1. City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No.

L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:

An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation of establishment of private cemeteries
in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the
taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed
and not for the benefit of the public.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:

No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires
payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just
compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be
taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the
police power of the state.

2. Phil Press Institute v COMELEC

Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of
not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated
by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand
on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the
Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print
media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to
donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation
required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by
respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private
property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution
No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing
of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

3. FACTS:

Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the intestate of the deceased Antonio
Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of fourteen thousand six
hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of Commonwealth Act No.
567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950. Commonwealth Act. 567
Section 2 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of
sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners or persons in control of the land devoted tot he cultivation of
sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference between the
money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value
of such land. It was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar
industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The
action was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the greatest industry of our nation, sugar
occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in
the fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the important source of foreign exchange
needed by our government and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its
promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for
the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the wide
field of its police power, the law-making body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted
among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.

The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the
threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police power.

4. TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

Facts: In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted
which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize
the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the
movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie
industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on
the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter
of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the
VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a
statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through
the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title.
As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and
control of the [VRB].”

 5. Osmena vs Orbos

FACTS:
President Marcos created a special account in the General Fund designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF).
The OPSF was designated to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil. Subsequently, EO 137 expanded the
grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for cost underrecovery. Now, the petition avers that the creation of the
trust fund violates the Constitution that if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated as a
special fund to be used only for the purpose indicated. 

ISSUE:
Is the OPSF constitutional? 

RULING:
Yes. The tax collected is not in pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide a
means for the stabilization of the petroleum products industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power
of the State. 

6. association of Small Landowners vs Sec of agrarian Reform

FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment
of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the
said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or
just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree.
They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.

RULING:

Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between the police power
and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose,
the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in
Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the
property expropriated.

7. Ortigas and Co. vs CA

FACTS:

Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with several restrictions
in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for residential purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025.
Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as commercial. Private respondent
(Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso and built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a
car sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint which sought the demolition of the constructed car sales
company to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of
Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.

HELD:

Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any standing contract. Hence,
petition is denied.

RATIO:

A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given
retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to
future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will
have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power
must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,  the Supreme Court
already upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power measure.

8. PNB vs Office of the President

FACTS:

Private respondents are buyers on installment of subdivision. However, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lands
in favor of the petitioner even though the sale of land was already executed. Unaware of the foregoing facts, the private
respondents continued to comply with their obligation as buyers. The subdivision developer later on defaulted and PNB
foreclosed on the mortgage and became the owner of the lots. A decision by the HLURB and OAALA ruled that PNB may
collect from private respondents only the remaining amortization payment and cannot compel them to pay again for the
lots they had already bought from the subdivision developer. The Office of the President affirmed this decision by
declaring Presidential Decree 957*.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Presidential Decree 957 applies to sale of land prior to its enactment

HELD/DECISION:

Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive effect of the law unless the contrary is provided. PD 957,
though implied, intended to include real estate mortgages executed prior to its enactment and therefore must take
effect to protect the innocent purchasers from swindling and fraudulent manipulations and illegal scheme of subdivision
developers. The court ascertained that they will not follow the letter of the statue if it will not reflect the intent and
purpose of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the protection of human rights. It would also be illogical
if PD 957 which seeks to oust the fraudulent practices would not be applied to existing mortgage contract due to some a
technicality.

*Section 18: Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written
approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan
shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been
provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and
the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his
installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage
indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over
the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereto;
9. St Lukes vs NLRC

Facts:
1. The private respondent Maribel Santos worked as an X-Ray technician at the petitioner hospital (SLMC) but she does
not possess  a certificate of registration as required under the newly passed Radiologic Act or RA 7431. Due to her non-
compliance and her failure to pass the exams, she was separated.

2. The private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other monetary
benefits. The Labor Arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay respondent separation pay and this was affirmed by both NLRC
and the Court of Appeals, hence this petition. The petitioner contended that respondent dismissal was valid.

Issue: Whether or not an employer can validly dismiss an employee based on her inability to secure a certification as
required by the Board

RULING: Yes, The petitioner is merely exercising its management prerogative and these rights are entitled respect and
enforcement in the interest of fair play. There was no malice imputed upon an employer where the separation of an
employee is undertaken in conformance with an existing law as in this case.

Management prerogatives include the right of the employer to determine the place or station where an employee is
best qualified to serve the interests of the company on the basis of the qualifications, training and performance.

10. Chavez vs Romulo

Facts: GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance pf Permit to
Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence.
Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the
petition for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.

Issue: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not the banning of carrying
firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be revoked any time. It
does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee
takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of
this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege.

The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines do not entirely
prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However,
those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.

11. Southeast Mindanao vs Balite

FACTS:

          On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was grantedExploration Permit No. 133 (EP No.

133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal area. On June

            27, 2991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-
Scale Mining Act. The law established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to beimplemented by the Secretary of the
DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and
control.

                Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing
Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED
Mines Case.

                On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land
covered by the permit. In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI)
accepted and registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter, several MAC cases were filed.

                On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the
MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining
rights. The RPA subsequently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases.

                On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03
which provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of diret state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.

                On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court
of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC). It
prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state
utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum
order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and
environmental laws are enforced by the DENR.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme" espoused in MO 97-03 divested petitioner of its vested right
to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133.

HELD:
                No. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal
dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed hereunder was merely a study of this
option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-
sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials
concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by petitioner, it is
well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated
Mines cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of the
issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which
purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP
No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in
the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired
by the issuance of MO 97-03. It must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's rights
under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely
evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so
requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral
resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest
in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and
due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or
amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare. Additionally, there can
be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized
to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of
theexploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking
the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he
ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy
enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the
only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush.

12. MMDA vs Garin

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic
violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo,
Manila, on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero
Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction, contending
that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA
unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of
the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore unlimited — fines and
other penalties on erring motorists.  
The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.

Issue:

1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.

HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body
of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government
units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.  

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local government is a
"political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local
government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No.
7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to
as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for
the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in
the charter itself

* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority."
The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-
moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this
purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center,
and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or
members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions
and requirements as the Authority may impose."

13. Carlos Superdrug Corp vs DSWD

Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners assail
the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Section
4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the SeniorCitizens. Petitioner contends that said
law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional 

Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object.

Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it
does to all the great public needs.” It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.”

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

14. SURNECO vs ERC

Facts:

The Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, as representative of SURNECO and of the other 33 rural
electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a petition before the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for the approval of the
formula for automatic cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power Corporation (NPC) restructured rate
adjustment to comply with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832.  The ERC (replaces ERB) hereby confirms the Purchased Power
Adjustment (PPA) of Surigao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) for the period February 1996 to July 2004
which resulted to an over-recovery for the amount of PhP18,188,794.00. In this connection, SURNECO is hereby
directed to refund to its Main Island consumers starting the next billing cycle from receipt of this Order until such time
that the full amount shall have been refunded. But in Hikdop Island it’s resulted to an under-recovery for the amount of
PhP2,478,045.00. SURNECO is hereby authorized to collect from its Hikdop Island consumers starting the next billing
cycle from receipt of this Order until such time that the full amount shall have been collected.

Accordingly, SURNECO is directed to:

a) Reflect the PPA refund/collection as a separate item in the bill using the phrase "Previous Years’ Adjustment on Power
Cost";

b) Submit, within ten (10) days from its initial implementation of the refund/collection, a sworn statement indicating its
compliance with the aforecited directive; and

c) Accomplish and submit a report in accordance with the attached prescribed format, on or before the 30th day of
January of the succeeding year and every year thereafter until the amount shall have been fully refunded/collected.

SURNECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the ERC.  So, SURNECO went to CA via petition for
review, but it was also denied.

Issue:

Is SURNECO denied in Due Process?

Held:

          No.In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA policies, which only ensured that the PPA
mechanism remains a purely cost-recovery mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric
cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to regulate and approve the rates imposed by the electric
cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in those
rates. The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and
statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private
property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be jurisprivati only and becomes
subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good.  Administrative due process simply requires an
opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.It means being given
the opportunity to be heard before judgment, and for this purpose, a formal trial-type hearing is not even essential. It is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable chance to demonstrate their respective positions and to present
evidence in support thereof.

Wherefore, SURNECO was not denied in due process.

15. Camarines norte electric vs ERC

FACTS:

The Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, as representative of SURNECO and of the other 33 rural
electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a petition before the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for the approval of the
formula for automatic cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power Corporation (NPC) restructured rate
adjustment to comply with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832.

The ERB granted SURNECO and other rural electric cooperatives provisional authority to use and implement the
Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA). In the meantime, the passage of R.A. No. 9136led to the creation of the Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC), replacing and succeeding the ERB. All pending cases before the ERB were transferred to
the ERC. Thereafter, the ERC continued its review, verification, and confirmation of the electric cooperatives
implementation of the PPA formula based on the available data and information submitted by the latter.

The ERC issued its assailed Order, mandating that the discounts earned by SURNECO from its power supplier should be
deducted from the computation of the power cost. SURNECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Aggrieved, SURNECO filed a petition for review to the CA but the same was denied. Upon denial of the motion for
reconsideration, SURNECO files the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ERC Decision

HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed

POLITICAL LAW- The State, in its exercise of police power, can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility such as
SURNECO

The ERC was merely implementing the system loss caps in R.A. No. 7832 when it reviewed and confirmed SURNECOS
PPA charges, and ordered the refund of the amount collected in excess of the allowable system loss caps through its
continued use of the multiplier scheme. The Commission deemed it appropriate to clarify its PPA confirmation process
particularly on the treatment of the Prompt Payment Discount (PPD) granted to distribution utilities (DUs) by their
power suppliers. The foregoing clarification was intended to ensure that only the actual costs of purchased power are
recovered by the DUs.

In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA policies, which only ensured that the PPA mechanism
remains a purely cost-recovery mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric cooperatives, the ERC
merely exercised its authority to regulate and approve the rates imposed by the electric cooperatives on their
consumers. The ERC simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in those rates.
As held in the case of Republic v. Manila Electric Company, the regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is
founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public
utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public
interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common
good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property
is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.

Likewise, SURNECO cannot validly assert that the caps set by R.A. No. 7832 are arbitrary, or that they violate the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution for allegedly traversing the loan agreement between NEA and ADB. Striking down
a legislative enactment, or any of its provisions, can be done only by way of a direct action, not through a collateral
attack, and more so, not for the first time on appeal in order to avoid compliance. The challenge to the laws
constitutionality should also be raised at the earliest opportunity.

Even assuming, merely for arguments sake, that the ERC issuances violated the NEA and ADB covenant, the contract had
to yield to the greater authority of the States exercise of police power. It has long been settled that police power
legislation, adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people prevail not only over future contracts but even over those already in existence, for all private
contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

POLITICAL LAW- Administrative due process simply requires an opportunity to explain ones side or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of the electric cooperatives monthly documentary submissions to
substantiate their PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of the need for other required supporting
documents and were allowed to submit them accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC
conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss preliminary
figures and to double-check these figures for inaccuracies, if there were any. In addition, after the issuance of the ERC
Orders, the electric cooperatives were allowed to file their respective motions for reconsideration. It cannot be gainsaid,
therefore, that SURNECO was not denied due process

16. Gancayco vs Quezon city

FACTS: The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City Government of Quezon City and the Metro
Manila Development Authority stemmed from a local ordinance pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and the clearing
of Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he was able to obtain a building permit for a two-storey
commercial building, which was situated along EDSA, in an area which was designated as part of a Business/Commercial
Zone by the Quezon City Council. The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which orders the
construction of Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was amended to not require the properties located at
the Quezon City - San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street to construct the arcades,
moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his property, already covered by the amended
ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no.
2904, part of his property had to be demolished, if he did not clear that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did not
comply with, and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or “wing walls.” Gancayco then filed a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the demolition
of his property, without due process and just compensation, claiming that Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and
selective. He sought the declaration of nullity of the ordinance and payment for damages. MMDA contended that
Gancayco cannot seek nullification of an ordinance that he already violated, and that the ordinance had the
presumption of constitutionality, and it was approved by the Quezon City Council, taking to note that the Mayor signed
the ordinance. The RTC, however, declared that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. MMDA
appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the CA partly granted the appeal, with the contention that the ordinance was to
be modified; it was constitutional because the intention of the ordinance was to uplift the standard of living, and
business in the commercial area, as well as to protect the welfare of the general public passing by the area, however the
injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance is lifted. With that decision, the MMDA and
Gancayco filed Motions for Reconsideration, which the CA denied, as both parties have no new issues raised. Therefore
they petitioned to the Court.

 ISSUES: Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as a public nuisance. Whether or not
MMDA was in their authority to demolish Gancayco’s property.

 HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided that the wing wall of Gancayco’s
building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of endangers the health or
safety of the others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstruct
or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property. A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per se are those which
affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of
necessity. As Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to construct the building, it was implied that the city
engineer did not consider the building as such of a public nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons and property.
The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila, and was not supposed to act
with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such by the constitution, nor was it expressed by the
DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore, MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s
property, and was solely liable for the damage.

17. SJS vs Atienza

Facts:

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the
following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of
Shell and Caltex.

But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property covered by
the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was
effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.

Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondent’s defense is that
Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a guideline to
8027.

Issues:

1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan Terminals, and

2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027

Held: Yes to both, Petition granted

Ratio:

1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the
act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a
substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest.
Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by
the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to
be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until
April 30, 2003.

18. MMDA v Garin

FACTS:
Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt and his driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin
wrote MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for case to be
filed in Court. Without an immediate reply from the reply from the Chairman, Garin filed a complaint for preliminary
injunction assailing among other that Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC
rules in his favor directing MMDA to return Garin’s driver’s license and for MMDA to desist from confiscating driver’s
license without first giving the driver to opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s license in the
enforcement of traffic constitutional.

RULING:
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislative to make, ordain and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for subjects of the
same.
There is no provision in RA 7942 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in
nature. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, P.O., NGO’s and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services.”

19. MMDA v Viron Transit

FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain:
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along
major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the
commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport
modes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel
through the improved connectivity of the different transport modes;
Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. – In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. – The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby
designated as the implementing Agency for the project.

As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the
numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA had
“recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public
through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities”which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila
Mass Transport System Project (the Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA,
issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to
integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the
need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public
transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila. Chairman
Fernando, was “poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus
terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation.” This impending move,
it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the
MMDA to administer Metro Manila’s basic services including those of transport and traffic management.

ISSUE: W/N EO is unconstitutional

HELD: YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation
of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal
basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President,
although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of
the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under
R.A. No. 7924.
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the
autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the
Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering
problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the
abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however.
It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC ─ as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and
communications ─ which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the Project subject of
the case at bar.

20. Lucena grandcentral terminal vs JAC Liner

Facts:

 The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town
passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common
terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are
hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses,
and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional
on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private
property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Issue: 

 Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful
means.

Held:

 The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena,
they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police
power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena
Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner
would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by
the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it
right there.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its
effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness,
then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

21. Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years
old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila
and directed solely towards the taxi industry.

Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from
the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of
police power.

HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general
welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common
knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial
distinction from taxicabs of other places.

22. Bautista vs Juinio

FACTS:  The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of
private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being
allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.

Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine,
confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI,
is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of “undue delegation of legislative power.”

Respondents denied the above allegations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain
constitutional rights.

HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution,
wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise
of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property  for the promotion of the general welfare. Those
adversely affected  may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which
contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the
conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

23. Sangalang vs IAC

Facts: The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the
petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. 

On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco
filed an explanation. 

The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, particularly, “. . . The Court not only put to
serious question its own integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption
undeniably pervading the judiciary . . .” disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for. His suggestions that the Court might
have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an
open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. 

Issue: Whether or not the counsel’s act constitutes malpractice in violation of the Code’s (CPR) provision on the use of
scandalous offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. 

Held:  In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside
influences, much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should
know better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other
party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the
highest tribunal and to the stability of theadministration of justice in general. 

Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses
to argumenta ad hominem . In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity . . . and to
safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession." 

The Court in their "show-cause" Resolution, they sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to
insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of
Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

24. Lim vs Pacquiang

FACTS:

The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).

 On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).

 On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065
entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To
Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For
Other Purposes.”
  On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled
“Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate
Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of
Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local
governments.

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games
and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails
the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.

HELD:

NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.

RATIO:

Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been
repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised
legislative powers).

Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of the
unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in said
case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the
Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.  

And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped  from contesting ADC’s possession of a valid
franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials
or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

25. Miners Association vs Factoran

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO
No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279
authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing
agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all
existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be
converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.” and
Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing
Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the
abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim
holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue : 
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the
acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development,
and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license,
concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of
the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order
No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing
law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides,
thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall
continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the
State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations
through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional
restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements
granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The
passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR
Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

26. Ynot Vs IAC

Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the
same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case
was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After
considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality
issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC. 

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving
them to another province will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due
process.

27. Balacuit vs CFI

FACTS:

This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation
engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other
performances to require children between 7 and 12years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but
should charge only one-half of the said ticket.Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed
a Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on
June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable.
The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and constitutional and was the
Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to
regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. However, to
invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police
power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the
bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater
have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own
advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or
an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in
derogation of a common right. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is
immediately executory.

28. JMM promotion vs CA

FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January
27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and requirements for
screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and
other related issuance, principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.)
abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of
law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross
violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for
intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995,
the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant.
An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB
requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the
said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of
Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or
trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when
their conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the
public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas  (use your
property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative
action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to
himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates due process clause is
to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades
or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are
deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a
property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory
standards no such deprivation exists.

29. Phil press vs comelec

Facts:

COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2)
page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates
within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press
Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said
resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not impose upon the
publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be followed
in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space”. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless
be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation
of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election
period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:

Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?

Held:

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate
“Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required
in expropriation cases. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for
the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been established
by respondent Comelec considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of
private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also
Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is
no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
However, Sec 8 still stands as it is within the power of COMELEC to control the media influences of candidates to
prevent unequal campaigns.

30.Cabrera vs Lapid

Facts: Petitioner accused respondents of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324
of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan
over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. According to petitioner, she had spent
approximately P5,000,000.00 for its construction before the fishpond operations commenced in August 1995. A month
later, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond as it was purportedly
illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Thus, petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to dissuade respondents
from destroying her property. Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the destruction of petitioner's
fishpond. The property was demolished on 10 October 1995 by dynamite blasting. Petitioner alleged that the demolition
was purposely carried out in the presence of media representatives and other government officials to gain media
mileage. Petitioner imputed evident bad faith on respondents Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor Cabrera in allowing the
destruction of the fishpond despite their prior knowledge of the existence of the lease agreement. She also charged
respondents Governor Lapid and Senior Superintendent Ventura with gross inexcusable negligence for ordering the
destruction of the fishpond without first verifying its legality. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution,
arguing that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is vested in the municipalities. Petitioner also questioned the
certification by the Municipal Health Officer, alleging that the same was issued before the ocular inspection of the
property which took place only on the day of the demolition. Petitioner also contended that a judicial proceeding was
necessary to determine whether the property indeed had caused the flooding. Respondents filed separate oppositions
to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a reply to the opposition and respondent Governor Lapid filed
a rejoinder to the reply.

Issue: WON the issuances of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 is valid.

Ruling: Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. The
provision allowed direct appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the O ffice of the Ombudsman to the Supreme
Court. The right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases.The provision does not cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. However, an aggrieved party in
criminal actions is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. But in this case, petitioner
has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a reading of the assignment of
errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing the assailed
Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his findings and conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal to the
Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong
remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright. Even if the Court treats the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, its dismissal is nevertheless warranted because petitioner failed to present, much more substantiate, any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. A careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the
Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of
the State when they effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a
nuisance per se. Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion that no violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act or of Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code was committed by respondents. In the words of the
Ombudsman, "those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve
the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good." The other errors raised by petitioner pertain
to the Ombudsman's opinion on the lack of probable cause to indict respondents. These are purported errors in
judgment which can be corrected by an appeal, although not via a direct appeal to this Court. Direct resort to this Court
may be had only through the extraordinary writ of certiorari and upon showing that the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion, which petitioner failed to demonstrate. The instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

31. de la cruz vs paras

Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or
the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right
to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they
employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier
issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads
“AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la
Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84
which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that
such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of
fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance,
Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

32. City of manila vs laguio

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES
IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It
basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District
which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation
avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or
entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC
also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates
that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that
the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it  must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional  limitations
thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar,
the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.

The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are different from sauna parlors, massage parlors,
karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls. The Supreme Court Said that it is
baseless and insupportable.

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use
of its property. Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and
constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid. The Ordinance  however is not a
regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance
is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an
undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid

33. pasong bayabas vs CA

FACTS:

 Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land, issued it in the name of its successor, the
Credito Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into two parcels

 LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a residential and industrial estate

 CAI embarked on the development of the housing project into three phases and secured a locational clearance
for the project from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC

 CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone Housing Project but the project was stymied by a
Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

 The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements with the respondent that they would remain in
peaceful possession of their farmholdings but notwithstanding such, the defendant ordered the bulldozing of the
property

 In answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffs to possess and cultivate the landholding with
fixed rentals

 Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement which eventually led to all of
the other plaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI

 CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed before the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged that
they are farmers who have occupied a parcel of public agricultural land adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River
 According to the petitioners, the said illegal bulldozing activities would convert the land from agricultural to
non-agricultural land, thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of their tenancy rights over the property. For this
reason, the petitioners prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop the bulldozing of the
property, and that a preliminary injunction or a status quo order be later issued to enjoin the same.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);

2. whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the
private respondent;

3. whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the private respondent for
possession and cultivation of the property in suit;

4. whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the
petitioners-members of the PBFAI; and

5. whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No.
49363.

HELD:

 The contention of the petitioners has no merit.

 Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long before the law took effect, the property subject of
the suit had already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land.

 With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as residential land since 1976, the DARAB
had no original and appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI and its
members.

 Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of the private respondent CAI, the petitioners
and its members had no cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to maintain
possession thereof and for damages.

When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven (37) members of the petitioners had already
executed separate deeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the portions of the landholding they
respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money. In executing the said deeds,
the members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence, they have no
right whatsoever to still remain in possessio

33. Valentini legazpi v City of cebu

FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil
action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent
had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

 ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health
Department employees
 HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations
as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must
be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public
interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question
is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first
addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this
does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government
agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern,
that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret
arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial
of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be
compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are
at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while
refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service
Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service
eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this
case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right
to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of
public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service
eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any
person occupying the position becomes imperative.

34. Social justice society v lim

Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December 28,
2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-
called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a memorandum of
understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most
viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited
area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97. In that resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was effective only for a period of six months starting July
25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city,
he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated
by the courts.

On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were contradictory with Ordinance
No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect
only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance
No. 8027.

35. Dipidio vs gozun

ACTS:  

This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order
No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June
1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws
of Australia and owned by its nationals.  

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new
name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian
nationals.  

on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering
the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino.  Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.  

The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress
and egress and the right to occupy the same.  It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into
private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.  

Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and indigenous peoples organized
under Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other
residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC.  

ISSUES & RULINGS:  

I 
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND
UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE
III OF THE CONSTITUTION.  

NO.  

The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-owned contractor,
disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface areas within the FTAA contract area to be
acquired for the mine infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the
contractor, through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA.
Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still various avenues by which surface rights can be
acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of the FTAA
given to CAMC and shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.  

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and regulations do not provide for
just compensation in expropriating private properties.  Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40
provide for the payment of just compensation.   

II  

WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE VOID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF DETERMINING JUST
COMPENSATION.  

NO.  

there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations that exclude the courts
from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in expropriation proceedings involving mining operations.  

Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the authority to decide cases where surface owners,
occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus, necessitating involuntary taking, this does not mean that
the determination of the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board is final and
conclusive.  The determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. There is nothing wrong with
the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a
preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or occupants. The original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of just compensation remains intact despite the preliminary
determination made by the administrative agency.  
III  

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA, ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.  

RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining operations.  The following provisions thereof
establish the mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations and institute reportorial
requirements.  

The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State to the role of a “passive regulator” dependent
on submitted plans and reports.  On the contrary, the government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or
disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding minimum
expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.   

IV  

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE OF WHOLLY FOREIGN AND FOREIGN-OWNED
CORPORATIONS IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MINING ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2, ARTICLE XII OF
THE CONSTITUTION.  

the use of the word “involving” signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to
do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance.  

Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of
restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression “agreements x x x involving either technical or
financial assistance” in an exclusionary and limiting manner.  

V 

WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS SERVICE CONTRACTS  

NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in the 1973 Constitution was not carried over to the present
constitution, sans any categorical statement banning service contracts in mining activities, does not mean that service
contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution was eradicated in the 1987 Constitution.  

The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would
invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this
time, however, safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime.  

the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service
contracts.  But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on
the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or “owner” of the works.  In the new service contracts, the
foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and
operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively
exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.  

OBITER DICTA: ! justiciable controversy: definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. ! to exercise the power
of judicial review, the following must be extant (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power;
- involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.  

In the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been enacted,
DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been entered into.  The FTAA holders have already been operating in
various provinces of the country.  

(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and - A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. (3) the person challenging must have the
“standing" - personal or substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.  

By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened
into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.  Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.  

! “taking” under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property for more than a momentary
period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.  

requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:  

(1)               the expropriator must enter a private property;  

(2)               the entry must be for more than a momentary period.  

(3)               the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;  

(4)               the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;  

(5)               the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.  

! Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power 

The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been
lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.On the other hand,
police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.  

Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent
trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional
distinctions between the two.  

Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no compensation
shall be paid.  Likewise, in the exercise of police power, property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.  Thus, an ordinance prohibiting
theaters from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which would result in the diminution of profits of the
theater-owners) was upheld valid as this would promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the customers.  

where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or
where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no
compensable taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is
compensable taking.  

! On different roles and responsibilities: 

* DENR Secretary : accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the
foreign proponent. (Executive Order No. 279, 1987)  

! in re: easements and taking 

In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the imposition of burden over a private property through easement
was considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is required.  The Court declared:  

And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely a real
right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by
expropriating it for public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of the property
condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy
employed in such cases, as it is only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent
which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the
same is invested.  

! in order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be inconsistent.The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act.