Bioethical Implicatioins of The Imago Dei
Bioethical Implicatioins of The Imago Dei
Bioethical Implicatioins of The Imago Dei
doi:10.1093/cb/cbx009
MARK J. CHERRY*
St. Edward’s University, Austin, Texas, USA
*Address correspondence to: Mark J. Cherry, PhD, St. Edward’s University, 3001
South Congress Avenue, Austin, TX 78704, USA. E-mail: markc@stedwards.edu.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can one appreciate the cardinal elements of human flourishing that
ought to shape medicine and provide content to Christian bioethics? How
should one demonstrate the proper role of medicine in a Christian life, or
make appropriate medical judgments in hard cases at the edges of life and
© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of The Journal of Christian Bioethics, Inc.
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(Lossky, 1957, 116). In each case, these Saints and Fathers of the Church are
grappling with the inadequacy of human language to convey central ele-
ments of our created human nature and our relationship with God.
The authors in this issue of Christian Bioethics consider the ways in which
foundational, and at times very different, understandings of being created
in the image of God lead to particular understandings of appropriate bio-
medical moral choice, resulting in divergent substantive and methodological
emphases. John Kilner and Brad Mellon, for example, approach such con-
cern through a Protestant biblical account, arguing that Christ must be under-
stood as the ideal of God’s image and as the moral and spiritual standard to
which persons ought to conform. With that shared Christological emphasis,
they reject efforts to equate the image of God in individuals with the current
presence or absence of particular traits or capacities, arguing instead that all
humans enjoy equal status before God. Mary Jo Iozzio draws our attention
to the Roman Catholic tradition of liberation theology and its reflections
regarding the preferential option for the poor to offer insight into how the
Imago Dei should illuminate and transform medical treatment of persons
with disabilities. Bryan Pilkington works to lay out the bioethical implica-
tions of the Imago Dei for appreciating what is often termed “human dignity.”
B. Andrew Lustig analyzes the links often drawn between image/likeness
language and appeals to “human dignity,” a term widely invoked in both reli-
gious and secular debates. In addressing that linkage, he questions whether
faith-based claims about human dignity based on image/likeness language
function independently of other principles and norms, and whether such
claims require greater specification to be practicable. Nonetheless, Lustig
concludes his contribution with this observation: “appeals to human dignity,
following directly from the affirmation of being made in the ‘image of God,’
may contribute to a deeper respect for what is at stake in the profound mat-
ters at issue in bioethical debates” (Lustig, 2017, 331). Together, these authors
lay out a theological geography of the meanings and uses of being made in
the image and likeness of God and their implications for Christian bioethics.
Vladimir Lossky appreciated that “The perfection of man does not consist
in that which assimilates him to the whole of creation, but in that which
distinguishes him from the created order and assimilates him to his Creator”
(Lossky, 1957, 114). Humans are created to worship God and to come to
know Him. This central reality of Christian moral anthropology frames all of
Christian life. Applied to medicine, for example, it calls Christians to recog-
nize that medical interventions cannot be sufficiently evaluated if one only
regards bodily functions, pain, and suffering within an immanent horizon of
human needs and interests; a transcendent focus is also essential. “For what
shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his soul”
those are blessed who do or suffer these things for the sake of Christ and after His
example. (St. Maximos, 1981, 90)
The political aim to create equality in this life or social justice for all can eas-
ily lead one astray, especially if one loses one’s primary focus on God.
For example, as Genesis 1:27 makes clear, being made male and female is
central to God’s creation of humanity: “male and female He created them.”
Consequently, traditional Christianity recognizes the deep sinfulness of reject-
ing one’s sex in favor of gender reassignment surgery. Sex differences are
deeply rooted in our biology; they are real and consequential aspects of our
creation. Men and women have importantly different biological natures, giv-
ing rise to natural distinctions in underlying psychologies, interests, talents
and family roles. Although there will always exist variations along a normal
distribution of sex characteristics, the most fundamental human passions
(such as sex, nurturing, and aggression) manifest themselves differently in
men and women (see Cherry, 2016).
As early as AD 325 at the First Council of Nicaea, the Church promul-
gated canons prohibiting the practice of voluntary, non-medically indicated
castration:
If anyone has been operated upon by surgeons for a disease, or has been excised
by barbarians, let him remain in the clergy. But if anyone has excised himself when
well, he must be dismissed even if he is examined after being in the clergy. And
henceforth no such person must be promoted to holy orders. But as is self-evident,
though such is the case as regards those who affect the matter and dare to excise
themselves, if any persons have been eunuchized by barbarians or their lords, but
are otherwise found to be worthy, the Canon admits such persons to the clergy. (Sts.
Nicodemus and Agapius, 1957, 163)
Persons are to master their passions rather than mutilate their bodies as a
physical shortcut. Castration could be licitly performed only if it were neces-
sary to save the life and health of the individual:
For precisely as the first Canon of the Council held in Nicaea does not punish those
who have been operated upon for a disease, for having the disease, so neither do
we condemn priests who order diseased men to be castrated, nor do we blame lay-
men either, when they perform the operation with their own hands. For we consider
this to be a treatment of the disease, but not a malicious design against the creature
or an insult to creation (canon 8, First and Second Regional Synod). (Sts Nicodemus
and Agapius, 1957, 465)
Castration that results from rejection of one’s creation as male (or the anal-
ogous surgical alterations to accommodate rejection of one’s creation as
female) is mutilation that inappropriately rejects the fundamental sexual
nature of God’s creation. As with all human goods, medicine must be placed
within the Christian life and understood in terms of the struggle towards
salvation.
Consider, for example, the way in which reproductive medicine has taken on
a central social role, with a strong political valence. On the one hand, access
to assisted reproductive services, often at tax-payer expense, have come to
be judged as central to civil rights and moral equality.2 Many perceive the
failure to provide such services to homosexual couples and single women
as unjust discrimination.3 Civil rights law and court decisions have been
specifically crafted to forbid Christians from refusing to assist homosexual
couples and single women with fertility treatments on religious grounds.4 On
the other hand, other elements of reproductive medicine seem to embrace
as their primary function the avoidance of the birth of any child that is less
than fully desirable. Prenatal testing and abortion, for example, have become
central to the achievement of political goals to remove particular forms of
disease and disability from the population.
There is real social pressure to ensure that children are free from any
significant mental or physical disabilities. A disabled child consumes pub-
lic and private resources, impacts on career and financial goals, while also
being at odds with a secular moral ethos that accents control over one’s
lifestyle. Consequently, as Christian Bioethics has documented in the past,
secular bioethics encourages a reproductive ethos of “responsible parent-
ing”, which holds that responsible parents ought to choose carefully when
to become parents and of which children (Lastochkina, 2013; Cherry, 2015).
This reproductive ethos normalizes not only contraception to control when
to have children and medical selection of embryos for desirable traits through
assisted reproductive technology, but also prenatal diagnosis and selective
killing in utero of children with a likelihood of disabilities or undesirable
genetic characteristics.5
As Mary Jo Iozzio argues in this issue, such initiatives continue to kill large
numbers of children:
While eugenics may not be institutionalized with anything like an official position, it
holds normative ideological power and is practiced widely in reproductive medicine
and the selective abortion of fetuses; it has become commonplace under the cloak of
routine prenatal genetic testing – from the 10th to 20th week of pregnancy, chorionic
villus sampling, amniocentesis, and/or maternal serum screening to detect chromo-
somal and/or genetic variance (in the US, pregnancy termination rates following a
diagnosis of Down Syndrome range from 67-92 percent). (Iozzio, 2017, 242; see also
Mansfield et al., 1999; Natoli et al., 2012)
Denmark’s stated goal was to remove Down’s syndrome from its population.
The data demonstrate that putting this policy into practice has reduced the
number of children born with Down’s Syndrome (Ekelund et al., 2008).6 One
should note, however, that there is no medical cure for Down’s syndrome;
eliminating it from the population requires aborting all children who test
positive for Down’s (Lindeman, 2015). Policy proponents depict such dis-
abilities as a tragic state that justifies termination of the pregnancy, even in
cases where the couple would like to keep the child ( Jesudason and Epstein,
2011, 541).
Other aspects of reproductive medicine look strikingly eugenic as well.7
Sonia Suter, for example, notes that while today’s policies and practices are
“. . . not identical to the eugenics of yesteryear, many of the same impulses
and drives exist today; most notably, the desire to improve the human spe-
cies and our children though reproductive choices” (Suter, 2007, 969). Here
one might consider, for example, selective breeding practices, such as those
encouraged through gamete donation. Maxwell Mehlman documents that the
Genetics & IVF Institute collects the following personal information about
egg donors for potential purchasers:
. . . adult photos, childhood photos, audio interviews, blood type, ethnic back-
ground of donor’s mother and father, height, weight, whether pregnancies have
been achieved, body build, eye color, hair color and texture, years of education and
major areas of study, occupation, Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores and grade
point averages, special interests, family medical history, essays by donors, and per-
sonality typing based on the Keirsey test, which uses a Jungian approach to classify
temperaments . . . (Mehlman, 2011, 222–3)
The next brace of articles turns the reader’s attention to the ways in which the
Imago Dei shapes Christian perspectives on bioethics and medical decision
making. John Kilner argues that recognition that humans have been made
in the image of God radically transforms how Christians ought to address
and resolve bioethical challenges, the bioethical positions Christians ought
to hold, and the degree to which we ought to engage in such challenges.
Brad Mellon exhorts medical decision makers to see, even in the profoundly
mentally disabled, persons who are deserving of care, love, and dignity.
Bryan Pilkington’s explicit connection between being made in the image of
God and concerns for human dignity leads him to conclude that simply sup-
porting patient autonomy is insufficient. Physicians and others must guide
patients towards appropriate medical choices that honor the image of God.
Kilner argues, for example, that Christians should approach the world
neither as utilitarians nor as isolated individualists; instead, they are called to
emulate Christ in obedience to God:
Utilitarianism’s weakness is not its concern for utility (benefit). Rather, its flaw is to
reduce everything to benefit, thereby leaving out of account such bioethically impor-
tant considerations as people’s creation in God’s image. Similarly, individualism’s
weakness is not its concern for personal fulfillment. Rather, its flaw is in failing also
to require loving one’s neighbor as oneself and, especially, loving God – following
the standards Jesus set for all bioethical thinking (Matt. 22: 37–40), a standard that
puts God’s intentions for humanity front and center. (Kilner, 2017, 277)
fatal or otherwise, then, are created in God’s image” (Kilner, 2017, 277).
This means that human embryos cannot be produced and destroyed for the
sake of research, nor tested and discarded in the name of assisted reproduc-
tion; that we should not limit access to lifesaving treatment simply because
individuals are older or disabled; and that individuals may not be killed
whether through assisted suicide or euthanasia. At the same time, he argues,
Christians should recognize their obligations to put forth positive compas-
sionate messages: not merely to be against abortion, but to support children
and to promote adoption; not simply to oppose human embryo experimen-
tation, but to advocate other forms of medical research that are appropriate
to help treat suffering people, and so forth.
Brad Mellon’s response to Kilner works readers carefully through a detailed
analysis of several clinical ethics case studies that involve medical decision-
making for disabled individuals. Drawing carefully on biblical analysis,
Mellon argues that one ought to appreciate that the image of God in human
beings is distinct from any particular human characteristics, such as suffi-
cient intelligence, reason or rationality. All humans, he concludes, “including
those with disabilities, enjoy an equal status before God and the church”
(Mellon, 2017, 295). It is not possible to damage or destroy the Imago Dei
in human beings. This means that “involuntary eugenic sterilization, denial
of life prolonging treatment (especially for newborns), and euthanasia” are
deeply sinful practices that straightforwardly deny the importance and worth
of such individuals (Mellon, 2017, 285). “Individuals with disabilities are to
be included and cared for as full human persons because they are fully in the
undamaged image of God” (Mellon, 2017, 295). Mellon recognizes, however,
that while we are commanded not to kill, we are not always obliged to save.
So, while Christians should neither engage in nor promote assisted suicide or
euthanasia, when patients are terminal and in the immanence of death it may
be appropriate to permit a natural death “once superordinate medical treat-
ments become futile” (Mellon, 2017, 295). Even the goals of saving human
life and reducing suffering must be placed within a proper Christian orienta-
tion towards God. All must face human finitude; all must eventually stand
before the dread judgment seat of Christ.14 But, killing the weak, the dying,
or disabled (even at their own request) utterly fails to recognize the image
of God within them, and similarly fails to respect their basic human dignity.
Drawing on the rich Roman Catholic tradition, Pilkington (2017) works
carefully through three central theological concerns—conformation, trinity
and vocation—to add depth to our understanding of human dignity and its
bioethical implications. Conformation is an aspirational concept: having been
conformed to the image of God, we must strive to orient our lives towards
Christ and to be like Him. We are similarly called, he argues, to share in the
Trinitarian love of God. This teleological orientation calls us to “collaborate
in God’s creative work,” to develop our relationships with others and with
God. We should not encourage others or support them in evil choices, even
V. CONCLUSION
as in authority to define the right, the good, and the virtuous for them-
selves. Indeed, at times, physicians appear as little more than technicians
whose social role requires assisting patients in developing and supporting
their own self-pleasing lifestyle choices.15 Reference to any underlying or
foundational moral law, much less obedience to God or recognition of the
Imago Dei, has been swept away. Such secular bioethical impulses, how-
ever, must be resisted.
Christianity is not a set of philosophical principles, an interpretation of
historical texts, or a particular set of values, much less is it a progressive
political agenda. Instead, Christianity is an encounter with God Himself. As a
result, Christian bioethics must be grounded in the Church’s mystical experi-
ence of God and work to reorient us towards Him. Although we must use
philosophical and theological language to shape persuasive arguments to
explain and defend Christian morality, to carve out social space for Christian
life and medicine, as well as to draw people into conversion, we must always
recognize that rendering Christianity, and by implication Christian bioethics,
into an academic research program ultimately misses the mark. As Patriarch
Bartholomew stresses:
Therefore we do not engage in idle talk and discuss intellectual concepts which do
not influence our lives. We discuss the essence of the Being Who truly is, to Whom
we seek to become assimilated by the grace of God, and because of the inadequacy
of human terms, we call this the image of the glory of the Lord. Based on this image,
and in the likeness of this image, we become “partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pet
1:4). We are truly changed . . . (Bartholomew, 1997)
NOTES
1. Thomas Aquinas, for example, associates being created in the image and likeness of God with
human rationality or intelligence: “The first stage is man’s natural aptitude for understanding and loving
God, an aptitude which consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. The next
stage is where a man is actually or dispositively knowing and loving God, but still imperfectly; and here
we have the image by conformity of grace. The third stage is where a man is actually knowing and loving
God perfectly; and this is the image by likeness of glory” (Aquinas, 1948, I.93.4).
2. The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine concluded, for exam-
ple, that fertility programs have an ethical duty to provide equal access to treatment for same-sex couples:
“As a matter of ethics, this Committee believes that the ethical duty to treat persons with equal respect
requires that fertility programs treat single persons and gay and lesbian couples equally to heterosexual
married couples in determining which services to provide” (Ethics Committee of the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine, 2013, 1526).
3. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists asserted, for example: “Allowing
physicians to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation would constitute a deeper insult, namely
reinforcing the scientifically unfounded idea that fitness to parent is based on sexual orientation, and,
thus, reinforcing the oppressed status of same-sex couples” (American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 2007; reaffirmed 2013).
4. In 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled in North Coast Women’s Care Group v. Benitez, 44
Cal. 4th 1145 (2008), that refusing to provide assisted reproductive medicine to a lesbian couple based on
the physician’s religious views violated state law.
5. “Prenatal screening using non-invasive methods (e.g., ultrasound scanning, maternal serum
screening) and genetic testing following invasive methods for obtaining fetal material (amniocentesis,
chorionic villus sampling or fetal biopsy) to detect genetic conditions or fetal anomalies have become
routine elements of reproductive medical care. They are framed as normative reproductive health prac-
tices allowing parents to avoid the birth of an affected child through ‘therapeutic abortion,’ or to prepare
for the child’s birth” (Kelly, 2009, 81; see also Jacobs et al., 2016).
6. Ekelund et al. document that their testing policy resulted in approximately half of the usual num-
ber of babies born with Down Syndrome: “Even before full implementation of the policy for combined
risk assessment during the first trimester in Denmark, the number of infants born with Down’s syndrome
decreased by about 50% and the number of cases diagnosed prenatally increased by about 30%” (Ekelund
et al., 2008, a2550).
7. Francis Galton defined the term “eugenics” as “the science of improving stock, which is by no
means confined to questions of judicious mating, but which, especially in the case of man, takes cogni-
zance of all influences that tend in however remote a degree to give to the more suitable races or strains
of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had”
(Galton, 1883, 24).
8. Here one might consider the recent issue of Teen Vogue that provided detailed instructions on
how to engage in anal sex. See Engle (2017).
9. As Father John Breck notes, sexual activity involves human passions that have ontological and
spiritual significance.
If we have insisted so adamantly on this point, it is because of its implications for the realm of sexual behavior. Most
basically, if gender and its sexual expression have neither ontological nor spiritual significance, then sexual behavior is
limited to earthly life, with no eternal consequences. In such a case, sexual morality would be a psychological or socio-
logical issue, not a theological one. On the other hand, if the sexes are ontologically equal and complementary, sharing
a common nature yet reflecting in ways appropriate to their specific gender the beauty and perfection of the divine
nature, then sexual conduct impacts directly on the person’s growth toward the likeness of God. Orthodox Tradition
unquestionably holds the latter to be the case. (Breck, 1998, 87)
All sexual activity outside of the union of husband and wife is misdirected and falls short of the mark. It
is sinful in turning towards and affirming one’s passions rather than orienting one towards the pursuit of
God and holiness.
10. As St. John Chrysostom argues in his commentary on Colossians, sexual pleasure in marriage is
an appropriate direction of one’s passions. “And how become they one flesh? As if thou shouldest take
away the purest part of gold, and mingle it with other gold; so in truth here also the woman as it were
receiving the richest part fused by pleasure, nourisheth it and cherisheth it, and withal contributing her
own share, restoreth it back a Man. And the child is a sort of bridge, so that the three become one flesh,
the child connecting, on either side, each to other” (Chrysostom, 2004b, 319).
11. As H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. notes, for example, “Misdirected sexual activity does spiritual harm,
even if in some sense involuntary, because passion has a compelling force . . . Traditional Christianity
recognizes sins that are ‘involuntary’ and ‘of ignorance’. Even if there were illicit sexual behaviors that are
‘genetically determined’ so that those who engage in them ‘do not choose their lifestyle’ (e.g., lifestyles
shaped from a compulsion to commit adultery or engage in homosexual acts), still those behaviors and
lifestyles remain sinful: they disorient from the pursuit of holiness. They would be sins, albeit involuntary”
(Engelhardt, 2000, 249).
12. Consider also Deuteronomy 6: 3–7, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one Lord; and you shall
love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul, and with all your might. And these
words which I command you this day shall be upon your heart; and you shall teach them diligently to
your children, and shall talk of them when you sit in your house, and when you walk by the way, and
when you lie down, and when you rise.”
13. Unless couples are strongly and traditionally religious, they are statistically willing to have at
most one or two children. There is a significant connection between being traditionally religious and the
willingness to reproduce and raise numbers of children beyond the mere replacement rate (Longman,
2004a, 2004b).
14. Consider St. John Chrysostom, who reminds us not to place too much emphasis on the health
of the body while forsaking the soul. Some ailments physicians cannot cure, “but in the case of souls . . .
there is no incurable malady” if one would only properly treat the illness:
For not only the bodily wounds work death, if they are neglected, but also those of the soul; and yet we have arrived
at such a pitch of folly as to take the greatest care of the former, and to overlook the latter; and although in the case of
the body it naturally often happens that many wounds are incurable, yet we do not abandon hope, but even when we
hear the physicians constantly declaring, that it is not possible to get rid of this suffering by medicines, we still persist in
exhorting them to devise at least some slight alleviation; but in the case of souls, where there is no incurable malady; for
it is not subject to the necessity of nature; here, as if the infirmities were strange we are negligent and despairing; and
where the nature of the disorder might naturally plunge us into despair, we take as much pains as if there were great
hope of restoration to health; but where there is no occasion to renounce hope, we desist from efforts, and become as
heedless as if matters were desperate; so much more account do we take of the body than of the soul. And this is the
reason why we are not able to save even the body. For he who neglects the leading element, and manifests all his zeal
about inferior matters destroys and loses both; whereas he who observes the right order, and preserves and cherishes the
more commanding element, even if he neglects the secondary element yet preserves it by means of saving the primary
one. Which also Christ signified to us when He said, “Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul;
but rather fear Him who is able to destroy both soul and body in Hell.” (Chrysostom, 2014a, 105)
15. See, for example, Ronit Stahl and Ezekiel Emanuel (2017) who argue that conscientious objection
for physicians and other health care workers not to participate in procedures that they find religiously
objectionable ought to be starkly curtailed. They conclude that physicians should either participate
directly or indirectly in abortion or leave the profession.
16. Truly to know the good, adequately to comprehend human flourishing, or to discern appro-
priate Christian medical choice, one must be oriented correctly towards God and united with Him. As
Engelhardt observes, there is “. . . a synergy of the Creator with the creature, through which God reaches
out to those who reach to Him as they turn to Him . . .” (Engelhardt, 2000, 183). As St. Maximos the
Confessor puts it, “The soul would never be able to reach out toward the knowledge of God if God did
not allow Himself to be touched by it through condescension and by raising it up to Him. Indeed, the
human mind as such would not have the strength to raise itself to apprehend any divine illumination did
not God Himself draw it up, as far as is possible for the human mind to be drawn, and illumine it with
divine rightness” (St. Maximos, 1985, 134).
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