Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55864 March 28, 1983

HEIRS OF MANUEL OLANGO, represented by PEDRO OLANGO (deceased) and now

Bernardo A. San Luis for petitioners.

Arturo Legaspi for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

VASQUEZ, J.:

A closer look at the Petition for certiorari and mandamus in the light of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the Decision in this case promulgated on April 12, 1982
and the comment of the private respondents thereon has led us to realize the merits of the petition
and accordingly to grant the aforementioned motion for reconsideration.

Our Decision dismissed the Petition for certiorari and mandamus and sustained the questioned
Orders of the respondent Court which disapproved the record on appeal and appeal bond filed by
the petitioners in connection with the appeal they were taking from a decision of the respondent
Court in Land Registration Case No. N-306 which denied their application for registration and
ordered the registration of the said parcel of land in favor of the herein private respondents, who
were the oppositors in the said land registration case. That the denial of the petitioners' appeal by
the respondent Court is characterized by capriciousness and grossly erroneous application of the
pertinent rules can readily be seen from the following facts which are not disputed:

The petitioners received a copy of the decision of the court a quo on December 29, 1978. On
January 25, 1979, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal, a cash appeal bond and Motion for
Extension of Time to File Typewritten Record on Appeal. Petitioners set their Motion for Extension of
Time to File Typewritten Record on Appeal for hearing on January 29, 1979. The said hearing was
not held due to the non-appearance of the counsel for the petitioners. The respondent Court motu
proprio ordered that the said motion be reset on "the next available date of the calendar of this
Court." The hearing was eventually set on March 2, 1979. A day earlier, or on March 1, 1979, the
petitioners filed their typewritten record on appeal. At the hearing held on March 2, 1979, the counsel
for the petitioners was again not present, but the counsel for the oppositors (herein private
respondents) manifested that he received a copy of the petitioners' record on appeal on March 1,
1979, and moved that the said record on appeal be disapproved on the ground that it was filed out of
time.

The respondent Court resolved the matter of the approval of the record on appeal filed by the herein
petitioners by declaring in its order dictated in open court on March 2, 1979 the following:

Considering that Atty. Galdino Jardin for the second time was not again present, the
record on appeal and the appeal bond are hereby disapproved. (Rollo, page 36).

A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on March 22, 1979 was denied by the
respondent Court in the Order dated November 21, 1980. Such denial led to the filing of this petition.

From the foregoing admitted facts, it could be seen that the disallowance by the respondent Court of
the appeal sought to be taken by the petitioners does not conform with the spirit of liberality and
fairness which courts are expected to manifest under the circumstances herein obtaining. The
petitioners may not be faulted with any vital transgression of the applicable rules in connection with
their intention to appeal the adverse decision rendered against them. They filed their notice of
appeal and cash appeal bond within the reglamentary period. Also, before the period of appeal had
expired, they filed a motion for extension of time to file their typewritten record on appeal. There is
nothing unusual in filing such a motion, it being done in almost all cases under similar
circumstances. The petitioners even scheduled their Motion for Extension of Time to file their
Typewritten Record on Appeal for hearing, although it is hardly necessary to do so (Commercial
Union vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., 86 SCRA 79). Instead of denying the said motion
outright, the respondent Court reset it for hearing on March 2, 1979. Such act on the part of the
respondent Court by itself could have readily induced a belief in the mind of the petitioners that their
motion for extension of time would be favorably considered. Petitioners did not wait for the hearing
or resolution of their motion for extension and filed their record on appeal on March 1, 1979.
Considering that the original period of appeal expired on January 28, 1979, the filing of the Record
on Appeal on March 1, 1979 was only one (1) day beyond the thirty day period of extension that they
prayed for. The respondent Court possibly realized that it could not disapprove the record on appeal
on the ground that it was filed out of time without being challenged as acting arbitrarily, it having
been held by the Supreme Court that such circumstance is not by itself reason to deny due course to
an appeal (Galdo vs. Rosete, 84 SCRA 238). It resorted to a reason which is neither legal nor valid
for disapproving the record on appeal, to wit, the failure of the counsel for the petitioners to appear at
the hearing for the approval of the record on appeal.

There is no rule or jurisprudence that requires the record on appeal to be set for hearing for the
purpose of securing the approval thereof by the Court. On the contrary, We have held in Olvido vs.
Ferraris, 90 Phil. 555, December 17, 1951, that "it is not necessary for the appellant to set a date for
the hearing of the record on appeal and to serve notice thereof on the appellee because upon its
filing, the record on appeal is deemed submitted for approval, modification or disapproval as the
case may be." (See also 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., page 433). It was,
therefore, plainly erroneous for the respondent Court to make capital of the failure of the counsel for
the petitioners to appear for the hearing of the record on appeal and utilize such non-appearance as
a ground for the disapproval thereof. It was also a manifest mistake to disapprove a cash appeal
bond (Section 5, Rule 41, Rules of Court).

Whatever shortcomings may be attributed to the petitioners and their counsel insofar as compliance
with procedural requirements in taking their appeal is concerned, as had been manifested herein,
they cannot be deemed sufficient to deprive them of a chance to secure a review by a higher tribunal
of the unfavorable decision rendered against them by the respondent Court. There is not enough
showing under the facts found that they are taking their appeal merely for purposes of delay or some
other motivation extraneous to the merit of their cause. The liberality which the rules exhort to be
extended under the herein circumstances becomes more compelling if taken in the light of the
ostensible merit of their case. Adequate grounds appear to necessitate that the decision of the
respondent Court be subjected to a more thorough scrutiny. Aside from the alleged procedural
missteps committed by the respondent Court, petitioners have complained that the decision
awarding the registration of the land in the names of the oppositors, who are the herein private
respondents, deprived them of their lawful share in the property which appears to have been owned
by a common predecessor-in-interest of both the petitioners and the private respondents. The truth
or falsity of this assertion does not appear to have been adequately passed upon in the decision
sought to be reviewed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby granted and the Decision promulgated on
April 12, 1982 reconsidered and SET ASIDE. The Petition is hereby GRANTED and the Orders
issued by the respondent Court dated March 2, 1979 and November 21, 1979 are SET ASIDE. The
respondent Court is ordered to approve the record on appeal filed by the petitioners and to give DUE
COURSE to the appeal being taken by them.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee (Chairman), J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

The principal reason for the disapproval of the Record on Appeal by respondent Judge was because
it was filed beyond the thirty-day extended period prayed for by petitioners. It was filed two days (not
one day) late. It was due on February 27, 1979 but was filed only on March 1, 1979. If petitioners
could not file their Record on Appeal within the 30-day period that they had requested, they should
have prayed for further extension.

The absence of petitioners' counsel on the date the Record on Appeal was set for hearing for the
second time was only the secondary reason. The portion of respondent Judge's Order quoted in the
main opinion was preceded by another paragraph showing that he had considered that the Record
on Appeal was filed out of time. To quote:

When the motion for approval of the record on appeal was called at 10:57 in the
morning, movant counsel, Atty. Arturo Jardin, was not around. Atty. Arturo Legaspi,
for the oppositors-appellees, informed the Court that he was only furnished a copy of
the record on appeal yesterday, March 1, 1979, and he has no time to make a written
opposition to the approval of the record on appeal, but in open Court he argued that
the motion for the approval of the record on appeal be denied because the record on
appeal was filed out of time.
 Considering that Atty. Galdino Jardin for the second time was not again present, the
record on appeal and the appeal bond are hereby disapproved.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 36, Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

In fact, in denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order disapproving the Record on
Appeal, respondent Judge stated more explicitly:

On January 25, 1979 the applicants, through counsel, filed a "Notice of Appeal, And
With Cash Appeal Bond, With Motion for Extension of Time to file Typewritten
Record on Appeal" and set it for hearing on January 29, 1979 at 9:00 A.M. The
request for extension of time to file record on appeal mixed up into the notice of
appeal and the filing of the cash bond was not resolved on January 29, 1979 as set
because neither movant counsel nor his clients were around, while the oppositors
through counsel were. The Court ordered the motion to be reset to the next available
date (p. 216, records). On March 1, 1979 the applicants through counsel filed their
Record on Appeal and set it for approval on March 2, 1979 at 9:00 A.M. Again
neither the applicants nor their counsel was around when the record on appeal was
called for approval on March 2, 1979 and the counsel for the oppositors was allowed
to argue and point out that the record on appeal was filed out of time. For this reason
and considering that movant counsel then seemed not to mind the calendar of the
case for two times already, the Court disapproved the record on appeal and entered
its said order of March 3, 1979.

xxx xxx xxx

But even granting, arguendo, that the motion for extension of time should be deemed
granted, yet the record on appeal filed on March 1, 1979 is still out of time. For, as
pointed out by Atty. Arturo Legaspi, counsel for the oppositors, in his opposition to
the motion for reconsideration, "... the 30 day extension period by applicants ...
should be computed from January 28, 1979, the last day of the original 30 day period
from December 29, 1978 when applicants received the decision." Therefore, when
applicants filed the record on appeal on March 1, 1979, 32 days had already
elapsed. (pp. 45-46, Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

The Trial Court had made a finding that the private respondents have "been in actual, physical,
open, public, adverse, peaceful, notorious, continuous and in actual possession and cultivation over
Lot 2161 in the concept of owner for more than fifty (50) years including that of their predecessors-
in-interest." This is a factual finding that should not be disturbed on appeal absent recognized
exceptions (Javier vs. Concepcion, 94 SCRA 212 [1979]; Santana vs. Marina, 94 SCRA 853 [1979]).

If I am concurring, in the result, in the reversal of the previous Decision of this Court, it is out of a
spirit of liberality invoked by petitioners, and not because the act of disapproval of the Record on
Appeal by respondent Judge was "capricious" or "grossly erroneous."

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

The principal reason for the disapproval of the Record on Appeal by respondent Judge was because
it was filed beyond the thirty-day extended period prayed for by petitioners. It was filed two days (not
one day) late. It was due on February 27, 1979 but was filed only on March 1, 1979. If petitioners
could not file their Record on Appeal within the 30-day period that they had requested, they should
have prayed for further extension.

The absence of petitioners' counsel on the date the Record on Appeal was set for hearing for the
second time was only the secondary reason. The portion of respondent Judge's Order quoted in the
main opinion was preceded by another paragraph showing that he had considered that the Record
on Appeal was filed out of time. To quote:

When the motion for approval of the record on appeal was called at 10:57 in the
morning, movant counsel, Atty. Arturo Jardin, was not around. Atty. Arturo Legaspi,
for the oppositors-appellees, informed the Court that he was only furnished a copy of
the record on appeal yesterday, March 1, 1979, and he has no time to make a written
opposition to the approval of the record on appeal, but in open Court he argued that
the motion for the approval of the record on appeal be denied because the record on
appeal was filed out of time.

Considering that Atty. Galdino Jardin for the second time was not again present, the
record on appeal and the appeal bond are hereby disapproved.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 36, Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

In fact, in denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order disapproving the Record on
Appeal, respondent Judge stated more explicitly:

On January 25, 1979 the applicants, through counsel, filed a "Notice of Appeal, And
With Cash Appeal Bond, With Motion for Extension of Time to file Typewritten
Record on Appeal" and set it for hearing on January 29, 1979 at 9:00 A.M. The
request for extension of time to file record on appeal mixed up into the notice of
appeal and the filing of the cash bond was not resolved on January 29, 1979 as set
because neither movant counsel nor his clients were around, while the oppositors
through counsel were. The Court ordered the motion to be reset to the next available
date (p. 216, records). On March 1, 1979 the applicants through counsel filed their
Record on Appeal and set it for approval on March 2, 1979 at 9:00 A.M. Again
neither the applicants nor their counsel was around when the record on appeal was
called for approval on March 2, 1979 and the counsel for the oppositors was allowed
to argue and point out that the record on appeal was filed out of time. For this reason
and considering that movant counsel then seemed not to mind the calendar of the
case for two times already, the Court disapproved the record on appeal and entered
its said order of March 3, 1979.

xxx xxx xxx

But even granting, arguendo, that the motion for extension of time should be deemed
granted, yet the record on appeal filed on March 1, 1979 is still out of time. For, as
 pointed out by Atty. Arturo Legaspi, counsel for the oppositors, in his opposition to
the motion for reconsideration, "... the 30 day extension period by applicants ...
should be computed from January 28, 1979, the last day of the original 30 day period
from December 29, 1978 when applicants received the decision." Therefore, when
applicants filed the record on appeal on March 1, 1979, 32 days had already
elapsed. (pp. 45-46, Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

The Trial Court had made a finding that the private respondents have "been in actual, physical,
open, public, adverse, peaceful, notorious, continuous and in actual possession and cultivation over
Lot 2161 in the concept of owner for more than fifty (50) years including that of their predecessors-
in-interest." This is a factual finding that should not be disturbed on appeal absent recognized
exceptions (Javier vs. Concepcion, 94 SCRA 212 [1979]; Santana vs. Marina, 94 SCRA 853 [1979]).

If I am concurring, in the result, in the reversal of the previous Decision of this Court, it is out of a
spirit of liberality invoked by petitioners, and not because the act of disapproval of the Record on
Appeal by respondent Judge was "capricious" or "grossly erroneous."