C.

4 Legislative Function

17. Garcillano v. HoR Committee on Public Information, GR No. 170338, December 23, 2008

Facts:
During the administration of Arroyo, “Hello Garci” was controversy that catches the attention of the public
and created a trust issue in the government. This “Hello Garci” tapes, was a recording of the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections that became the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by
committees of both Houses of Congress.
Petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction,
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He praying that the
respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained"
wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that
the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House
proceedings.
The Court dismisses the petition.
Issues:
Whether to grant Petitioner Virgilio Garcillano to restrain the tape recordings in the committee reports.
Ruling:

Garci’s petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played in
Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these
incidents hence it has become moot and academic.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of
the Civil Code, which provides that “laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”
18. Abas Kida, v. Senate, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Facts:

The enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act Providing for the Synchronization of
the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local
Elections and for Other Purposes" was petitioned.

The law reset the ARMM elections to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections.
The law as well granted the President the power to "appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office
of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected
in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."

Petitioner Abas Kida challenged RA No. 10153 assailing the constitutionality of both House Bill No.
4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756, and the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the
constitutional plebiscite requirement.

Issue:

Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution?

Ruling:

NO. RA No. 10153 does not violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill
can become a law: the bill has passed three readings on separate days and it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
19. TESDA v. COA, GR No. 196418, Feb. 10, 2011

Facts:

The Commission on Audit (COA) issued COA Decision No. 2010-39 which disallows the
payment of petitioner Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the
healthcare allowance of P5000.

Paid allowances is the application of AO No. 403 of the DOLE which authorized the
payment of the said allowance to all officials and employees of DOLE and its attached agencies
which, includes TESDA. The said administrative order is based on the CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 33. Upon post-audit, the COA issued AOM No. 04-005 which states that, DOLE A O
403 is clearly without any legal basis. COA then subsequently issued a Notice
o f Disallowance No. 2006-015 to disallow said allowances.

The TESDA then filed a petition assailing the disallowance.

Issue:

Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Notice of Disallowance
No. 2006-015 pursuant to AOM No. 04-005?

Ruling:

No. COA did not committed grave abuse of discretion.

The COA did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction because it properly exercised its powers and discretion in disallowing
the payment of the ₱5,000.00 as healthcare maintenance allowance.

The COA is endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the power to
ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended by
law.

The Constitution has made the COA "the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over
all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and
property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations."

Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty
and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are
perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law.
20. Jacomille v. Abaya, GR No. 212381, April 22, 2015
Facts:

The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) is the primary policy, planning,
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating, and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of
the government in the promotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of
transportation and communications systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient, and reliable postal,
transportation and communication services.

One of its line agencies is the Land Transportation Office (LTO) which is tasked, to register motor
vehicles and regulate their operation.
In accordance with its mandate, the LTO is required to issue motor vehicle license plates which serve to
identify the registered vehicles as they ply the roads. These plates should at all times be conspicuously
displayed on the front and rear portions of the registered vehicles to assure quick and expedient
identification should there be a need, as in the case of motor vehicle accidents or infraction of traffic rules.

The LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) to supply the
new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants. DOTC published in newspapers of general
circulation the Invitation To Bid for the supply and delivery of motor vehicle license plates for the MVPSP.

Petitioner Reynaldo M. Jacomille filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the legality of
MVPSP

Issue:

Whether the 2014 GAA included an appropriation for the implementation of the MVPSP?

Whether the use of the appropriation under 2014 GAA for the implementation of the MVPSP was
constitutional?

Ruling:

YES.

The Court affirms that there was an appropriation for the MVPSP under the 2014 GAA.

The use of such appropriation for the implementation of the MVPSP was constitutional.
The Court concludes that MVPSP did not follow the timelines provided in Sec. 37 of R.A. No. 9184. As
earlier recited, the project did not have the adequate appropriation when its procurement was
commenced on February 20, 2013, contrary to the provisions of Sections 5a, 7 and 20 of R.A. No. 9184.
The DOTC and the LTO likewise failed to secure the MYOA before the start of the procurement process
even though MVPSP is MYP involving MYC. All these irregularities tainted the earlier procurement
process and rendered it null and void.

The Court has stated that the present petition has been rendered moot and academic by the
appropriation for the full amount of the project fund in GAA 2014. Said appropriation "cured" whatever
defect the process had.

As to whether the responsible public officials should be held accountable for the irregularities in the
procurement process of MVPSP, the Court deems that it is not the proper forum to resolve the issue as it
is not a trier of facts and it cannot receive new evidence from the parties to aid it in the prompt resolution
of the issue.
21. Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994

Facts:
RA 7663 (The General Appropriations Bill of 1994) “An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the
Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was signed
and approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions.

The Philippine Constitution Association (Petitioners) prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as
unconstitutional and void:

a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt
Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and

b) The veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994

They claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and
activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on
executive power, since said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that the
proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment
thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether the Countrywide Development Fund is unconstitutional in which the separation of power is
violated?

Whether the Presidents’ veto of the special provision is valid?

Ruling:

No. The Countrywide Development Fund is constitutional.

The congress acted within its power wherein the power of appropriation carries with it the power to
specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be.

No. the Presidents’ veto is not valid.

the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall
be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting
the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators"
22. Daraga Press, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, GR No. 201042, June 16, 2015

Facts:
DBM Secretary Rolando G. Adaya, Jr. requested Commission on Audit to validate and evaluate the
request of ARMM Governor Nur Misuari for the release of funds for the payment of alleged unpaid
obligation to the Daraga Press, Inc. for the delivery of textbooks on July 3, 1998 to Department of
Education – ARMM.

In response to the request, Commission on Audit created a team of auditors who were tasked to validate
and evaluate the alleged unpaid obligation.

Assistant Commissioner Gloria S. Cornejo issued a Memorandum expressing serious doubts on the
validity of the obligation as the actual receipt of the subject textbooks could not be ascertained.

Based on COA findings, there is no convincing proof that the subject textbooks were delivered. Also, the
Supply Officer did not actually inspected and received the said delivery.

Issue:

Whether the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the money claim?

Ruling:

No. The COA committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the money claim.
COA committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the money claim as the denial is supported by
the evidence on record. They maintain that there is no credible evidence to show that the subject
textbooks were delivered and that without any proof of delivery, there is no basis for petitioner DPI to
recover even under the principle of quantum meruit.

Decisions and resolutions of the respondent COA may be reviewed and nullified only on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion exists
when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice,
whim, and despotism.
23. Gonzales v. Macaraig, GR No. 87636, November 19, 1990

Facts:

The Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989.
The bill was presented to the President for consideration and approval.

On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Rep. Act No. 6688. With her power to veto, the president vetoed seven (7) Special Provisions and
Section 55, a "General Provision,".

The Senate, in the same Resolution No. 381, declared that the veto made by the President of Section 55
of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is
unconstitutional, void and without any force and effect.

Issue:

Whether the assailed provisions are within the President’s power to veto?

The terms item and provision

in budgetary legislation and
practice are concededly
different. An ‘item’ of an
appropriation bill obviously means
an item which in itself is a specific
appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law, which
happens to be put into an
appropriation bill." However, we
are of the opinion that Section 55
(FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY
‘90) are not provisions in the
budgetary sense of the term.
Explicit is the requirement
that a provision in the
Appropriations Bill should
relate
specifically to some" particular
appropriation" therein. The
challenged "provisions" fall short
of
this requirement. Firstly, the
vetoed "provisions" do not relate to
any particular or distinctive
appropriation. They apply
generally to all items disapproved
or reduced by Congress in the
Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the
disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the
face of the Bill. Thirdly, the vetoed
Sections are more of an expression
of Congressional policy
in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation
The terms item and provision
in budgetary legislation and
practice are concededly
different. An ‘item’ of an
appropriation bill obviously means
an item which in itself is a specific
appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law, which
happens to be put into an
appropriation bill." However, we
are of the opinion that Section 55
(FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY
‘90) are not provisions in the
budgetary sense of the term.
Explicit is the requirement
that a provision in the
Appropriations Bill should
relate
specifically to some" particular
appropriation" therein. The
challenged "provisions" fall short
of
this requirement. Firstly, the
vetoed "provisions" do not relate to
any particular or distinctive
appropriation. They apply
generally to all items disapproved
or reduced by Congress in the
Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the
disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the
face of the Bill. Thirdly, the vetoed
Sections are more of an expression
of Congressional policy
in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation
Ruling: Yes, the provisions are within the President’s power to veto.

The assailed provisions are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items. The term item and
provision in budgetary legislation are different. The “item” of an appropriation bill would mean an item
which is a specific appropriation of money not some general provision of law.