Wa006.

RD
MAIMS 3 NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 1
TEAM CODE – TC 26P
MAIMS
3rd NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022
Before
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF HIMAL
In the matters of:
WRIT PETITION No. OF 2022
MR BLOOM …PETITIONER S
MR WATERMAN &
VICTIM X
Versus
THE UNION OF HIMAL & Others …RESPONDENT S
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S COMPANION
JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF HIMAL
WRIT PET ITION INVOKED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF HIMAL
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MAIMS 3RD NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
• LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................3
• INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................4 -6

• STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................................................................7
• STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................8

• ISSUES RAISED .....................................................................................................9
• SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................ 10

• ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................. 11-34
o WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF REVERSE BURDEN IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
VALID UNDER “SOC ACT”?
 What is Onus of Reverse Burden?
 Constitutional validity of § 29 and § 30 of the soc act, 2012.
• WHETHER THE ACCUSED MR BLOOM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND MORE

SPECIFICALLY RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN WITH RESPECT TO THE CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION ACT, 2022? o Right to Privacy o Right to be Forgotten
• WHETHER Mr. SARVESH SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF A VIOLATION OF THE

REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE ACT, 1951 FOR SUPOORTING THE VICTIM?
• WHETHER THE VICTIM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY? WHETHER THE VICTIM IS

ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION CONSIDERING BREACH IF ADMITTED?
• PRAYER ................................................................................................................. 36
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Full form
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
Art. Article
A.I.R. All India Reporter
All. Allahabad High Court
I.P.C. Indiana Penal Code
Cal. Calcutta High Court
Cr. L.J. Criminal Law Journal
Cr. P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure
Del. Delhi High Court
ed. Edition
Guj. Gujarat High Court
Mad. Madras High Court
POCSO Act The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences

Act, 2012
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
The Act The Criminal Procedure (Identification), 2022
The Constitution The Constitution of Himal, 1950

v. Versus

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

—STATUTES—
1. The Constitution of Himal, 1950
2. The Criminal Procedure (Identification), 2022
3. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
5. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
6. The Himal Evidence Act, 1872
7. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
8. The Representation of the People Act, 1951
9. Juvenile Justice Act (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
10. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3
—CASE LAWS—
Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India 2022 SCC OnLine SC

1098
Bagender Manjhi v State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi
2022/DHC/004326
Bodhisattwa Gautam v Subhra Chakraborty (Ms) AIR 1996 SC
922
Bhupinder v State of H.P 2003 8 SCC 551
Bijoy v State of W.B 2017 SCC online Cal 417
Coates v. Campbell 37 Minn 498
Dr. Manjula Krippendorf v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr

(2017) 15 SCC 133
Douglas V Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967
Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi 1981 AIR 746
Gobind v State Of Madhya Pradesh And Anr. AIR 1975 SC 1378
Gansu v. State of Chhatrisgarh 2017 KHC 2590
Gurmitt Singh Case 1996 2 SCC 384

Gangadhar Narayan Nayak @ Ganagadhar Hiregutti v. State of Karnataka & Ors 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 337
Ingirrampur coal co., ltd., and others v. State of orissa and others 1961 air sc 459
Jorawer Singh Mundy v Union of India 2017 10 SCC 1
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4161
Karthick Theodore v. Madras High Court 2021 SCC online Mad 2755
Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors 1963 AIR 1295
M Nagaraj v. Union of India AIR 2007 SC 71

M.p> sharma v. Satish chandra air 1954 sc 300
M.Chandramohan (M/48/2020) v. The Secretary, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs & Ors.
W.P.(MD).No.18733 of 2020
Maya Devi v. State of Haryana AIR 2016 SC 125
Name Redacted v. The Registrar General 2017 SCC. Online Kar 424
Nipun Saxena and Another v Union of India and others 2019 SCC 2 703
National Legal Services Authority v Union of India AIR 2014 SC 1863
Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration 1980 AIR 1535
Rajagopal and Anr. V State of Tamil Nadu 1995 AIR 264
Roberts v. Hopwood 1925 AC 578
Richardson-Gardner v. Eykyn 1869 19 LT 613
Rattiram and Ors. V. State of M.P AIR 2012 SC 1485

Sanjoy Narayan v High Court of Allahabad (2011) 13 SCC 155,
Selvi v State of Karnataka AIR 2010 SC 1974
State of Punjab v Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172
State of Maharashtra v Dilip Gajbhare, Special Case No 35/2014 (Bombay High Court).
State of Orrisa v. Sukru Gouda AIR 2009 Sc 1019
Satyapal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2018 4 SCC 800
Subash Chandra Rai v State of Sikkim 2018 SCC online Sikk 29
State through Supdtt., Central Jail, N.Delhi v Charulata Joshi & Anr A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1379

Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441
S. Subramaniam balaji v. State of tamil nadu 2013 ad sc 8 1
Union of India v. International Trading Co. 2003 5 SCC 437
V. D. Jinghan v state of uttar pradesh, air 1966 sc 1762
V. V. High court of karnataka 2017 scc online kar 424
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1935) ac 462
Yogesh Maral v State of Maharashtra 2016 (1) bomcr (Cri) 474
Zahira Habibbullah Sheikh v State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374
Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v. M/S Quintillion Business Media Pvt. Ltd. And others 2021 SCC
online. Del 2306
—BOOKS/COMMENTARIES—
1. M.P. Jain’s Indian Constitutional Law

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Himal has been invoked under Article 321 of the
Constitution of Himal (hereinafter “the Constitution”). The same has been reproduced hereunder for
ready reference:
Article 32.2 Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.—

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be
appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
*****
1 The Constitution of Himal, art.

32 2 Id.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. In Pelikan, a district in the State of Arya (Himal), on the unfortunate night of 12.06.2021, X,
who is the victim girl, is alleged to be sexually assaulted by Mr. Bloom, who is elder brother
of Master Lamy, while she was studying with her male friend Master Lamy.
2. On 14.08.2021, Mr. Bloom is alleged to have confronted her. It is further alleged that on the
basis of a video clip of her where she was semi-naked, Mr. Bloom allegedly asked her for
sexual favors and she was threatened with it being leaked. Mr. Bloom allegedly exploited her
for more than a month on the same threat.
3. On 18.09.2021 Victim X informed her parents about the incident. Her parents being enraged,
filed report against Mr. Bloom. It is alleged that after filing of the report, Victim X started
getting threats from Mr. Bloom but victim X ignored all the threats. It is further alleged that in
response Mr. Bloom released the compromising video clip.
4. The leaked video clip features the victim X and the presence of the eyes and palm of the
alleged leaker. On the basis of the report filed by parents of victim X, the police immediately
arrested Mr. Bloom and took his measurements as per the relevant provisions of the Criminal
Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022.
5. Mr. Bloom resisted and challenged it as a violation of his fundamental rights. He moved the
Supreme Court to enforce his right to privacy and right to be forgotten.
6. Petitioner Challenges his prosecution mainly on the ground that sections 29 and 30 of the
‘SOC
ACT” are unconstitutional and are violative of Articles 14, 19, 20(3) and Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
7. The MLA in the district Mr. Sarvesh offered financial Support to them and announced the
same to media. While on the footsteps of their house, he points to the party symbol placed on
his car and reminded them of the upcoming elections and where he is one of the candidates.

The opposing candidate lodged a complaint for violation of Representation of people’s Act,
1951.
8. The Supreme Court Has clubbed these petitions and ordered take-down notices for the leaked
video-clip on various porn websites. The victim X moved before the court for victim
compensation as well on both accounts of the offences as well as breach of privacy. Supreme
Court has given notice in the instant case for final arguments.
ISSUES RAISED
1. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF REVERSE BURDEN IS CONSTITUTIONALLY

VALID UNDER “SOC ACT”?
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED MR BLOOM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND MORE

IDENTIFICATION ACT, 2022?
3. WHETHER Mr. SARVESH SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF A VIOLATION OF THE
4. WHETHER THE VICTIM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY? WHETHER THE VICTIM IS


SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF REVERSE BURDEN IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID
UNDER “SOC ACT”?

The counsel for the petitioner contends that the § 29 AND § 30 OF THE SOC ACT, 2012 is
constitutionally invalid and does violate the right of defence of the accused. It is violative of Article 14,
19, 20(3) and Article 21 of the constitution of Himal. When the onus of burden of proof is reversed, it
creates a situation where the accused, now presumed guilty must adduce evidence beyond reasonable
doubt to prove his innocence and be granted an acquittal. It thus violates the right to remain to silent of
an accused which comes in the ambit of fundamental rights in the constitution. They are arbitrary and
are ultra vires of the constitutional provision
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED MR BLOOM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND MORE SPECIFICALLY
RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN WITH RESPECT TO THE CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION ACT, 2022?
The Counsel for the petitioner contends that the Petitioner has the right to privacy and right to
be forgotten in the criminal case against him with respect to the criminal identification Act,
2022 The right to security is maintained as an intrinsic element of the right to life and

individual freedom under Article 21 and as a portion of the opportunities guaranteed by Part
III of the Constitution as the constitutional provisions provides for the rights of the accused
under part III which are Fundamental Rights and the recent Judgements and precedents of the
Apex court highlighted the imperativeness and upholding that the accused person has a right to
privacy.
3. WHETHER Mr. SARVESH SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF A VIOLATION OF THE

The Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the Mr. Sarvesh should be held guilty of violating
the Representation of People Act, 1951 for supporting the victim as per Section 123 of the RP
Act, 1951, Mr. Sarvesh influenced the voters of the locality by the said money given in the form
of financial help and subsequent actions of reminding them about his re-election.
4. WHETHER THE VICTIM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY? WHETHER THE VICTIM IS

The Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the Petitioner has the right to privacy under Article
21of the Constitution and Mr. Sarvesh has violated it by disclosing the victim’s identity and
thereby victim is entitled to the compensation for the said breach.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
[ ISSUE 1] : WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF REVERSE BURDEN IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID

UNDER “SOC ACT”?
The Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the doctrine of reverse burden is constitutionally invalid under
“SOC ACT’
[1.1] What is Onus of Reverse Burden?
¶ India is classified as a common law country that runs with an adversarial system of trials An accused brought
to trial must be given a fair chance to be heard and cannot be presumed to be guilty of a crime till the
prosecution can prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is based on the principle that the accused is

innocent until proven guilty. In the famous case of Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions2, this
principle was referred to as ‘golden thread principle of criminal law’
¶ A reverse onus is ‘one that shifts the burden of proof upon the accused after prosecution proves the existence
f a foundational fact that leads to the shift in burden. This principle is referred to as ‘golden thread principle of
criminal law’.
¶ The § 29 AND § 30 OF THE SOC ACT, 2012 is based on the same golden thread principle of criminal law.
[1.2] CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF § 29 AND § 30 OF THE SOC ACT, 2012.

Since the very inception, reverse onus clauses have been subject of much debate and controversies. Some of the
contentions are:
¶ Violation of procedure Established by law:
In the Maneka Gandhi’s Case that right to life and personal liberty can only be regulated by procedure
established by law. The procedure should be just, fair and reasonable. In its doctrinal form, the reverse onus
clause is justified as one which serves its legislative purpose. The evidential burden that is the standard of proof
for the accused, when the onus is reversed, is raised to the threshold of a legal burden.
The burden of the prosecution is higher i.e. beyond reasonable doubt, while the burden on the accused is that of
preponderance of probabilities. But due to judicial discretion. These standards are getting diluted then the
procedure does not remain just. Fair or reasonable. This makes reverse onus clauses volatile of procedure
establishes by law.
¶Potential Abuse:
It is important implementing reverse onus clauses; they must be weighed against the compelling public interest
that they so deem to address. Often it is however agaist the compelling public interest that they so deem to
address. Often it is however seen that in order to achieve that public welfare, the legislation may create
unnecessary reverse onus clauses offences contravening the principles of equality in the eyes of the law3`, and
to extent, being ultra vires of Article 14 of the constitution5. Most cases registered under 498A4 and the
discretion of judges play a huge part on allowing the prosecution to discharge their burden. For instance, in
Maya Devi v. State of Haryana5, the prosecution could prove the basic fact of the meting out of cruelty on a
2 (1935) ac 462
3 Juhi Gupta, “Interpretation of Reverse Onus Clauses”, 5 NUJS Law Revie, 2012, PP.49-64, at
63 5 Article 14, Constitution of Himal
4 Section 498A, Constitution of Himal
5 AIR 2016 SC 125
preponderance of probabilities, giving great judicial discretion to deciding the limitation of time with respect to
the phrase ‘soon before death’.
¶ Self-Incriminating In nature
Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution, no person can be compelled to be a witness against himself. The scope
of Article 20(3) has been elaborately dealt with by the judiciary in many cases. Widening the scope of the
provision in the case of M.P> Sharma V. Satish Chandra6. The supreme Court held that the right against
selfincrimination included right to remain silent. In reverse When the onus of burden of proof is reversed, it
creates a situation where the accused, now presumed guilty must adduce evidence beyond reasonable doubt to
prove his innocence and be granted an acquittal. It thus violates the right to remain to silent of an accused
which comes in the ambit of fundamental rights in the constitution.
¶ Under the POCSO Act, Section 29 and 30 deal with reverse onus clauses and are stated as under:Section 29
states that whenever a person is prosecuted for committing, abetting to commit or attempting to commit an
offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the Act, the Special Court shall presume that the offence has been
committed, abetting or attempted to commit the offence unless the accused can prove to the contrary7
¶ Section 30 deals with presumption of culpability of the mental state of the accused with regards to any
offence committed under the POCSO Act until the defence proves it otherwise. Further, sub-clause (2) states
that the defence has to prove the innocence of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and not on the basis of
preponderance of probabilities8.
Both the Sections 29 and 30 of the Act should be held to be ultra vires of the Constitution as they violate the
fundamental rights of the accused and principles of procedural fairness under the common law where the
burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove the case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt11.
Until this is proved, there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused.
The prosecution which should prove the concurrent presence of mens rea and actus reus beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[A] VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY
6 AIR 1954 SC 300

7 Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012, § 29
8 Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012, § 30
11
V. D. Jinghan v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1762.
¶ Right to equality is one of the most basic fundamental rights as provided in the Constitution and it
encompasses both- Right to equality and equality of opportunity. The equals have to be treated equally.
There is no rational connection between ‘object and restriction’ as determined by the statute. The object of the
Statute is ‘protect children from sexual abuse and sexual exploitation’ and not increase the conviction rate even
if it is erroneous.
The Legislature was aware that there were chances of false accusation and hence had put Section 22 of the
POCSO9 which punishes the persons who falsely accuse the other of offences under the Act. The right of the
accused are also equally important and have to be balanced against the rights of the victim.
Even if the object of the statue is to secure justice and peace in the society or to secure interests of the public at
large, the Rule of Law demands that no person can be subjected to harsh or discriminatory treatment.10 Even if
the classification is valid in the interests of the public, the effect on the innocent accused should be minimal and
should not cause grave injustice to the accused.
¶ The result-oriented approach of the Legislature in this context is arbitrary and against the spirit of Article 14.
The Legislature cannot over include a particular class of accused without attaching any precondition even if the
society considers that offence greater than others. This is incompatible with the principles of punishment and
will lead to arbitrary decisions. The burden of proof in criminal cases is always beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such presumption rules out the burden on the prosecution in the very first instance and increases the burden on
the accused arbitrarily.
[B] VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION
¶ Article 14 pervades Article 21 and something which is not a valid procedure under Article 14 will
automatically not be a fair procedure under Article 2114 It is a settled law that the procedure established by law
that procedure, as interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, is in context of due process of law which includes
the presumption of innocence as an integral part of it. The procedure established by law which can be used to
curtail the freedom under this section has to be fair, just and reasonable, and non-arbitrary.
9 Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012

10 Rubinder Singh v Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 65
14
¶ Section 29 states that the Court ‘shall’ presume that the offences under section 3, 5, 7 and 9 have been
committed by the accused. The word ‘shall’ as oppose to ‘may’ puts an obligation on the Courts to presume that
the accused has in fact committed the offence.
¶ In Yogesh Maral v State of Maharashtra, the Court stated that the ambit of Section 29 is quite wide and due
care and precaution shall be used before applying it to any of the cases hinted towards its unconstitutionality.
The Court further stated that a plain reading of Section 29 would suggest that it is beyond the normally accepted
principles of criminal jurisprudence11.
¶ In State of Maharashtra v Dilip Gajbhare, the High Court of Bombay did not acquit the accused stating that
discharging burden of proof based on a mere preponderance of possibilities is not sufficient and accused has to
discharge his proof beyond a reasonable doubt12.
¶ Under Section 29, there is no guidance as provided by the legislature. In other laws, for instance, the Indian
Evidence Act and NDPS Act, the situation is quite different. The presumptions under these sections have a
precondition or some other condition attached to them.
¶ Section 113B states that the Court shall presume that the accused caused the woman’s death if the husband or
any of the relatives had subjected her to cruelty with regards to the demand of dowry. The statute uses the word
‘shall’ but is not capable of being loosely interpreted in fact again attaches a precondition to it which is even
strict that only when the woman would be subjected to cruelty in relation to demand of dowry.
¶ However, in the NDPS Act, it is the possession which is first proved due to which the presumption as to the
mental state is made. The essential difference between the two offences [under POCSO and NDPS Act] is the
fact that if there is no eye-witness of the offence under POCSO Act, the mental state cannot be presumed for a
thing which in itself has not been proven. In the NDPS Act, at least the possession has to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt because of which such presumption can be validly made and would not be unconstitutional
¶ The possibility of mistaken conviction and its consequences A mistaken conviction would unnecessarily
censure, punish and stigmatise the defendant and his rights13. While there might be numerous possibilities of
different incidents that can take place (positive presumptions); it is always difficult to prove the negative
presumptions of non-happening of any event. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault is rigorous
11 Yogesh Maral v State of Maharashtra, 2016 (1) BomCR (Cri) 474.
12 State of Maharashtra v Dilip Gajbhare, Special Case No 35/2014 (Bombay High Court).
13 David Hamer, The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing Act, 66 Cambridge LJ 142 (2007) p. 147.
imprisonment for a minimum period of 10 years which can extend up to life imprisonment and fine. ]As the
gravamen of the offence increases, the burden of proof increases proportionally.
¶ The right to a fair trial is an inherent right of the accused and its denial causes an injustice to the accused as to
the victim14 Presumption of innocence is one of the basic principles of the ‘Right to a fair trial’ which ensures
that the accused is not treated with biasness or any prejudice.15
¶ The pair of presumptions by not following this basic tenet of fair trial and by making it incumbent upon the
accused to rebut the presumptions with such high standards of proof leads to a violation of this right.
¶ Article 14 consists of the essential element of reasonable Nexus and intelligible differentia. The above implies
there must be reasonable Nexus for which there has been a classification or a differentiation, and that
differentiation can be understood. There is no legitimate link between the actus reus and mens rea in reverse
onus. It gives rise to grave injustices, as can be seen in the case of the NDPS Act, where the accused is held to
be guilty merely based on physical possession, and the concept of conscious possession is overlooked. The
reverse onus is insufficient protection for the accused because a basic fact may tend to prove a presumed fact
but not prove it beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, an accused could be convicted despite the presence of a
reasonable doubt if he is unable to satisfy the persuasive burden, which contravenes the presumption of
innocence. The debate that reversal of burden is violative of Articles 14 and 21 on the constitution of India is a
legitimate one; they cannot be used as a weapon to dilute the intent of the legislation.
¶ It is most humbly submitted to this hon’ble court that § 29 AND § 30 OF THE SOC ACT, 2012 is ultra vires
and in unconstitutional and should be struck down.
[ISSUE -2] : WHETHER THE ACCUSED MR BLOOM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND MORE
IDENTIFICATION ACT, 2022?
¶ It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that in the case of “Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India”20 the Hon’ble Supreme Court, rendered a landmark judgement upholding the fundamental right to
14 State of Punjab v Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172.

15 Zahira Habibbullah Sheikh v State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC
374 20 2017 AIR SC 4161
privacy and held, “the right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty
under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution” 16 and the Article 1717
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) states that: - “1. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks”.18 The states party to the ICCPR, as noted by the Human Rights Committee, have a
positive obligation to “adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to the prohibition against such
interferences and attacks as well as to the protection of this right (privacy).”19
¶ A- Right of Privacy: A prolonged journey of an intrinsic right
¶ It is brought to the esteemed attention of the Hon’ble court that the question, whether the "right to privacy" is
a fundamental right was first raised in the case of, “M.P. Sharma and ors v. Satish Chandra” 25the case involved
a challenge to the search and seizure warrant that was granted in accordance with Sections 94 and 96 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had held, “that the power of surveillance was not
against any of the constitutional provision” 20 and Hon’ble court refrained from giving recognition to right to
privacy as a fundamental right by observing that, "when the constitution makers have thought fit not to subject
such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the
Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right, by some
process of strained construction.”2122 And then in the case of Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors 28,
the Majority opinion in “Kharak Singh”23 went on hold to consider right to privacy as a fundamental right, the
minority opinion by Hon’ble Justice Subha Rao, recognised as an important facet of personal liberty and thus
Article 21 of the constitution of India by observing: - “It is true our Constitution does not expressly declare a
right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. ”30 In the
case of Gobind v State Of Madhya Pradesh And Anr. 24, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the police
16 Id.
17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49.
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ccpr.pdf
18 Id.
19 HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9(Vol.I) -
http://ccprcentre.org/page/view/general_comments/27798 25 1954 AIR 300
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 AIR 1295
23
Id. 30
Id.
24 Gobind v State Of Madhya Pradesh And Anr.,AIR 1975 SC 1378
regulations regarding making domiciliary surveillance, were not in compliance with the spirit of personal
freedom and accepted right to privacy, partially, depending upon a process of case-by-case basis and denied it
to be absolute in nature.
¶ It is brought to the esteemed attention of the Hon’ble court that in the case of State through Supdtt., Central
Jail, N.Delhi v Charulata Joshi & Anr. 25, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Article 19 1)(a) of the
Constitution of India which includes freedom of the press, is not absolute and that the press should seek
interviewee’s willingness and no court can pass any order if the person does not do so. And in the case of
Rajagopal and Anr. v State of Tamil Nadu33, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy observed that: - “right to privacy is
implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a “right to be
let alone”26. In Puttaswamy27, the Hon’ble Supreme court held that “In the context of Article 21 an invasion of
privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable.
The law must also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and personal liberty under Article 21.” 28
And provided a Three-fold requirement with respect to invasion of life and personal liberty of a person, and
held that, “(i) legality, which postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate state
aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to
achieve them; And States that, “Privacy has both positive and negative content. The negative content restrains
the state from committing an intrusion upon the life and personal liberty of a citizen. Its positive content
imposes an obligation on the state to take all necessary measures to protect the privacy of the individual.” 29
¶ B- Right of Privacy of the Accused
¶ It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the case of Selvi v State of Karnataka30, while dealing
with the validity of three investigative techniques: narco-analysis, polygraph test (lie-detector test) and Brain
Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) on the ground that they implicate the fundamental rights under Articles
20(3) and 21 of the Constitution, The Court held that the, “results obtained through an involuntary
administration of these tests are within the scope of a testimonial, attracting the protective shield of Article
20(3) of the Constitution”31 and stated that, “We must recognise the importance of personal autonomy in aspects
25 State through Supdtt., Central Jail, N.Delhi v Charulata Joshi & Anr., 1999 4 SCC 65
33
Rajagopal and Anr. v State of Tamil Nadu, 1995 AIR 264
26 Id.
27 AIR 2017 SC 4161
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 AIR 2010 SC 1974
31 Id.
such as the choice between remaining silent and speaking. An individual's decision to make a statement is the
product of a private choice and there should be no scope for any other individual to interfere with such
autonomy, especially in circumstances where the person faces exposure to criminal charges or penalties.” 32 And
that, “Forcible interference with a person's mental processes is not provided for under any statute and it most
certainly comes into conflict with the “right against selfincrimination.”41
¶ It is brought to the esteemed attention of this Hon’ble Court that in the case of Sanjoy Narayan v High Court
of Allahabad33, the Hon’ble court stated that freedom of press is not absolute and must reconcile with the the
right to privacy, the court observed that, “The unbridled power of the media can become dangerous if check and
balance is not inherent in it. The role of the media is to provide to the readers and the public in general with
information and views tested and found as true and correct. This power must be carefully regulated and must
reconcile with a person's fundamental right to privacy.”34
¶ It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that in the case of National Legal Services Authority v Union
of India35, the Hon’ble court with respect to right to dignity stated that, “Article 21 takes all those aspects of life
which go to make a person's life meaningful. Article 21 protects the dignity of human life, one's personal
autonomy, one's right to privacy, etc. Right to dignity has been recognised to be an essential part of the right to
life and accrues to all persons on account of being humans.” 3637 And Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi 46,
the Hon’ble court held that, “the right to dignity forms an essential part of our constitutional culture which
seeks to ensure the full development and evolution of persons and includes “expressing oneself in diverse
forms, freely moving about and mixing and comingling with fellow human beings…” 38 and in “Supreme Court
Advocates on Record Association v Union of India” 39, Justice Lokur Observed that, “The right to know is not a
fundamental right but at best it is an implicit fundamental right and it is hedged in with the implicit fundamental
right to privacy that all people enjoy”4041.
¶ It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the case of Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi
Administration50 ,the court highlighted the practice of handcuffing of the prsioners and held that, “the guarantee
of human dignity, which forms part of our constitutional culture, and the positive provisions of Articles 14, 19
32
Id. 41
Id.
33 (2011) 13 SCC 155
34 Id.
35 AIR 2014 SC 1863
36 Id.
37 AIR 746
38 Id.
39 (1993) 4 SCC 441
40 Id.
41 AIR 1535
and 21 spring into action when we realise that to manacle man is more than to mortify him; it is to dehumanize
him and, therefore, to violate his very personhood, too often using the mask of 'dangerousness' and security” 42
and in M Nagaraj v. Union of India 43, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court interpreted “human dignity as
being essential to and inseparable from human existence.”44
¶ It is brought to the esteemed attention of the Hon’ble Court that “The right to privacy is an element of human
dignity. The sanctity of privacy lies in its functional relationship with dignity. Privacy ensures that a human
being can lead a life of dignity by securing the inner recesses of the human personality from unwanted
intrusion. Privacy recognises the autonomy of the individual and the right of every person to make essential
choices which affect the course of life.”45
¶ C- Right to be forgotten
¶ The Right to be forgotten gives the right to have your information that is publicly available to people at large
get removed from different sources such as accessed online, engines, libraries, blogs, or any other public
platform, once the personal data in dispute is no longer required or relevant. This right has been recognised by
the European Union under the General Data Protection Regulation as a statutory right and has also been upheld
by various EU and English courts
¶ Today, the world is plainly under the grasps of social media. The foundation of an individual is evaluated on
the anvil of his/her presence at the virtual world. Google has become synonymous to “search” and it is perhaps
the virtual world that decides the credibility of an individual or an institution alike.The unparalleled growth of
information and technology had made us privy to the most intricate details of human lives – both good and bad.
The boundaries of privacy are blurring more than ever. We enjoy the latest controversies with a cup of tea but
have we ever thought what would things be like if we were placed in their shoes? Think of the most
embarrassing thing you have ever done, now conjure a reality where everybody in the world knows about it, it
is tough, right46
42 Id.
43 AIR 2007 SC 71
44 Id.
45 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4161
46 The Evolution of Right to be Forgotten in India, Sanjay Vashishtha, 2022 SCC OnLine Blog Exp 7,
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2022/01/27/the-evolution-of-right-to-be-forgotten-in-india/
¶ The personal information of an individual at this point not confined to just papers, official and government
records. It can now be easily assessed by an individual from anywhere around the world through web or search
engines. This incomparable change in both the nature and the expanse of personal information accessible online
is an underlining issue. An individual need not be grounded or an overachiever to be in the list items of Google
or any other search engine for that matter. “In light of the realities of our current digital world, it is important to
remember that not everything on the internet is desirable, especially for the people who are the source of
inspiration of that content. Any content can infiltrate borders and be viewed by an unbelievable wide audience
because of the Internet's far-reaching influence. This gave birth to a brand-new concept: The Right to Be
Forgotten. This right has far-reaching implications for hotly disputed and discussed Internet policies including
freedom of expression and online privacy. These concepts of privacy, as well as freedom of speech also
includes the ability to choose and determine the contents existence. As a result, if citizens' right to be forgotten
is recognised and granted, you can request the removal of specific web sites from search engine results, as well
as the erasure of personal data that you do not want to appear on search engines”47
¶ “Digital footprints on the web are used to create algorithms to study behavioural patterns and automate human
responses. At times like these, an individual can only have a small degree of control over personal information.
Besides, the right to be forgotten entails a delicate balance between one’s right to privacy and the right to
information in the larger public interest or for the State’s legitimate needs”48. Today, at this point it is not simple
to get away from one’s past when one’s personal information can be easily circulated around the web or stay on
the internet endlessly, accessible through speedy search results. For people who wish to start afresh, the right to
be forgotten remains essentially important and all the more necessary given the expand of our digital footprint.
The essential query that encompasses the commencement and nature of the right to be forgotten is: would it be
a good idea for us to reserve the right to be forgotten
¶ D. Evolution and judicial value of Right to be forgotten
¶ In 1998, Mario Costeja González, a Spaniard, had run into financial difficulties and was in severe need of
funds. As a result, he advertised a property for auction in the newspaper, and the advertisement ended up on the
internet by chance. Mr Gonzáles, unfortunately, was not forgotten by the internet. As a result, news about the
sale was searchable on Google long after he had fixed his financial issue, and everyone looking him up assumed
he was bankrupt. Understandably, this resulted in severe damage to his reputation, prompting him to take up the
matter to the court. Ultimately, this case gave birth to the concept of the “right to be forgotten”.
47 Waiting for Legislative Assent on the Right to Be Forgotten, https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5974-waiting-

forlegislative-assent-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten.html
48 More power to the right to be forgotten, Jul 23, 2022 07:39 AM IST,https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/more-power-
tothe-right-to-be-forgotten-101658509282031.html
¶ The European Court of Justice ruled against the search engine giant Google, declaring that under certain
circumstances, European Union residents could have personal information removed or deleted from search
results and public records databases. However, in 2019 the EU Court restricted the ruling only to the European
Union, saying Google does not have to apply the “right to be forgotten outside Europe”. The concept of the
right to be forgotten, also known as the right to erasure, is that individuals have a civil right to have their
personal information removed from the internet. Likewise, a traceable procedure must be in place to ensure that
removed data is also erased from backup storage media.
¶ India, at present does not have any statutory provision that provides for right to be forgotten (RTBF). The
Indian security system has seen an alternate wave with the presentation of the new Personal Data Protection Bill
(PDP Bill)[2] in 2018. The Bill envisages many changes with respect to data handling and security privileges of
an individual.However, the Bill guises to fetch in the right to be forgotten which is not accessible in the current
legitimate system under the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Information Technology (Reasonable
Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011.
¶ In simple terms, the “right to be forgotten” is the right to have publicly available personal information
removed from the internet, search, databases, websites or any other public platforms, once the personal
information in question is no longer necessary, or relevant.However, there is an intricate system envisaged
under the Section 20 of PDP Bill for setting off the right to be forgotten. The Bill articulates that the right can
be sanctioned only on the order of an adjudicating officer after an application recorded by the data principal.
Whereas, the choice on whether the right to be forgotten can be granted with respect to any information will
rely upon “the right to the right to freedom of speech and expression and the right to information of some other
citizen”.
¶ Keeping in view the laws of other countries, the European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) permit individuals to have their personal data erased, but the authorities noted that “organisations do
not always have to do it”.The GDPR provisions read like a master for the Indian PDP Bill and it further
expresses that an individual can look for the eradication of their information when “there are serious
inaccuracies in the data or they believe information is being retained unnecessarily, they no longer consent to
processing”.
¶ In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. vs Union of India58 the Supreme Court held that the Right to
Privacy is a fundamental right and it will be included in the Right to Life enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court observed that: the right of an individual to exercise control over his personal
data and to be able to control his/her own life would also encompass his right to control his existence on the
Internet. In Zulfiqar Ahman Khan v. M/S Quintillion Business Media Pvt. Ltd. And others 59, Zulfiqar Ahman
Khan demanded for the removal of articles written against him in news website The Quint. The Delhi High
Court observed the Right to be Forgotten and the right to be left alone as an integral part of individual's
existence.
¶ The Right to be Forgotten in India is handled by the Personal Data Protection Bill.2019 (PDP Bill) The Right
to be forgotten does not yet have formal approval in India. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled in the Justice
K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) v. Union of India60, 2018 that the right to security is a fundamental right.
¶ The Supreme Court declared the right to privacy a fundamental right in a landmark judgment in 2017. “The
right to security is maintained as an intrinsic element of the right to life and individual freedom under Article
21 and as a portion of the opportunities guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution,” the Court stated at the time.
When the legal administration enters Phase III of its major e-courts project, privileges such as the Right to be
forgotten should be inscribed into any innovative arrangement generated for legal information storage and the
board.
58
2017 10 SCC 1
59
2019 SCC OnLine Del 8494
60
2017 10 SCC 1
¶ With a more profound combination of innovation and information digitisation, a simple Google search may
provide a wealth of information about a person, potentially jeopardising an individual’s status and nobility as
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Many high courts have now expressly recognised the right
to be forgotten in their judgments, following international law on the subject. “Most importantly, justice Kaul
ruled that the right of an individual to exercise control over personal data and to be able to control life would
also encompass the right to control his or her existence on the Internet. “Humans forget, but the Internet does
not forget and does not let humans forget... People are not static. They change and grow throughout their lives.
They evolve. They make mistakes. But they are entitled to reinvent themselves and reform and correct their
mistakes,” noted the judge. Justice Kaul, thus, acknowledged the right to be forgotten as a facet of the right to
privacy — this right, however, would be weighed against other fundamental rights and larger public interests.
His judgment has since come handy for petitioners before several constitutional courts while seeking removal
of information about them from the Internet in exercise of their right to be forgotten”61.
¶ Jorawer Singh Mundy v Union of India62 An American citizen, namely Jorwar Singh Mundy, sought to
overturn the Delhi High Court’s verdict in a Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS
Act) body of evidence against him, in which he was cleared of all charges. He claimed that the judgement’s
internet accessibility constituted a blemish on his reputation. According to the Delhi High Court, the Right to be
forgotten allows persons to have data, recordings, or images about themselves removed from specified web

records so that web indexes cannot locate them. It was also mentioned that this freedom allows an individual to
silence earlier events in his life. Name Redacted v. The Registrar General63 The Karnataka High Court upheld
the Right to be forgotten while also recognising that this would be consistent with the practice in western
countries where this is a regulation. In delicate instances, such as assault or impacting the humility and infamy
of the individual concerned, the right to be forgotten should be preserved. Karthick Theodore v. Madras High
Court64 The Madras High Court held in the case that an accused individual is entitled to have their name deleted
from rulings or decrees, particularly those that are visible in the public domain and accessible through web
search tools. In
reaching its decision, the Court noted that it is the Court’s responsibility to protect people’s rights to privacy
and reputation until the Data Protection Act is approved by the legislative body. It went on to say that when the
council approves the Data Protection Regime, it should include an objective approach for dealing with requests
for the suppression of names of those who have been accused of crimes but have been found not guilty. In V. v.
High Court of Karnataka65, the Karnataka High Court recognised right to be forgotten. The purpose of this case
was to remove the name of the petitioner’s daughter from the cause title since it was easily accessible and
defame her reputation. The court held in favour of the petitioner and ordered that the name of the petitioner’s
61
More power to the right to be forgotten, Jul 23, 2022 07:39 AM IST,https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/more-
power-tothe-right-to-be-forgotten-101658509282031.html
62
W.P. (C) 3918/ 2020 & CM APPL. 11767/ 2021
63
2017 SCC. OnLine Kar 424
64
2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2755 65 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 424
daughter to be removed from the cause title and the orders. The court held that “this would be consistent with
the trend in western countries, where the ‘right to be forgotten’ is applied as a rule in sensitive cases concerning
women in general, as well as particularly sensitive cases involving rape or harming the modesty and reputation
of the individual concerned”.
¶ Noticeably, the right to be forgotten has now been perceived as a basic face of the right to privacy.The
Supreme Court had stated that the right to be forgotten was subject to certain restrictions, and that it could not
be used if the material in question was required for the—
1. exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information;

2. fulfilment of legal responsibilities;
3. execution of a duty in the public interest or public health;
4. protection of information in the public interest;
5. for the purpose of scientific or historical study, or for statistical purposes; or
6. the establishment, executing, or defending of legal claims.

¶ D-Right to be forgotten in respect of Criminal Identification Act, 2022
¶ The Criminal Identification Act, 2022 has infringed citizens’ fundamental rights by granting the State broad
powers to store prisoner records and conduct physical and biological tests with the implied force of law, which
is contrary to the rule of law and arbitrary in character. People do not lose their humanity while they are
imprisoned.
¶ The Supreme Court of India, as well as many other Indian courts, have reaffirmed this position in a number of
cases to ensure that prisoners do not become victims. Since then, the legislature has been unable to qualify the
intangible differentia and rational connection tests. As a result, it is a blatant infringement of the citizen’s
fundamental rights stated in Sections 14, 19, 20(3), and 21 of the Constitution of India49.
¶ The Act permits the collection of certain identifiable information about individuals for the investigation of
crime. The information specified under the Bill forms part of the personal data of individuals and is thus
protected under the right to privacy of individuals. The right to privacy has been recognised as a fundamental
right by the Supreme Court (2017). The Court laid out principles that should govern any law that restricts this
right. These include a public purpose, a rational nexus of the law with such purpose, and that this is the least
intrusive way to achieve the purpose. That is, the infringement of privacy must be necessary for and
proportionate to that purpose. The Bill may fail this test on several parameters. It may also fail Article 145051
requirements of a law to be fair and reasonable, and for equality under the law.
¶ The issue arises due to the fact that: (a) data can be collected not just from convicted persons but also from
persons arrested for any offence and from any other person to aid an investigation; (b) the data collected does
not need to have any relationship with evidence required for the case; (c) the data is stored in a central database
which can be accessed widely and not just in the case file; (d) the data is stored for 75 years (effectively, for
life); and (e) safeguards have been diluted by lowering the level of the official authorised to collect the data
¶ Clause 4(2) The Bill allows retaining the data for 75 years. The data would be deleted only on the final
acquittal or discharge of a person arrested for an offence. The retention of data in a central database and its
potential use for the investigation of offences in the future may also not meet the necessity and proportionality
standards which is a clear infringement of the right to be forgotten, as recognised by the Supreme Court in S.
49 The criminal Procedure Identification Bill (2022), Ministry Of home Affairs, https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-criminal-
procedureidentification-bill-2022
50 The Constitution of Himal, 1950
51 SCC 1
Puttaswamy v. Union of India68
¶ It includes preventive detainees as a category of the person whose measurements could be taken under the
provisions of this Act. Importantly, Section 3 has a safeguard appended to it – it excuses any person convicted,
arrested or detained in relation to any offence punishable under any law, except offence against a woman and a
child, from mandatorily giving their measurements. It is at the discretion of the offender of such crime to
provide measurements52. However, this proviso is said to be crudely drafted and, thus, prone to misuse for two
reasons. Firstly, it uses the word ‘may’ and not ‘shall’; therefore, it alludes to the discretion given to the officer
that he may compel a person to give his measurement. Secondly, the proviso only provides that the person
might not be obliged to give his ‘biological samples’, which effectively means that the proviso only extends its
operation in the case of extraction of biological samples and no other measurements mentioned in this Act;
hence, measurements other than biological samples could still be taken forcibly.
¶ Section 5 of the Act sanctions powers upon the magistrate, judicial or executive, to direct any person to
provide his or her measurements if he is satisfied that it is expedient to do so for the purpose of prevention,
investigation or identification of the crime.
¶ According to Section 6(2), if the person so directed refuses to comply with such order of the magistrate, then
penal provisions under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code (obstructing public servant in discharge of public
functions) could be attracted. It has been argued that Section 5, read with Section 3, has a neutralizing effect on
the proviso appended to the latter. The people who were given immunity to excuse themselves of not giving
biological samples under Section 3 of the new Act could be compelled by a magistrate under Section 5 to do so,
rendering the safeguard provided in the former Section a nullity. This Act is an example of the expansion of
powers to give a tough hand to law enforcement agencies for the identification and prosecution of crime.
However, in a democracy, expansion of power must be accompanied by augmentation of safeguards for
protecting the rights of the citizens.
¶ This Act sought to include ‘biological samples’ in the definition of measurements. At the same time, it is
unclear whether it includes DNA, polygraph test, narco-analysis, etc., which, until now, could not be extracted
from a person without his consent and free will. However, under the provisions (Sections 5 and 6, specifically)
of this Act, a person may now be compelled to provide such measurements to law enforcement agencies. The
refusal to give the same will attract penal provisions against the accused. Such forcible seizure of a person’s
52 Vulnerable to Misuse by Police, the New Criminal Identification Act Can Create a Surveillance State, 30/AUG/2022,
https://thewire.in/rights/criminal-identification-act-surveillance
sensitive data amounts to ‘testimonial compulsion’, which is in violation of a person’s fundamental right
against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the constitution.
¶ Apart from the Act’s upfront challenge to Article 20(3) of the constitution, it could also emerge as a threat to
a person’s freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution. Since this Act gives
vast powers to law enforcement agencies without providing adequate safeguards, it has a reasonable potential to
be misused to suppress the voice of dissent against the government.This effectively means that even the
slightest inconvenience caused to the government via acts of non-violent protest or through any forms of
dissent by various individuals or organisations like trade unionists, social activists, government critics, etc.,
could attract the wrath of provisions of this Act.
¶ Despite being aware of the prevalence of custodial violence in the country, the Act, in practice, would allow
police officers of lower ranks to brazenly use their coercive powers without adequate safeguards being
provided to the alleged offenders. It generates apprehension of misuse of powers by the authorities coupled
with the fact that even a person engaged in trivial crimes could now be forced to provide its measurements.
This contradicts Article 21 of the constitution, which is enshrined for protecting the person’s bodily integrity
and dignity. By mandating forcible seizure of measurements of a person, this Act goes against the essence of
this shield provided by the constitution and hence falls foul of a person’s right to privacy, which is an inherent
part of Article 21 of the constitution as declaimed in the Puttaswamy judgement53.
53 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4161

[ISSUE 3]: WHETHER Mr. SARVESH SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF A VIOLATION OF THE
1- It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that Mr. Sarvesh has violated the Representation of
People Act, 1951 for supporting the victim. The ‘financial support’ given by Mr. Sarvesh seems like a
bribe and freebie which is violative of the statute as well as the constitutional scheme. It is brought to
esteemed attention of the Court that the Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act,
195154(hereinafter referred to as, the RP Act), deals with the subject of corrupt practices. Section 123(1)
states that,“123. Corrupt practices.—The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the
purposes of this
Act:— 1[“Bribery”, that is to say—any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other
person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person
whomsoever, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing—(a) a person to stand or not to stand
as, or 2[to withdraw or not to withdraw] from being a candidate at an election, or(b) an elector to vote
or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to—(i) a person for having so stood or not stood,
or for 3[having withdrawn or not having withdrawn] his candidature; or(ii) an elector for having
voted or refrained from voting; the receipt of, or agreement to receive, any gratification, whether as a
motive or a reward—(a) by a person for standing or not standing as, or for 4[withdrawing or not
withdrawing] from being, a candidate; or(b) by any person whomsoever for himself or any other
person for voting or refraining from voting, or inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote or
refrain from voting, or any candidate 2[to withdraw or not to withdraw] his candidature.”55
54 The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act 43 of 1951)§123

55 Id.
2- It is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that Article 282 of the Constitution 56 only permits
defraying of funds from the Consolidated Fund of the State for “public purpose” Article 282 of the
Constitution reads as, “282. Expenditure defrayable by the Union or a State out of its revenues The
Union or a State may make any grants for any public purpose, notwithstanding that the purpose is
not one with respect to which Parliament or the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, may
make laws”74 read with Article 266(3), which states that, “266. Consolidated Funds and public
accounts of India and of the States -(3) No moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India or the
Consolidated Fund of a State shall be appropriated except in accordance with law and for the purposes
and in the manner provided in this Constitution.” 57 Article 16258, the extent of the executive power of
the State is limited to the matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has the power to
make laws. Likewise, under Article 28259, the Union or the States may make grants for “any public
purpose”, even if such public purpose is not one with respect to which the State or the Union may make
laws. Therefore, the funds taken out of the Consolidated Fund of the State can only be appropriated for
the execution of laws made by the
State, or for any other “public purpose”.
3- It is brought to the esteemed notice of this Hon’ble Court that the state raises funds through taxation
which can be used by the State only in discharge of its constitutional functions. The taxpayers'
contribution cannot be used to fund State largesse. While the taxpayer has no right to demand a quid pro
quo benefit for the taxes paid, he has a right to expect that the taxes paid will not be gifted to other
persons without general public benefit. The main intention of an act done for a public purpose must be
the public, and that the act would remotely, or in a collateral manner, benefit the local public is not
relevant at all.60
4- It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the case of Coates v. Campbell 79 the US Court held that,
Where the purposes of the expenditure are partly public and partly private, the courts in US have held
that the entire act must fail. Lord Atkinson stated in the case of Roberts v. Hopwood 80, “the State cannot
act in furtherance of eccentric principles of socialistic philanthropy”
5- It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the case of Union of India v. International
Trading Co.81, “Article 14 applies to matters of government policy and such policy or action would be
unconstitutional if it fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness.” 82 And further held that, "It must,
56 The Constitution of Himla, art.

282 74 Id.
57 The Constitution of Himla, art. 266
60 INGIRRAMPUR COAL CO., LTD., AND OTHERS V. STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS 1961 AIR SC 459
therefore, be held that a taxing statute is not wholly immune from attack on the ground that it infringes
the equality clause in Article 14, though the courts are not concerned with the policy underlying a taxing
statute or whether a particular tax could not have been imposed in a different way or in a way that the
Court might think more just and equitable. The Act has, therefore, to be examined with reference to the
attack based on Article 14 of the Constitution.”83
6- It is brought to the kind attention of the Hon’ble Court that the key element of Section 123 of the RP
Act84 is that the person must be influenced to vote in a particular manner. In the case of Richardson-
Gardner v. Eykyn85 it was held that, “the making of charitable gifts on an extensive scale would lead to
an inference that this was made to influence voters.”
7- It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashwini
Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India86, order dated 26.08.2022, observed while referring it to the
larger bench that, “Freebies may create a situation wherein the State Government cannot provide
basic amenities due to lack of funds and the State is pushed towards imminent bankruptcy. In the
same breath, we should remember that such freebies are extended utilizing tax payers money
only for increasing the popularity of the party and electoral prospects.” 87 The Hon’ble High Court
of Madras in the case of M.Chandramohan (M/48/2020) v. The Secretary, Ministry of
Parliamentary Affairs &
Ors.88, Observed that, “freebies vitiates the purity of election process and influence the voters, it should
be deemed to be a corrupt practice. It is not as if offers of money or kind to influence the voters by
candidates, alone can become corrupt practice and the polititcal parties which in whole sale manner
offer or lure by promising freebies to the people to vote for their respective party to power, cannot be
construed as corrupt practice. Whether it is done by an individual or by a party, it is definitely a bribery
or corrupt
79
37 Minn 498 80 1925 AC 578 81 2003 5 SCC 437
82
Id. 83
Id.
84
The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act 43 of 1951)§123 85 1869 19 LT 613 86 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1098
87
Id.
88
W.P.(MD).No.18733 of 2020
practice. Our democracy has stooped down to such a level that time has come to bring the political
parties which offer freebies to influence the voters for picking up votes also, within the scope of Section
123 of the Representation of the People Act.”89
8- It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu and
Others the court held that, “The provisions of the RP Act clearly draw a distinction between an
individual candidate put up by a political party and the political party as such. The provisions of the said
Act prohibit an individual candidate from resorting to promises, which constitute a corrupt practice
within the meaning of section 123 of the rp act. The provisions of the said Act place no fetter on the
power of the political parties to make promises in the election manifesto.”90 Mr. Sarvesh has violated the
Representation of People Act, 1951 for supporting the victim, as per Section 123 of the RP Act, 1951,
Mr. Sarvesh influenced the voters of the locality by the said money given in the form of financial help
and subsequent actions of reminding them the party symbol by pointing to the party symbol placed on
his car and reminded them of the upcoming elections and where is one of the candidates. Mr. Sarvesh
also announced his re-election campaign and promised that he will give money to all those victims who
come out with their victim stories, all thie clearly showcases the violation as held in the case of S.
Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu& Ors.91
[ ISSUE 4]: WHETHER THE VICTIM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY? WHETHER THE VICTIM IS
1- It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the victim is entitled to Right to Privacy. In the
landmark case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy. (Retd.) v. Union of India 92 recognised the right to privacy as
a fundamental right under the Constitution of India. The then CJ, Hon’ble Justice S.A. Bobde, with
repect to Right to Privacy, opined that, “The right to privacy is inextricably bound up with all exercises
of human liberty – both as it is specifically enumerated across Part III, and as it is guaranteed in the
residue under Article 21. It is distributed across the various articles in Part III and, mutatis mutandis,
takes the form of
89
Id.
90
2013 AD SC 8 1
91
Id.

92
2017 AIR SC 4161
whichever of their enjoyment its violation curtails.” In the case of Ms. Eera through Dr. Manjula
Krippendorf v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr. 61 the court dealt with the object of the said
legislation and held that, “On an avid and diligent discernment of the Preamble( of the said Act) , it is
manifest that it recognises the necessity of the right to privacy and confidentiality of a child to be
protected and respected by every person by all means and through all stages of a judicial process
involving the child. Best interest and well- being are regarded as being of paramount importance at
every stage to ensure the healthy physical, emotional, intellectual and social development of the
child.”626364 One of the major case through the decades of criminal jurisprudence around victim’s right to
privacy in this country has been Gurmitt Singh Case 95, where the court held, “that victims of sexual
abuse or assault were treated without any sensitivity during the course of investigation and trial.” 96 The
Court further held that trial of rape cases in camera should be the rule and open trial an exception
(gurmeet singh) and observed that “a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal
integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is
not merely a physical assault — it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer
destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female”.6566
2- It is Humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that Hon’ble High Court of Delhi held in the case of
Bagender Manjhi v State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi 98 held that the “The plight of a victim and the shock
suffered can be felt instinctively; as the victim of rape is left devastated by the traumatic experience, as
well as an unforgettable shame; being haunted by the memory of the horrific experience forcing her into
a state of terrifying melancholia. The torment on the victim has the potential to corrode the poise and
equanimity of any civilized society. It has been correctly said that whereas a murderer destroys the
physical frame of a victim, a rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female.”67 Furthermore,
while dealing with the issue of Section 327 68 ( in camera proceedings) the Hon’ble Court held that,
“Trial in camera would not only be in keeping with the self-respect of the victim of crime and in tune
with the legislative intent but is also likely to improve the quality of the evidence of a prosecutrix
because she would not be so hesitant or bashful to depose frankly as she may be in an open court, under
the gaze of public. The improved quality of her evidence would assist the courts in arriving at the truth
61 (2017) 15 SCC 133

62 Id.
63 SCC 384
64 AIR 1393
65 Id.
66 /DHC/004326
67 Id.
68 The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973(Act 2 of 1974)§327
and sifting truth from falsehood. … The courts should, as far as possible, avoid disclosing the name of
the prosecutrix
in their orders to save further embarrassment to the victim of sex crime. The anonymity of the victim of
the crime must be maintained as far as possible throughout.” 101
3- It is brought to the esteemed attention of the court that the Hon’ble Court in the case of Bhupinder v
State of H.P102 made reference to Section 228-A IPC103 and held that, “Section 228-A of the Penal Code,
1860 (in short “IPC”) makes disclosure of the identity of victims of certain offences punishable. Printing
or publishing the name or any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom
an offence under Sections 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or 376-D is alleged or found to have been
committed can be punished.”104
4- It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the instant case the victim is a minor and as
held in the case of Nipun Saxena and Another v Union of India and others 105 held that , “A minor who is
subjected to sexual abuse needs to be protected even more than a major victim because a major victim
being an adult may still be able to withstand the social ostracisation and mental harassment meted out
by society, but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so. Most crimes against minor victims are not
even reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a member of the family of the victim or a
close friend. Efforts are made to hush up the crime. It is now recognised that a child needs extra
protection. India is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child, 1989 and
Parliament thought it fit to enact Pocso in the year 2012, which specifically deals with sexual offences
against all children. The Act is gender neutral and whatever we say in this part will apply to all
children”106 further in para 37 of the same judgement the Hon’ble Court highlights the role of media
pertaining to cases like such and held, “No person or media can make any comments which may have
the effect of lowering the reputation of the child or infringing upon the privacy of the child. Sub-section
(2) of Section 23 clearly lays down that no report in any media shall disclose identity of a child
including name, address, photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood or any other particulars
which may lead to the disclosure of the identity of the child. This clearly shows that the intention of
the legislature was that the identity of the
child should not be disclosed directly or indirectly. The phrase “any other particulars” will have to be
given the widest amplitude and cannot be read only ejusdem generis. The intention of the legislature is
that the privacy and reputation of the child is not harmed. Therefore, any information which may lead
to the disclosure of the identity of the child cannot be revealed by the media. The media has to be not
only circumspect but a duty has been cast upon the media to ensure that it does nothing and gives no
information which could directly or indirectly lead to the identity of the child being disclosed.”107
101
2022/DHC/004326 102 2003 8 SCC 551 103 The Himal Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s.228-A 104 2003 8 SCC 551 105
2019 SCC 2 703
106
Id.
107
Id.
5- It is brought to the esteemed attention of this Hon’ble Court that as per Section 74 69 of the Juvenile
Justice
Act (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (Hereinafter referred to as JJ Act) enumerates the
‘Prohibition on disclosure of Identity of Children’, Section 74 70 of the JJ Act states that, “74.
Prohibition on disclosure of identity of children.—(1) No report in any newspaper, magazine, news-
sheet or audiovisual media or other forms of communication regarding any inquiry or investigation or
judicial procedure, shall disclose the name, address or school or any other particular, which may lead
to the identification of a child in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection or a child
victim or witness of a crime, involved in such matter, under any other law for the time being in force,
nor shall the picture of any such child be published.” 7172 The hon’ble Court in the case of Subash
Chandra Rai v State of Sikkim111 the court pressing on the level of sensitivity required in such cases held
that, “neither for a child in conflict with law, or a child in need of care and protection, or a child victim,
or witness of a crime involved in matter, the name, address, school or other particulars which could lead
to the child being tracked, found and identified shall be disclosed, unless for the reasons given in the
proviso extracted hereinbefore. The Police and Media as well as the Judiciary are required to be equally
sensitive in such matters and to ensure that the mandate of law is complied with to the letter.” 7374 And
this was unequivocally reiterated by the hon’ble court in the case of Bijoy v State of W.B.113
6- It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Section 23 of the POCSO 75 which states that, “23.
Procedure for media.—(1) No person shall make any report or present comments on any child from any
form of media or studio or photographic facilities without having complete and authentic information,
which may have the effect of lowering his reputation or infringing upon his privacy.(2) No reports in
any media shall disclose, the identity of a child including his name, address, photograph, family details,
school, neighbourhood or any other particulars which may lead to disclosure of identity of the child:
Provided that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Special Court, competent to try the case under
the Act, may permit such disclosure, if in its opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child. (3)
The publisher or owner of the media or studio or photographic facilities shall be jointly and severally
69 Juvenile Justice Act (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015(Act2 of 2016)§74
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 SCC online Sikk 29
73 Id.
74 SCC online Cal 417
75 Id.
liable for the acts and omissions of his employee. (4) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a period which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to one year or with fine or with
both.”76
7- It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that in the case of Bodhisattwa Gautam v Subhra
Chakraborty (Ms)77 held that, “the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional
crisis. It is a crime against basic human rights and is also violative of the victim's most cherished
fundamental right, namely, the right to life contained in Article 21 of the Constitution. The courts are,
therefore, expected to deal with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases
need to be dealt with sternly and severely.”78It is brought to the esteemed attention of this Hon’ble Court that
in the case of State of Orrisa v. Sukru Gouda 7980 and reiterated the same in Gansu v. State of Chhatrisgarh 119, held
that, “that non-compliance with Section 228-A IPC by the Courts would be indicative of judicial indiscipline by
the said Courts. Therefore, the Presiding Officers of the Courts must ensure that neither the name nor the identity
of the victim is disclosed in such cases. In case, there is any violation in future, the same shall be dealt with very
strictly.”
8- It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the case of Satyapal Anand v. State of Madhya
Pradesh120, the hon’ble Supreme Court ordered notice to be issued to a police officer who had disclosed
the name of sexual offence victim in an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court to show cause why crime
shall not be registered under section 228A IPC81. Ministry of Women and Child Development issued the
Model Guidelines under Section 39 of The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
issued on September 2013, under its chapter 2 titled, “General Principles for use of Professionals and
Experts Assisting the Child at Pre-trial and Trial Stages” laid down several principles to be followed and
one of those principles is the right to privacy, it is enumerated as, “i) The right to privacy–The child
‟sprivacy and identity must be protected at all stages of the pre-trial and trial process. The release of
information about a child victim or witness, in particular in the media, may endanger the child’s
safety, cause the child intense shame and humiliation, discourage him from telling what happened
and cause him severe emotional harm. Release of information about a child victim or witness may
put a strain on the relationships of the child with family, peers and community, especially in cases of
sexual abuse. In some cases it might also lead to stigmatization by the community, thereby aggravating
76 The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012(Act 32 of 2012)§23
77 AIR 1996 SC 922
78 Id.
79 AIR 2009 Sc 1019
80 KHC 2590 120
2018 4 SCC 800
81 The Himal Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s.228-A
secondary victimization of the child. There are two essential ways of protecting the privacy of child
victims and witnesses: firstly, by restricting the disclosure of information on child victims and
witnesses and secondly, by restricting the attendance of the general public or non-essential persons in
courtrooms.”
9- It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that as per the Article 16 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child82, which is read as follows, “Article 16 - 1. No child shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation. 2. The child has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.”8384 The said convention has been rectified by Himla and
puts an obligation on it to ensure the same. In the case of Gangadhar Narayan Nayak @ Ganagadhar
Hiregutti v. State of Karnataka & Ors. 124, the Hon’ble Justice Indira Banerjee observed that, “a child
against whom offence under Section 23 of POCSO has been committed, by disclosure of her identity,
may require special protection, care and even shelter, necessitating expeditious investigation for
compliance of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 19 of POCSO. POCSO not only protects children from
sexual offences but also protects the interests of children in general, as victims as well as witnesses. The
right of a child to dignity not only requires that the child be protected from offences of sexual assault,
sexual harassment and pornography but also requires that the dignity of a child be safeguarded.
Disclosure of the identity of a child who is a victim of sexual offences or who is in conflict with the law
is in fundamental breach of the right of the child to dignity, the right not to be embarrassed.”85
10- It is brought to the esteemed attention of this hon’ble Court that, the judgement of Sedley LJ in the case
of Douglas V Hello! Ltd.86, where it was said that, “What a concept of privacy does, however, is accord
recognition to the fact that the law has to protect not only those people whose trust has been abused
but those who simply find themselves subjected to an unwanted intrusion into their personal lives.
The law no longer needs to construct an artificial relationship of confidentiality between intruder and
victim: it can recognise privacy itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of
personal autonomy.”87
11- It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that as per Section 228A of the Himal Penal Code 88,
which states that, “228A. Disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences etc.—(1) Whoever prints
82 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3

83 Id.
84 SCC OnLine SC 337
85 Id.
86 [2001] QB 967
87 Id.
88 The Himal Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s.228-A
or publishes the name or any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom an
offence under section 376, section 376A, section 376B, section 376C or section 376D is alleged or
found to have been committed (hereafter in this section referred to as the victim) shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to
fine.”89 And as per Section 2390 and specifically Section 23(4)91 of the POCSO act which enumerates the
punishment for violation of the Privacy of the victim, as stated above and reiterated here again, “(4) Any
person who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be liable to be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a period which shall not be less than six months
but which may extend to one year or with fine or with both”92 Section 33(8)93 of POCSO provides that in
appropriate cases, in addition to punishment, the Special Court may direct payment of compensation to
the child for any physical/mental trauma caused to the child or for immediate rehabilitation. Pursuant to
the parent Act, the POCSO Rules of 2012 dedicated Rule 7 to the procedure and parameters of
providing such compensation. Rule 7(3) enlisted the various parameters/factors to be considered by the
Special Court in deciding such compensation, such as-gravity of the offence, expenditure incurred/likely
to be incurred on medical treatment, loss of educational opportunity, financial conditions, etc. Rule 7(4)
and (5) state that after the amount is decided/granted by the Special Court, it is to be disbursed from the
Victims Compensation Fund or such other scheme by the legal services authority within 30 days of
receipt of such order.
12- It is humbly Submitted before this Hon’ble court that in the case of Rattiram and Ors. v. State of M.P. 134,
the hon’ble court stressed on safeguarding victim’s right and held that, “Criminal jurisprudence, with the
passage of time, has laid emphasis on victimology which fundamentally is a perception of a trial from
the view point of the criminal as well as the victim. Both are viewed in the social context. The view of
the victim is given due regard and respect in certain countries. It is the duty of the court to see that the
victims’ right is protected.”94 It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Mr. Sarvesh has
vehemently violated the victim’s Right to Privacy under various statutes such as the POCSO, JJ Act,
Himal Penal Code and the Constitution of India and thereby causing her endless trauma and
incomputable harm which as the authorities cited above amounts to compensation, which the victim is
entitled for.
89 Id.
90 The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012(Act 32 of 2012)§23
91 The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012(Act 32 of 2012)§23(4)
92 Id.
93 The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012(Act 32 of 2012)§33(8)
134
AIR 2012 SC 1485
94 Id.
PRAYER
Therefore, in the light of facts and circumstances of the matter at hand, Petitioner most humbly pray that
the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to hold that:
1. The that the doctrine of reverse burden is not constitutionally valid under “SOC ACT’ and § 29 AND §
30 OF THE SOC ACT, 2012 is unconstitutional, should be struck down.
2. The right to privacy of Mr. Bloom i.e., Petitioner has been infringed by the state of Arya and,
3. Declare that the petitioner has the right to be forgotten with respect to the criminal identification
Act,2022.
4. Mr. Sarvesh should be held guilty of a violation of the Representation of people Act, 1951 for
supporting the victim.
5. The victim does have a right to privacy and is entitled to compensation considering breach.
6. Any other order(s) and/or relief(s) may be passed which the Hon’ble Court may deem just and fit as
per the facts and circumstances of the matters at hand, in the interest of justice. It is prayed accordingly.
DATED: 25.10.2022 Sd/-
PETITIONER
Through
Sd/-
COUNSEL
(Team Code – TC_26_)

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MAIMS 3 NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 1

TEAM CODE – TC 26P

3rd NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF HIMAL

In the matters of:

WRIT PETITION No. OF 2022

THE UNION OF HIMAL & Others …RESPONDENT S

WRIT PET ITION INVOKED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF HIMAL

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

• LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................3

• INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................4 -6

• STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................8

• SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................ 10

VALID UNDER “SOC ACT”?

 What is Onus of Reverse Burden?

 Constitutional validity of § 29 and § 30 of the soc act, 2012.

• WHETHER THE ACCUSED MR BLOOM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND MORE

• WHETHER Mr. SARVESH SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF A VIOLATION OF THE

• WHETHER THE VICTIM HAS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY? WHETHER THE VICTIM IS

Abbreviation Full form

A.I.R. All India Reporter

All. Allahabad High Court

I.P.C. Indiana Penal Code

Cal. Calcutta High Court

Cr. L.J. Criminal Law Journal

Cr. P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure

Del. Delhi High Court

Guj. Gujarat High Court

Mad. Madras High Court

POCSO Act The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

The Act The Criminal Procedure (Identification), 2022

The Constitution The Constitution of Himal, 1950

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India 2022 SCC OnLine SC

Bijoy v State of W.B 2017 SCC online Cal 417

Coates v. Campbell 37 Minn 498

Dr. Manjula Krippendorf v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr

Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi 1981 AIR 746

Gobind v State Of Madhya Pradesh And Anr. AIR 1975 SC 1378

Gansu v. State of Chhatrisgarh 2017 KHC 2590

Gurmitt Singh Case 1996 2 SCC 384

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Jorawer Singh Mundy v Union of India 2017 10 SCC 1

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4161

M Nagaraj v. Union of India AIR 2007 SC 71

Richardson-Gardner v. Eykyn 1869 19 LT 613

Rattiram and Ors. V. State of M.P AIR 2012 SC 1485

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Article 32.2 Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.—

1 The Constitution of Himal, art.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF REVERSE BURDEN IS CONSTITUTIONALLY