Expro and Cancellation of Title Q and A

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MAZY’S CAPITAL

Issues and Proposed Answers

I. Expropriation.

1. Q: What is expropriation?
A: It is the State’s inherent right to condemn private property for public use
upon payment of just compensation.1

2. Q: Is expropriation absolute?
A: No. The requisites for its exercise are:

i. the property taken must be private property; 2


ii. there must be genuine necessity to take the private property;
iii. the taking must be for public use;
iv. there must be payment of just compensation; and
v. the taking must comply with due process of law.3

3. Q: What were the governing laws in the subject expropriation?


A: They were:

i. Act 190 (7 August 1901), or the Code of Civil Procedure, more particularly,
Sections 241 to 253; and
ii. Act 2826 (5 March 1919).4

4. Q: What is public use?


A: The meaning of the term “public use” has evolved over time in response
to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use, which was
traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual “use by the public,”
has developed an expansive meaning. “Public use” is now synonymous
with “public interest,” “public benefit,” and “public convenience.” At
present, it may not be amiss to state that whatever is beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.” 5

1
PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation v. NGCP, G.R. 224936, 4 September 2019.
2
“[A] property already devoted to public use can still be subject to expropriation, provided this is done directly by
the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority to a delegate.” (See More Electric and Power
Corporation, infra).
3
More Electric and Power Corporation v. Panay Electric Company, Inc., G.R. 248061, 9 March 2021.
4
An Act to Establish Provisions Additional to Those Contained in Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety with
Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Eminent Domain in Cases in Which the Exercise of Said Right is Resorted to
in Favor of the Insular Government of or Any Province or Municipality.
5
More Electric and Power Corporation, supra.
5. Q: Can an expropriated property be used for a different purpose, i.e., other
than the original public purpose established in the expropriation
proceeding?
A: No. The Supreme Court held:

[…] the taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s


exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the
condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for
which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not
initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,
subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In
such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become
improper for lack of the required factual justification. 6

6. Q: For what public use was Lot 937 expropriated?


A: The Amended Complaint dated 18 November 1939 states that the
Government needs Lot 937, as well as the 17 other lots, “to carry out the
development program of the Philippine Army as provided in the National
Defense Act.”

Meanwhile, the Decision dated 14 May 1940 states that the lots were
condemned in favor of the Government “to form part of the military
reservation for the use of the Philippine Army.”

7. Q: Is Lot 937 still being used for the above public purpose?
A: Yes. Lot 937 is part of Camp Lapu-lapu, a military reservation, and is
being used to implement the National Defense Act. The Regional
Community Defense Group (“RCDG”) is stationed in, and conducts its
activities on, Lot 937.

8. Q: What is just compensation?


A: It is “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator.”7 It is synonymous to fair market value, or the “sum of
money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner,
willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and received for such property.”8

9. Q: When must the State pay just compensation?


6
MCIAA v. Lozada, G.R. 176625, 25 February 2010.
7
Lloyds Industrial Richfield Corporation v. National Power Corporation, G.R. 190207, 30 June 2021.
8
Id.
A: The State must pay within a reasonable time, i.e., within five years from
the expropriation judgment’s finality. 9

10. Q: What happens if the State fails to pay just compensation within a
reasonable time?
A: Where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)
years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings,
the expropriation is rendered “incomplete” and the owner has the right to
recover possession of the property.10

11. Q: Did the State pay just compensation for Lot 937?
A: Yes. The State paid the original owner ₱1,845.72 as Lot 937’s just
compensation.11

12. Q: Are you aware of the other cases involving Civil Case 781 that reached the
Supreme Court?
A: Yes. The allied cases are:

i. Valdehueza v. Republic;12
ii. Republic v. Lim;13
iii. Federated Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals;14 and
iv. San Roque Realty and Development Corporation v. Republic .15

13. Q: In those cases, the Supreme Court found that the State failed to prove,
among others, that it paid the original owners, and ordered the lots’
reversion. How is this case different from the allied cases?
A: In this case, the State has proof, i.e., Provincial Voucher, that it paid Lot
937’s original owner. In addition, unlike in the allied cases, the State has
been in possession of Lot 937 since 1938 until present. Except for the
portion that was demolished in November 2022, the State’s possession of
Lot 937 has been continuing and undisturbed.

9
Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, 29 June 2005.
10
Id.
11
Comment, Annex 5 (Provincial Voucher).
12
G.R. L-21032, 19 May 1966.
13
G.R. 161656, 29 June 2005.
14
G.R. 127967, 14 December 2005.
15
G.R. 163130, 7 September 2007.
14. Q: Whether Godinez is estopped from assailing the legality and/or propriety
of
the expropriation proceedings, considering that after the promulgation of
the Decision Parcial in 1939 and the Decision in 1940, he did not raise any
issue on the title until the filing of the Complaint for Reconstitution in
1954 and accion reivindicatoria in 1997.
A: It is submitted that Godinez should be estopped from assailing the legality
of the expropriation proceedings under the principle of estoppel and
laches.

In Secretary of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson ,16 the


Supreme Court held that the failure to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings for a long period of time by the movants amounted to a
waiver to assail the power of the government to expropriate, thus:

xxxx

Even if we squarely deal with the issues of laches and


prescription, the same must still fail. Laches is principally a
doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right
when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or
in an injustice. This doctrine finds no application in this case,
since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to
respondents’ claim. Both equity and the law direct that a
property owner should be compensated if his property is taken
for public use. Neither shall prescription bar respondents’ claim
following the long-standing rule "that where private property is
taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring
title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the
owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not
prescribe."

When a property is taken by the government for public use,


jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available to a
landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is
feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand
payment of just compensation for the land taken. For failure
of respondents to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed
to have waived and are estopped from assailing the
power of the government to expropriate or the public
use for which the power was exercised. What is left to
respondents is the right of compensation. The trial and
16
G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013.
appellate courts found that respondents are entitled to
compensation. The only issue left for determination is the
propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.17

Laches has also set in, the elements of which are as follows: (a) conduct
on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation of which complaint in made and for which the complainant
seeks a remedy; (b) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct
and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bares his suit; and (d) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held barred. 18

15. Q: Did the non-registration of title in the name of the Republic affect its title?
A: At the time the Republic filed its Complaint for Expropriation in 1938, the
governing law is Act No. 282619, which states:

SECTION 2. When condemnation proceedings are instituted


by or in favor of the Insular Government or any province or
municipality of the Philippine Islands in any competent court
of the Philippines, the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter
immediately upon the land covered by such proceedings,
after depositing with the provincial treasurer the value of
said land in cash, as previously and promptly determined and
fixed by the competent court, which money the provincial
treasurer shall retain subject to the order and final decision
of the court: Provided, however, That the court may permit
that in lieu of cash, there may be deposited with the
provincial treasurer a certificate of deposit of any depository
of the Government of the Philippine Islands, payable to the
provincial treasurer on sight, for the sum ordered deposited
by the court. xxx

The Code of Civil Procedure then in effect provides that the final judgment
in a condemnation proceeding shall be recorded in the office of the
registrar of deeds for the province where the property is located, thus:

17
Emphasis supplied.
18
Arga, et al., v. PNB, G.R. No. 133317, June 29, 1999.
19
An Act to Establish Provisions Additional to those Contained in Act No. 190 with regard to the Exercise of the
Right of Eminent Domain in Cases in which the Exercise of Said Right is Resorted to in Favor of the Insular
Government or of any Province or Municipality.
SECTION 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. — The
record of the final judgment in such action shall state definitely,
by metes and bounds and adequate description, the particular
land or interest in land condemned to the public use, and the
nature of the public use. A certified copy of the record of the
judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of
deeds for the province in which the estate is situated, and its
effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated
the land and estate so described.

When the Decision Parcial and the Decision were promulgated in the years 1939
and 1940, respectively, affirming the authority of the State to expropriate Lot
937, the governing law on land registration is Act No. 496 20, the pertinent
provision of which states, thus:

SEC. 88. Whenever any land of a registered owner, or any right


or interest therein, is taken by eminent domain, the
Government or municipality or corporation or other
authority exercising such right shall file for registration
in the proper province a description of the registered
land so taken, giving the name of each owner thereof,
referring by number and place of registration in the registration
book to each certificate of title, and stating what, amount or
interest in the land is taken, and for what purpose. A
memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on
each certificate of title by the register of deeds, and where the
fee simple is taken a new certificate shall be entered to the
owner for the land remaining to him after such taking, and a
new certificate shall be entered to the Government,
municipality, corporation, or other authority exercising such
right for the land so taken. All fees on account of any
memorandum of registration or entry of new certificates shall
be paid by the authority taking the land.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is no available record showing that the


Republic did or did not register the Decision Parcial (1939) and the Decision
(1940) with the register of deeds of the Province of Cebu. Worthy of note is that
the Philippines was more actively involved in World War II following the attack
on Pearl Harbor sometime in December 1941.

In any event, non-registration of the Decision Parcial (1939) and the Decision
(1940) and non-issuance of a certificate of title in the name of Republic does not

20
An Act to Provide for the Adjudication and Registration of Titles to Lands in the Philippine Islands.
amount to abandonment of ownership. Registration of title does not create or
vest ownership, for the same is merely an evidence of ownership, thus:21

Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title.


Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or
vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein.

Corollary, non-registration does not mean abandonment of ownership.

16. Q: What are the expropriation laws applicable in 1939?


A: (a) Section 63, The Philippine Bill, 01 July 1902

Section 63. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby


authorized, subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed in this Act, to
acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and personal
property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain.

(b) Section 64, Act No. 2711, The Administrative Code, 10 March 1917

SECTION 64. Particular powers and duties of (Governor-General) President of


the Philippines. – In addition to his general supervisory authority, the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines shall have such specific
powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and
also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth in this chapter xxx (h) To
determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of
eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the (Philippine Islands)
Philippines; and to direct the Attorney-General where such act is deemed
advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court
having proper jurisdiction.

17. Q: What is the expropriation procedure applicable in 1939?


A: The method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to
afford absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and
irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. 22
This is indicated in the following laws:

(a) Sections 241 to 253, Act No. 190, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and
Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands, 07 August 1901;
21
Heirs of Ermac v. Heirs of Ermac, G.R. No. 149679, 30 May 2003.
22
Visayan Refining Company, et. al, v. Hon. Manuel Camus, G.R. No. 15870, 3 December 1919.
(b) Sections 2 to 5, Act No. 2826, An Act To Establish Provisions Additional To
Those Contained In Act Numbered One Hundred And Ninety With Regard To
The Exercise Of The Right Of Eminent Domain In Cases In Which The
Exercise Of Said Right Is Resorted To In Favor Of The Insular Government
Or Of Any Province Or Municipality , 05 March 1919.

18. Q: What are the land title laws applicable in 1939?


A: (a) Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act, 6 November 1902.

SEC. 88. Whenever any land of a registered owner, or any right or


interest therein, is taken by eminent domain, the Government or
municipality or corporation or other authority exercising such right shall
file for registration in the proper province a description of the registered
land so taken, giving the name of each owner thereof, referring by
number and place of registration in the registration book to each
certificate of title, and stating what, amount or interest in the land is
taken, and for what purpose. A memorandum of the right or interest
taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the register of deeds,
and where the fee simple is taken a new certificate shall be entered to
the owner for the land remaining to him after such taking, and a new
certificate shall be entered to the Government, municipality, corporation,
or other authority exercising such right for the land so taken. All fees on
account of any memorandum of registration or entry of new certificates
shall be paid by the authority taking the land.

(b) Act No. 2259, The Cadastral Act, 11 February 1913

SECTION 1. Whenever, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the


public interests require that the titles to any lands be settled and
adjudicated, upon the order of the Governor-General, the Director of
Lands or the private surveyor named by the landowners, if the Director
of Lards approves, shall make a survey and plan of such lands. The
Director of Lands shall give notice to persons claiming an interest in the
lands, and to the general public, of the day on which such survey will
begin, giving as full and accurate a description as possible of the lands to
be surveyed. Such notice shall be published in two successive issues of
the Official Gazette, in both the English and Spanish languages, and a
copy of the notice in the English and Spanish languages shall be posted
in a conspicuous place on the lands to be surveyed, and also in a
conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the municipality,
township, or settlement in which the lands, or any portion thereof, are
situated. A copy of the notice shall also be sent to the president of such
municipality, township, or settlement, and to the provincial board.||| 
xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 5. When the lands have been surveyed and platted the Director
of Lands, represented by the Attorney-General, shall file in the Court of
Land Registration a petition against the holders, claimants, possessors or
occupants of such lands or any part thereof, stating in substance that the
public interests require that the titles to such lands be settled and
adjudicated, and praying that such titles be so settled and adjudicated.
The petition shall contain a description of the lands in question and shall
be accompanied by a plan thereof, and may contain such other data as
may serve to furnish full notice to the occupants of the lands and to all
persons who may claim any right or interest therein. If the lands contain
two or more parcels held or occupied by different persons the plan shall
indicate the boundaries or limits of the various parcels as correctly as
may be. The parcels shall be known as "lots" and shall on the plans filed
in the case be given separate numbers by the Director of Lands, which
numbers shall be known as "cadastral numbers." The lots situated within
each municipality, township or settlement shall, as far as practicable be
numbered consecutively, beginning with the number "1" and only one
series of numbers shall be used for that purpose in each municipality,
township or settlement: Provided, however, That in cities or townsites a
designation of the land holdings by block and lot numbers may be
employed instead of the designation by cadastral numbers and shall have
the same effect for all purposes as the latter. 

SECTION 6. After final decree has been entered for the registration of a
lot its cadastral number shall not be changed except by order of the
Court of Land Registration. Future subdivisions of any lot shall, with the
approval of said Court, be designated by a letter or letters of the
alphabet added to the cadastral number of the lot to which the
respective subdivisions pertain. The letter with which a subdivision is
designated shall be known as its "cadastral letter:" Provided, however,
That subdivisions of additions to cities or townsites may, with the
approval of the court, be designated by block and lot numbers instead of
cadastral numbers and letters.

(c) Act No. 2874, The Public Land Act, 29 November 1919

(d) Commonwealth Act No. 141, The Public Land Act, 7 November 1936

19. Q: What should the Republic have done upon securing the expropriation
order?
A: Consistent with the provisions of the law cited above, the Republic should
have filed for the issuance of a new certificate of title with the Registrar of
Deeds.23 When the Government is plaintiff, the judgment will take the
form of an order merely requiring the payment of the award as a
condition precedent to the transfer of the title. 24 A certified copy of the
record of the judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of
deeds for the province in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall
be to vest in the plaintiff, for the public use stated, the land and estate so
described.25

In addition, the Code of Civil Procedure then in effect provides thus:

SECTION 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect . — The record of


the final judgment in such action shall state definitely, by metes and
bounds and adequate description, the particular land or interest in land
condemned to the public use, and the nature of the public use. A
certified copy of the record of the judgment shall be recorded in the
office of the registrar of deeds for the province in which the estate is
situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use
stated the land and estate so described.

A memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each


certificate of title by the register of deeds, and where the fee simple is
taken a new certificate shall be entered to the owner for the land
remaining to him after such taking, and a new certificate shall be entered
to the Government, municipality, corporation, or other authority
exercising such right for the land so taken. All fees on account of any
memorandum of registration or entry of new certificates shall be paid by
the authority taking the land.

20. Q: Why was the Expropriation order never registered / implemented /


annotated?
A: There is no information based on available records whether the Republic
did or did not annotate the decree of expropriation. However, one of the
more logical explanations for this circumstance is the occurrence of a
supervening event which is World War II.

Based on historical timelines, shortly after the Decision in Civil Case No. 781 was
issued in the year 1940, World War II broke out in December 8, 1941. A few
months after, on April 10, 1942, the Japanese Imperial Army occupied Cebu. 26 As

23
Section 88, Act. No. 496.
24
Visayan Refining Company, et. al, v. Hon. Manuel Camus, G.R. No. 15870, 3 December 1919.
25
Section 251, 1901 Code of Civil Procedure.
26
Letter from Cebu (6) "Relations Between Japan and Cebu – During WW-II and After", Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, available at https://www.cebu.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_ja/11_000001_00447.html (last visited Jan
21, 2023).
a consequence of the occupation, provincial governors and judges of the courts
of first instance were appointed.27

In fact, this supervening event is a matter of judicial notice.

21. Q: Whether non-payment of just compensation defeats the authority of the


government to take private property, which authority was duly passed
upon in the expropriation proceedings
A: As a general rule, delay in the payment of just compensation does not
defeat the right of eminent domain of the State. In such case, the right of
the person deprived of property is to demand payment of just
compensation. The Court thus held in Republic v. Court of Appeals28:

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of


the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not
adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing
the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking
title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or
interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a
right to compensation for the taking.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic  where the private landowners had


remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation
proceedings, this Court ruled -

"The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be


made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject
of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in
said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of
an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows
that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the
expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title
certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their
expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for
which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair
market value of the same.

27
Lockwood, L.D. “The Philippine Supreme Court and Postwar Problems of International Law,” Stanford
Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Dec., 1950) available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/1226047.
28
G.R. No. 146587, 02 July 2002.
"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such
other remedies, which may be deemed just and equitable under
the premises'."

However, the Court clarified in Republic v. Lim29 that a deliberate refusal on the
part of the State to pay just compensation, exemplified by failure to pay within
five (5) years from finality of judgment, justifies recovery of possession, hence:

The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not


entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of
its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that "non-
payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not
entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated
lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,  and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority .
However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It
bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and
the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since
then. We cannot but construe the Republic’s failure to pay just
compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such
circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several
jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had
when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by
one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where a
rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay
the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon; or
fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.

xxx xxx xxx

In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of


just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that
"the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment." To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with
justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it
takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the
29
G.R. No. 161656, 29 June 2005.
payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals , we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the
property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just."

Lot No. 937 has been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and
executory judgment in said proceedings, it was condemned for public use, and
ordered sold to the government.30 The Republic has also paid just compensation
in the amount of One Thousand Eight-Hundred Forty-Five and Seventy-Two
Centavos (Php 1,845.72), as evidenced by a Provincial Voucher signed by the
Clerk of Court, Eugenio Rodil, and Felisa Sy Cip.

22. Q: Whether Republic may still be allowed to present evidence of alleged


payment of just compensation
A: It is submitted that the Republic should be allowed to present evidence of
alleged payment of just compensation.

It is well-settled that a void judgment never acquires the status of a final


judgment. A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid
judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any
tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding
effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or
create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to
those who seek to enforce. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a
nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no judgment. 31

It is of occasion that newly discovered evidence such as proof of payment of just


compensation can still be admitted in evidence as clearly discussed in the case
of Berry v. State of Georgia32where the Supreme Court of Georgia held:33

Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are


not favored by the Courts. x x x Upon the following points there seems to
be a pretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that it is incumbent on
a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his
knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due
diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it
would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That
it is not cumulative only - viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there
was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself
30
Valdehueza vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21032, May 19, 1966.
31
Canero vs. University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 156380, September 8, 2004.
32
10 Ga. 511 (1851), as cited in Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 96027-28, 8 March 2005, 453 SCRA 24, 34
33
Dinglasan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 14520, September 19, 2006
should be produced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial
will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the
character or credit of a witness.

These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the
propriety of motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.34

It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of
showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied with the
requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.35 

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence."
The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a
temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e.,
when should or could it have been discovered. 36

Here, as culled from the facts, the recent discovery of evidence of payment of
just compensation for Lot No. 937 as paid and received by Felisa Sy Cip, is a
supervening event which renders the supposed final decision of RTC Cebu City-
Branch 9 in Civil Case No. CEB-19845 inequitable and mutable.

23. Q: Whether non-issuance of a title in the name of the Republic defeats the
right of eminent domain of Republic, already established through the
Decision Parcial and Decision
A: It is submitted that the non-issuance of a title in the name of the Republic
does not affect its right over the subject property or its ownership thereof
by virtue of its expropriation.

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of


the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not
adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing
the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is
taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant
asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.37

34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002.
After condemnation of the property, the paramount title is in the
public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to
all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a
judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance.38

24. Q: Whether issuance of the Decision Parcial and Decision in the expropriation
proceedings vested title upon the Republic over Lot 937?
A: Yes. Expropriation of land consists of two stages: (a) the determination of
the authority of the plaintiff and the propriety to exercise the power of
eminent domain and (b) the determination by the court of just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. It is only upon the
completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed.39

The expropriation proceedings were completed in the Decision Parcial


dated 22 April 1939, when the court ordered the Republic to pay just
compensation for Lot 937 in the amount of Php1,845.72. Moreover, the
Decision dated 14 May 1940 declared the Decision Parcial as final.

D. Cancellation of Reconstituted Title.

1. Q: Whether the Petition for Cancellation of Title filed by the Republic is the
appropriate remedy to question the Reconstitution Proceedings held
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu
A: Yes, because its purpose is to annul the Order of Reconstitution and the
resulting reconstituted title. It is likewise submitted that a closer reading
of the material allegations and relief prayed for therein reveal that the
action may be considered as one for Quieting of Title.

A certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be


altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.40 Hence, in order to attack the reconstituted title No. TCT RT-
6757 in the name of Mariano Godinez which he secured through fraud and
misrepresentation, the petition for cancellation was filed.

The Republic was not impleaded or notified of the Petition for


Reconstitution filed by Godinez in the CFI of Cebu. Hence, the remedies
available to the State were limited, thus:

38
Id.
39
Republic of the Philippines v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, 23 June 2000.
40
Gaoiran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 215925, March 7, 2022.
 Rule 19 – Intervention . Republic could not have intervened because it was
not aware of the proceedings. There was likewise no appeal, which, assuming
that procedural rules are relaxed, could have been an avenue for the State to
intervene.

 Rule 38 – Petition for Relief from Judgment. This remedy could not have been
availed of because it must have been filed not more than six (6) months after
the judgment or final order was entered. The State was made aware of the
claim of Godinez only when the reivindicatory action was filed in 1997, more
than 41 years after the Order in Reconstitution case was issued in 1956. Even
then, it is submitted that the Republic was misled in the Reivindicatoria case
when Godinez made a general allegation that his right over Lot 937 was
acquired “pursuant to law.” There was no mention of reconstitution.

 Rule 41 – Ordinary Appeal from the RTC to the CA . The appeal must be taken
within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order. Where record on
appeal is required, notice of appeal and record on appeal shall be filed within
30 days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, Republic is not
a party in reconstitution case and has no personality to file an appeal. As
mentioned above, it could not have intervened in the RTC proceedings for
reconstitution.

 Rule 65 – Petition for Certiorari. The Petition must be filed within 60 days
from notice of judgment, order, or resolution. But since Republic was not
impleaded in the Reconstitution case, it could not have been notified of the
Order. The Republic was likewise misled in the Reivindicatoria case, when
Godinez claimed in his Complaint for Reivindicatory action that –

4. Lot 937 was originally registered and titled in the name of


Eustaqio Godinez and subject lot was later acquired by the plaintiff
in good faith, free of any lien or encumbrance and devolved upon
the latter pursuant to law and thus plaintiff is now the absolute and
exclusive owner of Lot 937, clean of any lien or encumbrance;

Notwithstanding the information of the Republic that there is a conflicting


claim in Lot 937 when the Reivindicatory action was filed, the allegation of
Godinez is that he acquired the Lot through inheritance. There was no
mention of the reconstitution proceedings.

 Section 10 of RA 6732. The law states that an interested party who, by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence was prevented from taking part in
the proceedings, may file a petition to set aside the decision and reopen the
proceedings, no later than six (6) months from the promulgation thereof.
When the Republic obtained knowledge of the reconstitution and the
fraudulent machinations of Godinez, it had been more than 40 years since the
Order of reconstitution was promulgated. When this law was passed on July
1989, it had been more than 30 years since the Order of Reconstitution was
promulgated in 1956.

As likewise discussed earlier, it is submitted that Section 19 of RA 26,


RA 9443, and the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on quieting of
title authorize the filing of the Petition for Cancellation of
Reconstituted Title.

To reiterate, the present complaint may be considered as an action for quieting


of title, a remedy which the Court has described as follows: 41

In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine


the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to
place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to
said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit
of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he
deems best.

The relevant provisions of the Civil Code provide:

ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any


interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein.

ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in
the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be
in possession of said property.

In Gatmaytan and Valdellon v. Misibis Land, Inc. 42, the Court laid down the
requisites, as well as the prescription, of an action for the quieting of title, to wit:

41
Yu v. Topacio, G.R. No. 216024, 18 September 2019.
42
G.R. No. 222166, 10 June 2020.
For an action for quieting of title to prosper: (i) the plaintiff or complainant
must have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (ii) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

As a general rule, an action for quieting of title, being a real action,


prescribes thirty (30) years after accrual. However, by way of exception, an
action to quiet title involving property in the possession of the plaintiff is
imprescriptible.

Here, the Republic’s legal title to Lot 937 is based on the Court judgments
upholding the right of the State to expropriate said lot, as well as the payment of
just compensation, duly evidenced by a Provincial Voucher. On the other hand,
the Order dated 01 March 1956 in GLRO Record No. 5988 (Reconstitution), the
reconstituted title, as well as the Court decision in the reivindicatory case,
although appearing valid, are in fact invalid. Considering that the Republic is in
possession of Lot 937, the action for quieting of title does not prescribe.

It is thus submitted that the Complaint for Cancellation may also be viewed as
one for Quieting of Title.

Other notes for consideration:

The position that the Republic could have availed of an action for annulment of
judgment could arise.

The Order dated 01 March 1956 in GLRO Record No. 5988 (Reconstitution) is a
void judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The Court instructs that the proper remedy
to assail a void judgment for lack of jurisdiction is an action for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.43

In Heirs of Ramirez v. Abon44, a case for annulment of a judgment ordering


reconstitution of an Original Certificate of Title, the Court upheld the finding of
lack of jurisdiction over a party who should be impleaded. The Court held thus:

However, Section 109 of PD 1529 also contemplates a situation wherein


the petition for reconstitution is filed by another person having an interest
in the property who is not the registered owner. In other words, when an
owner's duplicate certificate of title is lost or destroyed, a person who is a
transferee of the ownership over the property, who is not necessarily the
registered owner, may also file the petition for reconstitution. Similarly, in
43
Imperial v. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, 30 January 2017.
44
G.R. No. 222916, 24 July 2019.
this situation, the other persons having interest in the property should be
notified of the proceedings. 

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, which governs actions for Annulment of


Judgments or Final Orders and Resolution, provides:

Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only


on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. (n)

Section 3. Period for filing action. — If based on extrinsic fraud, the action
must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack
of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. (n)

Section 4. Filing and contents of petition . — The action shall be


commenced by filing a verified petition alleging therein with particularity the
facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting
the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case
may be.

The petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies, together with
sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents. A certified
true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to
the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as
such by the petitioner.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition affidavits of
witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense and a
sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency if there is such
other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or
is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof
within five (5) days therefrom.

The Republic prayed for the Court to declare as null and void, and order the
cancellation of, TCT No. RT-6757, and its derivative titles. Since TCT No. RT-
6757 was issued pursuant to an Order of Reconstitution in a proceeding that is
void for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint effectively prays for the nullity of the
Reconstitution Order.

An action for the Annulment of the Order in GLRO Rec No. 5988 is not barred by
prescription because a Petition under Rule 47 based on lack of jurisdiction is
allowable as long as it is not barred by laches or estoppel. As discussed in this
briefer, the State is not barred by estoppel or laches in instituting this present
action.

2. Q: Whether reconstitution of title is the same as issuance of title


A: In Marcelino Dela Paz v. Republic of the Philippines ,45 the Supreme Court,
citing Republic of the Philippines v. Dominador Santua,46 reiterated that
the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original
form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a
person to a piece of land, thus:

Reconstitution is the restoration of the instrument or title


allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.
Its only purpose is to have the title reproduced, after
observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form
they were when the loss or destruction occurred. The
process involves diligent circumspect evaluation of the
authenticity and relevance of all the evidence presented for
fear of the chilling consequences of mistakenly issuing a
reconstituted title when in fact the original is not truly lost or
destroyed.

The purpose of reconstitution of title is to have the title reproduced after


proper proceedings in the same form it was when the loss or destruction
occurred.47 It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title, but merely determines whether a re-issuance of
such title is proper.48 The reconstituted certificate of title does not vest
ownership but merely evinces title over a particular property. 49

Similarly, registration of a land under the Torrens System, and the


consequent issuance of title, does not create or vest title, because
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.50 Corollary, the issuance

45
G.R. No. 195726, November 20, 2017.
46
G.R. No. 155703, September 8, 2008.
47
Heirs of Abadilla vs. Gregorio Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041, July 12, 2006.
48
G.R. No. 155703, September 8, 2008.
49
Heirs of Abadilla vs. Gregorio Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041, July 12, 2006.
50
Id.
of title does not foreclose the possibility of having a different owner, and
it cannot be used against the true owner as a shield for fraud. 51

In Heirs of Abadilla v. Gregorio Galarosa, Galarosa obtained a favorable


judgment in the reconstitution proceedings he initiated. However, the
Register of Deeds refused to execute the same upon receiving reports
from various government agencies that the title subject of reconstitution
is of doubtful authenticity. Three years thereafter, Galarosa filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Annulment of Title with
Damages. The Court ruled that the latter action is not barred by prior
judgment nor conclusiveness of judgment. The Court added: 52

The nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is the


restoration of an instrument or the reissuance of a new
duplicate certificate of title which is supposed to have been
lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. xxx
Possession of a lost certificate of title is not the same as
ownership of the land covered by it, and the certificate does
not vest ownership but merely evinces title over a particular
property.

xxx

The issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate civil suit and
should not be confused with reconstitution proceedings.

In an action for reconveyance, the parties are obliged to prove their


ownership over the property. Necessarily, the parties may present evidence
to support their claims. The court must weigh these pieces of evidence and
decide who between the parties the true owner is. Therefore, it cannot be
bound simply by the factual findings of the land registration court alone. 53

An exception to the aforementioned rule is if the party claiming ownership


has had the opportunity to prove his or her claim in the land registration
case. In such a case, res judicata will then apply. Thus, when an issue of
ownership has been raised in the land registration proceedings where the
adverse party was given full opportunity to present his or her claim, the
findings in the land registration case will constitute a bar from any other claim
of the adverse party on the property. 54

51
Sps. Aboitiz and Cabarrus vs Spouses Po, G.R. No. 208450, June 5, 2017.
52
Heirs of Abadilla vs. Gregorio Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041, July 12, 2006.
53
Supra note 12.
54
Id.
3. Q: When the title was reconstituted, what remedies were available to the
State, if any?
A: As discussed above, the Republic was not impleaded in the judicial
reconstitution instituted by Godinez. Hence, the remedies available to the
State are limited.

The present Petition for Cancellation, as authorized under Section 19 of


RA 26, RA 9443, and which may be considered an Action for Quieting of
Title, are the available remedies for the declaration of nullity of the
Reconstitution Proceedings and the reconstituted title issued in the name
of Godinez.

It should be added that the indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not find
application when a title is secured through fraud, as was done by Godinez,
hence: 55

It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in


fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be
allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore,
have an ever existing authority, thru its duly authorized
officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru
the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be
authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the
reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject
thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance
with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land
previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the
Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if
the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or
not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order
that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the
Government.

The Republic can question even a final and executory judgment when
there was fraud, and that prescription or estoppel cannot lie against the
government.56 The principle of immutability of judgments must yield to the
basic rule that a decision which is null and void for want of jurisdiction of
the trial court is not a decision in contemplation of law, and can never
become final and executory.57

55
Piñero vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-36507, June 14, 1974.
56
Republic vs. Bacas, et al., G.R. No. 182913, November 20, 2013.
57
Id.
4. Q: Was the Republic prevented from seeking an appropriate remedy?
A: Yes, the Republic, particularly the DND, as true and lawful owner and
possessor of subject Lot 937, was not notified of the reconstitution
proceedings (GLRO Rec. No. 5988) and accordingly deprived of its right to
be heard and file an opposition to said petition for reconstitution.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the indispensability of


actual and personal notice of the date of hearing of the
reconstitution petition to actual owners and possessors of the
land involved in order to vest the trial court with jurisdiction
thereon. If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is
served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he
is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and
void.58

Courts have been forewarned to observe extreme caution by applying strictly the
requirement imposed by law, among which include proper publication and notice
to all interested parties including the registered owner, possessors or occupants
of the property and owners of adjoining lots and that:

(a) documents presented are sufficient and proper to warrant


the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title;

(b) petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an


interest therein;

(c) said certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed; and

(d) the description, area and boundaries of the property are


substantially the same as those contained in the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.59

As discussed above, the Republic was not impleaded in the Reconstitution proceedings,
and did not have an opportunity to intervene. As a non-party to the case, it did not
receive court processes, which would have allowed it to file an ordinary appeal or a
petition for certiorari. A Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38 was likewise not
available to the Republic because more than 40 years elapsed from the date the Order
of Reconstitution was issued until the Complaint for Reivindicatory action was filed. Rule
38 allows a petition to be filed not later than six (6) months after a final order is entered.

58
Republic v. Susi, G.R. No. 213209, January 16, 2017.
59
As culled from Section 15, Republic Act No. 26.

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