Functions of Language

As an important aspect of human culture, language has unlimited functions.

(a) Informative Function:

Here, the sole purpose of language is to give information. The information can be
given through whatever means: poetry, religion, etc. The information may be true
or false.

(b) Expressive function:

Here, the sole purpose of language is to express feelings or attitudes. When we
greet, thank or curse somebody we express our feelings.

However, it is important to note that expressive functions are not identical with
information about people’s feelings.

(c) Directive Function:

Here, the sole purpose of language is to direct. For example, when we ask
questions, make requests, our question is true or false. They are rather reasonable,
proper or not.

(d) Emotive Function:

This is when language is used to evoke or propagate feelings or attitudes in
human beings. For example, when we say someone is a socialist, man is really
only dust or God is your father, we evoke or propagate feelings.

(e) Commissive Function:

This is when we use language to commit ourselves. For example, when you make
a promise, vow or give your word. Comissives are either sincere, proper or not”.

(f) Declarative Function:

‘This is where “saying makes it so”. For example, “I name this place Okada,” “I
hereby declare this meeting closed”, “I resign”,.

(g) Multiple Functions:

This is when language is used for several purposes simultaneously.

Some Models of Linguistic Analysis

a. Chomsky’s Structural Analysis of the Universals of Syntax
It is not possible in this unit to explore all the classifications of language use. Chomsky
is known as the forerunner in the revolution of language in recent times. According to
Chomsky and his followers, a human child is equipped with information about the
structural characteristics common to all languages (Syntactic Structures, The Hague:
Mouton, 1957). They argue that the process of language learning is best studied by
comparing input with output (that is, comparing the language an infant is exposed to
with the language the infant produces).

However, we cannot actually know how the brain acquires language competence. The
term “language Acquisition Device” (L.A.D) is applied to this unknown quality of
acquisition. According to them, the L.A.D is innately programmed and sourced, and it is
overly sensitive to the universal deep structure of language in general. The main function
of
“Language Acquisition Device is to discover in any particular native language the
grammatical rules by which the language structures are manifest.

b. Austin J.L

In the book How to do Things with Words ( 1962), Austin claims that language is not a
mere set of syntactic rules for constructing sentences but rather a series of acts (speech
acts) meant for achieving the communicative distortions of a speaker in any given
context. For example, “if I address a question to a friend in any living room in the form:
Wouldn’t it be nice to get a breadth of fresh air? I do not intend to be understood as
making an inquiry into his state of respiratory physiology, but that I am rather asking
him to take a walk with me in my gardens (Otakpor, 2000: 26). In Austin’s view, we are
constantly fulfilling language functions by our choice and tiring of utterance, and by our
skill in implementing our intentions with the appropriate communication on their behalf.
The use of language is part of a policy for achieving our intentions. Austin claims that
our syntactic and semantic skills are usually deployed in order to get things done and to
get life going.

c. Halliday M. A. K.

Halliday also analyses the function and uses of language. In his view, a function is some
extra-linguistic role played by the use of language (1973: 201). In Exploration in the
Functions of Language, Halliday proposes some functions of language as follows:

1. Instrumental: Here, we communicate to get goods and services

2. Regulatory: Here, we communicate to control the behaviour of others
3. Interactional: Here, we communicate to relate to others
4. Personal: Here, we communicate to express one’s unique state or feelings
 5. Heuristic: Here, we communicate to get information about one’s
immediate surroundings
6. Imaginative: Here, we communicate to create a symbolic world with
another
7. Informative: Here, we communicate to inform about or examine what is
not known.

Language proper always includes two things: meaning and sound. Practically, before the
period of L.A.D, we use sound to get things done, to control and relate to others and to
express feelings. For example, when a body cries, either of the following may be the
case; (a) the nappies may be wet (b) the body may be the hungry, (c) the body is in need
of sheep or (d) any combination of (a)-(c), or all of them taken together: with time, the
baby will gradually ascend to the lexicon-grammatical level involving a set of
procedures where sound is reshaped into words in utterances. And, for Halliday, it is the
methatic stage and function where “newly acquired vocabulary is used for the purpose of
categorising the phenomena of the environment and relating them to own experience”.
DEFINITIONS

INTRODUCTION

A definition is a sine qua non tool for effective communication. We cannot avoid
vagueness, ambiguity or equivocation unless we rightly define our words or terms. It is
the major means through which we understand the meaning of words. It is different from
explanation, biverbal definition, translation or mere interpretation. It is true that
definition contains all of them but they are not identical. Definition is different from
them in the sense that it is sharp, short, delimited and consisting of the word to be
defined, that is, the definiendum (which may be a single word) and the expression which
defines the expression that is, the definitions (which must contain more than one word)
(Stebbing, 1993: 423 – 425).

Although there are so many types of definitions, this section introduces you to the major
types of definition that are most helpful in clarifying and sharpening arguments.

Major Types of Definitions

In most introductory logic textbooks, although it is not universal, we can identify at least
seven major types of definitions. This section will focus only on the lexical, theoretical,
intentional and extensional definitions.

1. Lexical Definition

A lexical definition is identical with a dictionary definition. It is the conventional or

established meaning of a term. Here are typical examples of lexical definitions:

a) “Immanent” means existing or remaining within, that is, inherent.

b) “Imminent” means about to occur (The American Heritage Concise
Dictionary, 1997: 417)

You should also know that lexical definitions have what is called “truth value,” that is,
“they are either true or false. They are true if they correctly report the establishment
intention of the term and false if they fail to do this” (Layman, 2000:98).

2. Theoretical Definition

In Layman’s word, “a theoretical definition is an intentional definition that attempts to

provide an adequate understanding of the thing(s) to which the term applies (2000:100).
It is different from lexical definition in the sense that it is more accurate and it goes
deeper to understand the nature of things. There are some terms that need to go beyond
their lexical definition according to their context. Here are some typical terms
“virtue”, “temperature”, “mass”, “truth”, “space”, “knowledge” and “time”. Whenever
these terms are mentioned by philosophers for instance, the necessity to go beyond their
mere lexical definitions becomes unavoidable. Plato’s definition of “right” in one of his
dialogues captioned “Euthypro” is quite interesting. According to him, “right means
approved of the gods” .

It is on record that because of the polytheistic nature of ancient Greek religion, Socrates,
one of Plato’s heroes in the dialogue, objected to this definition by pointing out that the
same act may be approved by one god but disapproved by another god.

3. Intentional and Extensional Definitions

You cannot attain clarity about meaning unless you succeed in distinguishing between
intentional and extensional definitions. According to Copi, an intentional definition is
“the collection of properties shared by all and only those objects in a term’s extension”
(1978:125). For instance, the intentional definition of a term like Zebra refers us to
certain four footed animal that has white and black stripes throughout the body. This is
the intentional definition of Zebra because Zebra as a species falls under this
characterisation.

So only Zebras as a species have the distinctiveness and universality of the definition as
it applies to them. In other words, the extension of a term consists of the set of things to
which the term applies while the intension of a term consists of the properties a thing
must have in order to be included in the term’s extension. And, according to Salmon
Wesley, since you can specify the meaning of a word through its extension or its
intension, the distinction between extensional and intentional definitions becomes very
necessary in language (1984:114).

There are two types of extensional definitions: non-verbal (or ostensive) and verbal.
Ostensive definition occurs when you attempt to specify the meaning of a term by
pointing to objects in its extension. For instance, if you want to teach someone the
meaning of the word “car”, you simply need to point to a car and utter the word “car”.
Keep in mind also that this definition does not go without some problems. For instance,
there are cars with different shapes, sizes and makes. In verbal definition we rely on
signification, that is, we use verbal definition to specify the meaning of a term. Here is
an example of an enumerative verbal extensive definition: “Philosopher” means
someone such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, or Hegel.
 4. Stipulative Definition

As a writer or speaker, you are free either to introduce a new word into language or to
give a word a new meaning. Once you do that, you are stipulating. According to Kahane,
a stipulative definition is one that specifies or stipulates the meaning of a word or phrase
(1973: 238). It is on record that until the year 2000, the word “double-dodge” had no
generally accepted meaning.

“Double–dodge” means the anticipatory movements people commonly make when they
nearly collide with some person (as when walking toward each other in a confined
space) and are trying to avoid such collision” (Layman, 2000: 98).

For instance: “Rebecca and Eduardo nearly ran into each other in the hallway; but at the
last moment they double – dodged and then came to a full stop, whereupon Rebecca
burst into laughter. Thus, even though the “double – dodge” is stipulated here, we still
understand the full meaning of the above expression. Always keep in mind that any
stipulative definition is a recommendation or proposal to use a term in a certain manner.
That is why as a recommendation or proposal, a stipulative definition is neither true nor
false, but under some circumstances a stipulative definition can turn into a lexical one.

5. Real Definitions

According to D.P. Gorsky, a real definition is one that specifies and unambiguously
distinguishes the object in question from other objects of a given domain (1974: 12-19).
In other words, the main business of real definition is to reduce the vagueness of a term
by imposing limits on conventional meaning. According to Gorsky, Aristotle was the
first European logician to study the logical procedure of defining the essence of things.
Plato was the first to talk about real definition: Aristotle only systematised it. Real
definitions are most common both in science and law. For instance, in ordinary English,
the word “velocity” simply means “speed”. But physicists go beyond the ordinary
definition.
According to them, “velocity” means rate of motion in particular direction.

6. Definition by Genus and Difference

It is a tautology to say that the method of definition by genus and difference is very
important in language and thinking. Indeed, it is known as one of the best ways to reduce
ambiguity and vagueness. The definition by genus and difference also encompasses
some other methods of definition such as: stipulative, précising or real, theoretical and
lexical definitions.
“Definiendum” and “definiens” are two key words you must master before you can
understand the method of definition by genus and difference. The “definiendum” stands
for the word being defined while the “definiens” is the word or words that do the
defining.

You also need some clarifications concerning proper sub-class, genus, species and
difference.

For a class X to be a proper sub-class of another class Y, every member of class X must
be a member of class Y. For example, the class of collies is a proper sub class of dogs.
For the above explanation, it is clear that the species is simply a proper sub class of the
genus ‘dog.’ You should also note that the way these terms are used here is different
from the use they are given in biology. In logic, the difference is the attribute that
distinguishes the members of a given species from the members of other species in the
same genus (Layman, 2000:101).

The processSpecies Difference Genus

of “Stallion” = male horse
constructing “Kitten” = young cat
a definition“Banquet” = elaborate meal
by genus and“Lake” = large inland body of standing
water
difference is
as follows:

1) Choose a term that is more general than the term to be defined and name it
genus.
2) Find a word or phrase that identifies the attribute that distinguishes the
species in question from other species in the same genus. For instance,

(Layman, 2000: 102)

There are at least six criteria we need for the method of definition by genus and
difference to be actually adequate.

Criterion 1: A definition must not be obscure, ambiguous, or

figurative.
Example: “faith means true belief”
Criterion 2: A definition should not be circular.
Example: Metaphysics” means the systematic study of metaphysical issues.
Criterion 3: A definition should not be negative if it can be affirmative.
Example: “Mammal” means an animal that is not reptile, not an amphibian, and not a
bird.
Criterion 4: Definitions should not be too wide (or too broad)
Example: “Bird” means animal having wings.
Criterion 5: Definitions should not be too narrow.
Example: “Bird’ means feathered animal that can fly.
Criterion 6: A definition is flawed if the definiens picks out the right extension via
attributes that are unsuitable relative to the context or purpose.
Example: Seven” means the number of days in a week, “Human” means a featherless
biped.