ABSTRACT

Since the departure of British from the sub continent there have been a series of events which have
strained relations between the two neighboring states of south Asian region; India and Pakistan. The
partition left a set back over the minds of the people of the two countries, induced and cultivated a felling
of hatred and abhorrence among the two states which can still be in sighted and is evident from the fact
that certain issues still stands unresolved even after 72 years of Independence. Contemplating the history
of the region analysis can be drawn, instead of allocating large amounts of the national budget for
ameliorations of the people the two nations are spending hefty amounts to overpower and destabilize each
other. This study is aimed to analyze Indo-Pak relation in coherence with the current scenario referencing
the strategic, economic and diplomatic disparity between the two nations.

INTRODUCTION
After 72 years of independence, it is time to look back on an epoch of long-going turmoil between the
two rival states; India and Pakistan. There is no edginess in confessing that the colonial era has
destructively affected the dynamics of south Asia. The two British children has suffered through a series
of plights, from the very first strategic and territorial dispute (1947 Kashmir insurgence) to the full
fledged wars of 1965 and 1971(the fall of Dhaka), peace between them remained an aspiration. It is
appropriate to analyze the recent happenings through the prism of history that the their antipathy towards
each other is the essential consequence of Hindu-Muslim conflict dated before the partition. Sumit
Ganguly asserts that the two nations remain mired in conflict due to inherent features of their nationalist
agendas. Indian nationalist leadership chose to hold on to that Muslim-majority state to prove that
minorities could thrive in a plural, secular polity whereas, Pakistani nationalists argued with equal force
that their homeland is created for the Muslims of South-Asia. Over more than seven decades has been
past but this dispute of agendas has remained an unresolved tenacity.

The crisis has affected every dimension of interstate and societal relations between the two countries and,
despite occasional peace initiatives, shows no signs of abating. This volume brings together leading
experts in international relations theory and comparative politics to explain the persistence of this rivalry
and their analysis offers possible conditions under which the rivalry could be terminated. This piece of
writing presenting a revisionist view of India-Pakistan relations unfolds into different sections. The first
sheds light of cognizance over the conflicts taken place between Indo-Pak till, today. Followed by, the
nuclear proliferation in the region and the factors igniting it. Furthermore, terrorism provoking and
triggering tensions between the two neighboring states.The last segment gives a synopsis of what both
states have achieved in the course of events that took place from the inception till date. A laconic view of
the whole insight over the thesis will be providing an optimistic approach to India-Pakistan situation.

THE HOSTILITY BETWEEN INDIA & PAKISTAN

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The study aims at discussing the incessant rivalry between India and Pakistan mainly categorized by
major armed conflicts; 1947-The Kashmir internal insurgency, 1965-16 day full fledged war, 1971-The
fall of Dhaka, low intensity military conflict at siachen, 1999 the kargil conflict and the series of events
followed by the pulwama attack. The emphasis of this study is to analyze the results of the conflicts and
impacts of these conflicts on the relations of the two countries and reactions of the international peace
bodies over different issues. The consequences of a possible war and impacts of aggression on the people
of the country and the ongoing fifth generation proxy warfare between the two states.

CONFLICTS

NOVEMBER 1947 INSURGENCY

All the princely states, except Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir, joined either India or  Pakistan  before
15th August  1947.  In a technical sense, therefore,  on  15th August  1947,  Hyderabad,  Junagadh  and
Kashmir  became independent.  Hyderabad and  Junagadh,  however, were forced
to join India. But Kashmir posed a unique problem since the state was  contiguous  to  both  India  and 
Pakistan  and,  hence,  claimed by both  sides  for  ideological  and geostrategic reasons. For over a two
months after the independence of the subcontinent from the British rule, the Maharaja had attempted to
remain independent whilst the government of Pakistan and the state of jammu and Kashmir were engaged
in their war of words over the deteriorating law and order situation. On the other hand, Indian rulers were
offering moral and materialistic support to the maharaja.

It was a general perception of the Pakistani people as the stories of atrocities, which the fleeing Muslims
brought to the streets of peshawar which incited the idea of a holy war which was ignited by a  young 
Kashmiri,  Mohammed Ibrahim  Khan,  who  established contact  with pathan  tribes  in  Pakistan  and
laid the foundation for an armed liberation movement against Hari Singh's oppressive rule by late
August 1947. In September and early October, the Pathan tribal invasion pushed rapidly into the Valley
and by 25th October 1947 was within a few miles of Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. Claims and counter
claims of aggression within the state of jammu and Kashmir persisted throughout the sept of 1947. The
Maharaja and its govt claimed that the raiders came from across the border from punjab, while the
pakistani govt insisted that there was an indegineous rebellion within the state of Jammu and Kashmir
which was an extension to the political opposition to the maharaja. Most of the pro-pakistan leaders were
still imprisoned in Kashmir. The insurgents had modern military equipments that could only be obtained
from pakistani sources(mortors,artillery and mark 5 mines) which are not normally the kind of ornament
which tribesmen possess.

Sensing military defeat, Maharaja  Hari Singh  appealed to  the Indian  government for help. Prime
Minister Nehru agreed to provide the Maharaja with military assistance in  return for his  acceptance of
Kashmir's legal accession to  India. Maharaja  Hari Singh had no choice but to comply. Once the
Instrument  of Accession was  signed,  Indian  troops  were  airlifted into the Valley.  By early
November the Indian  troops  forced the Pathan  tribal  force to  retreat  by capturing  Baramullah  on  8th
November  1947.  Thus  emboldened,  the Indian  Army prepared for  an  allout  offensive in  Kashmir  at 
the beginning of 1948.  In the spring of 1948 the Pakistan army was ordered into Kashmir. In the fighting
that  ensued in the next few months, the Pakistani Army was able to regain some lost ground  in the
west of Kashmir. But Pakistan's main gains came in the largely barren  region of the

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northern dependencies of Kashmir which stretches up to the Karakoram mountains. By late
1948, the main battle between the Indian and Pakistani forces was fought over  Poonch, which the
Pakistani Army was ultimately unable to hold. The grave danger in this 
war was that Pakistan, in order to counter the Indian gains in Kashmir, would allow the  war to spill
over into the IndoPakistan frontier in the Punjab. If that happened, then war  along the whole Indo-
Pakistan frontier could break out with disastrous consequences for  both states. To  prevent  such  a 
calamity the United Nations  (UN),  to  which  India  had referred the Kashmir dispute in  January
1948, prevailed upon both sides to accept a UN sponsored ceasefire  agreement  in  December  1948
based on the existing  dispositions  of their  troops. Under this ceasefire agreement, which came
into effect on 1st  January 1949, India  and Pakistan agreed to halt hostilities and also committed
themselves to accepting the presence of UN military observers in Kashmir until the dispute was 
resolved. The first  batch  of the United Nations  Military Observer Group in  India and Pakistan 
(UNMOGIP)  arrived in Kashmir in  January 1949 but failed to  resolve the political deadlock between 
the two sides.

THE INTEGRATION OF KASHMIR INTO PAKISTAN AND INDIA

India and Pakistan sought to absorb their  respective portions  of Kashmir.  In 1950,  Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POK),  which  was about onethird of the original territory, was split into two areas: the
area that bordered China  and the Soviet  Union  was grouped into  the Northern  Areas, and the
remaining  territory continued to  be called Azad (Free)  Kashmir.  Subsequently,  both  these areas  were
provisionally integrated into the Pakistani state.  Kashmir was also incorporated in the
Indian constitution under Article 370 which gave it  a  "special status. When  Pakistan  entered into  a 
defence agreement  with  the United States  in  1954,  India  interpreted the move as a  hostile act and
announced that Kashmir's accession to India was final. The 1949 Cease  fire  Line  (CFL) thus  became
the de facto border between  the two  states  thereby bifurcating  Kashmir.  The  Indian  portion consisted
of three main  regions:  the Valley,  Jammu and Ladakh.  In 1956, the
Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly approved the merger of the state with India.

INDUS WATER TREATY 1960

Among the issue of Kashmir ,there are several other hinderances which are regarded as a contributing
factor to their rivalry..The Indian denial of waters from three rivers is one of them.However this issue was
sorted out through the Indus Basin treaty with International assistance.The Indus Waters Treaty was
signed in 1960 after nine years of negotiations between India and Pakistan with the help of the World
Bank, which is also a signatory. The negotiations were the initiative of former World Bank President
Eugene Black. Seen as one of the most successful international treaties, it has survived frequent tensions,
including conflict, and has provided a framework for irrigation and hydropower development for more
than half a century. Former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower described it as "one bright spot ... in a very
depressing world picture that we see so often."

.But still the tension over this distribution of water comes alive after every few years.The issue of
Baglihar dam is also one of them and at present discussions are underway for a neutral view of the
building of dam. Baglihar dam, constructed in the Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir and completed in 2008,
has been the source of continuing disputes between India and Pakistan. After construction began in 1999,

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Pakistan claimed that the design parameters of the Baglihar project violated the Indus Water Treaty.
Finally, the World Bank held that India had not violated the Indus Water Treaty and said that the dam
could be completed with slight modifications in design and without any impact on the 450 MW power
component.

1965 WAR
The 1965 war between India and Pakistan .Conflict resumed in early 1965, when Pakistani and Indian
forces clashed over disputed territory along the border between the two nations. Before engaging India 
in  a  wider  military confrontation in  Kashmir, On March 20th , 1965,Pakistan  tested India's military
resolve in border skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in western Gujarat in  January 1965. India sought a
quick ceasefire and referred the issue to the International  Court of Justice. After Pakistans successes in
the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, is said to have believed that the
Indian Army was unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of
Kashmir, following a loss to China in 1962. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was
generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few
infiltrating saboteurs. This was codenamed Operation Gibraltar.However, the Pakistani infiltrators were
soon discovered, aided primarily by the local Kashmiris themselves and the entire operation ended in a
complete disaster. On August 15th , 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack
on Pakistan administered Kashmir. Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked.[9] Indian reports cite
the attack as a response to the massive armed infiltrations by Pakistan.Initially, the Indian Army met with
considerable success in the northern sector (Kashmir). After launching a prolonged artillery barrage
against Pakistan, India was able to capture three important mountain positions. However, by the end of
the month both sides were on even footing as Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri
and Punch and India had gains in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (sometime referred as Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir). Following the failure of Operation Gibraltar, that resulted in territorial gains and
rapid Indian advances in Kashmir, Pakistan launched a bold counter attack on September 1 st , 1965 to
reclaim vital posts in Kashmir lost to India. This attack, called "Operation Grand Slam" was intended to
capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu and thus sever communications and cut off supply routes to
Indian troops. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan
was on the verge of springing a surprise against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered
heavy losses. India then called in its air force to target the Pakistani attack in the southern sector. The next
day, Pakistan retaliated, initialising its air force to retaliate against Indian forces and air bases in both
Kashmir and Punjab. But Operation Grand Slam failed to achieve its aim as the Pakistan Army was
unable to capture the town. This became one of the turning points in the war, as India decided to relieve
pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south.India crossed the International
Border (IB) on the Western front on September 6th , marking an official beginning of the war. The same
day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air
Force Sabres rained down on the Indian 15th Division forcing it to withdraw to its starting point. Indian
Air Force and the Pakistani Air Force being involved in full scale combat for the first time since
independence. Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late
1940s, it was limited in scale compared to the '65 conflict. The Security Council passed Resolution 211
on September 20th calling for an end to the fighting and negotiations on the settlement of the Kashmir
problem, and the United States and the United Kingdom supported the UN decision by cutting off arms
supplies to both belligerents. This ban affected both belligerents. The UN resolution and the halting of

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arms sales had an immediate impact. India accepted the ceasefire on September 21 st and Pakistan on
September 22nd .The ceasefire alone did not resolve the status of Kashmir, and both sides accepted the
Soviet Union as a third-party mediator. Negotiations in Tashkent concluded in January 1966, with both
sides giving up territorial claims, withdrawing their armies from the disputed territory. Nevertheless,
although the Tashkent agreement achieved its short-term aims, conflict in South Asia would reignite a
few years later.

Both countries hold highly contradictory claims on combat losses during the war and hardly any neutral
sources have thoroughly verified the claims of both countries' claim. PAF claimed it had shot down 104
IAF planes losing only 19 in the process. India meanwhile officially stated that 35 IAF planes were lost
while shooting down 73 PAF aircraft. According to Indian figures, the overall attrition rate was 2.16% for
Pakistan Air Force and 1.49% for IAF.India also pointed that despite PAF claims of losing only a
squadron of combat craft, Pakistan had been seeking urgent help from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and
China, for additional aircraft within 10 days of the war.The ceasefire ensured a six year period of relative
peace between the two neighboring rivals before war broke out once again in 1971.

PAKISTAN’S MISCALCULATIONS
The Pakistani Army's failures started from the drawing board itself, with the supposition that a generally
discontent Kashmiri people would rise to the occasion and revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing
about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. For whatever reason, the Kashmiri people did not revolt,
and on the contrary provided the Indian Army with enough information for them to learn of Operation
Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but
Pakistani Army regulars. The Pakistani army failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would
attack the southern sector and open up the theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the
southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of penetrating into Kashmir.

"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of
Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure.
Many Pakistani critics have criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during
Operation Grand Slam. They claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of
Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two
nations into an all out war. Despite progress made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan for some inexplicable
reason relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik of charge and replaced him with
Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24 hour lull ensued, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and
oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the
Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik accused Ayub Khan for
planning Operation Gibraltar which was doomed to fail and for relieving him of his command at a crucial
moment in the war and threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, though he later
dropped the idea for fear of being banned.

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CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

The war had created a tense state of affairs in its aftermath. Though the war was indecisive, Pakistan
suffered much heavier material and personnel casualties compared to India. Many war historians believe
that had the war continued, with growing losses and decreasing supplies, Pakistan would have been
eventually defeated. India's decision to. Both India and Pakistan increased their defense spending and the
Cold War politics had taken roots in the subcontinent. The Indian Military, which was already undergoing
rapid expansions, made improvements in command and control to address some shortcomings. Partly as a
result of the inefficient information gathering, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for
external espionage and intelligence.

Many Pakistanis rated the performance of their military positively. September 6 is celebrated as 'Defence
Day' in Pakistan in commemoration of the successful defence of Sialkot against the Indian army.
Pakistani Air Force's performance was seen in much better light compared to that of the ground troops.
Moreover, the end game left a lot to desire as Pakistan had lost more ground than gained and more
importantly did not achieve the goal of occupying Kashmir.Many high ranking Pakistani officials and
military experts later criticized the faulty planning in Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war.
The Tashkent declaration was further seen as a raw deal in Pakistan though few citizens realised the
gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Under the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Pakistan's then foreign minister, the war created a huge financial burden, Pakistan's economy which had
witnessed rapid progress in the early 60s, took a severe beating.

Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government
in East Pakistan. Bengali leaders accused the government for not providing adequate security for East
Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the
war for Kashmir. In fact despite some PAF attacks being launched from East Pakistan (present day
Bangladesh) during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector,although East Pakistan was defended
only by a two-infantry brigade division (14th Division) without any tank support. Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman was apprehensive of this situation, and the need for greater autonomy for the east led to another
war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

1971 WAR
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a major conflict between India and Pakistan. The war is closely
associated with Bangladesh Liberation War (sometimes also referred to as Pakistani Civil War. The
armed conflict on India's western front during the period between 3 December 1971 and 16 December
1971 is called the Indo-Pakistani War by both the Bangladeshi and Indian armies. The war ended in a
crushing defeat for the Pakistani military in just a fortnight.The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by
the Bangladesh Liberation war, a conflict between the traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the
majority East Pakistanis. The war ignited after the 1970 Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani
Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan, thus securing a simple majority in the 313-seat
lower house of the Pakistani parliament. Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented Six
Points and claimed the right to form the government. After the leader of the Pakistan People's Party,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to give premiership of Pakistan to Mujibur, President Yahya Khan called in
the military, which was made up largely of West Pakistanis.Mass arrests of dissidents began, and attempts

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were made to disarm East Pakistani soldiers and police. After several days of strikes and non-cooperation
movements, Pakistani military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of March 25, 1971. The Awami
League was banished, and many members fled into exile in India. Mujib was arrested and taken to West
Pakistan.On 27 March 1971, Ziaur Rahman, a rebellious major in the Pakistani army, declared the
independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Mujibur. In April, exiled Awami League leaders formed a
government-in-exile in Boiddonathtola of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles, an elite paramilitary force,
defected to the rebellion. A guerrilla troop of civilians, the Mukti Bahini, was formed to help the
Bangladesh Army.

On 27 March 1971, the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, expressed full support of her government
to the Bangladeshi struggle for independence. The Bangladesh-India border was opened to allow the
tortured and panic-stricken Bangladeshis safe shelter in India. The governments of West Bengal, Bihar,
Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps along the border. Exiled Bangladeshi army
officers and voluntary workers from India immediately started using these camps for the recruitment and
training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.As the violence in East Pakistan escalated, an estimated 10 million
refugees fled to India, causing financial hardship and instability in the country. The United States, a long
and close ally of Pakistan, continued to ship arms and supplies to West Pakistan.

Indira Gandhi launched a diplomatic offensive in the early autumn of 1971 touring Europe, and was
successful in getting both the United Kingdom and France to break with the United States, and block any
pro-Pakistan directives in the United Nations security council. Gandhi's greatest coup was on 9 August
when she signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, greatly
shocking the United States, and decreasing the possibility that the People's Republic of China would
become involved in the conflict. China, an ally of Pakistan, had been providing moral support, but little
military aid, and did not advance troops to its border with India.Operation of the Mukti Bahini caused
severe casualties to the Pakistani Army, which was in control of all district headquarters. As the flow of
refugees swelled to a tide, the economic costs for India began to escalate. India began providing support
including weapons and training for the Mukti Bahini.

By November, war seemed inevitable; a massive buildup of Indian forces on the border with East
Pakistan had begun. The Indian military waited for winter, when the drier ground would make for easier
operations and Himalayan passes would be closed by snow, preventing any Chinese intervention. On 23
November, Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan and told his people to prepare for
war.On the evening of Sunday, 3 December, the Pakistani air force launched sorties on eight airfields in
north-western India. This attack was inspired by the Arab-Israeli Six Day War and the success of the
Israeli preemptive strike. At, 5:30 PM that day, General Yahya Khan ordered the Pakistan Air Force to
bomb Indian Forward Airbases. Pakistan started flying sorties towards India within fifteen minutes of the
order. Pakistan launched attacks against eight Indian airfields on the Western front including Agra which
was 300 miles from the border. Pakistani bombers dropped around 180 bombs on these airfields of which
around 125 hit their targets. These attacks could only achieve partial success. Unlike the Israeli attack on
Arab airbases in 1967 which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan only flew not more than
50 planes to India. Indian runways were non-functional for several hours after the attack. But these
attacks gave India a good reason to launch an attack against Pakistan.

India started flying sorties to Pakistan by midnight. On the Eastern front, the Indian Army joined forces
with the Mukti Bahini to form the Mitro Bahini ("Allied Forces"); the next day the Indian forces
responded with a massive coordinated air, sea, and land assault on the West Pakistani Army in East
Pakistan.Yahya Khan counter-attacked India in the West in an attempt to capture territory which might
have been used to bargain for territory they expected to lose in the east. The land battle in the West was
crucial for any hope of preserving a united Pakistan. The Indian Army quickly responded to the Pakistan
Army's movements in the west and made some initial gains, including capturing around 5,500 sq miles of

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Pakistan territory (land gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir and the Pakistani Punjab sector were later
ceded in the Shimla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill).

At sea, the Indian Navy proved its superiority by the success of Operation Trident, the name given to the
attack on Karachi's port. It also resulted in the destruction of 2 Pakistani destroyers and a minesweeper,
and was followed by the similar Operation Python. The waters in the east were also secured by the Indian
Navy. The Indian Air Force conducted 4,000 sorties in the west while its counterpart, the PAF put up
little retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel. This lack of retaliation
has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had
already incurred huge losses in the conflict. In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No.
14 Sqn was destroyed resulting in Indian air superiority in the east. Faced with insurmountable losses, the
Pakistani military capitulated in just under a fortnight. On December 16, the Pakistani forces in East
Pakistan surrendered.

The next day India announced a unilateral ceasefire, to which Pakistan agreed. India won a  diplomatic 
victory against  Pakistan  on the Kashmir issue in the postwar  peace agreement that was signed
between prime ministers Gandhi and Bhutto in 1972 at  Shimla. The second paragraph of the
Shimla Agreement stated that  India and Pakistan  "are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful
means through bilateral negotiations  or  by any other  peaceful means  mutually agreed upon  between 
them".  In  the years  following the Shimla Agreement, India has insisted on a strict interpretation of
paragraph  two  –  that  both  states  have agreed to  settle the Kashmir  dispute bilaterally without  outside
intervention – in order to prevent the internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute. 
On its part, Pakistan has contended that a strict reading of paragraph two is tantamount  to  a  violation of
its  national sovereignty and,  therefore,  has continued its  efforts  to  internationalise the
Kashmir dispute.

AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

The war led to the immediate surrender of Pakistani forces to the allied forces of India and Bangladesh,
jointly known as the Mitro Bahini. Bangladesh became an independent nation, and the third most
populous Muslim country. Loss of East Pakistan demoralized the Pakistani military and Yahya Khan
resigned, to be replaced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Mujibur Rahman was released from West Pakistani
prison and returned to Dhaka on January 10, 1972.The exact cost of the violence on the people of East
Pakistan is not known. R.J. Rummel cites estimates ranging from one to three million people killed.Other
estimates place the death toll lower at 300,000. On the brink of defeat around December 14, the Pakistani
Army and its local collaborators systematically killed a large number of Bengali doctors, teachers and
intellectuals, part of a pogrom against the Hindu minorities who constituted the majority of urban
educated intellectuals. Young men, who were seen as possible rebels, were also targeted, especially
students.The cost of the war for Pakistan in monetary and human resources was high. In the book Can
Pakistan Survive? Pakistan based author Tariq Ali writes, "Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its
airforce and a third of its army." India took approximately 93,000 prisoners of war that included Pakistani
soldiers as well as some of their East Pakistani allies. 79,676 of these prisoners were uniformed
personnel, of which 55,692 were Army, 16,354 Paramilitary, 5,296 Police, 1000 Navy and 800 PAF. The
remaining prisoners were civilians - either family members of the military personnel or Bihari
collaborators (razakars).

SIACHEN

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On April 13, 1984 a small force of the Indian Army occupied the Bilafond La pass. Four days later,
another small force occupied the Sia La pass. Both passes, the former at over 18,000 ft and the latter at
over 20,000 ft are located in the Saltoro Range and serve as the gateway to the Siachen Glacier. The
Indians had moved fast after receiving intelligence that the Pakistan Army was planning to occupy them.
The first Pakistani reaction to the occupation of the passes came on April 24/25, 1984 when a small force
attempted to get to the Bilafond La in an uphill assault but was thwarted by the difficult glaciated terrain
and adverse weather conditions.In the days that followed, the Indian Army built up a large force to defend
the 80 kilometre-long Saltoro Range ridgeline. Since then, the Saltoro Range has been the focal point of
operations — the Pakistanis seeking to gain a foothold on the ridge line, the Indians denying it.

In early April 1987, another attempt was made by the Pakistan Army to gain a foothold on the Saltoro
ridgeline. A small force consisting of about a dozen SSG commandos, using ropes and ladders, went up a
vertical cliff and occupied a position at over 21,000 ft that dominated the Indian positions at Bilafond La.
They named it Quaid post. The Indian Army made several attempts to evict the commandos but each time
they were repulsed with heavy casualties. On June 25, 1987, they succeeded in taking the post as the
commandos had run out of ammunition and could not be resupplied as the base supporting them came
under fire. With the only foothold on the ridgeline lost, the Pakistan Army launched a major attack in
September 1987 to get to Bilafond La. The attack was repulsed. In March 1989, another attempt was
made, this time in the Chumik glacier, three kilometres east of Giari (recently hit by an avalanche). At
over 19,000 ft, the place chosen is the most difficult to scale in the Saltoro Range for either side. In a
daring operation the peak was occupied by two men, an officer and a non-commissioned officer, slung
from a helicopter on a rope, turn by turn. The two thwarted all Indian efforts to get to the top for 36 hours
after which they were reinforced by a handful of soldiers dropped in similar fashion. But in May 1989
when the Indians succeeded in neutralising the supply base supporting the soldiers on the peak, the post
was vacated.

In November 1992, yet another attempt was made to get to the ridgeline by means of a major attack.
Launched in haste, the attack ended in failure. As a consequence, the general officer commanding was
sacked. Most of the casualties suffered by Pakistani troops in combat were in the two major attacks
(September 1987, November 1992).The Indians have rarely embarked on a major offensive venture. They
have left this to the Pakistanis who have obliged them at least.

1999 KARGIL CONFLICT

Kargil Episode In early 1999 the conflict between Pakistan and India, which was going on in Kashmir
and Siachin on limited grounds, broadened when Pakistan succeeded in gaining an obvious strategic
position over Indian troops. Kashmiri militants, with support of troops of Pakistan’s NLI, crossed the line
of control and occupied strategic mountain peaks in Mushkoh Valley, Dras, Kargil and Batalik Sectors of
Ladakh. The master plan was apparently to block the Dras-Kargil high way, cut Leh off from Srinagar,
trap the Indian forces on the Siachin glacier, raise the militants’ banner of revolt in the valley, question
the sanctity of the Line of Control and brining the Kashmir issue firmly back to the forefront of
international agenda. (Behera, 2007, 84) With this move in Kargil, the valley of Kashmir once again
became the flashpoint of the conflict between India and Pakistan. This move was not new and
unpredictable in the perspective of continued conflict between Pakistani and Indian military yet it was
unexpected in the wake of friendship moves and dangers of nuclear war. Nobody could expect a military

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clash before July 1998. Pakistan and India had gone through nuclear tests in May 1998 which could play
a deterrent for the war between two nuclear countries. Moreover the friendly atmosphere after the nuclear
tests and the visit of Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan had also diminished the dangers of military clash.
Even the July and August 1998 saw the most violent spell, in terms of military exchanges along the LOC
in a decade. According to news reports of the time, Pakistan had lodged complaints of ceasefire violations
and unprovoked firing by the Indian on the other hand that the Pakistani move was not abrupt in response
of Indian violations on the LOC.

India also claimed that the Pakistan Army had planned the invasion of the Kargil-Drass region 14 years
ago to cut off India’s road connection to Siachin. territory and took control of the road that was only link
for India to the Siachin arena of war. It was really embarrassing for Indian Army because on one hand
they were being deprived of the area under their control. Siachin was also lost and a heavy loss of men
and material was also unavoidable in case of accepting the militant’s control in the area.

From military perspective Pakistan’s strategy may be divided into three main planks: First to occupy the
dominating heights over looking the Srinagar Kargil Lah road which was left vacant by the Indian troops
during the winter. Secondly after establishing a firm base, the next strategy was to cut off the line of
communication to Ladakh which would frustrate the operation of Indian forces at Siachine. The third part
of the strategy was the use of these bases to facilitate infiltration of militants and mercenaries in to
Kashmir Valley. The militants claimed that they had liberated one hundred and twenty square kilometers
of Indian held Kashmir. They were able to penetrate along 140 km stretch of Himalayian ridges, some 05-
15 kms on the Indian side of the LOC.

The danger to the Indian military presence was to such an extent that it became the first time that India
had to use airpower to drive out militants in Indian held Kashmir.Pakistan, though appearing stronger in
the field by occupying strategically important military route, was in very much awkward position
politically and diplomatically. She did not recognize the militant as her regular troops but could not also
avoid supporting them because in real they were supporting Pakistan and were also deployed with the full
support of Pakistani forces. The biggest flaw militarily in the Kargil operation plan, in Pakistani point of
view, was that militants were present in the territory under Indian control and they could not be given full
air cover to maintain their position and save themselves from Indian bombing unless Pakistan launched a
full fledged war with India, which was in the interest of Pakistan neither strategically nor diplomatically.
Pakistan, thus, could achieve less despite strong position in the actual military control. This diplomatic
weakness of Pakistan became more evident with the support of world powers to Indian point of view. On
their side Indians became justified to defend the land under their control. They, in a move which the
hawks in Pakistan army had never thought of, took no time in opening the front with full force without
caring for the danger of nuclear or full scale war. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government, unlike the
concealed support of Pakistani government to militants, openly and clearly unleashed India’s artillery and
air force to bombard the enemy posts in Kargil. By mobilizing its armed forces into a high state of alert
and concentrating its naval power in the Arabian Sea. India signaled that it was fully prepared for a full
scale war.

Pakistan’s position was more awkward in the domain of communication between political leadership and
army commanders of the operation. This lack of communication not only enabled Indian forces to bring
Pakistani troops into loss despite being in control of strategic route but also created problem. It came to be
known afterwards that the plan was a secret between General Musharraf, the then Chief of General staff

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Lt. General Muhammad Aziz, and General Mehmood and what to speak of the then Prime Minister
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif even the Corps Commanders and naval and air Chief were kept in total dark
about it. (Siddiqueul-Farooque, 2006, 22) Nawaz Sharif learnt about the Pakistan Army’s involvement in
Kargil from the Indian Prime Mimister, Atal Bihari Vajpaee. Towards the end of the Kargil fighting, the
militants were forced to withdraw and, according to Indian Army sources, 464 militants and 725 Pakistani
regular soldiers were killed. The cost of Indian side was heavy 474 officers and men were killed with a
further 1109 wounded. In this episode of conflict India proved to appear at the end not victorious
militarily but politically and diplomatically. It bagged the moral and diplomatic liking of many
governments.

Conclusion Pakistan failed to get the support of international community during Kargil war because its
military and political leadership was not like a hand in glove. Pakistan failed on the front of propaganda
as well as in the diplomatic tactics. Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiri freedom fighters was based on
humanitarian grounds but the errors in the military plans, lack of confidence between military and
political leadership, too much secrecy within the government circles and failure in getting the
international support for the Kashmiri struggle did not take Pakistan out of this episode successful
diplomatically. Even the popular anti-India Kashmiri leaders could not be taken into confidence to rise
the people in support of freedom fighters and Pakistan who was supporting them.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA RECENT BORDER SKIRMISHES

2016 SURGICAL STRIKE

The mystery of the surgical strike cannot be solved by simply getting the forged facts of Indian officials
as it cannot get more absurd. While the Indians insist that they carried out a cross-LoC surgical military
strike, the Pakistanis are befuddled by the claim. Either the Indians are hallucinating or the Pakistanis are
in a complete state of denial. The riddle gets more confusing with the Indian claim of having destroyed
‘terrorist camps’ a few kilometres inside Azad Kashmir killing dozens of militants, and the Pakistani
security forces unofficially claiming to have captured one Indian soldier who ‘strayed’ into our part. The
mystery thickens.

There is no evidence substantiating the Indian boast of conducting cross-LoC preventive strikes
demonstrating their new aggressive approach. This according to some Indian analysts, redefines its
nuclear threshold.

There has certainly been an incessant exchange of fire between the two forces along the Line of Control
over the past one week leaving two Pakistani soldiers dead. However, there has not been any clear answer
by the Indian officials about where exactly the targeted camps were located. They have reportedly
released some grainy videos of the operation feeding into the jingoistic frenzy of the local media. But that
has failed to clear doubts. Surely the Indian claim has far too many holes — but so does our story.

Intriguingly, Pakistan has maintained a low profile throughout the crisis, focusing entirely on falsifying
the Indian claims of a surgical strike. One may argue that it was not in our interest to cause the situation
to escalate thus falling into the Indian trap. But there was no rationale in glossing over some facts that
were already in the public domain. There is not one official confirmation of the report about the capture

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of the Indian soldier. In fact, it was an Indian minister who broke the news.

Later, Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi mentioned the incident in her speech at the United Nations. There was
no word, however, from the military spokesman who is otherwise eager to comment on every subject. It
is still not clear how the Indian soldier was captured if there was no incursion inside our territory. It is
hard to buy the argument that the soldier just strayed into our territory crossing over the tight security
fencing. All this is quite puzzling.

Initially, the Indian officials indicated that helicopters were used in the surgical operations, but they soon
backtracked saying there were no aerial strikes and the cross-LoC operation just involved ground troops.
The Indian forces apparently launched attacks simultaneously on several positions and reportedly the fire
was promptly responded to by Pakistani troops.

Indeed, Indian military officials have not provided full details about the number of targets or the number
of casualties, nor have they identified them. Undoubtedly, there is much ambiguity over what the surgical
strikes by the Indian forces achieved exactly. But there is some indication that the Indian troops did come
inside our territory, though it is not clear how far they penetrated.

Of course, incursion by the rival troops on both sides of the LoC is not unusual and there are some recent
examples. But the context and scale of the latest infringement, and the fact that the Modi government has
chosen to publicly announce it, has completely changed the situation. While in the past, neither side
would acknowledge an incursion, it was different this time with New Delhi brazenly owning the act of
aggression. Our response uncharacteristically has simply been to repudiate ‘Indian lies’

KULBHUSHAN YADAV

The arrest of Indian spook Kulbhushan Yadav in March 2016, was not only unexpected but also came at a
time when India and Pakistan were on a political and military level trying to resolve bilateral issues.
However, the arrest of a serving high ranked Indian official has reset the India Pakistan relations. Both
countries have been spying on each other for decades so what is so different this time one might ask, well
first Pakistan has never apprehended an Indian serviceman for spying in the last two decades nor has
Pakistan faced the brunt of terrorism this high as it has been after 9/11.

There had been convincing voices in Pakistan echoing an Indian hand in some, if not all, terror attacks in
the country, and now the country finally has proof. While Mr. Yadev is no Anna Vasil’yevna
Kushchyenko, his timely capture has profoundly unraveled a Pandora’s box and our boys in the
intelligence department need to look if RAW has infiltrated Pakistan’s top offices through their
male/female operatives.

While Pakistan conveniently sentenced Yadav to death, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) deferred
the penalty by intervening on India’s insistence. The UN´s top court has asked Islamabad not to execute
the alleged agent until they have had time to pass final judgement in the case. This is given this case a
new dimension in which the RAW agent can actually get away with it.

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PULWAMA ATTACK
Pulwama attack is one of the deadliest terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir in which 40 Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF) personnel were martyred. The Pulwama attack happened on February 14 th, 2019,
when a Jaish suicide bomber rammed a vehicle carrying over 100 kg of explosives into their bus in
Pulwama district. The attack also left many critically wounded.Jaish-e-Mohammed, a terrorist group had
claimed the responsibility for the attack. Immediately after the attack New Delhi blamed Pakistan for the
attack and considered it as an act of state sponsored terrorism.as a reply the Pakistani Prime Minister
Imran Khan has already gone on national television to warn India that Islamabad will retaliate if New
Delhi takes any military action. On February 26, the Indian Air Force (IAF) carried out an aerial strike on
a Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terror training camp in Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.

Within hours of the Indian assault on the Balakot terror camp, Pakistan began firing at Indian military
posts near the LoC. A day later, Pakistan Air Force aircraft crossed the LoC into J&K. It appeared that
jets from the two sides were locked in a dogfight in the skies. Pakistan’s immediate response to the
Balakot incident resulted in destroying one IAF aircraft and capturing a pilot not only gave Pakistan the
upperhand but also satisfied the national ego.However, the issue was neutralised when pakistan returned
the captured pilot back to india.

The pakistani PM was hailed and applauded worldwide for promoting peace and returning the captured
pilot while this incident brough a bad name to India and especially Modi for manipulating the minds of
the indian people as general elections are due in the month of may in India.It is considered that if Imran
Khan would not have played role in descalating the situation this would have escelated into a war.

PAKISTAN NAVY DETECTS INDIAN SUBMARINE, FOILS INTRUSION

Pakistan’s Navy claims that it has spotted and warned an unidentified Indian Navy submarine in the
Arabian Sea on March 4. In a March 5 press statement, the Navy claims that it “detected and blocked” the
Indian submarine “from entering Pakistani waters.” The boat was purported detected in Pakistan’s
maritime zone.

“The submarine could have been easily engaged and destroyed had it not been Pakistan’s policy to
exercise restraint in the face of Indian aggression and to give peace a chance to prevail.” The service
added that it is keeping a close watch on other Indian Navy units stating that the detected sub is one of
“the latest submarines of Indian Navy.” Pakistan also released video footage to support its claim.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERTION IN SOUTH ASIAN REGION

The decade of 90's the zenith of the poor friendly relations between the two countries were observed
when India tested its nuclear bombs and consequetly Pakistan also tried to maintain the balance of power
in the region by testing its own Nuclear weapons.Infact it wouldn't be wrong to say that the explosion of
nuclear bombs between both the countries has become a significant turning point in the history of South

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Asian region. Because of this prevalent sensitive issue both India and pakistan have come under the
magnifying glass of the world.For this very reason too the relations between the both countries remained
unchanged . The issue of Kargil also added fuel to the fire and both the countries got involved in active
fighting resulting in heavy casualities on both sides. Infact these relations grew more intense till the
beginning of this century when India gathered its troops on Pak Indian border and pressurized Pakistan as
it was also holding its troops on the Afgahnistan border because of the war on terrorism . However after
the interference of USA in the issue India withdrew its troops from the Pakistani border and the pressure
on Pakistan lessend as regards to its immediate security threat.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COLLABORATIONS

As regards the social and cultulral collaborations the exchange of tourists as well as the
discussions.programs relating to the modern technologies of mass media communication can also prove
to be of great adavntage.Similarly at present the Khokhrapar railway link is expected to be launched by
teh end of this year However the major issue of Kashmir remains still there which needs early resolve if
both the countries want to move ahead towards progress and prosperity and establish themselves in the
world as a fully developed countries.The recent developments of peace and friendly relations between the
two can be regarded as bright signs of a hopeful future.

HISTORY OF THE ROAD TO PEACE

There is a long line of historical summits held between the officials of both India and Pakistan but all the
efforts to reach at a mutual ground went in vain and things remained static over the Kashmir issue. The
first summit held between Lal Bahadur Shastri and the filed marshal Ayub khan ended witout any change
in the boundries between the two kashmirs because the areas under possession of either side at the end of
1965 war were almost equal in size. The several rounds of talks between Bhutto and Sawran Singh at
foreign ministers level also proved to be fruitless as there was no pressure on India at that time to0 abide
by the resolution of the United nations on Kashmir. At Simla too in 1972,Ms. Gandhi had all the cards in
her hand but she too failed to reach on a settlement over the issue. Then the summit between Vajpayee
and Nawaz sharif at Lahore had the seeds of moving forward towards friendly relations but unfortunately
that spirit too ended because of the reason that Kashmir was only given a passing reference in the Lahore
declearation. The Agra Summit which also showed some bright hopes for the future also ended in disaster
when the PM of India refused to sign the dotted line till Pakistan agreed to the complete cessation of their
so called cross border infiltration. In other words history is replete with instances which vividly show that
bothe countries in one way or another failed to reach at a common acceptable solution over the issue.

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