Lecture 6 Trade Agreements
Lecture 6 Trade Agreements
Lecture 6 Trade Agreements
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6 lecture
Trade agreements
Economic Integration
World leaders have recognized that the reduction or elimination of
artificial barriers to trade is necessary for expanding world trade. The
worldwide postwar efforts to expand foreign trade included the elimination
of tariff barriers through the World Trade Organization and the
stabilization of currencies through the International Monetary Fund. At the
same time as these efforts went forward on the international level, many
countries around the world also pursued economic cooperation at the
regional level. Regional economic cooperation is based on the premise
that countries in a region connected by historical, geographical, cultural,
economic, and political similarities may be able to strike more intensive
cooperative agreements for mutually beneficial
• economic advantages.
From GATT to WTO
In 1947, 23 countries signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in Geneva. To join GATT, countries must adhere to the most
favored nation (MFN) clause, which requires that if a country grants a
tariff reduction to one country, it must grant the same concession to all
other countries. For example, if the USA cuts its tariff from 20 percent to 10
percent on wool sweaters from Australia, it must grant the same
concession on wool sweaters from all other countries. The MFN clause
also applies to quotas and licenses.
From GATT to WTO
• GATT members have held many talks since 1947 to expand and promote
world trade. First, GATT members held periodic meetings from 1947 to
1952 to cut specific tariffs.
• Second, the Kennedy Round (1964–7) covered across-the-board tariff
reductions on industrial products. Perhaps the most important part of the
Kennedy Round was to reduce trade barriers between the USA and the
European Economic Community.
• Third, the Tokyo Round (1973–9) of multilateral trade negotiations
discussed the reduction of nontariff barriers. The most important part of
these agreements is a series of detailed codes spelling out permissible
and non-permissible “good” behavior by governments in almost all
nontariff measures.
From GATT to WTO
• Fourth, the Uruguay Round (1986–93) discussed the expansion of trade
liberalization to include services, intellectual property rights, and
agricultural products.
• The new organization, known as the World Trade Organization (WTO),
has replaced the GATT since the Uruguay Round accord became
effective on January 1, 1995. Today, the WTO’s 144 members account
for more than 97 percent of world trade. The WTO has five major
functions: (1) administrating its trade agreements; (2) acting as a forum
for trade negotiations; (3) monitoring national trade policies; (4) offering
technical assistance and training for developing countries; and (5)
cooperating with other international organizations. China joined the
WTO in 2001. China’s WTO membership has further legitimized the idea
of free trade.
From GATT to WTO
The WTO has more power to enforce the rules of international trade
than the GATT. Under the WTO there is a powerful dispute-resolution
system, with three-person arbitration panels. Countries may bring
charges against their trading partners to a WTO panel. WTO members
cannot veto the panel’s rulings, as was the case under GATT. If an
offending country fails to comply with panel recommendations, its
trading partners are guaranteed the right to compensation. As a final
resort, the trading partners are given the right to impose countervailing
sanctions against the offending country.
From GATT to WTO
• In November 2001, WTO members began to explore a new round of
talks with the aim of further liberalizing global commerce. Major issues
include a moratorium on tariffs for electronic commerce, easier access
to foreign markets for high-tech, banking, and insurance exports,
elimination of agricultural subsidies, tougher labor standards around the
world, revision of US antidumping laws, and more time for developing
countries to liberalize trade.
Non-Discrimination Principle according to WTO
Salvatore: International Economics, 12th Edition © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
FIGURE 10.1. A Trade-Creating
Customs Union.
DX and SX represent Nation 2’s domestic demand and supply curves of commodity X.
At the tariff-inclusive PX =$2 before the formation of the customs union, Nation 2
consumes 50X (GH),with 20X (GJ) produced in Nation 2 and 30X (JH) imported from
Nation 1. Nation 2 also collects a tariff revenue of $30 (MJHN). Nation 2 does not
import commodity X from Nation 3 because of the tariff-inclusive PX > $2. After Nation
2 forms a customs union with Nation 1 only, Nation 2 consumes 70X (AB), with 10X
(AC) produce domestically and 60X (CB) imported from Nation 1 at PX = $1. The tariff
revenue disappears, and area AGJC represents a transfer from domestic producers to
domestic consumers. This leaves net static gains to Nation 2 as a whole equal to $15,
given by the sum of the areas of shaded triangles CJM and BHN.
Trade-Diverting Customs Unions
• Trade diversion occurs when lower-cost imports from non-members are
replaced by higher cost imports from members.
• By itself, trade diversion lowers welfare as it shifts resources away from comparative
advantages.
• Trade diverting customs union also results in trade creation. Change in welfare
depends on relative magnitude of creation and diversion.
• In Figure 10.2, the shaded triangles represent gains from trade creation. The
rectangle represents the loss of tariff revenue (that is not compensated with
consumer surplus gain).
FIGURE 10-2 A Trade-Diverting Customs Union.
FIGURE 10.2. A Trade-Diverting
Customs Union.
• It was once believed that any movement toward freer trade would increase
welfare, so formation of a customs union would necessarily result in increased
welfare for members and non-members.
• In 1950, Viner showed that formation of a customs union could increase or
reduce welfare, depending on the circumstances under which it takes place.
• Difficult to measure gains/losses empirically.
• Attempts to measure static welfare effects of the EU result in surprisingly small
gains of 1-2% of GDPs.
The Theory of the Second Best and Other Static Welfare
Effects of Customs Unions