Slender Was The Thread

Lt Gen. L. P.
Sen
D. S. 0.
Slender was the Thread

KASHMIR CONFRONTATION, 1 9 4 7 4 8
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First publishcd 1969
Reprinted a s a Sangam paperback 1973
Reprinted in hard cover by Orient Longman 1986, 1988, 1994
ISBN 0 86131 692 4
Published by
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To
the officers and men of
161 Infantry Brigade
who demonstrated that courage and patriotism
never go out of fashion
Foreword
I have read a number of accounts of the defence of the Kashmir

Valley when the tribal raiders from the North-West Frontier, actively
aided and abetted by Pakistan's armed forces and Government,
desceildcd in October 1947 on an orgy of killing, looting, pillage,
plunder and rape. Their object was to devastate the Valley and to
seize Srinagar.
How a fistful of the Indian armed forces, taken initially by sur-
prise, confronted the invaders and ejected them from the Valley has
been told before. It has never been told so vividly and in such faith-
ful detail as in this book by Lt. General L. P. Sen, then acting Briga-
dier in command of 161 Infantry Brigade which faced some fierce
fighting in the Valley. In the Kashmir operations of 1947-48, Indian
soldiers fought for the first time undcr Indian commanders at every
echelon. It was 161 Brigade which, under its stubborn, resourceful
commander stemmed the wave of invaders at U1.i in that fateful

winter.
'Bogey' Sen's account is racy and reaclablc but it is also rclnarkablc
for its perceptiveness and depth. A good journalist is one who can
see the news behind the news. Equally a good soldier can at times
intelligently anticipate the real move and motive behind a feint. It
is paradoxically less easy to do so against unsophisticated tribesmen,
brimming over with more bravado than brains. The author effec-
tively demolishes some widespread legends and fancies on the
military prowess of tribal warriors such as the much vaunted
Mahsuds, Waziris, Afridis and R4011mands. According to the author,
they "will only attack troops who are careless and present him with
an easy ambush from which lle can escape unscathed, ancl he will
attack isolated bodies of men when the n~unericalodds are greatly
in his favour, closing in ~ v h e nthe garrison has expended its ammuni-
tion, and overpowering it by sheer w e i ~ h tof numbers."
Genera1 Sen writes easily and often with grace, nr11ich cannot be
said of most military commanders. H e projects, for instancc, reveal-
ing cameos of political personages like Sardar Vallabhbhai Pate1 of
whom he relates a characteristic anecdote, and of military com-
manders like the often irascible but capable General Kulwant Singh.
His narrative of the burning of Baramula is absorbing. The story of
the Kashmir fighting is rounded off in a reflective last chapter which
throws into harsh relief the permutations and combinations behind
the British attitude to Kashmir. General Sen states bluntly what 11as
never been so forthrightly stated before - that as a result of Britain's
political hangover on Kashmir, neither Britain, Pakistan nor Kashmir
has been the beneficiary. The only beneficiary has been China. A
shrewd point which needed making.
I put down the manuscript of this book far more enlightened than
when I began reading it. I am sure other readers will benefit equally.
New Delhi
August 15, 1969
viii
Preface
In late October 1947, at what was virtually a moment's notice, a batta-

lion of the Indian Army was flown into the Kashmir Valley. It was
followed on succeeding days by further units, and eventually estab-
lished itself in Kashmir as 161 Infantry Brigade. By the third week
of December 1947 the only land route into the Valley over the Banihal
Pass was snowbound, and 161 Infantry Brigade spent the next few
xnontlls co~npletelyisolated from the rest of the Indian Army. During
this period it faced many crucial situations but the unbounded
courage of the officers and men saw it through crisis after crisis.
Tliese efforts have unfortunately been known only to those who
were involved in the actions and, through personal narration, to
a few others. This book is an effort to place on record, and enable
a wider section of the public to know, what exactly happened in
Kashmir during those grim days.
A rapid survey of the attitude adopted by the Rulers of certain
SIXNDER WAS THE THREAD
Princely States at the time of the partition of the sub-continent into

India and Pakistan has been included in the first chapter on the
advice and insistence of the late Mr. Y. P. Menon. Although a very
sick man, he gave me a great deal of his time when I paid visits to
his Bangalore home in 1965. He was quite czrtain that it was neces-
sary to portray the problems which faced the newly-born Dominion
of India and acquaint the reader with the circumstances in which
Indian troops entered the State of Jammu & Kashmir. When I said
to him that his authoritative treatment of this subject in his book Thc
Story of the Ir~tegratiott of Inrliala States was available, he clinched
the issue by remarking : "You can't attach my book as an Appendix,
can you ?" I am most grateful to him for giving me the factual data.
His death, soon after our last meeting, llas denied me the opportu-
nity of keeping a promise to present him with a copy of this book
if and when it was published.
Although the subject of the book is, in the main, warfare, an
attempt has been made to portray the events in language that can be
readily understood by those with little or no knowledge of military
matters or terminology. This necessitated passing the script to a cross
section of friends, with the request that they point out what p x t s
were obscure. Their comments and suggestions have been most use-
ful. To all of them I owe a debt of very sincere gratitude. Also to
the large number of officers who served in 161 Infantry Brigade for
recalling anecdotes. My acknowledgments are also due to the Direc-
torate of Public Relations, R4inistry of Defence for permission to
reproduce photographs.
This contribution is not designed to solve the problen~of Ki~sllmir.
Its main object is to portray a critical stage of the past, a stage in
which a relatively small body of extremely gallant men gave un-
flinchingly of their best, and made my role as their Brigade Com-
mander so simple.
New Delhi
August 9, 1969
Contents
A Vulnerable Prize 1 Hazards of Snow 152

Did No Briton Know ? 16 Psychological Warfdre 162
Delhi Caught off Guard 24 Foiling Encirclcrnent 179
Lights Go Out in the Valley 34 The Move to Leh 188
On Wings of Courage 40 Brickbats for Bouquets 200
Command of 161 Brigade 5 1 The Limber Nullah Battle 217
Anxious Vigil at the Airfield 70 An Offensive Without Teeth 236
'The Battle of Shalateng 78 Limited But Precious Gains 263
Baramula Retaken 101 Advantage Thrown Away 275
To Uri, but not on to Dome1 105 A Costly Legacy 293
Diversion to Poonch 1 18
Holding the Uri Bowl 129
Chapter 1
A Vulnerable Prize
SIR HARISLNGH, who became the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir in 1925,
was sensitive to any form of outside intervention in his State. Pro-
vided, however, that the visitor did not engage in political activity
he could enter the State without ddliculty and was indeed made wel-
come. A major portion of the State revenue came from the large
influx of tourists during the summer months. No entry permit was
necessary. One had only to fill up a form at the Custom Post, giving
particulars of where one intended to reside, the probable date of
departure, and a declaration that no prohibited items, a list of which
was handed to the visitor, were being brought in. Customs Posts
were located on the motorable routes into the State, at Domel and
Kohala for those entering the Kashmir Valley, and at Suchetgarh in
the case of entry via Jarnrnu Province.
Two major roads converged at Domel from the area of the sub-
continent now forming West Pakistan. One beginning at CVah from
the main Grand Trunk Road from Peshawar to Idahore, and the other
at Rawalpindi. The tarmac road from Vlrah, wide enough for two
lanes of traffic and with a gradual rise, was the better and more
popular of the two. It runs through Abbottabad, Manshera and
Garhi Habibullah to Domel. The other route, from Aawalpindi, in-
volves climbing the hill road to Pvlurree and then dropping down to
Kohala before proceeding to Domel by a road that runs alrnost
parallel to the Jhelum River. This route is subject to landslides in the
hilly sections and has many hairpin bends. From Domel, the junc
tion point of the two routes, the road runs alongside the Jhelum via
Chinari, Chakothi and Uri, then through the river gorge at Mahura,
and on to Baramula where the Kashmir Valley starts. From Bara-
mula to Srinagar is a gently climbing tarmac road, lined for most of
its length by tall chinar trees, with paddy fields and orchards stretch-
ing for miles on both sides.
The route to the Kashmir Valley from the south began from the
Grand Trunk Road at Wazirabad, and ran through Sialkot and
Suchetgarh to Jammu. Soon after leaving Jammu, it enters mountain-.
ous terrain and winds its way through Udhampur, Kud, Rarnban and
through the tunnels constructed under the 9,290-ft. Banihal Pass in
1955, and then descends into the Valley to proceed via Anantnag to
Srinagar. It is now an all-weather route, but until the tunnels were
constructed the road ran over the Pass and was snowbound from
mid-December to April. Movement across the Pass by any type of
vehicle or animal, or even man, was impossible during the winter
months. Even at other times the Banihal route was the worst of the
three leading into the Valley. Motoring on this narrow and steep
road, with blind corners and hairpin bends, required excessive low-
gear running of vehicles entailing abnormal wear and tear, and
imposed a severe strain on the drivers. Many sections of the road
were also subject to frequent landslides. During the pre-partition
days, visitors to the Valley from the Punjab or further east avoided
this route if possible, preferring the longer but less hazardous route
via Rawalpindi and Murree, or, if time was of no consequence, did
the extra mileage to Wah and took the easiest road.
The partition of the sub-continent presented Pakistan with all the
three major roads leading to Jammu and Kashmir. A road route of
a sort did enter the State from what is now India. It ran from Madho-
pur to Kathua and on to Samba and Jammu, but it was intersected
by numerous bridgeless tributaries of the River Ravi and other minor
streams, which had to be crossed by ferry or by using the fords over
the shallower streams. Not surfaced with tarmac it powdered very
quickly, while a shower of rain would make any attempt at speeding
extremely dangerous as even light traffic caused severe rutting.
There had been no railway systcm of any description in the Valley.
The rail route in undivided India tertninated at Jammu town, from
Sialkolt. It would have been difficult but not impossible to extend the
broad gauge railway line beyond Havelian and on to Domel, from
where a light railway could have followed the alignment of the road
into the Valley. It can only be assumed that the Maharajah, unlike
most of his brother-Princes who welcomed the open~ngup of their
territories for commerce, did not view such a facility as being either
necessary or desirable.
Two airstrips did exist, one at Srinagar and the other at Jammu,
but they were for the exclusive use of the Maharajah's private light
aircraft. -4s this was rarely utilised, the airstrips had no concrete
runways. Althollgh a number of airline companies were operating
in the sub-continent, and Srinagar and Jamrnu could have benefited
from their services, the towns were not on any scheduled air route.
Neither of the airstrips was equipped with navigational aids, crash-
fire tenders or arrangements for refuelling. For any other than a
light aircraft to attempt landing on them was risky.
Virtually the entire traffic within and out of the State was, there-
fore, dependent on motor or animal transport. As all the petrol, oil
and lubricants had to be imported from outside, the State was pecu-
liarly vulnerable even if it had possessed large and well-equipped
armed forces, which it did not.
The Jammu and Kashrnir State Forces amounted in their strength
to about an Infantry Division, and consisted mainly of infantry
battalions with hardly axiy artillery and other supporting arms. It
had been inconceivable that the State would be subjected to any
form of attack from without. Major General H. L. Scott, the Chief of
Staff of the State Forces, had therefore deployed the units in accord-
ance with the requirements of internal security.
This was the position on 15 August 1947, the day on which the
subcontinent stood partitioned into the Dominions of India and
Pakistan. While most of the Princely States had cast their lot with
one or the other Dominion, the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir
was among the few who remained undecided. His indecision was to
prove costly and fateful to the people of his own State as well as to
India and Pakistan.
On 24 March 1947, Lord (now Earl) Louis Mountbatten had been
SLENDER WAS THE TIZREAD
installed as Viceroy of India, replacing Field Marshal Lord Wavell.

Empowered by the British Government to put into effect its resolve
to transfer power, Lord Mountbatten commenced negotiations with
the two major political parties, the Congress and the Muslim League.
He tried without success to persuade Mr. Jinnah, leader of the
Muslim League, to a federal scheme which would retain the unity
of India. The story of this unavailing effort was narrated by the last
British Viceroy in the following words, in the course of the Nehru
Memorial Lecture he delivered in Cambridge on 14 November 1968:
"I first tried very hard to revive the Cabinet Mission plan with
him (Mr. Jimah) in order to retain the unity of India, but he
wouldn't hear of it. He insisted on the partition of India into a
Muslim State, to be called Pakistan, and the very large non-
Muslim residue, which he used to refer to as Hindustan. He
wished to include not only the provinces, like Sindh, which had
a very large Muslim majority, but also Bengal and the Punjab
which had very large non-Muslim minorities. I told him that
if he insisted on partitioning India he would have to agree to
partition these two provinces and only to include the Muslim
majority areas in Pakistan. He objected violently to 'a moth-
eaten Pakistan'. He pointed out that it was unreasonable to
divide these great provinces, as their inhabitants were primarily
Bengalis or Punjabis, which was more important than whether
they were Muslims or Hindus. I then applied the same logic to
the whole of India, claiming that a man was an Indian first and
foremost before he was a Muslim or a Hindu. Therefore the
whole of India should not be partitioned. This annoyed him. . . .
"I tried to tempt Jinnah by offering him Bengal and the Punjab
unpartioned provided he would agree that though the pro-
vinces with Muslim majorities would have self-government they
must be within an overall federal government at the centre.
However, he said he would sooner have a moth-eaten Pakistan
that owed no allegiance to a central government than a larger
and more important area which came under it.
"I then ascertained from the Congress and Sikh leaders that,
heart-broken though they were at the very thought of partition-
ing India, if the Muslim League would not accept a transfer of
power on any other basis, they would have no option but to
accept if they were not to remain indefinitely under British
rule."
On 3 June 1947 the Viceroy announced what is commonly referred
A YZTLNEIUBLe PRIZE
to as the Mountbatten Plan for the partition of the sub-continent.

The date for the transfer of power to the two Dominions of India and
Pakistan was advanced from the earlier target of June 1948 to 15
August 1947. Aware of the rising tempers, Mountbatten evidently
thought that the quicker the Plan was executed, the less would be
the agony. It requires no skill to be critical of the deficiencies that
follow the implementation of any plan, but in this particular case it
is debatable whether h4ountbatten's sharp acceleration of the original
date was a wise decision. It allowed only 73 days to partition a' s u b
continent which is the size of Europe less Russia and consisted of
11 provinces directly administered by the British and 565 Princely
States. The problems that had to be ironed out were numerous and
complex.
The leaders of the Congress party were consistent in their stand
that the partition of the sub-continent on a religious or 'two-nation'
basis was neither feasible nor acceptable to them. Such an approach
would have reduced the status of the 40 million Muslims who would
be left in the Dominion of India to that of aliens or second-class
citizens, whereas the Congress party stood for modem secular demo-
cracy. The division of the provinces as it eventually took place was
in the nature of a political division. Though certain areas with pre-
dominantly Muslim population were allotted to Pakistan, in the case
of Bengal and the Punjab the Legislatures of the two provinces
were consulted. It was agreed that the western half of the Punjab
and the eastern half of Bengal should go to Pakistan, and the other
halves to India. A referendum was held in the North-West Frontier
Province, even though its population was more than 90 per cent
Muslim. The area voted for Pakistan, the referendum being boy-
cotted by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his followers who, like the
Congress party, stood for secular democracy and would have pre-
ferred to exercise a third option -not given to them in the referen-
dum - of independence, Pakistan being ideologically unacceptable
to them and the area not being contiguous to India.
In the event, the two wings of Pakistan were formed by the North-
West Frontier Province. Baluchistan, Sind and West Punjab in the
West, and by the e'lstern half of Bengal in the East.
On the transfer of power by Britain paramouiltcy was retroceded
from the King Emperor to the 565 rulers who had never exercised
any authority in respect of External Affairs, Defence and Communi-
cations during British rule. The States ranged from the largest,
Hyderabad, with an area of 82,000 square miles, a population of 16
million and a revenue of Rs. 260 million, to Vejanoness with an

area of under one-third of a square mile, a population of about
and a revenue of Rs. 500 per annum. Of the 565 States, 140 were
fairly large and their rulers were described as 'fully empowered';
a further 70 were in an intermediate bracket, the rulers exercising
wide but not absolute powers; and the remainder, which were
Estates rather than States, had rulers with limited powers of juris-
diction. In 1945 an Attachment Scheme had been formulated under
which a large number of these Estates were placed under the con-
trol of the adjoining larger States. With paramountcy lapsing, the
Attachment Scheme also expired. Each of the 565 rulers was expect-
ed to accede to either of the two new Dominions according to his
choice, and not on the basis of the religious beliefs of the people
of the State.
The vast majority of the Princely States were linked irretrievably
by geography with the territory which was t o form the Dominion
of India. By 15 August 1947, the Instrument of Accession to India
had been signed by the rulers of all the States geographically con-
tiguous to it, with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir in the north,
Junagadh and some smaller adjoining States in the Kathiawar
peninsula on the west coast, and Hyderaljad in central India.
JUNACADH, bounded on three sides by States that had acceded
t o India and on the fourth by the Arabian Sea, was the largest State
in Kathiawar. It did nolt have a contiguous border with West Pakis-
.tan, the maritime route between its main port, Veraval, and Karachi
in West Pakistan being 325 nautical miles. With an area of 3,400
square miles and a population of abou:t 7 million, of whom 80 per
cent were non-Muslims, the territory of Junagadh was, like that of
many of the other Kathiawar States, splintered. It had enclaves in
the bordering States of Gondal, Baroda and Bhavnagar, all of which
had acceded to India, while other States which had also acceded to
India had enclaves in Junagadh. All these factors pointed in but one
direction: the Kathiawar States had to accede, as a whole, to one
or the other of the two new Dominions. They were much too mixed
u p territorially to do otherwise.
Sir Mahabatkhan Rasttlkhanji the Nawab of Junagadh, had
always maintained that Junagadh's future lav in the formation of
a self-contained group of Kathiawar States. When in April 1947,
weeks before the announcement of the Mountbatten Plan, articles
appeared in the local Press suggesting that Junagadh was consider-
ing joining Pakistan, the Dewan of the State, Khan Bahadur Abdul
Kadir Mohammed Hussain, firmly repudiated any such intention.
But on 15 August, with Abdul Kadir a sick man and Sir Shah Nawaz
Bhutto, a Muslim League politician from Karachi (and father of
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who later became prominent in Pakistan's public
SKETCH SHOWING
THE SPLINTERED STATE a
JUNAGADH
a JUWAGADH STATE
ARABIAN SEA
SLENDER WAS THE THI\EAD
life), installed in his place as t h e Dewan, the Government of Juna-

gadh announced its accession to Pakistan. The Government of India
had received no prior intimation of this decision, and only received
co&mation of it on 18 August in a reply to a telegram sent to the
Dewan. I t was not till after nearly a month, e n 13 September, that
Pakistan informed India that it had accepted the accession of Juna-
gadh and had signed a Standstill Agreement with the State.
Junagadh's decision infuriated the other Kathiawar States, and
protests poured into Delhi. Lord Mountbatten, now the Governor
General of the Dominion of India, despatched his Chief of Staff,
Lord Ismay, to Karachi for consultations with the Government of
Pakistan. On his return to Delhi, Lord Ismay stated that, in his
opinion, the Government of Pakistan was trying to provoke India
into taking a step which would discredit her in the eyes of the world
and obtain sympathy for Pakistan as an aggrieved party. Junagadh,
h e stressed, was an economic and an administrative unit firmly
embedded in Kathiawar, and as such could only be a liability to
Pakistan in every sphere.
The Khan of Manavadar, the Ruler of a small State with an area
of about 100 square miles, contiguous to Junagadh on three sides
and bordered on the fourth bv Gondal State which had acceded 2 0
India, who had not till then made a decision, also announced that he
had entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan and had
asked t h d Dominion to accept his accession. However, the Sheikh
of Mangrol, a very small State adjoining Junngadh, who had also
not announced his choice, now signed a Standstill Agreement and
Jnstrument of Accession with India. The Nawab of Junagadh refus-
ed to recognise Mangrol's accession to India, asserting that Mangrol
as an 'attached !State' was his vassal and had no right to conduct
negotiations without his authority. This position the Sheikh of
Mango1 refused to accept, maintaining that with paramountcy laps-
ing on 15 August, he was independent of Junagadh. Apprehensive
that other 'vassals' might follow Mangrol's exnmple, the Nawab of
Junagadh despatched his State Force troops into Bahariawad, an
area comprising Estates whose rulers challenged the Nawnh's over-
lordship and promptly acceded to India. The Government of India
thereupon requested the Nawab of Junagadh to remove his State
Force troops from Babariawad.
I n order to protect the areas that had acceded to India, an Infantry
Brigade of the Indian Army was despatched to Kathiawar. The
Brigade Commander was instructed not t o violate Jrinagadh terri-
A VULNERABLE PRIZE
tory in any way and not even to enter Mangrol and Bahariawad,
which had acceded to India but whose accession was being con-
tested by Junagadh and Pakistan, but to deploy his troops only in
the other territories that had acceded. On 25 September, the Dewan
of Junagadh sent a message to the Government of India in which he
stated that the State Force troops in Bahariawad would not be r e
moved, and that both Mangrol and Babariawad were integral parts
of Junagadh. A telegram was despatched by the Government of
India to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, demanding
that Junagadh State Force troops be withdrawn from Babariawad.
Two days later, on 1 October, the subject was discussed between the
Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan at a meeting of the Joint
Defence Council which was being held in Delhi. Fl'hile discussion
was in progress, information was received that Junagadh State Force
troops had entered Mangrol State.
This provocative act could have been met with retaliation, but the
Government of India decided not to move Indian .4rmy troops into
either Babariawad or blangrol but to continlie peaceful efforts to
secure the withdrawal of the Junagadh Statc Force troops. As neither
Pakistan nor Junagadh issued instructions for the withdrawal of the
State Force troops, the Commander of the Indian Infantry Brigade
deployed in Kathiawar was instructed on 4 October to prepare plans
for the occupation of Mangrol and Babariawad in case it should
prove necessary. Further exchange of communications between
India and Pakistan, and India and Junagadh, bore no fruit. Even-
tually, on 1 November, the Government of India despatched civil
administrators, each accompanied by a small token force, to take
over the administration of Man,qol and Babariawad.
The unsettled conditions in the area had caused a cessation of all
trade with Junagadh. The food position became precarious, and the
Nawab, realising that an untenable position had been reached,
decided to abandon the State. He flew to Karachi with most of his
family members, but not before ensuring for himself a life of ease
by emptying the State Treasury of its cash and securities. \Vith the
departure of the Nawab, local political forces came into operation
and began occupying various parts of the State. This compelled the
Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, to approach Samaldas Gandhi, the
leader of a political party which had assumed the title of Arzi Huku-
mat (Provisional Government), to take over the reins of the
government and to restore law and order. However, influential
citizens of the State, including prominent Muslims, persuaded Sir
SLENDER WAS THE 'IIZYCEAD
Shah Nawaz to hand over the administration to the Government of

India instead of to the Arzi Hukumat. On 7 November, Sir Shah
Nawaz made a request to this effect. to the Government of India.
Prior to taking over the administration of Junagadh, the Indian
Government cabled the Prime Minister of Pakistan to inform him
that it was acceding to the request of the Dewan in order to avoid
disorder and possible chaos in the State. The message stressed that
the Government of India desired that a quick solution be arrived at,
which should meet the wishes of the people of t h e State. It suggested
that representatives of India and Pakistan meet to discuss the matter
at the earliest possible moment.
The take-over of the State on 9 November was peaceful, without a
single untoward incident. Two days later, the Prime Minister of
Pakistan replied to the Indian cable. H e stated that the Dewan of
Junagadh had no authority to enter into any negotiations or settle-
ment with India, and that the taking over of the administration and
the sending of troops into Junagadh by India was a breach of inter-
national law. He demanded the immediate withdrawal of Indian
troops.
The Government of India stated in reply that if it had not taken
over the administration of the State, the Arzi Hukumat would have
done so, and that might have resulted in bloodshed. It had acted on
the request of Sir Shall Nawaz Bhutto and his colleagues of the
Junagadh State Council, who had stated that the administration had
collapsed. Further, Sir Shah Nawaz had taken the decision with
the unanimous approval of not only the State Council but also the
leaders of public opinion in the State.
In the absence of any constructive proposal from Pakistan, the
Government of India decided to hold a referendum to ascertain the
wishes of the people regarding accession as soon as normalcy had
been restored. The referendum was held on 20 February 1948. In
Junagadh, more than 190,000 votes were cast out of an electorate
of 200,000. Those voting for Pakistan totalled 91, and the rest voted
for India. In Mangrol, Manavadar and certain adjoining Estates,
Pakistan's share of the 31,434 votes cast was 39. Thus ended a chapter
full of incident, but one which could have been avoided if Pakistan
had not encouraged the Nawab of Junagadh in his folly.
HYDERABAD, as noted earlier, was the largest of the Princely
States in undivided India. The Nizam who ruled this ovenvhelmingly
non-Muslim State made known his aspiration for independence out-
side both the future Dominions as early as in April 1946, when the
A Y U L ~ L PRIZE
E
President of his Executive Council told Lord Wavell, the then Vice-
roy of India, that Hyderabad would prefer, on paramountcy lapsing,
to become an independent State. After the Mountbatten Plan was
announced on 3 June 1947, the Nizam of Hyderabad remained
silent, biding his time, and announced on 15 August that he was
entitled to and would assume the status of an independent sovereign.
He was immediately informed by Lord Mountbatten that his inten-
tion was not a possibility and the State could not become a
Dominion.
On 17 August, the Nawab of Chhatari, President of the Nizam's
Executive Council, wrote to Mountbatten expressing a wish to enter
into negotiations. This was agreed to, but on 25 August, the date
on which the Hyderabad delegation was due to arrive in Delhi, the
legal expert Sir Walter Monckton, K.C. who had been engaged by
the Nizam as his Constitutional Adviser, informed Lord Mountbatten
that he had resigned his position. H e said that a violent attack had
been made on him in the Hyderabad Press, engineered and organised
by the Ittehad-ul-Musilmeen, a communal organisation in the State.
The leader of this organisation, which was militaristic in nature,
was a sciolist named Kasim Razvi who had organised and armed
a large body of men, whom he named the Ramkars into a Brigade.
The Nawab of Chhatari also tendered his resignation but it was
refused by the Nizam. As a result of the Nizam's issuing a statement
condemning the attack on the delegation, Sir Walter Monckton with-
drew his resignation.
Negotiations with the Hyderabad delegation commenced, but they
met with little success. Each draft agreement, and there were a large
number of them framed, was brought back to Delhi with the inser-
tion of some unacceptable clause. It became obviolls that the Nizam
had no intention of surrendering his sovereignty, as there was a
constant demand for the right to enter into direct political relations
with foreign powers. Meanwhile, disquieting information was receiv-
ed in Delhi that Hyderabad was negotiating with a Czechoslovak
firm for the supply of arms and ammunition valued at &3 million.
On 22 October, a final revised draft was hammered out in Delhi,
and, having been agreed to by both sides, was handed to the State
delegation which left for Hyderabad the same day with the promise
that it would return to Delhi on 26 October with the Nizam's accep-
tance. This draft was debated by the Nizam's Executive Council for
three days, and eventually accepted bv a majority. The Nizam was
on the evening of 25 October and the document placed
before him, but although he approved, he postponed the signing until

the next day. On 26 October the delegation again approached the
Nizam, but once again he postponed the signing to the next day.
On 27 October, Kasim Razvi and his Razakars staged a demon-
stration. They surrounded the houses of the members of the dele-
gation - Sir Walter Monckton, the Nawab of Chhatari and Sir Sultan
Ahmed, - made inflammatory speeahes through loudspeakers, and
made it impossible for the delegation to leave for Delhi.
On the morning of 28 October the Nizam produced a surprise for
his delegation. H e introduced Kasim Razvi into the meeting. Raz\?i
did not mince his words: he said that a fresh delegation should be
formed t o negotiate with the Government of India, that India, tied
u p with trouble elsewhere (the invasion of Kashmir by raiders from
Pakistan had commenced), would be too hard put to refuse Hydera-
bad's demands if the State insisted strongly enough. Despite the
warning by his Executive Councillors that the course suggested by
Kasim Razvi would be most harmful, perhaps even disastrous to the
interests of the State, the Nizam showed a strong inclination towards
Razvi's suggestion. Thereupon the members of the delegation re-
signed and a new delegation was formed. It was composed of Nawal~
Moin Nawaz Jung, Hyderabad's Minister for Police and Information,
one of the dissidents in the Executive Council when the 22 October
draft agreement had becn discussed; Abdur Rahim, a prominent
member of the Ittehad-ul-hlusilmeen; and P. V. Reddy, a nonentity
with no opinion of his own.
Lord Mountbatten was most annoyed at this sudden change in
the membership of the delegation, and when Nawab Moin Nawaz
Jung attempted to resume nego,tiations on the basis of the very first
State draft, it was evident that the Hyderabad delegation intended
throwing to the four winds the hard work that had been put into
several weeks of conferences, consultations and drafting. This was
clearly unacceptable. Tlie leader of the delegation was informed that
the last draft had received the acceptance of the State Executive
Council and the agreement of the Nizam, and there was no question
of re-opening the issue from the start. Lord Ylountbatten told Naulab
Moin Nawnz Jung that the Niznm must make up his mind whether he
intended to rule his State himself, or b e ruled bv the Ittehad-ul-
Musilmeen.
The conferences that followed bore no fruit. The Nawab of
Chhatari, finding matters intolerable, resigned as President of the
Executive Council. The Nizam, on Razvi's advice, appointed Mir
A VULNERABLE PRIZE
Laik Ali, a prominent business man of Hyderabad and Pakistan's

representative to the LTnited Nations, to succeed the Nawab. Ll~i'th
other nominees of Razvi also included in the Executive Council, tlle
Government of Hyderabad was now fully under Kasim Hazvi's
control.
The Razakars launched on brigandage, joining hands with the
Communists. Kasim Razvi encouraged Razakar and Communist
bands to make incursions into the neighbouring Indian provinces of
Bombay, Madras and the Central Provinces. On 12 April 1948, in a
statement to the Associated Press of Il~dia, he declared that he
would plant the family flag of the House of Hyderabad on the R d
Fort in Delhi.
On 22 May, the mail train from Madras to Bombay was attacked
during its halt at Gangapur station in Hyderabad State. Two pas-
sengers were killed, eleven seriously wounded and thirteen kid-
napped. A large number of other travellers were manhandled and
subjected to indignities as the Hyderabad State Railway Police
looked on.
On 18 June 1948 negotiations between India and Hyderabad State
finally broke down. It was probably timed by Kasim Razvi to take
place round about this date, as Lord Mountbatten's tenure of
appointment as Governor General of India was to conclude on 21
June. H e had striven valiantly to persuade the Nizam to a sensible
course. Lord Mountbatten's failure was attributable in a not un-
important measure to the anti-Indian attitude of a section of the
British Press and certain British politicians who argued that Hydera-
bad could and should be independent. These statements stoked the
fires of ambition that smouldered in the Nizam and Kasim Razvi.
Although the Nizam had banned the Communist Party in his State
in 1943, he lifted the ban at the instance of Kasim Razvi. The latter
was now able to supply the ,Communists openly with arms and
ammunition and to co-ordinate their activities with those of the
Razakars. Raids on the borders of the neighbouring provinces of
India and on the railway trains passing through the State were
stepped up. Law and order broke down within the State and across
its borders. Indian police and troops had to be despatched to protect
the population of the adjoining provinces. In August 1448 the Nizam
was sent a sternly worded request by the Government of India to
take strong measures to bring the situation under control and to
disband the Razakars. \f7hether he had the power to do so-is doubt-
ful, and the request fell in any case on deaf ears.
As the situation worsened steadily, Indian troops were ordered on

13 September 1948 to march into Hyderabad. The Hyderabad State
Forces laid down their arms within four days, after offering token
resistance. The casualties suffered, about 800 in all, occurred mainly
among the Razakars and the Communists. A ban was placed imme-
diately on the Razakar organisation. Kasim Razvi was arrested on
19 September. The Communists were then engaged, but they proved
a much harder nut to crack. Operating mainly by night, they put
the arms handed to them by the Razakars to effective use, and it took
nearly three years to bring them under control.
Soon after the installation of a Military Governor, the Nizam issued
a proclamation which brought Hyderabad State into line with the
other geographically linked Princely States which had acceded to
India.
Till October 1947 the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir, like his
counterpart in Hyderabad, entertained visions of becoming a sove-
reign ruler outside the Dominions of India and Pakistan. He had
been informed by Lord Mountbatten, when he was still the Viceroy
of undivided India, that it was not a feasible proposition and that
he must accede to the Dominion of his choice. The Maharajah's
hesitation had little to do with the fact that the majority of the State's
population was Muslim. The major political party in the State, the
National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah, although predominantly
Muslim in its membership, was strongly inclined towards India. The
Maharajah sat on the fence for reasons of his own personal ambition.
Since no decision was conveyed by the Maharajah till 15 August
1947, Lord Mountbatten despatched Lord Ismay to Srinagar to
persuade Sir Hari Singh to take one course or the other. The mis-
sion was infructuous, but, as an interim step, the Maharajah signed
Standstill Agreements with both India and Pakistan. India abided
by the Agreement. Pakistan did not.
In the case of Junagadh and Hyderabad, which were separated
by vast distances from Pakistan, the Government in Karachi (the
then capital of the new Dominion) could only offer political support
to the rulers who held out against accession to India despite their
States being surrounded by Indian territory. Pakistan based its sup-
port to the Muslim rulers of these two predominantly non-Muslim
States on the ground that, under the Mountbatten Plan, it was en-
tirely for the rulers to opt for accession to either Dominion.
Jammu and Kashmir, on the other hand, was contiguous to Pakis-
tan as well as to India. The beautiful Kashmir Valley, famed as the
Switzerland of the East, was a tempting prize, and a vulnerable one
that was apparently within easy gasp. It suited Pakistan in this case
to deny the ruler his option aqd to harp on the religious composi-
tion of the State's population. Ironically, however, it was the popular
Muslim leaders of Kashmir - Sheikh Mol~ammed Abdullah, Bakshi
Ghulam Mohammad, Mirza Afzal Beg, Ghularn Mohammed Sadiq
and Syed Mir Qasim, to mention the foremost - who rejected the
two-nation theory and called for accession to India since it was a
modem democracy more suited for achieving their people's progress
in the conditions of the 20th century than semi-theocratic Pakistan.
Lacking support from any but a small section of the people of
Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan resorted first to economic coercion and
then to naked force.
In an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Maharajah, Pakistan
cut off all supplies of food, petrol, salt and other essential commodi-
ties on the import of which the State depended. As the main com-
munication lines ran from what was now Pakistan territory into
Jammu and Kashmir, the sanctions left a strong mark. In order to
exert even stronger pressure, a series of raids against the border posts
of the State Forces were organised in Pakistan and launched into
Jammu.
Far from heeding the Maharajah's protests, Pakistan capped its
intervention by sending tribesmen from the North-West Frontier
Province into the Kashmir Valley. On 22 October the border town
of Muzaffarabad was attacked and sacked, and the tribal raiders
commenced their advance into the Valley. Reports of the increasing
proximity of the tribesmen caused the personnel of the Mahura
Power House, on which the Valley relied for its electric power, to
abandon it and flee.
The Maharajah, finally realising the seriousness of the situation,
sent the Government of India a desperate call for assistance. India
could not, however, assist in repelling the tribal attack as long as
the State did not accede to the Dominion. The Maharajah, who had
evacuated Srinagar with his family on the night of 25 October, was
contacted in Jammu. He signed the Instrument of Accession on 26
October, and Indian troops were thereupon ordered into the Valley.
Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference to whom the
Maharajah had handed over the reins of the administration prior to
departing from Srinagar, formed an interim Emergency Government.
Chapter 2
Did No Briton Know?
CAPI'CTRED
documents showed that the officer entrusted with organis-
ing and implementing 'Operation Gulmarg' for Pakistan's capture
of Kashmir by force was Major General Akbar Khan, a Regular
Officer of the Pakistan Army and a product of the Royal Military
College at Sandhurst.
Adopting the pseudonym 'General Jebel Tariq', the Moroccan
name for Gibraltar, he established his Headquarters at Rawalpindi,
in the building occupied by Army Headquarters, Pakistan. He was
an autocrat in so far as the operation was concerned, and was given
free access to anything that he thought he should have in order
to ensure that the operation was a success. His failure to produce
the expected result led to his fall from favour, but being an indi-
vidual of great ambition he decided to rehabilitate himself without
undue loss of time. This called for action of an abnormal type. He
plotted to assassinate the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali
DID NO BRITON KNOW ?
Khan. The plot was, however, detected a few days before the target
date, and Akbar Khan found himself behind bars.
Akbar Khan must have been acutely disappointed at the failure
of his Kashmir venture. On the face of it, the problem that faced him
was a relatively simple one. All the' communication factors presented
him with a picture that few, if any, commanders have been lucky
to have before them. There was no problem in the transportation
of the formidable force of Frontier tribesmen that had been lined up.
As for opposition, it would encounter the Jammu & Kashmir State
Force troops, who would be taken by surprise and who in any event
were not high-grade troops. Moreover, Akbar K h a ~ had
, taken steps
to wean away a large percentage of officers and men of the Jammu
& Kashmir State Forces from their loyalty to the ruler. The defection
of these individuals at the moment of strike would embarrass the
defenders of Kashmir. There was nothing that was not in his favour,
and there was no reason for any qualms regarding the outcome of
the operation. There could only be one result, and it could be
achieved in a few days. H e must have been a pleasantly excited
and confident man as 22 October 1947 drew near.
Opposition by Indian troops was the only factor that could affect
the successful outcome of the plan, but the raids against variops
State Force outposts in Jammu, which had been under way for some
\\reeks, had drawn no reaction from the Indian Government. Active
opposition from India could, therefore, be ruled out; and in any case,
even if India did react, the time and space factors were predomi-
nantly in favour of the invading force. The Kashmir Valley would
be Pakistan's before India realised what had happened. Any pro-
tests that might follow could be debated on political platforms, but
possession was nine-tenths of the law.
The distance from Domel to Srinagar is about 100 miles, and
Major General Akbar Khan must have been well aware of the fact
that once the State Force unit at Domel was liquidated, the road to
Srinagar would be wide open, there being no other units deployed
along the route. It was merelv a question of how quickly the tribal
convoy could cover that mileage. Even at a slow rate of 10 miles in
the hour, the leading elements of the convoy would be either in, or
on the outskirts of, Srinagar in about 12 hours. The whole operation
could, in fact, have been completed quite comfortably within 24
]lours. And it would have been, but for a demolished bridge on the
way at Uri. Even with this obstruction throwing the time schedule
out of gear, had the invading force been composed of a disciplined
and resolute body of men instead of rapacious tribesmen, the 62 miles

from the demolished bridge to Srinagar could have been completed
on foot, and three days would have been more than ample.
What had evidently not received attention during the planning
stage was the tribal reaction to various situations that might be
encountered. They had been tempted to undertake the operation
with promises of loot and women, all theirs for the takiug. They
had no intention of settling down in the Valley permanently, nor for
that matter would Pakistan have permitted them to do so. Their
object was to get into the Valley, collect their booty, and to get
home as soon as they could. Motor transport was essential in order
to achieve this, and it is evident that the tribesmen were not pre-
pared to be divorced from it. When a demolished bridge blocked
the further passage of the vehicles, they sat back a t Uri until such
time as a diversion could be constructed. This took nearly four days,
and there is no denying the fact that these four days played a vital
role in saving the Valley.
As noted earlier, the Jammu & Kashmir State Forces were de-
ployed for internal security, not defence of the State against attack
from outside. The penny packets along the border, stretching from
Gilgit in the north to Suchetgarh in the south, a distance of 240 miles,
were garrisoned by units and sub-units ranging from a weak battalion
to a platoon. This dispersal left the State Forces weak everywhere,
and they did not have the backing of a readily available reserve.
Once the thin crust of resistance along the border was overcome,
there were neither plans nor units to form a second line of defence.
Major General Scott, Chief of Staff of the State Forces, was not in
the Valley when the tribal attack developed. Even had he been in
the Valley, he would have found it impossible, in the short space
of time available to him, to salvage the situation.
While military intelligence relating to the deployment of the
Jammu & Kashmir State Forces was well known to Pakistan, that
country having given it very serious attention over an extended
period of time, India had not given the subject a thought. Military
Intelligence Directorate of Army Headquarters, India, was fully
engaged in trying to cope with the spate of reports dealing with the
movements of troops and stores to and from India and Pakistan, in
accordance with the plan to implement the partition of the Armed
Forces and their assets which had been formulated by Supreme
Headquarters, India and Pakistan. The internal situation, which
necessitated reporting to Government on the progress of the refugee
convoys threading their way into and out of the country, demanded
constant attention. There was neither the time nor did it seem neces-
sary to delve into the affairs of Jammu & Kashmir, a friendly
autonomous State.
The Intelligence Bureau of the Government of India, manned by
personnel of the Indian Police Service, were indeed expected to
cover the State. They would naturally have been interested in keep-
ing abreast of happenings within and along the border, in so far as
they might have repercussions in India. But they were in a tragi-
comic state of helplessness. The Director of the Intelligence Bureau
of undivided India, during the months preceding 15 August 1947,
was an officer who was about to opt for Pakistani citizenship. This
individual, who was earmarked for appointment as Director of the
Pakistan Intelligence Bureau, took full advantage of his position to
transfer across to Pakistan every file of importance dealing with
Intelligence, leaving behind for his counterparts in India the office
furniture, empty racks and cupboards, and a few innocuous files
dealing with office routine. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that
on 15 August, Pakistan came into being with a well-established
Intelligence Service, while India had only a semblance of one.
The reticence of Maharajah Hari Sing11 about the hostile actions
bcing launched against his State in Jarnrnu, specially in the Poonch
area, is understandable when viewed in the light of his ambition to
retain his sovereignty. hloreover, he was perhaps unaware of the
magnitude of the threat that was developing. and thought that his
State Forces were capable of coping with what might have been
assessed by him as minor border incidents. Whatever it was, his
silence resulted in India's truncated Intelligence, both Civil and Mili-
tary, remaining unaware of what was happening.
While the Indian Intelligence Services may have been blind, it is
difficult to imagine that Pakistan's intention, preparation and plan
of action could have escaped detection by the numerous British
personnel who were holding key positions in both the Dominions.
Strangely enough, Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General of India,
and General Sir Rob Lockhart, the Commander in Chief of the
Indian Army, apparently knew nothing about the attack on Kashmir
until after the tribal raiders had sacked Muzaffarabad.
Before the division of the sub-continent into two Dominions, it
had been suggested that the Viceroy of undivided India, Lord
Mountbatten, should be the Governor General of both India and
Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah, the architect of Pakistan, would not have it.
SLENDER WAS THE -AD
H e became the Head of the State of his creation, while India accepted
Lord Mountbatten as its first Governor General.
That Mr. Jinnah disliked Lord Mountbatten is true, but surely
Lord Mountbatten's British colleagues in service with the Dominion
of Pakistan, the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army, General
Sir Frank Messervey, in particular, would not have been swayed by
Jinnah's animosity towards Lord Mountbatten so far as to withhold
from him such vital information as Pakistan's intention to take
Kashmir by force. They must have been fully alive to the fact that
it would place Lord Mountbatten in a most invidious position if, as
!he Governor General of India and even more as the creator and
pilot of the Mountbatten Plan, he knew nothing about it. Lord
Mountbatten's ignorance of the plot that was beina, hatched against
Jammu & Kashmir State can only point to one conclusion: his British
colleagues in Pakistan did consider him an outcaste. What is even
more amazing is the treatment accorded to Field Marshal Sir Claude
Auchinleck.
In order to ensure that the partition of the Armed Forces and their
assets was fairly and correctly conducted, both India and Pakistan
had agreed to the formation of a Supreme Headquarters, with Field
Marshal Auchinleck as the Supreme Commander. The Headquarters,
staffed entirely by British officers, was located in New Delhi. As a
neutral body, Supreme Headquarters owed its loyalty to both Domi-
nions. In his role as a neutral, Auchinleck had free access to both
Governments and their Armed Forces Headquarters, and was in
constant touch with them, either by personal visits, on telephone or
wireless, or through couriers.
I t would not have called for a great deal of thought on the part
of the Supreme Commander to arrive at the inference that the in-
duction of a large body of tribals into a Princely State that had yet
to make: its choice of accession could have serious repercussions, not
excludilrg a clash between the two Armies of which he was
the Supreme Commander. General Sir Frank hlesservey, the
C in C of the Pakistan Army, would also certainly have arrived at
the same conclusion, and it is, therefore, difficult to be!ieve that he
did not brief Auchinleck fully on the events taking place in Pakistan,
the intention behind them, and the serious repercussions that were
bound to follow.
If Messervey did not keep Auchinleck fully informed, then one
can only view the Supreme Commander as a rather pathetic figure,
badly let down by one of his senior commanders. If Auchinleck \$.as
DID NO B m N XNOW ?
aware of what was happening, then he was not the neutral in whom
India had placed its confidence and it was a case of clear betrayal
of trust.
The bare fact is that at no time before 24 October did Field Mar-
shal Auchinleck call the attention of the Government of India to
any untoward developments in Pakistan or in the vicinity of the
Pakistan-Jammu & Kashrnir border. His report came after the tribal
attack on Muzaff arabad.
The two Commanders in Chief, General Sir Frank Messervey of
Pakistan and General Sir Rob Lockhart of India, were no strangers
to each other, both having served in the undivided Indian Army for
a number of years. Their Headquarters were linked by direct tele
phone and wireless circuits, and it was routine for them to have long
telephone conversations during which they discussed matters of
mutual interest to the two Armies and exchanged information. That
Messervey knew what was happening and was about to happen can
be taken for granted. It would be most extraordinary for the C in C
of an Army to be kept completely in the dark about a large-scale
operation such as the one that was being mounted, involving as it
did a considerable amount of equipment and the posting of officers
to the Headquarters of 'General Jebel Tariq'. This Headquarters
was, in fact, located in the same building as Messervey's own Head-
quarters. Whether he informed his counterpart in India of what was
brewing is not known, but if he did, General I~ockhartdid not pass
the information to Military Operations and Intelligence Directorate.
An individual who was certainly fully aware of what was happen-
ing was Sir George Cunningham, the Governor of the North-West
Frontier Province. Thousands of tribesmen from across the Durand
Line had appeared in Peshawar, the capital of the N.W.F.P. and
were being heavily armed. Sir George was no stranger to the
N.W.F.P. as he had served there in various capacities for almost his
entire career, and this radical departure from the firmly maintained
policy of containing the tribesmen must have shocked him. It is
believed that he dropped a hint to General Sir Rob Lockhart, whom
he knew well, the latter having been his predecessor as Governor
of the N.W.F.P. However the C in C of the Indian Army was
apparently unable to grasp the full implications of it. Cunningham
also knew Messervey and Auchinleck well, and it is more than certain
that he must have warned Auchinleck.
Whether these individuals knew or did not know of the planned
raid on Kashmir will never be firmly established. Suffice it to say that
the Government of India, which had gladly accepted the formation

of Supreme Headquarters for a period of four years, now demanded
its dissolution. This was effected almost immediately. The services of
the Commander in Chief, General Sir Rob Lockhart, who should
normally have served for four years with effect from 15 August 1947,
were dispensed with, General Roy Bucher replacing him on
1 January 1948.
What happened in Gilgit in 1947, prior to and during the tribal
invasion, strengthens the inference of the involvement of certain
British officers in Pakistan's plan.
I t was the Treaty of Amritsar, concluded on 16 March 1846 after
the First Sikh War, between Gulab Sing11 and the British Govern-
ment, which resulted in Jammu & Kashmir being formed into a
political entity. Gulab Singh became the Maharajah of the State
comprising Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh and Gilgit. On 23 September
1925, one of his descendants, Hari Singh, became the Maharajah.
When Soviet Russia took over virtual control of Sinkiang in 1935, the
British Government came to an agreement with the Maharajah under
which a m y e a r lease of Gilgit was executed, The sole responsibility
for the administration and defence of Gilgit was transferred to the
British Government, which raised an irregular force, the Gilgit
Scouts, officered exclusively by British officers. With the announce-
ment of the Mountbatten Plan on 3 June 1947, Gilgit was handed
back to the Maharajah amidst much jubilation, and with it the
Gilgit Scouts became a part of the Jammu & Kasl~mir'State Forces.
The Maharajah despatched a Governor, accompanied by the Chief
of Staff of the Jammu & Kashmir State Forces to take over Gilgit.
When they arrived in Gilgit on 30 July 1947, Major General Scott
and the Governor were informed that all the British officers of the
Gilgit Scouts had opted to serve Pakistan. Scott returned to make
a report to the Maharajah, but the Governor stayed on in Gilgit to
administer the area. The Maharajah was taken aback by the infor-
mation conveyed to him by his Chief of Staff, but worse was to
follow. On 31 October 1947, soon after the tribal invasion of Kash-
nlir had commenced, the Gilgit Scouts surrounded the residence of
the Governor, and a Provisional Government was installed. On 4
November 1947, Major Brown, the British Commandant of the Gilgit
Scouts, hoisted the Pakistan flag in the lines of his command, and
on 21 November, an official styling himself as Political Agent arrived
from Pakistan and established himself in Gilgit.
The loss of Gilgit to Jammu & Kashmir State was the result of a
piratical action. Major Brown yas certainly not the chief conspirator.
He was a mere pawn in the game. The strategic value of Gilgit as
a base was first realised in 1935, hence the 60-year lease. Its impor-
tance had not changed in 1947, and had in fact grown much beyond
the earlier estimate because of the vastly increased power of the
Soviet Union. India, it was realised, would never have agreed to
Gilgit being used for spying on or mounting an attack on the USSR.
It is clear that the retrocession of the area to the Maharajah was no
more than a gesture, and that Gilgit was firmly designed to become
part of Pakistan.
Chapter 3
Delhi Caught off Guard
INDIA
was far from a state of preparedness to answer the S.O.S. call
which came from the Maharajah of J a ~ n m u& Kashmir. As a result of
the Junagadh Nawab's actions, it was not improbable that the situa-
tion in Kathiawar might explode if not tackled sensibly and expedi-
tiously. Hyderabad was being difficult. But most pressing of all was
the task of bringing back to normal the situation in the Punjab, Delhi
and its environs, where communal riots had resulted in a breakdown
of the local administration in certain areas. This was causing extreme
anxiety. Kashmir had received scant, if any, attention, India being
content to wait for Maharajah Hari Singh to make up his mind on
the question of accession. The sudden and unforeseen happenings in
the State therefore caught the Government of India off guard.
Mr. Jinnah's continuous harping on the two-nation theory, with
constant references to the new Dominion of Pakistan, that was about
to be formed, as the home of the Muslims, generated fears and ten-
DELHI CAUGHT OFF GUARD
sions which resulted in clashes -between Muslims and non-Muslims

in the Punjab and Bengal, the two provinces that were to be parti-
tioned. Mob violence increased as the date approached, and con-
tinued even after the partition. There ensued a mass exodus of
minority communities from the Indian and Pakistani halves of the
two provinces. They had to wrench themselves away from areas
where they had lived for generations and which they had regarded
as their homeland, selling at a loss or simply abandoning their agri-
cultural land and property.
As the huge refugee columns crossed the border, the stories of
the atrocities that they had witnessed and been subjected to spread
like wild fire. In a short whlle, i d a m e d crowds, thirsting for revenge
and egged on by the refugees, fell upon innocent citizens. A carnage
such as undivided India had never experienced engulfed the divided
Punjab. The refugee columns moving in both directions were sub-
jected to attacks. The administration found itself paralysed by deser-
tions of personnel belonging to the minority community who fled to
join the refugee columns.
Whether the upheaval could have been avoided is debatable.
There is, however, little doubt that Lord hlountbatten's accelerated
time-table for partition and transfer of power contributed to the
confusion. The 73 days allowed to execute the plan was far too short
a span of time, considering the size of the problems. Perhaps it might
have been more prudent to have phased the partition plan for im-
plementation by stages and to have adhered to the original target
of June 1948. The advancing of the date to 14 August 1947 was a
gamble, and it had devastating results. Fortunately, however, the
provinces of the newly born Dominion of India other than Punjab
and Bengal remained unaffected, and no harm was done to the mil-
lions of Muslims residing there.
The Indian Army was able to bring the situation in the Punjab
under control within a few weeks, though it had to face many other
pressing problems. It was being split into the Armies of India and
Pakistan, at the ratio of twcthirds to India and one-third to Pakistan.
This was based sot on the geographical dimensions of the two
Dominions, but on the territorial origin of those enlisted in the un-
divided Army.
Demobilisation after the termination of iVorld War I1 had pro-
ceeded apace. Of the infantry battalions, for example, only 152
remained. There was no infantry battalion consisting wholly of
Pakistan-enlisted personnel. Pakistan's highest contribution was fifty
SLENDEZI WAS THE THREAD
per cent in 55 of them, and seventy-five per cent in 6. The cornpo-

sition of the rest was wholly or predominantly Indian. The situation
was similar in the other combat units and in the Corps and Services.
The movement of the sub-units to form the Pakistan Army was there-
fore in full swing. There were, however, many units composed of
100 per cent of Indian nationals which were garrisoning the North-
West Frontier and other areas of Pakistan. These had to return to
India to resuscitate the formations. In addition there were numerous
sub-units composed of Indian nationals still serving in Regiments
allotted to Pakistan. In order not to embarrass the fighting efficiency
of the Pakistan Army, it was agreed that the Indian units and sub-
units located in West Pakistan would remain in that Dominion for
a few months till the Pakistan Army had organised itself and was
in a position to assume its responsibilities.
Army Headquarters, India, was in a very unhappy state. While
Pakistan Army Headquarters had established itself in the well-equip
ped Northern Command Headquarters in Rawalpindi, and was able
to commence functioning without impediment, its analogue in New
Delhi found itself engaged in an accommodation-cum-location battle
with Supreme Headquarters. The Supreme Commander, Field
Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, had decided that it would be in-
correct for Supreme Headquarters and Army Headquarters, India,
to be located in the same Secretariat building. This building, the
traditional home of Indian Army Headquarters, was fully equipped.
As it had accommodated a very large General Headquarters formed
during World War I1 in the place of Indian Army Headquarters, it
was more than large enough to meet the requirements of both the
Supreme Headquarters and the Army Headquarters which was about
to be resurrected. There were, in addition, a large number of war-
time hutrnents, located close to the Secretariat, which had formed a
part of General Headquarters and which were readily available to
absolb sections which could not be accommodated in the main build-
ing. Supreme Headquarters, however, characteristically decided that
Army Headquarters, India, should accommodate itself in the Red
Fort in Delhi.
The Red Fort may be an imposing' building, but it was neither
designed nor does it lend itself to accommodating a major Head-
quarters. Besides, it was not wired for the extensive telephone com-
munications necessary for an Army Headquarters to operate effi-
ciently. Nevertheless, a sincere attempt was made by Army
Headquarters to establish itself in the Fort, some Staff Officers with
their Sections even being accommodated in the vehicle garages.

Limited space, however, precluded the correct setting u p of the
various offices. Many files and documents had to be kept stored in
boxes for security reasons and could not be got at easily, causing
delays and ruffled tempers. It soon became apparent that to continue
to operate from the Red Fort would result in a major breakdown.
Army Headquarters insisted that it return to the Secretariat in New
Delhi before this happened. Supreme Headquarters vacated a small
part of its accommodation, and, making use of the hutments, Army
Headquarters established itself in its proper home and settled down
to carry out its functions. Though subjected to a rocky start, it re-
covered quickly. It is well that it did so, as the unforeseen trouble
in the Punjab was just around the bend. Had Army Headquarters
remained in the Red Fort, it would have been incapable of coping
with the situation.
With the Intelligence Bureau badly handicapped and the Civil
Administration in the Punjab thrown out of gear, the responsibility
for almost all types of Intelligence fell upon the shoulders of Military
Intelligence. It was required to produce for Government a compre-
hensive summary of the events taking place in the Punjab, on call,
nnd consolidated summaries twice daily. In addition, Supreme Head-
quarters had to be kept briefed of the progress made by the railway
trains carrying troops and stores to and from Pakistan. These require-
ments meant a tremendous load, and the Military Intelligence Direc-
torate had not been designed for work of these dimensions.The Staff
Officers of M.I. Directorate had to work a minimum of 16 hours per
day.
In order to enable Supreme Headquarters to function effectively,
the Indian Army Headquarters Signal Regiment provided it with all
its communications, including those to Pakistan Army Headquarters.
The links provided for Supreme Headquarters were for its exclusive
use. With the breakdown of law and order in the Punjab, Supreme
Headquarters found its traffic increased considerably, and began
utilising the already overstretched channels of communications of
Army Headquarters, India. This resulted in unacceptable delays in
the submission of the various summaries and reports by Military
Tntelligence to the Government and to the Directorates of Army
Headquarters. Some other channels of communication were des-
perately needed, and fortunately the Indian Navy and Indian Air
Force found themselves in a position to assist. Their wireless sets
while not linked to any specific stations were utilised as intercept
SLENDER WAS .THE THREAD
sets, and any messages that they picked up were passed to Military
Intelligence. In the majority of cases the intercepted messages were
those being passed between units and their formations giving the
latest situation, and it was useful in that it enabled Military Intel-
ligence to commence working on the various reports even if the
messages from the formation headquarters were received late.
It was from some of these intercepts received via the Naval and
,4ir Force channels that the first indication was received of something
amiss in the Jammu Province of Jammu & Kashmir State.
Among the intercepts received early in October 1947 was one that
read : 'Gorkhas still holding out in Sensa'. As Gorkha units were
part of the Indian Army, and no message had been received that
any unit was in trouble, a study was made of the Order of Battle of
the Indian Army to ascertain the Gorkha Battalion located in Sensa.
There was no such place. Then, to make quite certain, a meticulous
study was made of t h e border of the North-West Frontier Province
and Baluchistan, but without success. Had a compendium of place
names included in the maps produced by the Survey of India been
available, it could have been referred to, but so ill-equipped was
Military Intelligence that it lacked one. It was in fact in the same
position as the civilian Intelligence Bureau, its legacy being a few
files on routine office procedure and one file on a clandestine orga-
nisation that had operated in Burma during World Vf7ar I1 and had
been defunct since the termination of hostilities. This had been in-
advertently left behind or had escaped the general destruction of
sensitive records by the departing British officers.
To pass the half-baked information from the intercept to Military
Operations would evoke the rejoinder. 'Where is Sensa and which
Gorkhas ?', and the answer to neither question was available. It was
therefore decided to shelve the matter and to attend to it only if
further information came. This was received the next morning, one
of the intercepted messages stating that Sensa was still holding out.
The day after, another intercept stated : 'Owen being attacked'; the
same procedure as in the case of Sensa was undertaken to trace
Owen, with the same result. Puzzled, Military Intelligence came to
the conclusion that Sensa and Owen were probably the code names
of two places, and as the Signal Regiment was unable to identify the
station that had originated the messages, it was decided to file the
Owen message too.
The folIowing day a further intercept was received : "Commander
to Commander. Owen captured. w a i t until I join you then coordi-
DELHI CAUCHT OFF C
Nm
nated attack on Sensa." At about mid-day came another : "Com-

mander to Commander. Have received one hundred Poonchies.
Arrange rations."
a t n c stiowlra
~ mE ronotn
BEWEEN CAlISTAU AN0 JAMWU
MID THE INITIAL ATTACKS
0 nrwrLmmo~
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5
i
The word 'Poonchies' at last gave a clue. I1 indicated that the

area of operations was not the North-West Frontier Province or
Baluchistan, but Jammu & Kashmir State. As no maps of Jammu &
Kashmir were available with Military Intelligence, a Staff Of%cer was
sent to the Map Depot which handed him the necessary map sheets,
but with a note to the effect that stocks of these maps were very
limited, the main stock having been collected and taken to Pakistan.
The Jammu-Pakistan border was scanned, and first Owen and then
Sensa were located. They were both in the Poonch District of Jarnmu
Province. From their locations it was obvious that they were both
Jammu & Kashmir State Force border outposts. Only then was it
realised that the J & K State Forces enlisted Gorkhas.
As Military Intelligence was not required to cover Jammu &

Kashmir, and Indian Army units were not deployed in the area, this
information was not included in the Intelligence Summaries but a
separate note, together with the map, was sent to the Director of
Military Operations ( D M O ) , who passed it on to the Commander
in-Chief, General Sir Rob Lockhart, through the Chief of the General
Staff (CGS). Little interest was evinced in it by the D M 0 and the
CGS, and the C in C returned it without comment. This was not
unexpected, as what was taking place in Jammu nras no concern of
India, and in the absence of any information from the Maharajah
of Jammu and Kashmir it was assumed that, as the Poonchies were
subjects of the State, it was an internal security problem.
Further intercepts were received during the days that followed,
each one relating to other outposts that were attacked and presum-
ably forced into surrender or withdrawal. As neither the deployment
of the State Forces nor the strength of the garrisons was known, the
actual implications of the attacks could not be appreciated, nor was
there any indication that Pakistan was involved in them.
Then came the attack on Bhimbar in the Mirpur District of
Jammu. This evidently proved to be a hard nut to crack, and the
attackers appeared to be experiencing difficulty in overcoming the
stout resistance that faced them. There were many references in
the intercepts to 'burning them out', but the implication was not
realised until much later after the Maharajah had signed the Instru-
ment of Accession and units of the Indian Army had moved into
the State.
Survivors from the Bhimbar garrison stated that ,after they had
beaten off a number of assaults launched by the enemy, soon after
first light one morning, tanks approached their positions and
engaged them with automatic fire and flame. Ill-equipped to with-
stand or neutralise such an assault, the defences were soon liqui-
dated. Having completed their task, the tanks withdrew westwards
to Pakistan territory. An aerial reconnaissance was made of the area
to ascertain the authenticity of the survivors' statements, and the
air photographs showed unmistakable signs of tank tracks leading
to and from Bhimbar, from the west. Further investigations also
revealed the fact that the assaults which had taken place along the
Jammu-Pakistan border had been planned in Pakistan and executed
by ex-soldiers armed by Pakistan, and reinforced by Pakistan Regular
Troops who had been sent on leave and operated in civilian clothing.
Fortunately for Pakistan, there were no questions asked when the
attacks were being mounted, as there was no protest from the only
source authorised to lodge one, the Maharajah. Still sitting on the
fence, he had remained silent.
When the Maharajah of Jammu & .Kashmir eventually acceded to
India on 26 October 1947, the tribesmen were already at Uri, a mere
62 miles from Srinagar. The fate of the Valley hung by a slender
thread.
Lord Mountbatten ordered the Indian Army to be despatched
instantly to contain the raiders. That the tribal convoy had been
halted by a demolished bridge was unknown a1 the time. Lord
Mountbatten, who had been the Supreme Commander of the South-
East Asia Command during World War 11, must have been acutely
aware of the communication problem when he gave the order. A
powerful and mobile raider force of several thousands, with a tarmac
road at its command, was poised to strike at Srinagar, and could do
so in a matter of hours. The Indian Army, on the other hand, with an
eleventh-hour warning, was required to be airlifted into the Valley
in DC3 (Dakota) aircraft with their strictly limited payload and
to land on a makeshift airstrip.
It was a hazardous task that few, if any, armies have been called
upon to undertake. There had, however, been a definite violation by
Pakistan of its Standstill Agreement with Jammu & Kashmir, and,
on the State acceding to India, Lord Mountbatten had no option.
I t is to his credit that he did not hesitate to issue the order. The
Indian Army accepted the challenge.
That the Valley was saved must be put down to two factors : the
gallantry of the Indian soldiers, and Pakistan's error in choosing the
frontier tribesmen as its cats'-paw.
When Pakistan decided to present the Maharajah of Jammu 4
Kashmir with a fait accornpli, it chose to utilisc the frontier tribes-
men as a cover so as to avoid the impression of direct responsibility
for violating the Standstill Agreement. These tribesmen were col-
lected from the territory west of the Durand Line and assembled
in Peshawar. It must have been a strange experience for them, as for
decades they had never been permitted to cross the Durand Line in
any numbers, and whenever small parties were gi;en permission to
cnter the area to the east of the Durand Line, which was rare, their
weapons were taken away at the border posts and handed back only
when they were homeward bound. Now they found themselves being
welcomed in Peshawar, presented with arms and ammunition, which
in the past they had risked their lives to obtain, and transported
across West Pakistan to a land that most of them had probably never
heard of, in the role of 'liberators'.
To have attempted the coup with the Pakistan Regular Forces
would have been very effective but much too blatant. Major General
Akbar Khan, who was in charge of the operation, evidently calcu-
lated that the task could be successfully accomplisl~edon these lines:
following close on the heels of the tribals, soon after they had reach-
ed Srinagar, the Pakistan Infantry Brigade conveniently located near
Kohala would have arrived, to persuade the tribesmen to return to
their mountain homes with the loot they had amassed; this Brigacle
with an excellent motorable road at its disposal, could have been in
Srinagar in a matter of hours; having achieved their object, the
Pakistan leaders would then have announced to the world that they
could not be held responsible for what had taken place - the tribes-
men had flowed across the Durand Line and taken the law into their
own hands, and had it not been for the speedy action taken by des-
patching regular troops to contain them, the Valley would have
been pillaged, t h e Maharajah's accession to Pakistan would have
followed automatically, under duress.
In its selection of the tribesmen to consummate its plan, however,
Pakistan made a blunder. The general impression about the fighting
ability of the tribesman from the west of the Durand Line is
a fallacy. That he is tall and powerful in appearance is true, and
his haughty air of independence, coupled with the rifle and dagger
with which he is invariably armed, makes him appear formidable.
I n actual fact he is chicken-hearted. He will only attack troops who
are careless and present him with an easy ambush from which he
can escape unscathed. H e will attack isolated bodies of men when
the numerical odds are greatly in his favour, closing in when the
garrison has expended its ammilnition, and overpowering it by sheer
weight of numbers. If there is the remotest chance of a reverse, he
will break action and withdraw, and he is allergic to having his flanks
threatened or turned. His worst trait, however, is unreliability.
These characteristics of the tribesmen have been known for
decades and are substantiated by numerous examples, the most im-
portant being that the British fought shy of enlisting the tribesmen
into the regular Indian Army of the prepartition era. They had been
enlisted at one period, but their lack of soldierly qualities and their
untrustworthiness, especially during World War I when they indul-
(red in mutiny and murder, accelerated their disbandment. During
P
World War I1 they were given another chance to prove themselves,
DELEII CAVCHT OFT CUAPU)
but an Afridi unit raised as Infantry had to be relegated to the role

of a Labour battalion and sent to Persia while the Mahsuds, enlisted
and formed into a Rifle Compapy of the 4th Battalion 13th Frontier
Force Rifles, behaved true to tradition when the unit was ordered
overseas by deserting one night with its arms and ammunition.
Recruitment of the tribals was, therefore, confined almost entirely
to service in the Frontier Scouts, an irregular force located in their
own tribal areas and utilised to keep their own people in check
In arming and equipping the Mahsuds, Wazirs, Afridis and
Mohmands, Pakistan scrapped in a matter of weeks what Britain had
striven over a number of decades to prevent. In encouraging them
to enter the tenitory to the east of the Durand Line, Pakistan nulli-
fied the very object of deploying three quarters of the pre-partition
Army of India, composed of British and Indian troops, in frontier
forts, to contain the tribesmen.
Chapter 4
Lights go out in the Valley
Mw-, one of the three major towns of Kashmir, is located

astride the Kishenganga River about two miles to the north of the
Dome1 bridge over the Jhelum river. About seven miles to the
west of Muzaffarabad is the West Pakistan-Kashmir border. The
town was primarily a trade centre, most of the exports and imports
of the State passing through the hands of its merchants. The sanc-
tions imposed by Pakistan relating to the import of essential
commodities into Kashmir, especially petrol, had begun to have
a telling effect on the movement of merchandise, and was the sub-
ject of much adverse comment locally. Rumours of the raids against
the State Force outposts in Jammu province had reached the towns-
folk, but they were not unduly perturbed since one of the better
battalions of the State Forces, the 4th Jammu & Kashmir"1nfantry
( 4 J & K Infantry), was located in the Muzaffarahad-Dome1 area.
This unit had seen service in Burma during World War 11, and
LIGHTS CO OUT N THE VALLEY
had done reasonably well. It was a mixed battalion, its composition

being 50 per cent Dogra (Jammu Hindus) and 50 per cent Poonchie
Muslims. It was commanded by a Dogra officer, Lt. Col. Narain
Singh, who had spent most of his career with the battalion. As was
normal, defensive positions had been constructed on thc features
that commanded the approaches into the State, and the Domel
bridge in particular. But these were only required to be manned
in an emergency, and, not apprehending any such type of threat,
the battalion lived in its peace-time barracks. As is acceptable
under such circumstances, the weapons were stacked in the Com-
pany armouries when not required. Although there had been inci-
dents in Jammu, in which the State Force outposts had been
assaulted and in some cases annihilated, there had been no such
happenings on the borders of Kashrnir. Kashrnir State Intelligence
sources had given no indication whatsoever that either Domel or
Muzaffarabad was likely to be subjected to any form of attack.
SLEND- WAS TIXll
With reports of continued assaults on the border posts in Jn~nrnu

Province, Headquarters Jammu & Kashmir State Forces eventirally
became alarmed. It drew the attention of the Commanclins Officer
of 4 J & K Infantry to the fact that in certain cases the l'oonchie
Muslims had proved to be unreliable and had defected. It suggested,
in fact advised him, that it might be prudent to return his Muslim
troops to Srinagar in order to avoid the possibility of a similar
occurrence. Dogras would be sent forward to replace them. Lt. Col.
Narain Singh was furious when he received the proposal and rejected
it. He stated that he had served with the battalion for many years
and had more confidence in his Muslim troops than in the Dogras.
To order half his command to return to Srinagar and have it re-
placed by Dogras would be to i d i c t a grievous insult on his
Poonchie Muslim men. That he was not prepared to do under any
circumstances. This laudable attitude of the Commanding Officer
resulted in the battalion remaining intact, but Lt. Col. Narain Singh
was to pay a very heavy price for his loyalty to his men.
In the early hours of the morning of 22 October, while their Dogra
comrades lay sleeping, the Poonchie Muslim troops rose. They drew
their weapons from the Company Armouries and trained light auto-
matics and medium machine guns on the barracks occupied by the
Dogras, and on their Armouries so that they would be incapable of
reaching their weapons. They then moved in and killed their ccm-
rades, including Lt. Col. Narain Singh who had placed implicit
trust in them. This accomplished, they made contact with the tribal
convoy which had arrived and lay halted on the Pakistan side of
the border. With the town of Muzaffarabad open to them, the tribals
swarmed in. Rape, loot and arson engulfed the town. The tribesmen
were only brought under control with the promise of even better
booty ahead in the Valley. The tribal convoy, now led by the
Poonchie Muslims of 4 J & K Infantry, moved up the road towards
the Valley.
One might form the impression from these incidents in Jammu
and in Muzaffarabad-Dome1 area that the Muslims of the State
had risen against the Government and wished to join Pakistan.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Thousands upon thousands
of Muslims in the Government, the State Forces and in the National
Conference, the political party led by Sheikh Abdullah, braved
death in stemming the invasion. Many Muslim officers and men of
the J & K State Forces were later absorbed into the Indian Army.
Their loyalty is beyond question. It was only a certain number who
LIGHTS GO OUT IN THE VALLEY
defected. The defection was primarily due to the subversive acti-

vities of Major General Akbar Khan and of a few other &cers of
the ~akistanArmy whose domicile was in Jammu or Kashmir. These
officers also took a leading part in the conduct of the operations both
in Jammu & Kashmir.
Some of the Dogras of 4 J & K Infantry who had managed to
escape the slaughter, slipped through the cordon thrown around
them by the mutineers and moved back along the road to Srinagar.
Reaching a telephone, they informed Headquarters Jammu & Kash-
mir State Forces of what had happened in the Mumffarabad-Dome1
area. The news was received with alarm and despondency. There
were no State Force units of any description located between Domel
and Srinagar, and the route to the Valley, and Srinagar the capital,
lay wide open to the tribals. With a mere 110 miles of good tarmac
road to cover, the enemy could be at the gates of Srinagar in a
matter of hours. There was not a moment to be lost in meeting the
threat.
Brigadier Rajinder Singh, who had taken over as Chief of Staff
from Major General H. L. Scott, decided to deal with the situation
personally. Collecting some 200 men from the rear details of the
State Force units in Badami Bagh Cantonment in Srinagar, he rushed
down the road to Domel by motor transport. Realising that the only
hope lay in delaying the enemy as much as was possible, he took
with him sufficient explosives to carry out demolitions of the numer-
ous bridges on the route. He reached Uri, 62 miles from Srinagar,
before the raiders, and, deploying his small force on the features
to the west of Uri, began preparing the large steel-girder bridge at
the eastern exit of Uri, which spanned a deep seasonal river, for
demolition. This completed, the defenders awaited the arrival of the
tribal convoy.
It made its appearance soon after mid-day on 23 October, and
was halted with long-range fire. The Brigadier was able to thwart
the enemy attempts to outflank him, with a series of well-staged
withdrawals. But as the pressure increased and further enemy bands
were thrown in to encircle him, he decided to pi111 well back, and
gave orders for the bridge to be blown. The Engineers had pre-
pared it efficiently and the raiders were presented with a yawning
gap which it was impossible to span without equipment and engineer-
ing skill, neither of which was readily available to them. The blow-
ing u p of the hridge at Uri was to make a difference more moment-
ous than the gallant Brigadier Rajinder Singh could have anticipated.
By immobilising for three to four days the tribal raiders who would
not let themselves be separated from motor transport, it saved Sri-
nagar from the fate that had overtaken Muzaffarabad. With the only
motorable route made impassable, the tribal convoy lay halted for as
long as it would take to construct 3 diversion. With darkness falling,
the raiders decided to postpone further action until the next day.
On the morning of 24 October, elements of the raiders engaged
the small token force which had taken u p a defensive position on
the hills to the east of Uri. Unable to dislodge it with a frontal attack,
they decided to hold it frontally and to cut off its withdrawal with
a wide encircling movement. They crossed the Jhelum River by a
footbridge which lay to the north of Uri, and advanced along the
north bank in the direction of Mahura. Here lay another bridge
across the river, and having crossed it they would have been in a
position to occupy the features behind the State Force party. Their
movement was, however, spotted. Brigadier Rajinder Singh had no
option but to evacuate his defensive position and withdraw. A run-
ning battle across the hills now took place until, at Diwan Mandir,
Brigadier Rajinder Singh fell, mortally wounded. Realising that any
attempt to evaquate him would only hamper his men, he ordered
them to leave him behind and to continue the withdrawal. His men
placed him under a culvert, hoping that he might escape detection.
That was the last that was seen or heard of Brigadier Rajinder Singh.
In Srinagar, the electric power supply failed a t about mid-day.
Those in authority drew the only possible conclusion. The Mahura
Power House had fallen to the raiders.
That Brigadier Rajinder Singh's action was gallant in the extreme
is unquestionable. It disrupted the planned time-schedule of the
enemy and gave the Valley the hope of sunrival, but there is one
point in connection with his action which is inexplicable. Available
to him in Badami Bagh Cantonment was a total of 1,850 officers and
men of the Jammu & Kashmir State Forces of whom 500 were
Poonchie Muslims. In view of what had taken place, he may have
lost faith in the latter and decided not to put their loyalty to the
test. The remainder were either Sikhs, Dogras or Gorkhas - all
trained soldiers who were the Depot parties of the battalions deploy-
ed in both Jammu and Kashmir or personnel who had returned from
leave and courses of instruction who were awaiting movement
orders. This sizeable number of 1,350 officers and men could have
been formed into two relatively able battalions. They might not have
had the full complement of light automatics and mortars, but they
LICHTS CO O W IN THE VALLEY
were all equipped with rdes and there was no shortage of ammuni-
tion or grenades. These two ud hoc units would certainly have
offered stiff resistance to the tribals in country that lends itself to
defence. Yet, well aware that half the 4 J & K Illfantry had joined
hands with the enemy, and knowing that the tribal force was of
several thousands, he rushed forward with only 200 men.
It is possible that the petrol supply situation in Srinagar was bad,
severely limiting the motorised element that could be rushed to Uri.
The Brigadier probably felt that the task of demolishing the bridge
could be accomplished with a small force of 200 men. But in taking
over personal command of this party he demoted himself to the role
of a Company Commander. It is difficult to understand why he did
not place a junior officer in command of the token force, and, as
Chief of Staff and the virtual Commander of the State Forces, keep
himself free to organise the resources at his disposal and deploy
them to man various defensive positions. His disappearance with
his small force evidently left his Headquarters rudderless, as no one
made any effort to move troops forward or in fact do anything to
meet the serious situation. The officers and men sat tight in their
barracks and even kept their existence a secret from the Indian Army
which commenced arriving on 27 October. Had the raiders succeeded
in capturing Srinagar, they would have been butchered in their
barracks.
The fall of Muzaffarabad and Domel, the death of his Chief of
Staff, and the stoppage of electric power from Mahura at last brought
home to Maharajah Hari Singh the grimness of the situation.
He had, some time previously, appealed to a brother Ruler, the
Maharajah of Patiala to send him military aid. This request had been
complied with. An infantry battalion of the Patiala State Forces
moved to Jammu presumably to bolster up the gamson after the fall
of Bhimbar, and a Mountain Battery from Patisla arrived in the
Kashmir Valley. But, in view of the raiders' strength and the extra-
ordinary deployment of the Jammu & Kashmir State Forces, these
reinforcements were a mere token and their presence could not mate
rially alter the situation.
With the possibility of the tribesmen reaching Srinagar any
moment, Maharajah Hari Singh was strongly advised to evacuate
the capital with his family and to proceed to Jammu. This he did by
motor convoy over the Banihal Pass, leaving a Srinagar plunged in
darkness on the night of 25 October. His dreams of an independent
sovereign State of Jammu & Kashmir had been shattered.
Chapter 5
On Wings of Courage
IT is a basic military tenet that, in training during peace, all units of

an Infantry Brigade should be 'mamed up' with one another, the
armour, artillery, signals, infantry and the Corps units being exer-
cised together until very close liaison between them has been achiev-
ed and they get to know one another like members of a large family.
When committed to the battlefield, such cohesion ensures team work,
smooth cooperation and esprit de corps. Commanders must know
their units and the men, and have a shrewd howledge of their strong
points and limitations, while the men must know their commanders
and have confidence in them. Only then will a unit or a formation
operate like a well-oiled machine. The situation prevailing in India
at the time when the first troops were despatched to the Kashmir
Valley denied to both commanders and the men these essentials.
Contrary to nomial expectations, however, 161 Infantry ~ r i g a d e
ON \KINGS OF COURAGE
moulded itself, almost overnight, into one of the hardest hitting

Brigades of the Indian Army.
This Brigade was one of the formations of the Fifth Indian Divi-
sion which was located on the Ranchi Plateau in Bihar Province. The
Divisional Commander was Major General Russell, known affection-
ately throughout the Army as 'Russell Pasha' because of his exuberant
moustache which likened him to a famous Turkish military com-
mander. Consisting as it did of both Indians and others who were
about to become Pakistanis, the main effort of the Division was
directed towards despatching the Pakistani element to its new coun-
try. By 15 August 1947 this task had been completed and the Fifth
Division, now down to sixty per cent of its authorised strength, was
no longer an effective battle formation. The only training that could
be carried out was iridividual training, until such time as its forma-
tions and units could be built up to their normal establishment.
The sudden deterioration in the internal situation in the Punjab,
and the calm that prevailed in Bihar and the adjoining United Pro-
vinces (now known as Uttar Pradesh) caused Army Headquarters
to order the Fifth Division to move certain units to Delhi immediately
to assist the civil power in and around the capital. All that was
required to move was a skeleton Divisional Headquarters, an element
of the Divisional Signal Regiment, Brigade Commanders with a small
Brigade Staff, a few Infantry Battalions and the Motor Transport
Companies. The remainder of the Division and Brigade Head-
quarters, the Artillery, the Engineers, Signals, Infantry, the Corps
units, and the rear parties of the units were to remain behind in
Ranchi. It was stressed that the move to Delhi was purely temporary.
The journey from Ranchi to Delhi, about 600 miles, was carried
out by road and rail, and on arrival units and sub-units were detailed
to various trouble spots in order to instil confidence in the popula-
tion and to deal with any situation that might arise. As the heavier
infantry weapons such as three-inch mortars are not used in internal
security duties, they were left behind. Major General Russell was
appointed Commander, Delhi and East Punjab Area (DEP Area),
and set up his Headquarters in New Delhi. His role was to coordi-
nate the activities of all the units deployed in his area for internal
security duties. The Fifth Infantry Division element that had moved
from Ranchi now became DEP Area troops. 161 Infantry Brigade
found itself deployed in the Gurgaon District area under a newly
promoted commander, Brigadier J. C. Katoch, the previous one hav-
ing been taken away and posted to a Staff appointment.
ShENDER WAS THE THREAD
It was while the units of DEP Area were fully committed and
operating in penny packets ranging from a Platoon to a Company
that the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India was
received. I t was accepted by Lord Mountbatten, the Gvvernor
General, and, following a decision taken in a Cabinet meeting, orders
were issued to Army Headquarters to move troops immediately into
both Jammu and Kashmir.
Under normal circumstances Lord Mountbatten's order would have
presented few difficulties, but at that particular moment the order
entailed re-forming nearby units by hastily assembling their scattered
sub-units, some of which were operating in out-of-the way places and
were not easily contactable by wireless or telephone, and moving
them to New Delhi. The task was closely interlinked with other
major problems. In order not to denude inflammable areas of troops,
reliefs had to move in and take over before certain withdrawals could
be effected. This called for innumerable adjustments to the deploy-
ment plan and rapid movement of motor transport from one area
to another. Time was of the essence, as the Governor General issued
his order on 26 October 1947 and required the first troops to arrive
in the Kashmir Valley by the next day.
A few hours after Lord Mountbatten's order had been received,
a second one followed, this time from the British Government. It
stipulated that no British officer would accompany the troops moving
into either Jammu or the Kashmir Valley. This order could have had
a devastating effect, as at that time almost every unit of the Indian
Army had a high percentage of British officers commanding units and
sub-units. Some of these officers had served with their units for a
number of years preceding World War I1 and then throughout the
war. Many of them had family connections with the Regiments in
which they were serving, in some cases dating back to nearly one
hundred years. They h e w their men and held their confidence. Yet,
in this crisis, as a result of the British Government's ruling, they were
to be divorced from the men they knew so well, and the men were
to be placed uncler leaders who would be strangers to them. It cut
against the grain of the teaching which is accepted in almost every
Army in the world. While it could not have quite paral~sedthe Indian
Army, it could cause a delay which the situation would' not brook.
The reason advanced for the issue of the order forbidding British
officers to accompany troops into Jammu or the Kashmir Valley was
that Britain did not wish her nationals to be pitted against one ano-
ther in battle. This is understandable, and would have been valid
ON WINGS OF COURAGE
had Pakistan Army troops been the invaders. But that was not the
case. Tribesmen, apparently unknown to Pakistan, had invaded the
Valley and Pakistan denied for many months that her regular Army
was also involved. There were, at the time, British officers serving
in units of both the Indian and Pakistan Armies in the North-West
Frontier Province of West Pakistan, units which were located there
for the express purpose of keeping in check the remainder of the
tribesmen from the same clans that had invaded Kashmir. If the
British Officers could perform that role in the N.W.F.P.then why
not in the Valley 3 Ironical though it may seem, Indian units were
also guarding Pakistan's N.W.F.P. and preventing the tribesmen from
surging into that newly born Dominion, while their comrades were
sacrificing their lives to save Kashmir from the ravages of tribals
from the same area. Those Indian units, as mentioned already, only
returned to India after Pakistan had reorganised its Army from the
various sub-units that it inherited.
The most accessible unit for movement into the Kashmir Valley
was the 1st Battalion the Sikh Regiment (1 Sikh), kvhich was deploy-
ed in Gurgaon District, not far from New Delhi. It was commanded
by a very capable Indian officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai.
Orders were issued to Ranjit Rai to withdraw immediately the sub-
units of his battalion from the areas in which they were operating
and to assemble them in Gurgaon town. He was then to move to
Delhi with whatever troops he had managed to concentrate and to
arrive by the evening of 26 October. Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai was able to
assemble enough sub-units to form the equivalent of three Rille
Companies. Leaving instructions for the remainder of the battalion
to follow him to Delhi as soon after they had arrived in Gurgaon
town, he sped to Delhi with his Battalion Headquarters and the three
Rifle Companies, arriving soon after four o'clock. He reported to
DEP Area and was directed by Major General Russell to report to
the Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters.
The initial responsibility for the command and control of the units
being deployed in the Valley lay with Anny Headquarters, the
administration resting with DEP Area. This peculiar set-up was
dictated by the conditions that prevailed. The undivided Punjab had
been the responsibility of Headquarters Northern Command, but
after partition this Headquarters, which was located at Rawal-
pindi in West Pakistan, ceased to be responsible for East Punjab
which had become a part of India, and in fact'became Headquarters
Pakistan Army. DEP Area had had to be established almost over-
night, its foundation being the element of Headquarters Fifth In-

fantry Division which had moved up from Ranchi. This newly formed
HQ had its hands full in coping with the internal security situation
in Delhi and East Punjab, and confined its activities to those areas.
When an operation in Kashmir suddenly presented itself, it was
necessary for some one to command and control it. It was illogical to
expect DEP Area to take on a commitment of which it knew noth-
ing - not that Army Headquarters was any the wiser. DEP Area
was therefore made responsible for marshalling the units to be des-
patched to Kashmir and administering them, while Army Head-
quarters issued orders regarding their induction and controlled the
operations.
If the movement of Indian Army units into the Valley was to be
effective, with the main raider force barely 62 miles away from Sri-
nagar, speed in transporting them was paramount. The only land
route available to India was untarrnaced and unbridged, and more
than 300 miles in length, of which about two-thirds ran through
mountains. There was no alternative to an airlift.
The holding of Srinagar airfield and ensuring its immunity from
enemy action was of vital importance. The orders to Lt. Col. Ranjit
Rai were therefore short, simple and to the point. He was first given
an Intelligence briefing, which merely amounted to being informed
that thousands of raiders, well armed, were in the area of Uri and
perhaps beyond it. Their target was obviously Srinagar, but when
they woilld reach it was unknown. He was then ordered to report
at Safdarjung airport in New Delhi the next morning with whatever
troops he had available, for an airlift into the Valley. On arrival at
Srinagar airfield, he was to organise its defence and ensure that it
was kept free from enemy interference. Further troops would be
flown into the Valley as and when they became available.
There were, at the time of the partition of the sub-continent of
India, a number of civil airline companies operating the DC3
(Dakota) aircraft. These had been purchased after the termination
of World War 11, in which they had done magnificent work. Quite
a number of these Companies were fully employed in lifting evacuees
from one Dominion to the other. The Government of India requisi-
tioned all these aircraft for flights into the Valley. Though the Indian
Air Force utilised all aircraft it possessed, and even with the requisi-
tioning of civil aircraft, there was need for many more. Had they
been available, the induction of men and stores into Srinagar could
have been much faster,
To ask the pilot to land a fully loaded plane on an airstrip that
he has never seen before, which offers less than the requisite length
of runway, and which is devoid of any type of navigational aids and
airfield safety precautions, would normally bring a flat and merited
refusal. He would risk it only in an emergency, after first jettisoning
a large quantity of his fuel and perhaps a high percentage of his
load. In the present instance, however, he had to reach the airstrip
after flying over a treacherous range of mountains. With the limited
ceiling capability of the Dakota, he must cross at the lowest point
which is 9,300 feet, and which is more often than n& shrouded in
clouds or mist. Having negotiated this hazard he is required, with
a full load, to land on an airstrip which, because another aircraft
has landed just before him, has pillars of dust reaching high and
seriously affecting visibility. Being one in a relay of aircraft, the
pilot's decision to land is dependent entirely on what he can see
through the haze of dust, for there are no instructions from the air-
field. Nor is there time for him to dawdle, as there are aircraft fol-
lowing him at short intervals, and he is required to hasten back to
Delhi to return with a fresh load. Any error of judgment, whether
in landing or taking off, would be disastrous as it would make the
airstrip unusable and perhaps prejudice the whole operation.
Despite all these dangers and normally unacceptable hazards, the
pilots of the civil' airline companies cheerfully undertook the flights
into the Kashmir Valley with aircraft loaded with troops, stores and
ammunition. They judged the loads of their aircraft visually, and
they were lavish in their load acceptance. In almost every case, the
aircraft were loaded to a point which would have confounded the
manufacturers.
The courage and devotion to duty displayed by the civilian pilots
and their crews played a decisive part in saving Kashmir from the
ravages that threatened it. Nor were these qualities displayed for
just one day. Day after day, these gallants flew fight after fight from
New Delhi to the Valley, commencing from &st light and only ceas-
ing when darkness made yet another flight quite impossible. It speaks
volumes for their skill that there was not a single accident. The
Dakota aircraft also earned unstinted praise. It flew hour after hour
and day after day with little or no maintenance. Its performance
will probably never be equalled by any other aircraft.
Army Headquarters Movement Control Units are usually located
in major railway stations and at the ports. It is not normal in India,
in peacetime, to move troops by aircraft, and Safdarjung airport in
New Delhi had no such unit. A Movement Control Unit is essential

in any large-scale transport operation such as the one that was to
be mounted from Safdarjung, to enable close personal contact with
the airport authorities, ensure smooth working and avoid frayed
tempers when working under stress. When Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai arrived
at Safdarjung airport with the leading element of his battalion, there
was no such unit to assist him, but the urgency of the situation over-
came the normal dficulties. The airport officials and the air crew
rallied magnificently, and the Battalion Headquarters and the three
Companies were ferried expeditiously into the Valley. At half past
nine on 27 October, the first aircraft landed at Srinagar. With others
following at periodic intervals, the initial body of 1 Sikh was in posi-
tion in the airfield area by mid-day.
Having formulated a plan for the defence of the airfield and dlot-
ted roles to his sub-units, Ranjit Rai made contact with Headquarters
Jarnrnu & Kashmir State Forces and was provided with some trans-
port by the .State Force and the civil administration. H e obtained
the latest Intelligence reports and learnt that the raiders had not
reached Baramula; but as the State Force had no patrols out, it was
not possible to treat the information zs being wholly reliable. With
neither a telephone nor a wireless link with New Delhi, this informa-
tion was carried back by a returning pilot and passed on to Army
Headquarters. It was disturbing not to know where the raiders had
reached, but it was consoling at least to know that the airfield was
firmly in our possession.
Further sub-units of 1 Sikh continued to arrive in New Delhi from
Gurgaon during the dry, and were immediately despatched to
Safdarjung airport for ferrying into the Valley. By the afternoon of
27 October, 1 Sikh was almost a complete battalion in strength. Plan-
ning, meanwhile, had proceeded apace and it was decided to btiild
up the strength in the Valley t~ an Infantry Brigade. The units to
form the Brigade were obtained by relieving those units that could
most easily be spared from their internal security duties, and the
skeleton Headquarters of 161 Infantry Brigade, which was also
located in the Gurgaon area, was ordered to move to the Valley and
take over the operational role. The Brigade that had moved from
Ranchi was not, therefore, the one that flew into the Valley, but an
improvised Brigade made up of units and sub-units collected at
random, the principle adopted being the ability to release them from
their role and their capability of concentrating without undue loss
of time.
With almost his whole battalion now available for operations,
Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai decided to hand over the protection of the airfield
to a part of his command, and collecting a further assortment of
vehicles from the Emergency Government of Kashmir, he embussed
1 Sikh and moved forward to Baramula. He probably considered that
if he could reach Baramula before the raiders, and from the intel-
ligence reports in his possession this was a live possibility, he would
be able to deploy his battalion on the hills in the vicinity of the town.
If he succeeded in achieving this, he would be in an advantageous
position to check any further enemy advance, and with further units
under orders to proceed to Srinagar; prevent them from debouching
into the Valley.
1 Sikh moved from the airfield, through Srinagar and on to Patan,
which is 17 miles from Srinagar, Bnd from there to the hills to the
east of Baramula, a distance of 34 miles from Srinagar, without in-
cident. Debussing his unit, Ranjit Rai placed it in a defensive position
on the hills, and taking a small escort headed for Baramula town
which lay about a mile and a half away. The enemy was already in
Baramula, having got over the problem of the broken bridge at Uri
by constructing a diversion down and up the banks of the stream
and taking the motor convoy across. When the party reached a point
about half way to the town, the enemy engaged it with a medium
machine gun located on a hill to the south of the town and at the
entrance to the Valley. Ranjit Xai had to beat a hasty retreat, but his
jeep was struck and put out of commission. Abandoning it, he started
to make his way back to his battalion across the fields, those who
had been wounded also hobbling back. It was while he was follow-
ing his wounded that he was struck in the face by a burst of auto-
matic h e from a hill on the flank and was killed, as was the platoon
commander who was by his side. The well intentioned gamble had
failed, perhaps by a few hours.
1 Sikh, now without a Commanding Officer, embussed and returned
to Srinagar airfield. Here they were met by the Second in Command
of the battalion, Major Sampuran Bachan Singh, who took over com-
mand and led the battalion back the 17 miles to Patan. Here the unit
debussed and went into a defensive position. Patan, the only hilly
terrain between Srinagar and Baramula, lends itself to forming a rea-
sonably strong defensive position. The hills command the road, and
if held, deny the use of the road to traffic. Having established itself
at Patan, 1 Sikh awaited the expected advance by the raiders and
a possible attack. Neither, however, materialised. Perhaps the raiders
were surprised at the sudden appearance of 1 Sikh, and being un-
certain of the strength that lay behind 1 Sikh, decided that caution
was necessary. They left 1 Sikh well alone that night and in the days
that followed, merely probing the position. Reluctant to assault the
Patan defences, the tribals finally decided to bypass it and to fan out
all over the Valley.
The news of Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai's death came as a shock. There
were the arguments that normally follow such a tragedy, as to why
he had ventured forth to Baramula when his orders had been limited
to the protection of the airfield. A commander of troops placed in
the position of Ranjit Rai always leaves himself vulnerable to such
remarks and questions. It is true that he had left his prime responsi-
bility, the safety of the airfield, in the hands of an extremely weak
force, and had sallied forth 34 miles to Bararnula. Had his battalion
become involved in a dog fight and been pinned to the ground, or
perhaps even surrounded by the enemy which was known to be many
times its superior in numbers, it would have presented quite a prob
lem to extricate it. On the other hand, had he not moved forward
and made contact with the enemy at Baramula, and kept hls batta-
lion in the airfield area, there was an open and unprotected road, 34
miles in length, between Bararnula and Srinagar, ?'he raiders' convoy
could have been in the city in two hours, and with the airfield seven
miles away from Srinagar, it is difficult to visualise what 1 Sikh could
have done to salvage the situation. With the city in his hands, it is
fair to assume that the enemy commander would have taken steps
to seal off the Valley, and to do so was a relatively easy matter. A
strong party, probably formed mainly from the defectors of the 4 J &
K Infantry, would have been rushed to the Banihal Pass to hold it,
while another strong party would have moved to the airfield and
engaged the troops manning its defences with small arms and mortar
fire, ensuring that no further aircraft made a landing.
Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai's action in moving forward to Bararnula was
bold, but certainly not foolhardy. If, as was said by some at the time,
he strayed from the orders given to him, it was extremely fortunate
that he did so, although it cost him his life. He deserves full credit
for having had the initiative and the courage to do what he did. It
was a sound move by a very gallant soldier.
When Mr. Jinnah heard, on 27 October, that bdian troops had
landed in Srinagar, he ordered General Messervey, the Commander
in Chief of the Pakistan Army, to rush troops into Kashmir. Messervey
contacted the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Auchinleck, on
the telephone, having informed Mr. Jinnah that he must have the
approval of the Supreme Commander before issuing such an order.
On 28 October, Auchinleck flew-to Lahore and informed Mr. Jinnah
that as Kashmir was now a part of India, if Pakistan troops moved
into it every British officer serving in the Pakistan Army would be
immediately withdrawn. This would have crippled the Pakistan
Army, which could not function without the British officers. h4r. Jimah
stormed, but had no option but to rescind his order.
Pakistan's Regular troops, however, did move into Kashrnir soon
enough, early in 1948. General Sir Douglas Gracey had meanwhile
succeeded General Messervey as C in C, Pakistan Army, in which
there was a very large percentage of British personnel serving as
staff officers and commanding formations and even units, a percentage
much higher than in the Indian Army. The threat of withdrawing

every British officer proved empty and Mr. Jinnah had his way when,
on it becoming evident that the 10,000 tribal raiders could not over-
whelm Kashmir by mere numbers, Regular troops of Pakistan entered
Kashmir.
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, estab-
lished by the U.N. Security Council by its resolution of 9 November
1948, had this to say on Pakistan's belated admission that three
regular Pakistan Army Brigades had been fighting in Kashmir : "The
statements of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to the effect that
Pakistani troops had entered the territory of the State of Jammu and
later his reply to the Commission's questionnaire that all forces fight-
ing on the Azad side were under the overall command and tactical
direction of the Pakistan Army, confronted the Commission with an
unforeseen and entirely new situation.. . . . . . The presence of Pakistan
troops in J & K, however, constitutes a material change in the situa-
tion inasmuch as the Security Council did not contemplate the pre-
sence of such troops in that State, nor was it apprised thereafter by
the Government of Pakistan." ( UNCIP First Report, S/1100).
Chapter 6
Command of 161 Brigade
IN the absence of a direct wireless link with the troops in the Valley,
it was extremely diilicult to form any reliable picture of what had
actually happened in the region of Baramula and thereafter. The
wounded, who had been evacuated to the General Hospital in Delhi
Cantonment, related varying versions of the incident and the situa-
tion. I therefore suggested to the DMO, Brigadier Thapar, that I fly
into the Valley the next morning, 29 October, in the first outgoing
aircraft and return by the last incoming plane. This would enable
me to spend about six hours in the Valley and I would be able to
obtain an accurate and comprehensive picture. Although Brigadier
Thapar was the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, and
I was the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, on my assuming
the appointment he had decided that as he would be fully occupied
on the operational side, Intelligence would be left entirely to me
and I would in fact function as the Director of Military Intelligence.
SLENDER WAS THE T I W
H e was, at first, somewhat reluctant to let me leave New Delhi for

a whole day in view of the spate of work, but eventually agreed that
it would be the best course of action.
Arriving at Safdarjung Airport at 6 o'clock in the morning of 29
October, I met a Brigadier waiting to emplane and introduced my-
self. H e informed me that he was Brigadier J. C. Katoch, the Com-
mander of 161 Infantry Brigade, and introduced me to his Staff
Officers. W e flew into the Valley in the same aircraft, and on arrival
went into conference with the officers commanding the sub units
a t the airfield. 1 Sikh, we learnt, was still at Patan and had not been
engaged by the enemy, while the airstrip was being guarded by a
Rifle Company of 4 Kumaon. Bits and pieces of other units had,
meanwhile, started arriving in the following aircraft, and they were
ordered to remain in the airstrip area until further orders.
By the time the conference concluded, the Brigade Signal Section
reported that wireless communication with Delhi had been estab-
lished, and a message was despatched to the D M 0 giving him a
factual account of the 1 Sikh action of the previous day. Returning
to operational matters, it was decided that the first essential was to
deploy all arrived and arriving sub units for the protection of the
airstrip. With the aid of a map, all roads and tracks leading to the
airstrip were noted, and a plan was formulated to cover them. This
completed, a ground reconnaissance was carried out to choose suita-
ble positions and to determine the minimum force required to hold
them. By mid-day, the sub units that had arrived were moving into
position, and by four o'clock that afternoon were reasonably well
dug in and ready for action. I t was by no means an impregnable
defensive layout, the paucity of troops precluding that, but unless
attacked in strength it was capable of beating back small bodies of
the enemy and ensuring the airstrip immunity from small arms fire.
A quick visit to 1 Sikh at Patan was planned, but had to be dropped
because the only available vehicle was a jeep that was firing on two
cylinders and its guage indicated that there was little or no petrol.
Communication with the battalion was, however, good, and a very
detailed report of the situation facing the unit was received. 1 Sikh
and enemy patrols had been active but there had been no clashes.
The enemy had not debouched from Baramula in strength, but had
visited nearby villages in small parties, setting alight the houses if
any resistance was offered by the villagers.
With what was the most comprehensive picture of the situation
available so far, I emplaned on the last aircraft leaving for Delhi and
COMMAND OF 101 BRLCADE
arrived a t Safdarjung Airport at 8 o'clock. The D M 0 arrived at the

office about half an hour later, and was given a complete briefing
and an assessment of the situation. I stressed that from what I had
seen and heard during my few hours in the Valley, the situation
could b e summed up as being extremely dangerous. If we were to
beat back the thousands of raiders and save the Valley from des-
truction, many more troops would have to be flown in and very
quickly. It was a time and space problem and both factors favoured
the raiders. They had thrown many golden opportunities to the
winds, but it was much too much to hope that they would continue
in this strain.
This final assessment of the situation seemed to shatter the DMO.
H e informed me that another senior officer, deputed by the Prime
Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, had also visited the Valley, flying
in on a later aircraft, and had returned about three hours earlier.
His assessment of the situation was totally different to mine. H e had
painted a picture of complete calm, and of the situation being more
than well in hand, and had suggested that the number of troops in
the Valley were adequate and could easily cope with what was no
more than a band of ill-trained hooligans. His report to the Prime
Minister had been delivered in the evening, and now, a few hours
later, had come an entirely different picture.
I informed Brigadier Thapar that I had not met this officer in the
Valley and that he might have arrived and departed while I was on
reconnaissance in the airfield area with Brigadier Katoch. His assess-
ment of the military situation was certainly not arrived at as a result
of consultations with Brigadier Katoch, because Katoch and I were
together the whole time that I was in the Valley. After a great deal
of persuasion, Brigadier Thapar agreed to send the latest assessment
of the situation to the Prime Minister. A conference was called that
night, and after a stormy session, with the Prime Minister in the chair,
it was eventually agreed that further units would be called to Delhi
and inducted into the Valley.
In our discussion prior to the meeting with the Prime Minister,
Brigadier Thapar had argued that though at present only one full
strength battalion was in the Valley, it had been agreed that the
strength would be built up to an Infantry Brigade and two more
battalions would therefore be positioned there. hiv contention was
that three infantry battalions would be inadequate to deal with the
task. The area was much too large, the enemy was very much supe-
rior in numbers and would employ will-o'-the-wisp tactics, and with
numerous routes leading to Srinagar three battalions would not be

capable of preventing them from infiltrating into the city and doing
tremendous damage. Quite apart from this, the ultimate aim was to
evict the tribesmen from the whole of Kashmir, not only the Valley,
and that meant past Domel which was well over one hundred miles
away. The pursuit t o Domel and the holding of the territory recap-
tured would require one Infantry Division. I suggested that we
make a bid for a Division right away. Although Brigadier Thapar
agreed that the arguments advanced were sound, he said it would
be quite useless putting it up, as Government would never give its
assent, not with the Internal Security situation in the country being
what it was and requiring even more troops to bring it under control.
The Prime Minister's anger during the conference was justifiable.
To receive two diverse reports on the situation in the Kashmir Valley
over a matter of hours was more than he could tolerate. The esta-
blishment of a Boundary Force, composed of units of the Indian and
Pakistan Armies, had certainly assisted in controlling the situation
in the divided Punjab, and law and order was slowly but surely be-
ing restored in the trouble spots. Further troops if required for Kash-
mir would have to be found by denuding some of these areas, and
the chance of fresh outbreaks of hooliganism could not be ruled out.
There was, however, no other immediate solution, and the risk of
sending some more troops was accepted.
Arrived in Delhi, and arriving from Pakistan, were Rifle Com-
panies of Sikhs and Dogras from the Regiments that had been allotted
to Pakistan. These Rifle Companies were held in Delhi and a few
were, in due course, despatched to the Valley and attached to the
battalions there. In addition, some Sikh Artillery personnel, about
160 in number, who had served in a Mountain Artillery Regiment
that had been allotted to Pakistan, and were to form part of a
Medium Artillery Regiment in India, were also held up in Delhi and
were despatched to join 1 Sikh as a Rifle Company.
On 30 and 31 October, the airlift into the Valley went on apace.
Conditions were becoming more and more difficult with each land-
ing at Srinagar airstrip, which showed definite signs of crumbling
under the abnormal traffic. Thick walls of dust now filled the air
with each take-off and landing, and without sufficient quantities of
water or the means of spraying the strip, it was impossible to arrest
the deterioration. All one could hope and pray for was that it would
not reach a stage where further landings of aircraft would be either
dangerous or impossible.
In the evening of 31 October came further bad news. Brigadier
Katoch, while proceeding to visit 1 Sikh at Patan in a jeep, was hit
in the leg by a bullet. Fortunately it had been fired at long range and
did very little damage. It was assumed that he would be able to
carry on, but at mid-day on 1 November, a signal was received stat-
ing that he was suffering from shock and was being evacuated. Once
again, the troops in the Valley were being left without the appointed
commander.
At five o'clock that evening, the Military Secretary, Brigadier
Rudra, accompanied by Brigadier Thapar, entered my office. Assum-
ing that they had come in for a briefing, I gave them the latest situa-
tion report and awaited any questions that they may have wished
to ask. After a silence that must have lasted at least one minute,
Brigadier Rudra asked me to go and see the Commander in Chief
immediately. When I inquired what it was all about, I was informed
that the Chief would tell me. As I walked down the corridor to the
Chief's room, I wondered what I had done. I could only guess that
it had something to do with the Press briefing I had given that morn-
ing, in which I had perhaps divulged more than I should have.
General Lockhart received me almost immediately, and his open-
ing remark was, "Well, I suppose you know why I have sent for
you T' I informed him that I had no idea at all. "I have selected
you," he replied, "to go to Kashmir to command 161 Infantry Bri-
gade. I want you to leave first thing tomorrow. You will be given
the temporary rank of Brigadier, but it will only b e until Katoch
returns, which will b e in about ten days. You will then revert to
your rank as Colonel and return to your present appointment. Go
and see General Russell right away, and he will tell you the latest
regarding the troops he has earmarked for Kashmir."
I went from the Chiefs room to the DMO's and informed him of
what I had been told, and asked to whom I was to hand over Military
Intelligence. H e informed me that Colollel Clland Narain Das would
be taking over and was already on his way to my office. The handing
over to Chand Narain Das took only a few minutes as my Staff h e w
as much about everything as I did. I borrowed a couple of stars from
one of my Staff Officers, rearranged my badges of rank to conform
to those worn by a Brigadier, and set off to meet General Russell.
General Russell was having tea in his drawing room when I report-
ed to him. H e congratulated me on my promotion, and then glancing
at my shoulder said that he was very glad to see that I had put on
the badges of rank as it was essential that on my arrival everyone
SLENDER WAS llIE THREAD
should be well aware of who the Commander was. He informed me

that a new formation to be designated Jammu & Kashmir Force, or
Jak Force for short, was being raised and Major General Kulwant
Singh had been named as the Commander. 161 Infantry Brigade
would, eventually, come under the command of Jak Force. Then he
told me what units would move into the Valley. When I asked him
for advice as to how I should go about my task, he thought for a
few moments and then replied : "You know much more about what
is happening than I do, and I am not allowed to enter the Valley.
You will have to find your way about when you get there. The only
advice that I can give you is that if you get a chance of hitting them,
hit hard with all you have got, and don't let up.''
Vague though General Russell's words may sound, it was in fact
advice of solid worth. A practical commander and a veteran of many
campaigns, he made no vain or rash statements. There was no attempt
tc hedge the issue, a failing of many less brilliant soldiers, with the
clinche 'when you get there, send me your appreciation of the
situation and your plan', thereby giving the impression that he would
vet them and advise one accordingly. With his wide experience of
warfare, he knew that it was not possible to fight a tactical battle
in Kashmir off a map pinned on boards in Delhi, and h e made no
attempt to do so. What he did do, in a short chat as we had a cup
of tea, was to raise my morale and confidence to the ceiling.
As I was leaving General Russell's house, I received a message to
the effect that Brigadier Thapar would be awaiting me at the south-
ern entrance to South Block of the Secretariat. When I arrived he
informed me that Mahatma Gandhi wished to see me and be given
an Intelligence briefing. W e drove to his residence and I told him
everything that was known to us. H e listened most intently and when
I finished and asked whether he had any questions he would like
answered, he replied "No, no questions." After a few seconds of
silence, he continued: "Wars are a curse to humanity. They are so
utterly senseless. They bring nothing but suffering and destruction."
As a soldier, and one about to be engaged in battle in a matter of
hours, I was at a loss to know what to say, and eventually asked him:
"What do I do in Kashmir ?" Mahatma Gandhi smiled and said :
61
You're going in to protect innocent people, and to save them from
suffering and their property from destruction. To achieve that you
must naturally make full use of every means at your disposal." It
was the last time that I was to see him alive.
On the morning of 2 November when I arrived at Safdarjung
COMMAND OF 161 BRIGADE
Airport at six o'clock, I found the place buzzing with rumours. Some
individuals asserted that the raiders had entered Srinagar during
the early llours of the morning. Others said the airstrip was in
enemy's hands, and even if it was not in their physical possession,
enemy mortars and light autorAatics were raking the area making
it impossible for aircraft to land. These rulnours had apparently been
set afloat by enemy agents in order to arrest the airlift into the Valley
but it was not possible to trace the source of the rumours. The state-
ments however had no visible effect on the officers and men loading
aircraft and awaiting emplaning orders. Nor did they appear to affect
the civil airline crews who went about their work calmly and showed
no concern. They had received their orders to fly into the Valley,
and fly they would.
I phoned Military Intelligence Directorate and asked for the latest
information from 161 Brigade. I was .informed that nothing further
had been received since the report that had been sent to me at 8
o'clock the previous night.
The aircraft in which I was travelling was the first to taxi out to
the runway, and in course of time the Banihal Pass lay below us.
As we crossed it, the co-pilot came into the cabin and asked me to
come to the cockpit. On reaching it, the Captain of the aircraft
beckoned me to come forward. "That's the airstrip down there," he
said, pointing in its direction. "Some people in Delhi were saying
that it is in enemy hands and that the enemy is firing at it. What's
the answer 2 Shall I land ?" "I've got to get down,'' I replied. "That's
good enough for me," lle said. "I'll land.''
The aircraft touched down at five minutes past nine. The airstrip
was neither in enemy hands nor under enemy fire. I deplaned and
walked to the Control Tower, and on inquiry was led to Headquarters
161 Infantry Brigade. It was an apology for a Brigade Headquarters.
It was one small room, located in the Control Tower Building, and
around a small table were seated the Brigade Major, the staff Cap-
tain and Brigade Intelligence Officer, each trying to do his work
without disturbing the others. I announced that I was the new Com-
mander of the Brigade, and would be such until Brigadier Katoch
returned. I then asked for the latest situation, and Major Dilbagh
Singh, the Brigade Major, had barely started briefing me when the
next aircraft from Delhi flew in. A thick cloud of red dust swept
through the room making visibility impossible, while outside the
room people started shouting to one another to do this or to do that,
and in order to make themselves heard above the noise of the aircraft
engines they did not spare their lungs. Further landings made matters
even worse, until it was impossible to.see, hear or think. To attempt
to plan under such conditions was out of the question. Taking up
the situation map and accompanied by the Brigade Staff, I moved
to a relatively quiet corner of the airstrip.
y.. 1 KUMAON
DISPOSITIONS AS O N
--....--
{';;R~lELD:
a-- -9.' TWO companies 4 KUMAON
2 NOVEMBER 1947 .
5 10 MILLS
I
.*--.
Troop dispositions ,,
:
, *em. .a
I gave first attention to the deployment of the units and sub units
that had arrived in the Valley, the infantry in particular. 1 Sikh was
still at Patan, and had been reinforced by attaching to it two in-
dependent Rifle Companies. One was a Sikh Company from a
battalion of the 12th Frontier Force Regiment, that Regiment having
been allotted to Pakistan, and the other was an ad hoc Rifle Com-
pany formed from the Sikh personnel of the Mountain Artillery who
had arrived in Delhi from Pakistan. It was, therefore, a very strong
battalion, nearly 1,200 in strength.
The 1st Battalion The Kumaon Rifles (1 Kumaon) was a Para-
COMMAND OF 161 BlUCADE
chute Battalion, 850 in strength and commanded by Lt. Col. Pritam

Singh. This unit and two Rifle Companies of 4 Kumaon were man-
ning the airfield defences. An adjustment was made here. 1 Kumaon
was made responsible for all the airfield defences, and the two Rifle
Companies of 4 Kumaon were brought inside the airfield perimeter
and held as the Brigade reserve.
The 1st Battalion The Punjab Regiment (1 Punjab), commanded
by Lt. Col. G. I. S. Kullar, however, received much more attention.
It was under-strength, totalling 450 all ranks, the result of its Yakis-
tani element having left for that Dominion. Being a parachute unit,
and with no surplus para-trained personnel available, it had not been
built up to its normal strength. This unit was deployed astride the
road at Magam, which is about 12 miles from Srinagar, on the road
to Gulmarg. I asked the Brigade Major whether there were any
particular reasons for locating the unit at Magam, and was informed
that its role was to deny to the raiders' convoy the use of the road,
to protect the left flank of 1 Sikh at Patan, and to prevent the enemy
infiltrating to Srinagar from the west. I told him that in my opinion
it was most unlikely that the enemy convoy composed of about 200
large passenger buses and load carriers would use the road via
Magam. In order to reach it from Baramula the convoy would have
to move across country in many places, since, although there was a
road marked as 'motorable in the dry season' it was not designed
for the movement of a large number of heavy vehicles. The denial
of the road was therefore, I considered, a sheer yaste of &rt.
Regarding the protection of the left flank of 1 Sikh, there was a gap
of nearly 5 miles between 1 Puniab and 1 Sikh, and the protection
angle could therefore be discounted. Finally, the presence of 1 Pun-
jab at Magam would not arrest the enemy infiltration tactics. They
could move to Srinagar by by-passing 1 Sikh from the north, pass
through the five-mile gap between the two battalions and even by-
pass 1 Punjab's southern flank. The movement might be spotted b y
day, but not by night. I therefore informed the Brigade Major that
while I would not disturb the deplo\ment a t that moment, I would
find a more useful role for 1 Punjab within the next 48 hours. I asked
him to give the battalion an indication that it might have to move
at short notice.
What had to be disturbed immediately, however, was 3 Light
Field Ambulance. This unit of the First Armoured Division had been
sent to the Valley to provide medical cover. On arrival, the Com-
manding Officer had asked where he should locate his unit, and had
been told to choose any nice spot. He had selected an untenanted

house on a hill to the north-west of the airfield, but it was about
three thousand yards distant from the perimeter of the airfield
defences. Here his unit lay completely unprotected and liable to be
scuppered during the hours of darkness. Although the Medical Offi-
cers protested and advanced the valid argument that the airfield
was much too full of dust, the unit was brought inside the perimeter
defence.
The airfield itself required quite a bit of clearing up. As aircraft
landed, the troops had unloaded them and stacked the stores on the
sides of the runway. There were many such stacks, and in the absence
of labour to move them, they had lain there ever since the first air-
craft landed, growing in size every day. The small Ordnance and
Service Corps detachments that had arrived were instructed to col-
lect them, with the assistance of troop labour, and to take them on
charge. This required careful coordination, as some troops were in-
clined to take a short cut across the runway, unaware of the arrival
of incoming aircraft. By last light, however, the stores and equip-
ment were stacked and put in the custody of a Corps detachment.
While the airfield now looked ncater, the road leading from the
airfield to Srinagar resembled a graveyard for vehicles. Many people
who had come to the Valley in their private cars for a holiday found
themselves stranded in Srinagnr. The route back via Dome1 was
blocked by the raiders and there was an acute shortqge of petrol. It
started with requests from a few for transportation back to Delhi in
the returning aircraft. This was agreed to and they were told to
present themselves at the airfield at a specified time. Contrary to
what was agreed to, they arrived, not as small families with a little
luggage but with their entire household staff and enough baggage
to fill half a Dakota. This was due to the fact that it was customary
to come to the Valley for periods ranging up to six months and set-
ting up house at Gulmarg or other camping site. It was understand-
able that the owners wished to take back with them all their house-
hold goods. Their attitude towards their cars, however, was extra-
ordinary.
They arrived in motor vehicles of all shapes and sizes, mainly of
1936-39 vintage and piled up with enough luggage to make the
springs reach breaking-point. Because of the lack of personnel to
porter for them, they were permitted to drive the vehicles to the
aircraft. Having heaped his luggage in the aircraft, the vehicle owner
would inform a Staff Officer that he was handing over his vehicle
COMMAND OF 161 BRIGADE
to the Army and request a receipt for it. When it was explained to
him that the Army could make no use of the vehicle and he was asked
to have it removed immediately from the'airfield, lle would throw
the ignition key on the front scat and step into the aircraft. Troops
had to b e utilised to clear the airfieid of the abandoned vehicles and
to park them in a site that did not interfere wit11 the field of fire of
the defence positions. Orders were issued that no further vehicles
would be permitted to enter the airfield. The pattern had, unfortu-
nately, been set and further batches of returning vacationers, while
not abandoning their vehicles on the airfield, left them on the road
leading to the entrance. Since this affected the movement of military
transport, the cars were removed to a site earmarked for them. Over
a period of a week, they totalled nearly one hundred.
The news that seats were being provided on aircraft returning to
Delhi spread like a forest fire, and HQ 161 Infantry Brigade found
itself overwhelmed by hundreds of individuals, of all types and des-
criptions, pleading to be allotted seats in the aircraft. Two officers
from an already understaed Brigade Headquarters had to be struck
off their normal duties to deal with the problem. As any delay of the
aircraft returning to Delhi would have resulted in their inability to
make the necessary number of flights to the Valley each day to bring
in desperately needed troops and stores, the evacuation by air was
limited to the afternoon flights, when it was certain that the aircraft
could not make another trip from Delhi to the Valley.
It must have been very frustrating for those awaiting evacuation
to watch empty aircraft taking off without them, but nothing could
be allowed to prejudice the operational situation. By and large, the
greater majority of those awaiting instructions to emplane were
patient, but a few individuals, asserting that they were Government
of India officials and that their presence in Delhi was necessary with-
out delay, created unpleasant situations. They not only demanded
immediate evacuation for themselves, but also for their families and
other individuals whom they claimed were office personnel. One
individual, in particular, was extremely truculent and went so far as
to say that he would stand in front of an aircraft and see what we
would do about it. A quiet warning that if he made any such move
he would be treated as an enemy agent, and be dealt with accord-
ingly, .brought him to his senses, and he returned to take his place
in the queue that had formed outside the airfield gate.
To add to the difficulties, the Government of India readily agreed
to a request from Britain that Royal Air Force aircraft be permitted
SLENDER WAS .THE
to evacuate British families who had come from Pakistan to holiday

in the Valley. This imposed an extra strain on the airstrip which was
fast breaking up, and affected to some extent the landing and taking
off of our own aircraft. The task was, however, completed over three
days, with only one unpleasant and unnecessary incident. In order
to maintain contact with Rawalpindi, the H A F established a ground
wireless station on the airfield. In charge of this station was an RAF
Sergeant who kept u p a constant conversation with his station at
Rawalpindi, and in doing so caused serious interference to 161 In-
fantry Brigade's communications. H e was asked to change his
frequency or limit his communications, both of which he refused to
do. There was no option but to give him a firm order to close down
his set, which he did. The situation was explained to the Captain of
the next RAF aircraft to land, and he rectified matters.
The constant commotion in the airfield area made it impossible
for H Q 161 Infantry Brigade to conduct operations from its small
room in the Control Tower Building. There were far too many
demands from civilians to interview the Brigade Commander if the
decision made by a St& Officer did not meet with approval. H Q 161
Infantry Brigade was in fact rapidly deteriorating from an Opera-
tional Headquarters into an Information-cum-Travel Bureau. I
summoned Major Xak of the Jammu & Kashmir State Forces, who
had been assigned to me as Liaison Officer, and asked him whether
he knew of any place nearby to which I could move the Head-
quarters. H e said there was a small bungalow, about one and a half
miles from the airfield on the road to Srinagar, which belonged to
the Forest Department and was unoccupied. H e was certain that
there would be no objection to my using it. Although it meant mov-
ing the H Q away from the protection that it was being afforded by
remaining within the perimeter of the airfield defence, and creating
a situation that had enforced my bringing back the Field Ambulance
from its original location, I gave orders for the H Q to prepare to
move. The skeleton H Q and its small Signal detachment did not
take long to get ready. With one platoon of 4 Kumaon as the HQ
Defence Platoon, we arrived at the Forest Bungalow and by four
o'clock that evening, 2 November, were well established and
operating.
At my initial meeting with Major Kak, whicli was soon after my
arrival, I had inquired of him whether there were any State Force
units deployed in the L7a1ley, and how many men, by Arms and Ser-
COhfhfAND OF 181 BRIGADE
vices, with particular reference to infantry, were in Srinagar. As he

was an officer of the State Force Veterinary Corps, he was unable
to give me a ready answer, and suggested that 11c go to Srinagar
and obtain the details. To this I readily agreed, and climbing into a
jeep he drove to the city. Returning after about an hour, he informed
me that the information he had received was that there were no State
Force units deployed in the Valley, and the small number of men in
Badarni Bagh barracks were either hospital or convalescent cases.
He had been unable to obtain the actual figures, but had been in-
formed that they were unfit for any type of service. All fit personnel
had been despatched to rejoin their units in Jammu and elsewhere.
There were, however, about one hundred troopers of the Maharajah's
Bodyguard, but as this unit was utilised purely for ceremonial pur-
poses, its fighting value was negligible. Bitterly disappointed that
there were no State Force troops available to assist in manning the
extremely Lightly held defensive positions, I told Major Kak that
something was better than nothing, and instructed him to order the
Maharajah's Bodyguard to be ready to move at short notice should
I require them.
No sooner had Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade settled down in
its new location in the Forest Bungalow than I asked the Brigade
Major to hand me the latest patrol reports together with the patrol
programme for the night and at dawn the next morning. The patrol
reports from 1 Sikh and 1 Punjab showed no contact with tha raiders,
who appeared to be avoiding these two battalions, but the informa-
tion collected from the villagers had clearly indicated that they were
fanning out all over the Valley. The patrols that both units intended
sending out during the night and next dawn were then studied on
tlhe map and found suitable. There were, however, neither reports
nor patrol programmes-from any of the units deployed in the air-
field area, and it transpired that there had been no patrol activity
by the troops located in this area at any time. This had come about
because the sub units which had manned the airfield defences had
been located there temporarily, and moved out to join their parent
units. Therefore the troops available on the airfield, normally the
last to arrive during the day from Delhi, had been utilised to man
the defence and were only able to settle into their defensive posi-
tions before darkness set in. The Rifle Companies of 4 Kumaon, which
had remained in the airfield area, had also been fully employed in
multifarious duties on the airfield. This was much too dangerous a
state of affairs to be allowed to continue, as it was inviting the enemy
SLEM)ER WAS THE THREAD
to take the defences by surprise. With 1 Kumaon now made res-

ponsible for the airfield, the Brigade Major was ordered to contact
the Commanding Officer of the unit immediately and to ask him to
produce for me a patrol programme within an hour.
Major Kak was then instructed to order the Maharajah's Body-
guard to report at the Forest Bungalow as quickly as was possible
and not later than in one hour. I t arrived just before five o'clock, and
with the light failing, i t was only possible to give it a very limited
task. I t was ordered to move at the trot in a westerly direction from
the airfield for a period of 45 minutes and then to retrace its steps.
As its role was purely reconnaissance, the commander was instructed
that should any enemy forces be encountered, he was not to get in-
volved in a battle but was to fall back on the airstrip immediately.
Pointing to a small hillock about 800 yards off the main road, I in-
formed the Bodyguard Commander that I would meet him there on
his return, this vantage point giving me an opportunity of watching
the Squadron operating. As the Bodyguard moved off, I set out for
the hillock with my Intelligence Officer and a small escort.
On nearing the feature I was astonished to find a Battery of
Mountain Artillery deployed for action. It was in a fold of the ground
which made it invisible from the main road. The gun pits had been
dug and the gun crews were relaxing beside their guns. As I stood
watching them, with an equally surprised Intelligence Officer, the
Battery Commander came forward to meet me. As a result of our
conversation I learnt that it was the Patiala Mountain Battery which
had been sent to the Valley in answer to the request made by the
Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir to the Maharajah of Patiala, and
had been in Kashmir about ten days. When 1 Sikh had landed in the
Valley, the Battery had been given orders by Headquarters Jammu
and Kashmir State Forces to move out of Badami Bagh barracks and
to deploy itself near the airfield. It was being administered from
Badami Bagh, but had received no further orders. This was a most
welcome bonus and I immediately informed the Battery Commander
that from that moment his Battery would form part of and be under
command of HQ 161 Infantry Brigade, and would act on orders
received only from my Headquarters. Stuck outside the defences and
with no infantry protection, the Battery was in a very vulnerable
position, but with darkness fast approaching, it was not possible to
effect a change in location. The Battery was, therefore, ordered to
remain in situ for the night and to be ready to move to a fresh loca-
tion by eight o'clock the next morning.
Then came a shock and the bonus, acquiring wings, flew away. I
asked the Battery Commander what targets had been registered and
whether it had been done through silent registration or actual rang-
ing. He informed me that he had not been given any targets, and
even if he had been given any, he would not have been able to engage
them as his guns were without dial sights. That the guns were with-
out this essential part of their equipment was known before the
Battery had left Patiala, but he had been informed that on arrival
in the Valley the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces would supply
them. On arrival, he had asked for the dial sights but had been told
that none were available; nor had any effort been made to get them.
It was not difficult to see that the gunners were completely frust-
rated. Their artillery pieces were in fact hindrances instead of being
assets.
While I stood talking to the unfortunate gunners, the Bodyguard
returned from its reconnaissance and reported no sign of any enemy.
It was ordered to return to Srinagar and to be prepared for another
mission early the next morning; the orders for which would reach it
that evening. As the troopers trotted away, I ordered the Battery
Commander to cock up the barrel of one of his guns and to fire two
rounds of smoke and one round of high explosive into the blue, in
order to give any enemy in the area the impression that a target was
being registered. We had guns that could not hit any given target,
but it was worth announcing to the raiders that we did have guns.
If nothing else it might impose caution and even act as a deterrent.
On arrival back at my Headquarters, a signal was despatched to Delhi
asking for dial sights to be flown in as quickly as was possible.
A Brigade patrol programme for the next day and following night
was then drawn up. Patrolling had so far been uncoordinated and it
was essential that it be brought on a sound basis. Those that af3ected
1 Sikh and 1 Punjab, both these units being out on their own, were
first dealt with and liaison patrols between the two units established.
Then the Maharajah's Bodyguard was given the role of establishing
standing patrols in the area of Gandarbal to watch the approaches
to Srinagar from the north. This Squadron was to move out at first
light and to remain in position until last light. The territory due west
of the airfield and in-between it and 1 Punjab at Magam, had, how-
ever, been totally neglected except for the rather hurried patrol
undertaken by the Bodyguard a few hours earlier. This required
immediate remedying as it was an extremely sensitive area so far as
the security of the airfield was concerned, and although there had
been no indication that the enemy was operating in that area, it was
more than likely that he might, if he learnt that it was being
neglected.
I therefore decided that a patrol, planned and controlled by
Brigade Headquarters, must search the area the next morning. Ear-
marked to carry out this role was the newly formed Brigade reserve
of two Rifle Companies of 4 Kumaon, and one Rifle Company from
the airfield defence battalion, I Kumaon. Orders were issued for the
senior Company Commander of the two 4 Kunlaon Companies and
the Company Commander of the 1 Kumaon Company to report to
me at Brigade Headquarters at 8 o'clock on the morning of 3 Novem-
ber, the three R a e Companies to follow and be concentrated in the
Brigade Headquarters area by a quarter past eight.
The plan for the patrol operation was for the two Companies of
4 Kumaon, the platoon taken as the Brigade Headquarters Defence
Platoon rejoining its Company on arrival, to move to the hills over-
looking the village of Badgam which lay three miles to the west, and
to establish a firm base. When this had been effected, the Rifle Com-
pany of 1 Kumaon was to pass through the firm base and moving
cross country make contact with 1 Punjab at Magam. As the dis-
tance to be traversed by the 1 Kumaon Company was about 8 miles,
it was given four bounds, each of approximately 2 miles, on which
it was to halt prior to proceeding to the next one. On reaching the
second bound, which was the half-way mark, the Company's firm
base would change from the 4 Kumaon held position at Badgam to
the 1 Punjab position at Magam. Until it reached the second bound,
one of the 4 Kumaon Companies was earmarked to rush to its assist-
ance should it encounter any difficulties. On moving forward from
the second bound, the role of reinforcing it was made the responsibi-
lity of 1 Punjab, which was to keep a Rifle Company in readiness for
a quick move. On reaching Magam, the 1 Kumaon Company was to
return and rejoin its battalion on the airfield in the civilian transport
held by 1 Punjab, the two 4 Kumaon Companies to be withdrawn
from Badgam only on orders from Brigade Headquarters. With com-
mand and control of the 1 Kumaon Company changing half way
through its operation, very close coordination supported with sound
comn~unicationshad to be ensured between Brigade Headquarters,
1 Punjab, 4 Kumaon and the 1 Kumaon Company.
While these orders were being prepared for despatch, I walked
out of the Forest Bungalow and looked towards the west. The sky
was lit u p by a red glow of burning huts and houses, the flames lick-
ing their way up to the skies. It was obvious that the raiders had
moved out of Baramula in large numbers and were announcing their
entry into the Valley by setting fire to village after village. Then,
suddenly, flames shot high up from what could only be a house or
a hut on a prominent feature in Gulmarg. This was senseless des-
truction, as Gulmarg, a summer holiday resort, was at that time com-
pletely unoccupied. The firing of the house on the highest feature
could only be interpreted as a grim warning to the people of Srinagar
as to what awaited them. Except for the flames, and a &cker of lights
from kerosene lamps and candles, the Valley, deprived of its electri-
city, remained in darkness.
With the patrol programme checked and ready for despatch, I
decided to go to Srinagar to make contact with Sheikh Abdullah and
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the Leader and Deputy Leader of the
National Conference who were now controlling the Emergency
Government in Jarnmu & Kashrnir. Events throughout the day had
precluded my doing so earlier, but now that matters had been more
or less tidied up, it was an opportune moment. Taking Major Kak
with me, I set out in a jeep. We had barely proceeded two miles
towards Srinagar when we were faced by a long stream of men,
women, children, hand-carts and pack ponies. It was virtually im-
possible to make headway. Inquiries revealed that they were pro-
ceeding to the airstrip in order to be first in the queue for the airlift
to Delhi the next day. As it was impossible to use the road, the jeep
was left with the driver to make his way back to Headquarters as
best he could, add Major Kak and I went back on foot.
The movement of civilians towards the airfield after dark had
almost resulted in an unfortunate incident the previous night, and
on learning of it I had conveyed to the authorities concerned, through
Major Kak, a very special request that after four o'clock in the
evening, all civilian movement from Srinagar towards the airfield
must be stopped. I had been assured that my request would be given
immediate attention and strict measures would be taken to comply
with it. In my letter I had explained very carefully and clearly that
it was quite impossible for the troops to distinguish friend from foe
in the dark, and that the troops had been told that any movement
outside their perimeter, after darkness had set in, would be auto-
matically treated as being hostile. The advance of the civil popula-
tion towards the defences, after dark, would therefore draw fie. I
had also stressed that it presented a very live danger to the troops,
SLENDER WAS THZ THt\Ellf)
as parties of the enemy might intermingle with the civilians in the

dark and attempt a surprise attack.
Rapid orders were now sent to the airfield to warn the troops to
hold their h e and a section of the 4 Kumaon platoon with Brigade
Headquarters was rushed down the road to halt all persons and to
make them spend the night where they were. To have attempted to
make them return to Srinagar would probably have resulted in even
greater chaos. The halting of the civilian column was successfully
achieved, and the danger of moving forward to the airfield in the
dark carefully explained to the entire column. Only then was the
order to the troops to hold their fire rescinded, and we settled down
to face the night, which passed quietly.
Having been inducted into the Valley by air, the units had been
deprived of their own motor transport. The Emergency Government
did its best to assist by placing local passenger buses and load carriers
at the disposal of the Brigade, but these were limited in number
and their running had to be strictly controlled as the petrol stock in
the Valley was at a very low mark. The State Forces also handed
over a few jeeps and 15 cwt trucks but stated that the petrol stock
was almost finished. Apart from the petrol required for the motor
vehicles, there was the problem of refuelling the few Harvard air-
craft which the Indian Air Force had stationed on the Srinagar air-
strip and which, armed with machine guns, were being used for
reconnaissance duties. An unorthodox method had to be adopted for
refuelling them. As each civil airlines Dakota arrived in the Valley,
with troops or stores, it would be met by a jeep with a barrel in the
trailer. The Captain of the Dakota would be asked if he could spare
any petrol, and not a single Captain refused, a receipt being handed
over to the Captain for the approximate amount of petrol decanted
into the barrel.
The petrol thus obtained kept the Harvards airborne, and saved
the diversion of aircraft, already taxed to the limit in ferrying men
and supplies, for fuel-carrying duty. Later some Spitfires were also
positioned in Srinagar and were refuelled in the same manner. When,
in due course, the airline companies submitted their bills for the pay-
ment of the fuel supplied to the Air Force, there was an uproar from
the finance authorities of the Government of India at petrol having
been acquired in this unorthodox manner. They demanded explana-
tions as to why it was not carefully measured on receipt and recorded
on the correct forms. That the method employed was unorthodox is
undeniable, but the conditions prevailing at the time were also extra-
ordinary. Had the petrol been lifted into the Valley in aircraft, which
was the only method open at the time, air freight would have meant
quite a sizeable bill. What is more important, had the civil airline
Captains refused to supply the petrol, the Harvards and Spitfires
would have been grounded, and the battle of Badgam, which was
just around the corner, might have taken an entirely m e r e n t turn
with disastrous consequences for the Valley.
Chapter 7
Anxious Vigil at the Airfield
AT eight o'clock on the morning of 3 November, Major Somnath

Sharma of 4 Kumaon and Captain Ronnie Wood of 1 Kumaon re-
ported to me at my Headquarters. We went over the patrol plan on
the map and discussed the action to be taken by the 1 Kumaon Com-
pany if it encountered the enemy, and the possible action by the
4 Kumaon Company if it had to rush to its assistance. Meanwhile,
the three Rifle Companies had arrived from the airfield, and Shanna
and Wood, having briefed their men, reported that they were ready
to move. Major Somnath Sharma was a seasoned soldier who had
seen much of the bitter fighting in the Arakan during World War 11.
His right arm was heavily plastered, the result of a fracture sustained
in a fall on the hockey ground. Although advised to remain behind
until the fracture had set and the plaster was removed, he had in-
sisted on accompanying his Company into the Valley. He had argued
that he knew his men better than anyone else, and if they were going
ANXIOUS VIGIL AT THE AIRFIELD
into action, they were not going in without him. Captain Wood came
from far-off Assam, and was also a very experienced Company Com-
mander.
The two Companies of 4 Kumaon moved towards Badgam, fol-
lowed after. a short interval by the Company of 1 Kumaon. Soon
after half past nine, Major Sharma reported on the wireless that his
command was in position on the hills in the vicinity of Badgam and
had established a firm base. Captain Wood was then ordered to pass
through the firm base and to head for Magam and make contact with
1 Punjab.
The Rifle Company of 1 Kumaon had an uneventful patrol to
Magam, and having made contact with 1 Punjab, returned to the
airfield just before one o'clock. Captain Wood reported that there
were no signs of the enemy and that the villages that had been
skirted en route were undamaged. With the patrol successfully accom-
plished, Major Somnath Sharma was ordered to commence thinning
out from the Badgam position from half past one. At two o'clock,
Major Sharma reported that one Company had moved back towards
the airfield, and I told him that I would like the second Company
to stay on the position for another hour and to commence withdraw-
ing from three o'clock. He said that everything was very quiet and
that the villagers of Badgam were going about their business in the
normal way. He then confirmed that he would start thinning out,
commencing at three o'clock. There was no indication whatsoever
of what was going to happen within the next thirty minutes.
At twenty-five minutes to three, Major Sharma came up on the
wireless and informed me that his Company was being shot at by
people h a t e d in the houses in Badgam. He said that the firing had
been ineffective, but it was most unpleasant and he had not answered
it for fear of killing or injuring women and children.
While we were discussing this awkward situation and 'how to
cope with it, Major Sharma suddenly said that a large force of the
enemy had appeared from a depression to the west of his position
and was engaging his Company with mortar and automatic small
arms fire. With the road blocked against them at Patan by 1 Sikh, a
group of the raiders had moved across the courltry in an obvious bid
to put the Srinagar airfield out of action, i v l a j ~Sharma appeared to
be worried about the firing from the houses in Badgam which had
intensified, but it was obvious that this was to distract his attention
from the main attack which was developing from the west. H e then
reported that the enemy from the west' had advanced, that his Com-
pany was engaging him with everything that it had, but as he was
heavily outnumbered the enemy was gaining ground. No sooner had
he made this report than I heard a loud explosion, and the wireless
set went off the air.
THE RECONNAISSANCE BY
COMPANIES OF 1 AND 4 KUMAON I
Troop dlrporitionr
l 0..-.
-- - '...-
mo COMPANIES
4 KUMAON
,.. ,.I...i
l
AIRFIELD 1 NUMAON
lam one compuv
F m r Finn Boar
A Liaison Officer with the Indian Air Force was with me at the
time, and he was ordered to rush back to the airstrip and to inform
the Air Force of what had happened and ask for aircraft to strafe the
raiders in the Badgam area. The LO said that he did not have a 1
inch to 1 mile map, nor did the Air Force. Taking up a razor blade,
I imrr~ediatelycut out from the one and only map with Brigade
Headquarters the squares that included Badgam, and handing it to
him asked that it be returned to me the moment the Air Force had
ANXIOUS VIGIL AT THE AWPIEU)
finished with it, as I would require it for the land battle. In a few
minutes fighter aircraft were over Badgam and strafing the area.
With only one map between two aircraft, the form used was for the
leading aircraft to strike the target and the second one to watch
and then attack the same area. As the aircraft returned to the air-
strip, the piece of map was handed to the pilot waiting to take &.
The last sortie completed, the strip of map was rushed to me and
pasted back in its original position. It is probably the only occasion
when the commander of the ground troops and the Air Force pilots
have had to share the same map to fight a battle.
HQ I 6 1 INF ODE
THE BADGAM BATTLE
Troop disooaitiona
mm.f
:
,- ,
, . I*,#'.
--#'
I
Meanwhile, 1 Punjab was ordered to move immediately from

Magam to the Badgam area and to occupy a defensive position on
any suitable feature in the area of Humhom-Badgam in order to seal
off the route to Srinagar. It was not possible to give the battalion
commander, Lt. Col. G. I. S. Kullar, any specific position to occupy
as it was unknown what enemy was in the area and how far he
had advanced. He was told that he would have to judge the situation
for himself on arrival. 1 Punjab moved with great speed, and when
I visited it just before last light, it had taken up positions in the
Humhom area and had taken under command the men of the 4
Kumaon Company which had fallen back under the heavy enemy
pressure. There was peace and quiet in the area, the position having
~tabilisedas quickly as it had erupted, but then peace and calm had
also prevailed shortly before the 4 Kumaon Company came under
enemy fire.
It was impossible to arrive at any conjecture as to the enemy's
future intentions. His route to Srinagar was blocked by 1 Punjab.
This battalion was considerably under-strength, in strange terrain
with neither the chance nor the time to survey the country and for-
mulate a sound defensive plan. While it would be hard-pressed if
attacked by ag overwhelmingly strong enemy force, it would put up
very stiff resistance and take a heavy toll of the enemy. The chances
were, therefore, that the enemy would now turn his attention to the
airstrip. If he did so, the initial opposition that he would encounter
would be a Brigade Headquarters, about twenty-five all ranks in
strength and armed only with rifles and pistols, and bereft of its
Defence platoon. With Brigade Headquarters over-run, as it certainly
would be, command and control would be lost. Even if he did not
assault the airfield defences, the fire from his automatic weapons and
mortars would make the airfield unusable. But with light fading
fast, there was no alternative for Brigade Headquarters other than
to stay put, present the stoutest defence possible if attacked, and
hope for the best.
Brigade Headquarters stood to all night. The long vigil seemed
interminable. Eventually when dawn broke, patrols which moved out
reported that the area was clear. The enemy had failed to exploit his
success at Badgam, and with it had missed the chance of a lifetime.
Why he failed to move towards the airfield is unfathomable. Just
three miles from Badgam lay features from which he could have
commanded the airstrip, which, if denied to us, would have swung
the balance to a marked degree in his favour. Just one aircraft hit
and damaged on the airstrip, or hit in the air and forced to crash-
land, would have made it unusable.
One can only make a guess and ascribe the mason to the bullet
wound suffered by their leader, Kurshed, in his leg. The Pathan
without a leader is like a rudderless ship. With Kurshed wounded,
the tribesmen probably decided to retrace their steps and get him
back to Baramula. Or was it Kurshed's miscalculation of the strength
that faced him ? On return to Karachi he made a statement to the
Press that he had engaged an Indian Army Brigade and had routed
it, while all he had actually engaged was one Rifle Company. Per-
haps it was the reported arrival of 1 Punjab in the Humhom area
which gave the impression that he was facing great strength, and,
womed by the wound in his leg, he thought it prudent to withdraw.
Whatever the reason, the answer will neverabe known, as he died
a few months later.
Major Somnath Sharma was killed in the battle of Badgam, and
a number of his men were l d e d and wounded. The crash heard on
the wireless set before it went off the air was the bursting of a mor-
tar bomb which landed near him. He and his Company had fought
a great battle against tremendous odds and their engagement with
the enemy had disclosed an unknown and dangerous threat. What
would have happened if the 4 Kumaon Company had been given
orders to withdraw at 2 o'clock, in accordance with the original in-
tention, and had not been ordered to remain in position until 3
o'clock, or if Kurshed and his large band of raiders had held their
attack for another half an hour and allowed the Company to with-
draw undisturbed ? 161 Infantry Brigade would in either event have
settled down for the night quite oblivious of the fact that within
three miles of the d e l d , and with the route from Badgam to Sri-
nagar wide open, was a large body of the enemy who could have
presented it suddenly with an extremely serious situation. With 1
Sikh at Patan, 1 Punjab at Magam, and 1 Kumaon and two Com-
panies of 4 Kumaon on the airfield, the Brigade would have been
splintered into three pieces and would have lost its effectiveness as a
fighting formation. If, in addition, the tribesmen had liquidated the
isolated Brigade Headquarters, the confusion would have been mm-
plete.
The deficiency of dial sights with the Patiala Mosntain Battery
was most unfortunate, indeed tragic. Had this Battery been properly
equipped and operational rather than a liability, it would certainly
have been utilised to give covering fire to the 4 Kumaon finn base
at Badgam. It would have been presented with a wonderful target to
shoot at and would have done considerable damage to the enemy,
SLENDEm WAS THE THREAD
including neutralising the enemy mortar fire to answer which 4

Kumaon had nothing. On the other hand, if the dial sights were not
available in Patiala the Battery must have been completely untrained,
and its firing could have been as erratic as was the decision to send
it to the Valley in a non-operational state.
In the morning of 4 November, while engaged in reviewing the
grim situation that had faced the Brigade the previous evening and
during the night, and making the necessary adjustments to the troop
dispositions, I received a message that Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the
Deputy Prime Minister of India, and Sardar Baldev Singh, the
Defence Minister, had arrived in the Valley and were on their way
to my Headquarters. On arrival, I led them into the Operations Room
and briefed them on the situation. I explained what had happened
at Badgam and stressed that it was only sheer good fortune that had
seen us through the crisis. I then empliasised that Srinagar must now
be viewed as being very definitely threatened. Sardar Baldev Singh
was wide awake and had taken in all that I said. Sardar Pate1 had,
however, closed his eyes soon after I had begun the briefing and I
assumed that he was feeling the effects of the air journey and had
fallen asleep. The briefing completed, I therefore looked at Sardar
Baldev Singh and asked him a direct question : "Am I expected to
eject the tribesmen from the Valley regardless of the fate that mav
befall Srinagar, or is the town to be saved ?"
Sardar Pate1 stirred. The Tiger had not been asleep, and had heard
every word of the briefing. A strong and determined man, and one
of few words, "Of course Srinagar must be saved," he snapped.
"Then I must have more troops and very quickly," I answered,
adding : "And if it is possible, I would like some artillery."
Sardar Pate1 rose. "I'm returning to Delhi immediately," he said,
"and you will get what you want as quickly as I can get them to
you." On reaching the vehicle park, I called forward my jeep and
asked him whether I could drive-him to the airfield. "No, Brigadier,"
he replied, "don't bother to come to the airport to see me off. You
have got more important things to do than wasting your time doing
that." He then climbed into his own vehicle and, with a wave of his
hand, was off.
That evening I got a message that two Battalions of Infantry, one
Squadron of Armoured Cars and a Battery of Field Artillery were
being despatched to the Valley by road. The Engineers had bridged
the numerous culverts on the road from Pathankot to Jammu, and
the Valley could now receive large bodies of troops by surface trans-
ANXIOUS VICIL AT THE AIRFIELD
port. This was heartening news, as the airstrip was beginning to

look like a ploughed field. Sardar Pate1 had lived up to his reputation
as a man of action.
Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who had gone.
to the airfield to see Sardar Pate1 off, apparently decided to visit
Brigade Headquarters on their way back to Srinagar. Having been
denied the opportunity of meeting them the evening before, because
of the road being blocked by people heading for the airstrip, I had
no idea what they looked like. They arrived when I was busy on a
wireless set, and Major Kak, the Liaison Officer, had led them into
the Brigade Operations Room and had proceeded to explain the
situation to them, pointing out the deployment of the Brigade. When
I entered the room and was greeted with the sight of two unknown
civilians carefully studying the map, I was furious. I did not ask who
they were, but ordered them to leave the room immediately and
never to set .foot in it again. They left hurriedly. It was only when
their vehicle had disappeared into the distance that Major Kak told
me who they were.
Chapter 8
The Battle of Shalateng
the day - 4 November - information poured in from all sorts

DURING
of sources to the effect that the enemy was here, there and every-
where. With the limited number of troops available, it was quite
impossible to engage them and in any case, as they had split into
parties of varying strength and were constantly on the move, it would
have been tactically unsound to have attempted to do so. It was clear
that to bring the tribesmen to battle and to defeat them, it was essen-
tial that they concentrate. Unless some method could be evolved to
achieve this, they would i&ct immense damage with hit-and-run
raids. I therefore decided that the best way to effect such a con-
centration would be to give them the incentive to do so, and this
could only be achieved by giving them a very attractive bait.
The bait, I felt, could only be the road - freedom to use which,
I was convinced, would act like a magnet. The tribesmen had been
tempted to come to the Valley because of the loot that they would
THE BATITS OF SHALATENC
be able to take back, and with the use of the main road denied to
them they could not move the vehicles which were so essential to
carry back their booty. 1 Sikh at Patan was the stumbling block, and
I decided to withdraw this battalion and throw open the road to the
tribals. The withdrawal from Patan, coming in the wake of the Bad-
gam battle, would, I hoped, give the tribal leaders the impression that
we had taken a crippling knock at Badgam and were pulling in our
horns.
STATE FORCE
BODY OUARD
OlSPOSlTlONS AS ON
6 NOVEMBER 1847
Before rushing headlong into an action based on a hunch, the

relevant factors had to be given serious consideration. There was a
live possibility that 1 Sikh might be segregated from the rest of the
Brigade by the enemy, who could very easily interpose himself in-
between 1 Sikh and Srinagar. If this materialised, the maintenance
convoys to 1 Sikh at Patan would either have to run the gauntlet of
enemy f i e or face ambushes. It was also not improbable that the
enemy would pin down 1 Sikh in the Patan area and move past the
flanks of the battalion and on to Srinagar, thereby reducing the
attacking potential of 161 Infantry Brigade to just one bat talion,
1 Kumaon, or if a risk was to be taken and 1 Punjab removed from
Humhom, to two battalions. This would be totally inadequate to
ensure the safety of Srinagar. Although there was never any doubt
that 1 Sikh, a strong battalion with two extra Rifle Companies, would
be able to hold Patan, its withdrawal and with it a temporary loss
of territory which could be recovered in a matter of hours was accep-
ted as a justifiable gamble on the chance of the enemy biting the
bait and presenting us with a concentrated target. Orders were
issued to 1 Sikh to evacuate Patan and withdraw to Srinagar.
The Commanding Officer of 1 Sikh, Lt. Col. Sampuran Bachan
Singh, was most unhappy when he received the order to withdraw
to Srinagar. He stated that he would find it very difficult to break
contact with the enemy, who were now active along his front and
possibly in his rear. But firmness was employed and 1 Sikh evacuated
Patan after darkness had set in, and withdrew to Srinagar without
any interference from the enemy.
The gamble worked like magic. Penny packets of the raiders dis-
appeared from our front and information poured in throughout the
next day that they were all heading back towards Baramula. That
evening, while 1 Sikh was preparing to evacuate Patan, I went to
call on Sheikh ~ b d u l l a h .He had taken up residence in a small house
next to Nedous' Hotel, and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and D. P.
Dhar were closeted with him in a room lit by candles. Major Kak
introduced me, and I apologised for the rough treatment that I had
meted out to them that morning, explaining that an Operations Room
is more or less a 'holy of holies', access to which is strictly limited.
In the flickering light of the candles we then studied a map that
had been laid out on the table and discussed the situation. The
National Conference Volunteers, carefully chosen individuals from
the political party headed by Sheikh Abdullah, who volunteered to
carry out reconnaissance missions many of which were very danger-
ous, had brought in a great deal of information relating to the move-
ment of the tribesmen. I was shown on the map the concentrations
that had been located and were stated to be obvious targets
for attack.
I listened patiently, making notes and stating that I would do what
I could. What I did not say was that with the limited number of
troops at my disposal I could do nothing at the time to engage the
concentrations, nor did I mention that I had, only an hour previously,
ordered 1 Sikh to withdraw from Patan. I knew they would learn
of it sooner or later, but to have mentioned it at that moment, when
I was being urged to move out and engage the raiders, would have
been catastrophic. During the conference I had noticed a definite
tinge of bitterness in the hearts of the three men in the room, and
it was Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed who, unable to restrain himself,
brought the reason to the surface. "Brigadier," he said, "may I ask
you a question 3" I answered in the affirmative. "What," he conti-
nued, "would you do to a commander who left his troops and ran
away ?"
"Court-martial him," I replied, "on a charge of cowardice."
"Well, that's just what our Maharajah has done," he said slowly.
"He is the Commander in Chief of the State Forces, and when the
tribesmen arrived at Mahura he collected all his valuables, loaded
them into all the trucks he could lay hands on, and bolted with his
family to Jammu."
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed's statement was not wholly accurate.
The Maharajah might have been the Commander in Chief of the
State Forces, but he was the titular head and not the executive corn-
mander. That position was held by the Chief of Staff, who, un-
fortunately, had been killed at Diwan Mandir. Nor had the Maha-
rajah 'bolted' as Bakshi had put it. He had been persuaded for poli-
tical reasons to leave Srinagar and take up residence in another part
of his State. Had he remained in Srinagar and f d e n into tribal hands,
his functions as the Maharajah would have been dictated to him.
There was very little movement along the roads and no motor
vehicles were operating as I made my way ba'ck to my Headquarters.
Srinagar, with the dull glow of candles behind the windows of the
houses, gave the impression of a city that h e w it was doomed but
was trying to postpone the dread fate by hiding itself under a blanket
of darkness. The streets were deserted, but not due to any curfew
or other order warning people to remain indoors after dark. At no
time were such restrictions placed on Srinagar, as doing so might
create panic which anti-social elements and fifth columnists would
exploit to embarrass the Emergency Government.
As I expected, my signal to Jak Force Headquarters - it had mean-

while been established at Jammu - that I had withdrawn I Sikh from
Patan created a furore. Major General Kulwant Singh sent a message
that he would be arriving by air early the next morning, 5 flovember
and wished me to meet him at the airfield. He arrived at ten o'clock,
and having driven him to my Headquarters, I explained to him in
detail my reasons for having ordered the move. He was not in a
receptive mood, and not one bit impressed with my arguments. He
told me in 110 uncertain terms that he entirely disagreed with me,
that the tribals would never move towards Baramula but would
surge forward to Srinagar, and that my opinion was not a calculated
risk but sheer suicide. He made it very clear that as Jak Force Head-
quarters had not been approached before the order was issued, I
must accept full responsibility for what I had done. Further, he
insisted that I give it to him in writing, and in triplicate, that I had
withdrawn 1 Sikh without his approval and without consulting Jak
Force Headquarters. This I did, and having placed the three copies
in his pocket he stormed out of Headquarters and drove to Srinagar
to make a courtesy call on Sheikh Abdullah.
Major Kak, who accompanied Major General Kulwant Singh,
returned to Brigade Headquarters after a short while and stated that
neither Sheikh Abdullah nor Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed were
present. They had received information about the withdrawal from
Patan, and had left to visit various areas to ascertain for themselves
the effect that it had on the population. D. P. Dhar was, meanwhile,
in an aircraft heading for Delhi. It was he himself who, six weeks
later while lunching with me at Uri, apologetically told me the object
of his flight to Delhi. It was to interview the Prime Minister person-
ally and to request him to despatch another Brigadier to command
the troops in the Valley. Pandit Nehru had immediately agreed, but
Sardar Patel, who was also present, was adamant that no change of
commander was called for, regardless of the merit or demerit of with-
drawing from Patan. Sardar Patel's view prevailed.
With the road link from Pathankot to the Valley now available, I
considered that I could afford to take a risk with the safety of the
airfield. Sardar Pate1 had been emphatic that Srinagar must be saved,
and so I decided to redeploy the troops with the accent changed
from the security of the airfield to the security of Srinagar. There
were numerous approaches to Srinagar from almost every point of
the compass, and to cover all of them was impossible. The risk of
infiltration into the city by small bodies of the tribesmen would,
therefore, Lave to be accepted, although if it did materialise it would
be very difficult to flush them out. The only course open was to
occupy certain nodal points on the outskirts of the city, to patrol
vigorously, and to switch to the offensive as soon as was possible
after the arrival of the reinforcements that were already on their
way to the Valley.
As 4 Kumaon were still in the process of being built up, whatever
had arrived of the unit was made responsible for the defence of the
airstrip. 1 Punjab was left in its position in the Humhom area astride
the road leading from Badgarn to Srinagar, and 1 Kumaon was moved
forward from the airstrip and deployed in the R a e Range area, locally
named Chandmari, with orders to deny to the enemy the approaches
to the city from the west. 1 Sikh, on return from Patan, was deployed
on the south-eastern edges of Srinagar and covered the road running
from Pampur to the city. This was essential as there had been per-
sistent reports that the enemy had by-passed the airfield, moving
south of it, and was heading towards that suburb of Srinagar. The
Knshmir State Force Bodyguard was located in the Gandarbal area
with the role of covering the approaches to the city from both the
north and the west. This defensive layout, planned to save the
threatened city, was light by any standards, there still being many
loopholes, but with the limited number of troops available it was as
much as one could do.
What was particularly worrying was the fact that there was no
Brigade reserve. If any sector of the front came under heavy enemy
pressure and necessitated rapid reinforcing, it could only be achieved
by withdrawing a sub unit or unit from another sector. This would
result in the already slender Brigade defensive layout being still
further embarrassed. An infantry battalion, no matter how weak in
strength, or even two reasonably strong Rifle Companies, would have
been worth their weight in gold. They would have shifted the bias
from what was not short of extreme peril to a position which,
although dangerous, could have been held in check without placing
in jeopardy other equally sensitive areas. Unfortunately, they were
not available, or, to be strictly accurate, they were not known to be
available.
Strange though it may appear, a very large number of Jammu &
Kashmir State Force troops, fully trained and equipped, with Officers
and Non-Commissioned Officers, were, unknown to HQ 161 Infantry
Brigade, concealing themselves in Badami Bagh Barracks in Srinagar.
What made this crime even more heinous was the fact that 1 Sikh
was deployed south-east of Badami Bagh Barracks and was in fact

covering the route to the Barracks. The reason for HQ Jammu &
Kashmir State Forces adopting this attitude is unfathomable since,
if 161 Infantry Brigade had suffered a serious reverse, the tribals
would have slaughtered them in the Barracks. It was only towards
the end of the first week of December, just over a month later, and
after 161 Infantry Brigade had attacked and hurled back the tribals
and was consolidating its position at Uri, 62 miles to the west of
Srinagar, that the existence of over 1,850 fully armed, trained and
equipped officers and other ranks of the J & K State Forces in Badami
Bagh Barracks came to light. The State Force had run out of rations
and had submitted a ration indent to Rear Headquarters 161 Infantry
Brigade which was located in Srinagar. This request was relayed by
telephone to Main Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade at Uri, and
permission sought to issue 2,000 rations. As the Maharajah's Body-
guard had been despatched to Jammu towards the end of November,
and I had been originally informed by Major Kak that there were
only a small number of State Force troops in Badami Bagh Barracks,
hospital or convalescent cases, I assumed that the request was for
200 men for ten days. The rations were sanctioned, but Rear Head-
quarters was instructed to ensure that the State Forces realised that
the rations were being issued for that period. I was, however, in-
formed that the State Force indent gave the figure of 2,000 all ranks,
which included the non-combatants enrolled.
Rear HQ was ordered to check back with the State Forces, it being
more than probable that an extra '0' had slipped into the indent
through a typist's error. The reply was received about ten minutes
later. The figure of 2,000 was confirmed as correct by the State Force,
that being the actual strength of the State Forces personnel in Badami
Bagh. Wondering whether the rations were to be utilised to feed
unauthorised personnel, I instructed Rear Headquarters to issue just
5000 rations, and to inform HQ J & K State Forces that I would be
arriving at Badami Bagh at ten o'clock the next morning and that
all Officers and men, including the non-combatants enrolled, were
to be paraded on the barrack square in full field service marching
order. Only the sick and convalescent cases would be excused from
the parade, but their numbers and exact location would be included
on the Parade State.
I arrived at Badami Bagh Barracks at ten o'clock the next morning
and was led to the Parade Ground. I was greeted with a sight that
was quite shattering. Lined up on the Parade Ground was a mass of
armed personnel, equipped with light machine guns, sten guns
and rifles. The Parade State showed 1,854 all ranks present on parade
and 146 in the hospital or in the barracks. I inspected the parade and
noticed that almost every man was wearing a campaign or other
medal issued during World Wir 11, establishing the fact that they
were not raw recruits. Meanwhile two of my Staff Officers were mak-
ing a head count and confirmed that the number 1,854 was correct.
I ordered the parade to be dismissed and taking the officers aside,
I asked them where they had been during the last two months.
There was a grim silence. On an answer being demanded from the
senior officer present, he informed me sheepishly that everyone had
been in Srinagar the whole period. My further question as to why
they had concealed their existence from 161 Infantry Brigade, and
done nothing to assist in the grim days that the Brigade had had
to face, remained unanswered. I went away from Badami Bagh Bar-
racks thoroughly disgusted.
I telephoned Major General Kulwant Singh at Jammu and asked
him to come to the Valley to see a very interesting sight. He arrived
the next day, was presented with an identical parade, and was as
stunned as I had been. I informed him that I did not want these per-
sonnel in the Valley and requested orders for their immediate des-
patch to Jammu. They were merely consuming rations that were
still being built up, were nothing more or less than a liability, and
would never win my confidence. He agreed, and orders were issued
immediately. I was however persuaded to retain 600 Dogras and to
form them into a n ad hoc battalion. The battalion, when formed,
was moved to Baramula to garrison that town and patrol the arez.
It proved, however, to be such a nuisance, upsetting not only the
civilians but also the troops of 161 Infantry Brigade, that I had to
pack it off to Jammu after a week.
Having spent the morning and afternoon of 5 November visiting
all units and ensuring that the Commanding Officers had no doubts
that needed clarifying, I went to see Major General Kulwant Singh
at his residence in Srinagar, in order to brief him on the latest situa-
tion. He had calmed down quite considerably, accepting the with-
drawal of 1 Sikh from Patan as a fait accompli. I gave him the
latest tactical picture, informed him of the progress of the reinforce-
ments which were expected to reach the Valley on the evening of 7
November, and explained to him my future plans.
The date I had selected for the attack, I informed him, was 10
November, and the plan, in brief, was to hold the enemy with the
SLENDER WAS THE TllRJMD
troops already in position, and to make a wide encircling movement

with the two battalions due to arrive, from their concentration area,
which would be the airfield, to Patan Via Magam. The approach
march to Patan would be carried out in the dark, commencing in the
early hours of 10 November, and the rate of the advance so timed
as to enable the column commander to launch his attack on Patan
at first light. Reliable guides, who knew every inch of the ground,
were already with me at my Headquarters, and this would ensure
that although the units moving to Patan would be strange to the
ground, they would not lose direction. Further, a Company Com-
mander of 1 Sikh, who knew the Patan position well, would be attach-
ed to the Column Commander and would be readly available to
assist him with advice relating to the quick deployment of the units
into defence on the Patan feature. As soon as Patan had been con-
solidated, the enemy sandwiched in-between Patan and Srinagar
would be subjected to attacks from both the front and the rear. When
enemy resistance had been broken, the units from Srinagar would
advance to Patan, which would be held as a firm base, and move
forward to assault Baramula. This, I estimated, if things went accord-
ing to plan, would b e on 11 November.
Major General Kulwant Singh agreed that it was a sound plan,
but inquired whether it would be possible to speed it up by one day,
that is, to capture Baramula by 10 November. I said that I would
try to do so, but it was dependent on the actual date and hour of
arrival of the reinforcements, and also the physical condition of the
troops. They were scheduled to arrive in Srinagar by about last light
on 7 November, but the Banihal Pass had to be surmounted, and it
was not impossible that the loaded vehicles might feel the strain,
and the overheating of their engines might result iri enforced stop-
pages and consequent delay in arrival. Moreover, the troops would
have been on the road, cooped up in vehicles, for possibly 72 hours,
and with lack of sleep, cramp and hill road sickness, which would
certainly affect a number of them, time would have to be allowed
for them to find their land legs and regain their fighting efficiency.
It was finally agreed to leave the 'D' Day to mv discretion and I
returned to my Headquarters, still in the Forest Bungalow, to finalise
the plan.
The leading vehicles with the reinforcements actually arrived more
or less on schedule, soon after last light on 7 November, and the
whole column was in the airfield area just before midnight, but the
plan incorporating them was not to see the light of day.
On the night of 5 November, an unfortunate incident took place
involving a party of National Conference Volunteers. Returning to
Srinagar from a patrol in the Badgam area, it approached the posi-
tions held by 1 Sikh after darkness had set in. It was challenged, but
instead of answering the challenge, started to run. The 1 Sikh sentry
opened fire at the fleeing personnel, firing more at the sound than
any specific target. The next morning, the bodies of two men were
found about fifty yards from the 1 Sikh outpost. The unit could not
be held to blame for this incident, as it was impossible to see the in-
truders in the dark and they might well have been the enemy. Where
the unit did err was that the bodies having been recovered were
buried in slit. trenches in fhe unit's position, and Brigade Head-
quarters was not informed.
Tlle news that two of his Volunteers had been killed reached
Sheikh Abdullah first thing the next morning, and he asked me to
meet him. I had, fortunately, been informed by Major Kak of the
reason for the meeting, and having obtained the details from 1 Sikh,
I arrived at Sheikh Abclullah's house to be greeted by an infuriated
individual. I offered him my deepest sympathies that such an un-
fortunate incident should have cost two lives, but impressed on him
that it was the result of a genuine mistake, which could have been
avoided had the Volunteers answered the challenge and not run
away. H e was very upset and it took some time to get him to accept
the explanation, whereupon he calmed down. Dissident elements de-
cided, however, to make capital out of the incident. I was left no
option but to move 1 Sikh away from its position a t the south-eastem
end of Srinagar. The battalion was redeployed in the Rifle Range
area, to the north of 1 Kumaon and with its right flank resting on the
Jhelum River and astride the Srinagsr-Bararnula road.
No sooner had 1 Sikh evacuated its positions and moved to the
Rifle Range area than certain locals dug up the two bodies and carried
them in procession through the main roads of the city. Major Gene-
ral Kulwant Singh, who had also gone to see Sheikh Abdullah, to
offer his condoleness, was present \vllen the procession reached the
latter's residence, and not all his efforts prevented Sheikh Abdullah
from relapsins into a most morose state. It was then that Bakshi
Ghulam Mohammed rose to the occasion. Going to the head of the
procession he explained to the people what had happened and told
them that it was nothing but an unfortunate accident. They listened
to him, and having accepted his statement dispersed quietly. While
it lasted, however, it was a most e-qlosive situation.
The morning and afternoon of 6 November was spent in tidying

up the defences, and in briefing the unit commanders on the latest
situation and the proposed plan of action. I t was a quiet day, dis-
turbed only by the demonstration in the city, with no signs of the
enemy. All the reports that flowed in indicated that he had aban-
doned his harassing of the villages, and after wandering abovt the
area in parties of varying size, was hurrying back in the direction
of Baramula. The gamble in withdrawing 1 Sikh from Patan, in the
hope that it would tempt the tribesmen to concentrate, had paid off.
Now it was merely a question of when they would debouch from
Baramula towards Srinagar in their thousands and engage 161 In-
fantry Brigade in what would be a critical battle, on the result of
which depended the fate of Srinagar and the Valley. There was a
possibility that the enemy might dawdle and postpone his advance
towards Srinagar for another 48 hours, that is, not commence his
rnove until the morning of 8 November. In that case, the arrival of
the reinforcements on the evening of 7 November would halve the
numerical advantage that he possessed at the moment, which was
in the region of five to one. 161 Infantry Brigade's chances of scoring
a decisive victory would then be greatly enhanced.
If, however, he advanced before the arrival of the reinforcements,
and that meant during the early hours of the morning of 7 Novem-
ber, he would meet two battalions holding a thin red line, with
nothing in the shape of a strong reserve behind them. If he suc-
ceeded in breaching the line held by 1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon, a Rifle
Company of 4 Kumaon could be rushed up from the airfield, but it
would be faced with a task quite beyond its capabilities. I t was fully
expected that the enemy would make his approach march from
Baramula to Srinagar during the hours of darkness. I t was appre-
ciated that the enemy commander would not be so foolhardy as to
attempt a motorised advance along the main road during the hours
of daylight. He would realise from the air attack that struck the
raiders attacking Badgam, that such a column would be subjected to
similar treatment. There was a danger inherent in the enemy's ad-
vance in the dark, as having debussed, he might have probed the
position held by 161 Infantry Brigade and eventually found the left
flank of 1 Kumaon. Had he done so, and moved around it in strength,
it could have been disastrous. It was, therefore, koped that he would
confine his activity to the area near the road and attempt to bulldoze
his n7ay through the position. This course if adopted by the enemy
- llnd its disadvantage in that it would probably result in the two
THE BATIZE .OF SHALArraJC
front lines being so close together that it would have been impossible
to use aircraft for strafing purposes, thereby neutralising our air
superiority.
Last-light reports on 6 November, from all sources, still indicatd
bodies of the tribesmen weaving their paths back to Baramula, and
gave rise to the hope that although the advance might commence
during the early hours of the morning of 7 November, it was more
likely that it would be 8 November, or perhaps even later. This
assumption, which was a fair one, was based on a number of reliable
reports that the enemy commander was having a spot of bother with
his various tribal clans as to who should lead the way. Each tribal
leader evidently felt that someone else should be in the forefront,
and was not prepared to allow the rest of the column to move on
unless all his men had returned to Baramula. This attitude could
only cause delay which eminently suited 161 Infantry Brigade.
In order to cater for the possibility of an attack developing before
the reinforcements were ready to carry out the encirclement move
to Patan, an alternative plan was also preparcd and kept ready.
This plan provided for one of the battalions rushing forward from
the airfield and being placed in depth in the Rifle Range area, the
other battalion being held close to Srinagar and in reserve. That the
tribesmen would not appreciate a frontal slogging match against
Regular troops, deployed in what would be Brigade strength, gave
much confidence and strength to this plan. IVhile the alternative
plan was receiving its finishing touches and I was trying to pry into
the mind of the enemy commander, an officer walked into the Opera-
tions Room and announced that he was Major Inder Rikhye. He told
me that he was the Squadron Commander of a Squadron of Armour-
ed Cars of 7 Cavalry, and had been leading the reinforcement mn-
voy. As the bridge at Ramban was not in a v e n sound condition,
the passage of vehicles across it was being limited to one at a time,
thereby causing quitt a bit of delay. He had left the remainder of
his Squadron to accompany the main convoy, and had come ahead
with a Troop of Armoured Cars and a Rifle Troop. The main con-
voy, he estimated, would arrive late the next evening, 7 November,
on schedule. As the four Armoured Cars with him had been sub-
jected to considerable strain, he requested that he be given the next
day free for the maintenance of the vehicles.
I explained to Major Rikhye the situation as it faced us, and told
him that his unanticipated arrival had virtually been a gift from the
gods, and asked him whether it was humanly possible for him to
SLENDER WAS TILE THREAD
produce something, no matter how small, to assist with the next day's
reconnaissances. Sheikh Abdullah had constantly requested me to
send troops to Bandipura, a town lying to the north of Wular Lake,
since the people were panicking although the tribesmen had not
approached the town. I was unable to accede to the Sheikh's re-
quest, but now we had the ideal troops for the task. If he could carry
out a reconnaissance to Bandipura, which would mean a turn-round
of 74 miles, it would relieve Sheikh Abdullah of his anxiety and
also establish whether there was a threat to Srinagar from the north.
Major Rikhye left the room and returned after a short time with
Lieutenant Noel David, the Troop Commander. H e informed me
that all hands would be turned on to two Armoured Cars to get
them ready for the task, and they, together with the Rifle Troop,
would be ready to move at first light the next morning.
Lieut. David was then briefed. H e was to move from Brigade
Headquarters through Srinagar to Zinyimar and on to Gandarbal.
Here he was to contact the local Police Station, liaise with the Maha-
rajah's Bodyguard, and obtain any information that they might
possess. Leaving Gandarbal, he was to proceed via Krahom, Camping
Ground at point 5250, to Tsiyu and on to Bandipura. After spending
about an hour at Bandipura and having obtained the latest informa-
tion from all sources, he was to return to Brigade Headquarters by
the same route. From the moment he left Brigade Headquarters on
his outward journey, and until he reported back, he was to keep in
constant touch with Major Rikhye by wireless and report his pro-
gress. The briefing over, I finished the plan that I had been working
at, and we had dinner and settled in for the night. Not one of us had
any idea of the very vital part that this reconnaissance was going to
play in the events that were going to strike us the next morning.
No contact was made with the enemy during the night of 6 Novem-
ber, nor in the early hours of the 7th morning. This was exactly what
had been hoped for. At half past six, two Armoured Cars and the
Rifle Troop of 7 Cavalry, under the command of Lieut. David, start-
ed out from Brigade Headquarters to carry out its reconnaissance.
A guide led them through the city and having placed them on the
road to Gandarbal, returned and reported that he had done so.
David's reports commenced coming in almost immediately, relating
mainly to the expressions on people's faces as they saw the Armoured
Cars. It was while we were receiving these reports, and having a
laugh at some of them, that 1 Sikh came on the air soon after seven
o'clock. The Commanding Officer reported that his forward Com-
THE BA'ITLE OF S H U I E N C
MILES 6 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 MILES
panies were being heavily sniped at by the enemy, and then, a few
moments later, that the Rifle Company which was covering the
bridge in the vicinity of milestone 4 was being heavily engaged by
light automatic fire. Rushing to my jeep with a Rover wireless set
in it, I streaked off to the Rifle Range area, with Major Rikhye fol-
lowing in the jeep in which had been installed a wireless set linked
to Lieut. David. As I flashed through the city, I did not hear the
sound of firing, this presumably being dimmed by the somewhat
thick mist. The people were moving about unconcerned and appa-
rently unaware of the fact that the enemy was at their doorstep.
As I neared the Rifle Range area, the sound of firing was distinctly
audible, and by the time I had reached the Hesdquarters of 1 Sikh,
the volume of firing had increased quite appreciably. It was apparent
that the enemy was opposite us in strength, but whether we were in
contact with a strong leading element or the whole body of them it
was impossible to gness. I contacted my Brigade Major on the wire-
less set and having explained the situation to him, ordered him to
rush to the airfield and request the Air Force to carry out an im-
mediate reconnaissance of the road linking Srinagar and Patan, and
the area to the north and south of it. I wanted answers to the follow-
ing questions as soon as possible :
( a ) What is the approximate strength of the enemy facing us
in the milestone 4 area ?
( b ) What other strength, if any, is moving down the road
towards us 2
( c ) Are there any vehicles on the road, and if so, how many
and where i s the head of the convoy ?
( d ) Is there any large-scale movement towards the Humhom-
Badgam area ?
The mist had lifted and visibility was good when a Harvard flew
over the Rifle Range heading weshvards, and the first report was
received a few minutes later. It stated that the enemy was in front
of us in their thousands, that no further strength was moving down
the road and that about one hundred and fifty lorries were parked
almost nose to tail on the road, facing east, with the head at about
milestone 6. The second report stated that there was little movement
north of the road, but extensive movement to the south of it, and
trenches were being dug. There was no movement towards Humhom
or Badgam.
A medium machine gun now opened fire and this was closely
followed by two rounds of smoke from a three-inch mortar. The
THE BATT'LE OF SHALATEYC,
MMG fire coming from the enemy right flank established the f a d
that the defectors of the 4 J & K Infantry were in that area. Mean-
while, the volume of rifle and automatic fire increased steadily, cover-
ing almost the entire frontage, of the Brigade. The situation that I
had played for had been presented to me, but unfortunately 24 hours
too early. We were heavily outnumbered both in manpower and
weapons, having no medium machine guns and only a very few three-
inch mortars. If only the Patiala Mountain Battery had been equip-
ped with dial sights, here were perfect targets, and targets that could
have been struck so effectively that the enemy concentration would
probably have been broken up. Even if the Patiala gunners were
untrained, it would have made no difference, as I would have made
them swap places with the well-trained Mountain gunners now being
used by 1 Sikh as a Rifle Company. Unfortunately, the dial sights so
urgently signalled for on the evening of 3 November had not yet
been received.
What was very disturbing was the thought that, in the course of
the next hour or so, the situation prevailing at milestone 4 would
become known in Srinagar and it would perhaps result in panic set-
ting in. This would suit the tribals, but would seriously embarrass
the Brigade's lines of communication and nullify any chance of mov-
ing forward 1 Punjab from Humhom, should it be absolutely neces-
sary, and cut off the replenishment of our ammunition from the air-
field. There was no option, however. Even if we were outnumbered
by five to one, and also outgunned, this concentration had to be
tackled immediately and routed, and that meant within the next
hour, before the enemy had had a chance to consolidate his position.
Once he was well established, he would probably pin down both
1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon to the ground, and during the hours of dark-
ness sweep round the left flank of 1 Kumaon and stream into
Srinagar.
Thus came about the battle of Shalateng, fought in the morning
of 7 November, seventy-two hours before the proposed 'D' Day. It
had been forced on 161 Infantry Brigade before it had been geared
to face it, and was, therefore, fought with a plan that I had to formu-
late on the spur of the moment. In view of the fact that it was vital
that the attack be launched with the minimum loss of time, it was
simple in the extreme.
The troops available for the battle were 1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon,
both deployed in the Rifle Range area, two Armoured Cars and a
Rifle Troop of 7 Cavalry, and one R l e Company of 4 Kumaon which
SLENDER WAS THE TE-D
had been rushed forward from the airfield and located in the rear
of 1 Sikh as the Brigade reserve. The withdrawal of 1 Punjab from
Humhom and its deployment in the Rifle Range area was given
serious consideration, but in view of the behaviour of certain
elements at Badgam on 3 November, it was decided to leave that
battalion in its position. I t was also thought that the withdrawal of
1 Punjab would become known to the enemy and would perhaps
encourage him to work his way around the left flank of 1 Kumaon,
and threaten not only Srinagar but also endanger the security of the
airfield. An immediate air strike was also considered, but with the
two front lines so close together, it would have had to be delivered
at the rear elements of the enemy, and this might have resulted in
their surging forward into 1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon, and a hand to hand
battle might have resulted, which, with the numerical odds against
us, was not acceptable until we were ready for it.
I decided, therefore, to hold the enemy with 1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon
until such time as I could bring Lieut. David and his small element
from 7 Cavalry into the battle. Taking Major Inder Rikhye to
a sheltered spot where we could open out a map and study it with-
out attracting the enemy's attention, we discussed the situation.
Rikhye had already made inquiries regarding the state of the other
two Armoured Cars undergoing maintenance, but they were un-
fortunately already being worked upon and could not be got ready
for some considerable time. The map showed an unmetalled road
taking off from Krahom to Sumbal on the Jhelum River. From
Sumbal a road ran south, through Shadipur until it joined the main
Srinagar-Baramula road at the village of Shalateng. This stretch of
road was metalled, and while this would present no problems we
were uncertain about the unmetalled portion from Krahom to
Sumbal, as it had some bridges which might or might not be capable
of withstanding the weight of an Armoured Car. If, however, the
bridges could be crossed by the Armour, David could get his cars
down to Shalateng and would arrive in the rear of the enemy. The
surprise he would create among the tribesmen, when he opened up
with his automatics, would be quite devastating. It was a gamble
well worth taking, and Rikhye rushed to his Rover-set jeep to guide
David on to Sumbal and Shalateng, while I called in the Command-
ing Officers of 1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon to my Command Post.
Lt. Col. Pritam Singh of 1 Kumaon and Lt. Col. Sampuran Bachan
Singh of 1 Sikh sat grim-faced as I explained the plan. 1 Sikh was
ordered to remain in its position and to continue to answer the enemy
TIiE BATTLE: OF SIIALATEYC
fire ligl~tly.1 Kurnaon was to get ready to move, and when I gave
the executive order, it was to work its way for~vardto the west, ,in
small parties, as surreptitiously as possible, for about n mile, and
then to form up facir~gnorth. This would placc the battalion on the
Position d tha Amloand nl

Ritla Troop 7 CAVALRY
SITUATION AT 0730 HOURS

ON 7 NOVEMBER 1947
Routa t o be Followrd by 7 CAVALRY
.?.a,
troop dirpo~itions ,,, ,,, : :
MILES 5 4 3 2 1 0 S 10 MILES
-
right flank of the enemy. When Lieut. David and his command were
in position in the region of the road junction near Shalateng and
ready for action, I would give the order GO. On receiving this order,
the Armoured Cars would engage the enemy with their automatics
and 1 Sikh would open up with rapid fire. At the same time,
1 Kumaon would advance and deliver a bayonet assault on the enemy
right flank. I impressed on the two battalion commanders that the
plan was based on the ability of the Armoured Cars to reach Shala-
teng, and if they found it impossible to cross the bridges that lay
in their path, I would whip them back to Srinagar and bring them
in behind 1 Sikh, and formulate another plan. Meanwhile, they were
to brief their units regarding the plan that had been formulated, and
I would keep them informed of the progress of the Armour. Finally,
I informed them that I was quite certain that neither they nor I had
any doubts in our minds that there could only be one result to our
attack, it just had to be a complete success.
The two battalion commanders having left, I walked across to
Rikhye's jeep. H e informed me that he had halted the Armoured
Cars just short of Gandarbal, had given David his new route and
task and that they were already on their way t o Krahom. Good pro-
gress was made until David, soon after passing through Krahom,
announced that he had come to a wooden bridge which he didn't
think would take the weight of the Armour.
Further, it appeared to be too narrow and had railings. When
Rikhye inquired whether there was a diversion that could be used,
David, who had dismounted, said that he would have a look, but soon
reported that there was none, and said that he would examine the
bridge. After about five minutes, which seemed a very very long time,
he came on the air and said that the bridge was groggy but might
possibly stand up under the weight of the Armour. But its width,
with the railings inclining inwards slightly, was too narrow to permit
the safe passage of an Armoured Car. The Rifle Troop was at the
moment knocking down the railings, and when that had been com-
pleted, h e would have another look. The railings were removed with-
out much difficulty, but on measuring the bridge for width, David
found that there would only be about two inches of freeboard on
either side of the wheels, which called for extreme skill in driving,
there being no margin for error. Despite this, he said that he would
take the risk. It took ten minutes to get each Armoured Car across
the bridge. At the end of twenty minutes, which seemed a lifetime,
we were immensely relieved on hearing David announce that he was
across with the Armour and the Rifle Troop. H e added that he would
never like to try doing it again.
Rikhye and I waited as the h o u r moved towards Sumbal, h o p
ing that David would not meet another such bridge : getting the
Armour back to Srinagar would present a serious problem. Fortu-
nately there were no hazards, and David reported eventually that
he had reached Sumbal and had turned on to the road leading to
Shalateng. This was great news as now it was an easy run. When
this report was received, 1 ordered 1 Kumaon to start infiltrating
forward. The battalion did a wonderful job and arrived on the right
flank of the enemy undetected, and reported that it was ready to
attack.
When he was well clear of Sumbal, David was ordered to halt,
to receive an operation order and to brief his command. This I had
jotted down on the back of a message pad and handed to Rikhye,
who communicated it to David. The gist of it was :
( a ) On reaching the cross roads at Shalateng, he would see
thousands of armed individuals - they were the enemy.
Appearing from the rear, it would be assumed by the
tribals that his Arrnouued Cars and Rifle Troop were part
of their own forces.
( b ) In order not to disturb this thought or to attract atten-
tion to his command, he was to approach Shalateng very
slowly, and the general behaviour should incline towards
being casual.
( c ) If approached by any of the enemy, the attitude towards
them must not be hostile.
( d ) His Armoured Cars and Rifle Troop must, before proceed-
ing any further, be ready for immediate action.
( e ) On arrival near the cross roads at Shalateng, he was to
deploy his Armour and M e Troop facing east, as if he
was a part of the tribal force and in support of it.
( f ) The roles allotted to 1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon were then ex-
plained to him, and he was ordered to open rapid fire on
the enemy on receipt of the word GO.
( g ) The subsequent switching of his fire would have to be
decided by him, but he was warned to be careful that he
did not shoot up 1 Kumaon.
Asked if he had any doubts or questions to ask, David said that
he had none and that his role was clear. He was then wished the
best of luck. After he had briefed his men, the 7 Cavalry sub unit
made its way down to Shalateng, arriving almost at the same moment
that 1 Kumaon reported itself in position on the enemy flank.
SLENDER %'AS THE THREAD
David was asked what he could see and replied that there were
masses of armed men moving about, some of whom had approached
his Armoured Cars and, touching them, had smiled at him' and his
men and said to one another that they were their Cars. The Rifle
Troop, he said, had dismounted and taken up a position on a bank
THE BATTLE OF SHAUTENG

7 NOVEMBER 1847
I)
TO THE AIMIELD
quite close to the Armour, and he was ready for action. With 1 Sikh
also reporting its readiness, I gave the word GO and hell broke loose.
Shot up in the rear by the Armour and frontally by 1 Sikh, the
stunned enemy was wondering what was happening, when suddenly
1 Kumaon burst in on his right flank: its automatics blazing as they
were fired from the hip, and bayonets flashing. There was complete
confusion in the enemy positions. The defectors of 4 J & K Infantry,
the Mahsuds, Wazirs, Afridis and ?,lohmands, in trying to escape the
fire that was hitting them from three sides, and seeing the bayonet
charge descending on them, rushed in all directions and, crashing
into one another, turned and fled westwards. As they broke, 1 Sikh
was ordered to attack and the Rifle Company of 4 Kumaon was
thrown into battle on the right flank of 1 Sikh. An immediate request
to the Air Force to strike the fleeing tribesmen was answered with
some telling blows. The disorganised enemy streaked across the
Belds towards Baramula, while the Amour, switching its fire to the
west and supporting 1 Sikh, hurried him on his w ~ y .
The battle of Shalateng had been won, in twenty minutes from
the word GO. It was a major disaster for the tribesmen. Apart from
leaving behind 472 dead on the battlefield and a further 146 in-bet-
ween Shalateng and Bararnula, they had to abandon one hundred
and thirty-eight civilian buses and load carriers which had trans-
ported them from the North-West Frontier Province almost to the
gates of Srinagar. Scattered all over the Shalateng area were a large
number of weapons, including medium machine guns which were
very acceptable, boxes of ammunition and grenades. Two freight
carrying lorries and one passenger bus formed the Field Ambulance
and were well equipped with medical stores, making it clear that
the tribals had not expected to return to their homes unscathed, while
the other lorries and buses were full of rations, kit and beddings.
Orders were immediately issued to pursue the enemy, 1 Sikh to
lead the advance, and to make for Patan. This involved searching
the villages on both sides of the road, and flushing out any enemy
party that might have hidden in them. It was slow work, but very
essential. Prior to moving forward with my Tactical Headquarters,
I sent an officer into Srinagar to inform Major General Kulwant
Singh that I had fought a battle, had routed the enemy, and was
pursuing him. He came to the area of Shalateng after about an hour,
and I explained to him what had happened. I was surprised to learn
from him that Srinagar had no idea that a major battle was being
fought, but it was not long before the news spread and there was
jubilation. I informed Major General Kulwant Singh that I intended
attacking Baramula the next morning, 8 November, and then moved
forward to join my advancing troops.
An attempt was made to use the vehicles captured from the tribes-
men, but many of them were short of petrol, while others had various
mechanical idiosyncrasies, knowledge of which was essential to make
them run. As their drivers had fled, and like untrained horses many
would not answer to the normal aids, the few that did were taken
over by reserve drivers with the units, and utilised for the carriage
SLENDER WAS THE TIll'lEAT)
of supplies and ammucition. The remainder were handed over to

the Emergency Government who were very happy to receive them.
1 Sikh occupied Patan at eight o'clock that night, the remainder
of the Brigade arriving about two hours later, having cleared up
small pockets of tribesmen who had eluded 1 Sikh. There was a short
halt, and the advance to Baramula commenced at midnight. The
approach march to Baramula met with no opposition. W e were happy
to be moving as it was very cold, and our thin olive-green cotton
uniforms were quite inadequate for weather that demanded woollen
clothing. Halting the column behind the hills about a mile and a half
to the east of Baramula, I made a quick plan for the assault on the
town. 1 Kumaon, supported by the Armoured Cars, was to move
forward and capture the features to the south of the town. When
that had been effected, 1 Sikh was to move forward and, with the
Armoured Cars joining the unit, was to enter the town.
Chapter 9
Baramula Retaken
1 KUMAON reached its objective unopposed and was ordered to

change direction and to move on to the town. Meanwhile, 1 Sikh was
also ordered to move forward and enter the town together with the
Armoured Cars. At half past seven in the morning, Baramula was
in our possession. It had been captured without firing a shot, the
tribesmen having passed through it and continued their flight west-
wards. So, evidently had their senior-most commanders, as one of
the platoons of 1 Sikh, which had been operating to the south of the
road when advancing to Patan, had found an abandoned Chevrolet
Station Wagon in the vicinity of Hokar Sar. This was a duck-shoot-
ing preserve of the Maharajah, and only he and his selected guests
were permitted to use it. The enemy commanders were evidently at
Hokar Sar shooting duck while their tribesmen and the defectors
were being smashed at Shalateng. It was only when they streamed
past them, in full flight towards Baramula, that the officers must have
(h
101
realised what had happened and, considering it too dangerous to try

retrieving their car, had abandoned it and joined in the race. Apart
from the shot-gun cases in the car, there were a number of love
letters written to one of the officers and some very inferior poetry.
A map, marked with the dispositions of 161 Infantry Brigade, showed
one Rifle Company in the area of milestone 4, and the rest of the
battalion further south in the Rifle Range area. This, in fact, was the
layout when 1 Kumaon was the only battalion in the area.
The fortunes of war are strange and unpredictable. In the case of
the battle of Shalateng, the markings on the enemy commander's
map would have been completely accurate, had two incidents, both
unforeseen, not changed the Order of Battle of 161 Infantry Brigade.
The first was the enforced move of 1 Sikh from its location in the
south-east approaches to Srinagar, owing to the unfortunate incident
involving the killing of two members of the National Conference
Volunteers. The second was Major Inder Rikhye's decision to leave
the column at Ramban and to make a free run to Srinagar with a
Troop of Armoured Cars and a Rifle Troop. It was even more for-
tunate that the Squadron of 7 Cavalry sent to the Valley was a Jat
Squadron and not a Sikh Squadron. Had it been a Sikh Squadron,
while the Armoured Car crew might have escaped detection, the
Rifle Troop could never have done so. It would have blown the gaff
that the Armour was from Pakistan. Had neither of these incidents
taken place, the enemy would have found his path to Srinagar held
by only one battalion, 1 Kumaon.
As the 1 Kumaon move towards the hills south of Baramula was
under way, a group of people was observed running towards the
hills to the east of Baramula from the northern part of the town. A
Rifle Company of 1 Sikh was immediately deployed to cover them,
and not knowing whether they were the enemy or friendly, a burst
of light machine gun fire was aimed in their direction but well
away to their right, whereupon the whole group went to ground.
While we were watching them, a white piece of cloth attached to
a stick was raised and waved. A platoon of 1 Sikh was therefore sent
forward to contact them and escort them forward. On arrival, the
leader of the group introduced himself as Captain P. R. Dewan of
the Indian Army, and the Staff Captain of an Infantry Brigade
located at Ferozepore in the Punjah. He looked anything but an
Indian Army Officer. He was wearing a khaki Service cap which
looked as if it had been extracted from a dust bin, a fawn mackintosh
which showed unmistakable signs that it had been buried in the
B A I U M U L A RETAKEN
ground, grey flannel trousers and a pair of sandals. As 1 Kumaon

was nearing its objective, I told him to take his group to the side
of the road and to relax.
Later, when I had a chance to talk to him, I asked him to tell me
what had happened. He said that he was on leave in Baramula, and
everything was peaceful until the afternoon of 27 October, when the
tribesmen suddenly appeared in their lorries. They took control of
the town and a n orgy started. Anyone who attempted to argue with
them or showed any signs of resistance was shot immediately. This
resulted in those residng in the southern portion of the town fleeing
to the northern part which lay across the Jhelum River. Almost
throughout the night there were signs of arson and bursts of firing.
The next day, 28 October, groups of tribesmen entered the northern
part of the town and abducted women whom they dragged back to
the southern part. They warned the people to stay in their houses
on pain of death if they stirred out. He had hid his uniform and had
escaped detection, his Muslim friends sheltering him, or else he
would have been despatched like hundreds of others. Hearing that
the tribesmen had retreated, he had ventured out and made contact
with us.
The sight that greeted us in Baramula is one that no period of
time can erase from the memory. It was completely deserted, as
silent as a tomb, with not even a whimpering pie dog. Everywhere
one looked, whether it was a house or a shop or a shed, there were
signs of pillage, arson or wanton destruction. The well equipped
Mission Hospital, the most modern in the Valley, looked as if it had
been hit by a tornado. Nor had the Mission Church escaped the
wrath of the savages. The lovely images had been mutilated with
axes and riddled with bullet holes. There were unmistakable signs
that the patients in the hospital had been slaughtered in their beds
or dragged out to meet the same fate in the compound. The battle-
seasoned World War I1 veterans of 161 Infantry Brigade shuddered
at the sight, and my thoughts drifted back to Srinagar and the fate
that it had so narrowly escaped.
It was a lovely little liver-coloured cocker spaniel that led to the
discovery of the spot where the Mother Superior and the nuns lay
butchered. They had evidently rushed out to save the patients in
the Mission Hospital and had drawn the wrath of the tribesmen.
Where the little dog emerged from no one knew, but he approached
the Armoured Car Troop, which was resting in the Mission Hospital
area, very slowly and obviously very frightened. Lieut. David
SLENDER WAS TIiE THREAD
whistled to him and called him to come over, but the spaniel appeared
doubtful and decided to keep his distance. David walked over to
him and patted him as he lay cowering on the ground. The pat and
a few kind words, and his confidence was soon restored. Moving
back to the Armoured Cars, David called to the spaniel to follow
him, but i t didn't move. Then it made a sharp move in the opposite
direction, stopped and looked at David. A few more steps by David
towards the Armoured Cars, however, brought a reaction. The spaniel'
ran to him, and then whipping round ran back and stopped.
One of the men of the Armoured Troop then suggested to David
that perhaps the dog wanted to show him something. David agreed
that it was possible, and taking a few men of the Rifle Troop as an
escort, moved towards the little dog, who wagged his tail and bound-
ed forward, looking back frequently to see that he was being fol-
lowed. H e led the party to the spot where his mistress and her com-
panions had been dumped. David, tough soldier that he was, was
overcome by the sight and wept unrestrainedly. His escort was
equally stunned. The spaniel was immediately adopted and, in view
of the move forward from Baramula to Uri, was sent to Srinagar.
Even though affection was showered on him, he continued to pine
and one day disappeared, never to be found.
On Baramula being taken, a wireless message was flashed to Sri-
nagar to inform Major General Kulwant Singh and the Emergency
Government that the town was in our possession. Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammed came to Baramula within an hour and immediately go1
down to calming the local population. Doubtful at first whether it
was really true that they had been liberated, they were chary of
venturing across to the south bank of the Jheliim River. But when
the news got round that Bakshi had arrived, they flowed across the
bridge and rushed to meet him. Most of them were weeping, and
denounced the quislings who had been responsible for much of their
suffering. Bakshi's very presence had a wonderful effect on the
people, who soon went about trying to rehabilitate themselves.
That afternoon Press correspondents, some of whom had remained
in Srinagar and others, who in view of the inactivity had returned to
Delhi on 6 November, arrived in Baramula to view and judge the
situation for themselves.
Chapter 10
To Uri, but not on to Dome1
A QUICK reorganisation of the Brigade was now necessary in order

to absorb the reinforcements who had arrived on the evening of 7
November. The 6th Battalion The Rajputana Rifies ( 6 Rajrif ), com-
manded by Lt. Col. S. S. Kalaan, M.C.was allotted to the airfield.
The 2nd Battalion The Dogra Regiment ( 2 Dogra), commanded by
Lt. Col. U. C. Dubey, was located in Srinagar, and 4 Kumaon, now
complete and commanded by Lt. Col, Man Mohan Khanna, was
ordered to move from the airfield and to garrison Baramula. I h n -
jab, its presence at Humhom no longer being necessary, was ordered
to move forward and join the Brigade at Baramula, together with
one troop of Field Artillery, the Battery less this Troop having
arrived at Baramula as the attack on the town was being mounted.
With the dial sights for the Patiala Mountain Battery having arrived,
the Sikh Mountain gunners who had been acting as a Rifle Company
with 1 Sikh were withdrawn from the battalion and ordered to take
over the guns from the Patiala Mountain Battery, the personnel of
which were returned to their State. On taking over, the newly formed
Mountain Battery moved up from Srinagar and joined the Brigade
at Baramula.
A hitch in the rank structure of two officers enforced a small change
in the locations of 4 Kumaon and 2 Dogra. Lt. Col. Harbakhsh Singh
had been given the local rank of Colonel and sent into the Valley to
assist with the administration of the Brigade. Although not given
that designation he was more or less the Administrative Commandant
at the airfield. With the capture of Baramula, it was decided to
move all administrative units located on the airfield, and those about
to arrive, to Srinagar. An 'Administrative ,Commandant Srinagar', it
was considered, should therefore be appointed. General Kulwant
Singh, however, felt that as there were two infantry battalions located
in Srinagar, the title 'Commander Srinagar Garrison' (Sri Garrison)
would be better, as the Commander could. then use the two batta-
lions to deal with any situation that might arise. It was, however,
very clearly laid down that all troops located in the Valley, and
Sri Garrison, would form part of and be under the command and
control of H Q 161 Infantry Brigade, and that the responsibility for
all operational commitments in the Valley would rest with the Com-
mander 161 Infantry Brigade. The change of the designation to Com-
mander Srinagar Garrison resulted in .Lt. Col. U. C. Dubey, who
was many years senior to Lt. Col. Harbakhsh Singh, being placed
under the command of his junior. To rectify this, 4 Kumaon which
was under orders to move to Baramula was ordered to remain in
Srinagar, and Lt. Col. Dubey's unit, 2 Dogra, which was to remain
in Srinagar was ordered to move to Baramula.
The reorganisation completed, 161 Infantry Brigade moved out of
Baramula at seven o'clock on the morning of 10 November and
headed for Uri and on towards Domel. With the Brigade, at the start
of the move, was one Troop of Armoured Cars of 7 Cavalry, two in-
fantry battalions, 1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon, and a Troop of Field Artil-
lery. 1 Punjab which was engaged in handing over Baramula to 2
Dogra was ordered to join the column as quickly as possible, and
did so at ten o'clock, soon after the Brigade had entered mountainous
terrain. The road to Domel, down which the Brigade was advancing,
follows the south bank of the Jhelurn River, and is overlooked for
almost its entire length by heavily forested spurs of the Pir Panjal
Range of Mountains. This forbidding mountain range runs from east
to west on both the north and south banks of the Jhelum River. The
TO URI BUT NOT ON TO DOhfEL
terrain, which lends' itself admirably to defence and ambushes, neces-

sitated the piquetting of the heights that overlooked the road and
the searching of the hills, and in consequence the rate of advance
was severely curtailed. To have rushed down the road without taking
the essential steps to ensure security would have been to invite dis-
aster. These operations were being conducted against enemv fire,
from light to moderately heavy, aimed at the column by odd bodies
of the tribesmen who were wending their way back on foot, having
failed to reach Baramula in time to move along with their comrades.
TH6 ADVANCE FROM

BARAMUIA TO URI
AND ruwcn
It was at this juncture that I received a stag~eringsignal message

from hlajor General Kulwant Singh. I was ordered to return 1 Pun-
jab to Srinagar immediately. Assuming that there was some mistake,
I signalled back that it was not possible to do so, as it would totally
unbalance the Brigade which had now entered n~ountainousterrain,
and I could only do so if a relief battalion from Srinagar was first
rushed forward. I further stressed that, if anything, more units should

be sent forward rather than anything being moved back. In reply,
I received a curt message ordering me to comply with the order
immediately. It further stated that as 1 Punjab was a parachute batta-
lion, it was necessary to send it to Jammu to join 50 Parachute Bri-
gade. I insisted that Major General Kulwant Singh speak to me on
the wireless. Despite my arguments that to take the unit away from
me at that moment would seriously affect the advance towards
Domel, that 1 Punjab was unlikely to be used in a para role in Jammu,
and that there was easy access to an infantry battalion in the Punjab
or elsewhere to build up 50 Para Brigade, I failed to convince him
that the need of 161 Infantry Brigade was greater than that of 50
Para Brigade. I was ordered to return 1 Punjab immediately, and in
consequence had to call a halt to the advance.
1 Punjab, which was already on its way to occupy certain features,
had to be stopped and 1 Sikh, which was deployed on other features,
withdrawn to take over the 1 Punjab task. It was time-consuming
and resulted in at least three hours of daylight being wasted. In addi-
tion, the complete operational plan had to b e recast and modified
to suit the capabilities of the two infantry battalions that remained
with the Brigade. The advance became a slow and laborious affair.
With the enemy taking full advantage of the situation, and darkness
fast approaching, I decided to call a halt and to take up a defensive
position for the night. It had been a most frustrating day. At five
o'clock, after Brigade Headquarters had tucked itself into a small
re-entrant, I asked the Brigade Major to check whether 1 Punjab
had reported back in Srinagar, and was surprised to be informed
that the unit had halted in Baramula. I spoke to the commander,
Lt. Col. Kullar, and asked the reason. He told me that not long after
receiving my signal ordering him to return to Srinagar, he had been
handed another one by his Signal Section cancelling the order, and
ordering him to return to his last location. Assuming that the move
back to Srinagar had been cancelled, he had halted in Baramula. As
the signal message had been passed in clear to 1 Punjab, only the
code word for Srinagar being used, the enemy had obviouslv inter-
cepted the message and not knowing which place the code word for
Srinagar referred to, had sent a signal message changing the code
word to 'last location' and cancelling the previous order. Our secu-
rity measures were immediately tightened up and all units warned
to be careful regarding conversations in clear.
1 Punjab returned to Srinagar in the transport that had lifted 2
TO C . 1 BUT NOT ON 1'0 DOhfEL
Dogra to Baramula, and was then despatched to Jammu by road to

join 50 Para Brigade. This battalion was numerically weak, as men-
tioned earlier. It was given the task of holding Jhangar, which was
well beyond its capabilities, only to be heavily attacked and mauled
by the enemy operating in the Jhangar area. Perhaps the theory that
a formation fights better with units that are known to it prompted
the removal of 1 Punjab from 161 Infantry Brigade to 30 Para Bri-
gade. It was certainly not because 161 Infantry Brigade was entering
mountainous terrain, in which s para battalion would find itself
placed at a disadvantage, since in that case, I Kumaon, also a para
battalion should have been removed and sent back from the Valley
to rejoin its parent formation, 77 Para Brigade. Whatever may have
been the reason, the removal of 1 Punjab violated a cardinal prin-
ciple : instead of reinforcing success, exactly the opposite was done.
With 161 Infantry Brigade's striking force reduced to two in-
fantry battalions, and the task in front of it demanding a third batta-
lion, I signalled Srinagar to order 4 Kumaon to move forward and
to join the Brigade as soon as was possible after first light the next
morning, 11 November. In return, I received a message from Major
General Kulwant Singh stating that he had formed 4 Kumaon, 6
Rajrif, the Squadron 7 Cavalry less the Troop with me, and one
Troop of the Field Battery into an ad hoe force, and had placed it
under Lt. Col. Harbakhsh Singh, the Commander Sri Garrison. As
such, 4 Kumaon was not available to join 161 Infantry Brigade, and
I must make do with the three battalions that I had.
I replied to this signal and stated that one battalion, 2 D ~ g r a was
,
deployed in Baramula which had to be firmly held and as such could
not be moved forward. I had also sent back the Troop of Field Artil-
lery with me as the terrain was totally unsuitable for field guns and
the newly formed Mountain Battery had joined me. The infantry
strength was, however, extremely light, especially as the terrain was
mountainous, and was placing a very great strain on the two batta-
lions. The inclusion of a third infantry battalion in the striking force
was neither a bonus nor over-insurance; it was a pressing necessity.
Major General Kulwant Singh's reaction to this request was to in-
form me that although the enemy had been defeated at Shalateng,
he was of the opinion that odd parties of the tribal raiders were still
in the Valley, and as such he wished Srinagar airfield to be well pro-
tected, Srinagar and its environs to be patrolled, and the Srinagar-
Baramula road to be vigorously patrolled by a mixed force of
armour, artillery and infantry. As such, he could not send anything
forward. Even the suggestion that he postpone 1 Punjab's move back

to Jammu and retain it as Sri Garrison's second battalion for a few
days, or until such time as Uri was captured, and then review the
situation and troop allocation, was rejected. I did not consider it
prudent to inform him that his fears of tribal parties operating in
the Valley were unrealistic, as I felt that it would act as an irritant.
Consequently, 161 Infantry Brigade, seriously weakened when it
should have been strengthened, advanced to Uri, being engaged by
enemy parties the whole -way, while Sri Garrison, with equality in
infantry but stronger in armour and artillery, patrolled a Valley
completely devoid of the enemy.
161 Infantry Brigade spent the night of 10 November in the area
of milestone 44. It had advanced ten miles from Baramula, and, con-
sidering the enemy opposition and the thickly wooded mountainous
terrain which had to be searched, the progress was reasonable. In
order to retard the advance of a motorised column that might be
pursuing him, the enemy had destroyed every wooden bridge on
the road. This did not present any insurmountable problem as it was
possible to construct diversions around the bridge site without much
difficulty. Hostile fire had on occasions been heavy but tended to
be wild and inaccurate. The Brigade suffered only one casualty,
unfortunately from our own fire. The Company Commander of an
Independent Rifle Company, attached to 1 Sikh, lost his way in the
dark and approached his command from the wrong direction. He
failed to answer the whispered challenge of the sentry and was shot
in the leg. The wound was not serious, but necessitated his evacua-
tion the next morning. Apart from this incident, the night passed
quietly.
The advance was resumed early the next morning, 11 November,
and almost immedi.ately came under heavy enemy fire from light
machine guns sited on the hills overlooking the road. An attack was
mounted to dislodge the enemy, but before the attacking troops
could close with him, he withdrew. This was the typical pattern of
a rearguard action by the enemy which persisted throughout the day.
With the Mountain Battery unable to engage any targets, because
of the lack of suitable positions for deployment, the Armoured Cars
provided the supporting fire, the Humbers being particularly useful.
The Daimlers also did some useful shooting, but there was no suita-
ble target for their main armament, the two-pounder gun, until they
were presented with one at Mahura. With the progress of the vehicles
TO URI BUT NOT ON TO DOMEL
retarded, the Brigade reached Rampur at four o'clock that evening,

having covered only six miles.
With about one and a half hours of daylight left, I was about to
call a halt in order to enable the units to carry out reconnaissance
and take up their dispositions for the night, and also to give the
cook:; a chance to prepare a hot meal for them, when the sound of
an explosion was heard. A quick glance at the map left no doubt
that it had emanated from Mahura, and it was realised that the
enemy was employed in destroying the Power House machinery.
Leaving 1 Sikh to protect the transport and escort it forward, the
Troop of Armoured Cars and the Rifle Troop 7 Cavalry were ordered
to throw caution to the winds and to rush to Mahura, and 1 Kumaon
to follow them as fast as it could on foot. It was about five miles to
Mahura, but it was only possible to do four of them, as the enemy
had demolished the bridge at milestone 54. On reaching the bridge
the Armoured Cars were engaged by light automatic h e to which
they replied, and in about half an hour 1 Kumaon joined them. As
it did so, the sound of a second explosion rent the air. The enemy
light automatic fire now increased in volume, being switched towards
1 Kumaon, but as in the previous cases it was erratic and did no
damage.
There were only two alternatives, a frontal attack by 1 Kumaon,
supported by fire from the Armoured Cars, which would enable us
to attain speed which was so vital, or an attack from the left h k
which would entail climbing a steep hill and would be time-con-
suming. Despite the fact that it would take much longer, the flanking
attack was decided upon, as the frontal attack might have resulted
in severe casualties being inflicted on the unit. The move by 1
Kumaon to climb the hill was spotted by the enemy, who increased
his rate of fire. But it had little effect, and realising that a strong
attack was developing against him he prepared to evacuate his posi-
tion. As he did so, five uniformed individuals, three of whom were
officers, appeared on the main road from the Power House site.
Rushing to a khaki-coloured Staff car which was parked on the road,
facing west, they opened the doors hastily and started leaping in.
Unfortunately for the occupants of the car, a Daimler Armoured Car
had already trained its two-pounder gun on it, and the gunner was
waiting for it to move. As it did, he pressed the trigger and scored
a direct hit and the wrecked car burst into flames.
1 Kumaon reached its objective to find that the enemy had fled,
and sent a platoon to search the Power House area, which was found
SLENDER WAS TH.E THREAD
to be clear of the enemy. An inspection of the interior of the Power

House showed slabs of gun cotton, primers and fuse wire littered
over the floor. One generator appeared to be damaged, one was be-
ing prepared for destruction when the enemy was disturbed, and the
others appeared to be unharmed. Sand had also been lavishly thrown
into the working parts of the generators. The arrival of the Brigade
had, however, saved the Power House from extensive and possibly
irreparable damage. It was able to commence functioning in a few
weeks, and to provide Srinagar with the electric power it so badly
needed.
With the dawn patrols of 12 November morning reporting the area
clear of the enemy, the task of constructing a bridge at milestone
54 was taken in hand. But there was not the remotest possibility of
constructing a diversion without the use of a bulldozer, as it involved
cutting away a large portion of the hillside. Without Field Engineers
to assist or guide us, nor any type of equipment available to bridge
the 15 ft. gap, the only solution was to throw boulders and branches
of trees into the dry bed of the hill stream until road level was reach-
ed. This was quite a formidable task as the dimensions of the gap
to be Hled were 15 feet in length, 10 feet in depth and 8 feet in
breadth, and the filling had to take the weight of Armoured Cars
and loaded supply lorries. It was very slow work, but was completed
by the afternoon of 13 November. The 'bridge' that was constructed
was certainly unorthodox. It swayed gently as vehicles crossed it,
but it held, and was in constant use until a Company of Field Engin-
eers constructed a proper bridge about three weeks later.
While the 'bridge' was under construction, a Company patrol of
1 Sikh moved forward towards Uri, and reported it free of the enemy.
With the vehicles across, the Brigade moved forward and occupied
Uri. The diversion built by the raiders in the vicinity of the bridge
demolished by Brigadier Rajinder Singh was well made, and of great
assistance to us. It was in constant use for nearly six months until a
Bailey bridge replaced the demolished bridge.
With the capture of Uri, 161 Infantry Brigade - composed of a
skeleton Brigade Headquarters, a Troop of Armoured Cars and a
R a e Troop of 7 Cavalry, 1 Sikh, 1 Kumaon and a newly formed
Mountain Battery formed after the capture of Baramula - had ad-
vanced 62 miles from Srinagar, and had been engaged in battle with
the enemy almost the whole way. It was no mean achievement, and
for this the credit must go entirely to the unit commanders and their
men who accepted every difficulty willingly and with enthusiasm.
TO URI BUT SOT OS TO DOMEL
Although still clad in cotton uniforms, and with one blanket to be

sllarcd by tlrree men during the cold nights, they braved the enemy
and the elements and got the better of both.
Uri, until the raiders razed it to the ground, leaving one brick
house and two wooden ones to indicate that the area was once in-
habited, used to be a flourisl~inglittle town. Situated almost half
way between Domel and Srinagar, it was a most convenient halting
point for the tourist and other traffic to and from the Valley, and its
residents were engaged mainly in the running of wayside restaurants
and cafes. At its eastern approach, a road takes off to Poonch, wind-
ing its way through the steep climb to the Haji Pir Pass on the Pir
Panjal Range and then dropping towards Poonch. The Uri area is
shaped like a cup, with what used to be the town at the base and
encircled by high hills. To defend it is both dficult and easy
- depending on the availability of a sufficient number of infantry
units to man the heights, the effectiveness of medium and light auto-
matic weapons being severely limited by the folds in the ground.
With only two battalions available, 1 Sikh was deployed on the
heights, the Independent Rifle Company being kept in the bowl as
the battalion reserve, while 1 Kumaon was made responsible for the
lower slopes and the road entries into Uri.
As soon as the capture and consolidation of Uri was signalled to
Major General Kulwant Singh, who was still in Srinagar, a message
was received to stay any further advance along the road to Domel,
and for me to return to Srinagar the next morning for a conference.
Arriving in Srinagar at ten o'clock on 14 November, I immediately
put in my logistical requirements, emphasising that winter clothing
and extra issue of blankets were urgently required. A signal had
already been received from Delhi that these items had been despatch-
ed, and they arrived about three days later. I also asked for the
remainder of Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade, which was still
located on the Ranchi plateau in Bihar Province, to be moved to the
Valley as it was no longer possible to continue to operate with a
skeleton HQ. The party arrived in Srinagar about ten days later and,
after certain adjustments, the hIain Headquarters of the Brigade was
established in Uri, and the Rear Headquarters at Srinagar. With the
logistical problems sorted out, I was given my next task. I was order-
ed to hold Uri and to prepare to advance to Poonch, over the Haji
Pir Pass.
This order took me completely by surprise. I explained to Major
General Kulwant Singh that I had the enemy on the run, and unless
1 kept up the pressure he would recover and come back, and instead
of our attacking him we would be attacked. I suggested that I be
given additional troops and be permitted to continue the advance
on the existing axis. This move, I stressed, would have two advan-
tages : firstly, it would keep the enemy at arm's length from Uri,
and secondly, when the move to Poonch took place, which I suggest-
ed should be undertaken by an ad hoc column that could be formed,
it would ensure that the ad hoc column's flank was protected when
moving to and returning from Poonch. This suggestion, however, was
not accepted, and I was informed by Major General Kulwant Singh
that he was not interested in moving towards Domel, but was
interested in reinforcing Poonch which was under enemy pressure.
I was then given further instructions. I was not to carry out any
type of reconnaissance of the road from Uri to the Haji Pir Pass, since
if I did so it would give the enemy an indication that I was changing
my axis of advance from Uri-Dome1 to Uri-Poonch. An accurate
road report would be sent to me and I could rest assured that all
details relating to the route would be impeccable. An Operation
Instruction was under preparation and would reach me in a few
days. When I asked when this move to Poonch was to be launched,
I was informed that the actual date could not be decided just then,
as it was dependent on the progress made by 50 Para Brigade which
was already on the move from Jammu to Poonch but was not making
fast progress. 161 Infantry Brigade's move, I was however told, would
be about 18 November. This meant giving the enemy a four days'
respite, and I was most unhappy about it. But a pincer movement
on Poonch had been .planned, and it was essential that the jaws snap-
ped together simultaneously.
Before leaving the conference and returning to Uri, I again stressed
a demand that I had made soon after being ordered to go to Poonch,
that I could only carry out the role if I was allotted a minimum of
one more infantry battalion. I was assured that I need have
no worries on that score. I would have adequate troops not only
to form the column to Poonch but also to ensure the safety of Uri
in my absence from the town.
The outline plan for the relief of Poonch was for 161 Infantry
Brigade to move from Uri to Poonch over the Hziji Pir Pass with two
infantry battalions and attached troops. One infantry battalion was
to be left behind in Poonch, and the remainder of the column was
then to return to Uri. The battalion left behind in Poonch was to
make contact with 50 Para Brigade the day after its arrival in Poonch,
TO VRI BUT NOT ON TO DOMEf.
in the area of Kotli. 50 Para Brigade would then take this battalion
under command, and moving to Poonch be responsible for the opera-
tions in that area.
On my way back to Uri, I stopped at Baramula and had a confer-
ence with Lt. Col. U. C. Dubey of 2 Dogra. I explained to him what
was about to happen, and told him that his battalion would be the
one to move to Poonch and return to Uri and thence back to Bara-
mula, the other battalion, I Kumaon, being left behind in Poonch.
I impressed on him the need for complete secrecy, and said that as
he would be leaving his rear parties at Baramula and only taking
the sub units that would be necessary, should the column be involved
in a battle, no warning order should be issued to the battalion. When
the battalion did move out of Baramula, it should be stated that it
was going to Uri for two or three days. The transport to lift the
battalion to Poonch via Uri and back to Baramula would report to
him on or about 17 November. On arrival at Uri a further conference
was held with the Commanding Officers of 1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon,
and 1 Kumaon was ordered to start preparations for the move, and,
as it would be left in Poonch, was ordered to bring forward from
Srinagar any baggage or stores left in that place..
The period 14 to 17 November passed without the enemy engaging
the defences at Uri. But there were definite indications that he had
halted his rush to get away and was returning slowly but surely. The
inactivity enforced upon 161 Brigade was causing me a great deal
of concern, and as the Operation Instruction on the move to Poonch
had still not materialised, I informed the Commander Jak Force on
the morning of 17 November that any further delay might result in
our meeting with opposition. He suggested that I was being unduly
perturbed, and said the Operation Instruction was already on its
way to me.
I received it at half past ten, and noticed that instead of giving
me any troops, it required me to return to Srinagar immediately the
Independent Rifle Company attached to 1 Sikh, thus further deplet-
ing the strength in Uri. The courier who had arrived in a jeep from
Srinagar was handed a message to be delivered to the Jak Force
Commander. In it I stated that I was quite prepared to return the
Independent Company, and would do so after the arrival of the
infantry battalion which I had stressed was necessary to hold Uri
with 1 Sikh while I was away on the move to Poonch.
As the Signal's jeep was on its way back to Srinagar with my
message, I received a signal message from HQ Jak Force informing
SLENDER WAS THE T H W
me that as the advance of 50 Para Brigade was still behind schedule,

the date of my departure for Poonch would be postponed by .a
hours to 19 November. This was bad enough, but worse was to fol-
low. I received a message from Major General Kulwant Singh, about
three hours later, informing me that no infantry battalion was being
released to me.
As the situation was now developing into an argument between
the Force Commander and his Brigade Commander, I decided not
to use the wireless or telephone, but to write a personal letter and
send it to him through a Liaison Officer. I explained, as tactfully as
was possible, that Uri could not be held effectively without two
battalions, and especially so as there were distinct signs that the
enemy was moving back towards Uri. Unless I was sent one battalion
to assist 1 Sikh in holding Uri, a determined enemy attack could
result in the loss of the town, in which case the column to Poonch
would find itself marooned and would lose all its transport. If leav-
ing Uri to be held by one battalion was a calculated risk I would
take it, but in view of the enemy strength that was building up in
the Uri area, I was firmly convinced that it would lead to serious
trouble and I would therefore like the battalion from Srinagar to
b e established in Uri before I moved out.
My Liaison Officer returned without an answer, but I received it
at eleven o'clock the next day, 18 November. Major General Kulwant
Singh stated in his letter that he had given my arguments careful
consideration but disagreed with my views. From a study of the map
he had convinced himself that Uri could be effectively held with one
battalion and that the introduction of a second battalion was un-
necessary. Consequently he was not prepared to send me a battalion,
and the task that he had set me should be carried out with the troops
that I had with me. While I was composing a reply to Major General
Kulwant Singh's letter, I received a signal stating that, in view of the
continued slow advance by 50 Para Brigade, my advance to Poonch
would now b e postponed to 20 November.
In my letter to the Force Commander I stated that I had taken
many gambles with my truncated Brigade, but to move to Poonch
leaving Uri to be held by one battalion was no gamble, it was asking
to be hanged, drawn and quartered. As such, I regretted that I was
not prepared to move to Poonch until one battalion was moved from
Srinagar and located in Uri before I moved out. A study of the map
would give him no idea of the problem involved, and I suggested
The demolishing of the bridge at Uri presented the raiders with a yawning
gap. It was to make a difference more momentous than the gallant Brigadier
Rajinder Singh could have anticipated,
Seven months later, the Madras Engineers assisted by local tabour took its
repair In hand.
An aerial view of the bridge under reconstruction.
The complete r o d w a y had to be built anew as the
abutments had been seriously affected by the
explosion,
l n H ~ a 1948,
y the new bridge was ready for use.
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed named it 'The Bogey
Sen Bridge'.
I SACRED ~ 0 1
THE HEMORY
Ranl#Bal-CIlwvvafdY
Barmdr b chndr S4w- q--
sodwarn, Me ww M l b d fMt8 -
from WMm rnk ft3!Bdrrlwb
Had he been successful, Bara-

mula would not have suffered
this treatment at the hands of the
tribals....
,... or this.
Nor would this peace loving village have experienced

rape, loot and arson.
[-
- - ~?*?..
<_
:$@?&
=*:@&
\. &KV
:
&+;q
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&-,
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'-
,:
--!$&s-;;,
'a .$,
a-:
TO URI BUT NOT ON TO DOhlEL
that he come to Uri, get a view of the terrain, and permit me to

explain the defensive system on the ground. I requested that as time
was fast running out, I be sent an immediate answer to my letter.
I received a curt reply on the telephone - most welcome even if
curt - that 4 Kumaon would be arriving in Uri, but was not to be
committed on piquets but kept in the Uri bowl. The battalion would
thus take over the positions now being held by 1 Kumaon.
Chapter 11
Diversion to Poonch
THE reconnaissance report of the road from Uri to Poonch over the
Haji Pir Pass had been received on 16 November and was carefully
studied. It stated that it was a one-way road, had a good surface,
and that the bridges, although wooden, were strong enough to take
the weight of an Armoured Car. Civilian buses had used the route
in the past, and therefore the civilian buses being despatched to lift
the troops and stores should experience no difficulties. The average
speed that the column could attain was estimated to be ten miles
in the hour; while it would be slower during the climb to the Haji
Pir Pass, once the Pass had been surmounted the road permitted
speeding. With this data to work on, it was calculated that the 35
miles to Poonch would take abouit six hours for the head and eight
hours for the tail of the column to reach the destination. This allowed
a two-hour margin for unforeseen contingencies and halts. With the
start at seven o'clock, it was estimated that the complete column
should be in Poonch by three o'clock in the afternoon, which would
be ideal.
With 2 Dogra having arrived in Uri from Baramula, and 4 Kumaon
from Srinagar having taken over, from 1 Kumaon, the Poonch column
- consisting of Tactical Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade, one
Armoured and one Rifle Troop of 7 Cavalry, $ Dogra and 1 Kumaon,
a medical detaehrilent, a few engineers, and a detachment of Elec-
trical and Mechanical Engineers - prepared for the move. The
vehicles were loaded the previous evening, and by last light all
preparations, it was reported, were complete. Provided that no further
postponement order was received, the head of the column would
pass the start line, which was the bridge site at the eastern exit of
Uri, at seven o'clock the next morning, 20 November.
As the morning mist was lifting, the column of lorries moved out
of Uri and headed for the Haji Pir Pass. With the exception of a few
jeeps and 15 cwt trucks, two Armoured Cars and a heavy breakdown
vehicle, the remaining vehicles in the fleet were those that had been
captured from the raiders after the Shalateng battle and were being
driven by civilian drivers provided by the Emergency Government.
The fatality of accepting a reconnaissance report at its face value,
from sources uninitiated in military requirements, soon struck the
column in the face like a sledge hammer. The so-called 'good road'
was in a dreadful condition, its soft and muddy surface being akin
to a skating rink. The gradients in places were steep and the numer-
ous hairpin bends were negotiable at the first try only by the jeeps
and 15 cwt trucks, the civilian buses having to be manoeuvred back-
wards and forwards several times before they could round them.
The strict' instructions that no type of reconnaissance was to be
carried out in the vicinity of the road to Poonch, in order to maintain
secrecy, meant that the column of lorries was soon strung out help-
lessly on a mountain road wit11 no hope of extricating itself should
it be subjected to even light enemy oppositio~l.There was nothing
to do but move fonvard at a rate of under two miles in the hour.
Had a road reconnaissanee been carried out, the vehicles accom-
panying the column would have been limited to jeeps and light load
carriers. The sixty civilian buses would have been discarded for
smaller vehicles.
As it happened, both 2 Dogra and 1 Kumaon had to debus, 2 Dogra
being ordered to make its way on foot and to secure the Haji Pir
Pass, while 1 Kumaon was left to protect the vehicles and to hurry
them along. With our timed arrival at Poonch by the afternoon corn-
pletely out of the question, 2 Dogra took. u p defensive positions in

the Haji Pir Pass area, 1 Kumaon and the major portion of the
vehicles, which had arrived soon after last light, being harboured on
the road. A stage of the journey which it was expected would take
about four hours had consumed twelve, and we were still only one-
third of the way to our destination. That the enemy had not engaged
the column was extremely fortunate.
One of the vehicles allotted for the carriage of 1 Kumaon's stores
had developed a mechanical defect prior to starting from Uri, and
although it had eventually been started, it proceeded to stall con-
tinuously. This vehicle and five others, all carrying the rations and
ammunition of 1 Kumaon, failed to make the Pass by last light and
were ordered to harbour where they were, at milestone 7, for the
night, and to join the column after first light the next morning. Two
platoons of 1 Kumaon were left with them as protection.
Lt. Col. Dubey of 2 Dogra and I studied the route leading from
the Haji Pir Pass towards Poonch, through our binoculars. It
appeared to be a good stretch of road, zig-zagging its way down the
Pir Panjal Range but with easy gradients and wide corners. On
reaching the plain, it ran reasonably straight into the distance. Re-
ference to the map showed that it crossed a stream named the Batar
Nullah and then ran on to Poonch. The fourteen miles that had been
completed had been hell, but now our troubles appeared to be over.
The twenty-one miles to Poonch should be easily completed in three
hours, which meant that a seven o'clock start should find the whole
column in Poonch by ten o'clock. As we sat talking, Lt. Col. Pritam
Singh of 1 Kumaon joined us. He reported the main column in, and
explained the position regarding the small rear party in the vicinity
of milestone 7. The whole area around us presented an atmosphere
of peace and calm, with no sound of a rifle shot or the crash of a
mortar bomb.
Suddenly the sky in the distance was lit up by sheets of flame. It
was impossible to see what was burning, but it w2s assumed that it
was probably a haystack. The flames were seen for some considera-
ble time and then died down. Apart from this, there were no in-
cidents that night.
At seven o'clock on the morning of 31 November, the column set
off for Poonch with the Troop of Armoured Cars leading. The road
was, as we had judged the previous evening, easy going, and the
transport was experiencing no difficulty. At half past eight, however,
the Armour reported that it had been forced to halt because of a
demolished bridge near the village of Kahuta, near the 11th mile-
stone from Poonch. Detaching myself from the main body, I went
forward to where the Armour lay halted, and uras stunned by what
I saw. A recently constructed wooden bridge, spanning the Batar
Nullah, was a heap of charred ashes and was still smouldering in
places.
THE ROUTE FROM URI TO PUNCH
N
This act of sabotage by an enemy agent or perhaps by the tribes-

men themselves had a crippling effect. There was no way across the
nullah bed for the heavier vehicles. It was strewn with large and
small boulders, was ninety feet in width, and the banks were about
twenty feet in height and perpendicular. The large column of civi-
lian vehicles now began to pile up behind the Armoured Cars. The
possibility of making a slope leading into the nullah bed was con-
sidered, but the idea was abandoned as it would have taken the
whole day and perhaps even longer, and with both banks having to
be treated simultaneously and massive boulders to be cleared in
order to offer the vehicles a reasonable path, it was estimated that
the time required would be not less than two days and could extend
to three. There was only one solution to the problem : the baggage
and stores of 1 Kumaon would have to be humped across the
nullah bed and stacked on the far bank; that completed, the batta-
lion would have to march the eleven miles to Poonch and obtain
whatever transport was available to ferry its baggage forward. As
the rations and ammunition lorries of 1 Kumaon had not yet arrived,
the rations and ammunition of 2 Dogra were handed over to 1
Kumaon.
As the baggage of 1 Kumaon was being carried across the nullah
by the men of 1 Kumaon and 2 Dogra, Lt.Co1. Pritam Singh asked
me whether it would be possible to leave him three jeeps. This re-
quest was agreed to, but the question was how to get them on to the
nullah bed. If this coulcl be done, the jeeps co111d thread their way
between the boulders and run downstream until they found a sloping
bank on the opposite side which would enable them to reach the
road. The question of a party of men lifting a jeep and carrying it
down was considered and discarded as being impossible. Then it
was debated whether the vehicle would suffer serious damage if it
was pushed over the side, but the 20 ft. drop ruled out this course.
The driver of a 15 cwt Dodge truck, with a winch attached, then
came up with a brilliant idea. He suggested that if the winch hook
of his vehicle was attached to the jeep, he would use his vehicle like
a crane and lower the jeep gently into the nullah. This idea was
immediately adopted, but two Dodge vehicles with winches were
used instead of one, and to ensure that they were not dragged for-
ward by the weight of the jeep, two Armoured Cars were lashed to-
gether and one was tied to a nearby tree with a strong rope. The two
Dodge vehicles were then lashed to one of the Armoured Cars, and
with the winch hooks of the Dodge trucks attached to the front and
DIVERSION TO P O N m
rear of each jeep, it was pushed to the edge of the bank and sent over
the brink. It was then gently lowered to the nullah bed. Two further
jeeps received the same treatment.
This operation completed, I walked across the nullah and on reach-
ing the opposite bank saw a signal cable lying on the ground. I fol-
lowed the cable for about thirty yards and came across a field tele-
phone lying on the ground. I tried it, and my call was answered by
n signaller of the State Force battalion in Poonch, whereupon I asked
him to get me the Commanding Officer. In a few moments, a Lt. Col.
Dubey announced that he was on the line. Introducing myself, I
ordered him to come to the bridge near Kahuta immediately. He was
hesitant to comply with the order, and I got the impression that
he was very nervous. I informed him that if he did not report to me
at the bridge within thirty minutes, I would be in Poonch within the
next four hours and he would find himself in serious trouble.
Lt. Col. Dubey of the J & K State Forces arrived at the bridge
site in a jeep in about twenty-five minutes. He approached very
slowly, and it was apparent that he was not in a very happy state
of mind. When, however, he saw that we were not raiders but troops
of the Indian Army, he quickly regained his composure. When he
had done so, I asked him whether he knew who had burnt the bridge.
His answer staggered me. H e said that his platoon outpost a t the
bridge had seen first movement, and then lights, on the Haji Pir Pass
the evening before. When he received this report, he had told it to
remain in observation, but at about seven o'clock, the outpost had
reported that shouts of 'Pakistan Zindabad' were being raised on the
Haji Pir Pass. Convinced that the Pass was in enemy hands, he had
ordered the platoon to fire the bridge and to withdraw immediately
to Poonch.
H e looked shamefaced and had nothing to say when I informed
him that I and my troops had been on the Haji Pir Pass from the
afternoon of the previous day, and I had seen the flames that had
destroyed the bridge. There had been no shouts of 'Pakistan Zinda-
bad' either from the Haji Pir Pass or for that matter anywhere else, and
what his outpost had reported was from their o w n imagination. I
could only attribute their action to fright, as they had even left the
telephone behind. I left him in no douht that in giving the order to
destroy the bridge, he had done exactly what the tribesmen would
have prayed for but were not in a position to accomplish : the strand-
ing of a motorised column racing to save Poonch from destruction.
Instructing him to leave his jeep at the bridge, so that Lt. Col.
Pritam Singh could move forward quickly and join us on the road
to Poonch when his unit and its baggage had been moved across the
nullah, I set off with him, my Staff Captain, Captain Chadda, and a
small escort to walk the eleven miles to Poonch. We were fortunate
not to have to walk the entire distance, which would have wasted
a great deal of time. The jeeps that had been lowered into the nullah
bed had found a way u p the bank about four miles downstream.
Moving back to the bridge, they met us on the road. Taking two
jeeps and sending one back to the bridge, we drove into Poonch.
About three miles outside the town, on the road leading to the bridge,
I found two Companies of the State Force deployed in the open
space on either side. One of the Company Commanders informed me
that the Companies had been rushed out to combat the tribesmen
who had arrived at the bridge. The positions that they had adopted
were incapable of offering more than a token resistance. I ordered
Lt. Col. Dubey to instruct them to return to Poonch.
On arrival at Poonch town, Dubey took me to the palace of the
Rajah of Poonch, where Brigadier Kishen Singh of the Poonch Bri-
gade of the J & K State Forces met me. I asked for transport to be
despatched to the bridge to lift the baggage and stores of 1 Kumaon,
and the request was promptly complied with. I then went into con-
ference with Brigadier Kishen Singh. The disastrous consequences
of burning the bridge naturally formed the opening topic. I learnt
that Poonch Brigade was ignorant of the fact that 161 Infantry Bri-
gade was advancing on the town from the north and 50 Para Brigade
from the south. No communication whatsoever had been sent to the
Brigade by H Q Jak Force and a reference to the Operation Instruc-
tions issued to 161 Infantry Brigade and 50 Para Brigade substan-
tiated Brigadier Kishen Singh's statement. Poonch Brigade did not
appear on the Distribution List of either of them, while Jammu
Brigade of the J & K State Forces, which was operating in close co-
operation with 50 Para Brigade, appeared on the operation Instruc-
tions issued to Brigadier Y. S. Paranjpe, Commander 5(3 Para Brigade.
Poonch was admittedly isolated from Jammu, its road link having
been cut by the enemy, and the only method of getting both the
Operation Instructions to Poonch Brigade was by an air drop, or
by wireless. Perhaps H Q J & K Force considered an air drop but
vetoed it as they were likely to fall into enemy hands and endanger
the entire operation. This was understandable. But the Tactical Head-
quarters of Jak Force was in Srinagar, and s o was Headquarters
Jammu & Kashmir State Forces, which had a direct wireless link
DIVERSION TO POONCH
with Poonch Brigade. A condensed message to Poonch Brigade, in-

forming the Commander of what was about to happen was a very
simple matter, yet this channel of communication was never utilised.
One can only assume that the desire for strict secrecy had blurred
the horizon. The fact remained that Poonch and Poonch Brigade,
for whose benefit the operation was mounted, escaped attention as
the Operation Instructions could not be delivered by hand. This lapse
could have had far-reaching effects. Had the blown bridge been over
a river instead of a dry nullah bed, 161 Infantry Brigade would not
have been able to place 1 Kumaon in Poonch and would have had
to return with the battalion to Uri.
Lt. Col. Pritam Singh arrived after an hour and joined in the con-
ference. A survey of the hills overlooking the town showed many
of them with sangars. Inquiries showed that these stone battlements
had been constructed by the tribesmen who were in occupation of
many of them. Asked whether any attempt had been made to dis-
lodge them, Brigadier Kishen Singh replied in the negative. I imme-
diately appointed Lt. Col. Pritam Singh as the Commander of Poonch,
and had all the State Force Troops placed under his command, hav-
ing first informed Brigadier Kishen Singh that I had no option but
to take this step as it was essential that there was a coordinated plan
for the defence of the area and I could not place Indian troops under
his command. H e agreed with the decision. I then ordered Lt. Col.
Pritam Singh to liquidate the enemy holding the sangars on the hills
as soon as he was in a position to do so, and to establish his own
piquets in the area. Then the plan for (he overall defence of Poonch
area, and the town in particular, was discussed and an agreed solu-
tion arrived at. As matters turned out, it was the reinforcement ol
Poonch by 1 Kumaon that helped to save the town. 50 Para Brigade
never reached Poonch. The State Force units and 1 Kumaon, with
further troops that were flown in, held Poonch till a strong column
was sent up from Jammu in November 19-18.
We sat down to a quick lunch, and, bidding good-bye to those
present, I was about to get illto my jeep to return to my command
at the burnt bridge when I was handed an immediate signal : -the
small party which had been forced to harbour for the night in the
area of milestone 7, on the Uri-Haji Pir qasirbad, had been ambushed
and mauled, and the wooden.bridge at the site had been burnt. w h a t
the State Forces had done at.the Batar Nullah had now been repeated
by the tribesmen at milestone 7.
Speeding in a jeep to the burnt bridge over the Batar Nullah, I
SLEM)ER WAS THE THREXD
ordered 2 Dogra to make a dash for the Haji Pir Pass, impressing on
the Commanding Officer that it was vital that the Pass be in bur
possession. The battalion was on its way in a matter of minutes. The
drivers of the civilian vehicles, realising that an onward move to
Poonch was no longer possible, had used their initiative and reversed
their vehicles, parking them facing the Pir Panjal Range. Moving to
within a mile of the Pass, the battalion debussed and then proceeded
forward on foot. Just before three o'clock, 2 Dogra reported that the
Pass was in its possession and that no enemy had been encountered.
This was good news since, had the enemy been in occupation of. the
Pass-and this was a live possibility-we would have faced an acute
problem, particularly if he was holding it in strength. It would have
called for a full-scale Brigade attack with three battalions, and all
that was available was one battalion, and a raw one at that with no
experience of battle.
Although it was now a Regular battalion of the Indian Army, 2
Dogra had attained that status after the termination of World War
11. The original 2 Dogra, an extremely fine fighting unit with a long
and distinguished record, had been lost as a result of the debacle in
Malaya in 1942, and in order to resuscitate it, the Territorial Army
battalion of the Dogra Regiment was given Regular status and desig-
nated the 2nd Battalion the Dogra Regiment. How this ex-Territorial
Army battalion would perform, if faced by strong enemy opposition,
was a matter of deep concern.
With the Haji Pir Pass firmly in our hands, the buses and load
carriers which had been used to transport 1 Kumaon were now
ordered to advance to the Haji Pir Pass, the Troop of Armoured
Cars of 7 Cavalry acting as the Rear Guard. Just when it appeared
that things were going our way, one of the Armoured Cars deve-
loped a mechanical defect and, after moving forward erratically for
a few miles, petered out at the foot of the climb to the Pass. The
fault lay in a defect in the electrical system, but just could not be
traced. The services of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
detachment, which had been detailed to accompany the column from
Uri but which had been with the ambushed rear party, not being
available, almost everyone had a shot at trying to locate the fault.
After an hour had elapsed, and with the light failing fast, Major
Inder Rikhye and I were considering whether the armament and
ammunition of the vehicle should be removed and the Armoured
Cm left in situ to be dealt with the next morning, when there was
a shout from the Armoured Car driver. A jeep driver, who had stuck
DIVERSION TO P O O N C I I
his head into the engine compartment of the vehicle, had started
shaking various wires, and in doing so had inadvertently established
contact. What he had touched he could not say, but in a few seconds
the engine sprang to life, and with the Arrnoured Car now leading,
the tail of the column made the Pass soon after last light.
Remaining on the Pass for the night, the column continued its
return to Uri the next morning, 22, November. The hills overlooking
the road from the east were made the responsibility of 2 Dogra,
while the Armoured Cars and the reserve Rifle Company of 2 Dogra
were to protect the road itself and the transport.
Lt. Col. Man Mohan Khanna of 4 Kumaon, on hearing of the
ambush at milestone 7, had on his own initiative rushed from Uri
to the ambush area with two Rille Companies of his battalion, with
the intention of holding the area until the returning column linked
up with him. He was, however, ordered to return to Uri by HQ J & K
Force.
When the leading troops of our column reached the bridge at
milestone 7, at a quarter past ten, they were presented with a scene
of desolation. The wooden bridge, not unlike the one near Mahura
but at a hairpin bend and over a re-entrant, was a mass of cinders.
A few yards beyond the bridge and towards CTri was another hairpin
bend, and on the far side of it, not visible to the advancing column
lay the burnt-out vehicles, with ammunition scattered all over the
road and against the sides of the hills. Six civilian vehlcles had been
burnt and three Army men and four civilians were lying dead near-
by. The heavy breakdown vehicle was, however, undamaged. The
mutilated corpses left no doubts that an element of Mahsuds had
formed a part of the ambush party, their savagery towards the
wounded and the dead following a well established and unmistakable
pattern.
A subsequent inquiry into what had actually happened in the mile-
stone 7 area showed quite clearly that it had resulted from careless-
ness. Having spent an undisturbed night on the hill slope overlooldng
the transport, the fighting element of the Rear Party, two platoons of
1 Kumaon, did not search the area after first light but, as the
transport commenced to move forward, evacuated their defensive
positions and moved down the hill towards the road. The leading
vehicle had barely advanced thirty yards when the enemy appeared
from around the bend, and shooting up the vehicles, advanced and
attacked. One platoon, which was still moving down the his imme
diately took up a position and engaged the enemy, thus probably
SLENDER WAS TIIE THREAD
averting an even greater disaster. The plat0011 that had almost

ed the road was able to scramble back up the hill. Had even a sec-
tion been sent out to search the area before the order to move for-
ward was issued, it could not have failed to detect the enemy on
the road in the bridge area, and the ambushers would have beer1 the
ambushed. Withdrawing to Uri, the Rear Party reported the incident
to the Commanding Officer of 4 Kumaon. A few days later, Pa~ik'istan
Radio announced to the world that an Indian Army Brigade, with
a column of over two hundred vehicles, had been annihilated by
raiders on the road between Uri and the Haji Pir Pass on the Pir
Panjal Range.
The task of constructing a crossing place at the bridge site was
taken in hand immediately, the technique employed at Mahura of
filling the gap with large rocks and boulders being resorted to. The
manpower for the task was, however, about one quarter of that
available at Mahura, and despite a great effort by the men, the prog-
ress was slow. It was therefore decided to cut slopes on both sides
of the gap, so that the raising of the bed could be reduced by about
half. At mid-day on 25 November, the crossing site, while not afford-
ing an easy passage for a heavy vehicle, was considered to be nego-
tiable. The men had laboured for three days and three nights, and
the strain had begun to tell. Two Dodge vehicles with winches made
the initial crossing, and, having been stationed on the far bank, with
occasional assistance from the heavy breakdown vehicle hauled out
those vehicles which could not negotiate the crossing under their
own power. About sixty per cent of the civilian vehicles required this
treatment, but by four o'clock they were all across and the column
moved to Uri, arriving an hour later.
The three days and nights spent in the vicinity of milestone 7 were
fraught with danger. The enemy engaged us with long range fire,
aiming it at the bridge site, presumably to stop or slow down the
work. Fortunately he kept his fire away from the sixty-eight vehicles
lined up nose to tail on the road : had he set one of them alight, we
would have been presented with a blazing inferno to extinguish
which we had nothing. That he made only one attempt to close with
the column was probably due to an ill-fated effort by about thirty
tribesmen, who in the evening of 22 November made an encircling
move to occupy a feature which overlooked the road. Spotted, they
were permitted to advance as if undetected, and were then ambushed
by a Company of 2 Dogra.
Chapter 12
Holding the Uri Bowl
THElong respite from the pursuit they had feared enabled the panic-
stricken tribesmen to recover their composure. From 13 November
when Uri was captured they had, as a result of the 'stay put' order
from Jak Force, only been subjected to opposition from fighting pat-
rols. Whether during the period 14 to 19 November they formulated
the opinion that 161 Infantry Brigade was not going to continue its
advance towards Domel, or assumed that the Brigade was halted in
order to enable the logistical support to receive attention before any
further advance was contemplated, is not known. What was clear
was that when the information reached them that a very large
motorised column had set out for the Haji Pir Pass from Uri, they
realised that an immediate advance towards Domel was unlikely to
take place, and that the Uri garrison had been weakened. They be-
gan therefore to move back towards Uri in strength.
SLENDER WAS THE T'HREAO
The annihilation of the Uri garrison was almost certainly the main
aim of their plan, and the party sent to the road leading to the Haji
Fir Pass was probably given the task of destroying the road in order
to arrest the progress of the motorised columll should it decide to
race back to assist in the defence of Uri. That it arrived at the
wooden bridge at milestone 7 was probably due to its observing the
small Rear Party on the road. As the burning of a wooden bridge
is simple when compared to hacking up a rond, they must have been
very pleased with their effort. When the party returned to report the
successful completion of their operation, the tribal leaders, now con-
fident that the column moving towards the Haji Pir Pass would be
stranded, focussed their attention on the recapture of Uri.
The first objective chosen for assault was the hill feature point
4060, located to the north of Uri, code named Nalwar, and manned
by a strong platoon of 1 Sikh. It held a commanding position, over-
looking not only the Uri bowl but also the rond leading from Uri to
Baramula. While it was vital ground, it was by no means the only
feature which came into this category, there being many others to
the south, east and west of Uri. With 1 Sikh made responsible for
piquetting the heights, the battalion had been completely deployed,
with two platoons kept in the Uri bowl as the battalion reserve. To
reach Nalwar piquet from Uri took over an hour, and involved
crossing the River Jhelum by a steel rope bridge, wide enough to
permit the passage of a loaded mule but with its wooden decking
in urgent need of replacement, and thereafter was a steep climb to
the top of the feature.
In the morning of 21 November, an old woman was seen approach-
ing Uri along the road leading from the west. She was neither chal-
lenged nor stopped by the piquet located at the western exit of
Uri, which had been instructed not to bar her passage. When she
entered the camp, Lt. Col. Sampuran Bachan Singh, of 1 Sikh, met
her and having asked her to rest awhile, offered her a cup of tea
which she accepted after a certain amount of persuasion. Although
she was quite a harmless old lady, she had come from the direction
of the enemy, and Sampuran, a bit puzzled, asked her what she was
doing wandering about by herself in a dangerous area. She said that
she came from a village a few miles down the road, which was
occupied by the raiders, and as she did not like their behaviour she
was going to her daughter in Srinagar. She soon became talkative
and stated that the enemy, present in their thousands, were mainly
Pathans, and had all types of arms. When asked what the tribesmen
HOLDING URI W W L
felt about the fighting to-date, she stated that she had heard thcm
say that they had suffered severe casualties. They were very sore
about it, but they had impressed on the villagers that they intended
taking their revenge in the very near future. One Pathan, who was
said to be a famous tribal chief had, in fact, boasted that he would
SKETCH SHOWING
NALWAR, SUBHAS AND ASHOK t
score great victories on 22 and 24 November. He had called for por-

ters to carry the rations and beddings of his men, and in order to
assure the porters that they did not have far to go, had pointed out
the two features that would be attacked. She then pointed towards
Nalwar and in the direction of a piquet to the south of Uri which
had been given the code word 'Subhas'. When she said that she
would like to continue her journey, Sampuran sent for a jeep and
instructed the driver to take her to Srinagar, and although she stated
that she would prefer to walk, she was persuaded to accept the ride.
As one could not be too careful, Srinagar was contacted as soon as
the jeep had moved off and a request made that the jeep be met at
the Rifle Range and guided to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed's resid-
ence, and Bakshi be requested to ensure that she did not move back
towards Uri.
Just about this time the information relating to the ambush at
milestone 7 was received in Uri, and all the piquets were alerted.
Nothing untoward happened, however, and the night of 21 Novem-
ber passed by quietly. Soon after ten o'clock on the night of 22
November, however, Nalwar piquet reported that a large body of
the enemy was approaching. They were shouting and screaming, pre-
sumably to un-nerve the piquet or perhaps to boliter up their own
courage, and soon grenades began bursting all around the piquet
position. It was apparent that the enemy had encircled the piquet,
and it was now merely a question of time before they closed in
upon it.
The 1 Sikh reserve of two platoons and the 4 Kumaon reserve of
one Company were ordered to reinforce the piquet immediately.
Although strange to the terrain, and it was dark, the reinforcements
set off at great speed and by an almost superhuman effort reached
the piquet in just under half an hour. On their way forward they
encountered and dispersed the enemy who had formed up behind
the piquet in the hope that it would withdraw and run into the
ambush. The now heavily reinforced piquet engaged the enemy and
forced him to withdraw, leaving behind two medium machine guns,
one tfiree-inch mortar base plate, five light machine guns and rifles
and ammunition. From the enemy dead lying at the site, the casual-
ties i d i c t e d were estimated to be about one hundred killed and
wounded.
Nalwar had had a narrow escape, and was immediately built u p
to one full Rifle Company, since it was not improbable that the
enemy might have another go at it in even greater strength. The
old woman's words were now taken at their face value and a plot
was hatched to give the enemy a right royal reception if he came
to Subhas. A rapid deployment was made in the defences and one
more Rifle Company was kept ready for use at Subhas. To reinforce
this piquet would have taken a great deal of time so it was de-
HOLDING THE URZ BOWL
cided to move a Company illto a position in the close vicinity of

Subhas on 24 November, so as to have it readily available in the
area should its services be required. In order to conceal from the
enemy the knowledge that it was known that Subhas was the next
target of attack, no abnormal activity was permitted in the piquet
area. The company, platoon and section commanders of the rein-
forcement Company visited the piquet on 23 November, in the guise
of the daily maintenance parties, and having seen the position, re-
turned to brief the Company in the Uri bowl. The Mountain Battery
registered targets all around Uri, without giving any indication that
the Subhas area was the main target. With trip wire tied between
the trees and booby traps laid, everything was ready by the after-
noon of 24 November.
The reinforcement Company infiltrated fonvard during the day,
and was concentrated just below the piquet line well before last
light. As a result of the reconnaissances carried out the previous day,
it had been decided to locate it in the already existing bunkers, which
would be doubled in strength, and to get the sub units in position
so that the men could view the position and be given their tasks
before darkness set in. This was successfully achieved, and the Moun-
tain Battery laid its guns so as to answer the call for fire from Subhas
without any delay whatsoever. At half past nine, although the enemy
had not appeared, all the troops were ordered to 'stand to'. He arriv-
ed soon after ten o'clock and found himself ambushed. With Verey
lights lighting up the area, the piquet was presented with a perfect
target. The withering fire from the two R a e Companies and the
rain of shells that descended on him shattered the enemy so com-
pletely that he withdrew hurriedly. Reports from agents placed the
enemy casualties at about two hundred killed and wounded, while
intelligence from other sources stated that the Pathans were furious
at having been asked to launch these attacks, which they had been
assured were easy and unlikely to meet with serious resistance. Many
decided to go back home.
Uri had survived two determined attacks on it, success to the
enemy in either of which would have been disastrous. Had just one
battalion been left in llri when the Poonch column set out, two of
the most important piquets at Uri would probably have fallen, and
the Poonch column left high and dry on the Haji Pir Pass road. That
the personnel with the stranded Poonch column could have found
their way to Mahura, over the hills, is hue, but all the vehicles, stores
and baggage would have had to be be abandoned. With the enemy
occupying two commanding heights at Uri, and a big boost given to

his morale, to have recaptured the features would have been an
extremely difficult task, necessitating the move forward from Sri-
nagar of all the troops located in the Valley.
The advance of 161 Infantry Brigade down the road towards
Dome1 was now out of the question. The task of reorganising the
Uri defence system was therefore taken in hand. It was a disappoint-
ment for the Brigade, which had been riding on the crest of a wave,
and its only consolation was that it had assisted in saving Poonch.
A comprehensive report was sent to the Commander Jak Force in
Jammu, relating the experiences of the column from Uri to Poonch
and back to Uri, and an assessment of the situztion that faced the
Poonch garrison. It was recommended that Poonch should be imme-
diately established as an Independent Brigade directly under Head-
quarters Jak Force, and that Lt. Col. Pritam Singh, the Officer Com-
manding 1 Kumaon, shoulcl be given the rank of Brigadier. This, it
was stressed, was necessary as Brigadier Kishen Singh of the State
Forces was also in Poonch, and although he had agreed to place the
State Force troops under Pritam Singh, his prestige, in the eyes of
the officers and men of the units located in Poonch, would be under-
mined. This could be avoided if Pritam Singh's promotion was
announced immediately.
In support of the formation of an Independent Brigade, it was
emphasised that there was neither a secure motorable road nor an
animal-cum-porter land route from Uri to Poonch. The administration
of the Poonch garrison, unless 50 Para Brigade opened the land route
from Jamnu to that town, would have to be by air-drops, and by
airlifts when a landing ground, which Pritam Sing11 had been in-
structed to lay out, had been prepared. The administration and pos-
sible reinforcing of Poonch could, therefore, be best effected from
Jamrnu, where the facilities existed, and not from Srinagar which,
once the snows came, would be bereft of aircraft. Finally, it was
made clear that 161 Infantry Brigade could not effectively control
the operations that would take place in the area of Poonch, it being
impossible to influence any situation that might arise, other than
by offering advice over the wireless link.
Headquarters Jak Force's reactions to these recommendations
were contained in a signal making HQ 161. Infantry Brigade directly
responsible for the administration and conduct of operations in the
Poonch area. A telephonic communication with the Force Com-
mander, explaining the difficulties of implementing the order, met
HOLDING THE URI BOWL
with a sharp rejection. .4 further suggestion that as 50 Para Brigade

was to link up with the Poonch garrison, an action that was now
beyond the scope of 161 Infantry Brigade, he might consider plnc-
ing Poonch uncler 50 Para Brigade was also rejected. At the time
that the suggestion was made, 50 Para Brigade was still trying to
make its way to Kotli, and it \\!as the most obvious thing to do to
place Poonch under its command, thereby making the link-up bet-
ween 50 Para Brigade and 1 Kurmon from Poonch an operation con-
ducted by one commander. That 50 Para Brigade did not eventually
reach Kotli and the link-up with Poonch never materialised had no
bearing on the insistence of HQ Jak Force that 161 Infantry Bri-
gade must be wholly responsible for Poonch. The enemy and the
massive Pir Panjal Range had made physical contact with Poonch
impossible, and all that 161 Infantry Brigade could offer was lip
service.
It did not take long for the incongruity of 161 Infantry Brigade
being made responsible for Poonch to become apparent. All the
demands from the Poonch garrison were forwarded to HQ Jak
Force for implementation, and the introduction of the extra link
was placing an undue load on 161 Infantry Brigade Signal Section
which had to decode and then encode all the signal messages before
passing them on to HQ Jak Force. The freedom of action of the
Commander Poonch garrison was also being curbed, as before he
undertook any operations he was required to submit his plans for
approval. He was invariably given a free hand, qjnce to attempt
to suggest a change in the commander's plans, in a battle being
fought at platoon or company level, with no knowledge of the ter-
rain other than that depicted on a small-scale map, would have been
ridiculous and might have led him into a tactically unsound man-
oeuvre.
Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Pritam Sing11 had asked for the personnel of
the Rear Partv, ~ 1 1 0\irere from his battalion and who had been
arnbuslled on the road to the Haji Pir Pass, to be sent forward to
rejoin the battalion. Composed of his unit Quartermaster Staff and
two rifle platoqns, the batialion was unbalanced without them.
These personnel were despatched from Uri to Jammu by road, with
orders to report at HQ Jak Force, who had been requested to induct
them into Poonch \vithout delay. HQ Jak Force now began to see
the lisht, and in a few days the Poonch garrison was made into a
Brigade, and Lt. Col. Pritam Singh given the rank of Brigadier. He
was a tough, rugged soldier, eminently suited for the role that he
was charged with. That he held Poonch, which was isolated for
nearly one year, speaks volumes for his fighting qualities and ability.
With Poonch off its hands, 161 Infantry Brigade took stock of the
situation facing it in Kashmir. 1 Punjab having moved to Jammu
after the capture of Baramula, and now 1 Kumaon placed in Poonch,
the Brigade was back to four infantry battalions. The terrain that
it was responsible for, and the task that faced it, were both formida-
ble. After careful consideration, it was assessed that one more in-
fantry battalion was the minimum requirement, and in view of the
fact that the Brigade had surrendered one battalion, 1 Kumaon, for
the defence of Poonch, it was considered automatic for HQ Jak
Force to replace it. A request for the extra battalion, together with
the deployment of the Brigade on the arrival of the new unit in the
Valley, was sent to H Q Jak Force. I t was specifically stated in the
request that the deployment of the Brigade, including the infantry
battalion asked for, was based on holding the territory recaptured
from the tribesmen. Two battalions were required to hold Uri, one
to protect the thirty-two miles of road in-between Uri and Baramula,
one battalion to hold Baramula and its environs, and one battalion
to be held in reserve in Baramula.
The signal from H Q Jak Force was a flat refusal to send in ano-
ther battalion, with a rider included which informed me that my
responsibility was not only the area captured from the tribesmen,
but the whole of Kashmir and Ladakh.
For the first time since I had taken over command of 161 Infantry
Brigade, I began to wonder whether Jak Force, and perhaps even
Army Headquarters, were really serious about the operations in the
Valley. First the security of Jammu had been given pride of place
when 1 Punjab was whisked away from the Brigade soon after it
had advanced from Baramula and no replacement was agreed to,
then Poonch was given preference rather than an advance towards
Domel, and, once again, no replacement for the battalion placed
in Poonch. Although I did not mention it to my Staff Officers, I had
a feeling they shared the impression that was gaining strength in
me that 161 Infantry Brigade was the orphan child of Jak Force,
and that the Kashmir Valley was regarded as a secondary theatre of
operations compared with Jammu and Poonch.
With the fifth infantry battalion denied to 161 Infantry Brigade,
there was no option but to deploy the troops available in such a
manner that the Brigade could honour its commitments without
last-minute adjustments. The following dispositions were, therefore,
adopted :
URI Main Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade
One Mountain Battery
One Troop Field Artillery
One Field Company, Madras Engineers
1 Sikh
4 Kumaon
3 Light Field Ambulance.
BARAMULA
One Battery Field Artillery less one troop
One Squadron Armoured Cars 7 Cavalry less one troop
2 Dogra.
S RINAGAR
Rear Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade
Headquarters Sri Garrison
One Troop 7 Cavalry
6 Rajrif
Motor Transport Company, ASC
Composite Platoon, ASC
Ordnance and EME detachments.
This deployment left the vital line of communication between
Baramula and Uri completely without troops, except for the daily
move down the road by a Troop of Armoured Cars from Baramula.
To leave it unprotected by night was not a justifiable risk, but it
was dictated by the paucity of troops. With the troops committed to
piquets and living in bunkers, it was essential that they should be
relieved after a reasonable spell of time, and the infantry battalion
located in Srinagar was, therefore, not only the relief battalion but
also the Brigade reserve. The system of relief decided upon was for
the battalion in Srinagar to move to Baramula, the battalion in Bara-
mula to Uri, and one of the Uri battalions to Srinagar. This ensured
that Uri was always garrisoned by a battalion that had spent some
time in the area and knew it well.
The remainder of Brigade Headquarters had arrived from Ranchi
on 26 November, and after certain elements moved forward to join
Main Headquarters in Uri, the Rear Headquarters settled down in
Srinagar.
The enemy had meanwhile become very active on the Uri front
and engagements by night became a regular feature. The writing
was on the wall : he was going to make another determined attempt

to recapture Uri.
, Between the period 22 November, when Nalwar piquet was first
attacked, and 9 December, the piquets protecting Uri were assaulted
sixteen times in varying strength. The attacks were invariably
mounted after dark, and on some nights two, and even three,
attempts would be made on the same piquet. The enemy, however,
had no success, as the piquets stood firm and struck back hard.
After each attack on a position, the piquet location was studied and
adjustments made to strengthen it even further. In certain cases it
necessitated the re-siting of the piquet, some being subjected to
such treatment on as many as six occasions. Meanwhile, every effort
was being directed towards not giving the enemy a free hand to
dictate the shape of the operations. Our patrols continued to be
very active, the long range ones penetrating deep and harassing the
enemy. H e did not appear to be anxious to close with them, prefer-
ring to discourage them from advancing too close with fire from
extreme ranges. Patrolling alonc, however, was no adequate answer
to combating the enemy's designs. The area was extensive, mount-
ainous and in places thickly forested. While enemy movements could
be watched and neutralised by day, there were many hours of dark-
ness which gave him ample scope.
161 Infantry Brigade had, from the date of arrival of its first unit
in the Valley, been faced by an enemy many times its number. This
had necessitated the surrendering of the initiative to him on occa-
sion, but it had always been wrested back at the first opportune
moment. With the Brigade now tied down to a defensive role, the
initiative had passed back to the enemy, and it would be months
before it could be regained. This involved the dictation to us of the
place, date and time of his attacks by the enemv, who had the abi-
lity to achieve surprise. In order to combat this dangerous factor
it was essential that the Brigade was forewarned of possible enemy
actions, and this could only result from a very efficient ~ntelligence
system. Utmost attention was therefore given to building up such a
system, the standard aimed at being that the Brigade shollld always
be a clear jump ahead of the enemy. Only then would it be possible
to redeploy the troops in sufficient time to counter a threat on a
lightly held piquet, or to move them to an enemy target that was
not being manned.
Vigorous patrolling, round-the-clock interception of all the enemy's
wireless traffic, strict security precautions to be observed by all ranks
in conversation with strangers, or in their hearing, and in all com-

munications on telephone or wireless links were intensified, and con-
stant reminders issued. But these measures were. not nearly sufficient;
they had to be supplemented by the use of reliable agents. I there-
fore decided to visit the Emergency Government and to request it
to make available to me a number of individrlals with an intimate
knowledge of the area between Baramula and Domel. These indivi-
duals, I intended stressing, should be those whose occupation in the
past made it necessary for them to wander about the area. This would
ensure not only that they knew the area well, but that their presence
in it would not arouse suspicion. The personnel whom I had in mind
for the role were the Forest Rangers.
It was my intention to approach Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who
had been a pillar of strength, and, apart from the personal bravery
that he had displayed more than once, had impressed me as being a
man of action. The idea of approaching Bakshi was not uninfluenced
by a marked change that I had noticed in Sheikh Abdullah over the
short period that I had known him. The change was not in his atti-
tude to me - h e was always very courteous and friendly -but to the
over-all situation in Kashmir. From an individual who had initially
evinced keen anxiety regarding the safety of Kashmir and its people,
as the military situation improved he had become obsessed with his
own importance. His interest had veered from the tackling of the
many pressing problems which demanded his undivided attention
and time, to the building up of his popularity with the masses. On
second thoughts, however, I decided to pose my problem and request
to Sheikh Abdullah, since he was after all the leader of the Emergency
Government.
As it had become a routine matter for me to call on Sheikh
Abdullah every time I visited Srinagar, in order to brief him on the
situation, on arrival I was led straight into his drawing room. As
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, D. P. D h a . and Ghulam Mohammed
Sadiq, who were normally present during my visits were away at
the time, they were summoned to come over to Sheikh's house, and
I sat down with Sheikh Abdullah to have a cup of tea. Every time
that I visited Sheikh Abdullah, he ~ r o u l dsooner or later resurrect
the unfortunate case of the two National Conference Volunteers who
had been killed on the night of 5 November and tell me what a tragic
loss it had been. The first few times I reiterated my sympathy and
said that it had been an unfortunate accident. But when I found
the matter being brought up again and again, I felt it was time for
me to put a few basic facts before him.
I asked him how many times he had demanded an apology from
the tribals who had killed thousands of the people of Kashmir in
their advance to the Valley. Those killings had been deliberate
murder, without any semblance of an accident. I could see that he
was taken aback and was searching for an answer. Without waiting
for his reply, I pointed out that in defending the Valley, 161 Infantry
Brigade had never at any time either asked for, or used, a single man
from the National Conference Volunteers to take u p arms and assist
it in battling against the tribals. I t had not done so at the time of
the battle of Badgam, when the situation was precarious, nor when
the tribesmen were four miles from Srinagar, at Shalateng. The
request had not been made because, even had I produced the
weapons of the sick and wounded in the hospital and a t Badami
Bagh Barracks and handed them over to the National Conference
Volunteers, they would have been untrained and unskilled in their
use. To have moved them into the battle area would probably have
resulted in their suffering casualties because of their inability to
operate tactically, and I could rightly have been labelled a murderer.
The battle had, therefore, been fought entirely by my weak Brigade.
The Brigade had suffered casualties in both officers and men in the
various engagements that it had fought, but had accepted them will-
ingly in order to save the Valley from the bloody massacres that had
drenched Muzaffarabad and Baramula. The despatch of parties of
National Conference Volunteers on information-obtaining missions, I
reminded him, had been ordered without the -request or the know-
ledge of 161 Infantry Brigade. That they had done good work was
undeniable, and I had greatly appreciated the reports that I had
received from him. He had dwelt at length at my first meeting with
him on the fate that had befallen Maqbool Sherwani, one of his most
loyal and competent Volunteers, at the hands of the tribal raiders.
Shenvani had first been virtually crucified and then shot by the
tribesmen: in short, he had been murdered. Yet, after the first meet-
ing, he had never mentioned Sherwani's name to me again.
At this point Sheikh Abdullah tried to halt me, but I was in no
frame of mind to be stopped and sought his indulgence for just a
few more minutes. I then related to him the incident in which a
Company Commander had been shot in the leg by a sentry of his
own Company, for failing to answer a challenge made after dark,
and explained to him that incidents such as this had happened in
the past and would happen again in future wars. Then turning to
Badgam, I reminded him of my report in which I had stated that the
4 Kumaon Company had been shot at from the rear by individuals
located in the houses in Badgam. While expressing sympathy, he had
dismissed the incident with the remark that Badgam had always
been a troublesome village. Major Somnath Sharma and many of his
men had been killed in the battle, and I had stated at the time that
while he might consider Badgam a bad village, I was of the opinion
that the armed men in the village were probably tribals who had
infiltrated into it and held the people to ransom. The point I wished
to stress, however, was that Major Sharma had shown deep concern
for the villagers and had not fired back at those who were harassing
him, lest innocent people were killed or wounded. It was well with-
in his right to have done so, as his command was being endangered,
but he stayed his hand and spared the lives of the villagers. This
incident alone should be a clear indication that my troops were not
trigger happy, and kept their heads in deciding whom to shoot a t
and whom to avoid.
Finally I asked Sheikh Abdullah a pointed question : If Maqbool
Sherwani's torture and murder a t Baramula was any indicator of
the tribesmen's attitude, and had my Brigade been defeated at the
battle of Shalateng, what did he visualise would have happened to
him as the head of the National Conference Volunteers 3 "If Sher-
wani on capture was murdered, what is the treatment that would
have been meted out to the people of Srinagar, and yourself in
particular ?"
Sheikh Abdullah did not answer my question. H e suggested that
my tea had gone cold, and ordered that it be taken away and re-
placed by a fresh cup.
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq and
D. P. Dhar arrived soon after and within minutes of one another.
When they had settled down, I gave a resume of the latest situation,
and having completed it, suggested to Sheikh Abdullah that as he
was busy with other pressing problems and I had a few points for
discussions, I might take them up with Bakshi and any others that
he might care to bring along to my Rear Headquarters. sheikh
agreed, and Bakshi, Sadiq and D. P. Dhar came to my Rear HQ.
I suggested this since it would have been in the nature of an anti-
climax if, having impressed on Sheikh Abdullah the fact that 161
Infantry Brigade had never committed a single inhabitant of Kashmir
in battle or on a dangerous mission, I now made a request for some
to risk their lives in a dangerous role. Bakshi, Sadiq and D. P. Dhar,
I knew, would take a more objective view and if it was possible to
meet my request, they would immediately provide me with the right
material.
I explained to Bakshi, Sadiq and D. P. Dhar the situation that
faced 161 Infantry Brigade, and stressed that only an efficient Intel-
ligence coverage of the area would neutralise the advantage held by
the enemy, and, having described the type of individual who would
best fit the bill, suggested the Forest Rangers. There was immediate
agreement, and D. P. Dhar was given the responsibility for selecting
and sending me the personnel. The Forest Rangers arrived the next
day and were detailed for duty with Brigade Headquarters and cer-
tain selected units. Fully conversant with every trail, marked or un-
marked on the maps, they moved across the mountains and through
the forests with incredible speed, and produced the most accurate
information regarding the enemy strengths, location and movements.
I n addition, as the maps of the area were quite inaccurate in certain
areas, they were most useful in removing points of doubt and
enabling corrections to be made.
This contribution to 161 Infantry Brigade's effort was quite out-
standing, but Bakshi perhaps did the Brigade an even greater service.
In the course of our conference, I had mentioned to him that I had
often met an individual named Pir Maqbool near Mahura. He had
told me that he lived in a village in the area, and had asked me more
than once if he could be of any service. H e appeared to be a good
type, and as he had a certain amount of influence in the area, I
suggested that he might be able to assist. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed
cautioned me to b e very careful in my dealings with Pir Maqbool,
and advised me not to display any suspicion but not to let him come
anywhere near my troops. I made a note of this advice, passed it on
to my unit commanders, and politely resisted all Pir Maqbool's sug-
gestions that he come to Uri whenever he had shot any wild game
to present it to me. I would go out and meet him on the road near
Mahura. Bakshi's warning was timely, as Pir Maqbool defected to
Pakistan some time lster and is presumably still there.
The existence of the 1,854 officers and men of the Jammu &
Kashmir State Forces in Badami Bagh Barracks, in Srinagar, came
to light about this time. It was suggested to me by HQ Jak Force
that some of them might be usefully, employed in the collection of
Intelligence, but it was rejected for obvious reasons. Intelligence,
battlefield intelligence in particular, is not a subject that can be
treated light-heartedly. Those engaged in obtaining it must have un-
bounded courage, and be prepared to sacrifice their lives. Fictitious
reports are more dangerous than no reports at all, and can jeopardise
the safety of a whole command. The attitude that had been adopted
by the State Force personnel in Badami Bagh Barracks had shown
a marked disinclination to face the enemy, and it was hardly likely
that it had undergone any change. The Forest Hangers, on the other
hand, were brave to the marrow, and no matter how perilous the
mission allotted to them, never failed to carry it cut with both speed
and efficiency.
During the first week of December, the tactics employed by the
enemy underwent a radical change. The battle formations adopted
made it obvious that the enemy was composed not solely of tribes-
men, but included a percentage of either regular or irregular troops.
Patrols also reported having seen sub-units of various sizes dressed
in uniforms and equipped with modern weapons and wireless sets,
while the standard of the enemy's wireless communications showed
a marked iaprovement, indicating that they were in the hands of
well trained signallers. The almost regular nightly assaults on the
piquets, however, decreased in the weight of the attacks, and there
were reliable reports that the enemy was moving to the feature run-
ning from the Haji Pir Pass to Uri with the intention of occupying
a defensive position. Whether the weather had dictated this change
in tactics, or whether there was some deeper plan could not be
fathomed. Light snowfalls had commenced on 6 December, but the
snow had melted on striking the ground. On the night of 8 December,
however, the fall had been heavy, and the mountains surrounding
Uri were eight inches deep in snow.
On 9 December, one platoon of 4 Kumaon was ordered to carry
out a reconnaissance along the feature leading to the Haji Pir Pass,
as far as the village of Bhatgiran, and to confirm or deny a strong
report that the enemy was in that area. The going, bezause of the
snow, was heavy and difficult, but the platoon made good progress
and at mid-day reached a point from where it could see the village,
which consisted of a few huts. As the platoon commander took up
his binoculars to search the area, the platoon came under very heavy
fire from what was a well entrenched enemy. Realising that he was
faced by a minimum of two Rifle Companies, the platoon commander
decided to withdraw, having successfully completed his mission. The
enemy followed the withdrawing platoon, which fought a slcilfd
SLENDER WAS THE THREAb
rearguard action and passed through its own piquet line unscathed.
Engaged by the piquets, the enemy withdrew.
The next day, 10 December, a Company of 1 Sikh, under the
command of Major Ajaib Singh, was sent out to engage the enemy
and to force him to withdraw. The enemy was engaged, but was
far too well entrenched. The Company of 1 Sikh then withdrew in
good order, the enemy following u p once again but being repulsed
by the firm base piquets. Although it had not suffered any casualties,
the Company felt that it had delivered quite a knock to the enemy.
It was thought possible that he might decide that things were becom-
ing unpleasant and withdraw. On 11 December, therefore, one
section was sent forward to ascertain the position, but on return it
reported that there were very definitely two enemy Companies in
position with a possible third in depth.
The enemy had meanwhile proclaimed his presence in the area.
At about ten o'clock, while the section was moving forward, he
brought the road leading into Uri from the east under fire from light
machine guns, enforcing the halting of all traffic, and in fact placing
Uri in a state of partial siege. The Brigade was now left with no
option. The enemy just had to be forced to withdraw. Given the
paucity of troops, however, forming a striking force of reasonable
strength was a problem. Two Rifle Companies of 4 Kumaon were
collected by thinning down the piquets held by that battalion. Sent
forward to engage the enemy, the Companies got to within one
hundred yards of the enemy defences and came under very heavy
fire. It was soon discovered that the enemy was a battalion in
strength, well dug in and well led, and identified as Frontier Scouts.
Just when the situation facing the two ,Companies, which had been
pinned to the ground, was getting very serious, one of our fighter
aircraft happened to fly over Uri, arriving purely by chance. The
pilot was contacted by ground control and directed over Bhatgiran,
and briefed that the position would be indicated to him by a "T"
laid out with ground panels. Simultaneously the Commander of the
two Companies of 4 Kumaon was ordered to display a "T" with
his ground panels. A "T" laid out with ground panels indicates to the
aircraft very close contact with the enemy, the enemy being at the
other end of the head of the "T". How the pilot managed to detcct
in the snow the ground panel signal, which is white in colour, is a
mystery but see it he did, and diving into the attack he caught the
enemy with two bombs and then straffed the position. Under the
cover of this support from the air, the two 4 Kumaon Companies
were able to break contact and withdraw.
With the reinforcements despatched from the Kumaon Regimental
Centre, to bring 4 Kumaon up to war establishment, hzd arrived a
platoon of boys. These lads were from the Boys Company which it
was customary to have in each Regimental Centre. The sons of ex-
soldiers and serving personnel of the Regiment, they were recruited
and trained from a very young age in the Centre until such time as
they reached the age laid down for enlistment. With their education
and careful training, they were regarded as potential non-commis-
sioned officers and specialists. In its anxiety to reinforce 4 Kumaon,
the Regimental Centre had sent to the battalion almost everyone it
held who was from 4 Kumaon, and the boys earmarked for 4 Kumaon
had been included in the party. Lt. Col. Man Mohan Khanna, com-
manding 4 Kumaon, was not a little annoyed when he discovered
this, and gave orders that these youngsters were not to be drafted
into the R a e Companies but were to be formed into a special platoon
which he placed in the charge of a specially selected platoon com-
mander. He issued instructions that under no circumstances was the
Boys Platoon to be placed in a situation which might result in its
being involved in a battle. The boys, however, were not happy at
being kept in cotton wool, and as a result of their persistent pleas
to be allowed to see some fighting, when his two Companies moved
out to engage the enemy on the morning of 11 December, Lt. Col.
Khanna agreed that they could move as far as the piquet line and
take up a position there. He however instructed the platoon com-
mander to locate them on a safe flank, and to give them the im-
pression that they were holding an important position, but which
would in fact be well out of harm's way.
As the two withdrawing Companies of 4 Kumaon were nearing the
piquet line, the enemy, who was following, decided to outflank
them and sent a platoon on a wide flanking movement to get into
position and attack them from the rear. This enemy platoon appa-
rently saw what appeared to be an unoccupied knoll in a very suita-
ble position from which it could achieve its task; and moved towards
it. This knoll was the one position considered safe and was occupied
by the Boys Platoon. Seeing the enemy heading towards his position,
the platoon commander alerted his command, but ordered the boys
not to fire except on his order. He found himself in a peculiar posi-
tion. He had been instructed not to involve the boys in a battle, but
a situation had arisen in which the boys were going to be involved
in battle whether he liked it or not. When the enemy platoon had

come to within fifty yards of the knoll, he realised that his platoon
had to open fire and he gave the order to do so. The aim of the boys
was straight and true, and a completely surprised enemy halted in
his stride and then hastily withdrew, leaving behind his dead and
a few wounded. The chest of every boy in that platoon expanded
two inches. They had had a stunning success in their baptism of
fire, had routed the enemy platoon that had tried to challenge them,
and had inflicted casualties on it without receiving a scratch. It was
no longer possible for anyone to tell them that they were too young
to be soldiers.
With the road lending into Uri still unusable owing to enemy fire,
it was decided that only a full-scale attack by a battalion could r e
move the thorn in our side. Apart from making the road unusable,
located as he was, the enemy could mount a heavy attack on the
piquet line, which if successful could almost make Uri untenable
for us. It was not an attack that could be delayed. With heavy snow-
falls almost every day, the area between the piquet line and the
enemy was aIready about two feet deep in snow. To move forward
to the attack would be hard enough, but then the attacking unit
would also have to return. The enemy, on the other hand, would
move downhill towards Uri, and if successful in his attack, would
stay put. The only way in which it was possible to assemble one
battalion for the attack was to relieve 1 Sikh of its defence com-
mitments, and to hold the piquet line with a reduced strength by
deploying the Brigade reserve of two Companies of 4 Kumaon.
The orders given to Lt. Col. Sampuran Bachan Singh, commanding
1 Sikh, were that his unit would move out of Uri in the early hours
of the morning of 13 December, would pick up his sub-units in the
piquet area, which would have been taken over by 4 Kumaon, and
advance along the ridge towards Bhatgiran. His firm base would be
the 4 Kumaon held piquet line. When contact with the enemy had
been made the battalion was to attack and force the enemy to with-
draw. This having been achieved, the battalion was to withdraw
to Uri by the same route taken when advancing to Bhatgirsn, and
having passed through the firm base of piquets was to come into
the Uri bowl. Those sub-units of the battalion which would join it
on its reaching the piquet line, would return to their respective
piquets, but the 4 Kumaon personnel holding them in their absence
would not be withdrawn until the next morning. As the Company
commanded by Major Ajaib Singh had carried out the patrol on 10
December and knew the area, it was suggested to, and agreed vvith,
the Commanding Officer that Major Ajaib Singh's Company should
lead the advance. Regarding air support, HQ Jak Force had been
approaclled and had stated that it would be provided, weather per-
mitting. As the weather was still murky, it was doubtful whether it
would materialise.
In the early hours of the morning of 13 December, 1 Sikh moved
out of Uri, and having reached the piquet line was joined by its sub-
units from the piquets. Then, led by Major Ajaib Singh's Company,
the battalion advanced along the ridge towards Bhatgiran. With fur-
ther snowfalls, the going was heavy and d&cult, but satisfactory
progress was made, and by mid-day the battalion reported that it was
in the area of the previous contacts made with the enemy. During
the advance the leading Company had observed and reported small
parties of the enemy, probably those manning outposts or observa-
tion posts, abandoning their positions and rushing back. They made
no effort either to slow down or halt the advance of 1 Sikh. This was,
however, no reason to conclude that the main strength of the enemy
had been withdrawn from the area. Unfortunately that was the con-
clusion arrived at by the Commanding Officer.
Two factors had contributed towards Sampuran Bachan Singh
finding himself the Commanding Officer of 1 Sikh. The first was
the removal of all British Officers from the battalion prior to its move
into the Valley, and the second, the death of Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai on
27 October on the outskirts of Baramula. A Territorial Army Officer
posted with the Sikh Regiment, he was neither professionally quali-
fied nor competent to command a Regular battalion. Lt. Col. Rai had,
in fact, at his initial briefing at Army Headquarters, requested that
he should be sent a capable Second in Command, as Sampuran, by
virtue of his service in the Territorial Army, was now his senior
Major and as such his Second in Command, but was incapable of
holding down that appointment. With this background, it is not sur-
prising that Sampuran Bachan Singh needed tactical guidance, but,
owing to some previous friction between himself and his most capa-
ble Company Commander, Major Ajaib Singh, he placed his confid-
ence in and leant heavily on his Subedar Major.
Subedar Majors, as a whole, are excellent soldiers with years of
service and experience behind them. Rising from the ranks to the
position of the senior Junior Commissioned Officer of a unit is no
mean feat, but they understandably have their limitations in so far as
tactics and strategy are concerned. Their main experience as leaders
SLENDER WAS THE TH-
is generally limited to the command of a platoon, and on occasions to

that of a company. In training during peace, the Junior Commis-
sioned Officer is never exercised in command of a 'nit of the size
of a battalion; it is confined to the company level. There have been
cases during a war when a Subedar Major has taken command of a
battalion which has suffered a total loss of all its officers, but this is
for a limited time until the arrival of reinforcement officers, and is
exceptional. The appointment, peculiar to the Indian Army, was
created during the period when the officering of the Indian Army
was confined exclusively to the British, the main function of the
Subedar Major being to advise the Commanding Officer on matters
pertaining to the customs, peculiarities, welfare and morale of the
men enlisted in the unit. Never at any time has a battalion comman-
der shed his responsibility for the tactical handling of his unit and
made it the prerogative of the Subedar Major.
Having reached the point of his previous contact with the enemy,
on 10 December, Major Ajaib Singh halted his Company, placed it
in position and walked back to consult his battaliofi commander. He
informed him that although he had not been fired upon, the enemy
was in the area, and a battalion plan of attack should now be for-
mulated. To his amazement, Sampuran Bachan Singh stated that he
did not accept the report that the enemy was in the area, and des-
pite Major Ajaib Singh's protests that his reading of the situation
was the correct one, Sampuran turned to the Subedar Major for his
opinion. The Subedar Major immediately agreed with his Command-
ing Officer. H e too was of the opinion that there was no enemy in
the area. Now convinced that he was correct, Sampuran, ignoring
his senior Company Commander, decided after a consultation with
the Subedar Major that it was time to return to Uri. Moreover, in-
stead of ordering the battalion to retrace its steps in accordance
with the orders that had been given to him, he decided that it would
be quicker and easier to descend from the heights to the road lead-
ing from the Haji Pir Pass to Uri.
When given this order, Major Ajaib Singh protested most vehe-
mently. He informed the Commanding Officer that it violated all
the tenets of mountain warfare, and to order the battalion to move
from the heights, down a re-entrant, and on to the road was asking
for serious trouble and could even be suicidal. Once again Sampuran
Bachan Singh consulted the Subedar Major, who agreed with the
Commanding Officer's plan-he could hardly do otherwise as he had
helped to formulate it - and Sampuran, turning to Major Ajaib Singh,
-
as-
Uri used to be a flourishing little town until the tribal

raiders razed it to the ground.
Piquets, heavily bunkered, were located on the lofty heights

overlooking Uri to keep the enemy at bay ....
'4 %
<
, 'k3
Y",
,I,, whilst the swift flowing Jhelum River roared by.

Reconnaissance patrols were also active, studying every
inch of the country, in order to keep 161 Brigade one Jump
ahead of the enemy at all times.
The initial part of the route from Uri to the Haji Pir Pass
was easy going, but soon after commencing the climb it
became tortuous.
the Haji Pir Pass, bleak and desolate, but commanding

e wonderful view of both sides of the POr Panjal Range.
The sheets of flame from the bridge across the Batar
Nullah, destroyed by the State forces, were clearly visible
trom here.
This bridge constructed in the dark at the western exit
of Uri by the Madras Engineers heralded the Spring
offensive of 1948.
The tribals were meanwhile moving to the site of this

bridge at M. S. 7 and their successful ambush. The damage
is being surveyed by Maj. Gen Kulwant Singh and Brig.
1. P. Sen.
Maintaining a piquet in winter was hard work and called
...
for extreme fitness of both men and animals.
....when the snows melted it wag no relief as the sun1$
rays were hot and equally trying.
What the mules were unable to negotiate earned them

....
a well earned rest
,...but men had to take over the heavy loads and scale
the steep mountain sides.
1
HOLDING THE U R .BOWL
repeated his order. Ajaib Singh continued to protest but was cut
short by his Commanding Officer who told him not to argue and
to do what he was told. As he walked back to his Company to pass
SKETCH SHOWING
THE BHATGIRAN BATTLE
on the battalion commander's intention and plan, undetected by 1

Sikh was a strong enemy battalion of Frontier Scouts a bare one
hundred yards away, watching every movement and awaiting an
opportunity to strike.
Returning to his Company, Major Ajaib Singh gave thc necessary

orders to move to the road via the re-entrant. The leading platoon
rose, and followed by the rest of the Company, commenced the move.
No sooner had the whole Company entered the re-entrant than it
was trapped by murderous fire that poured into it from the well-
concealed enemy overlooking the re-entrant. Here was a situation
that the enemy had prayed for but had never thought possible. It
was a colossal blunder that could not go unpunished, and it did not.
Lt. Col. Sampuran Bachan Singh immediately realised the extent of
his error, and in an effort to extricate the trapped Company, ordered
the nearest platoon to attack the enemy. This platoon was led by
Jamedar Nand Singh, V.C. who ordering it to fix its bayonets, charged
headlong into the enemy. The full fury of the enemy fire was then
turned on this platoon. It was decimated, but it permitted Major
Ajaib Singh's Company to scramble back to the top of the ridge.
Then started a fierce fire battle between the two battalions.
Taken completely by surprise and caught out in the open, 1 Sikh
found itself at a serious disadvantage, and Sampuran Bachan Singh
having been shot in the leg, 1 Sikh was ordered to withdraw. The
withdrawal of 1 Sikh was hotly pursued by the enemy, and the pur-
suit was only arrested by the excellent work of the firm base piquets,
including the one manned by the Boys Platoon of 4 Kumaon, who,
seeing action for the second time in a matter of days performed like
seasoned warriors. 1 Sikh descended from the Bhatgiran feature into
the Uri bowl.
1 Sikh suffered 61 killed and 59 \vounded, a high percentage of
the casualties being the officers and non-commissioned officers. As
a battalion it was operationally unfit for any further action until
such time as it could make good its losses in leaders. It was ordered
to prepare,to move back to Srinagar and was replaced in Uri by the
6th Battalion The Rajputana Rifles (6 Rajrif). With Sampuran
Bachan Singh wounded, Lt. Col. Harbakhsh Singh, who was Sri
Garrison Commander, was relieved of that appointment and appoint-
ed the Commanding Officer. That many who were wounded in the
Bhatgiran battle survived is to the credit of 3 Light Field ~ m b u l -
ance, located in Uri. Thirty-six seriously wounded were operated
upon in 27 hours, the medical personnel resting only when the last
patient was off the operation table.
With 1 Sikh now operationally unfit for battle, a request was sent
to HQ Jak Force for two more battalions. One was required in re-
placement of 1 Sikh, and, in vie\\. of the fact that in a week or so the
HOLDrnC THE C . 1 BOWL
Banihal Pass would be snow-bound and would remain in that state

until the following spring, another to meet unforeseen eventualities.
It was stressed that with 1 Sikh non-operational, 161 Infantry Bri-
gade consisted of two Regular Battalions, 4 Kumaon and 6 Rajrif,
and one Territorial Battalion (now turned Regular), 2 Dogra. With
the advent of snow within the next few days, the Brigade would be
marooned in the Valley for four to five months, with no hope of
being reinforced should this be necessary. It was impressed on the
Commander Jak Force that the demand had not been pitched high,
nor was it unreasonable in view of the very large stretch of territory
that had been made the responsibility of the Brigade.
HQ Jak Force agreed to moving in only one more battalion, assert-
ing that the request for a second battalion was lavish and unneces-
sary. The 3rd Battalion The Garhwal Rifles ( 3 Garhwal), commanded
by Lt. Col. L. S. Negi was moved to the Valley, and none too soon,
as on 20 December, forty-eight hours after 3 Garhwal arrived, a heavy
snowfall blocked all road co~nmunicationsover the Banihal Pass.
161 Infantry Brigade found itself segregated from the rest of Jak
Force, by road and by air, until the first week of April. The Brigade
consisted of :
Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade
One Mountain Battery
One Battery Field Artillery
One Field Company Madras Engineers
A Squadron 7 Cavalry
1st Bn. The Sikh Regiment
6th Bn. The Rajputana Rifles
2nd Bn. The Dogra Regiment
4th Bn. The Kumaon Regiment
3rd Bn. The Garhwal Rifles
3 Light Field Ambulance
One Motor Transport Company, ASC
Composite Platoon, ASC
Ordnance Detachment
EME Detachment.
Chapter 13
Hazards of Snow
THEnight following the Bhatgiran battle was fraught with danger-

ous possibilities. In order to enable 3 Light Field Ambulance to
attend to the relatively large number of casualties, many of whom
were in a serious condition and required immediate surgery, all rest-
rictions relating to lighting were relaxed in the Field Ambulance area.
The limited lighting produced b y the generating sets was supple-
mented by Petromax lamps, the bright glare from which made the
low watt electric bulbs appear dim. That the lit-up area would pre-
sent to the enemy a wonderful t a r g ~ was
t fully realised and accepted.
It was taking a grave risk, especially as the enemy was known to be
equipped with mortars, but as he had not trained his fire on Uri in
the past, it was hoped that h e would stay his hand for just that night.
The perimeter defences caused greater worry. Against the barest
minimum requirement of one and a half battalions to man them, they
were now being held by just one battalion, 4 Kumaon. In order to
HAZARDS OF SNOW
take over the 1 Sikh piquets, 4 Kumaon had had to prune down its
own piquet strengths, and all piquets were now held with reduced
garrisons. This had been accepted as being a purely temporary mea-
sure, as on its return from Bhatgiran, the l Sikh sub-units, totalling
half a battalion, were expected to resume responsibility for their own
piquets, the 4 Kumaon 'stand-ins' rejoining their own charges. With
the Bhatgiran battle taking an unforeseen turn, and 1 Sikh unable to
re-assume its piquet responsibility, the calculated risk had boome-
ranged fiercely and had placed Uri in a vulnerable position.
What was even worse was the fact that there was now no reserve
that could be drawn on, the only troops available in the Uri bowl
being an extremely tired and dispirited battalion in a semi-disorga-
nised state. Although all piquets were warned to expect an attack, and
they would doubtless have hit back hard, yet an attack delivered in
strength and with determination had every chance of creating a seri-
ous breach in the defence which could not have been easily repaired.
Strangely enough, the expected attack did not materialise.
6 Rajrif, commanded by Lt. Col. S. S. Kalaan M.C. had already
been ordered to move from Srinagar to Uri, and was expected to
arrive soon after first light the next morning, 14 December. It would
have done so, but for enemy action. It reached the outskirts of Uri
at seven o'clock, but enemy light machine guns raked the road with
fire, halting the progress of the motorised convoy. They were imme-
diately engaged by a troop of Armoured Cars which had accom-
panied the column and were silenced. Entering Uri without damage,
6 Rajrif was immediately allotted the 1 Sikh commitments and
assumed them with remarkable speed. With the perimeter once again
held in reasonable strength, and with a readily available reserve, 1
Sikh was struck off all duties in order to enable it to finalise a s pre-
parations for its return to Srinagar. This was effected two days later,
when the position in Uri was considered to be fully stabilised.
Reconnaissance and fighting patrols towards Bhatgiran were imme
diately intensified, the enemy being kept under constant observation
and harassment. The intelligence reports trickling in indicated that
he had suffered severe casualties over the period 10 to 13 December,
particularly on 12 December when engaged by the two 4 Kumaon
Companies and the fighter aircraft that had arrived over the battle
area at such an opportune moment. Moreover, the increasing weight
of the snowfalls was stated to be placing a great strain on the enemy
in terms of administrative problems. This latter assessment was, how-
ever, not giveq much credence. 161 Infantry Brigade's piquets were
located in areas with equally heavy snowfall, and although the ad-
ministrative problem was difficult it was certainly not an insur-
mountable one, and not even a passing t h o u ~ h twas given .to the
withdrawing of the piquets. \;lrlzat was interesting in the reports re-
ceived was the constant repetition of a visible lowering in the enemy's
morale. There were strong rumours that a withdrawal was imminent.
Patrol reports also pointed in the same direction, and it was no sur-
prise when in the morning of 20 December, a platoon patrol from
4 Kumaon entered Bhatgiran and reported it clear of the enemy.
The same evening, Rear Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade in Sri-
nagar reported that a heavy snowfall had blocked the Banihal Pass
and made it impassable for any kind of traffic.
The steady increase in the weight of the snowfalls and the ever-
darkening clouds, had left little doubt that the days before the Pass
would be closed to traffic wcre numbered. A hastv review had,
therefore, been made of the stockpiling of supplies and ordnance
stores \vhich would be required to see the Brigade through the next
four months. Sllortages were telephoned to H Q Jak Force and were
promptly despatched to the Valley by road convoy. There was, how-
ever, a complete void where welfare and amenity stores for the
troops were concerned. It was essential that these were available in
sufficient quantities in order to provide the men with some form of
relaxation. During the nest few months they would be unable to
receive or despatch any mail to their families, and when not out on
operations would be cooped u p in bunkers on the heights or at the
basc of the mountains. An immediate signal, requesting these stores,
was therefore despatched.
Two days later, Major Dcrek Bobb, the D.4.4 & QMG at Rear HQ
161 Infantry Brigade, informed Main HQ that three crates of amenity
and welfare stores had arrived, and was instructed to for\vard them
to Uri. There was a distinct sense of jubilztion when the truck bear-
ing the crates arrived. Now, it was felt, the troops who had gone
through the most trying times would have something to keep them
cheerf~~lly occupied. The three crates were ripped open almost siinul-
taneously, but their contents were greeted with horrified stares and
the stifling of gasps. Neatly packed in them were nothing other than
hockey sticks and hockey balls ! Immediate remedial treatment was
indicated, and took the form of a flash call to HQ Jak Force in
Jammu. It was answered by a keen young Staff Officer who, not with-
out justification, as most telephone conversations were carried out in
veiled language, assumed that the words Ludo, Draughts and snakes
HAZARDS OF SNOW
iuld Ladders were code names for either units, places or warlike
stores. Gentle persuasion, however, convinced him that they had no
operatioilal significance. The stores, vcry fortunately, arrived twenty-
io~irhours before the Banihal Pass closed.
The last coi?vov, of just under one hundred lond-carrying vehicles,
\:;ith rations 2nd ammunition, was less fortunatc. Its abandonment,
to lie buried in snow until dug out and retrieved in April, resulted
from the rash act of a Jvoungofficer. Battle areas have a strange fas-
cination for rubber-necks. These individuals, who do nothing but get
in the \Yay of busy men working against the clock, are a plague to
any Commander or Staff Officer. One such rubber-neck was the
Assistant Provost h~larshalof H Q Jak Force. Although 161 Infantry
Brigade had no provost personnel on its strength, the APM arrived
in Srinagar on 18 December by road, and spent the nest day wander-
ing round Srinagar and Uri, the visit being more a social than a
business one. H e was jokingly informed by a Staff Officer that if he
did not get back to Jammu immediately, he would probably find
llihsclf spending the next few months in the Valley.
IVit11 patches of snow and a wet surface slowing down the rate of
advance of the motor convoy winding its way to the Banihal Pass,
orders were issued on the morning of 20 December that no vehicle,
civilian or military, was to proceed beyond Veranag, which lies on
the Kaslimir side of the Bani11al Pass, until the last vehicle of the
incoming convov had reached that point. The APM must have been
well anrare of the order, as his request to. be given exemption from
the restriction was firmly refused. Apparently, with the clouds dark-
ening and the snowfall thickening, he estrcised his appointment
and persuaded the Civil Police at Vernnag to permit him to move
forward. The Military Police Pilot jeep, in its enthusiasm to give
the APhI a clear run, halted the convoy, very unfortunately at a
point wherc the climb to the Pass wns at its steepest. It was a dis-
astrous gesture, from the point of view of the convov and 161 In-
fanhy Brigade. as the enforced halt caused msnv vel~iclesto stall,
while others found it difficult to move for\vard. Bv the time that these
e the convoy hacl once again begun
dificulties h3d been ~ \ ~ e r c o mand
to move fornrnrd. a blinding snowstorm descended makinq further
progress impossible, and it was trapped. One hour's delav had done
irreparable damage.
To those troops \vho came from areas stibjected to snow, the con-
ditions were not stranRe or abnormal. but there were manv, the
Rajputs and the blndrns Engineers, for example, to whom snow
was a novel experience. Although puzzled at first, they very quickly

acclimatised themselves to it, and weathered the storms as well as
their more habituated comrades. The heavy snowfalls of the next
few months played amazing tricks with the landscape. What had
been folds in the ground or deep re-entrants now appeared as flat
fields of snow. The heavily bunkered piquets, which had been sited
with meticulous care in order to ensure a field of fire of from 75 to
100 yards, were now found, in some cases, to be under snow or the
vision of the garrison limited to a distance of 5 to 10 yards. Strenu-
ous efforts were made to clear the snow, but it soon became appa-
rent that it was a vain effort. There was no option other than to
re-site a number of them, but this was not as simple as it would
appear, owing to the difficulty in ascertaining what was solid ground
and what was thin air. The barbed wire entanglements and the anti-
personnel mines and booby traps that had been laid to protect the
piquet were also undetectable, and to retrieve them from under the
snow was hazardous. They were therefore charted, and the new
bunkers that were constructed had to be protected afresh.
There were cases of twisted ankles and barked shins caused by
taking a step without realising what was in front, but the most re-
markable experience fell to the lot of the Brigade Education Officer.
Why Rear H Q had brought him to the Valley from Ranchi no one
quite !knew, as there was neither time nor scope for educational
training; further he was about fifty years of age. In order to pro-
tect him from the rigours of the long winter, the Engineers had built
for him a wooden shack. His absence from dinner in the Brigade HQ
Mess was noticed, but received scant attention, as it was not un-
usual for the Brigade Staff to spend an evening with the officers
of the other units located in the Uri bowl. His absence at breakfast
and lunch the next day also went by without comment, but when
he failed to put in an appearance at dinner for the second night in
succession, inquiries were made to ascertain whether he was sick.
When his batman announced that he had not seen him for twenty-
four hours, telephone calls were made to all units in Uri, Baramula
and Srinagar. No unit reported knowledge either of him or of his
whereabouts. An immediate search was, therefore, laid on and very
naturally started at his shack.
There were no notings on the papers lying on his makeshift writ-
ir~gtable to indicate what his plans 'had been or what his intentions
were. His batman, who was then questioned, was quite definite that
the Education Officer had been in the shack at six o'clock the pre-
HAZARDS OF SNOW
vious evening, as he had left him five minutes earlier to have his
food. When he had come in the next morning with a cup of tea,
lie did not find him in the shack and had presumed that he had
gone out somewhere. It was agreed by everyone that were he inside
the Uri perimeter, someone would have seen him, and the conclu-
sion drawn was that he might have strayed out of the perimeter as
a blinding snowstorm was raging at the time. This was possible, as
the eastern sector of Uri was bare, with no piquets guarding it.
We were wondering what to do, as darkness had set in and to
conduct a search outside the perimeter in the dark was asking for
trouble, when someone, pointing to a large pile of snow which lay
to the left of the door of the shack, suggested rather facetiously
that he might be buried under it. It was well worth exploring, and
two officers assisted by the batman using their hands as shovels
commenced to remove the snow. When about four feet of it had
been shovelled away, we found the Education Officer fast asleep.
He was picked up and rushed to the Mess and a Doctor sent for
from the Field Ambulance. A hot drink revived him, and when he
had almost fully recovered, he told us what had happened. He had
left his shack to come to the Mess when something struck him on
the head: what had happened after that he just did not know.
In trying to reconstruct what must have happened, there was
agreement on all hands that after he had stepped out of his shack,
the strong breeze which was blowing at the time must have resulted
in the shack door slamming, and the five feet of snow that was on
the roof must have come hurtling down. One thing was quite evident,
he had s d e r e d no ill-effects from his prolonged confinement under
the snow. In fact he told us that he had slept very soundly and that
it had been wonderfully warm I This the Doctor confirmed would
be correct as the snow being porous would present no breathing
difficulties, and it would also provide warmth. He did, however,
emphasise that survival would have been dependent on the weight
of further snowfalls, and how quickly the individual was recovered.
His advice to us not to carry out the experiment was superfluous.
Patrolling problems also came sharply to the surface. The snow,
varying in depths from four feet upwards, limited speed in movement
from about one mile in every hour to as little as one mile in every two
hours. It taxed the energy of the men to an extreme degree. It was
much too dangerous to go floundering through the snow, as there was
always the possibility of being caught in an embarrassing state of
unreadiness by the enemy. Lt. Col. L a c h m a ~Singh Negi, the Corn-
SLEM)ER WAS THE THREAD
manding Officer of 3 Garhwnl, was most indignant when ordered to

send out a patrol to an area under heavy snow. H e informed the
Brigade Major that what Brigade H Q apparently did not realise was
that his men were five feet in height and the snow was six feet deep
in the area. This outburst did not impress either me or my staff. The
Brigade Major was told to tell Lt. Col. Negi that it was not the
intention that his men should go under the snow, we would like them
to go over it, in the same manner as the Kumaonis, who were about
the same height as his Garhwalis, had done two days earlier. T11e
Garhwalis carried out the patrol and did it extremely well, and
Lt. Col. Negi was never permitted to forget his fabulous statement.
As the winter progressed, patrols, especially those despatched on
long range missions, faced many hazards, avalanches being the most
feared. It was made a standard drill for them to report their exact
location every half an hour, if on the move. A Rifle Company of
2 Dogra, on a patrol to Gagarhil, about ten miles to the south of
Rampur, was fortunate in escaping what could have been a disaster.
An avalanche, composed of snow and large loose boulders, about
two hundred yards in width, came roaring down the mountain side
and piled up to a height of about forty feet i ~ the . Valley below.
The leading platoon had passed that way exactly three minutes
previously, and for ten dreadful minutes the Company Commander
did not know whether his leading platoon had been trapped and
destroyed. Nor did the platoon know what fate had befallen the
Company, as the signaller with the platoon tripped and fell when
trying to scurry out of the way and damaged his wireless set.
Frost bite, that dreaded incapacitator of the careless, unwary or
unfortunate, claimed a few victims in the early days. Immediate
action was taken to educate all ranks in the do's and don'ts of com-
bating it. The roof cause in the initial cases was ascribed to men
who had walked in the snow, not necessarily those who had been
on patrol, placing their booted feet against a stove or a brazier in
order to warm them. That the number of frost bite cases became
insignificant after the instnictions had been issued, and amputations
a rarity, speaks volumes for the very careful attention paid to this
subject by leaders of all ranks down to the most recently promoted
Lance Naik.
Keeping the troops warm, and at the same time ensuring that
their mobility remained unaffected, presented a major problem in
those areas which were subject to sub-zero temperatures. Pitchforked
into Kashmir at short notice, and initially in cotton uniforms and
HAZARDS OF SNOW
bedding adequate only for the plains, the equipping of the Brigade
with winter uniforms was inadequate, thanks to the shortage of time
and the transport difficulties. Woollen clothing in the form of Battle
~ r e blouses
s and trousers, Balaclava caps, woollen gloves and extra
blankets were received, but in many cases they were used stock and
being alrnost threadbare provided little warmth. Warm undercloth-
ing was sent up in short supply, as were greatcoats. The troops were,
however, infused with a remarkable spirit, and accepted the short-
comings without a murmur. By day they kept themselves warm by
sitting in the sun, if it was shining, or moving about, and, by pooling
their blankets, provided themselves with reasonably warm beds at
night.
The sentries, especially those manning the heights, which on
occasion were swept by gale-force icy winds, required special atten-
tion. The Battle Dress provides little protection to the small of the
back, and with some hospital cases arising from ailments to this part
of the anatomy, Poshteins were purchased from the trade in Srinagar.
These knee-length leather coats with an inner lining of fur, while
providing the necessary protection, denied the sentry freedom of
action in operating his weapon, a difficulty which was aggravated
by the double pair of gloves which were also essential. The Kangrie,
an earthen pot filled with glowing embers and suspended in front
of the body by a string which runs around the back of the neck, is
commonly used by the Kashmiris. These were purchased, and by
discarding their gloves and clasping the Kangrie, the sentries kept
their trigger fingers warm and ready for instant action.
With no further advance contemplated until the spring, a close
survey was made of the territory which had been made the respon-
sibility of 161 Infantry Brigade. It was broadly the whole of Kashmir,
Gilgit and Ladakh, covering about 35,000 square miles. For obvious
reasons, the control of this vast area was neither within the compass
of one Infantry Brigade nor was it seriously expected. What was
expected, however, was that the Brigade should hold the area up
to Uri and the Valley which was nearly 6,000 square miles. In order
to carry out this task, it was of vital importance that information of
both operational and non-operational significance was collected and
made known to all unit commanders. Meetings were, therefore, held
with the civilian officials and the Forest Rangers in order to extract
from them all information that might prove useful.
The meetings, conducted with a critical study of the map, pro-
duced invaluable data relating to every road and track running into
the valley, with a special emphasis on the ability of vehicles, me11

and animals to use them during the winter months; the bridge
classifications and possible crossing places over the unbridged
streams; the depth of snow that could be expected in the various
areas, based on past experience, and any villages that might be
termed hostile aild likely to harbour the enemy. In compiling this
information, D. P. Dhar of the Emergency Government, who
remained in the Valley throughout the winter - Sheikh Abdullah and
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed having gone to Jammu -was most h e l p
ful in the suggestions that he offered and the information that he
obtained for us.
It was, perhaps, unfortunate that Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi
Ghulam Mohammed were both away from the Valley during the
winter of 1947-48. This was a crucial period. Bakshi was definitely
unhappy at the thought of being away from the Valley for what
would b e a lengthy period, but Sheikh Abdullah gave me the im-
pression that he was not going to be boxed up in the Valley, and he
more or less insisted on Bakshi accompanying him. Jammu &
Kashmir is admittedly one State, but Kashmir had suffered a severe
blow from the raiders, and Sheikh Abdullah would have been wiser
not to leave the Valley and its people a t a time when they required
all help, guidance and alleviation.
The extensive area of responsibility and the paucity of troops made
impossible the garrisoning of many points and precluded the draw-
ing u p of an operational plan that would cater for every contingency.
Many had to be faced and dealt with as and when they arose, and
the only way to cope with them was to withdraw troops from the
defences which did not appear to be likely to be subjected to an
immediate attack, deploy them in the threatened area, and then rush
them back to their original defences when the situation had been
stabilised. It was, in fact, a constant manoeuvre of robbing Peter to
pay Paul. With the intelligence data constantly being checked and
re-checked, and the Situation Map meticulously maintained and kept
up to the minute, the chances of being surprised were reduced to
a negligible degree, and the Brigade, instead.of aiming at being one
jump ahead of the enemy, now set its target at being two jumps
ahead.
Snow and the hostiles were not the only problems that faced us.
Water and salt also entered the lists to make matters more difficult.
The mountain streams came into spate on occasion and threatened
our hastily constructed wooden bridges. The one constructed in the
HAZARDS OF SNOW
vicinity of the diversion around the demolished bridge at the eastern

exit of Uri was saved by the Engineers who tied ropes to it and
hung on for grim death. Then the Flume Line either had a natural
break or was sabzaged, and put the road between Rampur and
Mahura out of commission for five days. This artificial channel, built
of wood, conveys the water from the Jhelum River a t Rampur to the
Power House at Mahura. It is visible for almost its complete length,
running along the side of the hills to the south of the main road and
at a height of about sixty to seventy feet. A break results in the water
pouring out and carrying mud and stones on to the main road. For-
tunately we knew the answer to this hazard, the headworks at
Rampur being ordered to cut off the water. But salt confronted us
with a real problem.
Kashmir had always been reliant on the import of salt into the
State. With the formation of Pakistan, and that Dominion cutting
off supplies in an effort to exert pressure, the shortage of salt had
become acute by December 1947. So valuable was this commodity
that porters employed by units requested salt in lieu of cash for their
services, and units, without realising the consequences of their
action, became very generous in their distribution of this item of
their rations. This act, though humane, was indiscreet, as in early
February 1948 the Brigade Supply Officer announced that there was
no more salt in his Depot and that there was none to be purchased
locally. This was a very serious state of affairs, as without salt the
health of the troops would be endangered.
There was an immediate exchange of signals with HQ Jak Force,
who correctly pointed out that it was a very difficult task to despatch
salt to the Valley, the weather having turned for the worse and mak-
ing flying conditions dangerous. It was, however, suggested by HQ
161 Infantry Brigade that if there was a break in the weather and
the Air Force could free-drop bags of salt to the east of Baramula,
a lookout posted on the roof of a house would direct retrieval squads
to wherever he, saw a hole in the snow. There was four feet of snow
in the area of Baramula when the Indian Air Force flew in three
Dakotas, a week later, and carried out a free-drop. All the bags were
retrieved. It was dot found necessary to issue any orders regarding
the conserving of salt : the troops had learnt a lesson the hard way.
Chapter 14
Psychological Warfare
FOLLOWING
the withdrawal of the enemy from the Bhatgiran Ridge,
an uneasy lull developed along the front line, but it was soon dis-
turbed. Early in January 1948, a body of hostiles, better organised
than the tribesmen, made their appearance on the heights in the
vicinity of Uri. Clad in uniforms identical to those worn by the troops
of 161 Infantry Brigade, they were reasonably well equipped with
arms and wireless communications and employed tactics which,
although not of a high standard, clearly indicated that they were
not just a bunch of recruits but trained soldiers At first sight it was
assumed that a Regular Pakistan Infantry Brigade had moved into
the line, since there had been constant and depeildable reports from
irltelligence sources to the effect that Pakistan Regular troops were
milling about in the area between Chakothi and hluzaffarabad. It
was essential that the true picture was obtained, and fighting patrols
and wireless intercepts very quickly cleared the air. The new arrivals
PSY(=flOLOGICAL WARFARE
were identified as Azad Kashmir Poonch battalions, or AKP for short.

These AKP battalions, raised mainly from released Poonchie
Mussalmans of the Pakistan Army, with a percentage of Punjabi
Mussalmans, and defectors from the Jammu & Kashmir State Forces,
had been grouped under AKP Brigades, three battalions to each
Brigade. The battalions \Yere commanded and administered by ex-
Jammu & Kashmir State Force officers, and officers on deputation
from the Pakistan Army, while the companies and platoons were
led by ex-junior and non-commissioned officers who had been
elevated to the ranks of Major, Captain and Lieutenant. The Brigade
Commanders ancl their Staffs were Regular officers of the Pakistan
Army, which also produced a large percentage of the personnel
required to man the specialist platoons, such as the Signals and
Mortars, and was also entirely responsible for the planning and
administration of the AKP Force.
Wit11 the raising of the AKP formations and units, the services of
the tribals from the North-il'est Frontier Province were not dispen-
sed with. They continued to serve in the area, arriving under their
own tribal leaders, and from knowledge gained over the next few
months it was found that their tenure of duty was for One month,
after which they would be relieved by fresh batches of equivalent
strength. The date of the relief was between the third and fifth of
each month and followed a set pattern. The outgoing tribals would
be very active during their last week, in which they would blaze
off all their ammunition, and the relief after showing great activity
on arrival would then drift into a state of lethargy only to brighten
up again in the last week before the relief date. These tribal lashkars
or bands, each numbering betwzen one thousaqd and twelve hundred
in strength, were attached to and operated wlth each AKP battalion.
The reason for this strange grouping is difficult to understand, and
it can only be presumed that it was considered that the newly raised
AKP battalions were in need of moral support and a hard core which
could play the role of 'shock troops'. If this was the object, and both
intelligence reports and captured AKP personnel seemed to codinn
that it was so, it backfired badly from the point of view of harmony
and maintenance of discipline. It was not long before the Pathans
treated the Poonchies with scorn and openly told them that they
were useless, while the Poonchies reciprocated the compliment by
referring to the Pathans as rogues.
An agent, despatched to Muzaffarabad from Uri in order to obtain
further information of the AKP set-up, was apprehended near
Chakothi by an AKP patrol but managed to escape, and confirmed

this reading of the situation. Taken to the battalion HQ, he had been
placed under arrest in the guard tent. There he met a companion
in distress, a senior NCO of the AKP battalion who had been de-ship-
ed and awarded twenty-eight days' rigorous imprisonment. Extremely
embittered, the ex-NCO informed the agent that prior to issuing the
Pathans with their rations, he had placed his rifle on the ground,
and on completing his task his weapon was untraceable. All his pleas
for its return had fallen on deaf ears, and his appeal to the tribal
leader had earned him a rebuke for having had tho audacity to
suggest that one of the Pathans had stolen it. He went on to say
that the Pathans adopted a most patronising attitude towards the
Poonchies, and refused their share in manning the piquets and
heights by night, asserting that they had not come to Kashmir for
that purpose. They were only interested in having a good time in
the villages. In the early hours of the morning, as the guard and the
dejected ex-NCO lay asleep and the sentry sat huddled up in a
blanket which covered his head, the agent rolled under the tent flap,
and creeping into the darkness made good his escape.
Assessments made after the initial clashes with the AKP units
showed that they were brave but very badly led. They would move
forward with determination, but would falter when faced with strong
resistance or when in danger of being outmanoeuvred. Under such
circumstances their leaders would waver and either lose command
and control or resort to tactics which were suicidal. Most of the
casualties suffered by the AKP can safely be attributed to indecision
at a critical juncture, or foolhardiness. After a spell of costly and
abortive attacks, the AKP units adopted the practice of advancing
to a position well out of range of our small arms fire, and comment-
ing to fire for hours on end without any chances of idicting damage.
In order to encourage this practice, patrols would set out in their
direction, and having moved into the bed of a dry stream, would
return to Uri undetected by the enemy. This resulted in every enemy
weapon opening up, and in cases zontinuing to fire at a rapid rate,
with intervals, for hours after the patrol had returned to its base.
The Pathans, on the other hand, confined their activities to sniping
at the road and launched the major night attacks. The sniping had
more nuisance value than danger attached to it. Jmmediately a sniper
disclosed his position with a shot, he was stalked, or jittered with
the threat of a stalk, whereupon he invariably took up a position
behind a rock, fired about ten rounds in rapid succession and slipped
away. The ineffectiveness of the sniping can be gauged from the
fact that in four months of sniping at the road, which was very
heavily used, the net result was eleven wounded.
Towards the end of January, Psychological Warfare was introduc-
ed. This took the form of a Medium Wave Radio Station designating
itself Azad Kashmir Radio. It broadcast items of news of astounding
successes on the Uri front, vitriolic attacks on Sheikh Abdullah,
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and the National Conference, and bio-
graphies of the senior commanders of the Indian troops operating
in Kashmir & Jammu. The author of the biographies was handicapped
by not having access to facts but overcame the deficiency by utilis-
ing a very fertile imagination. His vocabulary, unfortunately, was
acutely limited and that essential ingredient of this type of warfare,
subtlety, was completely absent. What was lacking in this sphere,
was compensated for by a number of sentences, obscene and vulgar
to a degree, which garnished tl~eend of each revelation. What these
tirades were in aid of was difficult to understand, as whether a senior
officer was unaware of his parentage-and apparently every one was,
this assertion being the mildest-was unlikely to materially alter the
course of the operations. Nor was there any frightful urgency to
accede to the biographer's impassioned pleas to ascertain the truth
of his statements.
Perhaps realising that these efforts to discredit the senior officers
in the eyes of the men were not having the desired effect, they were
supplemented with 'live' broadcasts along the front line. This neces-
sitated an enemy company or platoon taking up a position in the
vicinity of one of the piquets of 161 Infantry Brigade and engaging
it in conversation. Commencing with the asking of questions of a
harmless nature, it would soon develop into a wordy battle in which
the troops of 161 Infantry Brigade gave an excellent rendering of
unprintable phraseology. It was, in fact, of such a high order that the
enemy, apparently unable to stomach it, decided on occasion to vindi-
cate his honour by abandoning his positions and rushing forward in
attack. No worse mistake could have been committed and he paid
heavily for it, with nineteen counted killed in the first incident and
twenty-three in the second. Although it was unnecessary, the troops
of the Brigade were warned not to permit themselves to be ~rovoked
into such rash actions.
The battlefield area was not the only place where talking out of
turn was dangerous. That the enemy had sy-rnpathisers who were
acting in the role of agents was well known, and accepted as being
quite normal. Their main spheres of operation were Srinagar and

Baramula. Though 161 Brigade's intelligence set-up had reached a
very high level of efficiency, there was no room for complacency or
grounds for assuming that the enemy was not equally well equipped.
That every move to and from Uri was made known to the enemy
was confirmed by our counter-intelligence, but to hide them from
prying eyes was virtually impossible. This caused quite a lot of con-
cern, as it was vital that the enemy was kept ignorant of the fact
that Uri was lightly held with only two battalions, that the thirty
miles between Uri and Baramula were completely devoid of troops,
and that Baramula and Srinagar had between them three battalions,
one of which was being built u p to operational efficiency and was
not immediately ready for action. With this information in his posses-
sion, it would not have been difficult to clace 161 Infantry Brigade
in many awkward and dangerous situatior~s.As there was no possibi-
lity of the Brigade being reinforced until the Spring, it was decided
that it would be reinforced, in the minds of the enemy, by fictitious
methods.
This was urgently necessary, as the enemy had stepped u p the
tempo of his attacks against Uri. These had once again become almost
a nightly affair. The lower piquets, which were more easily accessible
because of the lighter snowfall in their vicinity, now became the
main targets. 'Jitter' and 'Fort', located on the western perimeter of
Uri, and manned by 6 Rajrif, received more than their fair share of
attention. Lightly held initially, as each attack was met and repulsed,
the piquets were strengthened both with troops and barbed wire
entanglements, reinforced with anti-personnel mines and booby traps.
At first the attacks were launched esclusively by units of the AKP,
and then the Pathan tribals took over, presumably to show them how
it should b e done. With the Brigade reserve committed to strengthen-
ing the piquets, it was found necessary to move forward 3 Garhwal
from Srinagar to Uri. The move forward of this battalion, which was
virtually the only potential reserve in the Valley, had been delayed
until it had become essential. I t amounted to placing a major por-
tion of the eggs in one basket, but if that basket was not held by
strong hands, an unfortunate slip could result in many a sllell cracking.
An intercepted wireless message engendered the idea of reinforc-
ing Uri by fictitious methods. On arrival in Uri, 3 Garhwnl dcspatched
a two-Company patrol towards Salamabad. Instead of wearing steel
helmets, the Companies sported what are commonly referred to as
Gorkha hats and which constitute the head-dress both of Garhwalis
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
and of the Gorkha Rifles. The intercepted message, from an AKP

battalion to its Brigade HQ, made reference to a Gorkha battalion
operating on its front. This was too good to be missed, and 1 Gorkha
Rifles was immediately included in the Order of Battle of 161 In-
fantry Brigade. In order to establish the existence of the batt a I'ion
in the minds of the enemy, wireless sets were netted in to the wave
lengths being utilised by the enemy, and messages were transmitted
to and from 1 Gorkha during the next ten days. The strictest secu-
rity measures were employed but quite a number of indiscretions
were permitted to creep in. That the presence in Uri of 3 Garhlval
would also be known to the enemy was fully expected. I t was too
much to hope that its move from Srinagar through Baramula had
passed by undetected. An intercepted message confirmed our ex-
pectation. In the enemy's estimation, however, Uri was now held by
four battalions, G Rajrif, 4 Kumaon, 3 Garhwal and the fictitious
1 Gorkha.
In order to build up the strength by yet another battalion, half the
strength of the Sikh Mountain Battery in Uri was slipped into Sri-
nagar in the returning ration lorries. They were then moved back
again in a large convoy of three-ton vehicles, three men in each
vehicle standing up and revealing themselves to prying eyes in Bara-
mula as the convoy sped through. Indiscreet statements dropped in
Baramula referred to then1 as the 1st Battalion Patiala Infantry. The
day after its arrival in Uri, '1 Patiala Infantry' was sent out on a
patrol to a spot where it could not escape the attention of the enemy.
It was not long before the enemy wireless was reporting the pre-
sence of a Sikh battalion in Uri, referring to it three days later as the
1st Patiala Infantry.
These 'extra reinforcements' did not, however, deter the enemy
from continuing to mount assaults against the piquets. To impose
caution on him and, if possible, to dampen his ardour, every strata-
gem was resorted to. An ancient and functionless electric generator,
which must have weathered many storms in the ditch in which it
lay near Heman Buniyar, was retrieved with great care and trans-
ported to Uri, where it found a similar grave. It was explained to
interested bystanders, who were watching its retrieval at Heman
Buniyar, that it was required to enable us to electrify the protective
wire at Uri. Patrols which visited the villages adjacent to Uri, dur-
ing the next few days, were instructed to advise the villagers to take
especial care of their cattle and not to permit them to approach the
wire lest they be electrocuted. It was not strange that the villagers
accepted what was told to them as they were totally ignorant of

modern warfare. A village to the north of Uri had been hastily eva-
cuated a few days previously by the- headman, who had despatched
a delegation to Uri to report that a large bomb lay unexploded in a
field. An Engineer detachment was rushed to the village, and re-
turned with the auxiliary tank jettisoned by a fighter aircraft.
The story of the electrification of Uri's defensive wire entangle-
rnents was soon confirmed in the enemy's mind as three buffaloes,
quite clearly driven forward by the enemy, sauntered down the road
towards Fort piquet after dark and were killed. They had not been
engaged by the garrison, the damage being done by a hail of rocks
that flew through space as the gun cotton slabs and primers, placed
in the midst of a tar barrel filled with large stones, were ignited by
a fuse attached to a trip wire. The sound of the explosion, which was
accentuated by the stillness of the night, and the blinding flash that
preceded it, made an immediate impression on the enemy, the tribals
in particular. A wireless intercent informed the HQ at Muzaffarabad
that there was unassailable proof that the protective wire at Uri was
electrified and no further attacks would be launched until a supply
of wire cutters with rubber handles was received.
Captain Kumar of the Madras Engineers, who had produced the
infernal machine which had created such a deep impression on the
enemy, had been nick-named 'Snags' by his brother officers. This
was because he invariably cited at least three 'snags' in any engineer
task allotted to him. Whether they existed or not, these drawbacks
were automatically over-ruled and Kumar never failed to complete
his task on schedule and in a most efficient manner. When asked
whether there were any 'snags' connected with the device that he
had produced, Kumar assured everyone that there were none what-
soever and quipped that the Engineers would show the Infantry
how to destroy an enemy section or perhaps even a platoon with one
shot. As soon as the eagerly awaited report from the piquet was
received the next morning, Kumar was summoned to Brigade HQ
but his Second in Command sent back a message that he had already
left Uri to inspect the bridges on the main road and would not return
before the evening. His prolonged absence merely whetted the appe-
tite of those awaiting him. Kumar more than held his own, maintain-
ing that had the three buffaloes been an enemy section, the result
would have been equally spectaculat.
Whether it was due to the phoney electrification of the Uri wire
entanglements or the fictitious number of battalions in the area, in-
telligence reports pointed to the enemy deciding to halt his attempts
to reduce Uri by direct assaults against the piquets. There were
frequent reports that the plan was to bypass it, cut the road at some
suitable point between Uri and Baramula, and having isolated the
garrison to force it into surrender when its means of subsistence ran
out. This was wishful thinking on the part of the enemy. The possibi-
lity of Uri being isolated had received serious consideration and the
garrison was stocked to withstand a siege of two months at full scale,
and four months at half scale. By that time the Banihal Pass would
have opened and further reinforcements could have been moved into
the Valley to relieve the siege. The danger that Uri faced, if an
encirclement materialised, was not related to the garrison being
starved into surrender, but the bald fact that the eastern sector of
Uri was unmanned because of the paucity of troops. The enemy, if
he gained a foothold on the road leading from Uri to Baramula,
would most certainly probe towards Uri, and the weakness of the
eastern perimeter would be discovered. In order to counter that
threat, the existing defences of Uri would have to be weakened some-
where, and this could be ill-afforded. An attempt would certainly be
made to break the siege by moving forward the battalion from Bara-
mula and making 1 Sikh responsible for that town in addition to the
rest of the Valley, but the chances of a single battalion raising the
siege were very limited. It was, in fact, the one plan that it was hoped
the enemy would never consider and execute.
The intelligence cover was immediately increased, and a special
section concentrated on the task of watching all signs relating to any
attempt at encirclement. During the first week of January, inforrna-
tion was received at about eight o'clock at night that a band of three
hundred tribesmen were on the move to occupy the heights to the
south of the main road in the vicinity of Mahura. The route of ad-
vance was said to be via the Haji Pir Pass. There was no time to
check the accuracy of the report. It could have been a rumour de-
signed towards a removal of troops from Uri, or it could have been
factual. Whichever it was, immediate action was necessary to check-
mate the move whether it materialised or not.
The Commanding Officer of 2 Dogra was telghoned and ordered
to despatch two Rifle Companies from Baramula to hlahura to be
in position on the heights by midnight. It was snowing heavily as
the two Rifle Companies moved to Mahura in lorries, and although
the drive was difficult, they reached their destination, scaled the
snow-covered hills and were in hastily prepared defences by mid-
night. Whether the tribals came, and having seen that the area was
occupied by troops decided to withdraw, or whether it was just a
rumour, is not known; in any case the threat did not materialise.
After a two days' stay a t Mahura, the two Rifle Companies of 2
Dogra were returned to Baramula, and the line of commu~~ication
was once again bereft of troops.
The enemy continued to be very talkative and reports of an encir-
clement persisted from many sources. While they could not be dis-
regarded, at the same time it would have been tactically unsound
to react to every one of them. The best one could do was to watch
for any definite indication and then to act fast. Such an indication
was received from a most unorthodox source. Arriving in Srinagar
to visit Rear H Q 161 Infantry Brigade, on 15 January 1948, I went
to visit a friend and was told that he had gone to Nedous' Hotel and
I would find him in the bar. On entering the bar, h e greeted me like
a long lost friend and invited me to join his table at which were
seated a young Irish couple, the McDermotts, both of whom I had
met previously.
McDermott was in the Kashmir State Education Service and a
Master in a school at Baramula which had not reopened since the
sacking of the town by the tribesmen. H e and his wife were, there-
fore, living in a houseboat in Srinagar. In the course of the conver-
sation, Mrs. McDermott suddenly asked me whether I had any troops
a t Mahura. Although stunned by this sudden question, I reacted
quickly and telling a white lie assured her that Mahura was garri-
soned. From the look on her face I realised that she was doubtful
of the veracity of my statement, and so I asked her, "Why, what's
worrying you about Mahura ?"
"My bearer told m e there was a rumour in the bazaar that the
raiders were going to attack Mahura and blow up the Power House,''
she said. "He also said that a friend of his who works in the Power
House was worried because there were no soldiers anywhere near
Mahura."
My host then chipped in. "Yes, I've also heard that rumour, and
I'm sure you must have too, Brigadier."
"Yes, I've heard it," I replied, "but if and when the enemy threa-
tens the Power House he will be suitably dealt with."
"But how are you going to do that ?" asked Mrs. klcDermott,
"you'll be unable to get at them with the Jhelum River in-between,
and no bridge to cross it."
"We'll deal with them effectively enough," I replied, and, as if
PSYCHOLOGICAL WAnFARE
to make light of the conversation, added : "Don't you start a scare

by buying up all the candles in the city."
I was anxious to race back to my Rear Headquarters to issue orders
for moving troops to hlahura. However, lest my hasty departure be
interpreted as my having been alarmed, I stayed with the party for
half an hour more and then left on the plea that I had another call
to make. Reaching my Rear Hefldquaters, I took a hurried look at
the map.
To meet the previous threat to Mahura, which did not materialise,
two Rifle Companies of 9 Dogra had been rushed to the area from
Baramula. It had by no means been the best method of dealing with
the situation as it had serious:y weakened the Baramula defences
which required a minimum strength of one battalion. A risk was
taken as speed was the dominant factor. The time available to man
the heights overlooking Mnhura was limited. Motor transport to lift
the troops was readily available a t Baramula while there was none
at Uri. The 2 Dogra Companies were, however, returned to Bara-
mula after a period of 48 hours, as soon after it was felt that the
danger was past.
The impending threat was of a different calibre and posed a far
more serious problem. It was being delivered, for the first time, from
the north bank of the River Jhelum, which for many miles of its
stretch was bridgeless, making it extremely difficult to come to grips
with the enemy. From positions along the north bank of the river
the enemy could command many miles of the main road, and if not
kept at arm's length he could do extensive damage to the Power
House. Further, if he continued his advance eastwards h e would
threaten Baramula. The hitherto adopted policy of plugging gaps
as and when they arose could no longer be pursued, nor could Bara-
mula b e weakened. A permanent garrison at Mahura had now be-
come a vital necessity, and it ~vouldhave to be held in strength, a
battalion being the minimum. There was, therefore, no option other
than to reduce the strength at Uri from three to two battalions, un-
desirable though it may have been. 4 Kumaon, the reserve battalion,
was in consequence given orders to undertake the role.
The Bausian Ridge on the north bank of the River was the obvious
position to hold, as it not only o~erlookedthe Power House but also
commanded the main road. There were two ways to get to it, by
crossing the bridge over the river at Uri and advancing to it along
the north bank, or to come to Mahura by the main road and to find
a crossing place over the Jhelum in the area of the Power House.
SLENDER *WAS THE THREAD
4
Having rapidly considered the pros and cons of the two routes, I
selected the advance along the main road, firstly because it would
be quicker and easier to get to Mahura, and secondly because there
was a possibility that 4 Kumaon advancing along the north bank of
the river in the dark might quite easily clash with the enemy who
were also heading, I presumed, for Bausian.
Having arrived at a decision, I telephoned Lt. Col. Man Mohan
Khanna of 4 Kumaon in Uri and ordered him to move with four
Rifle Companies to Mahura as quickly as he could. The remainder
of the battalion could remain in Uri and move forward the next
morning. Man Mohan Khanna told me that there was a blinding
snowstorm raging and progress would be very slow, but he would
collect his Companies and get to Mahura as quickly as he could, and
estimated his time of arrival at about eight o'clock the next morning.
I told him that I would get to Mahura by seven o'clock and would
meet him on his arrival.
4 Kumaon moved out of Uri soon after midnight, and considering
the appalling weather conditions, did extremely well to reach
Mahura a few minutes after seven o'clock in the morning of 16
January. After I had quickly told the officers why it was essential
that Bausian Ridge be occupied by us, reconnaissances were carried
out, and to our horror we realised that there was no ready means
of crossing the Jhelum river, about 60 yards wide and in a raging
torrent. The bridge that had once stood there had been dismantled.
Although the pillars were still intact on both banks, reconstruction
of the bridge would require trained Engineers and could not be
completed in under three days. To attempt to swim across would
have been suicidal.
Bausian Ridge towered above us, and was presumably still un-
occupied by the enemy as we were not fired upon. If the enemy
occupied it, not only would he make the road unusable for us, but
he would rake the Power House with fire. With the personnel unable
to operate the generators, Srinagar would once again be in darkness.
To have ordered 4 Kumaon to retrace its steps to Uri and to cross
the bridge and advance to Bausian along the north bank of the river
was possible, but was rejected. The battalion had had a gruelling
march of seven hours in order to get to Mahura, and it would have
taken at least another twelve hours to get to Bausian via Uri, in the
dreadful weather and ground conditions that prevailed. The move
along the north bank would also have to be conducted tactically as
the enemy was quite obviously in the area. This would curtail speed
P S Y c I X O ~ C A LWARFARE
which was so vital. I was on the verge of contacting Lt. Col.. Kalaan
of 6 Rajrif, and telling him to collect the Madras Engineers and any
other spare personnel in the Uri bowl, form them into three ad hoc
Rifle Companies and move them t o Bausian via the north bank of
the Jhelum River, when Dame Fortune smiled on us.
A Company Commander of 4 Kumaon, still searching the area to
find a possible crossing place, noticed a steel wire hawser with a
traversing pulley spanning the river. The mist hanging over the area
had obscured it. The Power House staff was immediately contacted
but could not offer any advice as to its strength, as it had been out
of commission for a number of years. The receptacle which was once
attached to the pulley was also not available, but fortunately the
rotating drum and the wire used to ferry the receptacle to and fro
across the river was found in a store shed, though in a very rusty
condition. All that was now required was any type of box or large
basket, large enough to accommodate one man, and an attempt to
ferry the troops across would commence.
A suitable container was found. It was a large dealwood box which
had once served the purpose for which it had been manufactured,
the carriage of tins of Lipton's tea. Now it was to serve another
purpose. Lashed with steel wires, the box was attached to the pulley
and the Platoon Commander of the leading platoon stepped into it
and was slowly and gently let down to the north bank over the
roaring torrent. It was a frightening -moment. Had the wire hawser
snapped, it was certain death. On reaching the north bank, the Pla-
toon Commander jumped out and the box was hauled back by the
rotating drum to the Power House bank, and the remainder of the
platoon ferried across: It was a slow and laborious task, but at the
end of three hours the first platoon was across the river. It was in-
structed to occupy Bausian Ridge as quickly as was possible, and
while it climbed the feature, the ferrying of the second platoon com-
menced. Fortune had smiled on us in the nick of time by giving us
the means to cross the river and save the Power House, as on reach-
ing the summit of Bausian the leading platoon saw the enemy
approaching the ridge from the north.
The enemy was in strength, but apparently surprised to see troop
movement on the feature, and unaware of how strongly Bausian was
held, he halted, stared, and then withdrew very fast. The occupation
of Bausian had saved the Mahura Power House and ensured the
protection of our vital roatl line of communication, perhaps by one
hour. Lt. Col. Man Mohan Khanna and his gallant men had achieved
what had seemed impossible a short while earlier. 4 Kumaon rein-
forced the platoon on Bausian with tlre remainder of the company
by the same hazardous ferry and the Engineers reconstructed the dis-
mantled bridge in a matter of three days, thereby ensuring that
the Bausian feature conld be speedily reinforced should it ever be
necessary to do so. The battalioa was permanently located in the
area, and for the first time since capturing Uri the line of communi-
cation from Baramula to Uri could be said to have been afforded
protection.
SKETCH S H O W I N G
THE' CROSSING OF THE ? H E L U M RIVER
AT MAHURA
Yards 1000 0 1000 2000 Vards

1 1
While we were still congratulating ourselves on having stylnied

the enemy's attempt to occupy Bausian and thus to deprive the
Valley of its electric power and deny to us the use of tlre road from
Baramula to Uri, we received a severe jolt. A threat developed in
a totally unexpected quarter, and our informant was nonc otllcr
than D. P. Dhar.
'DP' as h e was affectionately knodn, was regarded by 161 In-
fantry Brigade as a pillar of strength. Energetic to a marked degrer,
he spent a great deal of his time visiting the major towns and vil-
PSYCJIOLOGICAL WARFARE
lages in the Valley, encouraging and assisting the local administra-

tion, and doing all that lay within his power and slender resources
to overcome difficulties. One such visit took him and a colleague
to Handwara. This major town, about forty-five miles to the north-
west of Srinagar and about twenty-five miles to the north of Bara-
mula, the route being via Sopur, was not garrisoned by troops of
SKETCH SHOWING
THE LOCATION OF HANDWARA
161 Infantry Brigade. This u7as not because its importance had not
been realised : it was simply because of the lack of troops to pro-
tect every nook and corner. In arriving at the deployment of the
troops in the Valley, it \r7as thought that Handwara was unlikely
to be threatened, and even if it was, the threat would be minor in
nature, limited perhaps to a party of twenty or thirty. In conse-
quence, it was decided that the needs of Handwara could be served

by the occasional visit of a motorised patrol. A troop of Armoured
Cars drove to Handwara at varying intervals, when it was not re-
quired for any other task. All reports had indicated that the area
was clear of the enemy, and there was no indication or rumour that
there was likely to be any change in the situation.
On his arrival in Handwara, 'DP' was prostrated with a severe
attack of malaria and was confined to the house. It was while he
was in bed with a high temperature that a local resident rushed in
to tell him that a party of the enemy had reached the town and
that a quisling had informed them that he was present. The enemy,
the informant said, must be already on their way to apprehend him.
'DP' required no second warning : he rushed to the bedroom win-
dow, which luckily was at the rear of the house, and climbed out
into the snow. It was an escape by a hair's breadth, as the enemy
entered by the front door a few moments later. Lying low until dark-
ness, 'DP' and-his colleague managed to get a motor vehicle and
returned to Srirkagar.
It was about eleven o'clock that night when a messenger arrived
with this information. I happened fortunately to be in Srinagar. A
troop of Armoured Cars and two Rifle Companies of 1 Sikh, placed
under the command of the Second in Command of the battalion,
were ordered to move to Handwara, the advance to commence at
first light. The road to Handwara, the stretch from Sopur to Hand-
wara in particular, was difficult, the surface being treacherous on
account of frozen snow. Despite the fact that all vehicle tyres were
fitted with skid chains, the speed of the column had to be kept low
in order to avoid any accident. The journey to Handwara took four
hours, and soon after ten o'clock the Rifle Companies of 1 Sikh
debussed on the outskirts of the town and, with the Armoured Cars
in support, moved forward to search out and engage the enemy.
This presented no problem. When the enemy learnt of the arrival of
the troops they took to their heels, but were pursued and engaged.
After a sharp skirmish they surrendered. It was a platoon in strength,
and having been disarmed it was embussed in lorries and despatched
under escort to Baramula.
From information extracted from the enemy, 1 Sikh learnt that
the platoon was the advance element of a force of about three hund-
red-in strength, the rest following a day or two behind it, and head-
ing Handwara. The two Rifle Companies of 1 Sikh were,
PGPCH0UX;ICAL WARFARE
therefore, deployed astride the route leading into Handwara from

the west, and awaited the arrival of the main body of the enemy.
It was observed the next afternoon moving steadily fonvard into
the trap that had been laid for i t It would have resulted in a perfect
ambush, had an enemy sympathiser not rushed forward at the
eleventh hour and screamed to the enemy to withdraw. The main
body came to a sharp halt and, turning round very quickly disappear-
ed into the distance. It was a great disappointment to the troops :
had the enemy not been warned, not one of them would have had
an earthly chance of escaping. It can only be presumed that the
enemy column made its way back to Muzaffarabad, whence it had
come, as Handwara and the area around it were not subjected to
any further hostile activity.
The captured enemy personnel were well equipped. They were
clothed in Khaki Serge Battle Dress, wore woollen gloves, mufflers
and Service Greatcoats, and their equipment consisted of light
machine guns, sten guns, rifles and grenades. The platoon com-
mander had a pair of binoculars, a compass and maps of the area.
On being questioned he became quite talkative. He had been a
Havildar Clerk in the Quarter Master's Office of Pakistan's 14th
Punjab Regiment, and had accepted the offer of a commission as a
Lieutenant in the Azad Kashmir Forces. He had been put through
courses in minor tactics and weapon training, and on reporting at
Muzaffarabad had been appointed a platoon commander. His platoon
was composed entirely of Punjabi Mussalmans all of whom had
been recently released or were ex-soldiers. This had been his first
assignment. The platoon had advanced from Muzaffarabad at the
rate of about ten miles per day, moving from one major village to
another, the remainder of the column being a day or two behind
him. His orders were to go to Handwara and there await the arrival
of the main body. He had no idea what the plans were thereafter.
The platoon commander and his platoon were sent to Srinagar and
accommodated in a Prisoner of War Camp until despatched to Delhi
by air in late April.
The successful outcome of Operation Handwara, it was assumed,
would earn the Brigade some sort of congratulatory message from
HQ Jak Force. The reply to the signal message reporting the incident
in detail was totally unexpected. It was a short and terse signal which
read : "The Force Commander wishes to be informed immediately
how the ewmg came to Handwara." It was obvious that the inten-
tion of the message was : "Explain at once why you permitted the
enemy to come to Handwara." As it would have served no useful
purpose to reiterate that the paucity of troops precluded the Brigade
sealing every approach to the Valley and that the enemy could, if
he chose to, appear anywhere and at any time, the query from HQ
Jak Force was treated literally and the following answer sent : "Cap-
hired enemy platoon commander confirms that he and his men came
011 foot." There were no further exchanges on the subject.
Chapter 15
Foiling Encirclement
THEfailure of the diversionary threat must have reached the enemy

HQ at Muzaffarabad very quickly, probably t h o u g h a wireless set
with the main body of the enerny, as there were signs of intensified
activity in the Uri-hlahura area. Fresh reinforcements were both
observed by the troops and reported by agents to be moving forward.
161 Infantry Brigade's patrol programme was accordingly stepped
up, and attempts at encirclement were thwarted by fighting patrols.
The main burden fell on 4 Kumaon in the hlahura area. With strikes
at every possible opportunity both by day and by night, the enemy
was given no respite. Sultan Dacchi was raided and the enemy put
to flight, and shortly after that another strong fighting patrol of 4
Kumaon surprised and scattered a large enemy concentration at
Bijhama.
Similar surprise assaults were launched in other areas, and in due
course the area north of Uri and Mahura was cleared of the enemy.
$LEIWEE1 WAS THE THREAD
The senior enemy commanders did not appear to take kindly to the
reverses being suffered by their tribals and troops, and decided to
sack the commander of the enemy operating in the Mahura area.
This information was handed to us by one of our agents who added:
"The enemy commander is being removed by his superiors on a
charge that his failure to achieve any type of success creates a strong
suspicion that he is actively collaborating with 161 Brigade."
There was a lull in enemy activity for about a week, and then came
the information that the new incumbent had arrived and had taken
over command. His first action was to give his men a pep talk. He
said his orders were to capture Mahura and he was going to do so.
H e had been told that offensive spirit was lacking but from that
moment onwards things would be different. While his command was
reducing Mahura, others would capture Uri. With the strong re-
inforcements that were being sent forward, and would be arriving
very shortly, he had no doubt that he would successfully implement
the orders that had been issued to him. His name, according to our
informant, was Khalil, and he wore the badges of rank of a Brigadier.
Concurrently with the arrival of the new commander in the
Mahura area, Azad Kashmir Radio stepped u p its tirades and issued
ominous daily warnings of what was about to befall both Uri and
Mahura. Those serving with 161 Infantry Brigade were advised to
accept the friendly warning and to depart when the going was good.
To be stubborn and shortsighted and to treat a friendly gesture with
contempt, the broadcasts said, would be foolish in the extreme. As
time sped by, the cajoling made way for sarcasm and threats, and
finally a reversiot~to the initial tone of obscenity and abuse.
In the hope that word would get back to us and result in a splinter-
ing of the hard core defences, the er~emytook to openly boasting
in the hearing of the local villagers of their projected plans, and
nominated actual dates. These plans varied from full-scale attacks
on Uri or Mahura, to strong attacks against particular piquets.
Although none of them materialised, they definitely had a nuisance
value, as piquets had to be alerted on the off-chance that the threat
might be carried out. The only plan that the enemy rank and file
and the tribals neither bragged about nor discussed was the one
aimed at crossing the Jhelum River between Mahura and Baramula,
and, having cut the road, to attack from an easterly direction first
Mahura and then Uri. It was something that had to be kept a closely
guarded secret. It was known only to the senior enemy commanders,
FOILING ENCIRCLEMENT
a very few trusted lieutenants, and - quite unknown to them - to

the target of attack, 161 Infantry Brigade.
It was not that the enemy sent a copy of the plan to 161 Infantry
Brigade in error. His very movements in the area of Mahura had
made the intention crystal clear. The point at which the river would
be crossed and the date were, however, questions the answers to
which 161 Infantry Brigade would have to obtain by every means
at its disposal. Each little bit of information regarding the enemy
was, therefore, assembled in order to solve these two riddles.
SKETCH SHOWING THE AREA

NORTH OF MAHURA AND RAMWR
MILES 6 5 MILES
3 2 1 8
I
The enemy build-up in the Mahura area gained momentum with

the arrival of the new commander. He was certainly far more
methodical and capable than his predecessor. Efforts to obtain his
identification were not successful; all that was established was that
which was already known, that he was named Khalil and was a
Brigadier. This meant nothing as it was, in all probability, a

pseudonym. What was intriguing was his assertion that he knew the
commander of 161 Infantry Brigade very well.
A few days after his arrival, 'Khalil' sent an emissary to make con-
tact with me. This individual, a relation of the headman of Lachhi-
pura village, came to the bridge over the River Jhelum at Mahura
and surrendered himself to the 4 Kumaon platoon guarding the
bridge. H e asked to be escorted to the Commanding Officer, for
whom he had a message. Lt. Col. Man Mohan Khanna interviewed
the messenger and then telephoned me in Uri, whereupon I informed
him that I would come to Mahura immediately. On arrival, the emis-
sary was produced before me. He stated that his whole family was
being held as hostages and would only be freed when he returned.
H e was extremely nervous and pleaded that he should not be sub-
jected to any form of interrogation regarding the enemy, as he had
taken an oath that he would not reveal anything. He was assured
that he would not be detained and that his request would be res-
pected, whereupon, relief from the mental strain from which he was
obviously suffering evinced itself in a flood of tears. He was given
a cup of tea and told to rest for a few minutes.
Having recovered his composure, he produced a slip of paper
which he stated had been handed to him by the enemy commander.
It was unsigned, but the emissary was categorical that the message
had been written in his presence by an officer wearing the same
badges of rank as myself. The message requested that I agree to a
seven-day cease fire, commencing at midnight, and stated that, as
the writer knew my signature well, as a guarantee that his message
had actually been delivered to me, I should hand the messenger a
packet of ten Gold Flake cigarettes, endorsing the packet with my
signature in ink.
A packet of ten Gold Flake cigarettes was produced, signed in ink
in the presence of the courier, and handed to him with the instruc-
tions that he should hand it over to the author of the note and in-
form him that his message had been received and that the answer
would be delivered at ten minutes before midnight. The handker-
chief that had been used to blindfold him when he had been led to
the H Q of 4 Kumaon was then replaced. Led back to the point where
he had surrendered himself initially, it was removed and he was
permitted to return to Lachhipura village.
Man Mohan Khanna and I sat on a patch of green grass and dis-
cussed the strange request. We agreed that it was much too rich to
FOILING ENCIRCLEMENT
stomach. Over the past few weeks every possible means had been
utilised to harass the enemy and to break up his concentrations, and
here was a suggestion that was tantamount to saying to 161 Brigade,
"Please stop harassing us and let us gain a position of advantage
from where we can cut your throats." 161 Infantry Brigade was play-
ing for time, the time when the Banihal Pass would reopen and make
possible the induction of further units into the Valley. The enemy
was simultaneously forcing the pace, bent on launching his attack
and reducing the relatively weak garrisons holding Uri, Mahura and
the Valley to a state where reinforcements would be desperately
needed to face a situation identical to that which existed when the
troops were first flown into the Valley. 161 Infantry Brigade was not
prepared to cooperate in hammering a nail into its own coffin. There
was only one possible answer to the request, and it was delivered at
ten minutes before midnight : the field guns located in Uri blazed
the rejection.
Enemy activity in the area north of Mahura now increased to quite
an alarming extent. It was evident that the area was being heavily
reinforced. To ensure that the Bausian feature was reasonably
strongly held, and capable of withstanding a determined assault
against it, it was strengthened with additional sub-units of 4 Kumaon,
wired and mined. A battery of mountain guns in support of the posi-
tion would have been a valuable asset, but unfortunately there was
only one battery of four guns, and they were required to provide
the defensive fire for the Uri piquets. The field artillery in Uri,
while it could engage certain targets in the area to the north of
Bausian, could not, because of intervening features, afford close sup-
port fire to the Bausian garrison. There was also no possibility of
making use of the field artillery in Baramula as there were no suita-
ble positions for its deployment. The Bausian garrison had therefore
to rely upon the 4 Kumaon three-inch mortar platoon which, despite
suffering from severe range limitations, had been allotted the task.
Constant verbal threats notwithstanding, the enemy avoided Bausian
like the plague and it remained a sharp thorn in his side. It soon
became clear that his intention was not to stir up a hornet's nest,
but to lull the defenders into a state of security, and by surreptitious
means to work his way past Bausian to a position from which the
value of holding Bausian would be nullified. In order to reach this
position, and in order to ensure that the movement of his troops from
west to east was not subjected to a sudden strike from Mahura, he
began occupying piquet positions on the features to the north of
Bausian from which he could get good observation and give early
warning.
While by-passing Bausian and proceeding to his selected con-
centration area in the east, the enemy, in order not to attract undue
attention, limited the number of personnel who moved each day to
about one hundred armed men and fifty porters. These personnel
moved in groups of about fifteen to twenty, a t varying intervals,
commencing each day soon after nine o'clock. During the afternoon
and evening, the porters were observed retuning, sauntering back
in twos or threes as if they were harmless villagers. All armed bodies
of men were immediately engaged by the field artillery firing from
Uri. Each subsequent enemy advance was made a bit further to the
north, until eventually the route followed was out of the range of
the guns even when firing with super charge. It was then only pos-
sible to keep a count of the armed personnel who passed by each
day, so that there would be some idea of the strength that would
have to be combated when the time to strike arrived.
From our intelligence sources it was known that the enemy was
concentrating in the Limber Nullah area, and it was decided to per-
mit him to do so completely undisturbed, in the hope that he would
be lulled into believing that we were quite oblivious of the fact.
When, however, a report was received that he had moved further
east and had reached Pahlipura village, immediate steps were taken
to verify this but, as was expected, it was false. Had he advanced
as far as Pahlipura, an attack with the battalion located in Bara-
mula, 3 Garhwal, would have had to be mounted, as he would have
been much too close to Baramula and the Valley.
The enemy's discipline during this period cf March, when he was
concentrating his force, was very good. All villages were avoided
and there was no sign of movement in the concentration area by
day nor the £ticker of a light by night. In order to educate him, and
make movement by 3 Garhwal from east to west along the north
bank of the Jhelum river appear a matter of routine patrolling, both
to him and any agents in Baramula, 3 Garhwal was ordered to send
out patrols of varying strengths both by day and by night along the
north bank of the Jhelum river as far as Ijara. This, it was hoped,
would also give the impression that the river between Ijara and
Rampur was being neglected. From the enemy's point of view it
was perfect. This stretch of the river has many easy crossing sites
where the banks slope gently and the current is relatively slow. The
hills on the south bank were easily accessible, and sufficiently distant
FOILJNG ENCIRCLEMENT
from both Baramula and Mahura to ensure that, when occupied

eventually, neither garrison would know until it was a fait accompli.
The stretch of river from Ijara to Rampur was, however, far from
being neglected. On the contrary, it was receiving specialised treat-
ment. Located in well-concealed observation posts along the whole
length were small groups of men equipped with binoculars, and in
communication with Uri by wireless. These groups critically studied
the movements of all individuals approaching either the north or
south banks of the Jhelum river, and reported everything in the
nature of strange or suspicious behaviour. Soon after darkness set
in, the day observers would be withdrawn and replaced by similar
groups who positioned themselves at various points close to the
river. The enemy, however, was extremely cautious and gave away
nothing. Our observers possibly considered it a waste of effort since,
in order to eliminate idle chatter and possible speculation which
might have reached the enemy's ears, the enemy's intended plan of
action had not been divulged to the men, nor the plan to counter it.
This remained a closely guarded secret, known only to Lit. Col. Man
Mohan Khanna and myself.
The plan, in brief, was to permit the enemy encirclement party,
which was reported to be the 4th AKP battalion and a hard core of
two thousand five hundred tribesmen, to concentrate undisturbed in
the Limber Nullah. When the concentration was completed and be-
fore they could attempt the river crossing, they would be first sealed
off in the Limber Nullah and then annihilated. The sealing off of
the enemy in the Limber Nullah would be effected by 3 Garhwal
who would advance from Baramula and capture the feature point
8109, and by 4 Kumaon who would advance from Mahura and occupy
the Kopra feature. 1 Sikh would move forward from Srinagar to Bara-
mula, and be responsible for manning the defences evacuated by 3
Garhwal, two R a e Companies being held in readiness to move to the
Heman Buniyar Nullah area when ordered.
The timings in the plan could not be firmly laid down, as the ad-
vance by 4 Kumaon to Kopra was dependent on the success attained
by 3 Garhwal, and the move to the Heman Buniyar Nullah area bv
two Companies of 1 Sikh, on the success gained by 4 Kumaon. If
everything went according to plan, the enemy would be presented
with four options : to fight the Garhwalis, or fight the Kumaonis, or
attempt to cross the river in which case he would meet opposition
from 1 Sikh, or to beat a retreat which would entail climbing the
13,000 feet Pir Panjal Range which was covered by deep snow. In
SLENDER WAS THE THnEAD
order to present him with this situation, knowledge of the date of

completion of his concentration and the date of his attack were abso- 1
I
lutely vital requirements, as on them hinged the D day and )I hour

for the launching of 161 Infantry Brigade's strike which had to be
swift and sure.
SKETCH S H O m G
THE ENEMY'S CONCENTRATION AREA
AND PLAN OF ATTACK
and
161 INF BbE'S PLAN TO COU'NTER I T
R A N G E
Daily reports of the enemy strengths that had by-passed Mahura

and moved eastwards did not, initially, appear to cause any undue
alarm at H Q Jak Force in Jammu, but as the running total mounted
to a sizeable proportion, there were signs of uneasiness. H Q 161 In-
fantry Brigade was asked to report what it was doing about it. The
simple reply that the situation was well in hand, while accepted at
first with a certain amount of relief, began to be sarcastically referred
to as masterly inactivity. Perhaps it appeared that way as H Q Jak
Force had not been informed of the enemy's intention or of the plan
to combat it. To have passed this information would have necessitated
using the wireless link, which was considered unwise as there was a
possibility of leakage or the cracking of the cipher by the enemy.
FOILLNG ENCIRCLEMENT
Further, with the Banihal Pass under heavy snow and impassable,
there was nothing that H Q Jak Force could do to assist, other than
providing air support which could be called for at the last moment.
To have been stampeded into action would only have resulted in
an engagement with an indecisive result, probably favourable to the
enemy. A trap had been baited. It was hoped that, with luck favour-
ing us, the stalker would experience that dread of the hunter-the
sudden realisation that he was the one who was being stalked. He
would not be given the chance to sit down and consider why and how
it happened. H e would be struck a well-directed blow from- which
recovery would be impossible.
Chapter 16
The Move to Leh
MEANWHILEthe Brigade intercept sets, which had from time to time

picked up messages being passed in the Gilgit area, reported in-
creased activity concerning what the enemy had code-named 'Opera-
tion Sledge'. It was evident that the operation had either been launch-
ed or would be within a few days.
Operation Sledge was planned in Army Headquarters, Pakistan,
and launched from Gilgit in mid-February 1948. The target was Leh,
the capital of Ladakh. The enemy force employed to implement the
plan was composed of a strong element from the Gilgit Scouts, defec-
tors from the Jammu & Kashmir State Forces, and tribals. In con-
cept it was ambitious, involving a movement on foot of over three
hundred miles over most inhospitable terrain, but, apart from the
distance to be covered, it was by no means a pioneer effort. Fur
dealers and other traders had used the route for many decades, and
there was no possibility of the force becoming involved in a major
THE MOVE TO LEH
engagement. All that might have been encountered were minor skir-
mishes against weak opposition. The route followed the banks of the
Indus river. The first point at which opposition might be encoun-
tered was Skardu, garrisoned by a weak State Force battalion. After
neutralising this garrison the enemy force would proceed unimpeded
along the road, attack Kargil on its right flank, held by a very weak
State Force detachment, and move thence to Leh.
Pakistan's assertion was that the invasion of Kashmir in October
1947 by tribesmen from the North-West Frontier Province had come
as a complete surprise to her. Gullible individuals were led to believe
that the tribal action was motivated by a burning desire in the hearts
of the tribesmen to 'liberate' their Muslim brothers from the tyranny
of a Hindu regime. No such reason could be advanced for the inva-
sion of Ladakh. The Ladakhis are Buddhists whereas the 'liberators'
were not of that faith, nor had the Ladakhis asked for assistance.
They had been living a life of peace and contentment for decades,
with little, if any, external interference with their way of life. Yet,
even to the homeland of these peace-loving people Pakistan brought
war.
The blatant act of aggression was the more odious for the fact
that the people of Ladakh were unarmed and in consequence was
incapable of offering anything more than verbal resistance. Nor were
there any troops, Regular or Irregular, readily available to come to
their aid in the defence of their homeland. Was it a burning desire
to acquire territory as bleak and desolate as the North-West Frontier
Province that prompted Pakistan to engage in this escapade? Or
was there some other reason, and was she encouraged and persuaded
by others to undertake it 3 This only history will answer. The fact,
however, remains that the episode was engineered by Pakistan, and
an Irregular Force, now under her command and control, played the
major part in the attempt to subdue Ladakh.
The success of the operation, as envisaged by the planners, was
dependent on three factors : the ability of the men to walk the dis-
tance, the logistics, and the annihilation of the opposition that might
be encountered at Kargil. Segregating the Kashmir Valley from
Ladakh was the massive Great Himalayan Range, with the 16,427
feet Zoji La Pass the only route across it. This Pass, usable during
the summer months, was universally accepted as being an impregna-
ble barrier during winter, the exceedingly heavy snowfalls making
its crossing during the months of October to May unthinkable. There
was no airstrip at Leh. Its reinforcement with troops, even had an
airstrip existed, would have been extremely difficult because of the

adverse flying conditions during winter. The door to Leh was wide
open. Success was assured, even if the rate of advance was main-
tained at short stages of about ten miles per day.
The threat to Leh might never have materialised had Maharajah
Hari Singh taken the action that should normally have followed the
events of July 1947 and dispensed with the services of Major Brown
and his British colleagues of the Gilgit Scouts. When he received the
report of his Chief of Staff, Major General Scott; that the British
officers of the Gilgit Scouts had told him they had all opted for
Pakistan, he must surely have realised that his territory was beingq
protected by personnel whose loyalty lay elsewhere. As it was 30
July 1947 when they made their announcement, and the Dominions
of India and Pakistan did not come into being until 15 August, there
was ample time for the ruler to refer the matter to Lord Louis Mount-
batten, in his capacity as Viceroy of undivided India. If the Maha-
rajah so desired, he could have asked for the services of British
volunteers who would be willing to serve the State regardless of his
final decision on which Dominion he would accede to.
Major General Scott would certainly also have gauged the feelings
of the rank and file of the Gilgit Scouts, and it is presumed that he
informed the ruler that they were unlikely to swear allegiance to
him. These men, after all, had never formed a part of the Jammu &
Kashmir State Forces. They had been enlisted by and served the
British exclusively. It is, therefore, natural that they would be in-
fluenced by the action of their British officers, whom they knew and
under whom they had served, in preference to taking an oath of
allegiance to someone with whom they had had little connection over
a period of about tweIve years.
Considering the position of Major Brown and his British colleagues,
their opting to serve Pakistan was not extraordinary. All British offi-
cers serving in the undivided Indian Army had been called upon
to decide whether they wished to serve India or Pakistan, should
their services he required, or to take their release, the terms of the
release benefits being extremely generous. Pakistan's requirements of
British officers far exceeded those of India, the ratio of non-British
officers serving in the undivided Indian Army, being ten Indians to
one future Pakistani. It was, therefore, natural that the majority of
those British officers who wished to serve on opted for Pakistan,
where their chances of being absorbed were much brighter.
What is very difficult to understand, however, is Major Brown's
THE MOVE TO LEH
subsequent conduct wllich culminated in his hoisting the Pakistan

flag in the lines of his command, thc Gilgit Scouts, on 4 November
1947.
On 3 June 1947, with the retrocession of Gilgit to the Maharajah
of Jammu & Kashmir by the Government of Great Britain, and with
it the Gilgit Scouts, Major Brown and the other British officers of
the Gilgit Scouts automatically came into the service of the Govern-
ment of Jammu & Kashmir. As such, if they served on, which they
all did, they owed loyalty not to Britain or to undivided India but
to the Maharajah. Their position was identical to that of officers of
the British Army loaned to and seconded for service with the Timbuc-
too Rifles. Even cn 15 August 1947, when the Dominions of India
and Pakistan came into being, the position remained unaltered, as
the State of Jammu & Kasllmir was not part of either India or Pakis-
tan. When the Maharajah signed the Instrument of Accession with
India on 26 October 1947, honour and loyalty, qualities which would
have been expected of these individuals as British officers, dictated
that they make an immediate request for release from their appoint-
ments. Gilgit was now a part of India, and they had opted to serve
Pakistan. It would have been the right and honourable thing for them
to do. Their subsequent actions, however, betrayed a complete lack
of these qualities. They stabbed the Maharajah of Jammu & Kash-
mir in the back, and joined hands with his enemies. This led to the
butchering of men, women and children in the massacre that took
place a few months later at Skardu, for which they must be held in-
directly responsible.
Skardu came under pressure from enemy forces that moved down
from Gilgit in February 1948. The Gorkha Commanding Officer, of
of the weak 6th Battalion, The Jammu & Kashmir State Forces, soon
found that his best chance of survival, if he remained in the Skardu
area, lay in evacuating his lightly held outpost positions and con-
centrating his unit in the Fort. Within the precincts of the Fort he
also accommodated a number of women and children, and in order
to conserve the available foodstuff, placed everyone on a minimum
ration scale. Attacks against the Fort were delivered at periodic in-
tekvals, but a steady and firm defence repulsed them, the casualties
inflicted imposing caution on the enemy. However, the overall situa-
tion in Kashmir was such that no aid could be expected by the gar-
rison at Skardu. The enemy's next step would be to lay siege to
Skardu. It was in these circumstances that the Commanding Officer
at Skardu Fort signalled H Q 161 Infantry Brigade for permission to

slip away from Skardu and to head for Kargil.
His stock of food, he stated, was dwindling slowly but surely, and
there was no possibility of replenishing it locally. The ammunition
situation, though not precarious, was not in a healthy state. The
reduced ration scale was already having a noticeably adverse effect
on the physical condition of his men, which would further deterio-
rate as the days passed. If given permission to withdraw from
Skardu, his rate of movement, and the distance to be covered each
day, would be limited to that which the sick and wounded, and the
women and children, could cope with. Forced marches were not
possible in their case. He planned, therefore, to slip them away each
night, in small batches so as to avoid detection, with a small pro-
tective party. When these batches were sufficiently far away from
Skardu, he would evacuate the Fort with his main body and fight
a rear-guard action back to Kargil. Here he would link up with the
State Force detachment, and together they would present the enemy
with a much stronger front.
There was no alternative to the proposed withdrawal plan, and
although it carried some hazards it promised hope of success. It
was not the request of a coward, but of a gallant soldier who rea-
lised that Skardu Fort, if encircled, was incapable of being relieved,
and his men, and the women and children who had entrusted him
with their safety, would receive no mercy from the enemy. Skardu,
moreover, taking into consideration the situation as it existed at the
time, was of neither strategical nor tactical value. Its relatively small
garrison was quite incapable of either seriously harassing the enemy
or denying him access to the east should he desire to proceed in
that direction. It was in fact nothing other than a Flag Flying Out-
post, which would one day be forced into surrender through starva-
tion and the inability of the garrison to strike back in self-defence.
A signal message, stressing the position and the difficulties that
were facing the Skardu garrison, and emphasising that they would
increase as each day went by, was despatched to HQ Jak Force.
It was very strongly recommended that the Commanding Officer's
request should be acceded to immediately. As time was of vital
importance in ensuring that the disabled, and the women and child-
ren, were well clear before the Fort was evacuated, an answer within
the next few hours was requested. A feeling of despair descended
over H Q 161 Infantry Brigade when H Q Jak Force's reply was re-
THE MOVE TO L m
ceived. I t stated that the withdrawal from Skardu was not agreed
to, and that the commander would be ordered to stay put.
This refusal was not passed on to the Commander of the Skardu
garrison. A second signal was despatched to HQ Jak Force, empha-
sising again that Skardu had neither strategical nor tactical value,
that it would be subjected to a siege in a few days, and that as the
siege could never be relieved, it was throwing away human lives
without obtaining any benefit whatsoever. Operation Sledge, it was
stated, was about to be launched by the enemy at any moment, and
because of the logistical problems involved, the number of troops
or tribals or a mixture of both would have to be limited. The pre-
sence of the Skardu garrison would not prevent that number being
mustered, nor could it interfere with their progress towards the east.
If, however, the Skardu garrison was permitted to withdraw to
Kargil, together with the detachment already at Kargil, it could pre-
sent a much bolder front, and with the enemy line of communica-
tion stretched, it would not only survive but also be a thorn in the
enemy flank.
HQ Jak Force evidently did not appreciate the arguments ad-
vanced. It made no reference to them, and issued a cold sharp order
that HQ 161 Infantry Brigade would immediately order the com-
mander of the Skardu garrison to fight to the last man and the last
round, and that a confirmation that this order had been passed to
Skardu and understood would be signalled back as quickly as was
possible. The Jak Force instructions were carried out, and an
acknowledgement received from Skardu. HQ Jak Force was informed
that the message had been passed and had been understood.
Fifteen days later, Skardu sent a signal to the effect that the enemy
had occupied every vantage point around the Fort, and that as any
movement out of it drew fire, which was resulting in casualties, pat-
rolling outside the Fort was no longer possible. The inevitable had
happened-Skardu was besieged. An attempt was made to relieve
the siege of Skardu in late May 1948, but the State Force troops that
moved out made very little progress against determined enemy oppo-
sition and withdrew. An air effort was then mounted to drop ammuni-
tion and supplies but this proved too costly in casualties sustained
by the defenders, who had to battle with the enemy to recover the
stores that landed in the area outside the Fort. In early September,
their last round of ammunition fired and their ration store empty,
the Skardu garrison, too weak physically to offer any further resist-
ance, was forced to surrender, and, with the women and children that
THE MOVE TO LEI1
The ray of hope was transformed into a rainbow the next evening.
In a casual conversation, Lt. Col. G. G. Bewoor, who had taken over
as the Commanding Officer of 2 Dogra from Lt. Col. U. C. Dubey,
mentioned that 2 Dogra, during its service as a Territorial Battalion,
had enlisted, among other classes, a number of Lahulis. Many of
them were still serving in the battalion, including two officers, Cap-
tain Prithi Chand and his cousin Captain Khushal Chand. Lahul,
situated in the north of what is now the State of Himachal Pradesh,
has a contiguous border with Ladakh, and over the centuries there
has been close affinity between the Lahulis and the Ladakhis.
"Perhaps," Bewoor suggested, "it might be worthwhile asking
Prithi Chand and Khushal whether they and a few Lahuli other ranks
would volunteer to go to Leh and organise its defence." It certainly
was worth trying, and Gopal Bewoor was asked to sound Prithi
Chand and Khushal.
In his talk with them Lt. Col. Bewoor did not use persuasion nor
did he in any way minimise the dangers that would have to be faced.
Having explained the situation, he told the two young officers that
the only available route was via the Zoji La Pass, over the Great
Himalayan Range, which was covered in snow to a depth of about
thirty feet. Local experts, he said, were emphatic that no one had
attempted to negotiate it under such conditions and to do so would
be courting disaster. He asked them to consider the matter very care-
fully, assuring them that no adverse opinion would be held against
them if they decided not to undertake the task.
Leaving the two officers to deliberate over the proposition, Bewoor
returned to the conference room and had barely seated himself, when
Prithi Chand and Khushal Chand appeared. Without hesitating for
a second Prithi Chand said: "\Ve'll go to Leh." It was immediately
decided that volunteers should be called for from the battalion, the
target being set at about forty. This would form a strong platoon
with a signal detachment. The number of forty was arrived at so as
not to unbalance 2 Dogra, which had an operational role in Kashmir,
and also because of the logistical problem involved. The call
for volunteers produced a remarkable response, every Lahuli volun-
teering and a large number of Dogras in addition. A very strict
medical examination was conducted, and eventually fifty were select-
ed, forty to form the party to go to Leh and ten to be held in reserve
to replace any casualties that may be suffered in the selected forty
prior to the date of their departure.
The formulating of an Administrative Plan, to cover every possible
requirement of the volunteers to Leh, was taken in hand. It was

realised that once the party had set out, there was no earthly chance
of making good any deficiency. It would have to suffer the con-
sequences of an oversight until such time as the weather improved
and an air drop was possible, and that would probably not be earlier
than two months. Lists were prepared, checked, re-checked and
added to as omissions came to light. Extra winter clothing, Gilgit
boots, gloves, snow goggles and other such items necessary to combat
what would be sub-zero temperatures and possible blizzards were
purchased from the shops in Srinagar. Then, besides the normal
rations, an assortment of tinned products was included. Most im-
portant of all, medical panniers had to be equipped with medicines
and drugs to cater for ailments that would normally be attended to
in a hospital by a trained doctor, and a certain number of men had
to be educated in their use.
I n addition to the weapons with which the platoon wo,uld be
armed, one hundred rifles were collected from the State Force
Armoury and included in the load that would be carried to Leh.
The rifles, and the ammunition that accompanied them, were to equip
the Ladakhis so that they could take an active part in defending
their homeland. With the selection of a suitable wireless set with
which to ensure communication, and the men practised daily in
tying the various loads and placing them on ~ a c kponies, the column
was equipped and ready to move by the middle of March.
D. P. Dhar had, in the meantime, been busy collecting the pack
ponies for the column. As these animals were used exclusively during
the summer months by the tourists who camped and trekked in the
Valley, and were let out to graze during the 'off-season', it was no
easy job to obtain them and even harder to get their owners to under-
take any task in the winter. Moreover, in order to maintain secrecy, he
could not tell the pony owners where they were expected to go. The
ponies were, however, an operational necessity and 'DP' succeeded
in obtaining them, and had them concentrated at Sonemarg. In order
to economise in the number of personnel to be fed, it was decided
that there would be one man to ten pack ponies.
As HQ Jak Force permission was necessary before launching the
Leh volunteers on their way, and it was not considered prudent to
send a signal, even in cipher, a comprehensive letter enumerating
every detail was prepared and carried to Jammu by two volunteers
who agreed to tackle the snow-bound Banihal Pass. This, in itself,
was a commendable effort as it presented danger at every step. Three
THE MOVE TO LEH
days after their departure from the Valley, HQ Jak Force acknow-
ledged receipt of the l e t t q and stated that it was being examined.
Days sped by, and when no reply was received by mid-March, an
urgent reminder was signalled to HQ Jak Force. The answer stated
that the matter was still under consideration. Further reminders,
stressing that each day's delay would bring the enemy closer to
Kargil and possibly arrest the advance of the volunteers to Leh, had
no effect. It was always the same answer: "still under considerationu.
With the enemy presumably making good progress, the Leh volun-
teers champing at the bit to take off, and D. P. Dhar and his col-
leagues of the Emergency Government in the Valley showing signs
of increased anxiety, a final request was made to HQ Jak Force for
an answer. When the same reply, "still under consideration", was
received, Captain Prithi Chand was told to take off.
The Leh party was transported to Sonemarg, together with their
baggage, in motor transport that had been assembled in Baramula,
and on arrival married up with their pack ponies. Loading the
animals, the column moved forward to Baltal. Here many of the pony
leaders, having been made aware of the further moves, refused to
continue with the column, and were returned to Sonemarg for return
to their homes. One can hardly blame them for their attitude. This
was madness and suicidal, they said. The Zoji La had never been
crossed other than in the summer months, and they were not going
to risk it.
Basing his column at Baltal, Prithi Chand moved forward with a
few men to prepare the Zoji La Pass for the assault. It was necessary
to create avalanches, and this was done by beating drums in the
stillness of the night. This procedure continued over three nights
and then Prithi Chand signalled that he was ready to make the
attempt to cross the Pass. There was no contact with the column
for the next forty-eight hours, and then came a signal that the cross-
ing had been successfully accomplished without a casualty, and that
the column was setting out for Kargil on its way to ~ e h .
No amount of praise will suffice to laud this great effort. Many
hardened mountaineers, who knew the Zoji La P ~ s swell, had shaken
their heads and said it could result in a disaster to tackle it at that
time of the year. There is no denying, that it could have resulted in
the loss of the complete column, and no one suffered ~ ~ ~ from o r e
anxiety than myself and 2 Dogra. The wireless link at Brigade HQ
was kept working from the moment Prithi Chand announced that
he was ready for the assault on the Wss, and there were almost
hourly inquiries whenever contact was made. When the success

signal eventually came through, everyone in 161 Infantry Brigade
felt ten years younger. Fortune had truly favoured the brave.
SKETCH SHOWING THE ROUTES

GILGIT - LEH
SRINAGAR - LEH
TO
LAHUL
'1
A signal was despatched to HQ Jak Force stating that the Zoji

La had been crossed and the column under Prithi Chand on its way
to Kargil. There was an immediate reaction. A signal message was
received stating that a letter was being despatched by hand of the
couriers who had arrived with HQ 161 Infantry Brigade's letter.
When the couriers arrived, having once again braved the Banihal
Pass, the letter did not contain the necessary sanction to despatch
the column, this incidentally being necessary to support the expenses
iicurred in equipping the column. It called for an immediate enpla-
nation. The source of the trouble was that Prithi Chand's party had
'IWE MOVE TO LEH
been designated by me as 'Leh Force'. HQ Jak Force demanded on

whose authority this nomenclature had been given. The military
definition of the word 'Force' was explained in detail, and garnished
with examples such 'Paiforce' (Persia and Iraq Force) which was
in being during World War 11. The letter stressed that there was,
and would only be, one 'Force' in Jammu & Kashmir State, and that
was Jak Force. A signal stating that 'Leh Force' had been instructed
to change its designation to 'Lehdet' (Leh Dethchment) closed the
issue, and sanction, ex post facto, was duly received.
Prithi Chand and his men reached Leh without encountering the
enemy. The rifles and ammunition were distributed among suitable
young men and they were given hasty training in their use. Defen-
sive positions, based on a bridge, were taken up and the amval of
the enemy awaited. He arrived in due course and was surprised to
meet stubborn opposition. Every attempt to overrun the defences
met with a serious reverse, until eventually, finding that his attacks
were proving to be too costly, the enemy abstained from attempting
to proceed to Leh.
Prithi Chand and his gallant band of men were later joined by
two Companies of the 2nd Battalion 4th Gorkha Rifles, who had been
despatched by the recently revived HQ Western Command from
Manali in the Kulu Valley, and carried out an equally prodigious
march over heights extending to 15,000 feet, througll Lahul on to
Leh. That Leh was held, and the enemy deprived of the pleasure
of sacking and looting it, was the outcome of a great deed which
will find few equals in military history. It called for unbounded
courage, determination and stamina, and these qualities and more
were amply demonstrated by the defenders who took the first shock
of the attack, the two officers and their gallant men from 2 Dogra
of 161 Infantry Brigade.
Chapter 17
Brickbats for Bouquets
THE planning and preparations to combat Operation Sledge, though

they were time-consuming and involved a great deal of effort, were
not permitted to distract attention from the serious threat at our
doorstep on the Uri Front, or to hamper the measures necessary for
the slowing down of the enemy build-up in the Limber Nullah area.
The threat on both these fronts was increasing with each day. What
161 Infantry Brigade had done everything possible to avert, the
facing of major engagements simultaneously on two fronts, was on
the way to becoming a stark reality. Playing for time was very neces-
sary, but it would be hoping too much to expect the enemy to stay
put in the Limber Nullah until such time as the Banihal Pass was
open and strong reinforcements could move into the Kashmir Valley.
Every advantage rested with the enemy, the most disconcerting of
all being that he held the initiative. With an open motorable road
at his command, he could move forward anything that he chose to,
BRICKBATS FOR BOUQUETS
and could blitz 161 Infantry Brigade at Uri on a date and at a time
which suited him.
Serious though the situation was, 161 Infantry Brigade was by no
means depressed. Its morale was much too high for that. Being out-
numbered by the enemy - at the worst the odds had been about
ten to one against us, and were now estimated to be in the region
of six to one - was accepted as normal. What was causing a certain
degree of frustration was the f a d that all efforts directed at obtain-
ing the probable date of strike by the enemy concentrating in the
Limber Nullah had not borne fruit. If we could get some inkling
of it, we could strike first, and the numerical advantage held
by the enemy, the possibility of being presented with attacks on two
fronts, and the initiative that he held would all be erased at one
fell swoop. The enemy choice of the Limber Nullah as his concentra-
tion area suited us admirably, and would eventually be to his dis-
advantage if it was struck at the correct moment. As far as 161 In-
fantry Brigade was concerned, there was no latitude for launching
a 'hit or miss' operation. When battle was joined, the enemy force
in the Limber Nullah would have to be so completely routed that
it would never present another threat.
Our intelligence sources continued to report that strong enemy
reinforcements had arrived, and were earmarked to arrive, on both
fronts. In the Mahura area, an Azad Kashmir Brigade composed of
the 3rd, 4th and 5th AKP battalions, together with three thousand
Pathan tribesmen from the North-West Frontier Province, were
reported to have arrived by 1 March. The task of effecting the river
crossing in an area between Baramula and Rampur, it was stated,
had been assigned to the 4th AKP battalion and two thousand five
hundred tribesmen. The 3rd and 5th AKP battalions and five hund-
red tribals were to remain concentrated in the area of Lachhipura,
but whether they were to be held in reserve or had been allotted
some other role could not be gleaned. What was known, however,
was that certain elements of both these battalions were being utilised
in a porter role, carrying forward ammunition and stores for the
concentration in the Limber Nullah. The locals, who had been press-
ganged into porter duties, had not reacted kindly to the possibility
of being shelled and shot at by our patrols when accompanying
armed men, and more often than not had jettisoned their loads and
returned home.
This information about the behaviour of the locals was comforting,
not that we wished them any harm, but purely from the point of
view of its effect on the enemy's build-up programme, which would

be retarded. The enemy, then, suddenly changed his methods. All
moves to and from the Limber Nullah by daylight ceased, and in-
filtration by night was substituted. It was no longer possible for us
to keep any sort of a reasonably accurate running total of what
numbers had moved through, and our assessment had to be based on
past averages and intelligent guessing. With the enemy's security
measures also being tightened up, the use of agents to confirm or
correct our assessments was no longer possible.
Meanwhile, the melting snows had changed the situation confront-
ing Uri. What had been difficult or inaccessible areas, now became
fit for occupation and movement. In early March, a patrol of 2 Dogra,
this battalion having moved to Uri from Baramula and relieved 3
Garhwal, which had returned to Baramula, reported that the enemy
had returned to the Bhatgiran area and was digging in. This news
was disturbing. Quite apart from the fact that it constituted a definite
threat to Uri from the south, it also indicated that the enemy had
visions of encircling Uri from that area or of isolating it by bringing
the road from Mahura to Uri under fire.
His previous attempts in December 1947 had resulted in 161 In-
fantry Brigade reacting violently. It would have done so again, but
unfortunately there were now less troops available to remove the
hornet's nest. There were just two units manning the Uri defences,
6 Rajrif and 2 Dogra, and one Rifle Company of 3 Garhwal, which
had been retained in Uri as the Brigade reserve when the battalion
returned to Baramula. To attack Bhatgiran, previous experience had
shown, required one full strength battalion, and it was not available.
In view of the Limber Nullah build-up, neither 4 Kumaon, from
Mahura, nor 3 Garhwal could be touched. At Srinagar was 1 Sikh, its
role the protection of the Valley and Handwara, and earmarked to
move to Baramula and on to Heman Buniyar when the Limber
Nullah battle erupted. There was no option other than to live with
the threat, and to deal with it if, and when, the enemy decided to
sting us.
The enemy in the Bhatgiran area fortunately adopted a most
passive attitude. He made no attempt to interfere with Uri or its
defences. This was very strange, as it was the most obvious thing to
do. His patrol activities were also inclined to be slack, but there was
a live danger that in a fit of enthusiasm a patrol might venture as
far as Uri's eastern perimeter, in which case it would have discovered
that it was completely devoid of troops. This might have encouraged
BRICKEtAT8 FOR BOUQtTETS
the enemy to move round and occupy a feature in the area, and had
he done so, it would have made matters extremely difficult. It was
now no longer possible to take the risk which had, in the past, been
accepted. 2 Dogra was ordered to thin out some of its piquets and
to form an ad hoc Rifle Company, and to establish a piquet on the
Nambla feature. Other than one minor patrol clash in the area to
the south of Nambla, the enemy made no attempt to engage or dis-
lodge Nambla piquet.
It would be incorrect to give the impression that the enemy on
the Uri front was completely inactive. He was extremely active in
some areas, but showed a distinct partiality towards certain piquets
which he attacked with almost monotonous regularity, despite his
being repulsed on each occasion. His tactical ability, fortunately,
lacked a sense of adventure. At no time did he attempt to infiltrate
in-between the piquets and attack the Uri bowl which, especially
on a dark night, was easy. A report was received one day that he
intended doing so, the gun areas and Brigade Headquarters being
the selected targets. This called for emergency measures. The Com-
manding Officer of the Field Ambulance was, however, most indig-
nant when he found a platoon of infantry digging trenches in the
hospital area. He was emphatic that the protection of the patients
was the responsibility of the Field Ambulance, and insisted that he
would undertake the task with his own men. All he required was
the loan of three Bren guns. It was found impossible to persuac'
him to let those more accustomed to operating Bren guns assist him,
and eventually three light automatics, withdrawn from units, were
handed over to his command. The expected attack did not
materialise, and it was providential that it did not, as there would
have been a number of casualties, the majority of them in the Moun-
tain Battery and Brigade Headquarters. In the eagerness to ensure
an all-round defence, two of the Bren Guns allotted to the Field
Ambulance were so aligned that they would have made matters most
uncomfortable for the Mountain Battery, and the wooden building
of Brigade Headquarters would have had more perforations in it
than a sheet of postage stamps.
Along the road between Rampur and Uri, however, the enemy
had a far greater measure of success. In terms of casualties inflicted it
was very light, but the enemy action had nuisance value and imposed
delays on the road convoys. Snipers, initially equipped only with
rifles, took up positions on the hills on the north bank of the Jhelum
river, to the east and west of Bausian, and fired at men and vehicles
moving along the main road. Then, realising that the rifle fire was
not arresting movement along the road, light machine guns were
brought into action. With the river i n t e ~ e n i n gand the snipers con-
stantly changing positions, it was not possible to stalk them, but
every counter-measure was taken to deal with this situation, the
most effective being the stationing of an Armoured Car in a particu-
larly troublesome area, the sniper fire being answered with bursts
of automatic fire while men and vehicles continued to run the
gauntlet.
Enthusiasm coupled with foolhardiness, however, resulted in an
avoidable loss. A young Company Commander, ordered to carry out
a reconnaissance, tried to run the gauntlet in a truck, in the back of
which were sitting his three platoon commanders. A burst from an
enemy automatic wounded all four of them, the driver of the vehicle,
who escaped being hit, driving the vehicle out of range and into
a safe area. With the firing at the road increasing in intensity each
day, although it was by sheer good fortune that it met with no fur-
ther success, it was decided not to tempt Fate too far, and orders
were issued that the movement of vehicles and personnel would be
confined to the hours of darkness. This succeeded in keeping the con-
voys moving, and although the enemy continued to fire when he
heard the sound of a vehicle, the firing by night was erratic and did
no damage.
Denial of the use of the road during the hours of daylight was,
however, something that could not be accepted for a protracted
period. Strong counter-measures were taken to remove the sniper
menace, but the odds were definitely in favour of the enemy. While
our sniper had to locate and engage a pinpoint target, the enemy
sniper had a relatively large target to aim at in the shape of a vehicle.
The whole Squadron of Armoured Cars was, therefore, brought into
action, and taking up positions opposite known and favoured posi-
tions of the enemy snipers, they sprayed the area with automatic fire
whenever a sniper came into action. It certainly assisted in large
stretches of the road being declared 'Green', and the restriction on
movement along the road by daylight was lifted, although one or
two areas remained 'Red' until well into April. Over these Red
stretches one had to take a chance by making a quick dash.
Despite the steady enemy activity on the Mahi~rafront, intercept-
ed signal messages from Brigadier Khalil to Jamil, who was evidently
his superior commander with his Headquarters at Muzaffarabad,
gave indications that the target date for the implementation of the
plan to cross the river would not be earlier than some time during the
first fortnight of April. This was a wide range, and what was import-
ant was the actual date. Khalil's signals were therefore given very
careful study. It was he, after all, who would nominate the date and
it was hoped that while doing so he would make a slip. Khalil's
signals made one thing very clear, he was not going to attack before
lle had received all his requirements.
Whether it was impatience over the delay in launching the encir-
clement attack on the Mahura front, or perhaps a spur from superior
Headquarters to do something, the linked piquets, Fort and Jitter at
Uri, once again began to receive attention. Still manned by 6 Rajrif,
they appeared to have been singled out, probably because they were
almost at ground level and easily accessible. After a few half-hearted
attacks, probing in nature, an attack fiercer and more determined
than Uri had ever experienced previously was mounted against them.
The attack was delivered soon after midnight under a very bright
moon. The Pathan tribals, having crept forward stealthily, rushed the
barbed wire fence protecting the two piquets, filling the air with
blood curdling screams, whistles and shouts. Before their wire cut-
ters could create a gap, withering fire from both piquets took its toll
and the attackers withdrew. Assault after assault, each one of greater
weight and intensity followed. The Brigade reserve, the company
of 3 Garhwal, was immediately moved forward and located in depth
in-between the two piquets in the event of a breakthrough. The gar-
risons of Fort and Jitter were, however, taking a heavy toll of the
enemy, hurling back every attack and inviting the enemy to have
yet another try. This behavio~uof the tribals, in mounting attack
after attack, was a distinct departure from their previous practice.
It was immediately realised that something unusual had constrained
them into this course of action.
It was not until just before first light that they finally broke action
and withdrew, and then the reason became apparent. While clearing
the area of the killed, one victim, who was lying against the barbed
wire, was identified as a very important tribal leader. In his pocket
was a letter, in which the writer expressed supreme confidence in
his ability as a leader of men in battle, and stressed that he had been
especially selected to proceed to Kashmir to prove to others, less
capable, that the Uri defences were by no means impregnable.
That the tribal leader was a brave and fearless man is unquestion-
able. The very position where his body lay was a clear indication
that he had been in the forefront of the battle. It was probably he
who attempted to cut a gap through the wire, as cutting pliers lay
close to him. H e was given a burial with all the honours due to a
brave man. The fanaticism displayed by his followers, in launching
attack after attack, was clearly with the object of recovering his
body. In trying to do so, they had suffered very heavy casualties, and
presumably arriving at the conclusion that Fort and Jitter were much
SKETCH SHOWING
THE ATTACK ON FORT
end JITTER PIOUETS
too strongly held to be subdued, and with the light approaching,

withdrew. No further attacks were delivered at these two redoubts.
The concentration in the Limber Nullah continued to build up,
but incredibly sluggishly. The last week of March arrived, and there
was still no indication as to when Khalil intended striking. The melt-
ing snows must have caused Jamil a great deal of concern, as, during
BRICKBATS FOR BOUQUEX3
the first week of April, almost every intercepted message s m t by

him to Khalil urged the latter to get a move on and stressed that
every day's delay would benefit 161 Infantry Brigade and make his
task harder. Jamil was perfectly correct, but Khalil did not appear
to share his apprehensions. He invariably replied to ihe effect that
he intended making a very thorough job of his role, but could only
do so when he was fully prepared and in possession of all the equip-
ment necessary. In order to set Jamil's mind at rest, he stated in a
message : "The enemy is fast asleep. He has no idea of what is about
to happen. His days are numbered. When I strike, victory is assured."
Even this message did not appear to impress Jamil, who continued
to stress that time was fast running out. Unfortunately for both Jamil
and Khalil, it actually had.
Contrary to expectations, the Banihal Pass opened to wheeled tra-
ffic three weeks in advance of the estimated date. In the first week
of April, 161 Infantry Brigade received a surprise bonus when the
1st Battalion The Madras Regiment (1 Madras) reported for duty
in the Valley. IVith the weather over the Pass clearing, air traffic to
the Valley was also resumed. 1 Madras was immediately allotted the
role of protecting the line of communication from Baramula to Ram-
pur. One Rifle Company took over the piquets in Baramula, thereby
permitting 3 Garhwal. less its Rifle Company at Uri, to remain un-
committed in Baramula and ready for a quick move. Yet another
Rifle Company relieved the 4 Kumaon Company that had been locat-
ed in Rampur, and enabled that battalion to concentrate at full
strength in the Mahura area. The remainder of 1 Madras was station-
ed in the Heman Buniyar Nullah, and 1 Sikh relieved of the commit-
ment of having to move from Srinagar to Baramula, when 3 Garhwal
moved out to Heman Buniyar.
1 Madras was a young and relatively inexperienced unit, having
been raised at the outbreak of World War 11. As such, its employ-
ment had to be carefully considered, and its roles tailored so as to be
within its capabilities. This was purely an initial measure, as the
standard of training attained by the unit was not known, and its
true ability could only be assessed after having seen it operate. The
Commanding Officer of 1 Madras, Lt. Col. Menon, who had been
decorated with the Military Cross in World War 11, and was as brave
and gallant an officer as one could wish to serve alongside, was, how-
ever, champing at the bit to get at the enemy. When assigned what
appeared to be a defensive role, he showed distinct signs of dis-
appointment, but felt much happier when it was explained to him
that his role could very easily turn in a matter of minutes to an offen-
sive one, and was promised that the battalion would be soon given
an opportunity to cross swords with the enemy.
Following close on the heels of 1 Madras came Major General
Lakhinder Singh. The Duty Officer at HQ Jak Force telephoned Uri
and stated that Major General Lakhinder Singh would be arriving
by air at Srinagar at ten o'clock the next morning and that I was
required to meet him at the airfield. H e was unable to enlighten us
on the purpose of the visit. I received Major General Lakhinder Singh
at the airfield and drove him to Rear H Q 161 Infantry Brigade in
Srinagar. When he had settled down, he informed me that he had
been appointed the General Officer Commanding The Fifth Infantry
Division ( 5 Div), and that the Division was moving into the Valley.
161 Infantry Brigade, as one of the original Brigades of the Division,
would revert to its parent formation. This was great news, and I
informed Lakhinder Singh that the Brigade would be delighted when
this information reached it.
When he said that he was staying on in Srinagar and wished to
establish his Headquarters as quickly as possible, immediate steps
were taken to set up an ad hoc Divisional Headquarters. As he had
only one Staff Officer with him, a certain number of officers were
withdrawn from the administrative units in Srinagar and Rear HQ
161 Infantry Brigade was ordered to evacuate a certain number of
rooms in order to accommodate HQ 5 Div. By four o'clock that after-
noon, a skeleton HQ 5 Div had been established and had commenced
functioning, taking 161 Infantry Brigade under command. I sug-
gested to Lakhinder Singh that he pay a visit to Uri the next morn-
ing, so that I could brief him on a map and then show him the
piquets on the ground. This agreed to, it was decided that I meet
him at Baramula at nine o'clock and drive him to Uri.
The next morning I picked up Lakhinder Singh at Baramula and
drove him to Uri. I mentioned to him that on my way from Uri I
had not been sniped at, but warned him that on the way back we
might be subjected to sniper fire, but if a dash was made over the
normally active areas, the chances of being hit were very slight. The
snipers were probably having an off-day, as the drive to Uri was
undisturbed by them. After a short break, in order to allow the
effects of the drive to wear off, I took him into the Operations Room
and commenced a briefing with the aid of the Situation Map. Having
first pointed out the enemy concentrations in the Uri area, I explain-
ed very carefully the deployment of the troops on the various piquets
and those in the Uri bowl. I then took him out to a vantage point
from where most of the piquets could be seen, and pointed them
out to him, and indicated where those which were not visible were
located.
Lakhinder Singh had asked no questions and advanced no views
up to this stage, and I inquired whether he had any questions or
comments. His answer was to the effect that he considered the defen-
sive system to be weak. Assuming that he m7as referring to the lack
of sufficient troops, I stated that Uri certainly required another batta-
lion, but in view of the situation on the Mahura front, there was no
spare battalion. His reply to this was quite shattering. He stated
that in his opinion there were ample troops at Uri; what he meant
to convey was that full use had not been made of them, that he was
not at all happy with what he had seen and heard, and that the com-
plete defensive system was tactically unsound. When I asked him
how he would conduct the defence of Uri, he brushed aside the
question by saying that he had not had a chance to study the ground
in detail, but would do so at a later date. What Ee desired, however,
was for me to take immediate measures to bring the defences on a
sound and solid basis.
It being pointless to start an argument, I decided to drive him to
Fort piquet, where Lt. Col. Kalaan, the Commanding Officer of 6
Rajrif was awaiting us. Introducing him to Kalaan, I asked Kalaan
to show him around the piquet. From the remarks made it was clear
that there was nothing right with the piquet, but when the final
observation was made that Fort piquet was badly sited, badly con-
structed and would be incapable of standing up to even a feeble
attack, I decided to step in and save a rather shattered Commanding
Officer from any further gibes. Leading Lakhinder Singh away from
the piquet, I drove him about fifty yards, stopped, and reminded
him that only a few minutes previously I had explained to him in
minute detail the wonderful action fought by Fort and its linked
piquet Jitter. I had expected him to congratulate the C.O. and his
very gallant men, but all they had received for their fine effort was a
strafing. Lakhinder Singh was not one bit repentant, and he repeated
that he considered the siting and layout of the piquet tactically un-
sound. Although it had been my intention to take him to some other
piquets and units, I decided to head for the Mess.
After a quick lunch, I drove him back to Baramula, saying to him
as we approached a sniper's paradise that we might be shot at by a
light automatic but I would speed through the area and the chances
SLENDER WAS THE THTWAD
of being hit were negligible. Unfortunately a sniper did open fire as

we rushed through the danger area, and this brought a tirade against
4 Kumaon : the battalion must be thoroughly inefficient to permit
this state of affairs. I was instructed to convey to the Commanding
Officer his displeasure. Having reached Baramula, he got into a jeep
that was awaiting him, and I returned to Uri, wondering whether
what had happened was true or just a nightmare. Whichever it was,
I decided that in the interests of the Brigade it would be best to
treat the whole thing rather light-heartedly.
The next morning, Major Khare reported to me in Uri with a letter
from the Divisional Commander. The letter stated that he had found
Khare to be a thoroughly inefficient officer, that he had been relieved
of his appointment, and that immediate disciplinary action should
be taken against Khare, the sentence to be dernotion to the rank of
Captain from Acting Major. The verdict on Khare shattered not only
the Brigade H Q Staff but also the unit officers in the Uri bowl.
Khare's performance as the Senior Supply Officer, even during the
most difficult periods that the Brigade had faced, had been of an
extraordinarily high standard. As I was debating with myself how
best I could persuade the Divisional Commander to tone down his
demand that Khare be demoted, Major Derek Bobb, the DAA &
QMG, came into the office and informed me that numerous tele-
phone calls were being received from the officers of the administra-
tive units in Srinagar, pleading that their units be ordered to move
out of Srinagar to Baramula. The Divisional Commander, it was
stated, was finding fault with everything, and it was only a matter
of time before they suffered the same fate as Khare, or were placed
under arrest.
These were impossible requests to accede to, and the officers were
told to stick it out. To have made any major change in the administ-
rative set-up would have caused even more trouble with the Divi-
sional Commander, and in any case, with the situation about to erupt
on the Mahura front, it could have been courting a major breakdown
at a time when it could least be afforded.
So far as HQ 161 Infantry Brigade was concerned, pinpricks from
H Q 5 Div followed at varying intervals. Some created a certain
amount of amusement, but to deal with them was time-consuming
and distracted attention from far more important issues. What they
were in aid of was difficult to fathom. The Brigade had never can-
vassed for bouquets, but it did not merit, nor did it expect, brickbats
at a time when it needed all possible help to fight and win the im-
pending battle.
It was sincerely hoped that the annoying incidents that had taken
place were merely a passing phase. This was, however, wishful think-
ing, as a telephone message from HQ 5 Div to HQ 161 Infantry Bri-
gade brought matters to a head. It contained an order that just could
not be complied with.
The message from HQ 5 Div was dictated on the telephone by a
Staff Officer and received by HQ 161 Infantry Brigade at three o'clock
in the afternoon. It stated : "The following units of 161 Infantry
Brigade will move to Srinagar forthwith and without relief. On
arrival in Srinagar they will come under command HQ 5 Div. Ex
Baramula, one troop field artillery, squadron 7 Cavalary and 3 Garh-
wal. Ex Uri, Mountain Battery. All moves will be completed as early
as possible and not later than 48 hours from the receipt of this order.
On arrival at Srinagar units will concentrate in Badami Bagh Bar-
racks. Unit commanders will report to Div HQ for orders. Transport
requirements will be submitted to Div HQ by 1700 hours today.
Units in Baramula have already been issued a Warning Order. 1
Sikh already taken under command HQ 5 Div. Acknowledge."
This impossible order called for immediate action. The first was
to inform the units in Baramula that no action would be taken by
them on the 5 Div Warning Order without further orders from HQ
161 Infantry Brigade. The second was to get in touch with HQ 5
Div and request an immediate conference with thf Divisional Com-
mander. The first was very quickly completed, but the second was
subjected to inordinate delay. Lakhinder Singh was not available,
having gone out, and his Staff was unable to state where he could
be contacted or when he would return. Periodic telephone calls met
with a similar fate, until at five o'clock in the evening, HQ 5 Div was
informed that I was leaving for Srinagar immediately, and on arrival,
which would be in about two hours, would report at the Divisional
Commander's office and await his return, if he was still absent. Should
he arrive back while I was en route, it was to be stressed to him
that tile matter I had for discussion was one of immediate opera-
tional importance and could not be postponed to the next day.
On arrival in Srinagar, almost on the stroke of seven o'clock, I
drove to HQ 5 Div and went to Major General Lakhinder Singh's
office and found him awaiting me. He opened the conference by in-
forming me &at if I had come to Srinagar with the intention of hav-
ing the move order cancelled, I was wasting both my time and his.
The orders were firm and final, and had been decided upon after
very careful consideration of all the factors affecting the security of
Kashmir. They would stand, and he wished the moves to be com-
pleted without delay. If there were any other subjects for discus-
sion, he was ready to listen to me.
I informed Lakhinder Singh, very quietly but very firmly, that I
had come in to discuss only one subject, the one that he had just
tabooed. This order, if implemented, would result in the weakening
of the forward areas to such a degree that there would be every dan-
ger of the Valley being faced with a threat identical to that \vhicll
existed in October and November 1947. Stating that I would prove
it to him, I walked across to a map affixed to a wall in his office, and
was about to explain the situation in detail when I was cut short.
Lakhinder Singh remarked that he was well aware of what wag
happening, needed no briefing whatsoever, and if that was the only
subject for discussion I could take it that the conference was ter-
minated.
This was quite unacceptable to me, and I asked permission to
explain to him the Operational Plan to, combat the threatened en-
circlement, which I stressed was known neither to HQ Jak Force nor
to HQ 5 Div. I had started to tell him about it on his visit to Uri,
but he had not wished to get involved in planning operations at the
time, as he was not settled in; perhaps, I suggested, if he heard it
now, he would be in a better position to appreciate the grim situa-
tion facing the forward areas. To my utter surprise, he said that he
did not wish to listen to the plan, as he was convinced that the troops
which would remain in the forward areas were far in excess of the
requirements to meet any threat that was in the offing. What he was
more interested in, and what was far more important, was the secu-
rity of Srinagar, the defence of which had been grossly neglected.
That glaring error had to be rectified immediztely, and the troops
that had been ordered to report to H(2 5 Div were required for that
purpose.
Although I realised that I was hitting my head against a brick
wall, the situation on the Uri and Mahura fronts was so critical, and
the stakes so high, that I returned to my chair at his desk and re-
sumed the charge. I informed him that the defence of Srinagar had
neither been in the past, nor was it now, neglected grossly as he had
put it. The safety of Srinagar and the Valley was entirely dcpendent
on the ability of 161 Infantry Brigade to hold Baramula, Mahura
and Uri. As long as these areas were held firmly, there was little
chance of Srinagar being seriously threatened. The enemy, I ad-

mitted, had once attempted to enter the Valley via Handwara, and
he could also come via Gulmarg, but the administrative difficulties
that would face him would.lirnit these threats both in scope and
intensity. With the Banihal Pass now open to traffic, and weather
conditions making movement by air and the provision of fighter
cover possible, the Valley could be speedily reinforced, and a threat
to Srinagar, if he still visualised one, which I certainly did not, could
be easily defeated.
A reverse in the area between Baramula and Uri would, however,
I continued, have a direct bearing on the safety of the Valley, and
to strip this sensitive area of troops was inviting trouble. It would
only be justified if it was considered that it was impossible to hold
the enemy in the forward areas. In that case, in preference to being
weak everywhere, 161 Infantry Brigade should be withdrawn and
cleployed to hold the line Handwara, Baramula and Gulmarg. This
I considered would be the obvious way to defend Srinagar and the
Valley, and not what I had been given to understand by his Staff
was the intention, to man the defences held by the Brigade in the
Battle of Shalateng (they had asked me for the layout over the tele-
phone). In concluding, I stressed that 161 Infantry Brigade could
and would hang on to its forward area defences regardless of the
threats poised against it, but this would be possible only if it was
left intact. To whittle down its strength would be to play into the
hands of the enemy.
Lakhinder Singh was either unimpressed by the arguments ad-
vanced, or in an irreconcilable state of mind. He continued to doodle
with his pencil on the blotting paper, and then said that my asser-
tion that 161 Infantly Brigade could not spare any troops was fac-
tually incorrect. If the Brigade was short of troops and needed every
man, why, he asked, was a large party sent off to Leh on a "wild
goose chase", and "without obtaining the permission of HQ Jak
Force" ? Also, if the enemy had attacked before the arrival of 1
Madras, how w?ould 161 Infantry Brigade have coped with the situa-
tion ? H e was satisfied that the moves ordered could be effected
without prejudicing any actions that I intended conducting. The con-
ference was over, his previous decision was fi11a1 and irrevocable,
and he wanted the units to be in Srinagar by the next day.
There was now only one wav through which the implementation
of this disastrous order could be nullified, and I decided to take it.
Asking Major General Lakhinder Singh if I could use the telephone,
and receiving his assent, I asked the Signal Exchange to put me

through immediately to the Commander Jak Force, Major General
Kulwant Singh. Lakhinder Singh's reaction was retarded, as he 11arl
obviously been taken by surprise. When he recovered, he reacted
violently, demanding to know what I meant by approaching the
Force Commander over his head. I explained to him that I was not
doing anything of the sort. I had had neither verbal, nor written, nor
signal instructions from H Q Jak Force to the effect that 161 Infantry
Brigade was under H Q 5 Div. I had accepted the position as he had
stated it to be. Over the last few days, the Brigade had been receiv-
ing communications from both H Q Jak Force and H Q 5 Div. It was
essential that the command and control position was clarified, and
that I knew exactly to whom I was answerable for my actions. The
present state of affairs could and would eventually lead to confu-
sion. If 161 Infantry Brigade was under H Q 5 Div, his orders would
be implemented, but I had a right to inform H Q Jak Force of the
possible consequences. I had barely finished saying thi5 to Lakhinder
Singh, when the Commander Jak Force came on the line.
Major General Kulwant Singh was obviously in very good heart.
H e greeted me most cordially, inquired whether the Brigade was in
good shape and then asked what problem I had for him. I told him
that it was a simple one : H Q 161 Infantry Brigade was receiving
instructions from two major Headquarters, and I would like a firm
decision on which Headquarters I was answerable to-was it HQ
Jak Force or H Q 5 Div ? If confusion was to be avoided, I con-
cluded, the Brigade should be responsible for its actions to only one
master.
It was obvious that Kulwant Singh was baffled by my statement,
as there was a very distinct pause before he said : "5 Div ? What
orders have you received from 5 Div?"
"An order to move back certain units from the forward areas," I
replied, and then added, "which, if complied with, could be
."
disastrous
"An order to move back units?" said Kulwant Singh, emphasising
each word. Then, as if a light automatic was barking \vith rage,
came the questions : "How did you get this order? IVhere did it
come from ? IYho gave it to you ?"
"HQ 5 Div sent it to me over the telephone this afternoon," I
answered, "and it has been confirmed by the Divisional Corn-
mander ."
"Divisional Commander ?" stormed Kulwant Singh, his rage in-

creasing with each second that passed, "What Divisional Comman-
d e r ? What's his name T"
I was, by this time, beginning to wonder whether sanity had
deserted me, but managed to blurt out, "Major General Lakhinder
Singh."
"hlajor General Lakhinder Singh ?" roared Kulwant Singh, em-
phasising the rank, "Major General? Who said he is a Major
General ?"
"He says so," I replied, 'he's the General Officer Commanding
5 Div."
This was evidently too much for Major General Kulwant Singh.
A volcanic eruption must have shaken his office. His next few state-
ments, although spoken into the mouthpiece of the telephone, were
not intended for me. H e was evidently thinking aloud. Then he
roared : "Where is Lakhinder ?" When I said he was sitting in front
of me, I was ordered to hand him the telephone immediately. For
the next three minutes I saw Lakhinder Singh wilting under the
explosive attack.
The telephone was then handed back to me, and Kulwant Singh,
apparently well satisfied with his work of destruction, said in a clear
and authoritative tone : "There is no 5 Div in the Valley, and
Lakhinder is not a Major General. He is a Brigadier. He has had no
authority from me to command anything in the Valley, or to give
orders to anyone. NOW are you clear under whose command 161
Infantry Brigade is ?"
"Yes", I answered quietly, and bidding him a Good Night, replac-
ed the receiver.
It had been a nauseating experience. I had not visualised that my
telephone call to the Force Commander would produce such a
devastating result. Although it had been a fact, it seemed more like
fiction that a Divisional Headquarters could set itself up in the Valley
and take over operational control, without the knowledge of HQ
Jak Force. Why, or how, it happened was too delicate a subject to
be probed into, nor was it desirable to do so. Inevitably, however,
it became a topic of conversation among the young officers, and the
rank and file could not understand how a Div HQ could come into
existence one day and shut down almost overnight. The whole
episode reflected poorly on whosoever was responsible for what can
be best described as a first class bit of nonsense.
H Q 5 Div never moved into the Valley. If orders for its move had
been issued, they must have been cancelled as it remained at Ranchi

in Bihar. When a Division was formed in the Valley about a month
later, it was not Lakhinder Singh who was selected to commaild it,
but Major General K. S. Thimayya.
The next morning, after my return to Uri, a signal was received
from H Q Jak Force. It announced that 'Zebra' Brigade had been
raised in the Valley with Brigadier Lakhinder Singh as its comman-
der. The new Brigade was to take over 1 Sikh and certain adminis-
trative units located in Srinagar, and would be responsible for the
Valley and Handwara, but excluding Baramula which would remain
the responsibility of 161 Infantry Brigade. I was asked to submit my
recommendations as to what other combat units could be transfer-
red to the new Brigade, without prejudice to the security of the
forward areas. HQ Jak Force was informed that nothing could be
spared at the moment, but a firm list would be forwarded as soon
the situation stabilised.
Chapter 18
The Limber Nullah Battle
THE equipment demanded by the enemy commander, Brigadier

Khalil, was evidently materialising faster than he anticipated, as his
signals had a much more chirpy air. Movements of personnel from
the west to the east reported by agents and confirmed by 4 Kumaon
were found to have diminished quite considerably. The obvious de-
duction was that the enemy concentration was either complete or fast
approaching that stage. The long awaited attack was, therefore,
imminent, and 161 Infantry Brigade's plan to combat it was put into
motion.
Shielding from the enemy the fact that 161 Infantry Brigade was
aware of his intentions had always been an essential ingredient of
the plan. This had necessitated many surreptitious actions being
taken over a period, none of which it was hoped, even if noticed,
would give rise to suspicion. These essentials were completed by
7 April, one week before the forecast date of the attack. A party ol
troops, ostensibly on a pleasure jaunt, had arrived in a vehicle near

a deserted house in Rampur and tried their hand at fishing in the
river. When they left, about three hours later, the house, which was
ideally located as a Tactical Headquarters for thc Brigade, command-
ing an excellent view of the terrain to the north of the Jhelum River,
had been equipped with wireless sets, a telephone exchange and the
necessary maps. The small party of troops that remained behind to
man it were instructed not to expose themselves during the hours of
daylight.
A party from the field artillery in Baramula went to picnic in the
area of Naushara, and while doing so chose suitable gun sites and
carried out silent registration of targets on the north bank of the
river. A group of men from the Mountain Battery in Uri also visited
Mahura and carried out silent registration of targets in the area. The
main target was the Kopra feature. The gun sites having been
selected, the ammunition was brought forward from Srinagar and
stacked in a suitable area under the protection of 4 Kumaon.
Major Rajan Raju of the Madras Engineers and a party of his men,
travelling in a covered vehicle from Uri to Baramula, staged frequent
breakdowns of their truck in the area between Rampur and Naushara.
The scene, if viewed by the enemy, would have presented a case of
a serious mechanical defect which kept recurring and necessitated
the driver having to open the bonnet and carry out repairs. Con-
cealed in the vehicle, was an engineer group carrying out a field
glass reconnaissance of the river banks. The object was to select a
suitable site for a 'Flying Fox' type of ferry. When a suitable spot
was located, the vehicle stalled and two men equipped with buckets
moved to the river, ostensibly to collect water. While doing so, they
surveyed the banks and made an estimate of the water gap. It was
an ideal spot with two stout trees facing one another on the opposite
banks. Returning to the vehicle, they poured the water into the
radiator and the truck moved off in the direction of Baramula. The
necessary material for the ferry was collected and deposited in the
custody of 1 Madras in the Heman Buniyar Nullah.
With 3 Garhwal patrols to Ijara continuing to educate the enemy
and drawing no fire, and 4 Kumaon tiger patrols probing Kopra and
the route to it by dark, 161 Infantry Brigade's counter-measures were
ready for implementation. Only one problem remained, the timing
of the Brigade's attack. This, unfortunately, was dependent on the
enemy commander's decision, and it still remained a closely guarded
secret in his possession. Try as we did, we could secure no positive
THE LIMBER K U L W I BATTLE
~ndication,but if the operation was to be a complete success know-

ledge of this most important factor was essential. It was appreciated
that Brigadier Khalil, convinced in his own mind that 161 Infantry
Brigade was fast asleep, and with his attention focussed on the cross-
ing of the river, would not have catered for a contingency such as an
attack from an unexpected quarter. When this materialised it would
throw him off balance. His indecision if fully exploited would turn
into confusion, and before he could recover from this state, added
threats would turn it into a rout.
SKETCH SHOWING
THE LIMBER NULLAH u n L E
Our planning, hon~ever,had to provide for two widely divergent

situations. Plan 'A' was based on the Brigade launching the attack
and was naturally the easier to operate as the initiati~~erested with
us. Plan 'B' \\.as not a plan as such, but in the nature of a list of
situations that could arise should the enemy be successful in crossing
the river and occupying the hills to the south of the road, and of
action that could be taken to contain him. It ~vouldbe dominated by
the tactical situation existing at the moment. Plan 'B' was, therefore,
not passed down to unit commanders.
Plan 'A' was divided into three distinct phases :
Phase 1.
3 Garhwal, composed of a Tactical HQ, three rifle companies and
the mortar platoon, and with one section of 'A' Company The 1st
Battalion The Mahar Regiment (MMG) under command, was to
move out of Baramula and capture as its first objective point 7129.
The battalion was to be self-contained for 48 hours.
The battery field artillery was to move from Baramula to Nausharn
and be in position to support 3 Garhwal from its already recon-
noitred position.
The armoured car Squadron of 7 Cavalary was to patrol the road
between Naushara and Uri, the reserve troop beingplocated in the
Rampur area.
1 Madras, less its rifle companies a t Baramula and Rampur, was
to remain in the Heman ~uni;r Nullah as the Brigade reserve.
Transport had been attached to this battalion to make it mobile.
Phase I I .
3 Garhwal to capture point 7706 on orders from Brigade HQ.
Phase I I I .
3 Garhwal to capture point 8109 on orders from Brigade HQ.
4 Kumaon to occupy the Kopra feature on orders from Brigade
HQ.
The timings of the phases of Plan 'A' could not be laid down.
They had to be elastic as there were many unpredictable elements.
Most important of these was the enemy's reacticn to the advance by
3 Garhwal. There was a live possibility that the enemy might react
violently, in which case 1 Madras would have been rushed to Rllahurn
to take over from 4 Kumaon, who would have been used to pose a
threat to the enemy concentrated in the Limber Nullah from the
west, in order to ease the pressure on 3 Garhwal. If events took this
turn, then Plan 'A' would be scrapped and the battle fought in
accordance with the situation that presented itself. Every eveiltuality
was carefully considered, even that of a partial success of the enemy's
encirclement plan being coordinated with an attack on Uri. The
atmosphere was charged with dangerous possibilities, but 161
Infantry Brigade remained calm and waited confidently.
Meanwhile, commencing 3 April, there had been a marked change
in the signals despatched from Khalil to Jamil. Whereas in the past
they had tended to complain about the slowness in arrival of the
equipment and offered reasons why he could not accelerate the date
of the attack, they now exhibited a rather grandiose air. It was.
evident that Khalil realised thiit the eyes of everyone mattered
were now focussed upon him, and he was not going to miss the
opportunity of exploiting his position to the fullest degree. He was,
in fact, 'the man of the moment', and it was clearly his intention
that the higher authority shorild take cognizance of it. There was a
marked increase in the signals that he despatched to Jamil, the majo-
rity relating to the very high morale of his force, and anecdotes of
how he had completely bamboozled the enemy. As his s t ~ t u r ein-
creased in his own estimation so did his security-mindedness diminish
in actuality. He was rapidly moving towards making a thundering
blunder, and it happened in the afternoon of 10 April.
Incredible and puerile though it may seem, he sent Jamil a personal
signal, in clear, the words used being in Urdu, and evidently in his
opinion adequate to disguise the actual meaning. It was, however,
unlikely to deceive even the most dull-witted icdividual. Short and
simple, the intercepted message read, "Tomorrow night I shall change
the map." This was what 161 Infantry Brigade had striven so hard
to obtain, and the enemy commander had presented it to us on a
silver salver. Brigadier Khalil was to pay very, very dearly for this
glaring error; on intercepting the message, 'La1 Lotus' (Red Lotus),
the codeword for the immediate implementation of Plan 'A' was
flashed to all units of the Brigade.
Appointing Lt. Col. S. S. Kalaan of 6 Rajrif as the Commander of Uri,
and having ordered the staff who manned the Tactical Headquarters
at Rampur to move out of Uri soon after darkness set in, I proceeded
to Mahura in my jeep. Here I had a conference with Lt. Col. Man
Mohan Khanna of 4 Kumaon, and having satisfied myself that there
were no problems relating to the part 4 Kumaon would be called
upon to play in the battle, moved on to Heman Buniyar to check
on the Brigade reserve, 1 Madras, and finallv arrived at Baramula
at half past five in the evening. I foond all the units were ready and
merely awaiting the order to move. A short conference was held, and
having ensured that there were no doubts in anyone's mind, the firm
timings for the various moves were handed out. 3 Garhwal was to
commence moving out from Baramula at seven c'clock that evening.
the squadron of armoured cars at six o'clock the next morning, 11
April, and the field battery a t half past six.
On the stroke of seven o'clock, when darkness had set in, 3 Garh-
wal and the section of medium machine guns of A Company
1 Mahar, began moving out of Baramula, one company at a time and

with a reasonable interval in-between each company. Crossing the
bridge over the Jhelum River at Baramula, the companies headed
for a rendezvous about three miles to the west of Baramula. To an
enemy agent or a casual observer these moves would not be suspici-
ous as they had been made a daily habit. When the last element of
3 Garhwal had moved out of Baramula, I drove to the Tactical Head-
quarters at Rampur. It was so well 'blacked out' that, with the jeep
lights extinguished, I experienced a certain amount of difficulty in
locating it, and very nearly plunged into a ditch with steep banks.
Having concentrated at the rendezvous, 3 Garhwal set off for point
71.29. It had neither animals nor porters to assist in carrying the three-
inch mortar barrels and base plates, the medium machine gun
barrels and tripods, and the connected ammunition. Yet the rate of
advance was steady, and remarkably good considering that the
column was moving in the dark, over unreconnoitred country, and
without guides to ensure that it was on the correct bearing. At seven
o'clock the next morning, 3 Garhwal was within striking distance of
point 7129, and the Commanding Officer decided to take the feature
with two companies. Although movement had been observed on the
feature, and was presumed to be hostile, the enemy, if he had been
in occupation of point 7129, withdrew, as the Companies captured
the objective without opposition. The remainder of the 3 Garhwal
column then moved forward and consolidated the position.
Meanwhile the squadron of armoured cars which was patrolling
the road between Naushara and Uri reported everything quiet, and
at eight o'clock the battery of field artillery reported that it was in
position and ready for action. 3 Garhwal was now ordered to move
forward and take point 7706, but the Commanding Officer suggested
that as the advance to this point would be over open ground, and
there were definite signs that the feature was being held in strength,
the attack be postponed until after dark and the feature be first sof-
tened u p by the field artillery. This was agreed to, but it was decided
that the softening up of point 7706 by the artillery would not take
place until the hours of darkness, as it was necessary that Brigadier
Khalil should continue to live in a state of bliss for as long as pos-
sible, preferably up to just before his selected hour of attack.
The enemy had come to the conclusion that the occupation of
point 7129 was no more than a strong patrol action. This became
apparent when an intercept message reported that two companies
of 'Gorkhas' had appeared on the scene and had moved on to point
7129.1n the interests of secrecy, they had been permitted to do so,
and they had discovered nothing and would withdraw during the
course of the day. When, however, the occupation of point 7 1 B
continued throughout the afternoon and into the evening, Khalil
must have become perturbed. It was a nasty thorn in his side, and
could embarrass his crossing of t l ~ eriver, if not by fire most certainly
by passing information. With his own 'H' hour fast approaching, he
had to do something, and there were two alternatives. He could
attack point 7129 and drive the patrol away, but this would have
awoken 161 Brigade from its slumber and negatived in a matter of
minutes what he had spent weeks to achieve, the secret concentration
of his force. Or he could reinforce point 7706 and prevent the patrol
from interfering with his river-crossing. H e chose the latter alter-
native and at about five o'clock started reinforcing point 7706, which
was immediately reported by 3 Garhwal. Although premature by a
few hours, 161 Infantry Brigade decided to show its hand. Directed
by the artillery Forward Observation Officer with 3 Garhwal, the
battery of the field artillery came into action. It had an excellent
shoot, and taking the enemy completely by surprise, spread confusion
into his ranks.
Khalil, his bluster of the previous day vanishing like ice in a desert,
signalled Jamil that he was being heavily shelled and in danger of
being attacked, and demznded immediate reinforcements. Jamil
reacted by informing Khalil that he must attack the 'Gorkhas' imme-
diately and also the gun areas. In order to embarrass Khalil even
further, the field artillery was ordered to shell the Limber Mullah
area. This produced a vitriolic effect, Khalil demanding that as many
reinforcements as were possible should be rushed to him immediately.
Their movement forward was observed by 4 Kulnaon at hlahura and
reported to Brigade Tactical Headquarters. But it had become obvi-
ous that Khalil's boast of changing the map that night would not
materialise. H e would have to choose another date, if he was in a
position to do so.
The field artillery continued a sporadic shelling of point 7706
and the Limber Nullah throughout the night of I 1 April and during
the early hours of the 12th morning, only lifting its fire from point
7706 when the 3 Garhwal attack on the feature entered its final stage.
The enemy on point 7706 put up a weak form of resistance and with-
drew. Two counter-attacks were then launched by the enemy to
recapture the feature, but were thrown back. The Garhwali casualties
during this period had been extremely light, one killed and three
wounded. The beating back of the counter-attacks resulted in Khalil

reacting even more violently, on the wireless set. He demanded fur-
ther reinforcements, and 4 Kumaon confirmed that they could be
seen rushing forward.
With the capture of point 7706, the Madras Engineers came into
action. A platoon of 3 Garl~walwas ordered to move to the spot
selected on the north bank of the Jhelum river. On its arrival, a two-
inch mortar bomb had its cap pierced and a t;iole signal cable was
laced into it and fired across to the north bank. To the signal cable
was attached a wire hawser which was pulled over and wrapped
firmly around the tree on that bank. Then, with the assistance of the
company of 1 Madras which was located on the south bank, a pulley
was attached to the wire hawser whose other end was now affixed
to the tree on the south bank. With a platform attached to the pulley,
the 'Flying Fox' was ready for operation. The 3 Garhwal company
retained in Uri had been called back, and was ferried across the
Jhelum river to rejoin the battalion. With the troops of 1 Madras
carrying forward ammunition, especially three-inch mortar bombs,
3 Garhwal was replenished. The 'Flying Fox' bridge had provided
the unit with an excellent line of communication, and the battalion
was no longer out in the blue.
With point 7706 firmly consolidated, the Garhwalis were left with
only one more objective to capture, point 8109. With the capture of
this feature and the sealing off of the Limber Nullah concentration
by 4 Kumaon occupying Kopra, phase 111 of the plan would be im-
plemented. This would be the coup d e grace.
The engagement taking place in the Limber Nullah area produced
no reactions on the Uri and Mahura fronts, not even an enemy patrol
testing the defences. This, from 161 Infantry Brigade's point of view,
was agreeable but not altogether so since it could be the lull that
precedes a storm. Fortunately the storm did not break, and the Bri-
gade was able to concentrate on the job it had in hand without hav-
ing to divide its attention.
There are three possible reasons that might have fostered the
enerny inactivity. Firstly, Khalil's initial message informing Jamil that
a strong patrol of Gorkhas had stumbled into his outpost position at
point 7129, and suggesting that it would withdraw during the course
of the day. This did not call for any action on the other fronts.
Secondly, when the Garhwalis (Gorkhas to the enemy) remained on
point 7129 and the field artillery engaged point 7706, Jamil might
have assumed that the artillery fire had been ordered to enable the
THE LTMBER NULLAH BAT=
patrol to extricate itself. Khalil, it is true, had called for reinforce-

ments, but Jamil might have arrived at the conclusion that he r e
quired these troops to engage the patrol, thus obviating the need
to use units already earmarked for the river crossing plan. Thirdly,
the essence of the overall plan was the encirclement and annihilation
of the units in the Mahura area, the investment of Uri following in
due course. I t was, therefore, necessary that the Brigade was not
roused, as it might have resulted in the rushing forward of units from
Srinagar and Baramula; and in moving forward they might have
stumbled into the river crossing operation while it was still under
way.
Whether these assumptions and thoughts ever entered Jamil's head
is mere conjecture, and perhaps there were other reasons which
made him stay his hand. From the enemy's angle it was, however,
a tactical error, as it made possible the movement from Uri to Mahura
of the one unit on which every piquet in Uri was dependent for its
defensive fire, and which was urgently required to support the 4
Kumaon attack on Kopra, the Mountain Battery.
The Mountain Battery had, through its excellent performances,
earned for itself the title 'Sharpshooters of the Kashmir Valley'. So
corrfident were the gunners that they could engage with pin-point
accuracy any target within the range of their guns, that to ask them
whether they could engage a given knoll, which was within range,
would draw pained expressions on their faces. They would say:
"Tell us which particular pebble you want hit and we will do it for
you." Warned that the battery might be required for a role at
Mahura, wooden 'mock-ups' of the guns had been prepared and kept
handy, to take the place of the actual guns when they were moved
out. This substitution took place in the evening of 12 April, the
stripped mountain guns being placed in the trucks which arrived in
the unit lines as ammunition replenishment vehicles. The personnel
to man the guns embussed in the vehicles when they had returned
to the eastern sector of Uri, out of sight of any enemy on the Salama-
bad feature, and the trucks sped to Mahura. Here the guns were
unloaded and assembled and drawn to the gun pits that had been
prepared in advance; the ammunition had already been stacked at
the site. By 5 p.m. the Mountain Battery was ready to support the
4 Kumaon attack on Kopra.
At 8.00 that night, the Dogra Company of the 15th Punjab Regi-
ment, which had been serving with 4 Kumaon ever since its arrival
in the Valley as an Independent R a e Company in November 1947,
moved forward to patrol the north bank of the Jhelum River. One
platoon was to move westwards and another platoon eastwards, the
Company Headquarters and the third platoon forming the patrol
base and being located to the north of the bridge. The Company
Commander had been instructed that 4 Kumaon would start moving
forward to Kopra at 10 p.m. and that his company must not return
to the bridge site before 11, as otherwise there might be a clash in
the dark. On return to the bridge site, he was to take up a position
in its vicinity and protect it.
There was peace and quiet in the area. until twenty minutes to
ten o'clock, when there was a burst of firing from the east. The
platoon sent in that direction had encountered enemy and engaged
them. Lt. Col. Man Mohan Khanna and I, standing near the 'Start
Line' of 4 Kumaon, were cursing our bad luck, when a bren gun
with the leading platoon of 4 Kumaon at the bridge site opened fire
and there was a shout from someone who had been hit. A few
minutes later a rifleman from the Dogra Company of 15 Punjab was
led to us. He reported that the platoon that had moved to the east
had bumped into an enemy patrol and had engaged it, and that his
section commander, another rifleman and himself had been ordered
to return and warn 4 Kumaon of the presence of the enemy. The
section commander and the other rifleman had been wounded by
the fire from the Kumaon bren gun.
The two casualties were brought in. The section commander had
been killed and the other rifleman seriously wounded. It was an un-
fortunate and an avoidable incident. For these men of the Dogra
Company of 15 Punjab to rush back in the dark, despite the very
clear orders that the company was to stay clear of the bridge site
until 11 p.m. was courting disaster. That they had done so in order to
help their comrades of 4 Kumaon is undeniable, but the battlefield
has certain tenets whose violation, more often than not, inflicts a very
heavy penalty. The heat and excitement of battle, however, often
makes even the best trained troops forget the tenets until they are
brought home to them with a tragedy.
The firing in the area to the east of the bridge continued until five
minutes to ten and then died away. The patrol clash could not have
occurred at a more inopportune moment. FVlien the firing ceased, the
'Start Time' of 4 Kumaon was exactly five minutes away. That the
enemy piquets on Kopra and the nearby features would have been
alerted was accepted as being automatic, and with their senses shar-
pened, the possibility of 4 Kumaon making Kopra undetected would
THE LfMBW NULLAH B A m E
now be nothing short of a miracle. It was possible to defer the start

by an hour in order to let the enemy settle down, but there was grave
danger of a clash in the dark with the 15 Punjab Company which
was observing wireless silence. A postponement by 24 hours was the
other alternative, but this would disrupt the whole operation. It was,
therefore, decided that whether the enemy was milling about on the
route or not, and even if the piquets on Kopra had been alerted, the
risk had to be taken. At 10.00 p.m. the leading element of 4 Kumaon
rose from the ground and moved forward very slowly and very
quietly, the remainder of the battalion following close on its heels.
4 Kumaon reached the base of the Kopra feature without encoun-
tering the enemy, and then commenced the long climb to the peak.
.The sentry of an enemy outpost, about a section in strength, and
positioned on one of the lower slopes of the fezture, assuming that
the sounds of approaching footsteps were those produced by his own
comrades, called out softly in order to guide them to the post. The
section was silenced with the bayonet. The advance continued with-
out further incident, and by seven o'clock in the morning of 13 April,
Kopra was firmly in the hands of 4 Kumaon. The battalion signallers,
laying a signal cable as they advanced, enabled the battalion to re-
port its progress by telephone at regular intervals, thus ensuring both
rapid communications and the maintenance of wireless silence.
Reports received from various sources had indicated that the
Pathan tribesmen responsible for manning certain piquets had
adopted the habit of evacuating them after dark, and having spent
the night in a village at the foot of the feature, returning to occupy
them after first light. In so far as Kopra was concerned, this proved
to be wholly accurate. All the piquets, with the exception of the one
encountered and which was manned by a section of an AKP unit,
were found to be unoccupied. 4 Kumaon settled into them and await-
ed the arrival of the garrisons. Soon after first light they were ob-
served moving towards Kopra, apparently in no particular hurry.
Unaware of what w7as awaiting them, they adopted no semblance of
any tactical formation during the climb, and, having reached the
top, strolled very casually towards their sangars. They were swiftly
mown down, not a single individual escaping. This sharp burst of
firing, it was expected, would indicate to the enemy that Kopra was
in hostile hands, but oddly enough it did not. There was no reaction
whatsoever. It is not improbable that the sound of firing was attri-
buted to the tribals engaging in a bit of shikar.
At ten o'clock, a civilian porter train, carrying three-inch mortar
ammunition destined for the Limber Nullah, was observed approach-

ing the feature. A reception was immediately laid on, but when the
porters realised that the troops on the feature were neither AKP
nor tribals, they jettisoned their loads and bolted. They were not
fired at, and this perhaps led whomsoever had sent them forward
to discount their story, if they carried it back, that Kopra was
occupied by enemy troops. Brigadier Khalil, in the Limber Nullah,
was quite oblivious o f ' t h e fact that his line of communication had
been cut. He was busy trying to force 3 Garhcval to evacuate point
7706 by engaging the unit with mortar fire, while his own force was
being subjected to counter-mortar fire from the Garhwal mortars
and shelling by the field artillery.
About midday, a rifle company from the 4 AKP battalion
approached Kopra from the direction of the Limber Nullah. It is
more than probable that, with the mortar ammunition requiring
urgent replenishment, it had been sent out to contact the porter
train and speed u p its progress. This company was engaged by 4
Kumaon and forced to withdraw. Rushing back to the Limber Nullah,
it must have reported that Kopra was being held in strength and
that the line of communication had been cut, as at about 2 p.m.
there were definite signs of uneasiness in the enemy rank and file
in the Limber Nullah.
Khalil was now confronted with a most unsavoury situation. While
the 4 AKP battalion might have stood firm, once the information
relating to Kopra filtered down to the Pathan tribals, two thousand
five hundred in strength and forming the major portion of his force,
there would be serious trouble. The tribals' fear of being surrounded
would rise to the surface and result in panic. He had to take imme-
diate action to avert this, and he had four options from which to
make the choice. H e could either fight the Garhwalis and attempt
to break out to the east, or try to re-establish his line of communica-
tion which would entail battling with 4 Kumaon. The launching of
the encirclement plan was the third choice, but in view of the fact
that the crossing would be engaged by artillery, armoured cars
and Infantry, all of which he could now see quite clearly on the
south bank of the river, his chances of success were nil. His final
option was to attempt to escape to the north, which was not sealed
off by 161 Infantry Brigade but barred by the 13,000 ft. Pir Panjal
Range, its crest covered by deep snow.
From almost the moment that 4 Kumaon reported its engagement
with the rifle company of the AKP battalion, a battery of binocu-
THE LLMBER NULLAH BAlTLE
lars was trained on the Limber Nullah to watch for the reactions.
Their manifestation took some length of time because the U P
company was probably not in wireless communication, but about
the time that it would have taken to scurry back, there were definite
signs of restlessness. This was accentuated after an attempt to dis-
lodge 4 Kumaon from Kopra, by elements of either the 3rd or 5th
AKP battalions, was hurled back through accurate shooting by the
Mountain Battery and solid defence by 4 Kumaon. Khalil was now
given very little time to ponder over which of the four courses open
to him he would adopt. The field artillery was ordered to step up
its rate of fire, and the enemy in the Limber Nullah soon found
himself subjected to a murderous and well directed shoot. Simul-
taneously, 3 Garhwal was ordered to mortar point 8109 heavily, and
with the activity on point 7706 increasing, Khalil must have been
convinced that a battalion attack was imminent, and would probably
synchronize with something advancing on the Limber Nullah from
the direction of Kopra.
Whether Khalil issued any order, and if so what it was, is not
known, but it was evident that his previously well disciplined force,
having become aware that Kopra was being held in strength, degene-
rated into a rabble. The enemy ranks, who had shown a remarkable
sense of obedience to all orders relating to security and conceal-
ment, kicked over the traces in a matter of minutes. Throwing cau-
tion to the fouhvinds, they began revealing themselves by rushing
all over the place in an effort to escape from the devastating fire of
the fieId guns. Then, perhaps assuming that the hills in which they
had lain concealed were the main targets of the guns, they streamed
into the open bed of the Limber Nullah, which was soon filled with
a mass of humanity. It presented an amazing sight and a perfect
target, and the field artillery and the Garhwal mortars were on to
it in a flash. There was now only one way to escape destruction, and
the enemy took it, a mad rush commencing up the Limber Nullah
towards the forbidding Pir Panjal Range.
As the fleeing enemy scrambled out of the range of the field guns,
a fighter aircraft arrived overhead and was directed to the target
with a round of blue smoke. It immediately dived into the attack,
being joined a few minutes later by a second fighter. It must be
admitted that the use of aircraft had never formed a part of Plan
'A', and as such there was no VHF wireless set, for communication
aircraft, with 161 Brigade HQ. It was not because an air effort
would have been valueless, but for the fact that the Air Force had
evacuated Srinagar on the advent of winter and based itself in Jamn~u.

With the Pir Panjal Range intervening between the Kashmir Valley
and Jammu, and weather conditions still unpredictable, it would
have been unrealistic to incorporate an air effort into the plan with
any certainty that it would materialise at the required moment. Fur-
ther, the distance to be covered by an aircraft from Jammu to the
battle area would only permit it to be over the target for about
ten minutes, and it was impossible to predict when the particular
ten minutes of value would arise. The arrival of the two aircraft
at the propitious moment was purely by chance, and was a stroke
of good fortune. The air attack, had it been planned, could not have
been launched with a greater approximation to split-second accu-
racy in timing.
The battle of the Limber Nullah was over by half past four in
the evening. It had been won at a negligible cost in casualties, with
the very strong enemy force offering only slight opposition as com-
pared to what had been expected, a stiff and savage battle. It had,
in fact, been almost a repetition of the Battle of Shalateng. No one
was more surprised at the relative ease with which a dangerous
threat had been completely liquidated, and a powerful enemy force
put to flight, than the officers and men of 161 Infantry Brigade.
With the enemy streaming towards the Pir Panjal Range, 3 Garh-
wal advanced and occupied point 8109 in the evening of 14 April.
During the night, neither 3 Garhwal nor 4 Kumaon was subjected
to any type of activity by the enemy. 15 April was devoted to ex-
tensive patrolling of the area and the adjustment of the defences. On
the morning of 16 April, 3 Garhwal was ordered to advance from
point 8109 and to search the area in-between the Limber Nullah
and Kopra, and to come into reserve at Mahura. No enemy was met
by the battalion during the sweep, but it reported enemy dead and
a large amount of equipment, arms and ammunition lying in scatter-
ed dumps in the area. D. P. Dhar was contacted and asked whether
he could assist with a team of National Conference Volunteers to
clear the battlefield. He complied with the request immediately, and
five hundred Volunteers were moved forward in buses to the site of
the 'Flying Fox' ferry. Transported to the north bank of the river,
and with two companies of 1 Madras providing local protection, they
did an excellent job of work over the next three days. Eventually
fetching u p at Mahura, they were embussed and returned to Srinagar.
The enemy equipment and material collected was varied in range.
It included the Headquarters Office of the 4th AKP battalion, some
THE UMBER NULLAH BATTLE
of the correspondence in the files making verv interesting reading.

The existence of a large Reinforcement Camp at Muzaffarabad was
placed beyond dispute, and the reports and returns to and from
the Reinforcement Camp showed that they had not been prepared
by amateurs. Gallantry decorations had also been instituted, and
judging from the sharp reminders in the file, the Battalion Comman-
der had apparently shown slackness in forwarding the citations. Some
of the citations, lying ready for despatch, were neither of historic
nor of intelligence value. They only indicated that the person who had
written them had a very fertile imagination and a flair for fantasy.
More interesting were the expedients prepared and assembled for
the river crossing. They included large quantities of already inflated
goat skins, a few 'Mae Wests', presumably for the more senior officers,
light rafts made by lashing pieces of timber together, and numerous
lengths of rope of varying thicknesses.
The bulk of the equipment had been placed in caches almost oppo-
site Rampur, and the selected crossing site must have been in this
area. Whether the enemy crossing would have been successful or not
is problematical, as this area had been under close surveillance by
161 Infantry Brigade. The chances are that it would have been
detected almost immediately, and it would have developed into a
race as to how many of the enemy could have been ferried or
swum across the river before 1 Madras from Heman Buniyar appear-
ed on the scene, to reinforce its company that was located in the
Rampur area. It would have been a tricky operation for both sides,
as it would have been fought in darkness.
With Mahura now rid of the threat of encirclement, attention was
turned towards the 3rd and 5th AKP battalions and the five hundred
tribals who had been deployed in the area of Bari Baikh and Goshar.
It was decided to engage them with two battalions, 3 Garhwal and
4 Kumaon. Both battalions were to operate with three rifle com-
panies, one from each being left behind to ~ r o t e c tBausian and
Mahura. 3 Garhwal was to attack Bari Baikh and move forward to
point 9960, and 4 Kumaon to capture point 7760 and Goshar. The
field artillery from Uri was to be in support of 3 Garhwal, and one
section of the Mountain Battery in support of 4 Kumaon. ~ l t h o u g hthe
situation on the Uri front had remained peaceful, it was not con-
sidered prudent to continue the risk of denying the piquets gun sup-
port, and one section of the Mountain Battery had therefore been
returned to Uri.
The education of the enemy was immediately taken in hand. Con-

trary to the very strict secrecy that had been observed prior to the
Limber Nullah battle, there was now loose talk both in Baramula
and Srinagar that an attack was going to be launched on Lachhi~ura
SKETCH SHOWING THE ATTACKS

BY 3 GARHWAL AND 4 KUMAON
161 lnfantw Brigade ----=b

ThaEnemy --- --- 0
yard* 20W 1000 p 2 000 4000 Yards
by advancing over the hills from Uri. The 'Mahura battalions', it was
stated, had done their bit and were tired. They would be utilised to
pose threats, but the main assault would come from Uri. Whether
these rumours filtered down to the enemy or not is unknown, but
subsequent events would lead one to believe that they did. In addi-
tion to the rumours that were spread there were some flagrant
breaches of signal security, almost as bad as Khalil's 'changing the
map' signal.
THE LIMBER h % U A H BATIZE
During the next two days, both 3 Garhwal and 4 Kumaon made
feint attacks towards their objectives, during the hours of daylight,
pulling back hastily when the enemy opened up with long range
fire, and by night they harassed the enemy with jitter patrols. These
invariably produced a 'Brock's. fireworks display' from the enemy.
Meanwhile a t Uri, Lt. Col. S. S. Kalaan, with one company of 2 Dogra
and two platoons of 6 Rajrif, was busy preparing an equally good
demonstration, to be staged on Nalwar piquet half an hour before
the attacks by 3 Garhwal and 4 Kumaon were scheduled to
commence.
Heavy rain, which commenced in the early hours of the morning
and continued throughout the day and into the night, when the
attack would have been launched, enforced a postponement. It rained
throughout the next day, and in the evening changed to a steadv
drizzle. Conditions were by no means ideal for launching the troops,
particularly as they would have to negotiate the slippery mountain-
sides, but it was decided not to postpone the operation any further.
Half an hour before the Garhwalis and Kumaonis, who had moved
forward to their concentration areas soon after darkness, were due
to move forward, the troops on Nalwar piquet began to demonstrate.
They created a most awful noise, and it certainly attracted the
enemy's attention. H e was probably led into believing that the feint
attacks from Mahura were designed to distract his attention from the
main threat, which now appeared to be coming from Uri. As we
discovered later, he hastily readjusted his defensive layout.
4 Kurnaon, on its way to point 7760, found a previously held com-
pany position to be garrisoned by a platoon, which was scuppered.
The battalion then made its way to Goshar, an(! a1thoug;h the enemv
tried to rectify his mistake, by rushing forward troops to man the
well-sited trenches that had been evacuated, the Kumaons were in
irresistible form and went in with the bayonet while the enemy was
trying to settle in. An enemy company was caught out in the open
and withdrew hastily, one of its platoons making a bold attempt to
arrest the advance of 4 Kumaon but having to pull back under pres-
sure. Moving steadily forward, the Kumaonis liquidated post after
post, until eventually Goshar was captured.
3 Garhwal was, meanwhile, having a more difficult time. The
feature that the battalion had to climb was very steep and now also
slippery on account of rain. It fought its wav forward, but at first
light was well short of its objective, Bari Baikh. A battle of attrition
followed. Despite stiff resistance the Garhwalis worked their way
forward, and took Bari Baikh at 3 in the afternoon. The enemy

counterattacked, but in a half-hearted fashion and was easily repul-
sed. The battalion consolidated its gain, and continued its advance
in the early hours of the following morning. With enemy resistance
weakening, 3 Garhwal captured point 9960 soon after first light.
It had been a most successful operation, fought -under very d i e -
cult conditions. Both 3 Garhwal and 4 Kumaon had performed magni-
ficently, and the mountain and field gunners had answered their
every call with speed and great accuracy. The hlahura front, which
till a few days earlier had been bristling with enemy activity, and
which over a period of months had been a continuous source of
worry to 161 Infantry Brigade, had now become quiet and peaceful.
The road between Baramula and Uri was now safe, all sniping at it
having ceased.
The section of the Mountain Battery which had been retained in
Mahura to support 4 Kumaon was now returned to Uri. The expected
attack on Uri could not be far off, especially in view of the reverses
that had been suffered on the Mahura front. The enemy commander,
in order to bolster up the morale of his mixed force and to save face
with the locals, would have to do something s~ectacularin the very
near future. By a process of elimination, and in view of the enemy
concentration in the Bhatgiran area, it was considered that either
the Ashok or Subhas piquet would be the target. Both piquets were
manned with similar strengths, fully protected by wire and anti-
personnel mines, and each had an Artillery Observation Post manned
by the mountain gunners.
Major Mohinder Singh, the Commanding Officer of the Mountain
Battery, had received orders posting him to a unit in the Punjab, and
asked permission to hand over command of the Mountain B~kttery
ta his Second in Command to enable him to visit Ashok and Subhas
piquets to say farewell to his personnel manning the OPs. He also
requested that he be permitted to spend his last night in Uri in one
of the two piquets. Both these requests were granted, and when
Mohinder Singh asked which piquet he should stay in, although
there was little to choose between them, Ashok was suggested.
Climbing the steep mountain side, Mohinder Singh headed for
Subhas, and having spent about an hour in that piquet, moved across
to Ashok which he reached at about 5 p.m. and immediately inform-
ed Brigade Headquarters that he had arrived in the piquet. An ex-
tremely popular officer who had served the Brigade very well, he
was subjected to much good-natured bantering by the Brigade Staff
THE LIMBER NULLAH BATTLE
over the field telephone. Each one warned him to be careful, and
advised him what to do if the enemy came. Mohinder Sin$ reported
that he wished the enemy would come, and if they did, they would
wish that they had not. His wish was realised at 10 p.m. as AShok
piquet was fiercely attacked in strength.
Creeping through the thick forest, the enemy, about two com-
panies in strength, approached to within one hundred yards of Ashok
piquet and brought it under heavy automatic fire. The Mountain
Battery immediately went into action. Major Mohinder Singh decided
to take the shoot himself, and as the enemy crept forward he brought
in the artillery fire closer to the piquet, until eventually the shells
were bursting within a few yards of the defensive wire. The battle
raged for about two hours before the enemy withdrew. The next
morning, twelve enemy dead were found about twenty yards from
the wire and nine more about fifty yards further on. The blood in
the area was a clear indication that many more had been wounded.
The troops in Uri were delighted. Night after night they had
awaited the long threatened attack, and a t last it had materialised,
to be dealt with in a most successful fashion. On his return from the
piquet Mohinder Singh was given a hero's welcome. He left Uri a
few hours later with a heavy heart.
It was the last enemy attack on Uri. Although reports of various
planned attacks continued to come in, and on one occasion even
Poonch Brigade sent a flash message repeating an intercept that had
been picked up, indicating a heavy attack on Uri, none of these
threats materialised.
Bits and pieces of news now trickled into Uri relating to a new
command and control set-up. A Division, it was rumoured, was to
be located in the Valley, and fresh Brigades were under orders to
move in. Uri was to be taken over by one of the new Brigades, and
161 Infantry Brigade to go into reserve to enjoy a well earned rest.
Chapter 19
An Offensive Without Teeth
WITH no immediate operations on hand, 161 Infantry Brigade

readjusted its dispositions. 3 Garhwal returned to Baramula, and the
1 Madras rifle companies at Baramula and Rampur rejoined the
battalion which remained concentrated, and in reserve, in the H e ~ n a n
Buniyar Nullah. While remaining watchful and carrying out the
normal patrols, the units utilised the respite to replace worn out
equipment and attend to other administrative matters which had
been shelved owing to preoccupation with operations. The peace
and calm which reigned over the area seemed odd. Not even a stray
rifle shot disturbed the serenity of the atmosphere either by day or
by night. The unfortunate incident that was to take place in the
Heman Buniyar Nullah was therefore staggering. It was brought
about by enthusiasm which blinded the individual concerned and
led him to an act of unjustified rashness and stupidity.
One afternoon late in April, with the weather somewhat warm
AN OFFENSIVE WITHOUT 'IE;ETH
and humid, Lt. Col. Menon, the Commanding Officer of 1 Madras,

went to his tent after lunch and stretched himself out on his camp
bed to read a novel. Although his unit had not been given the oppor-
tunity to engage the enemy, Menon could not resist having a personal
crack at them. During the days when the main road was under enemy
fire he would, armed with a rifle, take up various positions along
the main road in the vicinity of his battalion camp, and stalk the
enemy snipers as and when they exposed themselves. When the
sniper threat to the. road u7as cleared, he evidcntly spent his spare
time roaming about in the hills on either side of the Heman Buniyar
Nullah, taking with him a few men, in the hope that he might be
able to bag some wild game. It was this practice that probably came
to the enemy's notice and led to the disaster.
At 2.30 an individual, professing to be a Forest Ranger, approached
a post of 1 Madras and asked to be taken to the Commanding Officer
for whom he had an important message. Lt. Col Menon interviewed
this individual outside his tent, and was evidcntly informed that a
party of enemy, six in number, had been detected resting in a desert-
ed hut about two miles u p the Heman Buniyar Nullah. Menon
needed no spur. Grabbing his rifle, he ordered the nearest available
sub-unit, the battalion Intelligence Section of seven men, to follow
him. Led by the informant, this small party hurried away up the
Nullah.
About twenty minutes later the rapid firing of small arms was
heard, and 1 Madras immediately stood to. The firing died away as
quickly as it had started, and after fifteen minutes a man from the
Intelligence Section came rushing back to the camp with the informa-
tion that the Commanding Officer's party had been ambushed. The
Second in Command of 1 Madras immediately despatched two rifle
companies to the scene of the incident, but although they carried
out a meticulous search of the area, they found no trace either of
the enemy or the guide but only the bodies of Lt. Col. Menon and
his men, stripped of their arms and ammunition.
I had been away in Delhi attending a conference, and on return-
ing the next morning went straight to 1 Madras. I found a shattered
and very depressed battalion. No one could offer any good reason
w l ~ yMenon, with a full strength and readily available battalion at
his disposal, should have chosen to rush off into the blue with a
handful of men. It was only after questioning the sentry who had
escorted the pseudo Forest Ranger to Menon, the lone survivor of
the ambush, and Menon's batman, that information on the various
stages of the incident could be pieced together. The rest of the bat-
talion had been unaware of the fact that the Commanding Officer
had rushed forth to intercept an enemy party, nor had there been
any sound of firing before the rattle of fire that had alerted the unit.
As it was not abnormal for Menon to move out with a handful of
men, those who had seen the small party set out had assumed that
it was for another wild game shoot.
On 1 May 1948, the command and control in Jammu and Kashmir
underwent a radical change. Headquarters Jak Force was disbanded,
and two new Division Headquarters raised, one being made respon-
sible for the operations in Jammu and Poonch and the other for
Kashmir. The Div H Q in Kashmir was designated Sri Division (Sri
Div), and Major General K. S. Thimayya was appointed its com-
mander. It established its H Q at Baramula. Zebra Brigade also chan-
ged its designation to 163 Infantry Brigade, and Brigadier J. C.
Katoch, originally the commander of 161 Infantry Brigade, took over
its command.
With the raising of 163 Brigade, the infantry battalions in Kashmir
were reallotted to 161 and 163 Brigades. 161 Brigade retained 6
Rajrif, 4 Kumaon and 2 Dogra, while 163 Brigade was formed of
1 Sikh, 3 Garhwal and 1 Madras. The supporting arms were also sub-
divided, 161 Brigade taking on its Order of Battle one battery Field
Artillery, The Mountain Battery, a squadron of armoured cars of
7 Cavalry and a field company of Madras Engineers. The administ-
rative units, with the exception of 3 Light Field Ambulance which
was later replaced by 60 Para Field Ambulance, were taken under
the direct command of H Q Sri Div and given the role of administer-
ing both Brigades.
The reorganisation did not come as a surprise to 161 Infantry Bri-
gade. Rumours apart, Major General Kulwant Singh, the Commander
Jak Force, when on a visit to the Brigade after the Limber Nullah
battle had hinted that such a move was likely in the near future. He
had also mentioned that more troops would be inducted into the
Valley and that 161 Infantry Brigade would be relieved of its Uri
commitment by 77 Parachute Brigade. On relief, he stated, 161 In-
fantry Brigade would be located in Srinagar as the reserve Brigade
of the Division about to be formed. After a short spell in Srinagar,
the Brigade would, on a further Brigade arriving in the Valley, re-
turn to Ranchi in Bihar to rejoin its parent formation the Fifth In-
fantry Division.
The move of 161 Infantry Brigade into a reserve role was by no
AN OFFENSIVE WITHOUT TE@III
means out of turn. From the day that its leading elements had
arrived in the Valley, the six months that had foIlowed had demand-
ed constant mental alertness and severely taxed the physical capa-
city of both officers and men. The mental strain had been the more
serious, as a single major error could be disastrous. A rest was, there-
fore, very welcome, but the thougl~tof leaving the Valley and pro-
ceeding to Ranchi met with definite disapproval. Somehow, 161
Infantry Brigade had come to feel attached to and possessive about
the Valley, and the very idea of having to sever connections with it
did not seem possible or right.
On taking over command of Sri Div, Major General Thimayya
summoned me to Baramula to brief him on all aspects of the situa-
tion in Kashmir and to discuss future operations. With the mine of
information that had been collected by the Brigade from all possible
sources, the briefing took the whole morning. The topography of the
various areas, from Srinagar to Skardu and Leh via the Zoji La Pass
and Kargil, Handwara to Tithwal and Muzaffarabad, and Uri to
Domel, was covered in very great detail. This was most important
as the mountains, the roads, tracks, bridges, rivers and streams would
all have a direct bearing on the quantum of trocps needed to mount
an operation in a particular area, and the type of transport and
equipment necessary to ensure adequate logistical support. The dis-
positions of our own troops and those of the enemy were easily seen
on the marked map, but I drew Major General Thimayya's attention
to one particular enemy position, the area of Chakothi-Chinari, in
which I stressed there was a regular Pakistan Infantry Brigade. I
informed him that I had regularly reported the existence of this
Brigade to HQ Jak Force for the past two months, but it had not
been accepted as being factual. I stated that two units had been
identified, the 1st Battalion the 13th Frontier Force Rifles and the
4th Battalion the 16th Punjab Regiment. The third battalion was from
the Baluch Regiment, and was either the 3rd or 4th. Major General
Thimayya accepted my assertion.
The formation of Sri Div might give the impression that Kashmir
was being heavily reinforced. It had for the last six months been
held by just one Infantry Brigade, and now it was to have a whole
Infantry Division. It is true that Zebra Brigade had been formed in
the Valley, but it could hardly be classified as a Brigade, being com-
posed of one infantry battalion, 1 Sikh, and a smattering of support-
ing arms that could be spared by 161 Infantry Brigade. It had, in
fact, been formed merely to cope with an administrative blunder
SLENDER WAS THE 'I'HREAD
and to absorb Brigadier Lakhinder Singh into some sort of appoint-

ment in the Valley.
Sri Div consisted of : ( i ) 161 Infantry Brigade which retained
three of its battalions-6 Rajrif, 4 Kumaon and 2 Dogra; ( i i ) the
newly raised 163 Infantry Brigade, which toolc the place of the dis-
banded Zebra Brigade and comprised two battalions-3 Garhwal and
1 Madras-transferred from 161 Infantry Brigade and 1 Sikh inherit-
ed from Zebra Brigade; and (iii) the newly arrived 77 Para Brigade.
The sum total of infantry battalions newly inducted into the Kashmir
Valley was therefore just the three battalions ol: 77 Para Brigade.
If 161 Infantry Brigade had had to struggle desperately to con-
tain the enemy both during winter and after the Banihal Pass had
opened, with the six battalions then present in the Valley, it is diffi-
cult to undersbnd how Army Headquarters expected Sri Div, with
just three more battalions, to accomplisl~its stiff task : the capture
of Domel initially, and the relief of Leh, in Ladakh, later. I stated
to Major General Thimayya that if Army Headquarters was really
serious about Kashmir, and agreed with the accepted principle that
the ratio between attack and defence should be at least 3 to 1, then
eighteen battalions were necessary to ensure success in the attack.
All it had done was to send in one Brigade of three battalions. By
juggling about with the battalions already with 161 Infantry Brigade
and Zebra Brigade, it had formed a Division of three Brigades and
conjured up the appearance of a strong force.
Of this Division, one Brigade, 77 Para, had been earmarked to
take over the Uri-Mahura commitment. This left him with just two
Brigades for operations. With the weather having changed and relia-
ble reports coming in that the enemy was in the Tithwal area, in
strength, he could not afford to neglect the Handwara-Tithwal area,
especially as the enemy had once reached Handwara by that route
during winter when the snows hampered progress on foot. It would
require one Brigade to operate in this area. That left him with just
161 Infantry Brigade to move down the main road to Domel. With
a regular Pakistan Infantry Brigade in position in the Chakothi-
Chinari area, supported by AKP battalions and tribesmen, it was
extremely difficult to visualise how 161 Infantry Brigade could break
through. Even if by a stroke of luck it did, there was forty-five miles
of road between Uri and Domel which would have to b e protected,
and that would call for another Brigade.
After a break for lunch we resumed the discussion. After Major
General Thimayya had given me a broad idea of the operations that
AN OFFENSIVE WITHOUT T E E T H
he wished to mount. I suggested to him that he make an immediate

bid for three more Brigades, bringing up the Division's strength to
six Brigades. One Brigade would be utilised to hold the U r i - ~ ~ h ~
area, two Brigades for the advance to Domel, one Brigade for the
advance to Tithwal, and as the advances to Domel and Tithwal were
so wide apart, he should have one Brigade in reserve for each front.
I stressed to Major General Thimayya that he was launching a Divi-
sional attack on two axes, and with only three Brigades he would be
doing so without a reserve which was absolutely essential. General
Thimayya said that he would 'chew over' the problem for a day or
two and then call me up for another conference.
Officers of various units now started arriving in Kashmir, and anxi-
ous to have a look at Uri and meet their friends serving in the area,
made daily trips to the place. Among them was Major Thimayya,
Major General Thimayya's younger brother. Hearing a dog bark,
I walked out of the Operations Room and saw a terrier running
about in the Brigade HQ area. As a number of stray dogs had met
their death by running into the anti-personnel minefields around the
piquet positions, strict orders had been issued that no animals were
to be brought to Uri. I therefore gave instructions that the owner
of the dog be located, informed that it was to be put on a chain
immediately, and removed from Uri at the first possible moment.
The terrier, I was informed, belonged to Major Thimayya, who
caught his pet and chained it to the railing of the Brigade HQ
building.
Atout half an hour later, Thimayya asked the Brigade Major for
permission to visit Nalwar piquet, and on receiving permission set
off with a friend who knew the piquet well. The dog, watching his
master disappearing in the distance, apparently tugged a t its chain
in an effort to free itself, and slipping its collar, rushed after him.
When the animal caught up with him, Thimayya and the officer
accompanying him should have turned back at once, but they con-
tinued on their way. The terrier. enjoying his outing, rushed all over
the place, and it was not until the two officers were reasonably close
to the piquet that Thimayya was advised by his companion to take
his dog up into his arms. The terrier permitted Thimayya to get close
to him and then playfully bounded away, until both dog and master
were perilously close to an anti-personnel minefield. ~himayya's
friend shouted to him to come back, but in his anxiety to save his
pet he rnade a lunge at it, and the animal leaping backwards set off
an anti-personnel mine. Both master and dog were killed instantly,
and it was my sad task to ring General T h i m a y p and give him the
tragic news. Another life had been needlessly thrown away.
In the first week of May 1948, 77 Para Brigade, commanded by
Brigadier P. S. Nair, having arrived in Kashmir, was sent forward
to relieve 161 Infantry Brigade of its commitments in the Uri-
Mahura sector. In order to eliminate any possibility of an enemy
attack attaining an element of success before the .units of 77 Para
Brigade had settled down, the units of 161 Infantry Brigade, on
handing over the piquets, came into reserve in the Uri bowl and at
Mahura. The operational command of both Brigades was also vested
in H Q 161 Infantry Brigade, the Divisional Commander having de-
cided that it should be so until the Commander 77 Para Brigade
declared himself ready and happy to assume the responsibility. H Q
161 Infantry Brigade continued to be in operational command until
20 May, when it moved down the road towards Don~el.
The reason for not handing over operational control until 20 hlay
was not because the Commander 77 Para Brigade did not re.CIC11 a
state of readiness before that date. It had been mutually agreed bet-
ween the two Brigades that as the opening phase of 161 Infantry
Brigade's plan was closely interlinked with the firm base and piquets
manned by 77 Para Brigade, and also the use of one of its units in
the Mahura area, it would be wiser to have one operational coin-
mander. This arrangement naturally meant that H Q 161 Infantry
Brigade could not avail itself of the ten days' rest that had been
sanctioned for the Brigade by H Q Sri Div, but the arrangement was
an operational necessity.
Planning for the Spring offensive proceeded apace. Major General
Thimayya's bid for a total of six Infantry Brigades met with a re-
fusal. H e was told that he must make do with the three Brigades in
the Valley, 161, 163 and 77 Para. This was an extremely shortsighted
decision by higher authority and was directly responsible for the
subsequent failure to achieve anything more than limited gains. If
the reason for the refusal was non-availability of the three Brigades,
then the directive to Major General Thimayya should have been
amended to something more in keeping with the capability of Sri
Div, in place of a task which from the outset had only slender chances
of success.
Unassailable arguments had been advanced in support of the neces-
sity for three more Brigades. The enemy had a numerical superio-
rity of nearly three to one; the terrain in which the troops would
have to operate, being mountainous and favouring defence, accen-
Ahi OFFENSWE $W"IMOUT TEETH
tuated the numerical disparity even further; one Brigade would be

static and the other two were required to operate on two widely
separated axes, each demanding that the line of communication be
protected; and in the event of either or both advances meeting with
stiff resistance and being halted, there was no Divisional reserve that
could be launched to influence the situation and force a break-
through. In fact, once H Q Sri Div launched 161 and 163 Infantry
Brigades on the Domel and Muzaffarabad axes respectively, it would
degenerate into an Administrative Headquarters, because both Bri-
gades would be operating as Independent Brigades and H Q Sri Div,
other than providing the logistical support, would be incapable of
assisting in any way.
Any one of the arguments advanced was in itself a good enough
case for the provision of the extra Brigades, that is, if Army Head-
quarters was serious about the operations; collectively, they made
the sanctioning of them absolutely imperative. The refusal, there-
fore, is not easily understood, especially as H Q Sri Div's directive
remained unamended. It could have been that the Army Headquar-
ters' assessment of the situation was diametrically opposite to that
which had been stated by H Q Sri Div on the basis of the details
supplied by H Q 161 Infantry Brigade, or there may have been some
other reasons that had not filtered through the Banihal Pass. In any
case the failure to send three more Infantry Brigades into the Valley
resulted in Sri Div's advance being bogged clown, and India being
denied the control of Kashmir up to Domel.
Perhaps this might have been averted had the British Govern-
ment's order that no British officer would involve himself in the
fighting in Jammu and Kashmir not been in force. General Sir Rob
Lockhart having left, General Sir Roy Bucher had succeeded him.
The order forbade the Commander in Chief of the Indian Army
to enter a certain area in which the units of the Army which he
commanded were engaged in operations. As such, he could never
feel the real pulse of the situation, and in so far as operations were
concerned, he was more a paper chief than the .Commander in Chief.
It was his responsibility to keep the Cabinet of the Government of
India fully briefed at all times, but his briefings could not carry the
authority or conviction \vhich they might have if he had come to
Kashmir, got a feel of the terrain and the diffic~iltiesthat it imposed,
and talked to the local commanders. Only then could he have arrived
at. his o\jrn assessment of the situation and advised Government cor-
rectly, and issued directives that were capable of being implemented.
The Sri Div plan was now formulated. 161 Infantry Brigade was
ordered to advanc,e towards Domel, 163 Infantry Brigade from Hand-
wara to Muzaffarabad via Tithwal, and 77 Para Brigade was given
the role of holding the firm base in the Uri-ivlahura area. Every
avenue was, meanwhile, being explored to find a means of slacken-
ing the enemy's grip in the Chakothi-Chinari area. It was suggested
to Major General Thimayya that if higher authority could be per-
suaded to agree to pose a threat to Chikar Khas, or even Bagh, with
a strong column from Poonch, it could produce the desired result.
If Chikar Khas was made the objective, the enemy line of communi-
cation would be threatened. When debating the possibility of Poonch
Brigade being able to mount such an operation, the various factors
and the situation confronting that Brigade were given full considera-
tion, and it was concluded that the plan was well worth pursuing,
and that it would, if successful, have far-reaching effects. Given the
attitude of Army HQ, however, it was neither unexpected, nor a
disappointment, when the use of the Poonch Brigade was vetoed.
THE SRI DlV PLAN
NOT TO SCALE
\
s_ _.*p.
PUNCH
a,,*
.
PUNCH BDE
JAMMU DIV
AN OFFENSIVE -OUT
HQ Sri Div had now to produce its own diversionary threat. This
was essential if the planned offensive was to have any hope of suc-
cess. Major General Thimayya. decided that the only possibility wm
for 163 Infantry Brigade's advance towards Tithwal to be launched
two days before that of 161 Infantry Brigade towards Domel. It
was hoped that the enemy might assume that the 163 Infantry Bri-
gade's advance was the main threat. This was not wishful thinking,
as 163 Brigade, unless halted, would arrive in Muzaffarabad which
was almost next door to Domel, and the enemy would probably have
to weaken his dispositions in the Chakothi-Chinari area in order
to arrest it. Though this was a gamble, there was nothing else that
could be done in the circumstances. 163 Infantry Brigade's attack
was, therefore, scheduled to be launched on 16 May, and 161 In-
fantry Brigade's on 18 May.
163 Infantry Brigade's role was by no means an easy one. The
Brigade was required to move from Handwara to Tithwal and thence
to Muzaffarabad. Tithwal, it was known, had elements of the enemy,
but its actual strength was unknown. The terrain over which the
Brigade would have to operate was mountainous and presented many
serious logistical problems, aggravated by its having to employ animals
and porters when the motorable road ended at Drangyari. From Tith-
wal onwards to Muzaffarabad, the route ran through a gorge over-
looked for its entire length by high hills. To expect just one Brigade to
capture or even threaten Muzaffarabad was, therefore, placing one's
hopes rather high. The task was, in fact, beyond the compass of any
Brigade but, starved of troops, Sri Div could do no more than its
best.
It was not surprising that 163 Brigade's advance was halted by
stiff enemy opposition at Tithwal. Without a reserve with which he
could break the stalemate, Major General Thimayya found himself
placed in an utterly helpless position. Brigadier J. C. Katoch fell sick
soon after the advance commenced and Lt. Col. Harbakhsh Singh,
the Commanding Officer of 1 Sikh, took over the Brigade in the
capacity of Brigadier.
In order to consolidate the impression that the main threat of the
Spring offensive would be the one posed by 163 Infantry Brigade,
various rumours were circulated regarding the future employment
and location of 161 Infantry Brigade. It was freely voiced in Sri-
nagar that the Brigade was returning to Srinagar en route to rejoin-
ing its parent formation in Ranchi, and many friends of the Brigade
asked for suitable dates for farewell parties. It was agreed that the
dates should be finalised after the Brigade had concentrated in Sri-

nagar. This news, eventually and unfortunately, reached the ears of
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed who had returned to the Valley from
Jammu. Hearing that I was at H Q Sri Div, at Baramula, he drove
over and confronted me with what he referred to as a rumour.
Knowing Bakshi as well as I did, I should perhaps have explained
to him the truth behind the rumour, but unfortunately confirmed
that 161 Infantry Brigade was pulling back, as it had undergone a
very tiring and trying spell of duty.
Bakshi was most unhappy when the rumour was confirmed, and
while agreeing that 161 Infantry Brigade was in need of a rest,
argued that there were many lovely spots in the Valley where the
Brigade could relax and enjoy itself. H e then stated that he would
never agree to the Brigade moving out of Kashmir, and would
approach the Government of India on the subject. I hastily advised
him not to do that, and suggested that he await Major General Thi-
mayya's return, which was expected in a matter of minutes, and said
I was certain that he could persuade Thimayya to retain 161 In-
fantry Brigade in Kashmir.
No sooner had Major General Thimayya joined us and sat down
than Bakshi assailed him in a most determined manner, insisting
that under no circumstances, and regardless of how many Brigades
came to the Valley, was 161 Infantry Brigade to leave. Seeing that
Major General Thimayya was flabbergasted, I quickly explained to
him that Bakshi was most unhappy to hear that the Brigade was
going to Ranchi, and that I had explained to him that he, Thimayya,
was the authority to cancel the move and retain the Brigade in Kash-
mir. Major General Thimayya then dealt with the situation in his
own inimitable way, a d Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed left Baramula
for Srinagar a very happy man, having been assured that 161 Infantry
Brigade would remain in the Valley and that the rumour was for the
enemy's benefit.
In Uri, the deception plan covered two bridges. One was a wooden
bridge not far from the eastern exit of Uri and on the road leading
to the Haji Pir Pass. The other was a completely demolished bridge
at the western exit of Uri, and about a hundred yards from Fort
piquet. The wooden bridge on the Haji Pir Pass route had been par-
tially burnt by the enemy during the winter, but as it was never
used nor likely to be used by the Brigade, it had been left in its
semi-charred state. It now received special attention. A small engin-
eer party, with two companies of infantry affording local protec-
AN OFFENSIVE WITHOUT T
Em
tion, visited the bridge site every day, and its repair was taken in
hand. As the bridge was left unprotected by night, it was destroyed
by the enemy when almost ready. Undeterred, the engineers pro-
ceeded to repair the damage, only for the enemy to repeat his act.
This continued until 17 May, the date preceding the advance gf
the Brigade from Uri.
The bridge that mattered, the cine at the western exit of Uri,
received no attention that was visible to the enemy. It was recon-
noitered in the hours of darkness and the span accurately measured.
The engineers then marked out an identical gap in the Uri bowl
and spanned it with a Bailey bridge. The prepared Bailey bridge
was then divided into sections capable of being carried to the site
on jeep trailers hauled by the infantry. Continuous practice during
the hours of darkness enabled the engineer cum infantry team to
reach a stage of perfection, the gap being spanned in five hours with-
out any noise to disturb the stillness of the night.
With the demo!ished bridge at the western exit of Uri receiving
no attention, and the wooden bridge on the road to the Haji Pir
Pass being reconstructed every time that it was destroyed, it is quite
definite that the enemy was led into believing that an assault was
about to be mounted against the Haji Pir Pass. Reports poured in
of strong enemy reinforcements, mostly Pathan tribals, moving to
and concentrating in the Bhatgiran area and on the spurs running
north from the Pass to Uri. While they could have engaged the Uri
defences, they showed a disinclination towards any type of offen-
sive action, presumably preferring to wait and see what would
happen.
The Emergency Government, on its arrival back in the Valley
from Jammu, decided to raise a Jammu & Kashmir Militia. This
Militia was formed from an element of ex-State Force personnel
and a large number of raw recruits. On 14 May, when Major General
Thimayya telephoned me at Uri and asked me whether I would
accept one of the newly formed battalions of the J & K Militia for
employment in the Uri sector, I very politely refused the offer. The
Militia was then only a few weeks old, and neither Major General
Thimayya nor I had any doubts that it had no place in the battle-
field in a combat role. Major General Thimayya had, in fact, made
one stipulation, that if I did agree to accept the battalion, I was to
ensure that it was employed in a role in which it would not be ex-
posed to enemy fire or action. I suggested to him that 77 Para Bri-
gade might have some suitable role, such as garrisoning Baramula
or guarding the bridges in-between Baramula and Heman Buniyar.
This, I added, would meet his stipulation as it would be well out
of harm's way. 77 Para Brigade, however, also declined the offer.
The same evening, Major General Thimayya spoke to me again
about the Militia battalion, and asked me to reconsider my refusal.
H e said that he was being pressurized to associate the Militia with
the fighting, and his argument that they were totally unfit to take
any sort of active part in combat was falling on deaf ears. He re-
quested me to relieve him of this embarrassment and to accept a
battalion. Very reluctantly I did so, and Major General Thimayya
again asked me to ensure that the unit was not exposed to any form
of threat. I decidk'd to postpone my decision as to what role I could
allot the unit until I had seen it. I t arrived in the morning of 18
May in Uri.
Uniformed, equipped with rifles and a few light machine guns,
and the major portion having fired a few rounds on a rifle range,
the battalion could march in step, and that was about all. It totally
lacked tactical knowledge, and thk training that it had received was
so puerile that it did not even feach the average section level. The
unit was, in fact, nothing more than a body of uniformed and armed
individuals, unfit for combat duties. I offered them to 77 Para Bri-
gade, but they had seen exactly what I had, and refused emphatically
to take them on strength. I therefore decided not to use the unit
unless I found a completely safe area, if such a thing exists in a com-
bat zone, and the role would have to be such that it would not divert
my attention from the operations to be conducted by 161 Infantry
Brigade, and that I would not suffer from a constant nightmare
wondering what was happening to the Militia battalion.
This is no reflection on the rank and file of the Militia battalion.
They were very keen, but whosoever had trained them was appa-
rently ignorant of the requirements of the battlefield. Keenness does
not suffice in a combat zone, and ignorance could and would lead
them to their deaths. That the battalion should have been permitted
to approach a battle area was unfair to Major General Thimayya,
unfair to 161 Infantry Brigade since it could have been a serious
embarrassment to the security of the Brigade. and, worst of all,
unfair to the men of the battalion who were being asked to face
possible situations which, had they arisen, would havc resulted in
the unit being decimated.
A few days prior to 18 May, 161 Infantry Brigade was allotted a
fourth battalion, the 7th Battalion The Sikh Regiment (7 Sikh), which
had arrived in the Valley. This extra battalion was essential as the
161 Infantry Brigade plan envisaged one of its battalions advancing
as a right flank guard, and well away from the main axis of advance,
thereby reducing the striking force down the main road to two batta-
lions. It was a workmanlike outfit, full of confidence and with a
high percentage of World War I1 veterans. In the actions that it
fought, this unit certainly lived up to the high impression formed
of it at first contact. Although strange to the Brigade, and with little
time to marry up with the supporting arms, it dovetailed into the
Brigade in a matter of hours and became a valuable member.
2 Dogra was, meanwhile, taken over by a new Commanding Offi-
cer, Lt. Col. Thakur. A posting order asking him to proceed to Delhi
to set up the National Cadet Corps had resulted in Lt. Col. G. G.
Bewoor having to hand over the battalion. This change of Command-
ing m c e r at a critical juncture was most unfortunate, especially in
the case of a battalion such as 2 D o p a which was just beginning
to find its feet. Bewoor had got to know the unit well and realised its
weaknesses, and this enabled him to command it with a rare mixture
of sympathy and firmness. Under its new Commanding Officer, 2
Dogra, given what was considered to be the simplest of roles, falter-
ed very badly. It caused utter confusion at the outset of the advance
to Domel, completely jeopardizing the Brigade plan and nullifying
all the strenuous efforts that had been made to achieve the surprise.
The plan shaped by 161 Infantry Brigade envisaged a two-pronged

thrust. One was to be delivered by 4 Kumaon acting as a right flank
guard, and necessitated an advance from Mahura along the crest of
the Kazinag Range to Pandu and point 6873. The feature formed a
part of the Pir Panjal Range, and ran parallel to the main road along
the north bank of the river Jhelum. Although its official name is not
the Kazinag Range, it was given this designation by 161 Infantry
Brigade, for convenience, as its highest point was Chhota Qazinag.
The other thrust was to be launched bv the remainder of the Brigade
along the main road from Uri to Domel.
Both advances posed diametrically different problems in the field
of logistics. 4 Kumaon's route lay across a high mountain range with
numerous cols, sharp peaks and precipitous slopes. Reliance for its
maintenance had, therefore, to be based on a veiy large porter train.
Pack ponies were also made available, but these stout-hearted little
animals were incapable of negotiating the trackless route taken by
the battalion, much of it being up steep mountain sides. They were

therefore employed in ferrying stores forward from Mahura to a
supply dump located at the base of the feature, from where the
porters hiked the loads forward to the unit. The main thrust had
the use of a first class tarmac road, bordered along its complete
length by the river Jhelum on the north, and mountain spurs running
up to the heights of the Pir Panjal Range flanking it on the soutll.
To make matters more complicated and capable of leading to
serious confusion, the map sheets depicting the route from Srinagar
to Domel underwent an extraordinary change at Uri. In one sheet
the milestones commenced at Srinagar and ended at M.S. 64 which
was the bridge site at the western exit of Uri. On the continuing
sheet, a second M.S. 64 appeared about four miles further to the
west of Uri, and the milestone numbers decreased until Domel was
shown as being M.S. 19. The use of milestones, in all the communica-
tions had, therefore, to be carefully watched, as, for example, M.S. 60
could be either between Mahura and Uri, or to the west of Uri at
Urusa, a variance of twelve miles.
Along the forty-five miles of road from Uri to Domel were twenty-
two bridges, of which eight were of wooden structure, three with
masonry arches, and eleven of steel girders. As past experience had
shown that the enemy was adept at bridge destruction, and had
invariably resorted to this practice in an endeavour to slow down or
halt an advance, it was fully expected that he would not hesitate to
demolish the bridges if the occasion demanded it. The possibility
of having to create cliversions was therefore given serious study, and
the advice of the engineers in the service of the Government of
Jammu & Kashmir, who had been responsible for the construction
and maintenance of these bridges, was obtained: The engineers
stated that diversions could be created around most of the bridges
with relative ease, with the exception of the bridges at (the mile-
stones quoted are those shown on the map sheet covering the area
from Uri to Domel) M.S. 58, M.S. 45, and M.S. 42, where the diver-
sions would take some amount of time and labour. The bridges at
M.S. 60, M.S. 28 and M.S. 18 would, however, present a very difficult
problem. From the point of view of operations, in which speed was
essential, the only answer was assault bridging.
Assault bridging had been brought into the Valley and stocked in
Srinagar, but the total length available fell far short of the estimated
requirement. With the logistical support of the units advancing along
the main road based on the use of mechanical transport, and there-
AN OFFENSIVE WITHOUT TEETH
fore dependent on the state of the bridges, in order to counter the

possibility of the advance coming to a grinding halt at a damaged
or destroyed bridge, each infantry battalion was allotted f ~ r t ~ - t . ~
pack ponies for use if and when required.
The smooth functioning of the logistics was naturally dependent on
the protection of the supply columns and the bridges. The route was
very vulnerable and presented excellent opportunities for attack by
enemy raiding parties, and as this was a live possibility the problem
was discussed at length with HQ Sri Div. It was argued that 161
Infantry Brigade would find it very difficult to fight an enemy far
superior in numbers, and in mountainous terrain, and also be res-
ponsible for the protection of its own line of communication. To
attempt to do so would only result in dissipating the fighting strength
of the Brigade, and would compel Brigade Headquarters to look
constantly over its shoulders.
Major General Thimayya fully appreciated the points raised, but
found himself helpless to assist with the problem. He pointed out
that he had no reserve and hence no spare troops, and Army Head-
quarters had refused all his requests for extra formations and units.
The Militia units were available, but he was doubtful whether they
would be able to cope with the task. I refused the o f f ~of the Militia,
stressing the point, with which Major General Thimayya agreed,
that to employ the Militia in a forward area would tempt the enemy
to help himself to an on-the-spot arsenal. There was no solution to
the problem. It was left to 161 Infantry Brigade either to protect
its own-line of communication from Uri westwards at the expense
of its striking ability, or to leave the line of communication unprotec-
tod and accept any consequences that might arise through taking the
risk.
161 Infantry Brigade's plan of action was finalised after taking
into account the difficulties imposed by the terrain, the possibility
of meeting with demolished bridges, the protection or neglect of
the line of communication, and the enemy strength likely to be
encountered - a Pakistan Regular Infantry Brigade, an AKP ~ r i g a d e ,
and a large number of Pathan tribals. It was limited, in the first
phase, to the capture of Chinari. Subsequent phases, it was agreed
by HQ Sri Div, would be undertaken should the first phase be
successfully accomplished, and dependent on the situation prevailing
at the time.
The plan in brief, was :-
( a ) 4 Kumaon was to advance from Mnhura, starting after
darkness had set in on 17 May, and to concentrate at

Sikkibat by first light on the 18th morning.
1 R
P
R A N G E
161 INF BDE PLAN

.---•
161 INF BDt ,,+@-,,,r
the Enemy G3
This preliminary move was necessary in order to enable the

battalion to position itself on the Kazinag Range, to carry out its
reconnaissances, and be poised to move forward as the right flank
guard to the thrust down the main road.
( b ) The Sawai Man Guards ( a unit of the Jaipur State Forces,
and now serving with 77 Para Brigade) deployed on
Goshar and point 9062 was to come under command of
4 Kumaon when the unit arrived at Sikkibat. The Com-
manding Officer of 4 Kumaon was authorised to use the
Sawai Man Guards to carry out a deceptive role, but not
to weaken its hold on the firin base. When 4 Kumaon
advanced, the Sawai Man Guards were to revert to the
command of 77 Para Brigade.
( c ) Commencing at 0200 hours on 19 May, 4 Kumaon support-
ed by 11 Field Battery was to pass through the firm base
AN OFFENSIVE WITHOUT TEETH
held by the Sawai Man Guards and advance via Tragan,

China1 Dori, Sufaida and Pandu to point 8873.
As 4 Kumaon was carrying out what was an independent role, and
it was quite impossible to gauge what difficulties it would experience
in overcoming the enemy opposition and the terrain, the timings,
objectives to be taken, and the rate of advance of the battalion, once
it passed through the Sawai Man Cuards, was left to the discretion
of the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Man Mohan Khama.
( d ) 2 Dogra was to advance from Uri at 2200 hours on 18 May
and capture the Salamabad feature by first light on
19 May. It was to be supported by 11 Field Battery and
the Mountain Battery.
2 Dogra had been selected for this task, as it was considered to
be reasonably easy and simple, and well within the capabilities of
the unit. There was little danger of losing direction during the
advance, as it would be a moonlit right and the feature to be occu-
pied would be clearly visible from Uri. Although occupation of the
Salamabad feature by a piquet had always been desirable, it had
not been possible owing to the shortage of troops. It had neverthe-
less been a regular patrol task of 2 Dogra. The enemy had also not
been attracted to it in any strength, an occasional platoon or obser-
vation post being noticed on it but withdrawing when a patrol from
Uri moved out in its direction. To take possession of it now was
essential. Not only did it command about eight miles of the road
from Uri to Domel, but its occupation would deny to the enemy,
particularly those in the Bhatgiran and Haji Pir areas, the ability to
interfere with movement down the main road. The Salamabad feature
had three distinct Pimples, and 2 Dogra was carefully briefed to take
each Pimple in turn, and to establish a company firm base on each
Pimple before moving on to the next.
( e ) The field company Madras Engineers was to proceed to
the bridge site at the western exit of Uri at 2300 hours
on 18 May, and to complete the launching of the Bailey
bridge by 0400 hours on 19 May.
( f ) On 2 Dogra reporting that the three Salamabad Pimples
were h l y held, one squadron armoured cars 7 Cavalry
and one rifle company 7 Sikh, mounted in Bren Carriers,
were to move forward on orders of Brigade HQ and deny
to the enemy the use of the bridge over the Jhelum River
near M.S. 68. (This M.S. did not appear on the map. It
was the second M.S. 64 on the map, and as it was about
four miles west of Uri, was referred to as M.S. 68 by the

Brigade. )
This move was aimed at preventing a large body of AKP troops
and Pathan tribals, who had been located on the north bank of the
River Jhelum, from crossing over to the south bank. The bridge,
which was almost opposite Sultan Dhakki, had been constructed by
the enemy.
( g ) 7 Sikh, less its rifle company with the armoured column,
was to advance and link u p with the armoured column
on orders from Brigade HQ.
( h ) 6 Rajrif was to b e held in reserve.
( i ) Brigade H Q was to be established in Fort Piquet at 1800
hours on 18 May, and its axis of advance was to be along
the main road.
( j ) Casualties from both axes were to be evacuated to 60 Para
Field Ambulance in Uri.
( k ) All units were to be on hard scale rations for seven days.
On 17 May, 4 Kumaon left Mahura a t 1300 hours, and by 0 6 0
hours on 18 May was concentrated a t Sikkibat. The approach march,
carried out over extremely difficult country and involving the climb-
ing of several precipitous mountains, was achieved in good style and
undetected by the enemy. The daylight hours were devoted to carry-
ing out reconnaissances and ensuring that the lcgistical support was
working smoothly. It was an excellent start to the Spring offensive,
but was unfortunately to be short-lived.
Advancing from Uri at !ZOO hours on 18 May, 2 Dogra headed for

the Salamabad feature and Pimple One. The mountain was bathed
in moonlight and stoocl out very clearlv and majestically. Standing
by to support the battalion a t a moment's notice were the field and
mountain batteries, while Brigade HQ, with a long night facing it,
waited calmly in Fort Piquet. At 2300 hours, moving past Brigade HQ
extremely silently, went the field company, Madras Engineers, head-
ing for the demolished bridge at the western cxit of Uri. A few7
moments later, a train of jeep trailers, loaded with prepared sections
of the Bailey bridge, and propelled by a rifle company of 6 Rajrif,
slid by equally quietly. On arrival a t the bridge site, the sections
of the Bailey bridge were unloaded and the jeep trailers returned to
the Uri bowl. With one rifle company of 7 Sikh already in position
AN OFFENSIVE WITHOUT T E E m
on the far side of the demolished bridge to afford local protection

to the bridging party, the Snppers comrnenccd their task.
The sound of muiled thuds disturbed the stillncss of the night,
and to those listening carcfully for any trace of sound the noise
seemed to be rather loud, but it was a case of anxiety sharpening the
faculty of perception. That the sound waves did not carry as far as
the enemy who miglit have been lurking in the area is ~.easonably
certain, as there was no hostile reaction. The work continued into
the early morning, and at 0330 hours, half an hour before the sche-
duled time, the engineers reported that their task was completed.
I t had been a superb performance, conducted with speed, silence
and efficiency.
The progress made by 2 Dogra was unknown. Wireless silence was
being observed to be broken only in the event of the unit encounter-
ing the eneiny in strength and requiring artillery support, or at first
light, by which time the occupation of the Salanlabad feature should
have been completed. No news was, therefore, good news and in
consequence no cause for anxiety. The maintenance of wireless
silence was, in fact, being interpreted as indication of an unopposed
success. This feeling of self-satisfaction was, however, rudely shatter-
ed at 0420 hours, when an extraordinary spectacle presented itself.
It was a sight that has rarely, if ever, been witnessed on a battlefield
in the modern era, and is unlikely to be seen ever again.
Without any indication or warning, the ridge running north from
the Haji Pir Pass towards Uri burst into flames. As the area was
thickly wooded, it was assumed that it was a forest fire which appear-
ed to be spreading rapidly. The flames then formed themselves into
long columns and snaked their way up the slopes towards the Haji
Pir Pass. After a few moments it became apparent what was happen-
ing. The enemy concentrations, in the Bhatgiran and other nearby
areas, had obviously received warning of the move on to the Salama-
bad feature. It had probably been interpreted by the enemy as being
an attempt to encircle the personnel in that area. This was under-
standable, as a continuation of the Salanlabad advance would have
landed I,Dogra on the Fir Panjal Range in the vicinity of Ledi Gali,
and cut the line of communication of those in the Haji Pir Pass area.
To aid them to attain speed in their flight, the enemy had lit torches
made of faggots, and had not been conservative in the numbers that
were gathered and lit. The torchlight columns were, unfortunately,
because of crest clearance, incapable of being engaged by the field
artillery, and a wonderful target had to go unpunished. It was most
frustrating, but nothing could be done other tlian to watch the Torch-
light Tattoo move further and further away and eventually disappear.
The obvious deduction drawn, from the pageant that had been
viewed, was that on the Salamabad feature there was either an
enemy observation post or perhaps a platoon patrol. Any doubt that
this was so was soon removed, as a section of 4.2-inch mortars started
shelling Uri from a position somewhere near the main road. The
fire, very definitely ordered in haste, was not directed at any parti-
cular target and in consequence was inclined to be wild. A few lucky
shots did, however, land close to the gun area and a few yards to
the east of Fort piquet, and inflicted three casualties. Although the
location of the enemy mortar section had not been spotted, the
Mountain Battery was ordered to engage various areas on the road
and near the base of the Salamabad feature, and had greater success.
A chance shot knocked out one of the mortars, which was found
next morning in a badly damaged condition. This must have acted
as a deterrent to the mortar section, as the firing ceased almost as
quickly as it had started.
The continued presence of the Pakistan Regular troops in the
Chakothi-Chinari area was now firmly established. The AKP units
had been equipped with threeinch mortars and had used them, but
never the 4.2-inch mortars. The advance of 163 Infantry Brigade
towards Tithwal, which it was hoped would result in the Pakistan
Regular Infantry Brigade being withdrawn, had not achieved that
object. 161 Infantry Brigade, when it moved forward, had therefore
to contend with a head-on clash against this Brigade, in a well
entrenched position, and in terrain which was eminently suited
to defence. This observation, supported by the fact that Uri had been
shelled by 4.2-inch mortars, was sent to HQ Sri Div and eventually
reached Delhi.
It was given no credence. An immediate rejoinder to HQ Sri Div
ordered it to inform HQ 161 Infantry Brigade that it was to cease
making wild statements. In order to prove that the report made was
no exaggeration, Rear H Q 161 Infantry Brigade, which had been
moved foward to Uri, was ordered to collect the tail fins of the
4.2-inch mortar bombs that were lying in the area and to despatch
them to HQ Sri Div for delivery to Delhi. Accompanying the package
containing the tail fins of the mortar bombs was a note to the effect
that neither 161 Infantry Brigade ndr 77 Para Brigade was equipped
with the 4.2-inch mortar, nor had it formed part of the J & K State
Force armoury. The AKP units and the Pathan tribals had not been
AN OFFENSIVE W m O U I TEETH
equipped with this weapon in the past, and it was most unlikely that
it now formed part of their arsenal. Despite what was unassailable
proof of Pakistan's active participation in the Kashmir operations,
her regular troops being deployed in the area, h y Headquarters'
insistence that it was nonsense continued, but only for a few more
days till they were presented with still further evidence, this time
in the shape of a prisoner of war.
At dawn, 2 Dogra broke wireless silence and reported that its
leading company was one thousand yards away from the final objec-
tive, Pimple Three, and advancing against no opposition. Although
the final objective was required to be taken by first light, which
would now be delayed by about half an hour, or at worst forty-five
minutes, the situation was satisfactory. The armoured column, of one
squadron 7 Cavalry and the rifle company 7 Sikh in Bren Carders,
was ordered to stand by to move at short notice, on receipt of orders
from Brigade HQ. Its move to the area of M.S.68 had, however, to
be postponed indefinitely, as almost immediately 2 Dogra reported
that it had run into trouble.
The message, received on the wireless from HQ 2 Dogra, stated
very bluntly that four of its platoons had been counter-attacked by
the enemy and scuppered. It was impossible to get any further
information as the set went off the air. Heavy firing of small arms
could be heard on Salamabad, and frantic efforts to regain contact
with the unit HQ succeeded only after a grim interval of twenty
minutes. The next report stated that of the four platoons, only the
company commander, one platoon commander, and two men had
survived what was described as a fierce hand-to-hand battle. The
enemy's strength was estimated at being over a battalion.
The Brigade plan had now been thrown completely out of gear,
as until such time as the enemy battalion on Salamabad was evicted,
and that would necessitate the launching of 6 Rajrif or 7 Sikh or
even both into the assault, no advance down the road could be
considered. Before committing either of these battalions into the
assault, it was essential that a clear picture was available as to what
features were in the possession of 2 Dogra, and which were held by
the enemy. Reports from HQ 2 D o g a were, however, garbled and
half-baked. Then, despite the fact that the Comma~dingOfficer was
unaware of the exact location of his d e companies, he called for
Artillery support without indicating which target he wished struck.
When asked where his artillery Forward Observation Officer was,
he said that he didn't know. The FOO was, in fact, within twenty
SLENDER WAS THE 1'HREAD
yards of him. This Gilbert and Sullivan opera continued until 0800
hours. How to terminate it was a problem. To have moved on to
Salamabad, and judged the position for myself, would have entailed
my having to segregate myself from the rest of the Brigade as it
involved a three hours' climb. This, with 4 Kumaon already on the
move on the right flank, was impossible at what was a most critical
juncture.
In order to get some idea of what features were held by 2 Dogra
on the Salamabad feature, I demanded that the battalion comman-
der give me his exact location on the ground, and the next moment
I was completely shattered. Instead of being with I-Lis forward com-
panies, he was with the reserve Company about eight hundred yards
in front of Brigade H Q located in Fort Piquet. There was now no
option but to take over command of 2 Dogra, ancl the first order
handed out was for the Commanding Officer to rnove immediately
on to the Salamabad feature, with the reserve company, and to join
up with his forward companies. I informed him not to issue any
orders to his forward companies without first obtaining my approval,
and to tell his Companies to stay put wherever they were and not
to wander about. The Battalion HQ would, in fact, be nothing more
than a Post Office for the next three hours, the time it would take
it to connect up with the rest of the battalion.
Then, taking a tremendous gamble - since I had no idea of the
exact location of the remnants of the 2 Dogra Rifle companies on the
-
Salamabad feature I ordered the field artillery to shell the area in-
between Pimples Two and Three. It was a dreadful thought that
casualties might be inflicted on my own troops, but if the enemy
was on the feature, that was his likely position. It was also reason-
able to assume that when the first few rounds, which would he
smoke, fell in the area, if it was in the hands of 2 Dogra there would
be an immediate protest. As no signal of dissent was received after
two rounds of smoke had been fired at the target, the field battery
was ordered to plaster the area, which it did by observation from
Fort Piquet.
At 0900 hours, HQ 2 Dogra reported that its forward companies
had indicated that all firing had ceased in the area to which the
four 'lost' platoons had moved. It was still not possible to indicate
the exact area, but there were unmistakable signs that the enemy
was concentrating to launch a counter-attack against the remainder
of the battalion. The ammunition had been almost expended and
AN OFFENSIVE WITHOUT TE-
the reserve ammunition was urgently required. This ammunition,

incidentally, was still lying within the unit lines in the Uri bowl.
W'ith the situation moving from the sublime to thc ridiculous, a
completely fresh approach to the problem was necessary. \+i't11 only
five rifle platoons remaining from the nine that had mounted the
feature, and tiley too with insufficient ammunition, the reserve
ammunition was not going to materially alter the situation, parti-
cularly if, as had been reported, there was an enemy battalion on
the feature. Salamabad had to be captured and cleared of the enemy.
Although it wa.s undesirable to commit the reserve battalion at this
early stage of the operation, there was now no o ~ t i o n At
. 1000 hours,
6 Rajrif moved forward, with orders to pass through the elements
of 3 Dogra, which would presumably still be on Pimple One when
6 Rajrif arrived, and to capture Pimples Two and Three.
Lt. Col. Kalaan and his men moved fast. That there were enemy
on the feature there is no doubt as they tried to retard the progress
of 6 Rajrif with long range sniping. It certainly was not a battalion,
and probably a platoon or a very weak rifle company. 6 Rajrif
reached Pimple One at 1230 hours, and spent the remaining hours
of daylight collecting 2 Dogra and reorganising the battalion.
Pimple One was then handed over to 2 Dogra and 6 Rajrif
prepared to attack the other two Pimples. Advancing from Pimple
One at 0.100 hours on 20 May, 6 Rajrif took Pimple Two and then
advancing to Pimple Three captured it without ~pposition,soon after
first light. The next few hours were spent handing over the positions
to 2 Dogra. When this had been completed, Lt. Col. Kalaan reported
seeing hundreds of the enemy crossing the bridge at M.S. 68 and
rushing back along the road towards Domel. He asked for permission
to rush towards Dardkot over the hills, in order to intercept them.
This was immediately agreed to, and 6 Rajrif swooped down on
Dardkot, but the enemy had had too big a start, and 6 Rajrif was
only able to fire into the tail end as it disappeared u p the Nawa
Rundan Nullah.
To return to 2 Dogra's escapade, which had completely wrecked
the Brigade plan in so far as timings were concerned, and had neces-
sitated the premature commitment of the reserve: the details of what
took place on the Sxlamahnd feature were learnt from Lt. Col. S. S.
Kalaan and later lrom the officers of S Dogra. It was quite clear that
three factors contribl-lted to the chaos : a total lack of command and
control, an arbitrary decision to change an order, and the flaunting
of the fact that a human being's sense of direction fails when in

strange surroundings, particularly so in darkness.
2 DOGM II
Tln Earmy LLL. p
2 Dogra had moved up the Salamabad feature, not as a battalion

which had been the order, but as three d e companies. Battalion
HQ and the reserve company remained in an area hours away from
the other companies, and with wireless silence imposed, the Batta-
lion Commander surrendered his prerogative of exercising command
and control of his unit from the obtset. Worse still, he left himself
impotent to iduence any battle that might demand the launching of
his battalion reserve.
When the Battalion Commander decided to remain behind, it was
essential that the operational control of the three companies moving
forward rested with one commander. The actions of the three corn-
panies demanded very close coordination, each Pimple being firmly
established before any move was made towards the next one. The
operation was never designed to be implemented by three independ-
ent rifle companies, and it was the failure to ensure that this was
clearly understood which started the rot. When the column was near-
ing Pimple One, the Company Commander of the company detailed
to occupy Pimple Two, instead of following on to Pimple One and
awaiting its consolidation, decided to save time by taking a short-cut
to Pimple Two and peeled off with his company in that direction.
This attempt to save time was fatal, as, quite apart from the fact
that it was dangerous, it had slipped the Company Commander's
mind that wireless silence had been imposed and there was no m e
thod by which he could indicate that he had reached Pimple Two
other than sending personnel back to Pimple One in the dark, which
could have been fatal. At the same time, the company earmarked
for Pimple Three could not move forward, and very correctly did
not because there was the perfect setting for an inter-company battle
in the dark.
The company heading for Pimple Two very soon found itself in
serious trouble as it entered thick jungle. Despite the moonlight it
lost all sense of direction. Meanwhile the other two companies
reached Pimple One, which was consolidated, and the company ear-
marked for Pimple Three stayed on Pimple One and awaited a report
that Pimple Two had been consolidated. The Pimple Two company
groped about in the dark for about two hours. At dawn it regained
its bearings, found itself about one thousand yards from Pimple
Two, and, moving towards it eventually consolidated the feature.
Feeling guilty over the damage that he had done, and learning that
the company earmarked for Pimple Three was still at Pimple One,
the Company Commander at Pimple Two decided to rectify matters
by taking Pimple Three himself. Almost at the same time he found
that he had lost his haversack in which was the battalion Operation
Order, which also included the Brigade plan in broad outline. He
therefore ordered the senior platoon commander to take the com-
pany to Pimple Three, and with another platoon commander and
two men \vent off in search of the missing haversack.
An enemy platoon, located on a flank between Pimple Two and
Pimple Three, was watching the company on Pimple Two and, per-
mitting it to go past, brought it undcr fire. IYireless silence was

immediately broken, the company calling for reinforcements. The
company which should have taken Pimple Three immediately sent
forward a platoon. The 'segregated' company, now four platoons
strong, took u p a defensive position and a fire battle commenced
with the enemy. The Company Commander and his party, hearing
the firing, gave up the search for the lost haversack but, finding it
impossible to rejoin the company, worked their way back to Pimple
One. That was how the report of the four 'scuppered' platoons and
the 'sole survivors' emanated. When 6 Rajrif arrived at Pimple One,
the enemy decided to witl~drawand the four lost platoons worked
their way back to Piinple One.
I t was not the troops who were responsible for this sad turn of
events but downright bad leadership. The men did all that was
asked of them, and had there been proper cvmmancl and control,
and the orders as issued carried out, there is no question of doubt
that 2 Dogra would have delivered the goods. The occupation of tlle
Salamabad feature had never been viewed as a major military ope-
ration. I t had been considered a simple and straightfor\vard opera-
tion. It was a much easier assignment than thnt given to 3 Dogra
on the return from Poonch, when the battalion, with only a few
minutes' warning, had to rush back, climb the Pir Panjal Range and
occupy the Haji Pir Pass. It had completed the task with speed and
efficiency. Nor can the Salamabad action even begin to bear com-
parison with the brilliant achievement of the sinall body of officers
and men of the battalion wllo had surmounted the dangerous Zoji
La Pass and made their way to Leh. That the men of the battalion
were capable and courageous, and if properly Icd could rise to great
heights, had been amply demonstrated.
The battalion had, during the six months that it had served with
161 Infantry Brigade, gained much in experience, and had shown a
marked improvement. The action at Salamabad is, therefore, some-
what incongruous, and when compared with its various past per-
formances does not add up correctly. The collundrum is, however,
answered if the missing factor, the plus value of leadership in opera-
tions, is taken into account. The column to Lch abounded with it
and attained a magnificent result, while the same battalion, whir11
had produced this column, started off with a leadership flaw at
Salamabad which escalated with each step up the feature. Tlle chaos
that followed was inevitable.
Chapter 20
Limited but Precious Gains
THE withdrawal of the enemy from the north to the south bank of
the Jhelum River, the moment 4 Kumaon's advance along the Kazinag
Range became known to them, had been foreseen, and the Brigade
plan had catered for this contingency with the formation of the
armoured column. The Salamabad set-back, and the consequent loss
of both time and surprise, had unfortunately presented the enemy
with a clear run, and lle had capitalised on it. What was worse, was
that when the armoured column set out, in unison with 6 Rajnf's
advance from Salamabad to Dardkot, it was halted by a burnt bridge.
An inspection of this bridge and of numerous other burnt wooden
bridges on the road to Dolnel showed quite clearly that their des-
truction had been accomplished during the previous twenty-four
hours. Had the column set out in accordance with the plan that had
been formulated, it would not only have stymied the enemy's escape
but also saved the engineers much hard labour.
The rapid advance of 6 Rajrif from Pimple Three on Salamabad

to the Dardkot area was, however, not infructuous. Its appearance
from an unexpected direction completely surprised a forward rifle
company of Pakistan's 1st Battalion The 13th Frontier Force Rifles,
located in a defensive position on a feature near Dardkot. The rifle
company withdrew hastily. Some Pakistan Engineers who were busy
preparing for demolition the steel girder bridge near Urusa were
equally shattered and, leaving their task, followed the withdrawing
rifle company. Having occupied the feature overlooking the bridge,
a party from 6 Rajrif moved forward to the bridge, collected a large
quantity of demolition stores, and having neutralised the work of
the Pakistan Engineers, rejoined the battalion. The saving of this
bridge from destruction was a great asset. Although a diversion
would have been constructed in the course of time, it would have
been, as the Kashmir State Engineers had stated, a herculean task.
Searching the area around its defensive position, 6 Rajrif found
the Quarter Master's store of the 1st Battalion the 13th Frontier Force
Rifles. This was located in a small red house not far from the eastern
approach to the steel girder bridge. It was well stocked with rations,
ammunition, blankets, clothing and the necessaries normally found
in a Quarter Master's store. In addition there were sewing machines,
bicycles and amenity stores. The orderly stacking of the various
items, and the carefully maintained ledgers, left no shadow of doubt
that the unit had been in the area for a considerable period of time.
There was also evidence to indicate that the QM's stores had had
orders to move back. This capture blew sky high Army Headquarters'
obstinate insistence that Pakistan Regular troops were not in Kash-
mir. Consolidating its gains, 6 Rajrif awaited the arrival of the
Brigade.
When 6 Rajrif moved from Salamabad to Dardkot, it was decided
to utilise the services of the Jammu & Kashmir Militia battalion. As
there was no intention of taking the unit forward, there was only
one area in which it could be employed and that was the Salamabad
feature. With the enemy in the Haji Pir Pass area having beaten a
hasty withdrawal, it was now reasonable to assume that the Salama-
bad feature would not be subjected to action. Even if 161 Infantry
Brigade had to piquet the feature, the maximum garrison would have
been one rifle company, and with a whole ~ i h t i abattalion on it
presence of such a large number of men would have deterred the
enemy from approaching it. With 2 Dogra holding the area, all that
the Militia had to do was to climb the hill and take over. A promise
LlMrmD BUT F'FUEIOUS cms
had been made that the unit would be used, and here was the ideal
opportunity to redeem it. C0ntac.t had been reported by 8 Rajrif
with a regular battalion of the Pakistan Army, and it was safe to
assume that a Pakistan Brigade was in the area. With only two batta-
lions available, 6 Rajrif and 7 Sikh, the move forward of 2 Dogra had
become a necessity, and this could most easily be achieved by hand-
ing over Salamabad to the Militia. The Militia battalion was, there-
fore, ordered to move on to Salamabad. I t set out in fine style, moving
in column of route and keeping in step.
This formation is normally used on a main road or on a barrack
square, and never in an operational area. With no possibility of
enemy intervention, and in order to avoid confusion by halting the
unit and ordering it to adopt a tactical formation, which it probably
did not know, it was permitted to proceed undisturbed. Its tactical
ability, which had always been suspect, was soon confirmed as being
non-existent, as the unit began to climb the feature as if it was every
man for himself. What was most disturbing was the total lack of
physical fitness. With the packs and weapons getting heavier with
each step, with only a quarter of the climb completed, the men of
the Militia started flagging and then came to a dead halt. It was
obvious that they would never make the summit of Salamabad in
any sort of condition, and it would serve no useful purpose to force
them to move forward. Orders were, therefore, issued for the unit to
return to Uri.
Efforts were made to try and persuade 77 Para Brigade to take
them over and use them in some sort of role, but this failed, and HQ
101 Infantry Brigade had no option but to return the unit to Srinagar:
Major General Thimayya, who was informed of what had happened,
was not one bit surprised, and agreed that the unit should be r e
turned. He had been pressurised to utilise the Militia. H e could now
state that they had been tried, and found too untrained to meet any
requirement of the battlefield. I t must have been most demoralising
for the men, who were very keen, and had been led to believe that
it was possible to turn a raw recruit into a combat soldier in two to
three weeks.
On the right flank, 4 Kumaon, having completed its reconnais-
sances, rested at Sikkibat during the daylight hours of 18 May, and
moved forward soon after darkness set in. In order to increase the
fire power of the battalion, four medium machine guns, which had
been captured from the enemy during the winter and were manned
by the unit personnel, accompanied the unit. The mountains over
which the battalion had to move were most forbidding, the heights
ranging from 10,000 to 13,500 feet. At 0200 hours on 19 May, 4
Kumaon reached its forming up place, point 11505. In order to reach
this position, the unit had carried out a wide encircling movement
which enabled it to concentrate in the rear of the enemy holding
Tragan, which lies to the north of the Maidan Pass. The enemy, one
company in strength, occupying a well constructed defensive posi-
tion, did not detect this move and was unaware of the fact that its
well sited position was about to be struck where it was weakest.
At 0230 hours, creeping forward as silently as was possible, the
leading troops of 4 Kumaon closed with the enemy before he knew
what was happening, and almost completely annihilated the gar-
rison, only a handful, assisted by the darkness, managing to make
their escape.
Consolidating its gain, 4 Kumaon began reconnoitering forward at
first light and prepared for its next attack. The objective was an
enemy rifle company entrenched at Chinal Dori, south of the Maidan
Pass. At 1230 hours in the afternoon, one rifle company of 4 Kumaon,
supported by 11 Field Battery and the unit mortar platoon, moved
forward to get into a suitable position from where the attack could
be launched. This again necessitated an encirclement move towards
Chinal Dori, which was completed during the hours of darkness,
and without rousing the enemy garrison. In position by 040 hours
on the morning of 20 May, the Kumaon company attacked at first
light, ant1 the enemy position fell after a savage battle. In order to
distract the enemy's attention from the encirclement, one rifle com-
pany of the Sawai Man Guards mounted a feirit attack on the right
flank of the enemy position, which apparently engaged his attention
so closely that he was totally unaware of the danger that threatened
his rear, until it descended upon him.
Chinal Dori was a brilliantly planned and executed action. The
Kumaonis, moving skilfully and making full use of ground and cover,
achieved surprise as complete as was possible. The supporting fire,
delivered from an opposite direction to the attacking troops, pinned
the enemy to the ground and then lifted as the attacking company
closed with the bayonet. The enemy fought hard and well, many
hand-to-hand encounters taking place, but the Kumaonis were in
irresistible form and, pressing their attack, gained the objective. As
at Tragan, very few of the enemy succeeded in making a getaway,
the majority being buried in the trenches that they had fought so
stubbornly to defend.
LIMITFCD BUT PRECIOUS GAINS
Chhota Qazinag, 10,657 feet in height, now faced 4 Kumaon. This

peak completely dominated the area, gazing down on those below
like a defiant giant. No one had any doubts that it was going to he
a very hard nut to crack. There were two approaches to the posi-
tion, one along the crest of the range and the other via the northern
flank. The southern flank was absolutely sheer, and incapable of
being scaled save by fully trained and equipped mountaineers. The
route along the crest was the easier of the two possible approaches,
but almost every inch of the ground was covered by enemy auto-
matics which would take a heavy toll of casualties. The more diffi-
cult approach, from the point of view of terrain, was therefore select-
ed. Nor was this the only problem that confronted Lt. Col. Man
Mohan Khanna. The extreme sharpness of the crest placed a strict
limitation on the number of sub-units that could b e deployed when
the ultimate attack was launched. The frontage could only accommo-
date about one platoon.
One rifle company was, therefore, detailed to assault the feature.
Advancing at 0400 hours on 21 May, it worked its way around
Chhota Qazinag until it reached a point due west of the feature.
Once again, the enemy failed to detect this move and the Kumaonis
were able to achieve surprise which was vital for success. Creeping
up the slope leading to the enemy defences, the Kumaon company
halted just below the crest and attacked as dawn was breaking.
The enemy reacted violently and a savage battle commenced. The
enemy company holding Chhota Qazinag, making quick adjustments
to its positions, fired its automatics and hurled grenades at the ad-
vancing Kumaonis, in a desperate effort to arrest their progress.
Determined and undeterred, the Kumaonis, u s h g all their skill in
groundcraft, steadily closed the gap and then rushed in with the
bayonet. The battle reached a crescendo, the trapped enemy fighting
desperately for every inch of ground. By 0900 hours, Chhota Qazinag
had been captured. The enemy suffered very heavy casualties, the
Kumaonis sustaining two killed and eleven wounded. With three
quick and spectacular successes notched up, 4 Kumaon were now on
top of the world.
There was now no holding the unit. Sufaida was assaulted and
taken and then Pandu was captured. But the enemy was certain to
try and bar the path of the steam roller advancing along the Kazinag
Range, and he made a determined bid to do so when 4 Kumaon
approached point 6873. This feature was held by two companies of
a regular Pakistan infantry battalion. Reconnaissances showed that
it was a formidable defensive position, heavily bunkered and its

frontage covered by medium inachine gun fire. It was, therefore,
subjected to a softening u p by the field artillery. When the artillery
fire lifted, at dawn on 24 May, two companies of 4 Kumaon moved
forward to assault the position, but the attack was halted almost
immediately by extremely heavy medium machine gun and light
automatic fire.
Lt. Col. Man Mohan Khanna was not going to be denied his prize.
Concentrating the light autonlatics and two-inch mortars of his two
reserve companies, and forming them into an ad hoe Support Com-
pany, he placed this company on a flank. Thls ad hoc company then
proceeded to pour a devastating weight of fire into the enemy de-
fences. As the enemy was still reeling under this, the two rifle com-
panies which had been held up during the initial assault worked
their way forward and assaulted with the bayonet. A fierce battle
raged for about twenty minutes, and then the enemy broke and with-
drew. The Kumaonis had inflicted very heavy casualties on the de-
fenders, their own being four killed and twelve seriously wounded.
With the capture of point 6873, the right thrust of the Brigade plan
had been a complete success. It had been achieved through skilful
planning, dash, and unbounded courage, and 4 Kumaon had every
reason to be elated. With the Kazinag Range firmly held, 161 Infantry
Brigade's right flank was secure.
With 6 Rajrif holding the Dardkot ridge, and the armoured column
held up at the first of a series of demolished bridges, the engineers
were ordered forward and took in hand the construction of diver-
sions. The squadron of armoured cars and the field artillery were
ordered to work their way forward as soon as each diversion per-
mitted them to do so, and Brigade Headquarters and 7 Sikh, the
company in Bren Carriers having dismounted and returned the
vehicles to Uri, set off for Dardkot on foot. Arriving just before 1400
hours, contact was made with 6 Rajrif, and 7 Sikh was immediately
deployed on the left flank of that battalion, and ordered to send out
patrols to the features adjacent to its positions. That the enem).,
although he had not engaged 6 Rajrif, was very close was quite cer-
tain, and it was also clear that he was occupying a very strong de-
fensive position in the area.
To attack a Pakistan Brigade of three regular infantry battalions,
and one that had been in the area for some considerable time and
was obviously well entrenched, 161 Infantry Brigade had two batta-
lions, 6 Rajrif and 7 Sikh, one of which would not be available for
LIMITED BUT PRECIOUS GAINS
an attack as it would have to hold a firm base. It, therefore, boiled

down to a position where one battalion would have to evict three,
a task which had slender hope of success. Had the enemy been com-
posed of ill-trained troops or tribals it might have been possible,
but not against regular troops occupying a strong defensive posi-
tion, armed and equipped in a fashion similar to our own, equally well
trained, and with the numerical odds of over three to one in their
favour. Sometlung, however, just had to be done, and if it was to
have any chance of success, it had to be carried out with the mini-
mum loss of time.
At 1700 hours, one of the Brigade jeeps arrived at Dardkot. In
order to ascertain the chances of the squadron of armoured cars and
the Field Battery moving forward, I drove back in order to obtain
a first-hand idea of when this would be possible. The engineers had
certainly done an excellent job, tackling all the demolished bridges
simultaneously, and the diversions would, I was informed, be ready
for the heavier vehicles within an hour. As there were only about
ninety minutes of daylight left, and not wishing the squadron and
the battery to be strung out along the road during the hours of dark-
ness, I drove to the point where they were held up and ordered one
troop of the armoured cars to move forward to Dardkot, when
possible, and the remainder of the squadron and the field battery
to return to Uri and await further orders.
As I was on the point of returning to Dardkot, with the light fad-
ing fast, I was informed that a 15 cwt Dodge truck had negotiated
the diversion at the first demolished bridge. This was good news,
and on reaching the diversion I congratulated the engineers, but
also had to reprove them for not having carried out what I con-
sidered a very essential precaution. On my way down fie road to-
wards Uri, I had instructed each team of engineers working on a
diversion to place an obstruction at either end of the demolished
bridge, so that personnel, animals and vehicles, moving in the dark,
would be warned and prevented from falling into the gap. This had
not been done, but I was assured that the order would be complied
with immediately.
Continuing my way back to Dardkot, on rounding a bend be-
yond which was the nest demolished bridge, I was greeted with a
sight that I had feared : the rear portion of a 15 cwt Dodge was
sticking out of the gap. Inquiries showed that it was the party of
engineers who, it had been reported, had moved forward. The.
vehicle had come shooting round the bend, and although the driver
had braked hard on suddenly noticing the gap, the vehicle's momen-
tum could not be arrested in time and it had plunged gently into
the gap. Fortunately, those in the vehicle sustained relatively minor
injuries in the form of broken ribs and fractures, but the accident
had deprived the Field Company of the services of its two officers,
at a time when they were most needed. A flash signal to HQ Sri Div,
however, proved fruitful and two replacements arrived the nelt
morning.
A troop of armoured cars arrived a t Dardkot at 2000 hours, and
tucked itself into a re-entrant on the side of the road. I t was decided
to use them as mobile pill boxes from the next morning. hleanwhile,
a patrol from 7 Sikh had returned and reported that it had heard
the enemy moving in strength towards the ridge overlooking the
western exit of the steel girder bridge. This could not be permitted.
It was essential that the bridge remained under our control, and
the enemy who was moving forward under cover of darkness had
to be stopped. 7 Sikh was immediately ordered to prepare to move
on to the same feature, commencing a t 2200 1:ours. Under normal
circumstances such an attack would not have been mounted, but
speed and darkness were invaluable allies, and both would deny to
the enemy the knowledge that h e was stronger than we were, a fact
that would become obvious the next morning if he was in posses-
sion of the feature.
With the object of achieving a certain amount of surprise, and at
the same time creating an impressiorl that a very heavy attack was
being mounted, the troop of armoured cars was moved forward
and placed in 2 position from which it could see the outline of the
ridge overlooking the steel girder bridge. It was instructed to train
the automatics a t the ridge, and commencing at 2200 hours, to rake
the area with fire for fifteen minutes. This, it \c7as hoped, \rlould dis-
tract the enemy's attention from 7 Sikh.
At 2200 hours, the armoured cars opened fire and 7 Sikh moved
forward to attack. After a few moments, enemy light automatics
replied, aiming their fire in the direction of the armoured cars. While
doing them no harm, it forced Brigade Heaciquarters. which ]lad
positioned itself near the armoured cars, to move to a more hospit-
able area. The fifteen minutes over, the armoured cars ceased firing
and there was a roar as 7 Sikh rushed in the diiection of the enemy.
The enemy battalion did not accept the challenge; it withdrcw
hastily and 7 Sikh took the position without loss. It sent back as a
LIMITED BUT PllECLOUS CAWS
prisoner of war an enemy rifleman, who stated that he was from the
1st Battalion The 13th Frontier Force Rifles.
During the morning and afternoon of 21 Mav, the enemy disclosed
a certain number of his positions by resorting to long range, inter-
mittent, medium machine gun fire. It was directed at the road, bht
because of the bends it was relatively simple to stay out of the line
of fire and to move past the danger zone during a lull in the firing.
7 Sikh was also subjected to bursts of firing, but as in the case of
the road, the damage done was negligible, the only casualty on the
road being one rifleman of 7 Sikh who was wounded in the leg. Two
other casualties, however, though not the result of enemy fire and
slight from the medical point of view, were serious from the opera-
tional angle. While not self-inflicted, and not the result of careless-
ness, they were caused by what can only be termed as an act of God.
The two Engineer officers, who had reported for duty at OSOO
hours on 21 May, as replacements for the two unfortunates who had
crashed into the gap of the demolished bridge, were hors de combat
by BOO hours the same evening. Tired, after a gruelling day's work
they fell asleep resting on the side of the road with their legs
stretched underneath a Dodge vehicle. As the driver of the vehicle
decided to move it to another spot, and did so, a rear wheel of the
vehicle ran over their legs and fractured one of the officers' ankle
and broke the other's shin. This was an expensive 'writing off' of
Engineer officers, and amused neither HQ Sri Div nor HQ 161 In-
fantry Brigade. Replacements from Delhi arrive6 in due course, and
fortunately the hoodoo on Engineer officers ceased.
On the morning of 22 May, HQ Sri Div signalled that an air strike
of two sorties would be available during the afternoon, weather
conditions permitting. This, while very acceptable, would be much
too light to do material damage of a major order to the heavily
bunkered enemy defences, and was unlikely to alter to any great
extent the situation facing 161 Infantry Brigade. It would, however,
be useful from a psychological point of view. The VHF wireless set,
for communication between ground and air, was ordered forward
and arrived at about 1100 hours. Loaded on a mule, t h e set arrived
a t the foot of the Brigade HQ feature, and Captain D'Souza reported
for orders.
With the hillsides steep and very slippery, D'Souza was given
strict instructions t o take the set off the mule and to have it carried
to the Brigade HQ Command Post. The mule leader, however, anti-
cipating that the wireless set would be required at the top of the
SLENDER WAS TKE TI-IREAD
hill, moved up a narrow track, and in a matter of seconds the mule

came slithering back and crashed into a ditch at the bottom. The
animal suffered only a few scratches, but the damage done to the
set was unknown. It was now much too late to call forward a reserve
set from Srinagar and to place it in position, and the only relief
available to the Brigade Staff was to castigate the stunned Captain
D'Souza. With no means of communicating with the pilots, the two
sorties would be valueless as target indication would be impossible.
D'Souza and his detachment sheepishly manhandled the equipment
to the Command Post and, after setting it up, announced, much to
their own and everyone's relief, that the set was undamaged.
The aircraft appeared on schedule at 1400 hours, and circled over-
head while the pilots were being briefed. The initial target, it was
explained, would be indicated with a round of blue smoke, and sub-
sequent targets with various combinations of coloured smoke. It had
been anticipated that the Pakistanis would try to confuse the pilots
by firing similar coloured smoke a t our positions, and in order to
counter this, varying combinations of the colour of the smoke, and
the intervals between them, were indicated to the pilots who were
briefed to ignore all other smoke seen in the area. What was anti-
cipated did in fact happen, but the pilots conducting the two sorties
were not deceived, and the strikes were made on the correct targets.
The air strike must have caused a certain amount of discomfort to
the Pakistan Brigade, but it was too light to achieve anything more
than that.
6 Rajrif and 7 Sikh had not sat back on their initial gains. Both
battalions probed forward and occupied features closer to the enemy
defences until 7 Sikh took u p a position on a spur to the west of
which, about one thousand yards away, was another spur with an
enemy battalion, firmly entrenched and fully supported by medium
machine guns and heavy mortars. The position occupied by 7 Sikh
proved to be a most unhealthy one. The enemy, located on a higher
spur, was able to look down on the unit and engaged it with medium
machine gun fire throughout the day. With 7 Sikh out in the open
and digging hard, the inevitable casualties were inflicted on the
battalion, and after fourteen men had been wounded over the next
forty-eight hours, it was decided to withdraw the unit to a position
slightly further back. This was successfully accomplished, and the
daily casualties which had been depressing, in that 7 Sikh could not
reply effectively from its previous position, ceased.
A stalemate having resulted, it was decided to strengthen the
LIMITED BUT PRECIOUS CAmS
Brigade position by bringing 2 Dogra forward. This was now neces-

sary in order to give the Brigade greater depth in defence. It was
fully realised that by evacuating Salamabad the line of commugica.
tion between Uri and Urusa would remain unprotected and a serious
risk incurred, but against this was a defensive position which very
definitely demanded depth and this could only be provided by a
third battalion. It was a choice between two evils, and it was the
lesser of the two that was selected, since, if the road was cut, HQ
Sri Div could employ the Para Brigade to re-open it.
Fantastic thcugh it may seem, soon after 2 Dogra moved forward
from Salamabad to the Dardkot area, HQ 2 Dogra 'lost' its corn-
panies. The move was being carried out in brozid daylight and over
the same route that had been taken by 6 Rajrif, and how it happened
is extremely difficult to understand. With HQ 2 Dogra feeling help-
less, a rifle company of 6 Rajrif was sent back to search for the
missing companies. It succeeded in locating them, after much hard
work, and led them to their new locations. Confused map reading
combined with companies moving forward independently must have
caused the confusion, but it was definitely accelerated by HQ
2 Dogra closing down its means of communication with its com-
panies and then being unable to regain contact. Handing over its
commitments to 2 Dogra, 6 Rajrif moved forward to the Urusa ridge.
With no further advance possible or contexnplated, 161 Infantry
Brigade confined itself to consolidating its gains and patrolling
vigorously. The squadron of armoured cars, based on Uri, was given
the role of road protection duties during the hours of daylight. The
guns of a troop of the field battery were manhandled u p a track
prepared by the engineers and placed in position on the Urusa
ridge. From this location, all crest clearance problems were eliminat-
ed, and the gunners were able to shoot effectively.
The steel girder bridge further to the west, at M.S. 58, was found
demolished, wit11 the enemy occupying strong emplacements on the
features overlooking the western exit of the bridge. The enemy
mediu~nmachine gunners were found to be very trigger-happy, blaz-
ing away at any target. But, apart from imposing caution, they did
no damage. The Pakistan Brigade made no attempt to recapture the
territory that it had lost, and was in fact very subdued.
161 Infantry Brigade's Spring offensive had not been spectacular,
with the exception of the effort on the right flank, but in view of the
strong enemy concentration that it had encountered, it had been rea-
sonable. To have tried to take Chinari, let alone Domel, single-handed
and with the dice loaded heavily against it, was impossible. 4 Kumaorl
had gained useful ground and was firmly entrenched on the Kazinag
Range, and nine miles of road territory had been gained by the main
thrust, despite the misfortunes that had plagued the Brigade from
the outset. It had, however, been a disappointing and to a certain
extent a depressing experience, and one which could have produced
quite a different result if Army Headquarters had responded positive-
ly to the request for another Infantry Brigade.
Chapter 21
Advantage Thrown Away
THE bridge constructed by the enemy over the JEelum River opposite
Sultan Dhakki, at M.S. 68, was invaluable as it provided a ready and
valuable link between 4 Kumaon on the Kazinag Range and 161
Infantry Brigade in the Urusa area. Had it been destroyed, the im-
mediately available route would have been via the bridge at Uri.
The ,engineers would certainly have thrown a bridge across the
river, but this would have taken time, and the evacuation of the
Kumaon casualties and the carrying forward of ammunition and other
stores would, in the meantime, have entailed a long trudge. Lt. Col.
Man Mohan Khanna was now able to visit Brigade H Q without
.having to make the extra trek to Uri. He was bubbling over with
confidence and was emphatic that he could hold on to his gains
against any attempts by the enemy to dislodge him.
77 Para Brigade now felt that it should be given a more active
role, and approached HQ Sri Div. Major General Thimayya posed
to me the possibility of the Kazinag Range, together with 4 Kumaon,
being handed over to 77 Para Brigade. While having no objection
to 77 Para Brigade taking over the Kazinag Range, there was no
reason why 161 Infantry Brigade should also have to hand over
4 Kumaon. This battalion could be very usefully employed in the
Urusa area. The reinoval of 4 Kumaon from 161 Infantry Brigade
was, therefore, stoutly resisted, and a counter-proposal was put
forward for his consideration. I suggested that I was quite prepared
to hand over the Kazinag Range to 77 Para Brigade, provided that
it relieved 4 Kumaon with its most experienced battalion, the 2nd
Battalion The 3rd Gorkha Rifles ( 2 ! 3 GR). I stressed that I had
laid down this stipulation as I could not afford to take a chance with
the right flank of 161 Infantry Brigade. I would withdraw 4 Kumaon
to Umsa when 213 GR was well settled in. The Commander 77 Para
Brigade was not, however, agreeable to utilising 213 GR to garrison
the Kazinag Range, and the idea was shelved.
The proposal that 77 Para Brigade take over the Kazinag Range
with one of its own battalions was not unreasonable. When 4 Kumaon
had passed through the Sawai Man Guards, who were holding
Goshar and point 9062, and had captured the whole of the Kazinag
Range, the holding of these two points was no longer necessary, and
the Sawai Man Guards had been withdrawn to Uri, where they were
in reserve. So for that matter were 213 GR, the Uri piquets, with
161 Infantry Brigade out in front, being manned by just one battlion.
77 Para Brigade thus had two battalions in reserve, while 161 Infantry
Brigade was fully stretched.
7 Sikh was finding that its frontage tended to. be too extended, not
an unusual state of affairs in the mountains, where for every positioil
occupied there is always a better one a bit further away. In the case
of 7 Sikh, however, the position was very acute, as the battalion was
located on the lower slopes of a spur which ran down from the lofty
Pir Panjal Range. There was a live danger of the enemy occupying
a higher feature on the left flank of the unit and overlooking its
defensive layout. In such an event, they could make the position
untenable. With 4 Kumaon released from Kazinag, this threat could
have been neutralised to some extent by locating the battalion in
echelon on the left of 7 Sikh.
FVith the enemy showing signs of, increasing activity, it was found
essential to place something on the left flank of 7 Sikh, and Lt. Col.
Man Mohan Khanna was asked whether it would b e possible for
him to release one company of 4 Kumaon for employment at Urusa,
ADVANTAGE T H R O W AWAY
and to take in exchange one company of 2 Dogra. He readily agreed

to this proposition, and the transfer was effected. The 4 Kumaon
company was placed under command 7 Sikh and positioned on a
knoll on the left flank. This company was to be faced with a situation
so amazing that it is difficult to believe that it actually took place.
At 1OOO hours on a sunny morning in the first week of June, a bugle
call sounded in the enemy lines. This was abnormal, but was dwarfed
by what was to follow. About fifteen minutes later, two rifle com-
panies of enemy troops appeared on the skyline of the feature held
by the fonvard battalion of the Pakistan Brigade, and began a
descent to the nullah below. Here they halted and proceeded to
adopt a battle formation. Well within the range of our medium
machine guns and mortars they could have been scattered in a matter
of minutes, but it was decided to leave them undisturbed until it
became clear what their intentions were.
After the rifle companies had carried out movements that would
have been appropriate if they had been performed on a parade
ground in a peace station, a whistle blast was heard and an advance
towards the feature held by 7 Sikh commenced. One enemy rifle
company was deployed in front, the second following about three
hundred yards to its rear. Crossing the nullah, the leading company
began the ascent. The twenty minutes required to negotiate the climb
gave 7 Sikh and the 4 Kumaon company ample time to make small
adjustments to their positions to beat off what was now clearly
intended to be an attack. For some unaccountable reason, the attack
was unsupported by covering fire of any description. Had the enemy's
idea been to gain surprise by not disturbing the defenders, it would
have been understandable, but the attack was mounted in broad
daylight and in full view of the defenders. And with bugle
and whistle sounds to boot, there was no chance of attaining any
surprise.
With their positions suitably adjusted, 7 Sikh and the 4 Kumaon
company waited calmly to accord a suitable reception to the enemy.
Before he had even neared the defences, it was perfectly obvious
that the fate of the leading company had been sealed, and that is
exactly what happened. As the two leading platoons neared the crest
and were onl~lforty vards awav, thev were subjected to a murderous
frontal and flanking fire and a hail of grenades. They were almost
decimated, as was the third platoon which attempted to run the
gauntlet. The follow-up company turned and rushed down the hill
and across the open nullah, suffering casualties from the medium
machine guns and the three-inch mortars which now came into
action.
An Identity Card retrieved from the pocket of the leading Com-
pany Commander disclosed that the unit was the 1st Punjab Regi-
ment. What tempted this famous Regiment, the senior-most Infantry
Regiment of the undivided Indian Army, to commit such an in-
comprehensible act is unfathomable. It could. by no stretch of
imagination be classified as an assault, it was sheer suicide. Not one
person in 161 Infantry Brigade felt elated over this action. If any-
thing, there was a general feeling of sympathy for the unfortunate
officers and men who had been sacrificed, thanks to the idiocy of
some grossly incompetent individual in command.
With 163 Infantry Brigade now firmly held up at Tithwal, Major
General Thimayya, anxious to set the advance in motion again,
suggested that the Kazinag Range be taken over by a battalion that
had arrived in the Valley and which he would send forward. I t was
the 1st Battalion The Bihar Regiment ( 1 Bihar). General Thimayya's
idea was that 4 Kumaon, on relief bv 1 Bihar, should proceed to join
163 Infantry Brigade a t Tithwal. His argument, in support of the
change in units, was that Kazinag was such a strong feature that it
could be held easily by a weak battalion. I disagreed with him, and
stated that the Kazinag feature was a strong position and would
remain so, but only as long as it was held by a strong and not a weak
battalion. I t was for this very reason that I had insisted, when it was
proposed that 77 Para Brigade take over the Kazinag Range, that it
would have to deploy on it its most experienced battalion. To entrust
the feature to 1 Bihar, which he himself admitted was a young and
inexperienced World War I1 raised unit, would be to take a grave
risk. I emphasised that I would b e most unhappy with the situation
if he insisted on the relief being effected, and requested him not to
force the issue. As a result of my arguments, Major General Thimayya
withdrew his suggestion and 4 Kumaon remained in situ.
This bidding for experienced battalions in his formation, which
Major General Thimayya was being subjected to, was hardlv the
position that one would expect a Divisional Commander engaged in
a serious operation to be plagur d by. He coulcl only effect changcs
in the Brigades by strengthening one at the expense of weakening
another, and as both 161 and 163 Infantry Brigades were facing
difficult situations, it was a state of affairs that should never ha1.c
been forced on him. Had 161 Infantry Brigade been able to assijt
by releasing any one of its experienced battalions, 6 Rajrif, 7 Sikh
ADVANTAGE THROWN AWAY
or 4 Kumaon, it wolild have done so gladly. But the situation facing

the Brigade did not permit such generosity. Far from being in a
position to hand out its experienced units at the expense of the
Brigade, there was pressing need for further units, of a high calibre,
to enable it to consolidate and hold the territory that it had gained.
The attitude adopted by Army Headquarters, from the inception
of HQ Sri Div, had been most extraordinary. There had been the
initial flat refusal for any further formations to make the Division a
reasonably strong one and capable of fulfilling its role. The despatch
of 7 Sikh to join 161 Infantry Brigade had been made grudgingly,
and only because it was very firmly stressed that with one unit in
an independent role on the right flank, the striking force of the Bri-
gade down the main road axis would be of two battalion strength
which, in view of the opposition that would be faced, was totallv
inadequate. Then, \rrhen both 161 and 163 Brigades were bogged
down, the inexperienced 1 Bihar was sent forward. The reinforce-
ments asked for were for employment in the Tithwal area, and the
battle envisaged was going to be a very stiff one. To have launched
1 Bihar into this battle was most inadvisable, and Major General
Thimayya was trying to absorb this battalion into a role where its
greenness would not be too apparent and the task within its capabi-
lities. The holding of the Kazinag feature was, however, not in that
category.
The company of 2 Dogra, sent to the Kazinag feature in exchange
for a company of 4 Kumaon, was placed by Lt. Col. Man Mohan
Khanna on a feature to the north of Pandu. I t was of no particular
importance, and although semi-isolated, the position was unlikely to
be attacked. In order, however, to enable the Dogra company to
further strengthen its defences, Lt. Col. Khanna had promised to give
it a medium machine gun. *Anxiety over the non-receipt of the weapon
resulted in daily inquiries by the Dogra company as to when it would
be delivered. These ~on\~ersations were held on the wireless, and in
clear. One afternoon, the signaller on the 4 Kumaon command set,
perhaps exasperated by the continual inquiries, informed the Dogra
company that the Commanding Officer was setting out the next
morning \vith the medium machine gun. This unforgivable violation
of security, which has been one of the main causes of loss of life in
battle, was going to claim its price, and the cost was a heavy one.
The enemy intercepted the message, and the stage was set for an
ambush.
SLENDER WAS ?'HE THREAD
Soon after 1 0 hours the next morning, Lt. Col. Man Mohan
Khanna set out for the Dogra company position, taking with him
the medium machine gun and its crew, and a plhtoon as escort. They
walked straight into the ambush. The enemy, a rifle company from
a regular battalion of the Pakistan Army, the 1st Battalion The 15th
Punjab Regiment, had chosen an almost perfect site for the ambush
and, dropping the major number of the party with well directed
fire, rushed in with the bayonet. Lt. Col. Khanna, whom a bullet had
struck through the chest, narrowly missing his heart, was fortunately
assumed to be dead and was spared the thrust of a bayonet. Regain-
ing consciousness after some time, he managed to reach a nearby
hut, which he and the survivors of the ambush made into a strong
point and engaged the enemy. The enemy withdrew after some time,
but only one rifleman with a wound in the neck and Lt. Col. Khanna
survived the action.
While lying in the hut, with slender hopes of being found and
recovered in time, a local villager, Jumma Mohammad, happened to
arrive on the scene and looked into the hut. Lt. Col. Khanna offered
him all the money in his possession, and a very substantial reward
if he would assist him to get back to his battalion. The villager imme-
diately agreed and led a relief party to the seriously wounded officer
and rifleman. Having done so, the villager refused to accept any re-
ward, monetary or otherwise, stating that what he had done was a
normal assistance to a wounded comrade. His name was, however,
brought to the notice of the Emergency Government of Jammu and
Kashmir. Jumma Mohammad was awarded the Vir Chakra b y the
Government of India and Rs. 25 a month for life. That Lt. Col.
Khanna survived was due to his good fortune and the gallant act of
the villager. His incapacitation was, however, a severe blow both to
his battalion and 161 Infantry Brigade, as he had proved himself to
be a thoroughly competent and skilful leader.
A sixth sense is said to be always an asset. In the battlefield it is
invaluable. While not claiming to possess a sixth sense or even a
semblance of one, on 24 June, soon after the ?awn patrols had re-
turned and reported all clear, 1 got an extraordinary feeling that
something strange was taking place on the left flank of the Brigade.
Calling up Lt. Col. Kalaan, whose Rajrif patrols had moved out in
that area earlier in the morning and had reported no signs of the
enemy, I asked him to debrief them again. I explained that I wa5
particularly anxious to know whether they had noticed any thin^
strange in the area, or had seen anyone, even a local, moving about.
A D V M A C E THROWN AWAY
Lt. Col. Kalaan reported, in due course, that the patrols had not seen
a soul in the area and that everything had been normal.
As the morning progressed, the queer sensation grew stronger and
stronger, until unable to tolerate it any longer, I ordered 6 Rajrif to
despatch a platoon patrol up the spur running between the Goalta
and Nawa Rundan Nullahs, as soon as was possible. The platoon set
out at 1000 hours and at 1115 hours it flashed back a message that
it had spotted the enemy, estimated at about a battalion in strength,
moving down from the crest of the Yir Panjal Range on the spur
that it was occupying. I phoned Major General Thimayya immediate-
ly, and he was fortunately at his Headquarters. I told him of the recent
development, and asked for two battalions from 77 Para Brigade
to be placed under command of 161 Infantry Brigade immediately,
so that I could move out to combat what would develop into a most
dangerous threat.
Major General Thirnayya was naturally rather dubious a t first,
and reminded me that the Brigade's Situation Report, received only
two hours earlier, had reported everything clear. H e could not under-
stand how the situation could have undergone such a radical change
in so short a period, and wondered whether the patrol had assessed
the situation correctly. Giving me two battalions of 77 Para Brigade,
he stressed, would seriously affect the operational efficiency of that
formation, which was undesirable. 'I informed him that I was com-
pletely convinced that the patrol's report was accurate, and know-
ing how short he was of units, I would never have made the request
had I been in a position to deal with the threat with my own re-
sources. I promised him that if what I intended doing turned out
to be a wild goose chase, I would send the two battalions back to
Uri within forty-eight hours. Major General Thimayya finally agreed,
and said that he would issue the necessary orders to the Commander
77 Para Brigade, on the telephone, immediately.
A quick conference followed with the Brigade Staff and the unit
commanders in the Urusa area. 7 Sikh, with 2 Dogra under com-
mand, was made responsible for holding the Brigade defences in
the Urusa area. 6 Rajrif was ordered to move up the spur between
the Goalta and Nawa Rundan Nullahs and to take up a position in
the area already occupied by its patrol which had remained in
observation. One battalion of 77 Para Brigade, I informed the con-
ference, would be sent by me from Uri, and on arrival was to be
guided on to the spur which lay between the Goalta and Kaliane de
Kas Nullahs. Tactical Headquarters, consisting of the ~ r i g a d eIn-
telligence Officer, Captain Harpal Singh Bedi, and a signal detach-

ment, would move with me to Uri and from there, with the second
unit of 77 Para Brigade, move on to the Salamabad feature and make
for Khilla Dher, which lay about 4,500 yards to the north-east of
Ledi Gali. Calls for artillery support were to be made to Main
Brigade HQ at Urusa by battalions, but they would have to direct
the shoot themselves, while Tactical Headquarters would pass to
Main Headquarters any demands for air support and Main H Q would
brief the pilots on the VHF set. When all three columns were ready,
I would give the order to advance. With everyone clear about their
varicus roles, I hurried off to Uri.
Brigadier Nair of 77 Para Brigadc was not particularly pleased
when ordered by HQ Sri Div to hand over two battalions to 161 In-
fantry Brigade. His annoyance can well be appreciated. 77 Para Bri-
gade had been wanting to see some action, and while two of the
battalions of the Brigade would now probably be engaged in battle,
it was to be under another Brigade Headquarters. He suggested that
2/3 GR should remain in Uri and the unit manning the piquets with-
drawn and handed to me together with the Sawai Man Guards. Time,
however, was of paramount importance, and the delay that the with-
drawal of the piquet battalion would entail was quite unacceptable :
2/3 GR and the Sawai Man Guards were handed over. 2/3 GR was
embussed and rushed off to Urusa, and on arrival guided to the spur
on the right of 6 Rajrif, and which led to Pir Kanthi, while the Sawai
Man Guards were ordered to accompany Tactical Headquarters to
the Salamabad feature and on to Khilla Dher.
At 1315 hours all three battalions reported readiness to start, and
the three-pronged advance commenced at 1330 hours. While the right
and left prongs made unopposed progress, at 1430 hours 6 Rajrif, in
the centre, reported contact with leading elements of the enemy who
were being forced back. This continued until 1800 hours when, with
darkness setting in fast, all three battalions werz ordered to halt and
to firm in for the night. Tactical Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade
and the Sawai Man Guards, and 2/3 GR had made reasonable pro-
gress, but 6 Rajrif, facing increasing opposition as it advanced, was
slightly behind in terms of distance advanced.
The climb to the crest of the Pir Panjal Range on all three axes of
advance was extremely stiff. In places it necessitated dragging one-
self up with both hands. To increase the difficulties, a drizzle
started soon after darkness had set in, and then it poured for the
greater part of the night. With no cover, everyone was soaked; and
the cold breeze that blew after the rain did not make life any easier.
6 Rajrif and 2 / 3 GR not only faced steep ascents but had to move
t h ~ o u g hvery thick scrub and forests. The advance commenced the
next morning, 25 June, at 0600 hours, and followed the pattern of
the previous day, the two flank battalions meeting no opposition,
and 6 Rajrif, although faced with stiff resistance, steadily forcing its
way forward.
At 1100 hours, Tactical Headquarters and the Sawai Man Guards

reached Khilla Dher ( 11,010 feet), which gave an excellent view of
Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi. The enemy could be seen moving about
oh the crest of the Pir Panjal Range. 2 / 3 GR continued to report un-
opposed progress, while 6 Rajrif reports indicated that the enemy
resistance was showing definite signs of weakening and he was fal-
ling back fast. This was, perhaps, due to the enemy detecting the
presence of the Sawai hlan Guards on the flank at Khilla Dher. This
position was visible from both Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi, and it was
impossible to conceal the fact that troops were present on it in large
numbers. The enemy on the 6 Rajrif spur was clearly visible to Tacti-
cal Headquarters and the Sawai Man Guards. He was withdrawing
as fast as he could towards the crest of the Pir Panjal Range. It was
a wonderful target, but unfortunately out of the range of the light
automatics of the battalion. The unit had, however, brought with it
a section of three-inch mortars, and this section was ordered to get
ready for action.
This was not a simple matter, as the ground was extremely rocky
and undulating, and it was difficult to find a suitable spot on which
to lay the mortar base plates. A couple of possible spots were even-
tually found, but they were not entirely satisfactory, and there was
a live possibility that the base plate would shift when the mortar
was fired, and throwing the barrel off alignment, hurl the projectile
in the wrong direction. A round of smoke was, therefore, fired, but
instead of landing near the enemy, towards whom all eyes were
focussed, it caused white smoke to spiral from what would have
been almost the centre of the Rajrif position on the middle spur, and
about sixty degrees to the right of the intended target. 6 Rajrif lost
no time in informing the Sawai Man Guards what it thought about
it. Fortunately no damage had been done. The mortar section plead-
ed that it be given another chance but it was refused, as although
it would probably have rectified the error and engaged the enemy,
it was much too great a risk to take.
An air strike against both Ledi Gali and Pir Karrthi was called for,
and aircraft struck both targets, but it was not possible to assess the
extent of the damage done. The strike must, however, have had some
effect on morale and left the enemy in no doubt that we knew ex-
actly where his positions were and that they would be subjected to
an attack in the very near future. However, the air strike was limited
to two sorties, and was not heavy enough to cause serious damage
to the strongly bunkered positions. Only a much greater air effort
would have produced any appreciable result.
At 1600 hours, 6 Rajrif and 2 / 3 GR reached points on their respec-
tive spurs, almost in line with the Sawai Man Guards and about the
same distance from the Pir Panjal Range. Lt. Col. Kalaan walked
across to Tactical Headquarters, but the Commanding Officer 2/3
GR, who was a little too far off to come over and return to his unit
well before last light, was told that he should remain with the unit,
and that the orders would be sent to him by hand. It was decided
ADVkVTAGE THROWN AWAY
to spend the next day, 26 June, in reorganisation and reconnaissances,

and to attack L e d Gali and Pir Kanthi on 27 June.
The plan of the attack was for the Sawai Man Guards to attack
Ledi Gali, and 2/3 GR, Pir Kanthi. 6 Rajrif, the centre battalion, was
to be in reserve. The assault was to be mounted at dawn on 27 June,
and with only very limited supporting fire available, limited to a few
mortars. The targets being out of the range of the field artillery,
HQ Sri Div was requested to provide as many air strikes as were
possible during the morning, afternoon and evening of 26 June. With
the extremely difficult terrain facing the attacking battalions, espe-
cially 2/3 GR, the final ascent to the defences being almost sheer,
it was impressed on both the battalion commanders that they must
adhere very strictly to the timings laid down, and press home their
attacks, or else the enemy would be afforded the opportunity of
taking on one battalion first and then turning on the other.
I was unfortunately not to witness the plan cperating. Soon after
arriving at Khilla Dher, I developed a splitting headache and began to
feel feverish. Ascribing it to a touch of influenza, brought about by the
soaking during the hours of darkness and the cold breeze, I obtained
two aspirins from the Regimental Medical Officer of the Sawai h3an
Guards. After discussing the plan for the assault with Lt. Col.
Kalaan, who then returned to his battalion, I sent the RMO a request
for some more aspirin. He came to me, felt my pulse and imme-
diately took my temperature which turned out to be 104 degrees.
I was provided with a blanket from the Regimental Aid Post, and
although it was damp from the rain it was a luxury. Wrapping my-
self in it I rested against a rock. It was not possible to lie flat because
of the sharp rocks, and the result was a restless night. The next
morning, 26 June, the RMO took my temperature and said that it
was 99 degrees, but a couple of hours later it shot up again to 101
degrees, and proceeded to alternate throughout the day. At 1500
hours the RMO decided that I must be evacuated, stating that he
was not prepared to have the Brigade Commander die on his hands.
With the attack due to start the next morning, I insisted on remain-
ing on the feature, but at 1600 hours, when I tried to move forward
to have a last look at the preparations made by the Sawai Man
Guards, I found that my legs had turned into rubber and would not
support me. The RMO, armed with a signal from HQ Sri Div, had
meanwhile organised a party of porters, who had arrived with
ammunition and rations for the battalion, to lift me down to the
road on a stretcher. This, however, proved impossible because of
the steepness of the terrain, and I was carried down a re-entrant in-
between the 6 Rajrif and Sawai Man Guards held spurs, pick-a-back,
and delivered to a jeep of 60 Para Field Ambulance which was
waiting on the main road.
Detained for the night in the Field Ambulance in Uri, I was eva-
cuated to the Military Hospital in Srinagar the next day. Whatever
ailment I was suffering from certainly mystified the doctors. Malaria,
influenza and pneumonia were eliminated as they did not fit in with
the symptoms, the temperature continuing to rise and fall through-
out the day. As tick typhus was suggested as a possibility, intravenous
arsenic injections followed. After four days in the Military Hospital
in Srinagar, I was evacuated to the Military Hospital in Delhi Can-
tonment, but not before I received the very heartening news that
Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi had been captured.
It had been a stiff battle, and Lt. Col. S. S. Kalaan, who was
entrusted with the command of the operation, conducted it extremely
well. The Sawai Man Guards and 2,/3 GR had advanced according
to schedule, but the extremely steep terrain that they encountered
had slowed them down. The enemy had also reacted violently, but
the two battalions grimly held their ground and, having weathered
the storm throughout the hours of daylight, had scaled the last bit
of the climb after darkness and successfully assaulted the enemy
defences on the morning of 28 June. With the two battalions firmly
established on the feature, the Pir Panjal Range from Pir Kanthi,
through Ledi Gali and on to the Haji Pir Pass was now firmly in the
hands of 161 Infantry Brigade. Both the right and left flanks of the
Brigade were now secure.
At the Military Hospital in Delhi, my illness was diagnosed as re-
lapsing fever and the arsenic injections continued. Lt. Col. Man
Mohan Khanna, also a patient in the hospital, and now walking
gingerly, used to come in for a daily chat. One morning he arrived
in a very agitated state of mind, and announced that Pandu had
fallen, and with it the enemy had recovered quite a bit of further
territory on the Kazinag Range, only being halted with difficulty. I
was speechless. It was unbelievable that such a thing could happen.
Then, before I could say a word, he added verv quietly : "They did
what you resisted so strongly, they took 4 Kumaon away and placed
1 Bihar on the feature."
When it was decided to evacuate me from Srinagar to Delhi, and
the doctors stated that I would not be able to return to 161 Infantry
Brigade for at least six weeks, Brigadier T. B. Henderson Brooks was
ADVANTACE THROWN AWAY
sent to the Valley and took over command of the Brigade. A few days
after his arrival Major General Thimayya contacted him and offered
1 Bihar as a relief for 4 Kumaon on the Kazinag Range. Henderson
Brooks, who was a virtual stranger to the area and apparently had
not realised what the holding of the Kazinag Range demanded, un-
fortunately disregarded the advice given to him by the Brigade Staff
who informed him of my views on the subject, and accepted the
Divisional Commander's offer. It was a militarily unsound decision,
and 161 Infantry Brigade was made to pay dearly for it.
With 1 Bihar in position, 4 Kumaon moved to 163 Infantry Brigade.
Its presence in the Tithwal area did little to alter the existing situa-
tion, but its absence from Kazinag did. The Pakistanis, learning that
an inter-battalion relief had taken place, decided to test the new
battalion, and sent forward a strong fighting patrol to Pandu. The
1 Bihar company holding Pandu fought well, and having failed in
its object, the enemy patrol decided to withdraw and proceeded to
do so. In order to thwart any attempt to harass his withdrawing
command, the Pakistan battalion commander left a platoon in posi-
tion to act as a rearguard. This enemy platoon naturally kept the
Pandu garrison under fire.
Whether it was lack of knowledge of the terrain, or garbled reports
received from the Pandu garrison, confusion soon overtook the in-
experienced battalion. For no cogent reason, the 1 Bihar company
which had in fact held the enemy attack was ordered by the Com-
manding Officer to withdraw, and did so. The enemy platoon, which
must have been utterly amazed, walked on to the position and the
enemy battalion, informed of the success, hurried back. It then pro-
ceeded to advance along the Kazinag Range from west to east. Its
progress was arrested only by another battaliori being rushed to the
Kazinag feature, but not before much valuable territory had been
lost.
What 4 Kumaon had gained through careful planning, skill and
unbounded courage, had been thrown away in a matter of hours.
It was a very expensive mistake. iT7ith Pandu in its possession, the
Pakistan Artillery established an observation post, from where it
was able to bring down fire by observation on Uri. The occupation
of a portion of the Kazinag Range by the enemy also changed what
had been a secure right flank into one of partial security the enemy
now being able to harass a section of the main road with fire, and
interfere with the line of communication from the road to Kazinag
via the bridge over the Jhelum River at M.S. 68.
The five and a half months between the loss of territory on the
Kazinag Range and 31 December 1948, when a Cease Fire Agree-
ment between India and Pakistan came into operation in Janlmu and
Kashmir, were more or less uneventful so far as military operations
affecting 161 Infantry Brigade were concerned. There was normal
patrol activity intermingled with the laying of ambushes, but noth-
ing in the shape of a major clash disturbed the atmosphere. It was
clearly evident that both 161 Infantry Brigade and the Pakistan
Brigade facing it had realised that, with the mountainous terrain
favouring defence and the opposing forces equally balanced, a major
attack would probably result in minor gains being achieved at a
relatively high price in casualties. There was no possibility of a large
scale offensive being launched unless strong reinforcements were
brought forward, and a stalemate developed along the front.
In the Tithwal area, 163 Infantry Brigade faced a similar situation.
The paucity of troops, the difficult terrain, and the logistical problem
becoming more acute with every step forward in the face of increas-
ing enemy opposition, any spectacular advance was almost an im-
possibility. 163 Infantry Brigade therefore engaged itself in con-
solidating its gains, and strengthening its positions by evicting hostile
elements from tactical features which overlooked its defences and
were proving to be of nuisance value.
Headquarters Sri Division, realising the futility of pressing either
161 or 163 Infantry Brigade to hammer their heads against a brick
wall, and accepting the stalemate on these two fronts, now turned
its attention to the mounting of an operation on another front -
the relief of Ladakh. In this sector, elements of the enemy force
that had been deployed to conduct Operation Sedge were still very
active. The small gallant party that had set out from 161 Infantry
Brigade, and which had been reinforced by the two companies of
214 Gorkha Rifles and the Jammu & Kashmir State Force detachment
at Kargil, was in dire need of relief. The relief operation, carried
out by troops inducted into Kashmir and supported by Stuart tanks
of 7 Cavalry, proved successful and a link-up with Leh in Ladakh
effected. It is not intended to probe deeper into this operation, as
the factual story can best be related, and will doubtless be placed
on record, by someone with a first-hand knowledge of the operation.
It is mentioned here as it was the finale to that great effort by the
small party from 2 Dogra of 161 Infantry Brigade, who underwent
immense hardships to reach and hold on to the area until relief
eventually arrived.
Jammu Division, formed simultaneously with Sri Div, and respon-

sible for the conduct of operations in Jammu and Poonch, opened
its campaign with the relief of Pooncl~as one of its main tasks. Ever
since 161 Infantry Brigade had moved from Uri across the Haji Pir
Pass and placed 1 Kumaon in Poonch on 21 November 1947, all land
communications with Poonch had remained severed. An airstrip had
been constructed by the Poonch garrison and further reinforcements
had been flown in, but for all practical purposes Poonch had remain-
ed under constant threat and under a partial siege. The enemy tried
to neutralise the advantage bestowed by the airstrip by bringing it
under fire a t every possible opportunity, but Brigadier Pritam Singh
thwarted all their designs in this sphere.
Jammu Division's operations to link up with Poonch were watched
with keen interest by those who had served and were still serving
with 161 Infantry Brgiade. Poonch had been spared the fate that
befell Baramula by one of the Brigade's original battalions, 1
Kumaon, and this unit had played the main role in saving the town.
Although in no position to assist materially, 161 Infantry Brigade
had been watching closely the actions and exploits of the Poonch
garrison. The eventual link-up was, therefore, greeted with much
jubilation when the news filtered through. A patrol from the Ledi
Gali-Pir Kanthi area moved south and made contact with a patrol
from 1 Kumaon which had moved out to the north from Poonch.
With the capture of Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi, the siege of Poonch
could, in fact, have been lifted by Sri Div had it been given the
troops to do so. With these two features firmly held, the Haji Pir
Pass was once again an open route. A small engineer effort at the
burnt bridge a t milestone 7, ~ ~ h i chad
h caused the Brigade so much
trouble on its return journey from Poonch to Uri on 22 November
1947, and the cutting of a path into the Batar Nullah near the bridge
destroyed by the State Forces about eleven miles from Poonch, would
have enabled a motor convoy of 15 ca-t Dodge trucks and jeeps with
trailers to makc its way to Poonch with little difficulty. A column on
foot, supportecl by animal transport, could at anv time ha\re made
the trip. Had Jammu Division run into serious difficulties or been
subjected to abllormnl delay, Poonch could have been afforded relief
with a move from Kaslimir.
An error that 1iad coqt 11s such valuable territory on the Kazinag
Rangc was, ho\vcvcl., to bc followed by another. This one was to
have cvcn grcnter rel>c3~.clissions. It was a tactical mistake of the
highest order, and therc is not a single argument that can be advan-
SLENDER W A S TIIE THREAD
ced to mitigate the seriousness of the lapse. With negotiatioi~spcr-

taining to a Cease Fire well under way, and cvery possibility that it
would come into effect, extreme caution and care was called for to
ensure that all territory in our possessior~was securely hcld. A usual
feature of any Cease Fire Agreement is the all important one that
all forward movement will cease froin the time that the Cease Fire
comes into effect, and the initial Cease Firc Line is normally traced
on a map in-between the territory in the physical possession of the
two contestants. Attempts at eleventh-hour liibbling by the enemy
into one's territory had therefore to be gunrded against with the
utmost vigilance.
The withdrawal of 4 Kumaon from the Kazinag Range, and its
replacement by the inexperienced 1 Bihar, had resulted in a severe
loss of territory, but there was at least one consolation, that it had
been kist after offering some resistance. Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi,
and with it the Haji Pir Pass and a deep salient beyond it, were lost
without a shot being fired. What 161 Infantry B r i ~ a d e ,reinforced
by two battalions of 77 Para Brigade, had sacrificed lives to secure,
was unfortunately presented back to Pakistan on a platter.
The Brigade Commander, on the score that the snow on the l'ir
Panjal Range was too heavy, withdrew the Lcdi Gali and Pir Kanthi
garrisons a few days before the Cease Fire came illto efrect. I11 doin:,:
so, he not only threw open to the enemy the firrnly lleld Pir Panjal
Range but, worse still, he left 161 Infantry Brigade wit11 its left flank
unprotected, permitted the route to Poondl over the Haji Pir Pass
to be cut, and presented to the enemy the ability to posc a thrcat to
Uri from the south. Snow, no matter how deep, had ncvcr bcen
considered nor proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to the troops
of 161 Infantry Brigade during the winter of 1947-48, ancl at that
period they were neither fully outfitted nor fully acclin~atiseclto face
the heights and the weather conditions. By t l ~ e~vintci.of 1948, th(1
experience gained during the previous winter was availal~lc,and thv
necessary administrative and other rcquiremcnts had been well taken
care of.
Had the piquets established by 161 Infantry Brigade, during thc
winter of 1947-48, ill-equipped as thc men werct to coml~atsno\I
conditions, wit11 tlle snow no less 11cavy tllrln that c\-peric~nccd011
the Pir Panjal Range, been withdrawn on the excuse that the snon.
was too deep and the piquet positions therefore untcnal)lc, it is not
improbable that 161 Infantry Brigade woultl 11;ivc 1)ccn tllro\vn 11;lcl;
from Uri and Mahura to the Srinngar Valley. T l ~ cCease Fire Line
ADVANTAGE THROWS A W A Y
would then probably have been drawn somewherc in tlic area bet-
ween Baramula and Uri.
Whilc the snow on the Pir Panjal Range was considered to be
much too heavy and deep to be faced by the troops oE the Indian
Army, it proved to bc no obstacle to the Pakistanis. The excuse is,
therefore, quite unacceptable. Even troops coming from areas devoid
of snow such as Rajastllan and Madras had operated extremely well
in the snow of the winter of 1947, and had not found it either too
heavy or too deep. The ofFicers and men of 2 Dogra had bravcd
snows which were probably six times deeper than anything that the
Pir Panjal Range is subjected to, when they crossed the Zoji La Pass.
Wit11 the flood gates thrown wide open, the Pakistanis lost no time
in occupying the abandoned Ledi Gali and Yir Kanthi piquets, and
advanced even further to the east. It was a heaven-sent gift and
Pakistan accepted it with grateful hands. With the Haji Pir Pass now
once again in their possession, the Pakistanis fanned out rapidly to
the north-east, east and south towards Poonch, creating a very deep
salient. The extent of this salient is shown on the sketch map. II'hile
the whole of it may not have resulted from the abandonment of tlle
two important piquets, the arcas closer to Poonch being the responsi-
bility of the Poonch Brigade, there is no doubt that the lapse by the
Brigade Commander responsible for the Pir Panjal Range left Poonch
Brigadc no opportunity to salvage the situation, as the Cease Fire
came into operation almost immediately.
SLEFDER WAS THE THREAD
- 0
- 0
I
I
o 0 H A J l PIR PASS
0
1 "
=A
-
.-0
\
\
0
. \
I H+d c/
SKETCH SHOWING THE CEASE FIRE LINE
-0
-0
- - .- --
THC CEASE f l R t L I N E . - -S-* 4 I
TERRITORV LOST - - -- I
I
L I M I T OF ADVANCE OF 0 PUNCH
.=I INC rnc ,A DIIUPU nnr
Chapter 22
A Costly Legacy
THWEare few catnpnigns in l~istoryin whicll an Infantry ~ r i g a d e

formed of llurricdly assemb1c.d bits and pieces. with units and sub-
units having their lcaders removed and replaced by others who were
strangers to the men, and 117itll0~1tthe full co~nl~lement of \Ireapons,
11i1s11cc.n pitchforked into a serious I~ilttle~vhilcstill in tlle process
of hcins built up. It spc'.iks \olumes for tile oificers and lnen of 161
Infantr). Brigndr. that it \vcldecl itself within a few days into one of
the lli~rdvst!littill? Brigiides of the India11 -4rrny.
Had it hecn otller~i,isc,it is not cliffic~~lt to \.is~lalise 1~11ntm i r l ~ t
ha\.e 1lal)pcnetl to thc Vallvy and to L,adakh. Srinagar ~irouldproll-
and Baramula, and a pillaged
~11-)1!;I~a\.cmct tllcl f'aic. of hI~izafi"iral),~d
Leh \\.auld hn\,c. beco~nct i i c l 1lillTIC' of a duad city on anotl~ercoun-
try's 111ap. 'That t1)c.y slir\ i \ nrltl itre fiourisllinq is due to n band of
warriors of' unparallc.lcd l ~ r ~ . i \ , vwho
~ y accepted every disadvantage
SLENDER W A S THE THREAD
without murmur and who had an uncanny knack of producing the

impossible at the right moment.
Could 161 Infantry Brigade have done even better, and cleared
Kashmir altogether of the raiders, in which event the unresolved
issue would not have remained a legacy of the sub-continent's
partition bedevilling the relations between India and Pakistan and
enabling foreign Powers to advance their own interests by playing
one country off against the other ?
The answer to the question will be evident from the foregoing
narrative. 161 Infantry Brigade would certainly have made a good
attempt, and with every chance of success, had it been permitted to
advance beyond Uri, along the axis of its offensive, on to Domel,
with the reinforcement of striking power that the situation demand-
ed. The Brigade had fought from Shalateng, through Baramula and
on to Uri with two infantry battalions, one troop of armoured cars
and later a Mountain Battery. There were six infantry battalions in
the Valley when 161 Infantry Brigade set out from Baramula for
Uri, and five when 112 Punjab was removed from it on flimsy grounds
and sent back over the Banihal Pass to far-off Jammu. The Brigade
advanced 62 miles to Uri with two of these five battalions. If it could
crush the enemy strength at Shalateng with just two battalions and
gain 62 miles of territory thereafter, Domel, which lay 45 miles fur-
ther, was not beyond its compass had it been given all the five units.
The Government of India was keen that Domel should be recover-
ed, and so were the popular leaders of Kashmir. 161 Infantry Brigade,
riding the crest of a wave, was ready and willing to move forward
and make a resolute attempt at achieving the object.
Unfortunately the military hierarchy in New Delhi did not appear
to share the objective. It was admittedly HQ Jak Force which stayed
the advance of the Brigade to Domel and ordered a change of axis
towards Poonch. But HQ Jak Force had no autocratic powers to
change the aim of an operation; it was receiving its orders from Army
Headquarters, and only Army Headquarters could effect such a
major change. Evidently the latter did not find it difficult to persuade
the new and inexperienced Government to accept the change of axis.
The halting of 161 Infantry Brigade's advance from east to west
and the switching of the axis from north to south certainly saved
Poonch, but at the same time it eliminated all chances of the Brigade
making any further gains to the west until the Spring of 1948. When
it was ordered to halt and not to make any further advance towards
Domel, the enemy was on the run and his morale was very low,
and it was unlikely that he would offer any great resistance. Further,
the capture of Dome1 would automatically have relieved the pressure
on Poonch. The Azad Kashmir Poonch forces had not been formed
and the Pakistan Regular Army had not yet entered Kashmir in
strength. The breathing space allowed to the enemy enabled him to
arrest the flight of his battered forces, to raise the AKP units and to
present 161 Infantry Brigade, starved of extra units, with a serious
problem during the period that it was virtually marooned in Kashmir
during the winter months.
The only conclusion that one can draw is that the rout of the
enemy in the battle of Shalateng shattered not only the tribesmen
but other quarters as well. When Baramula fell within twenty-four
hours of Shalateng and the Brigade set off for Uri, its advance had
to be arrested and so one battalion was withdrawn without relief.
When this failed to prevent the capture of Uri, something else had
to be thought of. Hence the change of axis towards Poonch. It is
little wonder that the Government of India began to sense some-
thing wrong and decided that General Sir Rob Lockhart, who had
been appointed Commander in Chief of the Indian Army in August
1947 for a four-year tenure, should have had his services terminated
after he had been in the chair for just over six months. He was re-
placed by General Sir Roy Bucher. But the change made no essential
difference to the higher direction of the operations in Kashmir from
Army Headquarters.
Sri Div, from the date of its inception in May 1948, met with the
same frustrating denial of encouragement and support as 161 In-
fantry Brigade. As long as the proposed attacks were from east to
west, the Division was stifled by a refusal of more formations. though
even one uninitiated in military strategy and tactics would have seen
that the extra formations asked for were not a luxury but a vital
necessity. The Spring offensive had to be launched without teeth to
it, because of the denial of the reinforcements necessary to provide
the punch for effecting a breakthrough. When the two advances from
east to west were bogged down and the operation to be mounted
took a south-to-north direction, extra Brigades were immediately
moved into J & K State.
Army HQs' handling of the operations in Kashmir in 1947-48
leaves more than a little room for speculation whether the formations
deployed there were really intended to score a decisive success, which
they could and would have achieved had reinforcements been moved
in, or whether it was the intention that their capacity should be
S1,ESDEll Ur.4S TI1K THREAD
liniittd to a strcngth wl~ereonly a stalc~ni~te could rcsult. From the

attitude adoptccl by Arrny HQ, tllc secor~dwould nppcar to 1x2 tllc
correct assessment.
The Cease Fire which came into effect in Ji~rnxnu& Kasl~mirat
the end of December 1938 l~rovecl to 1)c ;I mockery of the term.
Although the Agreement was formulated 11y t l ~ c IJnitcd Nstions
Organisatior?, and has bccn supcr\.ised by a large team of Ol,scrvc~.s
;~ssemblecl1)y the U.N. from countries a c c v l ~ t ~ l l ~ tol cI~otlrIndia ant?
I'i~kistan, more bullets have \vllined across thc C c a w Fire Line
(luring tile last 21 years than in the course of tlie fiqhting in 1947-48.
Violations of the line by infiltratol-s froin P;lkist;l~l,cles~~ntclietl on
~~iissions aimed at sabotage or at creating unrest and confusion, arc
lcgion. This is no reflection on the personnel of the U.N. Ol~scrver
Groups. They have operatcd with efficiency. But it is virtually iln-
possible for thern to seal cvery route and to control the triggcrs oil
weapons. Nor is this expected of t l ~ c m .They are o111>7 able to carry
out i11vestig;itions of complaints and to s1111mittllcb result of their
findings to tlle Chief U.N. Obscr17er for an a\\,artl of '\'ioli~tion' or
'No violation'.
Britain, which furnislicd tlle Comi~~~~i;clers in Chief of 11otl1 India
and Pakistan at the birth of the two Ilominions, could Ira\rc prc\7cnt-
ed the problem of Kaslimir from arising in t l ~ e first 13lac.c: II!J
preventing t l ~ etribal ri~iders' attack or, Kas111ni1. an operation that
\vas plannccl in the snlnc i ~ ~ i i l d i nthat g liousccl Pakistan A\~-myHQ,
or, failing that, by carryins out the threat of \\~itl~dl.,~\\~ing all Britisl~
officers \vl:cn Pakistan's Hcgular Army e n t c ~ c dI(;lsl~rni~. curly in 1948.
Illstcad, Britain's representiiti~,csconnivcd a t Pakist,~n's gross \ ioln-
tion of the hlountbatten Plan which had given the Rulers of Princcly
States ul~fettered discretion to accede to t l ~ e Dominion of t!lcir
choice. That this was no a1,crration on tllc 11iil.t of some indi\~itl~ials
1,ecame evident from the 1 1 . K . ' ~rolc in tllc clrsl~ingp~.occ~c~lin$s of
tllc U.N.O. on the Kaslllnir clucstion.
Free India's Army, \r-llic1-1hncl been pl:~nnccl to I:(. ill the region
of 300,000 all ranks, ]lad to 1)c. mi~intainccl; ~ at m~icll11iqlrc.r figrlrc
in ordcr to provide atlt.cluatc> ~,~l-~.isonq 11ot orlly in [alnmu ancl
K:lsllrnir 1)ut illso in tllc nrcn ot the India-Pakistl~n11ou11c1;11.\7in tlrc
['~injnl).ll'itl~an cstensivc lwrdcr to plottsct, a~ltla limitotl 1)udgc.t.
rnany equally sensitive iircas lia(1 to hc tlcnictl tl-oop tl(~plo\.mcnt.
The situation was ag(:i.,l\ , ~ t c ~\ \ l11(11i tllc I'nitc-(1 Sli~tcbsof rlr~~cricb:l
drcidccl to on'cr, nncl T'kiki\tnn I c'tdil!r ;~ccc~pttd. I ~ I ~ ~ ~ : ~aid.
I I ' v Tllc
ilioder~~ih~~tion of the l'~l\i\tiin -4rnled F ~ r c e s,~ncl tlle consicler,~J)le
A COSTLY 1,EGACY
illcrease in their strengtl~imposed a heavy defence burden on India.

It was not the Amcrican intention that Pakistan should be strength-
clned in order to tllrcatcn India. Military aid \ u s supplicd to enable
Pakistan to take her pluce as a partner in the treaty alliances dcsign-
cd to contain the Soviet 'LJnion and Conlmunist China in West Asia
and South East Asia. India reuctcd promptly to the military aid being
poured into Pakistan, and pointed out to America that it would bc
used against India. Tile U.S.A. gave assurances from timc to time
that she would never pcrmit American equipment to be used against
India. When it actually came to dissuading Pakistan from using
American military aid against India, first in the Rann of Kutcll early
in 1965 and again when Pakistan attacked Chhiimb in Jammu later
in the same year, sparking off the Indo-Pakistan hostilities, America
found herself powerless to restrain Pakistan.
Communist China, mean\vhile, was not slow to exploit the situa-
tion. Having overrun Tibet, she initially adopted a policy of ostensi-
ble friendship towards India but soon grabbed Indian territory in
Ladakh and cx~structedthe Aksai Chin road. Then she laid claims
to other areas, and refused to accept the long established McMahon
Line as the border between India and Tibet.
Faced wit11 two hostile neighbours along her land borders, India
found herself in a most unenviable position. American military aid
to Pakistan ellforced the deployment of the major portion of tllc
combat fornlations of the Indian Armv to face that country. There
was little left to deploy against a \Vorld Power whit11 w*as t11rcatc.n-
ing the northern border from Ladakll to NEFA. It suited China to
capitnlise on the situation by inaking overtures to Pakistan and forg-
ing a joint front against India. Tllis meant that the bulk of India's
armed strength would remain comlllittcd and incapable of deploy-
ment from one front to the other. Tlle areas chosen by China for
rattling the sabre against India \\-ere as wide aprrt as Ladakh in the
north-west and NEFA in the east. Therc were more than 1,000 miles
of land border betwecbn tl~cin,and each of the sectors was garrisoned
\\>it11n mere pittance of India's 6%5,5,000 strong Army.
The NEFA llostilitics of 1962 lla\.c oftcn been described as ~1 d e
bacle of India's Ammy. It would l ~ cmore correct to describe the
action as the defeat of a ha~ldfulof troops of the Indian Army, com-
posed of four Brigade. which attemptccl to combat four Chinese
ni\~isionsover a front;igc>of 600 rni1c.s of most inl~ospitablcterrain.
The Indian public and the world were led to believe - unfortunately
by the Indian Government itself - that an Indian Corps had moved
into NEFA. It was even given a number, IV Corps. Had a Corps

been in the area, it would have amounted to between 100,000 and
125,000 troops. That a truncated Corps Headquarters moved in is
true. But the troops available to it for operaticns were at no time
more than one fifth of the strength of a Corps. The Chinese, on thc
other hand, had available the equivalent of a strong Corps. The lack
of strength for deployment in NEFA arose precisely bec'wse the
Indian Government was not prepared to weaken the troop deploy-
ment in the Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir in view of the live possibi-
lity that Pakistan might take advantage of the situ at'ion.
The Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 followed the NEFA pattern,
but now in reverse. Considering herself strong enough to cross
swords with India, Pakistan attacked. But in order to arrest any
transference of the formations located in eastern India, China deli-
vered a boisterous ultimatum to India. It was a gesture of thanks to
Pakistan for what she had done for China in 1962 by arresting the
movement of troops from Punjab to NEFA.
With the Indian Army's strength substantially increased as a result
of the experiences of 1962 and 19f35, and sensitive areas former17
devoid of troops now firmly held, Pakistan and China have stepped
u p their assistance to the hostile Nagas. The situation in Nagaland
was rapidly being brought under control when NEFA erupted. Tho
hostile Nagas, who did not embarrass India during the conflict with
China, have now been persuaded to look in that direction for assist-
ance. Recent events have shown that they havc received both train-
ing and arms from China. The pattern is typically Chinese. Tliejr
have pursued this course of action throughout South-East Asia, and
it is directed at all countries which have no use for Mao Tse-tung's
ideology and which will not submit to dictates from China.
With Pakistan falling even more deeply into the bosom of China,
and China - now also the Soviet Union- filling the void left by the
halt of American military aid to Pakistan after 1965, it is difficult to
visualise when, if ever, the unsavoury situation faced by India will
terminate.
It has been a long road from 1947 to 1969, and India has had to
face many crises in safeguarding her rights. There can be no douht
that any further challenges that might arise in the future will bc
tackled with the same tenacity. In the perspective of history, the pity
is that these crises were allowed to dcvclop in tllc first place. Nad
their genesis in Kashmir in 1947 been dealt with firmly and in time,
India could have avoided what has proved to be a very costly legacy.
Index
- strain on 62
Al;sai Chin Rood 297
Abbottabad 2 Ali, Mir Laik 12
Abdullah, Sheik Mohammed 14-15, Amritsar, treaty of 22
3G, 67, 80, 82, 90, 130-141, 1 0 , Anantnag 2
16 Arzi Huk~rmat9-10
-his experience a t Brigade Hq 77 Ashok 234-235
- his lamentations over voluntee~s' Attachment Scheme G
death 87 Auchinleck, S i r Claude, Field Mar-
Afridis 32-33, 98 shal, Supreme Commander, Sup-
Ahmed, Sir Sultan 11 reme Army Hq of India and Pak-
Airlift 44, 54, 57 istan 20-21, 26, 49
-civilian queues f o r 67 -failure to keep India informed
Airstrip 3, 31, 54, 57, 69, 74, 105, of Kashmir border incidents 21
189-190, 289 -his visit t o Lahore to meet
- dilapidi\trbtl condition of 77 Jinnah 49
- hazards a t 45 - termination of his appointment
- protection of 52 21
SLENDRn WAS THE THREAD
- threat to withdraw British offi- 158-154, 162, 202, 234, 247, 253,
cars serving in the Pakistar. 255
Ariny 49 Bhavnagar 6
Azad Kashmir Forces 177 Rhimbai., attack on 30
Azad Kashmir Poonch Battalions or - fall of 29
A K P Brigades 163-164, 1GG-167, Bhutto. S i r Shah Nawaz (Dewan of
185, 201, 227-231, 240, 251, 254, Junagadh) 7, 9-10
256, 295 Ehutto, Zulfikar Ali 7
Azad Kashmir Radio 180 Bihar 41, 113, 216, 238
-attacks on Kashmir leaders 165 Rijhama 179
Bobb, Derek, Major 154, 210
British Government 4, 22, 42, 191,
243
Babariawad 8-9 -- families, evacuation of 62
-Junagadh troops' entry into 8 Brown, Major 190-191
Badami Bagh Cantonment (Bar- Bucher, Sir Roy, General, C in C of
racks) 37-38, 63-64, 83-85, 140, the Indian Army 22, 243, 295
142-143, 211
Badgam 83, 87-88, 02, 94
Baltal 197
Baluchistan 5, 28-29 Cabinet Mission Plan 4
Bandipura, panic in 90 Cease F i r e Agreement 288, 290
Banihal P a s s 2, 39, 49, 57, 86, 153, Cease Fire Line 290-291, 296
164-155, 169, 183, 187, 196, 198, Chadda, Captain 124
200, 207, 213, 240, 243, 294 Chakothi 2, 162, 164
Baramula 2, 46-49, 51-52, 59, G7, 75: Chakothi-Chinari a r e a 239-240, 244-
80, 82, 85, 88-89, 99-110, 112, 115, 245, 256
119, 136-137, 139-141, 147, 156, Chand, Khushal, Captain 195
161, 166-167, 170-171, 174-176, 180, Chand, Prithi, Captain 195, 197-199
183-185, 194, 201-202, 207-208. 210- Chhainb 297
211, 213, 216, 218, 220-222, 225, Chhatari, Nawnl) of 11-12
232, 236, 238-239, 246-248, 289, Chiliar Khas 244
291, 293-295 China1 Dori 253, 26G
- move t o assault 86 Chinari 2, 251, 273
-villages set fire to on outskil-ts Communist China, grabbing of
of 67 Indian territory 297-298
Bari Baikh 231, 233-234 Congress (Indian National) 4-5
Raroda 6 Cunningham, Sir George (N.W.F.P.
B a t a r Nullah 120, 125, 289 Governor) 21
Bausian Ridge 171-174, 183-184, Customs Posts 1
203, 231
Bedi, Harpal Bingh, Captain 282
Beg, Mirza Afzal 14
Eengal 4-6, 25 Dakota a i r c r a f t 44-45
- communal clashes i n 25 Dardltot 269, 263-264, 268-270, 273
Eewoor, G. G. Lieutenant Colonel Dns, Chand Narain, Colonel 65
195, 249 David, Noel, Lieutenant 90, 92, 94-
Bhatgiran 143-144, 146-147, 160, 97, 103-104
INDEX
Delhi 7, 9, 11, 13, 26, 41, 44-45,52- - Delhi and East Yunjab Area 41,
54, 56-58, 60-61, 63, G5, 76, 82, 43-44
104, 113, 177, 237, 249, 256, 271 - 161 Infantry Brigade 40-41, 46,
Delhi Cantonment Military Hospit'al 52. 55-57, 61-64,66, 68, 70, 72,
28G 74-77, 80-90, 93, 102-103, 106-
Dhar D. P. 80,82, 139, 141-142.160, 110, 112-115, 119, 124-125,129,
174, 176, 194, 196-197,230 134-136,138, 140-142,151, 163-
Diwan, Captain 102 156, 158-162, 166-168, 170-171,
n i w a n Mandir 38, 81 174-175, 179-182, 186, 192-193,
Dome1 1-3, 17, 35, 37, 54, 60, 106, 197-203. 207-208, 210-211, 213-
108, 113-114,129, 134, 136, 139, 221, 223-224, 228-231, 234-236,
239-245, 249-250, 253, 259, 263, 238-246,248-249,251. 253-254,
273, 294-295 256-258,262, 264.265, 2G8, 271,
- bridge 34-35
Drangyari 245
D'Souza, Captain 271-272 - 163 Infantry Brigade 238, 240,
Dubey, Lieutenant Colonel 123-124 242-245, 256, 278-279, 287-288
Dubey U. C. Lieutenant Colonel - Poonch Brigade 119, 124-125,133-
105-106, 115, 120, 195 135, 235, 244, 289, 291
Durand Line 21, 31-33 - 50 P a r a Brigade 108-109,114-116,
124-125,134-135
- 77 P a r a Brigade 109, 238, 240,
242, 244, 247-248,252, 256, 265,
Federal Scheme 4 275-2'76,278, 281-282, 290
Ferozepore 102 -Jammu Brigade 124
F i r s t Sikh W a r 22 -Zebra Brigade 216, 238-240
Flume Line 161 -J a m m u and Kashmir State Forces
Forest Bungalow 62-64,GG, 86 3, 17-18,29, 35-39,46, 62, 64-65,
Forest Rangers 139, 142-143,159 68, 88-85,123-125,142-143, 163,
Formations 188, 190-191
- Army H q India 26-27,41-44,46, 'Fort' 166, 168, 101-194, 205-206,
136, 147, 240, 243-244,251, 264, 246, 254, 256, 258
274, 279, 294-296 Frontier Scouts 144, 149
- Army Hq Pakistan lG, 26-27?43, Frontier tribesmen 17, 31-32, 163,
188 180, 185, 295
- Hq Western Command 199 - attack on Muzaffarabad 21
- J a k Force 56, 82, 115, 124, 127, - their characteristics 32
129, 134-136,142, 147, 150-151. - their reaction to various
154-155, 161. 177-178, 186-187, situations 18
192-193, 196-199. 208. 212-213,
215-216,238-239,204
- S r i Division 238-240.242-246.251,
25G, 270-271,27.3,275, 279, 282, Gagarhil 158
285-286,288-289,295 Gandarbal G5, 83, 90, 96
-Jnmmu Division 289 Gandhi, Samaldas 9
- F i f t h Infantry Division 41, 44, Garhi Habibullah 2
208, 211-212,214-216, 238. Garhwalis 158
Gilgit 18, 22, 159, 188, 191, 194

- loss of 23
- return of 22 I j a r a 184-185, 218
- Scouts 22, 188, 190-191 India 2-10, 12-15, 17-21, 23-24, 30-
- sixty-year lease of 22-23 31, 40, 44, 190-191, 243, 288, 294,
- strategic value of 23 296-298
Goalta Nullah 281 - and Pakistan, Dominions of 3,
Gondal 6, 8 5-6, 14, 190-191
Gorkha units 28-29, 38 - Dominion of 25
Goshar 231, 233, 252, 276 - Gondal's accession to 8
Governor General (see Lord - Government of 7-10, 12-13, 15, 21-
Mountbatten) 22, 24, 61, 68, 243, 246, 280,
Gracey, S i r Douglas, General 49 294-295, 297-298
Grand Trunk Road 2 - partition of 4
Great Himalayan Range 189, 194- - unity of 4
195 - urgent call f r o m . S i r H a r i Singh
Gulmarg 59-60, 67, 213 24
Indian Air Force 27-28, 44, 68, 72-
73, 92, 99, 153, 161, 229, 272, 284
Indian Army 25, 28-29, 31, 36, 30,
41-42, 49, 102, 123, 126, 148, 190.
Haji P i r P a s s 113-114, 118-120, 123, 243, 278, 291, 293, 295, 297-298
126-130, 133, 135, 143, 148, 160, - composition of 26
247, 253, 255, 262, 264, 286, 289- - division of 25
290 Indian Intelligence Bureau, Director
Handwara 175-178, 202, 213, 216, of 19
239, 244-245 - transfer of important files t o
Pakistan 19
Handwara-Tithwal a r e a 240
Havelian 3 Indian Navy 27-28
Heman Buniyar 167, 185, 202, 207, Indian troops 15, 17, 30-31, 33, 44,
40, 125, 165
218, 220-221, 231, 236-237, 248
India-Pakistan border 296
IIenderson-Blrooks, T.B. Brigadier
Indo-Pakistan conflict 297-298
287
Indus River 189
Himachal Pradesh 195 Instrument of Accession 6, 15, 30,
Hokar S a r 101 191
Humhom 74-75, 80, 83, 92-94, 105
Internal security 3, 18, 30, 41, 44,
Hyderabad 5-6, 10-14, 24 46, 54
-breakdown of law and order in Ismay, Lord 8, 14
13 I t t e h a d - z ~ l - M z ~ s i l ~ ~ 11-12
zec~n
- delegation 1
- disinclinati~nto sign d r a f t 12
-failure of talks 1 3
-futile attempt to retain 'Jamil', Brigadier 204-205, 207,
sovereignty 10 220-221, 223-225
- Government of 12 Jammu 2-3, 15, 17, 19, 22, 30, 35-
- military action in 13 36, 39, 42, 63, 76, 61-82, 84-85,
- Nizam of 10-14 108-110, 114, 124-125, 134-136,
INDEX
154-155, 160, 186, 230, 238, 246- Kashmir Valley 1-2, 14-15, 17-18,
247, 289, 294, 297 31-32, 36-40, 42-45, 48-49, 51-68,
Jammu and Kashmir 2, 6, 14-15, 60-66, 67-70, 76-76, 78, 82-83, 86,
19-21, 23, 28-29, 31, 37-39, 42, ,SO, 88, 102-103, 106, 109-110, 113,
1G0, 165, 199, 238, 243, 288, 295- 134, 136, 138, 140, 147, 161, 154-
296, 298 156, 158.161, 166, 169, 174-175,
- Interim Emergency Government 178, 183-184, 189, 194, 196-197,
of 15, 47, 67-68, 81, 99, 104, 200, 202, 207-208, 212-213, 215-
119, 139, 160, 191, 197, 247, 216, 225, 230, 236, 238-240, 242-
250, 280 243, 246-247, 249-250, 278-279,
Jammu-Pakistan border 29-30 287, 293-294
Jammu Province 1, 28-29, 34-35, 50 Kathiawar 6-9, 24
J h a n g a r 109 Kathua 2
Jhelum River 2, 34, 38, 87, 94, 103- Katoch, J.C. Brigadier 41, 52-53,
104,'. 106, 130, 161, 170-173, 180, 55, 57, 238, 245
182, 184-185, 203, 218, 222, 224, Kazinag Range or Chhota Qazinag
226, 249-250, 253-254, 263, 275, 249, 267-268, 274-276, 278-279,
288 286-288, 290
Jinnah, Mohammed Ali 4, 19-20, 24, 'Khalil', Brigadier 180-182, 204-205,
49 207, 217, 219-225, 228-229, 232
Joint Defence Council 9 Khan, Abdul Ghaffar 5
Junagadh 6-9, 14 Khan, Akbar, Major General 16-17,
- Nawab of 24 32, 36
- referendum in 10 Khan, Liaquat Ali 8-10
- State Council 10 Khanna, Man Mohan, Lieutenant
-- State Force troops 9 Colonel 105, 127, 146, 172-173,
Jung, Moin Nawaz, Nawab 12 182, 185, 221, 226, 253, 267-268,
275-276, 279-280, 286
Khare, Major 210
Khilla Dher 282-285
Kahuta 121, 123 Kishengsnga River 34
Kak, Major 62-64, 67, 77, 80, 82, Kohala 1-2, 12
84, 87 Kopra 185, 218, 220, 224-230
Kalaan, S.S. Lieutenant Colonel 105, Kotli 115, 135
153, 173, 209, 221, 233, 259, 280- Krahom 90, 94, 96
281, 285-286 Kud 2
Kaliane de Kas Nullah 281 Kullar, G.I.S. Lieutenant Colonel
Karachi 6, 8-9, 14, 75 59, 74, 108
Kargil 189, 192-194, 197-198, 239, Kulu Vallcy 199
288 Kumaonis 158
Kashmir 1, 16-17, 19-22, 24, 34-35, Kumar, Captain 168
43, 49-50. 05-56, 64, 136, 139-141, Kurshed, Pathan tribal leader 55
155, 158-161, 164, 189, 191, 195,
205, 212, 238-243, 246, 264, 288,
290, 294-296, 298
- invasion of 12, 22 Lachhipura 182, 201, 232
- military operation in 44 Ladakh 22, 136, 159, 188-189, 195,
- raids on border posts in 15 240, 288, 293, 297
SLENDER WAS THE T H R m D
Lahore 2 Mohammad, Bakshi Ghulam 14, 67,

1,ahul 195, 199 77, 80-82, 87, 104, 132, 139, 141-
Ledi Gali 255, 282, 284-286, 289-291 142, 160, 1G5, 246
Ledi Gali-Pir Kanthi area 289-290 Mohammad, J u m m a 280
Leh 188-190, 194-197, 199, 213, 239- Mohammed Hussain, Abdul Kadir,
Khan Bahadur 7
240, 262, 288, 293
Mohmands 33, 98
Limber Nullah 184-185, 200-202,
Monckton, S i r Walter 11
207, 220, 223-224, 228-230, 232,
Mountbatten, Lord Louis 3-4, 10-14,
238
19-20, 31, 42, 190
Lockhart, S i r Rob, General 19, 21-
22, 30, 55, 243, 295
- Governor General of the Indian
Dominion 7, 13, 19-20, 42
-last Viceroy of India 4, 14
- Mountbatten Plan 5-6, 10, 14, 20,
Madhopur 2 22, 25, 296
- Nehru Memorial Lecture 4
Madras 291
- Supreme Commander of South
Magam 59, 65-66, 71, 73, 75, 86
E a s t Asia Command 31
Maharajah of Kashmir (scc S i r -vain efforts to avert partition 4
H a r i Singh) Murree 2
Mahatma Gandhi 56 Muslim League 4
Mahsuds 32-33, 98, 127 Muzaffarabad 15, 19, 21, 34-36, 38,
Mahura 2, 38, 81, 110-111, 127-128, 140, 162-163, 168, 177, 179, 204-
133, 142, 169-172, 179-183, 185- 205, 231, 239, 243-245, 293
186, 201-202, 204-205, 207,, 200, Muzaffarabad-Domel a r e a 34, 36-37,
212-213, 218, 220-221, 223-225, 39
230-231, 233-234, 242, 249-251,
291
-power house 15, 38-39, 112, 161,
173 Nagaland 298
Maidan Pass 266 Nair, P.S. Brigadier 242, 282
Malaya, debacle in 126 'Nalwar' 130-132, 138, 233, 241
Manali 199 Nambla 203
Manavadar, Khan of 8, 10 National Conference 14, 36, 67, 165
Mangrol 8-10 --Volunteers of 80. 87, 102, 1.39-
Manshera 2 111, 230
Maqbool, P i r 142 Naushara 218, 220, 222
McDermotts 170 Nawa Rundan Nllilal~259, 281
McMahon Line 297 Negi, Lachmann Singh, Lieutenatit
Menon, Lieutenant Colonel 208, 237 Colonel 151, 157
Messervey, Sir Frank, General 20- Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, Prime
21, 49 Minister of India 53-54, 82
Milita!ry Intelligence Directorate, New Delhi 20, 26-27, 41, 43-46, 52,
India 18, 21, 27-29, 57 294
Minority communities, mass exodus N o r t h ~ E a s t Frontier A ~ e n c y
of 25 ( N E F A ) 297
Mission Hospital, wanton destruc- North-West Frontier Province 5, 15,
tion of 103 21, 26, 28-29, 43, 99, 163, 189, 201
250, 266, 262, 276, 281-282, 284-
2136, 200-291
'Operation Gulmarg' 16 Poonch 19, 29, 113-116, 118-126, 134-
'Operation Handwara' 177 136, 238, 244, 262, 289-291, 294-
'Operation Sledge' 188, 193-194, 200, 295
288 - Rajah of 124
Owen, capture of 28-29 Poonchie Muslims 35-36, 38, 163
Poonchies 29-30, 163-164
Princely States 3, 5-6, 10, 13-14, 20,
296
Pahlipura 184
Psychological warfare 165
Pakistan 2-10, 12, 14-23, 26-27, 29-
Punjab 2, 4-5, 24-25, 27, 41, 64, 102,
34, 36, 43, 54, 58, 62, 102, 142,
108, 234, 296, 298
161, 189-191, 288, 290-291, 294,
Punjabi Muslims 163, 177
296-298
-Army 26, 37, 43, 163, 265, 280
- Dominion cif 20, 24
-- Government of 8, 50 Qasim, Syed Mir 14
- Intelligence, Director of 19
-- Radio, bluff of 128
-Pakistan Forces in the Kashmir
Vulley Rahim, Abdur 12
Infantry Brigade 32, 251, 288 Rai, Ranjit, Lieutenant Colonel 43-
Regular Forces 31, 49-60, 162, 44, 46-49, 147
239-240, 256, 264, 267, 395 Rajasthan 291
- 13th Frontier Force Rifles, Raju, Rajan, Major 218
1st Bn 264, 271 Ramban 2, 89, 102
-Punjab Regiment, 14th Bn 177 Rampur 111, 168, 161, 184-185, 201,
- Punjab Regiment, 15th Bn 278, 203, 207, 218, 220-222, 231, 286
280 Ranchi 41, 44, 46, 113, 137, 166,
Pampur 83 216, 238-239, 246-246
Pandu 249, 253, 267, 279, 286-287 Rann of Kutch 297
Paranjpe, Y.S. Brigadier 124 Rasulkhanji, S i r Mahabatkhan,
P a t a n 47-48, 52, 55, 58-59, 71, 76, Nawab of Junagadh 6-7, 9-10
79-83, 85-86, 88-89, 92, 99-101 Ravi River 2
Patel, Vallabhbhai, S a r d a r 76-77, Rawalpindi 2, 16, 26, 43, 62
82 Razakars 11-14
Pathankot 76, 82 Razvi, Kasim (Razakar leader) 11-
Pathan tribals 163, 166, 168-170, 13
201, 205, 227-228, 231, 240, 247, Reddg, P.V. 12
251, 254-256 Red F o r t 13, 26-27
Patiala, Maharajah of 39, 64 Rifle Range a r e a (Chandmari) 83,
Patiala Mountain Battery 64, 75, 87, 89, 92-94, 102, 132
93, 105-106 Rikhye, Inder, Major 89-90, 92, 94,
Patiala State Forces, arrival of 39 96-97, 102, 126
Peshawar 2. 21, 31 Royal Air Force 61
P i r Kanthi 282, 284-286, 289-291 Rudra, A.A. Brigadier, Military
Pir Panjal Range 106, 113, 120, Secretary 55
126, 128, 135, 185, 228-230, 249- Russell, Major General 41, 65-56
Skardu 189, 191-194, 239

Sonemarg 196-197
Sadiq, Ghulam Mohammed 14, 139, Sopur 175-176
141-142 South-East Asia 297-298
Safdarjung airport 44-46, 52-53, 56 Soviet Russia 22-23, 297-298
Salamabad 166, 225, 253-260, 262- - and Sinkiang 22
265, 273-282 Srinagar 2-3, 14-15, 17-18, 31-32, 36-
Samba 2 39, 44, 46-49, 64, 59-60, 62-63, 65,
Scott, H.L. Major General 3, 18, 22, 67-68, 74-77 80-94, 96-97, 99, 102-
190 109, 112-113, 115-116, 119, 124,
Sensa 28-29 130, 132, 134, 137, 139-142, 150,
Shadipur 94 153, 155-156, 159, 166-167, 170,
Shalateng 93-97, 99, 101-102, 109, 172, 175-177, 185, 196, 202, 207-
119, 140-141, 213, 230, 294-295 208, 210-214, 216, 218, 225, 230,
Sharma, Somnath, Major 70-71, 75, 232, 238-239, 245-246, 250, 265,
141 272, 286-287, 291, 293
Sherwani, Maqbool 140-141 Srinagar-Baramula Road 94, 109
Sialkot 2-3 Standstill Agreement 7-8, 14, 31
Sikkibat 252, 254, 265 State Force outposts, assault on 35
Sind 4-5 'Subhas' 132-133, 234
Singh, Ajaib, Major 144, 146-150 Suchetgarh 1-2, 18
Singh, Baldev, S a r d a r 76 Sufaida 253, 267
Singh, Dilbagh, Major 57 Sultan Dhakki 179, 254, 275
Singh, Gulab 22 Sumbal 94, 96-97
Singh, Harbakhsh, Lieutenant Supreme Headquarters, India and
Colonel 106, 109, 150, 245 Pakistan 18, 22, 26-27
Singh, Kishen, Brigadier 124-125, Survey of India, maps produced by
134 28
Singh, Kulwant, Major General 56,
82, 85-87, 99, 104, 106-109, 113-116,
134, 214-215, 238
Singh, Lakhinder, Brigadier 208- Thakur, Lieutenant Colonel 249
209, 211-216, 240 Thapar, P.N. Brigadier, Director
Singh, Mohinder, Major 234-235 of Military Operations, 51, 53-
Singh, Narain, Lieutenant Colonel 56
36-36 Thimayya, K.S. Major General 216,
Singh, Pritam, Lieutenant Colonel 238-242, 244-248, 251, 265, 275,
(later Brigadier) 59, 94, 120, 122, 278-279, 281, 287
124-125. 134-136., 289
-
Thimayya, Major 241
Singh, Rajinder, Brigadier 37-39, Tibet 297
112 Tithwal 239-241, 244-245, 256, 278,
Singh, Sampuran Bachan, Major 287-288
(later Lieutenant Colonel) 48, 80, Tourists' plight 60
94, 130, 132, 146-148, 150 Tragan 253, 266
Singh, S i r Hari (Maharajah of 'I'ransfer of Power 4-5, 25
~ G m andu Kashrnir s t a t e ) 1, 3, Transport problem 44
14-15, 19, 22-24, 30-31, 38, 42, 64, Tsiyu 90
101, 190-191 Two-nation theory 5, 14, 24
-J a m m u and Kashmir Infantry,
4th Bn 34-37, 39, 49, 93, 98
Udhampur 2 - Jammu and Kashmir Militia 247-
U.N. Commission for India and 248, 251, 264-266
Pakistan 50 - Kumaon Rifles, 1st Bn 58-59, 64,
- its resolution 50 66, 70-71, 75, 83, 87-88, 93-94,
United Nations Organisation 29G 96-98, 100-103, 106, 109, 111-
U.N. Security Council 50 113, 115-117, 119-120, 122, 124-
United States of America 296-297 127, 134-136, 289
- military aid to Pakistan 298 - Kumaon Regiment, 4th ~n 52,
Units 59, 62-63, 66, 68, 70-71, 74-76,
-Mountain Battery 133 83, 88, 93, 99, 105-106, 109, 117,
--I1 Field Battery 252, 266 119, 127.128, 132, 141, 143-146,
- Field Company of Madras Engin- 150-154, 167, 171-174, 179, 182-
eers 112, 119, 126, 137, 151, 185, 185, 202, 207, 210-211, 213,
155-156, 161, 168, 173-174, 218, 216, 218, 220-231, 233-234, 238,
224, 238, 253-255, 268-269, 273, 240, 249, 251-254, 258, 263, 265-
275 268, 274-279, 287, 290
- 7 Cavalry 89-90, 93-94, 97, 102, -- Madras Regiment, 1 s t Bn 207-
106, 109, 111-112, 119, 126, 208, 213, 218, 220, 224, 230-231,
151, 211, 220, 238, 253, 257, 234-238, 240
288 - Mahar Regiment, 1 s t Bn 220-222
- Army Hq Movement Control - Maharaja's Bodyguard 63-65, 83-
Unit 45-46 84, 90
- Army Hq Signal Reginlent 27- -Punjab Regiment, 1st Bn 59, 63,
28, 41, 52 65-66, 71, 73-75, 80, 83, 93-94,
- Eihar Regiment, 1st Bn 278-279, 105-110, 136, 294
287, 290 - Rajaputana Rifles, 6th Bn 105,
- Dogra Company of 15th Punjab 109, 160-151, 153, 166-167, 173,
Regiment 225-227 202, 205, 209, 221, 233, 238,
- Dogra Regiment, 2nd Bn 105-106, 240, 254, 257, 259, 262-266, 268,
108-109, 115, 119-120, 122, 126- 272-273, 278, 281-286
128, 151, 158, 169-171, 195, 197, - Snwai Man Guards 252-253, 266,
199, 202-203, 238, 240, 249, 253- 276, 282-286
255, 257-260, 262, 264-265, 273, -- Sikh Regiment, 1st Bn 43, 46-49,
277, 279, 281, 289, 291 52, 54-55, 58-59, 63-65, 71, 75,
- G a r l ~ w a lRifles, 3rd Bn 151, 158, 79-83, 87-88, 90, 92-94, 96-102,
166-167, 184-185, 202, 205, 207, 105-106, 108, 110-113, 115-116,
211, 218, 220-224, 228-231, 233- 130, 132, 144, 146-147, 149-
234, 236, 238, 240 151, 153, 169, 176, 185, 202,
- General Hospital Delhi Canton- 207, 211, 216, 238-240, 245
ment 51 -Sikh Regiment, 7th Bn 93, 248,
- 3 Light Field Ambulance 59, 62, 253-254, 257, 265, 268, 270-272,
150-152, 157, 203, 238 276-279, 281
- 60 P a r a Field Ambulance 238, Upheaval following partition 25
254, 286 Uri 2, 17-18, 31, 37-38, 44, 48, 82,
- 2/3 Gorkha Rifles 276, 282-286 84, 104, 106, 110, 112-120, 125-
- 2/.1 Gorkhn Rifles 199, 256 138, 142-144, 146-148, 150, 152-157,
169, 161-169, 171.174, 180, 18%

185, 200-203, 207-213, 216, 218,
220-222, 226, 231-235, 238-243, Wah 1-2
246-251, 253-256, 259, 265, 268- Water and salt, problems of 160
269, 273, 275-276, 282, 286, 288- Wavell, Lord, Field Marshal 4, 10
291, 294-295 Wazirabad 2
Uri-Baramula Road 130, 169, 174, Wazirs 33, 98
234 West Asia 297
Uri-Haji P i r Pass Road 125, 246 West Pakistan-Kashmir border 34
Uri-Mahura area 179, 240-242, 244 Wood, Ronnie, Captain 70-71
Urusa 250, 264, 273, 276-276, 281- Wular Lake '30
282
Vejanoness 6 Zinyimar 90
Veranag 155 Zoji La Pass 189, 195, 107-198, 239,
Veraval 6 262, 291

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Lt Gen. L. P.

Slender was the Thread

Orient lnngman Limited

O Orient lnngman Limited

ISBN 0 86131 692 4

I have read a number of accounts of the defence of the Kashmir

commander stemmed the wave of invaders at U1.i in that fateful

In late October 1947, at what was virtually a moment's notice, a batta-

Princely States at the time of the partition of the sub-continent into

A Vulnerable Prize 1 Hazards of Snow 152

installed as Viceroy of India, replacing Field Marshal Lord Wavell.

to as the Mountbatten Plan for the partition of the sub-continent.

million and a revenue of Rs. 260 million, to Vejanoness with an

life), installed in his place as t h e Dewan, the Government of Juna-

Shah Nawaz to hand over the administration to the Government of

before him, but although he approved, he postponed the signing until

Laik Ali, a prominent business man of Hyderabad and Pakistan's

As the situation worsened steadily, Indian troops were ordered on

Did No Briton Know?

and resolute body of men instead of rapacious tribesmen, the 62 miles

the Government of India, which had gladly accepted the formation

Delhi Caught off Guard

sions which resulted in clashes -between Muslims and non-Muslims

per cent in 55 of them, and seventy-five per cent in 6. The cornpo-

their Sections even being accommodated in the vehicle garages.

nated attack on Sensa." At about mid-day came another : "Com-

The word 'Poonchies' at last gave a clue. I1 indicated that the

As Military Intelligence was not required to cover Jammu &

but an Afridi unit raised as Infantry had to be relegated to the role

Lights go out in the Valley

Mw-, one of the three major towns of Kashmir, is located

had done reasonably well. It was a mixed battalion, its composition

With reports of continued assaults on the border posts in Jn~nrnu

defected. The defection was primarily due to the subversive acti-

IT is a basic military tenet that, in training during peace, all units of

moulded itself, almost overnight, into one of the hardest hitting

night, its foundation being the element of Headquarters Fifth In-

New Delhi had no such unit. A Movement Control Unit is essential

much higher than in the Indian Army. The threat of withdrawing

Command of 161 Brigade

H e was, at first, somewhat reluctant to let me leave New Delhi for

arrived a t Safdarjung Airport at 8 o'clock. The D M 0 arrived at the

numerous routes leading to Srinagar three battalions would not be

should be well aware of who the Commander was. He informed me

chute Battalion, 850 in strength and commanded by Lt. Col. Pritam

been told to choose any nice spot. He had selected an untenanted

to evacuate British families who had come from Pakistan to holiday

vices, with particular reference to infantry, were in Srinagar. As he

to take the defences by surprise. With 1 Kumaon now made res-

as parties of the enemy might intermingle with the civilians in the

Anxious Vigil at the Airfield

AT eight o'clock on the morning of 3 November, Major Somnath

THE BADGAM BATTLE

Meanwhile, 1 Punjab was ordered to move immediately from

including neutralising the enemy mortar fire to answer which 4

port. This was heartening news, as the airstrip was beginning to

The Battle of Shalateng

the day - 4 November - information poured in from all sorts

Before rushing headlong into an action based on a hunch, the