskaya et al.
 active participation in democratic life and free society are important elements of citizenship education which
are aimed at promotion and defense of democracy and rule of law as well as development of national identity
which anticipates fixing of functioning of state language in all spheres of social life including respect and
development of all national minorities and indigenous people who live in the territory of Ukraine languages.

The document reflects the values of citizenship education, citizenship competences, tasks of citizenship education,
principles of the concept realization and main expected results on all levels and types of education:

System of citizenship education covers all components of education, levels and degrees of education,
institutions and other subjects of educational activity, participants of educational process, governing bodies
in the sphere of education as well as legal regulations between them.

Universal principles of human rights and democracy are built into the concept and these are reflected in formal, non-
formal and informal types of education on all levels of education from pre-school to adult education. The importance
of cooperation between formal education and NGOs is underlined in the context of citizenship competences acquisition.
Citizenship education plays an important role in citizenship identity (membership in civil society) formation. The citizenship
identity concept is becoming more and more important in the context of current political processes that result in the formation
of multicultural societies with the necessity to adopt some general social identity. Citizenship identity can be considered as a
type of social identity co-existing in the system of social identities with other social identities like gender identity, professional
identity, regional identity, ethnic identity and so on. It consists of meaning content, citizenship activity in which it is r evealed
and behavior in particular situation of interaction. That is to say, citizenship values, citizenship attitudes, citizenship activity
and behavior in particular situation of interaction are components of citizenship identity. The relationship between these
components of citizenship identity is shown on Figure 10.1.
Meaningful content includes a system of citizenship values (non-discriminative values connected with human
rights) and citizenship attitudes. While citizenship values lie at the center (the most stable component), citizenship
attitudes (more apt to changes) lie in the layer next to the center. The third layer, citizenship activity, is even more
apt to changes than the previous ones. The outer layer, behavior in concrete situation, is the most apt for changes
(Bondarevskaya, 2016). This model visualizes interconnection between citizenship values and citizenship activity
which is largely directed by citizenship values. Revolutions in independent Ukraine of the 21st century started
from the violation of citizenship values which resulted in quick rise of citizenship activity.Citizenship activity of
young Ukrainians 165
 In the context of citizenship education and citizenship identity, it is worth mentioning the all-Ukrainian survey on human
rights conducted by the Human Rights Information Centre and Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation with support
from UNDP Ukraine and the Ombudsperson’s Office in 2017 (Pechonchyk, 2017). The main results of this research reflected
citizenship values, citizenship attitudes and citizenship activity which correspond the citizenship identity model in Figure
10.1. They showed that basic human rights, such as freedom (80 %), security (70 %), justice (70 %) and dignity (60 %),
received the highest scores. Values with the lowest scores, and appearing in the rating’s bottom, were patriotism (38 %) and
tolerance (25 %). The overall high score for “freedom”, however, may be questioned. When respondents were offered to rate
what was of a higher priority – freedom or welfare – the opinion split was almost equal. One-third of respondents expressed
readiness to give up some of their rights for the sake of welfare, another third of respondents expressed willingness to tolerate
material difficulties for the sake of preserving their rights, while the remaining third could not decide.
In the aforementioned study, interesting attitudes to discrimination, important in the context of citizenship
education, were identified. Over half of Ukrainians (almost 60%) recognized the presence of discrimination in
society and 40% had experienced discrimination personally. Among the most frequently noted issues were age
discrimination (mentioned by 37%) and
Figure 10.1 Citizenship identity model (Bondarevskaya, 2016). Behavior in particular situation Citizenship behavior Citizenship
attitudes Citizenship values166 Irina Bondarevskaya et al.
 discrimination of people with disabilities (33%). Between 1/4 and 1/5 of respondents identified discrimination
based on the property status, sexual orientation, gender, health and political views (Pechonchyk, 2017).
Citizenship activity is very often connected to protection of human rights. The survey results demonstrated a clear lack of
trust in authorities, especially with regard to courts and law enforcement agencies. For 28% of respondents, the media are
important in the effective protection of human rights. Only interviewed human rights advocates and judges did not rank the
media as a priority choice, while teachers, law enforcers and public officials considered the media as the most effective means
of rights protection in the country. After appealing to the mass media, Ukrainians defined complaining to the European Court
of Human Rights (19% of respondents), asking family for help, looking for useful contacts and appealing to court (16% of
respondents for both) as the most effective means of rights protection. At the same time, about 19% of respondents believed
that there were no effective means of protecting human rights in Ukraine, and almost 15% did not answer this question. On
the other hand, over 54% of respondents had not attempted to protect their rights, and therefore their attitude was not based on
their personal experience. Only 46% of Ukrainians tried to protect their rights in case of their violations.
Among the ways of protection that were used in practice to protect their rights, respondents most often mentioned social
ties, i.e. relatives and friends (29%) and appealing to court (it was used by about 26%). Other possibilities listed as the best
ways to protect the rights were: appeals to the police (20% of cases) and appeals to local authorities (about 17% of cases). The
level of success in protecting their rights was often low. If we consider only those respondents who faced a violation of their
rights and have made efforts to protect them, only about 36% said that such protection in most cases was successful, while
about 64% said that most of the results of this struggle were unsatisfactory. The younger, wealthier and better educated people
are more likely to protect their rights actively, though even among them less than a half were successful in defending their
rights (Pechonchyk, 2017).
The results of this survey demonstrated the social context in which citizenship education is to be developed in
Ukraine. It showed the background for the necessity of both formal and informal education to focus more on
human rights values which are also citizenship values, human rights attitudes which are citizenship attitudes and
legal actions for human rights protection which is one of the directions of citizenship activity. Education and
especially citizenship education is responsible for development of non-discriminative values among young people
and by doing that overcoming discriminating stereotypes which are very strong in societies. Another important
issue that should be addressed in citizenship education is enhancement of knowledge and development skills in
legal protection of human rights. These two directions of citizenship education contribute to deep democratic
systemic changes rather than revolutionary changes the results of which can be unpredictable and not long-
lasting.Citizenship activity of young Ukrainians 167
 In the current Ukrainian reality, violation of human rights and democratic principles led to the rise of citizenship
activity which peaked during the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 and “Revolution of Dignity” in 2014. Yet both
revolutions led to the rise of nationalism and discrimination instead of human rights activity. Education is one of
the spheres which is affected by nationalistic politics that can reduce democratic freedoms. In our opinion,
education should be the first sphere for dissemination of knowledge about human rights and democracy. It was
for this reason that we focused our survey on current perceptions of democracy and intentions for citizenship
activity among Ukrainian students. The following questions were raised:

1) Do young people observe changes in the status of democracy in Ukraine and to what extent?
2) To what extent young people are active in protection of their rights?
3) Is young people’s perception of democracy status correlated with their citizenship activity?