Corporate Social Responsibility

and Corporate Governance: A

cognitive approach

Rania Béjia, Ouidad Yousfib and Abdelwahed Omric

Abstract

This chapter aims to critically review the existing literature on the relationship between
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate governance features. Drawn on
management and corporate governance theories, we develop a theoretical model that
makes explicit the links between board diversity, CSR committees’ attributes, CSR and
financial performance. Particularly, we show that focusing on the cognitive and
demographic characteristics of board members could provide more insights on the link
between corporate governance and CSR. We also highlight how the functioning and the
composition of CSR committees, could be valuable to better understand the relationship
between corporate governance and CSR.
Keywords Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, Diversity, CSR
committees, Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, Financial Performance

a
MRM, Université de Montpellier (France) and GEF2A, ISG de Tunis,
Université de Tunis (Tunisia). Email : r.beji@montpellier-bs.com. Phone: 00 33
(0) 610349198
b
MRM, Université de Montpellier (France). Email :
ouidad.yousfi@umontpellier.fr. Phone : 00 33 (0) 499585169
c
GEF2A, ISG de Tunis, Université de Tunis (Tunisia). Email :
abdelomri@gmail.com. Phone : 00 216 71588443

1
Introduction

Since the start of the new millennium, researchers have been looking for
an alternative way to achieve sustainable development and better
utilization of the firms’ natural resources [Carvalho et al., 2018].
Companies have become more aware of the negative impacts of many
business operations on the environment and society, specifically long-
term effects. To overcome the short-term thinking, many firms have
become more involved in socially and environmentally responsible
strategies to improve their social, environmental and financial
performances. This leads to the emergence of a more inclusive
philosophy in businesses going beyond stockholders: CSR.
According to Ashrafi et al. [2018], CSR is a long-term approach
that aims to bring a multi-dimensional added value to social,
environmental, and economic spheres. Nowadays, responsible companies
not only fully meet the applicable legal obligations, but also go beyond
by extending their efforts to promote more socially responsible projects.
For instance, companies, such as Starbucks and Orange, have become
more concerned about the protection of human rights, employees’
conditions, environmental issues, and communities’ expectations.
According to Bocquet et al. [2017], Zerbini [2017], and Goyder
[2003], there are two CSR strategies: (1) strategic CSR which ties in with
the highest level of commitment and implies a more comprehensive
implementation of CSR within a firm and (2) responsive CSR where
CSR involvement is mainly determined by external expectations and
reporting standards and corresponds to the lowest level of commitment.
CSR has been considered as one of the most important
challenges of corporate governance. Companies and their boards of
directors have to integrate socially responsible investment into their
overall approach [Jamali et al., 2008]. Due to the increasing attention
paid to CSR, scholars have examined the various antecedents of CSR.
On the one hand, there is an extensive literature on how CSR
could influence the firm’s performance and risks. Some CSR related
studies have shown evidence that CSR activities lead to financial and
3

non-financial benefits [Famiyeh, 2017; Hategan and Curea-Pitorac,

2017; and Reverte et al., 2016]. For instance, various empirical studies
have concluded that socially responsible firms tend to have better social
ratings and consequently are able to reduce their financial risk [Bouslah,
et al., 2016; Harjoto and Jo, 2015; and Benlemlih et al., 2014]. Other
studies have provided evidence on the existence of a negative correlation
between CSR and financial performance [Galant and Cadez, 2017; Kim
et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2013; and Baird et al., 2012]. We notice,
however, that several emerging evidence shows insignificant
relationships between the firm involvement in CSR activities and
financial performance [Javed et al., 2016; Reverte et al., 2016; and
Barnett and Salomon, 2012].
On the other hand, there is an emerging brand of the literature on
the role of boards of directors in managing the firm’s corporate image
and shaping strategic orientations [Schepker et al., 2018; Schulze et al.,
2001; Walsh and Seward, 1990]. In fact, CSR seems to be influenced by
the choices, motivations, and values of those involved in the decision-
making process. Accordingly, taking into account demographic attributes
of directors such as gender, age, nationality, educational background, and
multiple directorships, could be very helpful to better understand the
board's dynamics and how they could influence the firm performances
from different perspectives [Won-Yong et al., 2019; Tasheva and
Hillman, 2018; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; and Gibbins et al., 1990]. For
instance, more diverse attributes on the board could lead to better
organizational outcomes [Won-Yong et al., 2019]. Besides, the resource
dependence [Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978], resource-based view
[Wernerfelt, 1984; and Barney and Tyler, 1991], social categorization
[Tajfel, 1981], upper echelons [Hambrick and Mason, 1984], and agency
theories provide strong arguments on how more diverse boards could
lead to superior monitoring and advisory capabilities, and therefore a
more strategic involvement in CSR [Aggarwal et al., 2019; and Tasheva
and Hillman, 2018].
On the same vein, there is an emerging literature on the board
organization and the way boards conduct their roles and their influence
on financial and CSR performances. More specifically, the role and the
composition of specialized committees such as sustainable development,
CSR, nomination, and compensation committees, seem to be a key
determinant of CSR performance and CSR-related issues. For instance,
Peters and Romi [2015] and Rodrigue et al. [2013] argue that CSR
committees could be an essential part of the corporate governance
structure. They aim to guide the company towards CSR actions, as well
as to promote and implement firms’ CSR initiatives, which decreases
CSR risks and achieve new opportunities. Moreover, Khan [2017] argues
that the existence of CSR committees acts as an effective mechanism to
enhance CSR performance. For instance, it can provide new incentives to
CEOs to promote CSR strategies and to fulfill, therefore, sustainable
development goals. Similarly, according to Hussain et al. [2018a], CSR
committees establish the rules required to promote CSR activities. They
control the impacts of companies’ activities that affect or are affected by
their operations on different stakeholders’ groups such as
environmentalists, the community, employees, consumers, and suppliers.
The main aim of the current chapter is to cover these challenging
issues based on a critical state of the art. In particular, this chapter
stresses how board features could be a determinant key to CSR decision
making processes. Also, it and provides new perspectives to improve our
understanding of the role of diversity in boards in CSR performance.
From a managerial angle, it helps to assess how the board strategies and
human resources could drive the firms to achieve a better CSR
performance and more competitive advantages [Galbreath, 2010; Porter
and Reinhardt, 2007; and Hart, 1995].
This chapter is structured as follows. First, we analyze how board
composition could influence the CSR and financial performances. We
distinguish between diversity in boards and diversity of boards. We
identify the main features of strategic CSR and responsive CSR
activities. Section (2) focuses on the board functioning and brings some
light on the impact of the committee’s boards, specifically CSR
committees, and their role on CSR strategies and CSR-related decisions.
A critical analysis is provided in Section (3). The last section of the
chapter provides concluding insights.
5

(I) Corporate Social Responsibility: could Ethics rebuild

Financial Performance?

I.1 On the confounded link between social performance and

financial performance

The debate over the relationship between corporate social performance

(CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) has dominated the
empirical research during the last 40 years [Wood, 2010; Preston and
O’Bannon, 1997; and Wood, 1991].
The results of recent empirical studies remain very mixed [Rost
and Ehrmann, 2017]. More than 200 empirical studies have been
reviewed in previous research [Lu et al., 2014; Nelling et al., 2009;
Margolis et al., 2007; Allouche and Laroche, 2005; Margolis and Walsh,
2003; and Orlitzky et al., 2003]. The majority of studies show the
existence of a positive association between social performance and
financial performance [see among others Nelling et al., 2009; Margolis et
al., 2007; and Orlitzky et al., 2003].
In fact, three theoretical models have been developed. The first
model describes a positive association between CSP and CFP. The
results of several meta-analyses confirm the existence of a positive
relationship [Rost and Ehrmann, 2017; Endrikat et al., 2014; Albertini,
2013; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Margolis et al., 2009; and Orlitzky and
Swanson, 2008]. This model is based essentially on the theory of social
impact [Cornell and Shapiro, 1987] rooted in the stakeholder theory of
Freeman [1984]. It is based on the assumption that a company creates a
competitive advantage through the ability to acquire resources, which
leads to the establishment of a long-term synergy between the CSP and
the CFP [Barney, 1991]. Furthermore, previous studies point out that
meeting the needs of the different stakeholders acts as an insurance tool
covering reputation risk during crises [Peloza, 2006; Schnietz and
Epstein, 2005; Ziglidopoulos, 2001; and Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001].
Also, Lu et al. [2014] reported an inconclusive overall result of the CSP-
CFP link through a meta-analysis of 84 empirical studies from 2002 to
2011. They find a significant positive relationship between CSP
reputation ratings and CFP. Several other studies rooted in the social
impact theory and the slack resources theory, such as Waddock and
Graves [1997], state that better CFP is a source of social performance.
Although companies follow the normative rules of good corporate
citizenship, their actual behavior may depend on the resources available.
Accordingly, profitability can increase a company’s ability to fund social
performance projects.
The second model describes a negative link between CSP and
CFP [Shane and Spicer, 1983; Freedman and Jaggi, 1982; and Vance,
1975].
Based on the trade-off hypothesis and the hypothesis of the
opportunism of managers, CSR decreases financial performance.
The first hypothesis states that the investments in CSR activities
may worsen a firm’s profitability by inhibiting optimal resource
allocation, thus creating a competitive disadvantage [Kang et al., 2010].
The second hypothesis assumes that corporate executives can pursue
their private benefits at the expense of shareholders and stakeholders’
interests [Weidenbaum and Vogt, 1987, Williamson, 1985, 1967]. One
explanation could be that when financial performance is high, managers
can seize the opportunity to increase their gains by reducing social
spending [Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; and McWilliams et al., 2006].
The third model points out that the costs and benefits of CSR
cancel each other out [McWilliams et al., 1999]. In fact, previous studies
argue that the link between CSP and CFP may not exist [Germann et al.,
2015; Guiral, 2012; Goll and Rasheed, 2004; McWilliams and Siegel,
2000; and Aupperle et al., 1985]. In fact, CSP-CFP relationship could be
powered by many confounding variables, such as environmental and
social regulations stringency, R&D expenses, advertising expenditures,
labor market conditions, etc.
Besides, Allouche and Laroche [2005a] and Orlitzky et al. [2003] show
the existence of a virtuous circle, where a financially successful company
is prone to be able to spend more on social activities, and better CSP
provides a superior long-term economic return.
7

CSR literature has begun to question the validity of previous

studies on the relationship between CSP and CFP since many researchers
have displayed discrepancies [Shahzad and Sharfmann, 2017; Crane et
al., 2017; Jean et al., 2016; Endrikat et al., 2014; Schreck, 2011; and
Garcia-Castro et al., 2010]. For instance, Crane et al. [2017] and
Shahzad and Sharfmann [2017] point out that endogeneity could be the
main reason for the ambiguity of the results, specifically in structural
equation modeling (SEM) studies using regression analysis to extract
causal inferences [Jean et al., 2016]. This may change the direction and
the amplitude of CSR-CFP relationship, and distort results’ interpretation
[Ketokivi and McIntoch, 2017; and Zaefarian et al., 2017].
The mixed results on CSP-CFP relationship could be explained to a large
extent by the difference in terms of CSR strategies adopted by firms. In
fact, CSR practices vary significantly according to the firm's degree of
involvement in CSR behavior. Some firms are involved in strategic CSR:
they are pioneers and want to achieve a better CSP by going beyond
mandatory rules and standards. Some other firms adopt responsive CSR
strategies and get involved only on what is legally expected or compliant
with stakeholders’ demand.
Hereafter, we analyze the differences between the two strategies and how
they could shape CFP and firms’ strategies.

I.2 Strategic CSR versus responsive CSR

Recently, CSR has been directly associated with firms’ performance [see
among others Vilanova et al., 2009; and Porter and Kramer, 2006].
According to Amin-Chaudhry [2016] and Bagnoli and Watts [2003],
firms engage in profit-maximizing CSR, being their lead motivation.
Therefore, the proponents of CSR are convinced that investment in CSR
enhances the firm’s long-term revenue and reputation [Manzano and
Fernandez, 2016; Burke and Logsdon, 1996]. In fact, Porter and Kramer
[2006] point out that when firms integrate CSR activities into their
practices, this would help them in achieving competitive advantages. In
consequence, according to Zerbini [2017], Bocquet et al. [2017], Porter
and Kramer [2006], Goyder [2003], and Burke and Logsdon [1996], two
opposite views of CSR emerge:
1- Strategic CSR where CSR and the firm’s core competencies and
resources are aligned. According to Burke and Logsdon [1996], CSR
becomes strategic when the company considers social and environmental
issues as a high priority and goes beyond the implementation of best
practices. It consists of aligning all considerate acts towards people and
the natural environment in the organizational context beyond the legal
minimum, with the overall objectives and actions of a company. Besides,
Bansal et al. [2015] argue that the strategic CSR comprises activities
with long time horizons and large resource commitments. It also allows
the firm to achieve a distinctive position as compared to competitors
[Burke and Logdson, 1981].
2- Responsive CSR where CSR involvement is mainly determined
by external expectations and reporting standards. The basic aim of firms
is image-building to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders
[Ruggiero et al., 2018]. Porter and Kramer [2006] define responsive CSR
as mitigating existing or potential adverse effects of organizational
activities. Indeed, responsive CSR is, most often, associated with a
limited level of commitment and more adaptive behavior.
In fact, several relevant theoretical perspectives provide an
understanding of the strategic CSR [Bhattacharyya et al., 2008;
McAlister and Ferrell, 2002; and Burke and Logsdon, 1996].
The first framework is the natural resource-based view proposed
by Hart [1995]. Specifically, Hart [1995] classifies product stewardship,
pollution prevention and sustainable development as three interconnected
strategies to support a natural resource-based view. He also points out
that achieving sustainable development is the most demanding. It
requires good stakeholder integration and good planning. In fact, this
framework argues that by integrating sustainability and technological
innovation into their strategies, firms could acquire a competitive
advantage.
The second framework is the strategic CSR proposed by Burke
and Logsdon [1996]. In fact, the authors propose five strategy
dimensions to differentiate strategic CSR from responsive CSR: (1)
9

centrality (“the closeness of fit to the firm’s mission and objectives”); (2)
proactivity (“the degree to which the program is planned in anticipation
of emerging social trends and the absence of crisis”); (3) voluntarism
(“the scope for discretionary decision-making and the lack of externally
imposed compliance requirements”); (4) visibility (“observable,
recognizable credit by internal and/or external stakeholders for the
firm”); (5) specificity (“the ability to capture private benefits by the
firm”). Burke and Logsdon [1996] point out when firms’ CSR initiatives
meet these features, they are more likely to generate economic benefits.
Accordingly, strategic CSR could positively impact firm financial
performance.
The third framework is provided by Porter and Kramer [2002,
2006, 2011]. They argue that strategic CSR goes beyond best practices
and provides a competitive advantage, while responsive CSR concerns
acting as a good corporate citizen and responding to stakeholders’
demands. Accordingly, choosing strategic or responsive CSR produces
varied benefits [Bocquet et al., 2019; Martinez-Conesa et al., 2017;
Chang, 2015; and Bocquet et al., 2013]. In fact, if a company combines
effectively its resources and expertise with the competitive context, CSR
could drive an integral part of its profitability and its competitive
positioning [Porter and Kramer, 2002, 2006, 2011]. The strategic CSR
approach suggested by the authors aims to achieve convergence between
social and economic objectives, by requiring firms to use their attributes
to meet social needs. Specifically, this model encourages companies to
be more selective in terms of CSR engagement.
The final theoretical framework is the stakeholder theory
[Freeman et al., 2004]. In fact, managing complex stakeholder
relationships is considered as one of the main reasons why a firm should
be more concerned about CSR and the opportunities that stakeholders
could bring to the business [Post, 2003]. The instrumental theory of
stakeholders considers CSR as a strategic driver of wealth creation
[Garriga and Melé, 2004; Jones, 1995]. Also, according to Jamali [2008]
and Turker [2009], strategic CSR studies are aligned with the stakeholder
perspective of CSR. This could serve as useful guidance for managers in
their pursuit of CSR, by providing an easier explanation of stakeholder
issues.
All of the above theories on the link between CSP and CFP,
provide strong support for the positive association between corporate
governance and CSR activities.
In fact, the academic debates surrounding this approach argue that the
association between good CSR policy and the appropriate behavior of
board directors could improve financial profitability [Kaufman and
Englander, 2011; Choi et al., 2010; Pesqueux and Damak-Ayadi, 2005;
Donaldson, 1999; Jones and Wicks, 1999; Preston and Donaldson, 1999;
Sternberg, 1999; and Freeman, 1984]. For instance, according to Cuervo
[2002], corporate governance is a specific mechanism where the board of
directors plays a relevant role in advising management on taking the
most appropriate decisions and ensuring the long-term viability of the
company. Consequently, the decisions taken by the board could lead to
the possible implementation of CSR policies [Ingley et al., 2011] and
influence, therefore, CFP.
Moreover, Choi et al. [2010] argue that the level of effort in terms of
CSR depends on the relative importance given by the company to its
interest groups. The company establishes an order of priority amongst
them and favors those who are best positioned [Surroca et al., 2010].
Thus, it becomes imperative to introduce good corporate governance
recommendations as an important element of CSR.
In the next section, we analyze how governance features could be
influential to different extents on the degree of involvement in CSR
strategies. Specifically, we focus on board characteristics.

(II) Corporate Governance and CSR

Research and scholarship on board diversity have been one of the most
prolific topics in recent years, appearing as one of the most significant
current themes in corporate governance research [Tasheva and Hillman,
2018; Jizi, 2017; Harjoto et al., 2015; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Ben-Amar
et al., 2013; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Bear et al., 2010; Kang et al., 2007].
11

The prior literature has focused on the role of board diversity on

cognitive impacts such as creativity, innovation and the generation of
new ideas [Tasheva and Hillman, 2018; Adams et al., 2015; Miller and
Triana, 2009; Kang et al., 2007; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2003;
and Robinson and Dechant, 1997]. These studies show that diversity
fosters creativity, innovation, and independence of thought processes.
For instance, Carter et al. [2003] argue that board diversity allows a
company to better understand her marketplace, which improves market
penetration ability.
According to several studies [Mahadeo et al., 2012; Kang, 2007;
Erhardt et al., 2003; Milliken and Martin, 1996], board diversity refers to
the heterogeneity of a board across different demographic characteristics
such as age, educational level, gender, and nationality, as well as the
heterogeneity across different structural characteristics such as duality
and independence. For instance, Mahadeo et al. [2012] and Carter et al.
[2003] argue that diversity can be considered as an ethical objective,
which brings to the company several advantages, such as greater
creativity, a better understanding of the market, and better problem-
solving. Therefore, it provides a competitive advantage for the company,
as well as several beneficial long-term results [Erhardt et al., 2003;
Siciliano, 1996].
Furthermore, Hemmingway and Maclagan [2004] argue that
individuals’ beliefs and values could influence board discussion related
to CSR, as there is no mandatory standard for CSR [Deegan et al., 2006].
Also, Hambrick et al. [1996] and Nielsen [2010] put forward that, in
high uncertainty contexts, diverse teams are more successful, while, in
stable contexts, less diverse teams achieve better performance.
In fact, many theories have highlighted the effective role of
board members to implement effective CSR strategies. For instance, the
upper echelons theory [Hambrick and Mason, 1984] provides strong
arguments on how more diverse boards could lead to superior
monitoring, and thus, more strategic involvement in CSR [Aggarwal et
al., 2019; and Tasheva and Hillman, 2018]. This theory suggests that the
characteristics of directors, such as age, gender, educational level,
knowledge, skills, values, professional experience, and tenure, influence
their interpretations of the situations they face, which affects, therefore,
their strategic choices [Hambrick, 2007].
Based on agency theory [Jensen and Meckling, 1976], one of the
main functions of a board of directors is to act as fiduciaries of
shareholders by monitoring top management on behalf of shareholders.
According to Jo and Harjoto [2011, 2012], the effectiveness of corporate
governance practices is closely related to the board’s composition. For
instance, corporate transparency practices are determined by board
directors to improve management practices and to ensure the
involvement of a company in more ethical projects.
Furthermore, another important theoretical perspective for
diversity is the resource dependence theory [Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978].
In fact, several studies point out that board diversity allows the firm to
acquire critical resources, policy advice, knowledge, and networks, and
to widen the range of choices when making strategic decisions [Locke
and Reddy, 2015; Taljaard et al., 2015; Al-Musalli et al., 2012;
Goodstein et al., 1994; Pfeffer, 1972; and Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978].
According to Bear et al. [2010], diversity enhances the internal and
external resources of the board, such as the new skills and competencies.
This helps companies to better respond to stakeholders’ expectations.
They become more sensitive to CSR issues due to the variety of
resources given by board diversity [Davis and Cobb, 2010; Susan
Vinnicombe et al., 2003; and Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978].

II.1 Board diversities: diversity in boards and diversity of boards

Much of the prior literature has focused on the impact of board

composition on a firm’s behavior [Lehn et al., 2009; Linck et al., 2008;
and Fich and Shivdasani, 2006]. The level of diversity could be
considered as one of the key aspects of board composition.
Prior research on board diversity distinguishes between structural
and demographic diversity of boards [Aggarwal et al., 2019; Jizi, 2017;
Harjoto et al., 2015; and Hafsi and Turgut, 2013]. The structural
diversity of boards is linked to dissimilarities in board attributes, which
are related to boards’ formal structure, such as size, the non-separation
13

between management and control functions, board independence, and

board committees [Tasheva and Hillman, 2018]. Demographic diversity,
however, is given by the individual attributes of directors such as gender,
age, nationality, educational level, educational background, multiple
directorships, culture, tenure, nationality, and experience. Hafsi and
Turgut [2013] highlight that the structural diversity of boards does not
allow to differentiate among firms or to explain their differences, while
demographic diversity does. Table 1.1 summarizes the findings from this
literature review.
 Table 1.1.a. Summary of studies on the impact of board diversity on CSR

Author(s) Aim Method Diversity measure Sample and time Key findings
period
Olthuis and van den The impact of the ideological Quantitative Board Dutch firms A negative relationship between board
Oever [2020] diversity on CSR performance (regression) Ideological diversity (2014-2017) ideological diversity and CSR
performance.

Cordeiro et al. The impact of ownership structure and Quantitative Gender diversity U.S. firms The majority of family owners and dual-
[2019) board gender diversity on corporate (regression) Ownership structure (2010-2015) class owners interact with board gender
environmental performance diversity to positively influence corporate
environmental performance.

Harjoto et al. [2019] The impact of the nationality and Quantitative Board nationality U.S. firms Improving director nationality diversity
educational background diversity on (regression) Educational background (2000-2013) and educational background increase
CSR diversity firms’ social performance.

Galbreath [2018] The impact of board gender Quantitative Gender diversity Australian firms Gender diversity influences firms’

14
diversity on financial and social (regression) (2004-2005) prosocial actions, which results in higher
performance levels of CSR.

Cuadrado-Ballesteros The impact of the board of directors Quantitative Board size Firms from Canada, Board size is positively associated with
et al. [2017] on CSR practices. (regression) Board independence Denmark, Finland, CSR practices; however, when the
Diversity of gender and France, Italy, the number of directors is excessively high,
nationality Netherlands, Norway, the the CSR commitment decreases.
UK, the USA, Germany, board diversity increases the level of CSR
Spain, and Sweden. practices.
(2003-2009)

Ben Barka and The impact of board interlocks, Quantitative Director’ s background France Director's background and nationality
Dardour [2015] director’ s profile on CSR (regression) Nationality diversity (2010) diversity are the most relevant attributes
Age to discerning firms with high CSR scores.
Gender
Tenure
Board size
Ownership
Duality
Independence
 Table 1.1.b. Summary of studies on the impact of board diversity on CSR

Author(s) Aim Method Diversity measure Sample and time Key findings
period
Boulouta [2013] The impact of female directors on Quantitative Female directors U.S. firms More gender-diverse boards exert a
CSR (regression) (1999-2003) stronger influence on CSR performance.

Hafsi and Turgut The impact of board diversity on Quantitative Director ownership U.S. firms A significant relationship between
[2013] CSP (regression) CEO duality (2005) demographic diversity and social
15

Board independence performance, which is moderated by the

Director tenure structural diversity of boards. In
particular, gender, and age have a
Director ethnicity significant effect on corporate social
Director age performance.
Director experience
Gender diversity

Post et al. [2011] The impact of Board composition Quantitative Age U.S. firms A higher proportion of outside board
on environmental performance (regression) Gender diversity (2006-2007) directors is associated with better
(disclosure- Outside directors environmental performance and higher
proxy Cultural background KLD strengths scores. Firms with boards
Educational attainment composed of three or more female
directors have higher KLD strengths
scores. And, boards whose directors
average closer to 56 years are likely to
implement environmental governance
structures.

Jo and Harjoto The impact of CG on the choice of Quantitative Board independence U.S. firms CSR choice is positively associated with
[2011] CSR (regression) Board leadership (1993-2004) board leadership and board independence.

De Villiers et al. The impact of board Quantitative Board diversity U.S. firms Larger boards, higher board
[2011] characteristics on environmental (regression) Board size (2003-2004) independence, lower duality, more legal
performance Board independence experts on the board, and larger
Legal experts representation of active CEOs on the
board increase environmental
Active CEO performance.
CEO duality

Bear et al. [2010] The impact of diversity of Quantitative Gender diversity U.S. firms and Gender diversity increases CSR ratings.
board resources and the number of (regression) Director resource diversity: international firms
women on boards on CSR ratings variety of experience and (2009)
knowledge
II.1.1. Diversity of boards

Diversity of boards stems from the structural differences that could exist
between boards. It has several attributes.
First, board size is considered as a critical factor that determines the
effectiveness of board oversight. However, the literature provides no
consensus regarding the effect of board size on firm performance. The
resource dependency theory holds that large boards are likely to have
better information and more knowledge, which allows them to provide
more oriented advice on strategic decisions [De Villiers et al., 2011;
Siciliano, 1996; Provan, 1980; and Pfeffer, 1972, 1973]. For instance,
Kabir et al. [2017] put forward that large boards can increase the firm’s
involvement in CSR investments and have a better CSR performance as
they have more resources provided for consulting and monitoring roles.
Moreover, prior studies show that large boards are more likely to
constitute a specific social capital and have more effective
communication. Therefore, they are prone to contribute more to the
efficiency of the ethical decision-making process than small boards,
which could lead to a better CSR performance [Hillman et al., 2001;
Clarkson 1995; and Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978].
For instance, the mean board size of a firm is around 9 members in
European firms and US firms [Haque and Jones, 2020; and Madden et
al., 2020].
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics of the study of Beji et al. [2020]
on the association between boards’ characteristics and globally CSR and
specific areas of CSR, conducted on French companies listed on the SBF
120d index between 2003 and 2016. It uses Bloomberg, Factset IODS,
and Thomson Reuters for financial and corporate governance data, and
VigeoEirise for CSR scores.

d The SBF120 index consists of the largest 120 capitalizations listed on the French Stock
Exchange market (SBF: Société des Bourses Françaises).
e http://vigeo-eiris.com/fr/
16
17

Table 1.2 Descriptive statistics

VARIABLE N MEAN STD. MIN MAX

BOARD SIZE 937 12.8943 3.5268 3 23
DEV.
INDEPENDENCY 937 52.5293 21.4000 0 100
DUALITY 937 .33617 .4726 0 1
GENDER 937 22.1631 13.9675 0 63.6363
AGE 937 .6247 .1068 0 .7901
FOREIGN 937 23.5345 21.1733 0 100
EDUCATIONAL- 937 69.6529 22.2949 0 100
NATIONALITY
BUSINESS- 937 63.2988 18.4547 14.2857 100
LEVEL
MULTIPLE- 937 73.30 16.7990 9 100
EDUCATION
DIRECTORSHIPS
However, the agency theory holds that agency problems can become
more severe with larger boards, specifically when they suffer from
coordination and communication problems [Hermalin and Weisbach,
2003; Bushman and Smith, 2001; and Yermack, 1996]. In fact, it is
easier for the CEO to control and influence the smaller boards as they
can reach consensus more easily in comparison with large boards
[Cheng, 2008].
Another board characteristic is the presence of independent
directors on boards [Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003]. Harjoto and Jo
[2011] point out that independent directors have stronger stakeholder
orientation and better management quality, which leads to a successful
CSR implementation [Shaukat et al., 2015; Li et al., 2012; Harjoto and
Jo, 2011; Ho and Wong, 2001]. Also, Independent directors are prone to
reduce agency conflicts and to ensure effective monitoring. In the same
vein, Adams and Ferreira [2009] and Walsh and Seward [1990] point out
that independent directors help to monitor executives’ agency behavior,
as they tend to check managers’ self-serving decisions and to solve
attendance problems on the board.
Also, previous studies argue that the duality structure on the
board is prone to decrease corporate investment in CSR. According to
Jizi et al. [2014] and Surroca and Tribo [2008], the concentration of
management and control functions in the CEO’s hands is likely to have
negative impacts on the engagement in CSR activities. Furthermore, in
line with agency theory, duality increases the CEO power and, therefore,
CEO-chair could enjoy private benefits at the expense of CSR
investments. In fact, CEOs who also act as the chair may pursue
opportunistic strategies to protect their interests at the expense of
shareholders [Jizi et al., 2014; and Firth et al., 2007]. They are also prone
to prefer short term financial projects and to marginalize value-
enhancing projects, specifically long-term projects such as CSR ones
[Surroca and Tribo, 2008; and Firth et al., 2007].
Focusing only on the diversity of boards does not help to fully assess the
most influential factors of CSP. We need also to address its interaction
with other forms of diversity, such as diversity in boards.

II.1.2 Diversity in boards

There is emerging literature, specifically on cognitive governance, on the

influence of board members on CSP. It shows that, under specific
conditions, the diversity of directors ‘profiles could be a valuable
resource for the business, particularly on CSR area [see among others
Conyon and He, 2017; Rodriguez Ariza et al., 2016; Pucheta et al., 2016;
and Boulouta, 2013].
Gender diversity on boards has attracted increasing interest in the
last years. According to the social role theory [Eagly, 1987; and Eagly
and Wood, 1991], women are more likely to be oriented toward others’
welfare, more concerned with personal relationships, and more socially
skilled than men. They are prone to show communal qualities, while men
are likely to display agentic qualities [Eagly and Wood, 1991].
Moreover, in line with the cognitive moral reasoning theory (Kohlberg,
1969, 1976], women and men are different in terms of moral reasoning
[Jaffee and Hyde, 2000]. In fact, previous studies show that women have
higher cognitive moral reasoning scores and more ethical perceptions
than men [Elm et al., 2001; Eynon et al., 1997; Forte, 2004].
Also, consistent with the upper echelons’ theory [Hambrick and Mason,
1984], women and men on board display different cognitive features.
19

They have different norms, attitudes, perspectives, experiences, and

knowledge [Sundarasen et al., 2016; and Pelled et al., 1999]. For
instance, prior studies show that female directors could bring to light new
perspectives, which improves, therefore, the governance quality [Conyon
and He, 2017; Pucheta et al., 2016; and Krishnan and Parsons, 2008].
Furthermore, in line with the resource dependence theory [Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978] and the social identity theory [Ashforth and Mael, 1989],
female directors are more engaged in social activities and more likely to
undertake non-profit activities. Besides, they could provide new
perspectives and many resources to the board which improves, therefore,
the governance quality [Conyon and He, 2017; Rodriguez Ariza et al.,
2016; Pucheta et al., 2016; Boulouta, 2013; Zhang, 2012; Post et al.,
2011; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; and Krishnan and Parsons, 2008].
Previous studies put forward that socially responsible firms are
associated with a higher percentage of female directors [Harjoto et al.,
2015; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Zhang et al., 2012; and Carter et al.,
2003]. For instance, Carter et al. [2003] find that gender-diverse boards
perform better than less diverse ones. Further, Rodriguez Ariza et al.
[2016], Braun [2010], and Nielsen and Huse [2010] point out that female
directors are prone to be more engaged in green activities and more
concerned about environmental issues than men. However, low gender
quotas cannot influence CSP. For example, Post et al. [2011] show that
environmental strengths scores increases in the presence of at least three
female members on the board.
In fact, using a dataset of listed firms from India, China, and
Russia over the period 2007-2014, Saeed and Sameer [2017] find that
board gender diversity had increased in each country. Specifically,
gender diversity on boards had increased from 5.6% to 10.3% in India,
and 4.7% to 9.5% for Russia. The highest increase has been noticed in
China where the percentage of female directors has more than doubled
(from 7.6% to 14.4%). This could be explained by many reasons such as
globalization and the proliferation of cross-border trade, communities’
pressure (feminist groups), the emerging of standards and norms for
acceptable governance practices conducted by international organizations
(the UN and the OECD). In addition, there is a regulatory pressure of
governments all over the world to increase gender diversity. Moreover,
between 2009 and 2011, the GMI Ratings’ (2012) Women on Boards
Surveyf shows low percentages of women on boards: only 12.9% in
Germany, and 12.6% in the USA. In France, the parliament introduced in
2011, a gender quota law to have more gender-balanced boards: the
gender quota law of Copé-Zimmermann. French listed firms must
appoint at least 20 % of women to their boards by the end of 2010 and at
least 40 % by the end of 2017”. Consequently, many firms have suddenly
increased gender diversity in their boards to comply with this law.
Another dimension of diversity in boards is the director’s age.
Prior studies suggest that age diversity enhances CSR performance
[Ferrero et al., 2015; Hafsi and Turgut 2013; Post et al., 2011, and
Harrison and Klein, 2007]. According to Ouma et al. [2017], age
diversity could reflect directors’ knowledge, experience, and openness to
new ideas. Besides, Ferrero-Ferrero et al. [2015] argue that age diversity
helps to avoid the threat of “narrow group thinking”.
Regarding the influence of age diversity on CSR performance, results are
mixed. Hafsi and Turgut [2013] and Kets de Vries et al. [1984] argue
that as directors mature, their generational behavior increases, and
therefore, older directors are more likely to be sensitive to society.
However, other studies document a negative association between the
director’s age and CSR performance. For instance, Post et al. [2011]
argue that younger directors show more concern about environmental
issues and tend to be more sensitive to ethical issues.
Also, the presence of foreign directors could be a valuable
resource for businesses, specifically on CSR areas [Hafsi and Turgut,
2013; Tihanyi et al., 2005; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003; and Eskeland
and Harrison, 2002]. For instance, according to Tihanyi et al. [2005] and
Eskeland and Harrison [2002], foreign directors are more concerned
about philanthropic contributions and local social development. Most
often, they have access to broader social networks, diversified and
international expertise, and may prefer using technologies producing less

f https://www.boardagender.org/files/GMI-Ratings-2012-Women-on-Boards-Survey-
F.pdf
21

waste and pollution. In addition, foreign directors could take advantage

of their cultural values on the role of corporations in society to benefit
the business [see among others Hafsi and Turgut, 2013 and Oxelheim
and Randoy, 2003].
Another dimension of diversity is the educational level diversity
[Rupley et al., 2012; Goll and Rasheed, 2004; Hillman and Dalziel,
2003; and Geletkanycz and Black, 2001]. For instance, Geletkanycz and
Black [2001] and Hambrick and Mason [1984] argue that directors with
high educational levels contribute to the firm’s success, as they have a
better capacity to benefit from opportunities and to learn more about new
trends. Moreover, Finkelstein et al. [2009], Goll and Rasheed [2004];
and Grimm and Smith [1991] suggest that high-educated directors are
more likely to adjust their strategies in response to deregulation and other
changes, and display different and rational decision-making processes, in
comparison with other directors. Furthermore, several studies argue that
high-educated directors tend to be more concerned about environmental
issues and international markets, to better understand problems that may
affect the environment [Shahgholian, 2017; Ewert et al., 2001; and Hines
et al., 1987]. For instance, Shahgholian [2017] put forward that highly
educated directors are more likely to help the board to develop
environmental activities, as they have more knowledge of environmental
issues.
Previous research also shows evidence that multiple
directorships could be a key determinant of the involvement in CSR
activities [Rupley et al., 2012]. In fact, according to Rupley et al. [2012],
directors who are sitting on multiple boards could bring to the board
information about unfamiliar practices, based on their experience on
other firms. Therefore, they could help the company to adopt policies of
other companies, and increase environmental performance. They are
more likely to have access to more information about environmental
initiatives and to help to shape more proactive environmental strategies
[De Villiers et al., 2011]. Having different experiences could increase
CSR sensitivity directors with multiple directorships. Accordingly, they
could show more ethical behavior and become more involved in CSR
practices.
Finally, despite the fact that there is a growing number of studies on
diversity in boards and diversity of boards, to the best of our knowledge,
the interaction between the two forms of diversity and how it could
influence CSR is not yet fully explored.

II.2 CSR performance and CSR committees

According to Godos-Díez et al. [2018], companies establish specialized

committees to better deal with a wide range of board functions. For
instance, firms concerned about being socially and environmentally
responsible, create CSR committees (CSRC) in charge of CSR strategies.
Several emerging papers show that companies establish CSRCs to signal
their transparency in the field of CSR and their commitment towards
sustainable development [Hussain et al., 2018a; Mallin and Michelon,
2011; and Eccles et al., 2011]. These committees are prone to shape the
strategies required to promote and implement firms’ CSR initiatives and
to decrease CSR risks [Hussain et al., 2018a; Peters and Romi, 2015; and
Rodrigue et al., 2013]. Prior literature shows that the presence of CSRCs
on boards increases CSR performance [Cucari et al., 2018; Helfaya and
Moussa, 2017; Khan, 2017; Peters and Romi, 2015; Walls et al., 2012,
and Mallin and Michelon, 2011]. For instance, Sánchez et al. [2019] and
Khan [2017] point out that the existence of CSRCs allows for a better
understanding of the key strategic problems facing the board of directors.
CSRCs aim to promote CSR strategies and provide new incentives to
CEOs to get the business actively involved in CSR projects.
The survey of the literature shows that CSRCs could be also called
environmental committees [Liao et al., 2015; Walls et al., 2012; and
Adnan et al., 2010]. Environmental committees are established to
increase the firm’s proactivity in handling environmental issues [Walls et
al., 2012]. For instance, using a sample of 4,013 firm-year observations
from listed companies in 13 European countries from 2002 to 2016,
Haque and Jones [2020] find that 63% of the firms maintain CSR
committee of the board. Moreover, Eberhardt-Toth [2017] points out
that, in 2012, the proportion of firms with CSRCs on boards represents
25.42% in UK, and 16.38% in the USA.
23

The state of art on CSRC composition shows that most of the current
studies have focused on the analysis of structural and demographic
characteristics of CSRC members.

II.2.1 Structural characteristics of CSRC

Turning to the CSRC attributes, to the best of our knowledge, few

studies have investigated the CSRC composition. For instance, some
papers have analyzed how the presence of independent members in
CSRC could affect CSR performance [Danvila del Valle et al., 2013;
Adams et al., 2010]. According to Lovdal et al. [1977], in order to
maintain a critical view of management operations, 80% of CSRC’s
directors should be independent.
Also, Danvila del Valle et al. [2013], and Aboody and Lev [2000],
independent members of CSRCs are more likely to ensure effective
monitoring and better management quality, as they provide more
objective feedback on firms’ activities. Accordingly, their presence could
prevent stakeholders from the opportunistic behavior of managers, which
could enhance social performance. Another set of papers shows that the
presence of independent directors could decrease CSR performance. One
explanation is that independent members could suffer from a lack of
information about the day-to-day operations of the business and the
company’s strategies [Adams et al., 2010].
They may face limited-access to firm-specific information. Their
decisions could be, therefore, largely based on information provided by
the managers [De Villiers et al., 2011; Donnelly et al., 2008; and Adams
and Ferreira, 2007].
Another interesting feature of CSRC is CEO membership. In
fact, Graham et al. [2017] argue that the CEO is prone to care more
about profitable projects than environmental and social projects, and
could, therefore, avoid risks and uncertainty related to CSR activities.
Also, Danvila del Valle et al. [2013] point out that it could be difficult to
challenge the CEO on CSR issues if he or she is a member of the CSRC,
which may affect negatively CSR performance. According to the agency
theory, CEOs could adopt an opportunistic behavior to increase their
private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Powerful CEOs could be
tempted to manipulate information on CSR investments, particularly
when they are entrenched [Bebchuk et al., 2011; Bartov and Mohanram,
2004; and Aboody and Lev, 2000]. In fact, they could influence
committees’ discussions, by sharing their personal views in order to
maximize their benefits [Clune Richard et al., 2014].
Some studies have focused on the relationship between CSRC size
and CSR performance. According to Golden et al. [2001], significant
strategic changes are related to smaller board sizes. This idea can be
extended to the CSRC. In fact, strong strategic changes are needed to
achieve CSR performance. In a small committee, each director’s decision
is less likely to depend on the other director’s decision. Therefore,
directors make more individual effort to fulfill their responsibilities.
However, in line with the resource dependence theory [Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978], more directors imply more resources and larger
networks, which could be valuable to enhance CSR strategies [Mangena
and Pike, 2005; and DeFond and Francis, 2005]. Additionally, Bedard et
al. [2004] put forward that a larger committee has the necessary strength,
diversity of expertise and views to ensure appropriate monitoring’ which
leads to higher CSR performance.
Not only the CSRC size has been discussed in the literature but
also the committee functioning has been analyzed as it could matter in
CSR.
For instance, previous studies show that the number of meetings
organized could be considered as a proxy for directors’ monitoring effort
[Nurulyasmin et al., 2017; Ponnu et Karthigeyan, 2010; and Vafeas,
1999]. According to Vafeas, [1999], meetings’ frequency could be a
remedy to asymmetric information problems. For instance, Nurulyasmin
et al. [2017] and Ponnu and Karthigeyan [2010] put forward that with a
high-frequency meeting committee, directors could be more informed
about existing and appropriate strategies. Accordingly, they become
more likely to use their knowledge to help managers to enhance their
decision-making process. A higher frequency of board meetings allows
the directors to better carry out their duties in line with shareholders’
expectations [see among others Salim et al., 2016 and Chou et al., 2013].
25

Another interesting feature of CSRC functioning is directors’

assiduity in CSRC meetings. In fact, Huilong et al. [2014] argue that
directors’ assiduity shows the level of commitment to the job, which
could have an impact on a firm’s corporate governance. This could
enhance information sharing between firm management and CSRC,
which may increase CSR performance.

II.2.2 Demographic characteristics

Regarding the demographic characteristics of CSRC, very little evidence

has been provided. In fact, the most discussed feature is the presence of
female members on CSRC.
If gender diversity is valuable in boardrooms, there is some evidence that
it could be also valuable in CSRCs: Appointing more female members
on CSRCs on committees could be another way for directors to get
actively involved in CSR activities and to effectively enhance social and
financial performances [Pucheta-Martínez et al., 2016; Krishnan and
Parsons, 2008; and Carter et al., 2003]. For instance, Pucheta-Martínez et
al. [2016] and Carter et al. [2003] point out that female directors are
more prone to improve the performance of the CSRC, by increasing the
creativity and innovation of the committee. In fact, they could bring
important resources such as skills and constituencies and external
networks [Krishnan and Parsons, 2008].
Besides, previous studies also show that the significant roles of boards
are usually attributed to the more interactive and participative style of
leadership by female directors [Conyon and He, 2017; and Elstad and
Ladegard, 2012]. The firms rely more on female directors’ skills,
especially when the chair committee is a woman [Peterson and Philpot,
2007; and Mattis, 2000].
To the best of our knowledge, there is a huge gap in the literature on the
influence of other demographic features on CSRC such as age, the
educational level, the professional experience and ethnic diversity on
social performance.
 (III) Discussion

The current chapter sheds light on urgent and critical issues on boards
and their functioning when it comes to CSR-related concerns.
From a managerial perspective, it shows the relevance of the
board composition in CSR strategies. Boards have to prioritize structural
and demographic diversities to bring new meaningful insights
specifically in terms of more ethical behavior. Increasing diversity could
boost overall corporate visibility and develop a more proactive and
comprehensive CSR strategy and orientation.
First, the emerging studies on the Board-CSR relationship show
how the diversity of boards and diversity in boards could help the firm to
achieve a double-target: improving the governance quality and getting
better social and financial performances.
In practice, there is a huge debate on the way to achieve more
diverse-balanced boards. Some studies stand for the role of regulation to
increase diversity in boards (like for example, gender quota law).
However, this could lead to the increase of multiple directorships and
raises, therefore, several questions on the extent to which directors sitting
on different boards could be and stay independent.
For instance, in France and Spain, as the pool of business women
candidates and the need to urgently comply with the law, many firms
have appointed non-business women members to their boards. Some
non-regulation defenders highlight the side effects of appointing non-
expert profiles and its influence on the business. Accordingly, as a
response, many countries, have preferred to rely on recommendations
and voluntary quotas, instead of laws to increase the involvement of
minorities in top management positions.
Besides, when minority groups are not supported in their
choices, this could worsen the board dynamics, and slower therefore, the
decision-making process. For instance, Erkut et al. [2008] show that
when only one or two female members are appointed to the board, they
cannot influence the boards’ decisions. A critical number of female
board members is needed in order to exert a positive influence on the
boards’ decisions.
27

Furthermore, women are more likely than men to serve in precarious

management positions and continue to be underrepresented in leadership
positions. This is explained by the “glass ceiling” that prevents women
from gaining access to such positions [Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004;
Arfken et al., 2004; and Maume, 2004] and the “glass escalator”, which
means that men are accelerated through the organizational ranks
[Maume, 1999; and Williams, 1992].
Also, the current chapter shows that most of the existing studies
on Board-CSR relationship are more likely to explore one-direction of
this association, according to which governance features, and therefore
CSR committees, help to achieve higher social and financial
performances. However, the question of the potential reversal effect of
financial performance on governance quality, more specifically on the
effectiveness of CSR committees and their compositions, are not yet
analyzed. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have examined how
financial performance could influence board composition and
functioning.
Finally, identifying the timely role of CSR committees in
improving CSR strategies should not be taken without consideration of
the role of other board committees specifically nomination committees
(NC) that are in charge of selecting new board members candidates. NC
have definitely influential effects on diversity in (and of) boards and
therefore on CSRC composition. To the best of our knowledge, studies
on NC role and composition are still scarce.
Shedding more light on the cognitive and individual characteristics of
committee members is valuable to understand the board dynamics and
how they influence firms’ strategies (see figure 1.1).
Fig. 1.1. Theoretical model

Conclusion

Companies have become more concerned about the protection of human

rights, employees’ conditions, environmental issues, and communities’
expectations. They manage their business according to specific ethical
standards. Enhancing governance quality is also among the challenging
issues in CSR. The main aim of the current chapter is to put forward the
influence of governance features on CSR. It covers these challenging
issues.
29

First, the results of recent empirical studies remain very mixed and
the majority of these studies show the existence of a positive association
between social performance and financial performance [Rost and
Ehrmann, 2017; Endrikat et al., 2014; Albertini, 2013; Dixon-Fowler et
al., 2013; Margolis et al., 2009; and Orlitzky and Swanson, 2008]. This
could be explained by the difference in terms of CSR strategies adopted
by firms.
Second, previous studies show that strategic CSR is a source of
original and pioneering actions, where interactions with stakeholders are
the key to sustainable performance. Strategic CSR aims to create
resources and capabilities that can lead to superior economic
performance. While responsive CSR reflects more adaptive behavior.
Companies try to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the firm’s stakeholders to
appear socially responsible [Ruggiero et al., 2018].
Third, there is an emerging literature on how board diversity could
be an advantage for the decision-making process and the key to strategic
CSR [Bocquet et al., 2019]. This heterogeneity can promote diversified
exchanges and relationships, offer new perspectives, and influence the
board's functioning, which in turn can influence its performance [see
among others Isidro and Sobral, 2015; and Aggarwal and Dow, 2012].
Specifically, taking into account structural characteristics of boards such
as size, duality structure, and board independence, and director's profile
such as gender, age, foreign directors and educational level, could be
very helpful to better understand how boards of directors influence firm
performance from different perspectives [Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; and
Gibbins et al., 1990].
Finally, CSR committees have attracted increasing interest
[Khan, 2017; Peters and Romi, 2015; and Rodrigue et al., 2013].
Specifically, previous studies show that the presence of CSR committees
acts as an effective mechanism to enhance CSR performance [Khan,
2017]. They could help to promote and implement firms’ CSR initiatives,
which decreases CSR risks and achieve new opportunities [Perters and
Romi, 2015; and Rodrigue et al., 2013].
In future research, it could be interesting to focus on the financial
and strategic risk-taking in a responsive or strategic form of CSR.
References

Aboody, D., and Lev, B. (2000). Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains,
Journal of Finance, 55, pp. 2747–2766.
Adams, R., and Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards, Journal of Finance, 62,
pp. 217–250.
Adams, R., Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M. (2010). The Role of Boards of Directors in
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, Journal of
Economic Literature, 48, 58–107.
Adnan, S. M., Van Staden, C., and Hay, D. (2010). Do culture and governance structure
influence CSR reporting quality: Evidence from China, India, Malaysia and the
United Kingdom, In Proceedings of the 6th Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary Research
in Accounting Conference, Sydney, Australia, 12–13 July 2010.
Aggarwal, R., Jindal, V., and Seth, R. (2019). Board diversity and firm performance: the
role of business group affiliation, International Business Review, 28(6), pp. 1–17.
Al-Musalli, M. A. K., and Ismail, K. N. I. K. (2012). Intellectual capital performance and
board characteristics of GCC banks, Procedia Economics and Finance, 2, pp. 219–
226.
Albertini, E. (2013). Does environmental management improve financial performance? A
meta-analytical review, Organization and Environment, 26, pp. 431–457.
Allouche, J., and Laroche, P. (2005). A meta-analytical investigation of the relationship
between corporate social and financial performance, Revue française de gestion
des ressources humaines, 57, pp. 18–40.
Amin-Chaudhry, A. (2016). Corporate social responsibility-from a mere concept to an
expected business practice, Social Responsibility Journal, 12(1), pp. 190–207.
Arfken, D. E., Bellar, S. L., and Helms, M. M. (2004). The ultimate glass ceiling
revisited: The presence of women on corporate boards, Journal of Business ethics,
50(2), pp. 177–186.
Ashforth, B. E., and Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory and the organization,
Academy of management review, 14(1), pp. 20–39.
Ashrafi, M., Adams, M., Walker, T. R., and Magnan, G. (2018). How corporate social
responsibility can be integrated into corporate sustainability: a theoretical review of
their relationships, International Journal of Sustainable Development and World
Ecology, 25, pp. 672–682.
Bagh, T., Khan, M. A., Azad, T., Saddique, S., and Khan, M. A. (2017). The Corporate
Social Responsibility and Firms’ Financial Performance: Evidence from Financial
Sector of Pakistan, International Journal of Economics and Financial, 7(2), pp.
301–308.
Bagnoli, M., and Watts, S. (2003). Selling to socially responsible consumers:
Competition and the private provision of public goods, Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 12, pp. 419–445.
31

Bansal, P., Jiang, G. F., and Jung, J. C. (2015). Managing Responsibly in tough economic
times: strategic and tactical CSR during the 2008–2009 global Recession, Long
Range Plan, 48, pp. 69–79.
Barney, J. B., and Tyler, B. (1991). The attributes of top management teams and
sustained competitive advantage. In M. Lawless and Gomez-Mejia (Eds.),
Managing the high technology firm: JAI Press, in press.
Bartov, E., Mohanram, P. (2004). Private information, earnings manipulations and
executive stock–option exercises, The Accounting Review, 79, pp. 889–920.
Bear, S., Rahman, N., and Post, C. (2010). The impact of board diversity and gender
composition on corporate social responsibility and firm reputation, Journal of
Business Ethics, 97(2), pp. 207–221.
Bebchuk, L., Cremers, M., and Peyer, U. (2011). The CEO pay slice, Journal of
Financial Economics, 102, pp. 199–221.
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S. M., and Courteau, L. (2004). The effect of audit committee
expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management,
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 23(2), pp. 13–35.
Beji, R., Yousfi, O., Loukil, N., and Omri, A. (2020). Board Diversity and Corporate
Social Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from France, Journal of Business
Ethics, pp. 1–23.
Ben-Amar, W., Francoeur, C., Hafsi, T., and Labelle, R. (2013). What makes better
boards? A closer look at diversity and ownership, British Journal of Management,
24(1), pp. 85–101.
Ben Barka, H., and Dardour, A. (2015). Investigating the relationship between director’s
profile, board interlocks and corporate social responsibility, Management Decision,
53, pp. 553–70.
Bhattacharyya, S. S., Sahay, A., Arora, A. P., and Chaturvedi, A. (2008). A toolkit for
designing firm level strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives,
Social Responsibility Journal, 4(3), pp. 265–282.
Bocquet, R., Le Bas, C., Mothe, C., and Poussing, N. (2013). Are firms with different
CSR profiles equally innovative? An empirical analysis with survey data,
European Management Journal, 31(6), pp. 642–654.
Bocquet, R., Le Bas, C., Mothe, C., and Poussing, N. (2017). CSR, innovation, and firm
performance in sluggish growth contexts: A firm‐level empirical analysis, Journal
of Business Ethics, 146(1), pp. 241–254.
Bocquet, R., Le Bas, C., Mothe, C., and Poussing, N. (2019). Strategic CSR for
innovation in SMEs: Does diversity matter?, Long Range Planning, 52(6), 101913.
Braun, P. (2010). Going green: women entrepreneurs and the environment, International
Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship, 2(3), pp. 245–259.
Burke, L., and Logsdon, J. M. (1996). How corporate social responsibility pays off, Long
Range Planning, 29(4), pp. 495–502.
Cai, J., Liu, Y., Qian, Y., and Yu, M. (2015). Information asymmetry and corporate
governance, Quarterly Journal of Finance, 5(03), pp. 1550014.
Caren, O., and Recadina Y. W. (2017). Effect of Age Diversity of Board Members on
Performance of Non-Governmental Organizations in Kenya, International Journal
of Novel Research in Marketing Management and Economics, 4(2), pp. 101–123.
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., and Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate governance, board
diversity, and firm value, Financial Review, 38(1), pp. 33–53.
Carvalho, F., Santos, G. and Gonçalves, J. (2018). The disclosure of information on
sustainable development on the corporate website of the certified portuguese
organizations, International Journal for Quality Research, 12(1), pp. 253–276.
Chang, C. H. (2015). Proactive and responsive corporate social responsibility: antecedent
and consequence, Management Decision, 53(2), pp. 451–468.
Choi, J., Kwak, Y., and Choe, C. (2010). Corporate social responsibility and corporate
financial performance: evidence from Korea, Australian Journal of Management,
35(3), pp. 291–311.
Chou, H. I., Chung, H., and Yin, X. (2013). Attendance of board meetings and company
performance: Evidence from Taiwan, Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(11), pp.
4157–4171.
Clune, R., Hermanson, R. D., Tompkins, J., and Shelly, Y. Z. (2014). The Nominating
Committee Process: A Qualitative Examination of Board Independence and
Formalization, Contemporary Accounting Research, 31(3), pp. 748–786.
Conyon, M. J., and He, L. (2017). Firm performance and boardroom gender diversity: A
quantile regression approach, Journal of Business Research, 79, pp. 198–211.
Cordeiro, J. J., Profumo, G., and Tutore, I. (2019). Board gender diversity and corporate
environmental performance: The moderating role of family and dual‐class majority
ownership structures, Business Strategy and the Environment, pp. 1–18.
Crane, A., Henriques, I., Husted, B. W., and Matten, D. (2017). Measuring corporate
social responsibility and impact: enhancing quantitative research design and
methods in business and society research, Business and Society, 56(6), pp. 787–
795.
Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., García-Sánchez, I. M., and Martínez-Ferrero, J. (2017). The
impact of board structure on CSR practices on the international scale, European
Journal of International Management, 11(6), pp. 633–659.
Cucari, N., Esposito De Falco, S., and Orlando, B. (2018). Diversity of board of directors
and environmental social governance: Evidence from Italian listed companies,
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 25, pp. 250–
266.
Cuervo, A. (2002). Corporate governance mechanisms: A plea for less code of good
governance and more market control, Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 10(2), pp. 84–93.
33

Danvila del Valle, I., Diez Esteban, J. M., and Lopez de Foronda, O. (2013). Corporate
social responsibility and sustainability committee inside the board. Working paper
SSRN no. 2260382, University of Burgos, Burgos.
Davis, G. F., and Cobb, J. A. (2010). Corporations and economic inequality around the
world: The paradox of hierarchy, Research in Organizational Behavior, 30, pp.
35–53.
Deegan, C., and Blomquist, C. (2006). Stakeholder influence on corporate reporting: An
exploration of the interaction between WWF-Australia and the Australian minerals
industry, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(4–5), pp. 343–372.
DeFond, M., and J. Francis. (2005). Audit research after Sarbanes-Oxley, Auditing: A
Journal of Practice and Theory, 24, pp. 5–30.
De Villiers, C., Naiker, V., and Van Staden, C. J. (2011). The effect of board
characteristics on firm environmental performance, Journal of Management, 37(6),
pp. 1636–1663.
Dixon–Fowler, H. R., Slater, D. J., Johnson, J. L., Ellstrand, A. E., and Romi, A. M.
(2013). Beyond ‘‘does it pay to be green?’’ A meta-analysis of moderators of the
CEP-CFP relationship, Journal of Business Ethics, 112(2), pp. 353–366.
Donaldson, L. (1999). Making stakeholder theory whole, Academic Management Review,
24(2), pp. 237–241.
Donnelly, R., and Mulcahy, M. (2008). Board structure, ownership, and voluntary
disclosure in Ireland, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(5), pp.
416–429.
Eagly, A. H. (1987). Sex Differences in Social Behaviour: A Social-Role Interpretation,
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Eagly, A. H., and Wood, W. (1991). Explaining sex differences in social behavior: A
meta-analytic perspective, Personality and social psychology bulletin, 17(3), pp.
306–315.
Eccles, R.G., Ioannou, I., and Serafeim, G. (2011). The impact of a corporate culture of
sustainability on corporate behavior and performance, Working paper SSRN no.
1964011, Harvard Business School, Allston, MA.
Eberhardt-Toth, E. (2017). Who should be on a board corporate social responsibility
committee?, Journal of Cleaner Production, 140, pp. 1926–1935.
Erkut, S., Kramer, V. W., and Konrad, A. M. (2008). 18. Critical mass: does the number
of women on a corporate board make a difference, Women on corporate boards of
directors: International research and practice, pp. 222.
Elm, D. R., Kennedy, E. J., and Lawton, L. (2001). Determinants of moral reasoning: Sex
role orientation, gender, and academic factors, Business and society, 40(3), pp.
241–265.
Elstad, B., and Ladegard, G. (2012). Women on corporate boards: key influencers or
tokens?, Journal of Management and Governance, 16(4), pp. 595–615.
Endrikat, J., Guenther, E., and Hoppe, H. (2014). Making sense of conflicting empirical
findings: a meta-analytic review of the relationship between corporate
environmental and financial performance, European Management Journal, 32(5),
pp. 735–751.
Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., and Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of director diversity and
firm financial performance, Corporate governance: An international review, 11(2),
pp. 102–111.
Eskeland, G. A., and Harrison, A. E. (2002). Moving to Greener Pastures?
Multinationals and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, National Bureau of Economic
Research: Cambridge, MA, USA.
Ewert, A., and Baker, D. (2001). Standing for Where You Sit: An Exploratory Analysis
of the Relationship between Academic Major and Environment Beliefs,
Environment and Behavior, 33(5), pp. 687–707.
Eynon, G., Hills, N. T., and Stevens, K. T. (1997). Factors that influence the moral
reasoning abilities of accountants: Implications for universities and the profession,
Journal of Business ethics, 16(12–13), pp. 1297–1309.
Famiyeh, S. (2017). Corporate social responsibility and firm’s performance: empirical
evidence, Social Responsibility Journal, 13(2), pp. 390–406.
Ferrero-Ferrero, I., Fernández-Izquierdo, M. Á., and Muñoz-Torres, M. J. (2013)
Integrating sustainability into corporate governance: an empirical study on board
diversity, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 22,
pp. 193–207.
Ferrero-Ferrero, I., Fernández-Izquierdo, M. Á., and Muñoz-Torres, M. J. (2015). Board
Diversity: An Empirical Study in the Board of Directors, Cybernetics and Systems,
46 (3–4), pp. 249–270.
Fich, E. M., and Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors?, The Journal
of finance, 61(2), pp. 689–724.
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., and Cannella, A. A. (2009). Strategic Leadership:
Theory and Research on Executives, Top Management Teams and Boards, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Firth, M., Fung, P. M., and Rui, O. M. (2007). Ownership, two–tier board structure, and
the informativeness of earnings–Evidence from China, Journal of accounting and
public policy, 26(4), pp. 463–496.
Forte, A. (2004). Business ethics: A study of the moral reasoning of selected business
managers and the influence of organizational ethical climate, Journal of Business
Ethics, 51(2), pp. 167–173.
Freeman, R. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach, Massachusetts:
Pitman Publishing Inc.
Freeman, R. E., Wicks, A. C., and Parmar, B. (2004). Stakeholder theory and “the
corporate objective revisited”, Organization Science, 15(3), pp. 364–369.
35

Galant, A., and Cadez, S. (2017). Corporate social responsibility and financial
performance relationship: A review of measurement approaches, Economic
Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 30, pp. 676–693.
Galbreath, J. (2010). Corporate governance practices that address climate change: An
exploratory study, Business Strategy and the Environment, 19(5), pp. 335–350.
Galbreath, J. (2018). Is board gender diversity linked to financial performance? The
mediating mechanism of CSR, Business and Society, 57(5), pp. 863–889.
Garcia-Castro, R., Arino, M. A., and Canela, M. A. (2010). Does social performance
really lead to financial performance? Accounting for endogeneity, Journal of
Business Ethics, 92(1), pp. 107–126.
Garriga, E., and Melé, D. (2004). Corporate social responsibility theories: Mapping the
territory, Journal of Business Ethics, 53, pp. 51–71.
Geletkanycz, M. A., and Black, S. S. (2001). Bound by the past? Experience-based
effects on commitment to the strategic status quo, Journal of Management, 27, pp.
3–21.
Godos-Díez, J. L., Cabeza-García, L., and Fernández-González, C. (2018). Relationship
between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Internationalisation Strategies:
A Descriptive Study in the Spanish Context. Administrative Sciences, 8, pp. 1–57.
Golden, B. R., and Zajac, Z. J. (2001). When will boards influence strategy? Inclination ×
power = strategic change, Strategic Management Journal, 22, pp. 1087–1111.
Goll, I., and Rasheed, A. A. (2004). The Moderating Effect of Environmental
Munificence and Dynamism on the Relationship Between Discretionary Social
Responsibility and Firm Performance, Journal of Business Ethics, 49(1), pp. 41–
54.
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., and Boeker, W. (1994). The effects of board size and diversity
on strategic change, Strategic management journal, 15(3), pp. 241–250.
Goyder M. (2003). Redefining CSR: From the Rhetoric of Accountability to the Reality of
Earning Trust, Tomorrow’s Company: London.
Graham, J. R., Kim, H., and Leary, M. T. (2017). CEO power and board dynamics, SSRN
Electronic Journal.
Gras-Gil, E., Manzano, M. P., and Fernandez, J. H. (2016). Investigating the relationship
between corporate social responsibility and earnings management: Evidence from
Spain, Business Research Quarterly, 19, pp. 289–299.
Hafsi, T., and Turgut, G. (2013). Boardroom diversity and its effect on social
performance: conceptualization and empirical evidence, Journal of Business
Ethics, 103(3), pp. 385–402.
Hambrick, D. C., and Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a
reflection of its top managers, Academy of Management Review, 9, pp. 193–206.
Hambrick, D. C., Cho, T. S., and Chen, M. J. (1996). The influence of top management
team heterogeneity on firms' competitive moves, Administrative science quarterly,
pp. 659–684.
Haque, F., and Jones, M. J. (2020). European firms’ corporate biodiversity disclosures
and board gender diversity from 2002 to 2016, The British Accounting Review,
52(2), pp. 100893.
Harjoto, M., Laksmana, I., and Lee, R. (2015). Board diversity and corporate social
responsibility, Journal of Business Ethics, 132(4), pp. 641–660.
Harjoto, M., Laksmana, I., and Yang, Y. (2018). Board Nationality Diversity and
Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance: The International
Journal of Business in Society, 19(2), pp. 217–239.
Harrison, D. A., and Klein, K. J. (2007). What’s the difference? Diversity constructs as
separation, variety, or disparity in organizations, Academy of Management Review,
32(4), pp. 1199–1228.
Hart, S.L. (1995). A natural-resource-based view of the firm, Academy of Management
Review, 20(4), pp. 986–1014.
Hategan, C. D., and Curea-Pitorac, R. I. (2017). Testing the correlations between
corporate giving, performance and company value, Sustainability, 9, pp. 1210.
Helfaya A., and Moussa T. (2017). Do board’s corporate social responsibility strategy
and orientation influence environmental sustainability disclosure? UK Evidence,
Business Strategy and the Environment, 26(8), pp. 1061–1077.
Hemingway, C. A., and Maclagan, P. W. (2004). Managers’ personal values as drivers of
corporate social responsibility, Journal of Business Ethics, 50(1), pp. 33–44.
Hillman, A. J., and Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance:
Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives, Academy of
Management Review, 28(3), pp. 383–396.
Hines, J., and Hungerford, H. (1987). Analysis and synthesis of research on responsible
environmental behavior: A meta–analysis, Journal of Environmental Education,
18(2), pp. 1–8.
Huilong, L., Hong, W., and Liansheng, W. (2014). Removing Vacant Chairs: Does
Independent Directors’ Attendance at Board Meetings Matter?, Journal of Business
Ethics, 133(2), pp. 375–393.
Hussain, N., Rigoni, U., and Orij, R. P. (2018). Corporate Governance and Sustainability
Performance: Analysis of Triple Bottom Line Performance, Journal of Business
Ethics, 149, pp. 411–432.
Ingley, C., Mueller, J., and Cocks, G. (2011). The financial crisis, investor activists and
corporate strategy: will this mean shareholders in the boardroom?, Journal of
Management and Governance, 15(4), pp. 557–587.
Jaffee, S., and Hyde, J. S. (2000). Gender differences in moral orientation: A meta–
analysis, Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), pp. 703–726.
Jamali, D., Safieddine, A. M., and Rabbath, M. (2008). Corporate governance and
corporate social responsibility: Synergies and interrelationships, Corporate
Governance: An International Review, 16(5), pp. 443–459.
37

Jean, R.-J. B., Deng, Z., Kim, D., and Yuan, X. (2016). Assessing endogeneity issues in
international marketing research, International Marketing Review, 33(3), pp. 483–
512.
Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp.
305–360.
Jizi, M. (2017). The Influence of Board Composition on Sustainable Development
Disclosure, Business Strategy Environment, 26, pp. 640–655.
Jizi, M. I., Salama, A., Dixon, R., and Stratling, R. (2014). Corporate governance and
corporate social responsibility disclosure: Evidence from the US banking sector,
Journal of business ethics, 125(4), pp. 601–615.
Jo, H., and Harjoto, M. A. (2011). Corporate governance and firm value: The impact of
corporate social responsibility, Journal of Business Ethics, 103, pp. 351–383.
Jones, T. M. (1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory: a synthesis of ethics and
economics, Academy of Management Review, 20(2), pp. 404–437.
Jones, T. M., and Wicks, A. C. (1999). Convergent stakeholder theory, Academic
Management Review, 24(2), pp. 206–221.
Kang, H., Cheng, M., and Gray, S. J. (2007). Corporate governance and board
composition: Diversity and independence of Australian boards, Corporate
Governance: An International Review, 15(2), pp. 194–207.
Kaufman, A., and Englander, E. (2011). Behavioral economics, federalism and the
triumph of stakeholder theory, Journal of Business Ethics, 102(2), pp. 421–438.
Ketokivi, M., and McIntosh, C. N. (2017). Addressing the endogeneity dilemma in
operations management research: theoretical, empirical, and pragmatic
considerations, Journal of Operations Management, 52, pp. 1–14.
Kets de Vries, M., and Miller, D. (1984). The Neurotic Organization: Diagnosing and
Changing Counterproductive Styles of Management, Jossey Bass Business and
Management Series.
Kim, Y., Li, H., and Li, S. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and stock price crash
risk, Journal of Banking and Finance, 43(1), pp. 1–13.
Kohl, S. (1976) Working Together: Women and Family in Southwestern Saskatchewan,
Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada.
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive development approach to
socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.). Handbook of socialization theory, Chicago,
IL, Rand McNally, pp. 347–480.
Krishnan, G. V., and Parsons, L. M. (2008). Getting to the bottom line: An exploration of
gender and earnings quality, Journal of Business Ethics, 78 (1–2), pp. 65–76.
Lankoski, L. (2009). Cost and revenue impacts of corporate responsibility: comparisons
across sustainability dimensions and product chain stages, Scandinavian Journal of
Management, 25(1), pp. 57–67.
Lau, C., Lu, Y., and Liang, Q. (2014). lau: A corporate governance approach, Journal of
Business Ethics, 119, pp. 1–15.
Lee, E. M., Park, S. Y., and Lee, H. J. (2013). Employee perception of CSR activities: Its
antecedents and consequences, Journal of Business Research, 66, pp. 1716–1724.
Lehn, K. M., Patro, S., and Zhao, M. (2009). Determinants of the size and composition of
US corporate boards: 1935‐2000, Financial management, 38(4), pp. 747–780.
Liao, L., Luo, L., and Tang, Q. (2015). Gender diversity, board independence,
environmental committee and greenhouse gas disclosure, British Accounting
Review, 47, pp. 409–424.
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., and Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure,
Journal of financial economics, 87(2), pp. 308–328.
Lovdal, M. L., Bauer, R. A., and Treverton, N. H. (1977). Public responsibility
committees of the board, Harvard Business Review, 55(3), pp. 40–181.
Lu, W., Chau, K., Wang, H., and Pan, W. (2014). A decades debate on the nexus between
corporate social and corporate financial performance: a critical review of empirical
studies, Journal of Cleaner Production, 79, pp. 195–206.
Madden, L., McMillan, A., and Harris, O. (2020). Drivers of selectivity in family firms:
Understanding the impact of age and ownership on CSR, Journal of Family
Business Strategy, pp. 100335.
Mahadeo, J. D., Soobaroyen, T., and Hanuman, V. (2012). Board Composition and
Financial Performance: Uncovering the Effects of Diversity in an Emerging
Economy, Journal of Business Ethics, 105(3), pp. 375–388.
Mallin, C., and Michelon, G. (2011). Board reputation attributes and corporate social
performance: an empirical investigation of the US Best Corporate Citizens,
Accounting and Business Research, 41(2), pp. 119–144.
Mangena, M., and Pike, R. (2005). The effect of audit committee shareholding, financial
expertise and size on interim financial disclosures, Accounting and Business
Research, 35(4), pp. 327–49.
Margolis, J. D., Elfenbein, H. A., Walsh, J. P. (2007). Does it pay to be good? What a
meta–analysis of CSP and CFP can (and cannot) tell us, In: 67th Meeting of the
Academy of Management, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Martinez-Conesa, I., Soto-Acosta, P., and Palacios-Manzano, M. (2017). Corporate social
responsibility and its effect on innovation and firm performance: an empirical
research in SMEs, Journal of Cleaner Production, 142(4), pp. 2374–2383.
Mattis, M. (2000). Women corporate directors in the United States. In: Burke, R., and
Mattis, M. (eds.) Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: International
Challenges and Opportunities, pp. 43–55, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Maume Jr, D. J. (1999). Glass ceilings and glass escalators: Occupational segregation and
race and sex differences in managerial promotions, Work and occupations, 26(4),
pp. 483–509.
39

Maume Jr, D. J. (2004). Is the glass ceiling a unique form of inequality? Evidence from a
random-effects model of managerial attainment, Work and occupations, 31(2), pp.
250–274.
McAlister, D., and Ferrell, L. (2002). The role of strategic corporate philanthropy in
marketing strategy, European Journal of Marketing, 36(5), pp. 689–708.
Milliken, F. J., and Martins, L. L. (1996). Searching for common threads: understanding
the multiple effects of diversity in organizational groups, Academy of Management
Review, 21, pp. 402–433.
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., and Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts,
Academy of Management Review, 22(4), pp. 853–886.
Nekhili, M., Nagati, H., Chtioui, T., and Nekhili, A. (2017). Gender-diverse board and
the relevance of voluntary CSR reporting, International Review of Financial
Analysis, 50, pp. 81–100.
Nelling, E., and Webb, E. (2009). Corporate social responsibility and financial
performance: the “virtuous circle’’ revisited, Review of Quantitative Finance and
Accounting, 32(2), pp. 197–209.
Nielsen, S., and Huse, M. (2010). The contribution of women on boards of directors:
Going beyond the surface, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(2),
pp. 136–148.
Nurulyasmin, A., Ju, B., Afzalur, R., and Jeff, G. (2017). Board Independence and
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting in Malaysia, Australasian
Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 11(2), pp. 61–85.
Olthuis, B. R., and van den Oever, K. F. (2020). The board of directors and CSR: How
does ideological diversity on the board impact CSR?, Journal of Cleaner
Production, 251, pp. 119532.
Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F. L., and Rynes, S. L. (2003). Corporate social and financial
performance: a meta-analysis, Organization Studies, 24 (3), pp. 403–441.
Ouma, C. A., and Webi, R. Y. (2017). Effect of Age Diversity of Board Members on
Performance of Non–Governmental Organizations in Kenya. International Journal
of Novel Research in Marketing Management and Economics, 4(2), pp. 101–123.
Oxelheim, L., and Randoy, T. (2003). The impact of foreign board membership on firm
value, Journal of Banking and Finance, 27(12), pp. 2369–2392.
Panapanaan V. M., Linnanen, L., Karvonen, M., and Phan, V. T. (2003). Road mapping
Corporate Social Responsibility in Finnish Companies, Journal of Business Ethics,
44(2–3), pp. 133–148.
Pelled, L. H., Eisenhardt, K. M., and Xin, K. R. (1999). Exploring the black box: An
analysis of work group diversity, conflict and performance, Administrative science
quarterly, 44(1), pp. 1–28.
Pesqueux, Y., and Damak-Ayadi, S. (2005). Stakeholder theory in perspective, Corporate
Governance International Review, 5(2), pp. 5–21.
Peters, G., and Romi, A. (2015). The association between sustainability governance
characteristics and the assurance of corporate sustainability reports, Auditing: A
Journal of Practice and Theory, 34(1), pp. 163–198.
Peterson, C. A., and Philpot, J. (2007). Women’s roles on U. S. Fortune 500 boards:
Director expertise and committee memberships, Journal of Business Ethics, 72, pp.
177–196.
Peterson, C. A., Philpot, J., and O’Shaughnessy, K. C. (2007). African American
diversity in the boardrooms of the US Fortune 500: Director presence, expertise
and committee membership, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15,
pp. 558–575.
Pfeffer, J., and Salancik, G. R. (1978). The External Control of Organisations: A
Resource Dependence Perspective, New York, NY: Harper and Rob Publishers.
Ponnu, C., and Karthigeyan, R. (2010). Board independence and corporate performance:
Evidence from Malaysia, African Journal of Business Management, 4(6), pp. 858–
868.
Porter, M. E. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy, Harvard Business Review.
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and
Competitors, Free Press: New York, NY.
Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior
Advantage, Free Press: New York, NY.
Porter, M. E., and Kramer, M. R. (2002). The competitive advantage of corporate
philanthropy, Harvard Business Review, 80(12), pp. 56–68.
Porter, M. E., and Kramer, M. R. (2006). The Link Between Competitive Advantage and
Corporate Social Responsibility, Harvard Business Review, 12, 78–92.
Porter, M. E., and Kramer, M. R. (2011). Creating shared value, Harvard Business
Review, 89(1/2), pp. 62–77.
Porter, M. E., and Reinhardt, F. L. (2007). A strategic approach to climate change,
Harvard Business Review, 85(10), pp. 22–23.
Post, C., Rahman, N., and Rubow, E. (2011). Green governance: Boards of directors’
composition and environmental corporate social responsibility, Business and
Society, 50(1), pp. 189–223.
Post, F. R. (2003). The social responsibility of management: a critique of the shareholder
paradigm and defense of stakeholder primacy, American Journal of Business,
18(2), pp. 57–61.
Preston, L. E., and Donaldson, T. (1999). Stakeholder management and organizational
wealth, Academic Management Review, 24(4), pp. 619–625.
Preston, L. E., and O’Bannon, D. P. (1997). The corporate social-financial performance
relationship, Business Society, 36, pp. 419–429.
Pucheta-Martínez, M. C., Bel-Oms, I., and Olcina-Sempere, G. (2016). Corporate
governance, female directors and quality of financial information, Business Ethics:
A European Review, 25(4), pp. 363–385.
41

Reverte, C., Gomez-Melero, E., and Cegarra-Navarro, J. G. (2016). The influence of

corporate social responsibility practices on organizational performance: evidence
from eco–responsible Spanish firms, Journal of Cleaner Production, 112, pp.
2870–2884.
Rodrigue, M., Magnan, and Cho, C. H. (2013). Is environmental governance substantive
or symbolic? An empirical investigation, Journal of Business Ethics, 114, pp. 107–
129.
Rodriguez-Ariza, L., Martínez-Ferrero, J., and Bermejo-Sánchez, M. (2016).
Consequences of earnings management for corporate reputation: Evidence from
family firms, Accounting Research Journal, 29(4), pp. 457–474.
Rost, K., Ehrmann, T. (2017). Reporting biases in empirical management research: the
example of win–win corporate social responsibility, Business and Society, 56(6),
pp. 840–888.
Ruggiero, P., and Cupertino, S. (2018). CSR Strategic Approach, Financial Resources
and Corporate Social Performance: The Mediating Effect of Innovation,
Sustainability, 10, pp. 3611.
Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., and Tacheva, S. (2007). Nationality and gender diversity on Swiss
corporate boards, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), pp.
546–557.
Rupley, K. H., Brown, D., and Marshall, R. S. (2012). Governance, media and the quality
of environmental disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(6), pp.
610–640.
Saeed, A., and Sameer, M. (2017). Impact of board gender diversity on dividend
payments: Evidence from some emerging economies, International Business
Review, 26(6), pp. 1100–1113.
Salim, R., Arjomandi, A., and Seufert, J. H. (2016). Does corporate governance affect
Australian banks’ performance?, Journal of International Financial Markets,
Institutions and Money, 43, pp. 113–125.
Sánchez, I., Gómez-Miranda, M., David, F., and Lázaro, C. (2019). Board independence
and GRI-IFC Performance Standards: the mediating effect of the CSR committee,
Journal of Cleaner Production, 225, pp. 554–562.
Schreck, P. (2011). Reviewing the business case for corporate social responsibility: new
evidence and analysis, Journal of Business Ethics, 103, pp. 167–188.
Shahgholian, A. (2017). The Effect of Board Roles on Firm Environmental Governance,
Academy of Management Proceedings.
Shahzad, A. M., and Sharfman, M. P. (2017). Corporate social performance and financial
performance, Business and Society, 56, pp. 889–918.
Siciliano, J. I. (1996). The relationship of board member diversity to organizational
performance, Journal of Business Ethics, 15(12), pp. 1313–1320.
Singh, V., and Vinnicombe, S. (2004). Why so few women directors in top UK
boardrooms? Evidence and theoretical explanations, Corporate governance: an
international review, 12(4), pp. 479–488.
Sleeper, B. J., Schneider, K. C., Weber, P. S., and Weber, J. E. (2006). Scale and study of
student attitudes toward business education’s role in addressing social issues,
Journal of Business Ethics, 68, pp. 381–391.
Smith, K. G., Grimm, C. M., Gannon, M., and Chen, M. (1991). Organizational
information processing, competitive responses, and performance in the U.S.
domestic airline industry, Academy of Management Journal, 34(1), pp. 60–85.
Sternberg, E. (1999). The stakeholder concept: a mistaken doctrine, Foundation for
Business Responsibilities, Issue Paper, (4).
Sundarasen, S. D. D., Je-Yen, T., and Rajangam, N. (2016). Board composition and
corporate social responsibility in an emerging market, Corporate Governance: The
International Journal of Business in Society, 16(1), pp. 35–53.
Surroca, J., and Tribó, J. A. (2008). Managerial entrenchment and corporate social
performance, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 35(5‐6), pp. 748–789.
Surroca, J., Tribó, J. A., and Waddock, S. (2010). Corporate responsibility and financial
performance: The role of intangible resources, Strategic management journal,
31(5), pp. 463–490.
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories, Cambridge University Press;
Cambridge.
Taljaard, C. C., Ward, M. J., and Muller, C. J. (2015). Board diversity and financial
performance: A graphical time-series approach, South African Journal of
Economic and Management Sciences, 18(3), pp. 425–447.
Tasheva, S., and Hillman, A. (2018). Integrating diversity at different levels: Multi–level
human capital, social capital, and demographic diversity and their implications for
team effectiveness, Academy of Management Review, 44(4), pp. 746–765.
Tihanyi, L. D., Griffith, A., and Russel, C. J. (2005). The effect of cultural distance on
entry mode choice, international diversification, and MNE performance: A meta–
analysis, Journal of International Business Studies, 36(1), pp. 270–283.
Turker, D. (2009). Measuring corporate social responsibility: a scale development study,
Journal of Business Ethics, 85(4), pp. 411–427.
Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and firm performance, Journal of Financial
Economics, 53(1), pp. 113–142.
Vilanova, M., Lozano, J. M., and Arenas, D. (2009). Exploring the nature of the
relationship between CSR and competitiveness, Journal of Business Ethics, 87(1),
pp. 57–69.
Vinnicombe, S., and Singh, V. (2003). Locks and keys to the boardroom, Women in
Management Review, 18(6), pp. 325–333.
43

Walls, J. L., Berrone, P., and Phan, P. H. (2012). Corporate governance and
environmental performance: Is there really a link?, Strategic Management Journal,
33, pp. 885–913.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A Resource-Based View of the Firm. Strategic Management
Journal, 5(2), pp. 171–180.
Williams, C. L. (1992). The glass escalator: Hidden advantages for men in the “female”
professions, Social problems, 39(3), pp. 253–267.
Wood, D. J. (1991). Corporate social performance revisited, Academic Management
Review, 16 (4), pp. 691–718.
Wood, D. J. (2010). Measuring corporate social performance: a review, International
Journal of Management Review, 12 (1), pp. 50–84.
Zaefarian, G., Kadile, V., Henneberg, S. C., and Leischnig, A. (2017). Endogeneity bias
in marketing research: problem, causes and remedies, Industrial Marketing
Management, 65, pp. 39–46.
Zerbini, F. (2017). CSR initiatives as market signals: A review and research agenda,
Journal of Business Ethics, 146(1), pp. 1–23.
Zhang, Y., and Juelin, Y. (2012). Institutional Dynamics and Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) in an Emerging Country Context: Evidence from China,
Journal of Business Ethics, 111(2), pp. 301–316.
Biography of the authors

Author 1: Rania Beji

o PhD Student in Finance, Research Assistant at Montpellier
Business School
o Member of MRM Lab, Université de Montpellier (France) and
GEF-2A Lab, Institut Supérieur de Gestion de Tunis, Université de Tunis
(Tunisia)

Author 2: Ouidad Yousfi

o Associate Professor of Finance at IUT Montpellier
o Member of MRM Lab, Université de Montpellier (France)

Author 3: Abdelwahed Omri

o Professor in Financial and Accounting Methods at Institut Supérieur
de Gestion de Tunis
o Director of GEF-2A Lab, Université de Tunis (Tunisia)