Outline Article III

Bill of Rights
A Bill of Rights is a list of the most important rights of
citizens. The purpose is to protect these rights against
infringement by the state. It is a limitation on the intrusion on
these rights by the state.
 
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
104768, July 21, 2003.
• a) Is a Bill of Rights or a Constitution necessary in order
that a person may exercise and be protected by his rights?
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Declaration of
Human Rights
• b) Was the Bill of Rights, in general, and the right against
unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusion of
illegally seized evidence, in particular, not availing from
February 25 to March 26, 1986? (the interregnum)
•
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the law. 
 2 parts of section 1: Due process of law clause; equal
protection of the laws clause.
 
Bill of Rights contain mandates against the state. Why?
Protection that the constitution gives to its citizen as against
power of government. government is powerful, when unlimited
it becomes tyrannical. The Bill of Rights is a guarantee that
there are certain areas of a person's life, liberty, and property
which governmental power may not touch.
Does not govern relations between private persons.
General Rule: BOR applies to Filipino citizens and aliens alike.
Exception: Section 7 of bill of rights, right of citizen to access
government records for alien (not include in the political right
of alien)
Police power: constitutional provision found in section 1
• Police power. (Ermita Hotel and Motel Operators v. Mayor
of Manila, GR No. L-24693, July 31, 1967).
• Police power is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit
all that is hurtful to the comfort, safely, and welfare of society.

• May be delegated to local governments. (Legaspi vs City

of Cebu, GR 15911, December 10, 2013)
 The national government, through the legislative department, exercises police power. But
police power is also delegated, within limits, to local governments section

 The general welfare clause, which has two branches, the first known as the general legislative
power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not
repugnant too low.
 The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions, including the City of
Manila, has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to an act and pass. According to the procedure
prescribed by law.
 It must also conform to the following substantive requirements.
 That's not controlling the Constitution.
 For any statute.
 Two must that be unfair or oppressive.
 Three must not be partial or discriminatory.
 Poor must not prohibit, but may regulate trade 5 must be general and consistent with public
policy, and six must not be unreasonable.

Test of a valid Ordinance. (Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s

College, GR. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

• Cannot go beyond mere regulation into prohibition. (De

la cruz v. Judge Paras, GR No. 42571-71, July 25, 1983)
• Local governments cannot contravene the judgment of
congress not to prohibit gambling. (Magtajas v. Price
Properties, 234 SCRA 255, 268 (1994).
• Rights protected under the due process clause of the
constitution.  Right to life, liberty or property
• The exercise of police power is subject to judicial inquiry.
• The principal yardstick against which the exercise of
police power may be measured. US vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85,
1910. Due process and equal protection clause.
• The extent of the right to life that is protected by the
constitution. Right to a good life. Not just protection of
the right to be alive or the security against physical harm.
• The right to liberty is not simply freedom from bodily
restraint.
• The extent of the right to property that is protected by
the constitution.
• Hierarchy of rights protected by the constitution.
• Primacy of human rights over property rights
demonstrated.
• Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 50 SCRA 189, 1973.
Human rights over property rights
• Two aspects of due process of law: the procedural and
substantive aspects.
Difference of procedural and substantive?
• Procedural due process is a guarantee of procedural
fairness. 
• There are different sets of requirements of procedural
due process in judicial proceedings, in administrative
proceedings and even in student discipline cases. Why?
Bec it varies on the situation and subject matter of the
issue.
•  Requirements of procedural due process in judicial
proceedings: Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil 921
(1918).
• The requirements of procedural due process of law in
administrative proceedings. Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635
(1940).
• The requirements of procedural due process in student
discipline cases. Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA
699 (1986).
• Considered the heart of due process
• Whether in judicial or administrative proceedings, the
heart of procedural due process is the need for notice and
an opportunity to be heard.
• The heart of substantive due process is the requirement
of "reasonableness" or absence of the exercise of
arbitrary power.  
 • US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85 (1910) vs Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 1987. difference?
Ynot vs IAC: the SC finds that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions
and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

US v. Toribio: SC said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain.
The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a
mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general
welfare and public interest. Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use, within the
meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with the
rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so
used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the
community.

• Rubi v. Prov'l Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660 (1919).

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a
department head.

• The principle of presumed validity of statutes. Ermita

Malate Hotel and Motel Operators, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
What constitutes presumption of constitutionality?
• Publication and clarity of laws as a requirement of due
process: Tanada v. Tuvera, GR No. 63915, December 29
1986.
• The rule requiring publication for the effectivity of laws
applies not only to laws passed by congress. (Republic v.
Pilipinas Shell, GR No. 173918, April 8, 2008).
• Void for vagueness rule. (People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186
(1988)
• A law that is utterly vague is defective because it fails to
give notice of what it commands.
• When is a law vague? (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
148560, November 19, 2001)
• The guarantee of equal protection. (Tolentino v. Board of
Accountancy, 90 Phils 83 ,1951)
• The equal protection clause recognizes the power of the
state to act upon factual differences between individuals.
• The problem, thus, in equal protection cases is one of
determining the validity of the classification made by law.
• Requirements for a reasonable classification: (1) must
rest on substantial distinction; (2) must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members
of the same class.
• Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 147387, Dec. 10,
2003.  
• Tiu v. CA, GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999. The
constitution does not require absolute equality among
residents.
• International School Educators v. Quisumbing, GR No.
128845, June 1, 2000. Equal pay, equal work.
• Smith, Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil 136 (1919).
Alienage as basis of classification.
• Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538, (1994).
• The doctrinal supports in the constitution to achieve a
reasonable measure of equality:
• the Preamble proclaims equality as an ideal; the
command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10,
and Art XIII.  
• the Commission on Elections is given broad powers in
order to implement laws seeking to equalize political
opportunities;
• so is the command of the constitution to prohibit
political dynasties;
• Article III, Section 11, expressly guarantees free access
to the courts;
• and Article XIV commands the state to make quality
education accessible to all.  
 
• Section 2. The right of the people to be secured in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
search and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable,
• Purpose: To protect the privacy and sanctity of the person
and his house and other possessions against the arbitrary
intrusions of the state;
...and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized.
Purpose:
Provides for the conditions under which a valid intrusion
maybe made, as it spells out the requisites of a valid warrant.
• (1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
• (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge;
• (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce;
• (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
• May a private person or entity be held liable for illegal
search under Section 2, Article III. Silahis
International v. Soluta, GR No. 163087, February 20,
2006.
• At what point does an inspection (say in a check point)
become a search in the sense of Section 2. Valmonte v.
Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990); People v. Escano, GR No.
129756, January 28, 2000.
• People of the Philippines v. Jerry Sapla y Guerrero (G.R.
No. 244045, 16 June 2020).
• A text message from an anonymous person is not
probable cause for a conduct of an intrusive, warrantless
search.
• Must Read: Towards Justice – Emmeline Aglipay Philstar
Sept 22, 2020; Arrest, detention and bail under ATA,
Justice Vicente Mendoza, PDI, July 5/20; Business groups
welcome SC decision, Philstar, Aug 23/20; SC Resolute
stand, Justice Panganiban, Sept 13/20; Searches at
checkpoints, Justice Panganiban, PDI, Sept 30/20.
• Probable cause (In general).
• Probable cause is such facts and circumstances antecedent
to the issuance of a warrant that is in them sufficient to
 induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in
pursuance thereof.
• Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest /
search warrant.
• The quantum of evidence needed to establish probable
cause is probability, not absolute or even moral certainty.
Microsoft v. Maxicorp, GR No. 140946, September 13,
2004.
• Probable cause for a search warrant need not point to a
specific offender.
• But it must point to some specific violation of our criminal
law.
• Probable cause for a warrant of arrest must point to a
specific offender.
• Webb v. De Leon, GR No. 121234, August 23, 1995.
• Stonehill v. Diokno, GRL-19550, June 19 1976. The
description of the offense simply as "violation of the
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws" made it
impossible for finding probable cause.
• Central Bank v. Judge Morfe, GR L-20119, June 30, 1967.
The failure of the witness to mention particular individuals
 did not necessarily prove that he had no personal
knowledge of specific illegal transaction.
• Under the 1987 constitution, only a judge may determine
probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant.
• The prosecution determines probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information.
• People v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 126005, January 21,
1999.
• Must the Judge personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses?
• Soliven v. Judge Makasiar, 167 SCRA 988) (the Luis
Beltran case)
• Four instances where probable cause is needed to be
determined:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating
officer;
• (2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge;
• (3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a
private person;
• (4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge;
• ..."personally"
• The word "personally" defines determination of probable
cause by the judge, not his examination of witnesses.
• Purpose of requiring particularity of description in a
search warrant.
• Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil 886 (1920).
Warrantless search and seizure may be allowed
• (1) search incidental to an arrest;
• (2) search of moving vehicles;
• (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
• (4) customs searches;
• (5) where there is waiver of the right;
• Also rule on exigent circumstance and the stop and frisk
rule.  
• Search incidental to an arrest. Moreno v. Ago Chi, 12
Phil 439 (1909).
• Search incidental to an arrest cannot be made in a place
other than where the suspect is arrested. Nolasco v.
Pano, 147 SCRA 509 (1987).
• Search of moving vehicles. Papa v. Mago, GR No. L-27360,
February 28, 1968.
• Search of moving vehicles: Extensive search without
warrant could only be resorted to if there is probable
cause.
• Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424 (1994).
• Where marijuana sticks fall before the eyes of a police
officer.
• People vs. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144 (1993).
• Requirements for a warrantless search and seizure of
evidence in plain view.
• People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 413,1992.
• (1) there must be a valid prior intrusion in to a place;
• (2) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are;
• (3) the illegality of the evidence must be immediately
apparent;
• (4) it is noticed without further search.
• The discovery must be inadvertent.
People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993).
Customs inspections:
 • Requirements of a warrantless search and seizure to
constitute as waiver of the constitutional right.
• De Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689, reiterated in People v.
Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994).
• Implied conformity is not consent.
People v. Compacion, GR 124442, July 20, 2001.
• Spouses Veroy v. Layague, GR 95632, June 18, 1992.
The waiver must be understood to cover only what is
included within the terms of the language.
• Warrantless search and seizure: Exigent circumstances:
• Warrantless search and seizure: Stop and frisk rule:
• Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990).
• Same requirements for search warrants and warrant of
arrest.
• Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil 739 (1956).
A John Doe warrant of arrest is valid provided it satisfies
the requirement of particularity of description.
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil 169, 1925.
• A warrant of arrest against 50 John Does is not valid.
Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599, 1988.
• Warrantless arrest is generally illegal.
• The cases when a person may be arrested even without a
warrant is summarized under Rule 113, Section 5, Rules of
Court:
• Flagrante delicto rule.
• People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1968).
• A warrantless arrest cannot be effected three months or
even six days after the commission of the crime.
• People v. Salvatierra, GR 104663, July 24, 1967.
• Entrapment may or may not be allowed depending upon
the circumstances.
People v. Doria, GR 125299, January 22, 1999.
• A buy bust operation is a form of entrapment.
• People v. de la Cruz, GR 83260, April 18, 1990.
• When the validity of an arrest challenged.
• (People v. Cabiles, GR 112035, January 16, 1998).
• An application for bail not considered a waiver of the
right of an accused to question the legality of his arrest.
• Okabe v. Judge De Leon, GR No. 150185, May 27, 2004.
• The right to privacy is the right to be left alone.
 • Hing vs. Choachuy, GR 179736, June 26, 2013
• Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
orders of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.  
• The privacy of communication and correspondence is not
absolute.
• Section 3 allows intrusion into the privacy of
communication and correspondence.
• What are the conditions for such allowable intrusion?
The court may order intrusion based on the requirements
of probable cause in Section 2 (Art. III).
• (because the intrusion into communication and
correspondence is one kind of search)
• The implementing statute on the subject is RA 4200 known
as the Anti Wiretapping Law, as amended by the Human
Security Act of 2007 (RA 9372).
• Meaning of the exclusionary rule under paragraph 2,
Section 3.
 • The exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally obtained
evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.
•  How evidence declared inadmissible disposed of.
• (Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987)
Exclusionary rule: Evidence unlawfully obtained by private
individuals does not come under the exclusionary rule.
• People v. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991). In the
absence of governmental interference, the constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked against the state.
•  
• Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression or of the press, or the right of the
people to peaceably assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
• Freedom of expression: The foundation of our free, open,
and democratic society. (Carpio)
Speech, expression, and press include every form of
expression, whether oral, written, tape or disc recorded.
• The two prohibitions on the abridgment (curtailment) of
the freedom of speech, of expression or of the press.
 • Prohibition of prior restraint and prohibition of subsequent
punishment.
• Prior restraint.
Official governmental restrictions on the press or other
forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.
• Unconstitutional prior restraint.
• (Chavez v. Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008).
• Subsequent punishment:
• The mere prohibition of government interference before
words are spoken or published would be an inadequate
protection of the freedom of expression if the government
could punish without restraint after publication.
• Media and Judicial Process: When the right to free
speech and of the press collides with the right of the
accused to a fair trial.
• AM 01-4-03-SC Re: Sec. of Justice v. Sandiganbayan, June
29, 2001.
• AM 10-11-5-SC Re: Petition for Radio and TV Coverage of
the Maguindanao Massacre Cases, June 14, 2011.
 • Media and the right to privacy: Ayer Productions v.
Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988).
• The freedom of speech is not absolute.
• Freedom of speech may lawfully be impinged or
restrained.
• There must be standards for the lawful restraint of the
freedom of speech.
• The acceptable standards for the restraint : the
dangerous tendency rule, the clear and present danger rule
and the balancing of interest rule.
• The dangerous tendency rule: Speech can be curtailed
or punished when it creates a dangerous tendency to bring
about the evil which the state has the right to prevent.
• The clear and present danger rule:
It is founded on whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the evils that congress
has a right to prevent.
• The balancing of interests test:
• The function of the Court is to balance the interests served
by legislation against the freedoms affected by it.
 • Freedom of expression is not absolute. (Justice Carpio,
Inq., April 9,2020)
• Four exceptions when the State may impose prior restraint,
or subsequent punishment, on the exercise of freedom of
expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
• The very high bar or standard to hurdle before the State
can successfully invoke these exceptions. The State
must establish that the expression creates a clear and
present danger of an evil that the State has a right and
duty to prevent. The danger from the expression must be
extremely imminent, and the evil must be substantive and
extremely serious.
• Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission On Elections (GR No.
205728, January 21, 2015):
• The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) does not have the
competence to limit expressions made by the citizens —
who are not candidates — during elections.
• Why regulation is unconstitutional:
Regulation is inconsistent with according fullest opinion
and debate by the electorate.
• Declarative speech is a specie of speech by a private
citizen who is not a candidate that may be validly
regulated by law.
• Requisites of a valid regulation.
• The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of
enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard
and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive
means to achieve that object.
•  
• COMELEC may not order petitioners, who are private
citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their own
property.
• The message in the tarpaulin does not constitute
religious speech the prohibition of which is a violation of
religious freedom.
• The tarpaulin does not convey any religious doctrine of the
catholic church.
• The expressions on the tarpaulin is not an ecclesiastical
matter.
• The position of the Catholic religion as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting as religious speech.
• Unprotected speech:
• Freedom of expression has never been understood to be an
absolute right. Some forms of speech are not protected.
• Two types of unprotected speech: libel and obscenity.
• A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice, or a defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.  
• To be liable for libel, the following elements must be
shown to exist: (1) the allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (2) publication of the
charge; (3) identity of the person defamed; and (4)
existence of malice.
• The speech is libelous when the imputation is public and
malicious.
• The imputation is public when the defamatory statement
is made known to someone other than the person to
whom it is written.
• It is malicious when the author of the imputation is
prompted by ill will or spite and speaks not in response to
duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who
claims to have been defamed.
• If a speech is not malicious, even if defamatory, it is
privileged. (Alonzo v. CA, 241 SCRA 51 (1995).
• Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be untrue if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown.
• Are pleadings privileged? Under what condition may it be
privileged?
• (Armovit v. Judge Purisima, GR No. 39258, November 15,
1982).
• The prevailing rule is that parties, counsels, and witnesses
are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words
otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial
proceedings provided the statements are relevant to the
case.
• When may criticisms of a public figure constitutionally
protected? When not protected?
• When the object of criticism is his strictly private life,
defamatory imputations are not constitutionally protected
 expression. When, however, his public acts are the object
of criticism, constitutional immunity applies.
• The right to assembly and petition may be impaired.
What are the allowable standards for its impairment?
• Since the right to assembly and petition is equally
fundamental as freedom of expression, the standards for
allowable impairment of speech and press are also those
for assembly and petition.
• US v. Apurado, 7 Phil 422 (1907).
• Evangelista v. Earnshaw, 57 Phil 255 (1932), the
dangerous tendency rule.
• Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil 71 (1948), the clear and
present danger rule.
• JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing, GR 65366, October 25,
1983. The Court adopted the clear and present danger test.
• The right to peaceably assemble and petition must be
discussed in relation to Sec. 18, Art. II; Sec 8, Art III; Sec 3,
Art XIII; and also Sec 2 (5) B, Art IX.
• Question: Which rule is more in keeping with the spirit of
the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of
peaceful assembly and petition, the dangerous tendency
rule or the clear and present danger rule.
•  
• Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
• The twin mandates of the constitutional provision: The
non-establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
• The text of the section is the same in the 35, 73 and 87
constitutions.
• The essence of the free exercise clause is the freedom of
belief. It is based on the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
• Reynolds v. US, 98 US 145, the free exercise clause
completely insulated the realm of belief from state action,
leaving, however, religiously motivated action, including
expression, subject to police power.
• Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296. The constitutional
inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a
double aspect.
• People v. Fabillar, 68 Phil. 584 (1939).
• American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386
(1957).
• Imposition of civic obligations that conflict with one’s
religious beliefs.
• Gerona v. Sec. of Educ., 106 Phil. 2 (1969).
• Ebralinag v. Div. Sup. Of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256
(1993).
• The non establishment clause simply means that the state
cannot establish or sponsor an official religion.
• It prohibits the state from passing laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.
• Austria v. NLRC, GR 124382, Aug 16/99.
• Secular authority has no jurisdiction over ecclesiastical
matters.
• Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 206.
• Concession on taxes on property used for religious
purposes.
• The condition for the exemption is not just that the
property be used exclusively for religious purposes but that
 it be used actually, directly and exclusively for such
purpose.  
• Purpose of the provision prohibiting religious test.
• To allow religious test would have the effect of formal or
practical establishment of a particular religious faith.
• The case of conscientious objectors. Can the state
compel a person to bear arms in defense of the country
even when bearing arms is contrary to the person's beliefs?
• The state may support church social action centers.
Requirements:
• (1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
(3) must not require excessive entanglement with recipient
institutions.
• Estrada v. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, 2003, 2004.
• Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as maybe provided
by law.
• Freedom of movement involves two rights: The liberty of
abode and the liberty of travel.
• Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 66(89).
• The authority to impair the right to travel must be based
on law.
• The court found this authority in the totality of executive
powers, both stated and unstated in the constitution.
• Section 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and to papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as maybe provided by law.
• The rights guaranteed by the provision: (1) the right to
information on matters of public concern and (2) the
corollary right to access to official records and documents.
• These rights are political rights available to citizens only. 
• The right to access is a self executory constitutional right.
• Chavez v. PEA-AMARI, GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002.
• While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are
no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals.
• Recognized limitations to the exercise of the right to
information
• Section 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
•  All it means is that the right to form associations shall
not be impaired without due process of law.
• Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Sec. of
Labor, 27 SCRA 41 (1969). The registration prescribed
by the law is not a limitation to the right of assembly or
association, which may be exercised with or without said
registration.
• Government employees' right to form unions is
guaranteed by Article III, Section 8, Article IX, B, Section 2
(5), and Article XIII, Section 3.
• Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
• The constitutional provisions on eminent domain are
Article III, Section 9, Article XII, Section 18 (public utilities),
Article XIII, Section 4 (land reform), and Article XVIII,
Section 22 (idle or abandoned agricultural lands)
• The right of eminent domain is understood to be the
ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not
only public but the private property of all citizens for public
purpose.
• The exercise of the power of eminent domain is by
tradition lodged with the executive. The power, however,
must be granted by the legislature.
• The power of eminent domain may also be conferred
upon municipal governments and other government
entities.
• As to the legislature, the power is inherent.
• For government agencies, local governments and public
utilities, it is only a delegated power.
• City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil.
349 (1919).
• Constitutional limitations on the exercise of the power:
public use and just compensation.
• Requisites for the exercise are: (1) there is "taking" of
private property; (2) the taking must be for "public use";
(3) there must be just compensation 
• Public use: Any appropriating of private property by the
state for purposes of great advantage to the community, is
taking for public use.
• Mataas na Lupa Tenants v. Dimayuga, 130 SCRA 30, June
25, 1984.
• Manisca v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 106440, January 29,
1996.
• Just compensation: It is the just and complete equivalent
of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has
to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
• A statutory determination of just compensation would be
only a prima facie assessment. In the end, the final
determination of just compensation will have to be made
by the court.
• Who are entitled to just compensation? - It is not the
owner alone.
• When the filing of the case coincides with the taking, the
value of the property expropriated is determined as of the
time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
• Republic v. Sarabia, GR No. 157847, August 25, 2005.
• When there is taking before the filing of the proceedings.
compensation for the property expropriated must be
determined as of the time the expropriating authority
takes possession thereof and not as of the time of the
institution of the proceedings.
• DPWH vs. Tecson, GR No.179334, July 1, 2013.
• Latches and prescription do not apply against action for
compensation in expropriation proceedings. What is
imprescriptible is the action for compensation NOT the
action to question the expropriation.
• Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Borbon and CA, GR
No. 165354, January 12, 2015.  
• Just compensation in expropriations for land reform can
be less than market value .
• Expropriation for resale to landless: The Guido-Baylosis
cases under the 1935 Constitution.
• In Tuason vs. Land Tenure Administration (1970), the "area
test" was rejected.
• Judicial review of the valuation of the property made by
assessors is proper.
• Even when there is a statutory determination of just
compensation due, the courts may still review its
adequacy.
• Judicial Review of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain:
• When expropriation is not done directly by legislative
authority, review is proper.  
• When the expropriation is exercised by the legislature
itself, it is not subject to judicial review.
• Res judicata: The right to exercise the power is absolute
and unfettered by a prior judgment.
• Didipio Earth Savers v. Secretary, GR No. 157882, March
30, 2006.
• Republic v. Andaya, GR No. 160656, June 15, 2007.
• NPC v. San Pedro, GR No. 170945, September 26, 2006.
• Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 1972.
• Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga,
22 SCRA 1334, 1968.
• The power of eminent domain by local governments:
Section 19 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
• The essential requisites of the exercise: (1) there must be
an ordinance authorizing the expropriation; (2) the power
must be exercised for public use; (3) with just
compensation and; (4) there must be an offer previously
made and the same was not accepted.
• Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.
• What the provision envisions are laws passed by
governmental law making bodies.
• The law relating to the obligation of contracts does not
prohibit every change in existing laws.
• Manila Trading Co. v. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461 (1935). What the
Constitution prohibits is the substantial impairment of
contracts.
• Jurisprudence has established that a valid exercise of
police power is superior to the obligation of contracts.
• Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs
the contract itself.
• La Insular v. Machuca, 39 Phil. 567, 1919. To come under
the constitutional prohibition, the law must effect a change
 on the rights of the parties with reference to each other
and not with reference to non parties.
• Lim v. Secretary, 34 SCRA 751, 1970.
The non impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of
legislative power and not of judicial or quasi judicial power.
• Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil. 125 (1907).
• Reservation clause: Second Sentence, Section 11, Article
XII.
• Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied
to any person by reason of poverty.
• An indigent
• The provision is the basis for Rule 5, Section 17 of the New
Rules of Court allowing litigation in forma pauperis.
• Legislation incorporating the concept: RA 6033 - An Act
Requiring Courts to Give Preference to Criminal Cases
Where the Party or Parties Involved are Indigents (1969);
RA 6034 - An Act Providing Transportation and Other
allowances for Indigent Litigants (1969); RA 6035 - An Act
Requiring Stenographers To Give Free Transcript of
Stenographic Notes to Indigent and Low Income Litigants
(1969).
  
• Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
• (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
• (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or section 17 hereof (right against self incrimination)
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
• (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violation of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
• The provision is based from US supreme court decisions -
the Escobedo v. Illinois (378 US 478, 1964) and Miranda v.
Arizona (384 US 436, 1966).  
 • Escobedo spoke of the rights of a person under custodial
investigation, like when the suspect has been taken into
police custody.
• Miranda enumerated the rights available to a person
under custodial investigation and which must be made
known to the suspect
• Philippine jurisprudence followed the Miranda and the
Escobedo decisions. It used to be Sec. 20, Article IV, of the
1973 constitution. Now Sec. 12, Article III, of the 1987
constitution.
• For whom do the rights are available: The rights are
available to any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense.
• People v. Gamboa, GR No. 91374, February 25, 1991.
These constitutional rights extend only to testimonial
compulsion.
• People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525, 1987.
While the provision is a protection against testimonial
compulsion, it is extended to any evidence communicative in
nature.
• Gutang v. People, GR No. 135406, July 11, 2001. Urine
sample is admissible.
 • People v. Jungco, 186 SCRA 714, 1990.
Photos of reenactment are not admissible where accused
was not provided with counsel.
• People v. Ordono, GR No.132154, June 29, 2000. These
rights do not cover the verbal confessions to a radio
announcer.
• People v. Endino, GR No. 133026, February 20, 2001. An
interview recorded on video showing the accused
unburdening his guilt is admissible.
• Tanenggee v. People, GR No. 179448, June 26, 2013. No
violation of Section 12 if the questioning was not done by
law enforcement officers but by a bank employee. The
written admission given is admissible.
• When the rights begin to be available:
• People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994), follows Escobedo in
that the rights begin to be available only when the person
is already in custody.
• Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985). The SC
sustained General Ver that the provision covered even
persons NOT YET in custody.
• The 1986 Constitutional Commission debates manifest
the intent to expand the coverage of the right to situations
when a person under investigation is NOT YET in custody.
• People v. Maqueda, GR No. 112983 (1995). In an obiter
dictum, Justice Davide adverted to the view in the
Constitutional Commission that the rights are available
even to one who is not yet in custody.
• People v. Domantay, GR No. 130612 (1999); People v.
Principe, GR 135862 (2002). RA 7438 has extended the
guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been
formally arrested but has merely been invited for
questioning.
• RA 7438 (April 27, 1992) – An Act defining certain rights of
persons arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation.
• What rights are made available: (1) Right to remain silent;
(2) the right to counsel; (3) the right to be informed of such
rights.
• Right to remain silent:
• Under Section 17: An accused; a witness.
• Under Section 12, a person under investigation has the
right to refuse to answer any question.
• Right to counsel:
• The counsel made available to the person under
investigation must not only be competent and
independent but also preferably be of his choice.
• People v. Mojello, GR No. 145566, March 9, 2004.
• When do the rights cease to be available: The rights
under Section 12 (1) are available when the inquiry is
under the control of police officers. Beyond that, the rights
are no longer available.
• Waiver of the rights: Only if the waiver is in writing and
done in the presence of counsel. 
• People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465, 1985.
• Exclusionary rule: Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of Section 12 (1) and Section 17 shall not be
admissible in evidence against "him".
• People v. Balisteros, 237 SCRA 499, 1994. Against him.
The source of the confession or admission.
• Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
maybe provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
 impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
• Bail: is a mode, short of confinement, which would insure
the attendance of the accused at his trial.
• The right to bail is corollary to the right to be presumed
innocent.
• All persons charged with an offense, before conviction,
shall have the right to bail.
• Where the accused is charged with a capital offense, a
hearing is mandatory.
• The burden of proof.
• Strong evidence.
• The person claiming the right to bail must be under
actual detention or under the custody of the law.
• Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 115407, August
28, 1995.
• Govt. of Hong Kong v. Olalia, GR 153675 (April 19, 2007),
The right to bail in extradition proceedings.
• Comendador v. Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (91)
• People v. Divina, 221 SCRA 209 (1993).
 • See Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 213847
August 18, 2015; Motion for Reconsideration dated July
12, 2016.
• Dissenting opinion of Justice Marvic Leonen: Enrile bail
a ‘special accommodation,’ says SC Justice. (Tetch Torres-
Tupaz, Inquirer, Aug 20, 2015)
• Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
• The due process clause in paragraph (1), Section 14, is
understood to be criminal due process.
• Criminal due process in Section 14 as against due process
in Section 1.
• (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and ....
 
• ...and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
 he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
• When do these rights become available to the accused:
From arraignment to rendition of judgment.
• Right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved:
• Malana v. People, GR No. 173612, March 26, 2008. The
"equipoise rule"
• Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 96131, September 6,
1991.
Preventive suspension pendente lite
• Right to be heard by himself or counsel: 3 specific rights -
right to present evidence and to be present at the trial;
right to be assisted by counsel; right to compulsory process
• Under the right to counsel in Section 14 (2), counsel need
not be one who is the choice of the accused.
• Amion v. Judge Chiongson, AM RTJ-97-1371, January 22,
1999.
• May the right to counsel be waived? Yes according to
Bernas.
• No according to Lara.
 • At what point in the criminal proceeding is the accused
entitled to counsel: from arraignment to rendition of
judgment.
• Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him:
• Right to speedy, impartial and public trial: remedy for
violation is dismissal; it is equivalent to acquittal.
• Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (R.A. 8493)
If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit
provided by the Act, upon motion of the accused, the
information shall be dismissed (Sec. 13).
• Right to public trial:
A trial is public when anyone interested in observing how a
judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so.  
• Right of confrontation: Means the right to meet the
witnesses face to face.
• The right has a two fold purpose: 1) to afford the accused
an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by
cross examination; 2) to allow the judge to observe the
deportment of the witness.
• Testimony not subjected to cross examination must be
excluded.
 Dying declarations is an exemption.
• Estrada vs. Bersamin, et.al., GR Nos 212140-41, Jan. 21,
2015.
• It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a
preliminary investigation has no right to cross examine the
witnesses which the complainant may present
• Compulsory process: to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
• Trial in absentia: A situation where the trial of the accused
may proceed even when he is absent.
• May occur in two instances; must have been arraigned;
must be present during promulgation.
• Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it.
• Writ of habeas corpus is an order...
• The privilege of the writ is the privilege...
• What is suspended is the privilege of the writ; not the
issuance of the writ.
• The function of the writ of habeas corpus...
• The effect of the suspension of the privilege of the writ...
 • The suspension of the privilege of the writ is subject to
judicial review.
...under the express provision of the Section 18, Article VII,
of the 1987 Constitution.
• Under the express provisions of Section 13, Article III, in
relation to Section 18, Article VII, a person accused
(detained) for an offense covered by the suspension of
the writ is entitled to be released on bail.
• However, there is still a necessity for the filing of the
charges in court first. 
• The law on the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has undergone radical changes in the 1987
constitution: the doctrine on the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ, on the grounds for suspension, on the
termination of the suspension, on judicial review, and on
the scope and effects of the suspension.
• Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies.
• The provision guarantees the right to a speedy
disposition of cases. It covers the periods before, during
and after trial.
• Speedy trial in Sec 14 covers only trial phase.
• Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
• It is justified on the grounds of public policy and humanity.
• Public policy because if the party is required to testify, it
would place him under the greatest temptation to commit
perjury; Humanity because it would prevent the extorting
of confessions under duress.
• To violate the right, it is not necessary that a categorical
admission of a specific offense be sought.
• What is prohibited is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication
• Beltran v.Samson, 53 Phil 570 (1929).
• When the accused voluntarily answers an incriminating
question he is deemed to have waived his right.
• Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by
reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
• (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except
as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.
• Paragraph 1:
 does not add anything substantive to the due process
clause, nor to the guarantee of freedom of speech, press
and expression.
• Paragraph 2:
that involuntary servitude may exist only when it is a
punishment for a crime for which the party is convicted.
• Return to work order: may it be challenged as being
violative of the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude.
Take note of Sec 3, Art. XIII, where voluntary modes of
settling disputes is preferred.
• Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 (1975).
• Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the congress hereinafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
• (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
• Cruel, unusual, degrading, inhuman as prohibited
punishment under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions.
• 1935 constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual
punishment". 1973 constitution, the phrase became "cruel
or unusual punishment". 1987 constitution, the text is
"cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment“
• People v. Mercado, GR No. 116239, November 29, 2001.
Lethal injection is not a cruel and unusual punishment.
• Heinous crimes
• Paragraph (2) concerns itself with the manner of treating
prisoners in detention.
• When confinement amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment...
• Facilities must be to a level of constitutional tolerability.
• Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-
payment of poll tax.
• Simply means that no person may be imprisoned for debt
in virtue of an order in a civil proceeding.
• But a person may be imprisoned as penalty for a crime
from a contractual debt imposed in a criminal
proceeding.
• Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
• Meaning of jeopardy - being placed in danger of
punishment or annoyance and vexation of a criminal
prosecution.
• The provision consist of two parts: The first sentence
deals with prosecution for the same offense. The second
deals with prosecution for the same act.
• Requisites to raise the defense of double jeopardy: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy must have terminated; (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
• First requisite: Jeopardy attaches: (1) upon a good
indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) after plea.
• Good indictment means that there must be a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction.
 • Competent court means a court that has jurisdiction over
the offense charged or that it has territorial jurisdiction
over the crime committed.
• Arraignment and plea are the final steps in the
commencement of jeopardy.
• Second requisite: the first jeopardy must have been
terminated –
• Bulaong v. People, GR No. L- 19344, July 17, 1966.
• Termination of jeopardy may be by conviction or
acquittal. Termination may also be by "dismissal".
• Without the consent of the accused:
Dismissal, even if not on the merits, if done without the
consent of the accused is a bar to subsequent prosecution.
• People v. Velasco, GR 140633, February 4, 2002.
• With the consent of the accused:
Even if the dismissal is definite, if made with the consent
of the accused, it would not be a bar to subsequent
prosecution. The consent of the accused to the dismissal of his
case works as a waiver.
• Based on speedy trial:
 If the dismissal is predicated on the right of the accused to
a speedy trial, the dismissal is on the merits.
• Third requisite: the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as the first.
• Same evidence test: whether the evidence needed in one
case will support a conviction in the other.
• Same act (actually mean the same physical act) that is
punished by an Ordinance and statute.
• People v. Jovelo, 101 Phil. 1213 (1957).
• Yap v. Lutero, GR 12669, April 30, 1959.
• If the single criminal act is impelled by a single criminal
intent, the resultant harm cannot be split into different
offenses.
• Rule when one act violates two different statutes or two
different provisions of a statute: If the one act results in
two distinct offenses, prosecution under one is a bar to
prosecution under the other.
• Rule on new supervening fact: Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766
(1950).
• Appeals: The protection against second jeopardy not only
means that an accused cannot be prosecuted a second
 time for the same offense but also that the prosecution
cannot appeal a judgment of acquittal.
• Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986).
• Appeal by the accused:
• Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted.
• An ex post facto law is one: (1) Which makes an action
done before the passing of the law, which was innocent
when done, criminal, and punishes such action;
• (2) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than
when it was committed;  
• (3) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed;
• (4) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict
the defendant
• 5) Which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only
but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of right;
• and, (6) Which deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
 such as the protection of a former acquittal or conviction
or amnesty proclamation.
• Ex post facto laws embrace only criminal or penal
statutes.
• Bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial.
• Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply
either to named individuals, or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without trial are bills of attainder prohibited by
the constitution.
 
• People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972). At issue is the Anti-
subversion Act (RA 1700). The lower court declared the
law as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers the
CPP" and thereby congress usurped the powers of the
judge and assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the
guilt of the CPP without any of the forms or safeguards of
a judicial trial.