Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments

.

LX

Chapter 1: Time and the Emerging Other I

From Sacred to Secular Time: The Philosophical
TraveLer 2

From HiJtory to Evolution: Th,. Naturalization of Time 1J

Some Uses of Time in Anthropological Disc(JUTse 21

Taking Srock: A thropotogical Discourse and the

Denial rff Coroniness 25

Chapter 2: Our Time, Their Time, No Time:

Coevalness Denied 37
Circumventing Coevalness: Cultural Relativit)' 38

Prumpting Coeval:ness: Cultural Taxcmom), 52

Chapter 3: Time and Writing Aoout the Other 71

Contradiction: Real or Apparent 72

TemjxJraiiUltion: lH eam or End? 74

Time and Tense: The Ethrwgraphic Present 80

In My Time: Ethnography and the Autobiographic

Past 87

Politics if Time: The Tempoml Wolf in Taxonomic Sheep's

Clothing 97

Chapter 4: The Other and the Eye: Time

and the Rhetoric of Vision 105
VIII Contents

MttJwd and ViJiol1 106

Space and Memory: Topo; of Discourse 109

Logic ar .'\rml1gtmenl: Kn(m:ltdge Visib/€ 114

Vide et lmpem: The Other a.s Object 118

"T/u Symbol Btlongs to the Orient": Symbolic Anthropology

in Hegel's Aesthetic 12}

The Other as leon: The Care of "Symholu

Anthropology" 131 v'

Chapter 5: Conclusions 143

Retrospect and S ummary 144

Issues/or Debate 152

Coeualness: Points of Departure 156

Notes 167
References Cited 183
Index ·199
Preface and Acknowledgments

"YOIl Set, m} fnmd," Mr. BOW1derby pld in , "we art the

ltind of pwple who knuw the val1M of time, and you art' tht
ltind oj people who dQ71't know the vallU! of fi�," "/ MUll
not," retorted Mr. Childers, 'after m11it)'mg him frmn huul
ifyou mean tho.t
to foot, "/he h01Wur of Imtr.,JJ ing JOu--but
you can makt mort lIumq of your time than I can of mim,
I slwuldjudgefrom your appearance that )'OU art about
right. "
Charles Did.ens Hard Tinw

WHEN THEY APPROACH the problem of Time. certain

philosophers feel the need to fortify themselves with a ritual
incantation. They quote Augustine: "What is time? If no
one asks me about it, I know; if I want to explain it to the
one who asks, I don't know" (Confessions, book XI). In fact,
I have just joined that chorus.
It is difficult to speak about Time and we may leave it
to philosophers to ponder the reasons. It is not difficult to
show that we speak, fluently and profusely, through Time.
Time, much like language or money, is a carrier of signifi­
canet:, a form through which we define the contt!nt of rda­
tions between the Self and the Other. Moreover-as the
conversation between Mr. Bounderby, the factory owner,
and Mr. Childers, the acrobat, reminds us-Time may give
form to relations of power and inequality under the condi­
tions of capitalist industrial production.
It occurred to me that this could be the perspective for
a critique of cultural anthropology. These essays, then, are
offered as studies of "anthropology through Time." The
 x Preface and Acknowledgments Preface and Acknowledgments XI

reader who expects a book on the anthropology of Time­ wickedness. Aggression, one suspects, is the alienated bour­
perhaps an ethnography of "time-reckoning among the geois' perception of his own sense of alienation as an inevi­
primitj\'es"-will be disappointed. Aside from occasional table, quasi-natural force; wickedness projects the same
references to anthropological studies of cultural concep­ ine"itability inside the person. In both cases, schemes o f ex­
tions of Ti� e, he will find nothing to satisfy his curiosity planation are easily bent into ideologies of self-justification.
'about the Time of the Other. I want to examine past and 1 will be searching--and here 1 feel close to the Enlighten­
(present uses of Time as ways of construing the object of our ment philosophes whom I shall criticize laler on-for an
'discipline. If it is true that Time belongs to the political "error," an intellectual misconception, a defect of reason
. economy of relations between individuals. classes, and na­ which, even if it does not offer the ex planation, may free
.tions, then the construction of anthropology's object through our self-questioning from the double bmd of fate and evil.
, temporal concepts and devices is a political act; there is a That error causes our societies to maintain their anthropo­
"Politics of Time." logical knowledge of olher societies in bad faith. We con­
[ look an hislOncal approach in order to demonstrate stantly need to cover up lor a fundamental contradiction:
the emergence, transfonnation, and differentiation of uses On the one hand we dogmatically insist that anthropology
of rime. This runs counter to a kind of critical philosophy rests on ethnographic research involving personal, pro­
� longed interaction with the Other. But then we pronounce
whICh condemns recourse to history as a misuse of Time.
According to a famous remark by Karl Popper, "The his­ upon the knowledge gained from such research a discourse
toricist does not recognize that it is we who select and order which conStrues the Other in terms of distance, spatial and
the facts of history" (1966 2:269). Popper and other theo­ temporal. The Other's empirical presence turns into his
rists of science inspired by him do not seem to realize that theoretical absence, a conjuring trick which is worked with
the problematic element in this assertion is not the consti­ the help of an array of devices that have the common intent
tution of history (who doubts that it is made, not given?) and function to keep the Other oUlside the Time of anthro­
but tbe nature of the we. From tbe point of view of anthro­ pology. An account of the many ways in which this has been
pology, that �, �� subject of history, cannot be presup­ done needs to be given even if it is impossible to propose,
posed or left Implicit. Nor should we let anthropology sim­ in the end, more than hints and fragments of an alternative.
ply be used as the provider of a convenient Other to the we The radical contem oraneit· of mankind is a �t. The­
(�s exempli�ed by P? p� r on the first page of the Open So­ oretical re ectJon can Identl y 0 stades; only changes in the
. .
aety where . our avihzauon', IS opposed to the "tribal" or praxis and politics of anthropological research and ""Tiling
"closed sociel),," 1966 I, I). can contribute solutions to the problems that will be raised.
Critical philosophy must inquire into the dialectical Such are the outlines of the argument I want to pursue.
constitution of the Other. To consider that relation dialec­ It lies in the nature of this undertaking that a great mass of
tically means to recognize its concrete temporal, historical, matelial had to be covered, making it impossible always to
and political conditions. Existentially and politically, critique do justice to an author or an issue. Readers who are less
of anthropolog}' starts with the scandal of domination and familiar with anthropology and its history might first want
exploitation of one part of mankind by another. Trring to to look at the summary pro"ided in chapter 5.
make sense of what happens---in order to overcome a state 1 don't want to give the impression that this project was
of affairs we have long recognized as scandalous-we can in conceived principally by way of theoretical reasoning. On
the end not be satisfied with explanations which ascribe the contrary, it grew out of my ordinary occupations as a
Western imperialism in abstract terms to the mechanics of teacher working mainly in institutions involved in the re­
power or aggression, or in moral terms to greed and production of Western society, and as an ethnographer
xu Preface and Acknowledgments Preface and Acknowledgments XIII

trying to understand cultural processes in urban·industrial mention several highly original treatments of the topic, ex­
Africa (see Fabian L971 , 1979). [0 the act of producing eth­ emplified by G. Kubler's Til< Shape of Tim, (1962) and the
nagraphic knowledge. the problem of Time arises con­ work. of M. Foucault (e.g., 1973). The one blbhography I
cretely and practically, and many anthropologists have been found (Zelkind and Sprug 1974) lists more than 1 ,100 titles
aware of the temporal aspects of ethnography. But we have of time research but is badly in need of completing and up­
rarely considered the ideological nature of temporal con­ dating.
cepts which inform our theories and our rhetoric. Nor have As could be expected, many of the questio� s I raise oc­
wr.: paid much atlt;lIlioli Lo illlt::l-subjt!t:live Tillie, which does
.
cupied other writers at about the same ume. ThiS w?rk came
not measure but constitutes those practices of communica­ to my attention after these essays were completed (m 1978),
tion we cuslOmarily call fieldwork. Perhaps we need to pro­ toO late to be commented on at length. Most important
tect ourselves by such lack of reAection in order to keep our among these writings is undoubtedly Edward Said's Orien­
knowledge of the Other at bay, as i t were. After all, we only talum (1979 [1978)). Similarities in intent, method, and oc­
seem to be doing what other sciences exercise: keeping ob­ .
casionally in formulations between his study and rrune co�­
ject and subjeCl apart. firmed me in my ideas. I hope that my arguments "nil
Throughout, I have tried to relate my arguments to ex­ complement and, in some cases, elaborate his theses. Quite
isting work and to provide bibliographic references to fur­ possibly, M. Foucault's influence explains why there is so
ther sources. \'\". Lepenies' essay the "End of !\"atural His­ much convergence between our vie� ·s. Th�re may also be
tory" (1976) is closely related to my views on (he uses of deeper analogies in our intellectual biographies, as we found
Time in earlier phases of anthropology (although we seem out in later conversations. I believe we both struggle to re­
to differ on what brought about the phenomenon of "tem­ store past experiences, which were buried under layers of
poralization"); P. Bourdieu has formulated a theory of Time .
"enculturation" in other societies and languages, to a kind
and cultural practice (1977) in which I found much agree­ of presence that makes them critically fruitful.
ment with my own thought. H. C. Reid has been, to my A remarkable study by Ton Lemaire ( l976) rovides
l
knowledge, one of the few social scientists to employ the background and much detail to �apters 1 �n 2. Le­
notion of "politics of time" (see 1972). My indebtedness to maire's is one of the best recent cnncal evaluations of cul­
the work of Gusdorf, Moravia, Benveniste, Weinrich, Yates, tural anthropology; unfortunately it is as yet not available
Ong, and others is obvious and, I hope, properly acknowl­ in English.
edged. I made an attempt, within the limitations of libraries .
Justin Stagl achieved in my vie� a b!eakLh�ugh In the
at my disposal, to read up on the lOpic of Time in general. historiography of anthropology With hiS studies on early
The literature I consulted ranged from early monographs manuals for travelers and on the origins of certain social­
on primitive time reckoning (:"Jilsson 1920) to recent studies scientific techniques, such as the questionnaire-survey ( 1979,
or Lime<onceptions in other cultures (Riu..x:ur 1975); from 1980). His findings demonstrate a connection which I on�y
philosophical (\Vhitrow 1963) to psychological (Doob 1971) suspected, namely a direct influence of Ramist thought III
standard works. 1 looked at interdisciplinary projects from giving "method" to our knowledge of the Other. M�ch of
the "Time and its Mysteries" series 0936-1949) to the work .
what] discuss in chapters 3 and 4 takes on added slgmfi­
inspired by J. T. Fraser and the International Society for cance in the light of Stagl's writings,
the Stud\' of Time he founded (see Fraser 1966, Fraser el Stagl drew on the seminal work of W. Ong,. as did.l.
at., eds., '1972 ff). Special issues of journals devoted to Time Goody in his book T'" Domeslicalicm afthe Savage Ml1Id (1977)
have come to my attention from History alld Theory (Beiheft which provides valuable illustrations to issues treated in
6: 1966) to Cahiers lnUrnalionaux tk Socrologie (1979). I should chapter 4 , especially regarding the role of the visual i n the
 Preface and AcknowlcdgmenLS XV
XIV Preface and Acknowledgments

To Wesleyan University I am grateful for a sabbatical

presentation of knowledge. The section on Hegel's theory
lea\."e giving me time to write, and to students at Wesleyan
of symbols in that chapter is complemented bv F. Kramer's
University an� the University of Bonn for letting me try out
essay "Mythology and Ethocemrism" (1977:15�4).
my thoughts 10 courses on the History of Anthropological
Some of the points I make in chapters 3 and 4 receive
Thought.
� upport from a recent study by Arens (1979) on cannibal­
Ilona Szombati-Fabian helped generously with sugges­
� sm, one of the most persistent topics in anthropology. which
tions and critical response. Fredric Jameson, Martin Silver­
IS sho �n to have been primarily an "oppressive mental COil·
, man, Bob Scholte, and Walter Qng read the manuscript and
slmc.:l uenved from cosmological ideas abom other limes
encouraged me. Although this rna)' come as a surprise to
and places.
him, I t�ink that the time of dose collaboration with Hay­
Finally, I fou�� much co�rmation. albeit of a negative
den White at the Center for the Humanities at Vleslcyan
sort (from the pOSition taken I n this oook) i n the work of G.
University was important in giving shape to this project.
Durand (1979; see also Maffesoli, ed., 1980). He seems to
I want to thank Valborg Proudman and Hanneke Kos­
emer�e as the major proponent of a neohermetic move­
sen for help and competent assistance of which typing ver­
",lent �n French �nthropology whose strategy i t is to play the
sions of the manuscript was but a small pan,
"lmagtnary" agamst prosaic positivism and pseudoscientific
.
evolutiOnism. The effect is to revitalize "orientalism" and to
Amsterdam
reinstate the visualist rhetoric whose history has been criti­
November 1982
cally studied by Yates and Ong (see chapter 4).
With few exceptions I shall not refer to these and other
recent publications in the text or in the notes. I mention
some of them now because they confirm my conviction that
we are on the threshold of some major change in our con­
ceptions of the history and present role of anthropology.
Elements of a. ne\�' understanding are being formulated here
and there; mme IS one attempt to show how they might be
put together.
Muc� as I � m ind�bled to readings. lowe most to my
conversalJons Wll� Afncan workers and intellectuals. J hope
that V. Y. Mudlmbe, P. Laleye, Wamba-dia-Wamba, M .
Owusu. and inany others will recognize in these essays some
of the exc�anges we had through the years. A version of
"
chaptel 1 (1IICJUI..llll g tht:: plan for the book) was first read at
the Department of Anthropology at Harvard Uni\·ersity and
.
I want to thank Michael Fisher for giving me the opportu­
.
nity to fonnulate my thoug.hts. Perhaps even more impor­
tant was to me another occaSIon when I presented these ideas
in a panel discussio n wi� h the African philosopher M. Towa
. .
at the National UOIverslty of Zaire in Kinshasa" I discussed
chapter 3 with J. Habermas and his collaborators at the Max­
Planck-Institute in Starnberg.
Chapter One / Time
and the Emerging Other

Apartfrom Ibm Inn't is one Olht:r mtl'J1I.S W bring about lin­

porumt change-forct. 1/ OM work too shrdll), tht other
will do itfa:;�.
Georg Christc>ph LichurWn-g I

Ofwur� tJu history and prae-histtJr) of man laM tiltlr

PTopnplaces in 1M gClaal schtl1lt ofImfTJ)kdgr. Of course
fhe doctriru of the wm-ld-lcrtg nJoIuticm � civiiJa
J twn i5
ont which phiitJsophic minds will lake up with tagn inltT·
tst, as a themt ojabstract safflet. Bu! beyond this, such rt·
SLlJrch Iuu its prlUlKai si&, as a JOurct ofpower thstifILd /0
inJlueru:e the COUTU of nuxkrn iJhos and actioru.
Edw<Jrd Btlrntlt r,1or Z

KKOWLEDGE [S POWER. That commonplace applies to

anthropology as much as to any other field of knowledge.
But commonplaces usually cover up for not-SQ-common
truths. In this first chapter] want to set down some of the
tt"lms for an arb'umenr 1.0 he pursued throughout these es­
says: An..!p !:ro ?!ogy's claim to power originated at its roots.
,
h belongs to Its essence and IS not a matier of accidental
misuse. Nowhere is this more clearly visible.. a t least once we
look for it, than in the uses of Time anthroJXllogy makes
when it strives to constitute its own object-the savage, the
primitive, the Other. It is by diagnosing anthropology's
temporal discourse that one rediscovers the obvious, namely
that there is no knowledge of the Other which is not also a
temporal, historical, a political act.
2 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Other 3

Perhaps this covers too much ground; political can mean thought. In fact, "universal Time" was probablv established
anything from systematic oppression to anarchic mutual concretely and fKllitically in the Renaissance in' response to
recognition. The epigrams chosen for this chapter are to both classical philosophy and to the cognitive challenges
indicate that our attention will mostly be directed to the op­ presented by the age of discoveries opening up in the wake
pressive uses of Time. Anthropology's alliance with the of the earth's circumnavigation. Nevertheless, there are gcxxl
forces of oppression is neither a simple or recent one, as reasons to look for decisive developments, not in the mo­
some moralizing critics would have it, nor is it unequivocal. ments of intellectuaJ rupture achieved by Copernicus and
The brief sketches of some of the historical contexts m which Galileo nor for that matter, by Newton and Locke, but in
I

anthropologicaJ uses of Time developed have the main pur­ the century that elaborated the devices of discourse we now
pose of recounting a slOry whose conclusion is open-ended recogni7.. e as the foundations of modem anthropology-the
and contradictory. Anthropology may, during the period Age of Enlightenment.'"
covered here, have succeeded in establishing itself as an ac­ If we follow G. Gusdorf we rna)' locate the starting point
ademic discipline; it failed to come to a rest vis-a.-vis a clearly of these developments, a sort of barrier that had to be bro­
defined Other. ken through, in one of the last attempts during the seven­
teenth century to write a universal history from the Chris­
tian yiew?<?int, Bossuet's Discours sur l'histoire universelle (first
From Sacred to Secular Tit7re: The Philosophical Traveler pubhshed in l681). � Perhaps it is too simplistic to put Bos­
suet at the other side of a premodern/modern watershed,
In the Judeo-Christian tradition Time has been conceived for in many ways he anticipated the Enlightenment genre
as the medium of a sacred history. Time was thought, but of "philosophical hislOry." His 0PfKlsition to modernity is
more often celebrated, as a sequence of specific events that "!ot so 'I'!lt�C�in the detail of his methodological prescrip­
befall a chosen people. Much has been said aoout the linear hons as It IS m the position that integrates his \'iews: faith in
character of that conception as opposed to pagan, cyclical the evangelical specificity of all of history as history of sal­
views of Time as an eternel retour.3 Yet such spatial meta­ vat �on. A brief reading of the introduction to the Discours,
enuded "The General Plan of this Work:' will illuminate
phors of temporal thou�ht lend to obscure something that
IS of more immediate significance in an attem pt to sketch the importance of Bossuet's tTeatise.
the ancestry of Time's anthropological uses: Faith in a cov­ Bossuet's professed aim is to alleviate confusion caused
enant between Divinity and one people, trust in divine by the multitude of historical fact. This is to be accom­
providence as it unfolds in a history of salvation centered plished by teaching the reader to "distinguish different times
on one Savior, make for sacred conceptions of Time. They (temps)" with the help of "universa1 history," a device which
stress the specificity of Time, its realization in a given cul­ "is to the histories of every country and of every people
tural ecology-the Eastern Mediterranean, 'first, and the w at a general map is 1O particular maps" (1845:1, 2). In
�
circum-Mediterranean with Rome as its hub, later. t�IS analogy the umversal is aligned with the general, which
Decisive steps towards modernity, those that permitted s'�als a certain ambiguity (one which, incidentally, is still
.
the emergence of anthropological discourse, must be sought, with us m anthropology's quest for universals). Universals
not in the invention of a Jjnear conception, but in a succes­ app ears to have two connotations. One is that of totality; in
sion of attempts to secularize Judeo-Christian Time by gen­ thiS sense, �niversal designates the whole world at all times.
eralizing and universalizing it. The other IS one of generality: that which is applicable to a
Different degrees of universalizing Time had of course large number of instances.s The important point, borne out
been achieved in an abstract form by earlier philosophical by the body of the Discours, is that Bossuet does not therna-
4 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Other 5

tize the first connotation. His account does not cover the the light of divine providence creates order. It demon­
world, it never leaves the circllm�Mediterranean. Vhiting strates the omnipresent work of salvation.
within the horizon of the history o� Christian religion, h� O. Ranum, the editor of a recent English version, re­
does not see his perspective, nor does he look bey�nd hIs minds us that Bossuet used the term discou.rse in the title of
horizon. The former is self-evident as an article of faith, the his work deliberately. He wanted to break with conventions
latter is bounded by his political position at the FTench court according to which highly stylized secular and religious his­
of Louis XIV, whose succession to the Christian Roman tories were produced during the seventeenth century (see
Empire he takes for granted. Perspective an? hO rizon ?f the Kanum 1976:x\'iii). Bossuet asserted his freedom to abbre­
.
Discaurs are tied together by the all-pervadmg mtentlon to viate, condense, and emphasize without being bound by the
validate (albeit not uncritically) the political realities of his then finnly established canon of historical facts each histo­
day by a history that is universal because it expresses the rian was expected to report. ]0 this he anticipated the "phil­
omnipresent signs of divine providence. osophical history" which Voltaire opposed to mindless
.
In contrast, Bossuet is quite conscious of problems Im­ chronicling and out of which the first projects of modern
plicit in the second connotation of uni vcr� al. �o", can one anthropology were to grow. Less obvious, but equally im­
present history in terms of generally yah?� pnnCl: 1;J les? �e JX)rtant,is the model set by Bossuet for what one might call
argues that such a project rests on the ability to discern 10 sermonizing history, which is another possible connotation
the "sequence of things" (suite des cJw.ses) the "order of times." of di.�course. Bossuet wrote his work for the enlightenment
Methooologically this calls for an "abbreviatio�" o se­ � and education of the Daup hin (and his father,the Sun King).
quences in such a \Iray that order can be perceived at a It was meant as a refutation of attacks on the literal under­
glance" (comme d'un cou.p d'oeil, 1845:2). A long history of the standing of the Bible and as a defense of a Gallican, French­
"art of memorv" is behind this remark, and a history of the centered, reformed Catholicism. In short, his "distinction of
;
visual reductio ) of temporal sequence-its "synchronic" un­ times" is embedded in concrete political-moral concerns. He
derstanding-lies ahead of it. 7 expressed himself through discursive devices that were rhe­
A methodological device that opens the view over Time torical in the classical sense: aimed to move and convince
is the epoch, conceived, not in its currently most common the reader. His political intent and its rhetorical fOlm \\'ere
understanding of a period or interval of time, but � n a tr�n­ to influence the writing of the philosophes and to become part
sitive sense derived from its Greek root. An epoch IS a pomt of anthropology's heritage as, in Tylor's words, a "reform­
ploring the past; every step he makes is the passage of an age" er's science."
as from a place of rest, all that happened before or after, so We set out to show in Boussuet's DiscOUTS an example
that one 'may avoid anachronisms, that is, a kind of error for a premodern treatise on universal history; now we seem
which results in confusing the times." ]n exposing universal to end up with more similarities than dissimilarities if we
historv one proceeds by treating a "small number of ep­ compare his method and devices to those of the Englighten­
ochs."·in secular and religious history, the outcome of which ment philosophical histories. We are confronting here a well­
will be-and here Bossuet's methodology rejoins his faith-­ known problem in the interpretation of eighteenth-century
to make visible the "PERPETUAL DURATION OF REUGIOK, A:'>ID �ought. On the whole, the philosophes, whom we recognize
. . . THE CAUSES 01-' THE GREAT CHANGE.') IN THE EMPIRES" 111 many respects as our immediate ancestors, achieved only
(1845:3,4). Thus both, the external, spatial boundaries of a sort of negative modernity. ]n the words of Carl Becker:
history and its inner continui �y are of r�l�gior:' Where me �e "Their negations rather than their affirmations enable us to
.
sequence might cause confUSion, the d,stmcuon of umes In treat them as kindred spirits" (1963:30). Or, as Gusdorf puts
 6 Time and the Emerging Other
Time and the Emerging Other 7
it, these rhinkers replaced Bossuet's Christian myth with the
. ammatic formula: "The philosophical traveller, sailing to
"myth-history of reason" which, by and �arge. C? nu nued to
use the conventions and devices of earhe� per � o<ls. If �:me
�e ends of the earth. is in fact travelling in time; he is ex­
ploring the past; e,'ery step he makes is the passage of �n
wants to show how Time became secularized m the eigh­
teenth century and onward he T "
j age" (Degerando 1969 [1800] :�3).ln this st�tement. the attnb­
. l conce�trate on the
S .
ute philosophical echoes the milItant enthuslasm of the preced ­
transformation of the message of umversal hlst ?ry" rather .
ing century for a science of man to be concen:ed. by man and
than on the elements of its code. The latter display a re­
for man. one in which religious and metaphysical searches
markable continuity with preceding periods down to �e
for mankind's origin and destiny were to glV� place t� a
Greccr Roman canons of the arts of memory and rhetoric. radically immanent vision of humanity at home I� the enure
The transformation of the message had to be operated on
world and at all times. Kow man is, in MoraVia's words,
what we identified as the specificity of Christian . " .mi,,:ersal­
� "l?laced, withom residue, inside of a world-horizon which is
ity. " Change also had ro occur on the level of JX>hucal mtent . to travel means, in this framework, not only to
S own ..
hI
or ''judgment.'' It was on that level that me phi/osaphes had
quench the thirst for knowledge; .it �Iso �igni fies man's n:ost
to overcome Bossuet who "was never reluctant to Judge all
intimate vocation" (1967:942). It IS In thIS sense of a ,'ehl �le
of the past in the light of the single most important event
for the self-realization of man that the topo� of tra�el sig­
of all time: the brief passage of the man-god J esus through
nals achieved secularization of Time. A new dIscourseSI buill
a life on earth" (Ranum 1976:xxvi).
on an enormous literature of travelogues, collections and
In fact, among the many expr �ions of chang� one
syntheses of travel accounts.8. . . . . .
could cite is the very transformation of one man s all­
The manifest pr eoccu patlOn ill thI S hterature,. m Its
significant passage on earth into the topos of travel. In the
. popular forms as well as in its scienti!ic u� s, was ....'1 �h the
Christian tradition, the Savior's and the samts' passages on
description of movements and relations I� space ( . ge?g­
earth had been perceived as constituent events of a sacred
raphy") based primarily on visual observation of forelgn
history . To be sure, this ha� �casioned much travel �o .
foreign parts in the for':l of pilgnmag�s.. crusades, . and mis­
places ' However this does not contradict the contenuon that
elaoo rating a �ular conception of �ime was . its underlyin�
sions . But for the estabhshed bourgeolSle of the . eighteenth
concern. Precisely because secular TIme was Its presu p posI­
century. travel was to become (at least potentially) ev�ry
tion, logically speaking, or i.ts signifie�, in semiotic par�ance,
man's source of "philosophical," secular knowledge. Religi­
the new discourse had (with excepuons to be mentioned
ous travel had been to the centers of religion, or to the souls
later) no need to thematize Time. (Philosophical H.ist�)fy,. as
to be saved; now, secular travel was from the centers of
is well known, was strangel), ahistorical).Such d.lsu . ncoon
learning and power to places �here man w�s tl:! fin� no­
. between intent and eXl?ression is an important pru�Clple of
thing but himself. As S. �oravla had sho� n to hi S brilha� t
interpretation which ",ill be more fully elaborated m chap­
studies, the idea and practice of travel as scumce, pr�l? ared m
ter 3. It also invites consideration of the reverse case: A dI S ­
Didcrot's encyclopedia ()973:125-�32), was defiOltively es­
COurse in which Time is thematized may be about an aLem­
tablished toward the end of the elgbteenth century, espe­
poral referent,9 As we shall see, nineteenth-century
cially among the thinkers known as "ideologues" (see
evolutionism is a case in point. At any rat e, "ehilosophical
Moravia 1976). Two names, those of . J M. Degerando and
travel," that is, the conception of travel � �. ence. coul d lea�'e
C. F. Volney, are of special interest in this connection of
the problem of Time theoreticall), implICit �a �se t. ravel 1t­
travel and the secularization of Time.
self, as witnessed by Degerando , s statement, SI iOsUtuted as
It was Degerando who expr�ed . the te�poralizing
a temporalizing practice. . .
) ethos of an emerging anthropology tn thiS conCise and pro- .
Why this should be SO IS explamed by the subsumptton
8 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Em e rging Other 9

of tTavei under the reigning paradigm of naturdl history. piricism and pure. positive description. Volney. one of the
Moravia has shown thal the project of scientific travel was mosl eminent representatives of the genre, is also the one
consciously conceived to replace an earlier. enormously who advocated a critical stance based (and in this he is closer
IX>pular, genre of mostly sentimental and aesthelisizing ta1es ro the Romantic revolt against the Enlightenment) on ex­
of tTavel. The new traveler "criticized the philosophes: the plicitly historic.d, i.e., temporal considerations. During his
I'eality of lived experience and of things seen ",dS now op­ voyages in Egypt and Syria he const � ntly had to face � he
jXJsed to a reality distorted by preconceived ideas" dilapidated monuments of a once glonous past. COntTasung
(1967:963). One also begins to reject tIle linkup, unques.­ past and pre�nt became an int�lleclu�l concern as well as a
. . .
tioned by earlier voyagers, between travel in foreign parts literary de\'lCe pen·admg hiS wntmgs (see MoraVia
and military conquest. AccOJuing to La Perouse, one of the 1967: 1008 f). 1t was elevated to a poetic-philosophical vi­
most famous figures in this story, "the modem navigators sion in his Us Ruines au M!ditation sur ies Revolutions des Em­
only have one objective when they describe the customs of pires. Better than any comn:entary, the openiI?g page frol? ,
new peop les: to complete the history of man" (cited in Mo­ Ruines will illustrate the pOignancy of contradICtory expen­
I."ia 1967 :964 f). ences of past and present and the political nature of Vol­
There is a significant double entendre in the verb to ney's concern with Time:
complete. As used by La Perouse, it signifies belief in the ful­
fillment of human destinv: travel is the self-realization of In the eleventh year of the reign of Alxt-ul-HonUd,
man. It also has a more literal, methodological meaning and IOn of Ahmed, emperor of the Turks, at a time when
might then be translated as filling out (as i n "to complete a the victorious Russians took. the Crimea and planted
lheir banners on the coastlhat leads to Constanti­
questionnaire"). In the episteme of natural history 10 the ex­
nopl e, I was travelling in the empire of the Otto­
ercise of knowledge was projected as the filling of spaces or
-ans, and J traversed the provinces whkh once had
slots in a table, or the marking of points in a system of co­ been the kingdoms of Egypt and S)'ria.
ordinates in which all possible knowledge could be placed. Carrying with me my attentiveness to every­
1t is therefore not surprising that with the rise of an elbos thing that concerns the weU-being of man in society.
of scientific travel we also see the emergence of a genre of I entered the cities and studied the customs of their
scientific prepanuton for travel quite different from the in­ inhabitants; 1 vent ur ed into the palaces and ob­
slru.ctiones European potentates used to give to the early nav­ served the conduct of those who govern; llost my­
igators and conquistadors. \"'e know its modern offspring, self in the countryside and examined the conditions
the Notes. and Queries on Anthropology which accompanied of those who work the land. Seeing ever)'where
generations of anthropologists to the field. II Only recently nothing but pillage and devastation, nOlhing but
tyranny and miseT)·, m y heart was heavy with sad­
na\'e we rediscovered and come to appreciate such prede­
ness and indign ation. Everyday I found on my road
cessors as Degerando's The Observation oJ Savage Peoples, is ­
abandoned fields. deserted villages, and cities in
sued from the short-lived activities of the Societe des Obser­ r uins; often I encountered ancient monuments and
vaLeut's de J'Homme. 1t is most revealing to find that a model temples reduced to debris; palaces and fortres ses ,
of the genre was conceived by that natural historian par ex­ columns, aqueducts, tombs. This spectacle turned
cellence, Linnaells (ImtitutW Perigrif'Ultoris, Uppsala, 1759).111 my spirit to medidating about tmes past, and it
i

This confirms, if confirmation is needed, beyond any doubt caused in my heart thoughts that were grave and
the roots of the new science of travel in natural-historical profound. (Volnev 1830:21 f)
projects of observation, collection and classification, and de­
scription. Wnen he later draws the "lessons from times past for
The new travelers did not mindlessly subscribe (0 em- times present" (thus the title of chapler 12) he finds conso-
 10 Time and the Emerging Other Time and lhe Emerging Other II

ladon in a thought that rings with the optimism of the phil� [eristic of our discipline through most of its active periods:
osophes: The posited authenticit), of a past (savage, tribal, peasant)
serves to denounce an inauthentic present (the uprooted ,
It is a man's folly that makes him lose himself; it is
it-'oluis, acculturated). "Urban anthropology," inasmuch as it
up to man's wisdom to save him. The peoples are
�xposes counterimages to the pristine wholeness of primi­
ignorant, may they instruct themselves; their rulers
are pen:erted, let them correa and better them. tive life, was in an obvious sense the byproduct of an ad­
selves. Because that is the dictate of nature: Since /he vanced stage of colonization abroad and an advanced stage
evils ojjocieti� CO'NUfrmn cupidity and ignorance, man­ of urban decay at home. On a deeper level, as Vulney's ex­
Ja1ld will not etase to be tormented unlil it becomes enJight­ ample reminds us, it was the point of departure for our
ended and wist!, until they practice the art ofjUJtice, discipline in that it expressed the consciousness and con­
based on the knowledge of their relations and of the cerns of its urban, oourgeois founders.
laws of their organisation. (Ibid. 90)

The difference between this new faith in reason and

Bossuet's old faith in salvation could not be expressed more From Histmy to Evolutirm: The NaturaliUltion of Time
cJ�arly. Bossuet preached understanding of a past that con­
tamed a history of salvation and divine providence. Volney Thanks to studies such as those by Burrow, Stocking, and
preaches, too, but has no recourse from the history of man. Peel, our understanding of evolutionism, the paradigm un­
To him, knowledge of the past is a sort of Archimedian der which, at least in England, anthropology gained its sta­
point from which to change an otherwise hopeless present. tus as an academic discipline, is much improved. Neverthe­
There certainly is an element of romantic pessimism and less. there remains much confusion, some of it revived and
nostalgia in his reveries on the Orient's glorious past. At the perpetuated in various fonns of neoevolutionary anthropol­
�e tim�. if we consider the context and message of Ruims ogy whose historical awareness does not seem to go beyond
In Its e�tlret}', we find, beneath the image of a dream which Leslie White.13 A failure to distinguish between Darnin's and
the �nter conveys to his readers. the pragmatic assertion Spencer's views of evolution is responsible for a great deal
. .
that It IS hIS, the educated French traveler's, knowledge of of equivocal back-and-forth tracking between biolo cal and
gi
the past that counts. It is a superior knowledge, for it is not sociocultural applications. On the orner hand, an admixture
�ared by the Orientals caught in the present of their cities, of the two cannot simply be dismissed as an error. I t stems
e,�her deserted and dilapidating, or overpopulated and pu­ from a tradition of equivocation fostered by Spencer him­
t�d. Bos�uet had evoked the same tapos at the end of his self (see Peel 1971 :ch. 6) and perhaps by DaJt\lin in his later
�cours, albeit with a different conclusion: "Egypt, once so stages. One way to get a grip on this slippery issue is to
WIse, stumbles along drunken, dizzy, because the Lord has exam ine it in the light of a critique of amhropology's uses

spread giddiness in its designs; she no longer knows what of Time.

she is doing, she is lost. But peoples should not fool lhem­ If our conclusions in the preceding section are correct,
selves: \Vhen it pleases Him, Cod will straighten out lhose i
the starting point for any attempt to understand evolution­
who err" (1845:427). ary temporalizing ....ill be the achieved secularization of Time.
It resulted in a conception which contains two elements of
I Prefigured in the Christian tradition, but crucially
transformed in the Age of Enlightenment. the idea of a particular importance to further developments in the nine­
knowJedg� of Time which is a superior knowledge has be­ teenth century: 1) Time is immanent to, hence coextensive
come an mtegral part of anthropology's intellectual equip­ with, the world (or nature, or the universe, depending on
ment. \Ve recognize it in an outJook that has been charac- the argument); 2) relationships between parts of the world
12 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Olher 13

(in the widest sense of both natural and sociocultural emi­ historian will recobrnize as having produced a revolution in
ties) can be understood as temporal relations. Dispersal in the natural sciences, yet does not admit how incomprehen.
space reflects directly, which is not to sa)' simply or in ob­ siblv vast have been the past periods of time, may at once
VIOUS ways, sequence in Time. Given the sociopolitical con· cloSe this volume" (1861 [Third Edition] : I I I). Lyell's oon­
text of these axiomatic truths in the industrializing and col­ cern was with unifm7nitarianism, a theory which was to ac·
onizing West, it seems almost inevitable that sociaf theorists count for the present shape of the world ",ithout recour�
would begin to look for scientific frames in which to place to unique, simultaneous creation or to repeated acts of dl·
ideas of progress, improvement.. and development they had "ine inlervention ("catastrophes"). As summarized by him,
inherited [rom the Philo saphes. This is {he straighLforv.:ard it posited mat "all former changes of the organic and p�ys·
story as it is most Orten told. In reality, the history of early .
ical creation are referable LO one unmterrupted succeSSIOn
evolutionism is replete with puzzles, paradoxes , and incon­ of physica1 events, governed by laws now in operation"
sequential reasoning. (quoted in Peel 1971:293>19).
Theories of social evolution and vague ideas of biologi­ That was the basis for nineteenlh<entury auempts to
cal evolution were around before Darwin proposed his spe· formulate s�ific theories of evolution. Geological Time
ciflc theories of the origin of species. Once his theory gained endowed them with a plausibilily and a scope which their
popular acceptance it, or elements of it, were incorporated eighteenth century predecessors could not have had. �ur.
III views of social evolution even by those who, like Spencer, thennore, while it is true that the new conception proVided
had formed their basic convictions independently of Dar· first of alLa- vast.. quantitative expiiiSi'On oU lme, i�al
win. What they did was to redistill from Darwin's theory of significance wa u>f a qualitatiye nature. The problem wi?t
biological evolution those doctrines that were social to begin calculations based on me Bible was not only that they did
with (Malthusianism, utilitarianism). Paradoxically, the uti· not contain enough time for natural history. That sort of
lization of Darwin became possible only on the condition problem could have been dealt with (and is dealt with, I
that a revolutionary insight that had been absolutely crucial IJIlagine, b)' present-<lay fundamentalists) by redoing the
to his views, namely a new conception of Time, had to be, calculations and extending the chronology. The true r�a �n
if not eliminated, then a1tered and emasculated. Only then why biblical chronology had to be abandoned was that It did
could it be applied to various pseudoscientific projcclS sup­ not contain the right kind of Tim;!. Being calculated as the
posed to demonstrate the operation of evolutionary laws in Time after creation as it was revea1ed in the Scriptures. this
the history of mankind. was Bossuet's Time of salvation. It was Time relaying sig­
Numerous developmenta1 and protoevolutionary nificant evenlS, mythical and historical, and as such it w�
schemes had been tried before; and there was Vico, a dis· chronicle as well as chronology. As a sequence of events 1t
turbing figure when it comes to periodizations of modern· was linear rather than tabular, i.e., it did nO[ allow for Time
ity.14 BUl the qualitative step from medieval to modern time to be a variable independent of the events it marks. Hence
conceptions could not have been made without a break· it could not become part of a Cartesian system of time.s ace
r
through based essentially on a quantitative change . This was coordinates allowing the scientist to plot a multitude 0 un·
the demise of Bishop Vssher's biblical chronology, prepared �tmiful data over neutral time, unless it was first natura1-
by earlier skeptics by fully established only when Charles ized, i.e., separated from events meaningful to mankind.16
Lyell published his Pnnciples of Geolog;y (1830)." Its impor­ Let us for a moment return to Darwin in order to clar·
tance is Slated by Darwin in a passage "On the lapse of Tnne" ify two further issues. One is Darwin's own keen awareness
in The Origiu of Species: " He who can read Sir Charles Lyell's that Time, once it was naturalized, could and should not be
gnmd work on the Principles of Geology. which the future rehistonzed (which was precisely what the social evolution·
14 Tim e and the Emerging Other Time and the Em ergin g Other 15

ists would try to do). He could not have been clearer !.han man time in millions rather than thousands of years). Nor
in the following assage in which he rejects tendencies to
r could the social evolutionists accept the stark meaningless­
read some sort 0 inner necessity or meaning into the tem­ ness of mere physical duration. They were too full of . the
poral dimension of evolution : conviction that Time "accomplished" or brought about thmgs
in the course of evolution. And finall y. they had , as ret, no
The mere lapse of lime by itself does nothing either
use for a purely abstract methodolOgical chronolo�; theirs
for or against natural selection. I state this because
it has been erroneously asserted iliat the element of
was a preoccupation \o\.;th stages leading to civilizauon, each
time is assumed by me to play an all-important part of them as meaningful as a sentence leading toward the
in natural selection, as if all species were necessarily conclusion of a story.
undergoing slow modification from some innate Because they had no use for the positive implications
law. (186 1 : 1 1 0 f) of naturalized Time, the social evolutionists accepted it in
the end as a mere presupposition of natural history. Tn fact,
Second, Darwin had more than a first inkling of Lhe some took rhe consequences and discarded Time altogether
epistemological status of scientific chronologies as a sort of from their speculations about human social evolution. For
lan �age or code (an idea we will encounter later on in its instance, Morgan stated : "It does not affect the main result
UVI-Straussian version ) : that different tribes and nations on the same continent, and
For my part, follOWing Lyell's metaphor, I look at even of the same linguistic family, are in different condi­
the natural geological record, as a history of the tions at the same time . the coruiitWn of each is the material
world imperfectly kept. and written in a changing fact. the time being immaterial" (1877: 13). From Morgan's
dialect; of this histor» we IX>SSess the last \'olume timeless "condition" to the later topos of cultural "config­
alone, relating only to two or three countTies. Of urations" was but a small logical step. ]n posrularing the
this volume. onlv here and theTe a short chapteT radical irreducibility of "superorganic" history , militant an­
has been preser.:'ed; and of each page, only here tievolutionists such as A. Kroeber in his "E ighteen Profes­
and there a few lines. Each word of the slowly­
sions" became executors of the legacy of naturalized Time.17
changing language, in whkh the history is written,
After all these obsen'ations on what evolutionist an­
being more or less different in the successive chap­
thropologists did not 00 with Time we can now state what t
ten, may represent the apparently abruptly
Changed forms of life, entombed in our consecutive. they did do to it: they spatialiud Time. We may illustrate
but widely separated formations. (1861 :336 f) this by going back to Spencer. J. D� Y. Peel notes that Spen­
cer visualized evolution , not as a chain of being, but as a tree:
Unlike old sacred Time. or even its secularized form in the "That this image holds true for societies as well as or�­
"myth-history of reason," dle new naruralized Time was no isms. and for between them as well as for social grOUplOgS
longer the vehide of a continuous, meaningful story; it was within them. is clear from the opening (0 the final volume
a way to order an essentially discontinuous and fragmentary of the Sociology where he says 'social progress is not linear
geological and paleontological record. The social evolu��m­ but divergent and redivergenr and speaks of species and
ists, as J mentioned before. had to emasculate the new VISion genera of societies" (1971: ]57). What this describes (a point
on all the three accounts in which it difTered from earlier Peel who. in this context. sets bogged dow�
�ot developed �Y
conceptions. They could not use its vaSU1ess because the his­ , .
m t he spu rious Issue of unlinear vs. m u ltil inear e volution ) 15
i
tory of mankind. recorded or reconstTucted. occupied a a taxonomic approach to socia-cultu ral reality. The tree has
negligible span on (he scale of natural evolution (and I am always been one of the simplest forms of constructing clas­
not sure whether this has changed now that we count hu- sificatory schemes based on subsumption and hierarchy. We
16 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Other 17

are back to Linnaeus and eighteenth-century n�tural his­ all times and in all places. The enthusiasm and euphoria
tory. In other words. the socio-cultural e,'o.lulJoOists �ccom­ generated by this toy made it easy to overlook that. while
plishcd a major feal of scientific conservaUsm by s�\'mg ,an the data fed into the machine might have been selected with
older paradigm from what ).{. Fouc �ult «:all<;<l " the Irrl!pu�e p:>Sitivisl neutrality and detachment, its products-me evo-­
violence of lime" (1973: 132). The Imphcauons of thiS will lutionary sequences-were anything but historically or politi·
be spelled out at length in the chapters that follow. Let us cally neutraL By c1aimin S to make sense of contemporary
,
retain at this poim mal the temporal discourse of �nlhro­ lOCiety in tenns of evolutionary stages, the natural histories
pology as it was formed decisively under the paradl III of of evolmionism reintroduced a kind of specificity of time
,
evolutionism J:ested on a conception of Tlffie that was � and place--in fact a history of retroactive salvation-that has
on secula�� and naturalized but also thOf?Ughly spa­
1£ jts closest counterpart in the Christian·medieval vision con·
i@lzed. Ever smce, [ shall argue, anthropology s efforts to tested by the Enlightenment.
onstruct relations with its Other by means of temporal This was politically all the more reactionary because it
(devices implied afflnnation of difference as �is�nce. pretended to rest on strict1y scientific hence universally valid
The ingredients of evolutionist naturahzatlon of Time
.
p rinciples. rn fact little more had been done man to replace
were Newton's physicalism as well as LyelJ's (and t� a lesser faith in salvation by faith in rogress and industry. and the
r
extent Darwin's) uniformitarianism. In the histOriography Mediterranean as me hub 0 ' historv by Victorian England.
of anthropology things are usually left at that. Tylor or The cultural evolutionists became the BossueLS of "Vestern
Morgan are for many anthropologists still the uncontested imperialism.
founders of their discipline and, while most of th�ir '.'anifi. For better or worse, these were the epistemological con·
cial constructs" ma\' now be rejected, the naturahzauon of ditions under which ethnogra phy and ethnology took shape ;
Time which was evolutionism's crucial epistemological stance and they were also the conditions under which an emergmg
remains by and large unquestioned. That, I submit, betrays anthropological praxis (research, writing, teaching) came to
a good measure of naivete. The use of Time in evolutionary be linked to colonialism and imperialism. One cannot insist
anthropology, modeled on that of namral hi.story, undoubt. too much that these links were epistemological, not just
.
edly was a step beyond premodern concepuons. But It Cdn moral or ethicaL Anthropology contributed above all to the
now be argued that wh?lesal� adoption of ":lodels (and of intellectual justification of the colonial enterprise. It gave to
.
their rhetorical expressions In anthropologJca1 discourse) politics and economics---both concerned with human Time­
from physics and geology was, for a sc:ience of ��n, sadly a finn belief in "natural," i.e., evolutionary Time. It pro-­
.
regressive. intellectually, and qUile reacuonary politically. moted a scheme in terms of which not only past cultures,
Let me explain. I consider regressive the fact that an· but all living societies were irrevocably placed on a temporal
thropology achieved its scientific respectability by adopting slope, a stream of Time-some upstream, others down­
an. essentially Newtonian physicalism (Time being a univer· stream. Civilization, evolution, development, acculturation,
sal variable in equations describing nature in motion) at a modernization (and their cousins, industrialization, urbani·
moment near the end of the nineteenth century when me zation) are all terms whose conceptual content derives, in
outlines of post·Newtonian p.hysics (a-:d post."na tur�1 his· ways that can be specified, from evolutionary Time. They
.
lory" history) were clearly VISible. Radical naturahzatlon of all have an epistemolOgical dimension apart from whatever
Time (i.e., its radical dehistorization) was of course cen.tral ethical, or unethical, mtentions they may express. A dis·
to the most celebrated scientifIC achievement of that penoo, course employing terms such as primitive! savagUbut. also
the comparative method. that omnivorous intellectual rna· tribal, traditional, Third "'Torld.... or whatever e..uphemism is
chine pennitting the "equal" treatment of human culture at currenQ dQCs not think, or observe, or criticalLy study:. we
18 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Other 19

"E.r. imitive"� it thinks. observes. studies in lenns of !.he prim­ an extraordinary essay by Fried,-ich Ratzel, "History, Eth­
� Prill!i!i.ve �ing_ essentia1l), a temporal concept, IS a ca - nolo�ry aDd Historical Perspective" (1904). Half of the paper
e�ry. not an object. of Wester'!.. thgught. is ad� resse.d to questions ?f T.ime and temporal sequences
One last point needs to be made before we consider and, III thiS case, romantJc htstorism and natural hislOry
Time in the context of modern anthropology. Evolutionism, p
ro? uce arguments that seem to nm side by side. Ratzel
.
the very paradigm that made of anthropology a science be gm s. wl�h remarks on the theory of science, rejectillg the
worthy of academic recognition, was soon violently rejected evolu�lomst �etapho �' of � developmental tree. Such a tax­
on both sides of the ALlantic. One might be tempted to as­ ono mIC and hierarchICal view obscures the radical common­
sume that this rejection included its use of Time. This, how­ ality and equality of all sciences. Because all disciplines ulti­
ever, was not the case. Little needs to be said in this regard matel}' study phenomena that are on and of the earth the}'
about the diffusionisl opponents of evolutionism. Superfi­ all are earth sciences (see 1904:488). With acknowledge­
cially at least, their basic assumptions were so much like those !Dents to Herder, Rauel makes it clear that this geograph­
of evolutionism that their disputes could not have resulted Ism a�sumes a cotemporal cOIllmunity of mankind . Priority
.
in any major reorientation. The categorical frame of natu­ was given to the study of specific cultural identities under­
ralized Time had become so powerful by the end of the stood as the outcome of processes of interaction between a
nineteenth century that it easily absorbed ideas which the population and its environme.nt. Emphasis on real space
Kullurkreis people had inherited from the romantics. (�ology) precl !lded concern With temporal gradin g of soci­
This applies, for instance, to Graebner's textbook dif­ eties on evolutionary scales according to postulated general
fusionism. Throughout his Methode der EtlmowgU (191 1) laws.
"culture history" is predominantly construed from spatial Nevertheless, in the ceneUlY between Herder and Rattel
distribution. That he accepted the evolutionist equation of the episteme of natural history had established a hold on
time and change is implied in the following example of his ethnology. Wnen Ratzel turns to the question of "facts and
reasoning: "If I can demonstrate dlat the tOtal culture, in a temporal sequence" he advocates a "genetic" interp retation
given span of time, did not change at all, or only in minor of cultural facts but affilms that the foundation of such an
as{-'>CCts, then I am entitled to interpret dates which fall into approac� m u�t be (natural-hiSlorical) collection, description,
thiS period more or less as if they were contemporaneous" �nd claSSification. of cultur� tTa !ts (see 1904:507). Impercep­
(191 1 :62). In other words, in the study of "unchanging" ubly. real ecologl�al spa�e IS � lOg replaced by classificatory,
.
tabular space: dlSITl?utlon WlOS over growth and process.
p rimitive rulture, temfX>."t1 relations can be disregarded In .
favor of spatial relations. When Graebner frequentJy talks �tzel .IS awar� of 11115 and describes coneemporary mfatua­
aoout temporal sequence fl-eitfolge>, or temfX>ral depth (Zl!it­ bOn With conjectural histoT}', somewhat ironica1ly, as fol­
tit/I!) this expresses an Aristotelian notion of effective cau­ lows: "It sounds very simple: Since all historical events oc­
sality; temJX>ral sequence was indispensible for arguments Cur In space, we must be a�le to measure the time they
concerning culruraI causation. Still, di.f,£usiQpism amounted needed to spread by the distances that were covered: a
to a proj!Xt of writing a history without Time of �ples readi�g of ti�ne on the clock of the globe" ( 1904:52 1). AI­
"withrutt.. history." 1 8 �ost Immediately he doubts that in the realm of human
On the other hand, Graebner and other theoreticians history su�h simple translation of distribution in space into
�uence 111 time .
of �iffusionism �hou �d be read against the ba�kground of '�ill �ver be "s�i�ntifically" possible. Espe­
earher rulture-hlstoncal and culture-geographical writing, cially, th� deternllnauon of ongms in developmental se­
qu �nces IS a matter of " practical" rather than scientific so­
whose intellectual substance had not yet been diluted by
postivist methodologization . A document for that period is IUllons (1 hear in practical. at least a connotation of political).
20 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Other 21

Within ule human com munity (OkuJ1ln/e) it is impossible to domain irreducible to natural history. It relativized human
decree a specific period or area of cultural origins �eing cultural tune and left universal time to biological evolution.
. . .

:
situated on olle and same earth, "no country is privileged With that the Enlightenmem project was in fact ignored and
over anolhcl'" ( 1904:523). relegated to the natural sciences. Practicallv, concentration
The reason and excuse fOT this digression is ta register on cultural configUl·ations and patterns r�sulled in such
at least one instance of anthropological uses of Time which overwhelming concern with the description of states (albeit
hesitated to follow the main line of naturalization and tern· "dynamic" states) that the eighteenth-century elan in the
poral distancing. Its failure to influence mainslre,am anthro­ search for a theory of universal human progress was all but
pology in the twclllieth century certainly was in pan self· abandoned.:o In sum, functionalism, culturalism, and struc­
inflicted. I t is hard to recognize Herder i n Graebner's turalism did not solve the problem of universal human Time;
pedantry. The deeper reason, however, might be th,ftt the they ignored it at best, and denied its significance at worst.
dominant trends in anthropology could not accommodate the
ami-Enlightenment heritage that was at the roots of the cul­
ture-hiSlorical orientation. Some Uses of Time in Anthropological Discourse
Several discernible paradigms succeeded the evolution­
ist and diffusionist C1u.,ulerz.eil. For the sake of brevity let us One might be tempted to conclude from all this that not
refer to them as (British) functionalism, (American) cultllT­ much has changed since anthropology first emer ed. Yet i n
g
alism, and (French) structuralism. The early functionalists, at least one respect contemporary anthropology differs from
notably �1alinowski, simply rejected evolutionism on the its eighteenth and nineteenth century predecessors. Irre­
grounds that it was armchair historical speculation. Notice spective of theoretical orientation, field research has been
however that he objected, not to its being too naturalist or established as the practicaJ basis of theoretical discourse.
rationalist in dealing with hwnan s<x:iely, but rather to its That fact alone makes the problem of Time in modern an­
not being naruralist enough. Functionalism, in its fervor to thropology complex and interesting.
explore the mechanisms of livins societies, simply put on ice . I� one compa�es uses of Ti�e in anthropological writ­
the problem of Time. Synchromc anal}'sis, after all, presup­ rn.g With the ones III ethnographIC research he discovers re­
poses a freezing of the time frame. Similar postulates were markable di"erbrence. I will refel· to this as the schizogenic
formulated by de Saussure and French sociologists such as u� <?f Time. r believe it can be shown that the anthropolo­
Mauss and Durkheim. Eventually this made possible the rise fP:st m the field often empk:lys conceptions of Time uile
g
of h)'phenated functionalism-structuralism whose powerful different from those that inform reporLS on his findmgs.
hold on social anthropology, and. indeed, on sociology tes­ F':Irth�rmore, I will argue that a critical analysis of the role
tifies to the unbroken reign of evolutionist epistemology. Its Time IS �Ilowed to pl�y as a cOll?ition for producing eth­
open, explicit revival in the later writings of Talcott Par­ nographIC knowledge III the practIce of fieldwork rnav serve
sons, in debates on the history of science (Kuhn, Toulmin, as a starting JX>int for a critique of anthropolo ical dis­
g
Campbel l, and others), and even in the latest twist of critical COurse in general. But before that argument can be devel­
theory (Habermas and his opponent Luhmann), shows that oped we should be more specific about the notions of Time
it has not lost its attraction among "Vestern intellectuals.19 whose use in anthropological discourse we want to criticize.
Ironically, the supposedly radical break with evolution­ We must briefly survey uses of Time as they appear in an­
ism propagated by Boasian and Kroeberian cultural anthro­ �hropological discourse, i.e., in the writing of monographs;
.
pology had little or no effect on these epistemolo�ical pre­ In synthetlc and a 1alytical works covering different ethno­
. !
suppositions. True, cultural ism proclaimed "history" a graphIC areas, or dIfferent aspects of culture and society over
 Time and the Emerging Other 23
22 Time and the Emerging Other
verse, �as no taste for �tty �hronol?gizing. Instead, it in­
severaJ areas; and, finally, in textbooks presenting the sum .
dulges iO grand.-scale J?e n?rllzmg. �t likes to devise ages and
of o�r pre�ent knowledge. To shorten that task I propose
. stages. But unlike behef m the Millennium or the (;Qlden
to dlstmgUlsh three major uses of Time, each characteristic
A.ge, it keeps a cool distance to all times. The rhetoric of its
o� a. geI?-re of discourse, keeping in mind, however, that these
dlS?Jurs � can . t�erefore serve equally well the construction
dlstmcuons are not mutually exclusive .
of tmposmg VISIOns of the "human career" and the mainte­
Let us call the first one' Physical. Time. it serves as a sort
nance of cocktail talk about primitive mentality.
of paramct.er or v�lOr in desc�ibing- sociocultural process.
In another, more serious form this stance manifests it­
It appears m evolutionary, prehIStOrIcal reconstruction over
self as Typological �ilne. It signals a use of Time which is
vast spans but also in "objective" or "neutral" time scales
measu�ed, not as ume .elapsed, nor by reference to points
used to measure ?emogr�phic or ecological changes or the
on a (lmear) scale, but n::t te �s of socioculturally meaning­
recurrence of \Tanous social events (economic. ritual, and so
ful events or, more preCisely, IOLervals between such events.
forth). The assumption is (and this is why we rna\' call it
Typolo�ical Time �?derlies such qualifications as preliter­
physical) that this kind of Time, while i[ is a para�eler of
ate VS. literate, t....dlhO':'al vs . "?od�rn, peasant vs. industrial,
culluml process, is itself not subject to cultural variation . At
, and a host of pelIDutaUOns which mclude pairs such as tribal
urnes, t�e nature of our e"idence forces us to acknowledge
\'S. feudal, .ruTal vs. urban. In this use, Time may almost
chat � gIVen chronolo�y mig�t .be "relative"; but that means:
totally be d�vestecl of its vectorial, physical connotations. In­
relat!ve to ch?�n potn� �Ithl!l a s�uence, not culturally
stea� of bemg a measu�e of movement it may appear as a
relative. RelatiVity of thiS kmd IS conSidered a flaw, which is
q�ality of states; a quahty, however, that is unequally dis­
�'hy carbon 14 and a host of other physical methods of dat­ tributed among human populations of this world. Earlier
mg caused so much enthusiasm when they first appeared. 21
talk �bou( peoples withoul history belongs here, as do more
Not only were these though t to provide beuer, more correct
sophisticated distinctions such as the one between "hot" and
placement of human developments in Time; as far as hu­
"cold" societies.
':Ian evolution is concerned they lead to a temporal explo­
. In fact, co�uucts which appear (and often are pro­
Sion compara�le to the one that did away with biblical chro­
c1 �I�ed ?y their authors and users) to be purely "system­
nology . Most Importantly, though, these methods of dating
auc . do 10 f';lc� gen �rate discourse on Time and temporal
appeared to anchor human evolution and a vast amount of .
cultural mate�al once and forever in objective, natural, i.e., :elauons: ThiS IS obVIOUS ill the case of class (see, e.g., its use
In the nmeteenth century; Peel 1971:60 f); it is central in
?oncultural Time. To a great deal of anthropological writ­
Max Weber,s typology of authority . Systematizers such as
lOS' they convey� an aura of scientific rigor and trustwor­
T�lcott Par �ns. did not �ucc�-':"'and, God knows, they
thmess that preVIously was reserved to well-documented .
[ned-I.n punfymg Weber s brillia ntly condensed analytical
histories of the recent past.
categories and type-constructs from their historical, tem­
Of course, neither evolutionary theory, nor prehistory,
poral substance. After all, ",reber cannot be read as if his
nor archa� ology are confin� t? plotting data on temporal
cen�ral c�>nc.ern, the p rocess of rationalization, did not exist.
scales. ThiS leads us to consldenng a second use of Time in
R auo�ahzatlon clearly is a close relative of the Enlighten­
anthropolobrical discourse which makes its appearance in two
':lent Idea of p�il�ophical history. At any rate, not even the
relat� fo � ms. One ] will call Mundane Time, the other Ty­
lightest for� ahzatlons of the "social system" were able to
polOgICal Ttme. Mundane connotes to me a kind of world-wise
stop the 10,gtcal leak kept open by the concept of charisma.
:elation 10 T.ime w.hich,. while resting assured of !.he work­ .
In Weber s own wnungs about it temporal references
mgs of PhYSical Tlme 10 natural laws governing the uni-
 24 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Other 25

abound: The notion of Alltag is used to define. by contrast, often presented as the most "scientific" foml of anthr?po­
the nature of charismatic authority. As a process, charisma Iogic.ll discourse, try in fact to ignore the one problem, Tune,
undergoes "routinization" iYeraJitiigiichung). Duration (Dauer, which has been recognized as the greatest challenge by
daul"rhaft, 1964: 182), emergence (entsll!Ju!1I, in statu 1UlScendi modern natural science,
182, 184), flow (munden, 186), succession (passim), are all
temporal, directional qualifications which signal fundamen�
tal links between typologizing and temporalizing. These Taking Stock: Anthropological Discourse
connections were quite apparem to Weber's contemporar­ and the Dmial of Coevaltless
ies. Hans Freyer nOled in 1931: " Sociology grew out of the
philosophy of history_ Almost all of its founders regarded This sketch of major ways in which conceptualizations of
sociology as the legitimate heir to historical-philosophical Time inform anthropological tllOught and discourse shows
speculations . . . . Not only historically. but with logical ne- how enomlOusly complicated our lOpic could get, especially
o cessity, sociology includes problems of types and stages of if we would now go into further differentiations and into the
culture; at least, it always leads u p to that problem" many combinations in which Pllysical, Typologica�. �nd In·
( 1 959:294 f). tersubjective Time may be used. However, even If It were
Inasmuch as some kind of typologizing is part of almost possible to write some?"ting like a C(::mplete "grammar of
any anthropological discourse I can think of, notions of Ty. , �
Time" for anthroJXllogtcal dISCOurse, It would only show us
pological Time are all· pervasive. how anthropologists use Time in constructing their theories
Finally, time has informed anthropological discourse in and composing their writings. Findings from such ar:talyses
a third sense . For lack of a better label, I shall speak of it as would ultimately pertain to questions of style and hterary
/ntersubjt!clivt! Time. 1111,! t�nll points back to one of itS phil­ form; they are of great interest but do not as such raise the
osophical sources in phenomenological thought, as exempli­ epistemological question which must ask whether and how
fied in Alfred Schutz's analyses of intersubjective time and a body of knowledge is validated or invalidated by the use
in a few applications lO anthro logy, such as in Geertz's of temfK>ral catego rizations.
w:
Person, Time and Conduct in Bali. 2 More importantJy, the at­ We must ask what it is that anthropologists try to catch
tribute intersubjective signals a current emphasis on the com· with lheir manifold and muddled uses of Time. (Or, which
municative nature of human action and interaction. As soon is the same, what they are trying to escape from by employ­
as culture is no lon ger primarily conceived as a set of rules ing a given tempordl device). Let me indicate the direction
to be enacted by individual members of distinct groups, but of my argument by fonnulating Ule foUowing thesis: It is
as the specifit way in which actors create and produce be­ not the dispersal of human cultures in space that leadsan:
liefs, values, and other means of social life, it has to be rec­ thropolo.gy to "temporalize" (somethi�g that is maintai�ed
ognized that Time is a constitutive dimension of social real­ in the image of the "philosophical travder W ose roammg
itv. No maller whether one chooses to stress "diachronic" or in space leads to the discovery of "ages"t it is naturalized­
";ynchronic," historical or systematic approaches, they all are spatialized Time which brlves meaning (in fact a variet}' of
chnmic, unthinkable without reference to Time. Once Time specific meanings) to the distribution of humanity in �p?- .!=e.
is recognized as a dimension, not just a measure, of human (The history of our discipline reveals that such use Or i lme
activity, any attempt to eliminate it from interpretive dis­ .. Imost invariably is made for the purpose of distancing those
course can only result in distorted and largely meaningless \ who are observed from the Time of the observer. I will il­
represemations. The irony is that fonnal models, which are lustrate this first by taking another look at the historical
26 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Olher 27

break we attributed to Enlightenment thought. Then I will

give a more detailed account of how distancing works in Pagan World
current anthropological discourse.
Enlightenment thought marks a break with an essen­
tially ll"lfX1ieval, Christian (or Judeo-Christian) vision of Time.
That break was from a conception of time/space in tenns of
a history of salvation to one that ultimately resulted in the
secularization of Time as natural history. For the present
argument it is important to realize that this not only en­
Jeruaelem
tailed a change in the quality of Time (sacred vs. secular)
but also an important transformation as regards the nature
of temporal relations. In the medieval paradigm, the Time Circum Meditllrranean
of Salvation was conceived as inclusive or incorporative: 23
The Others, pagans and infidels (rather than savages and
primitives), were viewed as candidates for salvation. Even
the con'quista, certainly a form of spatial expansion, needed
to be propped up by an ideology of conversion. One of its
persistent myths, the search for PresLer John, suggests that Qrbls rrh. WOl1d!
the explorers were expected to round up, so to speak, {he
Figure 1.1. Premodern time/space: incorJX>r3lion
pagan world between the center of Christianity and its lost
periphery in order to bring it back into the confines of the T"",
Civilization Now
flock guarded by the Divine Shepherd.!4
England Hell!
The n.aturalization of Time which succeeded to that view
defines temporal relations as exclusive and expansive. The
pagan was always already marked for salvation, the savage is
not yet ready ror civilization . Graphically (see figures 1 . 1 and
1.2) the dirrerence berween these views can be illustrated by S.,...
contrasting two models. One consists of concentric circles o'r - S",""

proximity to a center in real space and mythical Time, sym­

bolized by the cities of Jerusalem and Rome. The other is Figure 1.2. Mooern timdspace: disldl1cing
constructed as a system of coordinates (emanating of course
also from a real center-the Western metropolis) in which raison d'ilu for the compar<1tive method if it was not the
given societies of all times and places may be plotted in terms classification of entities or traits which first have to be sepa­
of relative distance from the present. rate and distinct before their similarities can be used to es­
To anticipate an objection: evolutionary se<:Juences and tablish taxonomies and developmental sequences. To put this
their concomltanl JXllitical practice of colonialism and im­ more concretely: What makes the savage sil.. rnificant to the
perialism may look mcorJ'Xlrative; after all, they create a uni­ evolutionist's Time is t 1 ves in another Time. LIttle
�
'

versal frame of reference able to accommodate all societies. �eeds t esaid, I assume, about separation an :dTstancing
But being based on the episleme of natural history, they are III colom<:ilist praxis which drew its ideological justification
founded on distancing and separation. There would be no from Enlightenment thought and later evofutionism.
28 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Other 29

We can now examine how Time is used to create dis· particular data. To be sure, chrono�ogy i� onl'y � means t?
lance in contemporary anthropology. But before we get to an ulterior end. The temporal dlStancmg It mvolves IS
distancing itself we should note that anthropology, like all needed to show that natural laws or law:like regularities op­
scientific discourse. inevitably involves tempora1i.ullion (an in­ erate in the development of human SOCIety and culture.
sight which will be developed in chapter 3). VVe must nee­ It may seem that the use of Physical Time is politically
ess31;lr ex ress whatever knowledge we have of an object
p innocuous. If anything is "value-free" i n science it should be
in !.enns 0 temporal categorization . This is emphatically not the measurement of physical duration. On the o� ler hand,
only the case when we give "historical" accounts; Time is one is tempted to inYok e,relativity theory as eVidence:: for
involved in any possible relationship between anthropologi­ the inescapabl):sitional
:"'p-'o relativit), (StandpunkibezogenheitW
cal discourse and its referents. The referenL sh�lred by var­ �Jenre ofTIme. Physicists commen�g on th� wider
ious subdisciplines of anthropology is stricti)' speaking not implications of relativity theol,), have done thiS; occ�lonally,
an object, or a class of objects, but a relationship. This is a social philosophers have attempted to relate theIr argu­
Cautious. insufficient term (I would prefer contradiction ). In ments for a multiplicity of cultural times to relativity the­
any �en piece of anthropological writing the referent usu­ ory.�6 1 doubt that these connections can amount y:� much
ally IS a particular aspect of the relationship between ele­ more than analogies or metaphors. After all, rela ..tJvlty th�-
ments or aspects of a culture or society; but all particular 011:' is called for only in the realm of extreme! ) gh vek
' u
T .lCI­
ethnography is ultimately about general relationships be­ ties. I t is hard to see how it could be directly rel
ev ant on �e
tween cultures and societies. In fact, if we remember the .
level of cl!l�urally sha�ed �x\,eriences. ft �Ight eyen be �<l.Id
history of our discipline, it is in the end about the relation­ that relauvlty theory IS aJmlll 1? � . low m that It theo�lzes
ship between the West and the Rest.25 .
from the reference POint of mdlvtdual observers. Socially
By now it is generdlly admitted that all particular e..!Jl­ mediated "relativity" of Physical Time would have. to . be
nogr-a phic knowledge we may have acquired is affected Qy idelllified, rather, in historical processes of mechalllzatJon
histoncally established relations of powel' ana dommation (the technology of clocks) and st3!ldardization . (the accep­
.
between the anthropologist's society and the onene-studies. tance of universally recog11lze.d Units of measu.rmg). In ti ltS
tn that sense, all anthropological knowledge is political in latter sense of ,,,Testern clock tune, anthropologlsLS have used
nature. However, it seems possible to me to carry our se - Physical Time as a distancing device . In mOSl ethnographic
questioning further by focusing on Time as a key category studies of other time conceptions the diffel'ence betw�en
with which we conceptualize relationships between us (or standardized clock time and other methods of measurmg
our theoretical.constlucts) and our objects (the Other) . How provides the puzzle to be resolved.
exactly temporal categorizations contribute to defining and, Furthermore, the idea of Physical �ime is part or a sys­
in fact, constituting our object depends on the kind of time­ tem of ideas which include space, bodlCS, and mOllon. In
use in a given anthropological discourse. the hands of ideologues such a time concept is easily tr.ms­
Physiml Time may defUle seemingly objective distance formed into a kind of political physics. After all, it is not
between the researcher's culture and, say, the findings from difficult to transpose from physics to politics one of the most
an archaeological excavation or a record reconstructed from ancient rules which states that it is impossible for twO bodies
oral tradition. If an object can be located in 2000 B.C., or an to occupy the same s\,ace at the same time. Whe.� in the
event in 1865, they are defi nitely, irrevocabl>' past. Such de­ course of colonial expansion a Western body politic came
finitive anchoring in the past gives logical and psychological to occupy, literally, the space .of an autoch�onous h?dy,
finnness to the standpoint of the researcher; this is why several alternatives were concet,'ed to deal With that VIola­
chronological dating, in itself purely mechanical and quan­ tion of the rule. The simplest one, if we think of North
titative, can bestow scientific signi Ficance on a vaSI array of Amel-ica and Australia, was of course to move or remove
 30 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Other 31

�e. other 1x>d)'. Another one is to pre�nd that space is being occur, coevalness has to be created. Communic�ti0':l is. ulti­
dl\'lded and allocated to separate bodIes . South Africa's rul­ mately, about creating shared T�me. Such a vle� lS not all
ers cling to, that solution. . Most oflen the preferred strategy rhat outlandish to amhr?pologISlS. w�o, follown�g Durk­
has been simply to marupulate the other variable-Time.
heim's lead, have probed mto the SlgOlficance o.f ritual �d
�ith me he�p of various devices of sequencing and disranc­ .
the creation of sacred Time On.e c�)t�ld �Iso pomt to an. 1I�­
Ifl.g one assIgns (0 the conqu red populations a
�
Time. A �ood deal of such Anstotei an political
different creased recognition of intersubJecuv'lY In such new dlsCI-
reAec.led �n l.he �hemes of evolutlor . c: phys ics is lines as ethnomethodology and the ethnognlphy. of speak.­
the dlffuSIOruslS.2•
usts and their cousins
' rng. But, on the wh<;>le. th� d�n�ina.nt c?m !'unlcau
obJecuvlty IS still
,
tied to
on model
(te.mpo� )
remains one in which
Physical Time is seldom used in irs naked, chro the participan.ts A� least, I belie,'e thlS
nologi­ distancing between :
caJ form. More oflen than not, chronolo
J."'!uru!am gies shade into is implied in the ",,;.dely accepted dlSunClJons between sender,
or Typol�gical Time. As distancing devices, categ
f1Zatlons of ti o­ message, and receiver. Leaving aside the pr?blem of the
l lS kmd are used, for instance, when we are
told that certain elements in our culture are message (and t�e code), these t;lode1s proJect, between
"arc�aic"; or when ce�ta!n living societies are
"neolithic" or sender and receiver, a temporal distance (or sl�pe). Other­
.
Uce . slon� age economiCs , ; or when certain
said to prac­ wise communication could not be conceptualized as the
are IdenlJfied as "savage" or "primitive." Libe
stvles of thought transfer of information. ]n sum, even in .communi<::ati?o­
note temporal distanc�g need not have expl
ls that con­ centered approaches that seem to recogOl�e sh� red Time
:efer�nces (such as C)'citcal .or repetitive). Adjective
icitly temporal we can expect to find devices of temporal dlstancmg.
s lik� myth­ These examples all lead u p to the crucial poi�t of <;'l.1r
u:al� ntual-t....0r even t.ri1>a1, will serve the same func . ?ewildering.yariet ,. the dlstancu g
tion, They argument: Beneath . y �
t<K;', connote temporal distancing as a wav of a global esult . I will
creating tti� devices that we can Identify produce !
objects or referen� of anthropoJD �
extreme fonnulatlon:. �mporJI distance is objec
ourse. 0 use an call itJenial olcoevalness. By that I mean 9-perSlStm� aud sys­
.
, , by
tivity in the tematic � to pfliCe the rifermt(s-) of anthropow,gy m. .E:I!me
mmds of many pracl.ltloners. 11us
with.
gre�t accuracy and exasperating predictab
the way, is reflected other than the prtsent of1he producer ofonthrapolo cal diswur.se.
popular Ima.ge of our discipline. I am surel
ility in the What I am aiming at is covel-ro by the German terms
a':l thr�pologls{ who, when he identifies hims
), nO[ the only gleichzeitig and Gleichuitigkeil. The unusual coeval, and espe­
h �s nelghoor, barber. or physician, conjure
elf as stich to ciall)' the noun coevalness, express a need to steer between
dl�tant pasl. When popular opinion identifies
s up visions of a such closely related notions as .synchronQUJlsimultan�Qus �nd
all anthropol­ c01ltempurary. I take rynchronous to refere to events occumng
ogIsts as handlers of oones and stones it is
grasps the essential role of anthropology as
not in error'' it at the same physical time! cont�porary asserts co�currence
temporal distance. . a provider of in what I called typological time. Coeval, accordmg to my
pocket Oxford dictionary, cover.s �th ("of same age, dura­
To recognize �ntersu�jective Time would seem
clude any sort of dlstancmg almost by definition
to pre­ tion, or epoch"). Beyond th.at, It IS �o connote a c.ommon,
phenom�n�logists �ied to demonstnlte with
. After all active "occupation," or shanng, of lime. But that 1S .only a
their analyse; starting point; it will be elaoorated as I proceed With my
�hat socI.al. mterac� lon pr�up(Xlses imersubjectivity. Wl1ich
m tur� IS inconceivable w thou
argument. . .
� t assuming that the partici­ That coevalness may be dented With the figures of
f:ants Involved <;rre coeval, I.e. share the same Tim
e. In fact, Physical and TypologicaJ Time n�ds, in ':l1y mind, no fur­
ul"ther CI:mcluslons . c�n be drawn from this
basic postulate ther elaboration. But there remall1S the difficulty we noted
[0 the pemt of reallZmg that for
human communication to in regard to [ntersubjective Time. It might be argued that
 32 Time and the Emerging Other Time and the Emerging Other 33

tJ� is te"?porai category precludes the kind of ideological rna. date knowledge. For that �� happen it tak�s bad epistemol­
� Ipulallon " sug�sled br the notion that anthropologis ts ogy which advances cog01 �":e mten�sts wlthom reg.
ar? for
make use . C!r Tlln�. If coeval ness, sharing of present Time pposIU ons, �t any r le, what IS m�r­
. , their ideological p. resu
. �
IS a condition 01 communication, and 3nthropologkal esting (and hope-msplrlng) about Ideolog ca 1 l!ses . Ttme
of
knowledge �as its sources in ethnography, clearly a kind of is that they have not, or not yet, led OUI' dl� SCl, p h ne mto total
�mmunJCaLJo� . thel! Lh� anLh� pologist qua eLlmographer sel f-delusion . To insist on field researc h as the fundam ental
IS not �ree to grant. . or .deny coe\'alness to his interl
ocu. source of anthropological knowledge has ser�� as a p?w­
tors. Eaher he submits to the condition of coevalness and erful practical corrective, in fact a contradlCuon , ,vNch,
produces ethnographic knowledge, or he deludes himself philoso ph!cally spe�king, makes anthropology on the whole
lIllO ten p ral distance and misses the
� ?
,
object of his search. an aJXlreuc enterpnse.
ThlS I � the reasomng
. l
.
that under lies some of the most Let me explain . On the one hand, �t.hr,tographers, es­
radica cntlques of an th n:>pology. It is implied when we are pecially those who have taken comrnUfilcaUve approaches
�ol? th�l aU anth ropological . �nowledge is dubiolls because (and that includes most ethnographers of value) have .al­
�t IS gamed und�r lh� conditIOns of colonialism, imperial­ ways acknowledged coevalness as a condition without whICh
Ism, and oppression (views that were forcefully expressed
in hardly an}thing could ever be learned a?out another c�Jl­
Dell Hymes' Rein-z:enting AntkropolO!ri, ]974, and more thor­ ture. Some have struggled consciously With the cateW?nes
oU$hly explored m a volume ediled by Huizer and Mann
. - our discourse uses to :emove other peoples fron � our lm�,
"!,'
helin, 1979). Some needed breaks 10 that strugg fe-se e Malmo wskl S di­
Maxwell Owusu. in .an ess�y "Ethnograph y in Africa" ary; 2 8 some gave poetic expres sion to what is es�enti ally ' an
( 1 97�) argues, on the basiS of eVidence contained in writings epistemological act-se e the type of anthro po logl� W rltlllg
consldere� exemplary. that almost all the "classical" ethnog­ exemplified by Turnbull's For�t Peopk and the l!vI-Str auss
raphers faded LO meet one basic condition : command of the of Tristes Trapiques. But when II comes t p
o. � oduclll g a th
� ro­
language of the peoples they studied, As far as I can see pological discourse in the forms of de SC riptIon , anal):,sls. and
Owu�u ?oes not .dra�\' an explicit connection between com� theoretical conclusions, the same ethnog rapher s wil� often
mumcatJve deficienCies and the denial of coevalness, He forget or disavow their experience� of coev a �ess w, � the
h
does. however, denounce the "essential anachronism" people they studied. Worse, they WIll t�k, theIr expen e�c�
(1978: 32 1 . 3�2, 326) of eUll10graphic data collection aimed away with ritualistic invocations of " partiCIpant observ �uon
at sava�� socIety in its original state, but carried out under and the "ethnographic present." In the e-:d, the)' w.tli or­
�e ,JX>�ILJC� ecoflomy of � oloni alism. Our analysis of time ganize their writing in tenns of the categon�s of Physlca.1 or
, might
hstanctng III anth.rop olog.cal discou
�: rse will reveal that this Typological Time, if only for fear that, their repo,�s
IS perhaps not gomg far enou h . Anachronism signi fies a
� otherwise be disqualified as p:>tlry, fiction, o� political p�­
f�ct, or state,ment o� fact, that IS out of tune with a given paganda. These disjunctions between expenence and �I­
,
time frame; It IS a mls�ke, perhaps an accident. I am trying ence, research and writing, will continue to be, a festenng
t? show th�t we �r� faC ing, �ot mistakes, but deuices (existen­ epistemological sore in a discipline who�e self-Iffiage-�nd
[Ial, rhetor�c, poltucal). To signal that difference I will r�' that is another heritage from the Eni Jg�te�ment ph ilo­
to the denial of coevalness_ as the allochronism of anthropol. sophes--is one of aggressive. health and optun�sm.
ogy. Having dE!&!l0sed _the III�ess .as th� dental of coe\w­
- The critique �f a nthropology is too easily mistaken for ness or all�firQ.nismJ we can begm askmg ourselves what
mo�al co?�emnatlon. But at least the more clearheaded migh t be done about it. This will not be eas�, An �
radical cnllCS know that bad intentions alone do not invali- trenched vocabulary and obstinate literary co�t.lons alone
34 Time and the Emerging Other
Time and the Emerging Other 3;
are formidable obstacles . Moreover, coevalness is a mode of
temporal relations. It cannot be defmed as a thing or state by Owusu, I am tempted to say th�t �e. '''''es�e�n anthro­
pologist must lx: haunted b)' the AfrICan s. . �P:'IClOUS an.� es­
with certain properties. It is not ..there" and cannot be put
tors" as much as the African anthropologtst IS daunted by
there; it must be created or at least approached. As an
"Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, Mail', Gluc�man,
epistemological condition it can only be inferred from fe·
Forde. Kabbery [sic], Turner, Schapera. and the Wilsons,
sults, i.e., from the different ways in which recognition or
denial of coevalness infonn anthropological theory and among others" (1978:326) . . .
. '

Obviously, we are now getung 1I1to d�ep phtlosoph,cal

"'Tiling. A Kantian category of thought, or even a Durkhei­
waters. Our examination of the uses of Tlm� 111 antl:ttQpo­
mian collective representation, are by definition "necessary" .
(otherwise iliey could not be categorical). As such, it would logical discourse has led us 10 state t eir general ef @ or
seem that the category of shared Time cannOl be ques­ thrrntas. the aenialof coeval ness to the cultures that are
tioned; it is not subject to choice between recognition and stUd T
iecC he most interesting fmding, however� �as . one th�t
denial, at least not wiLhin the frame which produces and precludes a simple, overall indic�ent. of our dlSClphne. ThIS
uses it. Here is a dilemma with which we must struggle and was the discovery of an aporeuc spilt between recogmtlon
ofcoeyalness in some ethnogral.?�ic rese�r�h andden�� of
I see no other way out of it but to focus on ideological me­
diations of scientific discourse such as the uses of Time we �
c�n�&..in most anthropologlca lheonzmg. �nd wnU,:g.
There is a split between a recogmzab.le cogmtl�'e necessity
have examined hete.
and a murky, ultimalely JX'litical pracu�e . That IS, however,
First of all, that it seems possible to refuse coevalness to
not an accident or simply a theoretical w�aknes.s. Such
another person or another people suggests that coeval.ness
. schizogenic use of Time can be traced to certam chOICes th�t
is neither a transcultural fact nor a transcendental condition
of knowledge. The term..!!!9Lalness was chosen t� mark a were made at a time when anthroJX'logy emerged � a SCI­
.
central assumption, namelj: that all temP-2ral reialtons...L.ana ence. There is nowadays much talk � boUI the pol !ucal and
moral complicity of our discipline With the �olol1lal e�t�r­
therefore also contemE9raneity-, are emlx:dded in cuhuralf y .
prise . Much remains. to be said �boUl coglllllve comph� l.ty.
organized praxiS. Anthropologists have little difficulty ad­
To be Sllre, the logical conneclJons between,. -?y. Bnt�sh
mitting this as long as it is predK:ated on a specific cullUre.
evolutionism and the establishment of the B:lush Empire
usually one that is not theil' own. To cite but two examl?les,
are obvious. But our critique of these connections .IS bound
relationships between the living and the dead, or relation­
to miss ilS mark as long as it does not unearth some of the
ships between the agent and object of magic operations,
presuppose cultural conceptions of contemJXlraneity. To a deeper links. The distance between. the Wes � and the Rest
on whK:h all classical an thror:ologlCal theones have been
large extent, \Vestern rational disbelief in the presence of . ,
ancestors and the efficacy of magic rest on Ule rejection of
predicated is by now bemg disputed 1.11 �egard to alm�sl
every conceivable aspect (moral, aestheuc, Intellectual. po!tt­
ideas of temJXlral coexistence implied in these ideas and
ical). Little more than technol<:,gy and sheer econ?mlc �x­
practices. So much is obvious. It is less clear that in order to
study and understand ancestor cult and magic we need to ploitation seem to be: le�t over for the purposes of , explam­
ing" Western super!oflty. It �as be�ome foreseeable that
establish relations of coevalness with the cultures that are
studied. In that fOlm , coevalness becomes the ultimate as­ even those prerogatives may either dIsappear or .no lon�r
be claimed. There remains "only" the all-pervadmg dem�
sault on the protective walls of cultural relativism . To put it
bluntly, there is an internal connection (one of logical equiv­ of coeval ness which ultimately is expressive of a cosmologi­
cal m}th of frightening magni�ude and persistency. It takes
alence and of practical necessity) between ancestor curt or
magic and anthropological research qua conceptualizations imagination and courage to picture what would happen to
of shared Time or coevalness. Paraphrasing an observation the '",,'est (and to anthropolobry) if its temporal fortress were
suddenly invaded by Ule Time of its Other.
Chapter Two l Our Time,
Their Time, No Time:
Coevalness Denied

At any rale, the frrimaC} rfspace over timt i.; an infallibie

sig7i t( rU1£timulry language.
Emst Bloch!

It IL'I'U thm tJwJ I lftlrnl. puhapsfor tMfir5/. timL, Iurw

tJionJ1Jghl)' tlu Mtion of travel has b«ome wrrupttd by 'he
Itotion oj pot«r.

COEV ALKESS [S ANTHROPOLOGY'S problem with Time.

Trying to bring that idea into focus I have pushed the ar­
,

gument to a point where the next step would be to form­

ulate a theory of coeval ness. This will be a difficult task be­
cause the problem is not just "there" ; it is continuously
generated at the intersection of contradictions i n anthropo­
logical praxis. As a project, a theory of coevalness must
therefore be conceived in constant confrontation with an­
thropologic-.dl rlisc.ourse and its claims. Above all, we must
seek to clarify the l.enns and purpose of the project by ex­
amining more cJosel... "uses of Time" in the contexts of fully
developed anthropology. For the past history of allochronic
discourse is not the only obstacle on the road toward a the­
ory of coeval ness.
What was asserted about the allochronic, or schizo·
chronic tendencies of emerging anthropology !'.:i11 now be
extended to an analysis of two major strategies that have
38 Our Time, Their Time, No Time Our Time, Their Time, No Time 39

been employed by the established discipline. One is to cir. ments on the critique of evolution�sm . As a heor , in­
CU11ivent the question of coevalness through the uses of cul­
tural relativity; the olber preempts that question with the help
�nla.llY. he considers it "quite dead acade�l11�c philoso-
III
r

hich is now superbl), timeless . . . [and] virtually dead

ph w
of a radically taxonomic approach. Each strategy will be
documented from the writings of anthropologists (especially
,n�iology . , [w.hile] . in rorma� thc:'ugl�,t only defended
.

bv very occasional biologiSts and hlslOl:ans (1964: ! 1). �ot­

M. Mead, E, T. Hall, and C. Levi-Strduss) whose claims to 'g that the conflict berween evolutlOnary-geneuc (time·
,0
speak for established anthropology are widely accepted. The .
.

.
ntered ) and structural (ti meless) theones 0 f explanauon
mode of presentation will be JX>lemical , that is, one whose
primary objective is to advance or expound an argument.
�as fought out most dramatically in British
social an­
thropology, h e obse rv es:
Such a mode must respect historical accuracy in the choice
and interpretation of sources but it does not seek historio­ System;Hic study of "primitive" tribes begU ? first

graphic completeness. I n no way is this chapter to be mis­ in the hope of utilizing them as a kind of tlme­
machine, as a peep n i to our own historic p�st, �s
taken as an historica1 account of the schools it touches upon.
providing closer evidence about the ea�ly lmks 10 the
The evidence for allochronism [ am going to assemble �al Series. B�t real pr�gress was achl�"ed when
should, therefore, be re-dd as reasonsfor a thesis and not SO this supposed tlme·machme was used "WIth redou­
much (at least not yet) as evidence against an adversary. b�d vigour but without a�y concern. for reconstruct­
At any rate, the polemic will become accentuated as I ing the past: when (he lnbal grou'pll1� .....ere stud­
move on in later chapters. [n the end, I cannot accept what ied for their own sakes and explamed m Lerms of
[ appear to be granting now: that anthropology could ever Ihemselves, and not as 'survivals' from a past sup­
legItimately or even just factually circumvent or preempt the posedly even further back. (Gellner 1964: 18 f)
challenges of coevalness. If stluclUralism-functionalism showed disregard for
To oppose relativity to taxonomy may cause a logical Time (i.e., fOT Time as past) ulis does not mean that anthro­
brow to nse, In what sense are the two opposed? Here the pology ceased to serve as a time-machine. JuSt be�use one
terms are taken merely as convenient labels evoking distinc­ condemns the time-distancing discourse of evoluliomsm . he
tive orientations toward culture and knowledge. The trends does not abandon the allochronic und�rstandin � of such
they designate corresp:md roughly to the Anglo-American
terms as primitit>e. On the COntTary. t�e ume-machme, freed
and French "epistemlc paradigms" anal),zed by B. Scholt.e .
of the wheels and gears of the hlstoncal method, now works
( 1966) . These paradigms are undoubtedly in practical op­
with " redoubled vigour." The denial of coe\'aln�s� becomes
position (an� competition) even though, o� perhaps be­ intensified as time-distancing turns from an explICit concern
cause, they share a common ancestry. But It IS of course into an implicit theoretical assump �io � .
(X>Ssible to combine a relativist outlook on culture with a What happened, and how did It happ en? The cele­
taxonomic approach to it. This is the case with various eth­ brated pr0S".ess of anthro�logy from E:nl�gh ��nme�t c�l­
noscientific or ethnosemamic schools to which, for practica1
tural chau\'lIllSm toward treating other societies ,111 their OlAn
reasons, we will not pay much attention in these essays.3 terms" (notice: not on their ow � len!1s) was I"?�de possi�le
.
theoretically by logical and SOCiolOgIcal posltlvlSm and Its
radical rejection of "historicism." As regar�s �n�hropology,
Circum.venting Coevalness: Cultural Relativity
this meant above all dlat the task of our dlSClplme was de­
creed to be the "explanation" of systems or ':structures:' (in
In Thought and Change, a book which treats explicitly of the
Radcliffe-Brown's use of the term). Explanation was saKI to
uses of Time in anthropological theory, Ernest Gellner
be possible only within the frame of a present, synchronic
40 OUf Time, Their Time, No Time Our Time, Their Time, No Time 41

set of relationships. h mallers lilLIe whether that frame is social systems . This made possi­
was encapsulated in given
metaphorized as a IOf,ricai arrangement of structures, a me· an ethnograpic praxis which
ble or , at any ralt:, I"t:nected
0anicai or biological coordination of elemclll s in an organ­ � e importan e o f studying Time within c�ltures,
asserted �
_ ,"
Ism, or, somewhat later, as Popper's "logic of the sima­ while it Virtually exorc.�ed 1 f
� fr?,m the study 0/ reiahons be­
tion.''4 \Ve know now that extreme antihislorism has been tw«T' cultures. "Theones of Tlme held by vanous cultures
difficult to maintain. ).falinowski himself was led to concede
could now be studied Wi �l "timele � s" theoTY and illethod.
"
that the functional method must admit the "time eJement"5 This is what 1 mean by circumventing coevalness: Tune as
and Evans-Pritchard was eventualh' moved to formulate a a dimension of inteTcultura
l study (and praxis) was "brack­
full rehabilitation in his essay " Anthropology and History" eted our"' of the anthropol ogical discourse.
( ] 962, f 1 9� IJ). British functionalist anthropology is quite in­ To be exact. functionalis t encapsulati on of Time had
,
teresung In thIS respect because it shows that to get rid of tWO effects. and critical analysis must focus on the relation-
T�e as "past" (theoretically) is not equal to conquering ship between the two. .
.
Time altogether. Even if these thinkers could convince FiTst, in the view of its adherents. the functlon a li st­
tJlemselves that temporal relations between a given socio­ ,
StTuClUrdliM approach actually [a\ ol'ed elhnographic study
cultural order or system and its antecedent forms have no of Time. To be sure, culturally different conceptualizations
explanatory value the), could not ignore the problem of of Time, recognizable in language. s�mools, � nd noons of
Time and temporal relations wirlli n a given order. behavior and in material culture had been studi ed for a long
Talcott Parsons was awaTe of Ulat in The Social System: time (not ani), b), anthropologists but also by classicists, his­
Social action and interaction crucially involve "time Tela­ torians of reli�ton, and psycholo�is�). Yet to th� extent that
tions" in such fomls as time of action, "location in time" of their perspective was "comparative, these studies were out
.
actors, and "interpeTsonai time" (1963 [ 1 951] :91 f). Con­ to establish "contrast"-between, say, ''''estern linear Tune
cer?ed a � he wa� to sh ?w the social system as equilibrium and primitive cyclical Time, or between modern Time­
"
malntamlng, he links Ttme to the problem of deviance. He cemeredness and archaic timelessness. Functionalism made it
speaks of "time allocation" in the fOTm of time schedules for IXlssible to a\'oid these stereotypes of comparativ� discourse
certain kinds of action (251), "time off" [or others (see and to examine instead the specific, often contradictory uses
2�4n2, 302). Time is internally connected to deviance by of Time by a given society or culture. Even when the notion
vlrtue of the fact Ulat Time is a " possession" ( 1 20), i.e., an of Time is not explicitly discussed it clearly is touched upon
inherently limited resource for an actor or a society. Time in such classics as Malinowski's D)'namics of Culture �hallge,
being an essc;-ntial condition [or " goal attainment," misallo­ Leach's Polilica1 Systems of Highlmut Bunna, Gluckman s Order
cation of time is at the oottom of most deviant behavior. and Rebtlliun in Tribal Africa, as well as i n much of the work
�roperly allocated, Time is a means to keep out conflict and of Evans-Pritchard, M. Fortes, the Wilsons, MaTY Douglas,
mterference. BUL then Parsons notcs, cranking up the lime and especially in Victor Turner's analyses of ritual process.7
machine, while time allocation is a task for all societies (Tel­ Liberating and productive as it may hav� been et�o­
�tive to. each society) it is more crucial in our own complex graphically, functionalist emphasis on system-Internal Time
.
mdustnal world (which makes Time more relative to our stood on q uestionable theoretical ground. This brings us to
society). After all, "we know that in maIl�' societies the mo­ the second effect of "encapsulating" Time. As it turns out,
tivational prerequ isites for fitting into such a time orienta­ ule richness of relati\'istic ethnography of Time has its price.
tion do not exisl." 8 It must upparently be pa id [01" with epistemologic..1 na"lvete
. P?rsons illustTates the effect which the logic of func­ and log ical inconsistency on a higher theoretical level. Na­
tionalism had on thought about culture and Time: Time Ivete often characterizes talk about the "cultural construc-
 42 OUf Time, Their Time. No Time
Our Time, Their Time. No Time 43
tion" of Time. The very notion of cultural construction (un­
less it is backed up by a theory of symbolization , which it el, and Radcliffe·Brown asserts the essentialh social, that
was not in classical functionalism) implies that cultural en·
� �
lS, 'stem.relative nature of categories of th�ught. H foi­
codin S works on some preculturaJ, i.e., "nalUral" or "real" �
Iow 'd through to its ultimate consequences, thiS means that
expenence of Time. By relegating that problem to philosophy SOC i theor}' can accou nt neither for new rule� nor for new
or to the psychology of perception, cultural relativism not conce ,., fr
w,. because "if all conce lS and categories are deter·
.
only does nOl solve the question of human time experi­ min � by the social system a resh look
"
IS nn p osslble
'

sll�c,e
ence; it does not even raise it. :Much of the stud y of "cul­ all cognition , is alrea?y n:toulded l? fit what. I� �o be cnU·
tural transformation" of human experience remams sterile eel " Or "If we beheve 10 the SOCial detenmnauon of con·
� . . .' this leaves the actors wit� no language to tal�
,

because it is not capable (or unwilling) to relate cultural var­ Pts· .

iation to fundamental processes that must be presumed to about their society and so change It, smce they can talk only
be constitutive of human Time experience. within it" (Bloch 1977:281). Paraphrasing that last sta� e·
In that respect the problem with Time resembles, and ment , one might continue to reason that the anthropologist,
bears on, the problem with language and communication, inasmuch as he succeeds "Ill. enterm � , anoth,er SOCI· ·
,
This was observed recently by Maurice Bloch in an essay e Ly/cu lture and comprehendin g lt from wlthm (� hlch IS the
. .
critical of structuralist·functionalist presuppositions about the avowed ideal of cultural reiauvISts), would be Incapable of
relativity of Time experience, Taking note of debates in· saying anything abaut it . Such reduc,tio .04 ahsurd�� l �las of
volving British anthroJXllogislS and philosophers, Bloch re· course always been countered by mSlsung o� umversa �
jects the arguments for relativity, all of which ultimately tr.:lI1slatability." But unless one c:a� c?me up �Ith a theory
break down in the face of two facts: 1) "Anthropology itself of translatability, all talk about il IS Just beggmg the ques·
bears witness to the fact that it is possible, within certain lion.
Bloch's own way out of the dilemma does not Oller IT a
limits, to communicate with all orner human beings. how·
ever different their culture" and 2) "If other people really viable solution either. His attempt is unsuccessful because
.
had different concepts of Time we could not do what we he fo nnulates a critique that accepts t�e te"."s of hiS adver·
patently do, that is to communicate with them" (1977:283), saries. :"Jot surprisingly, this leads . hIm ul �lmat�ly back to
.
The first observation is the weaker one, it either rests the same empiricism a�d naive reahsm we l�entlfied earher
.
on an equivocal use of communication (one that would have as the hidden assumption of cultural relatl\'lsm. I f I under­
stand him correctly, his argument can be ,summanze� , as
to accommodate such instances of patent noncommunica· .
tion as the denial of coevalness in anthroJXllogical dis.­ follows: J f conceptions and categones of Time are SOCially
course); or it is naively positivistic in that it tries to convince determined we must ask how it is possible to study them
us that the success of a project legitimizes the means or even critically. We can avoid the logical impasse if we i�sisl. first
explains how it works. But I do believe that Bloch touches of all that the problem wilb Time is a problem With percep..
the heart of me matter in his second observation. Time. in lion df Time� Bloch then postulates two types of time per­
the sense of shared , intersubjective Time, is a necessary ception (using, it seems to me, perception al�osL syno.ny­
condition of communication .s As such it is the inescapable mouslv for conceptualizalion) There are perceptIons of Tune
counterpole to any investi�ation into culturally different no· thal a�e close to nature and others that are removed from
tions of time, not only logICally but also practically. it. He then asserts (criticizing but in fact rea�firming D�rk­
Bloch came to his position bj' way of analyzin the log· heim's distinction of profane and sacred reahty) that Time·
g close-to·nature is fou nd in one kind of cultural knowledge,
ical difficulties structuralist·funcuonalist theory had WitJl ex·
plaining dlllnge. Radical functionalism in the line of Durk· that which serves in "the organization of practical aclivities,
especially, productive activities." Time·removed· from·
 44 Our Time, Their Time. No Time Our Time, Their Time, No Time 45

nature is involved in "ritual communication." It is in practical . n (0 Man

and hum an labor (which is !.he pervad­
.
C?lllexts that we find universal categories of Time, while in � matter of
history) or to nature.
la�i"i� is here
. .

tu�ned
. Quite art­
into
tufiy, histOrical.
r.llual COnlexlS �""e � an expect to encounter the kind of rela. re.
m ca ug h t III cultural mo­
�
tl�'e concepl u lza�lons stud ied by the structuralist-function_ !Otp(thing
at
Slatlc
is ,
; It
culture
IS be
souls
g
with o ut window s, with no
alist �see 1 9 7 / : 28:>, 287). That, 1 fear, will nOt do. Bloch's nads, th
among each other, yet full of mirrors facing
solutIon does a?=ommodate uni\,ersality and relativity but links

only at Ih� price . of .compar�emalizing . human praxis . inside. ( 1962 [ 1932P26)

, entl hit much
�ranted, hiS lI1 � �n IS to contribute a crlllque of ideolog­ Bloch's critique is aimed at Spengler, but it does
Ical uses (that IS, misuses) of Time, something. as he ob­ ckJscr to home. There is now an anl.hmp ology which is fas­
(signs, signifi.ers, symbols )
sel-ve� co!reclly. that was precluded by structurdlist­ cinated with "symbolic" mirrors
f? lClIO�;.hst theory. But by alignin� ra�ional use with prac­ lining the inside walls of "cultures " and reflectin g all in·
� aeu\ .
tical Itles and nonrauon
,
, aJ use
with ritual he in fact seems terpretive discourse inside the confines of the chosen object.
to rel �pse IIlto a COInle� seq�ence of ?evelopmemal stages, These reflections give lO an ant.hropological observer the il­
.
a de\,lce whose Tlme-dlSt ancmg function is obvious. These Julion of objectivit}" coherence, and density (perhaps echoed
conse9uences cannot be avoided by insisting th al praxis is in Geertz' "thick description'); in short, mey accoum for
. t�e .MarxlSt .
here IIlvoked In much of Ule pride anthropology takes in its "classical" eth­
. sense. Marx was keenly aware
that t? oppose religlOus ?: Ideol�gical appearance (Schein) nogTaphies . One is tempted to continue Bloch's metaphori­
.
to SocloeconOllllC and lx>lltlcal reality (Wirklichluil) is in itself cal reverie and to muse over the fact that such mirrors, if
.
a pracucal act ?f revolu�?nary emancipation. Hence, the placed at propitious angles. also ha\ie the miraculous power
�emporaJ �ond!llon . s to make real objects disappear-the analyst of strange
cul­
. , . of cntJc�llIy under-standing "ritual" and sideshow o p era tor , a role that is nm
. prachc '.
? . conceptlo ns of Tune are essentially the same. 1t tures as magician or
�s a PO�ltl\'lSt . stra �gy to m�ke of rel�gion and ideology ob­ emirely foreign to many a practition er of anthropo logy and
Jecl.� sm gmens, epl�temo�oglcall)' while at the same time re­ one thal is most easih'' assumed under the cover of cultural
� relativism .
dUCing them to Ule!r SOC!al functIOns, ontologically.
Appeals to basIC, universal human needs not withstand­ A critique of relativism could of course easily take up
.
ng, structuralism-functionalism promotes a kind of rdativ­ most of this book. especially if we were to pay closer atten­
�
�� whose negl�� for. the epistemological si!Plificance of tion lO its crucial role in the development of American an­
llm.e becomes VISible m unsUlmountable lOgJcal inconsis­ throfKllog}'. Such is not the purfKlse of these essays. But be­
tencl�S. The.se have been demonstrated over and over.9 In fore we tum to another form of denyin g- coevalness the r,int
fact httle could be added to a much earlier incisive critique needs to be made that relativistic circumvention 0 the
by ano� her BI�h, Ernst, of another relativism, Spengler's. problem on a theoretical level did by no means lead its pro­
Here \'ie find In one condensed passage all the major ele­ ponents to ignore Time and temporal relations as they af­
men � that shoul� make liS a11lhropologists constantly re­ fect practical relations between cultures.
conSider 0l:'f allegJance to a doctrine which we know to be So far we have commented on forms of cultural relati\,­
u':llenable 10 Our he:ad.s even if we continue to cling to it ism whose roots must be sought in theories of sociocultural
With our he�r� . ThiS IS how E. Bloch summarizes the ef­ integration stressing- me social oribrins of cognitive catego­
fects of relatiVism: ries (the Durkheimtan approach in French and British an­
throfKllogy). E. Bloch's cntique of Spengler points to other
The very process of h is tory is broken u p into Gar­
dens of Culture or "Culture Souls." These are as sources in romantK:ism and NielZschean ideas, and numer­
u n related to each other as they are without COnnec. ous influences from Gestalt psycholog}' to linguistics. This
46 Our Time, Their Time. No Time Our Time, Their Time, No Time 47

second trend, exemplified and popularized by Ruth Bene· 1t we note the paradoxical nature of an enterprise
h' ds i� rl
diet's PattemJ oj Culture ( 1 934) proposed to study culmre III w h ich relativistic studies of values were to produce

�
,

with t.he help of aesthetic concepts such as pattern, style.

o,,'iedge that would help to bring the enemy down and,
and configuration. Both movements, however, converged in
their intense concern for the unifying ethos, the common
� n after, establish effective contTol and assure transfor·
mation o� these values toward the model of the anthropol.
morality that accounts for regularities in the behavior of the
ogist'S soclety_ "
members of a culture . In the United States, these research Such an alliance between theoreucal reiauv i sm and fight
,

efforts found their conceptual focus in such notions as "na­ j

for a cause perceived as ust and necessary was neiuler new
tional character" and in the debates aooul "values." Insti­
(it resembles fOrmally, i f not, hist?rically, the links between
tutes and programs (for inscance at Columbia and Harvard) ,
cokmial expansKln and ftmcuonahst anthropology), nor was
brought anthropologists together with psychologists, sociol­
it much of a logical problem, To see this we need o�lr be
ogists, and (Xllitical scientists and spawned unprecedented aware of an obvious implication of all cultuntl relatIVIsm:
interdisciplinary efforts. Once other cultures are fenced off as culture gardens or" in
To assess their bearing on the problem of coevalness, the terminology of sociological jargon, as IX)llndary·mal �.
we must recall for a moment the political context of these taming systems based on shared values; onc� each culture IS
studies, situated as they were during and soon after World ,
perceived as living its Tim�, it �omes poSSible and mdeed
War 11, Because intellectual·scientific and political preoccu· necessary to elevate the mterstlces between cultures to a
pations were so intimately connected in the minds and daily method�logical status, At that moment the study �f �ltures
activities of these researchers, much of the work of that pe. ,
"from a distance," clearly a vice in terms of the Injuncuon
riod. now seems dated and destined for oblivion , Yet, many demanding empirical research thr�ugh par�ici� nt obser·
of the senior anthropologists who continue to influence and ,
vation, may tum into a theoreucal "Irtue" A sltuauon of �.
shape the discipline today (and who are by no means to be , ,
litical antagon�m may th�n be rauonaltzed epistemologi­
found in the same theoretical or political corners) spent their , ,
cally as the kmd of objccu"e dlsta�ce that , allows the
,
formative years with culture-and·personality, national<har· anthropologist to view anolher culture m Its eoOrety, A cuI·
acter, and value studies, Taking into account the usual de­ tural holism is born which, in spite of terminological sllni·
lay of one generation it takes for scientific insights and con· larities, has little in common with lhe emphasis on totality
cerns [0 percolate to the level of popular consciousness, one that originates in dialectic::U thought (whose con�tituting ,acts
realizes that a particular brand of wartime cultural relati\'· are negations of cultural dIStance and of concomitant no�(:ms
ism continues [0 infonn the ouclook of a good deal of an· of scientistic objectivity), I t is lherefore not at all surpnsmg
gY
thropolo ,H' It certainly cannot be overlooked in this criti· to find relativistic and holistic orientations in the service of
cal exanunation of anthropological uses of Time, methodological projects which spurn time-consu£?ing de·
Of special interest in this context is the clash between scriptive and comparative study in favor of projects de·
extreme value·relativism in anthropological theory and the signed to get at the jugular of othe.r �ultures, lhat ,is! at [heir
perceived necessity to pass value judgments in political central values and vital characlenstlcs, I I The splnt of the
practice, Perhaps thel-e was never a stronger methodologi· times is aptfy expressed in "Assignment: Japan," the intro­
cal emphasis on explaining entire nations in terms of their ductory chapter in Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and
basic values and patterns of socialization and instituuonali· the Sword, "Tough.minded" acceptance of radical cultural
zation than during that period of war against Germany and difference is there opposed to soft sentiments alx)Ut One
Japan and in the cold war against the Soviet block which World and Universal Brotherhood (see 1967 [ 1946] : 1 4 f).
folrowed victory over the enemy of mankind_ With historical Benedict fully realizes that pursuit of national identity may
48 OUf Time. Their Time. No Time Our Time, Their Time, No Time 49

be intimatelv connected with the exercise of power over paDon of a propaganda statement, issuing an order
others, but that does not cause her to question the legiti­ 'pst fraternization, a threat of a certain t)"PC of
macy of "being American to the hilt" (see 1967:12. 15), let :ri sal, an introduction of a new international reg­
alone consider the epistemological implications of a nation­ ulat ion, or a like matter. The diagnosis is made for
the purpose of facilitating some specific plan or pol­
centered theory of culture.
National character was one of the unifying concepts in ic)', and at least implicitl�·, includes predictions of
these endeavors. The scholars who under the early leader­ ex.eected behavior that ma�' make such a plan or
policy successful or unsuccessful. (Ibid. 397)
ship of Ruth Benedict participated in studies of national
character eventually produced a manual significantJy titled It would be fascinating to subject this and similar pas­
The Study of Culture at a Distance (Mead and Melreaux 1953). sages [0 closer conceptual analysis. They illustrate the con·
The book is a document for an important period in the his­ tention that anthropologtc31 appmaches based on cultural
LOT)' of anthropology. Its purpose is stated in the first para­ relativism are easily put to work for such nonreJaLivist pur­
graph of Margaret Mead's introduction: poses as national defense, political propaganda, and out­
light manipulation and control of other societies. Having
This Manual is concerned with methods that have made that much dear, we must now ask a mOI'e pointed
been developed during the last decade for analyz­
ing the cultural regularities in the characters of in­ question : How does this particular amalgam of science and
dividuals who are members of societies which are �litics illuminate conditions and motives responsible for that
inaccessible to direct observations. This inaccessibil­ affliction of anthropology we called allochronic discourse?
ity may be spatial because a state of active warfare The mechanisms that translate relativistic s[Udies of
exists-as was the case with Japan and German)' in OOler cultures in thnr terms (and, incidemally, tlle ease with
the early 1940s; or it may be-as is now the case which theories and methods developed for the study of
with the So\'iet Union and Communist China--due "primitive" culture are transfelTed to investigations of "de­
to barriers to travel and research. Or the inaccessi­ veloped" nations and to groups and classes within our own
bility may be temporal, since the society we wish to society) are subtle and not always obvious. Readin g, for in­
study may no longer exist. (195B:3) llance, through Mead's introduction one cannot help but be
In another contribution to the volume, M. Mead speaks impressed by the intelligence and differentiated VIeWS she
of the political applications of studies of culture at a dis­ brings to her task, especially when she comments on con­
tance: crete problems encountered in the practice of anthropo­
logtcal research. In this she is representative of her genera­
The approach described in this Manual has been tion of eminent ethnographers. One gets the distinct
used for a variety of politica1 purposes: to imple­ impression of a decline toward crudeness and simplification
ment particular governmental programs within a in much of what is currently written about ethnographic
country, to facilitate relationships with allies, to method, even, and sometimes especially, by those who rightly
guide relationships with partisan groups in coun­
tries under enemv oontrol, to assist in estimating criticize the ethical, political, and intdlectual presupposi­
enemy strengths �nd weaknesses, and to pro\'ide a tions of their predecessors.
rationale for the preparation of documents at the Awareness of problems with Time could be a case in
imernational level. All these uses involve diagnosing point. To begin with, M. Mead makes it clear that cultural
the cultural regularities in the behavior of a partic­ distance is a problem of Time as well as space. In the brief
ular group or groups of people that are relevant to statement on political appltcations she notes the importance
the proposed action-whether this be the dissemi- of Time and riming in relations between cultures, cognitive
 50 Our Time. Their Time, No Time Our' Time, Their Time, No Time 31

or political. The passages where she makes recommenda­ core of beliefs and values which account for the identity of a
tions for fieldworkers contain numerous observations on the cultu re.
importance of native attitudes toward Time which must be Taken at face value, such could indeed be the starting
n� atche� by tJle researchers's temporal awareness. After all. point. fo� a th.eo�y of culture that would assign crucial epis·
If the a1m of such research is to observe "regularities" of (£1T1ologlcal slgmficance LO temporal relations. But closer
behavior exhibited by individual members of a culture' some analysis soon reveals th � L Hall is not concerned with episte­
notion of Time and temporal sequence and, consequently, mology. He does not raise the problem of knowledge in terms
,

some methodological consideration of these temporal as­ f{ Time; nor does he ask how temporal relations and condi­
pects must be an integral part of the approach. The pi­ tions a.ff�t the validity of anthropological findings. His in­
, te�t IS 10 methodology and leads him to exam ine cultural
oneenng work of Mead and Bateson (the lauer also con­
tributed to the manual) on the use of ethnographic film "ule" of Time. The book is replete with examples and com­
cenainly gives evidence for a keen awareness of the tem­ parisons between how we use time and how they use time.
poral flow of human action. Hall's opening statement also contains a theoretical as­
I r:t sum, the sort ?f c� ltural relativism which guided sumption aoout cul.tUl"e in general, namely that it shapes
and regulate.s be�aVI?r through unconscious mechanisms or
Amert � an anthropologiSts Involved in the study of culture
at a distance seems to put to a test our global thesis that rules. That lmphes 111 turn the methodological axiom that

I anthropologyJIas be.e.n constructing its object the O�e.r:­

?y,imploying var.ialls devices of temporal distancing...negat­
anthropology's major task is lO reveal the unconscious forces
?y CUlling through the layers of deceptive conscious behav­
k)r. I n short, the study of Time in culture is valuable be­
II'! the coeval eXlstence .of the object and sub'eet of its dis­
course. I At the very least. we wowonave to cr .It numer­ cause it reveals what is �idden beneath the "lies" of spoken
oU;CWtural relativists with awareness of the role of Time in words. Truth and conSCIOUS awareness are here aJigned with
shaping cultural behavior and. consequently, interaction be­ �e knower. th� anthropologist; dissimulation and submis­
.
[ween cultures (including field research). SIOn lO unconSCIOus powers are 011 the Side of the Other . No
This is the moment when a brief look at E. T. Hall's ",,"'Onder {hat the theoretical notion of an unconscious cul­
The Silent Language will show that ethnographic sensitivitv to tur� and th� methodological prescriptions that go with it
Time alone does not at all guarantee awareness of Lhe p�b­ easily turn mto schemes to influence, contl'ol, and direct
lern of coevalness. The opening paragraph of chapter I , o�ers; the anthropology of Time becomes the politics of
('''n e V�i�es of Time" ) exemplifies the rhetorical appeal of Tune. As one reads through The Silent Language one realizes
� tha� the many perceptive observations and examples iIIus­
Hall s wnttng. It also manages to pack numerous theoretical
assumptions into a fC'o.... lapidary sentences: "Time talks. It tmung how they use Time [Urn into so many rec ipes for how
speaks more plainly than words. The message it conveys � use that knowledge so that th.ei.r behavior can be tricked
uno �rving our goals. Hall's frequent criticism of American
comes through loud and clear. Because it is manipulated
less consciously, it is subject to less distortion than the spo­ boonshn�ss and intransigence in dealing Witll other cultures
cannot hide the fact that his book, too, is a "manual" for
ken language. It can shout the truth where words lie"
( 1 959: 15). Read in the light of elaborations in the later people who want to g�t things done (diplomats, ex patriate
chapters, �his ,? pening statement describes Hall's position as m na ers and supervlS?rs, salesmen and econOllllc advi­
� �
SOlS). l Nowhere does hiS awareness of the role of Time in
follows: Time is not a mere measu re or vector, of culture; it
communic.a�ion lead him to uestion the premises of cul­
,

is one of its constituents. Time contributes to the makeup of 'l

tUlal relauvlSm. Because Hall 10ids an instrumental view of
a culture because it is one of the most important means of
communication, The Silent Language is aoout temporal strat-
communication. Conceptualizations of Time belong to the
52 Our Time. Their Time. No Time Our Time . Their Time, Ko Time 53

egies, not aOOm the role of Time in processes of cultural ,;es of the intelligentsia of one country and, for all that
creation. Nor can it be said that HalJ's persuasive and infl1l­ maners. of one city.
ential treatment of the subject is merely a political exten­ By now numerous critical readings and appraisals of
sion, or perhaps perversion, of alllhroJXllogical insights. The Lhi· Strauss·s work are available . U The only excuse for
political act is built into the very theory. The axiomatic as­ adding my own observations to this literature IS that no cri­
sumption that much of culture is inaccessible to the con­ rique of the uses of Time i n anthropology can ignore a
sciousness of the "average member" 14 is already expressive mo\'ement whose proponents like to pomt out that thev . have
of a political praxis where true knowledge about the work­ no use for Time.
ings of society is the privilege of an elile. The fXJint of that To begin with, I do not think that musings about the
observation is not to deny the existence of unconscious mo­ notion of structure are helpful i n approaching structural­
tives but to question the strategy of a discourse which, with ism. The term simply has too wide a currency in anthropol­
the help of distancing devices, places the threat of the un­ og}', especially in the kind of relativist discourse we dis­
conscious somewhere outside its own prese nt. cUssed 111 the preceding section. Levi-Strauss has taken great
pains to set himself apart from these approaches on the
grounds that the)' are guilty of too much empiricism, i.t:.
Preempting Coevalruss: Cultuud Taxonomy nai\>'e tmst in that which is immediately observable. Follow­
ing Durkheim's and de Saussure's leads he disdains search
As Ernst Bloch observed, cultural g'drdens lie behind the for connections between cultural isolates and a reality OUl­
walls of rdativism. The anthropologist may watch them grow Jide. As a science of ruhure, anthropology i s for him the
and change but whatever happens behind the walls occurs stud" of relations between cultural isolates and of the rules
in a Time other than his. Whether he moves, temporarily, or laws governing Lhese relations. t n such an enterprise it is
inside the walls. or whether he considers a culture garden fu�le to. expect explanations either from history (asking how
from afar, the very notion of containing walls and bounda­ a glven I�late came about) or from psychology (asking what
.
ries cremes order .md sense based on discontinuity and dis­ a gwen Isolate means to members of a culture, or how it
tance. But this sort of relativism which circumvents the motivates their behavior).
problem of common Time by postulating a multiplicity of The fundamental assumptions of structuralism are best
times and spatial coexistence is not the only way of avoiding unnerstood as a radically tnxnnomic approach to cu lture 1 6 .

the question of coeval ness and temporal coexistence, \Ve will An anal),sis o f the temporal aspects of structuralist dis­
now consiper a trend or paradigm which goes much far­ COurse must therefore concentrate on the problem of Time
ther. Rather than walling-in the Time of others so that it and taXonomy. Among the many possible points of depar­
cannot spill over into OUTS, this school simply preempts the ture in Levi-Strauss' writings I have chosen the following
!�marks, which aTe part of his famous attack on Sartre's
question of coevalness. Its strategy is to elimmate Time as a
�Ignificant dimension of either cultural integration or eth­ idea of hi�lOry �n The Savag� l'1ind. Nothing illustrates better
nography. To this trend we usually affix the label of struc­ the peculiar mlXture of IUClda), and duplicity characteristic
turalism and we see it exemplified in the work of I..."
..e i-$trauss. of structuralist talk about Time. 1 1
For the sake of simplicity 1 will follow that practice. fully . In style with his fundarne.ntaJ convictions regarding the
realizing, however, that structuralism is at best a crude in­ blllary organi7 ..3tion of all knowledge, Levi-Strauss begins by
dex of a highly complex intellectual tradition whose world­ p?siti ,?-g a "symmetry" bern'een the preoccupations of the
wide success became paradoxically linked to the idiosyncra- historian and those of the anthropologist: "The anthro)X)l-
54 Our Time, Their Time, No Time
Our Time, Their Time, 1\0 Time 55
ogist respects history, but he does not accord it a special
value. He conceives It as a study complementary to his own: that allows him, not just to place, but to plot any and all
one of the them unfurls the range of human societies in cultural isolates in a logical grid.
time, the other in space:· He asserts that "distribution in At this point, those who are familiar with Uvi·SuausS'
space and succession in time afford equivalent perspectives" writings might objec� that he constantly sets his structural
and rejects the claims of those who posit that history consti­ analYSIS of myth agamst the background of lhe spatial dis-
tutes an irreducible and indeed privileged approach "as if uibutions of variants. But the point is that he perceived his
diachrony were to establish a kind of intelligibility not merely
superior to thaL provided by synchrony, but above all more
specifically human" (see 1966:256).
I work as a radical break with "historical" reconstruction based
on the geo graphic distribution of culture traits. Even when
be ostensibfy uses hard dara on the ecology of the honeybee
An unauentive reader may be lulled into laking this for or of the porcupine, his ultimate goal remains to show thal
a conciliatory view, em p hasizing complementariness, sym­ structural analysis of bee and porcupine tales can establish
metry, and even equivalence (Which? None of these terms r
connections of which historical-geogra hic research knows
simply implies the others). Such is not at all Levi-Strauss' nothing. Ofter:-- one cannot help but fee that he deliberately
intention. His structuralist duplk:ity rests on a not-so-subtle cre�tes confUSion between structural and ecological and his­
trick he operates in these passages. Ostensibly he sets up an toncal arguments because that confusion works i n his favor.
argument with an opponent holding a view different from It makes him, at first, appear to take ethnographic accounts
his own. In reality he has already reduced the opponent's on the location of variants in space seriously so that, later,
position to his and from then on his argument is nodling he can sho": the irrelevance of such infonnation t<;' a �eeper
but an elaboration of his own views. His ruse is to substitute understandmg. All alon lf. he knows that the dlstTibutlon
diachrony [or history. That sleight o[ hand is supported, maps on which culture historians and folklorists locale val'·
much like the diversions all illusionists try to create while iants in the hope of translating spatial relations into histor­
operating their magic, by directing the reader's attention to ical sequences are just that :--maps. Maps are devk:es to clas­
something else, in this case to the "opJX>sition" of Space and sify data. Like tables and diagrams they are taxonomk: ways
Time. of ordering cultural isolates lNith the help of categories of
Levi-Strauss leads us to believe that space here could C�ntrasl and op JXlsition: source vs. variant. center vs. pe·
mean real space, perhaps the space of the human geogra­ nph�ry, pure form vs. mixed variant. displaying criteria of
phers who became the ancestors of anthropological schools qualIty vs. those of quamity, or whatever else diffusionists
that defi':le themselves as historical. He permits the sous­ use to map the traits of culrures. All of them are as taxo­
entendu that his concern with space is expressive of attempts nomic as the oppositions used in structural analysis. the dif­
to understand human distribution in space as a I-eAex of ference being in whether or not one attributes the location
ecologicaJ variation, of the emergence of different modes of of an isolate to conscious acti,,;ties and historical events (such
production, or of geopolitical arrangements. I n fact, he has as borrowing, migration, and diffusion) or whether one ac­
little interest in understanding the role of real space in the counts for it in tenns of the operation of unconscious rules
genesis of human differences and conHicl. Space for U,,;· or laws.
Strauss is what .M. Foucault likes to call "tabular" space, i.e., Diachrony serves a similar strategy. In the context of
the kind of taxonomic space that must be postulated if cul­ Levi·Strauss' attacks on Sartre one is led to believe that
tural differences are to be conceived as a system o f semio· diachrony could mean the same as history. This is mani·
logical constructs, organized by a logic of oppositions. Levi­ festly not the case. Ever since de Saussure canonized the
Strauss' thought does not inhabit a world; it hves in a matrix opposi?�n 1J.etween synChrony and' diachrony it served. not
as a dlstmclJon oj temporal relations (as one might expect
56 Our Time, Their Time, No Time Our Time, Their Time, Ko Time 57

from the presence of the component chrQny in both terms), one gets more and more convinced , . . of a truth
but as a distinction against Time.H! The possibility of iden­ which gives us much to think. namely that the link
tifying and analyzing semiological systems is unequivocally one establishes between things pre.e�ists , . . the
said to rest on the elimination of Time and, by imphcation, chings themselves and serves to determine them.
of such notions as process, genesis, emergence, production, (1968,216)
and other concepts bound up with "history:' Diachrony does
not refer to a temporal mode of existence but to the mere This is clea� enough . If the proper subject matter of an­
succession of semiological systems one upon another. thropology IS the study of relationships between cultural
Succession, strictly speakin g , presupposes Time onl�' in the iIo!ates, an� if t�ese relationshi ps rest on principles 01' laws
sense of an extraneous condition affecting neither their syn­ that pr.e-exJst ti?elf actualization iO "contingent" history, then
chronic nor lheir diachronic constitution. Thus structural­ Tun.e IS eff�<:uvd}' r�mo �'ed from anlhroJX>logical consid­
ism, while accusing its oppo nents of I'eifying �l eratlon. 2o levI-Strauss attlrude lOward Time is firmly rooted
in ninetee �th-century notions o�' natural histor)', a fact which
0Lm-YllikaL power is guilt)' of ultimate ,'eification. Time is
�ts cOllSlde!able doubt on hIS claim to be the legitimate
..

re�e!!. from the realms of cultural praxis an.cLgW;n i�

place ill that o( J >ure I�gical-forms. Of course, he who ex­ he •r of the elg�leenth ce� tury. Admittedl),. Enlightenment
.
orCIses the-devil must somehow believe in him, which is why thmkers were Interested ill hIStory for "philosophical" rea­
structuralist exorcism of Time deserves serious attention , III IO�S . Abo\'e ,all they saw history as the theater of moral
.

pnnaples ultlmatel>: traceable to "constant laws of nature."

. F,?r a radical structur� .an!.hropology, Time (as Physical
Tune:) �. s a mere prerequiSIte of Sign systems; its real exis­ But nat�re �as deCIdedly human nature and the challenge
tence, If any, must be sou ght where Uvi-Strauss likes to lo­ of. th � hlstonan was. to s�o� t�e temJX>ral unfolding of its
cate the "real :" in the neural organization of the human pnnClI?les. The radICal dlSt.t.ncllon between contingent hu­
brain being part of nature. Structl..u:ali..s.m thusJilYstratesQ!!.e �n history and necessary natural history was drawn in the
of��logicaJ uses of Time l identified in chapter J. it Dlneteenth century, To maintain, as Levi-Strauss does, that
na.turalius T b '� �ovi�llrom the s�h� ofCO?: anthro I?Ology lQut court belongs to natural history is to deny
§:fIOUS cultural roducuon, U:", -Strauss, quotmg Engels III the Enli��tenment origin of our discipline.
suppon of his position, maintains that fOlms of thought re­ , As If It were not clear enough that the equivocation of
flect natural laws, Consequently, i[ is futile to use our (cul­ h�tory �n� diachrony implies the rejection of historical
tural). c:mcepti0!1s of temJX>ral relation for the purpose of Time, LevI-Strauss seems to feel the need to rub this in, so
� relationships
explallllllg . between things (see 1969:451), To to speak. He. sel:S out to �emonsLrate that even chrorwlog),­
expect meaning from Time would be Hegelian idealism; at a, con�ptuahzallon of Tune one might acce pt as the objec­
any rate, it would mn against the Saussurean principles on tIVe reSIdue after all !.he mystifications of the historical school
which structural anthropology is based . In L'Ongine des m.an­ have �en cleared away-is nothing but a classificatory, tax­
ieres de table Levi-SLrauss gives a succinct summary of the onomic device. "History," we are told, "does not . . escape
.

the commo!! obli gation of all knowledge, to employ a code

\
dif!!rences between the historici!Land his own a�ch.
,,,rnere the fonner seeks "to make out contingent links and
the traces of a diachronic evolution," the structuralist dis­
to
,
�lal rse Its . object, even (and especially) if a continuous
reali � y IS, attrIbuted to that qbject." For history. "the code
covers "a s)'stem that is synchronically intelligible"; conSISts ill a chronology" 0966:258). Predictably, this view
of the conceptualization of Time leads str.tight back to its
reduction to taxonomic space:
In doing this we have merely put into practice a les­
son by Ferdinand de Saussure . . . : As one con­ Given that the general code consists not in dates
siders the subject matter of linguistics more deeply which can be ordered as a linear series but in
58 OUf Time, Their Time, No Time Our Time, Their Time, No Time 59

rix, But as one need nOL accept the claim

classes of dales each furnishing an autonomous 5)'S­ inw a spati al m,a �
tern of reference. (he discontinuous and classifica­ thai a lemporah zH�
�g .JSa
. �e, s�ch as talk about the primitive ,
lory nature of hisrorical knowledge emerges clearly. is inn ocenl of spatlahzauon (m Lhe form of distancins) so it
It operates by means of a rectangular matrix . . . wo uld be nai'�e to believe that when selLing up a spaual tax­
where each line represents classes of dates. which ono mie malnx of human culture one does nOt temporalize,
may be called hourly, dail)'. annual , secular. millen­ ..\1 any rate, s(J:uc�uralism. LO my knowledge, does no t pro-­
iaJ for the purposes of schemati7.ation and whtch to­
,
"'ide us wllh cnlena to choose between a deception !.hal im­
gether make up a discontinuous set. In a system of poses c0!ltinuit>: on t�e d i�ontinu ?us and one that culS up
this type, alleged historical continuity is secured
!ibe conunuous Into dlsconunuous Isolates, Worse, by virtue
only b)" dint of fraudulent outlines. (1966:260 f)
of its self-assurance and faith that. with its own advent, such
One cannOl help but be astounded by the temerity of this criteria are no longer needed, Sll"ucturalism has in effect
argument. A banal fact, that classification is one of the tools functioned to freeze and thereby preserve earlier historical
of knowledge, perhaps even a tool of all knowledge at some and temporaliz ing ethnology, It is in such ethnology, after
,
point of ilS production, is made into a transcendental rule. all, where UVI-Strauss mines lhe building blocks for his
r
Structural �sm's own creature, the code, i� rom ul gated as a monumental ediflces, Behind the structural ramparts of his
standard, In fact a "common obligation" 0 all knowledge (a mythologiques he peruses and digests enormous amounts of
formula that rings with Durkheimian assumptions), This is ethnography without showing signs of being disturbed by
metaphysics of the worst sort, the one which is mixed with me possibility th�t, mO�I. of it �igl� t be corrupted to the core
moral,ism, So paralyzing is this self.righteousness of the tax· by the temporahzmg IdeolOgical Interests for which h e has
onomlSt that one almost forgets to question the insinuation so much contempt. Why is he so impatient with Sartre when
tha� h is:tory of any kind could �.\'er amount to chronology­ he has so much tolerance for the histories told by his an­
, thropological forerunners and colleagues? He assures us
as If histOrIans of all persuaSIOns, at least since the eigh­
teenth century, had not always insisted that chronology is that it "is not a bad thing , , , to borrow a quotation from a
b u t a scaffold or tool for ordering what remains to be \\Titer [\V , J. Perry] whose work is generally denounced as
understood, The same goes for history's alleged fixation on an extra vagant abuse of this h istorical method" ( 1 969: 122
continuity, Where i s the historian after Hegel and �1arx who f), He is. as I sa id , safe and does nOl need a true critique of
would dare to think continuity without discon tin uity? Cer­ bourgeous historism because " luckily, structural analysis
tainly Levi·Strauss cannot find him in Sartre. against whom makes up for the dubiousness of historical reconstructions"
he argues in this context. ( 1 969, 1 69).
But l�l us for a moment grant Levi·StrallSLhis peculiar , In the end, one comes to suspect that Levi-Strauss' flail­
, Ing ,at�c� on history might really bel!!!ti al.ed bVlirs diffi­
View of history and admit that historians ar� indeed...·.om
�
c,eQ1e witb.... establishing chronolog1esana detenninin con­
cult.'es ��lh �nother proble�n , He is t!oubled by J.he .IQ.lc-.Of
su1:!.Jectl\'lly JI1 the pn�luctlon of'lJOth culture and ...k.uQwl­
tlllu ities Such continuities, we are given to understan , are
qlge al)()�t c,ul1t;re, In The Savage A1ind, from which I have
,

rabricated by a deceptive use of Time, The remedy Levi­

Strauss presc ribes i s to concentrate on space and discol1lin­
�en quotmg, thIS shows up repeatedly, Sartre, the existen­
�h, �t, obviously irritates him wore than Saru'e, the Marxist.
uous �istributio�, If the historian's use of Time may be a
deception-and It IS , the argument of this book that such is leVI-Strauss' JXlsition on history and subjectivity, I believe,
,
�an be �ead In two ways: either as a rejection of history qua
the case �n much of anthropology-then Levi-Strauss' use
of space 1� a deception upon a deception, As we have JUSl j
�de<:>loS"cal prop f�r. a misconceived sub ectivity; or as a re­
jection of subjectiVIty for fear thaL 11IS1Ory-and with it
seen, he hunself has no difficulty packing chronological Time
60 OUf Time. Their Time, :-.Jo Time Our Time, Their Time, No Time 61

Time- misht pierce the armor of scientific anthropology. the "prim itive mind." This old e\'olutionist strate £ of ....ar­
Be that as It may, it is important for our larger argument
that structuralism's problem withJime is in variou� �ys
linked u iIDtb .
aJ"eluctance to adrniU:onscious, intentional,
�
�
j n from onto en,' to,rh "lo.Kenr (aIldObad) is cour.se.
assKal e�amp e foi· meiliOdolo�,'ical"_. abuses o L Illne:
-"; m itive thought illuminates the thought of Western chil­
and th,g.efor:e- subjective acuylt)' as_ <L SQ!.!fce of kno\\iCirge,
native or anthro�cal. Perhaps one needs to be rc­
nunded constantly that this position grew out of a critique
� ren because the two are equidistant from '·Vestern adult
Ught. Both represent early sta ges in a developmental se­
nce. Levi-Strauss is quick to denounce this as an insult
of a rival camp on the French intellectual scene; othen\·ise both, our children and primitive adults, and he calls on
one fails to appreciate the urgency with which it is ad­ the ethnographer as a witness. He especially rejects onto­
vanced. But il lS truly intriguing in the international context pneuc-phrlogenetic argumenLS which would make primi­
of anthropology that rejection of subjecri\'ity did not lead to tIVe children even more infantile than our own: "Every
contempt for cthnogJ'aphic "obsen'aoon," to use Uvi­ fieldworker who has had concrete experience of primitive
Strauss' favorite term for fieldwork. The struclUralists, at children will undoubtedly agree that the opposite is more
least those who practice anthropology, do not escape the likely to be true and that in many regards the primitive child
�
aporia arisin from the conflicting demands of coeval re­ appears far more mature and positive than a child in our
searchand a hx;hro nic discourse any more than their histor­ O\\'n society, and is to be compared more with a civilized
iCai and relativist predecessors and contemrx>f<tries. adult." ( 1 969:92)
Having outlined ways in which struclUralism con­ Even more important than the specific context of this
tributes to the Time-distancing conventions of anLhroJ,X>­ remark is the strategy of invoking the fieldworker and his
logical theorizing and writing, we must now briefiy examme "concrete experience" as an instance from which to judge
its struggle with the other horn of the dilemma, the tem­ the claims of a temporallzillg discourse. Cnfortunalely, it
poral demands on personal, participant research. Once lOOn turns out that a critique of temporal distancing is by
again. Levi-Strauss likes to confuse us. He may ridicule dog­ no means central to his argument. foremost in Levi-Strauss'
matic fixation on fieldwork in .situ as when he declares futile mind is the role of fieldwork in distinguishing the anthro­
the hope of the ethnographer in the Malinowskian tradition poiob-rist from the flilorian
s (il being understood that for him
"to grasp eternal truths on the nature and fu nction of social the latter is always the "cullU1'e historian" fascinated by cul­
institutions through an abstract dialogue with his little tl'ibe" (ure traits and their spatial distribution). He must, there­
( 1 967:12). But he never discards ethnography as a basis of fore, find a �ale for_ fi�k which not only �s
all anthrgpological knowledge, neither explicitly (as we will the ethno.grapher's suQjecti\'e ex � rience as_ the ultimate in-
see presently from a number of statements reg-Mding the 5�Ct � anthroPQ:logy but aJjo Claims superior objectivity
role and imporlance of fieldwork) nor implicitly (as is clear fQUucfL kD Owledge. Somehow there must be a way of show­
from his untiring use of ethnography, his own and that of ing that one person's immersion in the concrete world of
other anthropologists). Furthermore, he is aware of illli­ another culture accomplishes the scientific feat of reducing
mate links between the praxis of fieldwork and what we that concrete world to its most general and universal prin­
called anthropology'S problem with Time. cip les. Living in the Time of the primitives, the ethno�a.
On at least one occasion, Levi-Strauss invokes fieldwork p':her will be an ethnographer only if he outlives them, I.e.,
precisely in the problematic sense I try to explore in this If he moves thn:rngh the Time he may have shared with them
book. A chapter in The Elementary Strncture.s oj Kinship is t i­ Onto a level on which he finds anthropology:
lled ''The Archaic Ulusion." in it he criticizes the wide­
spread tendency, especial ly among psychologisLS, to draw Indeed, such is the "'ay the ethnographer proceeds
parallels between the minds of children and lunatics and when he goes into the field, ror however scrupulous
62 OUT Time, Their Time, No Time Our Time, Their Time, �o Time 63

and objective he may want to be, it is never himself, appreciate the primitive as a producer; or, which is the same,
nor is it the other person, whom he encOllnters at in comparing ourselves to the primitive we do not pro­
l �e end of his investigation. By superimposing nounce judgment on what he thinks and does, we merely
hImself on the other, he can at most claim to extri­
clas sify ways how he thinks and acts.21 '''''hen \Vestern man
cale what :Mauss called facts of genera1 functioning.
calls the primitive childlike, this is f<!r.. the structuralist not a
which he showed to be more universal and to have
statement on the nature of primitive man.- That particular
more reality ( 1 976:8 f)
.
fi
CO crytualization of a reiationshir-b el1N.een ( us and the
Such feats of transcendence as Levi-Strauss expects from Ot er we ar suredJ is merely ,.�9QOIDic. All we do i n
the ethnographer turn out to be vartousl)' linked to the calling primitives infantile is class perceived similarities: The
achie\'ement of "distance" conceived, not as a mere fact, but choices primitive societies have not yet made are analogous
as a methodological lOOl in a manner that reminds us of its w the choices children in our societies have not yet made
uses in relativist discourse. Much like American culturalism, (see 1969:92 I).
French structuralism manages to turn deniaJ of coevalness Levi-Strauss' demonstration of laxonomic innocence
into a positive [001 of scientific knowledge. A few examples leaves us with questions that must be asked. Are we to ac­
will show this. cept his contention that in our own society relations be­
Let us return, first, LO Levi-Strauss' critique of the "ar­ tween adults and children merely reflect different degrees
�haic illusion " i n The Elerrumtary Structures of Kinship. Draw­ of "extension" of knowledge? Are we to overlook that adult­
mg parallels between 'Western children and primitives, he child r:e1ations are aJso, and sometimes primarily, fraught
argues, is an insult to all involved except, as it turns out, to with barely disguised attitudes of jX)wer and practices of
the Western adult mind (which s i resfX>nsible for drawing repression and abuse? Even worse, are we to forget that talk
those parallels in the first place). To our surprise, Western about the childlike nature of the primitive has never been
th ough � is in the e�d acquitted �f the crime of ideological just a neutral classificatory act, but a jX)werful rhetorical fig.
. . ure and motive, informing colonial practice in every aspect
TIme dlstancmg whIch ontogenetic-phylogenetic arguments
seem to perpetrate on the primitive. The reasoning is as from religious indoctrination to laoor laws and the granting
follows: We do have a valid point after all when we observe of basic political rights? Is apartheid, one might ask, ten­
:
�hat the p�in:'i�ives �pp�ar .to u �nk like (o �r) .children. Call­
.
dentiously but not without justification, only a classificatory
m.g the prumuve childhke IS to 'generahze him as someone scheme? Aside from the evolutionist fi�re of the savage
With whom we share a common transcultural basis. Analo­ there has been no conception more obVIOusly implicated III
gies betw�n socialization into a culture and learning a lan­ political and cultural oppression Ulan that of the childlike
guage supposedly demonstrate this. native. Moreover, what could be dearer e\'idence of tem­
Levi-Strauss assumes (much like the American cultural poral distancing than placing the Now of the primitive in
elativ �sts) that a culture takes shape and identity by select­ the Then of the Western adult?
�
mg a few among a pr�tically infiOite number of possibilities My comment on these passages from The Elementary
(as a language selects It s significant sounds from an infmite Structures f?! Kinship was occasioned by Levi-Strauss' invoking
number of possible sounds). Such a view is not just medl­ the fieldworker as a .....itness against Time-distancing. What
odologicaJ-profX)sing that culture is best described taxo­ became of thal testimony in the course of a few pages of
nomically-it is also ontologicaJ when it maintains that cul­ structuralist argument? With remarkable ease, fieldwork ex­
ture is CTeaud by selection and classification. It is a concept perience .... as neutralized by a n overriding taxonomic con­
of culture devoid of a theory of creativity or production, cern to justify one of the more despicable devices of anthro­
because in a radically taxonomic frame it makes no sense to pological and ''''estern political discourse.
raise the question of production. By extension, we never So that it rna)' not appear as if the only objection to
64 Our Time, Their Time, No Time Our Time, Their Time, No Time 65

taxonomic subterfuge was a political one (although in the side-the investigator must be able to make a personal re­
end all objections are political, even those that are made on construction of the synthesis characterizing them, he must
"logical" grounds) let us take a Jook at another example. oat merely analyze their elements, but apprehend them as
Once 3g<11n the issue appears to be the role of fieldwork. a whole in the fonn of a personal experience--his own"
Twice in his essay "History and Anthropology" Uvi·Strauss ( 1967:370 fl·
is impelled to nOle the p;nadoxical nature of their relation­ So we are back to personal experience, and one begins
ship. Commenting on Boas' valuation of fieldwork he S£ales: to wonder how the same scholar who shows such relentless
contempt for subjectivity in his attacks on Saflre cOl!ld �s­
Knowledge of social facts must be based on induc­ sign epistemological significance to fieldwork as a sU�Jecuve
tion from individualized and concrete knowledge of
activity. OUf doubts are soon put to rest when we discover
social groups localized in time and space. Such spe­
that, once again, in affirming fieldwork, Levi-Strauss gets
�
cific nowledge, in turn, can be acquired only from
the hIstory of each group. Yel such is the nature of
around the problem with Time. As expected, he posits that
the subject-maller of ethnographic studies that in
the fieldworker's personal, concrete encounter with another
the vast majority of cases history lies beyond reach, culture is of a taxonomic lIature. This is how the argument
(1967,9) runs: The researcher's task is to make the otherness of the
lOCieties he studied available to his own a.� experience. He
La ter on he sums up the struggle of anthropology
' with his- achieves lhis by enlarging "a specific experience to the di­
tory in Lhis paradoxical formula: mensions of a more general one" (1967:17). Most impor­
The criticism of evolutionist and diITusionist inter­ Wlt. a "transition from the conscious to unconscious is as­
p«:t.ations showed us that when the anthropologiH sociated with progression from the specific to the general"
believes he is doing historical research, he is doing (ibid- 21). The fieldworker's experience. while personal and
!he opposite; it is when he thinks that he is not concrete, is not subjective but objective, inasmuch as he rea­
doing historical research that he operates like a sons
good hislori'-lIl, who could be limited by the same
lack of documents. (1967:16 f) on the basis of concepts which are valid not merel)'
for a n honest and objective observer, but for all
�o so!ve �at paraaox one must first realize that th�
,

\
possible observers_ Thus the anthropologist does
hlSlQrta n andthe anthropologist a� I-eallx- canceniet!iilih not simply set aside his own f�elings; he creates new
onejwd the same p roblem:�ss (see 1967 : 1 7). It is a mental categories and helps to introduce notions of
secondary. matter a( f ��r the historian otherness normally space and time, opposition and contradiction, which
means remo�eness In Tune, whereas the anthropologist is are as foreign to traditional thought as (he concepts
c� ncerned Wltl� � Itu:al differe':lce ':is it appears in spatial met with today in certain branches of the natural
distance and dIstribution. The hIstorian finds his sources of sciences. (1967:361)
knowledge in documents which he uses as best he can to
un�erstand (he actual, specific genesis of an institution or The key to understanding this view of empirical objec­
soc Iety . The anthro pologist relies on fiel dwork instead of tivity is its glorification of distance hased on a denial o� the
h,is,,?rical docu�ents which are lacking for most of the so­ conditions of shared Time. The structuralist can conUllue
cleUes he studies. But there is more to fieldwork than its to insist on the importance of concrete experience without
bein � a substitute for lacking documents. Nor is it adequate much of a problem because personal experience is in this
t? thmk of fieldwork as piecemeal induction: "forms of s0- view nothing but the vehicle or medium for the epiphany
, of the "general" and "unconscious."Z2 Like rays focused by
Cial eXistence cannot be apprehended simply from the out-
 Time, Their Time, I\To Time

�
66 OUf Our Time, Their Time, No Time 67

a lens, like the spirit's voice speaking through the medium, The observation that notions such as conversion and
�eClive knowledge of the unconscious appears through the �� easily .m�de
initiation smack of religio·m)'Sticai thought
ethnographer's (conscious) activity, but it is not a result of
it. Anthropological knowledge, like m:p_h, thinks the anthro· but perhaps not quite so easily un�erslOO d. . J.n. romung
out these resemblances ] have no ! nl�rest m JOlOlng the
logist. nOt the ?tI�er W3}' round. He tak.es �m his .rol� as
choru s of critics who claim to recogl1lze In that monu �en�al
the priest and missionary of the transsubJeclive. sCienufic,
inkblot which is Le"i·Strauss' oeuvre a1�ost everr major m·
speak taxonomic, structures that govern the universe.
teUectual movement in histol"}' (includll1g gnosls, the .Ka.
The most disconcerting fact about such a view of field
bata, and similar esoteri� pursuits). B.ut there are senous
research is that it leaves no instance for appeal or critique.
reasons for dwelling on hiS way of turnlllg apparent e.mp�a.
There may be bad anthropologists (as there are bad priests)
sis on the personal into affirmations of the trans·subJecuve,
but, structuralism seems to hold, that does not affect the �h� researc�er's�r�onal en·
the ritual and institutional: �l .
role and validity of the discipline they celebrate. Being the s the obl �ctlve wOfKlIlg orsCIence ?e.
counter, we are mld.. ..i
apprehension of the general and unconscious, anthropol. "p
sited as a sort of ure channel through WhiCh
cause it is
ogy is once and forever removed from the lowly regions of
eth"J1og:aph"'y"'passes into ethnology and an�:opology. Closer
political struggle, from intellectual contestation, and from m the many statements Levl·Strauss ma�es
examinatWn
outright abuse, in short, from the dialectic of repression and
about the nature of fieldwork reveals that the one notion
revolt that makes up the real context in which it appeared
which for him characterizes this activity more than any other
as an academic discipline.
is observation. He does not seem to have much use for the
Still, as if unable to find acquiescence in the exorcism
qualifier participant7 customarily .at�che? to th� term. �ven
of the subjective, concrete, and conscious, [k"i·Strauss ap·
less does he consider commUnicative mleracuon, an Ide.a
pears to struggle with a recalcitrant residue in his theory of
currently much discussed in theories of fieldwork; .For LeVI·
ethnographic objectivicy. He is, after all, not only a meore·
Strauss the ethnographer is first and foremost a vIewer (and
tician but also a p ractitioner of anthropology as an ethnog·
perhaps voyeur) . Observation conceived as the essence of
rapher and teacher. He recognizes that fieldwork experi.
fieldwork implies, on the side of � e ethn��apher, .a con·
ence involves in many cases a conversion, an "inner .
templative stance. I t invokes th� nat� rdhst watchmg. an
revolution that will really make [the ethnographer] into a
experiment. It also calls for a nauve � Iety that '7ould, lde·
new man" (1967:371). But apparently he has no difficulty ally at least, hold still Iike a tl!-blMu v,vant. Both Images are
at all in sepal-ating the effects of field experience from their .
ultimately linked up With a visual root metapho� ?� know�.
signifiqmce. The fact of personal conversion does not cause edge. In this, structuralis�. rejoins the aestbeuClzmg at�·
him to reconsider his epistemological stance. He takes the tudes of the cultural relatiVISts. In both movements, the d·
easy way out, which is to insist on the social function of the lusion of simultaneity (as between the elements of a picture
personal experience. ',"'ith disarming- frankness he qualifies that �ated·, or between the visual. object and the
It as a kind of initiation whose functlon it is to admit adel?ts act of its contemplation) rna>:lead to u\y:r�ls�a��e
to the discipline and to provide a selected few with leglti. active, proo_u-cth:e.nature
. of field-work and� !neyl��.
macy and a license to practice. In fact, he com pares the elh· aalC·
plicati<!i!Uu-hi£1m' cal situations and real, political comr
nographers' field experience to training analysls among psy· tions.
choanalysLS and goes on to recommend "personal"
- Another strategy of escape from Time and history
supervision in the training of the novice, suggesting that common (0 both movements has been to declare the uncon·
close contact with someone who has had the experience be· scious the true object of antluopological researcl� . But �o­
fore might expedite conversion in the apprentice. where are these convergences clearer and more directly Slg·
 Our Time. Their Time, No Time 69
68 OUf Time, Their Time, No Time
to
dons of
seiencific rationalit>, " �oliticaJly, .Uvi-Strauss' rise
nificant for the pn:blem of Tirr.'c.distancing and the denial opolo
of anthr gy
�
o� coevalness than m the valuauon of cultural difference as r minence and the quantJLauve explOSion
P o de with the period of "decoloni­
III the
United States coinci
dlSumce. J n the Mead-Merreaux volume this remained rather ization demanding
demise of direct colon
im �licil and vague; it is spelled om clearly by Levi-Strauss: zaoon·' i.c., the
in the oeuvre �vilisatrice.
?octal 311thmpology "apprehends" its objects. i.e., semiolog­ personal and direct involvement
gy and Frenc h struct uralis m, each
ICal facts as defined by de Saussure, "either in their most A merican anthropolo
circumven t or preem pt cocval­
remote manife ��lions or from the an gle of their most gen­ having developed ways to
contributors to ideolo gies apt
.
eral expression (1 976: 1 0). The pomt IS, as could be shown
, ness, are potential and actual
vast, anonymous, but terrib ly effec tive
from ? ilier contexts �at [he two are interchangeable. Dis­ to sustain the new,
absen tee colonialism . 24
� nce IS �e p-erequlslte for generality as the study of prim­
" regimen of
!live socIety IS the road toward uncovering the universal
!
structures of the human mind.
It is insofar as so-<:alled primitive societies are far
dinanl from our own that we can grasp in {hem
those "facts of general functioning" of which Mauss
spoke, and which stand a chance of being "more
lInive�sal" a�d having �more reality." . . . This ob­
servation which has the privilege of being distant'
no doubt implies some differences of nature be-
tween these societies and our own. Astronomv not
only demands that celestial bodies be far awa buty
also that the passage of time have a different
rhythm there, othen ....ise the earth would have
ceased to exist long before astronomy was born.
(1 976,28)

. SLaLe� enlS like thi � leave lit�le room for speculation .

Distance In space and lime and, In fa ct, a different Time
are made the prerequi �ites not o�I)1 for certain ways of doing
anthropology but fOI " Its very eXistence. With that, the tem­
po� is finally and totaJly removed to the level of meta­
phYSical I?resup positions; i t no longer can be a pl"oblem in
the exerase of anthropology as a "science."
.
The palOS taken by structuralism to remove Time and
�e problem of coevalness from anth roJXllogica l praxis and
dlSCourse should of course be evaluated historicalI\" ' i ts al­
P
lochronic escape is a rcsJXmse to its own social and olitical
�
context. !'a "! from expressing the coming-to-rest of a trou­
.
ble? diSCipline on a solid scientific basis and an unassailable
IOgtc, s�lUclU �alism indicates (by virtue of opposition) that
somethmg might be basically wrong with \Vestern concep-
Chapter Three I Time
and Writing About the Other

wn if (an obsen>erj li ill communic/Uirm with other Db­

tnltn", he can Q71IJ hear whm lh£y Nrot Sl'tn in their ab·

O/UU fxUl.S, at li�J which (Ire olIO his afuoluu past. So

�_ hlou.jedgt originaus in the n:perinut if a group
(fpropit (ff oj a socUty, it must always he based on tdwt is
� and gam, at the motlUfU wMn iJ iJ under amJida-a-
... .

David Boom 1
UJ roiJon du plUJfrm Nt tOUjOUTS 14 nmUetdt: Nuw 1'01-
IcmJ ml)rltrer rout rl l'heurt.
La Fontaine I

so FAR, EXAMPLES of temporal distancing between the

subject and the object of anthropology were invoked to sup­
port the argument that the temporal conditions experi­
enced in fieldwork and those expressed in writing (and
teaching) usually contradict each other. Productive empiri­
cal research, we hold, is possible onl)' when researcher and
researched share Time. Only as communicative praxis does
ethnography carry the promise of yielding new knowledge
�bout another culture. Yet me discourse that pretends to
mterpret, analyze, and communicate ethnographic knowl­
edge to the researc her's societr is pronounced from a "dis­
tance," that is, from a position which denies coe\'alness to
the object of inquirr. I s this contradiction real o r only ap­
parent? To make sure that we are not losing our time with
� false problem we must name the conditions under which,
In our understanding of the term, a real contradiction arises.
i2 Time and Writing About the Other Time and Writing About the Other 73

Contradction:
i Real or A.pparent obtained, as long a s certain basic rules were followed, nei­
dler vaJidate nor invalidate theories. Validity rests on logical
First, the two activites under examination-field research criteria of consistency, parsimony, elegance, and so forth.
and the communication of findings in writin S" and teach· In fact, to be at all admissible as evidence, data are required
ing-must in fact be part of a discipline c1aimmg a unified by some canons of scientific inquiry (those that rule quanti­
.
eXistence. This was certainly not always the case. After all, taD\.'e approaches and certam structural methods) to come
travelogues and armchair s}ntheses coexisted side by side in bits and pieces, preferably selected at random and
during most of the earl y history of anthropology without cleansed from possible contamination by lived experience
being practically united In the same person or institution.:' and the personal bias such experience might introduce. Such
Even today the degree to which empirical research is em· a view of social scientific inquiry could not possibly admit a
phasized over theoretical and synthetic work varies from contradiction between the temporal conditions of research
country to country and from practitioner to practitioner. But and writing. The only thing that could contradict the p rop­
wherever anthropolo� presently is recognized as an aca· ositions formulated in writmg would be contrary evidence.
demic discipline (albelt often under differem names, or in Such counterevidence, however, would not in principle be
conjunction with qualifiers indicating specialization within different from evidence supp:>rting the explanations that
the field) its representatives insist on the necessity of both would have to be dismissed. It, too, results from the manip­
empirical research and theoretical interpretation of some ulation of data, nOl from contradictions between insights
sor1.4 {-lined in lived experience and those reached by the opera­
Second, for a contradiction to arise between two activi­ bons of a method. If cocvalness were recognized by the p:>s­
ties there must be an issue , a problem with regard to which itivist, he would presumably relegate the problem to psy­
contradictory attitudes or effects can be identified. We found chology or philosophy.
such an issue in the contradictorv uses of Time. But there Communicative and dialogic alternatives to p:>sitivist and
remains a question that will need much further thought and empiricist ethnography have been widely discussed in re­
clarification. £t could be argued that to accept shared Time cent years.� Here I want to concentrate on the argument
in personal fieldwork is a malter of convenience. something that the idea of a contradiction between research and writ­
that goes with the prevalent lore of our discipline. Denying ing might raise a spurious problem. Could it be that tem­
coevalness need not affect in principle the production of penal distancing and denial of coevalness are not faults, but
ethnographic knowledge. Or one might posit that because conditions of possibility of anthropological discourse? An­
prose narrative is the liteTary genre of most anthropological throp:>logists, like other scientists, are expected to produce
writing, i:levices of temporal sequencing and distancing are a discourse of facts and not of fiction. The factum is that
simply inevitable aspects of literary expression. �hich was made or done, something lhal inevitably is "past"
If the first objection holds, our contention that there is �n relation to the acts of recording, interpreting, and writ­
a contradiClory, indeed schizoid and often hypocritical prac­ mg. In view of its obljgations to facticity, how could there be
tice i n need of careful analysis and critique would be seri­ any claims on anthroJX>logicai discourse to heed the de­
ously weakened . Many anthropologist'i insist that there is ?lands of coevalness qua copresence of talk and of that which
nothing to !he mystique of fieldwork. All it does, and it mat­ IS talked about?

ters little how, is to produce data. Data may be used, se­ Because these questions hear on the theory of literary
lected, and manipulated to verify the theories formulated in production in general they may lead us into an area too vast
anthropological discourse in any shape and manner the to be adequately covered in these essays. Yet if we cominue
theoretician sees fit. The conditions under which data were to identify (and denounce) denial of coevalness in anthrc>-
74 Time and Writing About the Other Time and Writing About the Other 75

pologica1 discourse we must at some point ask how such de� X)coll. antluoJX>logical language is of cou �se crowded with
nial can be identified on the level of texts. We should be which in one way or another Signal conceptual­
}eo res sions
able to adduce semantic, syntactic. and stylislK: examples of
allochronism. As will be seen presently. it is not difficult to :ru on of Time and te � poral .r�lations (such as sequenc� ,
inten-'al or penod. on g ms, and development). '" e
point out the workings of such devic�s here and there. duration,
already commented on some of these terms, as well a� C?11
However, to do this in a systematic fashIOn one \�'ould have . .. ,
to submit the oeuvre of a number of reprc:sentatlve anthro­ the fact that a term ?eed �ot � maOlt:estly temporal 10
pologists to linguistic and li �Tary af1:alyslS. � .task of v�st order to serve as a Tlme-dlstanc1I1g devlCe. In fac �, ex pres­
proportions and one for which no smgJe cnlle can claim ions that have a clear temJX>I1l1 referent (a date, a orne span,
adequate competence. We must set�e here for something
�n indication of past, present, or futur�) �re probably less
important, quantitatively as well as qUalitatIVely, than tho�
more modest and more general . 1 Will first ask to what e,,:­ whose temporalizing function derives from tt le �ontext � n
tent anthropologkal discourse act�allr re�lS o� temporah­ which they are used. With regard to our special . mterest m
zation and whether such temporahzauon mevltably results th(' critique of allochronic discourse we would h�ve to con­
, t�e up a ore
in temporal distancing, Follow�ng- rnat, i wIll � centrate, in semiological parlance, on connotation rat�er
specific problem, namely, t�e mhe.r�ntly �utoblograJ:lhlc na­
man denotation. The Time-distancins- effect may, for 10-
ture of much anthl'OpologlcaJ wntmg, Fmally, I Will once . ,
stance, be achieved by the moral-pohtlCal connotatiOns of
more confrom the claims of "taxonomic" discourse with re­ oste'nsibly pure temporal terms, or by the tem(XIral conno-
spect to temporalization . tations of "strictly technical," classificatory �rms. .
Temporalization, being an object of inquiry in these es­
Take a word like savagery'. As a techmcal term III evo­
says, cannot be defined axiomatically at the outset. In my lutionary discourse it denotes a stage in a developmental
understanding, it connotes an activity, a complex praxis , of
sequence. But no degree of no� inalist tec� �tcality can p� rge
encoding Time . Linguistically, temporaliza.tion rere �s to the the teml of its moral, aesthetic, and (XIhllcal connotations.
various means � langua ge has U? e�press t1.me rela �ons, �e­
Cumulatively, these result i':l a semanti� f�nc�ion that is
miotically, it designates the constItuuon of Sign relallons With ('\'erything but purely tech meal. As an lI:,dlcauon of rela­
temporal referents. ideologically, temporalization has �he
tionship between the subject and the object of � nthrC?po­
effect of putting an object of discourse into a cosmological logical discourse, it dearfy expresses temporal dlsta�cm � :
frame such that the temporal relation becomes central and
Savagery is a marker of the past, and if ethnographic eVI­
topical (e.g., over and against spa�al relations). Finally, t�lI�­
dence compels the anthropolog ist to state that savagery �x­
po ralizing, like orner instances of speech, may be a delCtlC islS in contemporary societies tn � n it will ?e loc iled, by dlllt
function. [n that case a temporal "reference" may not be of some son of horizontaJ stratigraphy, III theIr .
� Time, not
identifiable except in the intention and circumstances of a ours.
speech-acL
Kinship, on the surface one of the most innocent de­
scriptive terms one could imagine, is fraught with temtx>ral
connotations. From the early debates on ';dassificatory" kin­
TemporaliUltifm: Mums or End? ship systems to current srudies of its continued importance
in Western society, kinship connoted "primoridal" ties and
A rapid review of the most common temporal operators i n
?rigins, hence the special strength, peTSi� tence, and me�n-
antbTOJX>logical prose could follow custo� ary (but some­ 109 auributed to this type of social relation. Views .
of km­
what questionable) distinctions between leXical, (morpho- ) shIp relations can easily serve to measure degrees of �d­
syntactic, and stylistic levels of discourse. On the level of the .
Vance ment or modernization. By companng the relative
 76 Time and Writing AboUL the Ot her Time and Writing About the Odler 77

imfX>rlance of kinship bonds in different societies or groups discour se and would have no bearing on relationships be-
one can construct developmental, i.e., temporal scales. In
this context of connotative, symbolic function one would also
\tween anthropologists and tJleir "informants" as moral and
polilic
al agen!£.
have to examine the use of metaphors and other tropes.6 Such a VICW would have to be taken if one chooses to
Levi-Strauss' distinction between hot and cold socie ties be­ approac.h a given social-scientific discourse as a self-con-
longs here (see 1966:232 C) as do observations such as the lained Sign system. In that case, temporalization would have
olle where he aligns the synchronic with the diurnal and the to be evaluated strictly with respect to its semiotic function.7
diachronic with the nocturnal (see 1968: 156). One assUl �es that lemp<?ral. �igns. like .all �igns, are consti­
.
"Ve need not go n i to funher detail to make the point tu� as slgntfi�rs. and slgmheds, keeplllg m mind that ac­
that counts: An examination of the temporal lexicon inev­ rordmg to semlouc theory the referent (or object) of a dis­
itably leads critical analysis beyond the lexicon, to higher course is part of a sign relation; it is constituted, so to speak,
levels of discourse and to wider comexts. In the words of inside the discourse. Expressions and comem are but two
Roland BarLhes: "As for Lhe signified of connotation , its aspects of one and the same semiotic system (or semiotic
character is at once general, global and diffuse; it is, if you �ess, depending on which aspect one wishes to stress).
like, a fragment of ideology" ( 19iO:91). Above all, the semioticians tell us, one must a\'oid confusing
One would come to similar conclusions if one were to "content" with the real world. Accordingly, anthropological
examine the syntactic means by ·.vh ich anthropological dis­ discoun.� about the "primitive" or "sa\'age" is not about
course signifies (empor.d aspects and relations. Verbal and peoples 111 a real world, at least not directJy. First and im­
adverbial temporal markers abound in ethnographic ac­ lnediately, it is about the primitive as internal referent of a
counts and theoretical syntheses. As we shall see, studies of d �ourse or a� a sc!entifically constituted object of a disci­
the use of tense soon converge on such conventions as the plme . The articulatIOn of such a semiotic system \\oith the
"ethnographic present' which, although achie\'ed by syntac­ real world (with its " external referent") is a different matter
tic means, is evidently used to stylistic ends. In other words, altogether.
the "meaning" of the ethnographic present cannot be ascer­ W� will ask later whether such a position is tenable. At
.
tained simply from the ways in which the present tense ex­ !hIS POll?-t 1 want [0 follow the semiotic view and pursue its
presses conceptions of Time and temporal relations through unphcauons for the problem of temporalization. In his es­
the construction of sentences. Rather, it must be derived say .about scientific �isc?urse in the soc:ial scier:-ces, A. J.
.
from the intentions and functions of a lOLaI discourse of Greunas contrasts 11lSLOncal discourse With an "Ideological
which sentences are parts. In sum, a critique of allochronic humanistic discourse . " The lauer projects its referent on an
discourse needs to be carried out from top to oottom. so to " a-temporal mythical plane of eternal presence" ( 1976:29).
speak, although it may involve constant checks and reflec­ Anthropology, we may extraJX>late, differs from such an
tions in the other direction . achronic humanism in that its discourse refers to, speaks
There is, for instance. one kind of anthropological dis­ �OO�t, human culture an� society as it exists and develops
�n Time (and space). In thiS sense all anthropology is histor­
course which understands itself as historical. Unless one re­
K�l (but not to be confused with the discourse of a disci­
jects the legitimacy of such an understanding, it would seem
plme called history). Greimas goes on to state:
that, in all fairness, one cannot hold the use of temporal
devices against it. That some or all of these devices not only Now, h.i toric 1 discourse introduces two new pre­
� �

\ indicate, refer lO. or measure Time, but also signify tern- sUPPOs l1>ns In that it. first. replaces
� � the concept of
poral distance between the writer and the object. would then �Chr�mOly With. that
of temporality. At the same
be a problem internal to the production of anthropological time It assumes that the signifier of the text
which is
78 Time and ",rriting About the Other Time and Wriling About the Olher 79

has to realize that his "anthropological discourse" is

:e
in the present has a signified n i the past. Then it
reifies its signified semantically and takes it for a re­ ntica l to French structuralist a thropology He can
n .

ferent external to me discourse. (1976:29)

therefore postulate that
only a structural comparative methoo (c<mlparat!-'mt)
In other words, temporalization is not an incidental is capable of giving historical science a taxonomic
property of historical dis�o�rse.; tet�po:alit)' c�nstitu �es ,such .wdel of hum an societies or, which comes to the
a semiotic system by provldmg Its slgmfiers WIth a stgmfi.ed. same, of providing the methodol�cal loo�s fOT a
According to Greimas, (h,is works "0-rough t�e mec�amsm .
taXonomic enterprise ifaire taxinomlque) which hiS­
of tempural uncoupling, w�,ch �echan.lsm �onslsts ?f stipulat­ tory could e?1p!oy to construct its semiotic objects,
.
ing present statements (en01ues) as l;>emg sItuated '.n th� past, after whICh It would be free to relegate them to the
thus creating a temporal illusion. ]n Its turn, the rel�catJon of past. (1976,30)
the signified is recognized as a procedure producmg the Te­ A truly elegant solution (one that echoes Levi-Strauss'):
ferential illusion (ibid.)." Taxonomy purifies historical discourse from its illusionary uses
]n this sense, Time is used to create an object. The_�n­ of Time. Bul is the ideological machine" (Greimas 1976:31)
seguence of that "posi�iSt I1fusion" is-a na·ive_r.ealism ex­
"

of historical discourse as simple as that? What, apart from

p�ii.he unfounded claim that ''the Ic>:emes and Eh.rases the taxonomic satisfaction of having classed away historical
of historical te.xts really represent lhe objects of the �l? discourse, is accomplished by showing that temporalizing is
ai[d thcirj�teo:eJatio�s�ips ." F,!rthermore, be�� se o� thIS a fonn of signifying? Greimas himself insists that sign rela­
' illUSion leads to relatIvISm: 'The
sort of reahsm the POSItJVlSt tionships should be considered as processes and actlon, not
best historical discourse which has as its 'referent' a given only as systems. Even a strictly "linguistic" approach to so­
society can, through the lexicologica� ioterpretation of it� cia1 scientific discourse cannot ignore its subject, the "pro­
sources, only reproduce the 'catego;lZatIOnS . of the �orld ducer of discourse," a notion which would seem to anchor
proper to that society as they manifest themselves In the a discourse in the real world (even if its referent is merely
way the society covers its universe with lexemes" ( 1976:30) . 8 semiotic). I am not sure, however, that producticm means to
Once again, and in an unsuspected context, we find th.at Greimas more than an "ensemble of mechanisms by which
relativism in anthropological discourse and t�m20ral d�­ language is made into discourse" (l97�: 1 1 ). �n .that case, his
t,?ncing are internally WIlIIec.:teu. M<!'-t:O�er, .It �
l nO\� POS�l­ "producer" would be but a concept strICtly ",1.thm the system
ble to read that connection Jp both directIons: H �toncal d2§­ of sign relations, a mere auxiliary notion permitting to speak
course (of the positivist variety) is incapa?le. of g��ore of process even if the system "proceeds" nowhere in the r� aJ
than refativistic reproductions of the sooeJles a�cultUres world. Be it as it may, to me producti�n sign�ls the necess'91
that are its referents. Conversely, relativistic discour � e (such to go beyond the confines of eSlablished Sign systems; It
as structuralism-functionalism or American culturahsm, or, evokes the labor involved in creating kno'":"ledge and the
for that matter, remote descendants such as "ethnoscience") elements of a discourse capable of conveymg knowledge.
can always be expected to rest, epistemolo�cally, oJ? teI?­ From that perspective, semIOtic analysis of temporalization
poralizations, even if it professes a lack of mterest In hIS- �n do little more than prepare lhe ground for a critique of
tory.
. . . I·11llSlons Its epistemological and political implications . 9
How can temporaI , POSitIvIst · be shaltered'. In-
terestingly enough, Greimas proposes that this can only ,be
achieved by anthropology (see 1976:30). To understand hIm
80 Time and \"'riling About the Other Time and Writing About the Other 81

Time and Tense: The EtJmographic PUSt1/t readers because the stated fact would no longer be subject
to d�recl verification or falsification. It now poses a problem
.
In conversations about the planning of this book, the "eth­ of h,stoTlcal accuracy and would have to be judged by cri­
nographic present" was often broug�t up �s an example for teria which by their nature are indirect. Historical accuraev
the uses of Time in anthropologtcal dIscourse. T? my is a matter of the "critique of sources." Furthermore, histoi­
knowledge, there does not exi�L a well-docume,nted hIstory ical accuracy no longer is a strictly referential criterion. It is
of this literarv convention. If It were to be Wflllen, such a a quality of metastatements about statements and accounts.
study would probably retrace the use of the present t? the Certainly, !.hese few remarks hardly scratch the surface of
very first instances of eOmography. Herodotus gave his ac­ the logical problems of historical inquiry; but they may help
counts of strange peoples � i the present tense . In recent UI understand why the present tense in ethnographic ac­
limes, however, anthropologtSts appear to have �en LTOU­ CXJIUnts is troubling in ways in which the past tense is not.
bled by this venerable tradition.10 The ethnogra phiC present Ano!.her type of objection to the use of the ethno­
certainly should be an issue of debate as soon as t�e ac� of graphic present may identify itself as historical but in fact it
writing ethnography is perceived to h�ve temporal tmphca­ reprimands the ethnographer for ontological reasons. In that
lions. Yet neither the exact problem with the use of the pre­ cue, the statement "the X are matrilineal" is taken to imply

sent tense in ethnographic accounts nor its bearing on tem­ a static view of society, one that is unattentive to the fact
poralization are easy to de�ne. . <?ne need � to take .a that all cultures are constantly changing. What is objected
considerable detour through hngUlsbcs and epistemology If to is not so much that the X may no longer be matrilineal
one wants to get a grip on the proble?1' . by the time !.heir ethnography is published; rather the charge
In simple terms, the ethnogrAphIc 2resent �s ��.. JEac­ is one of projecting a cate�rical view on their society. At
tic�\'ing 3CCOUUI.S-P( QWer cultures and.�letles �e the very least, sa)' these crillCS, the present tense "freeZes" a
resent tense. A custom, a ritual, even an enUre s),stem of lOCiety at the time of observation; at worst, it contains as­
exc ange or a world view are thus predicated on a group IUmptions about the repetitiveness, predictability, and oon­
or tribe, or whatever unit the ethnographer . happens .to terVatism of primitives.
choose, Intradisciplinar), cri,tique of that pracuce .ma)' ann , Both obJe�tior:s, logical-statistical and ontological, are
at tWO implications, one logICal, the other onLOI�gtcal, both easily met by dISC�31mers. T�e ethnographic present may be
.
bearing on the referential validity of statements In the pre­ declared a mere literary deVice, used to aVOId the awkward­
sent tense. ness of the past tense and of constant doubling up in the
In the semence 'The X are matrilineal,' !.he present tense fonn of numeric or temporal qualifiers; that sort of prot>-.
copula art (especially if taken in conjunction wi�h the defi­ Iern can be dealt with once and for all in a methodological
nite article the) rna)' give rise to doubts concernmg the s�­ append�. In this way, intradisciplinary critique of the eth­
tistical validity of the assertion. To be sure, the present IS nographtC present qukkly completes a full circle: something
the proper tense in which to re�rt the res.ul� of counts O.r bo thers us about a literdry practice and we alleviate our
the value of correlations. But WIthout quahfymg or quantI­ doubts by finding out that it is ')ust" a literary practice.
fying modifiers ("most X," or "70. percent o� all X ques­ TI�at will not do for the critique of one of the most
tioned"), the present unduly maglllfies the claim of a. �t.:;tte­ pervasl\'e characteristics of anthl"Opological discourse. As we
ment to general validity. In principle, the sam.e cntlClSm turn to linguistics for illumination we find that matlers are
could of course be raised if the statement were m th� past much �ore cC?mplicated and also more interesting. In the
tense ("The X were matrilineal"). But in t,h�t form .It ap­ preced mg secnons on temporalization in social-scientific dis�
pears less offensive to empirically or staustlcally mmded COurse we came to an important conclusion: Relations be�
82 Time and Writing About the Other Time and Writing About the Other 83

tween a given type of temporal discourse and its refel-ent as (e.g., dates, advel-bial expressions) while others OCCur at a
well as relations between s�ific temporal operators and rate of about one per line of wrillen text. The lauer are the
their signifieds are seldom, If ever, plainly referential. What verb forms. Exactly what kind of verb !Cum is used varies to
temJXlralizing discourse and temporal devices have to say some extenL from language to language but in the texts of
aoout Time and temJX>ral relations must almost always be an�' language one may expect that the distribution of tern·
verb fonns-tense--is not random. Benveniste writ·
ascertained in a context that is wider, and on a level that is poral
higher than the one in which uses of Time can first be iden­ Ulg only, and Weinrich mainly, about the French verb found
tjfied. The term primitive, for instance, is not (only) tem por­ that certain tenses tend to be associated with each other,
aJizing qua lexical item. I t is the key term of a lemporalizing forming " groups," and Lhese groups appear to corresp:md
discourse . I I ro twO fu ndamental categories of speaking/writing: dis·

If the devices of temporalizing discourse have litue ref­ course vs. history (Benveniste), or commentary vs. story
erential value-i.e., say little or nothing alx)Ut real Time or (Weinrich). Dominance of a certain tense in a text signals
real temporal relations-this may appear to weaken the case directly the "Iocutionary attitude" (or the rhetorical intent)
against allochronism in anthropology. Allochronic expres· of the speaker/author.Tense only has indirect reference to
sions might "for all practical purposes" be neglected; practi. Time in the "real world" outside the communicative situa·
cal being what anthropology "really" does by way of manip. tion of the text. Hence, to write ethno�raphy i n the presenL
ulating concepts of Time in setting up relations between Us tense despite the fact that it is descnptive of experiences
and Them. The contrary is the case. If any. there is an in· and observations that lie in the author's past, would be in·
verse relationship between referential function and practi. different because tense does not locate the content of an
cal importance. The power of language to guide practical. account in Time. All the same, the present tense does signal
political action seems to increase as its referential function the �\'riter' � intent (at least in French and related languages)
decreases. to gIVe a dtscOUTlc or commentary on the world. Ethnographic
Does this also hold true for the use of tense? Following �counts in the past tense would prima facie situate a text
a ground.breaking essay by E. Benveniste (l971 [ 1956] :205- 111 the category of hisllJt), or stor)" indicating perhaps a hu·
_

222) and a thorough study by H. Weinrich (1973[ 1964]) we m�nistic rather than scientific intent on the part of the
may retain these crucial findings before we focus again on wnter That, however, is not a satisfying solution. Jt could
:
the problem of the ethnograpl uc present: Neither semami· be eaSily shown that anthropologists of a scientific bent rna)'
cally (regarding their conceptual "content") nor syntactically write ethnography in the past tense while others who pro·
(regarding their function in structuring utterances) can Cess a humanistic·historical orientation Olav write i n the
'
temporal verb forms be adequately understood. Linguistic present.
analvsis must concentrate on their role in constituting com· . . There remains ambiguity even if one accepts the basic
municative situations whose objectified p roducts are texts, dlStlllctions of locutionary attitude discovered by Benveniste
not words or sentences (see \Veinrich 1 973 :25 f). Temporal and vVeinr·ich bccause--as these authors JXlint out�tem·
forms are one of the ways in which a speaker (writer) com· para! verb forms are verb forms. Their temporal signifi.
municates with a hearer (reader); they are signals ex· cance m�sl not be sep�ated from other types of informa·
. n carried
lIO
changed between the participants in complex situations and by, or associated with, verb forms, such as person.
"it would be wrong to reduce [temporal forms] to simple in· The OCCUITence of pronouns and person markers is as obsti·
formations about Time" (Weinrich 1973:60). �te, a term Weinrich borrows from music (ostinato) to des.
If we examine occurrence of temporal forms in given � nate boUl frequency and repetitiveness, as Lhat of verb
texts we discover that certain among them are infrequent orms. Person and pronouns may have important temporal
84 Time and '''''riling A out the Other
b Time and Writing About the Other 85

fu nctions. ldeall). and typically , the first person singular / encompasses the �nres of dis­
should co-occur with tenses markillg the genre dis­ d.ialQgiQJ: A,;-raadresseS'l'Teports to)
course/commentary. e.g., the present. This would reflect the first and secon persons are oistin­
locutionarv attitude or communicative situation where a
speaker conveys directJy and purposefully to a listener whal
he believes to be the case or what he can report as a fact. In
ii��� along the axis of personness. The grammarian's
per S(;Hl" is op}X)
. .
�
nonpartICipant 10 the dia
to the first and second person as
logue. The " 'third person' is not
contrast to this, hislOr}Jsrory would be a 'person'; it is really the verbal form whose function is to
express the non-person" (Benveniste 1971 :198). The connec­
the mode of uuerance that excludes ever} "autobio­ lion between the fir�t �\'o and the third persons is a "cor­
graphical" linguistic form. The historian will never , .
reJauon of personaht},. FIrst and second person are in a
sayje or tu or l1unntelllmt, because he will never "rorrelation of subjectivity" (1971 :201 f):
make use of the Cannal apparatus of discourse [or
"commentary."] which resides primarily in the rela­ What differentiates 'T' from "',IOU" is first of all the
tionship of the personsje:tu. Hence we shall find Del of being, in the case of "1 ,; intffnal to the Stale­
only the forlll1; uf the "third person in a historical
'

"
"lit and extelnal to "tOU", bUl t:xlt:n!al ill a Ulall­
narrative strictly followed , (Ben veniste 1971:206 [) �r that does not suppress the human reality of
dialogue . . , . One could thus define "vou" as the
�ow if this is so, a good deal of anthropological discourse 'subju
ftfM-subjectilJe person, in contrast to the tive
confronts us with a paradox in the form of an anomalous person that "I" represents; and Lhese two "persons"
association of the present tense and the third person : "!.hey an together opposed to the "non-person" form
are (do, have, etc.)" is the obstinate form of ethnographic (- he). (1971:201)
accounts.
There are at least two ways to explain such co-occur­ Then ,:�at does the o�stinate use of the nonperson "third
rence. One is to probe more deeply into the significance of person III ethnogral>hlC �counts whose present tense si ­
g-
verb person and pronouns: the other is to trace the locu­ nals that they ar� dialogICal t �lI us about the relationship
tionary function of the present tense in ethnographic ac­ between the subject and object of anthropological dis­
counts beyond the confines of its immedi ate communicative oourse? If we go along wirn Benveniste we must conclude
situation, revealing its roots in certain fundamental assump­ [hal th<; usc o f the third person marks anthropological dis­
tions regarding the nature of knowledge. COUrse 10 terms of the "correlation of personality" (person
Foc the first argument we draw again on Benveniste's VI. nonperson). The eLhnob rrapher does not address a you
observations contained in his essays on relations of person except, presumabl\', in the situation of fieldwork when he
in the verb and on subjectivity in language. Philosophically, as� questions or 'otherwise participates in the life of his
subjeCts. He need not expl�it1y address his ethnographic
his findings are not new but they are of special interest be­ ac­
cause they are derived from linguistic analyses of the ways COUnl to a you because, as discourse/commentary it is
. already
of speaking (and writing) rather than from abstract specu­ suffiCiently placed in a dialogic situation; ethnog
raphy ad­
lation. Keep in mind that our problem is to understand [he dresses a reader. !he dialog-ic Other (second person,
the
obstinate use of the third person in a genre which, by the other anthropologist, the sClcntific community)
is marked
dominance of the present tense, is clearly marked as dis­ by the present tense; prorwu.: n-! and verb forms in the third per­
course/commentary pronounced by an I, first person sin­ :n mark an Other Ul!tside the d�gue. He (or she or it) is not
gular. A3 it turns out, the p rob le m may not be one of con­ �ken to but POSJted (pre (hcated) as that which contrast.s
tradiction but of confusion. The fundamental communicative With the person ness of the participants in
the dialogue.
86 Time and Writing About the Other Time and Writing About the Other 87

"Removal from !.he dialogic situation" is. in my view. Suc� a language provides glosses on the world as seen. It
another way to describe denial of coe\'alness, a conclusion �eplCts �nd �e- pl'esents �nother culture; it is its re-produc­
'
which, howe\'er, could not be drawn if we were to follow non by hngwsuc (s)'mbobc) means. All this corresponds to a
Benveniste's linguistic theory of subjectivity to the end. To theory of knowledge conslrUed around a visual root meta­
declare, as he does, that the dialogic situation i s a mere pho�. HistorkaJly, anthropology has been linked up with the
,
pragmatic consequence of certain fundamental linguistic tradition of " natural history," with its ethos of detached ob­
oppositions (see 1971 :224, 225) amounts to making both the serva tion and its fervor to make visible the hidden relations
participants and Lhe events of communication epiphenom­ between things. It is in that direction that we will have to
enal to language; personal consciousness and social praxis �l
pro� fur er. To r�monstrate that the ethnographic pres­
are reduced to linguistic phenomena. I agree with Benve­ ent IS an mappr?pn�t� temp<;>ral form is beside the point.
niSle when he rejects the notion that language is only an We accept the lmgtus t s verdict that tense in itself has no
, instrument (see 1971 :223 f) but jI cannot go along with his temporal ref�r<:nce, What must be critically investigated is
,
blatant idealism, which would have us conclude that the op­ the pecuhar IIlc!dence of atemporal modes of expression in
.
position of Self and Other and we preference for a certain a dl�ou rse whKh, on the whole, is dearly temporalizing,
tense in anthropological discourse are but general facLS 01 Puttmg .tt bluntly, we must atlempt to discover the deeper
, ,
language, On we contTary, these facts of language are but conn�(Jons �tween a certam type of political cosmology
.
special instances in which self-assertion, imposition, subju� (defi':lmg relatton� With the Other in temporal terms) and a
galion and other forms of human alienation manifest them� cenam type of epistemology (conceiving of knowledge as rne
selves, Because Benveniste (with de Saussure) is convinced reproduction of an observed world) ,
of the "immaterial nature" of language (1971 :224) he is in-
\ capable of relating a certain discursive practice to political
In My Time, Ethnography and the Automographic Po.st
praxis. His (and Weinrich's) detailed and ingenious analyses
of the workings of tense and person constantly rebound
from the inner walls of language qua system (or of speaking Anthropologic� discourse often exhibits (or hides, which is
qua iOCllt..ionary situation), �e �ame) conRicl betwe�n theol'etical-me�odologi al (on­
�
Much as we can learn from linguistics about we intri­ \,entu;>os and .h,�·ed exrenence. Anthropologtcal wnun may I
, �
cate workings of tense, in the end we must leave the con­ � �Clentlfic ; It IS a,lso mheren�y autobiographic. This IS notf
.
fines of linguistic analysis, especially if we take language se­ limlled to. the triVial obse� r
"allon that ethnogra hiC reports
are somet�es cluttered Mth anecdotes, persona asides, and
riously., The ethnographic present represents a choice of
oth �r devtCes apt to enlIven .
expression which is detennined by an epistemological posi­ an otheno/ise dull prose, In fact,
tion and cannot be derived from, or explained by, linguistic u�Jld recently anthropologists were anxious to keep auto­
rules alone, Anticipating an argument to be developed in blO�,:aphy separate from scientific \\-Tiling, The strictures of
the next chapter, the following hypothesis may be ad­ POSItJV�sm acc:)Unt for this, although they may have been
. �
\-anced: The use of the present tense in anthropological dis­ operatmg mdlrec tly. Somehow the discipline "remembers"
course not only marks a literary genre (ethrwgraph)l) through that it acquired its scientific and academic status by
on the shoulders of a�venturers and using their u-avel-I
climbing ;
the locutionary atlitude of discourse/commentary; it also re­ .
veals a specific cognitive stance toward its object, the 1lumde ogues, which for centunes had been the appropriate liter�
J

commenti (\'Veinrich). lt presupposes the givenness of the ob­ ary genre in whtch l? report knowledge of the Orner
. . In '
ject of anthropology as something to be observed, The present many ways thiS collective memory of a scientifically
doubtful
is a sigtUlI identifying a discourse as an observer's language, past acts as a trauma, blocking serious reAection
tense o n the epis-
88 Time and Writing AboUl the Other Time and Writ ing About t he Olher 89

temological significance of lived experience and its autobio­ Possibilities are founded on facts . . , , One could
graphic expressions. How would such reflection have to II)' that the present is (he one-ness f.einhtilJ of
proceed? dille. But here the cOn<:ept of the present does not
Once more we begin with the supposition that anthro­ eXplain the one-ness of time, rather it is the other
pology is based on ethnography. All anthropological writing 11ft)' round, Similarly, the concept of past does not
expla in facticity . . . rather, that which is past is the
must draw on reports resulting from some sort of co ncrete
presently factual (1977:315).
encounter between individual ethnographers and members

t
of other cultures and societies. The anthropologist who does
not draw on his own experience will use accoun s by others. cionship primarily one that points from he t writer's
Fact and past are not interchangeable, nor is their rela-\
present \
Directly or vicariously, anth ro pological discourse formulates
knowledb re thal is rooted in an author's autobiography. If
this is seen together wiLh Lhe convention that fieldwork
into the object's past. As I understand him, von \'\leizsacker \
.serts the inverse: The object'S present is founded in
writer's past. In mal sense, facticit its If, that cornerSlOne
the
comes first and analysis later, we begin to realize that the
Other as o�ect or conlent of anthropological knowledg
necessarily part or lhe JmoWn �
-eTs
Jecl's past. So we- find ;itiOJl J9 suQiectivity, es
t
of scientific thought, is llJ.llQbiQgraphic ,12 This, incidentally,
is why in anthrQpolo� ec ti vi v can nevei]>t ae6ncil..!..n
� pecial
ly if one does not want to
Time and tem(XIral distance once again linked up with the don the notion of facts,
constitution of the referent of our discourse. Only now tem­ Against the background of these abstract and difficult
pol-alization clearly is an aspect of a praxis. not just a mech­ Ihoughts about Time and fac ticit}' we may now consider
anism in a system of signification. That praxis includes all tanporal distancing n i a more concrete, hermeneutic frame.
the phases of the production of anthro(XI logical knowledge; Hmneneulic signals a self-understanding of anthroJX>logy as
Time is not ju st a device but a necessary condition for that interpretive (rather than nalvely inductJ.ve or rigorously de­
process to occur. In a general way, the same holds true, of ductive) , 1 3 No experience can simply be "used" as naked
course. for any type of l iterary production. The writer of a data. All personal experience is produced under historical
novel uses his or her past experiences as "material" for the conditions. in historical contexts; it must be used with criti­
lite!"3ry p�oject. Howe,,er, the a, nthropologist makes the pe­ cal awareness and with constant attention lO its authoritative
:
cuhar c1aun that certam expe nences or events 10 his p<!st claims. The hermeneutic stance presupposes a degree of
co!ll!itute faCtsi.. nOI iKfum .- What else could be the sense of distancing, an objectification of our experiences, That the

t
invoking ethnographic accounts as "data"?
Our inevitably tem(XII-a1 rela km to the Other as object
of knowledge is by no means a simple one. [n a most basic
anthroJX>logist's experienced Other is necessarily parr of his
pas� may therefore not be an im� iment. but a condition
of an interpretive approach , 14 ThiS is true on several levels.
sense (one that is, I suspect, quite acceptable to the positiv­ Fieldwork, demanding personal presence and involvi ng
ist) temporal distance might be a sort of minimal condition several learning processes, has a certain time-economy. The
for accepting any kind of obsenration as a fact. A frame for
suc� a view was sketched out in a note on "co-apperception
of time" by C. F. von Weizsacker, His reAection is all the
anthroJX>logical rule of thumb---n
may not be its exact measure but it recognizes at least
a certain passage of time is a necessary prerequisite. not just
that
-o e full cycle of seasons­

more interesting because it comes from a natural scientist �n annoying expenditure. More time, often much more time,
an� philosopher venturing to make a contribution to "his­ IS necessary to analyze and interpret experience recorded in
tOrical anthTOJX>logy." Von Weizsacker states : texts. I n sum, doing anthropology needs dislance, temporal
and oflen also spatial.
That which is past is stored in facts, Facts are the At this (XIint. after all the critical remarks we addressed
possibilities of the appearance of that which is past. to positive valuation of "distance" in relativist and stTuctur-
90 Time and \Vriring About the Other Time and WriLing Aoout the Other 9]

alist anthropology, a warning signal should go off. Are we

The context i s Levi-Strauss' assertion that primitives, much
not admitting now, by a detour through hermeneutics, what like ourselves, rely on observation and interpre[ �lion of �at­
we found questionable earlier? Xot at all. I n the first place, ural phenomena: . ''The procedu �e of the .�mencan ]ndla�
the dislance just invoked is essentially temporal. I t is, so to who follows a traIl by means of lmperceptlbl� clues . . . IS
speak, only supplemcmcd by spatial distance. Moving from . . .
no different [rom our procedure when we dTJve a car.
one living context to anomer in the course of anthropolog­ (1966:222) . . .
ical work merely underscores the necessity of objectifying Now, it seems to me, that the qua hfier tmperc�ptl�l£ here
our experiences. However, it is imaginable that an ethnog­ has an intliguing func1:�on. Upon d?ser examm�uon It turns
rapher constantly "on the move" may lose his ability to make out that it cannot possibly be used III a denotative, referen­
worthwhile ethnographic experiences altogether, for the tial manner; an impnuptible due is a logical im �ssibility.
simple reason that the Other would 1I£ver have the time to But perhaps that is �ing too rigorous. I"'.lrerce.puble may
become part of the ellmogntpher's past. Time is a],so needed be a manner of speaklllg and a reader famlhar With the lan­
for the ethnographer to become part of his interlocutor's guage can be expected to correct non-perceptible as scarcely
past. Many anthropologists have noted and reported dra­ pn'Ctptibl�. But that way out is to? easy. I w0!lld argu� �hat
matic changes in the attitudes of their "informants" on sec­ impercepllble here funcuons as an mdex reveahng (or hldiO �)
ond or subsequent visits to the field . Often these are inter­ the fact that not one but twO subjects inhabit the semantIC
preted in psychological or moral terms of increased trust, space of the statement. One is the Indian who " follows a
deepened friendship, or plain getting used to each other. If procedure," the other is the ethnogdpher r to whom the in­
it is true that ethnography, in order to be productive, must dian's clues are imperceptible. Such literary sleight-Qf-hand
be dialogical and therefore to a certain degree recipn)C'dl, camouflages the second su�ect in order to mark the obser­
then we begin to appreciate the epistemologiCal significance vation as objective fact.
of Time. The "imperceptible due" is only one example for the
Secondly, hermeneutic distance is called for by lhe ideal many conventionalized figures and images that pervade eth­
of reflexivity which is always also self-reflexivity. Affilma­ nographic and popular reports on encounters with Others.
Lion of distance is in this case but a way of underlining the When it is said that primitives are stolid this translates as "I
importance of subjectivity in the process of knowledge. never got dose enough to see them excited, enthusiastic, or
Hermeneutic distance is an act, not a fact. It has nothing in perturbed." When we say that "they are born with rhythm"
common with the noLion (such as Uvi-Strauss', see above, we mean "we never saw them grow, practice, learn." And so
chapter 2) that distance be somehow the source of more on and so forth. All statements about others are paired with
�neral, hence more "real" knowledge. 1 t may be useful to the observer's experience. But why would hiding the Self in
mtroduce a convention which distinguishes between riflexion statements about the Other make ethnograph}' more objec­
qua subjective activity cdtTied out by and revealing, the eth­ tive?
nographer, and uJlection, as a sort of objective reflex (like There is another reason for preferring reflexion over
the image in a mirror) which hides the observer by axio­ reflection. ReflexivilJ' asks that we "look back" and Ihe�by
matically eliminating subjec tivity. let our ex riences " me back" to us. Reflexivity is based'
i can think of at least two reasons for a�­ on memOrV, I.e., on the fact lhat the location of experience'
flexive over a reflective stanceJirS!d!!:tempts to eliminag:or in our past is not irreversible. \Ve have the ability to present
hi e- the su �ect in anthropological discourse too often re­ (make present) our past experiences to ourselves. More than
sult in epistemological hYJ?OCrisy. Consider, for instance, the L hat, this reflexive ability enables us to be in the presence of
following innocuous lookmg statement in The Savage Mind. others precisely inasmuch as the Other has become content
92 Time and Writing About the Other Time and Writing About the Other 93

of our eXJ?CTience. This brings us to the conditions of pos­ around with such crude data banks as the Human Relations
sibility of lI11ersubjective knowledge. Somehow we mUJ.t be able Area File and with low-power statistical operations on doubt­
toJftare each other's -fl.-rut in Qrder to_be knowing!) in each .A/M:r's fuJ samp!es.. There is no sign that operationalism will deter­
p'reseut:lr our experience of Time were nonreftexi,'e, uni. roine a �Ignl�cant part of the discipline in the near future.
directional, we would not have anything but tangential If .machrne tlln.e were, a� some point, to replace (not just
85SlSt) human Hme, and If our observations on the role of
knowledge of each other, on the level of interpersonal com·
munication as well as on the collective level of social and Time in constituting the object of our discourse are correct,
political interaction. "Vhen much or most of ant.hro�J.Qgy is we. would expect � nthr ?po.l�g)' to disappear. For the time
indeed-r-erceived as tange �si()e the point, irrelevam) beJJ�g, ethno�aphlc o�Jecu�lty remains bound up with re­
by those whonave been i� objects, thisffiints to a severe fiexlon, an activity which will call for Time as long as it in­
breakdown of "collective reflexIVity"; it is yet anorner s)'mp. voh'es human subjects.
tom of the denial of coevalness. _ . To �y that reflexive distance is necessary to achieve ob­
�eedless to say, these thoughts about reflexive distance j«ufica�on does not mean that the Other, by virtue of being
''''Quid not be universally accepted . Some social scientists want located LIl our past, becomes thinglike, or abstract and gen­
eraJ. O!l .the contrary, an ethnographic past can become the
to measure the reactions of experimental subjects, or the
disu;bution and fr�uency of certain kinds of quantifiable most vl\'ld parr of our present existence. Persons, events,
behavior. They could in princi ple work without temporal puzzleme;nts, and discoveries encountered during fieldwork
distance, as soon as data are fed mto the analytical machine . may cont1��e to occupy our thoughts and fantasies for many
At any rate, the time which even the most operationally years. ThiS IS probably not just because our work in ethnog­
minded social scientist must spend on devising his "instru­ raphy constantly [urns us toward the past; rather it is be­
. cause our past is present in us as a project, hence as our
meJl[�" (e. g questionnaires>. on co! lectin� , c�in,>, and
counLmg responses and then often on . c1eanmg u p ' IllS dala, future. In fact, we would not have a present to look back
is to him a practical nuisance, not an epistemological neces. from at o�r past if it was not for that constant passage of
sity . More sophisticated techniques and faster computers of­ our expenence from p�t (0 fl! ture. P�t ethnography is the
fer the prospea of cutting down on time to the point whel-e present of anthropological dIScourse masmuch as it is on
we can conceive research setups (such as used to determine the wa}' to become its future.
television ratings) where large numbers of subjects are Such ar� the gen.eral outlines of the processes in which
hooked up directly to analytical machinery-the statisti­ anthropologICal conscJ(lUsness emerges. In any concrete case,
.
cian's dream, perhaps, bUl our nighunare_ however, consclOl':sness of the ethnographic past may be as
1n this context one should also examine the temporal deformed and alienated as other types of consciousness.
implications of data storage, a notion that tempts many an­ �ake, for �xaml?le, one: of the most irritatin g of Our profes­
thropologists who seem to be troubled by the burden of ac­ S��al habits which ] will call the possessive pase. There is a
cumulated ethnography. Are our data banks simply more trmal and probably harmless form of thal affliction . Those
sophisticated archives of the kind societies have kept from Who suffer from it show the symptoms of an irrepressible
.
the beginning of historical times? Is the term bank reall}' just � rgc: Lo �call� refer �, Cite, and r�ounL experiences wilh
.
their natIves Sometimes the}' are Just conversational bores;
an innocent metaphor for a depository? 1\ot at aU. Data
banks are banks, not only because things of value are stored they ofte� resemble .former soldiers who are unable to sep­
in them, but because they are institutions which make pos­ arate their present lives from memories of "their war." For
sible the circulation of infonnation.15 ma�y ant �ro po log
isls, �e1dw?rk ob\�iously h�s this �ffect of
.
an mtenSifie d, traumabc penocl. wluch remams an mtellec-
So far, anthropology has done little more than toy
94 Time and Writing About the Other Time and Writing About the Othel· 95

tual and emotional reference poim throughout their lives. cio n on moral integrity. More insidious than individual
Whenever experience becomes so much part of an individ­ tpOra l failure is a collective failure to consider the intellec­
ual' s psychological history that a reflexive distance can no wal effects of scientific conve!1tions � � ich, by censoring r�­
.
longer be generated, neither the person involved nor those flexions on the autobiOgraphic condit Ions of anthropologi­
LO whom he reports his experiences can be sure of the na­ cal knowledge, remove an important part of the knowledge
ture and validity of his accounts and insights. To some ex­ process from the arena of criticism.
tent, such psychologica1 ingestion and appropriation (L.evi­ To make it clear that moral indignation at the sins of
Strauss would call it cannihalism) of the Other may be a nor­ ethnographers is not enough, one only needs to constder
mal and inevitable condition for the production or eLhno­ another aspect of what we called the possessive past. Figures
graphic knowledge. but it may verge on the pathological (as of speech-the use of possessive pronouns, first person sin­
there are indeed links between psychopathology and an ex­ gular or plural, in reports on infOlmams, groups, or tribes-­
aggerated exoticism). are the signs in anthropological discourse of relations that
Such 'aUophagy' is seldom critically analyzed or even ultimately belong to polit.ical economy, not to psychology or
noted because of an institutionalized fear of being accused ethics . After all, dogmatic insistence on fieldwork, personal
of unscientific autobio g-raphic divagation. InteliecLUal dis­ and participative, coincides with the virulent period of col­
honesty may then take Its revenge in the foml of utter COIl­ onization. Participant observation, however, was not canon­
fusion when it comes to taking a stand on such disturbing izrd to promote participation but to improve observation.
cases as Pere Trilles or Carlos Castaneda. I doubt that the Personal presence was required for the collecting and re­
experts on American Indian religion who have all but dis­ rording of data prior to their being de)X>siled and pro­
mantled Castaneda's credibility as an ethnographer realize cessed in Western institutions of learning. ]n structure and
that he probably parodied and exaggerated (with enviable intent these conventions of our discipline have been analo­
commercial success) the litl1e disputed privilege of me pos­ gous to the exploitation of natural resources found in colo­
sessive past which the conventions of anthropological dis­ nized countries. Talk of " geo)X>litics" and the predomi­
course grant to all practitioners.16 How many are the an­ nance of spatial images such as Western "expansion" cloud
thropologists for whom the aura of "empirical research" has the fact that our exploitative relatKms also had temporal as­
sen'ed to legitimize as fieldwork varying periods spent on pects. Resources have been transported from the past of
gelting over culture shock, fighting loneliness and some hu­ their "backward" locations to the present of an industrial,
miliating [ropical illness, coping with the claims of the local capitalist economy. A temporal conception of movement has
expatriate community, and learning about corruption in the always sen,ed to legitimize the colonial enterprise on all le\'­
local bureaucracy-all this before finally getting together els. TemJXlralizations expressed as passage from savagery to
some meager, secondhand infOimation? Or what about those civilization, from peasant to industrial societ}·, have long
who quite simply invented or faked their ethnographies, served an ideology whose ultimate purpose has been to jus­
perhaps because that was the only way in which they could tify the procureme nt of commodities for our markets. Af­
live up to the expectations of degree-granting deparunents rican copper becomes a comm odity only when it is taken
and funding agencies to "deliver" within the time allotted possession of by removing it from its geological context,
for research in the field? One shudders at the thought of placing it into the history of Western commerce and indus­
what time pressure may have done to the vast body of eth­ �rial production. Something analogous happens with "prim­
.
nography produced in the most expansive period of our ItIve art ." 17
discipline. The idea of a commodification of knowledge owes much
The point of these questions is not to cast vague suspi- of its conceptual clarity to Marx. But the basic insight on
96 Time and Writing About the Other Time and Writing About the Other 97

which it rests is by no means a recem one. 'Vhen Georg tant1y it confirms that temporal manipulations are involved
Forster, one of the founders of modern anthropology, once in working out our relationship to the Other.
comemplated lhe hustle and bustle of Amsrerdam- harbor
he was moved to the following meditation:
Politics of Time: The Temporal lVolJ
The ea gerne ss of greed was the origin of mathe­
matics, mechanics, physics, astronomy and geog·
it Taxo7wmic Sheep'S Clothing
raphy. Reason paid back wiLh interest the effort in­
vested in il'i formation. h linked farawa�' continents, We have examined temporalizing in anthropological dis­
brought nations together, accumulated (he products course as it manifests itself in the ethnographic present and
of all the different regions-and all the while its the autobiographic past. �ow we must face once more the
wealth of concepts increased. They circulated faster claims of "timeless" structuralism. After all, in his semiotic
and fa ster and became morc and morc refined. l(l31ysis of social scientific discourse, Greimas promised sal­
New ideas which oouJd not be processed locall)' .tion from the evils of temporalizing in the fonn of afaire
went as raw material to neighborin g countries. tmnomique which is (Uvi-Straussian) anthropology. Any in­
There they were woven into (he mass of already ex­
vocation of anthropology as a savior or dew ex 1MChina should
istent and applied knowledge, and sooner or later
make us suspicious. I t only makes more urgent the task of
the new product of reason returns to the shol'es of
naming how Time is used in defining refations . with the
the AmSleL (1968: (1791] :386)
referent of our discourse,
I f analogies (or homolo gies) between the colonial enter­ In an attempt to understand what exactly taXonomy
prise and anthrofX>logy hold, one would have to admit that does we may begin by considerin g the following proPOSI­
ethnography, lOO, may become a commodity. It s commodi­ lion: Whether taxonomy is carried out i n the structuralist
fication would require a similar temporal passage of data vein or in more modest varieties (such as in ethnoscience
(the goods) from their historical context in societies con­ and various strucrural approaches to folklore) taxonomic
sidered primiti\'e to me present of '''estern science, In the description always consists of rewriting our ethnographic
idiom of our economic philosophies, anthropology is an "in­ DOtes or texts. At the very least (and leaving asKle its tech­
dustry" with the peculiar trait that anthropologists are both nical understanding propaWdted by N. Chomsky) the proj­
workers who produce commodities, and entrepreneurs who ect of rewriting rests on (\\.'0 presuppositions, one being a
market them, albeit in most cases at the modest profit of presumption of fact, the other amounting to a kind of judg­
academic salaries. II! mem. The presumption of fact holds that there is a text to
This is a disquieting conclusion indeed, one that could be rewnUen. This is ultimately an ontological statement, one
hardly be expected from a review of some of the literary that anchors the taxonomic enterprise in a real world of
conventions of anthropologicaJ discourse. I f it is correct it texts and writers. Even the most abstract logico-mathemati­
would mean that precisely the autobiographic origins of the cal reduction of an ethnographic text i s still writing. It re­
ethnographer's possessi\'e past link his praxis to the political mains within the confines of discourse qua activity carried
economy of \'\lestern domination and exploitation. That link out by a subject. Being produced by a subject (and granting
is by no means just one of moral complicity, easily dis­ that "production" often is noming but reproduction of cog­
avowed by repenting on the ways of our colonialisl prede­ nitive templates and literary conventions) taxonomic dis­
cessors. The connection is ideological and even epistemo­ COurse stays linked with other forms of discursive expres­
logical; it regards conceptions of the nature of sion. Taxonomic description is therefore not a revolutionary
amhrofKllogical knowledge, not just of its use. Most impor- alternative to other forms of anthropological discourse. It is
98 Time and Writing About the Other Time and Writing About the Other 99

but a taxon, a class of writings in a taxonom y. a view we IS over when the solitary player, the anthropolobrist, has ex­
encountered earlier as Levi·Strauss' way of "reconciling" an­ hausted the moves pennitted by the rules. Now one may
thropology and history. invoke (following Levi-Strauss' example) the an alogy of the
However there is, secondly. a suggestion of judgment ga me in ordel· to characterize the playfulness of taXonomic
in the idea of re,niting-as i f taxonomic description were a escrip tion . But one should not forget that behind the mask
to make up for deficiencies in the original text, it being per­ of the modest, candid, and tentative lrricoleur hides a plaver
.
haps too confused, too cryptic, too exotic or simply tOO fong . � _' M �
to surrender its mean ing upon simple inspection. ttl this Win�ing th� laxonomic game consists of demonstrating
respect, "scientific" slTucmralism is undoubtedl}' akin to syoch rol1lc relal10ns of order beneath the flux and confu­
hermeneutic and historical philology which it wishes to SUT­ sion of historical events an d the expressions of personal ex­
pass and replace. Both are r>ervaded by an urge to restore, perience. The temporally contingent is made to reveal Ull­
to provide a better reading of, the original lex£. It makes derlying logical necessity. The Now and Then is absorbed
little difference whether the aim is the philologist's UtjOT'f1I, by the Always of the rules of the game. And one must never
or Lhe structuralist's form tout com·l, both traditions are forget thaL stmcluralist discourse accomplishing these feats
shaped by an ethos developed in the course of searching for is not just � discourse which h�s t�onomies as its referent.
the "authentic" meaning of the sacred texts of our tradi­ It defines Itself as a taxonomIC Jcare, Far from merely re­
tion.19 Levi-Strauss obviously sensed this. Because he wanted flecting relations of order. it creates them. The founding
to dissociate himself at all cost from the enterprise of a his­ classificatory act, the first binary opposition (or in Bateson's
torical hermeneutic he took his famous escape when he pro­ famous terms, the difference that makes the difference) is
nounced that anthropologicaJ discourse is but a myth upon the one between the native text and the taxonomic dis­
a myth ( 1 969b:6), He can feel free of the burden of having course about that text. Two steps follow: one is to declare
to justify his own rewriting of myth as a Uudgmental) act of the native text itself taxonomic (by opposing its constituent
liberating the original from its existence in obscurity. Of classificatory relationships to real relations, culture vs. na­
course, he also leaves unanswered the question why antlno­ ture); the other is to posit the taxonomic, speak scientific,
pology needs to write uuer its ethnographic texts at all. If nature of anthropoloSlcal discourse as being opposed to the
the hermeneutic Slance is to extract meaning from a text, humanistic, speak hermeneutic-historical, approach.
structuralist construction of a myth upon a myth appears to The outcome of all this is not at all a structural ar­
work by imposUion, Models that map basic and derived rela­ ��g�ment of opposition s suspended in an equilibrium, nor
tionsh,ips are laid u pon the native text. Where the herme­ IS It Just a classificatory schema innocently construed in a
neutic approach envisages its task as work, structuralism sees pme of imposing arbitrary models on reality. ,""hat we gel
.
is a hrerarch)' made up of relationships of order which are
it as play, as a game whose mles are the elegance and par­
simony displayed in "matching" text and mooel. sequential and irreversible; hence the seriousness of the tax­
But this is only pan of the story. Taxonomic rewriting onomic game, I f we lake Levi-Strauss (and for that matter,
never is just a purely contemplative, aesthetic g-ame of re­ the cognitive anthropologists) seriously we find that their
ducing mess>, data to elegant models. It is a drawn-out, se­ theory o� sc�ence is out to m i �rate anthro po lo � ' itself al
rious game in the course of which pieces of ethnography, �me polnl 111 the sequence of 'transformations' to be de­
isolated and displaced from their historical context, are used I"Ived from certain basic oppositions such as nature and cul­
ture, fonn and coment, sign and realit\'. and so forth. A
in a series of moves and countermoves, following certain
way to visualize this in a taxonomic idiom would be figure
basic rules (those of binary op(X)sition. for example) until a
poi n t is reached where the pIeces faU into place. The game 3. 1 .
100 Time and Writing About the Other Time and Writing About the Other 101

aecause the arrangement is hierarchical, movement within

dlc paralJeVopposed strings is aHvays either ascent or de­
,cen t. This would seemingly not affect relations of oPlXlsi­
don. But that is not really the case as soon as one takes into
account the ontological assumptions of taxonomic ap­
�ches in anthropology. The "oppositions" AB. CD, £F (and
HG, for that matter) are expressive of evolutionary devel­
opment; they are directional, in fact one-way relations: Na­
ture precedes Culture (at least in the minimal sense that it
was there before people existed); ethnography precedes
emnology (according to the canons of anthropological
praxis); and the humanities precede the sciences (in the his­
lOry of Western thought). Again, it matters little that any of
those assumptions might be debated as soon as a context is
real MIa.on.
specified. The point is that a taxonomk: conception of them
taxonomic lelMMicatoryl
rBlation,
cannot but present them in chains and, in the words of M.
dilcon�, $!l4tial continUOUI, Il!Imf>Orel Serres, none of these chains "can be thought without time"
�t\M.
(1977:9l).:lO The logic of these relationships of op � sition
,s, lA'
and inclusion generates the rules of the game wl uch is a
""igure 3 . 1 : The place of anthropology in a taxonomy of relations
Joire taxitwmique. If that game is, according to Greimas and
Levi-Strauss, the "constitution of the semiotic object" then i t
Undoubtedly this is not Lhe only way to draw the dia­
is clear that such constitution is arrived a t in a sequence of
gram ; another fOl,n could include different kinds of science
temporally ordered steps. Viewed from that angle, ta.xo­
or humanities, kinds of native texts, and even different v.<lYS
nomic anthropolog), is indistinguishable from approaches it
to set up the oppositions on the lowest level. But even i n j"LS
dismisses as hIStOrIcal and subjective .
fragmentary form it illustrates the crucial point; because the
. Following Serres (who in turn follows mathematical no­
nodes are arranged hierarchically, U1C relationships thal
tIOns regard ing "relations 'of order'") we can now more ac­
constiLUte taxonomic discourse are sequential and can also
curately characterize the nature of relations which taxo­
be presented as a string of points (steps, stages) on a line or
nomic discourse attempts to establish between the subject
arrow: .
and object of its discourse.
The relationships whose concatenation amounts to a
x x x x x x x x x �onomy of anthropological knowledge are nonrejlexive.
t\one of the members in the chain that makes up the struc­
A B C D E F G H
�re represented in our diagram can precede or succeed
or as two strings emanating from an opposition : Itself; it is aiwa>'s predecessor or successor of another mem­
ber in the chain. For example, a discourse having posited
H/G tha� the lexicon for a certain cognitive domain consists of
E F arbJtr �ry labels for things, and that the object of taxonomic
.
C 0 anal}'s�s IS the ordered system of relationships between La­
A B �Is, will not go back on itself and reexamine the assumption
 Time and Writing About the Other [03
102 Time and Writing About the Other

. temporal s�quences is
that the imposition .of lab�ls is indeed arbitrary. Similarly, confuses logical sequences ....ith .
es o�eself lOl0 aceeptmg .the un­
th � structural an�yslS of pieces of ethnography (myths, kin. del'WilOUS unless one delud . . tJ.1e
discourse IS outside
ship systems) will proceed by reducing them to model s. � ble position that taxonomic
demonstrable fact .that dlS­
There it will either come to rest, or it will seek further re� aim of human action. The .
n can be descrlbed !n purely
finemems. or more encompassing models, until it comes to Urse qua spatiotemporal actio
: .t.a"onomic terms in no way justifies the be le ! � tha� It
rest. But it will not, at the same time, question the method
it employs. Science, as T. S. Kuhn and many others seem to
�
&(JfISists of logical relations. A theory that holds thiS IS gudty
of method and substanc e, me � s �nd
tell us, cannot be done critically, that is, reflexively when and of the same confusion hlsto ncal
d to be the fallacy of
whik it is being done. Clitique needs the extraordinary time end5 which Greimas foun
of crisis--extraordinary meaning outside the established re­ � urse unredeemed by tax?nomy (l�76 :30).
'\1arx. whom
strUCturalists now like to
lationshi ps of order. claim as their ances tor, saw and
I � plied in the chainlike arrangement is also that rela­ avoided the fallacy when he critic ized Hege l a f! Feuer­
d
.
uonshlps between any two members cannot be symmetrical. If bach: To be able to distiU from
histo ry t e � �
" oglc" of t�e
wIl!
.4. precedes 8, B cannot precede A . One might object that this to find the "law" [hat the domm atmg class
�ess or class does not
neglects the possibility that, within the two parallel chains, mevitably be overthrown by the oppressed
�
movement may e either ascending or descending. For in­ amolve the analyst (as spokesman for
"history") � rom the
nary proJects: To
stance, ethnological theory may, depending on circum­ necessity �o. translate I.ogic iot? re�<?lutio .
take a poslUon on "logICal relatJons IS alwa
ys also a pohucal
� tances, precede as well as succeed ethnography. Or events
m nature such as ecologicaJ and demographIC changes rna.... act.
the �olf
precede as well as succeed cultural change. Nevertheless, th� Which finally brings us to the moment when
rule demands that no two members of the chain can pre­ enters the story. In La Fontaine's fable e come �
s to a I1ver
lmg the wate r. But
cede and succeed each other at the same time. Therefore it to drink and accuses the lamb of troub
s' inte.r pr�­
is ruled out that taxonomic discourse could ascend and de­ the lamb is positioned downstr��m. In M. . Serre .
SCientist, In
scend the relations of order in the same act. This does not tation of the "game of the wolf, the wolf IS the
, much
mean that in taxonomic anthropology ethnography should our case the taxonomic anthropologist. In the story
n,?t � "mixed ': with ethnology, or autobiography not with as in our diagram. he is plac: ed in a chain of relati ons of

&; �
lentI c analYSIS, or structural anaJ)'sis not with history. Any order in such a way that he IS upstr eam, up th� temp oral
gtven Instance of taxonomK: discourse may contain jUXLa­ slope. Yet his posture is to accuse the lam , that �
IS, to. ques·
he
positions of all of those "opposed" elements. But the rule of tion the "lamb"-the primitive or the naUve text .whlch
takes as his "problem"-as if the two were engaged 10
nonsymmetry does carry an injunction against reciprocal and a game
.
dialectical conce tions,
r l>? th of �hi�h w�:)llid presuppose that allowing moves in b?th dir�uon�. ,!e acts .as If there were
two members 0 the cham CoeXist m Time. a give and take; as If what IS va lid m the tlme o the lamb f
Finally, the chain of relationships of order implies that (there and then) could be made visible in the ume of �e
if A precedes B and B precedes C then A precedes C. In wolf (here and now). As it is the avo� aim of taxonomiC
other words, the entire structure is transitive. I f cuilUre mas­ discourse to establish relations that are always ana every­
te !'5 nature, and if the anthropologists master culture, then where valid, the story must end with the wolf aDso�5mg hi�­
SCIence, through anthropology, masters nature. Perhaps it is torical time into his time-he will eat the lamb. ThiS fable IS
the other way round; but never both at the same time OT, an "operational definition of hypocrisy" (Serres 1977:94)
in analogy to the game, never in the same move. because the wolf appears placed in the mid le of the � am. �
To object that such an interpretation of relations of OT- The anthropologist proclaim s himself to be m the service of
104 Time and '''''dting About the Other

science, to be nothing but an executor of the laws of nature

or reason. He uses the ta.xonomK: cover to hide his relent_
less appetite for the Time of the Other, a Time to be in­
gested and transformed into his own: "He has taken the
place of the wolf, his true place. Western man is the wolf of
science' (Serres 1977:104).
What we tak.e the fable to illustrate is an ideology of re­
lations, a game that defines its own rules. A crucial strategy
in this game is to place the players on a temporal slope.
Thal the time of the lamb is not the time of the wolf is
postulated, not demonstrated. iAn evolutionary view of re­
lations between Us and the Other is the point of departure,
not the result of anthropology. A taxonomic approach in­
serts itself effortlessly into that perspective. Its ostensibly
achronic stance turns out to be a flagrant example of allo­
I chronic discourse.
 hapter Four I The Other
d the Eye: Time
d the Rhetoric of Vision

[the thoughts rf man] art everyme a represenl<!­

or appeilranc� of!O,,� quality, or oliu,," rucid�lf � a
without w, which ;5 clJmmonly roOtd ali o�ect.
ThoJ1lill Hob!H.s 1
mojrn difecl of rrwtmalism up to this da'j' .. .. mu
..

10 Cl}7lcttvt the object. Ttoiil'l. SfflSUOUSlltsJ, only in the

ofan object ofCOtlUmploljOtI, not as sensuous-hmnan
.w" praru, IWt sllbjectil.�I) .
KaTl Man-1

GENERAnONS OF A.'1THROPOLOGY students setting

OUt to do their first fieldwork have received, and followed,
.h'ice to learn the language, if p>ssible before beginning
with research , and to start their inquiries on the spot by
IIlapping seulemenrs, countin households, and drawmg up
�
�nealogies of the inhabitants . This is sensible advice. Much
tune is saved if one comes to the field prepared linguisti­
cally. M aps, censuses, and kinship charts are the quickest
way to get a grip on the shape and composition of a small
community. I f the society studied keeps records which can
be used for these projects, all, the better. �'o on"e expects this
IOrt of work to be wimout snags and difficulties; but neither
have most anthropologists considered the possibility that
�ch simple and sensible methods or techniques might be
bIased toward a certain theory of knowledge whose claims
to validity are not beyond questioning.
 106 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 107

Method and Vision possibility that visual ism may be a symptom of

�doxical
e.
ihe denaturation of visual e�perienc . .
These conventional prescriptions contain at least three un. Visualism s may take different dlr�u0':ls-LO""'3n:t the
derlying assumptions deserving critical attention : ID3thematical.geometric or toward the pJClOnal.a� s�hetlc. In
First, they recommend the native language as a tool, as tbe1atler case, its idolau'ous tendency IS ofl�n ml!!&�te� by
� means to extract information. Somehow, w-hat one seeks tbeyrec�l to approachculture nOLas a pLClure.u...b t as a
IS thought to exist separately from language and the activit\' 1iict. certainly there has been progress in anthropology from
of speaking. To be sure, amhropologists have, before an(1 _re counting and mapping of cullUral traits toward ac·
after Whorf, maintained that rhe language of a people of. counts of cullUre whtch are allentive to co� text. symbols,
fers clues, perhaps even dle key, to its culture. In one re­ and semantics. Still, sooner or later on� �11l come upon
spect, however, the views of those who saw in the native syntheses of knowledge whose or�anlzmg me!aF.hor�,
lao.gt.
lagc a mere veh�le of research, and orners. who pro­
. ritodels, and schemes are thoroughly Visual and spaua . �hl s
clalT
r�ed It the depoSitory of culture, converged: neither iI obvious in such tenns as trait, pattern, configu �
auon,
,
considered senously that the " usefulness" of the native lan­ Itrocture, model, cognitive map; it is 'presupposed . III no·
�age might rest on the fact that it draws the researcher dons such as system, integration. orgamzation, funcuon. re­
m(O a communicative praxis as a result of which metaphors lation, network, exchange, transaction, and � any others
su.ch as tool, vehicle, or recepto.cle might be difficult to main. which cannot be purified from reference LO bcx iles, parts of
tam. All these images encourdge a manipulative use of Ian· bodies ensemble s, machine s, and points in space; in short,
guage derived from visual and spatial conceptuali7..ations to obj�ts of knowledg e whose primary o:'o?e of perce �t�on
whose long history will occupy us throughout tllis chapter . is visual. spatial, ?r tangible. Ther�for e It IS not su �pnslllg
SeC?nd, the recommendations to use maps, charts. and that anthropologISts of all persuasIons have been III over·
tables SignalS conviCtions deeplY ingrained in an empirical whelming agreement that their knowledge is based upon,
scien �fic tradition. Ultimately 'they rest on a corpuscular: and validated by, obsen.,'(ltion.
atomiC theory of knowledge and information.4 Such a the· Third, even the most simple and seemingly common·
ory in turn encourages quantification and diagrammatic lensical recommendations of the kind which served as a
representation so that the ability to "visualize" a culture or point of departure for these remarks can'y notions of speed.
society almost becomes synonymous for understanding it. I or expeditiousness of procedure. in other words, �ey are
shall call this tendency uisuaJism and because visualism will aimed at instituting a time·economy for anLhrojX)loglcal. re·
play a .role in our argument comparable to that of denial of learch. :'\'ot only is the total time for fieldwork con\,enlJon·
coevalness or temporalization, some sort of descriptive ally fixed, it is also thought (and often said) that the field·
\ statement is in order. The term is to connote a cultural worker "saves time" by learning the language beforehand;
ideological bias toward vis�on as the "noblest s� ns� " and to� that he "gains time" through the use of techniques and d�.
.
ward geometry qua graphlC·spauaJ concep tualIzation as the vices. Adv ice rna\' take a moral twist, when the student IS
most "exact" way of communicating knowledge. ·Cndoubt· told to make g� use of time by never letting the sun set
edly, the social sciences inherited that bias from rdtionalisl on untyped field notes. in all this i� is the researcher's tj�
thought (based on Descartes' distinction of res cof!:ilans and which is thought to affect the roducllon of kno�ledge. ThIS
l
res extensa) and from the empiricists (see Hobbes' fascination observation is not invalidate by recommendations to take
with geometry). However, deeper and more remote sources note of native ideas of Time, ei�er as ex li�itly formulal�,
.
will be considered in the sections that follow, as well as the or as inferred from the orgamzallon 0r ntual and pracll·
108 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 109

, or facilitated, a discourse whose visual-spa­

cal activilies. As an object of knowledge, the Time of the:
. brOught about
, nstruc !S ,,:lways seem .to
natives will be processed by the visual spOl tial tools an.j __ concepts, models : ann 'ype<o
of tempo ral conttnUity and CoeXIS­
methods invoked earlier, _k against the gram
r and the Known .
Anthropologists who have gone through the experi. .ace between the Knowe
�� ce of field research, and others who are capable of imago
�nmg �hat happe !ls to a slra�ger emering a society with the
mtentIOn of 1e< l rnmg somethmg about it, are likely to be PUt Sft'P and Memory: Topoi of Discourse
,
off �Y tillS �count. �Y did extrapolations from simple and
senSIble advIce regardmg method result in a caricature of In the Art of Memory, Frances Yates gives an account of the
with visual
ethnography? �ecause these recommendations not only ex­ dl:plh and complexity of \",Iestern preoccupation
aggerale (the VISual), they omit dimensions of experience. .xI spatial root-metaphors of knowledge. Her findings �m
, � With
No prOVISIon seems to be made for the beal of drums or the .. be supported by histor.ians of �ience who concu
rn SCienc e denve s from an earher art
blaring of bar music mal keep you awake at night; none for die thesis that Weste
ally (i.e., with regard to the seque nce
the strange taste and texture of food. or the smells and the "f"Mwric, chronologic
atically
stench. �ow does met� deal with the hours of waiting, Wilh G developments in our tradition), as well as system
scienti fic activity). Paul Feyer abend
maladrollness and ganes due to confusion or bad liming? (regarding the nature of
the es­
?"There .does It. put the frustrations caused by diffidence and pes as far as declaring that propag anda belong s to
for­
leJl(e of science, a view also held, but less outrag eously
mtra!1� l�nce, where th� joys of purposeless chatter and
J?Ma­
convIviality? Often all thIS IS written off as the "human side" aulated, by T. S. Kuhn in his theory of scientific
as mere rheton c:-a
�f our scientific activity: Method is expected to yield objec­ cigmS.6 Far from dismissing science
tt\'� kn.owledge by filtermg out experiential "noise" thought IIopeless attempt in view of ilS practical and techno loglc �1
t at all .sc�­
to Impm ge on the quality of information. But what makes a lriumphs--this position states the obvious fact �
dISCI­
(reported) sight mor� obj ective than a (reported) sound, ences, includin� the most abstract and mathemauzed
smell, or taste? Our bl?S for one and against the other is a plines, are SOCial endeavors which must be carried out
matter of culturaJ chOICe rather than universal validity. 11 through the channels and means, and according to the rules,
�erives from � scientific tradition which was firmly estab­ of communication available to a community of practitioners
lIshed by the lJ�e:: J: Locke fornlUlated lll� �Ill piricist canotl� and to the:: wider societ), of which they are a part.
of ,?�ern s� lal SCience, ''The perception of the mind," he As such, the observation that all science rests on rheto­
malll tal!1� . IS "most aptly explained by words relating to ric is a very general one and would not add much to o�r
.
the SIght ( 1964 [ 1 689J:227), Among all the tenets of empi­ understanding unless it is possible to show that the rhetonc
nCism tius one seems to have been the most tenacious . invoked here is a specific product of our ""'estern tradition
as well as the principal channel through which sciences ar
e
Even !f detached obsen:ation is regarded positively as a .
"�eeding back" into Western culture. Yates finds that tra h­
�
�eans to hft oneself above lhe immediacy of Heeling sounds.
mef�able odors, confused emotions, and the flow of Time bon jn the "art of memory." It began as a set of prescnp­
passmg, the anthropologist so inclined should �ve, at the tions . rules, and techniques developed by Greek .and Roman
v�ry least, some thought to the cultural determmedness of rhetoricians to enable the ancient orator, who spoke without
hiS quest fOT distance. Evidently. such critical reflection will a manuscript, to recall the points and arguments of a speech.

have a beanng on arguments regarding anthropology's uses She describes in detail several sources in the Latin tradition
. ! l966 :ch. I) whose common element was a method of join­
of Time and what I termed it'" ci�nial of coeval ness. For iT
remains to be shown what sort of theory of knowledge Ing the principal parts of a speech to objects i n various places
 1 10 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 1 11

i� a real or imagined bui l ding. While he delivers his 0 parts of speeches. and later
.- fu1 attempts to represent the
'
•
lion, the speaker's mind i� s� pposed l walk through ts of speech and the structures of proJX>silions and
? �� �p;r
rooms or parts of the bUlldmg, stoppmg to consider .-1f'tI en t5 through "signs."
t
things omo which he pre,,;ously (and habitually) confe he --
Lh� status of "places" of memory (hence the Greek term
rred f urthermore, the mles of the art of memory did not
/I).. ,..Jy prescribe visualization. Inasmuch as they s(X'ke of
P OI). ments between "places" of mem� ry they cal,led f�r SPa.­
Such are, in the briefest possible terms, the outline
s of of consciousne�s. The rhetor s art consls�ed 111 hiS
:;=ti(RI. :.r
..,.aty l0 resent to himself th� temporal flux of hve slJC7ech
a conceptian of rhe�ric which was to have conseque
, nces
reach mg far beyond Us apparently simple, mnemotech ? u� ents. ThIS., I
, nic • a spari topography of pom.LS . an arg
functio n. For the theory of "places" did not merelv � entitles us to trace the spatlahzaoon of Time, of which
aid
memory and recall; as it was developed in more and some examples in earlier chapters. to the rules of an
more �
�omplex ways during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, .
.amt art of memory In Bossuet's historical method. the
It served to define th� nature of memory. �d: through
it, �
n of epochs ("places to stop and loo aro�nd") is l!n­
(
the nat�re o any kmd of knowledge which IS communi­
e· btedly identifiable as a theory of to 1 deVIsed to ve
,
cated with an mtent to con\,Inc e, to win over an audience. foundations to his discourse, i,e. , � s oration on is­
�
.Most teachers of rhetoric also prescribed techniques .,-y. The same holds for Enlightenment philosophical his­
b�s�d on sound �nd he�i�g (such as rote learning by rep-­ .., . which rided itself in being topical and not merely
r
etltlon and phomc association). Nevertheless, there seems to ttaronologica . Which leads us to rbe doorstep of mooern
have develo ped very early a consensus that the higher and ....ropology: Culture traits and cycles, I?atterns and con·
mo.r� exclusive art of memory was tied, by natural gift and J.urallOns, national character and evolutIonary stages, but
trammg. to an abi lity to visuali7£ the points of a speech,
a .&, "classical monographs," compel us to attach our argu·
poem, or any other text destined for rhetorical use. In the .ellIS to the Kwakiutl, Trobriands, Nuer, or Ndernbu. They
fonns i� which t�e}' are reported, these theories were by no an: so many topoi, anchorings in real or mental space. of
means Just rudunentary pre philosophical epistemologies. ..thropological discourse.7
.
The classICal rules of the art of memory as summarized by Finally, lhe art of memory not only employed "places,"
Yates are based on numerous philosophical assumptions, Le. , a topogrdphy, but also an architecture of memory, The
none of them simple. orator's lOpoi were to be found in a house, preferably a
?
First, t e visualized objects (such as statues or parts of
. large, pubric building, [n the Renaissance this architectural
� �
l em, urrushmgs, and elements of architecture) were not conception led to actual construction of "theaters" of mem·
slOlple Images of the points to be memorized. They were OI}'lknowledge (see Yates 1966:chs. 6 and 7). Vast projects
assumed to work best when they were somehow "striking" to systematize knowledge were also based on astrolOgKal
and when the co � nection between image and JX>int of an tyrnbols and charts. The space of rhetoric w�s ultimately
.
oration was an ar b rtrary one, decreed by the orator. "Places" .
co.rmo-wgiaJ and this may pomt to �ome of the hlstonca� roots
were � ought of as products of the art of memory, not as of those uses of Space and Time .
In anthropology which we
actual lma'ges of the content of a speech. What set the skill· qualified earlier as a "poLitical cosmology." As images, places,
ful �rato: apa:t from other mortals was precisely his ability and spaces lurn from mnemotechnic aids into topoi they
to. vlsuahze Without actually picturing the contents of his become that which a discourse is about. \Vhen modern an­
. �
mmd; the use of illustrative p ctures and images belonged �
!hropology began to construct its Other n te�m � of topoi
,
to delIvery, not to the foundation of rhetoric. This is proIr unpfying distance, difference, and oppoSitIOn, u.s mtent was
ably where we have to seek the roots of increasingly suc- abOve all, bUL at least also, to construct ordered Space and
1 12 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 1 13

,;on of esoteric groups. Perhaps Yates' fascination

with her·
Time--a cos?1os-for Western �iet>' to i�habil, rather than gets too close to a
understandmg olher culnlres, Its ostensible vocation. .-oc-magic origins of Western science
conspiracy theory of intellectual history; but her finding s
Among the most suggestive lessons to be learned front
deep common roots of social and religious
Y,ales' The Art oj Memory is the evidence that links the pre. �t W the very
hlst<;>ry 0.£ '",'estern science to an artfully cultivated tendenc\" Jed3fian isrn. Both claim to possess special and exclusive
to visualize the contents of consciousness, Of equal impor. knOWledge conceived as manipulation of an apparatus of
tance are some of the eff�ts which an image-theor}> of \'ifiUaI.spatial symbols removed from ordinary language and
�no�ledge may have on social practJ.ce. , Stressing visualiza. (DI1lIIl unication. a
tlon m tenns of arbitrarily chosen "reminders" makes memo Many other developments had to occur before amhro­
ory an " art" and removes the foundations of rhetoric [rom � and similar disciplines staked out their exclusive ter­
profes-.
the philosophical problematic of an accurate account of ritDnes, devised technical languages, and gained
Iional recognition. These developments may be underst ood
reality. The main concern is with rhetorical effectiveness and
success in convincing an audience, not with abstract demo lXiologically and we can generalize them as instances of
c;mstrarion of "truth." This prepares the nominalist tradition functional specialization and role differentiation within
In Western thought out of which empiricism was to grow. JlrSer institutions and social systems. Only, such generali·
. �o recognize this may help us to get away from at­ JItIOns are often too abstract and at the same time naive. In
tnbutmg the development of the Western scientific mind cheir fixation on goal·oriented behavior and adaptive func·
mainly t? lit�racy or, at any rate, to our kind of literac\,. donaIity they Lend to overlook the expressive, playful origins
The arblU-anne� of t�e memory-images was not the same of social forms and institutions. Deep historical connections
as that of phonetic scnpt. The symbols used in writing- were, such as those between the modern sciences and the ancient
o�ce they had been agreed upon, constrained in therr com­ art of memory provide us with the means to correct and
. CXIUJ1terbalance sociologi:a1 utilitarianism or functionalism in
bmatlons and se uence by the sounds of the spoken lan­
. q , the history of science. I am convinced, and the following
gua�. The visual Images and topoi of the art of memory
�rovlded much fr�edom of cO':lbination and invention, pre­ IeCtion will offer further reasons, that some very important
cls�ly h,ecause their maOl. l?ulauon was thought of as an art aspects of anthroJX>logica1 discourse must be understood as
qUite different from the Simple sktll . of readmg and writing. dte continuation of a long tradition of rhetoric with a pe.
Y�tes describes in her account successful systems of what culiar cosmological bent. Conceiving outlandish images and
moving in strange space, mostly imaginary, was a preoccu·
�Ight be called combinatOrial mnemonics, up to the inven­
pelion of savants long before actual encounter with exotic
?on of calculus by Leibniz. Modern mathematics thus has
Its roots, at least some of them, in the same tradition of people and travel to foreign pans, and for reasons to which
visual�ed, spatialized, and ultimately cosmological thou gill acwal encounter seems to have added very little. The de·
.
to whICh we can tr�,e Enlightenment tour through past and current concerns in anthropology
philosophical history
and the modern ongms of the social SCIences. i which we took in the first three chapters has shown that the
Finally, the view of memory/knowledge as an "art" fa­ hold of a visual·spatial "logic" on our discipline is as strong
vored preten�ons to exclusive and arcane knowledge. As as ever; the ix>dies or organisms of functionalism, the cui·
�e memory lI!lages �nd topoi proliferated and as various ture gardens of the particulariscs, the tables of the quanti·
kmds of gnostIC, magICal, and astrological schemes came to fiers,. and the diagrams of the ta.'(onomists all proj ect con·
be used f or the purpose of systematizing this wealth of im­ ce�tlons of knowledge which are organized around objeccs,
or unages of objects, in spatial relation to each other.
ages, the art of public orators turned into the secret posses-
1 14 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 115

LiJgU as Arral1gemml: Knowledge Visibk . develop the didactic, schoolroom outlook

descends from scholasticism even more than
Pierre de 1a Ramee. or Petrus Ramus (l5 15-1572), was a ;">"-Ram,,, versions of the same ans, and lend
schooiman, a logician and dialectician who taught a( lht even to lose the sense of monologue in pure
L'niversity of Paris. He is perhaps rightly forgotten as a mi. ;a." m,m,,,K:',. This orientation is very profound
a piece with me orientation of Ramism to-­
nor philosopher. Yet, as the work of \V. J. Ong has shown
an object world (associated with visual pertep­
s?me time ago (1958), he was a major figure as a theoreti.
rather than toward a person world (associated
clan of me /Melling of knowledge. His writings. which were "oicc and auditory percep t ion). In rhetoric.
published in many languages and countless editions, and the "","Iy someone had to speak, but in the charac­
pedagogical movement associated with his name had an in. . outlook fostered b,· the Ramist rhetoric, the
calculable inAuence on Western intellectual history. The fact "",ing is directed to a �orld where even persons
that his Lheories soon became anon}'mous (precisely because only as objecr.s.--that is, say nothing back.
they were thought to be s}TIonymous with pedagogical 1958,287)
method) only underlines the importance of Ramism. In
many circles, especially among the Protestant educators of Ramus was a transitional figure in another, even more
respect. The beginning of his career coincided
Germany, England , and its colonies in North America, the
precepts of Ramism gained such a degree of accept::mce that the period immediately preceding the invention of the
they vinually disappeared in the undisputed practice of IIelrPl-ess, His systems reached tlleir maturity and had their
Normal Science, to use Kuhn's term. IIOI'm" us popular success in the beginning of the GUlen·
. The sources of Ramism were medieval "quantitative"
�
era. Ong goes as far as dep Clin� Ramus a� �ne of the
whose thoroughly V Isua lized, spaualtzed, and
logtc and comemporary forms of the art of memory as it
conception of knowledge prepared the break­
was expounded in the works of Renaissance and Humanist
that all the technologkal requisites had been
thinkers. They are far too numerous and complex even (0
attempt a summary. Suffice it to state that, for Ramus, the for some time before t}'pography was finally "in­
The connections are far reach i ng:
most pressing problem about knowledge-any kind of
knowledge-became its teachability. This concern placed him constructs and models were becoming in-
finnly in the tradition of rhetoric to which he addressed ...."i",gly critical in intellecrual development. The
most of his polemicaJ disquisitions. He was to become a key _nging attitude manifested itself in the develop-
figure jn transmilting some of the deepest convictions of 'went of printing, in the new Copernican way of
that l!"adition-those concerning visual i�ages and spatial thinking about space which would lead (0 NewlOn-
?
or enng-to the seventeenth- and elghteenth-century Ian physics, in the evolution of the painter's vision
thmkers whom we recognize as immediate precursors of climaxed by Jan van Eyck's u<>e of the picture frame
as a diaphragm, and in the topica/ logics of Ru-
modern science.tO
dolph Agricola and Ramus. (1958:83; see also 89)
The outlook of Ramism is best summarized in the fol­
lowing passage from Ong's work: Letter printing made possible mass reproduction with a
.
great degree of reliability; which in lurn favored mass Clr·
Ramist rhetoric . . . is not a dialogue rhelOric at all, CUlation of what Ramus considered his major contribution
and Ramist dialectic has lost all sense of Socratic to "method": his ambitious renditions of teaching matter
dialogue and even most sense of scholastic dispute. (poems, philosophical texts, biographies, and others) in ule
The Ramis( arts of discourse are monologue arts. form of diagrams based on a dichOLomization of its COI1-
116 The Other and w e Eye The Other and the Eye 1 17

tents. These figures (some of which are reproduced by Gng) bv was to be guaranteed by the kind of dispassionate
w ity
� ar an uncanny resemblance to generations of visual de. � l inspection and measurement practiced in the sciences
orthy of .that
ViceS used by anthropologists, from earlier evolutionary trees J nature. Once the. sou�ce of any .knowledge �
to comemJX>rary ethnosemantic paradigms and structuralist ...,ne is thought pnmarily to be VISUal percepllon of objects
arrangements of binary oppositions. If one reAcets, for in. ill space. why should it be scandalous to tTeat the Other­
s�nce. on the nature of kinship charts (of the genealogical oIheT societies. other cultures, other classes "i.thin the same
gnd type) one finds that, ultimately, the\' are limited onl\l JDCiety-,;omme des choses? To be sure. Durkheim did not coin
by t�e size of the paper on which they are'drawn or printed. rbis famous principle because he wanted persons or the
HaVIng learned more about the connections between print_ JDOf3I and spiritual aspects of societ'Y treated as things; bm
ing and diagrammatic reduction of the contents of thought be did postulate in that context that the social
and cultural
one is !.erupted to consider lhe possibility that anthropofog: JlUlSt assume, through observation, quantification, and sys­
ical kinship theories (at least the oncs that take off from IeIIl3tic generalization, the same facticilY that is exhibited by
data collected .�tilh Ri\'cr's chart) are actually detennined by abe choses in our field of vision. Behind all this is what S.
!-he presemabl�lt}' of whatever knowledge they may contain lIora\'ia called a mithodowgie du regard. which Enlighten-
m terms of dIagrams that fit onto a conventionaJ printed 8IeIlt philosophes and their positivist successors inherited
page, In other words, it is the mode of storing, reproduc­ from ancient sources and which, as in these sources, re­
l
mg, and disseminating knowledse in print (in articles, mon­ aWned tied to rhetoric. :.!
ographs, and textbooks) which, In ways that may have to be Later, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this
� peClfied in much more detail than it is )X>ssible here,I I pre­ lIIIlCe became more pedantic and more generally effective.
Judge the What and How of large )X>rtions of ethnogra p hy, Rhetoric developed and hardened when the pursuit of
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from knowledge became inextricably part of its standardization,
the study of Ramism and from similar critical analyses of IChematization, and comparunentalization in the vastly ex·
forgonell or suppressed periods in ""estern intellect�al his­ panded rhetoric enterprise of academic teaching.
, In the light of connections that are revealed by the
tory IS that melhoos, channels, and means of presenting
.
kno....ledge are anything but secondary to its contents.12 An· llUdies of Yates and Ong our present self-understanding as
thropologists show varying degrees of awareness of [his when II1thro(Xllogists appears historically and theoretically shal­
they allow themselves to be drawn into debates about low. It is all the more urgent to remedy that situation be­
whether or not their formal reductions of cullUre reAect ar­ cause, among the sciences that share common sources in the
ran�t;ment of ideas in "the heads of the natives." Not many rhetoric of images and topoi and which employ pedago cal �
realize that this question makes little sense. not so much be· methods of visualizing koo..... ledge. anthropology occupies a
cause \�'e ca �not ac tually look into the heads of natives (psy· peculiar position . It patrols, so to speak, the frontiers of
. . Western culture. In fact, it has always been a Grenzwissen­
c�ologlsts might disagree with this) but rather because our
dlag�ams are unquestionabl y artifacts of visual·spatial con­ sdtaft. concerned with boundaries: those of one race against
venL!0n� whose function it IS to give "method" to the dis­ another, those between one culture and another, and finally
semmatlon of knowled ge in our society. those between culture and nature. These liminaJ concerns
Ramism and its belated reincarnations (did not Chom­ have prevented anthTO�k>gy from settling down in any one
sky's trees descend. via Port Royal, from t1lat tradition?) of �he accepted domams of knowledge other than in the
equate the knowable with that which can be visualized and reSidual field of "social science." There, many of us live in
�
I�gic. the rules of kn?wledge. with orderl}' arrangeme ts of �
h ing from biologists, paleontologists. geneticists. psychol­
pieces of knowledge In space. (n that tradition. scientific ob- og"l5ts. philosophers. literary critics. linguists, historians and,
118 The Other and the Eye
The Other and the Eye 1 19

alas, sociologists on whose territories we are inevitably led

lJItctic. Persons. who alone speak (and in whom
�;thOut being able to offer any excuse except that the "stud"
_ne knowledge and science exist), will be eclipsed
of man" must embrace all these fields. That situation alon�
lPsofar as the world is thought of as an assemblage
makes synopticism-the urge to visualize a great multitude
_ the sort of things which vision apprehends-ob­
of pieces of information as orderl), arrangements, system s, jects and surfaces. ( 1958:9)
and lableaux-a conscanl temptation. There are reasons whl'
we should resist that temptation. Some are political, other's �s an alternative, Ong invokes the world of the "oral and
epistemological; both kinds will direct the discussion back to auditory" which is also "ultimately existential" ( 1958: I I 0).
the principal theme of these essays-Time and Lhe Other. ] ha ve doubts about this solution. Ong (�nd the critics
*'" the social sciences who echo his views) rightly denounce
wualist reductions. One can only applaud his inspiring ef·
Vide It hnpera: The Dllll!'r as Object forts to think through the consequences which conceptions
of knowledge could have that are based on auditory rather
Ong's principal intent is expressed in the subtitle of his work 'than visuaJ root metaphors.14 But to equate the aural with
on Ramus: "Method and the Decay of Dialogue." Through. "the personal and to i dentify roth with the "existential" and
out the book he deplores the antipersonalisl orientation of 'humane comes dangerously close to a kind of antisciemism
visualism. In this respect he anticipated themes which were which feeds on moral indignation and nostalgia for "dia­
taken u in the debates of the sixties and se\'enties when
r logue," raLhel- than on epistemological arguments.
critics 0 �iology and anthropolo�y �
gan to denounce the To begin with. aural perception and oral expression
dehumaOl1.lng efTeru of overly sclenusuc methods. A com· neither ..eresupJX>se nor guarantee a more "personal" idea
mon complaint was that social scientists treated their sulr or u_ sc of knowledge. That the spoken word is more Reet­
jects as objects. that is. as passive targets of various struc­ mg, andthat i t lends itself less easily to apersonal forms of
tural, behaviorist, and often quantitative schemes of fiXation and transmission than images or print, can no longer
explana�ion. and this to the detriment of "understanding" be held as a truism. New techniques available to record (and
the mouves, values, and beliefs of their subjects as persons. process) spoken lan�'l.lage and to translate it directly into
The study of Ramism reveals some deep historical rea­ print via electron ic SignalS rather than type and font make
sons for linking visual-spatial reduction of knowledge with the old divisions harder to maintain (even if one does not
the ethos of scientific explanation. Undoubtedly, modern care to go along with Derrida's reversal of relations between
.
sCience progressed as a result of this alliance but, according speaking and writing as he expounds it in his GrammatoL­
to Ong, such progress had its price: ogy).u We may be approaching the point where the ex­
c::han�e of spoken words will be distinguishable from the cir­
Ramism specialized in dichotomies, in "distribution" c:u latlon of primed messages and images mainl), because the
and "collocation" . . . , in "systems" . . . and in time economy of the former must res�nd, not ..n much to
other diagrammatic concepts. This hinlS that Ramist personal. but to interpersonal conditions of communicalion.
dialectic represented a drive toward thinking not DU:uogue is perhaps too weak a tenn to cover lhe nature of
only of the universe but of thought itself in tenns oral communication. The aural and oral muSt be invoked
of spatial models apprehended by sight. In this oon­
for epistemologicaJ reasons because the), rna)' provide a bet­
text, the notion of knowledge as word, and the per­ ter starting point for a dialectiwl concept of communicalion .
sonalist orientations of cognition and of the uni­
Knowledge rna)' be "depersonalized" orally as much as
verse which this notion implies, is due to atrophy.
through visual-spatial redu ction. '''lhy should mindless oral
Dialogue itself will drop more than ever out of di-
repetitions of standardized formulae or, for that matter,
 120 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 121

skillful manipulation of a store of tautological terms as the . Taught knowledge became arranged, ordered knowl­
OCcur in teaching, in religious �rmons, or in politi<: easily representable in diagrammatic or tabular form.
.
lt
s�eches be any I�ss depersonalIZIng than the peddling of use an extreme fonnulation, in this tradition the
pnnted words ! diagrams, a�d images? if by personal Olle of anthropology could not have gained scientific sta-
means sometlll�g more specific than a vague reference to until and unless it underwent a double visual fixation, as
humane ways; If one wants to designate with this term a .
....eplual ima ge and as illustration of a kind of knowledge.
greater degree of personal awareness and of individual con_ of objectification depend on distance, spatial and
trol, a sharpened sense for au.thorship and for knowledge In the fundamental. phenomenalist sense this
as a possession or tool, then It seems obvious to me thaI that the Other, as object of knowledge, must be sep-
visualization and spaLialization of knowledge signal a greater, , distinct, and preferably distant from the knower. Ex­
. otherness may be not so much the result as the prereq­
not a lesser, emphasis on the knower as an individual
In short, to invoke personalism in this and similar de­ of anthropological inquiry. ''''e do not "find" the
bates creates confusion. Perhaps it can be avoided if one IVagel"! . of the savage, or the primitivity of the primitive,
rejects roo simple an opposition between the "'isual and the them, and we have seen in some detail how anthro­
aural . A st�p into that direction might be to consider Time has managed to maintain distance, mostly by manip­
arx:l espec ially those temporal relations that must be in. temporal coexistence through the denial of coeval-
volv�d in interpel"sonal and, a fortinri, in intercultural pro­
ducllo.n ��d communication of knowledge. Visualization and spatialization have not only been
Llmltmg ourselves to anthropology, we can link the of departure for a theory of knowledge, they become
.
fi�dm� of the 1?revious chapters to the question at hand: program for the new discipline of anthropolo g y. There
Vlsuahsm alone IS .n :)t t<;' blame for what 1 called a political
cosmology. �hat VISIon �
IS the noblest, most comprehensive.
and most rehable of the senses has been an article of faith
�:�.
,
a time when this meant, above all, the exhibition of the
: in illustrated travelogues, museums, fairs, and exJX>­
s. These early ethnological practices established sel-
since tlle beginning of our philosophical tradition. As 'phe­
n.o�enalism,' �h.is emph�sis on vision became part of empi­
.
nast and POSll.l�·I�t theo�es o� knowledge. BU{ before it could
�2�:f::�;
articulated but finn convictions that presentations of
through visual and spatial images, ma ps, dia·
and tables are parllcularly well suited to the
assu�e the poh�cal � WlSt which we ascribe to anthropologl­ primitive cultures which, as ever)'one knows,
cal discourse, .v��a hsm had to be expounded in spatia l are supremely "synchronic" objects for visual·esthetic !?Cr­
schemes. EmpirICist phe�omenalism do:es pre�upJXIse that «ption . Underlying this may be an even older association,
Nature, at any rate expenenced Nature, IS atomlSllC and thai 10 which Ong directs our attention. The rise of topical logic
know�edge i� deriv.ed fro';l myriads of sense impressions, and the use of outlines and dichotomized tables, he points
especIally VISUal ImpresslO�s . Because knowledge was OUt, was a natural outcome given the necessities of teaching
�ought to operate �Y collecting, �omparing, and classifying philosophy to teenagers (1958:136 f). It is commonly be­
ImpressIo . .
ns, the nOUon of the mmd as a naturalist 's collec­ lieved that the visual-spatial is more germane to the infan·
ti�n or cabinet encouraged further extension of the visual til e and adolescent mind than to mature intelligence.
bias tow�rd the spatial. Not only the sources of knowledge, Whether such is indeed the case may be for the psychologist
but also Its contents were ima�ined to be visible. Add to this to decide. However it is easy to see how arguing from on­
the rhetoric.al intent of teachmg such knowledge, and the to�enetic to phylogenetic visualism may turn pedagogical
transformallon from visible source to visible content is com- prmciples into political programs. Concretely speaking, we
122 The Other and [he E)'e The Other and the Eye 123

must at least admit the possibility that striking images, sim. using "v;sualism" to designate an ideowgicaJ. current.. in
plified outlines, and overwrought tables were fed to stu_ ,...,orn thought. T am not trying to argue, by �a)' of nal\'e
dents in order to impress Lhem with a degree of orderlin ess , ali'
!iIic ! . that vision, visual experience, and Visual expres-
)1
and cohesiveness which the fields of knowledge taught by . experience should be removed from the agend of
these methods never possessed. Not the students' simplicit"
but the teacher's determination to maintain his superior pO.
��:.�;�����
of .
thought and discourse. As an ldeoloS1cal
�

if it is true that there is collusion between

'.
sition may have to be blamed. The same goes mutatis mula?l· a bent and allochronic lendencies, visualism functions
dis for the preponderance of visual-spatial presentation of a cognitive style that is likely to prejudice the study �f all
Lhe Other in amhropology. The hegemony of the visual as of cultural expression, including those that per,tam to
a mooe of knowing may thus direcdy be linked to the polit­ experience in general and to ViSUal aesthetl�s 111 par­
ical hegemony of an age group, a class, or one society over . The visualist bias that is brought to the �I.sual pro-
anotheL The ruler's subject and the scientist's object have, o f other CUltUl-eS is no less in need of cntlque than
in the case of anthropology (bUl also of sociology and psy­ reductions of, 53)" language, ritual, dance and mu-
chology), an interru.ined history. social relations, or ecological conditions. .
.
If this is true, it would allow us to see the dogma of All this applies, of course, to the emergmg field of viS­
empirical fieldwork i n a new light. It was already noted that. anthropology. ]ts evaluation in t�rrn.s of �he visualist and
as a systematic pursuit, it emerged as a symptom of anthro­ . tendencies we are explormg In thIS chapter would
pology's professionalization.'6 But we can ask now, what is more than a note in passing. My feeling is that, par-
behind the professionalization of anthropology? In some way we may have a movement here which is directed
or other it reflects the organization of a segment of bour­ limiting effects of visualism on a theory of
geois society for the purJX>se of serving that society's inner At least some visual anthropologists affirm the
continuity (through teaching and writing). Professionally re­ of intersubjective experience of Time and ex-
quired field research also contributes to maintaining the po­ plore hermeneutic approaches to visual data (see Ruby J 9�O
I sltion of that society vis-a-vis other societies. It is in this role and further references in that article). Needless to say, VIS­
that ethnography came IO be defined predominant1y as ob­ ual ethnography lends itself to methodologization, in some
seroing and gathering, i.e., as a visual and spatial activity. II Instances of the most excessive kind (see the heroic attempts
has been the enacllnent of power relations between societies at graphic reduction and formal analysis in proxemics, ki­
that send out fieldworkers and societies that are the field, nesics, and related fields).
Observing reason (Beobachtende Vernunfi) seems to be i mpli­
cated in victimage, an insight whiCh, long before Levi­
Strauss, was candidly expressed by one of Lhe g:eat ethnol­ 'The Symbol Belongs to the O,ient": Symbolic Anthropoiog')'
ogists of the nineteenth century: "For us, p rimitive societies in Hegel's Aesthetic
(Naturviilkn-) are ephemerdl, i.e., as regards our knowledge
of, and our relations with, them, in fact, inasmuch as they When one criticizes epislemologicaJ and political implica­
exist for us all. At the very instant they become known to tions of \'isualism and spatiaJi.sm, allegations of abuse should,
us the}' are doomed" (Bastian 1881 :63 f). This was said in a of course, be weighed III a larger con text of use. One must
political treatise pleading for the recognition of ethnology ask what the convictions and reasons are that make anthro­
as a scientific discipline and proposin g to create ethno­ pology accept visual-spatial reductions as legitimate modes
graphic museums as its principal research institutions. of knowledge. We have done this for the perioos when cul­
At the risk of repeating myself, I must insist that { have tural anthropology emerged under the episleme of natural
 124 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 125

history and d�velope? its relativist and ta�onomic discourse. �re:j �I�'��iS ri�n�cil�i��nl�ed� to "view" the Other as an object of
Itw�:)UI� he Imposslble .to conclude this account without � . "In the country of the blind," says
conslde:mg how a trend In c'!rrent anthropology which uses Geertz. "the one-eyed is not king but spectator"
�

the notion of symbol as a umfying concept fits into OUf ar­ �9:1!28). The example of M. Sahlins will show that this
gument regarding allochronic discourse. Because "symbo lic be carried to the point where the ardor to defend a
anth�opolog}''' is of more recent origin and an ongoing con. iailJOlic" approach even leads a bonafide materialist 10 af·
f ltu re. he etour
cern It defies easy summation; it also lacks a single towering C��
U � ��; � d
T
�
0� leads one
figure o� whose oeuvre o�e could concentrate as being rep.
? � � �5�
res�ntauve of l,he s):mbohc approach. Compared to the his_ � a� � �
universal and mode of existence
� � � �
toneal and cntlcal literature on, say, evolutionism or strue_ all culture: religion, art, e\'en id will then be
"cultural systems" and nothing ���� � � in principle
,
lUnllism, there is as yet little to build on.
The notion, of sY?1bol may have to be counted among science, JX)litics, and economics from being re·
tho� allochromc devices whose use emails or encourages by such panculturalism.
demal of c�valn�s between lh � subject an� the object of In sum, the s),mbolic carries a heavy load indeed. But
anthropologICal discourse. ThiS . IS not a verdict but a point .�:��II�oa�d is it? Is the subject of anthropological discourse
for debate. At. any ra.te, it would be extremely difficult to with it or is it carried .by the object? When we ask .
demonstrate thIS fully if only because the sources from which questions we note the of symbolic in
�
.

ant�1Topologists have been borrowing their ideas are 100 . rs it the ex·
.

�·aned. Between "symbolist" poeu-y and American "symbolic or

mteraclionisl" sociology, a crit.ique of symbolic anthropol. onto-ffi,
ogy would have to cover vast areas of intellectual hislOn' much as the artists of
not to mention further complications that arise from diS� consciousness with esoteric images
senting views within symbolic anthropolog),.17 and . the symbolic, as a mode of being. an object of
Th� pragmatist heritage of symbolic anthropolo� y has inquiry or does it constitute a method? If it is a mode of
caused ItS .best representabves to preserve a critical dlsu-ust aJ£tural existence then it is a problemfor us; if it is a mode
for the kmd of absu-act formalizat.ions to which French of inquiry then it is a problem generated b)' us, a load with
structuralists are given (even though connections between which we burden those whom we analyze "symbolically."
the two have by no means been severed, see Leach 1976). It These questions, 10 be sure, contain age-old philosophical
has, above all, led them to recognize concrete experience puzzles which have eluded definitive solutions and are likely
and com.municative interaction as principal sources of eth· to elude them in the future. But they also touch on history
flographJ knowledge . Still, deciding on the symbol as a kev and politics. It makes sense to ask them. for instance, in the
C tight of what we called allochronic discourse. In what sense
notion h.as far.reaching consequences and there are reasons
for argulJ'� & that contemporary symbolic anthroJX)logy is part does talk of symbols and the symbolic foster a tendency in
l of a tradition of thought which constructs its objects with anthropological discourse to place its Other in a Time dif·
the help of a visual·spatial rhetoric. System, order, models, ferent from our own?
blueprints, and similar terms which regu larlv occur in these At the risk of incurring the wrath of both symbolic an·
�r.itings signal a visua1ist e istemology. The}' are character· thropologists and historians of philosophy, [ will illustrate
ISHc of an anthropologica r discourse whose sel[.definition how symbol may be used as a tempora1lling device by com·
oscillates between semiotics (French·Saussurian) and serniol· rnenting briefly on some passages in the first and second
ogy (American.Peircean). In either case, the symbolic an· parts of Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics.18 There are striking
 The Olher and the Eye 127
126 The Other and the Ere
charac­
res��blances between these philosophical texIS and cenai n and foml, reality and expressions, presu mably
positIons held by ?J ntem JX?rarr analysts of cultural symbols of all culture. as well as a specific form or a �uliar
ese
(p�rhaps expressIve of his[oncal connections via Royce of expressi?n ch �racteristic . of certain cl!lt�!:.es. Th
, at the early stage s
�ri:��I:.' ,������
at leasC m their auLhe nuc state
Pell"'Ce,. and other American p ragmatists), Moreover, ' as: d. in the
outside of his own West ern worl
sumpuons that. are usually hidden in anthropological dis. .
course are exph�I�Y. S[ate� by Hegel, who was unhampered . That which is past is remote, that which is remote
ronic dis­
.. past: such is the tune to which figures of alloch
�

by' cuimraI relatiVism and Its conventions of intercultural d.

viltty. course are dancing.
Neither Hegel nor later symbologists
could confine
He!!el proposes his theory of the symbol in order to
ral distance. They had
dlemselves to affirmations of tempo
o

,
dlstmgUlsh �nvee� three major art [onus: symbolic, classic,
'PJ elaborate on the logic of dista nce lest placing Lhe sym­
a�d ro'!lanl�c. As IS characteristic of him, he makes these
. i 1tolic in the past might remove .it altog ether fro� serious
d�tmctlOns In such a way tbat they not only yield a system_
consideration. Our temporal dismissal of the Other IS alwa}'s
atic, typology but also a developmemal sequence. The s}m.
.JUCh that he remains "integrated" in our spati al concepts of
?ohc mod� precedes the cJ�sic �nd ro�antic forms by log. there­
lcal n�Jty. not by mere hIstorical accident. The hislOrical ���. (such as order, difference, opposition . Hegel, )
posit ion. Con­
mea r:tmg of spnbolism ';lnd its logical position in a system of �. , proceeds in his Aesthetic to s�ore up h �
Lhe �}m­
relauons are therefore Interchangeable. ceptually. it must be g:uard�d agamst confusl0r:t of
relauons;
. To analyze �e logic of symbolism is the purpose of an bolic mode of expression With other types of SI�
the con­
mtnx:lu�ory sec�on to the second aft of the Aesthetic with historkally, the symbolic must be shown to cause to
r that are unlik e those we ex­
the predICtable tlue "On the symbo as such." It begins with temporary spectaLOr reactions
a statement whose temporalizing intent could not be ex­ pect from more familiar art forms .
from
pressed more dearly: Hegel, accordingl}', first distinguishes symbols
e s the latter are ar­
other signs, e.g., linguistic signs. Wher �
In lh� sense in which we are using the word, sym­ bitrarily assigned to the sounds or meanmgs they repre sen �.
expre ss IS
bo.1 r:narks, conceptually as well as historically, the the relationship between symbols and what .they
ap­
ongm of art; therefore it should be, as it were, re­
not "indifferent." The symbol suggests by Its external
and
pearance that which it makes appear, not in its concrete
garded only as pre-arl, belonging mainly to the Ori­
�
unique existence, however, but by expressing "a gener
em. Only after man)' transitions, transfonnations
and mediations does it lead to the authentic reality ermo re, symb olic
quality of its meaning" (see 1: 395). Furth
of the id<;a of a classical artform. (1:393) each
expression and symbolized content are not reducible to
other. Thev lead, so to speak, an indep ende nt existe nce:
Such is the real meaning of symbol as opposed to a secon­
one symbol' can have many contents, one conte nt is capab le
dary, "ex.ternal" use according CO which certain modes of . e
of being expressed by different symbols. �enc e symb ols ar
presentation that can OCCu r in any of the three art forms
sanly
may also be called symbolic, essentia11y ambiguous; they leave the viewer neces
I n t?ese few sentences, Hegel summarized many of the "doubtful" (1:397). If and when ambiguity is removed and
/ assumptions that have been gUldjng inquiries into (tempo­ doubts are assuaged. then a s}'lTlbolK: rdationship in the strict
.
rally or spatially) remote expressions of culture. Most Im­ sense no longer obtains. What remains of the sylTlool is "a
portantly, he sets a. precedent for an extraordinary claim, mere image" whose relation to the content il depicts is that
namel)' th';lt s}'mbol� oould be at once analytical ("logical") of an analogy or simile (see I :398; the terms are Vergltichung
and hlStoTical: that It marks a type of relation between con- and Gleichllis).
128 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 129

ideolo�cal and p:>­

Hegel insists that doubtfulness and insecurity vis- a-vis d.ifCerence when one wishes ':0 examine
the srmbolic are not limited to certain cases . Rather, thev ches. As IS often �he
' Ijtical implications of symbohc ap proa
are the response c:ase (and Hegel would be the
first .to say so)'. the lOgIcal
t may contam assumptions, or d�­
to very large areas of art; they apply to an im- S[TUcture of an argumen
utionary sequence.. [n fact, m
.
mense material at hand: the rontent of almost all crees, of developmental, evol
he proposes hiS theor� �f
oriental art. Therefore. when we first enter the Hegel's case it is quite clear that
a) theory of hls�0I1;'; As s,:,ch 1t IS
world of ancient Persian, Indian, or Egyptian fig- the symbolic as a (part of ns Le­
ures (Gestalten) we feel uneasy. We sense that we aTe
a theory abo
ut Time, one that "temporahzes r�latlo
by plac mg the lat­
walk ing among tasJu; in themselves, these forms do
",,"f'en Western and non-Western cultures s betw een
. n the resemblanc�
ter in the time of origins Give
not strike us; their contemplation does not immedi-
ately please or satisfy us. But they contain a chal-
Hegel's views and thos e of pres ent-day symbologlsts (not to
lenge to go be)'ond their external appearance), to el and Comte an?
ak of convergences between Heg
that the sr:nbohc
their m�ning. which must be something more and
somethtng more profound than these images (1:400) it rkheim) one cannot help but s�spec� .
-dlstancmg deVice.
(lOIltinues to sen'e essentia1ly as a ume
.

logy pa� com-

In a �aJmer reminiscent of relativist appeals to the unity of Hegel and modern symbolic anthropo
r sym bof- theones are
mankmd, Hegel then notes that a sYffioolic interpretation is n as far as the extension of thei
called for because we simply cannot dismiss as childish the �r n erned . Hegel, whose dialectic thou ght alwa rs m�)\'es to­
as I.n hIS o�er
ward the concrete and who, in the A�
productions of peoples who may be in their childhood. but theti c
lfic,
.
hlst onc al reahza­
who ask for "more essential content." Their true meaning works, roposes to aaoum for �peC �en�e
must be "�ivined" beneath their " enigmatic" fonus (ibid.). t
lions o the spirit, rejects the nouon that
all
as symbolic. He
art, and
adm its (I�
All thiS sounds quite modern and is in fact ritually as­ all culture should be approached ,lona�le at his
fash
�rted by contemJX>rary anthropologists, especially the no­ some comments on symbolic thrones .
mig ht be con stru ed, but hiS mterest
�lOn that the non-Western poses a "problem" (eine Aufgabe, time) 1 9 that such a view
ts to show that the
In Hegel's words). Being alerted by the fable of the wolf and goes in the opposite direction. He wan
�e I �b to a certain kind of hypocrisy whene\'er the Other 5 mbolic was necessaritp
a histoncal rn e atart roduc­
whlC It co�tras
IS said to be pro�lematic. one suspects Hegel of duplicity. �n. s suc 'It is part of a typology with.in
and romanUc (see
He u� to be driven by an effort to give us a theory of the With two other major forms. calleo clasS IC
symbolIC as a special type of sign reration. Ambiguity and 1:405),
orates on th'IS
do�btfulness � ppear to be a "logical" property of the sym· In later sections of his Aesthetic, Heg<:1 elab
h �e �ree types
oohc. I n rea.Ilty, they are caused by actual historical con­ typology and names the grounds on "'nl�
III �ll three
fron ';3tu.:m with non-Western forms of cultural expression. are to be distinguished. The common cntenon
essIon an�
Ambiguity and doubtfulness are the primary datum ; they are forms is the relation of form and content. expr
the ra�k or problem. not t�e symoohc images by which they meaning. The s}'mbolic. "the stage . of .the origi
n of art� IS
that rel�tIon,
are triggered. The s}mbolx: approach is that part of a gen­ characterized by an inherent ambiguity of
me�ely Juxta­
eral theory of signs which functions most directly as an anx­ �ieaning and expression are, so to .speak,
mg fo� Unity of sub­
iety-reducing method. JXlsed; the human spirit is s?ll grop
One might argue that it is mere pedantry [0 hold Hegel stance and expression .. ClassIc . ar.t. exe� plifie d �r . Greek
Impe r­
sculpture. achieved unity , albeit 10 an �
(and perhaps s),mbolic anthropology) to the actual sequence e tern al.
was, to use a
0.£ steps by which they arrive at a theory of symbolic expres­ sonal fonn (see II: 1 3 ff). Such external umty
conte xt, mere
SIon. Not at all, because sequence may make a considerable Hegelian term nOl invoked by Hegel in this
 The Other and the Eye 13l
1 30 The Olher and the Eye
: his se1f-constitu-
anti�esis to symbol�c juxtaposition and ambiguity. On Iv Ro.. constitutes a "task" for modern man
manuc art accomplishes the s�nthesis of fonn and COnLe t ion is said to dom­
as jnn�r u� itr, as the subjective realization of the Spir: " The symbolic-visual mode of express
iguous and len­
the early stages of culture; it is amb
�
'h�;:'II�
From It sprmgs a new and "modern" creativitv' , in its e imagery or un­
'
always in danger of turning into mer
a culture
pan.l�eon all gods are dethroned, the Harne of suI, fancy. This is Hegel's counterirnage to
fom l and con tent. By
JectIVIl)' has �estroyed ,them, and instead of plastic j as achieved "inner unity" of
. _ h expe cts him to ex­
logic of contr.lSt and opposition one
polytheism , figures] art
[I.e. a rnulUlude of symbolIC
exp ress ions of 1"0-
now knows only ()1U God, Spirit, one absolute
01l.e
audial-verbal modes as appropriate
we wan t to sum ma­
""r.tie art. Such is indeed the case: "]f
autonomy. Art is constituted in free unity as its own
and form in the
�bsolute �nowl�ge and will, it no longer is divided in one word the relationship of content
I�to SpeCIfic (ralls and functions whose only connec­ its basic lOne is . , , music al
iiD,m,cr"i"e , . . we may say that
tIon was the force of some dark necessity. (11 : 130) insight syste m-
. . lyrical" (11:1 41). He develops this
Similar schemes of fin� identi�y a �e ex ? mnded in Hegel's
oJ the Spmt. and In hlS wntings on the pllllos­
Pht1lOmeruJ,iog),
1���':r and in great detail in the
� on romantic music and poetry)
third part
.
of Aesthetic (III,
There he speaks
as that which is " dominan t in mus ic" (111 : 1 63), a
�phy of h1S10!'y � d l �w. �ut no\\'�ere are his arguments as to an idea pervading
anthropologlc�1 as m hlS Aesthettc. For one thin g he soon which links his theory of art
�
that Hegel's
overcomes earher hesitation and e:ctends his typor gy of art � philosophical system. 1l has bee n said
hy of Tim e. 20
forms to all culture (see II :232), HIS theory of an is a theory. of Lhe human spirit is a philosop
are those
of culture: among Lhe most beguiling of his insights
with Sight, History
that contrast Time with Space, as Sound
These ways ?f \li �,,:ing the world constitute religion, formulates: "The au­
with Nature. ]n the Encyclopedia Hegel
the substantial Spirit of peoples and times. They spatial each have
dible and temporal, and the visible and
permeate art as much as all areas of a given living first, equ ally valid." But-and
presenl. As. �\lery h,;,man being is in all his activities, their own basis They are, at
,
and spea king-"visible
be . they p:11Ucal, rehgious, artistic, or scientific, a in this context he opposes writing
age only a� a
language relates to sounding (lihumd )
child of hiS time and has the task to work out the lan �
esSio n of the mmd
� ssentjal C?nlent and necessar>' fonn of his time, so sign." The catch is in the ol1ly: "true expr
). Vie can, and must
IS �rt destmed to.find the artistic expression appro­
. of a people. (u:232) OCCurs in speech" (see 1 969 : 374, par. 459
pnate to the spml go beyond signs and symbols.
The 'symoolic, . however, dearly is the Other. Classic art
a�pea:s as . a transltoq' stage, a pale "logicaJ" projection in
� IS tn partlt� typology. It is admirable but does not inspire Tlu OtJur as Icon: The Case of "Symholic AnthroJ)ology"
. ,
unea�l!1ess. The symbol 1C IS the problem, It is in practical probably not be
.
opposItIon to the r�mantlC, and the romantic clearly serves Contemporary s}wbolic anthropology can
, . blamed for (nor credited with) a hlsto riz.ing theory of the
as. a descnptlon 01 J:"I e�el's own nineteenth-century con­ acce pted \'Vhite­
, .
sciousness and s�nslbdlUes. The sovereign individual free symbolic. On the whole, it seems to have
ific styl� (as
fro � the �onstramts of "natural" forms and aestheti� con­ �ead's verdict that symoolism as a culturally spec,
ltec­
.
ventions, IS the Ideal of contemporary, modern man . To In "oriental symbolism:' or "medieval spnboilc arch
It ople for
d
overcome Lhe s}'JTlbolic, historically and by conceptual anal- tureB) is "on the fringe of IifeB ( l959 [ 1927 ]: I)"
 The Other and the Eye 133
132 The Other and the E)'e

1 an alte�na[i\'e that was rejected by Hegel, namely that the "Jbe projection of our sensatio�s is nothing
e1� than the
nce wlth the ,5),5-
symbohc ought to be taken as a mode of all perception in� Jllustration of the, world in par�ia1 accord�
which these reactions
sofar as it is cultural. tcfIlatic scheme, 10 space and time, to
ly: �'y wa�. of as­
. It app;ars, h?wever, if we let ourselves be guided by (OIlfor:m" (195 9:58 ; my emphasis). Final
umty o� so­
Whitehead s classical text, that a transhislOrical theory of allnpuons concernmg the spatla!�geographlc,
age as the most Impo rtant na·
symboliz�l�on shares �any of the assumptions we ascribed cieties and the role of langu
ehea d's argument
to a r�la �vlsl, LaxonomlC, and generally visualist outlook. The Jional symbolism" (",e 1959:64: 66 f.) Whit
�tu �e whic h tcxIay sou�d
constltullve act of knowledge-"selfproducLion" in '''''hite­ ends wim statementS of a pohuca! r In
IS hkel y to enco unte
�ead's ter:mino!ogy---consisls of bringing together into one much like t�e commonrlace,s one
:
�lgn�relatlon what was apart (l959:9). The temporal coex­ anlhropologlcal and soclologlCal texlS
Istence of perceptions, and expressions is not considered
Whtn we examine how a societ}' btnds its individ­
problematic. [t is an external, physical fact (see 1959:16, 21)' ual membtrs to functi on in conformity with its
w�a( cou':ltS is the "scheme of spatial relatedness of the per� aecds. we discover that ont impor tant operative
celved thmgs �o each other a,nd to, the perceiving subject" agency is our \'ast system of inherited symbolism,
(l?59:22), ThiS echoes RamlSl epIStemology and, as one
ml�ht expect, has strong affinities to a classificatory, taxon­
OIll1 C stance, Spatial relations and sense data are both "ge­
,
(1959:73).
The self-organisation of society depends on
commonly diffused symbols t�'oki�g �om,monl>' dif­
\
nenc abstactions" and (ustd idtas. and at the same time mdiCaung com­
�he main facts about presentational immediacy are: monJy understood actions, ( 1959:76)
(I) �hat the sense-data involved depend on the per­ ,
ancestor of
Cipient organism and its spatial relations to the per­ Whitehead is not the sole philosophical
most im(X)rtant
ceived organisms; (ii) that the contemporary world symbolic anthropology. perhaps not even its
and the essay
o exhi�,ited as extended and as a plenum of organ­ one, And there is much more to his thought
its being � exam ple of visual­
Isms; (m) that presentational immediacy is an im­ from which [ quoted than .
portant fac�r in the exper ience of only a few high­ isrn.2 1 Still, it is fair to say that Symb ollSfn : Its Meanmg and
presu pposi tions of the sym­
grade organisms, and that for [he others it is em­ Effect contains some of the basic
that �­
bryonic or entirely negligible. Thus the disclosure bolic approach tn currefll anthropology. It holds
res we study, 10
of a contemporary world by presentational immedi­ bois are the mode of knowledge of the cultu
acy is boum.i up with the di!IClos,,!re of the solidarity
fact of culture taut court, and that s mbolic anal 'sis or inter·
o,d of
pretation provide anthropology Wtth a equate meth
of actual ,thmgs by reason of theIr participation in
an Impartml system oj spatial extellsion, (1959;23; m\'
,
describin and understanding other �ultures. ..Symbollc an-
emphasis) crude
rop<? ogy shares with structuralism its, contempt for
siastic abou t Its conce rns for clas·
These premises are ingeniously developed until thev empiricism; it is less enthu
iption. I say "less" becau se rhe
lea ? to the conclusion that "Ultimately all observation, sci: sification and taxonomic descr
taste for taxonomies is not enurely absen t. For instan ce, V.
e,ntlfic 0: popular, consists in the determination of the spa­
s stem in terms of
na.!. relallon of the lxxIily organs of the observer to the 10- Turner's proposal to chart a symbol y
pre­
cauon of 'projected' sense aata" (J959:56), Furthermore, dominant and instrumental symbols (1967:30 L) dearl y
, as a
there is only a small step from spatialism to what I will refer Mlpposes classificatory and hierarchical ordering which
to as the iconism of s)'mbolic approaches: "Our relation­ method of description. could easily be prese�ted as a , tax·
.
shIps to these bodies are precisely our reactions to rhem. onomy of symbols. Incidentally, Turner prOVIdes us With a
 134 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 135

striking example of an ethnographic translation from a£fords us an extreme example of stereotypical knO\�'I­
tern� of an exotic people. Bali's ecological co�pactncss,. Its
poral to spatial schemes. At one point he notes that each
of relief, and the profusion of visual-spaual syo:bohsm
the sYlllools he identified as "dominant" is described by
the Oeloped b)' its culture contributed fl.Tther l? I!laktng the
Ndembu as mukulumpi, elder, senior (1967 : 3 1 : see also 30). ';
Relations based on seniority (especially when they are eminently suited to e�nowaph'c descnpuon �erle e
COn­ visual rhetoric . Boon IS crlucall y aware th �t hIS 0\\ n
�
cretized as filiation or generation) and relations based
on '1()gr phi c research inserts itself mto that hIstory. He
subsumption and dominance are of different types entire III ? ,
ly. he must work either with or against the trans-
Of course it is the juxtaposition of the Ndembu term
and ....'alion of Bali into an emblem of exoticism..
its ethn0w.aphic gloss--a trace of field work carried out .
Un­ The image of Bali derives from visual-spatial reducuon
� der condItions or coevalness--which permits this critique.
Symbolic anthropologisLS advocate hermeneutic ap� is at the same time too concrete and tOO abstract:. lOO
proaches and perter "thick" ethnographic accounts over
nemic diagrams and tables. Very likely, they come closer ���:'��
...,cet,e., inasmuch as it depicts the Balinese d�thed III a

icJ
plethora of s�nb?ls; lOO abstr.act when It w�ongly
hieratic continUllY onto theIr troubl� hlst�ry.
than other schools to treating Others not 'ust in but also on
their own terms. Yet s}mbolic anthropoJogy continues reports on virulent political strife, and dlsregard�ng
to .
Ispeak not only of symbols but of symbol-systems; it strives
to lay bare the symbolic structures and props of a culture.
del1Ce of historical process l� th� p�on(:)Unced syncreusm
its religious beliefs and �Ial IIlSUtu�IOns, the �estern
.

�:��:.�'��::
With unwa�,erlll � te�
) On the whole, it orients its discourse on rOOt metaphors de-
riVed from vision. Consequently it exhibits more affinities to
spatial order than to temporal process. :
of timeless Bali was maIntamed
lL spawned a long series of ever more danng Visual
including alteo:pts to rea:d the s),ste!ll ?f
Rather man [Tying to confront symbolic anthro ology ; . iiTigation canals literally as diagrams of kmslu
in terms of its numerous philosophical and social-SCIen p structure (see Boon 1 977:40). In sum, anthroJ?OE­
tific discourse on Bali has been given to excesses of VISU­
sources, I will discuss one example documenting the iconic
bent and then examine some further consequences in a re­ which have the cumulative effect of .temfKlral �Istanc­
cent case of conversion to symbolic anthropology. : Bali is paradisiacal , hieratic, emblemauc---everyt hmg but
My first example is James Boon's The Anthropological Ro­ lO CoC',al with the ""estern observer. .
mance of Bali ( 1 977), a thoughtful When Boon sets out to undo these delUSIO� S, ho�ever,
and (in a positive sense)
self-conscious work in the symbolic orientation. Boon's proj­ chooses a strategy whose prospects for br�a�mg W1:th the
eCt is calTied out with elegance and persuasiveness. His cen­ tr.u:liti·on he criticizes are not very good. �h's IS not Imme­
tral concern might in fact be quite close to the one pursued diately apparent from �i� meth� of playIng concepts �e-
. .
in these essays: The ethnography of Bali must be rived from literary cnuasm agamst the Ic�msm of eal.her
under­ .
stood in the context of "temporal perspectives" (thus the ethnogra hy; the verbal serves here as an Instance agal� st
title of part 1 ) which, successively and cumulatively, have the visua He applies the conce tual apparatus us� to diS­
F.
contributed to constituting " BaJi" as a topos, i.e , a striking tinguish between �he genres 0r romance and epic to ��­
. lmese history, anCient �d recent, and succeeds I.n com e}­
and significant place of recurn and reference in Western
ing an impression of a highly fl�xlble . and dynamIC cultu� .
anthropological discourse. From the time of its discovery as
a "paradise" by the Dutch, to Mead and Details of his account need not concern us h�re. ��ffice It
Bateson's delight at to say that Boon's sensitivity to th� eff�ts of vlsualtzmg and
finding its people superbly photogenic (1977: 10, 67), down
to the lOuristic packaging of the island in our da)'s, there spatializing devices in ant�roiX'logtcal discourse comes to the
runs a history of visualization whose explicitness and inten- point where he almost raises the Issue of coevalness.
1 36 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 137

But, and there is a but, it is not likely that Boon will may i n fact be quite immune to the problem o f coeval­
raise that problem in a fundamental way :is long as he re­ As an ideology it may widen and d.ee.pen the gap
""een the West and its Other, At least, thiS IS how I
mains within the theoretical and methodological frame of read
symbolic anthropology. True, he denounces facile vis ual. following statement from the introduction to a reader
spatial reduction. Yet his own approach is topical in the sense symbolic anthropology:
of a place�logic that permits him to attach his account to a
few striking themes (those of romance and epic and a series ndamental to the study of s)'mbolic anthropology
of features, styles, and recurrent motifs which are used to the concern with how people formulate their
define these genres). He thus constructs an architecture of ality. We must, if we ar� to unde�stand this and
tale it to an understandmg of their (and our own)
interpretations whose rhelOfK: appeal bears more than a su­
. n, examine thei,. culture, not our theories (and if
perficial resemblance to the " art of memory.'·22 The resuh study our theories, we must study them as "their
IS an account which rises alxwe its crudely visuaiist anteced­ hure"); study their systems of symbols, not our ad
ents. If successful, such description moves the ethnogra­ ()C presumptions about what it might or should be.
pher's audience to approval or rejection, as the case may be, Dolgin et al. 1977:34)
but it avoids calling the Knower and the Known into the
same temporal arena. Like other symoolic anthropologists, One can applaud the authors' intent when, in the same
Boon keeps his distance from the Other; in the end his cri­ ssage, they call for a study of culture as praxis rather than
tique amounts to posing one image of Bali against other orm. All the same, to insist on keepin "their cuJrure" and
images. This is inevitable as long as anthropology remains "our theories" apart countermands I'fle caU £�r {'praxis.=- A
�e one who �tudles It �an only
fixed on symbolic mediations whose importance no one praxis that does not include
denies but which. after all, should be the field of encounter beconfronted as an image of Itsel� as a representation, aild
with the Other in dialectical terms of confrontation, chal­ with that, anthropology is back to the interpretation of
lenge, and contradiction, not the protective shield which (symbolic) forms.
cultures hold up a�inst each other. So far, it seems, fixa­ This is exemplified by Marshall Sahlins in the account
.
ll?n on the symbolIC favored maintaining the stance of the of his conversion to symoolic anthropology, Culture and
Viewer, observer. perhaps !he decipherer of cultural "texts" ; Practical Rea.wn ( 1976). The book is devoted to demonstrat­
The Other remains an object, albeit on a higher level than ing the difference between s}mbolic culture and practical
that of empiricist or positivist reification. The following pas­ responses to life's necessities or the prospects for profit. I t
sage fro� Boon confirms this beyond any doubt: is of special interest here because i t nOt only opposes two
A major interest in the art of ethnology is to convey modes of knowledge and action (in this it is hardfy unique)
a sense of the whole society to fypify it in some but it aligns these modes, very much in the manner of He­
gel, Wilh the differences between what Sahlins calls the Wesl
.

\."ivid. compdling manner. Like any essentially met­

aphorical procedure, ethnology thus resembles the and the Rest.
arts of visual illusion, if one realizes there is no such I n his arguments Sahlins makes am�le use of the . term
thing as simple "realism� and no possible one-to­ primitive. It turns out, however. that he IS not much mte.r­
one correspondence between that which is "illu­ esled in evolutionary distancing and perhaps even less In
sioned to" and the perceptual or conceptual appa­ romantic idealiring. He goes farther than both �hese. forr� s.
ratus by which illusion is perpelTated. (1977: 18) Where the former projects developmental or historical diS­
Having moved to a higher level of visual-spatial reduc­ tance and the latter a ulopian-critical distance from Western
tion, and hence of temporal distancing, symoolic anthropol- socielY, Sahlins introduces an ontological difference: As
 138 The Odler and the Eye The Other and the Eye 139

symbolic and practical reason are IPbolic) reason." If this were taken to its radical conclu­
'� �ought �nd aelion. so are bein two prim
irreducible mod .
itive and beinge:h�l.1 one would have to assert that sense and meaning are
, modes of
hIZed two Irreducible �
eXis . Consciously no found in primitive societies only, whereas \"'estern civ­
symbolic 31llhropoiogislS promote Or
, and orner ten ce
Sahhns is but the result of economic mechanisms and prag­
�ental .oppositions which have left [Taces in almostfun d t,
adjustments. :!3
I eoJogJCaJ �amp of
our discipline. Certainly the natu��a-.}
ev
Sahfins does not pose the problem in such a radical
ru�lure d allsm of the
14 The remainder of his book is devoted to uncovering
.
� structuralis seems to be a Ie 'ti . .
ht;lr to nmeteent? c<=:ntury disjunctstion
ml�s, first by attnbulmg central impc>I1an
an exc�an�e u� primi tive society In Conce
s. It creates a:cJ:�
to classificaliQ )���;�;,,�I�n
b:
semiotic dimensions of our economy" ( 19i6: 165; m}'
other words, he proposes to show that even
American socien' has cuIUlre, i.e., is in some
productJon In ,<\ estern societ)'; second , h)' oppt [0 labor an�
tras " "

osing h,' go\'erned by symbolic reason whose logic is not reduc-

cal ("hot") to a lIsl
I onc . al ("cold") societies and claimingslOth".'
' to prdctical concerns. With that he takes back what his
latter as the proper domain of anthropology. e
thesis states .
Bu � let us take a closer look Sahlins' reasoning. To This attempt at s}'nthesizin� cultural and practical rea­
beg.lll With, he cann t be acc��ed ofatnaIv ete about the origin was doomed from the be g mning because Sahlins tries
and effect of such dIC �
hotomlzmg: , �rrv it out in telms of the disjunction it was supposed to
One evident mau�r--:-�or bou
rgeois society as much
ierco,ne, Throughout, he clings to the notion of primitive
as the so-called pnmltlve--i
s that material aspects
. In fact it is quile dear that he cannot do without it
are not usefully separated
from the social, as if the is to take the first step in his argument fi»· culrure
first were, re�erable to the practical reason. To identify, as he does, in Western
satisfaction of needs by
the explOlt tlon of nature,
� the second to problems the continued existence of symbolic representations
of the re!auons between men
. Having made such a ilar'acte,i<li'c of primitive society was a favorite strategy of
fateful dlfferentia�ion of cult
we are forced to live forever
ural components . . .
, evolutionist comparative method : one is
consequences. . .
.
with the intellectual to state . Sahlins resurrects the doctrine of sur-
�fuch of anthropology can
Little if anything, is gained for our understanding of
su�tamed effOl 1 at synthesizin
be considered as a symbolic if it is opposed to the practical.
.
�tlon. of �ts
: g an oribrinal segmen­ M. Foucault observed, in the Order of 71Iings ( 1973), that
" Ricardo and certainly since Marx, economic theo ry
object, an anal}tic distincti
i',in,
on of cultural
omams I.t made without due
reAcclion, if dearly
on the model presented by
our own society
.-'" through a profound change. At one time, the relation·
�ahip
.
(197 6,20 5) between value and latx)l- had been seen as one of rep­
So fa:, � good . But the history of anthropolog resentation or signification. Value was conceived as a si� of
.
contam I � ?wn Jus y does not human activity (axiom: "A thin g is representa.ble in. umts of
tification. The energy allegedl y spent on work") . Ricardo and Marx redefined the relatIOnshIp as one
res}nth�sl mg �oes n<?t gua
� rantee the success of these ef­ of origin and result: "Value has ceased to be a sign, it has
forts. SaWIT �S himself illustrates this by the way he carries
.
OUt �IS prOJect T�ree-four
�ome a product" (Foucault 1973:253). If this observation
ths of his book is IS correct it throws further light on current anthropological
.
oted to
.
sh�wlng that. \'�rlet les of practical reason, in pardev
ticu lar his­ dichotomies. C,ulQ![e, according to l?redominant 0 inion,
��ncal �atenahsm,. generate theories that are only app lica- relates to human actiVifii.y in .syifi'OOilc'Or selTilotic wa1:; It
� to "estern SOCiety. Primitive societies, we are TeJ!!.e.e.i nts -practical activities but is not studie<f"aSTheir prod ­
gUIded by, and must be understood in terms of, told. are
"cul�ural U£1. �Iins and other s}mbolic anthropologists who sub·
 140 The Other and the Eye The Other and the Eye 141

o­
scribe to this view and who are out to assert the autono­ With these remarks, our critique of symbolic anthr
he
mous, irreducible charact.er of symbolic culture CUt :foI:ogy converges with p. Bourdie�'s .0bjecti<? lls to what
in anthropology (almmg maml� at �renc�
_

themselves off from human �xis, which alone can accOunt jall5 objectivi.sm
f tfte issues are su�manzed In thiS
I
for the emergence and existence of cultural orders. llllls_
tratmg far-x's First Thesis on Feuerbach, with which pre�
faced this chapter. the}' advocate an anthropology for which
JlUUCluralis1l1). �ost ?
pa
ssage from hiS Outlm£ of a Theory of Prachce.
.

OijeCtivism constitutes the social world as a specta-

culture remains an "object of contemplation." t
� prt:'sented to an observer who takes up a "poin
To criticize such "symbolism" is not La deny all useful. Ii "iew" on the action? wh o stands b�k so as t<;' o�
ness to semiotic approaches . \-Vhat should be rejec� the .
"",e it and, transferrmg lilt? the obJe�l the .r r mcl-
ideological closure of semiotic and symbolic lypes of anthro_ a on the lves � It as a

I
.fie' of his re l ti to a �jeCt. canc �
. lon ala11:e, ill which all
pological analysis. That closure is usually aChievea-by as­ finality nte
i n d ed far cog!1lt
ges. .
( seTting the functional autonomy of s)'Illbolic relations and !jIlrractians are reduced to s)mbohc excha�
!Ibis point of view is the one afford� by high I,lOSI-
systems, and by relegating all q uestions that regard their
production, their being anchored in a nonrepresentational irtions in the social structure, f1X?m w.hlCh the SOCial
world of real space and time, to economics (as in Sahlins' ..,rld appears as a representauon (l� the. se.nse of
"practical reason") or to neurophysiology (as in Levi-Strauss' � Iist philosophy but also as used til pamtmg or
-
,"human mind"). the theatre) and practices art:' no more than Wexecu
lions," stage parts. perfor mance s of scores , or the
To insist on production besides, or against, represen·
,Jmplementing of plans. (1977 :96)
tation is not to assert an ontological difference between the
two. There is �ntolo�ical necessity to regard culture as a
producl rather than a Sign. The disunction....m usfb e main­
tained for epistemol<!gical reasons. Proclaiming the sym­
bolic autonomy of culture and practicing some sort of se­
miotic analysis on aspects of it really works only within one's
own culture (as demonstrated brilliantly by R. Barthes and
J. Baudrillard). 'Vhen the analyst participates in the praxis
that produces the system he analyzes, he may bracket out
the question of production without doing too much harm
to his mfllerial. Semiotic analxsis applied to other cultures
(especially when it is carried out without immerson mto the
praxis of these cultures) can only be realized as a form of
arbitrary im}X>sition--<:all it constructing the myth 0 a myth
(as levI-Strauss defines the task of the anthropologist) or
applying Occam's razor (as it is often put by his empiricist
counterparts). Arbitrary imposition worfu-witness the out­
put of various semiotic and symbolic schools in amhropol­
ogy-but only on the condition that the one who employs it
exercises a kind of epistemological dictatorship reflecting the
real political relations between the society that studies and
societies that are studied.
Chapter Five / Conclusions

nt5t fNtrifitd TtkltWIU musl beJeretd to dana by .singing

10 them thtir own melody.
Karl Marx I

AU Imowkdgt. Wknl at the momnll oflis corutilutilm, lS

,.,uwucallcnowltdgt.
Gaston Badulard I

FOR.\fLLATED AS A QUESTION. the topic of these es­

says was: How has anthropology been defining or constru­
ing its object-the Other? Search for an answer has been
gu ided by a thesis: Anthropolo.zy emerged and established
l df as an allochronic discourse; it is a science of other men
Is
inanomeT Time. It is a discourse whose referent has been
p
removed from the resent of the speaking{WTiting subject.
Tms "petrified relation" is a scandal. Anthropology's -Other
is, ultimately, other people who are Ollf contemporaries. No
maller whether iLS intent is historical (idtQgraphic) or gener­
alizing, (runnothttic) , anthropology cannot do without an­
choring its knowledge, through research, in specific groups
or societies; other\\;se i t would no longer be anthropology
but metaphysical speculation disguised as an em?irical sci­
ence. As-!e1ationships between peoples and soaeties that
study and those that are srudie4, relationships bety,.·een an­
j
throRQ1Q� and its ob ect are inevitably political; production
gT
of... knowledge occurs 10 a public forum of inter oup, inter­
class. and international relations. Among the histOrical con­
ditions under which our discipline emerged and which af­
fected its growth and differentiation were the rise of
144 Conclu s io ns Conclusions 145

capitalism and ito; colonialist-imperialist expansion into the jlat were to dominate Western social science in the decades
vcry societies which became the target of OUf inquiries. For at followed.3
this Lo occur, the expansive, aggressive. and oppressive 100- F. S. C. Northrop was an imJXlrtam figure during that
cieties which we coUecth'ely and inaccuratel}' call the '''''est :period. As a thinker who had achieved an astou nd ing com­
needed Space to occupy. More profoundly and problemati_ psand and synthesis of logic, philosophy of science, political
cally. they required Time to accomodate the schemes of a theory, and international law, he radiated the optimism of
one-way history: prob'Tess, development, modernity (and Western science on the threshold of new discoveries. It is
their negative mirror images: stagnation, underdevelop­ jalp0Ssible to do justice to his prolific writings by quoting a
ment, tradition). In shon, gi!f!Politics has its ideological foun_ few passages. Nevertheless, to recall some of Xorthrop's
dations in chronopolitics. ideas will help to clarify our argument aoom political uses
of Time and the role anthropo logy was to play in this. The
tcene may be set, as it were, by quoting from his progr<im­
Retrospect and Summa,)' Iflatic essay, "A New Approach to Politics":

Neither political Space nor political Time arc natural re­ The political problems of today's world. both do­
Ihestic and international, center in (he mentalities
sources. They arc ideologically construed instruments of
and customs of people and only secondarily and
power. Most critics of imperialism arc prepared to admit
afterwards in their tools-whether those tools be
this with regard to Space. It has long been recognized that
economic, military, technological or eschatological
imperialist claims to the right of occupying "empty," under­ m the sense of the Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr.
used, undeveloped space for the common good of mankind Sina customs are anthropological and sociological, con­
should be taken for what they really are: a monstrous lie lIrrtporary politics mUlt be also. (1960:15; my emphasis)
perpetuated for the benefit of one part of humanity, for a
few societies of that part, and, in the end, for one part of Northrop expected much from anthropology and took
these societies, its dominant classes. But bv and large, we initiatives to prod anthropologists into formulating their
remain under the spell of an equally me�dacious fiction: contributions to a new theory of international relations. At
that interpersonal, inteq,'Toup, indeed, international Time a time when he served as the moderator of a symposium on
is "public Time"---there to be occupied, measured, and al­ "Cross-CulturaJ Understanding"4 he professed to be guided
lotted by the powers that be. by two premises. One was the anthropological doctrine of
There is evidence-to m y knowledge not touched upon CUltural relativism which he accepted as an appro riate r
by historians of anthropology-that such a political idea of philosophical and factual foundation of imernationa plu­
public Time was developed III the years after \Vorld '''''ar 11, ralism. The other was his interpretation of the epistemolog­
wit� help from andlropolo � Perhaps it was needed to fill ical consequences of Einstein's space-time postulates. In a
. :
the mterstlces between relatiVist culture garde ns when, after formula he also uses in other writings XOl1hrop describes
cataclysmic struggle between the great powers and just be­ these consequences as "anyone's knowledge of the publicly
fore accession to political independence of most former col­ meaningful simultaneity of spatially separated events"
onies, it became imJXlssible to maintain tem(XIral pluralism (1964: 10). \Vhile the premises of- cultural relativism posed
in a radical way. Theoreticians and a�logists of a new iI�­ the problem (the multiplicity of cultures as s patially sepa­
ternational order perceived the need to safeb'Uard the POSI­ tated events), the Einsteinian conception of relativity sug­
tion of the West. The necessity arose to provide an objec­ gested to Northrop the solution. "Public" Time provided
tive, transcultural temporal medium for theories of change meaningful simultaneity, i.e., a kind of simultaneity that is
 146 Conclusions Conclusions 147

?at� r:aJ because �l is neural a�d independent of ideology Or however, compared to its eventual naturalization
mdlVldual consoousncss.$ With that solution (which, I be. been under way for several generations until it
lieve, is identical with Uvi�Strauss' recourse to neural struc. ��� , ' li,zed in the first third of the nineteenth century.
fi n a
ture) c�\lalness as the /Jr.oblemalic simultaneity of differe nt, lill ; i : � �l � � of Time involved a quantitative explosion of
.

.
confllctmg, and contradICtory forms of consciousness Was chronologies so as to make available enough time to
removed from the agenda of international relations. All. for processes of geological hislOry and biological
� ropology, of whose accomplishments Northrop had the without recourse lO supernatural intervention.
highest regard, \'odS to continue its role as the provider or it completed the process of generalization by
cultural difference as distance. Distance, in turn, is what the coextensiveness of Time and planetary (or
forces of progress need so that it may be overcome in time. Space. Natural history-a notion unthinkable until
.
That IS the frame for an autocritique of anthropologv of Time and Space had been ac­
which might have a chance to amoum to more than a gJoba'J based on a thoroughly spatialized conception
.
confession ?f guilt or to ad hoc adjusonems in theory and and provided the paradigm for anthropology as
method deSigned to fit the neocolonial situation. Let me now science of cultural evoluuon. Its manifest concerns were
recapitulate my attempts to draw at least the outlines of the and "history," but its theories and methods, in­
task that lies before us. by geology, comparative anatomy, and related scien-
I� chapter I the terms of the argument were laid down. disciplines, were taxonomic rather than genetic-proces­
The nse of modern anthrolX'logy is inseparable from the Most importantlyJby allowing Time to be resorbed by
emergence of new conceptions of Time III the wake of a tabular space of classification, nineteenth-century an­
thorough secularization of the Judeo-Christian idea of his· �� :� f sanctioned an ideological process by which rela­
tory. The transformation that occurred involved, first, a � �� the West allti its Otllel', between anthropol.
ge neraliza �on of historical Time, its extension, as it were, and its object, were conceived not only as difference,
Ii

from the cln:um-Mediterranean stage of events to the whole as distance in space and Time. Protoanthropologists of
world. Once that was achieved, movement in space could Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophes often ac­
become secularized, too. The notion of travel as science that
�ted the simultaneity or temporal coexistence of savagery
is, as the temporal/spatial "completion" of human hi tor}, � civilization because they were convinced of the cultural,
emerged and pnxluced, by the end of the eighteenth cen· conventional nature of tlle differences they per­
tury, research projects and institutions which can be called � ���:� 1 evolutionary anthropologists made difference "nat­

�
anthroJXlJo cal i n � strict sense. Precursors of modern an­ �ural," the inevitable outcome of the operation of natural
thropology m the eighteenth century have been called "time laws. ,"Vhat was left, after primitive societies had been as­
voyagers ,"6 a ch�racterilation which is acceptable as long as ligned their slots in evolutionary schemes, was the abstract,
.
one keeps In rrund that their fascination with Time was a merely physical simultaneity of natural law.
prere'JUlsite as much as a r�sult of travels in sp ce. It would When, in the course of disciplinary growth and differ­
. � .
be naIve t? thmk that Enlightenment conceptions of Time �ntiation, evolutionism was attacked and all but discarded
were the Simple result of empirical induction. As the "mvth­ as the reigning paradigm of anthropology, the temporal
� ist?ry of reason '' they were ideological constructs and ro­
.' p conce ptions it had helped to establish remained unchanged.
JectIons: Seculaflzed Time had become a means to occupy They had long become part of the common epistemological
space, a title conferrin g on its holders the right to "save" ground and a common discursive idiom of competing
the expanse of the world for history. schools and approaches. As conceptions of Physical, Typo­
The secularization of Judeo-Christian Time was a mild logical and Imersubjective Time informed anthropoJog'lcal
148 Conclusions Conclusions 149

writing in tum, or in concert, each became a means toward a ritual of initiation, a social mechanism that
the end of keeping anthrop ology's Other in another Time. connections with the substance of an·
There was one hiSLonca) development. though, which thought. Both strategies provide a cover·up,
prevented anthropology from finally dissolving into a "tem. do nothing to resolve the contradiction . Worse, they
poral illusion," [i'om becoming a hallucinatory djscour� ",[met' critical insight into the possibility that those ritually
about an Other of i(S own making. That was the undisputed i confrontations ....ith
. the Other which we call field­
rule requiring field research carried out through direct, may be but special instances of the general struggle
personal encounter with the Other. Ever since, ethnogra_ "",een the "Vest and its Other. A per-sistent myth shared
phy as an activity. not just as a method or a type of infor_ imperialists and many (Western) critics of imperialism
mation, has been regarded as the legitimation of anthropol_ has been that of a single, decisive conquista, occupa·
ogical knowledge. no maLter whether, in a given school, or establishment of oolonial power, a myth which has
rationalist-deductive or empiricist-inductive conceptions of co1np1e"Oelll in similar notions of sudden decoloniz.ation
science prevailed. The integration of fieldwork into anthro­ accession to independence_ Both have worked against
pological praxis had several consequences. Sociologically. proper theoretical importance to overu-helming evj.
field research became an instinltion which consolidated an­ for repeaud acts of oppression,1l campaigns of pacifi·
thropology as a science and academic discipline; it was to and suppression of rebellions, no matter whether
sen'e as the principal mechanism of training and socializing were carried out by military means, by religious and
new members. Epistemologically, however, the rule of field­ �u.c.[iollal indoctrination, by administrative measures, or,
work made anthropology an aporetic enterprise because it more common now, by intricate monetary and eco­
resulted in a contradictory praxis. This remained by and manipulations under the cover of foreign aid_ The
large unnoticed as long as ethnographic research h'as ��f�g��fUnCtiOn of schemes promoting progress, ad-
thought to be governed by positivist canons of "scientific ob­ and development has been to hide the temporal
servation." As soon as il is realized that 6ddworkis a (orm of imperialist expansion. We cannOt exclude the
of communi�tive interaction with an Other.:..... one thaI must to say the very least, that repetitive enactment of
be carried out coevally, on the basis of shared intersubjec­ research by thousands of aspiring and established
live Time and intersocietal contem oraneil ., a.....contradic­ i of anthropology has been part of a sustained
lion. had to appear between research and writing because to maintain a certain type of relation between the West
anthropologisal .....Titing had become suffused with the stral­ its Other. To maintain and renew these relations has al·
egle"S ilfId devices of an allochronic discourse.1:! That ethnog­ coevafTecogn ition of the 0.!tter as the object
raphy involves communication through language is, of 'a,ndl'or knowledge; to rationalize and ideolo ica lly
g
course, not a recent insight (Degerando insisted on that
point; see 1969:68 ff). Howe�er, the im pcu:tance of lan­
�;����ffii;;;i
� i
� ���i
' '· �
has always needed schemes of aile).
The praxis of field research, even in its
guage was almost alwa)'s conceIved methodologtcally. Because
linguistic method has been predominantly taxonomic, the
"tum to language" actually reinforced allochronic tenden­
���� rouliniLed and professionalized conception, never
to be an objective reflex of antagonistic political re·
and, by the same LOken, a point of departure for a
cies in anthropological discourse. I critique of anthropology,lO
There are ways to sidestep the contradiclion. One can There is a need to (onllulate these conclusions simply
compartmentalize theoretical discourse and er:'piric�l �'e­ brutally. At the same time. one must avoid the mis·
search; or one defends the contradiction aggressively, mSlst-. of concluding from the simplicity of effect LO a simplic.
ing that fieldwork is a requisite of the professionalization of of intellectual efforts that brought it about. I n chapter 2
 Conclusions 151
150 Conclusions

I analyzed two major strategies for what I called the denial

: (; :�S ;:t�o� consider links between communicative practices
"' I
::. r conventions) and the political economy: of sci-
of cc)evalness:-Relativism, in its functionalist and culturalist ���,��!��::,�l' � :Time, the real Time of human actIOn and
varieties, undoubtedly has its roots in romantic reactions does seep into the systems of signs which we
ga
a inst Enli$htenment rational absolutism . But romantic as representations of knowledge. We may even
ideas regardmg the historical uniqueness. �f �ultural c:ea­ to consider, following a suggestion by M. Serres, that
tions were only too vulnerable (0 chauvmlst!c perversion.
'",'hat staned perhaps as a movement of defiance, of an ap­
:-::.����up a semiotic relation, especially if it is p�rt of a tax­
!CI of relations. is itself a temporal act While preten�-
propriation of " our Time" by peoples (and intellectuals) re­ to move in the flat space of classification, the �onomlst
sisting French intellectual imperialism, soon became a way ; �,--. takes a position on a . temyor31' slo�uph,n, or up-
of encapsulating Time as "their Time" or, in the form of
taxonomic approaches to culture, a plea for ignoring Time
r.bce.",. from the object of hIS soen?fic deSire
.
. .
The allegation that sign theones of cultur� mevll<I:bly
altogether. The purpose of that chapter was to illustrate ac­ on temporal distancing between the decodmg subject
complished fOnTIS of the denial of coeval ness as the�e ex­ and the encoded object can obviously not be ?emonstrat�d
press dominant trends in modern anthropology. Conunued "semiotically'" such a project would necessanly get lost m
efforts to counteract these dominant trends were, therefore. an infinite �egress of sign-relation� upon sign-rela.tions.
not given adequate attention and this remains, of course, a There is a point at which sign-theones must be quesuoned
historical gap. I doubt that it will be closed soon. As long as epistemologically . What sort of theory of knowledge do they
the historiography of anthropology continues to be the story
of those schools and thinkers who can be credited with the presuppose, or: what sort of theory of knowledge can be
mferred from the history of sign-theories bearing on an­
"success" of our discipline we cannot expect to find much in thropology? Chapter 4 auempts to pro� into such d��r
it that allows us to appreciate its failure. connections by tracing the current promlllence of seml?t�s
Having demonstrated allochronism as a pervasive strat­ and semiology to a long history of visua�ist and }patlall�t
egy of anthropologicaJ discourse, I tried in chapter 3 to ad­ conceptions of knowledge. Specifically, I situated symbohc
dress the problem in a more pointed fashion. Above all, my anthropology" in a tradition domin.ated by the "art of mem­
q uestions were directed to one of �e more powerful d� ory" and Ramist pedagogy. The gISt �f that argument �\'as
fenses construed at about the same tune that anthropology s that sign-theories of culture are theones of representatIOn,
aggressive allochronism became enrrenc�ed: Can �e accept not of production; of exchange or "tra�." 1 1 not of crea­
the claim that anthropology'S allochroruc conception o Its � tion; of meaning. not of praxis. Po.tenHally, and .perhaps
object may be carried o�t �ith impunity be�use that o�J�t inevitably. they have a tendency to remforce the basIC pr�m­
is, after all, "onlv" semiotic? If the Other IS but a semiOtiC . hgn
ises of an allochronic discourse in that they consistently a
Other, goes the argument, then he remains internal to the the Here and Now of the signifier (the form, the structure"
discourse; he is signified in sign relations and must not be Ute meaning) with the Knower, and the There and Then of
confused with the victim of "real" relations. We found that Ute signified (the content, the func�on or �vent, the sy.mbol
a semiotic approach is useful, up to a point, when it comes or icon) with the Known. It was UlIS asserUveness of vlsual­
to analyzing the intricacies of temporalization. Yet when we spatial presentation. its authoritative role in the tran� mis­
proceeded from general considerations to refiexions on tWO Slon of knowledge. which I designated as the �'rheto�tC of
specific discursive practices-the ethnographic present and vision." As long as anthropology I?resents ,its ob�ect pnf!1ar­
the autobiographic past-we found serious limitations. In ily.as s�n, as long as ethnographic knowle�ge I� conceived
both cases, semiotic, i.e., self-contained linguistic explana­ .
pnmanly as observatIOn and/or representatIOn (m terms of
tions proved to be afflicted by logical "leaks" causing critical
 152 Conclusions Conclusions 153
models. symbol systems, and so forth) it is likely to per
siSt �'2tll to be, an acknowledgment of the coeval conditions of
in denying coevalness to its Other.
production of knowledge. .
Above all. polemic is future oriented. By con uenng�
past. it strives to. imagine. the fULUTe course of eas. It
Issues/or Debate
conceived as a project and It recogl11zes that man}. of �e
.
I expect that the sweeping character of this account of tem_ it needs to overcome have been both seif-servI?g 10- •

tefeH oriented and objec:: tive. project oriented. Evc;>lutlOlliSm

.

poral distancin g might be disturbin g to many rea?e�s. �1�

mlenl has not bee n to o ..
m: tpblished anthropoloWcai discourse as �.lloch��OIc. �ut was
q !ss a summary repudmuon of
anthropology. Rather, I wanted to oudine a program for JIIo an attempt to overcome a panlly.zmg diSJunction. be­
dismantling identifiable ideolobricai devices and strategies tween the science of nature and the s:'lence of man. D.lff�­
which have been functioning to protect our discipline from sionism ended in positivist ped� ntI'Y; It alS? hoped to vln�l­
.
radical epistemological critique. I do believe that allochron. tate the historicity �f mankmd . by takmg s�r�ousl}. Its
ism consists of more than occasional lapses. It is expressive --.odental" dispersal 10 �eographlc space. �elau\: lst cultur­
of a political cosmology. that is. a kind of myth. Like other lIism encapsulated Time III culture ga:dens; It de�l\'ed m�ch
myths, allochronism has the tendency to establish a tol.a.! grip of its elan from argumentS for the UOIlY of mankind agamst
on our discourse. It must therefore be met by a "tOtal" re­ racist delerminisms,13 a project that, ,in a somew�at differ­
sponse. which is not to say that the critical work can be ac­ ent fashion, is carried on by taxonomic structuralism.
complished in one fell swoop. All these endeavors and struggles are pres�nt and co­
Such a project must be carried out as a polemic. How­ p-esent with this critique of a?thro}X)logy. To lI�corpor�te
ever, polemic is not just a matter of style or taste-bad taste ibem into an account of the hlStory of allochrol1lslll: ma�es
by some canons of academic civility. Polemic belongs to the them past, not passi. Tha.L!rllkh � �st enters the dtalectlcs
substance of arguments if and when it expresses intent on of the present-if it is granted coevalness.
the part of the writer to address opponents or opposing AnoUler objection coul? be fonnu�ated as fol�o�s:
views in an antagonistic fashion; it is a way of argumg that Aren't you in fact compo� ndmg �lIoc�ronlSm ?y e�ammmg
does not dress up what really amounts to dismissal of the amhropology's uses of Tune wh�e dls.regardmg arne-con­
other as "respect" for his position; nor does it reject the ceptions in other cultures? There IS no Simple way to .counter
other view as dipa.s,�e. The ideal of coeval ness must of course that objection . I am not ready to. accept ule categOrIcal ver­
also guide the critique of the many fonns in which coeval­ dict that Western anthropology IS so corrupt that a�y fur­
ness IS denied in anthropological discourse. This is perhaps ther exercise of it. including its critique by insiders. WIll only
a utopian goal. I realize that certain ways of summarily des­ aggravate the situation. I also believe that the substance ?f
ignatmg trends and approaches as so many isms border on a theory of coevalness, and certaiDly... j:Q�yalne�s as praXIS,
a1lochronic dismissal. For insl.aIlce, anthr will have to be the result oU !l.Ual amfrontatlOD-wi ��
?pologists have used Time of the Other. I am not prepared to offer an opinion
the tenn anrmism (which they invented In order to separate
on how much of this has been accomplished by extant eth­
primitive mentality from modern rationality) as a means to
mdicale that an 0 ponent is no longer in the contemporary, nographies of Time. If there is any merit to my arguments
r one would expect that anthropology, in studying Time: as
arena of debate.1 That sort of arguing from upstream of
historical progress is unproductive; it merely reproduces al­ much as in other areas, has been Its own obstacle agamst
lochronic discourse. I n contrast, polemic irreverence is. or coeval confrontation with its Other. This is putting it mildly,
for denial of coe\·ainess is a political act, notjust a discursive
154 Conclusions Conclusions 155

fact. The absence of the Other from our Time has been his which are passed off as oppositions : left \'s, right, past vs,
mode of presence in our discourse-as an object and victim. present, primitive vs. modern. Tradition and modernity are
That is what needs to be overcome; more ethnography of not "opposed" (except semiotically), nor are they in "con­
Time will not change the situation. flict." All this is (bad) metaphorical talk, \Vhat are opposed,
Other questions are even more vexing. h not the the­ in conflict, in fact, locked in antagonistic struggle, are not
ory of coevalness which is implied (but by no mcans fully the same societies at different stages of development, but
developed) in these arguments a program for ultimate tem­ different societies facing each other at the same Time. As J.
poral absorption of the Other, just the kind of theory needed Duvignaud, and others, are reminding us, the "savage and
to make sense of present history as a " world-system," totally the _pmletarian" are in �ivaleTlL P-Q:sitiollU'ls-a-vis dQ.Dli­
dominated by monopoly- and state-capitalism? 1 4 When we nation (see 1973:ch. 1). Marx Tn the nineteenth century may
allege that the Other has been a political victim; when we, 6eCxcused for not giving enough theoretical recognition to
therefore. assert, that the West has been victorious; when that equivalence; certain contemJX>rary "Marxist" anthro­
we then go on to "explain" that situation with theories of pologists have no excuse.
social change, modernization, and so forth, all of which The question of Marxist anthropology is not resolved
identify the agents of history as the ones that hold eco­ in my mindYi Tn part this is so because we have (in the
nomic, military, and technological power; in short, when we " 'est) as yet little Marxist praxis on the level of the produc­
accept domination as a fact, are we not actually playing into tion of ethnographic knowledge. As long as such a practical
the hands of those who dominate? Or, if we hold that the basis is lacking or badly developed, most of what goes by
political-cognitive interests of Western anthropology have the name of Marxist anthroJX>logy amounts to little more
been manipulation and control of knowledge about the than theoretical exercises in the style of Marx and Engels.
Other, and if it is true (as argued by critics of our discipline) These exercises have their merits : the best among them have
that precisely the scientistic-positivistic orientation which helped to confound earlier approaches and analyses. They
fostered. domineering approaches has prroenled anthropol­ are bound to remain disconnected forays, however, as long
ogy from ever really "getting through" to the Other, should as their authors share with bourgeois positivist anthropol­
we then conclude that, as a by and large unsuccessful at­ ogy certain fundamental assumptions concerning the na­
tempt to be a "science of mankind," "",Testern anthropology ture of ethnographic data and the use of "objective" meth­
helped to save other cultures from total alienation? ods.
Are there, finally, criteria by which to distinguish denial An even more serious problem with Marxist anthropol­
of coeval ness as a condition of domination from refusal of ogy appears when we view it in the perspective of this book:
coevalness as an act of liberation? the construction of anthropology's object. In what sense can
Answers to these questions, if there are any at the pres-­ Marxist anthropology be said to offer a counterposition to
ent time, would depend on what can be said, positively, about the deep-rooted allochronic tendencies that inform our dis­
coevalness. If it meant the oneness of Time as identity, coc­ course? Do allochronic periodizations of human history wich
valness would indeed amount to a theory of appropriation play such an important role in Marxist analyses belong to
(as, for instance, in the idea of one history of salvation or the substance of �farxist thought or are they just a matter
one m)th-history of reason). As it is understood in these es­ of style inherited from the nineteenth century? How is the
says, coevalne ims at recognizing cotem�ralit as the 9ther construed in the anthropological discourse generated
conditioil for truly dialectical confrontation between per� 10 societies which are not part of the \Vest-and-the-Resl
sons as well as societies. It militates against false conceptions complex? Antagonism with the capitalist world notwith­
of dialectics-all those watered-down binary abstractions standing, these societies have built analogous spheres of co-
1 56 Conclusions Conclusions 157

lonial expansion and, more recently, of foreign ald and de_ imposing) motives, beliefs. meanings, and functions to
. .
velopment. Does the routinized world revolution constrU e a societies it studies from a perspecllye outside and above.
different Other than the capitalist world market? 1 6 compliance, aesthetic conformity. or systel?ic integra­
are, as bad substitutes for �i�ectic conceptions of pro­
projected onto other sOCieties. As demonstr?ted by
Coevalness: Points oj Departure �r<J<:be , T, Parsons, and more recently by M. Sahhns, cul­
�
then be ontolobrized. i.e., given an existence arart.
Those who have given lhe maller some thought developed
outlines of a theory of coevalness through critical confron.
tation with Hegel. Here I can DOer lill..Ie more than a few
���::�: so-called holistic approaches to culture result In a
theory of society which, in turn, i��ites spurious
of the kind represented by M. HarTIS cultural ma-
comments on what I consider significant steps in the devel­
�
opment of Hegel's insights. In doing SO I want to indicate
; Se nd, failure to conceive a theol'Y of praxis blOCks the
. . , even for those who are prepared to reject ,
points of departure, not solutions; appeals to the hislOl'Y of a pos-
philosophy as such will nOl save the history of anthropol­ .
epistemological stance, to. perce.iye an.thl1?p?log): as
ogy. There is no need for a "Hegelian" anthropolog y. \�lat activity which is part of what It studies. SCienusuc obJec­
ml!a-be devdoped are the elements of a p r�r fl1)d ma­ and hermeneUlic LCxtualism often converge.18 The We
lenG/ist theory apt lO counteract the hegemony of taxonomic anthropolob'Y then remains an exclusive �Ve, one that
and represemalional approaches which we Klentified as the .
its Other outside on all leyels of theonzlI1g except on
ip
princ a l sources of anthropology's allochronic orienta­ plane of ideological obfuscation, where everyone pays
tion. 1 Affirmations of coeval ness will not " make good" for service to the "unity of mankind,"
the denial of coevalness . Critique proceeds as the negation Among the most scandalizing of Hegel's pronounce­
of a negation; it calls for deconstructive labor whose aim have been those that affirm the all-inclusiveness of
cannot be simply to establish a Marxist ·'alternative" to bi�'���k�i process-its totality-and, a� a consequen�e, the
.
Western bougeois anlhropology, one that would have to beg of the different "moments lhrough which the
for recognition as just another paradigm or scientific cul­ realizes itself. In the Phenomenology o
j the Spirit he
ture garden. : "Reason (Vemunft) now has a general i!1terest in the
This being said, what are the points of d�arture for a ""Orld because it is assured to have p resence m the world,
theor of coevalness? A first step, I believe, must be to re­ or, that the present i� reasonable (vernunJtig )" (1973
cuper.tte .the idea of tOJ.<!Iity. Almost all the approaches we [1807]: 144).
tOuched on in these essays affirm such a notion--up to a To be sure, mat sort of equation of the reasonable and
point . This explains why the (totalizing) concept of culture the present can serve to justi[y evolutionist Realpolitik, which
could have been shared by so many different schools. Prac­ "..ould argue that a slate of affairs must be accepted because
tically everybody agrees that we �make sense of another it is a present reality. Marx criticized Hegel [or just that. At
society only to the extent that we grasp it as a Whole. an the same time he insisted, with Hegel, on the present as the
organism ..a configur.ltion.... a s stem. Such holism. however.
.
frame for historical analysis. Here the present is conce�ved,
usually misses its professed aims on at least two accounts. Il()t as a point in time nor as a modality of language (I.e. a
First. by insisting that culture is a system (ethos, model, tense) but as the copresence of basic acts o[ production and
blueprint, and so forth) which "informs" or "regulates" 3:c- reproduction-eating, drinking, providing shelter, doth �s,
tion. holistic social science fails to provide a theory of praxls; "and several other things." In the Gennan Ideology Marx nd­
it commits anthropology forever to imputing (if not out- icules German historians and their penchant f or "prehis-
158 Conclusions Conclusions 159

.
tory" as a field of speculation, an area outside of present his­ social thought has been his mdical presentism which,
tory. Research imo the principles of socia) organization mUSt in spite of all the revolutionary talk to whICh .Marx a�d. �s­
not be relegated to a mythical lime of origins, nor can it be peci ally Engels resorted, contained the theoretical pos:Hblhty
reduced to the construction of stages. Fonns of social dir­ ror a negation of allochronic distancing. What else IS coe·
feremiation must be seen as "moments" which, "from the be­ valness but recognizing that all human societies and all rna·
gi �ning of history , and ev�r since human beings lived, have
. ";'r aspects of � �uma� s� iety are '.'of the same age" (a dis·
eXisted .nmu�taneously and sull determine history" (1953 :355 f; tinctly romantic Idea, inCidentally, if we remember He.rd�r
my emphaSIS; see also 354 L). This is tht: "1II<tlt:rialisl wn­ and Ratzcl (see chapter I). This does nor me::!n. Ihat. wlthm
neetion among human beings which is conditioned by their the totality of human history, developments did not occur
needs and the mode of production and is as old as mankind which can be viewed in chronological succession. T. Adorno,
itself" (ibid. 356). To be sure, there are problems with the in a reflection on Hegel , summarized the difference be­
concept of needs � and �{arx did re1':lrn 00 phases, periods, [Ween allochronic historism and a dialectical conception of
and stages (even In the text from which weJust quoted) but coevaJness in one of his inimirnble aphorisms: " No universal
the poim is mat a Hegelian view of the totality of historietl history leads from the savage to humanity, but there is one
forces, including thei� cot� m po rality at any given time, pre­ that leads from the slin gshot to the megaoomb" (1966:312) .
pared Marx to conceive hiS theory of economy as a political Hegel and some of his critical successors 19 opened up
one . The same awareness underlies his critique of Proud­ a global perspective onto questions which we raised from
hon: the particular vantage point of anthropolog�" If allochron­
Th� relations of production of every society form a ism is expressive of a vast, entrenched pohtlcal cosmology,
.
totahty. Mr. Proudhon look.s at economic relations if it has deep historical roots, and if it rests on some of the
as so many social phases generating one another fundamental epistemological convictions of Western. cul­
such that one can be deri"'ed from the other. . . . ture, what can be done about it? If it is true that ultJ.mat�
Th� only bad thing about this method is that Mr. justification is provided by a certain theory of knowledg�. It
Proudhon, as soon as he ""mts to analyze one of would follow that critical work must be directed to episte­
these phases separatel)', must take recourse to other mology, notably to the unfinished project of a ��terialist
social relations. . . . Mr. Proudhon goes on to gen­ conception of knowledge "as sensuous-human actl\'lty [con­
erate the other phases with the hel p of pure reason, ceived as] praxis, subjectively." Concrete, practical contra­
he p�l.ends to be facing newborn babies and for­
diction between coeval research and a1lochronic interpreta.
gets that [hey are oj th� same age as the first one.
tion constitutes the crux of anthropology, the crossroa�s, �s
(1953:498; my emphasis)
it were, from which critique must take off and to which It
This is the passage-from The Poverty of Philosophy-­ must return. We need to overcome the contemplative stance
which was to b� a .com erstone for .L. Almusser's arguments (in Marx's sense) and dismantle the edifices of spatiotem­
for a structura
.
hsl mterpretatJon of Marx. In Reading Ulfilal poral distancing that characteri:l� the contemplative view.
he concluded "that it is essential to reveTse the order 0 re­ hs fundamental assumption seems to be tha.t the basic. act
flection and think first the specific structure of totality in of knowledge consists of somehow structuring (ordenng,
order to understand ooth the form in which its limbs and classifying) emnographic data (sense data, fundamentally, .but
constitutive relations co-exist and the peculiar structure of there are levels of infonnation beyond that). Jt matters httle
history ( '970 [ 1 966J;98). The valid point in Althusser's whether or not one ?Jsits an objective reality beneath the
readmg IS to have demonstrated that Marx cannot be dis­ phenomenal world that is accessible to experience. What
missed as just another historicist . Marx's contribution to counts is that some kind of primitive, original separation
 160 Conclusions Conclusions 161

between a thing �nd its appearance, an original and its rc­ mitted to a superorganic concept o f culture, to a Saussurean
,
�rod �ctlon. p,:ov,de tllt:: sranil lg lJOillt. This fateful separa­ model, or to Max Weber's Eigengesetzlichkeit. Tn fl'lc.t, even
tion IS the ulllm �te reasol� for what Durkheim (following vulg-dr biological and economic determinism sh?�ld be a�ded
Kant, up to a pomt) perceived as the "necessity" of cultur­ to the list. Nor does it really mauer-and tlllS IS certatn to
,
ally SLruct�nng the material of primitive perception. lL is scandalize some-that sever.l1 of these schools profess to fol·
, Iow an historical, even processual approach to culture (as
me necessIty to Impose order and the necessilv of whatever
order a society imposes. From Durkheim's theor> of the sa­ opposed to those that stress systemic and s}TIchronic analy­
sis). All of them have strained , at one time or another, to
'

cr� and the profan� to Kroeber's noLion of the superor­

:
game and Malmowskl s culture as "second nature" down to attain scientific status by protecting themselves ag-dimt the
Levi-Strauss' ultimate "opposition" of nature and culture­ "irruption of Time," that is, against the demands of coevaJ­
amhrol?O'ogy has been asserting that mankind is bound to­ ness which would have to be met if anthroJX>logy really took
geLher In communities of necessit\', its relation to its Other to constitute a praxis. Anthropology's
'
� much is clear and readily admitted by most anthro­ allochronic discourse is, therefore, the product of a.n idealist
polOgJSlS who care to be explicit ;lbou{ their theories of position (in Marxian terms) and that includes practically a�1
knowledge. But one issue is usual/v left in Ule dark of un­ forms of "mater ialism," from nineteenth-centur}' bourgeOiS
disJ;Jur.. able assumption� .3!ld that i s' � e Lockean phenome­ evolutionism to cunent cultural materialism. A first and
nalism shared by emplflClSts and rauonalists alike. No mal­ fundamental assumption of a materialist theory of knowl­
ter whethel- one professes belief in the inductive nature of edg� nd this may soum! paradoxica1, is to make c�nsious­
ethnography and ethnology or whether one thinks of an­ ness,- Inaividual and collective) the starting potnt. Not
thropol�bry as a deductive, constructive science (or whether disemFiX.fleil consciousness, however, but "consciousness with
one poSItS a se9uence of �n induClive ethnographic phase a body," inextricably bound up with language. A funda­
� nd a conStnlCtlve theoreucal phase), the primitive assumJ: mental role for language must be p?stulated, not ���se
tion, the root metaphor of knowledge remains that of a dif­ consciousness is conceived as a state tnternal to an tndlVld­
ference, and a �istance, ?etween thing a.nd image, reality ual organism which would then need to be "expressed" or
and representatIon. Inevitably, this eS[ablishes and rein­ " represented" through language (taking that term in the
forces models of cognition stressing difference and distance widest seme, including gestures, postures, attitudes, and so
between a beholder and an Object. forth). Rather, the only way to think of consciousness with­
Frc:m deraching: con�pts (ahS/1'(U:�01/) to overlaying in­ out separating it from the organism or banning it to some
te�pretJ\'e scher:res (t?'jOSlh or: ), from lmklng together (COOTe­
J kind of forum inlemum is to insist on its sensuous nature;
l�ll(m) to 1latchmg:
1. (lsQmmphism}-a plethora of visuaJlr-spa­ and one way to conceive of that sensuous nature (above the
ually denved notiOns dominate . 1 discourse founded on level of motor activities) is to tie consciousness as an activity
contemplative d�eories of knowledge. As we have seen, he­ to the production of meaningful sound. lnasmuch as the
.
gemony of �he vlSual-spaual had its price which was, first, to production of meaningful sound involves the labor of trans­
detempo�ahze t�e process of knowledge and, second, to forming, shaping matter, it mar still be possible to distin­
promote ideologtcal [emporaJization of relations between the guish form and content, but dIe relationship between the
Knower and the Known. two will then be constitutive of consciousness. Only in a sec�
Spatialization is carried on and completed on the next ondary, derived sense (one in which the conscious organism
J�vel, that of arranging: data and tokens in systems of one is presupposed rather than accounted for) can that relation­
kind or another. In thIS ,-espect there is li ttle that divides ship be called repn�'sent:llionl'll (significative, symbolic), or
otherwise opposed schools of anthropology, be Iller com- informative in the sense of being a tool or carrier of infor�
162 Conclusions Concl usions 163

mation. I t may come as a surprise but on this aocount [ find ness. I n the light of what has been argued so far, the follow­
myself in agreement wilh N. Chomsky when he states: ing two passages need no comment:

it is wrong to think of the human use of language The element of thought itself-the element of
as characteristically informative. in fact or in imen· thought'S living expression-language-ig of a sen­
tion. Human language can be used to inform or suous nature. The social reality of nature, and hu­
mislead, to clarify one's own thoughts or to display "!Mil natural science, or the natural science about man,
one's cleverness, or simply for play. If [ speak with are identical tenns. (Marx 1953:245 f.) Translation
no concern fOT modifying your behavior or from The Ea:nwmic and Philosr>phic Manuscripts of
thoughts, I am not using language any less than if 1 1844 1964,143).
sa)' exactly the same things with such intention. If
Only now, after having considered four moments,
we hope to understand human language and the
four aspects of the fundamental historical relation­
psychological capacities on which it rests, we must
ships, do we find that man also possesses " con­
first ask what i t is, not how or for what purpose it is
sciousness"; but, even so, not inherent. not "pure"
used. (1972,70)
consciousness. From the start the " spirit" is afflicted
Man does not "need" language; man, in the dialectical, tran­ with the curse of being Mburdened" with matter,
sitive understanding of to be, is language (much like he does which here makes its appearance in the form of
not need food, shelter, and so on, but is his food and house) . agitated larers of air, soun�s-in short of lan�age.
Consciousness, realized by ule [producing] meaningful Language IS as old as consCiousness; language IS
practical consciousness, as it exists for other men,
sound, is self-conscious. The Self, however, is constituted
and for that reason is reaUy beginning to exist for
fully as a speaking and hearing Self. Awareness, if we may
me personally as well (see Marx 1953:356 f. Trans­
thus designate the first stirrings of knowledge beyond the
lation quoted from Marx and Engels 1959:251)
registering of tactile impressions, is fundamentally based on
hearing meaningful sounds produced by self and oUlen. If A production theory of knowledge and language (in
there needs to be a contest for man's noblest sense (and spite of Engels and Lenin) cannot be built on "abSl�ction"
there are reasons to doubt that) it should be hearing, not or "reflec tion" �riderspiegelu1lg) or any other concepuon that
sight that wins. Not solitary perception but social commu­ postulates fundamental acts of cognition to conSist of the
.
nication is the starting point for a materialist anthropology, detachment of some kind of image or token . from �rcelved
provided (hat we keep in mind that man does not "need" objects. Concepts are products of sensuous mteracllon; they
language as a means of communication, or by extension, themselves are of a sensuous nature inasmuch as their for­
society as a' means of surviva1 . Man is communication and mation and use is inextricably bound up with language. One
societ't'. cannot insist enough on that point because it is the sensuous
What saves dlese assumptions from evaporating in the nature of language, its being an activity of concrete orga­
clouds of speculative metaphysics is, I repeat, a dialectical nisms ,:!Od the embodiment of consciousness in a material
understanding of the verb tf) be in these propositions. Lan­ medium-sound-which makes language an eminently tem­
gua�e is not predicated on man (nor is the "human mind" poral. phenomenon, Clearly, language is n01 17latniai if that
or ' culture"). Language produces man as man produces were to mean possessing properties of, or in, space: volume,
language. froduction is the pivotal concept of a materialis. shape, color (or even opposilion, distribution, divis�on, �tc.).
-
anthrogQlQgy. lts materiality is based on articulation, on frequenCies, pitch,
Marx was aware of the material nature of language as tempo, all of which are realized in the dimension of lime.
�

well as of the material link between language and conscious- These essentially temporal properties can be translated. or
164 Conclusions Conclusions 165

transcribed, as spatial relations. That is an undisputable �nce and that, as such, i t serves universa1 goals and human
Interests, should � difficult if the arguments advanced in
fact-this sentence proves it. What remains highly disput­
!.hese essays are valid , In order to claim that primitive soci­
able is that visualizaLion-spatialization of consciousness, and ,
eties (or whatever repla�es them now as the object of an­
especially historically and <.:ulLurally continge11l spatializa­
thropology) are the reality and our conceptualizations the
lions such ,IS a certain rhetorical "art of memory," Gin be
theory, one must keep aJlmro(X)logy standing on its head.
made the measure of development of human consciousness.
I f we can show that our theories of their societies are our
The denial of coevalness which we diagnosed on sec­
praxis-the way in which we p �uce and reproduce knowl­
ondary and tertiary levels of anthropological discourse can �
edge of the Other fOl' our socletles--we may (paraphrasing
� traced to a fundamental epistemological issue. Ultimately Marx �d Hegel) put anthropology back on its feet. Re­
It re�ts �n the negation of the temporal materiality of com­
ne:wed . 'nre!'est in the history of our discipline and disci­
mUnication through language. For the temporality of , ,
plmed mqUlry lIlto the hIstory of confrontation between an­
speaking (other than the temporality of physical mO'l- e­
thropology and its Other are therefore not escapes from
ments, chemical processes, astronomic events, and organic
emplry; they are practical and realistic. They are ways to
growth and decay) implies cotem(X>ralit}, of producer and
meet the Other on !.he same ground, in the same Time.
product, speaker and listener, Self and Other, \\-nether a
detem(X>ralized , idealist theory of knowledge is the result of
certain cultural, ideological, and political positions, or
whet�er it works the ollIeI' way round is perhaps a moot
questIon, That there is a connection between them which is
in need of critical examination, is not.

. At one time I mainrained that the project of disman­

th ng anthropolog�"'s intellectual imperialism must begin with
alternatives to positivist conceptions of ethnography (Fabian
1971). I advocated a turn to language and a conception of
ethnographic objectivity as communicath·e. intersubjeaive
•
objectivity. Perhaps 1 failed to make it clear that I wanted
hmguag� and cornmun' , ' n to nd tood kind of
praxis in wfilch the Knower cannQUlaim ascendanc:y o�r
the Known (nor, for that maller, one Knower over an­
oilier), AS! see it now, the anthropologist and his interlo­
cutors onl}' "know" when they meet each other in one and
the same coternporality (see Fabian 1979a), If ascendancy­
r,ising to a hierarchica1 position---is precluded, their rela­
,
tionshIPS must be on the same plane: !.hey �ill be frontal.
Anthropology as the study of cultural difference can be
productive only if diffel'enee is drawn into the aren" of di­
alectical contradiction . To go on proclaiming, and believing,
that anthropology is nothing bUl a more or less successful
errort to abstract general knowledge from concrete experi-
Notes

Time and Jnc Ernvging Other

I . 'Ausser de,- Zeit gibl c:s noch tin andc:n::s MiliC i, grosse Vc:randerungen
hcrvorzubringen, und das iSI die
... G
.... .. e ",IL Wenn die eine lU Iang!.;lm geht.
... $0 lut
die: andere liflcrs die $ache �-o,hcr' (Lichtenberg 1975:142). All translations into
English are my own unlcn an English version is cited.
2. T) lor 1958:529.
'

3. The 1TI051 in"uenLiai modern scm:mem of this idra was Mircca E1iadc's
Mydu de ",_I rdOllr ( 1 949). How much the lioear<�dical opposition continues
to dominate inquiry into conceptions of time � shown in a more recent collection
of essays roiled by P. Ricoeur (1975). Similar in outlook and somewhat broader in
KOpc was the volume Man and TUIIl (195i).
4. The point dlal philosophy and me IOci;al sciences miMed the Copcmian
n::�'olution or. at an)' raIl.'. failed to produce thefT Copernican revolution was m;l(\c­
by G. Gu$dorf: 'Aimi la Renaissance: cst vl"3.imem, pour Ie$ sciences humaines, une
ooca�ion manquir' (1968: 1 i81, �e abo 1778).
5. "'or Gur.dmf'$ discussion or B055uel St'r 1973:3i9 fr. See al� an nsay by
Kosdleck. on "History, Stories, and Formal Structures of Time" in ..'hich he points
to the Augustinian origins of Bossuet'� "order of limes" (1973:211-222) and a
stUdy by Klempt (1960).
6. These are connotations, not strict drfmitions ofll1Iivrnal. "£bey indicate ''''0
m'tiDr te ndcncies or intentions behind anthropological search for universals of cui·
tUI'e. One foll()\o's a rationalist tradition and often takes recourse to lingu;stics. The
other hali ..n empiricist orientalion alld seeks statistical proor for universal occur­
r-ence of certain tr.aits, institutions, or customs, The mOlil obvious example for the
fanner is Ihe work of lh;i-Strauss (especially his writing on the elemental')' nruc·
lUres of kinship and on 100emioim), For a statement of the problem from the point
of \iew or anthropoIogical linguistics see the chapters on Ksynchronic uni\'ersals�
;lnd �diachTOnic generalization " in Greenberg 1968: 173. A major rcpresentalh'e
of tile "generalizing" iCardl for uni\'ersals h;u been G. p, Murdoc,k (1949).
7. The continued influence of both traditions will be discussed in chapter 4.
On the rhetorical dC\ices used by Bossuet see 0, Ranwn n his introductioni 10 a
recent Engfish edition of tile Discoors (1976:xxi-Xl[viii).
8. Concise and infonnath'e over\'iew$ o\'er the opening of"human space" and
the processing of that information in a vast literature during the eighteenlh cen­
tul'}' lIllIy be found in the first 'wo Ch.itpl�T5 of Michele Duehet's work on anthro-
 168 I . Time and the Other 1 . Time and the Other 169

�Iog)' and history during the En!ightcnmr'nL (J971:25 rical bias in

-U6). See also a dis.serl<l. is doubtless w; but it mWit not blind us 10 it profoundly anti-hiSl�
uon, " 1l"IC: Geography of the PhilO§Ophes� by Brae ( was not much a VlctOry of the
1972). e"olution. For in one respect evolutio n §()
9. w. I...epenle� (\oes seem to take into acCOUnt this possibilil)' in hj� ill).
I'IOl
portanl euay on Icmpor.dnLion III the cighll�cnth «:
i l
n Ury (1976). As he ICJl� Ih('
:;;o riool style of explanation as a denatunng. or rather naturalization, of the proper

. or,ocicty and history" (1971 :158). .

51011;': the breakthrough into the dhllC':nsion of time responded ' y .n
l causalit
llCl
tQ -empirical pl�,. 17. Kroebcr attacks those: who imoke biological or m«hal �
sure, (Eifaltnm.g.sdrud); the rna<i! of ava;r.abh: data could
no Iollger be com.ained ill 00 explain hi!wry( his term for cultural anthropolog)'). But whc;,n he sayI �n
�pau al, achTOnlC $Chromes. I do 001
filtd Ihis very convincing. especially 1t0i n
('".!Sf! of anthropology, where il 15 manifest liliit tclllporal devices h.we
i the p;,;'e",m 16) "HuU/ry tkaIs lLofU, "ndwrms SIn( IfU'l flOtI. !WI' WIlli MI<St.!
(1915:28I).
been ideo­ � to concur with Morgan. .
logicaIl)' mediatul, 1lC\"Cr dirul responses to experienced
realil�. ruslorica1
lB. A fair and hislOrDgraphic apPl'cciation of ...hal IS cUUOlll
anly
10. The term rpiJI�_
ha,'r' to sa� :about "$pat
....as Inrroduarl by M. Fn"c""h Much of what I
ialilaf" Time has been inspired by a readmg of hi, 7M
...il) �;::':nloge!h�r as "Gennan (Iirf",innism" is another
a ignoran
mauer.. Rl!marls
ce of Ual
that
SOUn:t:!l
0411
r«em tc"tbooh uwally betray dismal IU tntcllccl
a
Orda rf Thing! (1973: origin lt� publi$I'Cd. as &5 Moo d If'S dl(_ 1966). AI

background. C&o� links bcrwttn German KuflurA

rtu-thOlight and earty Amer­
I J . Finl published in 1874 tJ,. the British A!SOCiation I� P�SfM'tlL"'
for the Adv;lncemelll and".opology are all but forgotttn , as is Edward
S�pir'l l>I"Ork, T
of Science. The project goes back 00 ule work of
(!) initiilted in lB�9 (sec Voga 1975: 105).
a commilt� of throe phHicians
. AWlgintJ/ AMmi"all Cuillott: A S/lJdy '" MtIiuJ.d, pu bb he d s
onl)" fiye yean after

Graebner', l\fttlwdt (in 1916). .

12. On th� S(}(lili, Peel dl'lClJsse�
19. For Parsons 5Ce Ihro book �itcd b)' J. Tooy (Parsons
�
$locking 1968: ch. 2, Mor.n-ia 1973:88 ff. CopallJ and
$CC 197 I).
. n.d. [ 1 9 ,8/.
Jamm On Degerando (.tho wl"itten dc Gcrando) sec F. C.
T. Moore'., the re"i\-al of e"olutioni�m in contemporary � iology and anth ropolo gy (19 1 :ch. ?
t�,msJator'$ introduction to the Ellglish edi ion (
via 1967:958. Lcpcnies also mentiolls this work and
l
1969). On the illSrilUtio, see Mor,l. 10); Toulrnin coauthored a major work on con�eptio�s
of:nme (sec T0lI1m�n and
. _
po5lt101l m an elisa)' titled r\alU­
links it to later treatises h) Goodlleld 1961); Donak! T. Campbell �tatcd hI!
Blurncnba.cll, Lamarck. and Cu\·ier (1976:55). A5 recent
. work by J. Stagl $ho\O" . Tal Srolection as an Epistemological �1ode1"' (1970).. Mud! of
�
t e Ha�Luhma. �
ho"'evcr, LUl!\aeus "'as b)' no meam all "anceswr." relUatn $ aU but I �access ble bccaU5C It
He wrote in an euabli�hed controveny and the litera tu re it ge ne rate d l
traditioll whose roolS must be !\Ought ill humanist educatio of the IInpol1ance of e,?lu+
,
nal trt';ltis.es and Ramis! " exprened in " forbidding jargon. For a statement
" method" (Stag! 1980). On Ramism see chapler 4. Halfma nn Idenlltles
tionary argumenl5 iIC'e an C5Sa)' by �laus Ed 097�). (1 979)
U. L White's Tlu f;w/ullon ojCuilutt
C<jllh'alem of Morglln's Ano:icll Sorvty' by M. Harris
( 1 959) has been hailed as "the modeln .
Ihe opponenl5 as Darwinisu \'5,. {lIllal thcorte.
�
sof d�elop�ent. .
�
.
TmlC arl5r'S, �n thropolo 5U In
"'00, ill Ihe Jame sentencc, 20. Howev�r. whcn the ncttS$ity 10 consider
�hows ho", lit�le 11
1II,llters to him Ihat Morgan's historical context wou quile differ lh century. O. Bidney states I nTIu·
. . the culrurnlist tradition !"Clncmbet the eightcfeT1 .
cnl from Whltc s. We are Ioki lhat the Manlv differe remains , hOwe\�r, � to lhe relaoon of
ncc" bctw�n the two works IS .,.�I AnthTOfXJlo KJ: "The prolJlcm still
"the updating of some of the C{hnograph�' alld the lture IS a direct. necessary
greattr consistence of the histotical e_olullOnarv (ulrure to human nature. If cu
�Itural-malerialist lhreac.i·· (1968:643). This is ttPical C"'oIution of culture pat­
HIS taI� l
of an h ropolog) IS confeumal, a&grC5�i\"e, and often
of Hams' hisloriograph\. expr :
CSSlo1 of human'nature, how IS on� to exp�in lhe
emenaining. but my opinion remams IIUiOllibl e u lo�g as on� does
terns in time? In the p roble m
nO( crillca!. Sahhns and Service's EvoluJicn aM CuituTt .
:h� rnay
(1960) and Julian SlC"'ard', not admit that bllTll'lIl n"lure. like culture,
e\'oh'd or unfokl � 10 lime. .
1111'0') of Cu/tur, CItongt ( \ 955) hal"C been among the most inAuential statements be understood on tbe assumptillTl that while the i
n nate bIological potentla ilUdI of
of neoel'olulionism ill anthropology.
man remain more or less constant Iheactual. effeclI\'e psycho phYS�ca1 PO""CJ'5 aod
14. �umerou5 public:uiollj aaCM to a rcnewed illterest n � 1 ;1m suggesting IS compa�
i ViOl; sec for 111- capabilities are subject to de,"elopmcnt in lime. Wh t .
l
Mance he cnlJe:-:llons of eS5a}"5 assembled ill two iss
ues of thejournal Soaal R�r(h blc 10 the eighteeDth-anmry Dotion of the perf ccu .
blht)' of human natute, wh �
(GiorgJo Tagliacouo. ed .. 1976). oontem porary ethnologKal t hou ght
seems 10 have drop ped 0\.11 of the picrure in
15. Puhapes there i5 a tendency, fostered b)' Darwin, to gil'c too
much crecht (1953:76). .
10 L�:clI. The �crI515 of chronolog:. � g:ot"S bad.
.
10
the sixteenth century and courage 21. Radiocarbon dating wa! full)' cstahlished by W.
��
F. (1 949); ItS
' 'der W\

� SpolUO� tJ,·
.
think In mlllloni of )'c;o" wa� dClnonslr ..t.ed br Kant and Uuffon, anlOrl IOt.her" b, sympolJia p�rbl :lnon�
. � a«cptance in ;uu.hrupologr � aided and �
� ule elghtcemh ccmuT'y (sec Lcpenies 1976:9-15,42 ff). of pubhcauon of works b) Oak­
.
Nevcnhelcs5, it remains the Wetlner-Gren foundation. Sy 1964 (the date
lmpot;n t. �t thaI e\'oJutioniSI thought o....ed its tempordl liberdtio
ella whICh perhaps rnOl"C than any
n to geology, a sci­ Ie)' and Butzer) it had atlained no �
tmal iiCicnti� � ua � s (in T. S. Kuhn's U:�S)
Olhel, ;utronOllly exceptttl, con�trlles Time the sense of provi<h�g
on the level of textbooks. While it was !"Cvolullonary III
from sp'lIial rei<ltion and distribution. On predecessors as regards certam
of L}ell, !lCc .Ei\CJe-..· 1961. hitherto unall;linable chronomrtric certailllY, it changed
little
. 16. I'eel �se. naluraJlZ.�ng
in a similar :leose. Although he doc� not develop
Iong.established convictions about the reL1.t ivel '"timeles s"' n aw!"C of early human
l
, y
thIs further, hL� statemen IS worth quoting here: �In by Oakley
.
WIth the pa.'lSage from
an ob�ior.lI sen5(' �iaJ el'O­ e�olution. Compar e thc following stateme nt
�ution ij easily the mOSI timc-orienLed style of i'iOCiolog)', time, in ;Il lost all� rt of lhe
� �
and mally write", CoIl­ Gr.�bncr (1911) quoted above " At the prescnt
mgwood and Toullllin alllong thelll, have !oCen the dominanc� of e�'olutio Ie\'e� of ur w hm shon
nar world , cultures of man)' kin ds ODd \'ilrying �
xlt)' lt
s '
v compl �
modes of thought as a ign of the canquen of sciencc b)' histo Re,"olutlo n was not so. The
ry. Cp to a poin't distances of one another. but WOn! the NeolithiC dlls
 17J
J 70 I . Time and the Other 2. Our Time, Their Time, No Time
i
Portugesc: mi!-Sion to Elhiopi.. n
cultures of the early hunters and foodgathcrers evolva! slowly and their traditions 1be story came to a cooclusion of sons with a
written by Father FraocilCo ."lval"ei, an �traOr.
spread ""idely long before there was any marked change. Where a paleolithic cui. 1520, the account of which was
lUre can be defined and identified on me bas" of sufficiently luge assemblages 01 dinary documellt for the uansition from
myth to ethnography (see Beckmgham
an.if;ICU, it i5 legitimate 10 n"g;;mJ its �induSU"ic5" as approximately comempora. and Huntingford 1961). . .
ith disarming fr.nkness III hiS rroetll
fIeOUl throughout thcir area of distribution. Llntil recently dll, view was bakd 25. Marshall Sahlins U!ie5 ulis fonnula ....
wholl)' on theory, but radiocarbon dating of early an:heologiGll horiwns in Afnca atttmpt to set up a basic opposition betwee
n �praccioll r�5Orl" (the West's) and
my comm ents In chapte rA.
al leaJt 5uppons the conclusion that in pre.f\"aJlithic limes cutur.1I t'\'OIuIKln ""il.� ·culture" (the: R$'s); see Sahlim 1976 and .
textbo o k on reLath> ity theory: "The IlOUOfl thaI
proceeding oomempor.meously O''leT vcry large areas. To mat extent paleolithic 26. Da...id Bohm SCites in a
re of tinlC is only a habit of thought
dHere is one unique urllveT!!a1 order and measu
industries mill" be used as means of approxima� synchronic dating of Pleistocene
dcposiu" (1961:0). Of coune, both Graebner and Oakley basc Ihei,- )I:.III:IIICIII5 on blllit up in the limited domain or NewlO
lli.ou med>a niu" (1965: 115). Ernst �loc::h,
the liule disputed assumption that material, ttthnical products of culture ("indu� � and mathe matics , propose d to extend .th� �OIl()n �f
(iring developments in phy1k
trioes"HhO$e thaI rcsull in a record of sJ1<Uial distribution-are key n
i dicaLOrs of rdati"it)' to human time. We mUSI recogn
ize iu "�lilSticit,... a�
mulupbcllY· Th i S,
e Af nca and A5I� under a � mon
the e'l'olution of human culture tolit an.rt. he argues, will be: the only wa.y to subsum
over the Weuern hnear concepuon of
22. OriginilUy publi!.hed in 1966 and reprinted in Gttru 1973: ch. 14, An buman history without stretching them
arully!is of time conceptiolU in Zulu myth and ritual, based on SchUtl, wu made progress (!lee 1963:176-203). . '
euher, at lc::ut toJudge from K.
'

by I. Srombilti·Fabiiln (1969), Among the writings of A, Schutz 'lei! especially 196i. 27. Apparentl)· it is nO( dead lfl phllo50phy
lly lucid �outhlle of the argument
One of bis more aoceuible esuys, 'Making Music Together' (originally published Wagn's What Time Dr.>t£ (1976). Foc an especia
n
i 1951), was reprinted in the !"eilder Sym/Hilic AntArDpcWgy (j. 1... Dolgin et al.. eds . , from linlC to sp<tee" :\lee lucilS 1973:99 rr.
his obsession "'ith sex. dl"Ugs, race
1977:106-119), \\.11erea! Husserl and Heidegger were primarily concerned WiUl 28, :\1alinowski's candid revelation about
Time as it needs to be thought in the context of human perception and "illlernal caught tht': prurien t interest when (he diary was first pub­
and political chauvinism
l document Wil' o�erlook� by most
conJCiousness," Schutz analYled its role in communication. He state, in !.he conchl­ lished. Its importaoce as an epistemologica
wski carefully recorded 1m struggle
�ion of ule es$lly just cited: �It appears that aU possible communication presup­ (but not by C. GeerlI, see 1979:225 f). Malino
]>OI5eS a mutual tuning_in relationship between the communicator and the addreJr­ of eSQIpe from reality" by rueling no\eb rather than
with " tht': uncreative demon
least twenty times he TeI)()rlS on situa­
see of the communic'.OOn, This rdatiomhip i!. established by the recipnx:al sharing pursuing his n:search work (1967 :86). At
tOO much 10 bear. Once he nOles:
of the Other's flux of experiences n
i inner time, by living through a vi�id pres.ent tions when: the pre:\lent wilh its demands became .
,

LOgether, by experiencing this togetherness as 'We' " (Schutz 1977:118). It is in � I enjo),e d lhing:'l retrospe ctively, as expenences I"\"­
·Profound intellectual lazinellS
becaU!le of my niser.lble s�te"
corded in memory, rather than immediately.
this context of interlubjeclivity and of the pmbkm of shared Time that some of
the iruights of phenomenological philosophy com n
i ue to n
i ftumce anthropology, (1967:35). All this, I believe, is not ani): eviden
�
ce o� Malino�5kl's psy � logical

nts hl'! sU'uggl e wllh an epIStem l prob­

olOgICa
sociology, and also linguistics. Examples for this an: R. Rommetveit's incisive cri. problems ..>ith fieldwork, it docume
tique of generativist hegemony in l inguistics (1974) and my own uappraisal of lem--cOC'o-a.Ines.s
sociolinguistics (t-abian 19i93). This paper should be consulted b)" Traders ""ho
are n
i terested in the practical-ethnographX: probkmalk:s of ntersubjecti"e
i Time.
2S. In a thoughtful book on the inteU�tual history of anthropological re­ 2. Our Timt, Their TiJM, .'\'0 TiJU: c-tntJS Chmitd
.§Carch among Australian "aborigines." K. Burridge develops tllis point at greater
fiber die Zeit ein untruglichcs
length (1973: 1.' fC). HO\O"ever, where I see br� and di:,:onlinuity, he reg;tn:15 I. 'O'berttaupt isl der Primat des Raume5
1962:322).
the Ouistian conception of othemes.s iIS the main continuous sourte of anthro­ Kennzcichen n:aktonaJl!r Sprache' (E. Bloch
pological curiosity. This leads him 10 ascribe a fundamental role to missionary 2. Uvi-Slrau5S 1963:�.
ning of ethno!cientil1c pnx�ure5
practice as a model for anthropology (1973;18, 83 fl. I don't think tttat his vie'" s
i 3, In my own de>.·elopmenl, critinl queSlio
of ume" has been Cfuclal. My
borne OUt by the hiStory of our dnciplule. I"hroughout, Burridge streS:\IeS moral as 10 their ability to deal with the "irnlptive force
omy and Ideolog )'� ( 1 975), one reason why
commitment as the common elemen! of religious and JCientific encounter with the view! are expresud in an essiI)' "Taxon
Other which, in my view, pn:vents him from properly appreciating the intellectual. . s this ;";$lle again. M. Durbin 's paper "Models of Simul­
I do not .. am to addre§
ionw jl975) in the same �olume mighl
cognitive side of it. taneity and Sctjuentiality in Human Cognit
of Time within the confines of a tax-
24, K. G, Jayne notes that Prince Henry the r..-avig-dtor u� the myth of Pres­ be read as an attempt to raise the problem
ter John to jU!lify an enterprise designed 10 "outRank� hlam through the circum­ onomic approach, .
...lIh change and iI
nilvigation of Africa ( 1 970 (1910): 13). For an historical and literar), anal)'sis of the 4. For critical appraisal of funcoonali.\! inabililY to deal
iI
his panisan defense of,func­
Presler John m)'lh as a ·spatial" dream and a utopia before Moore 5«: ch. 5 in plea for the Popperian approach � Jar.·ie (1964). In
doubt, the single most significa m body of theory m the
F. M. Rogen (1961; with referentt$ 10 the voluminou� lite....lture on the su�ect), tionalism (WWithout any
172 2 . Our Time, Their Tim"!, No Time 2. Our Time, Their Time, No Time 173

!(Kia! 5Cieoces in the present cenwryH) K. A. Nisbet ignores CritiqUClI SU(:h as Jar­ o f human rights in 1982. D.,I Cl)ue Kluckhohn in, a cok! ......r c:s.say "Educa­
�ie'J and speaks of functionalism under the heading of Neo-h�Ulionism (� Values. and AnlhropologiCilI Rdati,,; ty" (19621 1952]:286 n.
1969:223 IT). I I. It i s intriguing to note that ill coherent critical aocount of the ......T effort"
'·

5. Su M alino ",�i 1945:54. AI the same timro he �lcgaleS thaI eiemt'lll lo the American anthropology is ronspicu()ll.5!y iIIbtent fmm M. Harris' history of ali­
study of chan� which, with the slraighlfOtWardness that "-ab duracleriSIJC of hUI), I . although hc gi\'es a cur50ry review of 50me studIes of that pcriod
he idenlif.es u amhropology's n:spon5l' to problems of maintaining politial powel I Thc .same holds for Honigman, who mentlOflli "nilltional cbarac­
o,.cr col onized pol)u lations (see 19-i5:4 O. in connection witb Vico. Montcsquic:u. Humc:, and Herder (1976:99 f), iIInd
6. GeoTges Gun'ltch, one of the few wciologists comparable in stature to T. Vogc:t who docs, hOIo'ever, provide an informati\'e section on Kluckhohn's
Parsons, �mmariled his vic",! in a treatISe on Mrial timf'. His -dialectical" orier.. f p",= 01 ·covert" value studies in fh-.: (ulturn of the Southwe5t (1915:<114-<121).
lal>on produo:cd m�igh� or S'c,,1 .lcvi.l. a"d <'ullll'n:".'''�i'''"'''''''- B\.II he, tuu. starl'l iliOn: �urprising Ihal, as f .... ;)$ I can He, none of the .:ontriblllo.... In
from an unquestioned lWumption: Some :IOcirt;n ...re �promethean." i.e., history_ f �:,,::� Reinllenling ItnlhropologJ {l974) felt the need to drag that particular sbJ,c:·
�nd lime-centered, while others. notahly those that are studied by " ethnography," �I of the clo5c:t. Incidentally, no referc:nct is made in lheK books to the Mead
are not (see 1964 (I96ZJ:6). In me end his I� pological appmach 10 the problem and Metreaux manual on whicb I will comment below. One important critical ap­
leads him 10 a5!1ert a relatl\'dt �temporal pluralism.� Similar in approach and intent i� �;:
� : i, focusing on srudM:li of JillpaneK national charactcr by W. La BafT, ""lU
is the excellent, if frngrnent:ll)', essay �On Social Time" by V. Gioscia (1971). Gio. " made by P. T. Suzuki (1980).
!cia. bowel-er, is a...'are of the pollticaJ. nature of social conceptIOns of Time as well But this is onl)' 3 pa'lSing m
i pression. Ebewbere M. Mead sta�d: "These
,ill of the visualist bias �,u!ting 111 theon:ncal suppress ion of Time (see cha pter 4). , n3tioual character srudie5 of culture at a
dIStance rC$Cmble attempt!
7. A valuable summar)' of different genres of anthropological stud ies of Time reoonstnJ(t the cultural character of societies of the past , . . in which the !ludy
{ indud ing a bibliography corltaining refc:renco to most of the important articks of documents and monuments ha5 to be �bstituted for the dir�t study of individ­
and monographs) may be found in the c:s�y "Primitive Time·Re:koning as a Sym. uals interacting in obM-rvable social sitUdtions. However they differ from histOrical
bolic Srstem� by D . N. Maltz ( 1 968). R. j. Maxwell's contribution to Ihe Yakel' N!(:OnstruClion in that, whc:ther they arC' done: at a distan(c or throu gh field·work
volurne is Ie" uKful (1971). To the lin of Fnl1.erian compilation. of (ultural con. in the given nation, they are ba>ed primarily 011 intcn'ie....s with and ob�rvation
(eptiorn of Ti me one could add the three volumes of F. K. Ginzc:l's "Manual 01 �
of liv ing human beings (1962:396). :-.lOte that the a1lochronk intcnl of the stale·
Mathematol and Technical ChrollQlogy" (1906, 191 I, 1 914}-a m isleading title ment is reinforced. not mitigated by uference to living hu man beings.
because the work examines only early historical, ethnographic, and follJori( e\i­ 1�. This iment is expressed in the title of ill papcr by HiIIl! an d William Foote
dence. A paper by W. BogoriU (1925) is remarkable mainly for an early auempl Whyte (1966): Mlnt.eTCuilUra! Communication : A Guide to �ten of Action.� The
to silo"" similant;c:, bet ...·ec:n relativity theory and primitive Time ooncept.s. ."moog teClion on time pro...idcs a catalog of how·to rc:rommendationl for American busi·
more r«eo t ...·ork one could cile Boordieu ( 1963), a "Qo]ume edited by LacrOlX nessmen having to deal with Utin Amc:riclns, Greeks. japanese, and Indi3fiS aoo
(1972), an im portant paper by Tunon and Ruggles (1978). and an essay by Kra· concludes with this anthropologi:al maiapropos: �If )uu havcn't been needled by
mer (1978). The list is by no means complete. an Arab, )'OujUSl haven't been n.eedledn (1966:570).
8. For ill succinct summary of philosophic<lll arguments relating to time and H. Margarct Mead formulated that presupposition as follows: ''Cultural un·
communkatMm _ l..ucas 1975:4<1 ff. dcntanding of the sort discunrd in this Manual gn only be achiel'Cd ...ithin a
9. For instancc by D. 81dney in hi> critique of HerskovilS (1953:423 ff) iIInd frame of refcrence that rerognirs the: internal CO'lSl.5lCfl(Y of the premise5 of each
more recemly in a de'l-aslating c:ssa) by ;';o""el1-5miili (1971). R�je,,'anl ...·ritings b� human culture iIInd al50 recognizes that much of lhis consistcflCy is unCOlucious;
Herslw.its ...·et;c: republtshed. with a pmiti�c introduction, h) D. T. Campbell that is, is IIOt available to the avc:r.l.ge member of the culture"" (Mud and Metreaux
(Hersko\ils 1972), 8ook.length appraisals were given by Rudolph (1968) and Ten· 1953:399 f).
nekes (1971) and above all by Lc:maire (1976). Serious counterargumenlS contmue 15. Perhaps one: �houkl 1'101 elTn attempt a bibliographic nOle (a usc:ful ...·ork·
to be for mulated ...ilh respect to the quenxlO of linguistic relativilY; sec: lhe volumc ing bibliography on i..tvi-5lrauS'i and hi! critic!J-Conlitining 1,S84 title!l-i! now
of CS50iJys edited by PU1XtCn (H:I7b). �ee abo Hanson·s proposal lor "conlextuahsrn'" available: Lapointe and Lapoime 1977). NC'o·ert.heless, here ,HI:: Wille �itk� all pri.
as a mwiation Uc:t""een relath'ism and objtctivism ( 1 979). marily concerned ....ith � systematic interpretation of Uvi·Strauss' work, which I
10. And, oue m ight ..dd, d.e outlook of AmC'rican politics: "Wc cannot hope would Tc:t:ommend for consultation. In English: Lc:ach (l970)-readabl.e but to be
to di>ch;Jrgc: satisfactorily to our�lves or to other peoples the ludership th;1\ his· lillkcn with caution; Scholte ( 1974a), the m05t concise and differentiated imroduc­
tory has forced upon u, at this time unlc:55 we act upon reasoned and dC'arly 51atc:;J tion by an anthropologist: Ros.� (1974); and r005t recently jenkins (1979). In French:
uandards of evaluation. )'inally, all talk of an eventual peaceful and orderly ....orld Simonis ( 1 968) and MaTC.Upianski ( 1 973), the lauer being mainly a study guide.
ks but pious canl or �ntiment:ll fanlitsy unlen there are. in facl, some simple but In German: Lc:pcnies and Ritter (1970). a collective volume especially \'aluable as
powerful beliefs to ....hkh an n.en ho ld , some codes or callons that have or (.111 a study of Uvi-Srrauss' intellC(;D.Jal sources and affinities. Generally, I ha\'e found
oo.ain univenal acceptance." This is not an American president pre;Khing his doc· F. jameson's Tu Prison HfJ!L'iO! of umgwge (1972) to he a mOR con�incing critique
174 2. Our Time, Their Time, No Time 3. Time and Writin g About the Other 175

of strucrur.aJism (including re/aced movemenLS sudl as Russian fonnaiism and the mented, which is one reason wh)' it will be little discusstd in these es$ilYs. See Asad
Prague school). He is eSpcO,aJly insightful ....ith. . regard 10 the problem of Time. 1973, Leclerc 1971, Kuper 1973.
16. Stt Uvi-Slr.I.u.I$ 1976: 12. II shOtl Id be dear thai Ia.1(moIllic is here bring
used 10 designalc an epsleme i (see Foucault 1973 and L..epenies 1976) and IlOt In
a narro.... technical $l:1l5e of one type of dauification (�e Durbin 1975).
17. Sec abo the excellent euay on lb'i-Strau55 and Sarlrt' by ROlen (1971).
Time mid Writing AbQUt tJu Other
18. Ooe of �i-Str3u"' most bmouJ stalCmenu should be quOted here.
Spcilking of myth aDd music, he observeli lhal both require �a temfX'ral dimension
I. Bohm I�: 175 r.
in ....hich to unfold. But this relation 10 lime is of a rather special nalure: il is as if 2. La Fontaine 1962:Fable X.
music and mythology needed IUno:' only in order to deny it. Both, indi!M, Ut "
3. E\"an5-Pritc�rd found it i Urprisi ng that, "'ith the exception of Morgan s '
in$trumentl'l for the obliteration of time" {l970 (I%4J:15 O. Incidentally, when stud)' of the IroqUOiS [1851] not a 'ingle anthropologist conducted fll:ld studies till
i the end of the ninetec'nth oenrur).� He undoubtedly exaggera�d, but his obser­
J...eo.·i-$tnu55 later tries to correct mi5underst.andin� with regard 10 the distnction
.
v,iUon underscored the ni sight that the evenrual incorporation or field Te5C3I"ch
of synchron y and diachrony he reaffirms Ihe antitemporal inten!; see 1976: 16 f.
19. G. Bac:helard ;ugues similariy and concludes: " Subrepticernent, on a rern. into the I.'raxis �f anthropology ",u not 50 m uch due to a need for empirical
lad: la locution durer Mill II �p.s par la locution tUntturtr dam l'tspau el c'est confirmatIOn ru; I( was expressive of the professionalizarion of a discipline: "An­
I'intuition grossiere du plein qui donne !"impression "ague de plenitude. Voila Ie thropology became more and more a whole·time profenional study, and some
prix don! il faul payer la continuite eublie entre la connaiuana:: objective et b field experience came to be regarded al an essential pan of the training of its
connaissance su�ti>,e" (l950:27). students" (see 1962:71 f, 73).
20. I n this respect. Ltvj·StraUQ' po$ition is identical to L H. Morgan's (Stt 4. For a recent statement of this see an otherwise disappointing esny by

the quoution from Morgan, chapter I). Appropriatelr. TIlt E/eme.!ta? StruclUrt:l if F. A. Salamone (1979, with useful bibliographic references to the literature on
KiNAip is dedicated to Morgan. fiddwork). KoUce a remarkable shut in these debal.e$ from a !lCielltirl( orienution

2 1 . Absence of a theory of production is not a mere side effect of a radiGlI.l� inspired by an "Einsteinan i " notioo of epistemology in :'>Iorthrop and uvinguon
taxonomic approach. Structuralism i s a theory of non-JlrodlOdiQ7t: ostensibly. be:­ (1964) toward the communicath-e legitimat ion of anthropological knowledge.
;u an essay. "Language, History and
5 . -'iy own contribution to thIS debate ....
cause it is a theory tailored to oon- (K preindU$triai socic:tieJ ....hich are b<ued on
symbolci exchange; in reality, because: it is a theory produced by a society whose A nthropolog)'" ( 197 1) , ,,·hich occ�sioned an article by Jarvie (l9i5). Bob Scholte
�industrial" phlllse hu long been terminated by ..hal B audrillard calls the �end of contributed se�eraJ important essays (see 19i I , 1974b) ru; did K. D ....
yer (1977. 1979),
production." Al the writinS' of &udriDard show (soe especially 1976) strucrun.l­ J. P. Dumont (1978), B. Jules-Roseue (19i8), "nd D. Todlock ( 1979), among others.
lim as !he theory of the -simulation of the code" can be put 10 U!ie for a s hanering . 6. Too can be done n
i a cntical and fruitful fashion, as, e.g., by Ha)'den

crilique of late capitalist �(ulture" but only 011 the expense ofprimith-e society from �hite (19.'3). His analyscs of historical discourse m terms of metaphorical urate­
....hich it must continuously extract its insights. Levi-Strauss expresses awareness of Ilts penmt , at the very ltast. interesting comparisons between different hiuoriaru.
this in his famOU$ bon mot on ilIlthropology as tnlrOpObJlJ (1963:397). However, ....hen aU discourse on Time, history. ilIld charlge is denounced, rather
22. See abo a statement from the introduction to Tilt Raw alld tJu Coolud. t�an �na�)�, as meuphorical the n::sulu; can be stultirying: sec Nisbet (1969).
"Throughout, my intention remains unchanged. Starting from ethflOgrilphlc 1:1(­ t:sed)udlClOOsly or not, I find lIftt4p1wr to be of limited use for the criticl1ll prOjecl

pericnce, I have always aimed at drawing up an inventory of menul patterns, to of thIS book. No doullt many a1lochronic de\.·ices an:: rnetaphoric-but that is, I am
reduct appat;CntJy arbitrary data to some kind of order, and to atuin a level at tempted. to say, no excuse:.

....hich iI kind of necessity bccorTll:1o apparent. underlying the illu sion of libert( 7. !his has been asserted, inci:lental1r. �boUl "Time and Physical Language.�
i
(lbi-Strau55 I9iO:IO). Aa:Ofdmg 10 Schumacher, ....ho qualifies special relatvity as � � rule of communic:a­
2'. El5l:where I argue that the si l ence ilnd so:ruy surrounding the ethno­ i a fr.amc sepan.ting subject and �ecl, � the idea. of the progrelS of time is
tionft n
i
graphic act ilre comparable 10 the removal of fundalJu:ut.lll ..dl!l.iou," _16 from th.. an outgrowth of the linguistic fornu for physical communkationsft (sec: 1967:196.
everyday sphere. I then ask: "Couk! il be that in anthropology. as in many reE­ 203).
giou, mO>'CIDents, there is a ccruoring-out or its constirutive acts. expreuing (Ofl' 8.""'hat Grei mas has in mind stems to be illu5lrated by Evans-Pritchard ....hen
sciotu or uncorucious elTorts to proteCt the discipline from rcalaing thilt. ilfler all. he 5U1�es: "E\'ery kin� o� sociaJ relationship, every belief, every tC'OChnological pro­
��m fact C\'erythlng m the life . of the nati vet-is expn::ssed in words as ""eD as
it rests on iI hislOricaDy siruated praxis. iI mode of producing kno" i ....hich
.. lodge n
\(1 actIOn. and when one has fully understood the meaning of all the words of their
personal mediato i n is essential and mu51 be 'accounrcd for' instead of being simply
presumed in such fuzzy axioms as 'anthropology Would be bil.ied on field work' " Ian�age ilIld all their siruations of reference Ollt has finished. one's study of the
(Fabian 1979b:25). MXJ.ety" (196201:79 fl.
24. "The (okmial im�vement of British anthropology hu been well doelI- 9. For- a radical critique of claims that historical discourse might, or should be.
176 3. Time and Writing About the Other 3 . Time and '",'ritin g About the Other 177

viewed as self<ontained 5tt Mairet (1974). A 5imilar concern, combined ....ith

(1967), and Palmer's Hn-me1Itutics (1969) pro�ide clear and
�
G�mschaffen
critique of the Mposiuvist illusion" akin to that c"pre!oM:d by anthropologists (roee
' ri��': introdoctions in English. Two recent publications, an historical study by
I�
note 5 abo\'e), dlaracrenzes the work. of B. Yerhaegen (see 1974). The many fac­ :
,:(1978) and a reader (dited by Rabinow and Sullivan (l9i9), altest to
ets of the problem of history qua discourse are discussed in � collectiH� volume i: rec:eption of hermeneutics in the .'lOCiai sciences, including anthropology.
edited b,· KoseUeck and Stempel (1973; also Greimas' essay "Sur rhistoire ��'­
14. See also the rellec:lions on fieldwork and time by J. P. Dumont (1978:4i f)
stt

enemeniidle et rhiswire fondamentale" in that collection).

notice his taking recourse to visual-spatial representation when he reports on
10. Two sentences from Herodotus' Hiswna, chosen at random, illustrate thi.\.
Time and Social Space as Conkx( (ibid., ch. 5). Dumont illustrates my
Notia': lhat they could als.o occur in modern ethllOgrdphies: "The only deities to
regarding "contradictions" between temporal sensibility in doing research
whom Egyptians consider it proper to sacrifICe pigs arc: Dion�"3U5 and me Moon"
�i§ualist distancing in writing anthropology (see ch. 4).
{1972: 14�); Mil is the cuSLOm [of the L)'bian tribes], at a man', frrH m"lTidjl;t;,
1 5 . The process by which mane)' and language, merchandise and informa-
to
.
give a party, al which the bride is enjoyed by each of th� guesh in turn. . . :
become less and less distinguishable had been observed by thinlters at lea�t
t
(1972:329). On �arl� ehnological theorizing, �illier 1972. Examples of rec�nt
•

the seventeenth centur�. K;t:lt', critic, J. G. Hamann noted (with a refere�

Stt

criticism in anthropological t�xtbooks are Vansina {1970, see p. 165 wh�re h� calls
l.eibniz): "Money and language are two things whos� study is as profound and
the �thnographic present a "zero-time fiction'') and And�rwn (1973:205 f).
as their use is general. Both are more closely related than one would
II. This does not cancd earlier remarks on terminological allochronum: it
IUSpect. The theory of one explains the theor), of the orner; i t appeaT$, therefore,
makes them more precise. A furth�r point of clarification: What u gained or
that the)' deri�e from common grounds" (1967 [1761] :97). incidentall)', th� "'as
changed if primitive is used in quotation marh, or preceded b)' .o-wUrd and sim­
ilar dooaimers (see some random examples in Uvi-Straus� which are representa­
· iuen almost a century
...r and a half before de Saussure found n
i the economic
cheory of value a model for h� stTucrural linguistics (see, e.g., 1975 [1916]: 114 f,
tive of a widespread usage: 1966:222, 243, 267; 1976: 19 [in his Inaugural Lec­
157). Data storage and computer U!lC in anthropology are discussed in a volume
ture])? Perhaps these modifiers signal the label-character of the term, its
edited by Dell Hymes (1965).
conventional, classiflGltory function in a technical \'(lCabulary. But di�laimers ma)"
16. On Trill�'� fraudulent ethnography of West·African P)'gmies sec Piskal)'
be indexical rather than referential. I n that case they point to the position of the
(1957); for a useful soHey of the muddled debates concerning Castaneda see
primiti"e in amhropological d�ourse. Who calls the primitive Sf)-lalltdr Amhro­
Murray (1979).
pologiSlS. In that case the modifier may not dissociate its user from anthropologi­
17. For a theoretical discussion of this last point see our estay "Folk. Art from
cal praxis; nor does it soften the blow of a1lochronism. Be<:ause the use of primi­
nI Anthropological Perspecti�e" (Jo'abian and Swmbati-Fabian 1980).
ti"e is not just a matter of definition but expressive of historically estabished
l
18. Dell Hymes considers this in his introduction to
it
&ilWmting .�nJhrupolcg:;
praxis, the term ma)' become a Slarting point for fruitful philosophical analysis
(1974:48 IT) and quotes J. Galtung on "scientific colonialism": ''There are many
i deed, for a general critique of Western societ), (see
(see Dupre 1975: uHf) and, n
""'ays in which this can happen. One is to claim the right of unlimited access to
Diamond 1974), an intention that must also be granted to L.i�i-Strau�s. Yet there
data from other countries. Anomer is to ex.port d"ta about the country to one'�
remains the question to what extent Ihe polilical conditions of established anthro­
own home country for processing: into 'manufactured goods,' such as books and
pological praxis legitimalc: the use epistemologically, even if ethical intentions arr
articles. . . This is essentially similar to what happens when raw materials are
be�ond doubt. For Ihe wider hi510ry ofprimitlVUIfl see the standard worlt edited h�
exported at a low price and reimpm-ted as manufactured goods ata very hig? c�st"'
Lo'"t;joy et a!. (1935).
. (Galtung 1967:296). See also the introdoction to A. Wilden (1972, ''The Scienttfic
12. I beit�e
l that this is iUu�trated by a statement from one of anthropology>
Discourse: Kno....ledge as a Commodity'').
aocestors: "I h.;lve studied men, and I thinlt am a fairly good obser�er. But all
19. G. Gusdorf give!. an aCCQUnl of the rise of modern lingui:!tks in a context
I
the !aJlle I do not know how w see "'hat is before my eyes: I can anI)' se� clearJ�'
of struggle between old and new interp£ttations of the Western "tradition� (1973:
in retrospa:t, it is only in my memories that my mind can worlt. I have neither
part 3). See also Gadamer on the connection between theological and philological
feeling nor undeT$tanding for anything that is said or done or that happens before
hemleneutiCll (1965: 162 ff; basedon an earlier study by Dijthey). Gadamer notes that
lIl)" eyes. Jill that strikes me i� the external lnanifestation. But afteno,aros it all the origins of lhe mooern concept of "system" must be sought in attempts 10 rec­
comes back to me, I remember the place and the time, nothing escapes me. Then
oncile the old and the new n
i theology and in a phase that prepared the separation
from whal a man has done or said 1 can read his thought!;, and I am rarely mi5- of science from philosoph)' (1965:164n2). In other words, �system� always has served
taken" Rousseau 1977 (li81):1l4). a� a figure of thought rdated to Time. Its cun-ency n
i taxonomic anthropology
(j.J.
13. H��II(.1 {much like phntomnwlogy) retains a dlstincdy European­
(and other approaches stressing the scientifiC" character or our discipline) is n
i dic·
continental Aa�or. When it crosses th� Adantic it seems to arrive as a fashionable
ative of a11ochronic tendencies. (We will have more to say about these connections
jargon rather than a Slyle of thought with serious practical consequences. �ev�··
in the following chapler).
theless, there are now s
igns that il begins to have wbstantial influence on the SOCIal
20. The following reflections we� inspin:d by my reading of an essay by Michel
sciences in the English-speaking world. G. Radnitsky's Contin.mtal SduxilI rf Meta.!­ Serres, "I.e Jeu du Loup" (1977:89-104). 1 am grateful to Josur v. Harari who
dtnU (1968, with iaI.�r editions), K. O. Apel's .-4.'lalytlc Philosoph, rf Language and
brought the piece 10 my attention. He has since published an English version of
1 78 4. The Other and the Ere 4. The Other and the Eye 179

Serres' Cisay '"" hith includes the �X{ of La Footainc'J fable �Thc Wolf and the 9. This h�d ancient precedents in the Prthagorran and (nco- ) Platonic tr.JI­
Lamb� (sec Haran 1979:260-276). ditions. lamblichos (who died around $SO AD) rr poru in his book on Pythagor.JIS
thai the master "called geometry 'history.' · He abo notes that his followen avoided
COfTlmOll ami popul ar expre$5iom in their publiCllttioos; nul�r, "following the
-#. Tht a,lier and the Eye: TiN and /he Rhetoric rf Vision cOfl!m,tllld of P),thagoras to be iilent about dr..ine m)'ltcries, they chow: figures of
.peedt wh� meaning remained iocomprrhens ible to the non-initiated and the)'
L Thomas Hobbes, Ltviathon (1962 (1651):21). protected their discussions and writings through the ux of a�-upon �alsM
2. Karl Marx, �Finl Thesis on FeuerbachN (1953:339). (sec lamblichos 1963:97, I I I; my emphouis ).
3. Without attempting 10 document here whal is by now a considerable bter_ 10. NOlice that i n this chapter I concentrate on tracing a general histOry of
lIlUrc Ofl (tdtJw....L 01110.1 mClhuo.h uooe "'.y nOle 11 development from the catalogu.e. ri,...alism. For an account of Rcnaiswonc:c: auempt.l to irw:orporall!! thl!! nl!!,.,ly found
genre of !.he eighteenth and nine lttnlh centuries (see chapter I. nou: 12) toward lavage into such \'isual-�patial schemes as the wehain of beingM see Hodgen 1964:
more and more ngraphicN instructions. ThU5 Marcd Mauss declared in his ManlUl ch. 10 (especially the tree- ;md laddcr-diagr.JImli of hierarchy, pp. 399, 401, both
1'1::Ul'lol gropnlt: " Le premier point dans r�ude d'utlC' sociele oon5iSle a $3"oir de from work! by Ra�'mOlld Lull, one of Ramus' pr«ur5on).
qui I'on parle. Pour (ela, on �ablira I... carlOgraph)e complete de I... soc:il:h� ob­ I I. Sec Goody (1977) on tables, lim, formul ae, and olher de-.ices.
�n'ee" (1974: 1 SI. Notice the maMing of vi,uai-grarhic arnl tabtilar material in lIu:: 12. This evokes, of course, me "medium-is-the-mes.sage� sklgan to which M.
srctions on field methods in the :"Jaroll and Cohen (1970: p." 2) .nri the Honig­ McLuhan', brilliant insighu seem to ha\e been reduced by now. Ong. by the way,
m.nn handbooks ( 1 976: ch. 6); also in the more rreent manual b)' Crrsswell aod acknowledges intellectual debts to McLuhan who in turn builds on Ong's !tudie$
Godelier (1976). Much less frequently d()e$ one come upon �talement5 like "Un­ in his TM Culmbcg GaiarJ (1962:144 ff., 159 f., 162 f.).
denlanding in field rrJearch i$ �cry much like the aural learning of a language" U. &:cause methodology remained tied to the I.m5ioess of disseminating and
(Wax 19i1: 12). But Rosalie Wax does not develop her insight and her own ac­ uansmitting knowledge. Rhetoric aspidDgr>p. incidentall)', was the "narrow door"
count is dominated by the 'patial image of inside/outside. (M. Halbwachs) through which Durkheim-;.IIld wiTh him KlCiolog}-gained ad­
4. See Givner', essay �Scientific Preconceptions in Lock...-, Philosophy of Lan­ mission to the Sorbonne. He was first hired to teach education. His lecturrs on the
�age� (1962). history of higher education in France up to the Renaissance were laler published
5. On "The Sense of Vision 3m lhe Origins of Mode m Scirnce" see Lindberg as a book (Durkheim 1938).
and Stenec:k (1972); 5tt also L indbcrg'$ book 1'MtnYs of \'iSlonj�(}'lII AI_Kind! f() 14. Especially in his Tht
Pram" o j 'h, Word (Ong 1970 [1967]) to which 1
Krpln (1976). have paid liule attention in !hese Cl5a)'S.
6. S« Feyerabend 1975:157 (....·ith a n:ference 10 KO)'Tc:'$ .tudies of Galileo); 15. See Den-ida 19i6. especially part 2. ch. 1. At this point, I am not pre­
Kuhn 19iO [ 1 962J:47 f 5ttms to restrict the imparlance of "debates" to preplm,· pared to confront Derrida's undoubtedly important theses regarding writing and
digm periods. Wilden Ulalyses "binarumw fashionable in anthropology and else· v"'ence. Inasmuch as he seems 10 equate ..'l'iting with taxonomy (5tt 19i6: 109 f.)
where u nder lhe he3ding '"The Scientit1c DiKourse as Propaganda� (1972: ch. 14) our argumenu may converge. .oU regards his charge of Mepistemologiad phonol­
7. Pcrhap5 one should distinguish Je\eral ways in which (opai and topICa l ogismM (against Lb;-Strauss) I would think that hi5 critique is aimed n
i the same
logic in form allthroJXllogical discourse: (I) Thn)Ugh tilM, of�n ..i ·th astonishing direction as my vie...s on visualism.
continu ity down to the beginnings of rew.:ordrd Western n i tellectu"l histol1, phi. 16. On !he ritual·initiatory tharacter of fiddwork see chapter 2; on iu rela·
Iosophers.pluWophn, and anthropologisl!J ha,� rrrumed to the gme common places Ih-ely late appearance ou a required praceice, see chapter 3. I'\otice that in both
(often copyins from uch other)-sa\'ager)', barbarism, can ni balism (see the lateM these ronICXU the point was to litrrss the institution of field I'Csc;arch as a routine,
fashion in boob on thaI topml and certan i tenacious elements of ethnogrnphic i1!!IOIl1ething that was almost ncnellial
i to the rise of anthropology. This indicated
lore (see Vajda 196-1). (2) ....., an, givm tim" anthropologists ha\e been vi�tin8 :Ul(t the �noou, pracliUli integTaoon of empir)' and theory. IrkrMgtcally. it became all
r�iting famitiar imell«t.ual places--m...riarcby. couvade, mana, incest, totem and the more important 10 imisl on a tough. visualisl ideal of scientifIC observation.
taboo. culture heroes. kula, potlatch, Crow kmshlp systems, and !IO on. t�) finaUy. However, thiS was ideologization ".-ith a "engeance Insofar ill our clinging to field­
therr have been allempu to chart topoi-'\1urdock's ethnographk �ple, pre· "'ork abo produced. the aporetic siwation which allowed us to Klentiry deni.l of
ceded by Trior'. dassical study of marriage and descent, is an imtrument foT' !13.­ coevalneu ou the key 10 anthropology's anochronism (see chapter 1).
tistical calculations but a1!1O an atlas mapping lOpoi (see Tylor 1889. Murdock 1949: ]7. T. Todoro\' (1977) tract:! theories of symbol5 to the origins of our West.­
app. A). The Hall and Trager inventor y mar be read as a son of periodic chart ern tradition. J. Boon explorr5 connections belween symbolism and French "ruc­
of culture elements; iLl mnemonic (haracter is obvious (HaIl 1959:li4 n. Even turalism (19i2). R. Firth's 5wdy is the most comprehensive attempt by an anthro­
Hymes' "SPEAKING"--dlC mnemonic summary of components in a speech event­ pologist to provide a systematic uc.tis.r: on �ymbols (19i!). Works by Victor Turner
may belong here (Hymes 1972:65 ff). (e.g. 1967) ;and Ma." Douglas (1966). as well as the writings of C. Geertl le.g..
8. t'or further referrnces LO the tlr.J mnt'lllll
ll i.c.a, to the history of scientifIC il­ 197!). among others, have been inftuential. Geertz, especially, acknowledge! the
lustration and rrlated currenu in the eighteenth century. see upeoies 1976:!2 IT. influence of Susanne K. Langer {e.g. , 1951 (1942)). Therr exists a rrader on sym-
180 5. Conclusions 5. Conclusions 181

bolic anthropology (Dolgin <':1 ai, 1977), perhap! a symplol� of it! aspiring to nor­
"Unesco: l u Purpose and iu Philosophy" (1949). He had been the execUlive se.:­
mal scientifiC 5GlI.us. �"eral works documelll lhc roomy pomu of cOnlan and COfl­
reta", of the Preparator)' Commission 10 t:nesc:o in 1946, Although he irl$isu that
tn" between structurali5m and symbolic approilChe!. see Sperber (197S}, aoo Ba.w.
he is'�I)eaking only for himself he clearly was influentiaJ in shaping policies and,
aud Selbv (1976]. The l"lt"'r, incidell UlUy. cYOkel a related trend, expres.�ve of the
above all, in pro\iding them with a temporal penpecrive, The objective basis for
infl�nc� of K. 8urke, which concenlr.ue$ on the nolion of metaphor and on rh('l.
international cultural politic!, he argun, must be an �e'..oIutionary approach- based
ode models for cultural analysis (ICC the seminal article by FCMlandcl., 1974, and
on MKientiflc method," i.e" a transcultural theory of change, He undoubtedly had
the COIl«lioli of esuys edited by Sapir and Crocker, 1977). A collCi5e o\'uvicw of
anth�opology i
n mind "'hen he Slated that "the neccssary bridg.e betwtt� the.�illm
�symbolic interaclionism," a mo�cment c1osel), related to symbolic anthropology
: of fact and the realm of value . . . can be strcngthened b)' those !IOC1:!1 K1enca
"'as given by Meltz!'r et at 1975, On JJWrboi in social anthropolog-y see Skorupski
...-hich utilize the scif!ntiflC method oot endeavor to apply it to value�" (1949:.:-115).
1976.
4, i'onhrop prnumalJly qualified for that role as the author of 1M Mmirtg
IS. I am using the three-volume SUld)' edition, Hegel. Vor�8e>1 � au
i (1970) refcrr«l lo in the following a'JAt$tllnic I, II, Ill,
ifEm' and Wut (1946) and editor of /deo/Qgicul Diffrrmcn and World Order (1949).
AtJlAttA
Thc tailer includ«l contributions by D, Sidney tThe Conccpt of MeUl-Anthra­
19. Hegel refers to t'ri&edric:h von Schlegel and 10 Friedrich Creu�er, Kramer
v�) and
poIog C. Kluckhohn ('Tbe Philosophy of the Na..aho Indians").
lracU Creu2I:r', influence in creating the "myth of the OrientH (1977:20 ff.).
5:i'orthrop's �ie.... is exprened obliquely in this remark a bo ul. Be�n : "�t
20. See the commentary by Kojbe (1969:134 f.) esp«iaUy the important �_
....as beuuse Bergson assumed that a publit:1y meaningful ocurologlC3 l Cpt'i1eflUC
mark. on Hegt'rs hiMorical Time being COllcel\"ed a' a movement that stans "'lth
correlate of 1IllrOSp«led memory ill impossiblc to find that he relapsed into h15
the future and moves through the past into the present. Kojeve notes " It rna)' be
purely intuitivc philosophy ....hich accounted for imprC5.Sionistic art and the intra­
that the Time in which the Pre5('nl takes primilC)' i5 coemie Of physical Time.
sp«ted private Bo'" o f lime which he confused ,,<jth public lime and called 'du­
whereiU biological Time "ould be characteril.ed by the prinucy of the POI""'
ree," but whkh left no meaning for public space and time, Ihe public C"enU and
(1969:1341'121).
i it or a public self, all of ""hich he called 'fajjificatiom of fact' or the
objecu n
2 1 . I n f;urness to Whitehead aoo to contemporary symbolk anthropolo8151!i
'misuiC: of the mind' � (1960:51). The quotation is from the euay "The Neurolog­
one must ;acknowledge aC!'1llcai intent directed against crude empiricism and p0s­
ical Epistell\ic Correlates of Introspected Ideas."
itivism. A� Iuls been noted by others (e,g., Apel 1970, HabennaJ 1972: chs. 5
6. This is the heading of a chapter on De M;ullet. Buffon. and others in Loren
and 6) thc're are many poinl!i of conUCt bctw�n pragmatic philo»ophy, herme­
Eiseley's DarwrllJ C"'eury (l96I),
neutics, and critical thror), inspired by a Marxist theory of praxis. Roy \\'a�l�r's
. 7. Remember that Mona t igne ended hi-! essay "Des C.annibales" (based, inci.
original and insightful appro;ach to n'mboliution (e.g., 1975) uemplfi cnucal
� � dentally, on com"ersatiom with one of them) with this ironical remark: "All this
and autocntical symbolic anthropology. Sec also V. Tumer's e55aY re\leWIng cur­
isn't SO bad but, imagine, Ihe�" dOll't wear breeches" ("Tout cd.a ne va pas trop
relit s)'mbolic studies (I9751.
mal: mais quoy! il5 ne ponent point dc hault de chauues." See Montai ne 1925
22. Ironican,. in l1ew of the critique expressed here. I mwt express my gr:u­ �
. the
[1595J:248). T...-o centuries later, Georg
Forster noted: �We never consider how
itude to J. Boon for ha\'ing brough t to my ;menoon, with much eIllhusi
�� similar we are to the �vages and we caU, quite improperly. everyone by that name
work of Frances Yates. I also know of his interest in the history and sc:nIlOuc.� of
who lives on a different continent and dOC's not dre�s according to Parisian Fam­
ethnogr..phlC iUustration and I look forward to the �n..lu of his rese-.u-ch.
ion" ("denn wir bedenken nie. wie ahnlich wir den Wilden sind und geben diesen
23 . •
'or a critique of a similar argument e"pounded in another account of
Namen !lehr uneigentlich allem, was in cinem anderen Weltteile nicht parisisch
conversion to symbolic anthropology see my review of R. Rappapon's EaJkiV', geldeidet ist.� See Fonter 1968 117911 :598 f),
Mrolllng, aotd Rtllp,t.(1979). Fah\all 1982,
. 8. On " linguistic Method in Ethnography" .see Hymn 1970; on "Ethnogra_
24. That is done in the writings of J. Baudrilla.rd (whom SJhhn� quotesl. cs­
phy of Communication" Sf'e Schmitl 1975, On epistemological problems with the
i L'idw.ngr SJwtb,,/U[Ut d /a IlIOn (1976). To �ali� that Baudrill rd,
pedall�" in h s
�
1flO,feeds on the primiti\e-civilized dichOlOln)' IS perhaps the
.
antidote�a",lInst
�cLhnographv or §peaking" 3« my paper "Rule and Prooes.s� (I979a).

9, Alth�gh this """. l'CCogni7.ed by F, Fanon and others there i. a need 10

the spell cast by this brilliant ne,,' proponent of "philosophy WIth a halumer" (sa;
remind ourselves of the fact that colonial regimes "aim at the repeated defeat of
S. K, Levine's revie.. of Baudrillard's Alm'or of ProdudWtl. Lnint 1976),
resistance- (see Wamba-dia-Wamba n an essay on philosophy i Africa,
n 1979:221),
On the general issue of sustainccl oppression !lei! S, Amin 1976.
10. This was noted bv many critics of anthropology, especially in France: tee
5. COliciust()IU
the crithl acCOUnt of African Studies by Leclerc (1971) and of tthlloJogy in Latin
Amenca by Jaulin (1970). In a �imila.. vein are the essaYI by Duvignaud 097�)
I. l tnls5e dadurch 1um Tan:(Cn zwingen.
MM<tn muss diese \'ersteinerten Verha
and Copans (1974), More recently. a collection of artides (many of them discussing
i
dasl man iIlnen hre eigene Melodie voningt''" (Marx 1953:311).
. the thesis ofJau!in) ,,',1.5 edited by Amselle (1979).
2, ''Toule connaissance prise au moment de sa constitution est une connalS-
1 1 . C, Gecrtz ("'ith a reference to G. Ryle) po,ited that thought conlisu of "a
lance poIl!:mJque" (Sachd.ard 1950: 14).
, tral1ic III significant S)'Illboh,� a view which Hmakes of the study o f cullllre a posi.
S. A document for the spirit of t/\;1.1 time is all essay by JU!l3n Huxley titled
tive lICiencc like any other" 097�:�2). I suspect that he "'ould rather not be re-
182 5, Conclusions

minded of statements such as the one just quoted since he has been ad�ocating a

hermeneutM: nance in recent writings. Whethu one really can hold both, a rep_
resent;ltional theory of cutru� and a hermeneutk ap�h ill the 50eIUC ill which
for instance, by Cadarntr (1965) is in my \<)ew an open question.
il is intended,
12. A. Kroeber and L White u50ed animism as an ill\'fi:ti�e in their debate6
(see Bidney 195�: 110). Uvi·StTaUSII says about Sarlre's notion of the practico-inert
thaI it "quite simply revi�C5 the language of animism" (1966:249), and in the same
comelll he dismisses Sarlre's Crilitpu d, /a uu,on diakclilflU as a mylh and therefore
an "ethnographic document" (\-,:hal doc. Ihi� mll�e of !\:lrrr_ "primitive"? .se.­
iIl50 Sehohe', commenu on this. 197401:648).
I!I. I am sure that the glaring ab5oeoce of the issue of race from thoe es5a)'li
will be noted. It would be foolish 10 deny its importance in the rise of anthropol­
ogy (see Stocking 1968). Upon reflection, my f�iJure to discu�s race may have
.. t it was not considered � problem
50mething to do ",ith the fact th n
i the (noining
I received (..
nd that may be indic..ove of the rift betwccn iilC3derne and the wider
Amemn society). Apan from offering the lame ellcuse that one cannot spul.:
about evef}wing, I would argue th..t a dear conception of allochronism is the
prerequisite and frame for a critique of radsm. Refutations of racist thought from
genetia and ps)'chology are useful, but thq will not as such do away ",ith race as
an ideologicool and, indeed, cosmologkal concept.
14. Without .. ny doubt. the politics of Time which provided a motor for the
dC'\-elopment of anthropology is somehow COIlnected ..;ith the phenomena ana­
lyzed by L Wallenttin ( 1974). But I see .. major difficult)' in the: notion of s)'SU'm
itself, u.n it ever acoommod ..te coe\-atneu, i.e., a dialectical concept of Time:
N. Luhmann 5C'Cms to think 5(\ but I find till arguments inconclusive to sar the
leiilSt. See his m
i porlant essay "The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal SU-UCruTCS in
Modern Socidy" (1976).
15. And il rem..ins problematic ni the minds of anthropologists whose oeuvre
B commonly recognized ;as Marxill; � the preface to Codelier 1975; see the vol·
ume edite:d by M. Bloch (I975; especially R. Firth's contribution), and the lim.
chapter in Abeles 1976.
16, As far as Soviet ethnology is concerntd, the situation is unde�1' to !oay the
least. We olo'e to Stephen and Ethel Dunn an important Introduction to Sauw E/h·
-..ogrophJ (1974) but thelT inlerpret..oons have been hody disputed by Soviet emigre
anthropologim $uch as o..vid Zifbennan (sec 1976, including rq:.iies b y the Dunns).
17. There are signs that anthropologists have begun to develop elemenu of
,uch a theory, see Bourdieu (1977) on a theory of pnoctice, Friedrich (1980) on
the material-chaotk ioI�11It:'l:1.'j uf lauguiolg", Good r {1977) on the material conditions
of communication, to name but three eumples.
18. In this respe<:t, Bourdieu's qu;asi-synon)mous U5C of henneoeutic inter·
pre�tion and llTUCluralist dec::oding iljustified (5CC' 1977: I), II is another que5tion
whether this does juStice to recent proposals for a critical henneneutic.
19. E. Bloch formulated thoughts onGltidlUitig4ei1 and UngltidlZ�lligMit which
..
re too complell to be deal! with in 1M context. I want to note, though, that
totality was centul tO him and thaI he anticipated the critique: of visualism when
he insist<ed that use of the: concep t of ··tOtalit)' must not only be critical, but above
all non-conlempl..tive" (1962 (19�2): 125).
References Cited

Abeles, Marc. 1976. Antkrapologie rl marxisme. Brussels: Editiol1.'l Com­

plexe.
Adams, Charles R. 1979. "Aurality and Consciousness: Basotho Produc­
tion of Significance." In Bruce T. Grindal and Dennis M. Warren, eds.,
E:;.says in Humanistic Anlhropa/ogy: A FestJchrift in Honor of David Bidney,
pp. 303-325. 'Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.
Adorno, Theodor \\'. 1966. 1\'egativt Dialdtik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Allhusser, Louis and Etienne Balibar. 1970. Readmg Capitd. London: NLB.
Amin, Samir. 1976. Unequal Devtlopmem: An E5.W.Y on tilt Social Formations
if Peripheral Capitalism. Sussex: Harvester Press.
Amselle, Jean.LAmp, ed. 1979. Le Sauvage a la mode. Paris: Editions Ie
Sycamore.
Anderson, James N. 1973. WEcological Anthropology and Anthropologi­
cal Ecology." I n John J. Honigman, ed., Hwulbook oj Socid and Cultural
A.nlhropology, pp. 179--239. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Apel, Karl-DUo. 1967. AmUJtic Philowph), ofLanguage and the Gtisteswi
ssm­
schaften Dordrecht: Reidel.
.

- 1970. "Szientismus oder transzendemale Hermenemik?" I n Rudiger

Bubner, Konrad Cramer, and Reiner Wiehl, eds., Hermeneutil! und Di­
akktik, 2: 105-144. T"bingen: 1- C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Arens, W. 1979. Tire Man-Eatmg Myth. Anthropolog)' and :\nthropophagy. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Asad, Talal, ed. 1973. Anlhrapolog-y and the Colonial Encounter. New York:
Humanities Press.
Bachelard, Gaston. 1950. La Dialectique d� fa durie. Paris: PUF.
Banhes, Roland. 1970. Writing Degru ZLro and Elements oj Semiciogy. Bos­
ton: Beacon.
Basso, Keith H. and Henry A. Selby, eds. 1976. 1'IJraning in A nthropology.
Albuquerque: Universil>· of Kew Mexicu Press.
Bastian, Adolf. 1881. Dir �'orgtlchichtr iler EthrwlogU. Deutschlands Dmk­
Jrmnden geu:idmetfur nne .Ilt1u.ssestunde. Berlin: Dummler.
Baudrillard, Jean. 1976. L'Echange symbolique et la mort. Paris: Gallimard.
Bauman, Zygmunl. 1978. Hermeneutics and Social Scimce. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press.
184 References Ciled References Cited 185

Becker, Carl L 1963 ( 1 932). Tin Heavenl) Gily of rJu Eighful'llh-Ct1ltllry Butzer, Karl W. 1964. EnvinIn1lmt and Archaeology: .-i,t lntroductWn tc Pleis-
Philosophers. l'\ew Ha\cn: Yale University Press. foune Geography. Chicago: Aldine.
.
8eckingham, C. F. and G. W. Humingford. eds. 1961. The PTt$1n JollII of Cahim Inln7ialWooux de Soool�. 1979. Issues on "Tenlps et societe and
' ..

the India. 2 \,015. Cambridge: Cambridge Cniversity Press. ''Temps et pensee."

Benedict, Ruth. 1934. POlltnlS rif Culturt. New York.: Houghton Mifflin. Cam»bell, Donald T. 1970. " �atural Selection as an Epistemological
-- 1967 (1946). The Cltrysanlhcn.um and tJu Sword: Patterns oj japanm ModeL" In Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen, eds. A Hondboolt. of ,wttJwd
.

Culture. Cleve\;md: World. in CuuUTol AIIJhropoWgy. pp. 51-85. Gardt:n Cit),. N.Y.: :'IIatural History
Benveniste, Emile. 19i I ( 1 956] . Prob/m.s
in GmnaJ unguistitJ. Coral Ga­ Press.
bles: University of Miami �5S. Chomsky, Noam. 1972. L..;mguagt and Mind. Enlarged edition. )Jew York:
Sidney, David. 1953. 1"heortrical Anthropology. New York: Columbi.. Uni- Harcoun Brace Jm<anovich.
venity Press. Copam, Jean. 1974. CriJiqtW d politiquts tit l'onthropologie. Paris; �as�ro.
. .
Bloch, Ernst. 1962 [19321. " Ungleichzeitigket und PfhdH zu threr -- and Jean Jamin. 1978. Aux origifW de l'antllrofJowgie franraise. Paris:
Dialektik." In Erbscho/e dim.,. ZtiJ, pp. 104-126. rrankfurt: Suhr­ Editions Ie Sycamore.
kamp. Creswell, Roben and Maurice Godelier. 1976. 0uh/.5 d'tnfUlte If d'onalyu
__ 1963. TiibingeT Ei nUitung in diL Phu()jophit, \'01. L FrankJun: Suhr­ anfliropoJogiqlU5. Paris: Maspiro.
kamp. Darwin, Charles. 1861. On flit Origin c!f Sptaes by MeaN c!f ."'alura! StUC­
Bloch, Maurice. 1977. �The Past and the Prescnt in the Present." Man lion. 3d ed. London: J. Murray.
(",S,). 12,278-292. Degerando, Joseph-Marie. 1969 ( 1 800]. The Observalum of Sali4gt Ptoples.
Bloch, Maurice, ed. 1975. Morrist A1tolysis and Social AnlhropolcfD. lon· F. C. T. Moore, ed. and Berkeley: Cniversity of California Press.
don: Malaby Press. Oerrida, Jacques. 1976. Of Grommalolcgy. Cayatri Chakravarty Spivak,
Bogoras, Waldemar. 1925. "Ideas of Space and Time in the Conception trans. Baltimore, .\1d.: Johns Hopkins Universit�· Press.
of Primitive Religion." AmtTium ,-I.nlhropologist 27:205-266. Diamond, Stanley. 1974. In Starch ojlhe Primllive: A Critique ojCiviliwtion.
Bohm, Da\;d. 1965. The Sp«iaI Tluury oj Rlw.livifJ. :-.Jew York: W. A, Ben­ !\ew Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction.
jamin. Dolgin, Janet L., David S. Kemnitz.er, and Oa\'id M. Schneider, ec;ls. 1977.
Boon. James. 1972. From Synbol.ism w Strl/LWTlJiUm. New York: Harper Symbolic A,Uhroporog;y: A. lUader in tht Stud, c!f Symbols a,id Meanmg. New
Torchbooks. York: Columbia University Press.
__ 19i7, The Anthropological Romance of Boii, JJ97-I9i2. New York: Doob, L. W. 1971. PaUerning of Time. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cambridge Unh'ersity Pre5S. Douglas. Mary. 1966. Purit) tntd Da"�r. London: RoutJedge and Regan
B05suet, Jacques Benigne. 1845. Durou13' .fUT l'histoire 1lI1it:melle. Paris: Fir­ Paul.
min Didot freres. Duchet. Michele. 1971. Anihropologll tI hlS/oire au siicie dl$ 1l1rmires. Paris:
-- 1976. Discourse <m UniwnaJ HiJwry. O. Ranum, ed .• trans. Chkago' Maspero.
University of Chicago Press. Dumont. Jean-Paul. 1978. Tlu Headman aM I: Ambiguit) aztd AmbwaJence
Bourdieu. p.erre. 1963. "The Attitude of the Algerian Peasant Toward in rhe Fieldwurlt.ing Experitru:e. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Time," In J. Pitt-Rivers. ed., MeiJiJerranNln CounllJmnl: Essays in the So­ Dunn, Stephen P. and Ethel Dunn, eels. 1974. Introduction 10 Saviel Eth­
cial A'lthropology c!f the Mlditerrantan., pp. 55-�2. Paris: �outon. nography. Berkeley: Highgate Social Science Research St.:nion.
. .
-- 1977. OId/j'lt of a Theory of Practice. Cambndge: Cambndge Umver- Dupre, Wilhelm. 1 975. RlligiO'i n
i Prirnili'Ut Culturu. A Stud] in EIhMfJhi­
sit\" Press. The Hague: Mouton.
' wscpir.y.
Broc, Numa. 1972. 1.0 Glographie des phiJ&ophes: Glographtl et voyageurs Durand, Gilbert. 1979. Sciroct de fhomme et tradition. Paris: Berg Interna­
fram;ais au XVIJJ� suelt. Lille: Service de reproduction des theses, tional.
Burridge, Kenelm. 1973. Enc(}llnftrTng Aborigines. New York: Pergamon Durbin, Marshall. 1975. "�odels of Simultaneity and Sequentiality in
Press. Human Cognition." In M. Dale Kinkade, Kenneth 1. Hale, and Os­
Burrow. J. W. 1966. Eoolltlion and Societ). ,-I. Study in Victorian Social Tluory. wald Werner, eds., Linguistics and Anfhropolog'J: I'll HunQr oj C. F. VOtge­
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. lin, pp. 1 1S-135. Lisse: Peter de Ridder.
186 References Cited
References Cited 187
Durkheim, Emile. 1938. L'tuo/ution pidagogirpu en France des origines Ii fa
Views of Time as Exprrsud U)' thr Sci/lUes and by the Humanitu.J. New York:
Renaissance. Paris: Felix AlGIn.
George Braz;!1er.
Duvignaud, J . 1973. u Language pmlu. E.\sai sur W diffirClue anlhrofill/o­
Fraser, J . T., F. C. Haber. and G. H. Muiler, cds. 1972. The Stud) ofTime.
gigue. Paris: PUF.
Vol. 1 . New York: Springer. tVols. 2-4 published 19i5-1979).
Dwyer, Kevin. 197i. " On the Dialogic of Field Work:' Dialulical A.nthro­
Freyer, Hans. 1959 [1931], "Typen und Stufen der KuItur.OO In A, Vier­
pology 2: 143-151.
kandt, ed., Handw6rterbuch der $ouoloC'-r, pp. 294-308. Stuttgart: Fer­
1979. "The Dialogic of Ethnology." Dialedical Alilhropdogy 4:205-
dinand Enke.
__

224.
Friedrich, Paul. 1980. "unguistic Relativity and the Order-to-Chaos Con­
Eder, Klaus. 1973. "Kompiexital, Evolution und GeschlChte." 111 Fr<tIlL
tinuum." In Jacques .\taquet, ed., On linguistIc Allthrop% ffY: t:ssa)'s in
Maciejewski, ed., Tluorie der Gtullschaft oder Sozialltchtwiogie. Theone DI5-
HQIII)f of Harry Hoijer 1979, pp. 89-139. Malibu: Undina Publications.
kussil)II. supplement 1, pp. 9-42. Frankfurl: Sunrkamp.
, . Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1965. W'ahrhrit und Alrthode. Second edition. Tub­
Eisele\', Loren. )96L Darwin's Cenwry: Eva/u/joti and Ihe Mm Who Discrn.,',
ingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
erei It. New York: Doubleday Anchor.
Galtung, Johann. 196i. HAfter Camelot." Tn Irving L Horowitz. ed., The
Eliade. Mirua. 1949. Myllu de l'iterrl.fl 1'/101(1'. Paris: Gallimard.
Rue ami Fall of Project Camewl: Studies in lhe Rrlationship Betwelll Social
E\�J.ns-Pritchard. E. E. 1962a. "Fieldwork and the Empirical Tradition."
Sciffler and Practical Poli&s, pp. 281-312. Cambridge: MIT. Press.
In $ocial AnthrapoWffY mw Other ElSaYs, pp, 64-85. New York: Free Press.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The JlIltrpretalion r! Cultures, New York: Basic
1962b. "Anthropology and History." In Social AnthT�ology iUid Other
Books.
__

Ess(J'jJ, pp. 172-191. New York: Free Press.

1979. "From the �ati\'e's Point of View: On the :-.Jature of Anthro·
Fabian, Johannes. 1971. "Language, History, and Anthropology." Philos­
__

pological Understanding." In Paul Rabinow and William N. Sulli\'an,

OPh)' of the Socio.l Scienus 1: 19-47.
OOs., Inurpretive Social ScielUe: Ii. Reatkr, pp. 225-241 . Berkeley: Uni­
1975. "Taxonomy and Ideology: On the Boundaries of Concept­
versity of California Press.
__

ClassifICation." I n M. Dale Kinkade, Kenneth L Hale, and Oswakl

Gellner, Ernest. 1964. Thought and Changr. Chicago: Uni�'ersity of Chi­
Werner, eds. . Lillguistics awl Anthnpology: "� H&/wr rife. F. Vorge/in, pp.
cago Press.
183-19i. Lisse: Peter de Ridder.
Ginzel, F. K. 1906, 1911, 19 14. Hmulbuch der mathematischrn lind uch­
1979a. "Rule and Proce s..�: Thoughts on Ethnography as Commu­
nischrn Chronologie: Da.\ Zeitrechmmgswesm der \!iiIher. 3 vols. Leipzig:
__

nication." Philosvpit)' rif the SOCial Scienas 9: 1-26.

J. C. Hinrich.
1979b. "The Anthropology of Religious Movements: from Expla­
Gioscia, Victor. 1971. "On Social Time.� In Henri Yaker, Humphry Os­
__

nation to Interpretation." Social Research 46: 4-35.

mond, and Frances Cheek, cds., The Future of Time, pp. 73-14 1 . Gar­
1 982. "On Rappaport's Ecology, Meanmg, an d Rdigwn," Currt/lt An­
den City, N. Y.: Doubleday.
__

thropology 23:205-209.
Givller, David A. 1962. "Scientific Preconceptions in Locke's Philosophy
}<-abian, Johannes and Ilona Szombati-Fabian. 1980. "Folk Art from an
of Language." jvumai fGr tht H istory of Ideas 23:340-354.
Anthropolo'gical Perspectiye." In M. G. Quimby and Scott T. Swank,
Gluckman, Max. 1963. Order arlfl Rehellion n
i Tribal Africa. London: Cohen
cds., Perspecti"lm on .i.lI/mean Foil! .i.rt, pp. 247-292. New' York: Norton.
and West.
Fernandez, James \V. 19i4. "The Mission of Metaphor in Expressi"'e Cul­
Godelier, Manrice. 1973. H(Jnwm, ra
I jects marx istl'$ en anthropologil!. Paris:
(lire." Current AnthropoWg) 1�: 1 19-145.
Maspero.
Feyerabend, Paul. 1975. Against Method: Outline of all Anarchistic TheoT)' of Goody, Jack. 19i7. The Dome.ltization of the Savage Mind. C;lmbridge: Cam­
Knmvledgr. London: XLB.
bridge University Press.
Firth, Raymond, 19i3. Symbols: PIIMic and Pn:;mte, London Allen and Un­
Graebner, Fritz. 1 9 1 1 . Methodt der Ethrw/ogie. Heidelberg:.c. Winter.
W ill.
Greenberg,]. H. 1968. Anthropological Linguistics: An IntroductKIIl. l\"ew
Forster, Georg. 1968. [1791]. Ansichten vom ,\ji�derrhein. Collected Works.
York: Random House.
Vol. 2 (;(:rhard Steiner, ed. Berlin: Aufbau Verlag.
Greimas, Algirdas Julien. 1973. "Sur l'histoire evenementielle et l'histoire
Foucault, \fichel. 19i3. TIlt Order oJ Things: An Archeology of the Human fondamentale," In Reinhan Koselleck and Wolf-Dieter Stempel, eds"
Sdrnct. New York: Vimage Books.
Geschichte-Hreignis und Erwhiung, pp. 139-153, Munich: Wilhelm Fink.
Fraser, J. T., ed. 1966. The Voices of Time: A Cooperatil.-'t: SflrJey of .�·-fmi's -- 1976. Simiotique et science> sociales. Paris: Seuil.
1 88 References Cited References Cited 1 89

Gun-itc h, Georges. 1961. lA MuJliplicili d�5 lnnp:s w.ciatu. Paris: Centre de Huizer. Gerrit and Bruce Mannheim, cds. 19i9. Tht Polrtics oj A nthrqpol­
Documentatton Univcnilaire. Qgy. The Hague: MOUlon.
-- 1964. The Sptclrum if' &cliff Ti1fU. Dordrecht: Reidel. Huxley, Julian. 1949. " U nesco: Its PurjX)5e and its Philosophy." In
Cusdorf, Georges. 1968. "Ethnologic c:l metaphysique." In Jean Poirier, F. S. C. Xo.-throp. ed., ldtologit.al DiJftrtnCn and W(Wlt/ Ordn', pp. 305-
ed., E#l1101olJlegbriroJI, pp. 1i72-1815. Paris: Gallimard. !l22. New Haven: Yale l'ni\-ersity rress.
__ 1 973 . L'AWllb/U!flt des Jeienca humtu"rtfl au sitck dn lumitres. Paris: Hymes, Del l. 19iO. "Linguistic Method in [thnograph)': ItS De\'elopmem
ParOl. i n the United States." In F'aul L Garvin, cd., MtU1()d and Theory in Lin­
Haberrllas, jurgen. 1972. K,/UW{cdg., (...wi Human Intam.... London: Kuutic:,). pp. 249-325. The Hague: Mouton.
Hei�mann. __ 1972. "Models of the Imeraction or Language and Social Life.� In
Halfmann, JOSI. 1979. "Wi�nschaflliche Enlwicklung und holutions· John J. GUlllperz and Dell Hymes, eds., DlrtchoTIJ in Sociolinguistics, pp.
(hOOTie," Europ;iiJchtJ Archftlflir S01.ioIogie 20: 245--298. 35-7 1 . New York: HolL Rinehart and Winston.
Hall, Edward T. 1959. The Si!e?lt lLlIIgwgt. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcetl. Hymes. Dell, ed. 1965. ne USt oj Computtrs in AlII.hropology. The Hague:
Hall, Ed",'arcl T. and William Foote Whyte. 1966. "Intercultural Com­ Mouton.
munication: A Guide to Men of Action." In Alfred G. Smilh, ed Com­ .• __ 1974. Rtinvrnling An!h.ropvwg). :"'<lew York: Random House, Vin tage
munital.ion Wid GII/turt, pp. 567-576. New York.: Holt, Rinehart, and Books.
Wimton. lamblichos. 1963. Pythagr;rus. Mich..el von A lbrecht, eel., u·ans. Zurich:
Hamann, Johann Georg. 1967. Schriften wr Sprache, Wolrgang ROdd, ed. Artemis.
t'rankflln: SlIhk..1 mp. Jameson. Fredric. 1972. Tiu Pruun Hou.!e oj Language: A Cn'tical ACCQunl
Hanson, F. Allan. 1979. "D�s God Have a Body? Truth, Reality and oj StrnctIJralism and RUSJum FtmIUllism. Plincelon: Princeton University
Cultural Relati\·ism." Man (N.S.), 1 4 : 5 1 5-529. Press.
Harnri, Josue V., ed. 1979. Textual Strategies. PtrSptctiVLf in PrJSt·Stn.clllr­ Jarvie, I..n C. 1964. The Rroolution in AnlhrofxJlogy . New York: Humanities
mill Crilias",. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Press.
Harn�, Man'in. 1968. Tiu R� ofA:llthTOfJOloiml Theory. New York: Thomas __ 1975. �[pistle to the .'\nthrojX)logists." .immcan Anthropolbgisl 77:25�
Y. Crowell. 266.
Hegel. G. F. w. 1969 11830]. En:'Jklopiidit dtrphilru.ophi.Jchen WrumschoJun Jaulin. R. 1970. La Paix blancht. Paris: Scuil.
im Grund�. Friedheim :"IIicolin and Ouo POggt'!ler, eds. Berlin : Ab­ Jayne. K. G. 1970 ( 1 9 IOJ. Vasco da Cama and His SuatsSiWs 1460-1580.
demie Verlag. Xew York: Barnes and Noble.
-- 19iO ( 1 835]. Vorlmmgt1l r iber dit A.eslhtlik. 3 \'ols. Frankrurt: Suhr­ Jenkill!l, Ala.n. 1979. Tiu Social Thtmy oj Clnude LillI-Strauss. London:
kamp. Macmillan.
-- J9iS ( 1807). PhdnMNtnoicgie des Crislts. Gerhard Gahkr, ed. Frank· Jules-Roseue, Benneua. 1978. "The Veil of Objectivity: Prophecy. Divi­
furt: Cllstein. niltion and Social Inquiry." American Anthropologist 80:549-570.
Herodotus. 19'72. The HisroritJ. Aubrey de selincourt, trans. Baltimore: KJcOlpt. Adalbert. 1960. Die Sakulmisitrllng dtr ulliverS41-hislfJrisclr.en _iuf­
Penguin Books. Jauung. Zum Wandtl tIls GtSChlclusdtnilnu im 16. Ilnd 17. Jahrhunderl.
Hcr�koviu, MeI\'iIle J. 1972. Cultu.ml Re/al;..,ism: P(!r��hl'e5 III Cul'uMl Couingen: MUHerschmidt.
PluTllli5l1l. Frances Hersko\its, ed. New York: Random Home. Kluckhohn, Clyde. 1962. Cull!Jre and Beltauior. Richard Kluckhohn. ed.
HistQr)' a'id Theory. 1966. lJutory and tht C o ru:tpl of Tim#!. Beiheft 6. Middle­ New York.: Free Press.
town, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. KojeYe, Alexandre. 1969. II1Jroducti011 to liu Reading oj Hegel. �ew York:
Hobbes, Thomas. 1962 [ 1651]. Leviathall ur the Malltr, Furme amt Pl)'wtr of Basic Books.
a CQlnrnonwtalth Ecclt5ittllit.al and Croil. Michael Oakeshou, ed. �ew York: Koselleck. Reinhart. 1973. "Geschichte, Geschichtcn und formale Zeit­
Col lier. struckturcn." In Reinhart Kosellcck. and Wolr-Dieter Stempel, cds ..
Hodgen, Margaret E. 1 964. Early A.lIthropoiogy III !ht S'XUttI!h and Sevm­ Gmhichte-Ertignis lind Erziihlung, pp. 21 1-222. Munich: Wilhelm
tum!! Crnwrin. Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl\'ania Press. Fink.
Honigmann, John J. 1976. Tht J)n,tlupmrnt ofAnthropowgiml ldtaJ. Home­ Kosel1eck, Reinhart and Wolf-Dieter Steml)tl, eds. 1973. Geschiclut-Er­
wood. lit.: Dorsey. tiglll.I wid En.iih.lllng. Munich: Wilhelm Fink.
190 References Cited References Ciled 191

Kramer, frilz. 19 77 . Vtrkhrte Wt{lm. Zur imagirUirrn EthnQgraphie des /9. Levine, S . K. 197 6. "Review of J. Baudrillard, Tht MirTor of Produetion. "
Jahrhurukr15. Frankfurt: Syndikat. Dia]l(tica{ Anthropolcg;j 1:395-397.
-- 1978. "Ober Zeit, Genealogie und 50Iidarische Beziehung." In Fritz Libby, W. F. 1949. RadiocarW'l Dating. Chicago : L1niversity of Chicago
Kramer and Christian Sigrist, eels., Gutlhchaflni oknt Staal. Vol 2: Ct· Press.
nta10git und Solidaritiit, pp. 9-27. Frankfurt: Syndikat. Lichtenberg, �rg Christoph. 1975. lVtr4t /II tinl7ll Band. Hans Fried­
Kr�ber, Alfred. 1915. "The Eighteen Professions," Arneritan ;\mhrapolo­ erici, ed. Berlin: Aufbau Vtrlag.
gist 17:28�-289. Lindberg, David C. 1976. Thlorils if Visi&rl from AI·Kindi to Kepler. Chi·
Kubler. George. 1962. 7'1u ShajH of Ti�. Rnnarlts 1111 the Hi.itory of ThinKS. cago: Uni�ersiL}' of Chicago Press.
New Haven: Yale Uni\'ersiry Press. Lindberg, Da\'id C. and Nicholali H. Steneck. 1972. 'The Sense of Vision
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. TM StructuTt of ScinlJifi' RI!'I.'Olu/r(1llS. Second en­ and the Origins of :\'Iodern Science" I n Allen G. Debus, ed., Sritmt,
larged edilKm. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mtdicint O11d Soati)' in tht Re?Uli.sJanu: EssaJ5 to Honor Waittr Pagtl. 1 : 29-
Kuper. Adam. 1973. A rlihropolQgUt.> and .-lnlhrajJo{og]. Tiu Bn"tish School, 45. New York: Science HisLOry Publications.
1922 -1972. London: Allen Lane. Locke, John. 1964 ( 1689). A n Essay Cancerning H1Hn.an Understanding.
Lacroix, Pierre.Francis. ed. 1972. L 'Exprt.ssion du lemps tiHiS qutlqu� ian­ A. D. Woozley, ed. New York: Meridian.
gtU.J de ['(JUtst africain. Paris: Setaf. Lo\'ejoy, Arthur 0., Gilbert OIinard. George Boas, and Ronald S. Crane.
La Fomaine. 1962. Fabl� (hoisin moo en VeT.!. Paris: Gamier F�res. eds. 1935. A. Docu7flnllmy Histo'J of Primilwtsm and RtJaItd Idras. Balti­
Langer, Susanne K. 1 9 5 1 . Philosoph)' i'l a New Key. t\ Study 1'1 the SJ1'IbollSm more, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
of Rea.lOn, Rite, and the Aru. New York: Memor Books. Lucas, J. R. 1973. It Trtatm on Time and Space. London: Methuen.
Lapointe, Fran�is H. and Claire C. Lapointe. 1977. Claude Liuj·StTa!.W Luhmann , Niklas. 1976. "The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Struc­
and His Crincs. New York: Garland. i :\'Iodern Society." SoclCll R'Mau:h 43: 130-152.
lUres n
leach, E. R. 1954. Po/meal SFtems oj Highknld Burma: A stud] of Kaehin Lyell, Charles. 1830. Primipkl of GtoWKJ· London: J. :\oIurray.
Social Structure. London: Cohen and West. MafTesoli, Michel, ed. 1980. LtJ Galarie Il, rimagnwiTt'. Paris: Berg Inter­
-- 1970. Claude LM·Straws. :-Jew York: Viking. national.
-- 1976. Culure
t and Commtmication. Cambridge: Cambridge l.'ni\"ersity Mairet, Gerard. 1974. U DiscllUrS tt fhistoriqut. Essai rur /.a rrprisentatum
Press. historirnru du temps. p..,uis: Marne.
Leclerc, Gerard. 1971. Anlhrf1/HJlop It cololllalisnte: &sal sur I'histoire 11, Malinowski. Bronislaw. 1 945 . Tfu DyrIamics if' Culture Change: An Inquiry
l'afrironWite. Paris: Fayard. into Race Rdlltioru III AfriLG. Phyllis M. Kaberry. ed. ::-Je�' Haven : Yale
-- 1979. L'Observation lk I'hcmml: UIU hisWirt des mquillJ .rocialls. Paris: Universi ty Press.
Seuil. -_. 1967. A Dial) in tht Strict Sense of tht Term. New York: Harcourt,
Lemaire, Ton. 1976. Over fk W(J41"dt val1 4uJlurtn. Baarn: Ambo. Brace, and World.
Lepenies. Wolf. 1 976. Dos Ef'Ilk tkr- ,VaJurgtKhiehtl. Munich: C. Hanser. Maltz, D. K. 1968. "Primiti\'e Time·Reckoning as a Symbolic System."
Lepenies, Woif and H. H. Ritter, eds. 1970. Ortt drs Wildtll Dl1IArns. Zllr Comal Journal of SocitlJ RllDlioJlS 3:85-1 1 1 .
AnthropoJcgit von Claude Livi-StTallS$. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Mall and Tlmr. 1957. Papers from Ihe Eranru Y,arbooAs J. Bollingrn Snits JO.
Levi·Strauss, Claude. 1963. Tristes Tropiquts: An Anthropdlogical Study of New York: Pantheon Books.
Primitiw Socittit.> in Brau'l. New York: Atheneum. Marc+Lipansky,
l Mireille. 1973. U SlrIJCruraiisme de U!.;·S',UIID. Pari�:
-- 1966. Tiu Savage Mind. Chicago: L'niversity of Chicago Press. Payol.
-- 1967. Strw:tural Anthr"fHJiogJ. New York: Doubleday Anchor. Marx. Karl. 1953. Oil Frii.hschriftm. Stegfried landshut, ed. Stuttgan: A.
-- 1968. L'Origint tks rnlmiirrs de tab/,. Myllwlogiqurs 111. Paris: Pion. Kroner.
-- 1969 [1949]. Tiu Elementary ShUaurtJ oj Ki1Uhip. BOSlOn: Beacon -- 1964. Tht Economic and Philosophi£ Manuscript.5 of 1844 . Dirk Struik,
Press. ed. �ew York: International.
-- 1970. Tfu Raw and tht Cooktd. IntToductio'l to II Scier.ce uf .�fJtholcg)' I. :\oIarx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1959. Marx and Engtll: Basic. Writings
New York: Harper Torchbooks. on Polilia a'uf Philruoph,. Lewis S. Feuer, ed. Garden Cit}" �.Y.; Dou­
-- 1976. Struetura/ Anlhroporogy II. New York: Basic Books. bleday.
192 References Cited References Ciled 193

Mauss, Marcel. 19i4. Manud d'dhnographit. Paris: Payot. Nowell-Smith. P. H. 1971. �Cultural Relativism." Philosoph)' of tilt Social
Maxwell, Roben J. 1971. "Anthropological Perspeclh..es 011 Time : In '
Sckru:es l : l-li,
Henri Yaker. Humphry Osmond. and Frances Cheek, eds., Tht: Future Oakley. Kenneth P. 1964. FmmetJ.'Of'ltfOt' Dating FOJJil Marl. Chicago: AI­
tfTj",�, pp. 36-72. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. dine.
.\fcLuhan. Marshall. 1962. 'flu Gutenberg Galaxy. Toronto: University of Ong, Walter J. 1958. Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue. Cam­
TorOIllO Press. bridge: Harvard University Press.
Mead, Margaret. 1962. "National Character." I n Sol Tax. ed., .1nthropol­ -- 1970 [196i). The Prr;rtI€� of the Word. Kev.: York: Simon and Schus­
olf} Today: Sd«tions, pp. 396---42 1 , Chicago: Uni\'cnity of Chicago »1"(."$5. ter.
Mead, '\ial'garel and Rhoda Melraux, eds. 1933. The Stlld, of GU/furl! at a O""usu, MaxwelL 1978. "'Ethnographr of Africa: The Userulness or the
DutmlCt. Chicago: Unh'crsity of Chicago r�s. Useless.� ,ilrltrlcan AnthropoJ.ogisl 80:3 10-334.
.Meltzer, Bernard N., John W. Petras, and Larry T . Reynolds. 1975. Sym­ Palmer, Richard E. 1969. Htrn/nit"!ltUJ. EvanSlon: �onhwestern L'niver­
baHe lnienutiull/sm. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. sity Press.
Momaigne. 1925 [ 1 595] . £ua1s dt .�llW.taiplt. M. J. V. I ...«lerc. ed. Paris: Parsons, TalcOIl. 1963. Tiu Social S,sum. New York: Free Press.
Garnier Frt:res. -- 1977, Tlu EoolutiOfl oj Soc;m'tJ. Jackson Tob�.. ed. E.nglewood Cliffs,
MOI"3\·ia, �rgio. 1967. �PhiJo50phte el geographie a la fin du X V l l le sie­ �.J. : Prenlice-Hall.
cle." Stutbr; on Volroire arid the Eighlunth Cmtury·. 57:937- 1 0 1 1 . Peel, J. D. Y. 1971. Herbert Spencer: Th� Evo/uoon of a Soaologist. �ew
-- 1973. Hwbachtuw VtnlUnJt. Philosophie urM Anthropologie ill der Auf­ York: Basic Books.
kliirung. Munich: C. Hanser. Pinxten, Rik, ed. 1976. L'"wtTSlllism Versus Relativism In Ln.nguagt and
-- 1976. "Les Ideologues ec l'age des lumicres." Swtfjr; on VoUair, and Thooghl.. The Hague: ).tOUlon.
Iht Eighumth Ct1I1Ury 1 5 1 - 1 55:1465-1486. Pisk..lY, Kurl. 1957. "1st das Pygmaenwerk. von Henri Trilles eine zuver­
Morgan. L. H. 187i. Ancient Socidy. �ew York: World. lassige Quelle?" IWUtropos 52:3$-48.
Miiller, Klaus E. 1972. Gtschichu der anllJtI'fI Ethnogmphit Imd dhnologi.1cken Poirier, Jean. ed. 1968. EtJi1Iol� ginirale: Enqcwpid� dt 16 Plelalk. Paris:
Theoriebildung. Part 1 : Von de. ,hifiingen bis mif die I.ryuuitischrn Historio­ Gallimard.
graphen. Wiesbaden: Fran1- Steiner. Popper, Karl. 1966. The Open Socuty and. lIS Enemie.l. 2 vots. Princeton:
�furdock, G. P. 1949. Socid Strru;/ure. New York: Mac�fillan. Princeton University Press.
Murray. Stephen O. 1979. "The Scientific: Reception of Castaneda.� Con­ R..binow. Paul. 1978. Rtjle(tions on Fu!dwork in Morocco. Berkeley: Uni"er­
tempurary Sociology 8: 189-196. sity of California Press.
:"-1aroll. Raoul and Ronald Cohen. eds. 1970. A Handbook oj .Uethod in Rabinow. Paul and William M. Sullivan, cds. 1979. Interprtfiv� Social Sel­
C'IJ/turai ....nthropology. Garden Cit)" :"-1.Y.: Natural Hislory Press. ena: A Reader. Berkeley: University of California P�ss.
�ilsson, Manin P. 1920, Primil/l.'t Timr:-ReWJning: A Stud, In the Origin t'Uld Radnitzky, Gerard. 1968. ConJ.rm.purary Sehoob of Metascimct. Vol. 2: Con­
Fir5l Dn't/oJn�tnt of th, Art of Coun ting Time .imong Prim/tiiN and Earl, tinenlill Schools of Metasamce. GOteborg: AkademietOvlagel.
Cll/rure Pe&P'�. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ranum. Orest. 1976. "Editor' s Introduction." In J. B. Bossuet, Discourse
i\'isbet, Robert A. 1969. Social Challgt and Hi$tory. Aspects of the Wt.ll� OIl Universal History, pp. xiii-xliv. Chicago: l"niversity of Chicago Press.
Them, of Dn,dopnumt. Oxford: Oxford Ulliversil�' Press. Rappaport. Roy A. 1979. EcoliJgy, Meaning, alld RtliifUm. Richmond, Calif.:
:"-1orthrop, F. S. C . 1946. The Meeting of East aiM We.lt. New York: :'vfac­ North Atlantic Books.
millan. Raile!, Friedrich. 1904. "Geschichle, Volkerkunde und hislorische Per­
-- 1960. Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics. New York: Mac­ spekti\·e." In Hans Helmho1l, ed KUiru Schrifltn, 2:488-525. Munkh:
.•

millan. R. Oldenbourg.
:"-1onhrop, F. S. C, ed. 1949. ldeological Diff"eTlCeJ: and World Ordtr: St!ld�J Reid, Herbert G. 1972. "The Politics of Time: Conflicting Philosophical
in tiu Philosoph, and Somet of Ih� WOt'ld's Cu/ture.l. New Haven: Yale Perspectives and Trends:' TJu Human COlllext 4:456--4.83.
Uni\'el'!iit�, Press. Riooeur, Paul, ed. 1975.Lts Cldtures el ie umps. Paris: Payot.
�onhroJl, F. S. C. and Helen Livingston, eds. 1964. Cross-Culluml Under· Rogers, Francis M. 1961. The Trawls ojtJu In/film Dum P�dro of Portugal.
Slarniil:lg EpislemoliJgy iii .1/ithropohJgJ. N e"', York: Harper and Row. Cambridge: HiIT·yard L'nh'ersity Press.
194 References Cited
References Cited 195

Schutz, Alfred. 1967. The Phnwml'twiogy of the 50001 World. E\'aluton, Ill.:
Rommelveil, Ragnar. 1974. On Message Structure. Ii Fra71ltworAjor ihL Study
Northwestern Unh..ersit\' Pl'e�.
oj lAnguage and Ccrnmunication. London; Wiley. i
-- 1977. "Making Musc Together: A Study of Social Relationships."
Rosen, Lawrence. 1971. "Language. HiSlory, and the Logic of Inquiry in
In Janet L. Dolgin, Da�'id S. Kemnitzer, and David M. Schneider, eds.,
Levi-Strauss and Sartre." His/{)TY and Theory 10:269-294.
SprtOOlic AnthropolOlJJ, pp. 1 06--1 1 9 . New York: Columbia University
Rossi, Ino. 1974. TJu Un£Oruaous in Culture: The SttucturaJiim of CJ4ude
Press.
Livi-Strauss. New York: Dutton.
Serres, Michel. 19i7. HefTMJ IV; La distri/mfwti. Paris: Minuit.
ROUS5e3U. Jean-Jacques. 1977 1 1 i81]. Umfasions. New York: Penguin
-- 1979. "lne Algebra of Literature: The Wolf's Game:' In Josue V.
Clit�jq;.
Haral'i, ed., Tf.xtua/ !)lrauK'ts, pp. 260-276. Ithaca: KY. CuI nell U ni­
Ruby,Ja),. 1980. "Exposing Yourself: ReHexivil),. Anthropology and Film."
versity Press.
Semi
Olica 30: 153-179.
Simonis, Yvan. 1968. Claude Uvi-Slrauss OU 'fa fN'Wioli dr finctst,: bllroduc­
Rudolph, W. 1968. Drr IrulturelJe Relll1iIlUmw. Berlin: Duncker und Hum­
tion (11.1 structurallsrIU!. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne.
blOL
Skorupski, John. 1976. Symhd and Thtory. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
Sahlins. Marshall. 1976. Cullure and PractifAi Rea.Jon. Chicago: Univenit"
.
versit)- Press.
of Chicago Press.
Sperber, Dan. 1975. RrlhinAing Symholism. Cambridge:: Cambridge Cni­
Sahlins, Marshall and Bmer Service. 1960. EvolullOn and CuUure. Ann
versity Press.
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Stagl. Justin. 1979. " Vom Dialog zum Fragebogen. Miszellen WI' Ceo
Said, Edward W. 1979. Or�nlalisrn. New York: Random Hous�, Vintage
schichte der Umfragc." Kiilntr ZtILschriftJiir P.s'Jchol0K'e und Sawlpsycho­
Boo.. ,

Iogie 3 1 : 6 1 1 -638.
Salamon�, Frank A. 1 979. "Epistemological lmplK:arions of Fieldwork and
-- 1980. "Der wohl unterwiescne Pass.agier. Reisekunst und Gesell­
Their Con�uences.'· Arnnicall AntJrropologisf 81 :46-60.
schaftsbeschreibung VOIll 16. bis zum 18. JahrhunderL" In B . I. Kras­
Sapir, Edward. 1916. Ti11le Pmptctiw in Aboriginal.-\mmean CrJture: A Stud,
nobae\', Gcrt Nobel, and Herbert Zimmermann, e(b., Rnst11 und
in Mithed. Memoir 90, Geological Survey o r G..nada, Anthropological
RriMWschrtibungen i", 1 8 . und 19. Jahrhlmdn'1 ab Qutlltn tkr Kulturb€zit­
Serie5 no. 13. Ottawa.
.

hUTlgsJorschlmg, pp. 353-384. Berlin: U. Camen.

Sapir, J . David and J. Christopher Crocker, eds. 19i7. The Social Uu vJ
Steward, Julian H. 1955. TheolJ oj Culture Changt. Urbana: Uni,'ersity or
Metaphor. Philadelphia: University of Penns\'lvania Press.
Illinois Press.
i
de Saussure, F�rdinand. 19i5. Cours rk lin uisrique ginirale. Tullio de
Stocking. George. 1968. Rau, Cultu re (Hid £lJ()luJioll. New York: Free
Mauro, ed. Paris: Pa)'OL
.

Press.
Schmitz, Heinrich Walter. 1975. £tlmographie dlT Kommuni/tai(nI. KOOImu-
Suzuki, Peler T. 1980. "A Retrospective Analysis of ,,,'artime 'National
1I1ltati,nsbtTgriff und AmiUu rur Erfor5Chung von Koml1fljnikuivtUphiinomt­
Character' Study.H DialictiCll/ ATlihTOPOlog) 5:3�6.
Ilnl j1l tkr YOlUrlruntk. Hamburg: Hdmut BU5k.e.
Szombati-Fabi,Hl, Ilona. 1969. ''The Concept of Time in Zulu Myth and
Scholte, Bob. 1�66. "Episremic Paradigms: Some Problems m Cross.Cul­
Ritual: An Application of A. SchulZ's Phenomenology." M.A. thesis,
tural Re�drch o n Social Amhropological History and Theor),." A men­
Department of Amhl'Opology, Uni\'enily of Chicago.
can AnthropolcK'sf 68:1192-1201.
TagliacozlO, Giorgio, ed. 1976. Vieo arid Conumporary TOOl/gM. 1 alld 2.
-- 1971. "Discontents in Anthropology." Social RlM'flTrlt. �fI:i7i_80i.
SOCIal Rnearch (Autumn and Winter), \01. 43.
-- 197401. "The Structural Anthropology of Claude Lhl-StraUs.�.'· In
Tedlock. Dennis. 1979. "The Analogical Tradition and the Emergence of
J. J. Honigmann, ed., HandbooA of Social and Cultural Anliiropowgy, pp.
637-7 16. New York: Rand McNally.
\. a Dialogkal Amhropoiogy. " jollrnal oj .'''''lhl-opologiC(�1 &starch 35;387-
400.
-- 1974b. "Toward a Reftor.·e and Critical Anthropolc.gy: In Dell
Tennekes, J . 1971. AnlhTof1ology, Relflli'l!ism and Mrtiwd: An lrlquiry inw the
Hymes, ed., Rein:f.I�ting Anthropolog,., pp. 430-457. New York: Random
Meihod.oloK'ca/ Pri7lciplts of a Scietlu if' Cl,lttm. Assen: Van Corkum.
House, Vintag� Books.
Timl' and lIS MJ<tnU!. Series 1-3. 1936. 1940, 1949. Sew York: ::-.lew York
Schumacher, D. L 1967. "Time and PhY5icai Language." In T. Gold and
Unillersity Press.
D. L. Schumacher. eds., The ,VaJure oj Time, pp. 196-213. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Todoro�, Tz\,etan. 197i. ThioTUs du .s,mbole. Pari.,: Seuil.
Cornell Vni\'ersil)' Press.
196 References Cited References Cited 197

Toulmin. S. E. and June Goodfield. 1961. The Fllbnc of "If: Htavnu. Th� White, Hayden. 1973. Melahu/ory: The Hiswriail lmaginarion in Nj'ltluntil.­
Detlewpment of Astrononry alld l>ynmllics. New York: Harper. emtlll] Europe. Baltimore. Md.: Johns Hopkins U ni \e rsity Press.
'

Turnbull, Colin Yf. 1962 . Tht Fortit Ptoplt: II Study of tf� PJgrlll� rif Iht White, Leslie. 1959. Tht Evolution oj CU/lure. New York: .\fcGraw-HiJI.
Clmgo. New York: Natural History Library-Anchor. \Vhitehead, Alfred North. 1959 [1927]. Sy",boium: Its Mtam',tg (;md Eff«l.
Turner, Victor. 196;. The F()I"tSI oj Syntbol5. (maca, 1\.\'.: Cornell Cniler­ Xev.· York: I\JUlam.
sity Press. Whitrow, G. 1963 . 1'hl NalUral PlnLO$op/i), of Time. New York: Harper and
-- 1975. " Symbol ic Studies." In B. J. Siegel et aI., cds., Bitll11ial Rroiew Row.
oj A.nthropology, Palo Alto: }\nnuai Rc\ ie.....s. , Wilden. Anthony. 1972. Sysltlfl mul Struclure: Ella)' in Commu.nication mul
Turton, Da...id and Clive RlIggle�. 1978. "Aglceing to Disagree: The E:cc},n"K'. london: Ta\i�'('I("k.
:\feasurcmcnt of Duration in :1 Southwestern Ethi!,pian Communi,y," Yaker, Henri. Humphry Osmond, and Frances Check, eds. 1971. HI!
CurrtnJ Antitropol()g)' 1 9 : 585-600. Fu.I1/I·e Qf T,me. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
Tylor, [. B. 1889. "On a l\.felhod of Imestig-.tting .he Onclopmem of Yates, Frances A. 1966. TheArt oJMertwlJ. Chicago: Unh'ersity of Chicago
Institutions: Applied to Laws of Marriage and DeS(cnt." Journo.l oj lIlt Press.
RfY)'a{ Anthropological /nsf1l1dt 18: 245-269. Zelk.ind, I rving and Joseph Sprug, eds. 1974. Tmle Re.search: 1 1 72 Stwlies.
-- 1958 [187IJ. RtliglQn in Prim/Jiw Culture (pnmiltvt Culture, vol. 2). Metuchen, N.].: Scarecrow Press.
:">lew York: Harper Ton:hbooks. Zil'berman, David. 1976. Eth nogra phy i n Soviet Ru ssia. Dial«ticaJ :I.n_
" "

V'lgtii , Laszl6. 1964. Traditio nellc Konzeptioll und RcalicH in d�r Ethnol.
' thropology 1 : 135-15�.
ogic In Fes/Jchrift fliT Ad. E. jmsm, pp. 759-790. Mun ich: Klaus Ren·
,"

nero
Vansina, Jan. 1970. "Cultures Th rough Time." In Raoul Naroll alld Ron­
ald Cohen, eds., A flandhoolt oj Met/wd ill CulturaJ Anthropowg)', pp. 165-
179. Garden City :-.r.Y.: Natul'al HistOry Press.
,

Verhaegcn, Benoil. 1974. lnlroduclIO'fl Ii l'hislorre irnmidwu. Gembloux: J .

DuculoL
Vogel Fred W.
, 1975. A Hislo,)' oj Ethnology. New York: Ho[t, Rinehal' ! ,
and Winston.
Volney, C. F. 1830. La Ruinn, ou midiwtiOIl jur lts rfl.'OiWlo1U des tmpirtl'
suit'les de b.J loi nl/JurtUt. Brussels: Librairie Philosophique.
\I/agll, Klaus. 1976. What Tinu DotS. Munich: Caanll Verlag.
\\I'agner, Roy. 1975. The Invt1uiOrl of Cuillat. Englewood Cliffs, KJ.:
Prentice-Hall.
Wallerstein, hmnanucl. 1974. Tht iHoder1l World-System.' Capitalist Agncul­
fure and the Ongrns of the Europta ll It'arlt/.Ecolwmy in the Sixteenth Cmtur') .

:-.lew York: Academi< Press.

\\·amba·dia·WaIllUa.1979. "L.o I'hilQ!;ophie cn Afriquc, ou Ics dHis de
I'Mricain philosophe." RevIle Cmuuiil'1lne tUJ Eludts AjTicama 13:225-
244.
Wax, Rosalie H. 1 9 7 1 . Dmng FUidworlt.: WanringJ mId :\dwe. Chicago:
L'ni\'ersily of Chicago Press.
Wel>er, Max. 1964. Wirtschifl u11I1 Gml4dwJI. Sludlt'l1alLSgabe. Cologne:
Kiepenheuer \lnd Winch.
Weinrich, Har.ild. 1973. u Tnnps. p..aris: Seuil.
Weizsacker, Carl Friedrich mn. 1977. Der Gartffl des ,I1-!mJChlirJrt1i. Bd/riig/!
lur gmhichtilcher/ i\1II}1T()/1IO ogU. Munich: C. Hanser.
I ndex

Abt:les, �I., 182 B:lsso. K" 180

Achl'unicity, achronic, 77, 168 Ba�ti<ln, A., 122
Ad'lIm, eh. R., 183 Bateson, G., 50,99. 1 34
.'\dorno, T.. 159 Baudrillard, j., 140. li4, 180
Agrioo!;iI. 1 15 Bauman, Z., 177
Allochronism, allochronic. 32, 33, 37·38. Becker. C. L.. 5
49. 68, 74.i5, 76. 82. 10<1, 123-24. Ikckingh�lll. C. F., 1 7 1
125. 127, 143, 148, 150, 152-53, 155. Benedict, R. . 46-48
J�, 179 Be,»'enisle, t:., xii. 82-86
Allhus,ser. L. 1.>8 Berg50lI, H., 1 8 1
A]v<tr('S. hlher Fr.lnc:i5CO, 1 7 1 Bidner, 0" 169. 172. 1 8 1 . 182
.oI,lIIin. S.. 1 8 1 810(h, E., 44-45, 52, 171
AmseHe, L.. lSI Bloch. M., 42-44. 182
Anachroni�rn, 4. 32 Blumenbach, J. F.. 168
Anderson. J. i\., 176 Boas. r., 20. 64
Animism. 152. 182 Bogoras_ W.. I72
Anthropology: American, la. -45-51 , 62, Sohm. D., 7 1 . 1 7 1 , 175
69, 169 \0«' (lUO CullUralism); British, Boon.j., 13'1·;'6, 179. 180
39-40 , 4 5 , 1 74-75: critique of, le. 32- Bossue!. j . B .. ;,·6, 10, I l l . 167
33: French. 38, 45, 69, 79, 124, 141 Bourdieu, P., xii. 1 4 1 . 172, 182
1M, allo Suucturalism): �nnan. u, Broc. t'\" 168
DifrusKmism: and politics. 28. 48, 52. Buffon. C.-L l.zeleK, WmlC' de, 168,
M , 67. 68-69, 79, 95-96, 120. 143, .8.
149: symbolic. 1 2 3-24, 133. 134-39, Burke. K" 180
1 5 1 , 179-80; Time and the Object of. Burridge, K" liD
26, 90 (>n r.b� Odler); visual. 123 Burro!>', J. W" I I
Apd. K. 0. . 176, 180 BUlrer. K, W., 169
Aporetic. 33. 35. '48, 179
."'rCI1$, W.o xiv Campbell, D. T., 20. 169. 172
Asad, T., 175 Casmneda, C., 94
Augui:iIine, ix, 167 Cliange, 42-43, 144·45, 154, 1 7 1 . 1 8 1
Ault>biogr.lphr, 84. 102: Sit als() Past, Chomskr, N " 97, 1 1 6 . 162 '
autobiographic Quonologr, 13, 15, 2'.1. 28-29. I l l , 147.
159, 1 6S, 172; biblical. 1 2, 1 3 ; as a
Bachelard. G., IoU, 174. 180 code, 14, 5i·58: ami dating. 22. 28,
BardJeS, R., 76, 140 169·70
200 Index Index 201

CLaM. and Time, 23 Diadwony. diachrom(, 34. 55';i6. 76. Epislemology, c:pl51emological, 25, 33. Gahung. J.. 177
Oock time, 29 167, 174 4 1 , 5 1 . 65. 79. �7, 90, 96, l iB. 124. Gccrtz, c., 24, 45. 125, liO, 1 7 1 , 179.
Coc,',llnes.s. cot:\ al. 30-3 J. 34. 37. 38, 68, 1 1, -ti, 1 1 9 . 129. 1.'16.
Dialectic. didieniG 140. 147, 152. 159. liS 1 8 1 -82
1 3'1.35. 146, U2. 156, 159, 161. 1 7 1 , 1 5'1·55, 157, 159, 162 EthJlOj.,'Taph�. ethnographic. xi, 45,59, Gellner. E., 38..39
1i9, 182: circum'-cueing. 41 (de­ Dialog, dialogic, 73. 85. 90. 1 1 8 · 1 1 9. 175 60, 80. fl3, 94, 108. 1 16, 13<1. 1<18, Gestah j»y�;h<JIogr. 4!j
tined); denial of, 25, 3 1 (ddIllOO). 33 , Di,l1nond. S.. 176 160. 1 7 1 . 174: ;Uld Time. xii, 50, 61. Gin;.oel. �. K., 172
:H. 39, 15, ."0. 62, 65. 72. 86. 9'2 , 108, Dir;J.cns, C.. IX 72, 107; 01 Time, x, 1 1 , 107·8, 153- GiOSGl. V., 172
1 2 1 . 124, ].">0, 151-53. 15<1, 1:.6, 179: DidetOl. D .. 6 54. 172 . .Iu nI$� F"lCId rcse-.llch Gi'·ner. D. :\., 178
prl:<'lllpting, 52 (dennedi Di llcrcnce, ,\5 d,s.anre,Ut U,Sl.,.nCt" and , raph)' of speaking. 3 1 , 181
E1hno!r Gluckman. M., '11
CoI,cn, R., li� melhod Ethnom<:lhodology. 3 1 GOOdier, \1., 178. 182
tolling...ood, R. G., 168 DifiusionisllI. H �..20. 30. 55. 153. 169 Ethno'Lienee, 38, 78. 97, 1 16 . 171 GooJr .j., xiii, 179. 182
Colomalism, co\onit;ILi" " , 17. 27. 29, 32. !>i;c.-.II1-se: iml.hfUl"0loglCal, I. 21. 28, 68. Evans.Prl1(hard. E, 1' .• 4 0 . 4 1 . 17S Cradmr:r, F.. 18-19,20. 169. 170
-17, 63, 69, 95-96, 1<14, 149, 155·56. 97. Jl8; subjcct \'cr,us ohjec:1 of, 30, Evoluoon, t:loluuonism, I I . 12. 13, 14. Greenberg, J .. 167
172. li4, Iii 50. 7 1 . 75, 124·25. 1 13. 150..5 1 : In 18,20.22,27.30.35.39, 56. 61. 101. G.-c:imas. ,"" j., 77-79. 97, 101, 103. 175.
Commodific;mon. and Time. 95·96, \7i 040 Coc\ alness, denial oC Olher 104. 124. 129, U7. 139, 147, 153. 176
Communicat io n: and ethnography, 32. Dlst,IIlU:. di�tancing: and hemleneUlics. 168, 169-70. 181 Gun'ilch, G , 172
33.92. 12·1. 148, 164, 1 8 1 : and Time, 89: alld melhod. 30, 17, 48·50, 52.62, ["olutiolllm, .weial, )4·15, 169 Gusdorl, G .. xii, 3. 5, 167, 177
so·n 32. 42.43, SO-51 . 7 1 , 1 70, 172: 61. 6.'>. 68, 76, .'19. 92·93, 1 1 1 . 160; EXoti(15nl. 13S Gutenherg. 1 15, 179
'te alw DIalog �nd Time. xi, 16, 23·26. 27, 29, 30, E)[I:>crience, penon�l, 33, 6 1 , 65, 73. 88,
wl11p.1ratiH' method. 16-17.27. 139 32. 35, 39, 44. 62·6�. 68. 72. 75, 88.. 89. 91·92. 99, 108. 124 Habcnnas. .I-. 20, 169, 180
c.orutc. .0\., 41. 129 90. Il l . 1 2 1 . 129, 135-36. \47, 1. ., 1 . E)'ck.Jlln ,,.n, 1 1 5 Halbw<lchs. M 179 .•

Comempl"lion. (01111':10 1'1,,(,\1':. 67, 125, 159; and wrillng. 72. 1.'19 Halfmann, J., 1 6 9
182 DoIgin,j., 137, 170. 180 Fabian,J.. J64. 1 7 1 . 174, 1 7 7 , 180. 181 H�I1, t:. 'I " 37, 50-52, liS. 178
ComellljXIr.lneity. cnmempur,tn-, x
i. 31. Dooh. L W., )[Ii Fac!, and p;!st. 73, 88·89 Hamann,1- G.. 1i7
.H. 143. 148. 152 Doug�. M., 4 , 4 1 . 179 Fanon. t" .• lSI Hanson. F. A" 172
Wnlr.ulklioIlS. III :ulthmpological \)UChCl. �I., 167 fernandel,j., 1 8 1 Harari. J.. 177-78
praxis. xi. 33, 37, 72-73. 1-1-8-49. 159, DUIIIl)lIt,j.'P" 175. Iii Fellerhach, L , 103. 140. Ji8 H<lrris, \1., 157, 168. 173
177 Dunn, S. and E.. 182 Fe�er�ben/I. P • 109. 178 Hegel. hegelian, xi,'. 56, 58, 103. 123.
c.'lpans . j.. 168, l il l Dupre, W., 176 Field rc:_!'!nch, field work: ;lJId Ian. 125-3 1 . 132, 137, 156-57, 159, 165.
l..opcrnicui . 3 . 1 15. 167 Durand. G. . xi\ guage. 105·6; and profes5ionaIi7.,1' 180
Cosmology. 1)()lilicai. 35. 74. 87. I I I , Durbin, M.. Iii, 17-1 lion, 66-67, 122, 118, 1 75, 179. lleidegger, M., 170
1 13. 120. 152, 159. 182 Durkheim, E.. 20. 3 1 . }4, 42-41.45. 53. and Time, 50, 63. 89, 107. 1�7 Ilenr}' Ihe Na" igator, 170
Creuwell, R.. 178 58. 1 1 6 . 1 29, 160, 179 rinh. R.. 179, 182 IIerrler.j. G.. 19. 20, 159. 173
Crelu.cr. F., 180 DUl'lgllaud, J.. 155, H!J Forde, D.. 35 Hermeneutic. 89 (defined). 90, 97. 134.
Croder, j. C, 1$'0 Dwyer. K., 175 Forster. G .. 96. 1 8 1 176..77. 180. 182
Cuhur:llism. 20·21. 78. 1 13, 150, 169 Forte$. M " 35. 41 Henxlotu �, l:KI. 1 i6
f.mier, G.. HiS [der. K . 169 FOUGwlt, �1., xtil, 54, 139. 168, 174 Herskoviu, M . J .• I72
EinstelrJ, A., 14;.. 175 Fraser, j. T., xii HJerarch�, and order. 99-101, 133. 164.
1);lrwin. C. I I . It. I�, 16, 168 Eisele)" L., 168, 1 8 1 Frazer. 1- G.. !72 179
1>:11.., and Ti me. 72·73. 88. 9'1·93. 95. [hade. 1\.1.. 167 t'rq-et'. H .. 24 HlSlon': \'enus anthropology, 40, 53..54,
132, 155, 159·60, 177 [ll1plrt(lsm, 106. I I:!. 120, 133, 136. Friedrich. I' . 182 59·60, 64. 98; nalUral, 8. 16, 26. 57,
�ger:lndo. J..\'. 6·7. 148, 168 160 FunCoonaU5llt. 20. 42-43. 113, 150. 171· 87, 123·24: ph ilCY.lOphi cal. 5. 7 . 23.
l)erri(i;t,j.. 1 1 9 . 179 [liKe!" F.. 55, 155. 15'), 163 72 1 1 1 .. 12: s,1cred, 2: and temporillily,
1)e.K�nes. R, 1.'1, 106 Enlightenment. xi. 9, 10. 16, 17. 26.27. j
Future. as pro ect. 93. 153. 180 7 7..78; unilenal, 3..6 , 159
Dedcc�: discllni'e. 5: methodologicdl. 39, 57. 1 1 1· 1 2 , 1 17. 146-41. 168; ,
.... lIohbes, T .. lOS, 106. 178
I; rhClOncal. 5: of t.empnral distanc· a4., Phil()sophC$ Gadamer. l-I..(; . 182 Hodgen, �L t:., 179
ing, 3 1 . 32. N. 78. 124·25. 129. 152 Epl.u("rnc:, epiSiemic. 26. 3f!. 12�, 168 Galilc:o, 3, 178 Honignullln, j. j., 173, 1 7 8
202 index Index 203

HuiZ('r, G.. 32 Leach, E., 41, 124, 171 MClaphor. 175, 180: \"I§ual,spmi.tl. 45, Philmopilcs, XI, S. 6, 8. 10, 12. 117, 147,
Hume, D . 173
.
Lederc, G.. 174, 181 I:H. I60 16S. 178
Huntingford, G. W., Iii Lcibnil., G. W., 112. 177 Method, and printing. 1 1 5-16; )"t abo Pillll:len. R 172
.•

Husser!. E., 170 Lelmtire, T., xiii, 172 Vision, and IIlcthod P,sluuy, K., 177
Hude)" J.. 180 Lellin, \
\.... L. 163 MClrcaux, R.. 48, 68. 73 1'10110, 179
Hymes, 0.,32, )73, 177, 178. 1 8 1 Lc�nic�. W .. xii. 168, 173, 178 Mont.t'gnc. M. E)qllcm dc, lSI Polemic. 38. 143, 152·53, 1110
Uvi·Slr.l.uu, C" 14, 37. 3B. 52·69. go.. �iontcsquicu, C. dc Sec:oIxlat, baron de, Popper, K .. x, 40
Iamblichus, 179 91, 94,97.98,99. 101, 122, 146, 160. '" PorI Ro�al. 1 16
leon. iconism, 131·:15 lu7, i i I . 17.'l. 174, 176, 17'J, 182 M<.I<.J...,. F . C. T. . 168 I'o"er; ;:and kno",l.,dg.,. 1 . 48, 144. 149:
Ideology, and Time, 74, 76, 104, 123, l..e\ine, S. K.. 180 �10r;I\·ia. S., xii, 6·7, 8. 1 1 7, 168 ami Time, i�, 28-29
137, 149 Libbr. W. f., 169 �1org;r.n. L H. . 15, 168, 169, 174 p.otgmalisln, 12�, 126. 180
ImlXria1i�m, x. 17, 35, 149, 150 Lichtenberg, G. c., I. 167 .'-Hillcr. K. E.. 176 Praxis, 1.17. 143, 156.57, 161, 165. 180;
Lindberg. D. C, 178 .'-Iurdock. G. P.. 167, 178 J.U a/.w Com'�ldi(llons. in anthropol.

Jameson. F., \73 Linguink�, 45, �57. 74, 79, 81. 84-86. Murray. S . O .. 177 ogical pr:nd�
j;amil\, J.. 168 148, ISO, 167. 170, Iii, 181 Pre�nl. f'tilru_'j.,'Tdphic, 33, 76. 80 Idc­
Jan;ic. L C., 1 7 1.72, 175 Linnileus (Carl \un Unn.!:), 8, 16, 168 Xarroll. R , 178 hned), 87. 97, 150. 176
Jaulu}, R., \81 Lner.l.Iurt'. literil!"), 33, 72, 74. 8 1 , 86. \lattonal character, 46. 1i3 Pre.Sler, John. 26. 170-71
Jarne. K. G., 170 87·88, 96. 135. 151 'Iie!.>...hr. R. . 145 Primil.il"c. 17-IR, 30, 39. 5!.1. 61. n. 82.
Jenkins. A., 173 Livingston, H. . 175 ;.lieu!'IChc, F., 45 9 1 . 121, 137_39, 1M, 176
Jules-RoscHe. B., 175 Locke.j..S, 108, 160, 178 " ilswn, \ . 1. P., xii '>rodunion. 59. 62·6.1. 97, HIS, 162.
L.o<.ejoy, A. 0., 176 Xi,bet, R. A., 172, 115 174; "cnus reprcsenuUiou. 62, 79
KabC'rry. P 35 .•
LuCills, J. R., 1 7 1 , 172 XC"'Ioo. .'S, 16. 171 (dcfmffi), 117, 137. 139·40. 151. 161_
Kant, L. 34, 160, 168. Iii Luhm�nn, N 20, 169. 182
.• Xnflhrop, F. S. C, 145-46. 175. 181 "
Kinship. 116; as rcmporoliizing concept. L)"ell, C., 12-l!i, 14, 16, 168 �o...'ell·Smith, P. 11., 172 Proudhon, ".-J ' 158
75.76 Pylh"gor.ts, 179
Kkmpt, A 167 .•
Oakie)·. K. P.. 1 69.. 70
Kluckhohn, C., 173, 181 �1cl..uhan, M 119
.• Ol!it'Cti\�ly,�, Distance. and method R.1bino..... p.. 177
Kno....ledge:
. anthrOI)()logical. x, 28; M�ITr:$oIi, M xi\"
.•
ObkT\·ation. 25, 45, 60, 67. 86-87. 91. Race. 182
ethnographic, 21, 28. 32; theory of. Maillet, B. de, 181 107·8, 1 1 7 , 122, U2. 136. 151. 179; R.1ddiffe-Brown. A. R., 39. 13
106, 108-9. 112, 121, 151. 159. 160 Mair. L.. 35 I).'ITlidp,tnl. 33, 60. 67. 95 Radnilzky, G.. 176
K,*,e, A. . ISO Iolainet. G., 176 Ong, W., xii. xiii, 'tl\. 1 14-22, 179 Ramus. Ralllislll, "iiI, 1 1 4-16. 1 1 8-22,
Kosellec:k. R.o 167, 176 Malmowski. B., 20. 33, 35, 40, 4 1 , 160, Onenl, 10, 123. 126-27 1�2. lSi. 168, 179
KO�'rt, A.. 178 171, 172 OIlier, i,<, xi. 2 , 16, 51. 63. 64-65, 85- Ranum. 0., 5-6. 167
Kramer. F", Kiv, 172 Maltt, D. M., 172 Ru. 87·92. 1 2 1·22, 125, 127-28. 130, Rappaport, R.. 180
Kroebcr. A., i5, 20. 157. 160, 169, 182 Mannhcim. B., 32 136-37. 143. 118, 1<19, 152·5'1, 156. R.1tzcl, f . 19-20. 159
Kubler. G xiii .• Man::-Upiansk), M., 173 157. 1&1, 1fo5. 1 70;.sn ai.o Di.;coulse. Raymond Lull, 179
Kuhn. T. S., 20, 10'1. 109, 114, 178 �Iarx, marxism, 44, 58. 59, 95, 103, 105. subjttl U'r:5l1, objecl nr Reid. H. G xit
.•

Kuper, A., 174 1�!}-oIU, 143. 155-59, 162-63, 165, 178. o...u . ". .\1 . .'12,.'15
• Rcllexi\"ilY, 90-91 , 101
180, 182 Relati\"ism, cuhllral, 34. 38-M�. 62. 67,
La 8,m. W., 173 Matcrialism. maleri�liSI, 125, 138, 156. Palmer, R. E.< 177 78, 145. 150, 153, 172
Lacroix. .... f 172 .•
158, 159, 161-63. 182 Potrsons. T., 20, 23. 40.41, 157, 169 Relali\·ity. 22, 29, 38. 145. 171. 175
La Fontaiue, 71, 103·4. 175, 178 Mau!S. M., 20. 62, 68. 178 !'ast autobiographic, 87·97. ISO. 176; Rel'rC-!lt'nlalion, su Production. "ersu�
Lamarck, j..B., I68 Max....r:ll,j. R., 172 I)(I$5cSllivC". 911-96: su alro Fact. and represemaUOIl
Langer. S. K., 179 Mead, M., lB, 48-50, 134, I n P,IS! Rhetoric, \"i�lIalisl. xi\", 1()9.13, 114. 1 1 7 .
Language. 157, 161·62. 177; and Time, Meltzer, 8.. N 180 .• !'eel. j . D. Y., I I . l:t. 15, 23, 168_69 120, 124. 136, 151, 179
ix, 1. 14,25,42, 5().51, 163 Mcmory. 1 10; art or. 3. 1()9.J3. 125, Pdrcc, C. S" 12-1, 126 Ric.trdo, D.. 139
...... Perouk, j. F., 8 136, 151. 164. 178: �nd rdlcxion, 91· Per'1', W. J.. 59 RiC\>Cur, P.. xiii, 167
Lapointe, F. H. and C. C., In " Pcr!lOn. pcr!oOnah�m. 1 1 9-20 Riner, II. H., 173
204 index Index 205

147. 170: Judeo-Christian conceptloll V;msina. J., 176

Rr.·�n, W. H. R., 1 16 511M:ato'! . axonoml(,
t 19, 54. 57. 1 16.
of, 2. 26, 146: mUlld.me, 22-23. 30; Verhaegell, R., 1 7 6
Rogt'N. f. M., 170 1 2 1 . 14;-
1I,ItUr,.h/;lIion of. I I , 13, 14. 16, 25, Vit;o. 1 2 , 168. 173
Itvmanllchrn, 9, 18·19,45, 126. 129·3 1. Spc�r, H., I I , 12. 1 5
26, 56. 1 17, 168; perception of, 43; Vision: and method, 106-9, 1 1 0 , 117_
131. 159 Spen)!ler. 0., 44-45
ph�skal, 22, 29·"0, 56. 145-46, 147: 18, 1 19-20. 1 2 1 -22, 178: and Sp.:..;:e.
RormneIH:it, R., 170 Sperber, n., 180
polllk� ",f, x, xii, 1-2, 28, .'15, 46. -18- 7, 106. 1 1 3 ; theor� of. li8
Ro�n. L., 174 Spru)!. J., xii
:.0. 52. 69, 97, 144, 182 (iU (j�o Co­ Vimalj�m, vi�ual, 67, 8i, 106 (defined).
R01i�i. I., 17� St�gl,J., xiii, 168
loni:.lism: Imperialism); public. IH­ 107, 1 1 0 - 1 1 , I Ii!. 1 2 1 , 1 � "-�5, 1 5 1 .
Rousseau. JJ .• 176 Stem pel. W.·D., 176
'15. 1 8 1 ; and relations between cul­ 179, 182: <ee ab.6 Oh,en�tion; Sigill.
Rub}.J .. 1 2 3 Su,•..,d
..
. N. II., 17B
wre�, 45. 49-50, 145·46, 149: Je<:u­ ,enu, K/llnd
Ru dolph. W.. 172 S«:...;.r(l, J., 168
lari'�1Iion of. 6-7. 1 1 . 26, 146; '�P.11i.11- Vogel. F, W .. 168, In
Ruggl�. C., 172 Stocking, G., 1 1 . 168
il<l lion of, 2. 16. 25. 58-59, I l l. 147, VoIllI:y, C. F.. 6. 9-10, I I
SLTul:turahsm, 20, 52-69. 97·1()4. 1 16.
i60. 168, and lellSC. 80, 82-87: t}pol­ Voltaire, 5
S.,hlins .\1., 125, 137-40, 157. 168, 111 12-1, 13::5, 137. 153. 1i3·74, 179, 182
ogied. 23-24 . .30.
•

33, 14;; uni\'ersa)i­

Sa�. I:... xiii Structuraiism-fUlxut.ma)ism, j9-44, 78
:l.1liull of, 2-3; U!!e5 of, x, 2 1 -25. 32. Wagll, K" 171
SaI;l1no)lIc. f A.. 175 Subjecm.ity, 59-60. &4-86, 88·b9
34, j7. 38. 44, 46, 5 1 , 56. 80. 145 Wagner. R.. 180
Sapir, 0., ISO Sullivan. W. M .. 177
Tob�,J., 169 Wallerstei n, L. 182
Sapir. E., 169 Sumki, P. T.. 17.'l
Todoro\'. T., 179 Wamb,l-dia-W,lmb,l. E., 181
$alire, JA'" 52, 55, 58, 59. 174, 182 5ymlxll. s),lIll:tuliJauon, 45, 1 1 3, 123.
('opos, (opoi or di�ourM:. 109-10, 1 17, Wax, R., 178
S'IlI�'Urc. F. de. 20, 53, 55. 56, 68, 124, 179-S0. 1 8 1 ; lIegeJ'� theory 01, 125-
H16, 178 Weber, M., 23, 24, 161
161. 177 3i
rotaltty, 47. 156-58, 182 Weinrich . H" xii. 82-86
Sa• .Igery. !IOI.vOIge, Ii, 27, 30, 75. 77, 95, S)'nl:hrun), synchronic. 20, 5 1 . 39-40,
Toulmin, S., 20. 168, 169 Wei7.s3.cker, C. F. '·on. 88-89
1 2 1 , 147 M. 56, 76, 99, 121. 161. 16i, 171
Trager, C L., 178 White. II., 175
SchapcT3, I., �5 S�'tem. and Time. 177. 182
Trawl a� science. 6-9. 1 1 3 . 1<16, 167_ Whitt'. L. I I , 168, 182
Schlegel. F. \on, 180 SlUmhati-hbian. L. 170, 17i
68. a\ tOpos. 6. 1 13 \\1111t'head, A. �., 132-33, 180
Schrlll12. H. W.. 181
Tree, taxun ornic, 15. 19, 1 16, 1 2 1 , 179 Whttrow. G., x
ii
Scholle. S . • 38, 173, 175, 1M2 Tagliacou.o.G., 168
TnJI<", P., 94, 1 n Whorf. B.. 106
Sdlt1macher, D. L., 175 Taxonomy. t..nonomk, 52, 5<1, 55. 57,
Turnbull. C.. jj Whyte". W. t-., 173
SChUlZ, A., 2-1, 170 58. 62·63, 79. 97·I()4, 132, 1..7. 1-18,
Turner, V.. -I I , 133-34, 179, IfIO Wil(len, !\., 177. 178
Selby, II. A.. 180 1 5 1 , 174; J.U ooa StTUctUl-al ism: Tree,
TurtOll, I) .. 172 Wilson , G. and M.. 35. 4 1
Scnllo1ogy, �miological, 68, 75, 124, 151 taxollu",i,
·]'ylor. E. B . . 1 , 5, 167, 1 7 8 Writing. anthropolo�,'iCl.1. and Time, 21·
Semiotics . semiotic, 77-79, 1 24. 1�9, Teaching. and ,·isudlism. 1 1 4 , 117. 120-
22: $1'( !llso R,nnu� 22, 71-72, 76. 80
150-51
LTI(0IlKiou5, 51 ·52, 65
SeTTe'. ...,., 101-4, 1 5 1 . 177·78 Tedl oc:k, D., 175
Sen-ice. E.. 168 ICmpor.tI: ililisiuTl. 78, 148; "Iur ali �m,
L:lli\erS<lb. unin:r�al, 3-4. 16i Yakel", H .. li2
L�her, S1s-hop, 1 2 YateS, E., xii. xi\', 109-13. 1 17, 180
Slght. \CnU5 wund. 108. 110, 1 15, II!.!, 29. 144, 1 7 1 . l i2; reference "ersus
131. liS COlllloGUion. iI-75, 82: slope, 17. 103·
VaJrla, L , 178 lelkind, I.. xiii
SIgn. "', 77. 79. J:!i·28. 150-51 1. 1 5 1 . 152
ValUO:' olll.:!,.,., 46-17, JJ'!I Zir�rrnall, I).. 182
Signif.er, sigUilied, signincation. 45, 77. ·I emporaitzalioll. tempor.tltl1ng. 6, 7.
79.88, 150 1 1 , 24, 2S, 59. ;4 (defined). 77.78, 79,
Sit-flolni,. Y., 17j 8;, 9: 125·26, 129. ISO, 160: lexkal­
• .

Simultaneity. simultaneous. jl, 67, 145- semantic. 75. 82: �lrIiSlic'lext\l,Il, 76,
<1&. 147 82; synlactk. 76. 82
Sk(lrup�ki,J.. IMO 'lenm:kcs, j" li2
Soviet e thnology. 182 Time: cyclical verstl� linc"r I:oll(;eption
SplICe: �nd oo n�iousneu, I I I , I I�, 132, 01, 2, 41, 167: dimination of, 56-57.
164: dbtribu rion in, 18-19, 25. 29, 54. 68: ellcapsubtioll of, 4 1 . 150: inter-
5!,;, 58, &1, 168. 169-70: tabular. cl:1S- 5ubje<:li. e. xii, 2<1, $0-3 1 . 42. 92. 123,