CONTEMPT executory unless otherwise restrained by a court

of competent jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 129521 September 7, 1999
SO ORDERED.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS FE EDSA, Greenhills,
ELOISA C. GLORIA, EDIJER MARTINEZ and ROSALINDA U. Mandaluyong City.
CASIGURAN, petitioners,
vs.
(s/t) PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR.
MANUEL D. RECTO, PELAGIO T. RICALDE and CESAR P.
MANALAYSAY, respondents.
Chairman
 PARDO, J.:
(s/t) FE ELOISA C. GLORIA
The case before the Court is an appeal from a decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 setting aside the order of the Securities and Exchange Associate Commissioner
Commission
(SEC) 2 declaring respondents guilty of contempt for disobeying a (s/t) EDIJER A. MARTINEZ
temporary restraining order issued to respondents to desist from
holding a stockholders meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation.
Associate Commissioner4
The facts are as follows:
In due time, respondents appealed from the aforesaid order to the
Court of Appeals.
On June 28, 1996, SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of certain
stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation, directed respondent
Ricalde to submit to the SEC a list of stockholders and to set a definite After due proceedings, on April 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals
time and place for the validation of proxies and nominations for promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the SEC order
directors of the firm. declaring respondents guilty of contempt. The dispositive portion
reads:
On the same date, June 28, 1996, the SEC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Interport Resources Corporation WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents'
from holding the July 9, 1996 scheduled annual meeting of the Order dated July 15, 1996, is hereby REVERSED
stockholders. and SET ASIDE.

Notwithstanding the SEC's TRO, the stockholders proceeded with the The cash bond of P50,000.00 may be withdrawn
meeting on July 9, 1996, presided over by respondent Manalaysay. by petitioners.

On July 10, 1996, the SEC declared the stockholders meeting of SO ORDERED.
Interport Resources Corporation held on July 9, 1996, null and void
and directed respondents to appear before the SEC on July 15, 1996, (s/t) ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO
at 3:00 p.m., to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them or why they should not be cited in contempt.
Associate Justice

At the hearing on July 15, 1996, respondent Manalaysay questioned

the validity of the TRO as well as the contempt proceedings in light of (s/t) ARTEMON D. LUNA
the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals restraining the SEC from
enforcing its TRO. 3 Associate Justice

After the hearing, on July 15, 1996, the SEC issued an order stating: (s/t) HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA

xxx xxx xxx Associate Justice 5

VIEWED in this light Atty. Cesar Manalaysay, On May 2, 1997, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Manuel D. Recto and Atty. Pelagio T. Ricalde are decision. However, on June 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the
hereby DECLARED GUILTY OF CONTEMPT and are motion.
correspondingly ORDERED to pay a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos each upon finality
of this Order for willfully disobeying and Hence, this appeal.
disregarding the July 8, 1996 Order of this
Commission. Atty. Cesar Manalaysay is likewise On September 10, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment
BARRED from practicing his law profession before on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. 6 On October 7, 1997,
this commission for a period of sixty (60) days respondents filed their comment. 7 In the main, respondents submit
from date hereof and Mr. Recto and Atty. Ricalde that contempt is criminal in character and their exoneration from a
are, by this ORDER, prohibited and barred from charge of contempt amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal
acting as President/Chairman and Secretary would not lie. 8
respectively of Interport Resources, Inc. within the
same period. This Order shall be immediately
At issue in this petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred, as
a matter of law, in setting aside the order of the SEC finding

1
respondents guilty of contempt for disobeying its temporary restraining Consequently, respondents' act in proceeding with the scheduled
order to desist from holding the annual stockholders meeting of the stock-holders' meeting was not contumacious as there was no willful
Interport Resources Corporation scheduled on July 9, 1996. disobedience to an order of the SEC. 22 The disobedience which the
law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. For, at
bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience. 23
We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt partakes of
the nature of a criminal offense. 9 The exoneration of the contemner
from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would The SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for
not lie. contempt. The chairman and commissioners of the SEC must exercise
the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-
restraint. 24
A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil
contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done
for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed Finally, the penalty imposed exceeded those authorized in the powers
against the authority or dignity of the court. 10 of the SEC 25 in relation to the 1964 Revised Rules of Court as
amended. 26 If the contempt was committed against a superior court
or judge, the accused may be fined not exceeding thirty thousand
Petitioners argue that the contempt committed by respondents was
pesos (P30,000.00) or imprisoned not more than six (6) months, or
civil in nature, as the temporary restraining order the SEC issued was
both. The SEC suspended respondent Manalaysay from the practice of
for the benefit of a party to a case. The contention is untenable.
law in the SEC, a power vested exclusively in the Supreme Court. 27

"Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for review
in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of
on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in GA-
some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the
G.R. SP No. 41400, promulgated on April 14, 1997.1âwphi1.nêt
thing required." 11 "In general, civil contempt proceedings should be
instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who
has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected." 12 If the No costs.
contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the power to
punish a given contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the proceedings
SO ORDERED.
are to be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases. The State is the real prosecutor. 13
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771             May 27, 2004
(Formerly A.M. OCA-IPI No. 99-842-RTJ)
"The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be
determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is SALVADOR SISON, complainant,
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily vs.
compensatory or remedial." 14 JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., Presiding Judge, and TEODORO
S. ALVAREZ, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City,
Branch 253, respondents,
"But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal
proceeding in which acquittal, for instance, is a bar to a second
prosecution. The distinction is for the purpose only of determining the DECISION
character of punishment to be administered." 15
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed
to vindicate the dignity and power of the Commission; hence, as in The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, a
criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the order of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer,
dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt." 16 filed a verified Complaint 1 dated October 12, 1999, charging Judge
Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez of the Regional Trial
At any rate, the SEC order directing respondents to show cause why Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, with grave abuse of authority.
they should not be cited in contempt was highly improper. The Court
of Appeals issued on July 8, 1996, a temporary restraining order In turn, the complaint stemmed from an Order2 dated September 15,
against the order of the SEC of June 28, 1996 directing the Interport 1999 in Criminal Case No. 99-0023 which the respondent judge issued,
Resources Corporation to desist from holding the stockholders' requiring the complainant to appear before him to explain a traffic
meeting on July 9, 1996. Contrary to the view of petitioners, the effect incident involving his son and the complainant. The said Order reads,
of the temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals directing the thus:
SEC to desist from enforcing its own TRO was to allow such meeting to
proceed as scheduled. More, the Court of Appeals in its final decision
nullified the SEC's order. 17 Hence, there was no willful disobedience to Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding
a lawful order of the SEC. Respondents were not guilty of contempt. Judge of this Court on September 8, 1999, at about 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon of said date, said authorized driver,
while on board the official car of the undersigned on an
While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, 18 the official errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifanio
salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be delos Santos Avenue while he was positioning the car he
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, 19 and on the was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a right
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. 20 The courts and turn; that after he stopped, he was told by the accused that
other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the swerving to the right lane was prohibited when it appeared
power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, that the sign therefore was still far off and not readily visible
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as to the naked eye; that nonetheless, he introduced himself as
persons but for the functions that they exercise. 21 the authorized driver of the undersigned, his son in fact, and
showed to the accused the calling card of the undersigned
In this case, the SEC issued the citation for contempt sua sponte. with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof introducing
There was no charge filed by a private party aggrieved by the acts of the bearer of the card and requesting for assistance from
respondents. Strictly speaking, there was no disobedience to the SEC's law enforcers, and accordingly begged that he be allowed to
temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals enjoined that order. proceed on his way considering that there was no danger to

2
 limb, life and property occasioned by his alleged traffic which he is tasked by law to do so for those found violating
violation; that notwithstanding such introduction and plea, traffic rules and regulations;
the accused confiscated the driver’s license of the authorized
driver, even bragging in the process that he did the same to
9. That if the act of issuing a traffic violation receipt for a
somebody who introduced himself as a lawyer the day
traffic violation within the city limits of Mandaluyong City by
before.
the complainant is considered by the respondents as an
offense, then complainant should be tried for the said
The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not offense in Mandaluyong City, and not in Las Piñas City where
only indicative of his arrogance and deliberate disregard of the respondent judge has no jurisdiction;
the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation accorded to
a court of law and/or its representative but is one
10. That to the ordinary and lowly understanding of the
constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3,
undersigned complainant, the acts of respondents in
paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
arresting him without any warrant of arrest before a charge
specially considering that the authorized driver of the
of indirect contempt is heard constitute the gravest ABUSE
Presiding Judge of this Court was then on official errand.
OF AUTHORITY ever committed by the respondents; and

WHEREFORE, within a non-extendible period of twenty-four

11. That the manner the respondents are administering
(24) hours from receipt hereof, the accused is ordered to
justice in Las Piñas City is despotic and barbaric in the sense
show cause why he should not be cited as in contempt of
that they take the law into their own hands without due
court and dealt with accordingly. The Branch Sheriff of this
regard for the rights of the others.8
Court is authorized and ordered to serve a copy of this Order
upon the accused immediately and to make a return of his
proceedings thereon. After receipt of this Order, the accused The complainant, thus, prayed that the respondents be summarily
is ordered to personally file his comment in Court, within the dismissed from the service.
period allowed him herein.
In his comment, the respondent judge vehemently denied the
SO ORDERED.4 accusations against him, contending that he was merely preserving the
dignity and honor due to the courts of law. The respondent narrated
that on September 8, 1999, he ordered his son, Jose R. Caoibes III, to
Because of the complainant’s failure to appear before the respondent
go to the Pasig City Regional Trial Court to secure certain records.
judge as directed, the latter, after verifying that the said order was
While on his way there, he was flagged down by the complainant for
duly served on the complainant, issued another Order5 dated
an alleged traffic violation. Caoibes III explained to the complainant
September 22, 1999 for the complainant’s arrest and commitment, and
that he was on an errand for his father, the respondent judge, to
for the latter to appear for hearing before his sala on September 29,
which the complainant reportedly uttered, "Walang Judge, Judge
1999. The respondent sheriff then served the order on the
Caoibes sa akin; kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko."
complainant. On the scheduled hearing, the complainant appeared and
executed an affidavit 6 admitting to the court that he made a mistake
and that it was all a misunderstanding. The respondent judge, The respondent judge also alleged that he initiated the complaint for
thereafter, lifted the September 22, 1999 Order.7 contempt pursuant to the following provisions of the Revised Rules of
Court: a) Section 3(d) and Section 4 of Rule 71; b) Section 5(c) of Rule
135; and, c) the last paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 71.
In his complaint, the complainant alleged inter alia the following:

According to the respondent judge, the complainant’s allegation that

6. That on September 28, 1999, at around 6:00 P.M., the
he failed to contact any relative is belied by the fact that during the
undersigned complainant was greatly surprised when
hearing of September 29, 1999, the complainant was assisted by Atty.
respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ came and arrested him
Eduardo P. Flores of the MMDA, as evidenced by the transcript of
without any warrant of arrest, only on orders of the
stenographic notes9 taken during the proceedings. The respondent
respondent Judge, and he was ordered to board a motor
prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of legal or
vehicle and was brought to the respondent Judge in Las
factual basis.
Piñas City who ordered him detained in the Las Piñas City
Jail. When he was arrested, he was not able to call his family
to inform them where he was because he failed to return For his part, the respondent sheriff admitted that he personally served
home in the evening; copies of the respondent judge’s orders on the complainant, but
averred that he was merely performing his duties as deputy sheriff of
the court. As such, he did not commit grave abuse of authority in the
7. That the next day, September 29, 1999, respondent
performance of his functions.10
Teodoro Alvarez informed him that there will be a hearing of
his indirect contempt charge before the sala of the
respondent Judge in Las Piñas City. During the hearing, the Thereafter, the complainant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng
complainant was made to admit by the respondent Judge Pagbawi ng Reklamo dated November 26, 2002, where he indicated
that he made a mistake in apprehending his driver-son[,] that he was no longer interested in pursuing the administrative
conscious that he committed the gravest abuse of his complaint against the respondent judge. The complainant recanted his
authority, and perhaps in anticipation of the legal action the earlier claim, averring that the respondent judge’s son did not in fact
undersigned complainant may take against him after he is enter a one-way street and that he was standing by the September 29,
discharged from detention. Thus, after the complainant 1999 Affidavit he executed during the hearing. He then requested that
admitted his mistakes under duress, and upon appeal by his his complaint be duly withdrawn.11
counsel assuring the respondent Judge that the same
incident may not be repeated, the complainant was ordered Pursuant to the recommendation12 of the Court Administrator, the
discharged from detention at around 3:30 P.M. on Court, in a Resolution13 dated April 2, 2003, resolved to (a) dismiss the
September 29, 1999; instant administrative complaint against Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez for
lack of merit; and (b) refer the matter against respondent Judge
8. That the undersigned complainant did not know of any Caoibes, Jr. to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for raffle
offense he had committed, except for his issuing a traffic among the Associate Justices of the Court, and for investigation, report
violation receipt to the driver-son of the respondent Judge and recommendation. The case was, thereafter, raffled to Associate

3
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin. The Investigating Justice, thereafter, the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for the
submitted his Sealed Report dated February 26, 2004. courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary
to the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws
themselves.16 And, as in all other powers of the court, the contempt
According to the Investigating Justice, although the complainant never
power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously
appeared to prove the charges against the respondent judge, the facts
and sparingly.17 A judge should never allow himself to be moved by
averred in the complaint appear to be substantially correct and true.
pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his
Thus, the respondent judge abused his authority to charge and punish
duties.18
any person for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.14 The Investigating Justice recommended that the
respondent be admonished and warned, pursuant to Section 10(1), At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and Section 11(c) of the same rule. holding the complainant for contempt, due to the latter’s refusal to
comply with the judge’s Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is
not lost upon this Court that the complainant was not a party to any of
The respondent judge anchors the justification of his acts against the
the cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the
complainant on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, viz:
contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the
respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the record shows that when the
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent
hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an judge, the same was refused by some staff member in the
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon latter’s sala.19
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
In Cortes v. Bangalan,20 we held that a judge may not hold a party in
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
contempt of court for expressing concern on the judge’s impartiality
through a motion for voluntary inhibition, even if the latter may have
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the felt insulted therein. The Court also declared, thus:
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
…[W]hile the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all
courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, uphold due administration of justice, judges, however,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and
the act of a person who, after being dispossessed sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
or ejected from any real property by the judgment utilizing their contempt powers for correction and
or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, preservation not for retaliation and vindication.21
enters or attempts or induces another to enter
into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined that the
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
respondent judge should have refrained from ordering the arrest and
any manner disturbs the possession given to the
detention of the complainant, since the incident involved his own son,
person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
and the matter was very personal to him. The fact that the respondent
judge insisted that the complainant personally file his comment in
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with court gives rise to doubts as to the motive behind it; as the
the processes or proceedings of a court not Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement of personal filing was
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of deliberately inserted so that the respondent could confront and harass
this Rule; the complainant.22

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or We also agree with the following ruminations of Justice Bersamin:
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
…[T]he respondent judge obviously resented the refusal of
Sison to let off Caoibes III from the traffic violation
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a apprehension. The refusal of Sison was apparently
court, and acting as such without authority; aggravated by the son’s reporting to the father that Sison
had supposedly made the remarks of  Walang judge, judge
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; Caoibes sa akin; Kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko. …

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person ...

or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of
an order or process of a court held by him. The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the
act and remarks of Sison as thereby displaying arrogance
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect,
court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its
holding him in custody pending such proceedings. representative. First of all, the refusal of Sison and the
supposed remarks should not cause resentment on the part
of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most likely did not yet
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in know at the time) because he knew, as a public official
dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing
justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into
the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the a one-way street from the wrong direction, regardless of the
administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive office or position of the violator’s father. Secondly, the
personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court respondent Judge should have had the circumspection
orders.15 Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a court expected of him as a judge to realize that the remarks of
or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or Sison were invited by Caoibes III’s attempt to bluffhis way
interference with the court’s orderly process by exacting summary out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC
punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for judge. Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds

4
 to cite Sison for contempt of court. And, thirdly, the warned. The respondent was, likewise, found guilty of gross ignorance
respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the of procedural law and unreasonable delay in the issuance of an order
issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the of execution, where he was meted a fine of P30,000;32 and delay in
pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the resolving a motion to dismiss in a civil case pending before his sala
apprehension and also administratively charged Sison for where he was, likewise, fined P40,000.33
any unwarranted act committed. Since neither was done by
them, but, on the contrary, both ultimately accepted the
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr.,
validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, GUILTY of serious
the driver’s license after September 29, 1999 by paying the
impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code of
fines corresponding to the traffic violation, then it follows
Judicial Conduct, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with
that the respondent Judge had the consciousness that his
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, with
son was at fault, instead of Sison.
prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government or any of
its instrumentalities including government-owned and controlled
…[T]he respondent Judge claimed at the hearing that his corporations.
son "was at that time working with (sic) me as my personal
driver;" and that his errand was to secure some papers from
This decision is immediately executory. The respondent
the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City involved in a "personal
is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his
case" which the respondent Judge had "filed against a bank
Office. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s
for specific performance and damages, and since I just
personnel records.
suffered a mild stroke at that time, specifically on June 10,
1999, and the incident took place (sic) September, I could
not at that time personally go to Pasig to secure the SO ORDERED.
documents I needed for the next hearing of the case so I
had to send my son." G.R. No. 150949             June 21, 2007

The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
no legitimate basis by which to consider Sison’s Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, petitioner,
apprehension of his son as indirect contempt. As indicated vs.
earlier, the act complained against must be any of those ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO SEE and
specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; MARLY SEE, respondents.
otherwise, there is no contempt of court, which requires that
the person obstructed should be performing a duty
connected with judicial functions. As such, the respondent DECISION
Judge acted oppressively and vindictively.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Parenthetically, it is odd that the respondent Judge would
even propose herein that Caoibes III, already 25 years at Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
the time of the apprehension, was serving his father as the Decision1 dated September 12, 2001 and Resolution dated November
latter’s personal driver, albeit not officially employed in the 15, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652.
Judiciary. Most likely, therefore, Caoibes III might not be
doing anything for his father at the time of his apprehension
but was in the place for his own purposes.23 The facts are:

The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons)
which smacks of retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land consisting of 33,130
violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates square meters in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The property is
that "a judge should so behave at all times to promote public covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."24 The very her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
delicate function of administering justice demands that a judge should
conduct himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswinda’s name was cancelled and in
the respect and confidence of the people, for he is the visible lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons.
representation of the law.25 The irresponsible or improper conduct of However, when the latter’s workers tried to fence and take possession
judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge must of the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph
avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof.26 and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are
the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and
We do not agree, however, that the respondent judge should be found that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of
merely reprimanded for his actuations. The Court has not been blind to spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.
the improper use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of
contempt which, in fine, amounts to grave abuse of authority. The On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court
penalty imposed by the Court in such cases ranges from a fine of (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite a complaint for quieting of title,
P2,500;27 one month’s salary;28 suspension from the service without docketed as Civil Case No. 2035-00. Impleaded as defendants were
pay for a period of three months;29 and even the ultimate penalty of spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of
dismissal from the service.30 Trece Martires City.

Furthermore, we take judicial notice that the respondent judge was In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the
previously sanctioned by the Court for violating Canon 2 of the Code of documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
Judicial Conduct, where he was meted a fine of P20,000. 31 He was
found guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, for delivering
fistic blows on a complainant judge. To our mind, the instant case falls In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L.
under "similar conduct," which the Court avowed would be dealt with Español, petitioner, issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly
more severely if repeated, and of which the respondent was duly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its
counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious

5
certificate of title and tax declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are
RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, petitioner responsible therefor.
declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered
their confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas,
On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against
Cavite.
respondents. They were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas,
Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a
Petitioner’s Order is partly reproduced as follows: motion to lift the order of arrest. But they were denied outright by
petitioner.
From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view
and so holds that the instant case is a callous and blatant Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ
imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and fraudulent of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19,
manipulations, through the extensive use of falsified 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.
documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former
counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda
On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
C. Morales and even the Geodetic Engineer who connived
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
with this private group on one hand, and some officials and
employees of the government agencies responsible for the
processing and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant
other. Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.
complete and drastic halt, the Courts are at the mercy of Respondent judge’s July 9, 2001 Order, insofar as it declared
these unscrupulous people for their own personal gain. herein petitioners in direct contempt and ordered their
incarceration for ten (10) days, as well as the Warrant of
Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of Commitment,
Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and
dated July 13, 2001, which the respondent judge issued
user of falsified document is the forger thereof (Gamido v.
against the persons of the herein petitioners, are hereby
Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 [1995]), let the appropriate
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
falsification charges be filed against Benito See and Marly
See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy
of this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of SO ORDERED.
Investigation and the Department of Justice for their
appropriate action. As regards Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Español erred in taking
let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar Confidant’s cognizance of the Decision rendered by then Judge Tagle in Civil Case
Office, Supreme Court. Manila. No. 623-92 since it was not offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-
00 for quieting of title. Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is
Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer criminal in nature, petitioner should have conducted a hearing. Thus,
of Sharcons Builders Phils. Inc., respectively, and Atty. she could have determined whether respondents are guilty as charged.
Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel for Sharcons until March 13,
2001, are declared and held in contempt for foisting Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals
falsehoods and using falsified and spurious documents in the denied the same in its Resolution of November 15, 2001.
pursuit of their nefarious activities pursuant to the instant
case filed before this Court. Let the corresponding Warrants
of Arrest be issued against the aforesaid respondents who Hence, this petition.
should serve ten (10) days of detention at the Dasmariñas
Municipal Jail, Cavite. The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that
respondents are guilty of direct contempt of court for using falsified
Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of title.
Inc., under TCT No. T-511462 allegedly issued on November
11, 1994, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been The early case of In re Jones3 defined contempt of court as "some act
derived from another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the court, by a
allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on December 29, refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of
1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some way tends to
hereby cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of this Order interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus
be forwarded to the Registry of Deeds for its implementation lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has also been described
with respect to the two (2) titles for cancellation and to the as "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such
Assessor’s Office of the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite, conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law
to stave off the proliferation of these spurious instruments. into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their
witnesses during litigation."4 Simply put, it is despising of the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is authority, justice, or dignity of the court. 5
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, whereas, the private
defendant’s counterclaims, which need further The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when
substantiation, are likewise dismissed. However, the said all courts in the realm were but divisions of the Curia Regia, the
private defendants are not precluded from pursuing their supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an
rightful course(s) of action in the interest of justice. affront to the sovereign.6 This concept was adopted by the Americans
and brought to our shores with modifications. In this jurisdiction, it
SO ORDERED. is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to
punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts
guarantees the very stability of the judicial institution. 7 Such
Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint stability is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,
for quieting of title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts,
cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, and, consequently, to the very administration of justice.8
Cavite, presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle.2 Petitioner then took
judicial notice of the judge’s Decision declaring that Sharcons' TCT and
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

6
 SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a
guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the
to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or
including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a or degrade the administration of justice.11
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in
We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged
contempt by such court and punished by a fine not
documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such
exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial
act is an improper conduct which degrades the administration of
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine
justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI,12 we
not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not
ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the
exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.
falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely
constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such
In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized direct contempt as one defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus,
done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after
the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given
curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing. 10 In other to the accused to be heard by himself and counsel. 13 Moreover, settled
words, one may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a
moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act of separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises
contumely. limited jurisdiction.14 Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of
evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable
to those adapted to criminal prosecutions.15 Perforce, petitioner judge
Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:
erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct
contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and a hearing with notice to respondents.
hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
Petitioner, in convicting respondents for direct contempt of court, took
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
judicial notice of the Decision in Civil Case No. 623-92, assigned to
heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the
another RTC branch, presided by then Judge Tagle. Section 1, Rule
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of

SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. –  A court shall take
his official duties or in his official transactions;
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, history, forms of government, and symbols of nationality,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
property by the judgment or process of any court of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in divisions.
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
In Gener v. De Leon,16 we held that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even when
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the such cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct reiterate that petitioner took judicial notice of the Decision rendered by
contempt under Section 1 of this Rule; another RTC branch and on the basis thereof, concluded that
respondents used falsified documents (such as land title and tax
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to declaration) when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of
direct contempt of court.

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and

acting as such without authority; Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of
Appeals granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of respondents has
become moot. We recall that respondents were released after posting
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; the required bail as ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas
corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually restrained
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained of his
in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.17
of a court held by him.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65652
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the are AFFIRMED. No costs.
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings. SO ORDERED.

Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside

of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of
a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,

7
 So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV
is very long. Ang nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay
sila sa loob ng sasakyan ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that
there was a shootout pero ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.

Ernesto Manzano

Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga
mahal naming sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila
G.R. No. 205956               February 12, 2014 mismo na ang nagbigay ng hatol.

P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner, Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG
Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa
LA'O, Respondents.
yong kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so arrogant
because they protected him all these years. They let him get away
RESOLUTION with it. So even now, so confident of what he did, I mean confident of
murdering so many innocent individuals.
MENDOZA, J.:
Atty. Diokno
Before the Court is a petition to cite respondents in contempt of Court.
Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and
Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in company have never been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their
G.R. No. 199462,1 a petition filed on December 6, 2011, but already participation in the Ortigas rubout, instead they were commended by
dismissed although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent their superiors and some like Marantan were even promoted to our
Monique Cu-Unjieng La'O (La ‘O) is one of the petitioners in the said consternation and disgust. Ang problema po e hangang ngayon, we
case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. Diokno) is her filed a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6, 2011, humihingi po
counsel therein. kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. – hangang ngayon
wala pa pong action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba
yong pag charge ng homicide lamang e subalit kitang kita naman na
G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414- they were killed indiscriminately and maliciously.
PSG and 146415-PSG, entitled "People of the Philippines v. P/SINSP
Hansel M. Marantan, et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 265 (RTC), where Marantan and his co-accused are Atty. Diokno
charged with homicide. The criminal cases involve an incident which
transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the
respondent La’O), Francis Xavier Manzano, and Brian Anthony Dulay, policemen who killed them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same
were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at man who is involved in the Atimonan killings – still roam free and
Ortigas Center, which incident was captured by a television crew from remain unpunished. Mr. President, while we are just humble citizens,
UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident). we firmly believe that police rub-out will not stop until you personally
intervene.
In G.R. No. 199462, La’O, together with the other petitioners, prayed,
among others, that the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman Ernesto Manzano
downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and
set aside; that the corresponding informations for homicide be
Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.
withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed.

Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o

In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in
Barangay Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon,
where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with
which resulted in the death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). us, I mean everything shows that they were murdered.
This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative
publicity for him.
(Emphasis supplied by petitioner)

Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan

Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule,
incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto
making them liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71
Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted
of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper
press conference. During the press conference, they maliciously made
conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade
intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court
the administration of justice. He argues that their pronouncements and
in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on
malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the
the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding Marantan
Court in resolving the petitions filed, but also on the merits of the
and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and
his co-accused are guilty of murder. It is Maranta’s position that the
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an press conference was organized by the respondents for the sole
ABS-CBN news program. Marantan quotes2 a portion of the interview, purpose of influencing the decision of the Court in the petition filed
as follows: before it and the outcome of the criminal cases before the RTC by
drawing an ostensible parallelism between the Ortigas incident and the
Atimonan incident.
Atty. Diokno

8
The respondents, in their Comment,3 argue that there was no violation As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents
of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were
of their desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context murdered by Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in
and did not actually impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the
justice in a concrete way; that no criminal intent was shown as the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the
utterances were not on their face actionable being a fair comment of a face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument
matter of public interest and concern; and that this petition is intended in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence
to stifle legitimate speech. the Court.

The petition must fail. As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments
reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their
petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed
the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue,
without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A
on the dignity of the Court either.
violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under
Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,4 which reads:
"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
a judicial proceeding still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in
– x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair
for indirect contempt:
administration of justice."12 By no stretch of the imagination could the
respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the
xxx administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, comments of the respondents.
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. 13 The
nature.5 This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the justice.14 In the present case, such necessity is wanting.
court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in
criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to
commit it.6
SO ORDERED.

For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really

G.R. No. 182738               February 24, 2014
appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice.7 What is, thus, sought to be protected is the
all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B.
pending case.8 The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that ROMAN, JR., Petitioners,
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune vs.
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon MANUEL O. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.91âwphi1
DECISION

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them

PERALTA, J.:
to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments
which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise
obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Rules of Court assailing the March 13, 2008 Decision 1 and April 28,
Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two 100911, which affirmed the September 3, 2007 Resolution 3 of the
rights.10 Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 226.

The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence The relevant facts are as follows:
of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. On July 1, 2002, respondent Manuel O. Sanchez (respondent), a
There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc.
harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be (Corporation) filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting
impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special meeting of
unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious stockholders of April 23, 2002.4 Petitioners, along with their co-
and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute defendants, filed an Answer with Counterclaims5 and, thereafter, a
an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.11 Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Defendants’ Affirmative
Defenses,6 which was denied on August 9, 2002 7 by Hon. Apolinario D.
The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly Bruselas, Jr., then Presiding Judge of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
relate to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and 93, now a member of the Court of Appeals.
the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.

9
On August 12, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Production and to be out of town and petitioner Pablo B. Roman, Jr. (Roman)
Inspection of Documents, which the court granted in an Order dated purported to have shown no willingness to comply with the
September 10, 2002 directing, thus: directive.16 The matter was reported to the trial court, which merely
noted respondent’s Report and Manifestation.17 On November 3, 2003,
respondent moved for the issuance of an order for immediate
On motion of the plaintiff, without objection from the defendants, and
implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order, as reiterated in the
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Order dated June 16, 2003, but the court denied the same in its May
Corporate Controversies, in relation to Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of
24, 2004 Order.18 Respondent’s motion for issuance of writ of
Civil Procedure, the defendants are ordered to produce and make
execution suffered the same fate when the trial court denied it on
available for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following
February 10, 2005.19
documents:

When this Court settled petitioners’ challenge to the Orders dated

1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;
August 9, 2002 and December 9, 2002, respondent filed a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion for Clarification and to Resolve
2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been Plaintiff’s Pending Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and
received by the defendants; to Set the Case for Pre-Trial Conference.20 Acting thereon, Judge
Ramon Paul L. Hernando, likewise now a member of the Court of
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained Appeals, who took over Branch 93 after the appointment of Judge
in the Stock and Transfer Book or on the stub of the stock Bruselas to the CA, issued the July 10, 2006 Order, 21 which directed
certificate; and the immediate execution of the September 10, 2002 Order, and set the
case for pre-trial.

4. The tape recording of the stockholders’ meeting on April

23, 2002 and May 21, 2002. On February 9, 2007, Judge Hernando issued an Order 22 inhibiting
himself from handling the case in view of his "close friendship relation"
with petitioners’ counsel and ordering the transmittal of the records of
The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another sala.
the office premises of defendant corporation within reasonable The case was subsequently re-raffled to RTC Branch 90 presided by
business hours of a business day before the pre-trial with costs to be Judge Reynaldo B. Daway, who likewise voluntarily recused himself
shouldered by the plaintiff. from the case per Order23 dated July 13, 2007. Finally, on July 30,
2007, the case was re-raffled to RTC Branch 226 presided by Judge
SO ORDERED.8 Leah S. Domingo Regala.24

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration9 (MR) of the August 9, On November 28, 2006, the parties agreed to defer the pre-trial
2002 Order, which denied their motion for preliminary hearing. conference until the actual conduct of the inspection of
Subsequently, they filed a Supplement to Defendants’ Motion for records/documents on December 12, 2006.25 Before said date,
Reconsideration,10 attaching therewith an alleged certification issued however, petitioners and their co-defendants moved to hold the
by the National Printing Office to support their contention of lack of inspection to January 11, 2007, which the court granted.26
cause of action on the grounds, among others, that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of During the January 11, 2007 inspection, the only document produced
1996, as amended, has not been duly published in accordance with by the Acting Corporate Secretary, Atty. Antonio V. Meriz, and one of
law and jurisprudence. Pending resolution of the MR, petitioners filed the staff, Malou Santos, was the Stock and Transfer Book of the
on January 21, 2003 a Motion for Deferment of Implementation of the Corporation. They alleged that they could not find from the corporate
September 10, 2002 Order.11 records the copies of the proxies submitted by the stockholders,
including the tape recordings taken during the stockholders’ meetings,
For his part, respondent, on October 7, 2002, filed an Omnibus Motion and that they needed more time to locate and find the list of
to immediately allow him to inspect and photocopy the documents and stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the bodega of the
to compel petitioners to deposit with the court the documents subject Corporation.27 This prompted respondent to file a Manifestation with
of the September 10, 2002 Order. Omnibus Motion praying that an order be issued in accordance with
Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to (d) of Rule 29 of the Rules of Court
(Rules), in relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of
On December 9, 2002, then Presiding Judge Bruselas issued an Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act
Order12 denying petitioners’ MR of the Order dated August 9, 2002 and No. 8799 (Interim Rules).
considered respondent’s omnibus motion as a reiteration of his earlier
motion for inspection and production of documents; thus, the
immediate implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order was On September 3, 2007, the trial court issued a Resolution, the
simultaneously ordered. concluding portion of which ordered:

Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to
assailing the Orders dated August 9, 2002 and December 9, 2002. comply with the order dated September 10, 2002, this Court reiterates
However, the CA denied the same in its Decision dated June 29, 2004. the said order:
Petitioners’ MR was likewise denied on November 3, 2004. A petition
for review was filed before this Court, but We denied it per Resolution "On motion of the plaintiff, without objection from the defendants, and
dated January 10, 2005. pursuant to Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies[,] in relation to Rule 27 of the 1997 Rule[s] of
In the meantime, respondent sought to enforce the September 10, Civil Procedure, the defendants are ordered to produce and make
2002 Order. The supposed inspection on September 30, 2002 was not available for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following
held per the trial court’s Order dated September 27, 2002.13 The documents:
January 22, 2003 inspection also did not push through after petitioners
and their co-defendants again moved for its deferment.14 When the 1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;
court eventually denied their motion on June 16, 2003, respondent set
the inspection to August 1, 2003.15 On said date, however, Atty. Matias
V. Defensor, then Corporate Secretary of the Corporation, was alleged

10
 2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been Before Us, petitioners contend that the "threatened imminent action"
received by the defendants; by the RTC to penalize them sua sponte or without regard to the
guideline laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v. Judge
Sardido37 is not proper and calls for the exercise of Our power of
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained
supervision over the lower courts. Likewise, citing Panaligan v. Judge
in the Stock and Transfer Book or on the stub of the stock
Ibay,38 among others, they claim that the threatened citation for
certificate; and
contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be wilfullness
or that the contumacious act be done deliberately in disregard of the
4. The tape recording of the stockholders’ meeting on April authority of the court.
23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.
We deny.
The production, inspection and photocopying must be undertaken in
the office premises of defendant corporation within reasonable
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a
business hours of a business day before the pre-trial with costs to be
court39 or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
shouldered by the plaintiff.
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice40 may be
punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the
SO ORDERED." Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party
as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for
This Court orders the defendants to strictly comply with this order. failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery
Failure of the defendants to comply with all the requirements of the shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an
order dated September 10, 2002 will result in this court citing all the officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order to
defendants in contempt of court. This Court shall order defendants produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or
solidarily to pay a fine of ₱10,000.00 for every day of delay to comply photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such
with the order of September 10, 2002 until the defendants shall have orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court
fully and completely complied with the said order. under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the
phrase "among others." Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 41 We
said:
Further sanctions shall be meted upon defendants should the Court
find that defendants have been in bad faith in complying with the
order of September 10, 2002 despite the order of this Court. To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise
untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the
party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or
Both plaintiff and counsel, as well as defendants and counsel, are proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against
therefore ordered to meet on November 13, 2007 at the corporate the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or
offices of defendant firm between 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. so that agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses
faithful compliance with the order of September 10, 2002 may be incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the
done, otherwise, this Court shall allow the plaintiff to present evidence matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of
to prove their prayer in their Manifestation with Omnibus Motion filed the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party
on January 31, 2007 and issue a resolution based on the same support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out
accordingly. pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.42

SO ORDERED.28 If adjudged guilty of indirect contempt, the respondent who committed

it against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank
Petitioners questioned the aforesaid Resolution via Petition for may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos, or
Certiorari (With Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.43 In this case, the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction).29 In resolving the petition, the CA ruled threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a
that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of fine of ₱10,000.00 for every day of delay in complying with the
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. According to the September 10, 2002 Order is well within the allowable range of
appellate court, the September 3, 2007 Resolution was issued penalty. 
pursuant to Section 3,30 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, with the
suppletory application of Section 1,31 Rule 27 of the Rules. It noted As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case
that, except for the sanctions contained therein, the assailed of Baculi v. Judge Belen44 is instructive:
Resolution merely reiterated the September 10, 2002 Order of Judge
Bruselas, which petitioners did not dispute in accordance with Section
2,32 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules or via petition for certiorari. The CA x x x Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect
further held that petitioners were not denied due process as they were contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a
able to move for a reconsideration of the September 10, 2002 Order, verified petition.
but not opted to file the same with respect to the September 3, 2007
Resolution. In the Matter of the Contempt Orders against Lt. Gen. Jose M.
Calimlim and Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr. (Calimlim) clarified the
Anent the argument against the threatened imposition of sanction for procedure prescribed for indirect contempt proceedings. We held in
contempt of court and the possible payment of a hefty fine, the CA that case:
opined that the case of Dee v. Securities and Exchange
Commission33 cited by petitioners is inapplicable, since the September In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed.
3, 2007 Resolution merely warned petitioners that they would be cited Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure
for contempt and be fined if they fail to comply with the court’s to be followed in case of indirect contempt. First, there must be an
directive. Moreover, it said that the penalty contained in the order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
September 3, 2007 Resolution is in accord with Section 4,34 Rule 3 of cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the
the Interim Rules, in relation to Section 3,35 Rule 29 of the Rules. opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must
be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider
Petitioners moved to reconsider the CA Decision, but it was denied.36 respondent’s answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be
punished accordingly. (Citations omitted.)

11
As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, that xxxx
is, through a verified petition, the rule is already settled in Regalado v.
Go:
In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to
defend himself or herself and have a day in court – a basic
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the requirement of due process. This is especially so in indirect contempt
Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has complied with the proceedings, as the court cannot decide them summarily pursuant to
requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore the Rules of Court. As We have stated in Calimlim, in indirect contempt
quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules proceedings, the respondent must be given the opportunity to
of Court, must be filed. comment on the charge against him or her, and there must be a
hearing, and the court must investigate the charge and consider the
respondent’s answer.45
The Rules itself is explicit on this point:

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced
initiated.1âwphi1 To the Court’s mind, the September 3, 2007
by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true
Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10,
copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil
of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty
actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or
mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of
are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue order
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed,
to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the
heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders
requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to
the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for
comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally
joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis added.)
initiate the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory
requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of
court, courts have the duty to ensure that all the requirements for
Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a
filing initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It behooves them
"judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt," this
too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from
would still not work to petitioners’ advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of
the main case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of
the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in
the contempt proceedings and the main action.
indirect contempt proceedings. It states:

But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the

Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––The
court, the above rules, as clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily
judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may
apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the
be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution of
proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the
the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed
court has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance
by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court
with his or her right to due process. This formal charge is done by the
from which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be
court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why
decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final
he or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
order.

In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the petitioners to

The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear
explain their failure to bring the accused before the RTC for his
enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal
scheduled arraignment. We held in that case that such Order was not
under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond
yet sufficient to initiate the contempt proceedings because it did not
for its suspension pendente lite.46 Obviously, these were not done in
yet amount to a show-cause order directing the petitioners to explain
this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
why they should not be cited in contempt. The formal charge has to be
65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making
specific enough to inform the person, against whom contempt
the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
proceedings are being conducted, that he or she must explain to the
court; otherwise, he or she will be cited in contempt. The Order must
express this in clear and unambiguous language. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The
March 13, 2008 Decision and April 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100911, which affirmed the September 3,
xxxx
2007 Resolution of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 226,
are AFFIRMED.
Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the
duty of the court (1) to docket and (2) to hear and decide the case
SO ORDERED.
separately from the main case does not arise, much less to exercise
the discretion to order the consolidation of the cases. There is no
petition from any party to be docketed, heard and decided separately A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366               February 4, 2015
from the main case precisely because it is the show-cause order that [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ]
initiated the proceedings.
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant,
What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a vs.
verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is the duty of the court JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
to ensure that the proceedings are conducted respecting the right to
due process of the party being cited in contempt. In both modes of
DECISION
initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the
answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end.
The court must conduct a hearing, and the court must consider the MENDOZA, J.:
respondent’s answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be
punished accordingly. For consideration is the Report and Recommendation 1 of Justice Maria
Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted

12
to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution, 2 referring the investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, butshe
complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge resented his advice.
Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she
recommendation.
did not complain about or dispute his discussions in class regarding the
administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also
The Facts brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of
the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a
son named Francis who was a drug addict and thatdrug dependents
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged
had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested thatFrancis should
Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge
be removed from the judiciary.
Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year
2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that
sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court
named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis),then employee as a result of the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an
Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the
(MTCC),Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage persons to be appointed as court employees. JudgeTormis, however,
scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.
Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and
ignorant of the law.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes
admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail bond of 6,000.00 for
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions the temporary release of Lita Guioguio onMarch 13, 2011. He claimed
not only once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with
even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive
(Francis),son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on
addict."4 She was absent from class at that time, but one of her weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained
classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued
about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he
decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the
law school in Tacloban City. Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the
cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the
Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the
Jill also disclosed thatin the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge
afternoon of March 21, 2011.
Tormis"5 (Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the
service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash
bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she Lastly, Judge Paredes averred thatthe discussions relative to the
had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was administrative cases of Judge Tormiscould not be the subject of an
the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance
recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand. of his judicial duties.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse Reply of the Complainant
than that committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13,
2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that
Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita
her mother had nothing to do with the filing of the present complaint;
Guioguio in a case entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Lita
that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her
Guioguio,"docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then pending
law studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the
before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).
discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about
by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of her mother’s
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges
for his actuations. implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed
the matter in his classes, the case of her mother was not yet resolved
by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge
Comment of Judge Paredes
Paredes was aware that administrative cases were confidential in
nature.
In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the
accusations of Jill. He stated thatJudge Tormis had several
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when
administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a
Judge Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a "drug addict."
result of the investigations, he recommended sanctionsagainst Judge
Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him;
that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as
a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never
In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted
personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the
that it was not premature to discuss the marriage scams in class
marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all
because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and
the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court
was also written in many legal publications, and that the drug
employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds;
addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.
that the marriage scams werealso discussed during meetings of RTC
judges and in schools where remediallaw and legal ethics were taught;
that he talked about past and resolvedcases, but not the negative In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court
tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations by the
discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on
these cases were known to the legal community and some were even the evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive
published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other natureof the charges, a full-blown investigation should be conducted
legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to by the CA.

13
On January 14, 2013, pursuant tothe recommendation of the OCA, the Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated
Court referred the administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the subjudicerule when the latter discussed the marriage scams
the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.11 investigated. She cited, as basis for JudgeParedes’ liability, Section 4,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were
received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices were As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to
issued and the confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, the Guioguiocase, Justice Diy absolved him ofany liability as the charge
Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of the parties. of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She
accepted Judge Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the
procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of
when he approved the bail bond.
discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in class where she was present was an
open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of
delicadezabordering on oppressive and abusive conduct, which fell Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following
short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of magistrates. recommendations, thus:
She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be
made administratively liable as the act was not made in the
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes
performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge
is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a
should be the embodiment of whatwas just and fair not only in the
judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.
Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any
of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when he exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4)
discussed the marriage scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because Admonition with warning.
at that time, the case was still being investigated; that the
administrative case relative to the marriage scam was decided only on
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the
April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the Executive Judge ofthe
factual milieu and the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is
MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the Guiguiocase; that he
respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the
could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable
penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or
before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge
a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.18
Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of
the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did
not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of. In his The Court’s Ruling
Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations
contained in his previous pleadings. He added that the marriage scams The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy
scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. except as to the penalty.
Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that,
hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the
hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and
that Judge Tormis never intervened in the present case; that ifhe definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves
havefiled a criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the
ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
meant for the protection of the Judiciary.14 substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully
intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.19
ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly
insensitive and inexcusable.
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of his official
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against
discussions of the administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was an Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class
exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code discussions, they cannot be considered as "misconduct." They are
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge.
of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. She quoted with Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less
emphasis Section 6 which stated that "Judges, like any other citizen, for grave misconduct.
are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly,
but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the Discussion of a subjudicematter, however, is another thing.
impartiality and independence of the judiciary."16
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 ofthe New Code of Judicial
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not Conduct provides: CANON 3
be held administratively liable for his comments against Judge Tormis
and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of IMPARTIALITY
his judicial functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond reproach,
not only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also inhis other SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or
professional endeavors and everyday activities. could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the
manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment

14
in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated
issue. (Emphasis supplied) conduct unbecoming of a judge.

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis,
the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, whose condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. 21 The Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being
rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their
Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of reputations.
civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was
influence; thatfacts should be decided upon evidence produced in
never denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by
court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced
invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the
by bias, prejudice or sympathies.23 Notably, when Judge Paredes
New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other
discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is
investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In
not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a
fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on the
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution.
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of
independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedomof
the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudicerule. Justice
expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the
Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated
Judiciary ofwhich he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary
Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more
circumspect inhis language. Beinga judge, he is expected to act with
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge
Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed Paredes fell short of this standard.
noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste.
The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he
publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
cannot be held administratively liable for his negative portrayal of
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions.
Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes
The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact
should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him asa judge
that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical
not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his
opinions on the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to "rub
professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of
salt to the wound,"25 as Justice Diy put it.
the Code mandates:

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary

CANON 2
comments tending to project Judge Tormisas a corrupt and ignorant
INTEGRITY
judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial
office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure thatnot only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
CANON 4
observer.
PROPRIETY

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.1âwphi1 Justice must not
impropriety in all of their activities.
merely be done but must also be seen to be done. (Emphases
supplied)
xxx
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, mandates that the conduct of a judge mustbe free of a whiff of
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
dignity of the judicial office. duties, but also to his behavior outside his salaand as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life
and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. Heshould choose
Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely
his words and exercise more caution and control inexpressing himself.
and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-
integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of
tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide
a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life
remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be
should be above suspicion.27
temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.26

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the
case,Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot be regarded as grave
propriety required by the Code and to use temperate and courteous
misconduct. The Court findsmerit in the position of Judge Paredes that

15
the approval, as well as the receipt, ofthe cash bail bond, was in DECISION
accordance with the rules. Thus:
LEONEN, J.:
Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that
Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct when he personally
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the May 25,
received cash bailbond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes
2011 Decision2 and the December 19, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of
justified his action by stating that he was merely following the
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31985. The assailed Decision affirmed
procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC,
theRegional Trial Court Decision,4 which found petitioners Bro. Bernard
which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on
Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Cirila N. Mojica, Alejandro N. Mojica,
Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official
Josefina Pascual, Atty. Silvestre Pascual, and St. Francis School of
holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the
General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (petitioners) guilty of Indirect
accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge
Contempt.1âwphi1 The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion
receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt
for Reconsideration.5
therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said
procedure, he cannot beheld administratively liable for his act of
receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case. This indirect contempt case stemmed from an intra-corporate
controversy among the Board of Trustees of petitioner St. Francis
School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (St. Francis School).6
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond
under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle
the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court brothers on July 9, 1973 by respondent Laurita Custodio (Custodio),
(RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial petitioner Cirila N. Mojica (Cirila), petitioner Josefina Pascual
Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest. (Josefina), Monsignor Felix Perez, and Brother Vernon Poore.7 These
five (5) incorporators served as St. Francis School's Board of Trustees
until the latter two (2) passed away.8
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that
executive judges are authorized to exercise other powers and
prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of Without a written agreement, the La Salle brothers agreed to give the
their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, necessary supervision to establish the school's academic foundation.9
Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions
as anExecutive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita On September 8, 1988, the incorporators and the La Salle brothers
Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for cash bail formalized their arrangement in a Memorandum of Agreement, under
bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assignedto the which De La Salle Greenhills (La Salle) would supervise the academic
court where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive affairs of St. Francis School to increase enrollment. La Salle appointed
judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail supervisors to sit in the Board of Trustees without voting rights.10
bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice
was for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no
judge assigned for duty during Sundays. In 1998, petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca (Bro. Oca) became a member of
St. Francis School as a La Salle-appointed supervisor. He sat in the
Board of Trustees and was later elected as its Chairman and St.
Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by Francis School's President.11 In 2000, petitioner Bro. Dennis Magbanua
complainant Jill of any irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two (Bro. Magbanua) was also admitted as a La Salle-appointed
(2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient supervisor.12 He sat as a trustee and was later elected as Treasurer of
evidence.28 St. Francis School.13

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Sometime in August 2001, the members of the Board of Trustees
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and penalized under Section came into a disagreement regarding the school's administrative
11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than structure and La Salle's supervision over the school. Cirila, Josefina,
₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua wanted to expand the scope of La Salle's
and (4) Admonition with warning. supervision to includematters relating to the school's finances,
administration, and operations.14
Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the
appropriate penalty under the circumstances is admonition. This was opposed by Custodio. 15 After several incidents relating to the
disagreement, Custodio filed a complaint against St. Francis School,
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua on June 7, 2002 with Branch 23,
Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Regional Trial Court, Trece Martires, Cavite. She alleged that Bro. Oca
administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and and Bro. Magbanua were never qualified to sit in the Board of
ADMONISHES him therefor. Trustees.16 She also prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order to
prevent Bro. Oca from calling a special membership meeting to remove
her from the Board of Trustees.17
SO ORDERED.

This case was dismissed.18 Custodio was subsequently removed from

July 26, 2017
the Board of Trustees and as Curriculum Administrator.19

G.R. No. 199825

Custodio filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal but
eventually withdrew her appeal to file a new suit instead.20
BRO. BERNARD OCA, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, CIRILA N.
MOJICA, ALEJANDRO N. MOJICA, JOSEFINA PASCUAL,
On October 3, 2002, Custodio again filed a complaint against
SILVESTRE PASCUAL AND ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF GENERAL
petitioners for violating the Corporation Code with Branch 21, Regional
TRIAS, CAVITE, INC., Petitioners
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite.21 She sought to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro.
vs.
Magbanua as members and trustees of the school and to declare void
LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent
all their acts as President and Treasurer, respectively.22 She likewise

16
prayed for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary On February 21, 2003, petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation
injunction to enjoin the remaining board members from holding and Compliance. They alleged that they partially complied with the
meetings and to prevent Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua from October 21, 2002 Order by submitting an accounting on the tuition fee
discharging their functions as members, trustees, and officers of St. collections and by turning over to Reynante a manager's check in the
Francis School.23 This case was docketed as SEC Case No. 024-02.24 amount of P397,127.64 payable to St. Francis School. 35 The amount
allegedly represented the school's matriculation fees from October to
December 2002.36 However, they alleged that Reynante refused to
On October 8, 2002, the Regional Trial Court heard Custodio's prayer
accept the check and required that the amount be turned over in cash
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.25
or in a check payable to cash. Thus, petitioners placed the check in the
custody of the Regional Trial Court for safekeeping.37
The day after the hearing, Custodio filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated October 9, 2002. She alleged that after the hearing for the
Custodio filed a Comment dated February 26, 2003.38 Custodio
Temporary Restraining Order, the counsel for petitioners went to St.
manifested that petitioners did not even substantially comply with the
Francis School to instruct several parents not to acknowledge
October 21, 2002 Order because it excluded from its accounting and
Custodio's administration as she had been removed as a member,
turnover the following amounts:
trustee, and curriculum administrator and that her complaint had been
dismissed. The parents were also allegedly directed to pay the
students' matriculation fees exclusively to petitioner Alejandro N. 1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No.
Mojica (Alejandro), son of petitioner Cirila. Alejandro held office at the 239 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. which was allegedly owned by the
family of petitioner Josefina.26 This meeting allegedly caused 15
2) ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No.
teachers to hold a strike, which nearly disrupted classes and caused
459 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
parents to request the early dismissal of their children for fear that
violence would ensue.27 Custodio reiterated her prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order. She moved that the hearing be converted into an 3) ₱92,970.00 representing fees paid by the school canteen;
injunction hearing or that a status quo order be issued to allow her to and
continue functioning as school director and curriculum administrator.28
4) All other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19,
Custodio also filed a Motion for Clarification praying that the trial court 2003.39
clarify to whom the school's fees should be paid while her Complaint
and Manifestation and Motion were still pending. Petitioners allegedly Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the trial court order that
manifested that the payment of matriculation fees must be made to only she and Reynante were authorized to pay the outstanding
Alejandro. However, Custodio pointed out that Alejandro was not the accounts of St. Francis School. Petitioners allegedly made salary
school cashier and that the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. was not payments to four (4) employees who had resigned. 40
authorized to receive payments for St. Francis School. She also
manifested that prior to October 8, 2002, the school cashier was Ms.
Herminia Reynante (Reynante).29 This Motion was set for hearing on On March 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued another
October 18, 2002.30 Order41 directing petitioners to fully comply with its earlier order to
submit a report and to turn over to Reynante all the money they had
collected:
On October 21, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order
designating Reynante to act as school cashier "with authority to collect
all fees" and, together with Custodio, "to pay all accounts."31 The trial This treats of defendants' explanation, manifestation and compliance
court also directed all parties in the case to submit a report on and to and plaintiff's comments thereto.
turn over to Reynante all money previously collected, thus:
A pernsal of the allegations of defendants' pleading shows that they
Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other merely turned-over a manager's check in the amount of ₱397,127.64
collectibles, Ms. Herminia Reynante is hereby designated by the Court representing money collected from the students from October 2002 to
to act as cashier of the school to the exclusion of others with authority December 2002. The Order of October 21, 2002 directed plaintiff and
to collect all fees and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay defendants, as well as, Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
all accounts.  Said authority shall continue until the matter of the Reynante all money previously collected and to submit a report on
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction what have been collected, how much, from whom and the dates
is heard and resolved. This is hereby ordered so that an orderly collected.
operation of the school will be achieved.
Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn- from receipt hereof, to submit a report and to turn-over to Ms.
over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to Herminia Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from whom,
and the dates collected  Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia (1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings
Reynante shall submit to the Court, to the plaintiff and to all the Deposit No. 239 (Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all
disbursements made.
(2) ₱5,639,856. l 1 deposited in Special Savings
32
Deposit No. 459 (Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis supplied)

(3) ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they would school canteen;
have proven that Reynante lacked the moral integrity to act as court-
appointed cashier had they been given the opportunity to be heard.33
(4) Other fees collected from January 2003 to
34
Febrnary 19, 2003; and
On January 3, 2003, the Regional Trial Court denied reconsideration.

17
 (5) Accounting on how and how much defendants On August 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order granting
are paying Ms. Daisy Romero and three (3) other Custodio's Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002 and issuing
teachers who already resigned. a status quo order47 allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as
school director and curriculum administrator.48 The trial court ruled in
favor of Custodio when it found that petitioners had already
SO ORDERED.42
established another school, the Academy of St. John (Academy of St.
John) in Sta. Clara, General Trias, Cavite:49
Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception
and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying, among others, that the trial
This treats of plaintiff's manifestation and motion praying that the
court issue an order excluding from its March 24, 2003 Order the
court "immediately issue a temporary restraining order ... where
amounts which were not covered in its October 21, 2002 Order.43
plaintiff will be allowed to continue discharging the functions of a
school director and curriculum administrator ... "
On August 5, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying
all motions raised in petitioners' Manifestation, Observation,
During the hearing of the said motion and manifestation on October
Compliance, Exception and Motion and declared that they had not
11, 2002, both parties and counsel agreed before the court that no
complied with the March 24, 2003 Order:44
incident similar to what happened on October 8, 2002 will occur while
the motion is being heard.
This treats of defendants' manifestation, observation, compliance,
exception and motion dated April 18, 2003, plaintiff's
Plaintiff and defendants presented evidence, testimonial and
comment/opposition and defendants' rejoinder thereto filed on July 2,
documentary, to prove their respective causes. It took them nine
2003.
months to present their evidence before the matter was submitted for
the court's resolution.
Defendants are asking the Court first to set aside its orders dated
October 21[, 2002] and March 24, 2003 for having been issued
After a thorough review of all the evidences presented by both parties,
"without notice and hearing" and in "acting without or in excess of its
the Court is inclined to rule in favor of the plaintiff. The [pieces of]
authority/jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
evidence of both parties are convincing. But, the factor that convinced
lack or excess of jurisdiction" ...
the Court to rule in favor of plaintiff was the information conveyed to
the court by plaintiff and admitted by defendants, through their
With respect to the first matter, the motion is denied for being a counsel, that another school named Academy of St. John, a new La
prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Sallian Supervised School in Sta. Clara, General Tria[s], Cavite, was
for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC). The motion opened by defendants Josefina A. Pascual and Cirila N. Mojica and
which assails the two questioned orders is actually a motion for their respective families. In a brochure handed by plaintiff's counsel to
reconsideration but worded differently - "motion to set aside March 24, the court during the hearing on June 17, 2003 with a heading of
2003 Order" but both have the same purpose and objective and that is Academy of Saint John, De La Salle[-] Supervised, General Tria[s],
to reconsider the order(s). Cavite, it said that "such idea was conceived as a result of the
corporate problems and the never ending dispute in a former La
.... Salle[-]supervised school that finally brought confusion and havoc in
the said community."

On the contrary, the court found out that defendants have not
complied with the order of the court dated March 24, 2003 directing It further said that "alarmed with the impending loss of the La Salle
defendants and Mr. Al Mojica to submit a report and to turn over to Supervision which they both thought of leaving it as a legacy to the
Ms. Herminia Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly: youth, Mrs. Pascual and Mrs. Mojica together with their respective
families were convinced to continue their mission of spreading quality
education etc."
1. ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.)
It appears from the brochure that defendants Pascual and Mojica have
set up another school in the same municipality where the St. Francis
2. ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 (Rural School is located. The name of the school is Academy of St. John. The
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.) Academy of St. John likewise offers the same courses as th[ose]
offered by St. Francis [S]chool. Needless to state, this action of
3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen. defendants Pascual and Mojica is very inimical to the interest of St.
Francis School as the Academy of St. John put up by the
aforementioned defendants is in direct competition with St. Francis
4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003. School. In other words, a conflict of interest now exists insofar as
defendants Pascual and Mojica are concerned in view of their
5. Accounting on how and how much defendants are paying Ms. Daisy establishment of the Academy of St. John which is of the same kind
Romero and the three (3) other teachers who already resigned. and of the same nature of business as that of St. Francis School. One
cannot serve two masters a[t] the same time. And as already
intimated above, considering that there are now two competingschools
Accordingly, the defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed to in the same locality where defendants Pascual and Mojica hold an
comply with the aforementioned order of March 24, 2003, within ten interest, they cannot be expected to give their full devotion and
days from receipt hereof. cooperation to one without being disloyal and unfaithful to the other.

.... WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion is granted.

Accordingly, a status quo order is hereby issued wherein the plaintiff is
SO ORDERED.45 hereby allowed to continue discharging her functions as school director
and curriculum administrator as well as those who are presently and
actually discharging functions as school officer[s] to continue
In the meantime, La Salle served Custodio a notice dated January 4,
performing their duties until the application for the issuance of a
2003, that they were terminating the Memorandum of Agreement with
temporary restraining order is resolved.
St. Francis School.46

18
SO ORDERED.50 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendants are hereby
ordered to comply with the mandate contained in the order dated
March 24 and August 5, 2003.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Clarification,51 They alleged that the
bulk of the money ordered to be turned over to Custodio and Reynante
was allotted to St. Francis School's teachers' retirement fund. Defendants are further directed to inform the court of the total amount
Considering that it must be preserved, petitioners raised several of the funds deposited reserved for teachers' retirement, and in what
queries. They wanted to know if Custodio and Reynante would use the bank and under what account the same is deposited.
money for other purposes other than for the teachers' retirement
benefit and if Custodio and Reynante would be required to file a bond
SO ORDERED.59
to guaranty its safekeeping and exclusive use as teacher's retirement
compensation. Finally, they asked who would be held liable in case of
Custodio and Reynante's unlawful use of this fund.52 On October 10, 2003, petitioners filed their Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals to question the Regional Trial
Court's Orders60 dated August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October
On September 2, 2003, Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents
8, 2003. Eventually, this was elevated to this Court and was docketed
in Contempt of Court53 under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 54 She
as G.R. No. 174996.61
likewise prayed that an order be issued reiterating the Orders dated
October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003.55
Meanwhile, trial commenced for the contempt case. Custodio
presented as her lone witness, Joseph Custodio (Joseph), St. Francis
In response to petitioners' Motion for Clarification, the trial court issued
School's finance and property resource development administrator.
an Order dated October 8, 200356 clarifying that the retirement fund
Petitioners did not present any witness.62
was to be held in trust by Custodio and Reynante. It also directed
Custodio and Reynante to file a bond of ₱300,000.00 each.57 Later, it
ordered petitioners to comply with the mandate in the March 24, 2003 In its Decision63 dated February 6, 2008, Branch 90, Regional Trial
and August 5, 2003 Orders and directed them to disclose to the court Court, Dasmariñas, Cavite found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt
the total amount of the fund deposited and reserved for teachers' for failing to comply with the Orders dated October 21, 2002 and
retirement benefit and its bank details:58 March 24, 2003 and ordered them to jointly and severally pay a fine of
₱30,000.00.64 It likewise directed them to account for the amount that
they had paid the four (4) teachers who had already resigned:65
This treats of the motion for clarification filed by the defendants
through counsel.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the respondents, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis
The motion sprung from the Order dated March 24, 2003 and again
Magbanua, Ms. Cirila N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, Al N. Mojica,
reiterated in the Order of August 5, 2003 which required the
Atty. Silvestre Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite,
defendants and Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all
GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT of Court against the Regional Trial
the money which [is] in their possession enumerated in the aforesaid
Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite for their failure to comply with the
orders.
Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003, and
they are hereby ordered to pay a FINE, jointly and severally, in the
Considering that the bulk of the money pertains to the teacher[s'] amount of Php30,000.00 for the restoration of the dignity of the Court
retirement funds, defendants seek to clarify (1) for what purpose the and to comply with the Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002
funds will be used by the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante; (2) whether the and March 24, 2003 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
funds will be turned-over to the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante without judgment.
them having to put up a bond as a security for the protection of the
teachers; and (3) whether defendants will be held liable civilly and
....
criminally, in case of unlawful use and disbursement of the funds.

SO ORDERED.66
Teachers' retirement funds are funds principally set aside for the
purpose of the retirement of the teachers. As such, these funds cannot
be used for any other purpose other than that for which it is intended. In its May 25, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
Thus, neither the plaintiff nor Ms. Reynante may use this amount for court Decision.67 It found that it was sufficiently established that
the operation of the school. They should hold the same in trust for the petitioners did not remit all the money they had previously collected
beneficiaries of the same. despite the trial court's October 21, 2002 Order, which they admitted
to be lawful.68
As to whether the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante shall be required to put
up a bond as a security for the protection of the teachers before they It found that the March 24, 2003 Order merely reiterated the October
receive the teachers' retirement funds, the same is not only correct but 21, 2002 Order directing the payment of all money they had collected
also proper. Considering that they will hold these funds in trust for the and specified the amounts to be remitted.69 It noted that the trial court
retiring teachers, they should be required to file a bond to guarantee already clarified which funds to turn over but petitioners still refused to
their obligations as trustees of these funds. Accordingly, the plaintiff obey the orders.70
and Ms. Herminia Reynante are hereby directed to file a bond in the
amount of ₱300,000.00 each. The Court of Appeals ruled that defying the trial court orders
amounted to contumacious conduct, which "tended to prejudice St.
As to whether the defendants will be held liable, civilly and criminally, Francis School's operations due to lack of operational funds."71
in case of unlawful use and disbursement of the teachers' retirement
funds, the answer is in the negative. A person cannot be held liable for The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioners did not deny that the
his action when such was done in compliance with the lawful order of Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002 was heard on October
the court. Besides, considering that the plaintiff and Ms. Reynante are 18, 2002; thus, contradicting their claim that they were not afforded
required to file a bond, the bond shall guarantee for whatever damage an opportunity to be heard.72
the retiring teachers may incur by reason of the unlawful use and
disbursement of the funds.
The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in its Resolution dated
December 19, 2011.73

19
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review via Rule 45 arguing that they Custodio posited that petitioners only remitted the matriculation fees in
complied with the October 21, 2002 Order in good faith and that the the amount of ₱397,127.64. They did not render a report on the
validity of the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders were being amount or turned over any other amounts. They only partially
assailed in a separate case with this Court.74 Likewise, they contended complied with the trial court orders.95
that there was reasonable doubt on their guilt and that the Court of
Appeals erred in failing to dismiss the petition with respect to
Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4)
petitioners Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre Pascual (Atty. Silvestre) who
teachers who had already resigned despite the trial court order that
were not parties in SEC Case No. 024-02 where the assailed orders
only Custodio and Reynante were authorized to settle St. Francis
were issued.75
School's accountabilities.96

Petitioners held that to be cited for contempt, the contemnor must be

Custodio argued that petitioners did not refute the evidence she
guilty of willful disobedience.76 However, they did not disobey the trial
presented but merely attested that the orders only pertained to
court orders.77 They insisted that they had complied in good faith
matriculation fees.97
because the trial court October 21, 2002 Order only pertained to the
school's matriculation fees and not any other fees.78 They claimed that
the October 21, 2002 Order was a response to Custodio's Motion for Custodio ave1Ted that petitioners were afforded due process. She
Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which only requested that the pointed out that her Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002
matriculation fees be turned over to Reynante.79 Thus, they averred was set for hearing on October 18, 2002, which was attended by
that it was reasonable for them to conclude that the subject of the petitioners' counsel.98
turnover was the matriculation fees only.80
Custodio claimed that petitioners' Explanation, Manifestation and
Petitioners further claimed that in Custodio 's Comment to their Compliance dated February 19, 2003 was heard by the trial court.
February 19, 2003 Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance, Thus, petitioners were not denied due process when she filed her
Custodio surreptitiously included a prayer for the turnover of other Comment. If petitioners wanted to assail the Comment, they could
funds.81 They attested that Custodio's Comment became a litigated have easily filed a Reply.99
motion that should have been set for hearing by the trial
court.82 However, the trial court did not set a hearing or require the Custodio insisted that the trial court March 24, 2003 Order was a
filing of a responsive pleading.83 They insisted that they were denied clarification, not an expanded version, of its October 21, 2002 Order.
due process because the trial court's March 24, 2003 Order expanded Custodio reasoned that the March 24, 2003 Order was not even among
the scope of its October 21, 2002 Order and required the turnover of the orders they questioned in G.R. No. 174996; thus, showing that
additional sums which were not included in the October 21, 2002 they were not acting in good faith. She insisted that their claim of lack
Order.84 of due process was merely an afterthought after they were directed
several times to comply with the trial court orders.100
Petitioners insisted that the lack of due process and the expansion of
the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order rendered the trial court Similarly, Custodio claimed that the August 5, 2003 Order of the
March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders unlawful.85 They Regional Trial Court was not a violation of petitioners' right to due
questioned these orders in GR. No. 17 4996 and insisted that their process. It was issued in connection with their motion to set aside the
resort to legal remedies showed that they acted in good faith. They March 24, 2003 Order, which was heard. Moreover, the August 5,
argued that to be charged with indirect contempt, the violated order 2003 Order was a mere reiteration of the March 24, 2003 Order.101
must have been a lawful order.86 Since the validity of the trial court
orders was being questioned in GR. No. 174996, the Court of Appeals'
ruling was premature as it should have waited for this Court's finding Custodio held that the trial court orders are deemed valid and are
on the orders' validity before charging them with indirect contempt.87 entitled to respect while they are not yet reversed by a higher court.102

Petitioners asserted that these circumstances showed that there was Custodio averred that despite the trial court's rulings on the issues
reasonable doubt on their guilt and their acquittal was warranted.88 raised, petitioners insisted on filing prohibited pleadings under A.M.
No. 01- 2-04-SC, or the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies. These pleadings by petitioners were their (i) Motion for
Lastly, they held that Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre ought to be Reconsideration dated November 8, 2002, (ii) Explanation,
dropped as parties in the petition for indirect contempt as they were Manifestation, and Compliance dated February 19, 2003, (iii)
not parties in the intra-corporate controversy filed with the trial court Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion dated
and were not subject to its jurisdiction. Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre April 18, 2003, and (iv) Motion for Clarification dated September 1,
could not have been aware of the trial court's orders. They averred 2003.103
that there was no showing that they acted in conspiracy with the other
petitioners and that their guilt could not be assumed or based on mere
inference.89 Custodio posited that in filing these pleadings, petitioners abused court
processes as they served no purpose other than to avoid compliance
with the trial court orders.104
In its March 5, 2012 Resolution, this Court denied the Petition on the
ground that the issues raised were factual in nature and petitioners
failed to raise any reversible error on the part of the Court of She claimed that Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre were equally guilty of
Appeals.90 indirect contempt. Despite the fact that they were not parties to the
complaint, Alejandro collected the matriculation fees for the school
while Atty. Silvestre, as a member of the Board of Trustees, was
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.91 empowered to cause compliance of court orders.105

In its February 18, 2013 Resolution, this Court set aside its March 5, Lastly, Custodio pointed out that petitioners' raising of factual issues
2012 Resolution and ordered Custodio to file a Comment.92 was not proper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari.106

Custodio filed her Comment93 arguing that there was clear and Petitioners filed their Reply.107
contumacious defiance of the trial court orders and that the guilt of
petitioners was established beyond reasonable doubt.94
Later, the parties filed their respective Memoranda.108

20
Meanwhile, on December 3, 2014, during the pendency of this indirect to the good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws
contempt case, this Court issued a Decision in G.R. No. 174996, which themselves.116 (Citations omitted)
found that the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003 and October 8,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court were valid. The dispositive portion of
There are two (2) types of contempt of court: (i) direct contempt and
the December 3, 2014 Decision read:
(ii) indirect contempt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

Direct contempt consists of "misbehavior in the presence of or so near
The assailed Decision dated September 16, 2005 and the Resolution
a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before [it]." 117 It
dated October 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
includes: (i) disrespect to the court, (ii) offensive behavior against
79791 are hereby AFFIRMED in part insofar as they upheld the
others, (iii) refusal, despite being lawfully required, to be sworn in or
assailed August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial court.
to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition. It
They are REVERSED with respect to the assailed August 21,
can be punished summarily without a hearing.118
2003 Status Quo  Order which is hereby SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. The trial court is further
DIRECTED to resolve respondent's application for injunctive relief with Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated
dispatch. under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

SO ORDERED.109 (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or

her] official duties or in his [or her] official transactions;
For resolution is whether petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt.
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court,  including the act of a person who, after being
To resolve this, it is important to determine:
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
First, whether petitioners are guilty of willful disobedience; induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
Second, whether petitioners can refuse to follow the orders of the
entitled thereto;
Regional Trial Court on the premise that their legality is being
questioned in this Court; and
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section
Finally, whether Alejandro N. Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual are
1 of this Rule;
equally guilty of indirect contempt despite the fact that they are not
parties to the complaint.
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
I

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as

This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina
such without authority;
are guilty of indirect contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on
their part to comply with the Regional Trial Court Orders.
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or
defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity.110 It constitutes conduct (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by
of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due him [or her].119 (Emphasis supplied)
administration of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties[']
litigant or their witnesses during litigation."111
Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and
an opportunity to be heard is given to the party charged.120
All courts are given the inherent power to punish contempt. 112 This
power is an essential necessity to preserve order in judicial
In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt
proceedings and to enforce the due administration of justice and the
through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
court's mandates, orders, and judgments.113 It safeguards the respect
orjudgment of a court."
due to the courts and, consequently, ensures the stability of the
judicial institution.114
II
In Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.:115
Petitioners insist that they have complied with the October 21, 2002
Order in good faith as they have already turned over the matriculation
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in
fees to Reynante.121 They claim that this Order pertained to the
dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of
matriculation fees only, excluding any other fees, as it was issued in
justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of
connection with Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14,
the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the
2002, which requested that the matriculation fees be turned over to
administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive
Reynante.122 Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002
personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders.
allegedly did not cover other fees.123
Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a court or judge
to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or
interference with the court's orderly process by exacting summary However, the October 21, 2002 Order did not pertain to matriculation
punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for fees only:
the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for the
courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other collectibles,
Ms. Herminia Reynante is hereby designated by the Court to act as

21
cashier of the school to the exclusion of others with authority to collect simply stated that petitioners failed to substantially comply with the
all fees and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay all October 21, 2002 Order and specified the other amounts that
accounts.  Said authority shall continue until the matter of the petitioners needed to turn over.133 When she prayed for the turnover of
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction the other amounts, she merely sought petitioners' compliance of the
is heard and resolved. This is hereby ordered so that an orderly trial court October 21, 2002 Order.134
operation of the school will be achieved.
The trial court reiterated this in its March 24, 2003 Order and specified
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn- more particularly the amounts that needed to be remitted. It stated:
over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to
submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from whom
A perusal of the allegations of defendants' pleading shows that they
and the dates collected.  Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia
merely turned-over a manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64
Reynante shall submit to the Court, to the plaintiff and to all the
representing money collected from the students from October 2002 to
defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all
December 2002. The Order of October 21, 2002 directed plaintiff and
disbursements made.
defendants, as well as, Mr. Al Mojica to turn-over to Ms. Herminia
Reynante all money previously collected and to submit a report on
SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied) what have been collected, how much, from whom and the dates
collected.
The wording of the October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts
do not pertain only to the matriculation fees but Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days
to all  collectibles, all  fees, and all  accounts. It also states that from receipt hereof, to submit a report and to turn-over to Ms.
petitioners were to render a report and turn over all  the amounts they Herminia Reynante all money collected by them, more particularly:
had previously collected. It does not state that only matriculation fees
were to be handed over.
1. ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural
Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
Likewise, the subject of Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated
October 14, 2002 did not solely cover matriculation fees. Her prayer
2. ₱5,639,856. l 1 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of
sought to clarify "where the matriculation fees and other fees  should
(Rural Bank of Gen. Trias, Inc.);
be paid pending the hearing of the Complaint and the Manifestation
and Motion."125 She also prayed for other just and equitable
reliefs.126 Thus, the trial court ordered that all  amounts be turned over 3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen;
to Reynante for the orderly operation of the school.127 Understandably,
the school would operate better if all accounts were handled by one 4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003;
(1) person and not divided into two (2) arguing factions.

5. Accounting on how and how much defendants are paying Ms. Daisy
Petitioners insist that Custodio's Comment to their February 19, 2003 Romero and three (3) other teachers who already resigned.
Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance surreptitiously included a
prayer for the turnover of other funds, making it a litigated
motion.128 Petitioners claim that they were denied due process because SO ORDERED.135
the trial court did not set it for hearing. 129 Moreover, in its March 24,
2003 Order, the trial court allegedly required the turnover of additional Consequently, the Regional Trial Court did not unduly expand the
sums which were not included in the October 21, 2002 Order.130 scope of the October 21, 2002 Order when it issued its March 24, 2003
Order.
This Court finds that the subsequent trial court orders did not unduly
expand the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order as petitioners argue. However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with
The October 21, 2002 Order itself already directed that all fees  be the March 24, 2003 Order. Instead, they filed a Manifestation,
turned over to Reynante. Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003,
praying that the trial court exclude the other amounts, which were
Furthermore, Custodio's Comment dated February 26, 2003 simply allegedly not included in the October 21, 2002 Order.136
argued that petitioners did not comply with the October 21, 2002
Order because they did not remit the following amounts: The trial court denied petitioners' Manifestation,
Observation,Compliance, Exception and Motion in its August 5, 2003
1) ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 of the Order for being a differently worded motion for reconsideration, which
Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.; is a prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-
SC).137 The trial court noted that petitioners still had not complied with
2) ₱5,639,856.ll deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of the its March 24, 2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report
Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.; and turn over all the money they had collected.138

3) ₱92,970.00 representing fees paid by the school canteen; and Still, petitioners refused to comply.

4) All other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003.131 On August 21, 2003, the trial court granted Custodio's Manifestation
and Motion dated October 9, 2002. It issued a status quo order
Custodio pointed out that petitioners paid the salaries of four (4) other allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and
employees who had already resigned, violating the court order that curriculum administrator because it found that petitioners had already
only Reynante and Custodio were authorized to pay the outstanding established a new school.139
accounts of St. Francis School.132
However, petitioners still did not comply despite this Order. Instead,
Thus, it cannot be said that Custodio inserted a surreptitious prayer for they filed their September 1, 2003 Motion for Clarification, raising
the turnover of funds not included in the October 21, 2002 Order. She questions on Custodio's use of the turned over money, Custodio's and

22
Reynante's bonds as guaranty to the money's exclusive use as Thus, the question of whether petitioners were denied due process has
teachers' retirement fund, and petitioners' liability in case of Custodio's already been settled.
misuse of this amount.140
This Court notes that petitioners' justification for refusing to turn over
This prompted Custodio to petition the trial court to cite petitioners in the stated amounts was that the amounts constituted teachers'
indirect contempt.141 retirement fund, which consequently did not belong to St. Francis
School and was not covered by the assailed Orders. 149 However, the
trial court lent credence to Joseph's testimony that the amounts
The trial court responded to petitioners' Motion for Clarification dated
deposited in the Special Savings Accounts were funds for the
September 1, 2003 and issued its October 8, 2003 Order, agreeing
operations of the school.150
that the retirement fund would be merely held in trust by Custodio and
Reynante.142 It also directed Custodio and Reynante to file a bond of
₱300,000.00 each. Again, it ordered petitioners to comply with the In any case, whether the amounts are for the teachers' retirement
mandate in its March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003 Orders and fund or the school's operation fund, the trial court had determined who
directed them to inform the court the total amount of the money was to have custody over these amounts during the pendency of the
deposited and reserved for teachers' retirement and its bank account intra-corporate case. Thus, it is not for petitioners to choose which
details.143 amounts to turn over.

Nonetheless, petitioners still did not comply.  Instead, they argued in III

the contempt proceeding that the March 24, 2003 and August 5, 2003
Orders were unlawful and were being questioned in G.R. No. 174996.
The same principle applies to petitioners' argument that the trial court
They claimed that their availment of legal remedies showed their good
orders were being questioned in G.R. No. 174996.
faith.144

In intra-corporate controversies, all orders of the trial court are

All these acts show petitioners' contumacious refusal to abide by the
immediately executory:151
orders of the trial court.

Section 4. Executory nature of decisions and orders.  - All decisions and

Again, the trial court did not exclude any other kind of money in its
orders issued under these Rules shall immediately be executory except
October 21, 2002, March 24, 2003, and August 5, 2003 Orders, all of
the awards for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's
which directed petitioners to turn over all  monies.145 Petitioners,
fees, if any. No appeal or petition taken therefrom shall stay the
however, still insisted that they had complied because they had
enforcement or implementation of the decision or order, unless
remitted the matriculation fees. Even after clarification, petitioners
restrained by an appellate court. Interlocutory orders shall not be
were defiant.
subject to appeal.

The trial court also noted that even after petitioners had already
Questioning the trial court orders does not stay its enforcement or
established another competitor school and Custodio and Reynante had
implementation. There is no showing that the trial court orders were
already posted bond, petitioners still refused to comply.146
restrained by the appellate court.

The trial court reiterated the orders to turn over the amounts at least
Hence, petitioners could not refuse to comply with the trial court
thrice. Petitioners' filing of numerous pleadings reveals their
orders just because they opined that they were invalid. It is not for the
contumacious refusal to comply and their abuse of court processes.
parties to decide whether they should or should not comply with a
court order. Petitioners did not obtain any injunction to stop the
Their defense that they were denied due process deserves little implementation of the trial court orders nor was there an injunction to
consideration. Petitioners had attended hearings and had filed several prevent the trial court from hearing and ruling on the contempt
pleadings showing that they were given several opportunities to case.152 Petitioners' stubborn refusal cannot be excused just because
present their position on the matter. All these were considered before they were convinced of its invalidity. Their resort to the processes of
the trial court rendered its orders. questioning the orders does not show that they are in good faith.

In Oca vs. Custodio,147 this Court ruled on the validity of the trial court Petitioners likewise cannot invoke the principle of judicial courtesy.
August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders:
Judicial courtesy is exercised by suspending a lower court's
With regard to the right to due process, we have emphasized in proceedings although there is no injunction or an order from a higher
jurisprudence that while it is true that the right to due process court.153 The purpose is to avoid mooting the matter raised in the
safeguards the opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence higher court.154 It is exercised as a matter of respect and for practical
one may have in support of his claim or defense, the Court has time considerations.155
and again held that where the opportunity to be heard, either through
verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can "present
However, this principle applies only if the continuation of the lower
its side" or defend its "interest in due course," there is no denial of due
court's proceedings will render moot the issue raised in the higher
process because what the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to
court.156
be heard.

In the two (2) cases involved, there are two (2) separate issues. In
In the case at bar, we find that petitioners were not denied due
G.R. No. 174996, the issue was whether the orders of the trial court
process by the trial court when it issued the assailed Orders dated
were valid. In this indirect contempt case, the issue is whether
August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003. The records
petitioners willfully disobeyed the orders of the trial court. Although
would show that petitioners were given the opportunity to ventilate
this Court may find the orders invalid in G.R. No. 174996, the
their arguments through pleadings and that the same pleadings were
petitioners may still be cited in contempt for their contumacious refusal
acknowledged in the text of the questioned rulings. Thus, petitioners
and defiance of the trial court orders. Therefore, the finding of indirect
cannot claim grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court on
contempt will not render moot this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 174996.
the basis of denial of dueprocess.148 (Citation omitted)

23
This Court has acknowledged the trial court's power to cite parties in and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court
indirect contempt for their refusal to follow its orders, although the or judge.161
validity of the orders is being questioned in another proceeding.
This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i)
In Roxas v. Tipon,157 this Court found a party guilty of contempt to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to
although the disobeyed order was the subject of a pending petition compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform.162
before the Court of Appeals:
In Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations:163
The issue of indirect contempt needs further discussion because while
the Order of the RTC to allow audit of books of HEVRI has been
Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish
rendered moot, it does not change the fact that at the time that the
them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal. A civil contempt is
Order was a standing pronouncement, petitioners refused to heed it ...
the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge
for the benefit of the opposing party therein;  and a criminal contempt,
.... is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a
judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity
of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Where the
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting
punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a stranger,
in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a
is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power of
willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such
the court, either by fine payable to the government or by
conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case.
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the
Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the
due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the
nature of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a
authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to
coercive measure to enforce the performance of some act for the
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or decree rendered
interfere with or prejudice parties-litigant or their witnesses during
in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if made before final decree,
litigation. The asseverations made by petitioners to justify their refusal
be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made after
to allow inspection or audit were rejected by the trial court.
final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on
appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is appropriate
.... to the review of judgments in civil cases. . . . The question of whether
the contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the
The RTC initiated the contempt charge. In the Order dated 9 January jurisdiction or the power of a Court to punish the
2002, petitioners were directed to appear in court and to show cause same ....164 (Emphasis supplied)
why they should not be held in contempt of court for their refusal to
allow Financial Catalyst, Inc. to audit the books of HEVRI. Petitioners The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was
filed an urgent motion for reconsideration claiming that said order was further elaborated in People v. Godoy:165
the subject of a pending petition before the Court of Appeals and that
they can only be cited for contempt by the filing of a verified
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be
petition.  The RTC denied the motion and reiterated in its Order on 26
determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the
April 2002 explaining that it chose to initiate the contempt charge.
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
The RTC acted on the basis of the unjustified refusal of petitioners to compensatory or remedial.
abide by its lawful order.  It is of no moment that private respondents
may have filed several pleadings to urge the R TC to cite petitioners in
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature
contempt. Petitioners utterly violated an order issued by the trial court
of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and
which act is considered contemptuous. Thus, in Leonidas v. Judge
the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their
Supnet,  the MTC's order to the bank to show cause why it should not
prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the
be held in contempt, was adjudged as a legitimate exercise of the
authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its
MTC's judicial discretion to determine whether the bank should be
orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings
sanctioned for disregarding its previous orders.158 (Emphasis supplied,
or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a
citations omitted)
crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui
generis,  partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal
In this case, petitioners were given several opportunities to comply proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal
with the trial court orders. Even after the trial court clarified which contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the
funds to turn over, they still refused to obey. While petitioners principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such
questioned the legality of these orders, they are immediately procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt
executory. Moreover, the parties do not have the power to determine proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern
for themselves what should and should not be excluded from the criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt,
orders. Their failure to turn over the amounts showed petitioners' that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in
defiance and disregard for the authority of the trial court. regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing
them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are
Petitioners argue that contempt proceedings are similar to criminal not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial
proceedings, and thus, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt rights of the accused are preserved.
of their guilt.159
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil
The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of
and criminal contempt. some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the
thing required.  As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil
contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a
Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or
of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other party." 160 A criminal decree intended to benefit such a party litigant.  So a proceeding is one
contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly

24
the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in This Court finds that it was sufficiently proven that there was willful
behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, disobedience on the part of petitioners. Therefore, petitioners ought to
and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of be cited in contempt.
obedience.  The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt
proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to
IV
civil contempt proceedings  ...

However, this Court rues that the charges against Alejandro and Atty.
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an
Silvestre ought to be dismissed.
aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary
interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings,
it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor. While they were not parties to SEC Case No. 024-02, the trial court
ruled that they were guilty of indirect contempt on the following
premise:
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the
defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution
to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil The latter Orders are directed to "ALL" the defendants in SEC Case No.
contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on 024-02, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Ms. Cirila
the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual and St. Francis School; while the
doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of respondent Al N. Mojica was particularly mentioned in the said orders
evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt in view of the fact that it was he that collected matriculation fees, as a
proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" cashier. With respect to Atty. Silvestre Pascual, the latter was
burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden.166 (Citations omitted) impleaded in this case because he was a member of the Board of St.
Francis School at the time the petition was filed, and he is empowered
to cause compliance with these Orders. His failure to prove that he has
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey
the intention to comply with the subject orders showed his
acourt order, judgment, or decree which he or she refuses to do for
acquiescence to the collective act of defiance.170
the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and the
preservation of a right of a private party, who is the real party in
interest in the proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's In Ferrer v. Rodriguez,171 this Court ruled that a non-litigant may be
punishment is to compel obedience to the order. Thus, civil contempt cited in contempt if he or she acted in conspiracy with the parties in
is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable violating the court order:
doubt is not necessary to prove it.167
Nevertheless, persons who are not parties in a proceeding may be
In the case at bar, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the trial declared guilty of contempt for willful violation of an order issued in
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, read: the case if said persons are guilty of conspiracy with any of the parties
in violating the court's order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the respondents, namely: Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis "In a proceeding to punish for criminal contempt for willful
Magbanua, Ms. Cirila N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, Al N. Mojica, disobedience of an injunction, the fact that those disobeying the
Atty. Silvestre Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, injunction were not parties eo nomine  to the action in which it was
GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT of Court against the Regional Trial granted, and were not personally served, is no defense, where the
Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite for their failure to comply with the injunction restrains not only the parties, but those who act in
Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003, and connection with the party as attorneys, agents, or employees, and the
they are hereby ordered to pay a FINE, jointly and severally, in the parties accused, with knowledge of the order and its terms, acting as
amount of Php30,000.00 for the restoration of the dignity of the Court the employees of a party, willfully violate it." (People ex rel.  Stearns,
and to comply with the Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 et al. vs.  Marr, et al., 74 N.E. 431.)172
and March 24, 2003 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
judgment. However, there is no evidence of conspiracy in this case. The powerto
punish contempt must be "exercised cautiously, sparingly, and
.... judiciously."173 Without evidence of conspiracy, it cannot be said that
the non-litigants are guilty of contempt.
SO ORDERED.168
This Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy to
hold both Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre liable for contempt.
While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both
criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil
than criminal. Alejandro merely collected the matriculation fees as a designated
cashier who worked in the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. He neither
exercised power over the money nor had the authority to order how it
The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding
would be kept or disposed. Moreover, it has been established that the
show that Custodio was seeking enforcement of the trial court orders
matriculation fees had already been turned over to Reynante.
in the intra-corporate controversy because petitioners refused to
comply. Hence, this is a civil contempt case, which does not need
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Atty. Silvestre was indeed a member of the Board of Trustees.
However, decisions of the Board of Trustees are not subject to the
control of just one (1) person. While a board member may protest, the
This Court has ruled that while the power to cite parties in contempt
majority of the board may overrule him or her. Thus, it is not correct
should be used sparingly, it should be allowed to exercise its power of
to say that a board member is empowered to cause compliance of the
contempt to maintain the respect due to it and to ensure the
trial court orders. It does not matter if Atty. Silvestre was unable to
infallibility of justice where the defiance is so clear and contumacious
prove his intention to comply with the orders. The burden of proving
and there is an evident refusal to obey.169
contempt is upon complainants and there is no presumption of guilt in
contempt proceedings such that the party accused of contempt must
prove that he is innocent.174

25
In the absence of proof of conspiracy, it cannot be said that Alejandro The prosecution should be given its day in court. To deny the Motion
and Atty. Silvestre are guilty of contempt. For Reconsideration is a (sic) deny to prosecute on the part of the
prosecution.5
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 25, 2011
Decision175 and December 19, 2011 Resolution176 of the Court of Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's November 23,
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31985 are AFFIRMED. However, the 2015 Resolution granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration
complaint against Alejandro Mojica and Atty. Silvestre Pascual is because, according to them, it was elementary for respondent Judge
hereby DISMISSED. Dela Rosa to know that the prior dismissal of a criminal case due to a
violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial is equivalent to a
dismissal on the merits of the case and, as such, granting the
SO ORDERED.
prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation
of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. 6 Complainants
March 7, 2018 averred further that it was unacceptable, given respondent Judge Dela
Rosa's position and the presumption of his knowledge of the law, for
OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ him to have disregarded a rule as elementary as the constitutional
right of an accused against double jeopardy.7

ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING and PERCIVAL CARAG

MABASA, Complaints Complainants also criticized respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of
vs. referring to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Atty. Causing's
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LORENZO R. DELA ROSA, Regional two (2) separate posts on his Facebook and blogspot accounts about
Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila, Respondent the subject criminal cases. They reasoned that respondent Judge Dela
Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause why he
should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and taking his posts to
DECISION social media. Atty. Causing emphasized that the posts were presented
using decent words and thus, it was incorrect for respondent Judge
CAGUIOA, J.: Dela Rosa to refer his actions to a disciplinary body such as the IBP.
Atty. Causing further asserted that he did not violate the sub
judice8 rule because this rule cannot be used to preserve the
Before the Court is the Complaint 1 dated January 6, 2017 filed before unfairness and errors of respondent Judge Dela Rosa.9
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Atty. Berteni C. Causing
(Atty. Causing) and Percival Carag Mabasa a.k.a. Percy Lapid (Mabasa)
against respondent Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa (respondent In a 1st Indorsement10 dated January 16, 201 7, the OCA directed
Judge Dela Rosa), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch respondent Judge Dela Rosa to file his Comment within ten (10) days
(Br.) 4, Manila. from receipt thereof.11

Antecedents In his Comment12 dated March 13, 2017 (Comment), respondent Judge

Dela Rosa averred that he had already reversed the November 23,
2015 Resolution as early as June 20, 2016 - or way before the filing of
Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa (Complainants), charged the Complaint on January 6, 2017 - when he issued a Resolution13 of
respondent Judge Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of the law, gross even date, which states:
misconduct and gross incompetence for reversing2 the dismissal of
Criminal Case Nos. 09-268685-86 entitled People v. Eleazar, et
al. (Libel Cases), wherein Mabasa was one of the accused. x x x While the records of the cases will show delay also attributable to
the defense and that this court was acting in the spirit of fairness, the
April 13, 2015 Order of Hon. Disalo should be upheld to the prejudice
Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former of fairness. Being caught between a rock and a hard place, liberality is
Acting Presiding Judge Gamor B. Disalo (Judge Disalo) in an afforded to the accused. x x x
Order3 dated April 13, 2015 on the ground that the right of the
accused to speedy trial had been violated. The prosecution filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the April 13, 2015 Order before the RTC xxxx
Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa.
As the records would show that the Hon. Judge Disalo dismissed these
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa granted the prosecution's Motion for cases on the right of speedy trial, double jeopardy attaches. Hence,
Reconsideration in the assailed Resolution4 dated November 23, 2015 this Court's Resolution dated November 23, 2015 is recalled and set
(November 23, 2015 Resolution), the pertinent portions of which read: aside. The dismissal dated April 13, 2015 as dictated in the Order of
Hon. Judge Disalo is reinstated.

xxxx
While the right of due process of the State may have been
circumvented, the interest of the private complainants with regard to
In opposition thereto, counsel for the accused cites double jeopardy. the civil aspect of the cases is protected as the dismissal of the subject
However, several settings of this Court showed that the resetting was criminal cases is without prejudice to the pursuit of civil indemnity.14
on motion of counsel for the accused and hence with the consent of
the accused. Further, the questioned Order dated April 13, 2015 has
not yet attained finality, so double jeopardy is not yet attached. Respondent Judge Dela Rosa explained in his Comment that he had
issued the November 23, 2015 Resolution because, after studying the
records, he discovered that Complainants caused much of the delay in
Further, the records of this case would show that the accused is not the proceedings.15
entirely without blame as to why this case has been pending. Aside
from that, the accused filed a Motion to Quash as well as accused’s
Motion for Reconsideration thereto resulting in the conduct of the Respondent Judge Dela Rosa then enumerated in his Comment the
arraignment only in the last year of September. instances wherein Complainants caused the delay in the proceedings in
the Libel Cases:

26
 1. While the warrant of arrest for Mabasa was issued on May motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or caprice.
28, 2009, it was only one (1) year and four (4) months after In fact, Respondent Judge issued this as a matter of fairness - that is,
or on September 28, 2010 that Mabasa was detained;16 to give the private complainants in the Libel Cases an opportunity to
pursue against Mabasa and his co-accused the civil aspect of the Libel
Cases.30
2. Mabasa filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30,
2010;17
Finally, respondent Judge Dela Rosa stressed how the filing of this
administrative complaint against him - on January 6, 2017, or after he
3. The aiTaignment and pre-trial of the cases were reset
had already reversed the November 23, 2015 Resolution through his
after then Presiding Judge Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr. (Judge
June 20, 2016 Resolution -is pure harassment.31
Sayo) issued an Order dated April 6, 2011, which indicated
that Mabasa, through counsel, moved that the scheduled
arraignment and pre-trial be reset in order "for the parties to OCA Report and Recommendation
settle the civil aspect of these cases"·18
In a Report and Recommendation32 dated June 28, 2017, the OCA
4. The counsel of Mabasa filed an Urgent Motion for recommended that the administrative complaint against Judge Dela
Deferment dated June 9, 2011 requesting again for the re- Rosa be dismissed for lack of merit.
scheduling of the arraignment and pre-trial;19
After considering the allegations in the Complaint and respondent
5. The pre-trial of the case was again rescheduled in an Judge Dela Rosa’s Comment, the OCA found that in the absence of any
Order dated August 24, 2011 by the lower court due to the proof that respondent Judge Dela Rosa was ill-motivated in issuing the
absence of Mabasa’s co-accused, Johnson L. Eleazar;20 November 23, 2015 Order and that he had, in fact, issued his June 20,
2016 Resolution reversing himself, the charge of gross ignorance of
the law should be dismissed.
6. Mabasa filed a Motion to Quash dated October 11, 2011,
citing the court's lack of jurisdiction;21
The OCA ratiocinated as follows:
7. The lower court, in an Order dated June 27, 2012,
rescheduled again the arraignment and pre-trial, citing the The main issue in this administrative complaint is rooted in respondent
absence of the private prosecutor, Mabasa and his counsel;22 Judge's issuance of the Order dated 23 November 201 [5], reversing
the previous one dismissing the criminal cases on the ground of
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. Respondent
8. Judge Sayo thereafter issued an Order dated November
Judge has already admitted that he made a mistake in issuing
28, 2012, directing the issuance of warrants of arrest against
the said order as this would have constituted a violation of the
Mabasa and co- accused Gloria Galuno due to their
right of the accused against double jeopardy. To rectify his
continued non-appearance in court;23
error, he granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the
accused.
9. In an Order dated December 12, 2012, Judge Sayo lifted
the warrants of arrest against Mabasa and his other co-
Although not without exceptions, it is settled that the function of a
accused in the Libel Cases after their counsel admitted that
motion for reconsideration is to point out to the court the error that it
their non-appearance in the previous hearing was due to the
may have committed and to give it a chance to correct itself.
fault of their counsel's law office;24
In "Republic of the Philippines v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al. "33 , the
Court explains the general rule that the purpose of a motion for
10. The hearing of the case on June 30, 2014 was reconsideration is to grant an opportunity for the court to rectify any
rescheduled after Mabasa moved for the resetting of the actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal
case due to the absence of his counsel;25 and factual circumstances of the case. The wisdom of this rule is to
expedite the resolution of the issues of the case at the level of the trial
11. In an Order by Judge Disalo dated August 11, 2014, court so it can take a harder look at the records to come up with a
counsel for Mabasa was absent again. Mabasa was finally more informed decision on the case.34 (Emphasis supplied)
arraigned after the court appointed one of the lawyers from
the Public Attorney’s Office as counsel de oficio for The OCA found that the records of the case show that respondent
Mabasa;26 Judge Dela Rosa admitted that he had erred in issuing the November
23, 2015 Order, but that he had rectified such mistake. 35 The OCA held
12. The Commissioner's Report dated September 23, 2014 that this is precisely why our judicial system has remedies for both the
stated that the preliminary conference failed to push through party-litigants and the court to avail of if need be.36 The OCA asserted
due to the absence of Mabasa and his counsel;27 and that it would be absurd to still hold respondent Judge Dela Rosa liable
despite his rectification through his June 20, 2016 Resolution.37

13. The initial date of the presentation of the prosecution

evidence was set on April 13, 2015 by the branch clerk of As to the referral by respondent Judge Dela Rosa to the IBP of Atty.
court. Notably, the cases against Mabasa would be Causing' s act of posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal
dismissed on the same day.28 case on the internet, the OCA disagreed with Atty. Causing's argument
that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required him to
show cause for having done so.38 The OCA explained that respondent
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa emphasized that the day the Libel Cases Judge Dela Rosa cannot just exercise his contempt powers on a whim,
were dismissed, i.e., on April 13, 2015, was actually the date set for if not haphazardly, if he believes that he has other remedies to resort
the first actual trial of the cases. He stressed that the delay of almost to, just like in this case.39
five (5) years in the subject cases was attributable more to Mabasa
than anyone else.29
The Court’s Ruling

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa claimed that the November 23, 2015
Resolution was issued in good faith and after evaluation of the
evidence submitted by each party. He denied that the same was

27
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the June 11, 2018
findings of facts and conclusions of law in the above-mentioned OCA
Report and Recommendation.
A.C. No. 11173 (Formerly CBD No. 13-3968)

Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled
Re: CA-G.R. CV No. 96282 (SPOUSES BAYANI AND MYRNA M.
jurisprudence.40 A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to
PARTOZA vs. LILIAN* B. MONTANO and AMELIA
have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in
SOLOMON), Complainant
ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and
vs.
jurisprudence.41
ATTY. CLARO JORDAN M. SANTAMARIA, Respondent

The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a
RESOLUTION
judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable."42

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order,
decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties
must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also A recalcitrant lawyer who defies the directives of the court "must
be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or deservedly end in tribulation for the lawyer and in victory for the
some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, higher ends of justice."1
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are The administrative liability of a lawyer who repeatedly ignores the
erroneous.43 directives of the Court of Appeals (CA) is properly resolved in this case.

The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold Factual Antecedents
respondent Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November 23, 2015 Order
when he had himself rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016
Order. To rule otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, A civil action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Real Estate
for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the Mortgage, Reconveyance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-710729
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.44 To and Damages2 was filed by the spouses Bayani and Myrna M. Partoza
hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the (spouses Partoza) against Lilia B. Montano and Amelia T. Solomon.
fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments."45
The case was dismissed3 by the Regional Trial Court.
Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that
respondent Judge Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith, fraud, On November 25, 2010, a Notice of Appeal 4 was filed by the counsel
corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering his decision. on record, Atty. Samson D. Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva). The appeal
Other than their bare assertions, Complainants failed to substantiate was docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 96282 and in a Notice 5 dated March
their allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be 25, 2011, the CA required the submission of the Appellant's Brief
presumed46 and this Court cannot conclude bad faith intervened when pursuant to Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
none was actually proven.47

On April 27, 2011, however, Atty. Villanueva filed his Withdrawal of

The Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that Appearance;6 subsequently, a Motion for Extension of Time to File
respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing Appellant's Brief7 dated May 19, 2011, was also filed. Atty. Villanueva's
to show cause for his act of posting matters pertaining to the pending Withdrawal of Appearance carried the conformity of the appellant's
criminal case on the internet.1âwphi1 The Court agrees with the OCA attorney-in-fact, Honnie M. Partoza (Honnie) who, on the same
that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to the occasion, also acknowledged receipt of the entire records of the case
IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over from Atty. Villanueva.
lawyers, was a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court
judge. The Court has explained, in the case of Lorenzo Shipping
Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria (respondent)
Philippines,48 that judges' power to punish contempt must be exercised submitted an Appellant's Brief8 dated July 4, 2011.
judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz.:
In a Resolution9 dated August 4, 2011, the CA directed Atty. Villanueva
x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the to submit proof of authority of Honnie to represent appellants as their
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally attorney-in-fact and the latter's conformity to Atty. Villanueva's
should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect Withdrawal of Appearance; in the same resolution, the CA also
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As required respondent to submit his formal Entry of Appearance, viz.:
judges[,] we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in
CA G.R. CV No. 96282 Sps. BAYANI P. PARTOZA and MYRNA
view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the
M. PARTOZA vs. LILIA B. MONTANO
dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.49
and AMELIA T. SOLOMON

In fine, the administrative charge against respondent Judge Dela Rosa

should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. Before acting on the counsel for appellant's Withdrawal of Appearance,
[Atty. Villanueva ] is directed to submit within live (5) days from notice
the proof of authority of Honnie M. Partoza to represent the appellants
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against
and to signify his conformity to the Withdrawal of Appearance. In the
respondent Presiding Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa, Regional Trial
meantime, the Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellants' Brief is
Court, Branch 4, Manila is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
granted in the interest of justice.

SO ORDERED.
[Respondent] is directed to submit within five (5) days from notice his
formal Entry of Appearance as counsel for appellants and to secure

28
and submit to this Court also within the same period the written The Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan (Investigating
conformity of his clients to his appearance as their counsel. Likewise, Commissioner) found respondent liable for willful disobedience to the
said counsel is also directed to furnish this Court the assailed R TC lawful orders of the CA and recommended that he be suspended from
Decision that should have been appended to the Appellant's Brief also the practice of law for six months. The investigating Commissioner
within the same period. gave the reasons for the said recommendation in his Report and
Recommendation, 15 viz.:
Atty. Villanueva then filed a Manifestation with Motion10 dated August
31, 2011 explaining that he communicated with Ronnie and with The act of respondent in not filing any of the compliances required of
appellants as well, but was informed that appellants were residing him in the 4 August 2011. 20 March 2012.1âwphi1 5 September 2012,
abroad (in Germany at the time). He then requested for a period of 15 and 25 October 2012 Resolutions of the [CA] despite due notice.
days, or until September 15, 2011, to comply with the CA's Resolution. emphasized his contempt and total disregard of the legal proceedings.
for which he should be held liable.
On March 20, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution granting the
Manifestation and Motion filed by Atty. Villanueva, and ordered the xxxx
latter to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why he should not be
cited in contempt for his failure to comply with the CA's Resolution of
Granting that he [was] not aware of the problem between Atty.
August 4, 2011; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by respondent
Villanueva and [ Honnie] he could have explained this fact by
should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal
complying with the court resolutions and not just ignored them on the
dismissed for his failure to comply with the August 4, 2011 Resolution.
premise that he has no personality to represent the [spouses Partoza]
The compliances required of the respondent by the [CA] are provided
On September 5, 2012 the CA, in another Resolution,11 declared that: under the rules for a valid substitution of counsel and validity of the
1) as shown by the Registry Return Receipt dated April 4, 2012, appeal and may not be disregarded.
respondent received the copy of its March 20, 2012 Resolution; 2) on
June 19, 2012, the Judicial Records Division reported that no
The nonchalant attitude of the respondent cannot be left
compliance with the March 20, 2012 Resolution had been filed by
unsanctioned. Clearly, his acts constitute willful disobedience of the
respondent; and 3) respondent was, for the last time, directed to
lawful orders of the [CA], which under Section 27. Rule 138 or the
comply with the March 20, 2012 Resolution within five days from
Rules of Court is a sufficient case for suspension. x x x
notice and to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for
his failure to comply with the CA's Resolutions, dated August 4, 2011
and March 20, 2012; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by him should Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal be
dismissed. The IBP Board of Governors resolved 16 to adopt and approve the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
All these directives by the CA were ignored by the respondent.
In its Report 17 elated March 18, 2016, the Office of the Bar Confidant
Thus, in a Resolution12 dated October 25, 2012, the CA cited informed this Court that no petition for review or motion for
respondent in contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of reconsideration has been filed by either party. Thus, pursuant to
₱5,000.00. In the same Resolution, the CA once again directed Section 12(c) of Rule 139-8 of the Rules of Court, this case is now
respondent: (1) to comply with the requirements of a valid substitution before us for final action.
of counsel and to file his formal Entry of Appearance within five days
from notice; and (2) to show cause, within the same period, why the Issue
Appellant's Brief filed should not be expunged from the rollo of the
case and the appeal be dismissed for his failure to comply with the
Rules of Court. Whether or not respondent is administratively liable.

Respondent paid no heed to this Resolution. Our Ruling

So it was that the CA, in a Resolution 13 dated September 17, 2013, This Court adopts the findings of fact of and the penalty recommended
referred the unlawyerly acts of respondent to the Integrated Bar of the by, the IBP Board of Governors.
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
This Court explained the crucial role played by lawyers in the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating administration of justice in Sabado v. Villaruel. Jr., 18 viz.:
Commissioner
While it is true that lawyers owe entire devotion' to the cause of their
In his Answer 14 of November 13, .2013, respondent contended: (1) clients, it cannot he emphasized enough that their first and primary
that the spouses Partoza sought his opinion regarding their case and duty is not to the client but to the administration or justice.' Canon 12
later on requested that he handle their appeal before the CA; (2) that of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that 'A lawyer shall
he advised the spouses Partoza to infon11 Atty. Villanueva of their exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
decision to engage the services of a new counsel; (3) that he relied on efficient administration of justice.' x x x This is a fundamental principle
the Withdrawal of Appearance filed by Atty. Villanueva and then in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has iterations in
prepared the Appellant's Brief; (4) that he was not aware of the various forms:
authority of Honnie to represent spouses Partoza as well as of Honnie's
conformity to the Withdrawal of Appearance by Atty. Villanueva; (5) xxxx
that he believed that he had no personality to represent the spouses
Partoza in the case, and to address the problems/compliances
pertaining to applicant's appeal; and (6) that it was still Atty. Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the
Villanueva who should have continued to represent the spouses administration of justice. any act of a lawyer that obstruct, perverts, or
Partoza. impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and
justifies disciplinary action against him. (citations omitted)

29
There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five
Resolutions of the CA. His actions were definitely contumacious. By his
repeated failure, refusal or inability to comply with the: CA resolutions,
respondent displayed not only reprehensible conduct but showed an
utter lack of respect for the CA and its orders. Respondent ought to
know that a resolution issued by the CA, or any court for that matter,
is not a mere request that may be complied with partially or
selectively.

Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court. In particular; Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
states that it "is the duty of an attorney [t]o observe and maintain the
respect due to courts of justice and judicial officer." In addition. Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "[a] lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal process." Also, Canon 11 provides that a
"lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court: grounds therefor.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearring as an attorney for a party to a case without authority [to
do so]. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court, in Anudon v. Cefra19 citing Sehastian v. Atty. Bajar,20 held

that a lawyer's obstinate refusal to comply with the court’s orders not
only betrayed a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscored
his disrespect towards the court’s lawful orders which was only too
deserving of reproof

"Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and

processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well." 21 In this case,
respondent deliberately ignored five CA Resolutions, thereby violating
his duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.

In one case,22 the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law

for one year for having ignored twelve (12) CA Resolutions. The Court
found that the said lawyer's conduct gave the impression that he was
above the duly constituted judicial authorities of the land, and looked
down on them with a patronizing and supercilious attitude. In this
case, we find the penalty of suspension for six (6) months, as
recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal

records as attorney, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country through the Office of the Court
Administrator

SO ORDERED.

30