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Communication Practices for Oil Spills: Stakeholder Engagement

During Preparedness and Response
Article in Human and Ecological Risk Assessment · April 2015

DOI: 10.1080/10807039.2014.947869
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Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 21: 667–690, 2015
Copyright C Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1080-7039 print / 1549-7860 online
DOI: 10.1080/10807039.2014.947869
Communication Practices for Oil Spills: Stakeholder

Engagement During Preparedness and Response
Ann Hayward Walker,1 Robert Pavia,2 Ann Bostrom,3 Thomas M. Leschine,2 and
Kate Starbird4
1
SEA Consulting Group, Cape Charles, VA, USA; 2School of Marine and
Environmental Affairs, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA; 3Daniel J. Evans
School of Public Affairs, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA; 4Human
Centered Design & Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
ABSTRACT
The Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill was a pivotal moment in the expression of
and reporting on stakeholder risk perceptions about oil spills, response options, and
safety. Public engagement through both traditional and social media was arguably
much higher than in prior spills. The DWH response organization undertook a
wide variety of activities to manage risks and communicate with both the general
public and those directly affected, such as commercial fishers. However, these did
not fully address widespread concerns about ecological and human health risks
associated with dispersant use. Consequentially the DWH spill heightened awareness
of persistent risk communication problems around oil spill response, and especially
dispersant use. Oil spill risk research and experience suggests that institutional and
operational factors inhibit engaging communities and stakeholders during oil spill
preparedness and response, and that such engagement is essential for effective risk
management. In this article we review and assess current oil spill preparedness and
response practices for community and stakeholder engagement, including related
institutional and operational constraints. This assessment suggests five example risk
management practices to improve and advance risk communications during oil spill
preparedness and response activities.
Key Words: oil spill preparedness and response, risk communication, stakeholder
engagement, dispersant(s), incident command system (ICS).
INTRODUCTION
The Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill was a pivotal moment in expression
and reporting on stakeholder risk perceptions about oil spills, response options,
and safety during a major event. The public in particular engaged though both
Address correspondence to Ann Hayward Walker, SEA Consulting Group, 325 Mason Avenue,
Cape Charles, VA 23310, USA. E-mail: ahwalker@seaconsulting.com
667
A. H. Walker et al.
traditional and social media, arguably more so than in prior spills (Starbird et al.
2015). The DWH response organization undertook a wide variety of activities to
manage risks and communicate their practices to both the general public and
to those most directly affected, such as commercial fishers. In many ways those
communication activities could not overcome widespread concerns about ecological
and human health risks associated with dispersant use (Greiner et al. 2013). In
this regard, the DWH spill heightened awareness of persistent risk communication
problems around oil spill response and especially dispersant use.
Stakeholders are part of a community and broadly defined as those groups that
have a stake, interest, or right in an issue or activity (e.g., an oil spill) and those that
will be affected either negatively or positively by decisions about the issue or activity
(Krick et al. 2005). Formal authorities, which include agency representatives having
oil spill authority at multiple levels of government and potential Responsible Parties
(RPs) (i.e., private or public sector spillers) make and implement preparedness
and response decisions to mitigate impacts on ecological resources and habitats,
human health, resource users, and property owners. Oil spill stakeholders include
communities who could be affected by preparedness and response decisions, in
addition to the public at large and knowledge sources, influencers and opinion
leaders, such as academia. These stakeholders are infrequent participants in oil spill
preparedness activities for various reasons, including competing priorities for their
attention, lack of staffing, and no regulatory driver.
Stakeholder engagement is a process by which an organization engages relevant
stakeholders for a clear purpose to achieve accepted outcomes. This represents an
opportunity for preparedness and response organizations to learn about the risk
perceptions and concerns of stakeholders and communities, share technical infor-
mation, and establish constructive relationships and dialogue about oil spills and
response options, such as dispersants (Walker et al. 2013). Engagement can also
be a fundamental accountability mechanism that obliges formal authorities to un-
derstand, and respond to stakeholder concerns about issues (AccountAbility 2011).
Engagement benefits stakeholders in various ways including building community
resilience. Community resilience in the context of oil spills is the capacity of people
to cope with a serious event that has impacted them, they did not cause, and that is
managed by outside entities including government, insurance, and experts (Walker
et al. 2013).
External linkages to government officials and others are important for access-
ing assistance; the provision of external resources and knowledge is necessary for
communities to adapt and be resilient to environmental changes caused by oil
spills (Cheong 2012). Furthermore, belief in the validity and trustworthiness of ex-
pert knowledge and government-disseminated information hinges on appropriate
knowledge exchange, which occurs over time. Developing and sustaining these ex-
ternal linkages with oil spill formal authorities and responders should begin during
preparedness and be actively used during response.
Assessments of oil spill responses indicate that communications between formal
authorities and responders, and other stakeholders, and the public are critical and
must be effective for an oil spill response to be regarded as successful (Walker et al.
1995; Harrald 2006). A report on risk communication for accidental oil pollution
identified seven communications mistakes made by responders following the M/T
668 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

Prestige oil spill in Spain, one of which was the absence of interaction/direct com-
munication with those affected in the local area and suffering from the incident
(AMPERA 2007). This article explores the relationship between engagement and
communications among responders, affected communities and the public, and dis-
cusses its importance to improving future preparedness and response to oil spills.
RISK COMMUNICATION TECHNICAL CONTENT AND OIL SPILLS

Research on risk communications regarding the use of dispersants and their con-
sequences for both ecological and human health has been sparse to date (Levine and
Picou 2012). Comparisons of lay and expert risk perceptions, together with research
on the effects of risk communication, indicate that expertise and information can
have a large impact on risk perceptions. Cognitive processes such as categorization,
similarity judgments, and inference from mental models are, from an information
processing perspective, all components of risk perception (Bostrom 2005). A mental
model is an individual’s understanding of how something works in the real world.
Previous studies of the mental models of U.S. oil spill decision-makers (Bostrom
et al. 1995, 1997) about dispersants showed a significant divergence in fundamental
understanding of oil weathering and fate processes among decision-makers. Find-
ings from local stakeholder oil spill workshops in Virginia and Washington state
(Walker 2012; Walker and Bostrom 2014) show that some local stakeholder mental
models omit key elements and may focus on elements that contribute relatively little
potential risk (Bostrom et al. 2015a,b).
To be effective in addressing risk perceptions, the technical content of oil spill
communications needs to address stakeholder and community understanding about
oil composition, response options, fate, and effects processes.
OIL SPILL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) specifically states its disas-
ter preparedness goal as, “A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required
across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and
recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk” where hazards in-
clude spills and other technological disasters, in addition to natural disasters (DHS
2011, p. 1). Community engagement during FEMA’s disaster preparedness cycle of-
ten focuses on keeping communities safe from harm and resistant to disasters. It is
noteworthy that the term disaster is absent in the language of the National Response
System (NRS) and National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan (USEPA 1994), generally referred to as the National Contingency Plan (NCP),
which may contribute to a gap in actively engaging with communities about oil
spills. The DWH oil spill has been recognized as a technological disaster, which
results from human causes and therefore is considered preventable. Disaster re-
searchers argue that the effects of technological disasters differ in nature from
other types of hazardous events due in part to the uncertainty or ambiguity of harm
that surrounds the event (Edelstein 1988). The contamination of the environment
from a significant oil spill has direct social consequences in that both ecological and
Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015 669

A. H. Walker et al.
sociocultural systems are challenged (Picou 2009). In fact, research on the Exxon
Valdez oil spill reveals severe and chronic impacts to human populations (Picou
2009).
The NCP defines authorities, responsibilities, organization, and procedures that
govern oil spill preparedness and response operations in the United States (USGPO
2011). The NRS is the U.S. organizational framework, derived from the NCP, for
spill preparedness and response. The NRS provides opportunities for some stake-
holder engagement during preparedness through participation in Area Committee
(AC) and Regional Response Team (RRT) activities. The foundation for effective
response is developed during preparedness; these activities are highly interdepen-
dent. However, the emphasis of the U.S. national oil spill response framework is
operational (i.e., implementing actions to mitigate the impacts of spilled oil on the
environment).
An interrelated set of preparedness activities supports the U.S. National Incident
Management System (NIMS) in a continuous cycle of planning, training, exercising,
and evaluating. After the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, oil spill response organizations
in the United States began adopting the Incident Command System (ICS), which
is a component of NIMS, as the system for managing oil spills. ICS is now used by
government to respond to all emergencies (HSPD-5 2003). ICS provides a common
organizational framework that is flexible and adaptable to all kinds of incidents.
Unified Command is the ICS structure that enables joint incident management for
oil spills based on geographic and/or legal jurisdictional authority and functional
responsibility. Leadership and decision-making during response, including whether
or not to make stakeholder engagement an objective, is the responsibility of Uni-
fied Command. Oil spill response plans generally reflect an ICS-based organization
for response. Personnel who respond to incidents receive ICS training, and inci-
dent management teams and other response organizations implement ICS during
preparedness exercises as well as during response.
How to implement ICS with responsibility assigned for engagement and external
communications (e.g., using social media), is a subject of debate in the emergency
management community (Barron 2013). The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Incident
Management Handbook (IMH) is both an ICS training and response guide for
government and industry responders to oil spills. If a needed ICS function is absent
in the IMH, it is less likely that it will be identified and supported during a spill
by Unified Command, especially the RP’s Incident Commander. This is particularly
true for external communications and engagement, which carry significant legal
implications for the RP.
In ICS, the Public Information Officer (PIO) is assigned the primary responsibility
for communicating with the public, media, and/or coordinating with other agencies
about external communications. The PIO is a key member of the Joint Information
System (JIS), which is responsible for developing, verifying, and gaining approval
for coordinated information dissemination during an incident. The JIS mission is to
coordinate information delivery to the public for all involved organizations—so all
responders speak with one voice. The Joint Information Center is the place where
JIS functions are carried out, often but not always within the ICS incident command
post, which is located on-scene. This center is managed by the lead PIO for the
incident (NRT 2013). Another ICS position, the Liaison Officer, is responsible for

assisting and cooperating with agency representatives, and in this context has limited
responsibility for external communications.
Improving and enhancing community engagement going forward requires in-
corporating stakeholder input into ICS procedures and organizational constraints
with a greater focus on the human dimensions of oil spills. The most recent IMH
(USCG 2014) has begun to explicitly address stakeholder engagement and risk
communications.
LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT PRACTICES

The overarching rationale of the oil spill regulatory framework is environmental
protection of U.S. waters. Human dimensions impacts from oil spills (e.g., economic,
sociological, and cultural risks to communities), that is, those that are not ecological,
have received very limited attention (Webler et al. 2010; Walker 2014), even though
oil spill and spill response activities can result in direct and indirect human impacts.
Community participation in ACs and RRTs has been infrequent and spotty over
the years, in part because there is no specific regulatory requirement to engage
with communities. Also, unless there has been a recent significant spill in their
area, communities have more pressing priorities than hypothetical future oil spills.
Omitting the consideration of human dimensions impacts during preparedness sets
up conditions for shortfalls during response. The absence of a regulatory driver
to engage with the general public and communities during oil spill preparedness
means that engagement is often overlooked or treated as a low priority during
response. Also, the lack of clear funding to reimburse community engagement
activities through the Oil Spill Liability Trust fund is a disincentive to community
engagement.
Oil spill communications between those within the formal response organization
and the public are especially challenging because information about the situation
can change rapidly, there are complex technical issues involved, and the general
unfamiliarity with the NRS, the NCP, and response decision processes. During a
significant spill like the DWH, the vast amount of situation-specific information also
complicates effective communications and information sharing. Managing the sheer
volume of information during DWH was a challenge, and what was shared online,
for example, in the Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA),
was overwhelming for many stakeholders and community members seeking to un-
derstand and interpret the spill and response actions.
Uncertainty characterizes an oil spill situation. Responders begin working im-
mediately to interpret sparse information and understand the implications of the
situation. In this regard, both responders and the public are trying to make sense
of a complex information landscape (Starbird et al. 2015). The incident-specific in-
teractions of spilled oil, weather, oceanographic conditions, and ecological systems
present significant engagement challenges. For example, the geography bounding
the location and extent of spilled oil changes until all oil has stranded. This dy-
namic situation creates uncertainty when anticipating outcomes from the myriad of
response decisions. Complex assessment actions are needed to address the percep-
tions, questions, and concerns of public officials, media, public, affected community

A. H. Walker et al.
members, and other stakeholder groups about the oil spill. This requires dedicated
resources, experience, and capability to process and integrate real-time information
with existing oil spill knowledge.
Communications shortfalls and areas of improvement identified following the
DWH oil spill largely focus on the traditional areas of crisis communications, public
affairs, and communications technology (National Commission 2011; USCG 2011)
and also note the impact of political influence on external communications. The
functioning of the ICS and JIC model has limitations in communicating informa-
tion under conditions of risk and uncertainty, especially as social media has strained
the ability of the ICS to control the timing and content of messages about the in-
cident. In 2013 the National Response Team (NRT) published an ICS-based model
for collaborative communications. However, this is (still) a traditional media/mass
communications model oriented toward internal collaboration among multiple gov-
ernmental levels in an IMT to deliver a unified message, rather than external collab-
oration through engagement with communities, stakeholders, and trusted sources
of information outside the response organization.
There is active debate about how social media should be integrated into the ICS.
Crowe (2010) identifies a fundamental incompatibility between the constraints of JIS
as defined under NIMS and the realities of social media. A particular conflict is seen
in the NIMS construct, which controls information assuming the public accepts
that as valid. The absence of trust in the government can lead people to other
sources to validate information about an emergency. This assertion seems borne
out by Pew (2010a,b) research on the DWH oil spill, where there were significant
issues of public trust when government and industry-issued information about the
spill. Crowe did not propose a solution for addressing the fundamental conflict
between NIMS/JIS and social media demands. As observed by Waugh and Tierney
(2007):
The national emergency management system includes complex networks of
public, private, and nonprofit organizations; nongovernmental organizations;
and volunteers. The networks are diverse, and communication—let alone one
collaboration—can be very difficult. Integrating volunteer organizations, faith-
based organizations, for-profit organizations, and others into one unified effort
can be a monumental task.
Engagement must acknowledge an evolving situation space that is defined by
complex networks, cultural interoperability, and the need for collaboration across
traditional ICS boundaries.
ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES DURING PREPAREDNESS

AND RESPONSE
An important opportunity and challenge for oil spill decision making is finding
an effective way to integrate the external input from community representatives
and their trusted information sources into the NRS and an incident-specific ICS
organization. This challenge can be addressed in part through engagement during
preparedness about issues of public concern (Walker et al. 2014). Collaborative
information sharing and input from pre-spill identified knowledge sources that

are trusted by communities could be mutually valuable. Tapping into networks of

knowledge sources (e.g., academic researchers in an area), would help leverage
limited resources during both preparedness and response. Joint training, response
plans, and pre-spill agreements with networks developed during preparedness would
enable expedited engagement during response between the ICS-based response
organization and communities.
Community engagement with emergency managers could take place during
preparedness, and response within the confines of the ICS organization (FEMA
2007), but such collaboration is more common during a disaster declared under
the Stafford Act (bottom up—local-level management) (FEMA 2013) than a pollu-
tion response under the NCP (top down—federal-level leadership). There are both
advantages and disadvantages of ICS that are relevant to oil spill communications.
In particular, ICS is less compatible with the collaborative modes of decision-making
often found in community-based organizations and Stafford Act responses that
typically involve natural hazards-related emergencies or disasters (e.g., from hurri-
canes, tornadoes, and floods; Tierney 2009). Collaborative decision-making during
response involves both horizontal (collaborative/external) and vertical (chain-of-
command/internal) integration. Further complications stem from the fact that crit-
ical strategic decisions often fall to elected or appointed leaders who are external
to the ICS-based response organization (Tierney 2009), and from the limitations of
ICS when events become politicized (Buck et al. 2006).
Integrating crisis communications with risk communications about oil spill re-
sponse, especially controversial issues like dispersants, requires continuous coordi-
nation and collaboration to exchange information, first within the incident com-
mand organization, and then by engaging with affected communities to address
their emerging risk perceptions, questions, and concerns (Walker 2012). This real-
time coordination and collaboration is important, both to learn about stakeholder
and community risk perceptions and to assess the situation in relation to those
perceptions. Those working on a spill in the ICS organization possess oil spill tech-
nical knowledge about incident-specific risk that is critical to share through external
communications and engagement, but useful only to the extent that it demonstrably
helps local communities and responders make better decisions.
The media have a strong influence on the social amplification and attenuation of
risk, since most of society learns about risk events through mass media (Kasperson
et al. 2009). Risk attenuation and amplification can affect response planning both
before and during spills (Leschine et al. 2015). Media coverage is important in
shaping group and individual views of risk, including the ways in which risk is framed,
interpretations of messages concerning the risk, and the way(s) risk is characterized.
Social media is forcing an evolution of PIO roles within the ICS, in particular the
bi-directional flow of information between the JIS and the media, and the JIS and
the public (Hughes and Palen 2012). Hughes and Palen’s model highlights critical
changes in information flow; they argue that the public through social media now
informs the media, rather than being a passive receptor of information.
Communication strategies for planning and response can be improved by mod-
ifying the paradigm of the PIO as an external communications gatekeeper. Uni-
fied Command has the authority to assign additional ICS functions to the PIO to
serve as response information translators and guides for those stakeholders who are

A. H. Walker et al.
external to the response organization. Such a shift could provide new insights into
the decision-making process to reflect public concerns and enable broader commu-
nication patterns.
ICS’s inherent flexibility makes it possible to adapt and integrate scientific and
local knowledge within the response organization. Unified Command can assign
responsibility for engagement activities to collaboratively address risk perceptions,
questions, and concerns through interactions with knowledge sources, influencers,
and opinion leaders, which would help improve communications with the public
at large and more completely inform Unified Command decisions (USCG 2014).
Such functional evolution could be further enhanced by implementing social media
activities at multiple levels of the response organization to increase responder situa-
tional awareness, assessment and external coordination on environmental, human,
and public health issues of concern.
ICS paradigm shifts are likely to require changes in the central control of media
communications with the public at large and in particular the application of social
media to enable situational awareness, collaboration, and communication. During
preparedness, this shift could extend to using social media networks to empower
collaborative information sharing, address questions and concerns about spill con-
troversies, such as dispersant use, and distill inputs into pre-spill decision-making
about priorities and response options: “Coordinative systems are more appropriate
for dealing with disagreement, controversy, and integrating multiple divergent per-
spectives, while command systems such as ICS remain useful for the organization
and completion of predictable agreed upon tasks by formal agencies” (Buck et al.
2006, p. 15).
When a response organization is considering dispersant use, communities, stake-
holders, and the public at large may challenge Unified Command and other
decision-makers as official sources of credible information in ways that are diffi-
cult to overcome without pre-spill engagement, especially if the JIS model of com-
munications remains unchanged. Given the continuing controversy associated with
dispersant use and the ubiquity of information containing misrepresentations or
misinterpretations of facts (Devine and Devine 2013; Maynard 2010; Tobin 2010),
highly adaptive decision-making and communication will be needed when disper-
sant use is considered by regulators.
Monitoring social media is an effective means for the response organization to
identify, listen to, and address concerns, questions, and risk perceptions reflected
in social networking. The challenges inherent in this change led Hughes and Palen
to recommend redistribution of PIO social media functions to other components
of the ICS. Hughes and Palen, however, do not explicitly address how internal
(inside the response organization) and external subject matter experts (academia,
for example) fit into their model as sources of knowledge. A recent spill provides
an example of how this integration can occur. In 2011, the container ship M/V Rena
ran aground close to New Zealand; the response lasted over a year (MNZ 2011).
In direct response to citizen outcry, Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) adapted their
response organization within the first week to establish a robust community relations
and media team. National and local authorities managed staffs for the media team,
which included a community relations team led by local authorities.

IMPROVING COMMUNICATION PRACTICES

When a crisis occurs, traditional and social media outlets begin collecting and
disseminating emergency information, while new incident-specific content is gath-
ered and shared by the response organization, external subject matter experts (e.g.,
academia), and affected communities. Wide-scale interaction among members of
the public has qualities of being collectively resourceful, self-policing, and capable
of generating information that cannot otherwise be easily obtained (Sutton 2008).
Past surveys of local-level oil spill stakeholders have shown that they consider known
websites (government websites, or websites of professional associations) most impor-
tant to inform judgments about dispersant use in response to a spill (Walker 2012).
However, people will use information from diverse sources to satisfy their needs
and inform their actions in the face of disaster, especially when official information
portals and known websites fail to meet their information needs (Sutton et al. 2008;
Starbird et al. 2015) with regard to timing and content.
Community engagement is integral to effective disaster management, so it is im-
portant to embrace this concept in ways that allow it to develop strategically. We use
three categories to frame engagement practices for improving linkages among gov-
ernment officials, responsible parties, and stakeholders, based on the mechanisms
of public engagement identified by Rowe and Frewer (2005): Communication or
outreach, consultation, and participation. Outreach communication is one-way infor-
mation flow from authorities to public audiences. Consultation is structured dialogue
from publics to the authorities. Participation is two-way flow of information (joint
problem solving and collaborative action) between authorities and publics. Rowe
and Frewer also identified 100 participatory mechanisms and pointed out that there
is no overarching theory on how to best apply these mechanisms. Social media is
absent from this list because it was not yet a driving force in community engagement.
This evolution of communication technologies supports Hughes and Palen’s more
pervasive two-way communication model.
Targeting and tailoring may have limited effectiveness when the information
available during a spill is limited and rapidly changing. Conversely, without signif-
icant effort to segment audiences based on their interests and information needs
and tailor messages, communications may be less effective than desired (Bostrom
et al. 2013). Participating in social media among some population segments is ac-
celerating this process during disasters. While targeting and tailoring can still be
broadly applicable for spill response communications, example practices focus on
two heterogeneous groups beyond those directly engaged in preparedness and re-
sponse efforts: (1) the public at large and (2) trusted sources of information, which
can include subject matter specialists with specialized knowledge of specific oil spill
issues of concern.
We outline five engagement practices using the above categories as examples
for applying findings from recent oil spill risk communication research (Bostrom
et al. 2015a,b; Starbird et al. 2015; Leschine et al. 2015). These examples focus on
stakeholder engagement approaches that build resilience during preparedness and
response in order to strengthen the capability for adaptive responses to unantici-
pated situations. They include recommendations for analytics and feedback that can

A. H. Walker et al.
empower consultation and participation as part of community engagement. These

five example practices are:
1. Structured dialogues to help communities understand complex science and un-

certainty; (consultation)
2. Adapting scenarios to strengthen oil spill preparedness and response; (participa-
tion)
3. Collaboration with local knowledge sources during response; (consultation)
4. Using social media and Internet surveys to listen to and understand community
risk perceptions; (participation) and
5. Participating with digital volunteers to monitor oil (participation).
Each of the practices can be separately implemented, but several benefit from joint
implementation. They were chosen for their oil spill relevance, utility, and feasibility.
Practice 1: Structured Dialogues to Help Communities Understand Complex

Science and Uncertainty
The strategy for this consultation practice is to engage scientists and technical
experts outside of the ICS-based organization during spill response to evaluate and
discuss issues among themselves and with the public and responders via structured
dialogues. The anticipated benefit of the practice is the ability to communicate
complex technical information and uncertainty affecting spill response decisions of
high public interest to responders, stakeholders, and communities. The practice will
enhance public and stakeholder understanding about the basis for and credibility
of response decisions.
Problem statement
The complex scientific issues, their associated uncertainty, and differing view-
points on the best response options warrant informed public discussion. However,
developing ways to engage technical experts, scientists, stakeholders, opinion lead-
ers, and the public in civil discourse about oils spills during an event has proven
elusive.
The public is more than a passive receptor for information issued by officials
and channeled by mass media. The Internet allows people much broader access
to information and the means to express opinions on topics that concern them.
The public increasingly demands transparency and openness about information
and uncertainties. Content gaps and delays in official information may lead to
public speculation about potential scenarios with dramatic consequences. Given
the complexity and uncertainty associated with oil spills, it is reasonable for subject
matter experts and scientists outside the ICS to have varying insights and opinions
on technical issues of public concern.
The public has demonstrated an interest in not just listening to experts and
scientists, but also asking questions. The media often reports on the differing views
of scientists, and their interpretations of complexity and uncertainty. The public has
engaged in discussion and debate of such views through social media comments on
articles and reports. Open public comment is problematic, in part because special

interest groups through “spambots” and “trolls” can exploit them for purposes of
their advocacy, resulting in risk amplification or attenuation.
Scientists and technical experts working outside the response organization gen-
erally lack access to accurate situation-specific information. They are external to
response discussions that might benefit from their expert knowledge and perspec-
tive. However, these non-responders have neither the jurisdictional role nor the
funding source necessary to participate in structured dialogues. These scientists
and technical experts need opportunities, financial means, and incentive to col-
laborate with response specialists. Scientists and technical experts who are working
in the ICS have specific assigned functions to perform and may have signed non-
disclosure agreements that preclude external communications and collaboration.
These organizational constraints and operational priorities of ICS tend to inhibit
external information sharing and transparent discussion about complexity and un-
certainty. During previous spills, including DWH, ad hoc Science Advisory Boards
have been established to create an opportunity for input from scientists with knowl-
edge relevant to an incident. We suggest that Area Committees implement the
practice of establishing Science Advisory Boards (SABs) during preparedness, and
working out pre-spill terms for their activation, representation, and funding during
response.
Lacking adequate information from sources they trust, the public at large will
try to access and process available information without the benefit and insight
from those with key knowledge and understanding of the response situation that
is directly relevant to the issues of concern. Technical experts outside the response
also engage in collective sensemaking, sometimes in the media and other times in
academic forums.
Approach to implementing
Multiple solutions, including establishing SABs, are needed to help scientists and
technical experts engage in dialogues that address gaps in the public’s oil spill men-
tal models to inform and improve collective sensemaking. Social media can provide
platforms for engaging scientists, technical experts, and other parties in civil and
informative discussions of the complex issues and uncertain outcomes inherent
in oil spill response. These practices can be undertaken before spills on topics of
special interest, but are likely to generate the greatest interest and participation
during spills. Implementation plans, policies, and procedures will need to be de-
veloped and tested during preparedness, including exercises, to ensure successful
implementation during response.
This practice describes improved ways to use social media platforms. While the
social media platform can vary, there are four key elements that are likely to be key
to a successful implementation.
1. Hosting organization—a group to invite participation, establish norms, guide

discussions, and monitor pubic interests.

A. H. Walker et al.
The public has to trust the credibility of the hosting organization, as do sci-
entific and technical experts who would participate. Given public distrust of re-
sponsible parties and government, entities not seen as beholden to either might
be best suited as hosts.
2. Process for participation—a transparent process for inviting participants and
establishing discussion norms.
What questions will be discussed, who is invited to participate, are they re-
munerated, how does the public ask questions, how is the conversation kept on
track? These questions and more should be answered as part of a transparent
process that establishes the social norms for the discussion platform.
3. Social media platforms—selecting social media platforms that both enables mod-
erated interaction and encourages free flowing conversations.
There are many social media platforms that could be used to support the
informed discussion of issues. One example is Branch (http://branch.com) but
there are many others. Branch could host two types of conversations of relevance
to response communication. One would be a digital panel discussion where
experts might discuss an issue trending in media reporting or a Twitter thread,
such as scenarios for different response strategies. A second type could be a
community forum where scientists might discuss ongoing research on a topic of
interest, such as dispersant toxicity.
4. Public concerns and information gaps—monitoring and moderating connections
to the conversation by the public.
The third practice, “Collaboration with local knowledge sources,” discusses
approaches that can help address community and stakeholder information gaps
through individuals or organizations that have important influence in ongoing
conversations. These can provide a foundation for determining the types of panel
discussions that might be held and also participants in the conversation. So, for
example, important nodes in a Twitter conversation could become invited panel
participants even though they might not hold the credentials of a scientist or
technical expert. Comment sessions, even moderated ones, are subject to uncivil
discourse and even hijacking by interest groups. They are not recommended as
a feedback mechanism in this context.
Policy and procedure obstacles to implementing

Policy and liability questions present the most significant obstacle for implement-
ing this practice. Current ICS agency communication policies require refinements
to incorporate an approach that provides for discussion of response issues by scien-
tists and technical experts, both within and outside the response organization. To
a lesser extent, the organization will need to assign new ICS functions and respon-
sibility to engage scientists and technical experts whose viewpoints might challenge
those held by the response experts. This certainly presents risks to the response,
but those risks could be more than balanced by a robust and transparent exchange
of technical information. Identifying and demonstrating the advantages of tech-
nical information exchange during preparedness activities will be key to gaining
acceptance within ICS organizations during response.

Practice 2: Adapting Scenarios to Strengthen Oil Spill Preparedness and Response

The strategy for this practice is to use scenarios in new ways during preparedness
and response to consider a full range of “what if” possibilities that will (1) engage
stakeholders at all levels (community, local, state/regional, national) to actively
address possible ecological, socioeconomic, human health, political, cultural and
psychosocial aspects of oil spills, (2) facilitate learning more about non-responder
mental models of oil spills, and (3) identify ways to address and mitigate the range
of spill causes, possible impacts, and new opportunities for improving oil spill pre-
paredness response plans, training and exercises.
The anticipated benefit of the practice is the ability to adapt scenarios to
strengthen current procedures, cultivate relationships, and build trust among stake-
holders at all levels. This practice will enable NRS participants to adapt and
strengthen current oil spill preparedness and response activities and for community
and other stakeholders to provide direct input into spill preparedness.
Problem statement
Scenarios offer a realistic context to consider and practice various aspects of spill
causes, response activities, and identify areas for future improvement (Leschine
et al. 2015). Traditional oil spill scenarios are framed by exercise requirements in
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) and guidelines for the National Prepared-
ness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) (USCG 2004). Scenarios are used as a
preparedness tool in PREP exercises, other exercises and training by various entities
in the response community, including response plan holders, RRTs, and incident
management teams. When developed by oil spill practitioners, scenarios generally
begin with the oil types and volumes outlined in OPA 90 for response plans and
PREP (i.e., average most probable, maximum most probable, and worst case dis-
charges). Scenarios have also been used in Net Environmental Benefit Analysis and
ecological risk assessment workshops to compare the relative adequacies of response
options (no active response, mechanical containment and recovery, dispersants, and
controlled burning of oil in situ) in mitigating ecological impacts.
Modifying the way oil spill scenarios are used during preparedness, beyond OPA
90–prescribed quantities, will lead to expanded awareness about the socioeconomic,
political, cultural, and psychosocial aspects of oil spills. By imagining situations and
risks that are possible, even if they seem unreasonable, we stand a better chance of
preparing for catastrophic failures, such as technological disasters, and to address
community concerns that arise from significant and complex oil spills.
This practice can be implemented in multiple ways during the preparedness
cycle (e.g., in response plan plans development, in training, and during exercises).
This practice can also be applied during response to more completely consider
and understand implications of ecological and human dimensions impacts. If a
broader range of oil spill stakeholder groups are included when anticipating the
potential outcomes of various response options and strategies, especially from the
communities near spill areas, Unified Command and incident management teams
will improve their understanding of stakeholder mental models around oil spill risk

A. H. Walker et al.
perceptions. This will yield opportunities to address social conflicts in advance, and
ideally lead to a shared definition of a successful response. The involvement of new
stakeholder groups in scenario development is an initial step in creating new oil spill
partners and will be an investment in community resilience from oil spill impacts.
Government leaders in spill response would benefit from consulting with dis-
aster emergency managers to learn about the collaborative disaster networks and
resources that are already in place and to identify stakeholder organizations and rep-
resentatives with an interest in oil spills. This should be done at the national (NRT),
regional (RRT), and local (AC) levels. Stakeholder and community resources can
be mapped to identify a set of community representatives to invite to participate
in oil spill scenario planning. Stakeholders can be mapped according to their at-
tributes of dependency, responsibility, tension, influence, and diverse perspectives
(AccountAbility 2011) with regard to oil spills.
New stakeholder representatives in scenario development might include, for
example, community health workers, Sea Grant advisory agents, tourist and fishing
trade organizations, and community leaders. Their local knowledge is useful in
stakeholder mapping. Chairs of the RRTs and ACs should lead the discussion to
imagine oil spill scenarios that are of concern and possible, even if responders
consider them unlikely. This approach could lead to more informative scenarios,
invigorating what has become a rather predictable process in exercises under the
National PREP, and become a step toward cultivating shared, realistic expectations
about oil spill response (Leschine et al. 2015). Individuals and groups, who could
emerge as key stakeholders during an event, should be invited into the process at the
outset to develop scenarios of mutual interest, even if they choose not to participate
in all aspects of the exercise.

The lack of funding for community involvement is a real problem, during both
preparedness and response. However, this practice can be implemented within cur-
rent preparedness budgets by modifying the existing scenario development process
for training courses and PREP exercises. For example, scenarios can be adapted
to include disaster officials and networks by selecting a storm or hurricane as the
cause of an oil spill from a facility or vessel in a PREP exercise. This would be a
value-added way to practice integration of the National Response System within the
National Response Framework, which is an evolving need.
A potential policy problem could arise during response from implementing this
practice during preparedness. New stakeholders may begin to expect formal roles
in response such as input into decision-making and compensation for those roles.
Some roles may be appropriate, such as helping set priorities for shoreline cleanup.
Early on, it will be important to have explicit conversations with stakeholders who
participate in expanded scenarios about existing funding constraints during re-
sponse.
Given the U.S. prescriptive-based approach for compliance and liability, private
sector plan holders and RPs are unlikely to embrace actions suggested by this prac-
tice, beyond compliance, without an incentive to do so.

There is sufficient discretionary space within the NRS to broaden the traditional
ways responders develop scenarios during preparedness and consider all identified
potential event causes and risk perceptions about fate, transport, and impacts. Gov-
ernment leaders in oil spill preparedness and response in particular possess the
discretionary authority to lead their respective response communities to adapt tradi-
tional approaches and broaden scenarios. This shift also can be reinforced through
clarifying language in regional and area contingency plans.
Practice 3: Collaboration with Local Knowledge Sources During Response

The strategy of this practice is to collaborate with local knowledge experts dur-
ing response through engagement activities developed to share information and
learn about risk perceptions. This approach can help to leverage and integrate
knowledge among response and external experts and distribute incident-specific
information through networks external to the response organization (Walker et al.
2013, 2014). The anticipated benefit of the practice is the ability to develop action-
able, consensus-based knowledge for decision-making and external communications
among responders, stakeholders, and communities around incident-specific issues
of interest, uncertainty, and controversy. The practice can expand the robustness of
real-time spill decisions and improve the quality and quantity of external communi-
cations with elected officials, the public at large, and affected communities.
Problem statement
A core component of uncertainty underlying spill response decision-making is
estimating spilled oil volume, understanding the fate and transport of the spilled oil,
and anticipating the consequences of the spilled oil alone and in conjunction with
response actions, like dispersant use on the environment and the people in affected
areas. Knowledge-based decision-making about spills can be broadly informed by
applying and integrating the knowledge from spill practitioners (operation spe-
cialists), traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, and local knowledge of in-
dividuals (e.g., academic researchers, fishers, and marine pilots) with information
about specific conditions in an area. Spill preparedness and response practition-
ers, such as technical specialists and responder scientists, have valuable experience
with pollutants in the field under different conditions and locations. In this regard,
their knowledge offers insights helpful in anticipating what could happen and how
pollutant impacts might be mitigated under a variety of conditions. Appropriately
applying and integrating this practitioner experience with local knowledge and ex-
perience can improve preparedness, response, and recovery decisions. A simple
example is that the responder biologists know about how different oils affect fish-
eries, and local researchers and agency managers will know the timing and location
of spawning for various species in an affected spill area. With regard to currents in
an area, those with local knowledge often know the locations of natural collection
areas and how recent weather patterns influence tidal predictions. These various
sources of knowledge are relevant and important to consider in planning response
actions. The challenge is how to best integrate relevant, external knowledge sources
into the incident management team to inform real-time response decision-making.
The solution lies in planning ahead for effective collaboration.

A. H. Walker et al.
This practice can be undertaken as part of preparedness activities and exercises
with RRTs and ACs. Building on the stakeholder mapping in the first example prac-
tice, RRTs and ACs could identify issues around which to engage relevant sources
of knowledge, such as community health workers, Sea Grant advisory agents and
researchers, tourist and fishing trade organizations, local media, and community
leaders. To be effective, mutually beneficial pre-spill agreements should be reached
and documented in Area Contingency Plans with regard to identifying representa-
tives from knowledge-source organizations, training, response activation, response
roles, information sharing, and compensation. Example activities during response
could include participating in oil overflights, supporting the PIO in external infor-
mation sharing through local social media networks, supporting Liaison Officers
in engaging local stakeholders, and serving as Technical Specialists to provide lo-
cal knowledge on such issues as marine currents, human health concerns, seafood
sampling, and safety.

Implementing this practice will require that ICS guidance and training evolve
to allow horizontal collaboration, and a more transparent system of external com-
munications, recognizing that boundaries for information sharing will need to be
defined and mutually agreed pre-spill. Policy and procedures on sharing data that
could be used in post-spill litigation will be necessary. Key agencies involved in con-
troversial decisions such as dispersant approval—that is, USCG, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
the Department of the Interior, and affected States—will need to help develop these
policies and procedures to assure quality and to properly coordinate within respond-
ing organizations. This should include approaches for addressing questions from
stakeholders, communities, and the media. Policies and procedures prepare the
response organization for value conflicts and risk aversion when communicating
uncertainties about response decision processes. During spills, Unified Command
should anticipate these potential conflicts and be ready to implement appropriate
actions.
Practice 4: Using Social Media and Internet Surveys to Listen and Understand
Community Risk Perceptions
The strategy of this practice is to use social media analytics and surveys to under-
stand community concerns, priorities, and risk perceptions, during preparedness
and especially during response. The anticipated benefit of the practice is providing
data-driven analyses of Internet sources and timely information to the response that
helps to identify key public information needs and influential information sources.
This information will enhance the response organization’s ability to develop com-
prehensive, understandable communication and engagement practices.

Problem statement
Real-time coordination and collaboration is necessary within the response or-
ganization to understand stakeholder and community risk perceptions about an
incident, and to empower decision-making in the context of those perceptions.
The complex science and risk-based decision requirements of oil spill response can
be confusing and difficult to understand when an event is unfolding. The rationale
around oil spill decisions is often unclear among stakeholders and local participants.
During a response, it will be important to engage the individuals and organizations
that are most influential in shaping information and risk perceptions. Risk commu-
nication principles encourage simple, lay language when explaining complex topics,
with links to more specific information or supporting sources. Understanding key
information needs, risk perceptions, influential sources, and analyzing communi-
cation effectiveness during a response is critical for developing comprehensive,
understandable outreach communication and engagement practices.
The ICS-based response organization monitors social and traditional media and
conducts public meetings as a tool to help gauge public understanding of response
issues and risk perceptions during spills. These activities tend to be more anecdotal
than data driven, and have been one-way communications, which reduces their value
to accurately address risk perceptions and identify emerging issues and stakeholders.
Data-driven mental models–informed Internet survey research and social media
content analysis provide opportunities for developing more in-depth profiles of key
information needs and risk perceptions.
This practice should be deployed during preparedness, in response to an oil spill,
and as follow-up to oil spill events. Spill authorities representing Unified Command
entities should develop survey toolkits and social media analytical tools such as
network node mapping for use during events. These actions taken together can help
to inform, empower, and improve risk communication activities during a response.
They can be directly linked to other practices outlined in this article. The value of
implementing this practice pre-spill will be to develop more comprehensive decision
models, survey strategies, and analysis methods. It may be possible to evaluate aspects
of this practice during the “plan” and “exercise” phases of the preparedness cycle
such as regional dispersant planning workshops. Surveys conducted after an event
can help to inform the “evaluate and improve” phase of the preparedness cycle.

The primary policy issues relate to integrating this active listening practice into the
ICS-based response organization and obtaining clearance to conduct information
collection activities by the Federal Government. The IMH (USCG 2014) now lists
relevant functions under the PIO and Liaison Officer, including: coordinate with
PIO to develop and implement social media strategy by providing input on social
media uses and interface with stakeholders and the public; and coordinate with the
Environmental Unit Leader to address stakeholder and public risk perceptions by
assessing pollutant/hazard situation and obtaining technical content for stakeholder
engagement.

A. H. Walker et al.
Federal agencies collecting information from more than 10 citizens may need to
obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget under the Paperwork
Reduction Act. While the normal review process can take 6 months, there is a fast-
track approval process that might be applicable during a spill. While survey work
could be contracted to outside researchers, they may also be subject to institutional
review requirements, particularly at universities.
Tools and methods in this area of study are rapidly evolving, as is the social media
landscape. As a result, methods deployed during spills will need continual evolution
to stay abreast of the scientific practice. Regardless of the methods deployed, proper
interpretation and application of the resulting data should maintain scientific trans-
parency and integrity. It is important that inferences from data analysis during spills
be fully supported in the source data. There could be pressure during a spill to
produce findings that go beyond what the data support. Therefore the operational
needs of the response will need to be balanced against the interpretations spill and
academic researchers are willing to provide.
Practice 5: Participating with Digital Volunteers to Monitor Oil

The strategy of this practice is to engage digital volunteers to verify citizen reports
about the location of oil on the water and shorelines during response for use by the
Incident Command, or for field exercises that use simulated oil. The anticipated
benefit of the practice is the ability to use community volunteer response data col-
lection to expand information for use in response decision-making and enhance
community confidence in information used for response decision-making. Integrat-
ing volunteer data with response data has the potential to contribute to community
support of response actions and to strengthen community resilience by making
positively contributions to the response.
Problem statement
Data concerning the location and quantity of oil on (in) the water and along
shorelines are key elements of oil spill fate and transport modeling, decisions on
deploying spill response equipment, and shoreline cleanup management. The re-
sponse organization deploys trained individuals to observe and report oil locations
using standard methods. This approach delivers regular updates for daily planning
of response operations and assures inter-comparison of visual observations by dif-
ferent individuals over time. Since locations of waterborne oil are dynamic, it is a
continuing challenge to know where all spilled oil is throughout a response. Oil
overflight observations and photos are sometimes made available to the public on
line, for example through ERMA (NOAA 2014a).
The public and media are deeply interested in oil location information. Citizens
are capable of reporting observations that can be shared through self-organizing
tools such as Ushahidi’s CrowdMap software (Marsden 2013). It can be difficult
to authenticate citizen reports, which reduces their utility for response decision-
making. In some cases, citizen reports may seem at odds with official reporting
because the observations may be incomplete, inaccurate, or reported without the
standard terminology. NOAA recently developed an online training course for aerial
observation of oil spills, which is available to the public at large (NOAA 2014b). Such

training enables improved connectivity between citizen observations with those of

trained observers, which could lead to increased public understanding and con-
fidence in the data used for response decision-making. Crowd-sourced location
information, sometimes known as volunteer geographic information, also can serve
as a mechanism for building a common, validated set of oil location information
that integrates citizen observations with those of trained observers.
There are policy, technical, legal, and/or cultural barriers within response organi-
zations that have significantly limited volunteer participation in past response efforts,
particularly in the U.S. Engaging digital volunteers in collecting and validating geo-
graphic information provides an opportunity for overcoming these barriers to both
expand information sources and build public trust. These efforts also contribute to
outreach, providing an opportunity to share science and get people excited about
research.
At present there are no accepted, viable mechanisms available during spills for
validating volunteer citizen reports and integrating them with operational response
information sources. Many scientific efforts successfully use digital volunteers to
collect, interpret, and validate data of interest to scientists(Scientific American 2014).
Researchers have developed a range of mechanisms for data quality and validation
of citizen-collected data (Cohn 2008; Elwood et al. 2012. These efforts provide
examples that can help guide the successful development of procedures to allow
productive use of digital volunteers during an oil spill response.
This practice should be developed during preparedness activities and docu-
mented in response plans. Oil spill exercises provide opportunities to test and
evaluate the practice. There is no single technology or set of procedures for en-
gaging citizens in collecting and verifying response data, although the Ushahidi
Crowdmapping platform offers a good exemplar. It is important when developing
the approach for implementing this practice to consider both the social and tech-
nological characteristics of crowd work. This includes motivations for participation
and how the structure of the work affects those motivations.
The approach for engaging digital volunteers to verify reports of oil locations
for use by the ICS must be scalable, credible, and timely in order to allow turning
observations into actionable information. It must also ensure that safety is a priority
for everyone engaged in the activity. The foundation for using standard methods and
terminology for reporting information on oil location exists in the form of NOAA’s
Open Water Oil Identification Job Aid for Aerial Observation and its Shoreline
Assessment Job Aid. The key elements of a citizen observation report would include
a photograph with associated metadata that includes time and location along with
descriptions that conform to the NOAA methods. Initial validation can be performed
with algorithms that check time and location of the report and consistency among
reports from the same location. It might also be possible to do initial automated
checks of associated photographs for quality and content. The algorithms could then
push information to a second group of digital volunteers for further processing to
check that metadata matches the photographic content. Those data might then go

A. H. Walker et al.
to a paid expert for final review and acceptance. Each of these steps can include a
feedback loop to improve reporting and validation by the volunteers.
As part of validation, it might be possible to enable the “crowd” to detect and cor-
rect misinformation being reported by others. With both crowdsourced and expert
observations, expert and non-expert conceptualizations of oil coverage on shore-
lines and water could be compared, helping to diffuse concerns of misreporting on
both the part of experts and the public.

There are two primary policy issues for this practice. The first relates to volunteers
and the second relates to integrating volunteer data with operational response data.
Policies being developed for the inclusion of volunteers during response have mainly
focused on the issues associated with volunteers working alongside paid responders
in field situations or in command posts. These policies will need to be adapted to
address potential roles of digital volunteers and assess safety concerns associated
with their activities (Tucker and O’Brien 2011; Fraser et al. 2012; NRT 2012).
Data validation procedures will need to be developed for integrating volunteers’
data with operational data. While the obvious ICS integration point might seem
to be with the Situation Unit, the Environmental Unit also has a role to play. The
Situation Unit could be the focal point for gathering and processing information;
the Environmental Unit could be the focal point for developing actionable products
using volunteer data. Procedures will also need to be developed to make validated
volunteer data public, along with similar data collected by the response, as a key
element of building public confidence in response decision-making. This is likely to
require close coordination with the PIO.
CONCLUSION
Engagement and communications among responders, the public, and communi-
ties are critical to improving preparedness and response to the inevitable future oil
spills. The DWH oil spill highlighted shortcomings in engaging stakeholders during
response to address their risk perceptions. Those shortcomings are rooted in oil spill
preparedness activities that have not adequately engaged local communities, largely
due to the lack of a regulatory driver. Improving and enhancing community engage-
ment for oil spills will require incorporating stakeholder input into ICS procedures
with a greater focus on the human dimensions of oil spills. The roles of those within
the response organization need to evolve from traditional communications with
talking points and press releases to developing approaches that allow responders to
serve as both guides to and translators of response information and external data.
Citizens-at-large and affected communities want, and are capable of, understand-
ing more detailed information than conveyed in one-directional communications,
plus they may neither trust nor believe the messages and the messengers from Uni-
fied Command. There is a need during response to leverage trusted relationships
with local knowledge sources and opinion leaders that can be developed during
preparedness. The five practices described above illustrate example approaches for

bridging gaps in information exchange as well as building trust to improve commu-

nications with oil spill stakeholders during preparedness and response.
ABBREVIATIONS
AC Area Committee
DWH Deepwater Horizon (oil spill)
ERMA Environmental Response Management Application
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
ICS Incident Command System
IMH Incident Management Handbook
IMT Incident Management Team
JIS Joint Information System
NCP National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
NIMS National Incident Management System
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRS National Response System
NRT National Response Team
PIO Public Information Officer
PREP Preparedness for Response Exercise Program
RP Responsible Party
RRT Regional Response Team
USCG United States Coast Guard
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks to peer-review workshop invitees Robert Pond and Debra Scholz
for their helpful comments and suggestions on the draft of the article, and Melinda
McPeek for her continuous support on this project.
FUNDING
The authors gratefully acknowledge the funding for this interdisciplinary research
project, Response Risk Communication Tools for Dispersants and Oil Spills, which
was provided by the University of New Hampshire’s Coastal Response Research
Center (NOAA Grant Number: NA07NOS4630143, Contract: 13-003).
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Communication Practices for Oil Spills: Stakeholder Engagement

Article in Human and Ecological Risk Assessment · April 2015

Ann Hayward Walker Ann Bostrom

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Communication Practices for Oil Spills: Stakeholder

668 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

RISK COMMUNICATION TECHNICAL CONTENT AND OIL SPILLS

OIL SPILL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

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670 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT PRACTICES

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ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES DURING PREPAREDNESS

672 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

are trusted by communities could be mutually valuable. Tapping into networks of

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674 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

IMPROVING COMMUNICATION PRACTICES

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empower consultation and participation as part of community engagement. These

1. Structured dialogues to help communities understand complex science and un-

Practice 1: Structured Dialogues to Help Communities Understand Complex

676 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

1. Hosting organization—a group to invite participation, establish norms, guide

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Policy and procedure obstacles to implementing

678 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

Practice 2: Adapting Scenarios to Strengthen Oil Spill Preparedness and Response

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Policy and procedure obstacles to implementing

680 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

Practice 3: Collaboration with Local Knowledge Sources During Response

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Policy and procedure obstacles to implementing

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Policy and procedure obstacles to implementing

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Practice 5: Participating with Digital Volunteers to Monitor Oil

684 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

training enables improved connectivity between citizen observations with those of

Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015 685

Policy and procedure obstacles to implementing

686 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

bridging gaps in information exchange as well as building trust to improve commu-

Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015 687

688 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

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690 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 21, No. 3, 2015

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