Cristopher V.

Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022

1. Verba Legis
REPUBLIC VS. SERENO
(G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

Facts: This case is about the unprecedented quo warranto against the incumbent Chief Justice to
declare the respondent herein ineligible to hold the highest position in the Judiciary for failing to
regularly disclose her assets, liabilities, and net worth prior to her career duty as public official
before she was appointment as Associate Justice, later became Chief Justice. Henceforth, the
failure on her part to file those required disclosures and submit the same to the Judicial and Bar
Council constitutes the violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft Law, and Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, therefore, not possessed the demanded “proven
integrity” for every aspirant in the judiciary.

The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General Jose Calida, invoked the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, through special civil action
under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to
declare as void respondent’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

The respondent herein stated that only impeachment proceedings by the Congress may remove
her, as Constitution provides in Art. XI Section 2, being the Chief Justice.

Issue: Whether or not, the respondent is correct that only impeachment proceedings can remove
them as public officers.

Ruling: No. Applying the verbalegis principle, the word “only” or it equivalent, does not appear
in Section 2, Article XI or anywhere else in 1987 in order to qualify the term “impeachment” that
would establish exclusivity to such mode of removal affecting the impeachable officers,
therefore, the provision indicates non-exclusivity of impeachment as a mode of removing an
impeachable officer.

Siding with the Republic, the Court concurred that invoking the verbalegis principle in statutory
construction, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not expressly prohibit resort to other
means to remove impeachable officers in position.

2. Dura Lex Sed Lex

Facts: Basallote was appointed as Administrative Officer II of Tabaco National High School, and
assumed office. She was informed that her appointment could not be forwarded to Civil Service
Commission (CSC) because of her failure to submit a position description form signed by School
Principal Gonzales. She tried to obtain the signature but the Principal refused. She was advised
to return to her former teaching position and she complied. The appellant herein was appointed
to the same position as the respondent that attested by the CSC. Later, the respondent filed a
Cristopher V. Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022
complaint with CSC Regional Office V which later dismissed but she appealed and the
appointment of Obiasca was recalled. The latter party filed petition before Court of Appeals but
denied the same, she was not later filed motion for reconsideration allowing the CSC’s decision
to be final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the decision was final and executory without any benefit of filing
motion for reconsideration.

RULING: The Court denied the petition. The law on the matter is clear. The problem is
petitioner’s insistence that the law be applied in a manner that is unjust and reasonable. The
Court cited the Section 18 of the Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
292. Hence, the petitioner did not file a petition for reconsideration of the CSC resolution dated
November 29, 2005 before filing a petition for review in the CA. Such fatal procedural lapse on
petitioner’s part allowed the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 to become final and
executory. Hence, for all intents and purposes, the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 has
become immutable and can no longer be amended or modified.

A final and definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended or reversed. Thus,
in praying for the reversal of the assailed Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the final and
executory CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005, petitioner would want the Court to reverse
a final and executory judgment and disregard the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.
True, a dissatisfied employee of the civil service is not preempted from availing of remedies
other than those provided in Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules. This is precisely the purpose of
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the filing of a petition for review as a remedy
to challenge the decisions of the CSC.
While Section 18 of the Omnibus Rules does not supplant the mode of appeal under Rule 43, we
cannot disregard Section 16 of the Omnibus Rules, which requires that a petition for
reconsideration should be filed, otherwise, the CSC decision will become final and executory.

3. Primordial Duty
LITO CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014)

FACTS: An information was filed against Lito Corpuz for the crime of estafa, wherein the said
Danilo Tangcoy is engaged in the business of lending money to casino players, that on May 2,
1991 the petitioner approached him and offered to sell his jewellery pieces in a commission basis
and the Tangcoy agreed. He gave the petitioner several jewelleries that has an aggregate value of
P98,000 as evidence by receipt. Both agreed that within 60 days, Lito Corpuz shall remit the
proceeds of the sale or if unsold the amount will return and the petitioner promised to pay the
value the said item. It was alleged stated in Information stated that petitioner had an intent to
defraud said Tangcoy misappropriated, misapply, and covert such jewelleries into his personal
use. The petitioner filed a not guilty plea but found guilty by the RTC and sentenced him guilty
Cristopher V. Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022
for estafa and suffer penalty of imprisonment under the indeterminate sentence law of 4 years
and 2 months to 14 years and 8 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the RTC erred in their ruling and that punishment was harsh.
RULING: Although the Court agreed that the petitioner is guilty for estafa but there seems to be
a perceived injustice brought by the range of penalties and punishment, later the Court modify
the penalties for that would constitute judicial legislation and that such duty does not to the Court
but to the legislature. The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way
that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that
would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and
purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function
of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of
the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation. Finally, the Court should
give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-
empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the
most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court
dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

4. Constitutional Test
BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
(G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)
FACTS: E.O. No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by
late and former President Benigno S. Aquino III. The said commission is a mere branch formed
under the Office of the President tasked to investigate the reports of graft and corruption
committed by the third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices, and
accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to
the President, Congress, and the Ombudsman. But, the PTC is not quasi-judicial body, so they
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. The job
solely is to investigate, collect, and assess evidence gathered and make recommendation. It has
subpoena powers but no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for
such facts if probable exists as to warrant the filing of information in our courts of law.
Private citizen Biraogo and group of congressmen led by LAKAS-KAMPI CMD Chairman
Edcel Lagman filed separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality
of E.O. 1 based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the
legislative power to create public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution for specifically targeting
the certain officials under Arroyo administration.
Cristopher V. Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022
ISSUE: Whether or not, the E.O. should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause.
RULING: Yes, the E.O. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause.
Laying down a long line of precedents, the potential reiterated that equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of equal protection clause is to secure every
person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.
The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only.
The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it
has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo
administration is just a member of a class, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own, not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction such discriminating differentiation gave the majority an
impression that PTC is just being used “as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution
and only “adventure in partisan hostility.”

5. Vagueness
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK vs. ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNSCIL, et al
(G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)

FACTS: There are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 or the
Human Security Act of 2007. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and
Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security
Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. Petitioners claimed that RA 9372 is vague and
broad in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among populace” and
“coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the law be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and over
breadth doctrines.
RULING: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein
certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly expected. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness
and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free
speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. A facial challenge is allowed to
be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect”
upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
Cristopher V. Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons; especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

6. Decisions of Supreme Court shall form part of the law of the land / res judicata.
FLORENCIA G. Diaz vs. REPUBLIC
(G.R. No. 181502, February 2, 2010)

FACTS: This is letter-motion praying for reconsideration for the third time of the resolution of
the Supreme Court denying the petition for review filed by the petitioner herein. The latter filed
an application for registration of a vast tract of land in Nueva Ecija. She alleged that she
possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested that agricultural products and
benefits of the same continuously, publicly, and adversely for more than 26 years.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the application because the land in question
was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of
the public domain.

The Supreme Court already ruled in the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes that the property
was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation.

Hence, the Petitioner moved for consideration and assailed the decision of Justice Mendoza
saying that the latter inhibited himself when the case reached CA since he was also the assistant
SolGen during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings. Then, filed for a review on
certiorari which the SC denied, and MR denied also. The petitioner wants the case referred to the
SC en banc which denied, and issued a directive that no further pleadings would be entertained.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the land in dispute can be registered to the petitioner.

RULING: The ruling in the case of Director of Lands is applicable in this case, thus constitutes
res judicata. The Supreme Court ruled that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order
dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain
constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant but also against all persons. All
lower courts, especially the trial court concerned at this case, ought to be reminded that their duty
to obey the decisions of Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a
conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial
system.
Cristopher V. Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022

7. Repeal
GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER vs. COMELEC, et al
(G.R. No. 215847, January 12, 2016)
FACTS: The COMELEC granted the petition to disqualify the petitioner herein and to annul his
proclamation as duly elected governor of Antique. This originated when Mayor Roquero filed an
Election Offense complaint against the petitioner for violating the Section 261(x) of the Election
Code followed by the several filing of petition for disqualification against the former sought to
disqualify the petitioners after committed the election offenses of Coercion of Subordinates and
Threats, Intimidation, Terrorism x x x or Other Forms of Coercion by suspending Mayor
Roquero.

After the May 2013 Elections, the petitioner proclaimed as winners in the elections, they filed a
petition disqualifying and annulling the proclamation of respondent as Governor of Antique, and
the Commission found that there was substantial evidence showing the petitioner acted in bad
faith when he suspended Mayor Roquero as a form of punishment for opposing him. Hence, the
COMELEC voted in favor to disqualify the petitioner and annul his proclamation as governor of
Antique.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the COMELEC erred in ruling that R.A. No. 7890 did not remove
coercion as ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code.

RULING: Yes. The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7890 expressed that in Section 2, the
Section 261, Paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), Article XXII of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby
repealed.

An expressed repealed is one wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed. An implied repeal
transpires when substantial conflict existed between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an
express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irrevocable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of new and old laws.

It is clear that R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the
Omnibus Election Code. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually
be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.
Stated plainly, a petition for disqualification on the ground of coercion shall be taken differently
and distinctly from coercion punishable under the RPC for the two can very well stand
independently from each other. Therefore, unless proven that the two are inconsistent and would
render futile the application and enforcement of the other, only then that a repeal by implication
will be preferred. A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative
from the moment the repealing law becomes effective.
8. Foreign Jurisprudence
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAQUITO
OCHOA et al.
(G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016)
Cristopher V. Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022

FACTS: The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks (Madrid System), which
is the centralized system providing a one-stop solution for registering and managing marks
worldwide, allows the trademark owner to file one application in one language, and to pay one
set of fees to protect his mark in the territories of up to 97 member-states. The Madrid System is
governed by the Madrid Agreement, concluded in 1891, and the Madrid Protocol, concluded in
1989. The Madrid Protocol has two objectives, namely: (1) to facilitate securing protection for
marks; and (2) to make the management of the registered marks easier in different countries.
In 2004, the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL), began considering the
country's accession to the Madrid Protocol. After a campaign for information dissemination, and
a series of consultations with stakeholders, IPOPHL ultimately arrived at the conclusion that
accession would benefit the country and help raise the level of competitiveness for Filipino
brands. Hence, it recommended to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) that the Philippines
should accede to the Madrid Protocol. After its own review, the DFA endorsed to the President
the country's accession to the Madrid Protocol. The DFA determined that the Madrid Protocol
was an executive agreement.
On March 27, 2012, President Benigno C. Aquino III ratified the Madrid Protocol through an
instrument of accession and entered into force in the Philippines on July 25, 2012.
Thus, the Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines (IPAP) commenced this special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition to challenge the validity of the President's accession to
the Madrid Protocol without the concurrence of the Senate. According to the IPAP, the Madrid
Protocol is a treaty, not an executive agreement; hence, respondent DFA Secretary Albert Del
Rosario acted with grave abuse of discretion in determining the Madrid Protocol as an executive
agreement.
ISSUE: Is the Madrid Protocol unconstitutional for lack of concurrence by the Senate?
RULING: NO. The Court finds and declares that the President’s ratification is valid and
constitutional because the Madrid Protocol, being an executive agreement as determined by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, does not require the concurrence of the Senate.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, the registration of trademarks and copyrights have been the
subject of executive agreements entered into without the concurrence of the Senate. Some
executive agreements have been concluded in conformity with the policies declared in the acts of
Congress with respect to the general subject matter. Accordingly, DFA Secretary Del Rosario’s
determination and treatment of the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement; being in apparent
contemplation of the express state policies on intellectual property as well as within his power
under Executive Order No. 459, are upheld.
The Court observed that there are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering into a treaty
or an executive agreement on a given subject as an instrument of international relations. The
primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to
craft their international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests.
Cristopher V. Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022
The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the
enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement; inasmuch as all the parties; regardless of the
form, become obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda. The principle binds the parties to perform in good faith their parts in the agreements.

9. Processual Assumption
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. Vs. ASIAVEST MERCHANT
BANKERS
(G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015)

FACTS: Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn.
Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate company known as Asiavest-
CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural
roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia. In connection with this construction
contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty
stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the
due performance by PNCC of its construction contracts and the repayment of the temporary
advances given to PNCC." These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of
Malaysia.

There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State
of Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance
bonds. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint16 for recovery of sum of
money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian
laws. Specifically, it invoked Section 9818 of the Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and Section
1119 of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956. The trial court declared PNCC in default for
failure to file any responsive pleading and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to
present its evidence ex parte and rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad. The trial court found that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the
requisites for proof of written foreign laws.

ISSUE
Whether or not, our courts can apply the principle of non conveniens involving contract executed
and performed in foreign country.

RULING: Yes. The doctrine of forum non conveniens applies in conflicts of law cases, which
gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not most convenient
forum and the parties may seek redress in another one. It’s a device “designed to frustrate illicit
means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue
of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.

The petitioner invokes Malaysian laws on prescription, but it was not able to prove these foreign
law provisions. Citing the jurisprudence, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded,
Cristopher V. Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022
is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. The Philippines does not
take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged, they must be proven.

10. Test of Valid Ordinance

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City passed Ordinance 1664 authorize the
traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restriction
and prohibitions defined in he Traffic Code of Cebu City (Ordinance No. 801). Later, two
lawyers brought suit seeking the declaration of the Ordinance as unconstitutional for being in
violation of due process and contrary to law and damage.

Hence, the three actual incidents recorded.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the enforcement of Ordinance 1664 is a breach to constitutional

RULING: No. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.The
CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power
to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and
also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription
of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as
well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
Cristopher V. Sabal – JD 1-A
Statutory Construction
Date: January 14, 2022

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to
enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability
by simply driving away.