Category: RE MARRIAGE ANNULMENT

LEGAL ADVICE 0003: EVOLUTION OF JURISPRUDENCE ON ANNULMENT OF

MARRIAGE BASED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Filed under: RE MARRIAGE ANNULMENT — Leave a comment

November 7, 2010

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, PETITIONER, VERSUS ANGELITO SUAZO AND

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS (G.R. NO. 164493, 12
MARCH 2010) (PONENTE: BRION, J.)

EVOLUTION OF JURISPRUDENCE ON MARRIAGE ANNULMENT BASED ON

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS STATED IN ABOVE CASE

ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any

party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it

merely introduced an abstract concept – psychological incapacity that
disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage – without
any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We
must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological
incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
SANTOS VS. SANTOS (310 PHIL 21 (1995)

Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be

characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. It should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”[10]

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS, MOLINA CASE (335 PHIL 664 (1997). )

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as
follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It
decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be “protected” by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the

celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.[12]

Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic

requirements of Santos.[13]

MARCOS VS. MARCOS (397 PHIL 840, 850 (2000).

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows
that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability can be duly established.[15]

PESCA VS. PESCA (408 PHIL. 713, 720 (2001).

Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases
then already pending, under the reasoning that the court’s interpretation or
construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law;
the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND

ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (A.M. NO. 08-11-1O SC, 15 MARCH
2003)

On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC,
Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules
pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the
evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section
14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid
in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the
grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage
must be proved.

All cases – involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code – that
came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited
cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the
Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.

TE VS. YU-TE (G.R. NO. 161793, FEBRUARY 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193

Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family
Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by
so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the
Canon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so
designed to allow some resiliency in its application.[19]

Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is

consistent with that of the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis,

that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court’s judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was
not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the

resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set
of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according
to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the

abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely
looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

TING VS. VELEZ (G.R. NO. 166562, MARCH 31, 2009.)

The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Te’s lead when it reiterated

that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of
the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report
of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive
for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is
also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available.
Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of
a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court
during the pre-trial conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely

stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy
for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as
follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.

xxxx

HERNANDEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting

expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And
as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of

cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the
intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage;
that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception
of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she is about to assume.[25] It is not enough that the respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with
his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in
the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown.[26]
Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or
ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.[27]

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos’
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of
Santos’ continuing doctrinal validity.

THIS CASE: SUAZO VS. SUAZO

The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to establish Angelito’s

psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so
conclude based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we
were compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and
the appellate court’s appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn’s presented
evidence.

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s
alleged psychological condition.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion

evidence – the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological evaluation
report – that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court,
the psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an
indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given
the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied
upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due
care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party

alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence
holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While
such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all
instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For
a determination though of a party’s complete personality profile, information
coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the party’s close
relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application
of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not
totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion
based entirely on doubtful sources of information.

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager

information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured
a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness
of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the
Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity
exists.

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist’s report
and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported
anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this
disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These particulars
are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her
testimony.

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito’s personality disorder is

chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior
to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage,
as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this
declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion
on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional
family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologist’s own equivocation on
this point – she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have
realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is
highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn’s assumed knowledge of
Angelito’s family background and upbringing.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why

and to what extent was Angelito’s personality disorder grave and incurable,
and on the effects of the disorder on Angelito’s awareness of and his
capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more

important concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are
critical to the success of Jocelyn’s cause.

b. Jocelyn’s Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report

and the psychologist’s testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of
Jocelyn’s testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with
sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelito’s psychological incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely

testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek
employment and the physical beatings she received from him – all of which
occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony
that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be
indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the
earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged
physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly
took place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the
marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that
materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require
that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of

psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of
proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different

treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on women
indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence,
standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost
in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist
cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of
the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual
bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in
Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in
Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn’s main anchor in her present appeal with
us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the
CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and
the evidence of the present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62443. Costs against the petitioner.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, and concurred in by

Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and Associate Justice Santiago Javier
Rañada (both retired).

[2] Penned by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.

[3] TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 16-17.

[4] TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 15-22.

[5] Record, pp. 36-39.

[6] Parenthetical notes supplied.

[7] The RTC enumerated the requisites as follows: (1) that psychological
incapacity refers to no less than a mental not physical incapacity; (2) that
the law intended psychological incapacity to be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage; and (3) that the
psychological condition must exist at the time of the marriage and must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. See citation
at note 9.

[8] Parenthetical notes supplied.

[9] 310 Phil 21 (1995).

[10] Id. at 39-40.

[11] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).

[12] Id. at 676-680.

[13] See Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).

[14] Id.

[15] Id. at 850.

[16] 408 Phil. 713, 720 (2001).

[17] G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.

[18] Id. at 213.

[19] Id.

[20] G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009.

[21] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

[22] A step that Te, a Third Division case, could not have legally undertaken
because the Molina ruling is an En Banc ruling, in light of Article VIII, Section
4(3) of the Constitution.

[23] Supra note 16, pp. 231-232.

[24] Supra note 19.

[25] See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, and Padilla-Rumbaua
v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009.

[26] Id., Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua.

[27] Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272,
288-289.

Comment

LEGAL ADVICE 0002: Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a

job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. While we may concede that physical violence on
women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence,
standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Filed under: RE MARRIAGE ANNULMENT — 1 Comment

November 3, 2010
CASE: JOCELYN M. SUAZO, PETITIONER, VERSUS ANGELITO SUAZO AND
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS (G.R. NO. 164493, 12
MARCH 2010)

BRION, J.:

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

DOCTRINES:

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of

psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of
proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different

treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on women
indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence,
standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost
in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist
cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of
the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the Santos requisites.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

FULL DECISION

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, PETITIONER, VERSUS ANGELITO SUAZO AND

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS (G.R. NO. 164493, 12
MARCH 2010)

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the
July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No.
62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The
reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyn’s marriage with respondent Angelito
Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985;
they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship,
Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone
for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding
them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and
Angelito’s marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986
in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
Angelito’s parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelito’s relatives as
household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most
of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels
often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found

another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with
the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship,
she alleged in her complaint:

xxxx

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987,
their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused
unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because
defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a
troublesome encounter;

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the
defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking which makes
him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making
life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation
in fact in July 1987;

10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the
time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves
to be continuous, permanent and incurable;

xxxx

Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit

himself to a psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who
was presumably hired by Jocelyn).

The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano,
and the psychologist testified at the trial.

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition,

including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received from
Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations
but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before
they were married.

Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got
married?

A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe
his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?

A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature

before you got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

Q. Even to other people?

A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]

Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.

When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of
his behavior?

A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time
of the marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-social personality
Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently incurable (sic). This
disorder is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of

lying when I examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive,
coherent, relevant to marital relationship with respondent.

Q. And the last page of Exhibit “E” which is your report there is a statement
rather on the last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion
of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had already hit bottom
rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(’s)
immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the
possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the
diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality
Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his
capacity to provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family.
The disorder is chronic and long-standing in proportion and appear(s)
incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding and became
manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does
chronic mean?

A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there

long before he entered marriage apparently, it came during early
developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because

psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but to others particularly
and this (sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder do not know
that they have this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?

A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the
wedding or at the time of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?

A. Yes, ma’am.”

xxxx

Court:

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social

Personality Disorder (sic).

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any

employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is
clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder
(sic)?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that
they are suffering that kind of disorder (sic).

Court:

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to

the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more
often than not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).

Court:

Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.
Court:

Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent

(sic).

Court:

Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the
respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Why did you know?

A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the
respondent is not aware that this kind of personality affect the other party
(sic).

Court:

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is
under the influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious
relationship during the less than one year and one thing what is significant,
respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should
provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for the five
months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of
the vices. (sic)

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the
petitioner?

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital
relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).

Court:

Q. What are the vices?

A. Alcohol and gambling.

Court:

Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?

A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social

Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing person.[4]

The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The
Report pertinently states:[5]

Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for

“Nullity of Marriage” versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO

GENERAL DATA

[This pertains to Jocelyn’s]

BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

xxxx

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a
part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine
operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler.
While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their
vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial
relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and
squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately

suppressed so much so that it does not create inner tension and anxiety.
She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly in
uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She
may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness;
in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.

She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better
future in spite of difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully
aware of external realities of life that she set simple life goals which is (sic)
commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to
prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her
tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping mechanism
that she is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.

REMARKS : [Already cited in full in the psychologist’s testimony quoted

above][6]

The Office of the Solicitor General – representing the Republic of the

Philippines – strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about
him was purely hearsay.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:

While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person
may be considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some
admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply with his
marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like
refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by
which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” (The Family
Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)

The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner
and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing – that the petitioner failed to
establish a harmonious family life with the respondent. On the contrary, the
respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by
the former’s being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and
worst of all – a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the
misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and four
months of messy days, to leave the respondent.

In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of
her married life with the respondent, she already suffered from
maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she was
the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain
the latter’s niece (sic) and because they were living with her husband’s
family, she was obliged to do the household chores – an indication that she
is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his
(sic) husband’s family.

This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the
fact that at the time of their marriage, she and her husband are still young
and was forced only to said marriage by her relatives. The petitioner and
the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead,
the respondent blamed the petitioner’s family for said early marriage and
not to his own liking.

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity

enunciated by this Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC
concluded:

The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist’

testimony quoted above] would only tend to show that the respondent was,
indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only grave but
also incurable.

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:

x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case
was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is psychological
incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital
obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner
is entitled to the relief prayed for.

A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of

the respondent is a speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty.
This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will
still be using the surname of the respondent, although they are now
separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a
slave and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage with him.
The law on annulment should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent
suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to protect
persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein
respondent.[8]

THE CA RULING

The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC
decision, ruling that:

True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in
Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require
that a physician personally examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of
evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be
drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of
the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the
aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the
social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological
incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the
respondent was psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage
state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to an
underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on
the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the
Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support
to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to
show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that
was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the
respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the
time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at
best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply
to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or
refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of
one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage. In any event,
the respondent was not under a permanent compulsion because he had later
on shown his ability to engage in productive work and more stable
relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that
is one of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not
present.

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same
roof, the married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy
one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the
Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a
reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and
the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of
psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are
convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.

THE PETITION

Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the
reversal of the CA ruling based on the following arguments:

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally
disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and
void – Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason
v. Court of Appeals) holds that “the finding of the Trial Court as to the
existence or non-existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity at the
time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court);
petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court’s factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses vis-à-vis
petitioner’s defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous”;

2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this
omission was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the
term without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was
taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three
conditions that would make a person unable to contract marriage from
mental incapacity as follows:

“1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning

essential matrimonial rights and duties which are to be mutually given and
accepted;

(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony
due to causes of a psychic nature.”

The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these

criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its
finding of psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the
law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what
constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims,
the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to
the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s
marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

THE COURT’S RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error

of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare
Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code
and its related jurisprudence.

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any

party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it

merely introduced an abstract concept – psychological incapacity that
disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage – without
any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We
must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological
incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.

Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be

characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. It should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”[10]

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as
follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It
decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be “protected” by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.[12]

Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic

requirements of Santos.[13]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no

requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows
that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability can be duly established.[15]

Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases
then already pending, under the reasoning that the court’s interpretation or
construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law;
the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC,
Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules
pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the
evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section
14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid
in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the
grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage
must be proved.

All cases – involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code – that
came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited
cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the
Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.

Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family
Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by
so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the
Canon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so
designed to allow some resiliency in its application.[19]

Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is

consistent with that of the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis,

that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court’s judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was
not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the

resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set
of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according
to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the

abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely
looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v.
Velez-Ting[20] follows Te’s lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon
Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its
stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee
on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of
the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report
of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive
for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is
also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available.
Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of
a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court
during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely
stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy
for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as
follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.

xxxx

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting

expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And
as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of
cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the
intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage;
that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception
of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she is about to assume.[25] It is not enough that the respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with
his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in
the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown.[26]
Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or
ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.[27]

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos’
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of
Santos’ continuing doctrinal validity.

The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to establish Angelito’s

psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so
conclude based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we
were compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and
the appellate court’s appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn’s presented
evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s
alleged psychological condition.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion

evidence – the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological evaluation
report – that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court,
the psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an
indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given
the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied
upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due
care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party

alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence
holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While
such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all
instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For
a determination though of a party’s complete personality profile, information
coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the party’s close
relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application
of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not
totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion
based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured
a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness
of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the
Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity
exists.

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist’s report
and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported
anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this
disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These particulars
are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her
testimony.

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito’s personality disorder is

chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior
to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage,
as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this
declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion
on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional
family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologist’s own equivocation on
this point – she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have
realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is
highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn’s assumed knowledge of
Angelito’s family background and upbringing.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why

and to what extent was Angelito’s personality disorder grave and incurable,
and on the effects of the disorder on Angelito’s awareness of and his
capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more

important concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are
critical to the success of Jocelyn’s cause.

b. Jocelyn’s Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report

and the psychologist’s testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of
Jocelyn’s testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with
sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelito’s psychological incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely

testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek
employment and the physical beatings she received from him – all of which
occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony
that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be
indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the
earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged
physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly
took place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the
marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that
materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require
that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of

psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of
proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different

treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on women
indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence,
standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost
in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist
cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of
the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual
bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in
Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in
Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn’s main anchor in her present appeal with
us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the
CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and
the evidence of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62443. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, and concurred in by

Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and Associate Justice Santiago Javier
Rañada (both retired).
[2] Penned by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.

[3] TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 16-17.

[4] TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 15-22.

[5] Record, pp. 36-39.

[6] Parenthetical notes supplied.

[7] The RTC enumerated the requisites as follows: (1) that psychological
incapacity refers to no less than a mental not physical incapacity; (2) that
the law intended psychological incapacity to be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage; and (3) that the
psychological condition must exist at the time of the marriage and must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. See citation
at note 9.

[8] Parenthetical notes supplied.

[9] 310 Phil 21 (1995).

[10] Id. at 39-40.

[11] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).

[12] Id. at 676-680.

[13] See Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).

[14] Id.

[15] Id. at 850.

[16] 408 Phil. 713, 720 (2001).

[17] G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.

[18] Id. at 213.

[19] Id.

[20] G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009.

[21] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

[22] A step that Te, a Third Division case, could not have legally undertaken
because the Molina ruling is an En Banc ruling, in light of Article VIII, Section
4(3) of the Constitution.

[23] Supra note 16, pp. 231-232.

[24] Supra note 19.

[25] See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, and Padilla-Rumbaua
v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009.

[26] Id., Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua.

[27] Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272,
288-289.

For advice on above subject, you may contact J.A.B. Bulao & Associates at
jabblaw@yahoo.com or send a message to Cell No. 09155205254.

Comment

LEGAL ADVICE 0001: RE COMMON GROUND FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

Filed under: RE MARRIAGE ANNULMENT — Leave a comment

October 22, 2010

Query: Do you want your marriage declared null and void? What could be a
possible ground?

The common ground is provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code. It

provides: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was spychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Family Code did not define the meaning of psychological incapacity. The
concept is based on paragraph 3, Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law (effective on November 27, 1983) which also made no attempt to define
the term. (SOURCE: THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED,
1999 EDITION, BY ATTY. ERNESTO L. PINEDA).

Considering that psychological incapacity is just lifted from the Canon Law
the pertinent decisions of the marriage tribunals of the Catholic Church may
be used as precedents if they are not contrary to the civil law and existing
civil jurisprudence. According to Church authorities, aside from the well-
known psychological cases of psychoses, psychoneuroses, and other psychic
disorders which render a party or spouse psychologically unfit to assume the
essential functions and duties of marriage, the following may also be
considered as causes of psychological incapacity: (a) homosexuality, (b)
lesbianism, (c) satyriasis, (d)nymphomania, (e) emotional immaturity or
irresponsibility, (f) epilepsy, (g) habitual alcoholism, and (h) criminality. This
list is not exclusive. (IBID)

Early jurisprudence related incapacity either to the ability to exchange the

right of the body for hetoro-sexual acts or to the essential obligations arising
from the three goods of marriage: (a) children, (b) fidelity and (c)
permanence. As the object of marital consent was expanded to include the
right to the community of the whole life, so the understanding of marital
incapacity has expanded to include other essential obligations of marriage.
(IBID)

For advice on above subject, you may contact J.A.B. Bulao & Associates at
jabblaw@yahoo.com or send a message to Cell No. 09155205254.