Northwestern Kirshon Miles Aff Wake Round2
Northwestern Kirshon Miles Aff Wake Round2
Northwestern Kirshon Miles Aff Wake Round2
Contention 1 – advantage
many promising developments which is precisely why the government should not interfere
in the works— ,
¶ (SMRs)
as subsidies and government programs have already resulted in an inefficient system for large reactors. Heritage Foundation nuclear policy experts explain how the future for small reactors can remain bright. Small modular reactors
have garnered significant attention in recent years, with companies of all sizes investing in these
smaller, safer, and more cost-efficient nuclear reactors. Utilities are even forming partnerships
with reactor designers to prepare for potential future construction this . Perhaps most impressive is that most of
innovative, and growing SMR industry . Multiple technologies are being proposed that each have their own set of characteristics based on price, fuel, waste characteristics, size, and any number of
policymakers should reject the temptation to offer the same sort of subsidies and
other variables. To continue this growth,
government programs that have proven ineffective for large LWRs. While Department of Energy cost-sharing programs and capital subsidies seem attractive, they have yet to
Instead, policymakers should focus on the systemic issues that have continued to
net any new reactor construction.
thwart the expansion of nuclear power in recent years. Specifically, the federal government
needs to develop an efficient and predictable regulatory pathway to new reactor certification and to
develop a sustainable nuclear waste management strategy. ¶ Why SMRs?¶ Small modular reactors share many of the attractive qualities of large reactors, such as providing abundant emissions-free power, while adding new features that could make them more
SMRs represent an
appropriate for certain applications, such as providing power to rural communities or for dedicated industrial use. are not yet positioned to take the place of traditional large LWRs, but they
important growth area for the commercial nuclear industry ¶ the . Indeed, should the promise of small modular reactors be realized,
technology could transform the nuclear industry mitigate some of the . That is because these attributes would potentially
financial and regulatory problems that nuclear energy has recently faced. SMRs cost less (at potentially
reactors, alternatively, can be purchased in increments which would allow costs to be of 125 megawatts (MW),
spread out over time. Though cost estimates are not yet available for the mPower reactor, its designers have stated that they will be competitive. This should not be used as a reason to refrain from building larger, 1,000-plus MW
reactors. Each utility will have its own set of variables that it must consider in choosing a reactor technology, but given that one of the primary justifications for government subsidies is that the high costs of large reactors puts unacceptable strain on utility balance
sheets, an option that spreads capital outlays over time should be attractive. ¶ Safe Installation in Diverse Locations. Some designs are small enough to produce power for as few as 20,000 homes. One such reactor, Hyperion Power’s HPM (Hyperion Power Module)
offers 25 MW of electricity for an advertised cost of $50 million per unit. This makes the HPM a potential power solution for isolated communities or small cities.[1] The Alaskan town of Galena, for example, is planning to power its community with a small reactor
designed by Toshiba, while Fairbanks is looking into a small plant constructed by Hyperion.[2] In addition, Western Troy Capital Resources has stated that it will form a private corporation to provide electric power from small reactors for remote locations in
Canada.[3] Public utility officials in Grays Harbor, Washington, have spoken with the NuScale Power company about powering the community with eight small nuclear plants;[4] and Hyperion Power has reported a high level of interest in small nuclear reactor
SMRs could
designs from islands around the world.[5] ¶ Using a small nuclear reactor could cut electricity costs in isolated areas since there would be no need for expensive transmission lines to carry power to remote locations.[6] also
potentially be integrated into existing energy infrastructure. SMRs could be built into old coal
plants The reactors would replace the coal boilers and be hooked into the existing turbines
, for instance.
small reactors will likely be easier to control during times of malfunction ¶ SMRs can be .[7] Multi-functionality.
used in a variety of applications that have substantial power and heat requirements. The
chemical and plastics industries and oil refineries small reactors could all use massive amounts of natural gas to fuel their operations. Similarly,
produce the heat needed to extract oil from tar sands While affordable today , which currently requires large amounts of natural gas. ,
gas prices vary significantly over time, so the long-term predictable pricing that nuclear
natural
provides could be very attractive. SMRs may also provide a practical solution for
desalination plants that can bring fresh water to parts of the world where
(which require large amounts of electricity)
such supplies are depleting SMRs have the potential to bring power and electricity
.[8] Perhaps most important, is that
to the 1.6 billion people in the world today that have no access to electricity , and to the 2.4 billion that rely on biomass, such as wood,
¶
agricultural residue, and dung for cooking and heating.[9] small reactors will add a new dimension
Competition. While competition among large nuclear-reactor technologies currently exists,
to nuclear-reactor competition. Multiple small technology designs are set to emerge on the
market. Not only will competition among small reactors create a robust market, it
will provide an additional incentive for large reactors to improve . If smaller reactors
also
begin to capture a share of the nuclear market and the energy market at large, it will drive
innovation and lower prices for both new and existing technologies ¶
ultimately the nuclear . Domestic Production. Although
found in the U S nited tates. Lehigh Heavy Forge Corporation in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, could build the forges while Babcock & Wilcox could provide the heavy nuclear components, for instance. AREVA/Northrop Grumman
¶ If SMRs are
Shipbuilding broke ground on a heavy components manufacturing facility last June.[10] Further, a number of companies are expanding manufacturing, engineering, and uranium enrichment capabilities—all in the United States.
so great, where is the construction?¶ America’s regulatory and While some designs are closer to market introduction than others, the fact is that
it ignores the larger systemic problems that create the unstable marketplace to begin with . These systemic
regulatory framework for new reactor technologies, and no reactor can be offered commercially without an NRC license. In a September 2009 interview, former NRC chairman Dale E. Klein said that small nuclear reactors pose
The result is
a dilemma for the NRC because the commission is uneasy with new and unproven technologies and feels more comfortable with large light water reactors, which have been in operation for years and has a long safety record.[11]
that enthusiasm for building non-light-water SMRs is generally squashed at the NRC as potential customers realize
bring to the market, the regulatory risk is such that real progress on commercialization is
difficult to attain . This then leaves large light water reactors, and to a lesser extent, small ones, as the least risky option, which pushes potential customers toward that technology, which then undermines long-term progress, competition,
and innovation.¶ Nuclear Waste Management. The lack of a sustainable nuclear waste management solution is perhaps the greatest obstacle to a broad expansion of U.S. nuclear power. The federal government has failed to meet its obligations under the 1982
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, to begin collecting nuclear waste for disposal in Yucca Mountain. The Obama Administration’s attempts to shutter the existing program to put waste in Yucca Mountain without having a backup plan has worsened the situation.
This outcome was predictable because the current program is based on the flawed premise that the federal government is the appropriate entity to manage nuclear waste. Under the current system, waste producers are able to largely ignore waste management
because the federal government is responsible. The key to a sustainable waste management policy is to directly connect financial responsibility for waste management to waste production. This will increase demand for more waste-efficient reactor technologies and
drive innovation on waste-management technologies, such as reprocessing. Because SMRs consume fuel and produce waste differently than LWRs, they could contribute greatly to an economically efficient and sustainable nuclear waste management strategy. ¶
Government Intervention. Too many policymakers believe that Washington is equipped to guide the nuclear industry to success. So, instead of creating a stable regulatory environment where the market value of different nuclear technologies can determine their
success and evolution, they choose to create programs to help industry succeed. Two recent Senate bills from the 111th Congress, the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative Improvement Act (S. 2052) and the Nuclear Power 2021 Act (S. 2812), are cases in point.
Government intervention distorts the normal market processes that, if allowed to work, would
yield the most efficient, cost-effective, and appropriate nuclear technologies . Instead, the federal government picks winners and
This
losers through programs where bureaucrats and well-connected lobbyists decide which technologies are permitted, and provides capital subsidies that allow investors to ignore the systemic problems that drive risk and costs artificially high.
approach is especially detrimental to SMRs because subsidies to LWRs distort the relative
benefit of other reactor designs by artificially lowering the cost and risk of a more mature
technology that already dominates the marketplace ¶ ¶ . How to Fix a Broken System At the Global Nuclear Renaissance Summit on July 24, 2008, then-NRC chairman Dale
a
Klein said that a nuclear renaissance with regard to small reactors will take “decades to unfold.”[12] If Members of Congress and government agencies do not reform their current approach to nuclear energy, this will most certainly be the case. However,
new, market-based approach could lead to a different outcome . Instead of relying on the policies of the past, Congress, the Department of Energy, and the
attractive to private investors even without government intervention. But loan guarantees
undermine this advantage by subsidizing the capital costs and risk associated with large
reactors. A small reactor industry without loan guarantees would also provide competition and downward price pressure on large light water reactors. At a minimum, Congress should limit guarantees to no more than two plants of any reactor design
¶ Avoid
and limit to two-thirds the amount of any expanded loan guarantee program that can support a single technology. Such eligibility limits will prevent support from going only to a single basic technology, such as large light water reactors.[13]
subsidies. Subsidies do not work if the objective is a diverse and economically sustainable
nuclear industry. The nuclear industry’s
Despite continued attempts to subsidize the nuclear industry into success, the evidence demonstrates that such efforts invariably fail.
success stories are rooted in the free market. Two examples include the efficiency and
low costs of today’s existing plants, and the emergence of a private uranium enrichment
industry. Government intervention is the problem ¶ , as illustrated by the government’s inability to meet its nuclear waste disposal obligations. Build expertise at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. The NRC is built to regulate large light water reactors. It simply does not have the regulatory capability and resources to efficiently regulate other technologies, and building that expertise takes time. Helping the NRC to develop that expertise
now would help bring new technologies into the marketplace more smoothly. Congress should direct and resource the NRC to develop additional broad expertise for liquid metal-cooled, fast reactors and high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors. With its existing
relies on reactor customers to drive the regulatory process. But absent an efficient and
predictable regulatory pathway, few customers will pursue these reactor technologies. The
problem is that the legal, regulatory, and policy apparatus is built to support large light water
reactors, effectively discriminating against other technologies. Establishing an alternative
licensing pathway that takes the unique attributes of small reactors into consideration could
help build the necessary regulatory support on which commercialization ultimately depends ¶ .[14]
Resolve staffing, security, construction criteria, and fee-structure issues by December 31, 2011. The similarity of U.S. reactors has meant that
inappropriate for many SMR designs that often have smaller staff requirements, unique control
room specifications, diverse security requirements, and that employ off-site construction
techniques. Subjecting SMRs to regulations built for large light water reactors
would add cost and result in less effective regulation . The NRC has acknowledged the need for this to be resolved and has committed to doing so,
nuclear holocaust, as did most of my compatriots. That's the conviction that inspired Greenpeace's first voyage up the spectacular rocky northwest coast to protest the testing of U.S. hydrogen
bombs in Alaska's Aleutian Islands. Thirty years on, my views have changed, and the rest of the environmental movement
needs to update its views, too, because nuclear energy may just be the energy source
that can save our planet from another possible disaster: catastrophic climate change.¶ Look at it this way: More than
600 coal-fired electric plants in the United States produce 36 percent of U.S. emissions -- or nearly 10
percent of global emissions -- of CO2, the primary greenhouse gas responsible for climate change. Nuclear energy is the only
large-scale, cost-effective energy source that can reduce these emissions while
continuing to satisfy a growing demand for power. And these days it can do so safely.¶ I say that guardedly, of course, just days after
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that his country had enriched uranium. "The nuclear technology is only for the purpose of peace and nothing else," he said. But there is widespread
speculation that, even though the process is ostensibly dedicated to producing electricity, it is in fact a cover for building nuclear weapons. ¶ And although I don't want to underestimate the very real dangers of
nuclear technology in the hands of rogue states, we cannot simply ban every technology that is dangerous. That was the all-or-nothing mentality at the height of the Cold War, when anything nuclear seemed to
spell doom for humanity and the environment. In 1979, Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon produced a frisson of fear with their starring roles in "The China Syndrome," a fictional evocation of nuclear disaster in
which a reactor meltdown threatens a city's survival. Less than two weeks after the blockbuster film opened, a reactor core meltdown at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island nuclear power plant sent shivers of very
real anguish throughout the country.¶ What nobody noticed at the time, though, was that Three Mile Island was in fact a success story: The concrete containment structure did just what it was designed to do --
prevent radiation from escaping into the environment. And although the reactor itself was crippled, there was no injury or death among nuclear workers or nearby residents. Three Mile Island was the only serious
accident in the history of nuclear energy generation in the United States, but it was enough to scare us away from further developing the technology: There hasn't been a nuclear plant ordered up since then. ¶
Today, there are 103 nuclear reactors quietly delivering just 20 percent of America's electricity. Eighty percent of the people living within 10 miles of these plants approve of them (that's not including the nuclear
British
workers). Although I don't live near a nuclear plant, I am now squarely in their camp.¶ And I am not alone among seasoned environmental activists in changing my mind on this subject.
atmospheric scientist James Lovelock, father of the Gaia theory, believes that nuclear energy is the only way to
avoid catastrophic climate change. Stewart Brand, founder of the "Whole Earth Catalog," says the environmental
movement must embrace nuclear energy to wean ourselves from fossil fuels . On occasion, such opinions have been met
with excommunication from the anti-nuclear priesthood: The late British Bishop Hugh Montefiore, founder and director of Friends of the Earth, was forced to resign from the group's board after he wrote a pro-
nuclear article in a church newsletter. ¶ There are signs of a new willingness to listen, though, even among the staunchest anti-nuclear campaigners. When I attended the Kyoto climate meeting in Montreal last
December, I spoke to a packed house on the question of a sustainable energy future. I argued that the only way to reduce fossil fuel emissions from electrical production is through an aggressive program of
renewable energy sources (hydroelectric, geothermal heat pumps, wind, etc.) plus nuclear. The Greenpeace spokesperson was first at the mike for the question period, and I expected a tongue-lashing. Instead, he
place, but because they are intermittent and unpredictable they simply can't replace big baseload
plants such as coal, nuclear and hydroelectric. Natural gas, a fossil fuel, is too expensive already, and its price is too volatile to risk building big baseload plants. Given that hydroelectric
resources are built pretty much to capacity, nuclear is, by elimination, the only viable substitute for coal . It's that simple.¶ That's not to say that
there aren't real problems -- as well as various myths -- associated with nuclear energy. Each concern deserves careful consideration: ¶ · Nuclear energy is expensive. It is in fact one of the least expensive energy
sources. In 2004, the average cost of producing nuclear energy in the United States was less than two cents per kilowatt-hour, comparable with coal and hydroelectric. Advances in technology will bring the cost
down further in the future.¶ · Nuclear plants are not safe. Although Three Mile Island was a success story, the accident at Chernobyl, 20 years ago this month, was not. But Chernobyl was an accident waiting to
happen. This early model of Soviet reactor had no containment vessel, was an inherently bad design and its operators literally blew it up. The multi-agency U.N. Chernobyl Forum reported last year that 56 deaths
could be directly attributed to the accident, most of those from radiation or burns suffered while fighting the fire. Tragic as those deaths were, they pale in comparison to the more than 5,000 coal-mining deaths
that occur worldwide every year. No one has died of a radiation-related accident in the history of the U.S. civilian nuclear reactor program. (And although hundreds of uranium mine workers did die from radiation
exposure underground in the early years of that industry, that problem was long ago corrected.) ¶ · Nuclear waste will be dangerous for thousands of years. Within 40 years, used fuel has less than one-thousandth
of the radioactivity it had when it was removed from the reactor. And it is incorrect to call it waste, because 95 percent of the potential energy is still contained in the used fuel after the first cycle. Now that the
United States has removed the ban on recycling used fuel, it will be possible to use that energy and to greatly reduce the amount of waste that needs treatment and disposal. Last month, Japan joined France,
Britain and Russia in the nuclear-fuel-recycling business. The United States will not be far behind. ¶ · Nuclear reactors are vulnerable to terrorist attack. The six-feet-thick reinforced concrete containment vessel
protects the contents from the outside as well as the inside. And even if a jumbo jet did crash into a reactor and breach the containment, the reactor would not explode. There are many types of facilities that are far
more vulnerable, including liquid natural gas plants, chemical plants and numerous political targets. ¶ · Nuclear fuel can be diverted to make nuclear weapons. This is the most serious issue associated with nuclear
energy and the most difficult to address, as the example of Iran shows. But just because nuclear technology can be put to evil purposes is not an argument to ban its use. ¶ Over the past 20 years, one of the simplest
tools -- the machete -- has been used to kill more than a million people in Africa, far more than were killed in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings combined. What are car bombs made of? Diesel oil,
fertilizer and cars. If we banned everything that can be used to kill people, we would never have harnessed fire. ¶ The only practical approach to the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation is to put it higher on the
international agenda and to use diplomacy and, where necessary, force to prevent countries or terrorists from using nuclear materials for destructive ends. And new technologies such as the reprocessing system
recently introduced in Japan (in which the plutonium is never separated from the uranium) can make it much more difficult for terrorists or rogue states to use civilian materials to manufacture weapons. ¶ The
600-plus coal-fired plants emit nearly 2 billion tons of CO2annually -- the equivalent of the exhaust
from about 300 million automobiles. In addition, the Clean Air Council reports that coal plants are responsible for 64
percent of sulfur dioxide emissions, 26 percent of nitrous oxides and 33 percent of mercury
emissions. These pollutants are eroding the health of our environment, producing acid rain, smog,
respiratory illness and mercury contamination .¶ Meanwhile, the 103 nuclear plants operating in the
United States effectively avoid the release of 700 million tons of CO2emissions annually -- the equivalent of the exhaust from more than 100
million automobiles. Imagine if the ratio of coal to nuclear were reversed so that only 20 percent of our electricity was generated from coal and 60
percent from nuclear. This would go a long way toward cleaning the air and reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Every responsible environmentalist should support a move in that direction.
pollutants such as acid gases stay in the local area, metals such as lead and arsenic travel beyond
state lines, and fine particulate matter has a global impact. In other words, while for some workers the pollution may be a tradeoff for
employment at a plant, other regions don’t reap the same benefits, but still pay for the costs to their health. ¶ The report connected specific pollutants with their health effects. According to the ALA, 76% of
U.S. acid gas emissions, which are known to irritate breathing passages, come from coal-fired
power plants. Out of all industrial sources, these plants are also the biggest emitter of airborne mercury, which
can become part of the human food chain through fish and wildlife -- high mercury levels are
linked to brain damage, birth defects, and damage to the nervous system . Overall, air pollutants
from coal plants can cause heart attacks, strokes, lung cancer, birth defects, and
premature death.¶ The American Lung Association isn’t the only group to connect coal plants with death and illness. A recent study released in the
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences found that, due in large part to health problems,
coal costs the U.S. $500 billion per year. Specifically, the study found that the health costs of cancer, lung disease,
and respiratory illnesses connected to pollutant emissions totaled over $185 billion per year .
large nuclear plants cost $10 billion and utilities are having
percent of the nation’s electricity and more than 70 percent of our carbon-free energy. But $8 billion to
ranges in size from 25 to 140 megawatts, hence only costs about a tenth as much ¶ 2. It uses as a large plant.
a cookie-cutter standardized design to reduce construction costs and can be built in a factory
and shipped to site ¶ The major parts can be built in U.S. factories, unlike
the by truck, railroad or barge. 3. parts for some
the larger reactors that must be fabricated overseas ¶ 4. Because of the factory-line .
production, the SMR could be built in three years with one-third of the workforce
of a large plant ¶ 5. More than one SMR could be clustered together to form a larger power
.
plant complex ¶ 6.
. This provides versatility in operation, particularly in connection with large wind farms. With the variability of wind, one or more SMRs could be run or shut down to provide a constant base load supply of electricity.
A cluster of SMRs should be very reliable . One unit could be taken out of service for maintenance or repair without affecting the operation of the other units. And since they are all of a common
France has already proved the reliability of standardized plants ¶ At least half
design, replacement parts could satisfy all units. .
inherently safe. It could be located totally below ground, and with its natural convection
partially or
cooling system, it does not rely on an elaborate system of pumps and valves to provide safety.
There is no scenario in which a accident could occur.
loss-of-coolant
Contention 2 – Framing
Academic debate over energy policy in the face of environmental
destruction is critical to shape the direction of change and create a public
consciousness shift---action now is key
Crist 4 (Eileen, Professor at Virginia Tech in the Department of Science and Technology,
“Against the social construction of nature and wilderness”, Environmental Ethics 26;1, p 13-6,
http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/againstsocialconstruction.pdf)
Yet, constructivist analyses of "nature" favor remaining in the comfort zone of zestless
agnosticism and noncommittal meta-discourse . As David Kidner suggests, this intellectual stance
may function as a mechanism against facing the devastation of the biosphere—an undertaking long
underway but gathering momentum with the imminent bottlenecking of a triumphant global consumerism and unprecedented population levels. Human-driven
extinction—in the ballpark of Wilson's estimated 27,000 species per year—is so unthinkable a fact that choosing to ignore it
may well be the psychologically risk-free option.¶ Nevertheless, this is the opportune
historical moment for intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences to
join forces with conservation scientists in order to help create the consciousness shift and
policy changes to stop this irreversible destruction. Given this outlook, how
students in the human sciences are trained to regard scientific knowledge, and what kind
of messages percolate to the public from the academy about the nature of
scientific findings, matter immensely . The "agnostic stance" of constructivism toward "scientific
claims" about the environment—a stance supposedly mandatory for discerning how scientific knowledge is "socially assembled"[32]—is, to
borrow a legendary one-liner, striving to interpret the world at an hour that is pressingly calling
us to change it.
not upon motivating small private-sphere behavioural changes on a piece-meal basis Rather, it .
marshals evidence about how best to motivate the systemic behavioural change ambitious and that is
necessary including, crucially greater public engagement with the policy process
– ,
to the imperative for more vocal public pressure to create the ‘political space’ for them
to enact more ambitious policy interventions individuals making small . 1 While this paper does not dismiss the value of
private-sphere behavioural changes do not, represent a(for example, adopting simple domestic energy efficiency measures) it is clear that such behaviours in themselves,
proportional response to climate the challenge ofDon’t be change. As David MacKay, Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Department of Energy and Climate change writes: “
distracted by the myth that ‘every little helps’. If everyone does a little, we’ll achieve only
a little ¶ The task of communicators
” (MacKay, 2008). must be to
campaigners and from government, business and non-governmental organisations therefore
new policy interventions ¶ . Current public communication campaigns, as orchestrated by government, business and non-governmental organisations, are not achieving these changes. This paper asks: how
should such communications be designed if they are to have optimal impact in motivating these changes? The response to this question will require fundamental changes in the ways that many climate change communication campaigns are currently devised and
implemented. ¶ This advisory paper offers a list of principles that could be used to enhance the quality of communication around climate change communications. The authors are each engaged in continuously sifting the evidence from a range of sub-disciplines
within psychology, and reflecting on the implications of this for improving climate change communications. Some of the organisations that we represent have themselves at times adopted approaches which we have both learnt from and critique in this paper – so
some of us have first hand experience of the need for on-going improvement in the strategies that we deploy. ¶ The changes we advocate will be challenging to enact – and will require vision and leadership on the part of the organisations adopting them. But without
such vision and leadership, we do not believe that public communication campaigns on climate change will create the necessary behavioural changes – indeed, there is a profound risk that many of today’s campaigns will actually prove counter-productive. ¶ Seven
Principles¶ 1. Move Beyond Social Marketing ¶ We believe that too little attention is paid to the understanding that psychologists bring to strategies for motivating change, whilst undue faith is often placed in the application of marketing strategies to ‘sell’
behavioural changes. Unfortunately, in the context of ambitious pro-environmental behaviour, such strategies seem unlikely to motivate systemic behavioural change. ¶ Social marketing is an effective way of achieving a particular behavioural goal – dozens of
practical examples in the field of health behaviour attest to this. Social marketing is really more of a framework for designing behaviour change programmes than a behaviour change programme - it offers a method of maximising the success of a specific behavioural
goal. Darnton (2008) has described social marketing as ‘explicitly transtheoretical’, while Hastings (2007), in a recent overview of social marketing, claimed that there is no theory of social marketing. Rather, it is a ‘what works’ philosophy, based on previous
experience of similar campaigns and programmes. Social marketing is flexible enough to be applied to a range of different social domains, and this is undoubtedly a fundamental part of its appeal. ¶ However, social marketing’s 'what works' status also means that it is
agnostic about the longer term, theoretical merits of different behaviour change strategies, or the cultural values that specific campaigns serve to strengthen. Social marketing dictates that the most effective strategy should be chosen, where effective means ‘most
likely to achieve an immediate behavioural goal’. ¶ This means that elements of a behaviour change strategy designed according to the principles of social marketing may conflict with other, broader goals. What if the most effective way of promoting pro-
environmental behaviour ‘A’ was to pursue a strategy that was detrimental to the achievement of long term pro-environmental strategy ‘Z’? The principles of social marketing have no capacity to resolve this conflict – they are limited to maximising the success of the
immediate behavioural programme. This is not a flaw of social marketing – it was designed to provide tools to address specific behavioural problems on a piecemeal basis. But it is an important limitation, and one that has significant implications if social marketing
techniques are used to promote systemic behavioural change and public engagement on an issue like climate change. ¶ 2. Be honest and forthright about the probable impacts of climate change, and the scale of the challenge we confront in avoiding these. But avoid
deliberate attempts to provoke fear or guilt. ¶ There is no merit in ‘dumbing down’ the scientific evidence that the impacts of climate change are likely to be severe, and that some of these impacts are now almost certainly unavoidable. Accepting the impacts of
climate change will be an important stage in motivating behavioural responses aimed at mitigating the problem. However, deliberate attempts to instil fear or guilt carry considerable risk. ¶ Studies on fear appeals confirm the potential for fear to change attitudes or
verbal expressions of concern, but often not actions or behaviour (Ruiter et al., 2001). The impact of fear appeals is context - and audience - specific; for example, for those who do not yet realise the potentially ‘scary’ aspects of climate change, people need to first
experience themselves as vulnerable to the risks in some way in order to feel moved or affected (Das et al, 2003; Hoog et al, 2005). As people move towards contemplating action, fear appeals can help form a behavioural intent, providing an impetus or spark to
‘move’ from; however such appeals must be coupled with constructive information and support to reduce the sense of danger (Moser, 2007). The danger is that fear can also be disempowering – producing feelings of helplessness, remoteness and lack of control
(O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Fear is likely to trigger ‘barriers to engagement’, such as denial2 (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Weber, 2006; Moser and Dilling, 2007; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). The location of fear in a message is also
relevant; it works better when placed first for those who are inclined to follow the advice, but better second for those who aren't (Bier, 2001). ¶ Similarly, studies have shown that guilt can play a role in motivating people to take action but can also function to
stimulate defensive mechanisms against the perceived threat or challenge to one’s sense of identity (as a good, moral person). In the latter case, behaviours may be left untouched (whether driving a SUV or taking a flight) as one defends against any feelings of guilt or
complicity through deployment of a range of justifications for the behaviour (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). ¶ Overall, there is a need for emotionally balanced representations of the issues at hand. This will involve acknowledging the ‘affective reality’ of the
situation, e.g. “We know this is scary and overwhelming, but many of us feel this way and we are doing something about it”. ¶ 3. Be honest and forthright about the impacts of mitigating and adapting to climate change for current lifestyles, and the ‘loss’ - as well as
the benefits - that these will entail. Narratives that focus exclusively on the ‘up-side’ of climate solutions are likely to be unconvincing. While narratives about the future impacts of climate change may highlight the loss of much that we currently hold to be dear,
narratives about climate solutions frequently ignore the question of loss. If the two are not addressed concurrently, fear of loss may be ‘split off’ and projected into the future, where it is all too easily denied. This can be dangerous, because accepting loss is an
important step towards working through the associated emotions, and emerging with the energy and creativity to respond positively to the new situation (Randall, 2009). However, there are plenty of benefits (besides the financial ones) of a low-carbon lifestyle e.g.,
health, community/social interaction - including the ‘intrinsic' goals mentioned below. It is important to be honest about both the losses and the benefits that may be associated with lifestyle change, and not to seek to separate out one from the other. ¶ 3a. Avoid
emphasis upon painless, easy steps. ¶ Be honest about the limitations of voluntary private-sphere behavioural change, and the need for ambitious new policy interventions that incentivise such changes, or that regulate for them. People know that the scope they
have, as individuals, to help meet the challenge of climate change is extremely limited. For many people, it is perfectly sensible to continue to adopt high-carbon lifestyle choices whilst simultaneously being supportive of government interventions that would make
these choices more difficult for everyone. ¶ The adoption of small-scale private sphere behavioural changes is sometimes assumed to lead people to adopt ever more difficult (and potentially significant) behavioural changes. The empirical evidence for this ‘foot-in-
thedoor’ effect is highly equivocal. Some studies detect such an effect; others studies have found the reverse effect (whereby people tend to ‘rest on their laurels’ having adopted a few simple behavioural changes - Thogersen and Crompton, 2009). Where attention is
drawn to simple and painless privatesphere behavioural changes, these should be urged in pursuit of a set of intrinsic goals (that is, as a response to people’s understanding about the contribution that such behavioural change may make to benefiting their friends
and family, their community, the wider world, or in contributing to their growth and development as individuals) rather than as a means to achieve social status or greater financial success. Adopting behaviour in pursuit of intrinsic goals is more likely to lead to
‘spillover’ into other sustainable behaviours (De Young, 2000; Thogersen and Crompton, 2009). ¶ People aren’t stupid: they know that if there are wholesale changes in the global climate underway, these will not be reversed merely through checking their tyre
pressures or switching their TV off standby. An emphasis upon simple and painless steps suppresses debate about those necessary responses that are less palatable – that will cost people money, or that will infringe on cherished freedoms (such as to fly). Recognising
this will be a key step in accepting the reality of loss of aspects of our current lifestyles, and in beginning to work through the powerful emotions that this will engender (Randall, 2009). ¶ 3b. Avoid over-emphasis on the economic opportunities that mitigating, and
adapting to, climate change may provide. ¶ There will, undoubtedly, be economic benefits to be accrued through investment in new technologies, but there will also be instances where the economic imperative and the climate change adaptation or mitigation
imperative diverge, and periods of economic uncertainty for many people as some sectors contract. It seems inevitable that some interventions will have negative economic impacts (Stern, 2007). ¶ Undue emphasis upon economic imperatives serves to reinforce the
dominance, in society, of a set of extrinsic goals (focussed, for example, on financial benefit). A large body of empirical research demonstrates that these extrinsic goals are antagonistic to the emergence of pro-social and proenvironmental concern (Crompton and
Kasser, 2009).¶ 3c. Avoid emphasis upon the opportunities of ‘green consumerism’ as a response to climate change. ¶ As mentioned above (3b), a large body of research points to the antagonism between goals directed towards the acquisition of material objects and
the emergence of pro-environmental and pro-social concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009). Campaigns to ‘buy green’ may be effective in driving up sales of particular products, but in conveying the impression that climate change can be addressed by ‘buying the
right things’, they risk undermining more difficult and systemic changes. A recent study found that people in an experiment who purchased ‘green’ products acted less altruistically on subsequent tasks (Mazar & Zhong, 2010) – suggesting that small ethical acts may
act as a ‘moral offset’ and licence undesirable behaviours in other domains. This does not mean that private-sphere behaviour changes will always lead to a reduction in subsequent pro-environmental behaviour, but it does suggest that the reasons used to motivate
these changes are critically important. Better is to emphasise that ‘every little helps a little’ – but that these changes are only the beginning of a process that must also incorporate more ambitious private-sphere change and significant collective action at a political
level. ¶ 4. Empathise with the emotional responses that will be engendered by a forthright presentation of the probable impacts of climate change. ¶ Belief in climate change and support for low-carbon policies will remain fragile unless people are emotionally
engaged. We should expect people to be sad or angry, to feel guilt or shame, to yearn for that which is lost or to search for more comforting answers (Randall, 2009). Providing support and empathy in working through the painful emotions of 'grief' for a society that
must undergo changes is a prerequisite for subsequent adaptation to new circumstances. ¶ Without such support and empathy, it is more likely that people will begin to deploy a range of maladaptive ‘coping strategies’, such as denial of personal responsibility,
blaming others, or becoming apathetic (Lertzman, 2008). An audience should not be admonished for deploying such strategies – this would in itself be threatening, and could therefore harden resistance to positive behaviour change (Miller and Rolnick, 2002). The
key is not to dismiss people who exhibit maladaptive coping strategies, but to understand how they can be made more adaptive. People who feel socially supported will be more likely to adopt adaptive emotional responses - so facilitating social support for
proenvironmental behaviour is crucial. ¶ 5. Promote pro-environmental social norms and harness the power of social networks ¶ One way of bridging the gap between private-sphere behaviour changes and collective action is the promotion of pro-environmental
social norms. Pictures and videos of ordinary people (‘like me’) engaging in significant proenvironmental actions are a simple and effective way of generating a sense of social normality around pro-environmental behaviour (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and
Griskevicius, 2007). There are different reasons that people adopt social norms, and encouraging people to adopt a positive norm simply to ‘conform’, to avoid a feeling of guilt, or for fear of not ‘fitting in’ is likely to produce a relatively shallow level of motivation for
behaviour change. Where social norms can be combined with ‘intrinsic’ motivations (e.g. a sense of social belonging), they are likely to be more effective and persistent. ¶ Too often, environmental communications are directed to the individual as a single unit in the
larger social system of consumption and political engagement. This can make the problems feel too overwhelming, and evoke unmanageable levels of anxiety. Through the enhanced awareness of what other people are doing, a strong sense of collective purpose can
be engendered. One factor that is likely to influence whether adaptive or maladaptive coping strategies are selected in response to fear about climate change is whether people feel supported by a social network – that is, whether a sense of ‘sustainable citizenship’ is
fostered. The efficacy of groupbased programmes at promoting pro-environmental behaviour change has been demonstrated on numerous occasions – and participants in these projects consistently point to a sense of mutual learning and support as a key reason for
making and maintaining changes in behaviour (Nye and Burgess, 2008). There are few influences more powerful than an individual’s social network. Networks are instrumental not just in terms of providing social support, but also by creating specific content of
social identity – defining what it means to be “us”. If environmental norms are incorporated at this level (become defining for the group) they can result in significant behavioural change (also reinforced through peer pressure). ¶ Of course, for the majority of people,
this is unlikely to be a network that has climate change at its core. But social networks – Trade Unions, Rugby Clubs, Mother & Toddler groups – still perform a critical role in spreading change through society. Encouraging and supporting pre-existing social
networks to take ownership of climate change (rather than approach it as a problem for ‘green groups’) is a critical task. As well as representing a crucial bridge between individuals and broader society, peer-to-peer learning circumnavigates many of the problems
associated with more ‘top down’ models of communication – not least that government representatives are perceived as untrustworthy (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Peer-to-peer learning is more easily achieved in group-based dialogue than in designing public
information films: But public information films can nonetheless help to establish social norms around community-based responses to the challenges of climate change, through clear visual portrayals of people engaging collectively in the pro-environmental
behaviour. ¶ The discourse should be shifted increasingly from ‘you’ to ‘we’ and from ‘I’ to ‘us’. This is starting to take place in emerging forms of community-based activism, such as the Transition Movement and Cambridge Carbon Footprint’s ‘Carbon
Conversations’ model – both of which recognize the power of groups to help support and maintain lifestyle and identity changes. A nationwide climate change engagement project using a group-based behaviour change model with members of Trade Union networks
is currently underway, led by the Climate Outreach and Information Network. These projects represent a method of climate change communication and engagement radically different to that typically pursued by the government – and may offer a set of approaches
that can go beyond the limited reach of social marketing techniques. ¶ One potential risk with appeals based on social norms is that they often contain a hidden message. So, for example, a campaign that focuses on the fact that too many people take internal flights
actually contains two messages – that taking internal flights is bad for the environment, and that lots of people are taking internal flights. This second message can give those who do not currently engage in that behaviour a perverse incentive to do so, and campaigns
to promote behaviour change should be very careful to avoid this. The key is to ensure that information about what is happening (termed descriptive norms), does not overshadow information about what should be happening (termed injunctive norms). ¶ 6. Think
about the language you use, but don’t rely on language alone¶ A number of recent publications have highlighted the results of focus group research and talk-back tests in order to ‘get the language right’ (Topos Partnership, 2009; Western Strategies & Lake Research
Partners, 2009), culminating in a series of suggestions for framing climate-change communications. For example, these two studies led to the suggestions that communicators should use the term ‘global warming’ or ‘our deteriorating atmosphere’, respectively,
rather than ‘climate change’. Other research has identified systematic differences in the way that people interpret the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’, with ‘global warming’ perceived as more emotionally engaging than ‘climate change’ (Whitmarsh,
2009).¶ Whilst ‘getting the language right’ is important, it can only play a small part in a communication strategy. More important than the language deployed (i.e. ‘conceptual frames') are what have been referred to by some cognitive linguists as 'deep frames'.
Conceptual framing refers to catchy slogans and clever spin (which may or may not be honest). At a deeper level, framing refers to forging the connections between a debate or public policy and a set of deeper values or principles. Conceptual framing (crafting
particular messages focussing on particular issues) cannot work unless these messages resonate with a set of long-term deep frames. ¶ Policy proposals which may at the surface level seem similar (perhaps they both set out to achieve a reduction in environmental
pollution) may differ importantly in terms of their deep framing. For example, putting a financial value on an endangered species, and building an economic case for their conservation ‘commodifies’ them, and makes them equivalent (at the level of deep frames) to
other assets of the same value (a hotel chain, perhaps). This is a very different frame to one that attempts to achieve the same conservation goals through the ascription of intrinsic value to such species – as something that should be protected in its own right.
Embedding particular deep frames requires concerted effort (Lakoff, 2009), but is the beginning of a process that can build a broad, coherent cross-departmental response to climate change from government. ¶ 7. Encourage public demonstrations of frustration at
government itself Climate change communications . should work to , including government communication campaigns,
normalise public displays of frustration with the slow pace of political change. Ockwell et al
acceptance of - policy change . Climate change communication could (and should) be used to encourage people to demonstrate (for example through public demonstrations) about how they would like
structural barriers to behavioural/societal change to be removed.
to more public attention to, processing of, and engagement with forecasts of climate variability and
climate change. Vicarious experiential information in the form of scenarios, narratives,
and analogies can help the public and policy makers imagine the potential
consequences of climate variability and change, amplify or attenuate risk
perceptions, and influence both individual behavioral intentions and public policy
preferences. Likewise, as illustrated by the example of retranslation in the Uganda studies, the translation of statistical
information into concrete experience with simulated forecasts, decisionmaking and its
outcomes can greatly facilitate an intuitive understanding of both probabilities and
the consequences of incremental change and extreme events, and motivate contingency
planning.¶ Yet, while the engagement of experience-based, affective decision-making can make risk communications more salient and motivate behavior, experiential processing is also subject
to its own biases, limitations and distortions, such as the finite pool of worry and single action bias. Experiential processing works best with easily imaginable, emotionally laden material, yet many aspects of
climate variability and change are relatively abstract and require a certain level of analytical understanding (e.g., long-term trends in mean temperatures or precipitation). Ideally, communication of
climate forecasts should encourage the interactive engagement of both analytic and experiential
processing systems in the course of making concrete decisions about climate, ranging from individual choices about what crops to
plant in a particular season to broad social choices about how to mitigate or adapt to global climate change. ¶ One way to facilitate this interaction is through group
and participatory decision-making. As the Uganda example suggests, group processes allow individuals with
the shared
translate statistical information into formats readily understood in the language, personal and cultural experience of group members. In a somewhat iterative or cyclical process,
concrete information can then be re-abstracted to an analytic level that leads to action.¶
Risk and uncertainty are inherent dimensions of all climate forecasts and related decisions. Analytic
products like trend analysis, forecast probabilities, and ranges of uncertainty
ought to be valuable contributions to stakeholder decision-making. Yet decision makers also listen to
the inner and communal voices of personal and collective experience, affect and emotion, and cultural values. Both systems—analytic and experiential—
should be considered in the design of climate forecasts and risk communications. If not, many analytic
products will fall on deaf ears as decision makers continue to rely heavily on personal experience and affective cues to make plans for an uncertain future. The challenge is to find innovative and creative
ways to engage both systems in the process of individual and group decision-making.
role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics . Writing more than
Bull
twenty years ago, Hedley outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his
(a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school)
arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who somehow seek to "get beyond
the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict
or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation given that .10 As Bull argued,
the state is here to stay whether we like it or not , then the call to get "beyond the state is
a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting
the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it ¶ rejecting the "statist frame" of ."" In any event,
world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the state as a
crucial "node" in any future network of global ecological governance one . This is especially so, given that
can expect states to persist as major sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable
future and that any green transformations of the present political order will, short of
revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about
ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and seek to , where possible,
"rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at
redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance . States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and
institutions of governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated
in global environmental change . Nonetheless, while the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and
wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing
private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism . Every one
of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the
global environmental crisis . Given that the green political project is one that demands far-
reaching changes to both economies and societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes
might occur on the kind of scale that is needed without the active support of states . While it is often
constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and nations all the way to
global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and
exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world ."13 In short,
state power ¶
transform . Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic
sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its ends* only
formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the
circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted
world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16 ¶ In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of
liberal normative theories of the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states
possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event, whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns
on the purposes for which that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and accountable ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under-
The coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade
standings.
privacy. It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of
corporate power, and protect the environment.¶ although the political autonomy of In short,
states is widely believed to be in decline, there are still few social institution that can
match the same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect
societies and economies along more ecologically sustainable lines to address
ecological problems such as warming pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes global and
and the rapid erosion of biodiversity States have the capacity to curb the
the earth's . —particularly when they act collectively—
socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the
theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state
system offer two cheers as a potentially
. While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by ing "a timid for the old beast," at least
“politician”. Latour isn’t referring solely to those persons that we call “politicians”, but to all entities that exist. And if Latour claims that we’ll never do better than a politician, then this is
because every entity must navigate a field of relations to other entities that play a role in
what is and is not possible in that field. In the language of my ontology, this would be articulated as the thesis that the local manifestations of which an
entity is capable are, in part, a function of the relations the entity entertains to other entities in a regime of attraction. The world about entities perpetually introduces
resistances and frictions that play a key role in what comes to be actualized . ¶ It is this
aphorism that occurred to me today after a disturbing discussion with a rather militant Marxist on Facebook. I had posted a very disturbing editorial on climate change by the world renowned climate
scientist James Hansen. Not only did this person completely misread the editorial, denouncing Hansen for claiming that Canada is entirely responsible for climate change (clearly he had no familiarity with
Hansen or his important work), but he derided Hansen for proposing market-based solutions to climate change on the grounds that “the market is the whole source of the problem!” It’s difficult to know
It is quite true that it is the system of global capitalism or the market that has
how to respond in this situations.¶ read on! ¶
created our climate problems (though, as Jared Diamond shows in Collapse, other systems of production
have also produced devastating climate problems). In its insistence on profit and expansion in
each economic quarter, markets as currently structured provide no brakes for environmental destructive
actions. The system is itself pathological.¶ However, pointing this out and deriding market based solutions doesn’t
get us very far. In fact, such a response to proposed market-based solutions is
downright dangerous and irresponsible . The fact of the matter is that 1) we currently live in a
market based world, 2) there is not, in the foreseeable future an alternative system on the
horizon, and 3), above all, we need to do something now . We can’t afford to
reject interventions simply because they don’t meet our ideal conceptions of
how things should be. We have to work with the world that is here, not the one
that we would like to be here. And here it’s crucial to note that pointing this out does not entail that we
shouldn’t work for producing that other world. It just means that we have to grapple with the
world that is actually there before us.¶ It pains me to write this post because I remember, with great bitterness, the diatribes hardcore Obama supporters leveled
against legitimate leftist criticisms on the grounds that these critics were completely unrealistic idealists who, in their demand for “purity”, were asking for “ponies and unicorns”. This rejoinder always
Obama, through his profound power of rhetoric, had, at least the power
seemed to ignore that words have power and that
to shift public debates and frames, opening a path to making new forms of
policy and new priorities possible. The tragedy was that he didn’t use that
power, though he has gotten better.¶ I do not wish to denounce others and dismiss their claims on these sorts of grounds. As a Marxist anarchists, I do believe that we
should fight for the creation of an alternative hominid ecology or social world. I think that the call to commit and fight, to put alternatives on
the table, has been one of the most powerful contributions of thinkers like Zizek and Badiou. If we don’t commit and fight for alternatives those alternatives will never appear in the world.
Nonetheless, we still have to grapple with the world we find ourselves in . And it is
here, in my encounters with some Militant Marxists, that I sometimes find it difficult to avoid
the conclusion that they are unintentionally aiding and abetting the very things they claim to
be fighting. In their refusal to become impure, to work with situations or
assemblages as we find them, to sully their hands, they end up reproducing the
very system they wish to topple and change . Narcissistically they get to sit there,
smug in their superiority and purity, while everything continues as it did before
because they’ve refused to become politicians or engage in the difficult concrete
work of assembling human and nonhuman actors to render another world possible . As a consequence,
they occupy the position of Hegel’s beautiful soul that denounces the horrors of the world, celebrate the beauty of their
soul, while depending on those horrors of the world to sustain their own
position. ¶ To engage in politics is to engage in networks or ecologies of relations between humans and nonhumans. To engage in ecologies is to descend into networks of causal relations and
feedback loops that you cannot completely master and that will modify your own commitments and actions. But there’s no other way, there’s no way around this, and we do need to act now.
be no different and no more reliable as a guide to action than any other set of opinions. The trouble is that, in order
therefore
to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those aspects of the
scientific endeavor that do in fact distinguish it from other types and sources of belief
formation.¶ Indeed, if the integrity of the scientific endeavor depended only on the wisdom and
objectivity of the individuals engaged in it we would be in trouble . North American agriculture would today be in the state
of that in Russia today. In fact it would be much worse, for the Soviets threw out Lysenko's ideology-masquerading-as-science decades ago. Precisely because an alternative
scientific model was available (thanks to the disparaged Darwinian theory) the former Eastern bloc countries have been partially successful in overcoming the destructive chain
of consequences which blind faith in ideology had set in motion. This is what Lewontin's old Russian dissident professor meant when he said that the truth must be spoken, even
at great personal cost. How sad that Lewontin has apparently failed to understand the fact that while scientific knowledge -- with the power it gives us -- can and does allow
humanity to change the world, ideological beliefs have consequences too. By rendering their proponents politically powerful but rationally and instrumentally impotent, they
throw up insurmountable barriers to reasoned and value-guided social change.¶ What are the crucial differences between ideology and science that Lewonton has ignored? Both
Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have spelled these out with great care -- the former throughout a long lifetime of scholarship devoted to that precise objective. Stephen Jay Gould
has also done a sound job in this area. How strange that someone with the status of Lewontin, in a series of lectures supposedly covering the same subject, would not at least
have dealt with their arguments!¶ Science has to do with the search for regularities in what humans
experience of their physical and social environments, beginning with the most simple units discernible, and gradually moving
towards the more complex. It has to do with expressing these regularities in the clearest and most precise language
possible, so that cause-and-effect relations among the parts of the system under study can be publicly and
rigorously tested. And it has to do with devising explanations of those empirical regularities
which have survived all attempts to falsify them. These explanations, once phrased in the form of testable hypotheses,
become predictors of future events. In other words, they lead to further conjectures of additional relationships
which, in their turn, must survive repeated public attempts to prove them wanting -- if the set of
related explanations (or theory) is to continue to operate as a fruitful guide for subsequent research.¶ This means that science, unlike mythology and
established by the community of science is one of precisely defined and regulated "intersubjectivity". Under
these conditions the theory that wins out , and subsequently prevails, does so not because of its agreement with
conventional wisdom or because of the political power of its proponents, as is often the case with
ideology. The survival of a scientific theory such as Darwin's is due, instead, to its power to explain
and predict observable regularities in human experience, while withstanding worldwide
attempts to refute it -- and proving itself open to elaboration and expansion in the
process . In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective and universal. All this
has little relationship to the claim of an absolute universality of objective "truth"
apart from human strivings that Lewontin has attributed to scientists.¶ Because ideologies, on the
other hand, do claim to represent truth, they are incapable of generating a means by which
they can be corrected as circumstances change. Legitimate science makes no such claims.
Scientific tests are not tests of verisimilitude . Science does not aim for "true" theories
purporting to reflect an accurate picture of the "essence" of reality. It leaves such
claims of infallibility to ideology . The tests of science, therefore, are in terms of workability and
falsifiability, and its propositions are accordingly tentative in nature. A successful scientific
theory is one which, while guiding the research in a particular problem area, is continuously elaborated, revised and refined, until
it is eventually superseded by that very hypothesis-making and testing process that it helped to define and sharpen. An ideology , on the other hand, would be
considered to have failed under those conditions, for the "truth" must be for all time . More than anything, it is this
difference that confuses those ideological thinkers who are compelled to attack Darwin's theory of evolution precisely
because of its success as a scientific theory . For them, and the world of desired and imagined certainty in
which they live, that very success in contributing to a continuously evolving body of increasingly
reliable -- albeit inevitably tentative -- knowledge can only mean failure, in that the theory itself
has altered in the process.
2ac
waste
problems as over-fishing, the over-drafting of groundwater aquifers, the early and inept exhaustion of oil fields, and high levels of population growth. n29
The second, more general concept (of which the tragedy of the commons actually is a specialized instance) is the " negative externality ." n30 When
parties do not bear the full cost to society of environmental harms that they cause, they tend to under-invest in the elimination or correction of the harm. Externalities
helpexplain why factories pollute, why landowners destroy ecologically valuable wetlands or other forms of habitat, and why current
generations consume high levels of exhaustible resources. The final concept is the problem of " collective action." n31 If political or market actions will
benefit a large group of individuals and it is impossible to exclude anyone from enjoying the benefits, each individual will have an incentive to "free ride" on the
explains why the private market
actions of others rather than acting themselves, reducing the possibility that anything will get done. This
does not provide us with more wildlife refuges or aesthetic open space. n32¶ Although these economic
explanations for environmental problems are not universal truths, accurate in all settings, they do enjoy a
robust [*188] applicability. Experimenters, for example, have found that subjects in a wide array of countries succumb to the tragedy of the
commons. n33 Smaller groups sometimes have been able to overcome the tragedy of the commons and govern a resource in collective wisdom. Yet this exception
appears to be the result of institutional characteristics peculiar to the group and resource that make it easier to devise a local and informal regulatory system rather
than the result of cultural differences that undermine the economic precepts of the tragedy of the commons. n34¶ These economic explanations point to a vastly
different approach to solving environmental problems than a focus on environmental ethics alone would suggest. To environmental moralists, the difficulty is that the
population does not understand the ethical importance of protecting the environment. Although governmental regulation might be necessary in the short run to force
people to do what they do not yet appreciate is proper, the long run answers are education and moral change. A principal means of enlightening the citizenry is
the problem lies in our economic
engaging them in a discussion of environmental goals. Economic analysis, by contrast, suggests that
institutions. The solution under economic analysis is to give those who might harm the
environment the incentive to avoid the harm through the imposition of taxes or regulatory fines or the
awarding of environmentally beneficial subsidies .¶ The few studies that have tried to test the relative importance of environmental precepts and of
economics in predicting environmentally relevant behavior suggest that economics trumps ethics . In one 1992 experiment designed to
test whether subjects would yield to the tragedy of the commons in a simulated fisheries common, the researchers looked [*189] to see whether the environmental
attitudes of individual subjects made any difference in the subjects' behavior. The researchers measured subjects' environmental beliefs through various means. They
administered questionnaires designed to elicit environmental beliefs; they asked the subjects how they would behave in various hypothetical scenarios (e.g., if
someone asked them to volunteer to pick up litter on the weekend); they even tried to see how the subjects would react to real requests for environmental help (e.g.,
No matter how the researchers tried to measure the
by asking them to participate in a Saturday recycling campaign).
those who reported that people have a conservation obligation . Informing these
individuals of their high electricity usage and even supplying them with conservation tips
did not make a statistically significant difference in their energy use . The only thing that
led these individuals to reduce their electricity consumption was a letter reminding them of the earlier survey in which they had espoused a conservation duty and
shame
emphasizing the inconsistency of that view with their high electricity usage. In response to this letter, the subjects reduced their energy use. Apparently
can be a valuable catalyst in converting ethical beliefs into action. But the effect may be short
lived. Within two weeks, the Perth subjects' energy use had risen back to its
earlier levels. n36¶ Ethical beliefs, in short, frequently fall victim to personal convenience
or cost considerations . Ethical views sometimes can make a difference in how people behave. Examples include the role that ethics has
played in encouraging people to recycle or to eat dolphin-free tuna. n37 But the [*190] personal cost, if any, of recycling or of eating dolphin-free tuna is exceptionally
small.For most of the environmental dilemmas that face the nation and the world today, the economic
cost of changing behavior is far more significant. And where costs are high, economics
appears to trump most peoples' environmental views. Even if ethics played a more powerful
role, we do not know for certain how to create or strengthen environmental norms. n38 In contrast, we
do know how to change economic incentives. Although environmental moralists should continue trying to promote
environmental ethics, economic analysis currently provides the strongest tool for diagnosing
something we are not, both individually and as a political and economic community . It is
impossible to convert humans into the wise, selfless, and nearly omniscient creatures
required to build and operate a system that incorporates sustainability. Even if it were ultimately possible (and it is not), it
would take many generations to achieve and we are running out of time.¶ There is an
enormous gap among what we claim we want to do, what we actually want to do, and our ability to
achieve our professed goals. I admit to an absolute distrust of cheap and easy
proclamations of lofty ideals and commitments to voluntary or unenforceable codes of
practice. The only thing that counts is the actor's actual behavior. For most people, that behavior is
shaped by self-interest determined by the opportunity to benefit or to avoid harm. In the economic arena this means
that if a substantial return can be had without a high risk of significant negative consequences,
the decision will be made to seek the benefit. It is the reinvention of Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. n1¶ This essay explores the nature of
human decisionmaking and motivation within critical systems. These systems include business and governmental decisionmaking with a focus on environmental and social areas of emerging crisis
nothing
where the consequence of acting unwisely or failing to act wisely produces large-scale harms for both human and natural systems. The analysis begins by suggesting that
humans create is "sustainable." Change is inevitable and [*597] irresistible whether styled as systemic
entropy, Joseph Schumpeter's idea of a regenerative "creative destruction," or Nikolai Kondratieff's "waves" of economic and
social transformation. n2¶ Business entities and governmental decisionmakers play critical
roles in both causing environmental and social harms and avoiding those consequences . Some have
thought that the path to avoiding harm and achieving positive benefits is to develop codes of practice that by their language promise that decisionmakers will behave in ways consistent with the
sustainability
principles that have come to be referred to as " ." That belief is a delusion--an "impossible dream ." Daniel
Boorstin once asked: "Have we been doomed to make our dreams into illusions?" n3 He adds: "An illusion . . . is an image we have mistaken for reality. . . . [W]e cannot see it is not fact." n4 Albert
Camus warns of the inevitability of failing to achieve unrealistic goals and the need to become more
aware of the limited extent of our power to effect fundamental change . He urges that we
concentrate on devising realistic strategies and behaviors that allow us to be effective in our actions. n5¶ As
companies are expected to implement global codes of conduct such as the U.N. Global Compact and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD)
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, n6 and governments [*598] and multilateral institutions supposedly become more concerned about limiting the
environmental and social impacts of business decisionmaking, it may be useful to consider actual behavior
related to corporate and governmental responses to codes of practice, treaties, and even national laws.
Unfortunately, business, government, and multilateral institutions have poor track records vis-a-
vis conformity to such codes of practice and treaties.¶ Despite good intentions, empty dreams and
platitudes may be counterproductive. This essay argues that the ideal of sustainability as introduced in the 1987 report of the Brundtland
Commission and institutionalized in the form of Agenda 21 at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit is false and counterproductive. The ideal of sustainability assumes that
we are almost god-like, capable of perceiving, integrating, monitoring, organizing, and controlling
our world. These assumptions create an "impossible" character to the "dream" of sustainability in business and governmental decisionmaking.¶ Sustainability of the
Agenda 21 kind is a utopian vision that is the enemy of the possible and the good. The problem is that
while on paper we can always sketch elegant solutions that appear to have the ability to achieve a desired utopia, such solutions
work "if only" everyone will come together and behave in the way laid out in the
"blueprint." n7 Humans should have learned from such grand misperceptions as the French Enlightenment's
failure to accurately comprehend the quality and limits of human nature or Marxism's flawed
view of altruistic human motivation that the "if only" is an impossibly utopian
reordering of human nature we will never achieve. n8¶ [*599] A critical defect in the idea of sustainable development is
that it continues the flawed assumptions about human nature and motivation that provided the foundational premises of Marxist collectivism and centralized planning authorities. n9 Such
perspectives inject rigidity and bureaucracy into a system that requires monitoring, flexibility, adaptation, and accountability. But, in criticizing the failed Marxist-Leninist form of organization, my
limited human capacity, inordinate systemic complexity, and the power of large-scale driving
forces beyond our ability to control lead to the unsustainability of human systems. Human
self-interest is an insurmountable barrier that can be affected to a degree only by
effective laws, the promise of significant financial or career returns, or fear of
consequences. The only way to change the behavior of business and
governmental decisionmakers is through the use of the "carrot" and the "stick ." n10 Yet even
this approach can only be achieved incrementally with limited positive effects.
is long since over. Although the details of future forecasts remain unclear, there's no
humans were the cause, and whether it would be a significant problem. That debate
serious question about the general shape of what's to come. Every national academy of science, long lists of
Nobel laureates, and in recent years even the science advisors of President George W.
Bush have agreed that we are heating the planet. Indeed, there is a more thorough scientific process here than on almost any other issue:
Two decades ago, the United Nations formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (lPCC) and charged its scientists with synthesizing the peer-reviewed science
and developing broad-based conclusions. The reports have found since 1995 that warming
is dangerous and caused by humans. The panel's most recent report, in November 2007, found it is "very likely" (defined as more than 90 percent certain,
or about as certain as science gets) that heattrapping emissions from human activities have caused "most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century." If
anything, many scientists now think that the IPCC has been too conservative - both because member countries must sign off on the conclusions and because there's a time lag. Its last report
synthesized data from the early part of the decade, not the latest scary results, such as what we're now seeing in the Arctic. In the summer of 2007, ice in the Arctic Ocean melted. It melts a little every
summer, of course, but this time was different - by late September, there was 25 percent less ice than ever measured before. And it wasn't a one-time accident. By the end of the summer season in
2008, so much ice had melted that both the Northwest and Northeast passages were open. In other words, you could circumnavigate the Arctic on open water. The computer models, which are just a
few years old, said this shouldn't have happened until sometime late in the 21st century. Even skeptics can't dispute such alarming
events.