Notes Making of Past Papers
Notes Making of Past Papers
Notes Making of Past Papers
3. Unlawful force
1. Causing apprehension Spratt fired an air pistol from his apartment, hitting a
Simple assault involves making someone girl outside. His conviction for assault causing bodily
believe they are about to be unlawfully harm was quashed because the prosecution could not
touched. House of Lords approved in Venna prove his intention or knowledge of harm to the victim.
case.
2. Immediacy
- Thomas v NUM
Battery or assault by beating
Battery can be defined as:
So, in Thomas v NUM [1986], a civil case, it was not an
assault when picketing mineworkers made threatening any act by which D, intentionally or recklessly, inflicts
gestures. (non-consensual) unlawful force upon P.
- Smith v chief constable Actus reus of battery
D looked through V's curtains at night and made her
Battery involves someone using force or making
afraid. Court found him guilty of assault because his
physical contact with the victim without their consent.
actions caused fear of potential violence, even though
he could not physically harm V from his position outside 1. Force
the apartment. - Collins v Wilcock 1984: a police officer touched
women without consent; the court ruled that
- Ireland case 1998
any intentional and unwanted physical contact,
It established that non-physical conduct like silent even if it does not cause harm, is a battery.
telephone calls and heavy breathing could constitute an
assault, even if the victim did not fear immediate
violence. The case broadened the definition of assault
- DPP V SMITH 2006 Mens rea of battery
Cutting hair amounts to actual bodily harm under s. 47 Mens rea for battery is intention or recklessness
OAPA towards unlawful contact, not harm. Actus reus of
- Fagan v MPC 1968 battery is unconsented force, Mens rea is intention or
foresight of unconsented force.
The case involved a police officer who accidentally
drove his car onto a man's foot and then refused to
move the car when the man asked him to. The court
# CRIMES OF VIOLENCE
held that the act of driving the car onto Mr. Morris' foot
was sufficient to establish the Actus reus (the guilty act) Assault occasioning actual bodily
of the offence of assault, and that the Mens rea (the
guilty mind) could be established by Mr. Fagan's
harm
subsequent refusal to move the car. Section 47 OAPA makes it an offence to commit
an assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Is direct force necessary?
- Haystead v DPP 2000
- There should be no new intervention; casual A wound requires more than a scratch or a graze, even
connection should remain intact. This is known though blood may show. It requires a penetration of
as test for causation. both layers of skin – namely the dermis and epidermis.
Internal ruptures do not count as a wound, nor does
- Case of Roberts 1972 bruising, despite the blood loss (Mcloughlin (1838) 173
ER 651). In Eisenhower [1984] QB 331, D shot V with an
Touched the girl; jumped out of car fearing sexual
air gun and the pellet hit V near the eye, resulting in a
assault; the court convicted saying there was
bruise below the eyebrow and a bloodshot eye. D was
reasonable foreseeability.
charged under s.20. The injury satisfied neither form of
- Savage 1972 the Actus reus of s.20: it was insufficiently serious to
count as grievous and nor did it count as a wound,
In the case of Savage [1992], the House of Lords because a wound is a break in the continuity of the
approved the case of Roberts [1972]. skin. In short, an internal rupturing of the blood vessels,
as here, is not a wound. This should have been charged
as a s.47 offence.
Mens rea of S.47?
- Mcloughlin 1838
The Mens rea for section 47 only requires an intention - Eisenhower 1984
to cause fear of physical contact or an intention to apply
unlawful force to the victim.
What is meant by Grievously bodily harm?
- In the case of Savage, where the defendant
threw beer at the victim, and the victim was In a court case called Bollom [2003] EWCA Crim 2846,
injured by a broken glass. The defendant was the Court of Appeal said that the seriousness of an
guilty of section 47 because he intended to injury depends on who the victim is.
throw the beer at the victim, and it was not
- Example of pianist and office worker; injury to
necessary to show that he foresaw the glass
finger. (it determines who the victim is)
breaking and causing injury.
Conduct elements/ Actus reus (a) when the defendant intentionally lied to the
victim about the nature or purpose of the act,
The Actus reus of rape involves the non-consensual and
penetration of the mouth, anus or vagina of a man or a
woman by a man’s penis. (b) when the defendant tricked the victim into
consenting by pretending to be someone known to the
Penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth with the victim.
tongue or finger or with objects such as broom handles,
bottles or dildos is not rape. It is the separate offence of - Section 76(2) (a)
(sexual) assault by penetration (SOA 2003, s.2). Williams [1923] 1 KB 340. D, a singing teacher, told V,
Under SOA 2003 s.79(2), ‘Penetration is a continuing his pupil, that it was necessary to perform an act (sexual
act from entry to withdrawal.’ This enshrines the pre- intercourse) in order to improve her singing. He was
SOA 2003 decision in Kaitamaki [1985] AC 147 that a convicted
man who continues to have intercourse after consent - R v Linker
is withdrawn commits the Actus reus of rape.
In the case, the defendant agreed to pay £25 for sexual
intercourse with a prostitute but afterward refused to
- R v DPP 2013 pay. The ruling retained the "very narrow" definition of
rape that, although consent was based on payment,
Any kind of sexual activity involving penetration of the refusing to do so after the fact was only fraud, not
vagina, mouth, or anus without consent is considered rape.
rape. It doesn't matter whether the perpetrator
ejaculates or not. Under s.79(3), ‘vagina’ includes - Section 76(2) (b)
surgically constructed vaginas following gender If someone pretends to be someone the victim knows
reassignment surgery. and has sex with them without their consent, it's
considered rape. This applies only if the person
impersonated is known personally to the victim. It can
be tricky to determine what "known personally" means,
especially in cases involving social media.
The case of Kamki 2013 the court of appeal
- Section 76: questions of procedure
approved the following important direction
In cases where there are concerns about consent, the Even if a woman has had a lot to drink, she can still have
prosecution will first try to prove if there were the capacity to choose whether or not to engage in
circumstances that prevented the victim from giving sexual activity. However, if she becomes so intoxicated
consent. If they can't prove that, they will try to prove that she can't make a decision about having sex, then
the absence of consent. In the Jheeta case, the she can't give consent. If she is unconscious, she
defendant used fake text messages to pressure the obviously can't give consent either. There can be a state
victim into having sex, and the court ruled that the of incapacity to consent that falls between being
victim was deceived about the situation, which led to conscious and being unconscious due to the effects of
her lack of choice in the matter. This led to the alcohol. It's important to determine if someone is
conviction of the defendant for rape. capable of consenting before engaging in any sexual
activity with them, even if they have been drinking.
b. The evidential presumptions
2. Deception and consent
Section 75 of the SOA 2003 lists six situations where it's
presumed that the complainant did not consent to the - In the case of B [2006] EWCA Crim 2945
sexual act and the defendant didn't believe they
consented. These include cases where violence is used Sex with consent; but HIV (DECEPTION); it is not a rape
or feared, the complainant is unconscious or physically but a grievously bodily harm under OAPA 1861.
disabled, or has been given a substance without their - In the case of R (Monica) v DPP
consent. This presumption can be challenged with
evidence. Consent was not affected because there was no
pressure; a police officer rather than an environmental
c. Section 74- the statutory definition of consent activist. This decision is confusing and raises questions
about the definition of free choice in consent, especially
- Olugboja case in light of other cases.
In Olugboja case, the victim said she didn't consent but In two cases, Assange and F, it was held that a victim
didn't resist because she was scared, while the did not consent to intercourse when the defendant
defendant said she had consented. The Court of Appeal breached a condition set by the victim, such as wearing
couldn't decide, so it was up to the jury to use their a condom. The decisions were controversial as the
good sense and knowledge of human behavior to draw victim did consent to sex, but not to the way it
the line between real consent and mere submission. occurred. Some argue that the defendant should have
In a case called R v Ali and Ashraf, the Court of Appeal been charged with common assault instead.
ruled that immature people have no consent even if a
person appears to have given consent to sex.
Procedure: relationship between S.1, S.75 and S.74
In the case of Bree 2007, a man was charged with rape Mens rea for it?
after having sex with a heavily intoxicated woman. The
a. Intention to penetrate
judge said that is important for the judge to explain the
jury that alcohol can affect a person’s ability to consent. To be guilty of rape, the defendant must intentionally
penetrate the complainant's vagina, anus, or mouth
Dougal case: a drunken consent is still consent.
without their consent. If the penetration is accidental,
even if the complainant did not consent to it, it is not
rape. In a case (R v Gabbai)
b. Fault with regard to consent
TOPIC 4- ACTUS REUS: Hart and Honoré describe a factual cause as:
CONSEQUENCES AND THEIR CAUSES
an event or act which ‘makes the difference’
between something happening and something not
happening.
WHAT IS MEANT BY RESULT CRIMES IN CRIMINAL LAW
(Causation and the law (1959))
For example, murder is a result crime because the
offender must cause the death of another person to be The common way of representing this is:
charged with this offense. Similarly, arson is a result
crime because the offender must set fire to another
person's property to be charged with this crime. an act is the factual cause if the
consequence would not have happened but
Examples of conduct crimes include assault, battery,
and drug possession. In these cases, the crime is based for that act
on the act itself, rather than a specific outcome.
an omission is the factual cause if the
consequence would not have happened but
Chain of causation for the defendant’s failure to act as they
should have done.
WOOLIN DIRECTION
Intention? (Mens rea-subjective fault) Woollin threw his infant son across the room in a
moment of fury, and the son’s skull fractured and he
- Basic and specific intent died. Woollin was charged with murder. The
prosecution accepted that Woollin did not act in order
- Murder and manslaughter: what does an to kill or cause serious injury, but nevertheless argued
intention mean? that he intended at least serious injury. Woollin was
Hyam v DPP 1975: whether he was guilty of murder or convicted of murder. He appealed on the basis that the
manslaughter; petrol bomb; killing of two children as a trial judge misdirected the jury on the meaning of
result; convicted of murder; the court held she must intention.
have likely to intended those consequences; criticism on If someone is charged with murder, the jury can't find
decision; it was later overruled. them guilty unless they believe that the person
intended to cause serious harm or death and knew it
was highly likely to happen. The jury needs to look at all
it was inconsistent with s.8 of the criminal justice act the evidence to make this decision.
1967.
- Theft etc
Temporal coincidence
Temporal coincidence refers to the requirement in Transferred malice: a qualification to the
criminal law that the elements of a crime, such as the correspondence principle
Actus reus (the guilty act) and the Mens rea (the guilty
mind), must occur at the same time. In other words, It applies when a person intends to commit a crime
there must be a temporal connection between the against one person, but instead causes harm to another
criminal act and the criminal intent. person. In such cases, the law transfers the person's
criminal intent from the original target to the actual
For example, if someone plans to commit a murder but victim.
then changes their mind and does not carry out the act,
they cannot be charged with murder because there was For example, if someone intends to shoot and kill
no temporal coincidence between the intent to kill and Person A, but instead accidentally shoots and kills
the actual act of killing. Similarly, if someone Person B, the law can apply the doctrine of transferred
accidentally kills someone while committing a lawful malice. The person intended to commit a crime against
act, such as driving a car, they cannot be charged with Person A, but the act was still unlawful and the intent
murder because there was no intent to commit the act. can be transferred to the actual victim, Person B.
1. A killing
It requires an act or, in the case of murder and gross What has to be intended/ MENS REA
negligence manslaughter, an omission in breach of duty.
The Mens rea for murder is either an intention to kill
Three principle ingredients of killing are the victim or an intention to cause grievous bodily harm
1. Act, or omission in breach of duty to the victim. This was made clear in Vickers [1957] 2
2. Death of a human being QB 664 and confirmed in Cunningham [1982] AC 566,
3. Unbroken causal link between act and death in which the defendant repeatedly hit the victim over
the head with a chair, which caused his death.
2. An unlawful killing
Sexual infidelity refers to the act of one partner in a The relative functions of judge and jury are described in
romantic or sexual relationship engaging in sexual s.54(5) and (6) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009:
activities with someone other than their partner
If a murder case includes enough evidence that suggests
without the consent of their partner. It can be a
the partial defence of loss of control may apply, the jury
sensitive issue that often leads to emotional distress
should assume that the defence is valid unless the
and relationship breakdowns.
prosecution can prove beyond reasonable doubt that it
It can act as a qualifying trigger is not.
The case of Clinton 2012: the jury said; sexual infidelity - Diminished responsibility: S.2 of the homicide
which prompts a loss of self-control due to sexual act 1957
jealousy, possessiveness or family honour is not a
Diminished responsibility is a partial defence to murder
qualifying trigger. However, if the sexual infidelity
where the defendant can show that they were suffering
provides the context within which another trigger
from an abnormality of mental functioning that
operates, it must be considered.
substantially impaired their ability to understand the
nature of their conduct, form a rational judgment or
exercise self-control at the time of the killing. An
2. The objective element
example could be a person with severe depression or
To use the new partial defense of loss of control, the psychosis who kills someone while experiencing
defendant's reaction must be consistent with what an delusions or hallucinations.
ordinary person of their sex and age, with a normal
The defence was reconfigured by S.52 of the coroners
degree of tolerance and self-restraint, might do in the
and justice act 2009.
same circumstances. The circumstances that the jury
can consider are those that any ordinary person might Section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009
experience, such as their race, religion, gender, sexual amends s.2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957, as follows:
preference, physical appearance, and past events and
experiences. Mental disorders or personality disorders
that only affect the defendant's ability to control (1) A person (‘D’) who kills or is a party to the killing of
themselves cannot be considered. This was confirmed another is not to be convicted of murder if D was
in R v Willcocks (2016). suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning
which –
Brain damage. (Hendy [2006] EWCA Crim The new law requires that a mental condition must
explain why a defendant committed a killing. If their
819; Wood [2008] EWCA Crim 1305).
ability to reason, understand, or control themselves was
Psychopathy (Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396). impaired due to the condition, it can be a defense.
However, a psychopath cannot use this defense
Paranoid personality disorder
because they have normal cognitive abilities and self-
(Martin (Anthony) [2001] EWCA Crim control.
2245). According to Section 52(1B) of the Coroners and Justice
Postnatal depression (Reynolds [1988] Act 2009, a mental condition can be a defense if it is a
significant factor in causing the conduct leading to the
Crim LR 679). killing. The jury decides if it is a valid defense, even if
there are multiple causes involved, which could be
2. Alcohol and drugs
difficult to determine.
In Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281, (2012) MHLO
In Golds (2014), the Court of Appeal preferred the
18, the Court of Appeal concluded that voluntary acute
second interpretation, ruling that the defendant’s
intoxication, whether from alcohol or another
mental abnormality must have had a very significant
substance, is not capable of founding diminished
effect on his ability to understand/control himself, etc.
responsibility.
Whether the impairment crossed this threshold is a
matter for the jury. (Important)
So a person who kills due to the combined effect of
intoxication and a recognised mental condition may still
have a defence (Dietschmann [2003] 1 All ER 897
Involuntary manslaughter? Constructive manslaughter is the correct charge
when there is evidence that death resulted from an
Involuntary manslaughter can be one of three unlawful and objectively dangerous act of D, but
types: there is insufficient evidence that D intended (or
foresaw) death or serious injury or was grossly
negligent as to the risk of death.
‘foresight’ or ‘reckless’ manslaughter
‘unlawful act’ or ‘constructive’ manslaughter Illustration 7 A hits B with a single punch to the
jaw. B dies as a result of a hidden weakness in
gross negligence manslaughter (causing his skull which implodes under the force.
death through lack of care).
This is constructive manslaughter; neither of the
other two forms apply since A neither foresaw
death nor grievous bodily harm, and nor was he
- Overlap between forms of involuntary grossly negligent as to the risk of death.
manslaughter
Gross negligence manslaughter is the correct
Hyam (Hyam [1975] AC 55) and Smith (Smith [1961] AC charge where there is insufficient evidence that D
290) both killed in the course of doing something foresaw death or serious injury resulting from their
extremely dangerous. In the former case, Hyam threw a conduct and there is no unlawful and dangerous act
upon which to graft liability. It is most appropriate,
petrol bomb through V’s letter box, while, in the latter
therefore, for those who kill in the course of
case, Smith drove his car extremely dangerously in an performing a lawful activity in a criminally careless
attempt to dislodge a police officer trying to arrest fashion, or who omit to do something they should
him. Both victims were killed. The House of Lords have done. It covers, for example, parents who
found both defendants had been properly convicted of neglect their children, train drivers who ignore
murder. If these cases came to court today, the signals, electricians who forget to earth their
outcome would be different. Murder requires an circuits, builders who break building regulations,
surgeons who perform incompetent surgery on their
intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. And
patients, bus drivers who fall asleep at the wheel
what Hyam and Smith did, although wicked and and so on.
dangerous, was not done in furtherance of an intention
to kill or cause serious injury. They could, however, be
charged with:
Constructive manslaughter
Constructive manslaughter is a type of manslaughter
reckless manslaughter, if the prosecution could
where the defendant did not intend to cause death or
prove foresight of death or serious injury
serious harm but was engaged in an unlawful and
dangerous act or omission that caused death. The term
gross negligence manslaughter, if, irrespective
"constructive" means that the defendant is considered
of whether the prosecution could prove
responsible for the death even though they did not
foresight of death or serious injury, the jury
intend it because their actions were so dangerous that
considered their actions to be grossly negligent
they should have foreseen the risk of harm. Examples of
as to the risk of death
constructive manslaughter include reckless driving that
results in a fatal accident or supplying drugs that lead to
an overdose.
constructive manslaughter, since both
defendants killed in the course of doing 1. An act: actus reus
something illegal and dangerous.
To be guilty of constructive manslaughter, the cause of
death must be an act. This is one of the few crimes
which cannot be committed by omission. Omissions
- Distinctiveness are not sufficient even where there is a duty of care.
Example
In Lowe [1973] QB 702, D was initially charged If V self-injects and this causes V’s death, D (who
with constructive manslaughter for the death of his supplied the drugs) is not guilty of manslaughter. V’s
child, but the Court of Appeal quashed his free and informed act breaks the chain of causation
conviction because there was no evidence of an act (Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38).
that caused the child's death. Instead, the charge
should have been gross negligence If, however, D does the injecting then D will be liable for
manslaughter. The prosecution's decision to constructive manslaughter if this results in V’s death.
charge constructive manslaughter was seen as an
Another knotty problem concerns acts of the defendant
attempt to avoid having to prove gross negligence.
towards V, which triggers V’s suicide. What test of
2. An act which is criminally unlawful causation is to be applied here? Is it ‘take your victim
as you find them?’, as in Blaue; a reasonable foresight
In Scarlett [1993] 4 All ER 629, D, a publican, ejected a
test, as in Roberts; a daft or disproportionate reaction
drunk from a public house, who then fell backwards
test, as in Williams; or a voluntary act test, as in
down the steps and died following a fractured skull. D’s
Kennedy? In Wallace (see Section 4.3.6), the Court of
conviction for constructive manslaughter was quashed
Appeal sidestepped this question, ruling that the
on the basis that he feared the drunk was about to
question to be considered in all cases where more than
attack him and so his use of force was lawful self-
one cause contributed to the death is whether ‘the
defence. This meant that he had not committed the
accused’s acts can fairly be said to have made a
core offence that constructive manslaughter requires.
significant contribution to the victim’s death’ .
(Important cases)
6. Reform proposals
4. the criminal act must be dangerous
- Gross negligence manslaughter (manslaughter
In this case, Edmund Davies LJ gave the following by breach of duty)
authoritative definition of what counts as a dangerous a. Duty of care
act:
In Lipman [1970], a man killed his girlfriend while under In the case of Kemp 1957, the defendant attacked his
the influence of LSD. He claimed automatism (lack of wife with a hammer and claimed the defense of
control over his actions), but it was rejected because he automatism due to a temporary lapse of consciousness
voluntarily took the drug. If he had been charged with caused by hardening of the arteries. However, the court
murder, he could have used the LSD as evidence to rejected this defense and ruled that hardening of the
show he did not have the intent to kill, but this defense arteries is a disease of the mind that can cause a defect
was not available for manslaughter. of reasoning or understanding, making the defendant
eligible to plead insanity.
Second limb of the M’Naghten rules If a person becomes voluntarily intoxicated to gain the
courage to commit a specific intent crime, they cannot
The M’Naghten rules also permit the insanity defence
use that intoxication as a defense. This was established
for those who know what they are doing but do not
in the A-G of Northern Ireland v Gallagher case 1963,
‘know that it is wrong’.
where the House of Lords held that if the defendant had
In Windle 1952, a husband killed his suicidal wife at her the intention to commit the crime before becoming
request due to a mental disorder, believing it was right intoxicated, that was enough to establish guilt. It was
to do so. However, he could not plead insanity because not necessary to prove that they had the necessary
he showed an awareness that what he was doing was intention at the time of the actual crime.
legally wrong when he said, "I suppose they will hang
me for this" to the police. This was especially
unfortunate as murder was a capital offense at the - Voluntary and involuntary intoxication
time. distinguished
Public and private defence The use of force can only be considered reasonable if it
is immediately necessary based on the beliefs of the
including self-defence
person using force. If there are other options available,
Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (CLA 1967) such as locking a door, then the use of force may not be
provides the basic template for both public and private reasonable.
defence. Section 3(1) reads:
2. No duty of retreat
This applies to self-defense and also to the defense of Add cases later
duress. However, the threat does not give a person the
7. Duress may be a threat to any crime except
some forms of treason, murder and attempted
murder.
DURESS OF CIRCUMSTANCES
# NECESSITY
1. Necessity as an excuse
2. Necessity as a justification: do it later?
TOPIC 12- PROPERT OFFENCES
So, a person can steal land if:
definition of property in s.4 of the Theft Act 1968. Subsection 4(2)(c) deals with the case of tenants,
Subsection 4(1) who cannot steal turf or topsoil, garden trees or
shrubs, but can steal fixtures such as fountains and
stone terraces.
includes money and all other property, real or
personal, including things in action and other
intangible property.
To determine if appropriation has occurred, we In the Morris case 1984, the defendant swapped
need to consider what rights an owner has over the the price tags on a can of beans to pay a lower
property and if the defendant has assumed any of price. The court ruled that an appropriation
those rights. If they have, then they have happens when someone takes property in a way
appropriated the property.
that goes against the owner's rights. Taking
In the case of Pitham and Hehl 1977, the defendant something from a self-service shop shelf is not an
offered to sell his friend's furniture, which was an appropriation because it is allowed. But in Morris,
assumption of the right to sell, and therefore, an swapping the price tags was not allowed, and it
appropriation. In the case of R v Darroux 2018, the went against the owner's rights. This decision was
defendant filled out false claim forms for overtime and also made in other cases, like Meech and Fritschy.
expenses, but this did not constitute an appropriation of
In Gomez, the assistant manager of a shop helped
the money that was transferred to her account. The
a customer acquire goods in exchange for two
Court of Appeal quashed her conviction because she did stolen cheques. The manager knew the cheques
not assume a right of ownership over the money; she were stolen and deceived the shop manager into
only wrote a false claim form. authorizing the sale. The manager was charged
with theft, but appealed, arguing that the goods
were sold under a contract between the customer
If A takes the key of a car so that he can steal the and the shop, and there could be no theft where
car later, has he appropriated only the key or also ownership passed to the customer. The Court of
the car? Appeal agreed and allowed the appeal. However,
the House of Lords overturned the decision and
held that even if an act is authorized or consented
to, it can still be an appropriation if it involves taking In the case of Williams v Phillips, it was
someone else's property without their consent. determined that refuse placed out for collection by
the local authority remained the property of the
In Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241, D befriended V and householder until it was collected by the local
encouraged him to make gifts of money from his authority. Therefore, refuse workers who took
bank account. D was convicted of theft, even property that did not belong to them could be
though there was no evidence of duress or convicted of theft. This decision was supported by
deception, because the acquisition of title subsequent cases such as Woodman and
(ownership) of the money was an appropriation. Hancock. In summary, taking someone else's
Lord Steyn said that even if V had gifted the property without permission is theft, regardless of
money, D, by acquiring title, had appropriated it. whether the property is valuable or not.
This was a surprising decision because the transfer
was considered valid under civil law, but invalid
under criminal law. The same principle applies to
other transactions involving the transfer of 3. The property must belong to
ownership, such as contracts for sale. The House of
another at the time of appropriation
Lords made it clear in Hinks that, despite their find that
an appropriation had occurred, most people who
received property by way of gift would not be guilty of
theft. Liability in such a case will depend upon whether
D was dishonest in receiving the gift.
In Chodorek v Poland [2017] ACD 244 (82) QBD, the
debit card;
- Belonging to another
Corcoran v Whent [1977] Crim LR 52 is a
A person cannot be guilty of theft if the property perfect, if rare, example of how a theft conviction
they appropriate does not belong to another was not possible because the property
person. But a person can be guilty of theft if they appropriated no longer belonged to another person
appropriate property that belongs to them! at the time of appropriation.
(example of Horse) How can this be? The answer
to this question is to be found in s.5 of the Theft Act D ate food in a restaurant with a friend; left without
1968, which defines the term ‘belonging to another’. payment; had no mens rea to theft; at the time
mens formed property does not belong to other
Section 5(1) states that property belongs
to ‘any person having possession or control
- Subsection 5(3) of the Theft Act 1968
of it or having in it any proprietary right or
This is a deceptively difficult subsection designed to
interest’. cover the case of someone who has passed
ownership and possession in property to someone
- Abandoned property
else for a particular purpose and that purpose is
If property is abandoned, it may belong to no one, disregarded. Is the transferee guilty of theft? The
in which case it cannot be stolen. However, even subsection reads:
abandoned property may belong to someone else –
for example, the owner of the land or vessel in If someone receives property or money from
which the property is found. another person and has a legal obligation to keep
and use it in a certain way on behalf of the other
In Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142, D was a person, then that property or money is still
trespasser; golf balls considered to belong to the original owner, even
though it is in the possession of the person with the
To that extent, the club had control of the balls and obligation. This means that if the person fails to
so they belonged to the club for the purpose of s.5. fulfill their legal obligation, they can be charged
with theft or other offenses related to
misappropriation of property or funds.
This subsection has the effect that if A gives
property (e.g. money) to B to do something specific a. a belief that he has in law the right to
with it (e.g. pay a bill, deliver to charity), B commits deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself
theft if they do something else with it even if B has
become the sole legal owner of the property. or of a third person; or
b. a belief that he would have the other’s
This is exactly what happened and was decided
in Wain [1995] 2 Cr App R 660. consent if the other knew of the
appropriation and the circumstances of it; or
c. a belief that the person to whom the
In Davidge v Bunnett [1984] Crim LR 297, the
defendant shared a flat with others, who gave her property belongs cannot be discovered by
cheques to pay their joint gas bill. It was
understood that D would have to pay the cheques taking reasonable steps.
into her own bank account before doing so. In fact,
D spent the proceeds on Christmas presents. The An example of s.2(1)(b) is where D takes V’s milk
Divisional Court held that s.5(3) applied, and that D from the refrigerator of their jointly occupied flat for
was under a legal obligation to use the proceeds to a cup of tea, having used all their own milk. An
pay the bill, and therefore they were property example of s.2(1)(c) is where D finds a sum of
belonging to another by virtue of s.5(3). money in a public area which, because of its
relatively small size, they conclude will never be
- Subsection 5(4) of the Theft Act 1968 reported to the police. The key point here is not that
D does have this right (s.2(1)(a)) or does have V’s
Subsection 5(4) was designed to address problems consent (s.2(1)(b)), or that the property cannot be
such as occurred in Moynes v Cooper [1956] 1 QB returned to the owner by taking reasonable steps
439, in which an employer paid an employee’s (s.2(1)(c)), but that D has this belief. The jury will
salary twice into the employee’s bank account by decide this by reference to all the evidence.
mistake and the employee spent it. Under the civil
law, the funds in the account (thing in action)
belong to the account holder. Subsection 5(4)
confirms that the property mistakenly transferred or
otherwise received belongs also to the transferor
for the purpose of the law of theft, so that if the D was a cashier in a betting office who, contrary to
transferee treats the property as their own they will his firm’s instructions, took some money out of the
be guilty of theft. It states: till on a Friday, intending to repay it on the Monday.
He left a note to this effect in the till. D was charged
with theft. The trial judge held that D’s actions were
clearly dishonest. Section 2 did not apply and his
intention to replace the money was irrelevant. The
Mens rea: theft Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Lawton LJ
agreed that a person could be acting honestly
although s.2 did not apply. He said that the final
- Dishonesty decision on whether the appropriation is dishonest
lies not with the judge but was a question of fact
which should have been left to the jury. He said:
Dishonesty is not defined in the Theft Act 1968. Jurors should use their own understanding of what
However, s.2 of the Act tells us what dishonesty it means to be honest and apply that standard
is not. Section 2(1) states that certain beliefs of the when deciding whether someone's actions were
defendant are inconsistent with having a dishonest dishonest. They don't need a judge to tell them
state of mind. These are: what constitutes dishonesty.
Ivey/Feely test:
Under the Ivey/Feely test, a jury must first Do you think the current mechanism for deciding
determine whether the defendant's actions were whether a person is dishonest is sufficiently clear?
dishonest according to the standards of ordinary, Outline the proposals for reforming theft and
reasonable and honest people. If the jury finds that dishonesty tabled by Professors Smith, Glazebrook, Tur
the actions were dishonest, they must then consider and Elliot.
whether the defendant knew that their actions were
A takes a bruised apple from a market stall and gives it
dishonest according to those standards.
to a homeless person sitting on the floor nearby. What
direction should the judge give the jury on dishonesty?
Read Wilson, Chapter 14.2.B.2 ‘Dishonesty’, Section (b) A person is to be treated as having an intention to
‘What dishonesty is’ and Section (c) ‘Reforming permanently deprive the owner of his property if his
dishonesty’ and answer the following questions. intention is to:
If someone treats something as if it belongs to
them, and they can do whatever they want with it
without considering the owner's rights, it's
considered as if they have taken ownership of it.
This can include borrowing or lending something if
it's done in a way that's similar to taking or
disposing of it completely.
The s.9(1)(a) offence requires intention to commit (a) ‘firearm’ includes an airgun or air pistol,
one of the ulterior offences. It will be charged when and ‘imitation firearm’ means anything which
there is evidence that D had entered with the has the appearance of being a firearm,
relevant intent but had not yet consummated the whether capable of being discharged or not;
proposed crime. In everyday language, a person and
can be a burglar without actually stealing anything
or causing any harm. (b) ‘weapon of offence’ means any article
made or adapted for use for causing injury to
It is important to remember that it is not necessary or incapacitating a person, or intended by the
for the prosecution to prove entry with intent to person having it with him for such use; and
steal, although, of course, this will usually be the
case. A person who enters with intent to commit (c) ‘explosive’ means any article manufactured
any of the offences specified commits burglary. By for the purpose of producing a practical effect
s.9(2) these are offences of: by explosion, or intended by the person having
it with him for that purpose.
stealing anything in the building or part of
The mere fact that the defendant has with them at
the building in question, or the time of the burglary an object that could be
used as a weapon of offence, such as a crowbar or
inflicting on any person therein any grievous knife, does not mean the offence is committed. The
bodily harm, or prosecution must either show that the article’s
primary purpose is for causing injury, such as a
doing unlawful damage to the building or gun or hunting knife, or has been adapted for such
use, or, in the case of articles such as crowbars,
anything therein. knives, etc. that it was intended for such use by
the defendant. See R v Eletu and White [2018]
It is not burglary, therefore, to enter premises as a EWCA Crim 599.
trespasser with intent to commit fraud, rape or
cause actual bodily harm. In O’Leary (1986) 82 Cr App R 341, D entered a
house without a weapon. Once inside he took a
- Section 9(1)(b) burglary knife from the kitchen and took it upstairs to effect
the burglary. D’s conviction was upheld on appeal.
The s.9(1)(b) offence does not require proof of an
It was held that, since the offence was charged
ulterior intent at the time of entering as a
under s.9(1)(b), there was no requirement that he
trespasser. It is charged only where there is
had the knife at the time of entry.
evidence that the substantive offence has been
committed. It is committed where, having entered
as a trespasser, the entrant:
Illustration 2
A sells B a car, the odometer of which he knows In both cases, Adam’s silence is impliedly telling
carries a false reading. the other party that nothing relevant to their
agreement has changed since the first
A cannot be guilty of fraud as he has made no false representation was made. Put another way, in both
representation as to the mileage. It would be cases, the statement that Adam has made which
different if, upon being asked, A confirmed the was once true is now false. The change in
reading or said that it was genuine (express circumstances has made it so.
representation of fact) or that he believed it to be
genuine (express representation as to his state of # Representations and machines
mind).
The Fraud Act 2006 s.2(5) now makes it possible to
In two situations, silence may constitute a false commit fraud via a machine, since a representation
representation. In both cases, the silence creates a is regarded as having been made:
false impression.
This would include putting false information in an
online tax or insurance form, or computer
‘phishing’, as in the case of those who place viral
# Where there exists a duty of disclosure (also sob stories on the internet which are intended to
covered by s.3) cause naive recipients to transfer money to the
phisher.
The important aspect of s.3 is the requirement that (c) intends, by means of the abuse of that
the defendant be under a legal duty of disclosure: a position –
moral duty is not enough. The concept of ‘legal
duty’ is explained in the Law Commission’s (i) to make a gain for himself or another,
Report on Fraud, which said: or
A duty can come from different sources like laws (ii) to cause loss to another or to expose
(for example, rules about company prospectuses), another to a risk of loss.
or because of the nature of the agreement (like
insurance contracts, where both parties have to be
(2) A person may be regarded as having abused
completely honest with each other). It can also
his position even though his conduct consisted of
come from the terms of a contract, trade customs,
an omission rather than an act.
or a special relationship between the people
involved (such as a person acting as an agent for
someone else). The Law Commission described the type of
relationships intended to be covered by fraud
by abuse of position as follows:
So, an art dealer would not commit the offence if
they bought a painting at a car boot sale knowing
that the painting was worth a thousand times the There are certain relationships that automatically come
asking price, as they have only a moral duty of with fiduciary duties, like between a trustee and
disclosure. beneficiary, director and company, or agent and
principal. However, this kind of relationship can also
exist in other situations, like within a family, voluntary
work, or any situation where the parties are not
a. Adam parks his car in a pay and display
completely separate. Even if it's not a typical fiduciary
relationship, the law can still recognize it as such. But, car park. Eve, who is about to leave the
the authors believe that it's not necessary for these
car park, gives Adam her unexpired
duties to exist in all situations.
ticket. Adam places the ticket on his
windscreen.
Adam is guilty under s.11. He is also guilty
of fraud by false representation. By putting
the ticket on his windscreen, he is impliedly
representing that he has paid for it. The gain
he makes is keeping the fee due.
3. Obtaining services dishonestly
(a) by a dishonest act, and (2) A person obtains services in breach of this
subsection if –
(b) in breach of subsection (2).
(a) they are made available on the basis that
payment has been, is being or will be made for
or in respect of them,
Actus reus: obtaining services dishonestly
(b) he obtains them without any payment
Under the previous law it was an offence only having been made for or in respect of them or
where there was a deception. Now any dishonest without payment having been made in full, and
act will be covered. The difference in coverage can
be seen in the following example. (c) when he obtains them, he knows –
Illustration 7 (i) that they are being made available on
the basis described in paragraph (a), or
D parks her car in a pay-and-display car park.
She does not pay for a ticket, hoping that she (ii) that they might be, but intends that
will return before a ticket inspector arrives. payment will not be made, or will not be
made in full.
Under the Theft Act 1978, this would not be an
offence under s.2, as no false representation has Subsection 11(2) makes it clear that only services
been made. It is, however, an offence under s.11 made available on the basis that payment has
because D has obtained a service and her conduct been, is being or will be made for or in respect of
is dishonest. them are covered.
Illustration 9
Mens rea: obtaining services dishonestly
The offence requires Ivey dishonesty, knowledge
that payment is required or might be, and an
intention not to pay for the service or not to pay in Both theft and fraud by fraudulent
full. Section 2 of the Theft Act 1968 does not apply. misrepresentation
(3) Where property is subject to a trust, the persons - Damaging property in order to protect a
to whom it belongs shall be so treated as including person’s own property or an interest therein
any person having a right to enforce the trust.
The simplest case of s.5(2)(b) is where D damages
(4) Property of a corporation sole shall be treated property in order to protect their own property (e.g.
as belonging to the corporation notwithstanding a shoots a dog worrying their sheep or sets fire to a
vacancy in the corporation. haystack to prevent a fire on neighbouring land
spreading to their house). The defence extends beyond
property to property interests. So knocking down a wall
blocking a right of way was held to be a lawful excuse
Mens rea: simple criminal damage
in Chamberlain v Lindon [1998] 1 WLR 1252.
The defendant must intend to damage property
Section 5(2)(b) has been held to apply only where the
belonging to another or be reckless in respect of
damage done is for the direct and immediate purpose
causing such damage. Intention carries its general
of protecting property. So, in Hunt (1978) 66 Cr App R
meaning. The meaning of recklessness for the purposes
105, D argued that he set fire to a bed in an old people’s
of the Criminal Damage Act was for many years a
home to draw attention to the non-working fire alarm.
matter of controversy until the House of Lords’ decision
The Court of Appeal ruled that this was not a lawful
in G [2003] UKHL 50, which returned recklessness to its
excuse. D’s action was taken not to protect the old
previous (subjective) meaning.
people’s home from damage but to act as a warning. In
- LAWFUL EXCUSE short, the act must be for the direct purpose of
protecting property from harm.
Section 5 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 provides
two defences for damaging property without lawful # Aggravated criminal damage
excuse: belief in the owner's consent and belief that it is
necessary to protect one's own property. These Section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971
defences apply even if the defendant would not states:
normally have a lawful excuse. It is enough for the
A person who without lawful excuse destroys or
defendant to honestly believe that they had the owner's damages any property, whether belonging to
consent or that it was necessary to protect their own or himself or another –
another's property, without requiring the belief to be
reasonable. (a) intending to destroy or damage any
property or being reckless as to whether any
property would be destroyed or damaged; and
- Belief in the consent of the person or persons
(b) intending by the destruction or damage to
believed to be entitled to consent
endanger the life of another or being reckless
In Jaggard v Dickinson [1981] QB 527. D, after an as to whether the life of another would be
evening’s drinking, found that she had been locked out thereby endangered;
of her home. She broke into a house which, in her
shall be guilty of an offence.
drunken state, she thought belonged to a friend who
would consent. In fact, she was mistaken; it was the Simple criminal damage is a property crime.
house next door. The magistrates held that she could Aggravated criminal damage, however, is a hybrid
not rely upon s.5(2)(a), since her belief in consent was offence against property and against the person. Its
brought about by self-induced intoxication (see Topic core application is cases of dangerous arson. The kind of
10). The Divisional Court quashed the conviction, case covered by the aggravated offence is A-G’s
relying on s.5(3), which states: ‘For the purposes of this Reference (No 50 of 2005) [2005] EWCA Crim 2041, in
section it is immaterial whether a belief is justified or which the defendant used petrol to set fire to his room
not if it is honestly held’. in a hostel, in the hope that he would be rehoused. The
hostel was destroyed. The aggravated offence was imprisonment, D had to do more than prepare for
committed – D had committed arson and he was it. He had to have done things which formed part of
reckless as to whether life would be endangered by that the execution of the offence.
arson.
Overall, the cases of White and Stonehouse illustrate A case falling on the other side of the line is Jones
the application of the proximity test and the various (1990) 91 Cr App R 351. In this case, D, who was jealous
ways in which it has been applied by the courts to of V, got into V’s car while it was stationary and handed
determine whether an act constitutes an attempt to over a letter. While V read it, D took a loaded sawn-off
commit a crime. The key factor in each case is the shotgun from his bag, pointed it at V at a range of some
degree of proximity between the defendant's acts and 10 to 12 inches and said, ‘You are not going to like this’
the completed offence, and the extent to which the or similar words. V grabbed the end of the gun and
defendant has gone towards achieving their criminal pushed it sideways and upwards. There was a struggle,
objective. during which V managed to throw the gun out of the
window. D’s conviction for attempted murder was
The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 s.1 defines the offence
upheld.
of attempting to commit a crime as follows: if a person
intends to commit a crime and does an act that goes
beyond just preparing to commit the crime, they can be
found guilty of attempting to commit the crime. In other
words, the act they do must be more than just planning
or preparing to commit the crime; it must be a direct
step towards actually committing the crime. Mens rea