Joint Publication 3-04

T OF T H
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Information in Joint Operations

14 September 2022
 PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, coordinate,

execute, and assess the use of information during joint operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations
for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and
prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces of the United States in preparing and executing their plans and orders.
It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing
the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure
unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat
support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter;
however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service
publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in
coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current
and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance

i
or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures
ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US,
commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and
procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DAGVIN R. M. ANDERSON
Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
Director, Joint Force Development

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii

CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF INFORMATION

 Overview ..................................................................................................................... I-1

 The Security Environment .......................................................................................... I-2
 Information ................................................................................................................. I-5

CHAPTER II
JOINT FORCE USES OF INFORMATION

 Military Operations and Information .........................................................................II-1

 The Operational Environment and the Information Environment .............................II-1
 Information Advantage ..............................................................................................II-2
 Informational Power ..................................................................................................II-2
 Relevant Actors..........................................................................................................II-5
 Joint Force Use of Narrative ......................................................................................II-5
 The Information Joint Function .................................................................................II-6
 The Information Joint Function and Joint Operations .............................................II-15

CHAPTER III
UNITY OF EFFORT

 Introduction .............................................................................................................. III-1

 Authorities................................................................................................................ III-2
 Responsibilities ........................................................................................................ III-3
 Service Organizations ............................................................................................ III-23
 Information Forces ................................................................................................. III-27
 Interorganizational Collaboration .......................................................................... III-29
 Multinational Partner Considerations .................................................................... III-31
 Legal Considerations ............................................................................................. III-33

CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND PLANNING

 Introduction .............................................................................................................. IV-1

 Information Planners and Operational Design and Planning ................................... IV-1
 Operational Design .................................................................................................. IV-2
 Joint Planning Process ........................................................................................... IV-14

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CHAPTER V
EXECUTION

 Introduction ............................................................................................................... V-1

 Execution in Context................................................................................................. V-1
 Essential Elements for Incorporating Information into Execution ........................... V-1

CHAPTER VI
ASSESSMENT

 Introduction .............................................................................................................. VI-1

 Requirement for Assessment ................................................................................... VI-1
 Challenges Assessing Information in Joint Operations ........................................... VI-2
 Organizing for Assessment ...................................................................................... VI-3
 Assessment Process ................................................................................................. VI-4
 Recommendations for Assessing Inform and Influence Activities........................ VI-12

CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

 Overview ................................................................................................................. VII-1

 Operations in the Information Environment ........................................................... VII-1
 Organizing for Operations in the Information Environment .................................. VII-7
 Operations in the Information Environment Planning, Coordination,
Execution, and Assessment ................................................................................. VII-11

APPENDIX

A Narrative Development .................................................................................... A-1

B Information Staff Estimate Format ....................................................................B-1
C Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations ...........................C-1
D References ........................................................................................................ D-1
E Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5

FIGURE

I-1 Examples of Inherent Informational Aspects .............................................. I-6 

I-2 Examples of Drivers of Human Behavior ................................................... I-7 
II-1 Tasks and Outcomes of the Information Joint Function ............................II-7 
IV-1 Joint Planning Overview .......................................................................... IV-3 
IV-2 Narrative Hierarchy .................................................................................. IV-4 

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IV-3 Planning Functions, Process, and Operational Design

Methodology .......................................................................................... IV-15
IV-4 Questions for Narrative Analysis ........................................................... IV-18 
VI-1 Operation Assessment Process ................................................................. VI-5 
VI-2 Assessment Plan Development Process ................................................... VI-6 
A-1 Potential Testing Pool ............................................................................... A-7
C-1 Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations ....................C-2
 

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Introduces the fundamentals of information in the context of the security

environment

• Describes the joint forces use and leveraging of information through the
information joint function during all joint operations

• Discusses the Department of Defense’s role in maintaining unity of effort in

and through the information environment (IE)

• Outlines information planners’ contributions to operational design and

planning

• Presents essential elements for incorporating information into execution

• Describes the requirement to, and challenges of, assessing the joint force’s use
and leveraging of information in joint operations, organizing for assessment,
the assessment process, and recommendations for assessing inform and
influence activities

• Discusses the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of operations

in the information environment and the forces that conduct those operations

Fundamentals of Information

Introduction The Department of Defense (DOD), in coordination

with the other United States Government departments
and agencies, supports the informational instrument of
national power by using information to impact the way
in which humans and systems behave or function. The
joint force leverages information across the competition
continuum to assure, deter, compel, and force relevant
actor behaviors that support US interests.

The information joint function organizes the tasks

required for the management and application of
information during all activities and operations. The
three tasks of the information joint function stress the
requirement to incorporate information as a
foundational element during the planning and conduct
of all operations. Those tasks are:

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 Understand how information impacts the

operational environment (OE).
 Support human and automated decision making.
 Leverage information.

The Security Environment The security environment is the set of conditions,

circumstances, and influences that affect the
employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.
It is impacted by advances in information technology
that enable individuals and organizations to access, use,
and share information across the globe; to interfere,
alter, or disrupt the transmission of information; and to
employ and deny information to affect individuals,
groups, and automated systems worldwide.

Information Information is data in context to which a receiver

assigns meaning. Receivers include human and
automated systems and each may acquire information in
a variety of ways (e.g., through spoken or written words,
observation, or some other sensing mechanism).

Humans use information to understand, make

decisions, and communicate. Automated systems use
information to support decision making, control their
own functions, or control the behavior or functions of
other systems. Humans and automated systems share
information to establish a common understanding.

Information can affect behavior. Understanding the

factors that drive behaviors is essential to the effective
use of information. One can leverage information to
affect drivers of behavior for automated systems by
changing the algorithms, programs, and data that control
the system’s behavior (e.g., computer virus) or by
sending information to the system’s sensors to produce
a predictable output (e.g., jamming a radar).
Information can also affect human behavior. This is
frequently more complicated because the drivers of
behavior do not work in isolation—affecting any one
driver can affect other drivers.

Joint Force Uses of Information

Military Operations and The joint force uses information to improve

Information understanding, decision making, and communication.
Commanders use information to visualize and
understand the OE and direct and coordinate actions.

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The joint force leverages information to affect the

perceptions, attitudes, decision making, and behavior of
relevant actors.

The Operational Within each commander’s OE there exist factors that

Environment and the affect how humans and automated systems derive
Information Environment meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by
(IE) information. We refer to the aggregate of these social,
cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and
physical factors as the information environment (IE).
The IE is not distinct from any OE. It is an intellectual
framework to help identify, understand, and describe
how those often-intangible factors may affect the
employment of forces and bear on the decisions of the
commander.

Information Advantage Information advantage is the operational advantage

gained through the joint force’s use of information for
decision making and its ability to leverage information
to create effects on the IE.

Informational Power Informational power is the ability to use information to

support achievement of objectives and gain an
information advantage. The essence of informational
power is the ability to exert one’s will through the
projection, exploitation, denial, and preservation of
information in pursuit of objectives.

Relevant Actors Relevant actors include individuals, groups,

populations, or automated systems whose capabilities or
behaviors have the potential to affect the success of a
particular campaign, operation, or tactical action.

Joint Force Use of Narrative Narratives are an integral part of campaigns, operations,
and missions. The joint force strives to provide a
compelling narrative that is integrated into operation
plans (OPLANs) and resonates with relevant actors by
fitting their frame of reference. An effective and
integrated narrative can mitigate, undermine, or
otherwise render competing narratives ineffective if it is
accompanied by complementary actions.

The Information Joint The information joint function is the intellectual

Function organization of the tasks required to use information
during all operations—understand how information
impacts the OE, support human and automated decision
making, and leverage information. The information

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joint function encompasses the management and

application of information to change or maintain
perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior and
to support human and automated decision making.

The Information Joint The joint force commander (JFC) uses the abilities
Function and Joint provided by the information joint function during all
Operations operations. The understand task provides the JFC with
the ability to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and
opportunities in the IE and provides a better
understanding of which drivers of behavior to affect to
achieve objectives. These activities facilitate the
availability of timely, accurate, and relevant information
necessary for joint force decision making. The leverage
task provides the JFC with the ability to inform
audiences; influence foreign relevant actors; and attack
and exploit, information, information networks, and
information systems in support of the JFC’s objectives
and enduring outcomes. The joint force operationalizes
the information joint function through operational
design in planning of operations that use information
and deliberately leverage the inherent informational
aspects of its activities, and by conducting operations in
the information environment (OIE).

Operations in the OIE are military actions involving the integrated

Information Environment employment of multiple information forces to affect
(OIE) drivers of behavior by informing audiences; influencing
foreign relevant actors; attacking and exploiting relevant
actor information, information networks, and
information systems; and protecting friendly
information, information networks, and information
systems.

Unity of Effort

Introduction DOD’s role in maintaining unity of effort in and through

the IE is, for the most part, the same as it is for the
physical domains. DOD establishes policies and sets the
conditions for components and their staffs to identify
adversarial and potential adversarial threats (including
attempts to undermine US alliances and coalitions) and
bring capabilities to bear in an effort to affect,
undermine, and erode an adversary’s or enemy’s will.

Authorities Military activities that leverage information frequently

involve a unique set of complex issues. There are legal

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and policy requirements, including DOD directives and

instructions, national laws, international laws and rules
of engagement, all of which may affect these activities.
Laws, policies, and guidelines become especially
critical during peacetime operations and competition
when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions,
and agreements are more likely to affect planning and
execution. Commanders should know who has the
execution authority for the conduct of information
activities since many capabilities require separate and
distinct execution authorities.

Responsibilities Information can have significant regional and global

impacts that challenge the joint force with unanticipated
threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. Effectively
dealing with these challenges and communicating
intended meanings to selected populations requires
individuals and organizations across DOD and
interagency partners to understand their own and others’
responsibilities related to achieving and maintaining
unity of effort in the application of informational power.

Service Organizations The Services man, train, and equip organizations to

provide the joint force with the ability to leverage
information during joint operations and to conduct OIE.
Those Service organizations provide distinct specialized
capabilities to the joint force or provide information
commands composed of multiple specialized
capabilities that focus on leveraging information and
enable the joint force to create effects in the IE. Those
Service-provided organizations that are trained and
equipped to conduct OIE are referred to as OIE units.

Information Forces Information forces are those Active Component and

Reserve Component forces of the Services specifically
organized, trained, and equipped to create effects in the
IE. These forces provide expertise and specialized
capabilities that leverage information and can be
aggregated as components of an OIE unit to conduct
OIE. Information forces are available to the joint force
through the request for forces process.

Interorganizational Interorganizational collaboration seeks to find common

Collaboration goals, objectives, and/or principles between diverse
organizations to achieve unity of effort and, through
planning and leveraging of cross-organizational
capabilities, set the conditions to achieve unified action

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during execution. The relationship that the joint force

establishes with relevant organizations helps it develop
a more comprehensive awareness of the OE and
understanding of the impact of information on the OE.

Multinational Partner There is no single doctrine for multinational action, and

Considerations each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and
plans. With regard to information activities and the
conduct of OIE, US planning for joint operations
accommodates and complements the inherent
complexity of multinational partner considerations.

Legal Considerations US military information activities are subject to

applicable international laws and treaties, US laws and
policies, and DOD regulations and policies.
Understanding how various policies and laws interact in
practice with respect to the IE is a challenging task. To
overcome these challenges, commanders and staff
consult with legal advisors throughout the planning
process. Planners should maintain awareness of
relevant international agreements and consult with legal
advisors to identify associated legal
obligations/constraints that must be incorporated into
plans.

Operational Design and Planning

Information Planners and Information planners assigned to the staff enhance the
Operational Design and JFC staff’s ability to carry out information joint function
Planning tasks. Those planners have subject matter expertise with
specialized capabilities, experience working with and in
OIE units, and an understanding of the inherent
informational aspects of capabilities and activities of
other units. Information planners collaborate with the
rest of the staff to develop and plan activities in a manner
that most effectively leverages the informational aspects
of joint force operations, as well as planning OIE, to
support achieving the JFC’s objectives.

Operational Design Operational design is the analytical framework that

underpins planning. Operational design supports
commanders and planners in understanding the JFC’s
OE as a complex interactive system. As commanders
and staffs apply operational design methodology to
develop the operational approach, they account for how
information impacts the OE and the potential inherent
informational aspects of their activities. In doing so,

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joint force planners gain an understanding of relevant

actors and consider how information is used by, and
affects the behavior of, those actors.

Joint Planning Process The Joint Planning Process (JPP) is an orderly,

analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps
to analyze a mission, select the best course of action and
produce a campaign or joint OPLAN or order. Like
operational design, it is a logical process to approach a
problem and determine a solution.

Throughout the JPP steps, information planners assist

other joint planners in incorporating their understanding
of how information impacts the OE to identify how to
best support human and automated system decision
making and how to best leverage information to achieve
the JFC’s objectives during operations.

Execution

Execution in Context Joint operations span the competition continuum from

recurring cooperative activities to sustained combat
operations in armed conflict. The information joint
function enables the application of informational power
by expanding commanders’ range of options for action
across the competition continuum. Employing the
information joint function may be the primary option
available to a JFC during long-duration cooperation and
competition short of armed conflict, where the use of
physical force is inappropriate or restricted.

Essential Elements for The JFC focuses on synchronizing, monitoring, and

Incorporating Information adjusting all joint force activities (i.e., not just
into Execution information activities) so they have the desired effects
in and through the IE and support achievement of joint
and national objectives. The dynamic nature of the IE
makes it vital that the JFC have the organizations,
processes, and tools in place to rapidly recognize the
informational aspects of activities and adapt joint force
activities in response to failures or to exploit successes
in and through the IE. The following are essential
elements that facilitate that rapid adaptation:

 Organization.
 Monitoring and analyzing for effects in and
through the IE.
 The synchronization matrix.

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 The narrative.
 Information and knowledge management.
 The information staff estimate.

Assessment

Introduction Assessing the joint force use and leveraging of

information allows the JFC to appreciate whether those
efforts are helping to achieve objectives. Assessment of
joint force information activities is a continual and cyclical
process.

Requirement for Assessment Assessment of operations and activities is key to the

commander’s decision cycle, helping to determine the
results of actions in the context of overall mission
objectives and providing recommendations for
refinement of future plans. Assessing the joint force’s
use and leveraging of information in joint operations
provides data and analysis to inform the commander on
how effectively the joint force is able to understand how
information impacts the OE, support human and
automated decision making, and leverage information to
achieve objectives.

Challenges Assessing Distinguishing between correlation and causation makes

Information in Joint information activity assessment difficult. Analysts
Operations should approach assessment with open minds, and
determine whether correlation, causality, or a
combination of the two is the appropriate approach for
specific measures of effectiveness. This approach
provides insights to the likelihood of particular events
and effects given certain criteria in terms of conditions
and actors in the OE. When assessing information in
joint operations, evidence has shown that correlation
between indicators and events has proven more accurate
than efforts to establish concrete cause and effects
relationships. This is especially true when assessing
public opinion or human behavior.

Organizing for Assessment Three potential approaches for organizing for assessment
are:

 Special Staff Section. In this approach, the

assessment element reports directly to the
commander, via the chief of staff or deputy
commander.

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 Separate Staff Section. In this approach, the

assessment element is its own staff section, akin to
plans, operations, intelligence, logistics, and
communications.
 Integrated in Another Staff Section. In this
approach, the assessment element is typically
integrated into the operations or plans sections and
the assessment chief reports to the plans chief or
the operations chief.

Assessment Process Assessments of information in joint operations are

conducted in accordance with the assessment process:

 Step 1—Develop Assessment Approach

 Step 2—Develop Assessment Plan
 Step 3—Collect Information
 Step 4—Analyze Information and Produce
Intelligence
 Step 5—Communicate Feedback and
Recommendations
 Step 6—Adapt Plans for Operations,
Campaigns, and Assessment

Operations in the Information Environment

Introduction OIE are military actions involving the integrated

employment of multiple information forces to affect
drivers of behavior. The forces that conduct OIE include
OIE units (i.e., those formations that JFCs may choose
to assemble to conduct OIE) and information forces,
which are the building blocks of those OIE units.

Operations in the IE OIE leverage information for the purpose of affecting

the will, awareness, and understanding of adversaries
and other relevant actors and denying them the ability to
act in and through the IE to negatively affect the joint
force, while protecting joint force will, awareness,
understanding, and the ability to take actions in and
through the IE. Throughout the competition continuum,
the JFC integrates OIE into joint plans and synchronizes
it with other operations to create desired behaviors,
reinforce or increase combat power, and gain decisive
advantage. OIE are conducted as an integral part of all
operations and campaigns at any level of conflict and
help shape the IE. As such, joint forces will always be
conducting one or more OIE to remain continuously

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Executive Summary

engaged in and through the IE. The joint force should

still integrate information into strategic art and
operational design, planning guidance, and planning
processes.

Organizing for OIE OIE units consist of a headquarters organization with

command and control of assigned and attached
information forces. JFCs may choose to create a task
force for the integrated employment of the specialized
capabilities required to conduct OIE.

Information forces are those Active Component and

Reserve Component forces specifically organized,
trained, and equipped to create, and/or support the
creation of effects on the IE. Information forces
aggregate military personnel, weapon systems,
equipment, and necessary support that provide expertise
and specialized capabilities that leverage information
and conduct activities central to OIE. OIE units are
typically composed of the following types of information
forces:

 Psychological Operations Forces. Psychological

operations forces conduct military information
support operations, planned operations to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives,
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior
of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
and individuals in a manner favorable to the
JFC’s objectives.
 Civil Affairs (CA). CA forces conduct civil
reconnaissance, network analysis, and network
engagement to support, influence, compel, or
leverage populations, governments, and other
institutions to expose malign influence, counter
coercion and subversion, and impose costs through
conventional and unconventional activities.
 Public Affairs (PA) Organizations. PA
organizations and personnel focus on the OIE core
activity of informing domestic, international, and
internal audiences.
 Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
(EMSO) Elements. EMSO elements assigned to
OIE units work with the joint electromagnetic
spectrum operations cell at the parent command to
organize, execute, and oversee the conduct of

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electromagnetic warfare and spectrum

management.
 Cyberspace Forces. Units of the Cyber Mission
Force include cyberspace protection teams that
defend blue cyberspace in reinforcement to the
system operators and local defenders; national
mission teams, supported by national support
teams, that defend the Nation from threats in
cyberspace by operating in gray and red
cyberspace; and combat mission teams, supported
by combat support teams, that project power in
support of combatant commander objectives, by
operating in and through gray and red cyberspace.
 Space Operations Elements. United States
Space Force Guardians assigned as planners on
OIE unit staffs ensure commanders and their staffs
have a common understanding of space operations,
provide space domain awareness, and coordinate
space capabilities for OIE.

OIE: Planning, JFCs integrate OIE into operations, as main or

Coordination, Execution, supporting efforts, or conduct an OIE as a stand-alone
and Assessment effort. During plan development, the JFC provides
planning guidance that describes the desired conditions
that must exist in the IE to support mission
accomplishment, how the joint force will leverage the
inherent informational aspects of its activities to support
the JFC’s objectives, and the types and level risk that the
JFC will accept in the IE. Specifically for OIE units, the
JFC provides guidance on how OIE will support the
JFC’s scheme of maneuver.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and

guidance to plan, coordinate, execute, and assess the use
and leveraging of information during joint operations.

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 CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF INFORMATION

“Information is such a powerful tool that it is recognized as an instrument of

national power. The elevation of Information as a joint function impacts all
operations. It signals a fundamental appreciation for the military role of
information at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within today's complex
operating environment.”
Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis
15 September 2017, Information as a Joint Function

1. Overview

a. This joint publication (JP) guides how the joint force considers and uses
information to support achieving its objectives. This JP identifies the operational
significance of information in achieving commanders’ objectives across the competition
continuum. This publication is the result of a change in mindset based on the joint force’s
recognition that all activities have inherent informational aspects that impact the
operational environment (OE) and can generate effects that may contribute to or hinder
achieving commanders’ objectives. The Department of Defense (DOD), in coordination
with the other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, supports the
informational instrument of national power by using information to impact the way in
which humans and systems behave or function. The joint force leverages information
across the competition continuum to assure, deter, compel, and force relevant actor
behaviors that support US interests.

b. The Armed Forces of the United States are poised to fight and win the Nation’s
wars. Transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional threats require the joint force to
conduct operations across the competition continuum to prevent armed conflict and set the
conditions to prevail during armed conflict. To deter or defeat these threats and achieve
strategic objectives, the joint force commander (JFC) should understand how information
impacts the OE, use information to support human and automated decision making, and
leverage information through offensive and defensive actions to affect behavior. Relevant
actors include individuals, groups, populations, or automated systems whose capabilities
or behaviors can affect the success of a particular campaign, operation, or tactical action.

c. The joint force can win tactical fights during armed conflict but has not always been
able to translate victories into enemy behaviors that lead to intended, enduring, strategic
outcomes. Defeat of an enemy, by whatever mechanism, is usually a psychological
outcome. The enemy is not really defeated until they believe they are defeated. Even in
operations without an enemy or adversary, such as foreign humanitarian assistance,
successful outcomes hinge on the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and other drivers of
behaviors of the affected population.

d. The joint force cannot rely on attrition or its ability to compel behavior through the
use of destructive and disruptive lethal force. To support achieving the commander’s
objectives, the joint force deliberately leverages information through activities that inform

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Chapter I

audiences; influence foreign relevant actors; and attack and exploit information, information
networks, and information systems.

e. JFCs use the seven joint functions (command and control [C2], information,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) in combination
to integrate, synchronize, and execute joint operations. The information joint function
organizes the tasks required for the management and application of information during all
activities and operations. The three tasks of the information joint function stress the
requirement to incorporate information as a foundational element during the planning and
conduct of all operations. Those tasks are:

(1) Understand how information impacts the OE.

(2) Support human and automated decision making.

(3) Leverage information.

2. The Security Environment

a. The security environment is the set of conditions, circumstances, and influences

that affect the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is impacted by
advances in information technology (IT) that enable individuals and organizations to
access, use, and share information across the globe; to interfere, alter, or disrupt the
transmission of information; and to employ and deny information to affect individuals,
groups, and automated systems worldwide. Most competitors and adversaries impose
some level of restrictions on their populations’ access to information or information
sources.

b. A defining feature of the security environment is how competitors, adversaries, and

enemies are using information as they seek to gain relative advantage over the United
States, its allies, and partners and use that advantage to affect behavior and achieve their
objectives. Competitors and adversaries rely on enduring campaigns of influence to
achieve their objectives and operate below the threshold of armed conflict.

c. Individuals and groups can easily and inexpensively wield information to affect
audiences far beyond their physical reach. Technological advances have made IT readily
available to individuals and organizations throughout the world and accelerated the
increase in global human-to-human, human-to-computer, and computer-to-computer
interactions. This has enabled an exponential growth in the amount of information created,
processed, and shared. It is now possible for people and automated systems to access
information and to instantly communicate globally.

d. Information is pervasive and difficult to control. Populations, organizations, and

individuals are capable of sensing, creating, transforming, and disseminating information
globally to spread ideas, allowing them to gain momentum and mobilize others to action,
even if the information is insufficient, inaccurate, or biased. The proliferation of media

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 Fundamentals of Information

platforms tailored to specific points of view impacts the ability of the joint force to
influence relevant actors. This fragmented media environment means that anyone trying
to convey information must compete with others for relevance and credibility. The ability
to reach and influence audiences requires not just access, but an understanding of the
factors that affect how they receive, interpret, and act on information.

e. Today, more individuals, organizations, and even automated systems can observe
joint force activities, interpret them, and share their observations and interpretations about
those activities. These actors use information to affect joint force operations and the joint
force’s use of information. Competitors, ranging from great powers to non-state actors,
use information to avoid or offset the physical overmatch of the United States.

f. State and non-state actors use narratives to shape perceptions and beliefs of
audiences. Narratives express ideologies, policies, and strategies and are used to gain or
deny popular support. Narratives communicate grievances, goals, and justifications for
actions to both internal and external audiences. An effective narrative can induce long-
term effects on an audience’s beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. A struggle or clash between
competing narratives is often referred to as a “battle of the narrative.” See Chapter II,
“Joint Force Uses of Information,” and Chapter IV, “Operational Design and Planning,”
for a discussion of the joint force’s use of narratives. Refer to Appendix A, “Narrative
Development,” for the seven-step process for developing a narrative.

g. Technological advances and the ease with which people and automated systems
can access and use information contribute to today’s threats becoming increasingly
transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional. Transregional threats are capable of
exploiting and using information globally to spur multiple, simultaneous, interconnected
crises or conflicts that span more than one combatant command’s (CCMD’s) area of
responsibility (AOR) or functional area. All-domain threats have access to advanced
capabilities and exploit IT during operations across all of the physical domains and the
information environment (IE) to contest US advantages. Adversaries seek to deter US and
combined forces with the threat of sophisticated antiaccess and area denial capabilities that
would impose significant losses on friendly forces. Threats employ a broad range of forces

USE OF INFORMATION: RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN UKRAINE

Following the admission of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, Russia embarked on a
national and military strategy designed to realize regional and global
ambitions. This strategy prioritized the reestablishment and
maintenance of influence in Russia’s “near abroad” and the protection
of individual Russians living in those areas. The strategy included the
use of “soft power” to exploit the Russian cultural influence and
diaspora across its near abroad and especially in the Baltics, Georgia,
and Ukraine. Since that time, Russia has employed “information
confrontation” to manipulate perceptions and drive behavior with
activities that include control of the flow and content of information and
the use of disinformation, agents of influence, bribery, staged acts, front
organizations, malicious cyberspace activity, and propaganda.

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Chapter I

In November 2013, a wave of civil unrest, dubbed “Euromaidan,” began

in Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or “Independence Square,” in Kyiv. The
protests were in response to Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s
rejection of integration into the European Union in favor of closer ties to
Russia. Popular protests and civil unrest continued for several months
culminating with violence and the ousting of President Yanukovych. A
pro-Western interim government was established, and the situation was
seen as a great loss to Russia’s influence in the region. The resulting
combination of fleeing pro-Russian officials and the establishment of
the interim government in Kyiv created a lapse in governance, providing
Russia the opportunity to invade neighboring Ukraine to take control of
significant territories and populations, similar to what they had done six
years earlier in Georgia.

Russian activities prior and subsequent to the invasion and annexation

of Crimea included:

– Providing overt and covert support to Crimean separatists: separatist

elements carefully cultivated an image as polite protectors of the Crimean
population and encouraged the ethnic Russian majority’s desire for
autonomy. Covert Russian agents fomented unrest, undermined the
Ukrainian government in Crimea, overwhelmed pro-Ukrainian security
forces, and backed local Crimean separatists as they occupied key
government buildings, facilitating the isolation of the Crimean peninsula.

– Manipulating and controlling the flow and content of information: The

Russians removed all non-Russian radio and television stations in Crimea
and cut the underwater communications cable carrying international data
to and from the peninsula. Russia dominated the media with
disinformation, propaganda, and patriotic themes to “legitimize” Crimea’s
call for independence and its eventual annexation. Meanwhile, Russia and
its local supporters blocked, intercepted, and manipulated pro-Ukrainian
media so there was no effective alternative to the Russian ethno-sectarian
narrative.

– Promoting a Russian nationalist narrative in the region and around the

world: Russia intensified its ethno-sectarian narrative while its
propaganda characterized pro-Ukrainian forces as Nazis and NATO as a
threat. In Ukraine, Russia disrupted communications, to include access
to the Internet and other media, inhibiting the Ukrainian response to
separatist operations.

Various Sources
and systems in an integrated manner to conduct operations that challenge the joint force,
most often below the threshold of armed conflict.

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 Fundamentals of Information

3. Information

Information is data in context to which a receiver assigns meaning. Receivers

include human and automated systems and each may acquire information in a variety of
ways (e.g., through spoken or written words, observation, or some other sensing
mechanism). Regardless of how they acquire information, a receiver may not be the
intended recipient of that information.

a. Humans use information to understand, make decisions, and communicate.

Automated systems use information to support decision making, control their own
functions, or control the behavior or functions of other systems. Humans and automated
systems share information to establish a common understanding and to inform, influence,
or direct the behavior of others.

b. By definition, meaning is receiver-centric in that humans and automated systems

assign meaning and relevance to the information they receive. The meaning of information
that leads to understanding, decision making, and communication relies on both the
information itself (data and its context) and factors that influence how a receiver interprets
that information. The premise of receiver-centric meaning is that each individual or
automated system interprets symbols, messages, and actions differently. To increase the
likelihood of a receiver interpreting the information in the way it was intended, the sender
considers the factors that influence how a receiver assigns meaning.

(1) The phrase “inherent informational aspects” refers to the features and details
of a situation or an activity that can be observed. They are used to derive meaning from
that situation or activity. Inherent informational aspects include, but are not limited to,
physical attributes of the capabilities and forces involved; the duration, location, and timing
of the situation or activity; and any other characteristics that convey information to an
observer. Inherent informational aspects, along with the context within which the activity
occurs (i.e., the background, setting, or surroundings), are processed through an
individual’s worldview to make sense of what is happening. In automated systems,
programming and algorithms take the place of worldview. Inherent informational aspects
are similar to nonverbal communication; they are the “body language” of activities (see
Figure I-1).

The meaning derived by a receiver may be different from what was

intended by a sender. For example, transiting US Navy ships or an
amphibious ready group near a coast to demonstrate freedom of
navigation (intended meaning) might be interpreted by a foreign
government (the receiver) as an indication of an impending invasion (the
assigned meaning).

(2) How an observer interprets information to make sense of a situation or

activity is influenced by a multitude of factors.

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Chapter I

Examples of Inherent Informational Aspects

Duration:
The time period during which an activity or situation lasts.
Example: Whether an exercise takes place for one day or two weeks. Whether
a ship is visible from shore for an hour or for multiple days.
Location:
A position or site in which the activity or situation takes place usually marked
by a distinguishing feature.
Example: Whether the situation or activity takes place at a strategic choke
point. Whether the situation or activity takes place at or near a religious or
culturally significant site.
Timing:
The precise moment or the range of time(s) in which the activity or situation
takes place.
Example: Whether a bomber flyover occurred on a significant holiday. Whether
raids are conducted during the day or at night.
Platform:
The equipment or capability used during an activity or situation.
Example: Whether a hospital ship or an aircraft carrier is used during a relief
mission. Whether US forces are patrolling unilaterally or in conjunction with
host nation or multinational partners.
Size:
The physical magnitude, extent, or bulk; relative or proportionate dimensions
of the force being presented.

Example: Whether the military presence consists of a seven person 

detachment or an infantry company of over 100 people.
Posture:
The state or condition at a given time in particular circumstance; the position or
bearing of the force.
Example: Whether or not members of a patrol are wearing individual body
armor. Whether flight operations at a base are routine or are modified in
response to a change in threat level.

Figure I-1. Examples of Inherent Informational Aspects

(a) Human Factors. A range of complex factors combine to affect how

individuals and groups interpret information and make decisions. We refer to these factors
as drivers of human behavior because, ultimately, they affect how humans act on
information. Attitudes, culture, narratives, and perceptions are detailed here, but any
combination of the items summarized in Figure I-2 can drive human behavior.

1. Attitudes. How humans feel about information impacts how they

interpret and remember information. Humans pay greater attention to messages that are

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 Fundamentals of Information

Examples of Drivers of Human Behavior

 Attitude is a positive or negative evaluation of a thing based on thoughts,
behavior, and social context.
 Cognition is the mental process such as thinking, retrieving stored
information, and processing of the information. It is the process by which
knowledge and understanding is developed in the mind.
 Culture is the customs, arts, social institutions, and achievements of a
particular nation, people, or other social group.
 Desire is a strong feeling of wanting to have something or wishing for
something to happen, and may be derived from factors such as affiliation,
self-esteem, safety, security, freedom, or power.
 Emotion is an internal, conscious mental reaction subjectively experienced
and often manifested in physiological reactions and behavior. Emotional
appeals are highly effective because they bypass logic and critical thinking.
 Instinct is an innate, typically fixed, pattern of behavior derived from events
such as will to live, procreation, and pleasure.
 Language enables a population/group to interpret or make sense of data
and information. Awareness of the attributes of a culture's language can
provide insight to a cultures norms, attitudes, and beliefs.
 Memory is the store of things learned and retained from activities and
experiences. False and inaccurate memories have been shown to affect
behavior just as much as accurate ones.
 Narrative is a way of presenting or understanding a situation or series of
events that reflects and promotes a particular point of view or set of values.
 Perception is the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory
information influenced by factors such as experiences, information,
education, faith, values, and biases.

Figure I-2. Examples of Drivers of Human Behavior

consistent with their attitudes and beliefs and tend to discount messages that are
inconsistent with existing beliefs unless the message is extremely compelling. This
cognitive bias causes humans to interpret information so it is consistent with their attitudes
and beliefs. Since people tend to remember information that is important to them, this bias
impacts how they interpret that information later. This can be helpful as a mental shortcut
when trying to make a decision or judgment with a limited amount of information, but can
also lead to wrong conclusions if individuals have consumed targeted misinformation and
propaganda.

2. Culture. Culture significantly influences how humans interpret

information, make decisions, and behave. Culture incorporates knowledge, experience,
beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, social hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles,
(including gender and age-related roles), and spatial relationships. Sociocultural analysis
requires subject matter expertise on the culture and how that culture influences behavior.

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Chapter I

3. Narratives. Humans use stories and anecdotal evidence to help them

derive meaning from their environment and experiences. Humans combine stories into
narratives that they use to describe their version of the past and vision of the future and
communicate that vision to others. A narrative can connect seemingly unrelated events
and provides an overarching concept that influences thought, meaning, and decision
making. Narratives evolve over time. A good narrative will use a range of stories that
illustrate, animate, and validate its message. A good narrative will give meaning to a
broader vision of how the world should and could be and why an audience should move in
the direction of that vision. Humans perceive narratives as credible if they build on their
understanding of the world and their social environment to connect new information to the
information they already have. Effectively using narratives can shape behaviors and even
transform culture. See Chapter II, “Joint Force Uses of Information,” and Chapter IV,
“Operational Design and Planning,” for a discussion of the joint force’s use of narratives.

4. Perceptions. Humans derive meaning based upon their perception of

the credibility of information and its source. Perceptions rely on reasoning and emotional
appeal. Information that elicits an emotional response or confirms a personal bias grabs an
observer’s attention and is often perceived as more credible.

(b) Automated Systems. Automated systems are a combination of software

and hardware designed and programmed to work automatically without the need for a
human operator. Automated systems assign meaning to information in ways that are less
complex than those of humans. Humans use information that has been processed by
automated systems to support decision making, to establish understanding between each
other, and to inform, influence, or otherwise direct the behavior of others. Humans also
use automated systems, such as computer algorithms, to control the information an
individual or group receives as a means to inform, influence, or direct behavior. Because
they are not influenced by emotion or perception, these systems can quickly sort through
volumes of information, which would overload human decision makers, and provide a
concise analysis or take an action.

c. The receiver determines the relevance and value of information. Information

is relevant and valuable when it contributes to understanding the environment, making
decisions, performing assessments, or communicating. Information has the most relevance
when the receiver perceives it as accurate and timely, and leads to an increase in
understanding and a decrease in uncertainty.

d. Information can affect behavior. Understanding the factors that drive behaviors
is essential to the effective use of information. One can use information to affect drivers
of behavior for automated systems by changing the algorithms, programs, and data that
control the system’s behavior (e.g., computer virus) or by sending information to the
system’s sensors to produce a predictable output (e.g., jamming a radar). Information can
also affect human behavior. This is frequently more complicated because the drivers of
behavior do not work in isolation—affecting any one driver can affect other drivers. For
example, eliciting strong emotions through an inflammatory headline will affect whether

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 Fundamentals of Information

or not an individual will read the article, but it will also affect how that individual perceives
the information contained within the article, regardless of whether it was read.
JOINT FORCE TRANSITION FROM INFORMATION OPERATIONS
TO OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The establishment of the information joint function and the development

of this joint publication (JP) on information in joint operations is driving
changes across joint and Service DOTMLPF-P [doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and
policy]. One significant doctrinal change is the transition from joint
information operations (IO) to operations in the information environment
(OIE). This transition is a substantial force development challenge
requiring the joint force to evaluate how to organize forces and staffs to
deliberately plan and execute OIE.

This publication cancels JP 3-13, Information Operations. Joint IO, as

defined and practiced, had shortcomings that inhibited it from
contributing to the commander’s application of informational power. As
defined, IO focused on the integration of information-related capabilities
(IRCs) to affect the decision making of adversaries and potential
adversaries, and effectively ignored other relevant actors that shape the
strategic and operational environments. IO planning concentrated on
the employment of those IRCs in support of broader joint force
operations, ignoring planning for the inherent informational aspects of
all activities.

This publication describes how the joint force applies informational

power across the competition continuum. That application of
informational power includes both the deliberate leveraging of the
inherent informational aspects of activities as an imperative for all joint
force operations, and the conduct of OIE. OIE are military actions
involving the integrated employment of multiple information forces to
affect drivers of behavior by: informing audiences; influencing foreign
relevant actors; attacking and exploiting relevant actor information,
information networks, and information systems. As such, OIE are
distinct from, but complementary to, the joint forces’ deliberate
leveraging of the inherent informational aspects of military activities
during all operations.

OIE calls for formations with the capabilities (i.e., the authorities and
tools, as well as subject matter experts possessing in-depth skills,
knowledge, and abilities to employ those tools) required to carry out
actions that leverage information to affect behavior. Building and
resourcing organizations with subject matter experts and tools is part of
the joint and Service force development challenge. The joint force and
the Services’ force development proponents will need to evaluate
options to create these organizations and efficiently and effectively
ensure that they are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct OIE.

Various Sources

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Chapter I

Intentionally Blank

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 CHAPTER II
JOINT FORCE USES OF INFORMATION

“[The] DOD [Department of Defense] must evolve from a primary focus on

executing its preferred method of warfare to one that incorporates information
as a foundational element of plans and operations.”
Dr. Mark T. Esper
Secretary of Defense
Written Response to Secretary of Defense Senate Confirmation Hearing
July 2019

1. Military Operations and Information

Information is a resource of the informational instrument of national power at the

strategic level. Information is also a critical military resource. The joint force uses
information to perform many simultaneous and integrated activities. The joint force uses
information to improve understanding, decision making, and communication.
Commanders use information to visualize and understand the OE and direct and coordinate
actions. The joint force leverages information to affect the perceptions, attitudes, decision
making, and behavior of relevant actors. The joint force employment of information is of
central importance because it may provide an operational advantage.

2. The Operational Environment and the Information Environment

a. An OE is the aggregated conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the

employment of forces and bear on the decisions of a commander. Each commander’s OE
is different from every other commander’s OE.

(1) Within the OE there exist factors that affect how humans and automated
systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information. We refer to the
aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors as
the IE.

(2) The IE is not distinct from any OE. It is an intellectual framework to help
identify, understand, and describe how those often-intangible factors may affect the
employment of forces and bear on the decisions of the commander.

b. The joint force plans and conducts activities and operations that have inherent
informational aspects that will impact the factors that make up the IE. The joint force must
account for those informational aspects so that joint force activities and operations affect
the OE in a way that supports the JFC’s objectives. Additionally, to ensure unity of effort
among different commands, each JFC must consider and communicate how the
informational aspects of their planned activities and operations may impact the factors that
make up the IE to affect other OEs.

II-1
Chapter II

3. Information Advantage

Information advantage is the operational advantage gained through the joint force’s
use of information for decision making and its ability to leverage information to create
effects on the IE. Commanders achieve this advantage in several ways: identifying threats,
vulnerabilities, and opportunities along with understanding how to affect relevant actor
behavior; obtaining timely, accurate, and relevant information with an ascribed level of
confidence or certainty for decision making and the impact of decision making;
influencing, disrupting, or degrading the opponent’s decision making; protecting the joint
force’s morale and will; and degrading the morale and will of adversaries. The joint force
exploits these advantages through the conduct of operations. For example, disabling an
opponent’s space-based assets might provide the joint force with the operational advantage
of being able to communicate securely over long distances without interruption and of
being able to move without being detected. The joint force could then exploit that
advantage through an operation to destroy an enemy ground force. Likewise, gaining and
maintaining sufficient goodwill among a local population provides the operational
advantage of joint forces being able to move more freely in the vicinity of the populace
without the locals alerting insurgents to friendly force activities. The joint force could
exploit that advantage by conducting operations to capture insurgents hiding in or near
civilian populations and by conducting operations that facilitate the host nation (HN)
delivery of services to the population.

4. Informational Power

a. Informational power is the ability to use information to support achievement of

objectives and gain an informational advantage. The essence of informational power is the
ability to exert one’s will through the projection, exploitation, denial, and preservation of
information in pursuit of objectives. The joint force cannot achieve all of its strategic
objectives by relying solely on attrition to coerce change in the behavior of an enemy or
adversary. The joint force leverages the power of information as a means to support
achievement of its objectives.

b. The joint force applies informational power in two ways. First, the entire joint
force plans and conducts all operations, activities, and investments to deliberately leverage
their inherent informational aspects. Second, specially trained and equipped units conduct
operations in the information environment (OIE). Leveraging the inherent informational
aspects of activities in combination with OIE maximizes the effectiveness of all joint force
activities.

c. The joint force can leverage the power of information to effectively expand the
commander’s range of options. The joint force applies informational power:

(1) To operate in situations where the use of destructive or disruptive

physical force is not authorized or is not an appropriate course of action (COA). The
majority of joint force operations support campaigns and do not involve armed conflict.
Leveraging information through operations that do not use destructive or disruptive force

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 Joint Force Uses of Information

may be the only viable option to achieve the JFC’s intent and objectives. Conducting
noncombat operations and activities to communicate the purpose of joint operations,
reinforced by information activities, may be the most effective way for the JFC to develop
local and regional situational awareness, build networks and relationships with partners,
shape the OE, keep tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed
conflict, and maintain, enhance, and expand US global influence.

(2) To degrade, disrupt, and destroy the C2 ability of an adversary or enemy.

The joint force interferes with an adversary or enemy’s ability to execute the decision cycle
thus degrading their ability to make appropriate command decisions. This includes
targeting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and C2 systems to interfere
with an enemy’s ability to understand joint force operations and effectively control their
forces.

(3) To prevent, counter, and mitigate the effects of external actors’ actions
on friendly capabilities and activities. The joint force also uses information for defensive
purposes. This includes denying an adversary or enemy access to friendly critical
information that would allow them to impede joint force C2, understanding of the OE,
movement and maneuver, and sustainment.

(4) To create and enhance the psychological effects of destructive or

disruptive physical force. The use of destructive or disruptive force creates psychological
effects. Executing actions specifically to create desired psychological effects can elicit
profound changes in behavior. Amplifying or manipulating certain features and details of
these activities to emphasize the psychological effects of destructive or disruptive force
can be a more effective way of achieving joint force objectives than relying on physical
force alone to destroy or disrupt enemy capabilities.

(5) To create psychological effects without destructive or disruptive force.

The joint force conducts information activities to influence foreign relevant actors, in
conjunction with other efforts (e.g., show of force, foreign military sales). In some of these
activities, information is the main effort, supported by maneuver elements and the implicit
threat of force.

(6) To confuse, manipulate, or deceive an adversary or enemy to create an

advantage or degrade the adversary or enemy’s existing advantage. By leveraging
information to confuse, manipulate, or deceive an adversary, the joint force has the
potential to deter threats or induce actions favorable to the JFC. By doing so, the joint
force may mislead adversary commanders as to the strength, readiness, locations, and
intended missions of friendly forces, causing them to misallocate or waste combat power.

(7) To prevent, avoid, or mitigate any undesired psychological effects of

operations. This is particularly true in cases where civilians may be affected by armed
conflict. This includes the potential consequences of physical harm, as well as the
destruction of homes and key infrastructure. The joint force takes feasible precautions to
protect civilians from harm and addresses civilian casualty incidents if they occur. These

II-3
Chapter II

efforts include disseminating information to remove civilians from areas of risk, preparing
deliberate public communication efforts to minimize reaction to the occurrence of any
civilian casualties due to joint force operations, and providing releasable information on
actions taken to minimize harm to civilians. More broadly, communication with the
civilian population can allay their concerns during periods of increased tension or counter
adversary efforts to stoke civil unrest.

INTERMEDIATE FORCE CAPABILITIES

Civilian casualties adversely impact mission accomplishment. After

United States Central Command developed formal nonlethal weapons
training requirements, there was a 50 percent reduction in civilian
casualties between 2011 and 2014. Continued emphasis of United
States' use of intermediate force capabilities to reduce civilian
casualties demonstrates United States commitment to protection of
civilian life and property.

Various Sources

Current and future nonlethal weapons, devices, and munitions will

provide the “intermediate force” that can fill the gap between mere
presence and lethal effects. Nonlethal weapons are, therefore, more
accurately and appropriately characterized as “intermediate force
capabilities.” Intermediate force capabilities provide options in
situations where individuals may appear to be demonstrating hostile
intent, but, in reality, their intentions are innocent rather than true hostile
intent. Intermediate force capabilities, when employed in those
circumstances, may provide time to better assess intent. They can be
appropriate, proportional responses to acts that present hostile intent,
but fall short of acts or behaviors justifying the use of deadly force. In
comparison to lethal weapons, intermediate force capabilities may
reduce claims of excessive force, and might be a better option in tactical
situations with significant operational, political, or moral equities.
Modern intermediate force capabilities are useful beyond law
enforcement, security missions, and crowd control. While campaigning
through the competition continuum, intermediate force capabilities can
address threats with proportional force, and potentially minimize civilian
casualties.

US Department of Defense Nonlethal Weapons Program, Executive

Agent's Planning Guidance 2020, Intermediate Force Capabilities:
Bridging the Gap Between Presence and Lethality

(8) To communicate and reinforce the intent of joint force operations,

regardless of whether those activities are constructive or destructive. The JFC cannot
assume audiences intuitively understand the intent of joint force operations and activities
and behave in ways that support the JFC’s objectives. Even when the joint force is engaged
in constructive activities, audiences may misinterpret the JFC’s intent. Planning activities
to leverage information based upon an understanding of the intended and likely audiences

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 Joint Force Uses of Information

will reduce the chance of misinterpretation. In some cases, competitors, adversaries, or

enemies will attempt to use disinformation about the intent of joint force activities to
undermine joint force credibility and freedom of action, or even take credit for the positive
outcome of US activities. Planning and conducting joint activities and operations in ways
that communicate the intent, supported by OIE, promotes understanding of the mission,
enables initiative, and counters disinformation.

(9) To prepare and support resilience in partner nations’ populations. The

imminent or perceived imminent threat of force can be as psychologically damaging as the
use of force. Many PNs execute programs to instill and ensure resiliency in their
populations to guard against the psychological effects of potential physical force as well as
to guard against attempted influence by adversary informational activities.

5. Relevant Actors

Advantages are usually thought of in relation to an opponent. However, the joint force
also recognizes that friendly and neutral actors also have the potential to positively or
negatively impact the friendly mission. By understanding the importance of all the relevant
actors and the relationships between them, the JFC develops operation plans (OPLANs)
that effectively leverage information to support achievement of objectives. Those relevant
actors that the joint force intends to affect then become audiences for inform tasks, target
audiences (TAs) for influence tasks, or targets for joint fires or other action.

a. Relevant actors include individuals, groups, populations, or automated systems

whose capabilities or behaviors have the potential to affect the success of a particular
campaign, operation, or tactical action. The nature of information and how it impacts the
OE will change how relevant an actor may or may not be to the success of joint force
activities. Military operations have inherent informational aspects that can negatively or
positively impact an actor and, ultimately, change how relevant they are to the joint force.

b. Automated systems are the sets of software and hardware that allow computer
systems, network devices, or machines to function without human intervention. These
automated systems detect and react to sensory inputs to make sense of their environment,
act upon that sense making based upon programming or experience and receive feedback.
These systems can be platform-based (e.g., satellite, robot) or may reside and act entirely
in cyberspace (e.g., bots, malicious code). Depending upon purpose and required actions,
these systems may have a varying degree of autonomy. Examples include, but are not
limited to, autonomous vehicles, integrated air defense systems (IADSs) programmed to
operate without constant human intervention, and some cyberspace capabilities.

6. Joint Force Use of Narrative

a. Narratives are an integral part of campaigns, operations, and missions. When two
or more organizations’ narratives are received by an actor, the narratives can be perceived
as either competing or complementing. Competing and parallel narratives exist and are
used by a broad range of actors (e.g., partners, allies, competitors, adversaries, enemies) to

II-5
Chapter II

gain support for their efforts. The joint force strives to provide a compelling narrative that
is integrated into OPLANs and resonates with relevant actors by fitting their frame of
reference. An effective and integrated narrative can mitigate, undermine, or otherwise
render competing narratives ineffective if it is accompanied by complementary actions.

b. The joint force uses narrative as part of campaigning to support understanding the
purpose of military operations, link military activities with the activities of other USG
departments and agencies, and reflect policy objectives. It provides an overarching
expression of strategy and context to a military campaign, operation, or situation. A narrative
provides internal and external audiences with the intended meaning of joint force operations,
actions, activities, and investments. An effective narrative affects perceptions and attitudes to
complement or compete with other narratives. While the joint force conducts all operations
to achieve objectives, the narrative explains why the joint force is carrying out operations so
the actions are planned and conducted in a way that complements the narrative and avoids a
“say-do gap.” Planning joint force missions to align with the narrative helps the joint force
increase the probability that relevant actors will derive the intended meaning from joint force
operations. The commander’s intent should include a brief statement of the narrative for the
operation. It is important to understand that a narrative is not a “fire and forget” document.
Once a narrative is introduced it will most likely have to be further explained and defended
based on audience reaction.

c. Synchronization between multiple JFCs contributes to a persistent and global narrative

alignment. Informed joint force mission planning reinforces the narrative and increases the
probability that relevant actors derive the intended meaning from joint force operations.

7. The Information Joint Function

The information joint function encompasses the management and application of

information to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior and
to support human and automated decision making. The information joint function is the
intellectual organization of the tasks required to use information during all operations—
understand how information impacts the OE, support human and automated decision
making, and leverage information (see Figure II-1). JFCs and their staff perform these
tasks during all operations to accomplish their respective missions.

a. Understand how information impacts the OE. This task helps the joint force
identify threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the IE. It provides a foundation for,
and supports the continued refinement of, joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment (JIPOE) products to improve the commander’s decision making during
planning, execution, and assessment of operations. There are three steps to understanding
how information impacts the OE: analyzing of the informational, physical, and human
aspects of the environment; identifying and describing relevant actors; and determining the
most likely behaviors of relevant actors. These steps are continuous and iterative because
the OE is always changing. Planners use the JIPOE products and inputs from other subject
matter experts (SMEs) to understand the interrelationships between the informational,

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 Joint Force Uses of Information

Tasks and Outcomes of the Information Joint Function

The information joint function provides the intellectual organization

required to use information during all operations
to create advantage in and through the information environment.

Tasks
Understand how Support human and
information impacts the automated decision Leverage information.
operational environment. making.

Subtasks
Analyze informational, physical, Facilitate shared understanding Inform domestic and
and human aspects of the across the joint force. international audiences.
environment.
Protect friendly information, Influence foreign relevant actors.
Identify and describe relevant information networks, and
actors. information systems. Attack and exploit relevant actor
information, information
Determine likely behaviors of Protect joint force morale and will. networks, and information
relevant actors. systems.

Outcomes
Joint force identifies threats, The JFC has accurate and The joint force is able to affect the
vulnerabilities, and opportunities timely information available on drivers of relevant actor behavior
in the information environment. which to base decisions and is and, ultimately, the behavior of
able to communicate those those relevant actors in support of
The joint force commander (JFC) decisions for action. the JFC’s objectives and enduring
has a better understanding of outcomes.
which drivers of relevant actor Joint force is able to maintain its
behavior to affect and how to morale and will against malign Joint force operations and
affect them to achieve objectives. influence. activities are perceived as
legitimate and justified by
domestic and international
audiences.

Figure II-1. Tasks and Outcomes of the Information Joint Function

physical, and human aspects within the context of operational objectives. This task
requires fusion of multi-source data from across, and external to, the joint force to achieve
and maintain an understanding of how information impacts the OE. Sources of internally
produced data for this task include inputs from intelligence, public affairs (PA), civil affairs
(CA), cyberspace forces, psychological operations units, and C2 systems. Sources of
information external to the joint force include USG departments and agencies, businesses,
and academic communities, as well as foreign governments, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and various traditional and nontraditional media
sources. This task also relies on language, regional, and cultural expertise to help avoid
mirror-imaging and other forms of bias.

For specific planning guidance and procedures regarding language and regional
expertise, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01,
Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, Planning,
and Sourcing.

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(1) Analysis of the informational, physical, and human aspects of the

environment. Understanding how information impacts the environment and identifying
how it can be used to affect behavior requires analysis of the increasingly complex and
dynamic relationship of the informational, physical, and human aspects of an environment.
A systems approach, such as political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure (PMESII), that focuses on the interactive nature and interdependence of each
of the aspects to characterize an environment, has been found to be a best practice.
Analysis using the three aspects does not separate elements of the environment into “bins”
for individual analysis. Instead, this systems approach is a way of describing the different
characteristics of objects, activities, or relevant actors; their informational, physical, and
human aspects, and the context in which they exist. These results are included in the
information staff estimate (see Appendix B, “Information Staff Estimate Format”) and help
identify the relevant actors the joint force needs to affect, how to use information to
effectively impact those relevant actors, and what friendly information the joint force needs
to protect. The running estimate integrates intelligence and other information that
characterizes the informational, physical, and human aspects of the environment against
the established baseline to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities.

(a) Informational aspects reflect the way that individuals, information

systems, and groups communicate and exchange information. Informational aspects are
the sensory inputs (e.g., content, medium, format, and context) of activities that a receiver
interprets and uses to assign meaning. The content of communication can be verbal and
nonverbal. If nonverbal cues do not align with the verbal message, ambiguity is introduced
and uncertainty is increased. Medium refers to the system used to communicate (e.g.,
radio, television, print, Internet, telephone, fax, and billboard). The details of the medium
can be described in as little or much detail as necessary. Format is how the information is
encoded, such as what language is used, style of delivery (e.g., poetry, songs, imagery),
tone, and volume. Context refers to the environment in which the communication happens
(e.g., face-to-face, over the phone). Format and context can affect the content of a
communication. For example, a text message may contain different content than the same
communication delivered face-to-face. Actions are a form of nonverbal communication
that have inherent informational aspects and are generally more impactful.

(b) Physical aspects are the material characteristics, both natural and
manufactured, of the environment that may inhibit or enhance communication. Physical
aspects may create constraints and freedoms on the people and information systems that
operate in it. Physical aspects are critical elements of group identity and impact how groups
form, behave, or might be disrupted or cease to exist. For example, groups may be formed
by the people inhabiting an island or an isolated jungle habitat. Similarly, a community
might be disrupted by the building of a highway that divides a neighborhood and causes
the creation of new, separate, and distinct communities. How information is exchanged is
where the interplay between the informational and physical aspects is most apparent. As
an example of this interplay, an isolated community without access to modern
communications technology will likely have a stronger group identity and be more likely
to communicate face-to-face compared to residents of a large modern city.

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(c) Human aspects are the interactions among and between people and the
environment that shape human behavior and decision making. Those interactions are based
upon the linguistic, social, cultural, psychological, and physical elements. Human aspects
influence how people perceive, process, and act upon information by impacting how the
human mind applies meaning to the information it has received. Individuals have distinct
patterns of analyzing a situation, exercising judgment, and applying reasoning skills
impacted by their beliefs and perceptions. Character and tradition are aspects that suggest
how humans perceive a situation and how they might behave under particular
circumstances in the future. For example, individual and group identity is often closely
related to a geographical area, which can impact how individuals and groups in that region
relate to one another and communicate along with the forms that communication may take.
Describing these inextricably linked aspects will provide insight into relevant actors’
worldviews that frame the perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive behaviors.

(2) Identify and Describe Relevant Actors

(a) The analysis of informational, physical, and human aspects of the OE

provides the context needed to understand how individuals, groups, populations, and
automated systems operate and makes it possible for the joint force to identify who or what
is a relevant actor based upon the joint force mission and objectives. The staff conducts
this analysis as part of the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2)-led JIPOE process.
Equipped with a thorough understanding of its objectives and the general context of the
OE, the joint force undertakes deliberate steps to determine the environment in which the
relevant actor exists. These efforts include the conduct of intelligence operations and
communications with partners to improve knowledge of friendly, neutral, and threat actors
and their social, cultural, political, economic, informational, cyberspace, and
organizational networks. Intelligence’s JIPOE and target systems analysis, psychological
operations unit’s target audience analysis (TAA), North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Strategic Communications Division’s IE assessment, and CA’s area studies and
area assessments are analytical products and processes that can help identify and describe
relevant actors. Other analysis products may be available from interagency and
multinational partners (see Chapter III, “Unity of Effort”).

(b) In determining who or what is a relevant actor, the joint force considers
the particular function and role of systems, individuals, groups, networks, and populations,
while attempting to discern the affiliations and connections among them. Insight into
institutions and their processes is often needed to comprehend the roles and relationships
among actors. This includes a description of how relevant actors receive information and
the factors that will impact the processing and interpretation of that information. The joint
force should recognize that mission partners may be relevant actors that need to be
understood to ensure unity of effort.

(c) Identifying relevant actors goes beyond just listing entities of the friendly
and enemy order of battle. It also includes a range of nonmilitary actors in the environment
(e.g., local authorities, civilian supervisory control and data acquisition systems, religious

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leaders, community figures). Some potential relevant actors may exist far outside the
geographic boundaries of an operation.

(d) This is an iterative process where the staff continuously reassesses the
relevance of actors and prioritizes them in regard to the commander’s objectives and
approach to mission accomplishment. The analysis and description of relevant actors will
differ based upon whether the relevant actors are human or automated systems.

(e) When considering relevant actors who are human, gaining an

understanding includes multiple inputs from across the staff and from attached units.

1. Describe the relevant actors. Commanders and their staffs describe

the individuals, groups, or populations who can aid or hinder success of their missions. As
mentioned, some of these may exist outside of the JFC’s operational area.

2. Describe what effects the informational, physical, and human aspects

of the environment have on each relevant actor; how the actor affects other actors; and the
influences the actor has on the environment. This includes identifying what drives joint
force and other relevant actor behavior, what narratives are used for their worldview and
decision-making processes, and how relevant actors would interpret friendly activities.
The JFC needs to understand how the joint force and other relevant actors use information
to communicate, so this description should encompass a discussion of each relevant actors’
means, context, and patterns of communication.

(f) When considering automated systems, understanding consists of the

following two activities:

1. Describe automated systems. Commanders and their staffs should

remain aware that as automated systems become more sophisticated, their behaviors will
have greater impact on joint force campaigns, operations, or tactical actions. Automated
systems vary based on their degree of autonomy, intelligence, and sophistication.
Additionally, their pervasiveness makes it difficult to identify their presence and relevance.
Adopting a systems approach as used in JIPOE will help identify automated systems’
relevance. Additionally, just as not all human relevant actors are adversaries or enemies
of the joint force, or even military in nature, some relevant automated systems will reside
outside of the control of adversaries, enemies, and militaries. Understanding automated-
systems includes analysis that determines and describes the programming and logic that
lead to automated-system decision making and behavior.

2. Describe what effects informational and physical aspects of the

environment have on each automated system that is a relevant actor. This includes
describing the drivers of behavior and decision-making processes of the automated systems
in question. This involves identifying the programming that allows the systems to detect,
react to, and learn from the sensory inputs in their environment; act upon that detection
based upon programming and experience; and adjust their sensing and actions based upon
feedback received. This also involves determining the means, context, and patterns of

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automated system communications and how automated systems receive input and
communicate decisions and actions, thereby providing the JFC with an understanding of
the range of potential behaviors.

(g) As part of JIPOE, network engagement and its associated analyses helps
the JFC to identify and understand relevant actors and their associated links with others
within a network.

For more information on network engagement, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat
Networks.

(3) Identify Likely Behavior of Relevant Actors

(a) This final step builds upon the previous steps to develop a detailed
understanding of the range of available behavior options and assess which of those
behaviors are most likely to have the greatest impact on the joint force. This is similar to
traditional military planning where commanders and their staffs evaluate an enemy’s most
likely and dangerous COAs.

(b) Identifying the likely behavior of relevant actors also helps the JFC and
staff determine which relevant actor COAs in a given time and space will be advantageous
or disadvantageous to friendly operations. This leads to the joint force being able to plan
for activities that affect the drivers of behavior in support of achieving objectives.

(c) Efforts to anticipate relevant actor reactions and decisions based upon
joint force or other actions will be imperfect. Information will frequently be incomplete,
imprecise, or flawed. Nevertheless, joint forces make use of the best information available.
Once the range of potential behaviors has been determined, the joint force is better able to
select appropriate methods to affect future behavior, while considering intended and
potential unintended effects. These predictions become inputs to identify initial collection
requirements. Once collected and analyzed, the analysis will reveal which COA the
relevant actor has adopted.

b. Support human and automated decision making. This task includes facilitating
shared understanding across the joint force; protecting friendly information, information
networks, and information systems; and protecting joint force morale and will. These
activities help ensure the availability of timely, accurate, and relevant information
necessary for joint force decision making.

(1) Facilitate Shared Understanding. This task of the information joint

function is related to building shared understanding in the C2 joint function and includes
collaboration, knowledge management (KM) and information management (IM), and
information and intelligence sharing. Although these are typically staff and organizational
tasks conducted during daily operations, they are more critical and challenging in today’s
security environment given the exponential growth in the volume of information the joint
force needs to analyze and share. This task requires automated tools that manage and

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organize large quantities of disparate, structured, and unstructured data required for
decision making. These tools, combined with people and processes, ensure the effective
and timely transfer of knowledge to provide an operational advantage to commanders and
other decision makers.

(a) Collaboration. Collaboration includes activities such as sharing data

across the joint force in real time; building situational awareness views; conducting
collaborative planning and decision making; execution, coordination, and deconfliction of
missions in near real time; and enabling IE visualization. That collaborative environment
is enabled by communications systems and applications that improve long-distance,
asynchronous collaboration among dispersed forces to enhance planning, execution, and
assessment of joint operations. These systems and applications improve efficiency and
common understanding during periods of routine interaction among participants and
enhance effectiveness during time-compressed operations. Collaboration also requires
information and intelligence sharing. Commanders at all levels should determine and
provide guidance on what information and intelligence needs to be shared with whom and
when. Standard operating procedures should include sharing information to the maximum
extent allowed by US law and DOD policy.

(b) KM and IM. KM and IM facilitate understanding and decision making.

KM is a discipline that integrates people and processes throughout the information lifecycle
to create shared understanding, increase organizational performance, and improve decision
making. KM identifies and fills knowledge gaps, minimizes or eliminates stovepipes,
captures knowledge and transfers it to those who need to know, helps synchronize a battle
rhythm, and cultivates a culture of sharing across multiple staff organizations. IM is the
function of managing an organization’s information resources for the handling of data and
information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations in
a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that data or a right to that
information. IM provides a structure that supports and enables KM. Effective IM
contributes to the KM tasks of knowledge creation and supports shared understanding for
all unit members. Depending upon the size and mission of the command, the JFC may be
supported in their information and KM responsibilities by various staff officers, including
chief knowledge and information officers and supporting knowledge and IM officers.
See JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters, for additional information on KM and IM.

(c) Information and Intelligence Sharing. Sharing of information and

intelligence with relevant USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, security
forces, interorganizational participants, NGOs, and partner organizations in the private
sector promotes interoperability and facilitates collaboration. The joint force shares
information to the maximum extent necessary and allowed by US law and DOD policy
(e.g., foreign disclosure law and policy). The public affairs officer (PAO), in coordination
with the foreign disclosure officer, clears information for public release. While every
country has its own sharing caveats, the United States often has additional responsibilities
when leading an alliance or coalition. Risk to mission and risk to force related to sharing
of information and intelligence is a consideration from the start of operational design in

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planning through execution. This includes consideration of the risk of not sharing
information and intelligence.

(2) Protect Friendly Information, Information Networks, and Information

Systems. This task helps ensure joint force C2 by protecting information and the systems
and networks on which it resides from loss, manipulation, or compromise. Protection tasks
are conducted during daily activities and are implied, if not specified, tasks for all units
during all operations.

(a) Protect Information. The protection of information includes passive

and active measures to preserve information and prevent or mitigate competitor, adversary,
and enemy collection, manipulation, and destruction of friendly information, to include
attempts to undermine the trustworthiness of friendly information. Threats may attempt to
manipulate or destroy friendly information to undermine the joint force’s understanding,
decision making, morale, and will. Activities that contribute to protecting information
include intelligence, operations security (OPSEC), military deception (MILDEC), PA, IM,
signature management, counterintelligence, cyberspace security procedures, and
vulnerability assessments. Two categories of information relevant to joint operations are:

1. Classified information. Classified information is official

information that has been determined to require, in the interests of national security,
protection against unauthorized disclosure, and which has been so designated. Department
of Defense Manual (DODM) 5200.01, DOD Information Security Program, identifies the
procedures for classifying, marking, downgrading, declassifying, and safeguarding
classified information.

2. Critical information. Critical information is specific facts about

friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities sought by adversaries and enemies to plan
and act so as to thwart friendly mission accomplishment. Critical information may be
unclassified information. For example, informational aspects can become signatures that
divulge critical information by revealing intent or planned action. Department of Defense
Directive (DODD) 5205.02E, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program, directs
personnel to maintain the essential secrecy of information that is useful to adversaries and
potential adversaries to plan, prepare, and conduct military and other operations against the
United States. This includes safeguarding critical information from unauthorized access
and disclosure.

(b) Protect Information Networks and Information Systems.

Adversaries and enemies threaten joint forces through any vulnerability, to include joint
force and partner networks, wireless apertures associated with weapons and C2 systems,
and other processors and controllers. Through the cyberspace operations (CO) missions of
Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations and defensive
cyberspace operations (DCO), cyberspace forces protect the DODIN and, when ordered,
other friendly cyberspace capabilities from threats in cyberspace. This activity includes
securing the DODIN from known vulnerabilities, educating DODIN users to recognize and
thwart malicious cyberspace activity, implementing DOD cybersecurity policy, hunting for

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known or suspected threats in blue cyberspace, and engaging threats forward in gray and
red cyberspace. These CO are informed by up-to-date knowledge about vulnerabilities in
DODIN software and hardware, intelligence about malicious cyberspace activity, and
counterintelligence analysis. Protecting the integrity and availability of friendly
information helps support decision making.

For additional information on CO, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations, and JP
6-0, Joint Communications System.

(3) Build, Protect, and Sustain Joint Force Morale and Will. Activities to
build joint force morale and will reinforce the baseline strengths the Services have
developed in their members to create a cohesive joint force and increase awareness of, and
resistance to, malign influence and the demoralizing effects of operations to assure the joint
force. Activities to protect joint force morale and will support the force’s resiliency against
trauma; deployment length; isolation; and propaganda, misinformation, disinformation,
deception, persuasion, and dissuasion. As commanders build and protect the forces’
resiliency, they prepare to sustain those gains. As conditions change in the OE, the force
can be affected in a variety of ways. Sustaining resilience requires commanders to adapt
to these changes. Examples of proactive measures and of countermeasures to build,
protect, and sustain joint force morale and will include preparing Service members for the
psychological effects of loss of life and mitigating those effects when they occur,
conducting command information activities, facilitating shared understanding,
authenticating trustworthy sources of information, establishing reliable and secure
communications, conducting counter-deception and counter-propaganda activities, as well
as conducting religious support and command psychologist activities, and facilitating face-
to-face communication between command teams and Service members at the lowest
echelon. The protection of information, information networks, and information systems
task supports the protection of joint force morale by maintaining the integrity of
information sent to and received from authenticated and reliable sources. Protecting
information contributes to protecting joint force morale and will because it prevents
adversaries from accessing or manipulating data and information to incite and spread
dissension, confusion, and disorder.

c. Leverage Information. When commanders leverage information, they expand

their range of options for the employment of military capabilities beyond the use of or
threatened use of physical force. JFCs leverage information in two ways. First, by
planning and conducting all operations, activities, and investments to deliberately leverage
the inherent informational aspects of such actions. Second, by conducting OIE.

(1) Inform domestic, international, and internal audiences. Inform activities

are the release of accurate and timely information to the public and internal audiences, to
foster understanding and support for operational and strategic objectives by putting joint
operations in context; facilitating informed perceptions about military operations; and
countering misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda. Inform activities help to
ensure the trust and confidence of the US population, allies, and partners in US and MNF
efforts; and to deter and dissuade adversaries and enemies from action. PA is the primary

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 Joint Force Uses of Information

means the joint force uses to inform; however, civil-military operations (CMO), key leader
engagement (KLE), and military information support operations (MISO) also support
inform efforts.

(2) Influence relevant actors. The purpose of the influence task is to affect the
perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of relevant actor behavior. Regardless of its
mission, the joint force considers the likely psychological impact of all operations on
relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior. The JFC then plans and
conducts every operation to create desired effects that include maintaining or preventing
behaviors or inducing changes in behaviors. This may include the deliberate selection and
use of specific capabilities for their inherent informational aspects (e.g., strategic bombers);
adjustment of the location, timing, duration, scope, scale, and even visibility of an
operation (e.g., presence, profile, or posture of the joint force); the use of signature
management and MILDEC operations; the employment of a designated force to conduct
OIE; and the employment of individual information forces (e.g., CA, psychological
operations forces, cyberspace forces, PA, combat camera [COMCAM]) to reinforce the
JFC’s efforts. US audiences are not targets for military activities intended to influence.

(3) Attack and exploit information, information networks, and information

systems. The joint force targets information, information networks, and information
systems to affect the ability of adversaries and enemies to use information in support of
their own objectives. This activity includes manipulating, modifying, or destroying data
and information; accessing or collecting adversary or enemy information to support joint
force activities or operations; and disrupting the flow of information to gain military
advantage. Attacking and exploiting information, information networks, and information
systems supports the influence task when it undermines opponents’ confidence in the
sources of information or the integrity of the information that they rely on for decision
making. Activities used to attack and exploit information include offensive cyberspace
operations (OCO), electromagnetic warfare (EW), MISO, and CA operations. PA also
contributes to this task by publicly exposing malign activities.

8. The Information Joint Function and Joint Operations

The JFC uses the abilities provided by the information joint function during all
operations. The understand task provides the JFC with the ability to identify threats,
vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the IE and provides a better understanding of which
drivers of behavior to affect to achieve objectives. These activities facilitate the availability
of timely, accurate, and relevant information necessary for joint force decision making.
The leverage task provides the JFC with the ability to inform audiences; influence foreign
relevant actors; and attack and exploit, information, information networks, and information
systems in support of the JFC’s objectives and enduring outcomes. The joint force
operationalizes the information joint function through operational design in planning of
operations that use information and deliberately leverage the inherent informational aspects
of its activities, and by conducting OIE.

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a. Using operational design to plan operations that deliberately leverage the

inherent informational aspects of activities and operations. Everything the joint force
does impacts the IE, either by intent or incidentally. All joint force operations, activities,
and investments have the potential to affect the perceptions, attitudes, and, ultimately, the
behavior of relevant actors. The conclusions that observers draw from interpreting joint
force activities may drive them to act in ways that impact the joint force. Whether or not
commanders consider this during planning, their activities will impact the IE and resonate
in their operational area and potentially other operational areas.

b. Conducting OIE. OIE are military actions involving the integrated employment
of multiple information forces to affect drivers of behavior by informing audiences;
influencing foreign relevant actors; attacking and exploiting relevant actor information,
information networks, and information systems; and protecting friendly information,
information networks, and information systems. OIE are conducted in support of the JFC’s
operation or campaign objectives or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint
forces continuously conduct OIE to remain engaged with relevant actors. Chapter VII,
“Operations in the Information Environment,” discusses the conduct of OIE.

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 CHAPTER III
UNITY OF EFFORT

"At no time in our history has unity among our people been so vital as it is at the
present time. Unity of purpose, unity of effort, and unity of spirit are essential to
accomplish the task before us."
President Harry S. Truman
Special Message to Congress, 1948

1. Introduction

a. Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even
if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. Unified
action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of
governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of
effort. It is essential to all DOD initiatives to achieve unity of effort through unified action
with interagency partners, the broader interorganizational community, and multinational
partners. The joint force collaborates with other USG departments and agencies and with
multinational partners to effectively use and leverage information to achieve strategic
objectives.

b. DOD’s role in maintaining unity of effort in and through the IE is, for the most part,
the same as it is for the physical domains. DOD establishes policies and sets the conditions
for components and their staffs to identify adversarial and potential adversarial threats
(including attempts to undermine US alliances and coalitions) and bring capabilities to bear
in an effort to affect, undermine, and erode an adversary’s or enemy’s will. Additionally,
DOD closely coordinates operations, activities, and investments with other USG
departments and agencies to facilitate horizontal and vertical continuity of strategic themes,
messages, and actions.

c. To facilitate unity of effort, the JFC and supporting staff should be familiar with
the roles, expertise, and capabilities of individual and organizational stakeholders relative
to the use of information and leveraging information to create relative advantage over an
opponent. The JFC will need to understand what activities external organizations are
currently doing to leverage information and whether the inherent informational aspects of
their activities support or hinder the joint force objectives and mission. The JFC’s
challenge is how best to deconflict, synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate activities to
achieve unified action. This chapter describes the authorities of DOD related to
information in joint operations, delineates various roles and responsibilities of
organizations that support the joint force use and leveraging of information, describes DOD
and interorganizational collaboration and multinational partner considerations regarding
their contribution to OIE, and addresses legal considerations in the planning and execution
of OIE.

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Chapter III

2. Authorities

Military activities that leverage information frequently involve a unique set of

complex issues. There are legal and policy requirements, including DOD directives and
instructions, national laws, international laws (i.e., international treaties, the law of war),
and rules of engagement, all which may affect these activities. Laws, policies, and
guidelines become especially critical during peacetime operations and competition when
international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and agreements are more likely to affect
planning and execution. Commanders should know who has the execution authority for
the conduct of information activities. Many capabilities require separate and distinct
execution authorities (e.g., MISO and some CO). Normally, the JFC is designated as the
execution authority in the execute order (EXORD) but should consider requests for
delegation of certain authorities down to the lower echelons to support tactical
commanders. The exercise of operational authority over joint forces conducting
information activities inherently requires a detailed and rigorous legal interpretation of
authority and/or legality of specific actions. Legal considerations are addressed in more
detail later in this chapter. Commanders will also need to know who has release authority
for information. For example, release authority can be granted to the joint task force (JTF)
PA for unclassified COMCAM products to expedite their release to the media.

a. Title 10, United States Code (USC), outlines the role of the Armed Forces of the
United States and provides the legal basis for the roles, missions, and organization of each
of the Services as well as DOD. Title 10, USC, Section 164, gives command authority
over assigned forces to the combatant commander (CCDR), which provides that individual
with the authority to organize and employ commands and forces, assign tasks, designate
objectives, and provide authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations.
Specifically, Title 10, USC, Chapter 19, authorizes the military to conduct operations,
including clandestine operations, in the IE to defend the United States, its allies, and its
interests. This includes operations in response to malicious influence activities carried out
against the United States or a US person by a foreign power. Authorities for specific types
of operations are established within Secretary of Defense (SecDef) policies, including
DOD instructions, directives, and memoranda, as well as in EXORDs and operation orders
authorized by the President or SecDef and subordinate orders issued by commanders
approved to execute the subject missions.

(1) The Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information

Environment established strategic initiatives for DOD to operate effectively in and through
the IE, defend national interests, and achieve national security objectives. This strategy
guides DOD support to the whole-of-government effort. It complements, and supports,
other guidance documents, including the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, 2017 [short title: NSS]; 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge [short title: NDS];
Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018; and the Department of Defense Strategy for
Implementing the Joint Information Environment, which focuses on IT implementation. In
general, the Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information
Environment describes operational-level objectives for OIE in which, through operations,

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 Unity of Effort

actions, and activities in the IE, DOD has the ability to affect the decision making and
behavior of adversaries and designated others to gain advantage across the competition
continuum.

(2) The Global Integrated Operations in the Information Environment

[short title: GIOIE] EXORD directs the joint force to conduct globally integrated
operations to maximize the cognitive impacts of combined informational power and
physical force on an adversary and other relevant actor perceptions and decision making,
to coerce behavior, communicate the costs of aggression, offer opportunities for updating
alliances, and create new strategic partnerships to protect US interests. The GIOIE
EXORD also addresses the need to improve OIE by adopting methods that deliberately
align our analysis, decisions, investments, activities, operations, and relationships in time,
space, and purpose.

b. Title 50, USC, Section 3093, states that any activity of the USG to influence
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
USG will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, is a covert action and is only
authorized pursuant to a presidential finding. This is considered during the identification
of attribution requirements and impacts any non-attribution or delayed attribution
decisions. The law further states that traditional military activities fall outside of the
statute.

c. Title 17, USC, governs the use of copyrights. The joint force uses a variety of
multimedia formats and commonly incorporates music, symbols, graphics, and messages
into its products. It is important to note these products are required to adhere to the
copyright restrictions under Title 17, USC, that protect published and unpublished works
in a variety of forms and formats.

3. Responsibilities

Information can have significant regional and global impacts that challenge the joint
force with unanticipated threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. Effectively dealing
with these challenges and communicating intended meanings to selected populations
requires individuals and organizations across DOD and interagency partners to ensure
coherency with, and align their policies and activities to, national strategic objectives.
Unified command enables the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of
activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to
achieve unity of effort in support of an overall strategy. Senior leaders work with the other
members of the national security community to promote unified action. A number of
factors can complicate the coordination process, including various agencies’ different and
sometimes conflicting policies and overlapping legal authorities, roles and responsibilities,
procedures, and decision-making processes for information activities. This section
describes responsibilities of individuals and organizations related to achieving and
maintaining unity of effort in the application of informational power.

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a. The President of the United States. The President exercises authority over and
control of the Armed Forces of the United States. The President frames the strategic
context through guidance documents like the NSS, presidential policy directives,
EXORDs, and other national strategic documents, informed by the National Security
Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council. These national strategic documents,
provided by the President or NSC, provide strategic guidance that is passed along to
military planners and provided to the JFC. The end result should be a military plan that
aligns both operations and communications with the national strategy (see Chapter IV,
“Operational Design and Planning”).

b. NSC. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering and deciding
national security policy with the President’s senior national security advisors and Cabinet
officials. The NSC facilitates the development of an integrated approach to strategic
matters, allowing the USG departments and agencies to bring their assets to bear in keeping
with statutory roles. SecDef is a statutory member of the NSC and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the military advisor to the NSC. The NSC provides a forum
through which various USG departments and agencies can develop a common
understanding of the situation and review and identify the need for policy changes and
adjustments. The NSC’s Information Statecraft Policy Coordination Committee is a
mechanism for interagency coordination on messaging and influence strategies.

Refer to JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, and CJCSI 5715.01, Joint Staff Participation
in Interagency Affairs, for more information on the NSC and its membership.

c. SecDef. SecDef is the principal assistant to the President for all DOD matters, with
authority, direction, and control over the entire DOD. SecDef oversees the development
of broad defense policy goals and priorities for the deployment, employment, and
sustainment of US military forces based on the NSS. For planning, SecDef provides
guidance to ensure that military action supports national objectives through the NDS,
Defense Planning Guidance, Contingency Planning Guidance, Global Force Management
Implementation Guidance, and the Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the
Information Environment. These guidance documents are used by the CJCS to develop the
NMS, which CCDRs translate into clear planning guidance with desired, behaviorally
focused objectives. Additionally, SecDef articulates the joint force strategic messages to
focus operations within the context of the overarching USG narrative.

(1) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]). The USD(P) is the
principal advisor to SecDef on the exercise of policy development, planning, resource
management, fiscal, and program evaluation responsibilities.

(a) The USD(P) manages DOD-level programs and oversees all activities
related to the use and application of information by DOD. In this capacity, the USD(P)
manages guidance publications (e.g., DODD 3600.01, Information Operations [IO]) and
associated policy on behalf of SecDef. The USD(P) is responsible for tasks related to
information activities as delineated in DODD 3600.01.

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(b) The USD(P) acts as the principal information operations advisor to

SecDef and carries out responsibilities as detailed in Title 10, USC, Section 397.

Refer to DODD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), for more
information on the roles and responsibilities of the USD(P).

(c) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity

Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]). The ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to SecDef
on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters and has overall supervision (to
include oversight of policy and resources) of those operations and activities. In addition to
policy oversight for special operations and stabilization capabilities, the ASD(SO/LIC) has
policy oversight for strategic capabilities and force transformation and resources. As such,
ASD(SO/LIC), after SecDef and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the principal official
charged with oversight over all special operations and low intensity conflict warfighting
capabilities within the senior management of DOD. The ASD(SO/LIC) also has
responsibility for policy formulation and implementation related to information-related
activities as detailed in DODD 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

(d) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global

Security (ASD[HD&GS]). The ASD(HD&GS) develops policy and oversees planning,
capability development, and operational implementation for countering weapons of mass
destruction, defense continuity, mission assurance, and defense support of civil authorities,
and supervises homeland defense activities of DOD.

(e) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. Fills the role of
Principal Cyber Advisor and includes the office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Cyber Policy, who establishes and oversees the implementation of DOD cyberspace-
related policy and strategy, integrating it with national cyberspace policy and guidance.
Provides guidance and oversight on DOD cyberspace operations as they relate to foreign
cyberspace threats, international cooperation, engagement with foreign partners and
international organizations, and implementation of DOD cyberspace strategy and plans,
including those related to cyberspace forces and their employment.

Refer to DODD 5111.13, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
Security (ASD[HD&GS]), for more information on the roles and responsibilities of the
ASD(HD&GS).

(2) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD[PA]). The
ATSD(PA) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to SecDef for DOD news media
relations, internal communications, community outreach, PA, and audio-visual
information. The ATSD(PA) is the sole authority for release of official DOD information,
to include but not limited to, press releases and visual information (VI) materials including
COMCAM footage. As the principal spokesperson for DOD, the ATSD(PA) develops
communication policies, plans, and programs in support of DOD objectives and operations,
along with a wide variety of DOD public outreach activities. ATSD(PA) coordinates with

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USD(P) to ensure that DOD information activities are consistent with the policy
established in DODD 3600.01 and DOD influence activities are not directed at or intended
to manipulate US audiences, public actions, or opinions, and are conducted in accordance
with all applicable US statutes, codes, and laws. ATSD(PA) interfaces with the CCMDs,
normally through their joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) and passes
information down through public affairs guidance (PAG). The ATSD(PA) publishes PAG
ahead of plan execution to provide a common reference for all military and USG
organizations. PAG helps the USG present a coherent narrative and includes themes to
assist the joint force in deliberately aligning the inherent informational aspects of their
activities with those themes.

Refer to DODD 5122.05, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
(ATSD[PA]), for more information on the roles and responsibilities related to the
ATSD(PA).

(3) Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD[I&S]).

The USD(I&S) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to SecDef and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense on intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and
other intelligence-related matters. These matters include coordination of activities within
the intelligence community (IC) related to DOD management and application of
information, as well as serving as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) program
management lead for the DOD OPSEC and MILDEC programs.

Refer to DODD 5143.01, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

(USD[I&S]), for more information on the roles and responsibilities related to the
USD(I&S).

(4) Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

(USD[A&S]). The USD(A&S) is the principal staff element for DOD for acquisitions,
advanced technology, and logistics. The USD(A&S) manages the DOD special access
program (SAP) management and control structures through the Special Program
Directorate and executes proponent responsibilities for EW. The USD(A&S) enables the
delivery and sustainment of secure and resilient information capabilities to the warfighter
and international partners quickly and cost effectively.

Refer to DODD 5135.02, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

(USD[A&S]), for more information on the roles and responsibilities related to USD(A&S).

(5) DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO). The DOD CIO is the principal staff
assistant and senior advisor to SecDef and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for IT,
information resources management, and efficiencies. The DOD CIO is DOD’s primary
authority for the policy and oversight of information resources management, to include
matters related to IT, network protection, and network operations. The DOD CIO is
responsible for all matters relating to the DOD information enterprise, such as
cybersecurity policy and standards; communications; information systems; spectrum
management; network interoperability policy and standards; positioning, navigation, and

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timing policy; and the DOD information enterprise that supports DOD C2. In this capacity,
the CIO develops DOD strategy and policy on the operation and protection of all DOD IT
and information systems, including development and promulgation of enterprise-wide
architecture requirements and technical standards; enforcement, operation, and
maintenance of systems, interoperability, collaboration; and interface between DOD and
non-DOD systems. The DOD CIO exercises authority, direction, and control over the
director of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and the Joint Artificial
Intelligence Center (JAIC).

(a) DISA. DISA is a DOD combat support agency that provides, operates,
and ensures C2 and information-sharing capabilities and a globally accessible enterprise
information infrastructure in direct support to joint warfighters, national-level leaders, and
other mission partners across the full spectrum of military operations. DISA ensures
mission partners have secure, available, and reliable services and capabilities to achieve
their mission in a contested cyberspace. DISA enhances operations through the security,
operation, and defense of the DISA-managed portion of the DODIN, management of the
Cyber Security Service Provider program, and support to CCMDs, including United States
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and its subordinate Joint Force Headquarters-
Department of Defense Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN).

(b) JAIC. The JAIC provides expertise to help the DOD harness the power
of artificial intelligence. The JAIC integrates technology development, with the requisite
policies, knowledge, processes, and relationships to ensure long-term success and
scalability. The JAIC seeks to deliver an information advantage to DOD working to
accelerate the delivery and adoption of artificial intelligence to achieve mission impact at
scale. The goal is to use artificial intelligence to solve large and complex problem sets that
span multiple Services, then ensure the Services and components have real-time access to
ever-improving libraries of artificial intelligence data sets and tools.

d. Department of State (DOS) Organizations. DOS plans and implements foreign

policy. DOS is led by the Secretary of State, who is the President’s principal advisor on
foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for US representation abroad. DOS’s
primary job is to promote and communicate American foreign policy throughout the world.
DOS interfaces with representatives of foreign governments, corporations, NGOs, and
private individuals. A key DOS function is assembling coalitions to provide military forces
for US-led multinational operations, as well as communicating the President’s policies to
other nations and international bodies. The following internal DOS offices have
information-related duties and with whom DOD planners may need to coordinate OIE:

(1) Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs serves as the lead policy maker for
DOS’s overall public outreach and press strategies. The Under Secretariat team
coordinates closely with the regional bureaus, functional bureaus, interagency partners, the
private sector, and international partners to ensure DOS’s public diplomacy and PA
activities are consistent, forward-looking, supportive of US foreign policy, and grounded
in research.

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(a) Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Bureau of

Educational and Cultural Affairs designs and implements educational, professional, and
cultural exchanges and other programs that create and sustain the mutual understanding
with other countries necessary to advance US foreign policy goals. The Bureau’s programs
cultivate people-to-people ties among current and future global leaders that build enduring
networks and personal relationships and promote US national security and values sharing
America’s rich culture of performing and visual arts with international audiences.

(b) Bureau of Global Public Affairs. The Bureau of Global Public Affairs
serves the American people by effectively communicating US foreign policy priorities and
the importance of diplomacy to American audiences and engaging foreign publics to
enhance their understanding of and support for the values and policies of the United States.
Some of the centers and offices in this bureau include:

1. Foreign Press Centers. The Foreign Press Centers’ mission is to

deepen understanding of US policy and American values through engagement with foreign
media. They provide clear and accurate understanding of policy and American values to
global audiences via first-hand access. The Foreign Press Centers support US policies by
helping foreign media cover the US and by providing direct access to authoritative
American information sources.

2. Office of Global Social Media. The Office of Global Social Media

expands the reach of US foreign policy through new media and web-based communication
technology. Working with the entire DOS, the team maintains the DOS’s official blog,
DipNote. The office also maintains DOS’s official presence on social media platforms.

3. Office of Global Web Platforms. The Office of Global Web

Platforms oversees the DOS’s use of websites to inform the public. State.gov delivers
information about DOS, such as press releases, key policy information, and details about
the US relationship with countries and areas of the world. Complementing state.gov, the
team manages the platform on which nearly 200 missions update their own websites to
communicate with local audiences. The team coordinates with all bureaus and offices in
DOS and trains both domestic and mission staff to use the Internet to communicate
effectively.

4. Office of International Media Engagement. The Office of

International Media Engagement creates and manages DOS mechanisms to ensure accurate
coverage of US foreign policy priorities by major international media. The office oversees
the DOS’s six regional media hubs, which serve as overseas platforms for engagement of
foreign audiences via the media. The office ensures DOS international media capabilities
are integrated into the interagency press and PA planning and execution. The office works
within the Bureau of Global Public Affairs and with DOS regional bureaus and other USG
departments and agencies to develop foreign media engagement strategies in furtherance
of US foreign policy priorities.

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5. Office of Press Operations. The Office of Press Operations supports

the President and Secretary of State by explaining the foreign policy of the United States
and the positions of DOS to domestic and foreign journalists. The office responds to press
queries, conducts media interviews, monitors media for breaking international events, and
coordinates special press briefings and conference calls.

6. Office of Public Liaison. The Office of Public Liaison connects

DOS to domestic audiences to advance the DOS’s work at home and abroad. The Office
of Public Liaison also responds to inquiries on foreign policy issues, handles requests for
briefings from groups coming to DOS, and partners with organizations to sponsor major
conferences and events.

(c) Global Engagement Center. The Global Engagement Center directs,

leads, synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates efforts of the federal government to
recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and
disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or
stability of the United States and its allies and partner nations. The Global Engagement
Center partners with DOD to counter propaganda and disinformation from foreign nations.
One initiative supports public and private partners working to expose and counter
propaganda and disinformation from foreign nations.

(d) Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources. The Office of Policy,

Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs provides long-term
strategic planning and performance measurement capability for public diplomacy and PA
programs. It also enables the Under Secretary to better advise on the allocation of public
diplomacy and PA resources, to focus those resources on the most urgent national security
objectives and provide realistic measurement of public diplomacy’s and PA’s
effectiveness.

(e) US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD). The ACPD

appraises USG activities intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics and
to increase the understanding of, and support for, these same activities. The ACPD
conducts research and symposiums that provide independent assessments and informed
discourse on public diplomacy efforts across government. Supported by the Under
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Commission reports to the
President, Secretary of State, and Congress.

(2) Country Teams. The country team unifies the coordination and
implementation of US national policy within each foreign country under the direction of
the chief of mission (COM), working directly with the HN government, and consists of
key members of the US diplomatic mission or embassy. Country teams meet regularly to
advise the COM on matters of interest to the United States and review current
developments in the country. The COM, as the senior US representative in each HN,
controls information release in country. The CCMDs are the primary entry point for DOD
personnel to coordinate with country teams in their AOR. CCMD staff coordinates all
themes, messages, VI products, and press releases impacting a HN through the respective

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US embassy channels. The DOS foreign policy advisor (POLAD) at CCMDs can facilitate
access to DOS and has reachback to resources for CCMD staff. The COM also directs the
country team system, which provides the means for rapid interagency consultation and
action on recommendations from the field (including US embassies, CCMDs with an AOR,
and international programs) with a consistent USG voice and effective execution of US
programs and policies. The CCDR and staff should establish habitual working
relationships with relevant organizations before incidents occur that trigger planning and
requests for military resources. As emergent events requiring planning develop, the normal
flow of DOS and other agencies reporting from the field will increase significantly. Under
the country team construct, USG departments and agencies are required to coordinate their
plans and operations (including OIE) and keep one another and the COM informed of their
activities (including activities that leverage information). The COM has the right to see all
communication to, or from, mission elements, except those specifically exempted by law
or executive decision.

e. The Joint Staff (JS). The JS assists the CJCS in accomplishing responsibilities for
the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, their operation under unified
command, and for their integration across Service components. The direction of the JS
rests exclusively with the CJCS. Additionally, the JS coordinates with CCMDs, OSD, and
other USG departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort. The following directorates
perform functions that directly support the joint force use and leveraging of information:

(1) CJCS. A primary statutory responsibility assigned to the CJCS in Title 10,
USC, is to act as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and NSC. The
CJCS functions under the authority, direction, and control of SecDef; transmits
communications between SecDef and CCDRs; and oversees activities of CCDRs, as
directed by SecDef. The CJCS develops the NMS, which provides the CJCS’s guidance
on information and its role in strategy. The CJCS also updates CJCSI 3050.01,
Implementing Global Integration, and CJCSI 3110.01, Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
(JSCP) [short title: JSCP], which includes planning direction related to the joint force’s
leveraging of information. Cross-functional teams (CFTs) facilitate the effort to organize
and coordinate operations, actions, and activities in the IE. CJCSI 3110.01, Joint Strategic
Campaign Plan (JSCP), includes guidance mandating that all commanders develop
operations and activities with the aim to emphasize informational aspects of those
operations and activities. The CJCS represents the Military Departments in national
security policy-making activities of the interagency process. In this role, the CJCS assists
SecDef in implementing operational responses to global threats and acts as the coordinating
authority for transregional threat planning and response. From an information perspective,
the CJCS functions as the oversight authority for policy execution within the CCMD and
subordinate commands; develops procedures for a professionally trained and educated joint
information force in coordination with the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness
and USD(P); emphasizes the importance of including information as an instrumental part
of military operations through the development and validation of joint doctrine; validates
information requirements; serves as the joint proponent for MILDEC, OPSEC,
PA/VI/COMCAM, and information activities; and ensures coordination and deconfliction
of joint information and intelligence activities in all planning and execution.

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(2) Director, Joint Staff (DJS). The DJS is the primary advisor to the CJCS on
the application of informational power and acts as the CJCS’s lead for cross-staff, joint
force, intra-DOD, and interagency coordination for the management and application of
information. The Directorate of Management (DOM) is part of the Office of the DJS. The
Director of DOM serves as the DJS’s principal advisor on enterprise mission support and
management operations. The Director of DOM also acts as the JS’s principal planner,
director, and representative on all mission support and management matters. The DOM
supervises all facility and security operations at 18 locations throughout the continental
United States, with special emphasis on those that serve as nodes of the National Military
Command System with a staff of civilians, uniformed military, and contractor
professionals. The DOM supervises, administers, and integrates all enterprise decision
support systems, processes, and procedures to meet DOD and Title 10, USC, requirements
for accountability, standardization, execution, and reporting.

(3) Joint Staff J-2 [Intelligence]. The JS J-2 implements OUSD(I&S) policy
for intelligence support for the management and application of information in joint
operations, including characterization of the IE and intelligence support to OIE. The JS J-
2 coordinates with the CCMDs to staff intelligence-related CJCS orders (e.g., alert orders,
planning orders, warning orders) and coordinate requests for forces (RFFs) in response to
a CCMD request for intelligence capabilities.

(4) Joint Staff J-3 [Operations]

(a) JS J-3 Director. The JS J-3 Director assists the CJCS in carrying out
responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef by developing
and providing guidance to the CCDRs and by facilitating communications between the
President, SecDef, and the CCDRs regarding current operations and plans.

(b) Joint Staff J-39 [Deputy Director for Global Operations]. The JS J-
39 advises the JS J-3 and CJCS on OIE and special actions. The JS J-39 serves as the JS
focal point for OIE and special technical operations (STO), sensitive DOD support to/from
non-DOD agencies, MISO, and OCO and DCO.

(5) JS J-5. The JS J-5, in coordination with the JS J-2, JS J-3, OSD PA, CJCS
PA, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Office of the Undersecretary
of Defense for Intelligence and Security, develops and coordinates globally integrated,
campaign-level, thematic information guidance linked to national security direction and
national security policy and in support of whole-of-government strategic communications
objectives. Additionally, the JS J-5 coordinates on strategic information guidance and
plans with the NSC Inter-Agency Policy Committee, the IC, and DOS. This coordination
ensures continuous alignment among understanding of the threat, military actions
including PA activities, and military contributions to national/interagency communications
strategy and communication guidance. The JS J-5 provides planning recommendations
and oversight through the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) process to
regional, transregional, and country-specific strategy, plans, and policy recommendations,
to include the development and coordination of military information activities. In
coordination with the JS J-3, develop assessment criteria for information activities. The JS

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J-5 also leverages multinational contacts to advise, collaborate, monitor, and report
concerning the information efforts of our allies and partners. Under the Promote
Cooperation Program, the JS J-5 facilitates periodic interagency working groups that
include CCMD planning staffs, other DOD offices, and agency partners for collaboration
on planning (e.g., campaign and other contingency plans). The Promote Cooperation
Program ensures DOD speaks with one voice and the information shared with other USG
departments and agencies is fully vetted and authorized.

(6) Joint Staff J-6 [Command, Control, Communications &

Computers/Cyber]. The mission of the JS J-6 is to assist the CJCS in providing the best
military advice, while advancing DODIN protection, joint/multinational interoperability,
and C2 capabilities required by the joint force to preserve the nation’s security. In
conjunction with OSD, the JS, and operational stakeholders, JS J-6 facilitates managing
requirements for the C2 of the IE program and other requirements that support the
management and application of information in joint operations.

(7) JS J-7. The JS J-7 is responsible for the six functions of joint force
development—doctrine, education, concept development and experimentation, training,
exercises, and lessons learned. The JS J-7 supports the CJCS and the joint warfighter
through joint force development to advance the operational effectiveness of management
and application of information in the current and future joint force. The JS J-7 works with
CCMDs to ensure adequate inclusion of informational capabilities and concepts in
exercises. In conjunction with the JS J-39 and JS PA, the JS J-7 develops
exercise/experiment concept details and workable implementation plans for exercise
inclusion, supports exercise development throughout the joint event life cycles, and reports
exercise dates and descriptions to facilitate the identification of opportunities and
vulnerabilities related to the management and application of information in joint
operations.

f. CCDRs. The Unified Command Plan provides guidance to CCDRs, assigning them
missions. CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned
forces and are directly responsible to SecDef for the preparedness of their commands to
perform, and their performance of, assigned missions. CCDRs are responsible for the
implementation of strategy and US policy and the execution of assigned missions. One
way they do this is by integrating, synchronizing, and employing forces to achieve effects
in the IE that support achievement of operational objectives CCDRs also translate national
strategic objectives into operational objectives that specify the desired behavior of relevant
actors to support the attainment of enduring strategic outcomes. CCDRs organize their
staffs to best employ the information joint function. This may include standardizing
organizational practices by aligning related capabilities into the same directorate,
establishing routine working groups, and establishing a center with responsibility for the
information joint function tasks, while maintaining PAO as their principal spokesperson,
senior advisor, and a member of their personal staff. They also ensure all plans mitigate
vulnerabilities, counter threats, and exploit opportunities in the IE. CCDRs develop and
prioritize intelligence requirements that support leveraging information. CCDRs and
subordinate JFCs develop, plan, program, and assess information activities during all

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 Unity of Effort

phases of military engagement across the competition continuum; in coordination with the
USD(P) and CJCS, identify and seek the appropriate delegated authorities required for
leveraging information; integrate information guidance for theater planning and deliberate
and contingency planning; develop interagency coordination requirements and
mechanisms for each OPLAN; and ensure coordination and deconfliction of CCMD
information and intelligence activities in all operational planning and execution. CCDRs
guide the collaborative development of narratives for their assigned responsibilities and
ensure actions across AORs or functional areas to align with that narrative. The following
CCDRs have additional responsibilities related to the information joint function:

(1) Commander, United States Special Operations Command

(CDRUSSOCOM). CDRUSSOCOM is the designated joint proponent for MISO and CA,
responsible for leading the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of
MISO and CA capabilities across DOD. This responsibility is focused on enhancing
interoperability and providing other CCDRs with MISO and CA planning and execution
capabilities. CDRUSSOCOM also serves as the coordinating authority for MISO Web-
Operations, and conducts transregional MISO with concurrence from applicable CCMDs.
The USSOCOM Joint MISO Web Operations Center provides the JFC with a capability
which facilitates and conducts MISO employing social media, mobile applications,
websites, and other Internet-based capabilities and technologies to influence foreign
audience behavior.

(2) Commander, United States Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM).

CDRUSCYBERCOM is the coordinating authority for global CO. This responsibility
includes planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, and conducting OCO, DCO,
and DODIN operations. CDRUSCYBERCOM conducts CO in support of national
objectives and provides other CCDRs with CO planning and execution capabilities.

(3) Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM).

CDRUSSTRATCOM’s assigned responsibilities include strategic deterrence, nuclear
operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), global strike, global
missile defense, and analysis and targeting. As the joint proponent for JEMSO,
CDRUSSTRATCOM focuses on enhancing interoperability and providing other CCDRs
with contingency EW expertise in support of their missions. This is in addition to the
responsibilities shared by all CCDRs, in coordination with the USD(P) and through the
CJCS. CDRUSSTRATCOM coordinates JEMSO.

(4) Commander, United States Space Command (USSPACECOM).

Commander, USSPACECOM, plans and executes global space operations, activities, and
missions. Space supports the flow of information and decision making. It may also serve
as an information capability essential to the delivery of specific information in the IE.
Space control consists of operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the United
States and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space. The
space control mission area includes defensive and offensive activities; supported by the
requisite current and predictive knowledge of the space environment.

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(5) Commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

Commander, USTRANSCOM, is responsible for mobility and joint enabling capabilities.
One of USTRANSCOM’s components is Joint Enabling Capabilities Command that
provides mission-tailored capability packages on short notice for limited duration to assist
the joint force plan, prepare, establish and operate joint force headquarters in globally
integrated operations. The Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE) deploys expeditionary,
mission tailored, joint SME across operations, plans, sustainment, intelligence, KM, and
PA.

Refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for more information on the various

organizations and their respective roles and responsibilities related to interorganizational
cooperation.

g. Joint Organizations. The following joint organizations perform functions that

support the joint force use and leveraging of information:

(1) Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC). The JIOWC is

a CJCS-controlled activity under the supervision of the JS Director for Operations. JIOWC
enables the application of informational power at the strategic level and performs CJCS
proponency responsibilities for joint enterprise information and information activities,
MILDEC, and OPSEC, to create, enhance, or protect joint force advantages in the IE. The
JIOWC provides OIE subject matter expertise and advice to the JS and CCMDs, facilitates
CCMD and Service collaborative efforts to identify and develop joint OIE concepts and
solutions, assists in advocating for and integrating CCMD OIE requirements, and assists
in developing and coordinating force development requirements for joint force information
professionals.

(2) Joint Planning Support Element-Public Affairs (JPSE-PA). JPSE-PA, a

functional group within JPSE, plans, coordinates, and synchronizes PA activities with
informational power activities to maximize support to campaign objectives and ensure
execution of PA roles, responsibilities, and fundamentals. JPSE-PA provides ready,
rapidly deployable, expeditionary joint PA capability to CCDRs to support joint
operations, facilitate the rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, and bridge joint
requirements supporting worldwide operations. JPSE-PA personnel assist
development, planning, assessment, and synchronization of operational and mission
narratives, themes, messages, PA and VI activities with the national narrative.

(3) Joint Warfare Analysis Center. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center
provides CCMDs, the JS, and other customers with effects-based analysis and precision
targeting options for selected networks and nodes to carry out the national security and
military strategies of the United States during peace, crisis, and war. The Joint Warfare
Analysis Center provides timely and accurate engineering and scientific analysis to military
commanders and government officials to advance the NSS.

(4) Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center (JEWC). JEWC integrates joint

effects in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) by providing adaptive operational solutions

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and advocating for the coherent evolution of capabilities and processes to control the EMS
during military operations. The JEWC assesses EW requirements, technology, and
capabilities while conducting modeling, analysis, and EMS activity coordination between
CCMDs and other USG departments and agencies. The JEWC also deploys EW experts,
trains staffs, stands up forward planning cells, and delivers rapid warfighter support when
required. JEWC personnel provide CCMDs with options to gain and maintain joint EW
freedom of maneuver in the EMS, which is critical to conducting all operations.

(5) Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE)/Joint Intelligence Operations

Center (JIOC). The JISE provides the JTF with tailored intelligence products and services
with a continuous analytical capability. Capabilities of the element may include order of
battle analysis, collection management, target intelligence, OIE analysis, a warning
intelligence watch, and a request for information (RFI) desk. Alternatively, in a
particularly large or protracted campaign, the JTF commander may decide to employ an
operational-level JIOC. An operational-level JIOC incorporates the capabilities inherent
in a JISE but is generally more robust. The JISE can provide population-centric, socio-
cultural intelligence and physical network lay downs, including the information transmitted
via those networks. The JISE/JIOC can greatly facilitate an understanding of the
interrelationship between the physical, informational, and human aspects of the
environment and assist information planners in determining the desired effects that lead to
mission success.

For more information on JISE/JIOC, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

(6) Defense Media Activity (DMA). DMA is a mass media and training and
education organization that creates and distributes DOD content across a variety of media
platforms to audiences around the world.

h. The Joint Force

(1) JFC. The JFC establishes and communicates command-specific guidance to

ensure all joint force operations and activities are planned and executed to account for the
effective management and application of information. This will include assigning
responsibility for the tasks related to the information joint function. This may include
standardizing organizational practices, establishing routine working groups, or establishing
a center with responsibility for the information joint function tasks. Each of the directorates
has responsibility related to information joint function tasks, but the JFC should assign
overall responsibility and authority to a staff lead to ensure unity of effort. The JFC may
choose to create additional staff or functional organizations to conduct or coordinate joint
force activities related to the leveraging of information, coordinate with other organizations
to obtain support, or synchronize activities with other organizations. This includes creating
groups of specialized forces to conduct OIE. The JFC may choose to retain control of any
newly created formation under the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) or create a
separate task force. From this point forward, “OIE unit” will be used to represent a
formation that conducts OIE. The JFC also identifies requirements for information
planners to serve as OIE and capability SMEs and planners on the joint force staff or other

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headquarters staffs. During operational design and joint planning, the JFC provides
planning guidance that describes the desired conditions that must exist in the IE to support
mission accomplishment, how the joint force will leverage the inherent informational
aspects of its activities to support the JFC’s objectives, how information activities will
support the scheme of maneuver, and the types and level risk that the JFC will accept in
the IE. The JFC will also assign missions to OIE units.

(2) JFC’s Staff. The JFC’s staff performs duties and handles special matters
over which the JFC wishes to exercise close, personal control. JFCs and their staffs
evaluate communication considerations with the interagency partners when planning joint
operations. The staff advises the JFC on the inherent informational aspects of their
activities, including how words and images will impact the JFC’s operational areas. The
staff also advises the JFC when their activities may have effects on the IE that impact other
AORs. The chief of staff (COS) manages the staff. The staff group may include, but is
not limited to, the PAO, staff judge advocate (SJA), KM officer, and POLAD.

(a) COS. The COS is the key staff integrator and synchronizer. The COS
establishes a framework of trust, shared understanding, and intent within the staff. This is
accomplished through the establishment and management of staff processes and
procedures, understanding and management of staff capacity, setting priorities, and KM
and IM. The COS coaches, mentors, and leads the staff. The COS is also normally
empowered to make certain decisions to retain agility in decision making, such as in the
areas of targeting and messaging.

(b) POLAD. POLADs are senior DOS officers (often flag-rank equivalent)
detailed as personal advisors to senior US military leaders and commanders, and they
provide policy analysis and insight regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the
commanders’ duties. Due to their status and contacts, they can enable interorganizational
cooperation relationships and foster unity of effort. The POLAD provides USG foreign
policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations and establishes links to US embassies in
the AOR or joint operations area (JOA) and with DOS. They articulate DOS objectives
relevant to the CCMD’s theater strategy or JTF commander’s plans.

(c) PAO. The PAO is the commander’s principal spokesperson, senior PA

adviser, and a member of the CCDR’s personal staff. In that role, the PAO provides
counsel to leaders, leads PA and communication activities, collaborates with other
information planners to develop the narrative, supports the commander’s intent, and
supports community engagement and KLE. The PAO may also co-chair the JFC’s
information CFT. The PAO, in conjunction with others on the staff, quickly and accurately
assesses the IE to provide guidance and COAs to the commander. Such assessments enable
the commander to better inform relevant audiences about ongoing operations and engender
their support. The PAO has the knowledge, skills, resources, and authority to provide
timely, truthful, and accurate information, VI, and context to the commander, the staff, and
subordinate and supporting commanders. PAOs are able to rapidly release information in
accordance with DOD policy and guidance to the news media and the public. PAOs and

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PA staffs work with other information professionals to coordinate and deconflict

communication activities.

(d) Joint Force SJA. The joint force SJA, also titled the command judge
advocate, is the principal legal advisor to the CCDR, with a focus on joint operational law
issues pertaining to their commander’s AOR. In most cases, the joint force SJA is also the
principal legal advisor to the deputy commander, COS, and any Service element. The SJA
provides advice on laws and policies related to operating in and through the IE, potential
legal limitations on information activities, and bilateral agreements that may impact the
management and application of information.

For more information on the SJA section, refer to JP 3-84, Legal Support.

(3) Joint Force Staff Directorates. Each staff section collaborates routinely, but
to varying degrees, to plan, synchronize, support, and assess activities that leverage
information.

(a) Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-1). The J-1
is the principal staff officer for personnel functions and processes requirements for
individual, team, and unit augmentation or attachment. The J-1 builds manning documents
and provides advice regarding information forces and support available to the joint force.
In coordination with the J-3, the J-1 determines information force and personnel
requirements, to include number of personnel, Service, grade, skill, clearance, and any
special requirements for each billet description.

(b) J-2. The J-2 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning
military intelligence, security operations, and military intelligence training. The J-2
produces the intelligence used by information forces and working groups, and provides
intelligence briefings or updates and answers information requirements. It also coordinates
with counterintelligence; law enforcement; and information system developers, providers,
administrators, and users to ensure timely sharing of relevant information. J-2 supports
leveraging information by:

1. Preparing a JIPOE product and a threat assessment of enemy C2

systems that addresses the political, economic, social, and cultural influences, along with
the targets and methods for offensive operations. The threat assessment describes enemy
decision-making processes with biographical backgrounds of key threat leaders, decision
makers, and communicators and their advisors. It should also include a comprehensive
comparison of enemy offensive information capabilities against friendly vulnerabilities.

2. Collecting data to establish an EW database, target list, and

coordinate intelligence gain/loss assessments for C2 targets.

3. Providing intelligence support to MILDEC operations, specifically

helping the communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) plan use of friendly

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information systems as deception means; and establishing counterintelligence measures to

protect the MILDEC operation from detection.

(c) J-3. The J-3 assists the commander in the direction and control of
operations, beginning with planning and through completion of specific operations. In this
capacity, the J-3 plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. As the staff principal
charged with ensuring that the joint force leverages information during the conduct of all
operations, the J-3 responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

1. Ensuring the leveraging of information is addressed as an element

along with movement and fires in the joint force scheme of maneuver.

2. Planning all operations to leverage the inherent informational aspects

of military activities, and tasking units and assets as necessary.

3. Integrating OIE into joint force plans and assigning missions to OIE
units in plans and orders.

4. Coordinating information forces and determining personnel

requirements for the joint force. This includes providing appropriate billet descriptions
and justifications to the J-1 for sourcing and prioritizing augmentation requests or RFFs.

5. Validating or approving, as necessary, inputs and products from the

information planning cell and the JFC’s information CFT (these are discussed in
paragraphs 3.h.(4) “Information Planning Cell” and 3.h.(5) “Information CFT,”
respectively) for inclusion into plans and orders.

6. Ensuring effective coordination and synchronization of activities

among information planners and other staff sections and CFTs.

7. Overseeing the staff functions of the information planners and the

functioning of the information planning cell.

8. OPSEC and the protection of critical/sensitive information.

(d) Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-4). The J-4 develops logistic
plans and services, to include the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance
operations, deployment and distribution, engineering, health services, operational contract
support, food service, and other operationally required logistic support activities. The
inherent informational impacts of these highly visible activities could support or undermine
the JFC’s objectives. Those informational aspects will encompass political, social,
cultural, legal, or other concerns. Consequently, the J-4 should plan sustainment activities
to best leverage those aspects to support the JFC’s objectives and to protect the joint force
from vulnerabilities in and through the IE. J-4 responsibilities with respect to leveraging
information include, but are not limited to:

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1. Identifying the inherent informational aspects of logistics activities

that will potentially affect relevant actor behavior and including those informational
aspects in the sustainment annex and in the information estimate.

2. Formulating logistics policies and planning sustainment activities to

reinforce the positive and avoid or mitigate the negative impacts of those activities. For
example, awarding contracts to support operational requirements to local vendors through
an open and transparent contracting process that a local populace trusts would reinforce
support for joint force activities, whereas operating a logistics hub in an area or manner
that disrupts local agriculture or commerce will undermine support for joint force activities.

3. Advising the information CFT on how military operations will affect

logistics efforts and how those logistics efforts can be conducted in a way to support the
OIE (e.g., conducting logistics activities in a way that prevents disclosure of joint force
intentions).

4. Coordinating with OPSEC planners, as necessary, to identify critical

information and indicators to protect essential secrecy.

5. Identifying relevant actors who may be positively or negatively

impacted by logistics activities. That includes understanding how relevant actors will
perceive those activities.

(e) Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-5). The J-5 assists the commander
in planning and preparing joint plans, orders, and associated estimates of the situation. The
J-5 may also contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist the
commander in plans preparation activities, or such a cell may be established as a special
staff. J-5 responsibilities related to the leveraging of information include, but are not
limited to:

1. Including the inherent informational aspects of joint force activities

in estimates of the situation.

2. Planning operations so the leveraging of information is addressed as

an element along with movement and fires in the scheme of maneuver.

3. Planning operations to leverage the inherent informational aspects of

military activities, and tasking units and assets as necessary.

4. Integrating OIE into the planning of operations and including tasks

for OIE units in plans and orders.

5. Assessing the impact in and through the IE of operations, activities,

and actions, and determining whether operations, actions, and activities contributed to or
detracted from the successes.

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6. Participating in the narrative development process to ensure

alignment of planning with national/interagency communication guidance.

(f) J-6. The J-6 is the principal staff assistant to the JFC for all matters
concerning DODIN operations, applicable portions of DCO, network transport,
information services, and spectrum management operations within the operational area.
As such, the J-6 is a key enabler for the development of a secure, collaborative environment
that enhances the JFC and staff situational awareness and ability to leverage information.
The J-6 responsibilities relative to the leveraging of information include, but are not limited
to:

1. Directing the actions of subordinate DODIN operations and IM staff

elements.

2. Coordinating DODIN operations and IM support of information

collection with the J-2.

3. When notified, coordinating with the cybersecurity service provider

for network intrusion devices, information, approved systems, and software.

4. Identifying the inherent informational aspects of communication

activities that will potentially affect the drivers of relevant actor behavior and including
those informational aspects in the communications annex and in the information estimate.

5. Advising the information CFT on how the joint communication

system can be employed during operations to support the leveraging of information. This
includes using the communications system to enable the planning and conduct of
information activities and how signature management can be employed.

6. Planning and directing the actions of subordinate DODIN operations

and IM staff elements in support of information activities and OIE.

7. Coordinating with other commands to avoid conflicting information

and ensure unity of effort.

(4) Information Planning Cell. JFCs may establish an information planning

cell to provide command-level oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates and
supporting organizations on informational considerations during planning and the conduct
of operations. The information planning cell, composed of information professionals on
the staff, serves as the focal point for planning how the joint force will leverage the inherent
informational aspects of its activities and for planning OIE.

(a) The information planning cell is a standing organization subordinate to

the operations branch within the J-3 to provide command-level oversight on all aspects of
leveraging information.

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(b) The information planning cell comprises personnel with subject matter
expertise in OIE, specialized capabilities (e.g., CA, MISO, PA, EW, COMCAM, CO) and
information activities (e.g., KLE, OPSEC) who serve as staff information planners. The J-
3 should tailor the composition of the cell as necessary to accomplish the mission. In cases
where specialized capabilities have their own staff entities, SMEs may be assigned to the
information planning cell as planners and serve as liaisons to their respective staff section
(e.g., a PA planner assigned to the information planning cell would liaise with the PAO
and PA staff; an EW planner assigned to the information planning cell would liaise with
the JEMSO or joint electromagnetic spectrum operations cell [JEMSOC]).

(c) The information planning cell members collaborate with all staff
directorates and supporting organizations to ensure the joint force effectively leverages
information as an element of maneuver in support of the JFC’s objectives. Information
planners provide subject matter expertise throughout operational design and the joint
planning process (JPP) (see Chapter IV, “Operational Design and Planning”). The
information planning cell supports the J-3 in the direction and control of operations to
ensure the impacts, in and through the IE, of all activities support the JFC’s objectives and
enduring outcomes. Information planning cell members participate in staff joint planning
groups (JPGs) or equivalent organizations and may be subtasked to serve as information
planners in the JS J-5. The information planning cell chief heads the information CFT and
may co-chair the information CFT with PAO. Information planning cell members
comprise the core of the information CFT (see paragraph [5], “Information CFT”) and is
responsible for incorporating input from the information CFT into plans and overseeing
execution of information activities.

(d) The information planning cell collaborates with other staff sections to
identify the inherent informational aspects of activities that should be included in those
staff estimates. Additionally, they identify and maintain the information estimate.

(e) The organizational relationships between the information planning cell

and the information forces, to include OIE units, are per commander guidance. Information
forces provide input on the employment of their respective capabilities and activities. The
information planning cell chief and commander or senior representative of each of the
information forces exercises their specific supporting duties and responsibilities.

(5) Information CFT. The information CFT is the JFC’s forum for the
development of a shared understanding of the IE and for the organization, coordination,
and synchronization of joint force activities in and through the IE. The information CFT
maintains situational awareness of the impact in and through the IE of operations, activities,
and investments. As necessary, the information CFT develops and recommends
alternatives or follow-on activities that support achieving the JFC’s objectives.

(a) The information CFT is comprised of members of the information

planning cell and representatives from across the staff directorates, subordinate OIE units
and information forces, and USG and other mission partners.

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Chapter III

(b) Members of the information CFT should establish ongoing

communications with similar forums at the JS and other joint force, interagency, and
multinational partners to ensure the joint force remains aware of the actions of others that
may have impacts on those factors that make up the IE that will affect the JFC’s OE. This
awareness also helps identify threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the IE.

(6) Media Operations Center. A JFC may establish a media operations center
to serve as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the
conduct of military operations. The media operations center serves as a central meeting
place for military personnel and media representatives and provides the media with a
primary information source, a logistics support base, transmission capability, and a
coordination base.

(7) JEMSOC. The JEMSOC synchronizes and integrates the planning and
operational use of electromagnetic support sensors, forces, and processes within a specific
JOA to reduce uncertainties concerning the threat, environment, time, and terrain. The
JEMSOC consolidates, prioritizes, integrates, and synchronizes the component
electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) plans and attendant EMS-use requests to
produce a consolidated JEMSO plan. Joint force unity of effort in the EMS derives from
the JEMSOC’s integration of all joint force EMS actions across both the joint force’s
functional staff elements (e.g., signals intelligence, EMS management, EW, CO, fires) and
the joint force’s components.

(8) KLE Cell. A KLE cell may be established to map, track, and distribute
information about the key leaders within the JOA. The KLE cell should establish and
maintain a human information database, recommend KLE responsibility assignment,
deconflict KLE activities, conduct pattern analysis, develop a detailed background briefing
on each key leader, suggest specific approaches for encouraging support for activities and
objectives, ensure debriefs are conducted following engagements, and update the map with
current information and intelligence and debrief information. The cell provides an updated
map (with human information of the area), background information, and desired effects for
KLE in the JOA to field units and staffs. The KLE cell coordinates subordinate command
KLE activities to ensure a coherent effort across the JOA, gathering of debriefing
information, and updating of the data base.

(9) Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Cell. CTF cells are a central point to
integrate threat finance intelligence into CTF operations and coordinate execution of CTF
activities. The principal mission of a CTF cell is to identify and disrupt funding flows,
financiers, and financial networks of terrorists, insurgents, and other relevant actors. CTF
actions, activities, and operations are designed to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat the
generation, storage, movement, and/or use of assets to fund activities that support an
adversary’s ability to negatively affect US interests. When establishing CTF cells, it is
important to ensure the relevant participants have been included as a part of the
collaborative effort. The CTF cell’s staffing structure, toolset, and command hierarchy are
designed to leverage tools and resources from across the intelligence, policy, military, and
law enforcement communities to complement and enhance the military and other

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 Unity of Effort

objectives of the USG. When optimally configured and supported, a CTF cell is a force
multiplier that can increase insight into the threat’s capabilities, exploitable weaknesses,
and intentions. The involvement of various interagency stakeholders enables the CTF cell
to leverage multiple authorities and unique capabilities. CTF activities are inherently
information activities that can affect the behavior of relevant actors. CTF cell members
should be standing members on the information CFT and will advise that forum on how
the CTF activities can impact relevant actors. For example, CTF actions that disrupt the
flow of illegal funds from malign actors to corrupt government officials may dissuade other
government officials from participating in corrupt activities. Or, when CTF actions result
in the successful prosecution and conviction of government officials for corruption, a local
populace trust in government institutions is increased, resulting in those locals actively
supporting and participating in those institutions.

(10) Joint IM Cell. Depending on the size of the joint force and scope of
operations, the COS may establish a joint IM cell within the joint operations center. The
joint IM cell reports to the COS or joint operations center chief (or the J-3) and facilitates
information flow throughout the JOA. The joint IM cell ensures the commander’s
dissemination policy is implemented as intended; takes guidance published in the
commander’s dissemination policy and combines it with the latest operational and
intelligence information obtained from the joint operations center or joint analysis center;
works closely with the joint network operations control center to coordinate potential
changes in communications infrastructure to satisfy changes in the commander’s
information dissemination requirements; and coordinates the accurate posting of all
current, approved commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

4. Service Organizations

The Services man, train, and equip organizations to provide the joint force with the
ability to leverage information during joint operations and to conduct OIE. Those Service
organizations provide distinct specialized capabilities to the joint force (e.g., MISO, CMO,
CO, PA, EW, COMCAM) or provide information commands composed of multiple
specialized capabilities that focus on leveraging information and enable the joint force to
create effects in the IE. Those Service-provided organizations that are trained and
equipped to conduct OIE, as described in Chapter VII, “Operations in the Information
Environment,” are referred to as OIE units. A United States Marine Corps’ (USMC’s)
Marine expeditionary forces information group (MIG) is an example of one such force.
For a discussion of the types of Service organizations that provide distinct specialized
capabilities, see paragraph 5, “Information Forces,” and Chapter VII, “Operations in the
Information Environment.”

a. United States Army

(1) Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER). ARCYBER, the United States

Army Service component command assigned to USCYBERCOM, directs and conducts
integrated EW, information activities, and CO as authorized, or directed, to ensure freedom
of action in and through cyberspace and the IE and to deny the same to adversaries.

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Chapter III

ARCYBER defends military networks, secures Army weapons platforms, and protects
critical US infrastructure. Army cyberspace forces are deployed globally, conducting DCO
and OCO.

(2) 1st IOC [1st Information Operations Command] (Land). 1st IOC is under
operational control (OPCON) of ARCYBER and provides the Army and the joint force
with information activities support through deployable teams, reachback planning and
analysis, and specialized training. Deployable teams include field support teams with
information activities subject matter expertise and vulnerability assessment teams that
assist units in identifying and resolving vulnerabilities to improve the command’s
defensive posture.

(3) United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). USASOC

oversees the special operations forces of the United States Army and is the Army Service
component command of United States Special Operations Command. In addition to Army
Special Forces, a military intelligence battalion, and other support troops, USASOC
encompasses the 4th and 8th Psychological Operations Groups (Airborne) and the 95th
Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne). The 4th and 8th Psychological Operations Groups
(Airborne) provide psychological operations forces and MISO capabilities to CCMDs, US
embassies, and other USG departments and agencies to synchronize plans and execute
MISO across the competition continuum. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade enables military
commanders and US ambassadors to improve relationships with various stakeholders in
local areas to meet the objectives of the USG. 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) teams
work with DOS country teams, government, and NGOs at all levels, and with local
populations in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments.

(4) United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

Command (USACAPOC). All United States Army Reserve Component psychological
operations and CA units are assigned to USACAPOC. The two assigned psychological
operations groups (2nd and 7th) and four CA commands (350th, 351st, 352nd, and 353rd)
comprise over 80 percent of the total Army CA and psychological operations forces
available to DOD, providing the capability to support Army conventional forces across the
competition continuum. In addition, the United States Army Reserve’s only theater
information operations group (TIOG) is assigned to USACAPOC. The 151st TIOG
supports several CCMDs with modular and tailorable information planning capabilities in
support of Army and joint requirements.

(5) The United States Army National Guard TIOG. The Army National
Guard contains two TIOGs (56th and 71st). Each TIOG consists of two battalions and
deploys mission-focused, modular teams capable of conducting information activities,
created from various capabilities resident within the groups. In the field, these teams
provide the supported command with information planning, synchronization, assessment,
and analysis of the OE.

b. United States Navy

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 Unity of Effort

(1) United States Fleet Cyber Command (US FCC)/United States Tenth
Fleet. US FCC reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations as a Navy Echelon 2
command and is assigned to USCYBERCOM. US FCC plans, coordinates, integrates,
synchronizes, directs, and conducts CO. US FCC is responsible for Navy network
operations, OCO and DCO, space operations, and signals intelligence. United States Tenth
Fleet is the operational arm of US FCC and executes its mission through a task force
structure similar to other warfare commanders. United States Tenth Fleet exercises
OPCON of assigned naval forces through its task force structure to create tactical and
operational effects in and through cyberspace, space, and the EMS to naval partners and
joint forces worldwide.

(2) United States Naval Information Forces (NAVIFOR). NAVIFOR mans,

trains, and equips information warfare capabilities ashore and afloat. NAVIFOR provides
operational commanders ashore and afloat with combat-sustainable forces. The
command’s areas of expertise include communications, networks and architectures,
combat systems interoperability, cryptology/signals intelligence, CO, EW, information-
related activities, intelligence, meteorology, oceanography, precise time, astrometry, and
space.
WARFARE TERMINOLOGY

Joint doctrine recognizes only two types of warfare – traditional warfare

and irregular warfare. Strategic documents and Service publications
may use the term ‘information warfare’ to describe the mobilizing of
information to attain a competitive advantage and achieve United States
(US) policy goals. In this sense, information warfare encompasses the
range of offensive and defensive efforts that use information across the
competition continuum to exploit the information environment against
adversaries, to inform public opinion, and to compel decision makers to
take certain actions. The US military contributes to information warfare
by deliberately leveraging the inherent informational aspects of
activities and by conducting operations in the information environment.

c. USMC

(1) DC I [Deputy Commandant for Information]. The DC I develops and

supervises plans, policies, and strategy for all OIE related activities and identifies
requirements for OIE doctrine, manpower, training, education, and equipment to support
the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). In support of the Commandant of the Marine
Corps’ Title 10, USC, responsibilities as a Service Chief, DC I serves as the principal
advisor on all matters and services as the principal spokesperson on Marine Corps OIE
related programs, requirements, and strategy throughout the regarding Marine Corps IE
operating programs, requirements, strategies throughout the Department of the Navy and
DOD.

(2) Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command (MARFORCYBER).

MARFORCYBER is assigned to USCYBERCOM and conducts the full spectrum of CO,

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to include operating and defending the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN),
conducting DCO within the MCEN and joint force networks, and when directed,
conducting OCO in support of joint force and multinational force (MNF) operations; to
enable freedom of action and deny the same to adversaries.

(3) MIGs. MIGs coordinate, integrate, and employ capabilities to ensure the
MAGTF commander’s ability to facilitate friendly forces maneuver and deny the enemy
freedom of action in the IE. MIGs also provide communications, intelligence, and
supporting arms liaison in support of MAGTFs operations. The MIG, in coordination with
the MAGTF command element staff, leverages capabilities resident within its subordinate
units to conduct offensive, defensive, and exploitative actions within the IE. The MIG via
its subordinate units and the information command center integrates and employs
information capabilities in execution or support of the information joint function. MIG
OIE capabilities include communication strategy and operations, which entails
PA/VI/COMCAM that provide timely, accurate information, which informs and educates
about the missions, organization, capabilities, needs, activities, and performance of the
Marine Corps as a part of national defense.

(4) Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC). The MCIOC

provides operational support to the Marine Corps forces and MAGTFs and provides OIE
subject matter expertise in support of USMC OIE advocates and proponents to enable the
effective integration of OIE into Marine Corps operations.

(5) Civil Affairs Group (CAG). The CAG provides the MAGTF commander
with specially trained and organized CA personnel to facilitate the planning, coordination,
execution, and assessment of CA operations. The CAG is a subordinate command of
Marine Forces Reserve and functions either as an integral unit or in support of the gaining
force commander, or will provide separate detachments, separate teams, staff augments, or
liaison personnel.

d. United States Air Force

(1) 16th AF [Sixteenth Air Force]/Air Force Cyber Command [AFCYBER].

16th AF is responsible for developing, preparing, generating, employing, and presenting
information warfare forces. AFCYBER is assigned to USCYBERCOM to employ
cyberspace forces and 16th AF integrates multisource ISR, CO, EW, and information
warfare capabilities across the competition continuum. A key mission task includes the
integration of information warfare, which is accomplished by the application of the
principal Air Force capabilities to create desired effects on the IE.

(2) 616th OC [616th Operations Center]. The 616th OC handles daily

intelligence-gathering and offensive and defensive missions in the air, in cyberspace, and
across the EMS.

(3) 16th AF Information Warfare Cell. The 16th AF Information Warfare Cell,
attached to Headquarters, 16th AF, helps in operational planning of information warfare

III-26 JP 3-04
 Unity of Effort

capabilities and integration at operational and tactical levels required to support United
States Air Force and joint operations.

e. United States Space Force (USSF)

(1) Space Delta 6 CO. Space Delta 6, as part of Space Operations Command
(SPOC), executes CO to protect space operations, networks and communications. SPOC
is the United States Air Force Service component to USSPACECOM.

(2) Space Delta 8 Satellite Communications and Navigational Warfare.

Space Delta 8, as part of SPOC, provides position, navigation, timing, and satellite
communications to US military, multinational partners, interagency partners, and
commercial/civilian users.

5. Information Forces

Information forces are those Active Component and Reserve Component forces of the
Services specifically organized, trained, and equipped to create effects in the IE. These
forces provide expertise and specialized capabilities that leverage information and can be
aggregated as components of an OIE unit to conduct OIE. Information forces are available
to the joint force through the RFF process.

a. CA. CA provides expertise on the civil component of the OE. CA forces analyze
and evaluate civil considerations for the commander and staff during mission analysis. CA
forces promote the legitimacy of the mission by advising commanders on how to best meet
their moral and legal obligations to the people affected by military operations. CA
conducts civil reconnaissance and network engagement to help define the OE for the
commander, to create options to influence the networks in support of US and joint forces
information activities. CA coordinate, integrate, and synchronize plans and operations
with the civil component. CA produce area studies, area assessments, and analysis that can
help identify and describe civil considerations within the OE and refine the IE.

For additional guidance on CA and CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

b. Psychological Operations Forces. Psychological operations forces are trained

and equipped to conduct MISO. Their primary task is to influence. They create effects in
the IE, bringing significant human factors analysis, assessment, and capability to formulate
MISO plans and programs that enhance the development and effectiveness of JFC’s
missions. MISO planners evaluate the psychological effects of military actions and advise
the JFC and staff to maximize influence task effectiveness and minimize adverse impact
and unintended consequences. The employment of psychological operations forces is
governed by explicit policy and legal authorities that direct and determine how their
capability is utilized. Synchronization of MISO with other actions precludes DOD
messages or actions, and other agencies’ messages and actions from contradicting or
weakening each other.

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Chapter III

For additional guidance on psychological operations forces and MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2,
Military Information Support Operations.

c. PA. PA staffs are involved in planning, decision making, training, equipping, and
executing operations, as well as integrating PA and communication activities into all levels
of command and ensuring narrative alignment. PAOs and PA staffs also work with other
planners to coordinate and deconflict communication activities. PA activities are divided
into public information, command information, and community engagement activities,
supported by research, planning, execution, and assessment to support the commander’s
intent and concept of operations (CONOPS). PAOs at all levels participate in planning,
provide counsel to leaders and key staff members on the possible outcomes of military
activities, lead development of the mission narrative, and identify the potential impact on
domestic and international perceptions.

For more information on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

d. Cyberspace Forces. Cyberspace forces comprise those personnel whose primary

duty assignment is DODIN operations, DCO, or OCO. Cyberspace forces include the units
of the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) as well as Service-retained units and various units
assigned to CCMDs. CMF units operate under the tactical control of the supported CCDR
or in direct support or general support, depending upon the circumstances. Although it is
possible for CO, including cyberspace-enabled OIE, to produce stand-alone tactical,
operational, or strategic effects and thereby achieve objectives, commanders integrate most
CO with other operations to create coordinated and synchronized effects required to
support mission accomplishment. Cyberspace operations-integrated planning elements
(CO-IPEs) integrate within CCDRs’ CO support staff to provide CO expertise and
reachback capability to USCYBERCOM. The CO-IPEs are organized from
USCYBERCOM, JFHQ-DODIN and joint force headquarter-cyberspace personnel and are
co-located at the supported CCMD.

For more information on CO, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

e. EMSO Forces. JEMSO actions to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the
electromagnetic environment rely on personnel and systems from EW, EMS management,
intelligence, space, and cyberspace mission areas. EMSO personnel prioritize, integrate,
synchronize, and deconflict all joint force operations in the electromagnetic environment,
enhancing unity of effort. The result is a fully integrated scheme of maneuver in the
electromagnetic environment to achieve EMS superiority and objectives.

For additional guidance on EMSO, refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum

Operations.

f. COMCAM Forces. Imagery is one of the most powerful tools available for
informing internal and domestic audiences and for influencing foreign audiences.
COMCAM forces provide imagery support in the form of a directed imagery capability to
the JFC across the competition continuum. COMCAM imagery supports capabilities that

III-28 JP 3-04
 Unity of Effort

use imagery for their products and efforts, including MISO, MILDEC, PA, and CMO.
COMCAM also provides documentation for sensitive site exploitation, legal and
evidentiary requirements, battle damage assessment (BDA), operational assessment, and
historical records.

For additional information on COMCAM, refer to CJCSI 3205.0l, Joint Combat Camera
(COMCAM).

g. Space Forces. Space operations and activities that leverage information are
mutually reinforcing. Space supports the flow of information and decision making. It may
also serve as an activity essential to the delivery of specific information in the IE.
Conversely, activities that leverage information to generate effects support achievement of
space superiority. USSF Guardians on Service, CCMD, and other staffs ensure
commanders and their staffs have a common understanding of space operations and how
they should be integrated with other military operations to achieve unity of effort and meet
US national security objectives. The Joint Combined Space Operations Center, on behalf
of the Combined Forces Space Component Command, coordinates, plans, integrates,
synchronizes, executes, and assesses space operations and facilitates unified action for joint
space operations.

For more information, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.

6. Interorganizational Collaboration

Interorganizational collaboration seeks to find common goals, objectives, and/or

principles between diverse organizations to achieve unity of effort and, through planning
and leveraging of cross-organizational capabilities, set the conditions to achieve unified
action during execution. The relationship that the joint force establishes with relevant
organizations helps it develop a more comprehensive awareness of the OE and
understanding of the impact of information on the OE. Ultimately, these relationships help
the joint force and the other organizations appreciate the impact of their activities and
operations toward achieving shared objectives. This interdependency between the CCMD
and other USG departments and agencies to achieve common objectives is a vital element
of a whole-of-government effort. From an information planning perspective, unified action
is particularly critical since the inherent informational aspects of activities resonate through
the IE and may create desirable or adverse effects in the operational area. IT may also be
leveraged to enable complex interorganizational coordination through collaborative virtual
networking to facilitate reachback to the required SMEs. The JFCs and staff consider the
capabilities and priorities of USG components, NGOs, and other interorganizational
partners throughout the joint force’s planning and execution of OIE.

a. Coordination and Synchronization. The deliberate coordination and

synchronization of interorganizational efforts enables inclusion of the various perspectives,
interests, and equities of each stakeholder; enhances friendly credibility and narrative;
preserves legitimacy; mitigates the potential for conflicting messages; and improves the
overall efficiency and effectiveness of whole-of-government efforts. To facilitate the

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Chapter III

working relationships among the stakeholders, the JFC will need to establish coordination
and synchronization mechanisms to facilitate planning and execution with mission
partners. The JFC establishes working relationships, specific organizational structures, and
operational practices with external organizations to align activities and achieve unity of
effort consistent with the overarching USG narrative. For example, the collaboration and
synchronization of information activities can be accomplished through the establishment
of cross-functional organizations (e.g., joint interagency task force [JIATF], JIACG)
capable of leveraging information.

For more information, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

b. USG Organizations. Effective integration of the appropriate USG organizations

will enhance the overall success of joint force operations. There are a multitude of
organizations inside and outside DOD that are relevant to the joint force’s management
and application of information. The JFC and staff, when appropriate, coordinate
information activities and objectives for OIE with organizations that can impact the joint
force’s leveraging of information.

(1) At the national level, the NSC, with its policy coordination committees and
interagency working groups, advises and assists the President on all aspects of national
security policy. OSD and the JS, in consultation with the Services and CCMDs, coordinate
interagency support required to support the JFC’s plans and orders. From an information
joint function perspective, it is essential to coordinate activities that support creating the
JFC’s desired effects, with careful consideration of the inherent informational aspects of
those activities. While a supported CCDR is the focal point for coordination of interagency
supporting activities, interagency coordination with supporting commanders is also
important. Prior to integrating interagency capabilities into their estimates, plans, and
operations, JFCs should only consider those partners that can realistically commit their
resources to the JFC’s mission.

(2) Any USG department or agency planning or conducting activities within the
JOA, is considered a relevant organization. This is also true of private-sector entities and
NGOs. JFCs and their staffs should consider how the capabilities of other USG
components, NGOs, and members of the private sector (e.g., multinational corporations,
academia, operational contract support) can be leveraged to assist in accomplishing their
mission and broader national strategic objectives. JFCs should also consider the
capabilities and priorities of interagency partners in planning and executing information
activities. Such organizations do not necessarily need to have a physical presence in the
JOA to have an impact. Joint planners need to account for these impacts.

(3) In the case of international organizations, the JFC should determine the
significance of their presence in the JFC’s JOA and account for that presence in the JFC’s
planning and execution efforts.

(4) Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs). The CMOC is a mechanism

to coordinate CMO and can also provide operational- and tactical-level coordination

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 Unity of Effort

between the JFC and other stakeholders. Horizontal and vertical synchronization among
multiple CMOCs assists in unity of effort. The CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders,
providing a forum for military and other participating organizations. Sharing information
is a key function of the CMOC. CMOCs receive, validate, and coordinate requests for
support from NGOs, international organizations, indigenous populations and institutions,
the private sector, and regional organizations. They also liaise and coordinate between
joint forces and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the humanitarian
needs of the populace. This level of interaction results in CMO having a significant effect
on the perceptions of the local populace and improves understanding of the IE. Since this
populace may include potential adversaries, their perceptions are of great interest to the
information community. CMO can assist in identifying relevant actors; synchronizing
communications media, assets, and messages; and providing news and information to the
local population.

For more information on CMOCs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

(5) JIACG. The JIACG is an interagency staff group composed of USG civilian
and military experts tailored to meet a validated CCDR’s requirement. The primary role
of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination. JIACGs facilitate unified action in
support of plans, operations, contingencies, and initiatives. Members participate in
planning and provide links back to their parent civilian departments and agencies to help
synchronize JTF operations with their efforts. A JIACG provides the means to establish
collaborative working relationships between civilian and military planners. For example,
during joint operations a JIACG, as the bridge between the CCDR and interagency
partners, provides the CCDR and subordinate commanders with an increased capability to
coordinate and synchronize the joint force’s leveraging of information with other USG
departments and agencies. When augmented with other partners, such as international
organizations, NGOs, and multinational representatives, the JIACG enhances the
capability to conduct interorganizational cooperation.

(6) JIATF. A JIATF is a potential source for fused interagency information and
intelligence analysis. For example, Joint Interagency Task Force-West is United States
Indo-Pacific Command’s (USINDOPACOM’s) lead for DOD support to law enforcement
for counterdrug and drug-related activities in the USINDOPACOM AOR. Its assigned
mission is to protect national security interests and promote regional stability by providing
US and foreign law enforcement with fused interagency information and intelligence
analysis and with counterdrug training and infrastructure development support.

Refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for a list of USG and international

organizations relevant to the joint force’s planning of, requirements for, and support in
leveraging information.

7. Multinational Partner Considerations

Collective security is a strategic objective of the United States which, generally,

requires effective integration of diverse multinational partners. This integration effort is

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Chapter III

often complicated since some of these mission partners have policies, doctrine, procedures,
and capabilities that differ from those of the United States. During such operations, joint
planning is accomplished within the context of multinational operations. There is no single
doctrine for multinational action, and each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols
and plans. With regard to information activities and the conduct of OIE, US planning for
joint operations accommodates and complements the inherent complexity of multinational
partner considerations.

a. It is essential for the MNF commander to resolve potential conflicts as soon as

possible by establishing standard lexicon and procedures, as well as appropriate shared
understanding of each other’s capabilities. It is also an operational imperative for the MNF
commander to integrate multinational partners into joint planning as early as possible.
Early integration enables the efficient and effective use of MNF capabilities and resources
throughout planning and operations.

b. Each nation has classified and unclassified capabilities, products, and resources that
are useful to the joint force and to the MNF’s information activities. For example, NATO’s
Strategic Communications Division produces an IE assessment that improves joint force
understanding by identifying audiences; benchmarking attitudes, perceptions, and
behaviors; and identifying communications processes and systems. To maximize the
benefits of multinational information activities, each nation must be willing to share
appropriate information to accomplish the assigned mission, while excluding the
information that each nation is obliged to protect. To enable shared understanding across
the MNF, the activities and the structures, systems, and facilities that support them should
be classified at the lowest level possible. Information sharing arrangements in formal
alliances, such as United States participation in United Nations’ missions, are worked out
as part of alliance protocols. Conversely, information sharing arrangements in ad hoc
multinational operations during which coalitions are working together on a short-notice
mission, should be developed during the establishment of the coalition.

For more information on MNFs, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

c. Planners and operators consider the capabilities, limitations, and authorities of

partners related to the management and application of information by the joint force (e.g.,
a partner nation with established policies, laws, and means for information dissemination
across its country). The policies of each partner regarding the use of information might
not align with US/DOD policy, so joint planners, even while collaborating with a partner,
always comply with US/DOD policy. See paragraph 8, “Legal Considerations,” for a
similar discussion related to laws of the United States and its multinational partners. From
an information joint function perspective, initial requirements for coordinating and
synchronizing with and integrating other partners into US planning include:

(1) Understanding partner agendas, priorities, and objectives.

(2) Clarifying partner narratives, themes, messages, and activities.

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 Unity of Effort

(3) Establishing deconfliction procedures for narratives, themes, and messages of

the MNF that may differ from those of the United States/DOD.

(4) Identifying threats to, vulnerabilities of, and opportunities for the MNF.

(5) Developing options to deter or defeat MNF threats and to mitigate MNF
vulnerabilities.

(6) Identifying MNF authorities, capabilities, and capacities.

(7) Determining appropriate access of partners to US systems, services, and

information, to include unclassified and appropriate levels of classification validated as
mission-essential.

Refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for additional information on multinational

partners and operations.

8. Legal Considerations

US military information activities are subject to applicable international laws and

treaties, US laws and policies, and DOD regulations and policies. Understanding how
various policies and laws interact in practice with respect to the IE is a challenging task.
To overcome these challenges, commanders and staff consult with legal advisors
throughout the planning process. Planners should maintain awareness of relevant
international agreements and consult with legal advisors to identify associated legal
obligations/constraints that must be incorporated into plans. The DOS publication,
Treaties in Force, (https://www.state.gov/treaties-in-force/) outlines international
agreements currently binding on the United States, but is not intended to be a definitive
listing of all such obligations (i.e., classified agreements, implementing arrangements, and
other agreements are intentionally omitted).

a. Many activities and operations that leverage information require specific review
processes and execution authorities. Presidential executive orders and policy
memorandums, DOD directives, instructions, manuals, and policy memorandums establish
the authorities and permissions to plan, integrate, approve, and execute information
activities. During the initial planning process, planners should coordinate information
activities and OIE across the joint force, as well as with USG departments and agencies.
In some cases, DOD may not be the lead agency and, therefore, may be subject to additional
constraints.

b. Conducting OIE involves complex legal issues such as statutory, policy, and
budgetary authorities that require careful review and may require national-level
coordination and approval. Moreover, legal interpretations can differ because of the range
of legal interests potentially affected and the challenges for laws and policies to keep pace
with the complexity of, and rapid changes in, IT. Commanders and their staffs should

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Chapter III

involve legal advisors and policy experts early in, and throughout, the planning and
execution process. A best practice is to include legal and policy experts in CFTs.

c. DOD components will execute information activities in accordance with DODD

3600.01, Information Operations (IO); DODD 5122.05, Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD[PA]); US law; and other supporting policy, guidance,
and directions.

d. DOD personnel will not intentionally disseminate information to influence US

domestic audiences, organizations, or individuals, to include US Service members and their
families.

e. DOD components conducting information activities that also qualify as intelligence

activities comply with all law and guidance applicable to such activities including, but not
limited to, Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (as amended), and
DODM 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities.

Refer to JP 3-84, Legal Support, for additional guidance on legal support to CCDRs.

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 CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND PLANNING

“The world has changed, and our approach to warfare must change with it. As
traditional organized power structures erode, disorder fills the void. We are
moving from successive regional conflicts to a future characterized by continual
global competition. This circumstance will reward those who can leverage
information for strategic advantage.”

Lieutenant General Timothy D. Haugh,

Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas J. Hall, and
Major Eugene H. Fan
16th Air Force and Convergence for the Information War,
Cyber Defense Review, Summer 2020

1. Introduction

Fundamentally, US strategies are grounded in the knowledge that we are guided by

our values and disciplined by our interests. Commanders and their staffs employ
operational art to connect tactical actions to strategic objectives. This chapter examines
how the joint force translates strategic guidance operationally focused outcomes and
describes how commanders and staffs incorporate the information joint function into the
planning of operations. This chapter amplifies JP 5-0, Joint Planning, with the emphasis
on how the joint force integrates information into operational design and planning.

2. Information Planners and Operational Design and Planning

a. All members of the JFC’s staff are responsible for accomplishing or contributing
to tasks of the information joint function, to include understanding how information affects
joint force operations, understanding how their respective activities impact and are
impacted by the IE, and integrating that understanding into their respective portions of joint
plans.

b. Information planners assigned to the staff enhance the JFC staff’s ability to carry
out information joint function tasks. Information planners are trained professionals from
across specialized capabilities (e.g., MISO, CMO, CO, EMSO, PA). Those planners have
subject matter expertise with specialized capabilities, experience working with and in OIE
units, and an understanding of the inherent informational aspects of capabilities and
activities of other units (e.g., a bomber task force or a carrier strike group executing a show
of force, an armored task force conducting a feint). Information planners collaborate with
the rest of the staff to develop and plan activities in a manner that most effectively leverages
the informational aspects of joint force operations, as well as planning OIE, to support
achieving the JFC’s objectives. They ensure the joint force remains aware of interagency
activities that may either support or potentially conflict with achieving objectives and,
when possible, collaborate with external organizations to coordinate and synchronize
information activities that support achieving shared objectives.

IV-1
Chapter IV

c. Information planners comprise the information planning cell and are the core of the
information CFT with responsibility for incorporating input from the information CFT into
the operational design and planning of joint operations and maintaining the information
estimate. Some information planners are assigned to serve in the JS J-5, or as liaisons to
external organizations, particularly with OIE units and information forces.

3. Operational Design

a. Overview. Operational design is the analytical framework that underpins planning.

Operational design supports commanders and planners in understanding the JFC’s OE as
a complex interactive system. Operational design is interwoven within the planning
process (see Figure IV-1) to provide a framework in which to plan. The framework enables
planners to address the complexity of a commander’s OE, support mission analysis and
COA development, and develop a CONOPS with the highest likelihood of success.
Operational design is continuous and cyclical in that it is conducted prior to, and during,
joint operations. As commanders and staffs apply the operational design methodology to
develop their operational approach, they account for how information impacts the OE and
the potential inherent informational aspects of their activities. In doing so, joint force
planners gain an understanding of relevant actors and consider how information is used by,
and affects the behavior of, those actors.

b. Operational Design Methodology Steps

(1) Understand the strategic direction and guidance.

(a) Strategic guidance and direction give commanders perspective on national-

level goals. Sources of strategic guidance include the JSCP and Contingency Planning
Guidance; policies and directives; domestic and international laws; communication
synchronization guidance; and higher headquarters’ orders or estimates. Commanders and
staffs translate strategic guidance into plans and orders, to include desired behaviorally
focused effects that support commanders’ objectives and enduring strategic outcomes.

(b) National and subordinate mission narratives also help guide the joint
force on how to conduct operations in a manner that supports USG enduring goals.

1. National Narrative. When employing the US military instrument of

national power, the President or national security staff may provide a narrative that includes
national-level communication guidance. More often, the strategic national narrative will
have to be derived (understood) from guidance such as the NDS, NSC talking points, and
speeches. The national narrative informs the development of mission narratives in
accordance with the narrative hierarchy shown in Figure IV-2.

2. Strategic Mission Narrative. The DOD, either the JS or OSD, then

develops a strategic mission narrative that explains the use of the military and puts global
operations in context. CCDRs also develop a strategic mission narrative based upon the
national narrative. This strategic mission narrative and its supporting themes are included

IV-2 JP 3-04
 Operational Design and Planning

Joint Planning Overview

Commander
Actions Commander’s Refine, as necessary Commander’s Refine, as necessary Commander’s Commander’s
Guidance Approval/ Approval/ Approval/
Guidance Guidance Guidance

Iterative Dialogue Between the Commander, Staff, and Higher Headquarters

Staff Actions Mission

and Analysis
Products Brief COA
Decision
JIPOE Staff Revise Staff Estimates Brief COA
Estimates Approval

Joint COA
Planning Planning Mission COA Analysis COA Plan/Order
Process Initiation Analysis Development and Comparison Development
(JPP) Wargaming

Operational
Design
Understand Understand Understand Define Develop the Identify
Strategic Strategic Operational the Operational Decisions and
Direction Environment Environment Problem Approach Decision Points

Assess and Refine the Operational Approach

Legend
COA course of action commander actions primary plan flow
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of
the operational environment staff actions
supporting actions
JPP steps flow

operational design steps

Figure IV-1. Joint Planning Overview

or referenced in the military orders or other strategic direction to lend continuity to

campaigns and communications.

3. Operational and Tactical Mission Narratives. CCMD and

operational-level headquarters staffs develop cascading operational-level mission
narratives with associated themes and messages that nest under the strategic military
narrative. As necessary, each tactically focused unit develops and incorporates a local
mission narrative that nests under the operational mission narrative.

For more information on narratives, see Appendix A, “Narrative Development.”

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Chapter IV

Narrative Hierarchy

Primary
Narrative Type Sources
Audiences
National Global President
Domestic National Security Council

Strategic Mission Global Secretary of Defense

Theater Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Domestic Combatant Commanders

Operational Mission Theater Combatant Commands

Regional Joint Force Commanders
Domestic Component Commanders

Tactical Mission Local Area Joint Force Commanders

Figure IV-2. Narrative Hierarchy

(2) Understand the strategic environment. The strategic environment is the

composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect national interests
beyond the JFC’s OE and may impact the composition of alliances, establish competing
requirements or priorities, and/or affect deployment and distribution operations (e.g.,
degrade or disrupt force flow). The second step in operational design methodology,
understand the strategic environment, provides the JFC and staff the strategic context for
the assigned mission and provides the boundaries within which the JFC’s operational
approach must fit. Information planners work with intelligence analysts to contribute to
understanding the strategic environment. These analyses include conclusions on how
information is likely to impact the strategic environment and a broad analysis of opponent,
friendly, and neutral efforts to influence domestic, regional, and world opinion.

(a) Analysis of the IE is conducted using several analytical processes and

models. The result of those analyses provides conclusions about how information in the
strategic environment is likely to impact the JFC’s OE and operational approach and how
joint force operations are likely to impact the strategic environment. Analysis includes the
following considerations:

1. What events or activities (whether related to friendly, neutral, or

adversary actors) are resonating in and through the IE that could impact the strategic
environment and how those events could affect USG national security objectives, priorities,
or the JFC’s operational approach (e.g., a global pandemic, the eruption of a volcano that
impacts air travel, national elections in an allied nation, an adversary’s conduct of a ballistic
missile or nuclear bomb test).

2. What USG activities, both ongoing and those directed in strategic

guidance, will resonate in and through the IE to impact the strategic environment and how
they are likely to impact the JFC’s OE.

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 Operational Design and Planning

(b) Analyzing the ability of an opponent to influence their domestic

audiences, as well as their ability to influence regional and world opinion through the
conduct of diplomatic, informational, military, or economic activities.
INFORMATION WITH STRATEGIC IMPACT

Russian intelligence agencies and state sanctioned organizations have

waged a steady campaign of attacks on information systems around the
globe for many years. These have been in retaliation, such as the 2007
targeted attacks and denial of service of the Estonian parliament, banks,
ministries, newspapers and broadcasters websites after the Estonian
government removed a Soviet-era statue in its capital city; in support of
Russian combat actions in neighboring Georgia, Crimea, and eastern
Ukraine; to steal information and data as it did when it hacked and
inserted malicious code of tech company SolarWinds software in 2020
used by private sector and United States Government organizations;
and to influence domestic politics of other nations, such as its
disinformation campaign largely waged on social media leading up to
the 2016 United States national elections. More domestic examples are
digital breaches of the White House, Department of State, and Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 2014 and 2015, as well as the hack of the Democratic
National Committee email in 2016.

These are steady and synchronized actions with strategic objectives by

Russia. First and foremost, Russia wants to return to a world power
status. Disinformation is one way to blunt US influence as a world power
both in Allied and partner perceptions of the United States, as well as to
foment division and turmoil domestically. Second is to protect Russia’s
sphere of influence. By forcing the United States to focus more on
domestic disorder, it creates a vacuum in which Russia can exert
pressure on the world order. Russia targets our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization partners and the European Union to sow discord and
negatively affect Western liberal democratic institutions. Russia uses
disinformation and cyberspace operations to target weaker nearby
nations to pressure leadership to reject integration with the West. Third,
Russia uses information to protect and strengthen its current regime.
Vladimir Putin relies on his hand-picked oligarchs to maintain control of
the country. By targeting Western democratic nations it seeks to show
the current government in Russia is more stable and able to protect its
citizens. Finally, information activities strengthen its military
capabilities. Russia does not have the economic means to procure and
maintain the traditional military capabilities that the West possesses, so
disinformation and cyberspace operations are “cheaper” tools to
engage in adversarial competition below the level of armed conflict. In
many ways, Russia has an advantage in using information capabilities
since it does not subscribe to the same norms and values inherent in
democracies. The much quoted adage of “a lie can travel halfway
around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes,” rings true.

Various Sources

IV-5
Chapter IV

(c) Analyzing the ability of US and partner nations’ diplomatic,

informational, military, or economic activities to influence regional or world opinion.

(3) Understand the OE. A JFC’s OE is a diverse, interactive, and constantly

evolving collection of systems. It encompasses the immediate operational area and all
conditions, circumstances, and influences that impact the employment of forces or have
the potential to impact and affect the JFC’s decisions. To frame the problem, the JFC
requires an understanding of the current state versus the desired state of the OE. It is also
important to appreciate the competing conditions competitors, adversaries, and enemies
seek to realize through their operations. Before defining the problem and developing an
approach to solve it, the commander and staff first need to describe conditions in both the
current state of the OE and the desired state of the OE when operations conclude. Those
desired conditions should facilitate the desired relevant actor behaviors. Identifying
necessary conditions early in planning will help the commander and staff devise an
operational approach with lines of effort (LOEs) and lines of operation (LOOs) that link
each current condition to objectives. Information planners assist in the analysis of the
informational, physical, and human aspects of the environment; identifying and describing
relevant actors and their drivers of behavior; and determining the most likely behaviors of
relevant actors.

(a) Characterize the human, informational, and physical aspects of the

OE. The JIPOE process provides the basis for understanding information and how it
affects the JFC’s OE. Even though the intelligence directorate of a JFC’s staff manages
the JIPOE process, other directorates and agencies contribute valuable expertise to develop
and assess the complexities of the JFC’s OE. Information planners use their specific
expertise to assist the planning team to:

1. Understand how information moves in and through the OE. Planners

should identify how it is received, processed, and employed, by whom or what, and for
what purposes.

2. Establish a baseline of the IE to create a reference point of relevant

actor perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior, while assessing changes to the baseline
over time.

3. Distinguish what information in the IE is relevant and characterize its

sources and methods of movement or transmission.

4. Identify misinformation and disinformation and credible from non-

credible sources of information.

5. Understand the information networks and systems that are being used
by relevant actors.

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 Operational Design and Planning

6. Identify which joint force activities are observable and by whom.

This includes understanding the inherent information aspects of those activities that are
most likely to be used by relevant actors to derive meaning.

(b) Identify and understand relevant actors. These efforts include the
conduct of all-source intelligence operations and engagement with partners to improve
knowledge of friendly, neutral, and adversary actors and their PMESII systems and how
they work as networks. Products that can help identify and describe relevant actors are
JIPOE products, target systems analysis, center of gravity (COG) analysis, network
engagement analysis, TAA, publicly available information, and area studies and
assessments. Information planners use their specific expertise to assist the JPG to:

1. Identify humans and automated systems that are potential relevant

actors.

2. Describe what drivers of behavior are most likely to affect relevant

actors (see Chapter I, “Fundamentals of Information,” Figure I-2, for examples of drivers
of behavior).

3. Understand how relevant actors sense and process information to

trigger a behavior that can positively or negatively impact joint operations.

4. Describe how relevant actors communicate and make decisions.

5. Identify relevant actors that are decision makers, key influencers, or

both.

6. Identify those key influencers of relevant actors both inside and

outside the AOR.

(c) Identify range of potential behaviors of relevant actors. Identifying

the range of potential behaviors of relevant actors helps planners formulate the operational
approach that will result in desired behaviors. Intelligence analysts help the JPG to develop
a detailed understanding of the range of behavior relevant actors may display and assess
which of those behaviors are most likely or might have the greatest positive or negative
impact on joint force objectives. Information planners use their specific expertise to assist
the JPG to:

1. Identify the perceptions that relevant actors are likely to form based
on the inherent informational aspects of activities and OIE included in the operational
approach.

2. Identify what relevant actor behaviors can be anticipated as a result

of those perceptions.

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Chapter IV

3. Describe how the behaviors of relevant actors are expected to evolve

over time.

4. Describe how information can affect behavioral trends to yield

outcomes favorable or unfavorable to friendly interests.

5. Identify what broad actions the joint force should take to create the
effects in the JFC’s OE that arrest or encourage behavioral trends.

6. Identify potential second and third order effects of the operational

approach, inside the JFC’s operational area and globally, including domestically.

(4) Define the problem

(a) Defining the problem involves understanding and isolating the root
causes of the issue that are the essence of what may be a complex, ill-defined problem and
determining how and why the particular problem requires a joint force solution. Defining
the problem begins with a review of the tendencies and potential of the relevant actors and
identifying the relationships and interactions among their respective strategies, objectives,
and desired conditions. This review helps define areas of tension, competition, and
contested environments, as well as the opportunities and challenges these present to the
joint force, and helps identify the difference between the current conditions and desired
conditions. Framing the problem statement in terms of human behavior and conditions of
the environment helps the joint force understand the nature of the problem.

(b) The JFC and staff identify and articulate the following when developing
the problem statement:

1. Tensions between current conditions and desired conditions at the

objective.

2. Elements within the OE that must change or remain the same to

achieve the objective, including relevant actors’ behaviors, which impede or support
changing the current conditions in the OE to the desired conditions in the OE.

3. Opportunities and threats that the joint force can exploit or that will
impede the JFC from achieving the required objectives.

4. Operational limitations.

5. Sources of stability and sources of instability within the OE.

(c) Information planners provide the following inputs for the analysis portion
of this step:

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 Operational Design and Planning

1. The description of the informational, physical, and human aspects of

the environment, and their effects on relevant actor behavior, that were part of the systems
perspective in the previous step.

2. The description of the desired conditions expressed in terms of

relevant actor behaviors.

(d) Information planners contributions to the outputs in paragraph (b)

include:

1. Description of the linkages between the root cause of the problem and
relevant actor behaviors.

2. A description of the differences between current conditions and those

desired conditions that need to be reconciled to support achieving the JFC’s objectives, to
include cultural, religious, or other human aspects that drive relevant actor behavior. This
includes a description of the tensions between current and anticipated relevant actor
behaviors and the JFC’s objectives and desired conditions.

3. A description of what must change in the IE to facilitate achieving the

JFC’s objectives. Examples include availability of a reliable communications
infrastructure to enable free-flowing information, availability of accurate information to
counter adversary propaganda, and a credible and compelling narrative that counters the
adversary’s narrative.

4. A description of the opportunities and threats in and through the IE

that would hinder achieving the JFC’s objectives. Opportunities might include an
adversary’s reliance for C2 on a portion of the EMS that the joint force can control or a
populace support of the joint force presence to counter enemy forces. Threats could include
sophisticated enemy EMSO capabilities against a joint force relying on the EMS for C2 or
a local population’s acceptance of an insurgent narrative that describes the joint force as
foreign invaders. Opportunities or threats could also include narratives in the OE from
third parties or neutral groups that do or could potentially reinforce friendly or adversary
narratives. Constraints could include directives to the joint force that dictate actions that
have affects in and through the IE (e.g., a requirement to conduct OCO to eliminate a threat,
the requirement for the joint force to hold weekly PA briefings or embed reporters with
operational units) or directives that restrict actions that cause impacts in or through the IE
(e.g., prohibition on the use of OCO that targets relevant actors outside of the JFC’s
operational area, prohibition on establishing radio stations that compete with local national
stations for listenership, restrictions on using religious or sensitive cultural topics in
psychological operations messages).

(5) Identify assumptions. Where there is insufficient information or guidance,

the commander and staff identify assumptions to assist in framing solutions. At this stage,
assumptions address strategic and operational gaps that enable the commander to develop
the operational approach. During this step of operational design methodology, information

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planners contribute to the development of the operational approach by drafting assumptions

focused primarily on the ability of the joint force to leverage information. These include
assumptions about the availability of the means to affect relevant actor behavior, the access
the joint force will have to the relevant actors through those means, the joint force
authorities and permissions to conduct information activities, and the funding, staffing, and
time needed to affect relevant actor behavior. Also, though behavior can be changed in the
relative near-term, attitude change might take generations to become enduring. All
assumptions should be carefully assessed for internal biases and mirror imaging. Other
assumptions include the joint force ability to manage and protect friendly information,
information systems, and information networks, and the forces required to conduct those
activities.

(6) Develop the operational approach. The operational approach is a

commander’s description of the broad actions the force can take to achieve objectives. This
step of operational design develops the initial model for execution of a campaign or
operation that a JFC and staff will continually refine and is the basis for beginning,
continuing, and completing detailed planning in JPP.

(a) The JFC’s operational approach is the commander’s visualization of how

the joint force’s operations will transform current conditions into desired conditions—the
way the commander envisions the OE at the conclusion of operations to support national
objectives. When developing the operational approach, planners identify and describe the
logic of the effort—the theory of change—by starting with the desired future state of the
OE and working backwards to the current state. A theory of change describes how planners
think elements of an operation or LOE will lead to a desired future state. The descriptions
should explain how actions or inputs to the activity are expected to lead to changes that
support desired outcomes, either directly or through a chain of linked events. These
expected changes and their linkages inform assessments to identify progress in producing
the desired results and provide indicators of challenges or problems. Information planners
use their expertise to describe how information activities link to desired relevant actor
behaviors that support the JFC’s objectives.

(b) Information planners’ contributions to developing the operational

approach include analysis of the informational, physical, and human aspects of the
environment. These products help the JFC determine how to leverage information as part
of the operational approach.

1. Leveraging information as the main effort. In operations where a

relevant actor is the adversary’s COG, the JFC may choose an operational approach that
leverages information against the relevant actor to drive desired behaviors. In such cases,
joint force efforts will focus on deterring or defeating an opponent coercively by leveraging
information to isolate, disrupt, degrade, and control behavior. During armed conflict, this
approach may include the application of lethal or nonlethal force against the COG.
Carefully applied force can contribute to deterring an actor from taking unwanted actions.

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 Operational Design and Planning

2. Leveraging information as a supporting effort. In other

operations, directly leveraging information to affect the opponent COG or critical
capability may not be sufficient to produce the behaviors in relevant actors needed to
achieve objectives. In these cases, the JFC may describe an operational approach that
leverages information in a supporting role during operations, as well as to maintain the
support from allies and other mission partners for those operations. During operations not
focused on the defeat of an opponent force (e.g., humanitarian assistance, personnel
recovery, noncombatant evacuation operation) the JFC’s operational approach should
leverage information to inform the supported government and population of joint force
efforts to facilitate the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts and to transition the
efforts to full civilian control as quickly as possible.

3. Leveraging information LOE. Regardless of how the JFC

addresses the joint force leveraging of information in operational design, a commander
should always integrate information and its effects into all LOEs. The JFC may even
consider using an information LOE in plans. An information LOE focuses efforts on
producing relevant actor behaviors by linking strategic and operational-level objectives,
tasks, effects, and conditions to achieve enduring strategic outcomes. In operations
involving many nonmilitary factors, an information OE may be the only way to link tasks,
effects, conditions, and the operational objectives.

(7) Identify decisions and decision points. During planning, commanders

inform leadership of the decisions that will need to be made, when they will have to be
made, and the uncertainty and risk accompanying decisions and delay. This provides
leaders a decision matrix to provide warning and enable decisions in advance.
Additionally, this helps facilitate collaboration with interagency partners and allies to
develop alternatives and exploit opportunities short of escalation. The decision matrix also
identifies the expected indicators needed in support of operation assessment and
intelligence requirements and collection plans.

(a) Information planners provide input on the decisions and decision points
related to the joint force leveraging of information. Examples include decisions on the use
of OCO techniques that could reveal a previously undisclosed friendly system, tactic,
technique, or procedure; whether to degrade an enemy’s C2 through the use of EMS
capabilities that would reveal the conduct of covert operation; the timing of a PA briefing
to announce the initiation of operations; or whether to conduct MISO ahead of major
combat operations.

(b) Information planners also consider and recommend decisions and

decision points related to protecting the force from the impacts of activities, to include joint
force activities, in or through the IE. These would include decisions to increase cyberspace
protection condition system levels in response to enemy or adversary actions, decisions on
the timing of disclosing joint force crisis action deployments to delay adversary
understanding of friendly movements and force posture in support of force protection, and
decisions on procedures for publicizing joint force-caused civilian casualties to mitigate
the impact of the incident on joint force credibility and legitimacy.

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Chapter IV

(c) Information planners need to consider how operations support options for
commanders to provide an enemy or adversary an acceptable means to de-escalate.

(8) Refine the operational approach. Throughout the planning processes,

commanders and their staffs conduct formal and informal discussions at all levels of the
chain of command, supporting CCDRs, and subordinate commands. These discussions
help refine assumptions, limitations, and decision points that could affect the operational
approach and ensure the plan remains feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Information
planners participate in the refinement of the operational approach by updating the
information estimate and providing the results of information activities.

(9) Develop planning guidance. Ideally, the commander issues initial planning
guidance, either written or oral, prior to the start of JPP. At a minimum, the commander
provides planning guidance at the conclusion of mission analysis. The commander will
refine that guidance as understanding of the OE, the problem, and visualization of the
operational approach matures. Planning guidance should include a description of the
commander’s understanding of the strategic and OEs, a definition of the problem, and a
description of the operational approach. Information planners help develop the specific
content to inform and guide how the joint force will leverage information to achieve
objectives. That content should include a description of:

(a) The OE and how informational, physical, and human aspects impact one
another and cause tensions.

(b) The problem framed in terms of relevant actor behavior. This should
include the tensions between relevant actor behaviors and the JFC’s objectives, along with
a timeline for resolution.

(c) Behaviorally focused objectives, which specify relevant actor behaviors

required to bring about desired conditions.

(d) Decisive points in the IE that provide the joint force with relative
advantage in influencing relevant actor behavior (e.g., gaining access to a threat’s
information system or network that can be exploited to affect decision making; gaining
active support from a key figure whom relevant actors support).

(e) LOEs or LOOs that focus the force on leveraging information to affect
behavior.

(f) A summary of limitations regarding the conduct of information activities.

For example, constraints might include the requirement for a deliberate communication
effort to mitigate the occurrence of civilian casualties in the operational area or to exploit
the use of weapons systems for their deterrent effect on adversaries or enemies outside of
the operational area. A restraint might include the prohibition on the use of certain social
media or the possession of unapproved personal electronic devices by joint force members
during an operation. Additionally, the inherent informational aspects of some activities

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 Operational Design and Planning

may lead to additional restraints or constraints if the inherent informational aspects of those
activities have transregional effects.

(g) A statement of where the commander will and will not accept risk in
leveraging information during operations and conducting OIE. For example, a JFC may
identify local population support of a HN’s government as a key objective. Consequently,
the JFC may be willing to accept the risk of an inefficient, HN-led, US-supported disaster
relief effort to avoid a greater risk of an efficient US-led effort causing the local populace
to perceive their government as incapable of meeting their needs.

(h) The commander’s initial intent that includes desired relevant actor
behaviors and the narrative statement or paragraph that conveys the commander’s reasons
and desired outcomes for the campaign/mission/operation.

c. Informational Considerations During COG Analysis. Identification and

analysis of friendly and adversary COGs is a key step in operational design and informs
JPP. A COG is a primary source of power that provides moral or physical strength,
freedom of action, or will to act. COGs can be a military force, an alliance, political or
military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. Success requires
protecting the friendly COG while defeating the enemy COG. The protection of friendly
strategic COGs such as public opinion and US national capabilities typically requires
efforts and capabilities beyond those of just the supported CCDR.

(1) COG analysis is used to identify potential threat and friendly COGs, identify
critical capabilities, identify critical requirements for each critical capability, and identify
critical vulnerabilities for each critical requirement. Based upon how the threat organizes,
fights, makes decisions, and uses its physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses,
planners identify the threat’s and joint force’s COGs for further analysis. Planners should
recognize that relevant actors may be a COG or key factor for an operation and that using
information or denying information to deceive, confuse, or disrupt the ability of the
relevant actor to sense and make sense of the situation may be a decisive factor in that
operation. Planners analyze COGs within a framework of three critical factors—
capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities.

(2) Information planners do not conduct a separate COG analysis but actively
participate in and contribute subject matter expertise to the joint force, J-2-led COG effort.
Additionally, information planners use their understanding of relevant actors to reduce the
potential for inadvertently injecting internal biases such as mirror imaging.

(a) Identify Critical Capabilities. A critical capability is a means that is

considered a crucial enabler for a COG to function as such and is essential to the
achievement of the specified or assumed objective(s). Information planners identify
critical capabilities by analyzing each COG to determine what primary abilities or
functions are possessed by both friendly and threat forces that can prevent the joint force
or the threat from understanding how information impacts the JFC’s OE, supporting its
decision making, or effectively leveraging information. To test the validity of a critical

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Chapter IV

capability, the staff asks, “Is the identified critical capability a primary ability in context
with the given missions of the threat or the joint force? Is the identified critical capability
directly related to the COG?”

(b) Identify Critical Requirements for each Critical Capability.

Information planners analyze each critical capability to determine what conditions,
resources, or means enable the friendly or threat critical capability. To test the validity of
a critical requirement, the staff asks, “Will an exploitation of the critical vulnerability
disable the associated critical capability? Does the joint force have the resources to affect
the identified critical vulnerability?” If either answer is no, then the information planner
reviews the threat’s identified critical factors for other critical vulnerabilities or reassess
how to attack the previously identified critical vulnerabilities with additional resources.
Information planners also look at the critical requirements for friendly capabilities to
identify what must be protected.

(c) Identify Critical Vulnerabilities for each Critical Requirement.

Planners then analyze each critical requirement to identify its vulnerability to attack.
Information planners help identify critical vulnerabilities that will do the most decisive
damage to a COG’s ability to access, generate, share, and restrict access to information.
Additionally, information planners help identify critical vulnerabilities associated with a
COG’s critical capabilities associated with the ability to leverage information to affect
behavior. However, in selecting those critical vulnerabilities, planners also compare their
criticality with their accessibility, redundancy, resiliency, and impact on other military and
national objectives. If the exploitation of a critical vulnerability would disable the
associated critical requirement, information planners determine if the joint force has
sufficient resources to leverage information to affect identified vulnerabilities.

4. Joint Planning Process

a. Overview. JPP is an orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of

steps to analyze a mission, select the best COA and produce a campaign or joint OPLAN
or order. Like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and
determine a solution. It is a tool to be used by planners but is not prescriptive. Throughout
the JPP steps (see Figure IV-3), information planners assist other joint planners in
incorporating their understanding of how information impacts the OE to identify how to
best support human and automated system decision making and how to best leverage
information to achieve the JFC’s objectives during operations. The result of the JPP is a
plan or order that clearly specifies how the joint force will use and leverage information as
part of the overall operation. There are information considerations for each of the seven
steps of the JPP that are covered in the remainder of this chapter.

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 Operational Design and Planning

Planning Functions, Process, and Operational Design Methodology

Strategic Guidance Concept Development Plan Development Assessment
 Initiate Planing  Shared Understanding  COA Selection  Plan
Planning  Basis for Mission  Develop Options  Plan or Order Assessment
Functions Analysis  Develop Operational Approach Development  Operational

(four)  Develop Shared  Course of Action (COA)  In-Progress Reviews Assessment

Understanding development and Approval
 Understand Operational  COA wargaming

Environment  COA comparison

Joint
Planning COA COA COA Plan or
Planning Mission COA
Process Development Analysis and Order
Initiation Analysis Wargaming Comparison Approval Development
(seven
steps)

Understand Strategic Direction

Understand Strategic Environment

Understand Operational Environment

Operational Define the Problem
Design
Methodology Identify Assumptions

Develop Options

Identify Decisions and Decision Points

Refine the Operational Approach

Develop Planning Guidance

Figure IV-3. Planning Functions, Process, and Operational

Design Methodology

b. JPP Steps

(1) Step 1—Planning Initiation. During planning initiation, information

planners use their specific expertise to assist the JPG in:

(a) Reviewing commander’s planning guidance for information activities

and explicit and implied tasks that will impact planning.

(b) Identifying external stakeholders that the joint force should collaborate
with for planning and executing information activities (e.g., DOS Global Engagement
Center, country teams, JIATF or JIACG). See Chapter III, “Unity of Effort,” for
organizations to consider.

(c) Determining initial information planning support requirements to

augment the staff (e.g., information professionals to serve as information planners,
language/regional/cultural expertise).

(d) Gathering and analyzing the information required to plan operations that
affect relevant actor behavior and identified networks.

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Chapter IV

(e) Updating the information estimate, providing updates on changes in the

IE, updating the status of information forces, and providing the results of any ongoing
information activities.

(2) Step 2—Mission Analysis. The JFC and staff develop a restated mission
statement that allows subordinate and supporting commanders to begin their own estimates
and planning efforts for higher headquarters’ concurrence. The joint force’s mission is the
task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken
and the reason for doing so. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to
identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Mission analysis focuses the
commander and the staff on the problem at hand and lays a foundation for effective
planning.

(a) Analyze Higher Headquarters’ Planning Directives and Strategic

Guidance

1. Information planners contribute to the analysis of strategic guidance

and higher headquarters’ planning directives by understanding and advising the JFC on
how national leadership and higher headquarters intend for the military to support the
informational instrument of national power. In particular, information planners determine
higher headquarters’ perspective of how the military will leverage information to achieve
national strategic and military objectives, what behaviors that higher leadership wants from
relevant actors to support those objectives, and what role the joint force has in leveraging
information to obtain those desired behaviors.

2. During this step of mission analysis, CCMD and operational-level

headquarters staffs use strategic guidance to begin developing the operational mission
narrative. The operational mission narrative will include themes and messages that nest
under the strategic mission narrative. The development of the operational mission narrative
is a collaborative effort that should include planners with regional and cultural expertise.
Operational mission narratives focus on the theater/region and seek to advance the
legitimacy of the mission while countering adversary narratives. A compelling narrative
at this level guides planning, targeting, and execution. Likewise, the joint force should
make every effort to ensure operations, activities, words, and images are perceived as being
consistent with the narrative, thereby preventing audiences from perceiving a conflict
between the joint force’s actions and its words.

a. When developing the operational mission narrative, planners

should recognize that narratives are not created in a vacuum. There are pre-existing
narratives in the OE and others may emerge. These narratives may be from adversaries,
friendly forces, or relevant neutral groups. These other narratives may reinforce or run
counter to the joint force narrative. Awareness of these narratives leads to greater
understanding of how to leverage operations and messaging activities to achieve friendly
objectives.

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 Operational Design and Planning

ALIGNING ACTIONS TO THE NARRATIVE

When General Stanley A. McChrystal assumed command of the

International Security Forces Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2009, he recognized
that "the side with the most compelling narrative will succeed" and
conveyed messages with increased timeliness and transparency while
ensuring they matched actions. Preoccupied with force protection, ISAF
had operated in a manner that distanced itself, both physically and
psychologically, from the people they were seeking to protect. Force
protection measures conflicted with General McChrystal’s narrative of
security and confidence. When ISAF forces traveled through even the
most secure areas of Afghanistan firmly ensconced in armored vehicles
with body armor and turrets manned, they conveyed a sense of high risk
and fear to the population. McChrystal believed that unarmed Afghans
would not feel secure if ISAF forces presented an image of insecurity
even in relatively secure areas. ISAF needed to be willing to share risk,
at least equally, with the local people. Adjusting force protection
measures downward to match local conditions sent a message of
confidence and normalcy to the population that aligned with the
narrative.

Various Sources

b. Analyzing existing narratives provides insight into the messages

that relevant actors are conveying, how they are disseminated and propagated, how the
intended audiences and relevant actors react to the themes and messages in those narratives,
and potential avenues for influence. In addition to informing mission analysis and the
development of the operational mission narrative, the results from narrative analysis should
be incorporated into JIPOE and operational assessment processes. Figure IV-4 shows some
sample questions that an analysis of existing narratives can answer.

3. Additionally, information planners identify operations worldwide in

execution and ongoing activities, to include information activities, which will limit the
JFC’s range of possible COAs, as well as impact plans and operations. This awareness of
other ongoing operations and activities includes those of multinational partners.

4. Finally, as part of mission analysis, information planners identify

existing authorities and permissions and what additional authorities and permissions that
the JFC will require for the conduct of information activities. This is done as early as
possible in the JPP because of the time required to obtain those additional authorities and
permissions. Use of some capabilities or activities that leverage information to affect
behavior may require unique authorities and permissions. Joint force planners should also
review the authorities for the use of capabilities and conduct of activities in their own AOR
that could affect the OEs of other JFCs through the IE. Achieving a shared understanding
of authorities vertically across echelons of command and horizontally across mission
partners is key to successful execution. Information planners can advise the planning team
on which authorities for leveraging information may require additional time, legal review,
or subject matter expertise to request.

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Chapter IV

Questions for Narrative Analysis

(a) How do the relevant actors frame and explain their ideology?
(b) How do relevant actors make their ideology appear enduring and natural to
the local culture?
(c) Do joint force activities challenge their assumptions, beliefs, and meanings?
(d) What are the local culture/society goals that the joint force can leverage?
(e) Are there inconsistencies in a relevant actors’ narrative? If so, how does the
relevant actor deal with those inconsistencies? Do those inconsistencies
present a vulnerability that can be exploited?
(f) What is the structure of the existing narratives?
(g) How do existing narratives resonate with relevant actors?

Figure IV-4. Questions for Narrative Analysis

(b) Review Commander’s Initial Planning Guidance. Information

planners use the commander’s initial planning guidance as the basis for continuing the
analysis of the OE begun during operational design, which focused on describing the
relationship between the informational, physical, and human aspects of the environment,
and on identifying and describing relevant actors and their range of potential behaviors (see
paragraph 3, “Operational Design”).

(c) Determine Known Facts and Develop Planning Assumptions.

Information planners provide facts and assumptions related to the joint force understanding
of how information impacts the OE, the joint force’s ability to manage and share
information to support decision making, and the joint force’s ability to leverage
information. Potential facts and assumptions include but are not limited to:

1. The identity of relevant actors and why they are relevant to the JFC’s
mission.

2. The degree to which the joint force understands the perceptions,

attitudes, beliefs, and other drivers of relevant actor behaviors (see Chapter I,
“Fundamentals of Information,” paragraph 3.d., “Information can affect behavior,” for
examples of drivers of relevant actor behaviors).

3. The access that the joint force will have to humans and automated
systems to affect the behavior of relevant actors.

4. The impact that joint force operations will have upon the OE and
relevant actors. This includes the range of potential and likely behaviors of relevant actors
in response to joint force or others’ activities.

5. The availability and capacity of specialized capabilities for the joint

force to conduct OIE and information activities, to include those of mission partners.

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 Operational Design and Planning

6. The ability of the joint force to affect relevant actor behavior within
the parameters of the mission. In other words, will the joint force be able to affect relevant
actor behavior to the degree necessary and in sufficient time to support the achievement of
the JFC’s objectives?

7. The authorities and permissions available to the joint force to use

specialized capabilities, to target specific relevant actors, and to undertake information
activities.

8. The ability of relevant actors to attack or exploit the joint force’s

information, information networks, and information systems.

9. The ability of the joint force to protect its information, information

networks, and information systems from relevant actor action and the resilience of those
information networks and systems.

10. The ability of the joint force to manage and share friendly
information to support effective decision making and C2 during operations, especially
during multinational operations.

(d) Determine and Analyze Operational Limitations. Some operational

limitations may arise due to the inherent informational aspect of military activities, the
effects of which are not geographically constrained or limited to a joint force’s intended
audiences. The joint force cannot control the spread of information or its impact on
audiences, within or beyond their specified JOA. This may restrict a commander’s freedom
of action if the informational aspect of a COA undermines higher-priority national
objectives or negatively impacts the operations of other JFCs. Based upon their
understanding of how information impacts the OE, information planners work with the
other joint planners to develop a list of limitations related to relevant actors, the
employment of specialized capabilities or conduct of information activities, and the use of
specific themes and messages. Many of these limitations will be specified in authorities
and permissions from higher headquarters.

(e) Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks and Develop the
Mission Statement. The commander and staff review the planning directive’s specified
tasks and discuss implied tasks during planning initiation, then confirm the tasks during
mission analysis. Information planners identify specified and implied tasks to understand
how information impacts the OE, leverage information, and support decision making.
Information planners identify other implied tasks based upon their analysis of the
informational, physical, and human aspects of the OE and on an understanding of the
relevant actors and how to affect their drivers of behavior. From the lists of specified and
implied tasks, the commander and staff determine the essential tasks and use them to
develop the mission statement.

(f) Conduct Initial Force and Resource Analysis. During mission

analysis, the commander and staff team begin to develop a list of required forces and

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capabilities necessary to accomplish the specified and implied tasks. Information planners
contribute to this list by identifying those forces and capabilities required to understand
how information impacts the OE, support human and automated decision making, and
leverage information. In resource-constrained environments, military forces or capabilities
may be unavailable or not readily available to meet all requirements. As part of their initial
force and resource analysis, information planners should consider:

1. The lead time to deploy information forces and specialized

capabilities into theater or direct support to the joint force from a home location.

2. The lead time to coordinate approval of information authorities and

activities.

3. RFF or personnel with unique skills such as linguists, sociocultural

experts, social media experts, experts in analyzing publicly available information, as well
as experts on artificial intelligence and machine-learning.

4. Collaborating with mission partners who have information forces and

specialized capabilities and the capacity to fill joint force resource gaps.

5. Planners evaluate appropriate requirements against existing or

potential contracts or task orders to determine if a contracted support solution can meet the
requirement.

(g) Develop Military Objectives. Each military objective establishes a

clear goal toward which all the actions and effects of a LOO or LOE are directed. While
military objectives commonly describe the condition and/or the relative position of the joint
or enemy forces, the JFC may also express objectives as a particular behavior that the
military operation will bring about. Information planners work with the rest of the staff to
determine attainable behavioral goals that are based upon the analysis of the OE, including
the previously identified potential behaviors in response to joint force or others’ activities.
Information planners use these objectives to develop measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
and MOE indicators to assess how well the joint force leverages information. These
include identifying and incorporating indicators of trending success or failure into the
monitoring and assessment plan before finalization of the overall plan. Planners should
keep in mind that it may take a considerable amount of time to observe the effects of
information activities, and cause and effect relationship may be difficult to assess.

(h) Develop COA Evaluation Criteria. Information planners help develop

evaluation criteria that measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of a COA to
address threats and avoid or mitigate hazards in or through the IE. Potential evaluation
criteria may include whether and how well the COA:

1. Aligns planned actions with strategic and operational mission

narratives to establish the legitimacy of the joint force mission and actions with relevant
actors.

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 Operational Design and Planning

2. Includes information activities focused on producing the desired

behaviors in prioritized relevant actors.

3. Includes information activities that protect the joint force from

adversary attempts to undermine the joint force narrative or the legitimacy of the joint force
mission and actions (e.g., coordinated PA efforts to engage foreign and domestic publics,
leadership outreach to mission partners, and HN military and civilian leadership).

4. Includes information activities that prevent, counter, and mitigate

adversary or enemy attempts to undermine the joint force decision making and C2 (e.g.,
hardening of information systems against known enemy capabilities, building resiliency
into C2 systems)

5. Identifies and accounts for the potential second- and third-order

effects and potential risks to enduring strategic objectives (e.g., hardening of information
systems against known enemy capabilities, building resiliency into C2 systems).

6. Accounts for the potential impacts on the joint force from the
activities that resonate in and through the IE.

(i) Develop Risk Assessment. Information planners characterize the risk of

obstacles or actions having effects in and through the IE that could preclude mission
accomplishment. This includes actions that counter the narrative and indicate a “say-do
gap” in joint operations. Information planners are responsible for carefully articulating this
risk characterization so that commanders have a clear understanding of the potential
benefits and dangers associated with information activities. Many of these impediments
can be derived from an examination of friendly strategic and operational COGs and
include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Likelihood and impact of an adversary denying friendly C2 through

technical means (e.g., EMSO or CO).

2. Likelihood and impact of allied or partner nation withdrawing support

from a multinational operation.

3. Likelihood and impact of the collateral effects of joint force actions

(e.g., civilian casualties, economic hardship, cultural offense) undermining the strategic or
operational narrative and/or legitimacy of the joint force operation.

4. Likelihood and impact of adversary propaganda efforts undermining

joint force strategic or operational narrative and/or legitimacy of the joint force operations.

5. Likelihood and impact of friendly force casualties undermining

domestic support for joint force operations.

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6. Likelihood and impact of international pressure causing cessation of

joint force operations prior to strategic objectives being achieved.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis,
for additional information and guidance on risk determination.

(j) Determine Initial CCIRs. CCIRs identify key elements of information

the commander identifies as being critical to timely decision making.

1. Information planners should consider the following as potential

priority intelligence requirements (PIRs):

a. Intelligence required to resolve any remaining assumptions

related to adversary actions or capabilities or unresolved assumptions regarding the IE.

b. Intelligence required to detect the existence of any obstacles or

any adversary actions that were characterized during risk assessment as moderate or higher
risk.

c. Intelligence about the pending or actual conduct of activities by

opponents or other actors that will create effects in and through the IE that will likely
impact the JFC’s or strategic objectives (e.g., an opponent’s announcement that they will
withdraw forces from a contested area, a political announcement that would cause partner
nations to doubt US or joint force resolve to continue operations, corruption in a supported
government that would cause locals to oppose that government and the joint force).

2. Information planners focus on the following as potential friendly

force information requirement (FFIR):

a. Information required to resolve any remaining assumptions

related to the availability and capabilities of friendly information forces and OIE units or
of authorities and permissions to employ those capabilities or conduct information
activities.

b. Any change in status of OIE units or specialized information

forces’ capabilities, to include MNF partners conducting information activities.

c. Any change in the authorities or permissions to employ

specialized capabilities or conduct information activities.

d. Information on the planned or actual conduct of activities by

other commands that will create effects in and through the IE that will likely impact the
JFC’s or strategic objectives.

e. Planned or actual activities by or related to mission partners that

would undermine the composition or cohesiveness of the MNF (e.g., political

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 Operational Design and Planning

developments in a partner nation that could jeopardize continued support by forces from
that nation, operations by the forces of one mission partner that are publicly opposed by
another).

f. Degradation or loss of any communication capability resulting in

the JFC’s inability to C2 the joint force.

g. Loss of access to social media or other outlets the joint force is

using to understand, inform, and influence relevant actors.

h. Loss of critical access point or other conduit the joint force is

using to attack, exploit, or deny information, information, networks, and information
systems of relevant actors.

(k) Prepare Staff Estimates

1. The information planners produce the information staff estimate in

conjunction with OIE units and Service component information planners. That estimate
includes the status and capabilities of OIE units or other forces tasked with leveraging
information or elements that are critical to joint force protection of the joint force’s
information, information networks, or information systems. The information staff estimate
includes an analysis of how information impacts the OE, as well as an assessment of how
the inherent informational aspects of activities planned by each of the functional areas
might impact the IE in ways to support or to undermine achieving the JFC’s objectives.
The information staff estimate will also identify additional capabilities to augment organic
assets.

For a sample template of an information estimate, see Appendix B, “Information Staff

Estimate Format.”

2. The intelligence estimate includes an information section. This

section should include relevant aspects of the IE, such as:

a. Inputs from capabilities, operations, and activities that gather

operational information. These include, but are not limited to, CA, KLE, PA, MISO,
OPSEC, JEMSO, COMCAM, space operations, and CO.

b. Those likely and dangerous transitions of enemy, adversary, or

competitor behavior that challenge US objectives. This section enables planners to
estimate the interests, intent, capability, capacity, and likely disruptive actions of relevant
actors to support or counter USG interests.

For additional information on the intelligence estimate, refer to CJCSM 3130.03, Planning
and Execution Formats and Guidance.

(l) Prepare and Deliver Mission Analysis Brief

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1. Upon conclusion of the mission analysis, the staff, including

information planners, will present a mission analysis brief to the commander.

2. A key portion of the information planners’ input to the mission

analysis briefing is the development of the operational mission narrative. The operational
mission narrative will immediately follow the commander’s intent in the final plan or order.
The commander’s intent describes the desired outcome and the operational mission
narrative communicates the “why,” “how,” and “by whom” of an operation. A well-crafted
mission narrative and commander’s intent provides coherence to military actions and
activities and facilitates synchronization of communications and actions. Tactical units use
the commander’s intent and the operational mission narrative to develop a tactical or local
narrative that lends continuity to operations and communications.

(3) Step 3—COA Development. A COA is a potential way to accomplish the

assigned mission. After the mission analysis briefing, the staff begins developing COAs
for analysis and comparison based on the commander’s intent, operational mission
narrative, restated mission, and planning guidance. A good COA accomplishes the mission
within the commander’s guidance, advances the narrative, provides flexibility to meet
unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations.

(a) Information planners use their specific expertise to:

1. Identify ways land, maritime, air, space, cyberspace, and special

operations forces contribute to each of the tasks of the information joint function.

2. Advise on how the joint force can leverage the inherent informational
aspects of activities to create or shape the desired perceptions to achieve the commander’s
objectives.

3. Advise on how to integrate actions in the physical domains, IE

(including cyberspace), and EMS to align with the operational mission narrative.

4. Identify threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the IE.

5. Determine how to task organize and employ OIE units and other
information forces in support of objectives. This includes identifying how OIE will
amplify or conceal physical actions in a manner that increases or decreases ambiguity.

6. Identify critical capabilities required to inform domestic,

international, and internal audiences; influence relevant actors; and attack and exploit
information, information networks, and information systems.

7. Identify any friendly information systems or segments of friendly

information networks that need to be prioritized for defensive actions based on each COA.

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 Operational Design and Planning

8. Identify critical information that the joint force needs to protect for
each COA and recommend appropriate protection measures.

9. Determine communication channels that are most credible to and are

most effective for reaching the selected audiences.

10. Identify how to integrate lethal and nonlethal actions required to

create specific effects in and through the IE (e.g., destruction of a radio tower) into existing
targeting and fires planning processes.

(b) Review objectives and tasks and develop ways to accomplish tasks.
During COA development, planners review and refine objectives from the initial work
done during the development of the operational approach. Information planners determine
the tasks required to effectively leverage information to achieve the refined objectives.
These objectives and tasks are assigned in plans or orders to joint force units, including
OIE units (see Chapter VII, “Operations in the Information Environment,” for a discussion
of OIE). COAs should include tasks to inform domestic and international, and internal
audiences; influence relevant actors; and attack and exploit information, information
networks, and information systems. See Chapter II, “Joint Force Uses of Information,”
paragraph 7.c., “Leverage Information,” for a discussion of these tasks.

(c) Select and prioritize audiences, TAs, and targets. Information

planners participate in the joint targeting process during COA development to identify and
prioritize relevant actors with whom the joint force will interact. Relevant actors are
categorized as audiences, TAs, or targets depending upon their relationship to a threat and
the means with which the joint force will interact with them (i.e., whether through lethal
or nonlethal engagement).

1. Audiences. Audiences are a broadly defined group that contains

stakeholders and/or publics relevant to military operations. Audiences are not the enemy
and do not directly perform a function for the enemy. KLE, PA, and CMO are examples
of activities that use the term audiences to characterize the relevant actors selected for
engagement. Information planners aid in selecting and prioritizing audiences to ensure
activities are synchronized and deconflicted and to prevent or mitigate any negative effects
caused by fires or other information activities.

2. TAs. A TA is an individual or group selected for influence.

Individuals or groups are designated as such when a change in their behavior is necessary
to achieve the commander’s objectives. TAs will sometimes also meet the criteria of a
target if they perform a function for a threat, whether they do so knowingly or not, willingly
or unwillingly. In those cases, TAs are included on one of the joint target lists to be
prioritized, vetted, and approved in accordance with JFC priorities; legal, political, and
operational constraints; rules of engagement; collateral damage restrictions; political
considerations; and operational requirements.

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3. Targets. A target is an entity or object that performs a function for

the threat considered for possible engagement or other action. A TA may be a target if it
is the adversary or performs a function for the adversary. A target’s importance derives
from its potential contribution to achieving a commander’s objective(s) or otherwise
accomplishing assigned tasks. Offensive military activities (e.g., electromagnetic attack,
cyberspace attack, MISO) should be coordinated and deconflicted within the joint targeting
process. Information planners participate in the targeting working groups and boards to
nominate targets, identify targets for inclusion in the joint restricted fires list, and evaluate
targets for their psychological impact on relevant actors. The traditional methodology of
identifying target systems, sets, components, and their critical elements remains valid for
OIE. Some capabilities used for OIE may require long lead time for development of the
JIPOE and release authority and should be identified as early in the target process as
possible.

(d) Identify the sequencing (simultaneous, sequential, or a combination)

of actions for each COA. Understand which resources become available and when during
the operation or campaign. Resource availability will significantly affect sequencing
operations and activities. Sequencing of inform, influence, and attack tasks rely on the
relevance of the information in relation to the timing of an event. Any gap between
publicized information and performance of an activity has the potential to undermine the
intent of the activity and negatively affect the achievement of objectives. Information
planners carefully consider how the sequencing of activities will impact the inherent
informational aspects of each COA. This includes consideration of how information
activities will be synchronized with other activities to enhance the effectiveness of the COA
(e.g., synchronizing jamming against an IADS in support of air interdiction). The timing
and synchronization of activities of each COA should consider how it can pre-empt,
undermine, or counter adversary and enemy use of narratives, especially those that convey
misinformation or disinformation. This is critical due to the extreme difficulty to change
minds or beliefs, even when presented with facts and evidence once an audience has been
influenced by misinformation or disinformation. Therefore, the goal is to provide accurate
and useful information to relevant actors in a timely manner to increase its credibility and
relevance. Information planners can advise on how each COA can communicate
information in a timely fashion, multiple times, and from multiple sources to create the
desired effects.

(4) Step 4—COA Analysis and Wargaming. COA analysis is the process of
closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that enable the commander and staff to
tentatively evaluate COA validity and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each
proposed friendly COA. Wargaming is a primary means for COA analysis. Wargames are
representations of conflict or competition in a synthetic environment, in which people make
decisions and respond to the consequences of those decisions.

(a) During COA analysis and wargaming, information planners examine

how well each COA leverages information to achieve objectives. Wargaming helps the
staff to visualize the flow of the operation and, in doing so, facilitates understanding the
effects of the joint force’s leveraging of information. During wargaming planners also

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 Operational Design and Planning

examine the extent to which joint force activities align with and support JFC’s operational
mission narrative. Information planners help examine friendly and adversary information
activities (i.e., those activities that inform audiences; influence foreign relevant actors; and
attack and exploit relevant actor information, information networks, and information
systems) to determine their potential effects in relation to the objectives. To the extent
possible, those personnel or organizations tasked to conduct such activities participate in
the wargaming process. Wargaming might identify activities that were previously not
identified. During COA analysis and wargaming, information planners help the staff:

1. Determine the likelihood that joint force activities will affect relevant
actor behavior. This includes consideration of how relevant actors are likely to react to
information activities and the inherent informational aspect of physical activities.

2. Determine the relative importance of relevant actors and identify the

potential emergence of new relevant actors.

3. Identify high-value targets related to inform, influence, attack, or

exploit activities.

4. Identify decision points related to the joint force’s leveraging of

information to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of relevant actor
behaviors.

5. Identify how the joint force reacts to threats, vulnerabilities, and

opportunities in the environment.

6. Identify and recommend adjustments to information tasks conducted

by information forces, including OIE units.

7. Recommend adjustments to task organization of joint force elements

to better support leveraging information and the inherent informational aspects of
activities.

8. Identify and provide time, space, and purpose input for

synchronization matrices or other decision-making tools.

9. Identify tasks that leverage information for branches and sequels.

10. Identify PIRs and FFIRs.

11. Refine information concept of support (the description of how

information will support the CONOPS).

12. Refine sequencing and timing of information activities.

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Chapter IV

13. Refine risks associated with joint force use and leveraging of
information.

14. Review and update the information estimate (see Appendix B,

“Information Staff Estimate Format”) from applicable OPLANs and concept plans.

(b) COA analysis and wargaming benefits from the participation of red
teams, green cells, and white cells. Because they bring a different perspective into COA
analysis and wargaming, these elements help joint planners reduce mirror-imaging and
better understand and evaluate the potential actions and reactions of relevant actors. SMEs
for red teams, and for green and white cells may include multinational partners, behavioral
scientists, and cultural anthropologists. If not resident to the core planning staff, these
experts may be available through reachback support.

(5) Step 5—COA Comparison. COA comparison is both a subjective and

objective process, whereby COAs are considered independently and evaluated/compared
against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. COA comparison
starts with all staff elements analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of
each COA from their respective viewpoints. Each of the COA evaluation criteria should
contain information considerations. During mission analysis, information planners helped
develop the evaluation criteria used in COA to measure the relative effectiveness and
efficiency of a COA to address threats and avoid or mitigate hazards in or through the IE.
How well the joint force uses information and leverages information may indirectly affect
the rating of that COA evaluation criteria. For instance, if “speed of movement” is
specified as an evaluation criteria and a COA is relying on deceiving an enemy decision
maker to facilitate unimpeded movement, that COA is dependent upon the ability of the
joint force to leverage information to affect behavior. If only one of multiple COAs is
relying on deception, then the ability of the joint force to leverage information to affect
behavior will impact the rating of that criteria for that one COA more significantly than the
others.

(6) Step 6—COA Approval. In this JPP step, the staff briefs the commander on
the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results and provides the commander
with a recommended COA. The commander combines personal analysis with the staff
recommendation, resulting in a selected COA. It gives the staff a concise statement of how
the commander intends to accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for
planning and plan development. The information planner helps the staff refine the
commander’s COA selection into a clear decision statement, then completes the
commander’s estimate. The commander’s estimate provides a concise statement of how
the commander intends to accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for
campaign planning and contingency plan development. The commander’s estimate will
include the refined commander’s intent along with the commander’s operational mission
narrative.

(7) Step 7—Plan or Order Development. This final JPP step includes
development of the CONOPS and publication of a plan or order. During plan or order

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 Operational Design and Planning

development, the staff further develops and refines component missions and tasks that
specify how the joint force will use information and leverage information to achieve
objectives. The final plan or order will assign those missions and tasks to OIE units and
other information forces.

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 CHAPTER V
EXECUTION

1. Introduction

a. Chapter IV, “Operational Design and Planning,” explained how the joint force
institutionalizes the use and leveraging of information as a functional element of maneuver
in the design and planning of operations. This chapter discusses the context in which the
joint force will conduct operations and the essential elements necessary to incorporate
information into execution.

b. Execution puts a plan into action by applying the power of the joint force to
accomplish the mission and adjusting operations based on changes in the situation.
Commanders and staffs use situational understanding to assess progress and make
execution and adjustment decisions. They apply all available joint force abilities to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage.
Commanders gain an operational advantage through their ability to deliberately persuade
or coerce desired perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior to achieve enduring
outcomes with our partners, competitors, or adversaries. This advantage contributes to
their freedom of action and ability to affect operational tempo.

2. Execution in Context

Joint operations span the competition continuum from recurring cooperative activities
to sustained combat operations in armed conflict. The application of informational power
expands commanders’ range of options for action across the competition continuum. The
application of informational power may be the primary option available to a JFC during
long-duration cooperation and competition short of armed conflict, where the use of
physical force is inappropriate or restricted.

For a discussion of the competition continuum, see JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting, and
JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.

See Chapter II, “Joint Forces Uses of Information,” paragraph 4, “Informational Power,”
for more discussion of informational power.

3. Essential Elements for Incorporating Information into Execution

At its most basic level, execution involves synchronizing activities to maximize their
combined effects during the conduct of operations, monitoring those activities and the
effects they have on the OE, and adjusting activities based upon threats, vulnerabilities,
and opportunities in the OE. The JFC focuses on synchronizing, monitoring, and adjusting
all joint force activities (i.e., not just information activities) so they have the desired effects
in and through the IE and support achievement of joint and national objectives. The
dynamic nature of the IE makes it vital that the JFC have the organizations, processes, and
tools in place to rapidly recognize the informational aspects of activities and adapt joint

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Chapter V

force activities in response to failures or to exploit successes in and through the IE. The
following are essential elements that facilitate that rapid adaption.

a. Organization. The JFC modifies current or establishes new command and staff
structures, as necessary, to facilitate joint force unity of effort to use and leverage
information. This includes the option of establishing an OIE unit with the personnel,
authorities, and other resources to conduct OIE. This requires an overarching strategy to
gain operational advantage through the use of information and synchronizing the execution
of that strategy between the command, subordinate units, and supporting or related
operations of component commanders.

See Chapter III, “Unity of Effort,” for a discussion of staff organizations and the
component command for information. See Chapter VII, “Operations in the Information
Environment,” for a discussion of OIE units.

b. Monitoring and Analyzing for Effects In and Through the IE

(1) Monitoring and analysis comprise the observation and evaluation of how
information impacts the JFC’s OE, how joint force activities affect relevant actors, and
how those activities resonate in and through the IE to affect other JFC’s OEs. Monitoring
and analysis contribute to maintaining situational awareness for the command and are
facilitated by sharing information and knowledge. They include observing and evaluating
the informational, physical, and human aspects of the OE for potential threats,
vulnerabilities, and opportunities (to include a nuanced view of relevant actors) that could
impact the JFC’s decisions concerning mission requirements.

(2) The JFC may establish and resource an information CFT with the means to
monitor and recommend adjustments to joint force operations to align them with objectives
and the strategic and operational narratives. This forum provides visibility on the effects
of joint force activities that impact the IE and presents proactive options to the JFC for the
leveraging of information to affect behavior. The information CFT is integrated into the
JFC’s battle rhythm to provide more accurate and timely situational awareness and promote
more effective use and leveraging of information.

Refer to Chapter III, “Unity of Effort,” for more information on the information CFT.

c. The Synchronization Matrix. An information synchronization matrix, built

around the CONOPS, contains the phasing of the operation and enables planners to
graphically display the activities, linked to the scheme of maneuver, that leverage
information to affect behavior and impact the OE. The matrix displays the mechanics of
physical movement but, more importantly, reveals how the informational aspects of the
operations are knitted together with other functional elements of joint maneuver to
deliberately show or hide joint force activities or intentions. The body of the matrix
contains critical tasks, arrayed in time and linked to responsible elements for execution.
Joint force planners may use a matrix to display progress against actual execution and
recommend adjustments as needed. It is important for the matrix to identify when tasks

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 Execution

are executed and when effects are required since they often do not align. For example,
MISO messages may be disseminated during a certain window, but the desired effect may
happen much later. The synchronization matrix also helps planners identify potential gaps,
develop options to mitigate those gaps, and respond to a changing OE.

d. CCIRs. Information planners update the critical information requirements to

provide the JFC with an understanding of how information impacts the OE; an awareness
of the threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the IE; and the status of organizations
critical to supporting human and automated decision making and leveraging information.

Refer to Chapter IV, “Operational Design and Planning,” for a discussion of CCIR
relevant to the joint force use and leveraging of information.

e. The Narrative. The narrative can be thought of as a unifying story that acts as an
information control measure to avoid conflicting messages and promote unity of effort.
This is analogous to control and coordination measures used for maneuver and movement
control, airspace coordination, and fire support coordination. The JFC and staff monitor
the effects in and through the IE of the activities of the joint force to ensure those activities
support the narrative.

f. Information and KM. IM and KM ensure users are aware of and can access
critical information for decision making, and enables shared understanding. During
execution, IM and KM facilitate synchronization, monitoring, and direction of activities.
Effective IM and KM are essential for staying inside the enemy’s decision-making cycle.
Combined with effective planning, IM and KM help commanders anticipate enemy actions
and develop branches, sequels, or adjustments.

For additional details on KM and IM refer to Chapter II, “Joint Force Uses of
Information,” paragraph 7.b.(1)(b), “KM and IM,” and to JP 3-33, Joint Force
Headquarters.

g. The Information Staff Estimate. The information planning cell is responsible for
the information staff estimate. The information staff estimate is a continual evaluation of
how factors related to the IE impact the planning and execution of operations. The purpose
of the information staff estimate is to inform the commander, staff, and subordinate
commands on how information can be used to support mission accomplishment. The
estimate helps feed the commander’s estimate and contributes to the JFC’s common
operational picture of the OE for planning, mission coordination, and assessment of all
operations. The information planning cell on the JFC’s staff produces this consolidated
estimate as an overview of all capabilities and activities available to perform tasks related
to the information joint function. It includes the analysis of the informational, physical,
and human aspects of the environment; the status of friendly OIE units and information
forces and their activities; and an assessment of adversarial capabilities and intent. See
Appendix B, “Information Staff Estimate Format,” for a sample format.

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 CHAPTER VI
ASSESSMENT

1. Introduction

This chapter is about determining the effectiveness of the joint force’s use of
information and leveraging of information to achieve the commander’s objectives.
Assessing the use and leveraging of information allows the JFC to appreciate whether, and
to what extent, those efforts are helping to achieve objectives and gain/exploit information
advantage. Assessment of joint force information activities is a continual and cyclical
process.

a. Whether inform, influence, and attack activities are driving competitors,

adversaries, or enemies to the desired actions.

b. Whether shared understanding activities contribute to achieving unity of effort.

c. Whether activities to protect information, information systems, and information

networks are contributing to making decisions.

d. Whether protect actions shield joint force personnel from malign influence.

For more details on assessment, see JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, and JP 5-0,
Joint Planning.

2. Requirement for Assessment

a. Assessment of operations and activities is key to the commander’s decision cycle,

helping to determine the results of actions in the context of overall mission objectives and
providing recommendations for refinement of future plans. Assessing the joint force’s use
and leveraging of information in joint operations provides data and analysis to inform the
commander on how effectively the joint force is able to understand how information
impacts the OE, support human and automated decision making, and leverage information
to achieve objectives.

b. Embedded in all military operations is the requirement to provide operational

reporting to all echelons of command with essential information on the planning, initiation,
termination, and results of military operations. Additionally, some operations (such as CO
and MISO) have quarterly and annual reporting required by Congress. This operational
reporting impacts future decisions, efforts, and resources. Operational reporting provides
the data required to support other analyses and assessments.

c. Staff estimates are continually updated based on changes in the situation. Operation
assessment provides the means to maintain running staff estimates for each functional area.
The staff estimates identify available CCMD capabilities and anticipated shortfalls that
may limit the ability to support the proposed friendly COAs. They are the link between

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planning and execution and support continuous assessment and can help commanders
decide to adapt plans or shift resources based upon the intelligence and other staff
estimates, including the information staff estimate (refer to Appendix B, “Information Staff
Estimate Format”), as well as input from other mission partners.

3. Challenges Assessing Information in Joint Operations

a. Distinguishing between correlation and causation makes information activity

assessment difficult. Analysts should approach assessment with open minds, and
determine whether correlation, causality, or a combination of the two is the appropriate
approach for specific MOEs. This approach provides insights to the likelihood of particular
events and effects given certain criteria in terms of conditions and actors in the OE. When
assessing information in joint operations, evidence has shown that correlation between
indicators and events has proven more accurate than efforts to establish concrete cause and
effects relationships. This is especially true when assessing public opinion or human
behavior. Unforeseen factors can lead to erroneous interpretations, for example, a traffic
accident in a foreign country involving a US Service member or a local civilian’s bias
against US policies can cause a decline in public support, irrespective of otherwise
successful operations. Incorrect assumptions about causality in a complex system can lead
information planners to incorrect conclusions that undermine planning for future
operations. This exposes the assessment to potential discredit, especially if counter-
examples exist.

b. Other factors that complicate the assessment of information activities include:

(1) Intelligence assets may not have the ability to directly gather the necessary
data on a relevant actor in a timely manner.

(2) Logistical challenges related to capturing accurate data, particularly in hostile

or uncertain environments.

(3) Operational tempo.

(4) Rapidly changing conditions that affect the accuracy and volume of data that
is able to be collected.

(5) Cognitive biases that influence accuracy.

(6) Requirement for resource-intensive continual and cyclical assessments.

(7) Incomplete data.

(8) Lack of universal measures and indicators of data used for assessment.

(9) Complexity of assessing joint operations may also require specialty expertise,
assets, and capabilities that exceed the organic capability of the command.

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 Assessment

c. It is possible for the planner to fall prey to perfectionism. Given the inherent biases
and the limitations of measurement and collection tools, planners seek to reduce
uncertainty about the value being measured as opposed to seeking perfect accuracy or
precision. The information planner should articulate any challenges or obstacles
encountered so that the commander understands the relative reliability of the assessment,
such as restricted access to populations for data collection, small sample size, incomplete
data, and changes in collection methods.

4. Organizing for Assessment

a. Organizing for assessment involves identifying the appropriate data needed to

assess progress during the operation and whether that data can be measured at all.
Typically, data refers to facts or information used to calculate, analyze, or plan. In the case
of assessment, the appropriate data should provide the basis for identifying changes in
conditions as they relate to specific plan outcomes.

b. Organizing for assessment also impacts staff organization. Assessment of

information in joint operations is commander led; it is supported by, but not delegated to,
a staff activity. The way the staff is organized for assessment is a commander’s
prerogative; however, it is critical that the assessment staff be embedded throughout the
planning process. Refinement and specification of objectives are integral parts of the
planning process. Three potential approaches for organizing for assessment are:

(1) Special staff section. In this approach, the assessment element reports directly
to the commander, via the COS or deputy commander. In such an organization,
information professionals could advise lead planners on the use and leveraging of
information, in addition to their role in the assessment of information LOEs. Advantages
of this approach may include increased access to the commander and visibility on decision-
making requirements, as well as an increased ability to make recommendations to the
commander as part of the assessment process. Disadvantages may include being isolated
from the other staff sections, thereby not having staff support and not having access to the
information being collected and monitored across the staff.

(2) Separate staff section. In this approach, the assessment element is its own
staff section, akin to plans, operations, intelligence, logistics, and communications. In a
separate staff section, information professionals would need to take proactive measures to
ensure full participation in all planning events and avoid stovepiping. The advantage of
this approach is that it legitimizes assessment as a major staff activity equivalent with the
other staff functions and enables the assessment team to participate in staff coordination
and activities as co-equals with the other staff sections. A disadvantage to this approach is
that it has the potential to create stovepiped assessment efforts without full collaboration
for a whole-of-staff assessment.

(3) Integrated in another staff section. In this approach, the assessment element
is typically integrated into the operations or plans sections and the assessment chief reports
to the plans chief or the operations chief. Integrating information planners into an

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operations or plans section could involve them being dedicated to specific planning efforts.
The advantage of this approach is that it tends to create close ties between the assessment
team and either the plans or operations teams, but a significant disadvantage is that it limits
the number of information planners who can contribute to the assessment products for that
specific planning effort.

(4) Integrating assessment into the planning effort is normally the responsibility
of the lead planner, with assistance across the staff. The lead planner understands the
complexity of the plan and decision points established as the plan develops. The lead
planner also understands potential indicators of success or failure. It is the information
planner’s responsibility to support the lead planner with perspective on information’s role
in the overall plan.

(5) When conducting highly classified operation assessments, such as during

MILDEC operations, special consideration is given to assessments with limited staff
access. Assessment staff provides guidance to these special access elements to standardize
timing and products with other operation assessment efforts.

(6) As a plan becomes operationalized, the overall assessment responsibility

typically transitions from the lead planner to the J-3. The information lead provides the
necessary information and analysis to guide the assessment and recommendations for
implementing specific changes to better accomplish the mission.

5. Assessment Process

Assessments of information in joint operations are conducted in accordance with the

assessment process shown in Figure VI-1. The assessment plan for a campaign integrates
products from a range of strategic objectives, each encompassing its own set of
intermediate objectives and desired conditions, subordinate operations, subordinate plans
(i.e., country-specific security cooperation sections/country plans, contingency plans not
in execution, ongoing operations, directed missions). Operational-level assessment must
account for progress or setback of multiple operational-level objectives within the
operation or campaign.

a. Step 1—Develop Assessment Approach

(1) The first step is to develop the assessment approach. The assessment
approach, which eventually becomes the assessment plan (refer to Figure VI-2), is a
description of the specific information needed to monitor and analyze desired effects
created and progress toward achieving the objectives. Development of the assessment
approach begins during the first step of JPP as the command develops its operational
approach and identifies the desired outcomes. The staff begins to develop the assessment
approach by identifying and establishing the appropriate framework and structure needed
to assess progress during the operation or campaign. Information planners contribute to
developing the assessment approach by participating in the JIPOE process through the
analysis of the IE (see Chapter IV, “Operational Design and Planning,” paragraph

VI-4 JP 3-04
 Assessment

Figure VI-1. Operation Assessment Process

3.b.(3)(a), “Characterize the human, informational, and physical aspects of the OE”) and
by advising on the best approach for measuring the impact of joint force activities on the
IE.

(2) As part of developing the assessment approach, information planners develop

a framework for assessing the inherent informational aspects of joint force activities and
OIE. This framework includes collection and reporting responsibilities. The assessment
plan continues to mature through plan development. The assessment plan describes how
to answer three questions: What indicates progress toward the desired outcomes? What
data is required? Who or what is best postured to provide that information?

(3) During initial planning, the joint force uses information from intelligence
assessments and estimates from the JIPOE process, as well as specific information and
intelligence requirements identified during the development of the assessment approach to
form the initial assessment baseline. The baseline is necessary for identifying changes in
conditions and serves as a reference point for comparison, enabling an assessment of the
way in which activities create desired effects. This typically requires assessment planning
and initiation of data collection prior to commencing the assessed operation. It is not
always imperative that baseline data be quantitative. Sometimes, qualitative baseline data
(such as data from focus groups) can provide a sufficient baseline. However, when
qualitative data collection is used, there should be a predetermined plan to systematically
code and/or quantify information in order to measure change over time. The baseline

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Assessment Plan Development Process

Input Process Output

 Assessment Approach 1. Document assessment Approved Assessment Plan
which includes: framework and construct integrated into the overall
assessment framework plan. Includes:
and construct. 2. Finalize the data collection
plan  Task or mission measures
 Specific outcomes (end (MOEs/MOPs) based on
state, objectives, effects) 3. Assign responsibilities for observable key indicators
monitoring, collection, and
 Commander’s analysis  Vetting process and
estimate/CONOPS (from timelines for integration
JPP) 4. Identify how assessment is into staff organizations
integrated into battle
rhythm/feedback  Information oversight
mechanism responsibilities
5. Vet and staff the Draft
Assessment Plan

Legend
CONOPS concept of operations MOE measure of effectiveness
JPP joint planning process MOP measure of performance

Figure VI-2. Assessment Plan Development Process

enables the commander and staff to set goals for desired rates of change within the OE and
establish thresholds for success and failure. This focuses information and intelligence
collection on answering specific questions relating to the plan. This will also capture the
constellation of narratives in the IE, which ones resonate with whom and why, as well as
how the joint force’s hierarchy of narrative can compete.

b. Step 2—Develop Assessment Plan

(1) Early integration of assessments into plans is paramount. One of the first
things that happens during planning is to ensure the objectives to be assessed are clear,
understandable, and measurable. Equally important is to consider, as part of the assessment
baseline, a description of the conditions within the OE at the time the baseline was
established to help account for conditions outside of operations that may impact the
assessment of the assigned tasks (e.g., statistics on the availability and usage of Internet in
the region, literacy rates). Assessment products portray a progression from the baseline
toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective.

(2) Developing and refining the assessment plan is concurrent and

complementary throughout joint planning and modified during execution, if necessary.
This step overlaps with the previous step during identification of the objectives and effects.
Developing the assessment plan is a whole-of-staff effort and should include other key
stakeholders to better shape the assessment effort. The assessment plan should identify
staff or subordinate organization responsibilities for monitoring, collecting, and analyzing
information and developing recommendations and assessment products as required.
Requirements for staff coordination and presentation to the commander should also be
included in the plan and integrated into the commander’s decision cycle and the
command’s battle rhythm. The information CFT is a stakeholder in the coordination of the

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 Assessment

assessment plan and serves as a cross-functional conduit to develop, implement, and

consolidate assessments on the command’s approach to synchronizing communications in
support of JFC’s objectives.

(3) When assessing joint force efforts to leverage information to affect behavior,
it may take some time for the full effect of the activity or activities to be experienced.
When assessing tasks and activities that leverage information, there are three likely
outcomes. First, the message or action is not seen, heard, or experienced by the designated
recipient or targeted system. Second, the desired recipient or targeted system disregards
the message or activity. Third, the recipient or targeted system internalizes or processes
the message or activity to some degree. Outcome variability requires the assessment
process to both determine results and to feed back into the iterative process of re-
engagement until the desired effect is created.

(4) When developing an assessment plan dealing with complex open systems,
identifying and clearly articulating an expected change greatly aids in understanding task
and objective, cause and effect relationships. Since the IE is an extraordinarily complex
and open system, information planners can help the assessment team determine the
interrelationships between tasks and objectives and between cause and effect for
information LOEs.

(5) Mapping the expected change provides the clear, logical connections between
activities and desired outcomes by defining intermediate steps between the current situation
and the desired outcome. Mapping the expected change also assists in the development of
MOEs and measures of performance (MOPs). It should include clearly stated assumptions
that can be challenged for correctness as activities are executed. The ability to challenge
assumptions in light of executed activities enables the joint planner to identify flawed
connections between activity and effects, incorrect assumptions, or the presence of
variables that are outside of the joint force’s control and can influence the outcome causing
a spurious association between joint force’s actions and the effect. The example that
follows shows:

(a) Logical connection between activities and effects. Activity: training and
arming local security guards. Effect: increased ability to resist insurgents.

(b) Clearly stated assumptions; increased ability and willingness to resist

leads to an increase in security in the locale; increased security leads to increased
perceptions of security.

(c) Intermediate steps and points of measurement; MOPs regarding training

activities; MOEs regarding willingness to resist; MOEs regarding increased local security.
MOPs regarding number of local security guards armed and trained.

(6) This expected change shows a logical connection between activities (e.g.,
training and arming locals) and effects (e.g., increased stability). Even clearly stated
assumptions can be challenged if they are determined to be incorrect. Further, those

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activities and assumptions suggest obvious things to measure, such as performance of the
activities and the resulting effect. They also suggest measurement of more subtle elements
of all the intermediate logical nodes such as capability and willingness of local security
forces, change in security, change in perception of security, change in participation in local
government, and change in governance. Better still, if one of those measurements does not
yield the desired result, the joint planner will be able to ascertain where in the chain the
logic is breaking down, which hypotheses are not substantiated. The joint plannery can
then modify the expected change and the activities supporting it and continue to progress
toward the objectives. Such an expected change might have begun as something quite
simple: training and arming local security guards should lead to increased stability. But
more is needed for building assessments. Stopping there would suggest only the need to
measure the activity and the resulting effect and leaves a huge, assumptive gap. If training
and arming security guards goes well, but stability does not increase, there will be no
apparent reason why. To begin to expand on a simple expected change, the information
planner should determine cause and effect. How might “A” lead to “B”? (i.e., in this case,
how would training and arming security guards lead to stability?) A thoughtful answer to
this question usually leads to recognition of another node to the expected change. If
needed, the question can be asked again relative to this new node, until the expected change
is sufficiently articulated.

(7) Circumstances on the ground might also require the assumptions in an

expected change to be more explicitly defined. For example, using the expected change
articulated in the above example, the joint planner might observe that, in successfully
training and arming local security guards, they are better able to resist insurgents, leading
to an increased perception of security, as indicated by increased traffic in local markets and
other outdoor locations. However, participation in local government, as measured through
voting in local elections and attendance at local council meetings, has not increased. The
existing expected change and associated measurements illustrate where the chain of logic
is breaking down (i.e., somewhere between perceptions of security and participation in
local governance), but it does not (yet) tell why that break is occurring. Adjusting the
expected change by identifying the incorrect assumption or spoiling factor preventing the
successful connection between security and local governance will also help improve
achievement of the objective.

(8) The assessment plan should also include a plan for how data will be analyzed
and include specific statistical analyses, if applicable. The number of research
questions/MOEs to be measured, the predictive variance in a TA, and data analysis will
help determine how many responses or data points are required.

c. Step 3—Collect Information

(1) Well-developed MOEs serve as a foundation for development of intelligence

requirements. To operationalize assessments, a collection management plan is critical. It
is imperative that the data collected be tied to the assessment of MOEs. A collection plan
is the integration of intelligence requirements with the assigned tactical, theater, and
national intelligence sources and other resources used for collection. This step also serves

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 Assessment

as a decision point for staff planners (including information planners). Not every
intelligence requirement will be answered by the IC; therefore, planners should consider
collaborating with other sources of information, to include DOS, the Department of
Homeland Security, other USG departments and agencies, and academia. Information
planners use publicly available information, surveys, polls, and other research to gather
information and intelligence for MOEs.

(2) During preparation, for those operations not yet in execution, the joint force
should continue to collect information in accordance with the data collection plan or as
directed. Information planners will provide updates on changes in the IE. Analysis of this
new information could result in changes to the operational approach, objectives, or planned
tasks within the current plan.

(3) During mission execution, the joint force uses the data collection plan and
defined reporting procedures to gather information about the OE and the joint force’s
actions as part of normal C2 activities. Typically, staffs and subordinate commands
provide information about plan execution on a regular cycle through specified battle
rhythm events. Intelligence staffs continually provide intelligence about the OE and
operational impact to support the collective staff assessment effort. Information planners
contribute to that support by monitoring activities and operations to determine progress
towards achieving objectives, especially objectives for OIE. Planners monitor the threat
and friendly situations to track accomplishment of information tasks, determine the effects
of leveraging information, and detect and track any unintended consequences. Information
planners work closely with the intelligence cell, intelligence staff officer, and information
CFT representatives to provide a running assessment of the effectiveness of threat
information efforts and keep the operations staff officer and various integrating cells
informed. In accordance with the assessment plan, assessment considerations may help
the planning, operations, network communications, and intelligence staffs when
determining the presence of decision point triggers and other mission impacts across the
staff.

d. Step 4—Analyze Information and Produce Intelligence

(1) To identify trends and changes, it is necessary to isolate, from the data, those
differences that are the result of observable and predicted changes in the system from noise
or normal variation in the indicators being collected. Analysis of data seeks to identify
positive or negative movement or stagnation toward achieving objectives.

(2) While individual staff elements may be responsible for analysis within their
functional area, the staffing and vetting process enables the assessment to develop
coherent, holistic assessment products, including recommendations resulting from the
individual analyses. As the entire staff conducts analysis of the OE, the information staff
focuses on the informational attributes. This analysis occurs when planning for an
operation begins or, in some cases, prior to planning for an operation (e.g., during routine
analysis in support of combatant command campaign plan [CCP] activities). It is a required
step for viable planning and provides necessary data for, among other things, development

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of MOEs, determining potential TAs and targets, and baseline data (e.g., status of the
potential TAs and targets, attitudes of the local populaces) from which change can be
measured. Analysis is conducted by interdisciplinary teams and staff sections. The
primary product of this step is a description of the informational, physical, and human
aspects of the OE.

(3) Analysis of the OE identifies key functions and systems within it. The
analysis provides the initial information to identify decision makers (human), factors that
guide the decision-making process (informational), and infrastructure that supports and
communicates decisions and decision making (physical).

(4) Gaps in the ability to analyze the OE and gaps in required information are
identified and transformed into intelligence requirements and requests, RFFs and/or
augmentation, and requests for support from external agencies. Technological, cultural,
and infrastructure changes, regardless of their source or cause, can impact the informational
aspects within a dynamic OE. Once the initial analysis is complete, periodic analyses
should be conducted to capture changes and update the analysis for the commander, staff,
other units, and mission partners. Much like a running estimate, the analysis of the OE
becomes a living document, continuously updated to provide a current, accurate picture.

(5) If available, personnel trained or qualified in statistical analysis techniques

should conduct data analysis. Analysis can be done outside the operational area by
leveraging reachback capabilities. Nonstatistical comparisons (e.g., average rating of
United States at baseline, time 1, and time 2) and graphs can also be presented, although
limitations in interpretation of significance should be discussed. One of the most important
factors for analysis is that it is conducted in an unbiased manner. Assessment data is
analyzed and the results are compared to the baseline measurements and updated
continuously as the staff continues its analysis of the OE. These comparisons help the staff
determine whether the OE has changed and, if so, the degree and area of that change. These
changes are indications of effects on or in the OE and help determine whether progress is
being made toward achieving objectives. Assessment remains an iterative process.

(6) Military operations are inherently human endeavors. Analysts use both
quantitative approaches (e.g., content analysis, descriptive statistics) and qualitative
approaches (e.g., interviews, temperature maps) to assess the psychological effects of
military operations. Military and nonmilitary SMEs should validate data quality and its
appropriateness to the phenomena and answers being sought.

(7) Both qualitative and quantitative approaches require a sound statistical

approach and expert interpretation to provide meaningful and accurate assessments. Even
when data is collected and analyzed by trained personnel, errors can occur (e.g.,
unrecognized bias resulted in an incorrect cause and effect determination, errors in
translation skewed the data). Transparency in the assessment process is vital to success.
When problems or errors are found in the data, feedback about what occurred and where
adjustments are necessary is reported, as appropriate. This is crucial as such feedback is
critical to adjusting processes to avoid further issues.

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 Assessment

e. Step 5—Communicate Feedback and Recommendations

(1) The staff may be required to develop assessment products, which may include
summary reports and briefings, containing recommendations for the commander based
upon the guidelines set forth in the assessment plan. Discussing assessment findings within
the context of the commander’s guidance is the most critical step in developing assessment
products. Regardless of quality and effort, the assessment process is useless if the
communication of its results is deficient or inconsistent with the commander’s personal
style of digesting information and making decisions.

(2) Assessment results enable staffs to ensure tasks stay linked to objectives and
objectives remain relevant. They provide opportunities to identify capability shortfalls and
resource issues that may be impeding effectiveness. These results provide information to
agencies outside of the command or chain of command. The primary purpose of reporting
the results is to inform the command and staff concerning the progress of objective
achievement, create effects in the OE, and enable decision making. The published
assessment plan, staff standard operating procedures, battle rhythm, and orders are
documents in which commanders can dictate how often assessment results are provided
and the format in which they are reported. The staff reports progress and makes
recommendations for plan adjustments, as necessary. The assessment team ensures that
organizational procedures are established for capturing the commander’s decisions and
guidance resulting from assessment results and the actions taken (e.g., increased media
coverage, decrease in shows of force).

f. Step 6—Adapt Plans for Operations, Campaigns, and Assessment

(1) Once feedback and recommendations have been provided, commanders

typically direct changes or provide additional guidance that dictates updates or
modifications to operation/campaign plans. There may also be implications of those
decisions or guidance impacting the need to modify the assessment plan.

(2) As the operation or campaign progresses, the assessment plan will likely
require updates to adjust to any changes in objectives, effects, and tasks. While some of
these changes can be anticipated during the original assessment plan development,
revisions may be necessary to reflect actual conditions in the OE or changes to the
operation/campaign plan.

(3) Sometimes the assessment plan and its associated data collection may need to
be refined based on changes in the IE (e.g., an information system used by the adversary is
updated or replaced). This may also result in adjustments to the information or intelligence
requirements to support the data collection.

(4) There should be organizational procedures associated with capturing the

commander’s decisions and guidance resulting from assessments that ensure necessary
actions are taken. Examples include fragmentary orders, actions requiring requests for
policy/authority changes or funding/resourcing requirements, additional forces needed,

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partner-nation KLE requirements, other USG support from an interagency partner, or

modifications to the rules of engagement.

6. Recommendations for Assessing Inform and Influence Activities

Below are some additional recommendations of particular importance for inform and
influence activities:

a. Start with objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-
bound.

b. Clearly describe the problem.

c. Tailor assessment results to specific stakeholders, ensuring data collection,

measures, and results are as transparent as possible.

d. Throughout the assessment process, consider how commanders and other decision
makers will use the assessment results.

e. In real-world scenarios, trade-offs between precision and constraints (e.g., time,

money, access) are often made to ensure assessments are conducted. It is imperative that
analysts develop a plan that meets at least the minimum requirements of reliability and
validity and clearly describe in detail any compromises that must be made to facilitate an
assessment.

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 CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

1. Overview

This chapter discusses OIE and the forces that conduct OIE. These include OIE units
(i.e., those formations that JFCs may choose to assemble to conduct OIE), and information
forces, which are the building blocks of those OIE units.

2. Operations in the Information Environment

a. OIE are military actions involving the integrated employment of multiple

information forces to affect drivers of behavior by informing audiences; influencing
foreign relevant actors; attacking and exploiting relevant actor information, information
networks, and information systems; and by protecting friendly information, information
networks, and information systems.

b. OIE leverage information for the purpose of affecting the will, awareness, and
understanding of adversaries and other relevant actors and denying them the ability to act
in and through the IE to negatively affect the joint force, while protecting joint force will,
awareness, understanding, and the ability to take actions in and through the IE.

c. OIE may provide commanders with a decisive advantage over adversaries by

helping to maintain the credibility and legitimacy of joint force actions, preserving the joint
force will to fight, maintaining situational understanding, and keeping the joint force free
of prohibitive interference due to cyberspace or EMS activity, which cumulatively preserve
freedom of action throughout the OE.

d. OIE are conducted as an integral part of all operations and campaigns and help
shape the IE for future operations. As such, joint forces will always be conducting one or
more OIE to remain continuously engaged in and through the IE.

e. OIE are conducted in support of all operations and may be a main effort or
supporting effort.

f. Any organization or capability may be tasked to conduct activities to support OIE,

whether or not assigned to an OIE unit. For example, a JTF hosting a visit by local
journalists, an aviation unit conducting a show of force, or a naval strike group conducting
a freedom of navigation mission may all be carrying out these activities to inform or
influence relevant actors in support of OIE.

g. OIE are not a substitute for the joint forces’ deliberate leveraging of the inherent
informational aspects of military activities. The joint force should still integrate
information and informational considerations and capabilities into strategic art and
operational design, planning guidance, and planning processes.

VII-1
Chapter VII

h. OIE Limitations

(1) The ability of the joint force to conduct OIE is limited by the availability of
OIE units.

(2) OIE may be limited by the capabilities and authorities of OIE units or of their
higher headquarters.

(3) OIE may be more successful when integrated with other joint, Service,
interorganizational, and other US and foreign mission partners.

(4) JFCs must obtain and delegate authorities to conduct specific OIE activities
to be effective during crisis situations of short duration.

(5) OIE units and other information forces require prior engagement in an OE to
have an understanding of, and experience in dealing with, the aspects of a problem set to
be effective during crises situations.

(6) OIE require intelligence collection support during the conduct of operations
to determine the effectiveness of activities.

i. OIE Mission Considerations. When planning or conducting OIE, commanders

and staffs should consider:

(1) How the mission will support CCPs, the operation, campaign, OPLAN, or
contingency response plan.

(2) The risks of OIE before making employment decisions. OIE may have
strategic and transregional impacts beyond the employing JFC’s area of operations, and
commanders should consider US diplomatic and informational interests in risk
calculations.

(3) Authorities and permissions required for the conduct of activities and the lead
times necessary to obtain those authorities and permission.

(4) The coordination required with other joint, Service, interorganizational, and
other US and foreign mission partners to align and synchronize activities and achieve unity
of effort.

(5) Coordination for appropriate SME support (e.g., cultural knowledge and
language skills, specialized intelligence support) and capabilities. OIE rely on joint,
Service, and other mission partners for SME support.

(6) The establishment of an assessment framework during initial planning (i.e.,

baseline, clear MOEs, and MOE indicators).

VII-2 JP 3-04
 Operations in the Information Environment

j. OIE Across the Competition Continuum. Military operations vary in scope,

purpose, and intensity in cooperation, adversarial competition below armed conflict, and
armed conflict. Throughout the competition continuum, the JFC integrates OIE into joint
plans and synchronizes it with other operations to create desired behaviors, reinforce or
increase combat power, and gain advantage in the IE. Each joint operation has a unique
strategic context, so the nature of OIE and its activities will vary according to the distinct
aspects of the mission and OE. While OIE may be conducted as an independent operation,
it is never done in isolation. OIE are conducted throughout all campaigns or operations
and at any level of conflict.

For a detailed discussion of the competition continuum, including the relationship to the
instruments of national power, levels of warfare, and the categories of joint military
activities, see JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting; and JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and
Operations.

k. The Joint Functions and OIE. JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations,
describes the seven joint functions common to joint operations: C2, information,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Each joint
function is a grouping of tasks and systems that provide a critical capability to help JFCs
synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. Commanders leverage the capabilities
of multiple joint functions during operations to achieve objectives. This section presents
an overview of how commanders use joint functions to integrate, synchronize, and direct
OIE in support of all DOD missions.

(1) C2 Joint Function. C2 primarily focuses on the exercise of authority and

direction by commanders over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of their
assigned mission. That authority and direction are exercised through a C2 system that
consists of the facilities, equipment, communications, staff functions and procedures, and
personnel essential for planning, preparing for, monitoring, and assessing operations. The
C2 systems enable the JFC to maintain communication with higher, supporting, and
subordinate commands to control all aspects of current operations while planning for future
operations. The C2 joint function enables the commander to balance the art of command
with the science of control and integrate the other joint functions. C2 of the information
planners on the staff and OIE units encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by
a commander over assigned and attached information forces to accomplish the mission.

(2) Information Joint Function. The three tasks of the information joint
function support all the other joint functions and provide commanders with the ability to
understand how information impacts the OE, use information to support human and
automated decision making, and leverage information through offensive and defensive
actions. OIE is closely tied to the tasks of the information joint function. The understand
task of the information joint function is used to understand the threats, opportunities, and
vulnerabilities required to conduct OIE. It is the preparatory work that sets the stage for
OIE. Additionally, the understand task should identify access points and lines of influence
that can be exploited through OIE to create effects and ultimately change behavior. It also
helps identify the operational signatures that need to be managed or controlled to maintain

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essential secrecy. OIE uses that understanding to reveal or conceal those signatures to
ensure relevant actors see what we want them to see and not see what we do not want them
to see. The second task of the information joint function, support to human and automated
decision making, is a critical prerequisite of effective OIE. It enables joint forces to
preserve and protect our ability (and our trust in that ability) to make sense of the IE. All
operations perform the third task of the information joint function, but leveraging
information is the primary effort of joint OIE units.

For a more-detailed discussion on the tasks of the information joint function, see Chapter
II, “Joint Force Uses of Information,” paragraph 7, “The Information Joint Function.”

(3) Intelligence Joint Function. Understanding the OE, which encompasses

aspects of the IE, is fundamental to all operations to include OIE. The intelligence joint
function helps to inform the JFC and staff about the opponent’s intent, capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and future COAs. It also helps them to understand friendly, neutral, and
threat information networks and information systems; the ways that information is
received, transmitted, and processed; and how information may impact the opponent’s own
decision making and drivers of their behavior. Using the continuous JIPOE analysis
process, properly tailored JIPOE products can enhance understanding of the OE and clarify
the impacts of information. This understanding enables the JFC to act inside the
opponent’s decision cycle. JIPOE provides a socio-cultural analysis of all relevant actors
to reveal their decision-making process, norms beliefs, power structures, perceptions,
attitudes, and other drivers of behavior. JIPOE also reveals how relevant actors might
apply information to exploit vulnerabilities in the joint force’s information networks and
information systems and how they might leverage information to affect drivers of joint
force behavior. Intelligence support to OIE follows the same all-source intelligence
process used by all other operations, with unique attributes necessary for support of
planning and assessment for OIE. The intelligence necessary to understand the drivers of
behavior of enemies, adversaries, or other audiences often requires that units position and
employ specific sources and methods (e.g., counterintelligence, human intelligence,
targeted social media monitoring) to collect the information and conduct the analyses
needed.

See Chapter IV, “Operational Design and Planning,” for a discussion of JIPOE and
Chapter VI, “Assessment,” for a discussion of assessing information in joint operations.

For more details on the joint intelligence process, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. For an
explanation of JIPOE, see Joint Guide 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.

(4) Fires Joint Function. Fires is the use of weapon systems or other actions to
create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target. The nature of the target or threat, the
conditions of the mission variables (i.e., mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available, time available, and civil considerations), and desired outcomes
determine how lethal and nonlethal capabilities are employed. OIE may leverage the
inherent informational aspects of joint fires. Fires in and through the IE encompass a

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 Operations in the Information Environment

number of tasks, actions, and processes, including targeting, coordination, deconfliction,

and assessment (e.g., BDA).

(a) OIE tasks and capabilities leverage information through fires to create
specific effects. To integrate effectively, information planners participate in the joint
targeting process by selecting and prioritizing targets for fires or TAs for other actions.
OIE units create fires that typically result in nonlethal effects. OIE can also indirectly
create effects that result in physical destruction (e.g., manipulating computers that control
physical processes). Additionally, OIE can leverage the inherent informational aspects of
fires to reinforce the psychological effect of those fires. OIE may rely on joint fires support
to transmit information to relevant actors and to deliver nonlethal payloads to affect
information, information systems, and information networks (e.g., leveraging CO to
deliver computer code designed to deny network access to an adversary, PA releases to
inform friendly audiences, or MISO products to influence foreign audiences).

(b) The integration of OIE into the targeting process—a task managed within
the fires function—is important to creating effects in and through the IE that will achieve
objectives. Even when OIE do not require joint fire support to create effects, they still
depend upon the joint targeting process to integrate and deconflict fires effects that may
impact strategic- and operational-level objectives (see Chapter IV, “Operational Design
and Planning,” paragraph 4.b.(3)(c), “Select and prioritize audiences, TAs, and targets”).
It is important to note that not all forms of information fires dovetail into the targeting
process; in some instances, these fires bypass the targeting process to go directly to the
effects board. For instance, if the JFC’s intent is to influence a relevant actor to participate
in peace negotiations during armed conflict, all participants in the targeting process must
ensure lethal fires and joint force combat actions do not inhibit or dissuade that
participation. Information planners participate in the targeting process as members of the
joint targeting coordination board, which plans, coordinates, and deconflicts joint targeting.

(c) Like all forms of fires, fires in support of OIE are included in the joint
planning and execution processes to facilitate synchronization and unity of effort. JFCs
use coordination and control measures to enable joint action. These measures include
strategic and operational mission narratives, PAG, other communication-related guidance,
the law of war, and rules of engagement. Additionally, information planners identify
control measures for OIE that have the potential to conflict with the OIE of other CCMDs
or interorganizational partners. OIE units work with maneuver and fires elements to
establish fire control measures to reduce the impact of combat operations on the civilian
populace. If multiple USG or allied entities have requirements to create effects or collect
intelligence on the same target in the IE, then synchronization and deconfliction across all
USG entities are critical to prevent uncoordinated actions from exposing or interfering with
each other.

(d) Finally, units conducting OIE contribute to, and benefit from, the joint
fires task of assessing the results of employing fires. That task includes assessing the
effectiveness and performance of fires, as well as their contribution to the larger operation
or objective.

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For details on joint targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

(5) Movement and Maneuver Joint Function

(a) Maneuver is the employment of forces in the JOA through movement in

combination with the other joint functions to gain a position of advantage in respect to the
enemy. The movement and maneuver joint function encompasses the disposition of joint
forces to conduct operations by securing advantage and exploiting tactical success to
achieve operational and strategic objectives. Movement and maneuver to and within the
JOA can signal adversaries, allies, and neutral actors and may have a deterrent or assuring
effect in support of JFC objectives. Movement and maneuver involve deploying forces
and capabilities into a JOA and positioning them within that area to gain operational
advantage in support of mission objectives, including accessing and, as necessary,
controlling key terrain. Movement and maneuver of forces have inherent informational
aspects that affect the achievement of JFC objectives and should be accounted for during
planning and execution.

(b) OIE, the art of maneuvering in the IE, is conducted to enhance the effects
of the inherent informational aspects of the movement and maneuver of forces. The
pervasive nature of information and the IE provides the joint force with operationally
significant access to relevant actors within the JOA, as well as outside the JOA. OIE
contribute to the joint force’s freedom of action and control of the operational tempo
necessary to conduct its activities at a time and place of its choosing to produce the
operational reach necessary to create an advantage over the adversary.

For more information on maneuvering in cyberspace, see JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace

Operations.

See JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, for a discussion of maneuvering

in the EMS.

(6) Protection Joint Function. The protection joint function provides the JFC
with the capabilities needed to protect the joint force, its bases, necessary infrastructure,
and lines of communication from attack. The protection joint function complements the
information joint function by ensuring the use of appropriate physical defensive measures
necessary to safeguard information. With respect to OIE, the protection joint function
attends to the physical security necessary for the deployment, storage, employment, and
redeployment of SAP capabilities necessary for classified OIE. As part of OIE, DODIN
and DCO secure and defend the joint force’s information, information networks, and
information systems that form the backbone of the JFC’s C2 joint function. Due to their
global and commercial connectivity, protection of these assets is complicated. OIE
reinforces the protection function by degrading the opponent’s ability to target the joint
force by attacking its information, information networks, information systems, and human
and automated decision making. For example, OIE that include OCO and JEMSO (e.g.,
jamming communication frequencies) can protect the joint force by disrupting the

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 Operations in the Information Environment

opponent’s targeting and C2 systems. OPSEC also supports the protection joint function
by protecting critical information.

(7) Sustainment Joint Function. The sustainment joint function provides the
JFC with the capabilities necessary to provide the logistics and personnel services required
to maintain and prolong joint operations until mission objectives are achieved. Successful
execution of OIE requires that information be regarded as a mission-essential resource that
must be sustained (e.g., assuring its integrity, accuracy, confidentiality, accessibility,
nonrepudiation, and flow). Joint operations, especially globally integrated operations in
the IE, may require those portions of the joint force that conduct OIE to be geographically
dispersed and virtually connected, which will require special considerations for
sustainment. Sustainment support for the OIE unit is essential and requires coordination
with the joint force’s logistics staff. Sustainment contributes to the joint force’s ability to
generate effects and operate in the IE. From an operational perspective, OIE can help
protect sustainment efforts by manipulating or masking the inherent informational aspects
of joint force sustainment activities in ways that impair an opponent’s ability to sense and
target these efforts.

For a discussion of joint functions, see JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations. The
protection of the DODIN is discussed in JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations, and JP 6-
0, The Joint Communications System. See JP 13-13.3, Operations Security, for more
details on OPSEC.

3. Organizing for Operations in the Information Environment

a. JFCs may choose to create a task force for the integrated employment of the
specialized capabilities required to conduct OIE.

b. Information forces, the building blocks of OIE units, are those Active Component
and Reserve Component forces specifically organized, trained, and equipped to create,
and/or support the creation of effects on the IE. Information forces aggregate military
personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support that provide expertise and
specialized capabilities (e.g., CMO, MISO, PA, EMSO, CO) that leverage information and
conduct activities central to OIE. See paragraph d., “Information Forces,” below, for a
discussion of the types of information forces that make up OIE units.

c. Organizations and Personnel. OIE units consist of a headquarters organization

with C2 of assigned and attached information forces.

(1) OIE unit personnel include information planners and support personnel (e.g.,
intelligence, logistics). Information professionals are information force personnel who are
specifically trained to inform audiences; influence external relevant actors; attack and
exploit relevant actor information, information networks, and information systems; and
protect friendly information, information networks, and information systems. Information
planners serve in OIE units and as OIE and specialized capability SMEs on JTF and other
headquarters planning staffs.

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Chapter VII

(2) OIE unit headquarters are composed of a commander and a staff of

information planners who possess a depth of knowledge and experience in their respective
fields, as well as broad experience working alongside planners from other fields.

d. Information Forces. OIE units are typically composed of the following types of
information forces:

(1) Psychological Operations Forces. Psychological operations forces consist

of personnel trained and equipped to conduct MISO. MISO are planned operations to
convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the JFC’s
objectives.

For additional guidance on PSYOP forces and MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military
Information Support Operations.

(2) CA. CA are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed through
civil reconnaissance, network analysis, and network engagement to support, influence,
compel, or leverage populations, governments, and other institutions to expose malign
influence, counter coercion and subversion, and impose costs through conventional and
unconventional activities. CA forces execute CA operations and enable the commander’s
CMO, engaging the civil component of the OE to support the JFC’s CMO efforts. CA
enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the OE,
identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society, engage and
influence civil networks, and support other information activities.

For additional guidance on CA and CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

(3) PA Organizations. PA organizations and personnel focus on the OIE core

activity of informing domestic, international, and internal audiences. They contribute to
the achievement of OIE objectives by putting joint operations, activities, and policies in
context; facilitating informed perceptions about military operations; countering
disinformation and propaganda; and correcting misinformation through the dissemination
of timely and accurate information. PA personnel participate in staff planning and lead the
collaborative development of operational- and tactical-level narrative development. They
contribute to the development of constraints and restraints, the identification of potential
intended and unintended consequences of planned actions, and to an appreciation of the
nature of information flow in varying cultural contexts. PA planners advise the JFC on the
possible direct and indirect effects of joint force actions on public perceptions, attitudes,
and beliefs and work to formulate and deliver timely and culturally attuned messages.

For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

(4) EMSO Elements. EMSO elements assigned to OIE units work with the
JEMSOC at the parent command to organize, execute, and oversee the conduct of EW and

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 Operations in the Information Environment

spectrum management. They do this as part of OIE and, when tasked, in support of other
joint force operations. Because EMSO is an enabler for other activities that communicate
through or use the EMS, such as MISO, PA, or CO, EMSO elements work closely with
information planners from other fields on the OIE unit staff.

For additional guidance on EMSO, refer to JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum

Operations.

(5) Cyberspace Forces. Units of the CMF include cyberspace protection teams
that defend blue cyberspace in reinforcement to the system operators and local defenders;
national mission teams, supported by national support teams, that defend the Nation from
threats in cyberspace by operating in gray and red cyberspace; and combat mission teams,
supported by combat support teams, that project power in support of CCDR objectives, by
operating in and through gray and red cyberspace. Units of the cyberspace forces retained
by the Services or assigned to the CCMDs conduct similar missions of more limited scope.
Mission-tailored force packages of cyberspace forces and cyberspace capabilities are
established as required and can include small mission elements selected from one or more
teams up to named JTFs.

For additional guidance on cyberspace forces, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace

Operations.

(6) Space Operations Elements. USSF Guardians assigned as planners on OIE

unit staffs ensure commanders and their staffs have a common understanding of space
operations, provide space domain awareness, and coordinate space capabilities for OIE.
Space operations support the flow and protection of information and decision making and
are an enabler for other activities that communicate through or use space capabilities.

For additional guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations.

e. OIE Unit Core Activities

(1) Introduction. OIE unit core activities include conducting OIE and
facilitating the JFC’s integration of information into joint force operations.

(a) These core activities reflect the collective abilities of OIE units rather
than those of any one Service or unit. OIE unit core activities are organized into missions
that contribute to achieving a commander’s objectives. OIE units may conduct one or both
core activities during the conduct of a mission.

(b) Other joint force elements conduct some of the information activities
associated with these core activities during their operations. However, OIE units conduct
these core activities with assigned capabilities in a manner that complements and supports
joint force abilities to achieve a broad range of strategic and operational objectives. For
example, a ground maneuver element might conduct a MILDEC activity in support of its
own mission to get an enemy decision maker to move forces to a location where they could

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Chapter VII

be destroyed, but a JFC would task an OIE unit to conduct MILDEC as part of OIE that is
focused more broadly on the JFC’s objectives. Likewise, all of the joint force’s subordinate
elements have a responsibility to understand how information affects their OE, but the OIE
unit conducts that activity at the direction of and for the JFC.

(2) OIE. OIE are the primary focus of OIE units. OIE encompass critical tasks
that OIE units must perform to achieve JFC objectives by leveraging information. OIE
units accomplish these tasks using military capabilities in a coordinated and synchronized
manner to collectively achieve objectives affecting the IE by informing audiences;
influencing foreign relevant actors; attacking and exploiting information, information
networks, and information systems; and by protecting friendly information, information
networks, and information systems. OIE are conducted in support of the JFC’s operation
or campaign objectives or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint forces
continuously conduct OIE to remain engaged with relevant actors.

(a) The inform task involves actions taken to accurately communicate with
domestic and foreign audiences to build understanding and support for operational and
institutional objectives. It seeks to reassure allies and partners and to deter and dissuade
competitors, adversaries, and enemies. The inform task uses accurate and timely
information and visual media to counter disinformation; correct misinformation; and put
operations, activities, and polices in context. It involves communication with domestic and
international audiences and with joint force personnel. Planning and executing tasks to
inform include public engagement and the acquisition, production, and dissemination of
communication and other information products. The inform task facilitates educated
perceptions by establishing facts and placing joint force activities in context, correcting
inaccuracies and misinformation, and discrediting propaganda with counter-narratives.
The primary means used for the inform task is PA; however CA, cyberspace, and
psychological operations forces can facilitate the release of truthful information through
their respective CMO, CO, and MISO activities.

(b) The purpose of the influence task is to affect the perceptions, attitudes,
and other drivers of relevant actor behavior. This task is focused on impacting the human
aspects of the OE, so planners should consider elements of these aspects as they relate to
decision makers (e.g., each decision maker’s culture, life experiences, relationships,
outside events, ideology, and the influences of those people inside and outside the decision
maker’s group) during OIE planning, execution, and assessment. Planners integrate
influence activities into the existing targeting process. Activities designed to contribute to
the influence task include MISO, CMO, CO, OPSEC, and MILDEC operations. Influence
may also involve the use of STO. Commanders consider the influence potential of all
available capabilities in design, planning, and targeting. OIE units conduct all influence
tasks in accordance with approved authorities.

(c) The attack and exploit task comprises activities meant to impact or use
opponent information, information systems, and information networks in ways that affect
decision making and other drivers of behavior to create relative advantages for the joint
force. OIE units execute these actions to manipulate or paralyze the adversary or enemy

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 Operations in the Information Environment

decision-making processes. Attack activities encompass affecting the real or perceived

accuracy, integrity, authenticity, or confidentiality of information or the availability of
information. OIE units accomplish attack tasks through technical means, such as CO,
EMSO, and STO, though maneuver forces and joint fires can also be employed in support
of these tasks. Exploit activities include accessing information, information networks, or
information systems to gain intelligence and support operational preparation of the
environment (OPE) for current or future operations. OPE may subsequently support
inform and influence tasks of OIE. OIE units accomplish the exploit task through technical
means, such as CO or EMSO.

(3) Facilitate the JFC’s integration of information into joint force

operations.

(a) OIE units have the responsibility of supporting the JFC’s integration of
information into the planning and execution of all joint force operations and activities. This
encompasses maintaining an understanding for the JFC of how information affects their
OE; providing advice and assistance on how to best leverage the inherent information
aspects of all joint force activities; collaborating with the JFC staff on the protection of
information, information networks, and information systems; and assessing the
effectiveness of joint force activities from an informational perspective.

(b) OIE units accomplish this with assigned, attached, or supporting

intelligence capabilities and analysts in conjunction with the joint force intelligence staff.
It includes providing analysis of the informational, physical, and human aspects of the
environment; identifying threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the IE; and
identifying and analyzing relevant actors.

See Chapter II, “Joint Force Uses of Information,” paragraph 7, “The Information Joint
Function,” for details on the task understand how information impacts the OE.

(c) OIE units conduct this core activity by providing original products to the
staff (e.g., analysis of the informational, physical, and human aspects of the environment),
input to staff products (e.g., military narrative, information estimate), or participating in
JPP with the staff. OIE units do this via planners serving on, or as liaisons to, higher
headquarters staffs or through coordination between their staff and higher headquarters
staff.

4. Operations in the Information Environment: Planning, Coordination, Execution,

and Assessment

a. JPP and OIE

(1) Commanders integrate OIE into their operations at all levels. Plans should
address how OIE affect the will, awareness, and understanding of adversaries and other
relevant actors; deny competitors the ability to act in and through the IE to undermine the

VII-11
Chapter VII

joint force; and protect joint force will, awareness, understanding, and the joint force ability
to take actions in and through the IE.

(2) JFCs integrate OIE into operations, as main or supporting efforts, or conduct
an OIE as a stand-alone effort. During plan development, JFC provides planning guidance
that describes the desired conditions that must exist in the IE to support mission
accomplishment, how the joint force will leverage the inherent informational aspects of its
activities to support the JFC’s objectives, and the types and level risk that the JFC will
accept in the IE. Specifically for OIE units, the JFC provides guidance on how OIE will
support the JFC’s scheme of maneuver. The JFC ensures supporting OIE plans and
concepts describe the role and scope of OIE in the JFC’s effort and address how OIE
support the execution of the JTF plan.

(3) OIE are planned using JPP. Planners integrate OIE unit capabilities into JPP
as a part of adaptive planning.

b. OIE Planning Considerations

(1) Overview. Information planners have the same operational design

considerations and challenges as planners for operations in the physical domains but also
have some unique considerations for planning OIE. While OIE plans are developed to
inform and influence, and to affect or protect information, information networks, and
information systems, but there are factors outside the control of OIE that will have impacts
in and through the IE that undermine those plans. These factors range from unanticipated
adversary or mission partner actions inside the JOA to natural disasters or unforeseen
domestic social or political developments that occur outside of the JOA that, nonetheless,
affect the JFC’s OE. Regardless of the event or action, they create conditions to which
OIE planners must adapt and have the flexibility to address in branch plans or sequels.

(2) Different Planning Considerations for Contributing Information Forces.

Each of the information forces that contribute to OIE (e.g., psychological operations forces,
cyberspace forces) has their own unique planning considerations that increase the
complexity of planning OIE. For each capability or activity employed, OIE planners will
need to understand the different authorities and permissions, coordination requirements,
intelligence requirements, and account for the lead time necessary to satisfy these
requirements prior to the execution of activities.

(3) Planning and Execution Timelines. Related to the above, the applicable
authorities will vary depending upon when and where the activities occur and what or
whom they will affect (e.g., if effects are likely to impact other relevant actors outside of a
JFC’s operational area). This includes accounting for the lead time required to obtain the
necessary intelligence for target development and target access; confirm the appropriate
authorities; and complete necessary coordination, including interagency coordination
and/or synchronization. Additionally, planners will need to understand the length of time
it will take for certain actions to have the desired effects and the duration of those effects.

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 Operations in the Information Environment

This may require OIE to begin prior to other joint force activities or even continue after
some of those activities cease.

(4) Language, Regional, Cultural, or Technical Expertise. Leveraging

information for the purpose of affecting the behavior of relevant actors requires an
understanding of the drivers of human or automated systems behavior. These drivers
include language, regional, cultural, and often technical aspects. Planning teams will need
to obtain support from various SMEs with an understanding of these aspects to understand
relevant actors and develop feasible plans.

(5) Plan for Monitoring Effects and Adjusting Activities. The dynamic nature
of the IE often makes it challenging to determine whether OIE are effective. Planners of
OIE should determine MOEs and MOE indicators during initial planning, incorporate
monitoring tasks as essential elements of all OIE plans, and obtain adequate support to
fulfill information and intelligence requirements.

(6) Unintended Effects in and through the IE. The inherent informational
aspects of activities and the lack of boundaries in the IE guarantee that military activities
will often have impacts in and through the IE beyond the intended area or relevant actor.
This makes the evaluation of potential effects particularly important when conducting OIE.
Information activities can cause effects in and through the IE in ways that are not evident
to planners. Some of these effects may affect other commanders’ areas of operations and
objectives or have strategic impacts. Coordinating plans and activities with joint, USG,
and other mission partners will help identify potential effects beyond those intended and
allow planners to avoid or mitigate effects that jeopardize their own or mission partner
objectives.

c. Intelligence Support to OIE. The complexity of OIE requires dedicated

intelligence support. Intelligence professionals will need to work closely with OIE
planners throughout the planning, execution, and assessment of operations to ensure they
understand and meet the unique OIE information and intelligence requirements.

(1) Intelligence requirements. During OIE mission analysis, the planners

identify significant information gaps about the adversary and other relevant aspects of the
OE. After gap analysis, the staff formulates intelligence requirements, which are general
or specific subjects upon which there is a need for the collection of information or the
production of intelligence. Based upon identified intelligence requirements, the staff
develops more specific questions known as information requirements (those items of
information that must be collected and processed to develop the intelligence required by
the commander). Information requirements related to the IE will include questions about
the informational, physical, and human aspects of the environment; the questions about the
characteristics of relevant actors; and the impact of the aspects of the environment on
relevant actor behavior. These intelligence requirements are fulfilled through a
combination of military intelligence and national intelligence sources.

See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for additional details on intelligence requirements.

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Chapter VII

(2) RFIs. Planners can submit RFIs to obtain intelligence products that support
their activities or trigger collection efforts in any part of the OE. RFIs are specific, time-
sensitive, ad hoc requirements for intelligence information to support an ongoing crisis or
operation and not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence
production. RFIs fulfill customer requirements and range from disseminating existing
products through integrating or tailoring on-hand information to scheduling new collection
and production. RFI managers work closely with the OIE planners to understand the OIE
information requirements and translate those requirements into RFIs. The RFI manager
and the primary intelligence producer determine how best to meet those requirements. In
addition to information collected during military operations, information required to
support OIE planning can come from signals intelligence, human intelligence,
counterintelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, geospatial intelligence, or
open-source intelligence. Regardless of source, the information should be timely, accurate,
and in a usable format.

See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for additional information on RFIs.

d. Targeting. Commanders may choose to engage relevant actors through lethal

and/or nonlethal fires as part of OIE. Relevant actors selected for engagement through
joint fires are developed, vetted, and validated within the established targeting process.
Planning and targeting staffs develop and select relevant actors for targeting in and through
the IE based on the commander’s objectives rather than on the capabilities available to
achieve them. The focus is on creating effects that accomplish targeting-related tasks and
achieve objectives, not on using a particular capability simply because it is available. For
a discussion of relevant actors and targeting, refer to Chapter IV, “Operational Design and
Planning,” paragraph 4.b.(3)(c), “Select and prioritize audiences, TAs, and targets.”

For details on joint targeting see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

e. C2 of OIE Units

(1) The complex and dynamic nature of the IE, where all joint force activities
cause effects in and through that environment, make unity of effort crucial for all effective
operations, including OIE. The JFC promotes unity of effort through the integration of
information considerations into the planning and execution of all joint force operations, as
discussed in Chapter IV, “Operational Design and Planning.” The JFC may reinforce this
unity of effort with unity of command by establishing a subordinate task force so the
preponderance of information forces’ capabilities and activities are the responsibility of
one commander under the JFC.

(2) The JFC provides OIE unit commanders with the authorities, processes, and
tools required to C2 assigned and attached units. The JFC will also provide OIE unit
commanders the appropriate level of control of additional forces necessary to accomplish
OIE missions.

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 Operations in the Information Environment

(3) The JFC assigns OIE units missions to create effects in and through the IE to
set conditions that support the JFC’s objectives and enduring outcomes.

f. Synchronization of OIE Activities

(1) By its nature, OIE involves the synchronization of multiple capabilities and
activities to aggregate their effects and achieve operational objectives. Synchronization
comprises the coordination, tracking, and direction of all OIE activities to ensure they are
aligned with the JFC’s overarching narrative and objectives, and synchronized and
deconflicted with activities external to the command.

(2) An OIE unit achieves internal synchronization through a commander-led joint

planning and execution processes for all OIE. This includes planning the conduct of
information activities by assigned and attached information forces to create effects in the
IE resulting in the publication of a synchronization matrix during orders generation.
Through and following orders generation, OIE units position and employ their elements in
accordance with the synchronization matrix to create desired effects at the right time and
place.

(3) Due to the interconnectedness of the IE, the effects of activities in and through
the IE may cross geographical boundaries and, if not carefully planned and synchronized,
may have unanticipated effects on tactical up through strategic-level objectives. OIE
should be coordinated with other DOD entities, the interagency, and multinational partners
so objectives and activities are deconflicted and, to the greatest extent possible,
synchronized to create greater effects. Coordination of OIE with external organizations is
through information planners or other personnel serving on higher headquarters staff or at
adjacent joint and mission partner units. Coordination is accomplished with multinational
partners via the staff unless otherwise authorized.

For details on interorganizational collaboration, see Chapter III, “Unity of Effort.”

g. Assessment of OIE Activities

(1) Assessment helps the commander determine progress toward achieving joint
force objectives and mission accomplishment. This requires identifying current (baseline)
conditions of the OE and determining those desired conditions that define achievement of
objectives, then monitoring for change from the current to desired conditions. Measuring
this progress toward the mission objectives and delivering feedback into the planning
process to adjust operations during execution involves deliberately comparing the planned
effects of OIE with actual outcomes to determine the overall effectiveness of OIE unit
activities.

(2) The assessment process for OIE begins during planning and includes
developing MOEs and MOPs of OIE activities, as well as their contribution to the larger
operation or objective. This includes identifying MOE indicators and incorporating
monitoring tasks as essential elements of those OIE plans. Historically, combat assessment

VII-15
Chapter VII

has emphasized the BDA component of measuring physical and functional damage, but
this approach does not always represent the most complete effect, particularly with respect
to OIE. OIE often seeks to have effects outside the scope of battle and often do not create
physical damage. While assessing the effects of OIE may require typical BDA analysis
and assessment of physical, functional, and target system components, the higher-order
effects of actions in and through the IE are often subtle. Assessment of second- and third-
order effects of OIE activities can be difficult and may require significant intelligence
collection and analysis efforts. Clearly articulating the desired effects and creating and
resourcing an assessment plan for OIE during the planning processes increases the
likelihood that all objectives are met. Planners should emphasize JIPOE, COG analysis,
target systems analysis, and collection management activities to inform assessment.

For details on assessment of information activities, including OIE, refer to Chapter VI,
“Assessment.”

VII-16 JP 3-04
 APPENDIX A
NARRATIVE DEVELOPMENT
“There is empirical evidence that experiencing a narrative can be
transformational and can induce long-term effects upon audiences’ beliefs,
attitudes, and behavioral intentions and actions.”

Brigadier General Tim Fay and Dr. Jorge Barraza, Leveraging Neuroscientific
and Neurotechnological Developments with Focus on Influence and
Deterrence in a Networked World

1. Principles of Developing Narratives

Successful military operations depend on creating an operational advantage in a highly

complex and dynamic IE. To meet this challenge, the joint force communicates the
rationale for their actions to a wide range of friendly, neutral, and adversarial audiences.
This need to communicate a rationale is just as true for military operations conducted in a
poorly developed area that depends on word-of-mouth to remain informed as it is for
operations conducted in a highly technologically connected environments inundated with
sources of information. If planners fail to provide a narrative that provides an observer
with context for sense-making, observers will use their own narratives to explain the
military events around them, which may or may not advance the commander’s overall
intent. Developing an effective narrative helps audiences from the individual military
member to international audiences understand the reasons behind joint force activities.
This appendix describes a seven-step process for developing a narrative.

2. Characteristics of an Effective Narrative

Applied narrative research has demonstrated that effective narratives can and do affect
rationality, decision making, and other aspects of thought processes. A narrative focused
on meaning is more effective and more persuasive than a narrative that relies on one-way
communication strategies that focus on transmission of messages. Studies have shown that
an effective narrative:

a. Provides coherence to military actions and activities through a structured

expression of the reasons for and the desired outcomes of the campaign/operation.

b. Is easily understood and remembered by intended audiences.

c. Describes the context of the organization (e.g., JTF, CCMD), why it does what it
does, and ideally something about what it does.

d. Makes clear and removes the ambiguity of US values and interests regarding the
current situation.

A-1
Appendix A

e. Provides a more compelling and believable alternative for the future than the
outcomes the adversary is attempting to portray. Ideally, it does so by exploiting adversary
weaknesses and mitigating adversary strengths.

f. Offers a better and just future regarding the contested interest. This future should
appeal to emotions and demonstrate an awareness of the audiences’ values and social
norms.

g. Is logical, meaning it falls within the belief system of the intended audience (e.g.,
linguistically, culturally, socially). Presenting a logical narrative is not about including a
bunch of facts. It is about presenting a narrative that is grounded in the realities of the
situation, including important factors within PMESII systems.

h. Supports the development of a common identity (e.g., shared values, goals) and a
desired image of the force that is necessary to integrate words and deeds and thus creating
desired effects in the IE.

i. Is easily communicated through credible sources. This means it should be

unclassified and written so that it can be shared with partners and publics without
jeopardizing the mission.

3. Narrative Hierarchy

a. As part of campaigning, the joint force helps develop and employ military strategic
and cascading mission narratives that reflect policy aims and are targeted at the adversary.
The President or national security staff may provide a strategic narrative that includes
national-level communication guidance. More often, the national-level strategic narrative
will have to be derived (understood) from guidance (e.g., NDS, NSC talking points,
speeches). DOD, either the JS or OSD, then develops a military strategic narrative that
explains the use of the military and puts global operations in context.

b. CCMD and operational-level headquarters staffs develop cascading operational-

level mission narratives with their associated themes and messages that nest under the
strategic military narrative. These operational-level narratives focus on the theater/region
and seek to advance the legitimacy of the mission while countering adversary narratives.
Staffs at this level should assess whether the narrative audience operates on a global stage,
exposing them to narratives of other JFCs. If so, planners should ensure narrative
synchronization with other narratives to minimize potential blue-on-blue narrative
confliction and strive to maximize TA narrative engagement. This will enhance narrative
penetration and reduce “say-do gap” possibilities. The joint force should make every effort
to ensure operations, activities, words, and images are perceived as being consistent with
this narrative.

c. Tactical units develop a local tactical mission narrative nested under the operational
mission narrative to lend continuity to operations and communications. Figure IV-2 in
Chapter IV, “Operational Design and Planning,” shows how these narratives flow from the

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 Narrative Development

national level through the operational to the tactical. Component and tactical force
narratives for audiences operating on the global stage should be deconflicted and
synchronized with component and tactical forces with the potential to convey the narrative.
This collaboration is critical to minimize “say-do gaps” and ensure narrative coherency and
consistency.

d. In addition, commanders ensure the mission narrative is communicated internally

to their forces. Communicating the narrative internally helps forces understand the
necessary conditions and their roles in achieving the objectives. Internal and external
harmonization of narrative efforts is paramount for the development of both a common
identity and a desired image of the command/unit. Communicating a clear and compelling
narrative internally fosters a sense of common purpose and shared direction. Internal
communication of the narrative enables military personnel to better understand their roles
by explaining the legitimacy of policies, programs, and operations affecting them. This
understanding helps protect forces against malign influence.

4. Developing the Narrative

Narratives are developed through a PA-led collaborative effort that reflects what the
mission itself is likely to communicate or signal to those audiences observing it. Primary
collaborators for narrative development are PA, psychological operations forces, J-5 KLE
personnel, the POLAD and staff, and intelligence planners.

a. Incorporate Guidance/Strategic Narrative. Strategic guidance initiates

planning, provides the basis for mission analysis, and enables the JPEC to develop a shared
understanding of the issues, OE, objectives, and responsibilities. A strategic narrative is
constructed for the purpose of providing common guidance for subordinate forces to
communicate that shared understanding effectively and accurately. As mentioned, the
strategic national narrative with national-level communication guidance may be provided
by the President or national security staff. More often, planners will need to derive the
national-level narrative from strategic guidance such as the NSS; NMS; NSC talking
points; and speeches. Commanders’ guidance informs development of the military mission
narrative by providing the purpose, aim, and scope of the mission. Mission analysis
supports development of the narrative by providing an understanding of the overall
situation and its root causes. A key output from mission analysis is the identification of
the actors that are most relevant to the campaign or operation.

b. Narrative Analysis. Narrative analysis is used to gain greater understanding of

the OE. Narratives are always in existence, whether we purposefully create them or not.
They exist because every culture transmits and sustains its own narratives that provide it
with its own identity and basis for actions. Before crafting their own narrative, joint force
planners need to understand what narratives exist in the OE, what they reveal about relevant
actors, and how they are propagated.

(1) Narrative landscape. The joint force will face pre-existing, and potentially
competing, narratives. Understanding this narrative landscape helps the joint force to

A-3
Appendix A

predict how audiences will receive and interpret information. Prior to developing the
narrative, the joint force should identify what narratives exist in the OE, which ones are
prevalent, and which ones seem to be most effective.

(2) Narrative content and form. Narratives can provide information from
relevant actors’ cultural perspective about what they consider important, how they interpret
events, and how they are being positively or negatively impacted. Narrative content
includes the story or message that is communicated, the symbols used, the actors involved,
and the meaning of the message for the narrator. Narrative form includes the structure of
the narrative, the sequencing of events, and how language is used. Information
professionals, regional-cultural experts, and other SMEs can help analyze the content and
form of existing narratives.

(3) Narrative transmission. How the various narratives are disseminated,

received, and processed not only helps identify effective communication paths but can also
reveal key influencers in the IE. Understanding how relevant actors communicate and
exchange information will impact how the joint force will craft and communicate its
narrative. The primary executors of the mission narrative are personnel who routinely
interact with the local populace.

c. Audience Analysis

(1) An audience is a broad, roughly defined group based on common

characteristics. It defines a group or population to whom the military intends to
communicate. Audiences can include the US populace, regional parties, allies, NGOs,
international organizations, private sector, foreign populations, and adversaries. Each
audience views words, images, and deeds through their cultural lens and local
environmental conditions. Each uses trusted communication mediums to receive, process,
and disseminate information. Audience analysis informs the joint force’s planning to
inform and influence key audiences, recognizing the responsibility to provide factual
information, particularly to US and friendly audiences.

(2) Commanders and staff attempt to understand the many audiences within the
operational area, across the broader region, and around the world to develop a compelling
narrative and deliver messages using the appropriate means to educate, inform, and
influence those audiences. Each audience has its own beliefs and perspectives, which
affect how it perceives our actions and words, often in ways we may not anticipate. Each
audience receives information differently—whether by word of mouth, written texts,
Internet (including social media), radio, or television.

(3) Intelligence, PA, CA, and MISO staff all perform some type of audience
analysis. Intelligence staff use socio-cultural analysis and a system perspective to identify
and analyze all relevant actors, to include their relationships and interdependencies (see JP
2-0, Joint Intelligence). PA officers use quantitative and qualitative research to better
understand internal and external publics, and the cultural landscape to better understand
audience needs and predispositions, and better design messages to increase audience

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 Narrative Development

understanding (see JP 3-61, Public Affairs). CA professionals understand the key

audiences within the civil dimension by analyzing the six interrelated civil considerations:
areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (see JP 3-57, Civil-Military
Operations). MISO planners follow a MISO-unique TAA model to analyze potential or
approved foreign TAs’ current attitudes and behavior, their ability to accomplish desired
behavior change, their accessibility by various dissemination means, and their
susceptibility to influence. TAA includes a thorough examination of the political, military,
economic, cultural, religious, psychological, environmental, physical, and social
conditions that shape the OE and influence the behavior of the individuals and groups (see
JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations). Common questions that can be
answered by audience analysis are:

(a) Who are the various audiences, their beliefs, and relationships to others?

(b) Who are the friendly audiences that we need to inform and what is the
best way to inform them?

(c) Who are the neutral audiences that might potentially support friendly
objectives or the adversary, and how may they be engaged?

(d) Who are the adversary’s supporters or potential supporters and how can
they be influenced?

(e) What are the audience’s rules, customs, norms, beliefs, and motivations?

(f) What linkages and relationships exist within the audience that can be
leveraged?

(g) What are the trusted mediums (conduits) through which the audience
receives information (governmental, academic, cultural, and private enterprise) and by
what means (Internet/social media, radio, face-to-face, television)?

(h) How can effects be observed/measured (informs assessment which is

addressed below)?

(i) In addition to the TA, which audiences might also receive the narrative
and how would they perceive and react to it?

d. Audience Accessibility. Planners consider the various ways in which narratives

may be conveyed to audiences. Considerations for reinforcing the narrative are:

(1) What are the means that can be used to provide multiple/reinforcing
communication channels?

(2) What capabilities (physical or informational) are available for this operation?

A-5
Appendix A

(3) What methods of communication will be effective in reaching audiences?

(4) How does the joint force identify the right conduits and then access those
conduits?

(5) What are the audiences’ critical networks (formal and informal)?

(6) How does the joint force identify and analyze potential communication media
and channels?

(7) How does the joint force identify relevant actors’ physical communication
and human networks?

e. Writing The Narrative Statement or Paragraph. A narrative can be detailed and

complex with lots of background details. These details from the narrative development
process should be documented for later use by information professionals. This detailed
narrative should be expressed in plans and orders through a concise statement or paragraph
that articulates the conditions, opportunities, key actions, and payoffs associated with a
particular mission/operation/campaign. The first three steps of narrative development
make it possible to construct a concise but comprehensive written narrative statement,
which can stand on its own and support the creation of local narratives that will resonate
with specific TAs. It is important that this written narrative statement or paragraph conveys
the commander’s reasons and desired outcomes for the campaign/mission/operation.

(1) Elements of a narrative. There are four elements to the written narrative:

(a) The current state. This includes a description of the current problem
and why it is important. This can be a wrong that will be righted or a desirable condition
to be retained. Additional details can describe what has been done up to now and what will
happen if nothing is done.

(b) The desired future state. This includes a description of the necessary
behaviors and conditions required to accomplish the mission. It should describe what good
or right looks like in terms that the audience can understand.

(c) The pathway. This includes a description of how the joint force intends
to get to the desired future state. It answers the questions of what will be done, who it will
be done to, and who it will be done with.

(d) The justification. This includes a description of why the proposed future
state is better than the alternatives, thus validating the pathway. The justification is best
when woven into the other three elements.

(2) Narrative Storytelling. The narrative statement/paragraph provides a

framework for communicating meaning that goes beyond simple transmission of messages
and themes. In crafting the narrative, writers should consider components/elements of

A-6 JP 3-04
 Narrative Development

storytelling. These components are characters, traits, goals, motives, conflict and
problems, risk and danger, struggles, and details. These components are conveyed through
words, deeds, and images. Carefully crafting a narrative with these components of
storytelling increases the likelihood that the audience will make sense of the narrative.
Storytelling can create an emotionally appealing narrative that elicits personal investment
in the audience.

(3) Themes and Messages. A narrative provides a cohesive background story

for themes and messages. If the themes, messages, operations, and imagery (also known
as words, deeds, and images) are not synchronized, contradictions may emerge and can be
exploited by the enemy. Themes are distinct, unifying ideas or intentions that support the
narrative. These narratives and themes enable the development of discrete messages and
ideas relevant to specific audiences and are delivered through words, actions, and images.
Messages support themes by delivering tailored information to the specific public for
delivery at a specific time, place, and communication method. While messages are more
dynamic, they must always support the more enduring themes up and down the chain of
command. Messages should support the themes at their specific level. The themes should
support (or be nested under) the next higher-level themes and support the overarching
narrative.

f. Approval and Placement in Plan/Order. It is essential that narratives are

approved and endorsed by the commander to achieve permanence. The approval process
should allow for multiple reviews, but pretesting should also be conducted to ensure the
narrative will be understood, will be accepted, and will resonate with the appropriate
audiences and stakeholders prior to dissemination. The pretesting process may include red
teaming/“wargaming,” expert panels, and focus groups or surveys (refer to Figure A-1).

Potential Testing Pool

Communication Experts (Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military
Information Support Operations)
Legal Advisors
Political Advisors
Intelligence Personnel
Cultural Experts
Language Experts
Foreign Area Specialists
Representatives from Relevant Audiences
Information Cross Functional Team

Other Working Groups

Figure A-1. Potential Testing Pool

A-7
Appendix A

After pretesting and refinement, approval is granted once the commander feels the narrative
captures the intent of the mission/operation/campaign. The narrative statement is included
in the planning directive, ideally right after the mission statement.

g. Assess and Refine

(1) Once a narrative is associated with an event or series of events, regardless of

the effects, it is very difficult and often inadvisable to change it. However, narratives can
be refined and/or rebalanced to change the emphasis or create greater emotional appeal.
Throughout the operation, the mission narrative will be continuously assessed to identify
any requirement to refine it. This also ensures the mission narrative remains consistent
with political guidance as the mission evolves. Assessment is also done to determine how
operations/activities should be refined based on the effect they have on the narrative.
Continuous assessment of operations and activities on the narrative is a critical function to
mitigate unintended consequences.

UNITED STATES DRONE OPERATIONS IN PAKISTAN

For the United States, drone operations were an effective means to

target officials, members, and affiliates of al Qaeda who posed an
imminent threat of attack on the US homeland. They were also part of a
longer standing narrative of the United States as a superior
technological power, especially in war. The Pakistan media however,
portrayed the drone strikes as killing thousands of civilians. Eventually,
the drone strikes began to be seen by some as a war against Pakistanis
and Muslims in general. In this example, although the drone strikes were
executed in a bilateral manner with Pakistani officials, internal and rival
political factors leveraged the same events to their advantage. This
negative reaction, at the strategic level had to be carefully weighed
against short-term tactical gains.

Various Sources

(2) Information forces, along with the JFC’s J-2, support assessment efforts by
analyzing open and classified sources of information to determine audience perspectives
and reactions to joint force messages and physical activities. Engagements with the various
audiences by the commander, staff, subordinates, and mission partners also provide useful
feedback. Surveys, both those conducted by the joint force and those conducted by other
stakeholders such as DOS, media, the HN, and mission partners, can provide quality
feedback on how the narrative is resonating with audiences.

5. Changing the Narrative

a. Sometimes, it will be necessary to change the narrative. Some reasons to change a

mission narrative include a change in policy, a change in conditions in the OE, or because
the current mission narrative is detrimental to achieving objectives. When changing the
narrative, it is important to remember that the joint force can control what it says about
itself (the mission narrative), but it can only influence (not control) what audiences are

A-8 JP 3-04
 Narrative Development

saying about the joint force. As a result, it may take time to overcome any negative effects
that the previous narrative may have generated. Additionally, changing a narrative can
cause audiences to question the resolve or credibility of the joint force so it should be done
only after a careful consideration of the risk associated with not changing it.

b. Changing the narrative involves the same considerations and steps as developing
the narrative above but also involves:

(1) Understanding how the current narrative is resonating with the relevant
audiences. This includes understanding how operations are currently reinforcing unwanted
perceptions.

(2) Clearly identifying and articulating the compelling reason to change. The
rationale has to be communicated as part of the narrative.

(3) Identifying and communicating the desired or anticipated changes.

A-9
Appendix A

Intentionally Blank

A-10 JP 3-04
 APPENDIX B
INFORMATION STAFF ESTIMATE FORMAT

Originating Division, Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date-Time-Group, Month, Year

INFORMATION ESTIMATE NUMBER ________*

References:

(1) JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.

(2) JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(3) Maps and charts.

(4) Other pertinent documents.

1. Strategic Mission Narrative and Commander’s Intent Two Levels Up

The strategic mission narrative conveys the commander’s reasons and desired
outcomes for the campaign/mission/operation along with its supporting themes. The
strategic mission narrative explains the use of the military and puts global operations in
context. The commander’s intent identifies the major unifying efforts during the campaign
or operation, the points, and events where operations must succeed to control or establish
conditions in the JOA, and where other instruments of national power will play a central
role. The intent must enable decentralized execution. It provides focus to the staff and
helps subordinate and supporting commanders to take actions that achieve the
commander’s objectives without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold
as planned.

2. Operational Mission Narrative and Unit Commander’s Intent

The operational mission narrative nests under the strategic mission narrative.
Operational mission narratives focus on the theater/region and seek to advance the
legitimacy of the mission while countering adversary narratives. From the current planning
guidance or orders, each unit commander develops a clear and concise expression of the
purpose of the operation and the desired outcomes.

3. Desired State of the Joint Operations Area

Concisely express the desired state of the JOA within the expanded purpose statements
as determined during operational design. Includes relevant aspects of the USG strategic

B-1
Appendix B

narrative to inform JFC objectives. Military Messaging Guidance is normally a component

of the national strategic narrative. The estimate will include behavioral objectives and
conditions linked to the desired state of the JOA. Objectives are written so that they inform
the development of CCIRs.

4. Area of Interest

AOI is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas
adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. The AOI also includes areas where
relevant actors reside that may not be adjacent to the JFC’s JOA or AOI but from which
they have the potential to affect the success of the JFC’s mission. Include those relevant
actors linked by common language, religion, and other cultural factors (e.g., diaspora
enclaves, co-religionists) and/or that may have other objectives (e.g., political interest,
business interest) that have the potential to affect the JFC’s mission.

5. Mission

State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander’s mission
analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

6. Centers of Gravity

The information CFT expands the COG analysis approach to describe and prioritize
relevant actors, including the joint force itself, during conditions of cooperation,
competition, and armed conflict. Representatives from each of the joint functions
contribute to COG analysis (e.g., the sustainment staff conduct analysis of transportation
methods, routes, and numerous business interests for contracting within the JOA). The
information planners consider sustainment input during COG analysis to gain a refined
understanding of relevant actors, to include an assessment of their importance in achieving
JFC’s objectives, which then informs COA development, analysis, and selection. Based
on COG analysis, planners recommend actions (to include communications) the joint force
should take and what actions they should avoid taking in support of the JFC’s objectives.
Potentially, planners will nominate multiple COGs for simultaneous targeting based on the
critical vulnerabilities of each. The joint force leverages information, to include the
inherent informational aspects activities, to affect identified COGs. The joint force
monitors COGs over time to gain a more nuanced understanding of how to attain enduring
outcomes. The information CFT will help identify which USG and joint force activities
require a sustained effort during COG analysis.

7. Situation and Considerations

a. Characteristics of the Environment. Summarize the analysis of the

informational, physical, and human aspects of the environment by describing the different
characteristics of objects, activities, or actors in the context of one another and of the
broader environment. This summary helps identify the relevant actors the joint force needs
to affect, how to use information to effectively impact those relevant actors, and what

B-2 JP 3-04
 Information Staff Estimate Format

friendly information the joint force needs to protect. As a minimum, use the following as
references: the current intelligence estimate, CMO estimate, military police estimate,
MISO estimate, and TAA. Depict the characterization in visual and narrative forms to
communicate it to the commander, staff, and subordinate units.

(1) Informational Aspects. Describe how individuals, information systems, and

groups communicate and exchange information. This description includes informational
content that can be collected, transmitted, processed, stored, and displayed. Describe the
formal and informal communication infrastructure and networks, kinship and descent
relationships, licit and illicit commercial relationships, and social affiliations and contacts
that collectively create, process, manipulate, transmit, and share information in an
operational area and among relevant actors. These also include the inherent informational
aspects of activities (i.e., the “body language” of activities), which are described in Chapter
I, “Fundamentals of Information.” Describe the features and details, which include, but
are not limited to, the size of a force and its types of capabilities; the communications about
an activity (e.g., verbal and nonverbal communication, images, credible voice); and the
duration, location, and timing of the activity.

(2) Physical Aspects. Describe the material characteristics of the JOA, natural
and manufactured, that inhibit or enhance communication between people and between
information systems. This includes physical features such as terrain and lines of
communication that impact the transmission and processing of information. Physical
aspects include territorial boundaries associated with governments’ obligations to provide
security for their people. Physical aspects are critical elements of group identity and frame
how tribes and communities form. Physical aspects also include the characteristics of the
medium used in communication such as the material on which something is printed or the
radio frequency and bandwidth used during broadcast. Other physical aspects are
geographic features that can block or enable communication, provide protection, and
obstruct or enable movement. Information infrastructure to include its capabilities, its
organization, and how it impacts the content and flow of information, are also included in
this description.

(3) Human Aspects. Describe how relevant actors (human and automated
systems) interact with each other and with their environment. Human aspects frame how
relevant actors perceive a situation from their world view. This frame is the basis of their
perspective, from which they derive meaning to what they observe to understand the
context of the world around them. Human aspects may include, but are not limited to, the
language, social, cultural, psychological, and physical characteristics that shape a relevant
actor’s behavior. Identify aspects that may be useful in anticipating how relevant actors in
the JOA might behave under particular circumstances. Identify issues such as competition
for territory and resources, contending wills, and injustice or lack of representation, which
may be the root of the current problem or conflict. Identify the key linguistic, social,
cultural, psychological, and physical elements that shape the behavior of relevant actors.
This may include the character, tradition, and the objectives of relevant actors that suggest
how they might behave under particular circumstances. Also included is identification of

B-3
Appendix B

the key influencers within the area and known linkages to organizations and groups that
may support or challenge the commander’s objectives.

(4) Synthesis of Aspects. An environment is characterized by its informational,

physical, and human aspects. Explain how these three aspects influence and interact with
each other. Include a description of likely methods of approach to gain access to
communicate with the groups of interest. Through understanding relevant actor culture,
economics, security, food, water, transportation, communication, relationships with other
groups, and other relevant vulnerabilities and strengths, the joint force is more likely to
gain and maintain communication with relevant actors. This approach leverages any means
and combination of capabilities within the lawful parameters of the operation.

b. Enemy Forces

(1) Strength and Disposition. As a minimum, use the following as references

to form a multisource description: the current intelligence estimate, CMO estimate, military
police estimate, MISO estimate, and TAA.

(2) Enemy Capabilities. Describe enemy abilities to use information to reduce

the effectiveness of friendly forces and inhibit the joint force from achieving its objectives.
This includes enemy force’s ability to disseminate propaganda and disinformation.
Describe the known and suspected reach of enemy and adversary relationships known to
influence action of those groups that can support or challenge the commander’s objectives.

c. Friendly Forces

(1) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include estimates of force

strengths for those capabilities, operations, and activities that will be used to leverage
information.

(2) Own COAs. State the proposed COAs under consideration; focus on the key
tasks associated with the operations or plans. COAs are developed based on the operational
mission narrative, restated mission, commander’s intent, and planning guidance.

(3) Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and logistics

preparations necessary in all phases of the proposed operation.

(4) Unit Status. State known personnel, equipment, and training shortfalls,
which may affect the ability to meet the developing situational requirements.

(5) Assumptions. State assumptions about the informational, physical, and

human aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Do not repeat here the basic
assumptions for the operation that have already been made and will appear in planning
guidance and in the plan itself. State certain assumptions that may have been made
concerning potential or likely vulnerabilities in preparing this estimate.

B-4 JP 3-04
 Information Staff Estimate Format

(6) Special Features. State here any special features not covered elsewhere in
the estimate that may support or counter the commander’s objectives.

(7) Informational Capabilities, Operations, and Activities. Describe

capabilities, operations, and activities that use information and leverage information to
affect behavior and impact the OE. This section includes authorities and permissions
required to execute these information activities. All tasks of the information joint function
should consider their contribution to joint maneuver. It is important to note that the
following list of capabilities, operations, and activities employed to leverage information
is not all-inclusive. From the multifunctional information perspective:

(a) Key Leader and Other Engagements. Describe scheduled and likely
engagements (e.g., KLEs, civilian-to-civilian, military-to-military, civilian-to-military,
military-to-civilian). Identify relationship and influence objectives. Specify capabilities
and shortfalls for language, regional expertise, and culture knowledge and skills; and
include COAs and approximate time necessary to mitigate capability gaps. Identify key
leaders, develop messages, and describe options for ways and means (i.e., place, time, and
event) of delivery, focused on interpersonal relationships. Understand the impact of the
KLEs over time. Is the command getting what it perceives it needs to achieve objectives
while attempting to build relationships and cooperative action?

(b) PA. Relevant overview from the PA estimate. Describe organic and
partner PA capabilities relevant to inform tasks based on commander’s objectives,
including the location and capabilities of key PA units and teams. Describe PA
communication and synchronization planning, execution, and assessment activities for the
operation in alignment with the USG narrative. Describe the strategic and operational
media environment and the critical factors that could impact the command’s mission.
Assess potential media presence, capabilities, and content, as well as national and
international attitudes about the situation, command, and leaders. Analyze key audiences
and their news and information expectations and how the command can best inform them.
Provide an assessment of the public, social, and traditional media sentiment and the
potential effects of joint operations on that sentiment. Consider the requirement to
effectively communicate with the populace for whom the commander may become
responsible. State known capabilities and shortfalls (to include access to relevant actors
and audiences) and include COAs and approximate time necessary to mitigate capability
gaps. Describe status of authorities relevant to PA activities.

(c) CMO. Relevant CMO overview from the estimates of the situation, to
include area studies. Describe logistics and support infrastructure required to sustain
CMO-contracted support by function and location, from interagency, HN, multinational,
and NGO partners during shaping and follow-on phases of operations. Describe
information approach to enhance whole-of-government effectiveness and work toward
efficiency. Describe gaps remaining in the area study, assessment, and staff estimate.
Identify the problems and estimate the risks to the commander’s objectives. As required,
provide updates to ongoing assessments, estimates, and area studies. As required, describe
activities that may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. Describe

B-5
Appendix B

the civil component of the JOA and identify underlying causes of instability within civil
society. Identify gaps in functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil
government. Describe CMO view of COG analysis. Describe status of authorities relevant
to CMO activities.

(d) Deception. Describe competitor, adversary, and enemy relevant actors’

impressions about friendly force dispositions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions
to aid other staff members in understanding how to affect the opponent’s drivers of
behavior to mislead or induce them to behave in a manner advantageous to the joint force.
This section should increase the understanding of other multifunctional planners who can
suggest options to manipulate the opponent’s intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination systems. The information staff presents options for developing credible
stories, identifies and orients on appropriate deception audience, and assesses the
effectiveness of any deception effort. Thorough knowledge of the relevant actor and the
relevant actor’s decision-making processes informs options for all joint force activities.
Planners describe focused approaches intended to cause the relevant actor to behave in a
desired manner, not simply to be misled in their thinking and processing of their mission
essential information. Describe status of authorities relevant to deception activities.

(e) MISO. Describe the characteristics of the operational area (from MISO
perspective), the psychological impact of JFC’s proposed COA, and key considerations for
COA supportability. Describe MISO planning, execution, and assessment activities for the
operation in support of JFC objectives. Identify hostile, friendly, and neutral target sets.
Describe current status of organic and external influence capabilities. Identify critical
shortfalls such as information/intelligence needs for the proposed MISO programs and
ongoing TAA, availability of linguists, availability of indigenous personnel for
employment with psychological operations personnel, or accessibility to reach selected
TAs, and include COAs necessary to reduce their impact. Describe status of approval
process and authorities to execute MISO.

(f) OPSEC. Assess the risk to preserving essential secrecy by identifying

the crucial information and indicators that must be protected, assess the vulnerabilities to
adversary collection and interpretation, and identify possible OPSEC countermeasures to
mitigate vulnerabilities. Present options to highlight or conceal friendly intentions,
capabilities, or activities to support joint force objectives. Include information that
facilitates staff understanding of how to derive critical information. Recommend OPSEC
planning guidance for inclusion in the commander’s planning guidance. In conjunction
with the intelligence joint function, during options development, integrate the estimated
enemy’s assessment of friendly operations, capabilities, and intentions with the rest of the
information staff. Specifically, address any known opponent knowledge of the friendly
operations covered in the basic plan. Identify indicators during plans and analysis of
options. Describe indicators that opponents can interpret and piece together to reach
conclusions or estimates of friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities. Recommend
OPSEC practices that balance the responsibility of accountability with the American public
against the need to protect critical information and indicators.

B-6 JP 3-04
 Information Staff Estimate Format

(g) JEMSO. Describe the integration and synchronization of EW, EMS

management, intelligence, and other mission areas to achieve EMS superiority, unity of effort,
and the JFC’s objectives. Describe future opportunities in time, space, and technology
affecting a physical area to enable other activities that communicate or maneuver through the
EMS, such as MISO, PA, or CO. Describe status of authorities relevant to JEMSO activities.

(h) COMCAM. Discuss status, capabilities, and locations of COMCAM

forces providing mission support functions to the JFC. Describe gaps in capabilities tied
to unsupported request for support within the JOA. Provide recommendations to fill
specified requests for support.

(i) Space Operations. Describe space capabilities supporting the JFC.

Describe the effects of hostile actions from both state and non-state actors on space support
to the JFC. Describe activities to neutralize or reduce the effectiveness of hostile action
against US, allied, and partner-nation space capabilities. Describe activities to reconstitute
space capabilities. Recommend specific space operations tasks to support the JFC’s
objectives.

(j) STO. Acknowledge when STO may provide contribution to joint force
operations.

(k) CO. Describe an integrated application of cyberspace forces and

capabilities to support the management of information and the leveraging of information
in and through cyberspace. Describe when threats in cyberspace will negatively impact
the JFC’s ability to assure system and network availability, information protection, and
information delivery. Describe gaps in DODIN protection capabilities required to assure
JFC essential functions and what is required to mitigate these gaps. Describe specific OCO
that will support the JFC’s objectives. Describe the authorities to be used or that will be
required to execute the COA. Describe cyberspace-enabled activities that require special
authorities or permissions for execution and describe the associated risk of conducting
these activities.

(l) Miscellaneous. Include other capabilities, operations, and activities that

leverage information, but are not considered elsewhere, that may influence selection of a
specific COA. Include identity of known deficiencies of information force structure.
Include identity of foreign and indigenous resources available or essential to support joint
operations.

8. Information Analysis of Own Courses of Action

a. Analyze each COA considering the ways land, maritime, air, space, cyberspace, and
special operations forces contribute to the three tasks of the information joint function; how
the joint force can leverage the inherent informational aspects of activities to create relevant
actor perceptions to achieve commander’s objectives; and how the joint force will task
organize and employ OIE units in support of objectives. This analysis should also identify
how OIE will be used to amplify or conceal physical actions in a manner that increases or

B-7
Appendix B

decreases ambiguity and any friendly information systems or segments of friendly

information networks that need to be prioritized for defensive actions based on the proposed
COA. Finally, include a description of critical information and signatures that need to be
protected for each COA along with recommended protection measures.

b. Examine each COA under consideration realistically from the standpoint of known
and likely requirements versus available or programmed capabilities, climate and weather,
hydrography, time and space, opponent capabilities, and other significant factors that may
have an impact on the information situation as it affects each COA.

9. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. The information CFT considers each COA independently and evaluates/compares

each against a set of criteria information planners helped develop and which contains
information considerations. These criteria and their information considerations should be
described here. The relative effectiveness and efficiency of each COA to address threats
and avoid or mitigate hazards in or through the IE should also be described here. List the
advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA in leveraging information to achieve
the JFC’s objectives.

b. If necessary, use a worksheet similar to that used for the commander’s estimate.

10. Conclusion

a. State which COA under consideration best leverages information in support of

objectives.

b. Identify the major deficiencies in capabilities, operations, and activities that use
information and leverage information to affect behavior and impact the OE which require
the commander’s attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods to eliminate
or mitigate the negative effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed)

B-8 JP 3-04
 APPENDIX C
GUIDE FOR THE INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION IN JOINT
OPERATIONS

Figure C-1 is a reference guide for the integration of information during the planning,
execution, and assessment of joint operations.

C-1
Appendix C

Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations

A. Operational environment
awareness and understanding B. Strategy and course of action development
(continually ongoing)
Develop and maintain an integrated
understanding of the OE spanning Establish operational approach and develop COA
geographic, functional, domain, options for attaining and maintaining conditions
classification, and organizational that enable achievement of JFC intent and
boundaries. advancement of campaign objectives.

1. Characterize overall IE. 1. Initiation: receive and refine planning guidance

a. Understand why and how information moves a. Review overall approach to integrating efforts with overall joint force, allies/partners, and Interagency.
through the OE, how it is received,
processed, and employed, by whom, and for b. Describe relevant actor desired behaviors (e.g., specifics in terms of assure, deter, induce, compel)
what purposes. c. Articulate current authorities for information activities at JFC and subordinate levels.
b. Establish IE baseline to create a reference i. CCMD-approved MISO program.
point of relevant actor perceptions, beliefs,
and attitudes. Assess changes over time. ii. CCMD-approved CO/MILDEC/Space activity.
c. Distinguish relevant information and d. Identify forces available to conduct or support OIE (via OPCON, TACON, direct support, or general
characterize its sources and methods of support relationships).
movement or transmission.
e. Identify risks that can or cannot be accepted related to activities in the IE.
d. Identify misinformation and disinformation
and credible from non-credible sources of f. Update the information estimate.
information. g. Provide updates on changes in the IE, status of information forces, and results of information activities.
e. Understand the information networks and
systems used by relevant actors.
f. Understand social/cultural norms needed for 2. Mission analysis.
effective influence.

a. Analyze planning directives and strategic guidance from HHQ.

2. Identify and undertand
relevant actors. i. Determine national and HHQ objectives.
ii. Determine desired relevant actor behaviors.
a. Identify humans and automated systems that b. Develop mission narrative.
are potential relevant actors.
i. Develop JFC operational narrative and supporting themes and messages based on
b. Describe what drivers of behavior are most CCMD guidance.
likely to affect relevant actors.
c. Determine facts and planning assumptions.
c. Understand how relevant human actors sense
and process information to trigger a behavior i. Identify relevant actors within context of JFC’s objectives.
that can positively or negatively impact joint ii. Identify relevant actors outside the JOA who may present opportunities for
operations. secondary/tertiary influence or affect joint force activities.
d. Understand how relevant automated systems iii. Describe relevant actor current known/relevant behaviors and key informational
sense and process information. capabilities.
e. Describe how relevant actors communicate
and make decisions. iv. Describe perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and other drivers of relevant actor behaviors.
f. Identify relevant actors that are decision v. Characterize relevant actor physical and informational escalation thresholds.
makers, key influencers, or both. vi. Characterize relevant actor equities, interests, and decision-making processes.
g. Identify key influencers for relevant actors vii. Identify authoritative sources used by relevant actors.
both inside and outside the operational area.
viii.Identify information conduits used by relevant actors.
ix. Identify partner nation sensitivities, constraints, and restraints (e.g., OIE attribution).
3. Identify range of
potential behaviors of d. Identify operational limitations.
relevant actor. i. Review current OIE-related authorities and permissions, and identify requirements for
obtaining additional authorities and permissions as early as possible.
a. Identify humans and automated systems that
are potential relevant actors. ii. Determine constraints and restraints related to engaging relevant actors, use of
certain capabilities, and use of specific themes or messages, given that information
b. Describe what drivers of behavior are most and its effects may not be geographically constrained or limited to intended
likely to affect relevant actors. audiences.
c. Understand how relevant human actors sense e. Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks and develop the mission statement.
and process information to trigger a behavior
that can positively or negatively impact joint i. Identify specified and implied tasks for leveraging information and supporting decision
operations. making.

Figure C-1. Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations

C-2 JP 3-04
 Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations

Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations (cont.)

B. Strategy and course of action development (continued)

Establish operational approach and develop COA

options for attaining and maintaining conditions
that enable achievement of JFC intent and
advancement of campaign objectives.

2. Mission analysis. (continued) 3. COA Development

f. Conduct initial force and resource analysis. a. Develop initial COA.

i. Identify the lead time to deploy information forces and i. Establish approach to informing domestic, international, and internal audiences.
specialized capabilities into theater or provide direct ii. Establish approach to influencing primary relevant actors.
support to the joint force from outside the JOA.
iii. Establish approach to attacking and protecting information, information
ii. Request for forces or personnel with unique skills (e.g., networks, and information systems.
linguists, sociocultural experts, social media experts,
and automated-intelligence and machine-learning iv. Validate operational objectives by developing preliminary MOE indicators for
experts). relevant actor behaviors and evaluating ability to assess them.
iii. Identify mission partners with information forces and v. Identify forces desired to support informational power actions (including mission
specialized capabilities and/or capacities to fill joint force partners).
resource gaps. vi. Develop COA narrative, key themes, and messages.
iv. Evaluate requirements against existing or potential b. Refine COA (Based on COA analysis/wargaming).
contracts or task orders.
i. Select relevant actors inside or outside JOA that may be opportunities for
g. Develop military objectives. secondary or tertiary influence.
i. Determine and articulate attainable behavioral goals. ii. Depict primary, secondary, and tertiary regions of influence inside and outside
ii. Develop MOEs and MOE indicators to assess how well the JOA.
the joint force leverages information. iii. Determine relative timing, tempo, intensity, scope, and linkage of physical force
iii. Identify indicators of trending success or failure into the and informational power activities to create reinforcing effects in such a way to
monitoring and assessment plan. maximize their potential value.
h. Develop COA evaluation criteria. iv. Identify opportunities to leverage/exploit PAI through MILDEC or other means.
i. Information activities that produce desired behaviors in v. Determine inherent informational aspects of activities and develop OIE approach
prioritized relevant actors. for leveraging them to shape relevant actor behavior.
ii. Information activities that protect the joint force from vi. Integrate OIE approaches into main and supporting lines of effort.
opponent attempts to undermine the joint force narrative vii. Anticipate how joint force actions will resonate from physical domains to the IE,
or the legitimacy of the joint force mission and actions. and how to respond to reactions by any potential relevant actors.
iii. Information activities that prevent, counter, and mitigate viii. Anticipate the opponent’s OIE approaches and develop flexible options for
attempts to undermine joint force decision making and countering them.
C2.
ix. Establish weights of effort for informational power and physical force.
iv. Identify potential external information activities that
negatively impact the achievement of the JFC’s c. Establish timelines for executing proposed COA under available and accessible
objectives. authorities.
i Develop risk assessment. d. Identify OIE tasking mechanisms and associated timelines for employment to
synchronize effects as required.
i. Identify strategic risks to JFC’s narrative.
e. Develop layered assessment plan.
ii. Identify risk to joint force from malign influence.
i. Develop MOEs and MOE indicators for relevant actor behavior changes and
iii. Refine analysis of risks to strategy, force, and mission. overall strategic gain.
Develop mitigation approaches.
ii. Identify anticipated timeframes for gathering useful MOE indicators – initial
j. Develop CCIRs. reactions followed by long-term sentiment analysis.
i. Relevant actor behaving in a way that was not iii. Develop collection requirements to observe MOE indicators.
anticipated.
ii. Demonstration by an opponent of a new information
capability against the joint force not foreseen during
planning. 4. COA analysis/wargaming
iii Loss of access to communications channels used to
inform or influence relevant actors. a. Assess how relevant actors react to changes that each COA causes in the IE/OE.
iv. Emergent events that present a challenge to or b. Anticipate how relevant actors might exploit PAI.
opportunity for the JFC narrative.
c. Identify new relevant actors that may emerge as a result of the COA.
v. Relevant actor desired behaviors and perceptions.
d. Identify high priority relevant actors for influence.
k. Develop Information Estimate (see Appendix B).
e. Evaluate ability to gather MOE indicators of relevant actor behavior changes within
l. Prepare and deliver mission analysis brief. operationally relevant timeframes.

Figure C-1. Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations (cont.)

C-3
Appendix C

Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations (cont.)

C. Detailed Planning D. Execution E. Assessment

Develop detailed plans that affect relevant Synchronize the creation of Evaluate effects created against relevant
actor behavior through the integration of
informational power with other capabilities integrated effects. Adapt actor perceptions, behavior, and
and activities using assigned, attached, approach as evolving capabilities. Identify new opportunities
and supporting forces. circumstances require. created to advance JFC objectives.

1. Develop detailed 1. Check executive 1. Evaluate ability to execute

plan. conditions. OIE and synchronize with
other activities (MOPs).

a. Incorporate behaviorally-focused a. Red-team informational power approaches a. Determine if OIE and other activities were
objectives into existing targeting prior to execution, leveraging up to date sequenced and executed as intended.
processes and practices. understanding of operational environment.
b. Identify capability shortfalls and resource
b. Conduct ROE/JA review of proposed issues impeding effectiveness.
informational power effects.
c. Identify gaps in authorities/permissions
c. Draft collection plan to observe 2. Monitor execution. impeding effectiveness.
informational power-related MOE
indicators. d. Identify communications (technical or
human) issues that impeded
d. Develop integrated force package options a. Collect MOE indicators and maintain effectiveness.
to create desired effects. understanding of the IE.
i. Identify and select specialized b. Monitor how joint force activities are
capabilities that can best resonating through the IE. 2. Evaluate MOE
enable/support other capabilities and indicators and MOEs
activities (C2, fires, intelligence, c. Update Information Estimate.
movement and maneuver,
sustainment, or protection). a. Evaluate MOE indicators to characterize
ii. Identify and select specialized 3. Manage and adapt changes in relevant actor perceptions,
capabilities that can best leverage execution. attitudes, beliefs, and other drivers of
inherent informational aspects of behaviors.
activities. i. Ascertain if inherent informational
a. Synchronize execution of OIE activities with
iii. Identify and select specialized other joint force activities. aspects of activities were interpreted as
capabilities that can best directly intended.
affect relevant actor attitudes, i. Maintain synchronization matrix.
ii. Track echoing/re-communication of
perceptions, and other drivers of ii. Align OIE activities within overall JFC and DOD messaging (accurately
behaviors. targeting cycle. or inaccurately).
e. Ensure access or ability to use iii. Maintain updated narrative. b. Evaluate OIE gain/loss.
specialized capabilities when required.
b. Ensure operating within limits of applicable i. Establish extent to which non-overt
f. Identify capability and capacity shortfalls OIE authorities throughout execution. actions were attributed to the joint
related to the management and force.
application of information and develop c. Identify and resolve conflicting OIE
potential solutions. approaches with mission partners. ii. Determine what was revealed about
d. Anticipate/adapt OIE approach to evolving joint force capabilities through OIE
g. Develop synchronization matrix to align activities, and if that met gain/loss
informational power and physical force situation in accordance with JFC objectives.
expectations for those capabilities.
(fires, movement and maneuver, e. Counter and compete with the opponent’s
sustainment, protection, intelligence, and emergent narratives and other OIE of c. Evaluate effects of component-level OIE in
intelligence) activities. concern. contributing to overall campaign-level joint
force strategic gain.
f. Integrate OIE into approach to handling
escalation.

Figure C-1. Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations (cont.)

C-4 JP 3-04
 Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations

Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations (cont.)

F. OIE toolbox: capabilities, operations, and activities for leveraging information

Civ-mil Cyberspace EMSO KLE

ops ops MILDEC MISO
Coordinate Degrade Degrade Maintain Communicate Deceive Minimize Amplify Inform
Establish Deny Deny Protect Engage Distort Mislead Clarify Mitigate
Exploit Disrupt Destroy Secure Establish Exaggerate Misrepresent Counter Persuade
Influence Enable Manipulate Reinforce Educate Reinforce
Maintain Exploit Influence

OPSEC Public Combat Space

Affairs Camera ops STO
Coordinate Inform Enhance Communicate Inform Degrade Enable
Establish Mitigate Inform Clarify Persuade Deny Support
Exploit Persuade Reinforce Document Reinforce Disrupt
Influence Reinforce Enhance
Maintain

Legend
C2 command and control MILDEC military deception
CCIR commander's critical information MISO military information support operations
requirement MOE measure of effectiveness
CCMD combatant command MOP measure of performance
Civ-mil civil-military OE operational environment
CO cyberspace operations OIE operations in the information
COA course of action environment
DOD Department of Defense OPCON operational control
EMSO electromagnetic spectrum operations ops operations
HHQ higher headquarters OPSEC operations security
IE information environment PAI publicly available information
JA judge advocate ROE rules of engagement
JFC joint force commander STO special technical operations
JOA joint operations area TACON tactical control
KLE key leader engagement

Figure C-1. Guide for the Integration of Information in Joint Operations (cont.)

C-5
Appendix C

Intentionally Blank

C-6 JP 3-04
 APPENDIX D
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-04 is based on the following primary references:

1. General

a. Title 10, USC.

b. Title 17, USC.

c. Title 22, USC.

d. Title 50, USC.

e. Unified Command Plan.

f. (U) National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2018.

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. SecDef Memorandum dated 15 September 2017, Information as a Joint Function.

b. (U) 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge.

c. (U) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018.

d. DODD 3600.01, Information Operations (IO).

e. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) O-3607.02, Military Information

Support Operations.

f. DODI 5040.02, Visual Information (VI).

g. DODD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]).

h. DODD 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict.

i. DODD 5111.13, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
Security (ASD[HD&GS]).

j. DODD 5122.05, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

(ATSD[PA]).

D-1
Appendix D

k. DODD 5135.02, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

(USD[A&S]).

l. DODD 5143.01, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

(USD[I&S]).

m. DODM 5200.01, DOD Information Security Program.

n. DODM 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence

Activities.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3050.01, (U) Implementing Global Integration.

b. CJCSI 3110.05F, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan.

c. CJCSI 3141.01F, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans.

d. CJCSI 3150.25G, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

e. CJCSI 3205.01D, Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM).

f. CJCSI 3210.01C, Joint Information Operations Proponent.

g. CJCSI 3211.01F, Joint Policy for Military Deception.

h. CJCSM 3130.03A, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

i. CJCSM 3500.04F, Universal Joint Task Manual.

j. JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting.

k. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

l. JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.

m. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

n. JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

o. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

p. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

D-2 JP 3-04
 References

q. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

r. JP 3-14, Space Operations.

s. JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters.

t. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

u. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

v. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

w. JP 3-84, Legal Support.

x. JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

y. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

z. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

aa. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

D-3
Appendix D

Intentionally Blank

D-4 JP 3-04
 APPENDIX E
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using
the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to:
js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content
(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent for this publication is the Director for Global Operations (J-39). The
Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff Director of Operations (J-
3).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent, Joint
Information Operations Warfare Center, Mr. Derek Elliot; Joint Staff doctrine sponsor,
CDR Keith Adkins, Joint Staff, J-3; and LTC Joshua Darling, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine
Branch.

3. Supersession and Cancellation

This supersedes and cancels JP 3-13, Information Operations, 27 November 2012

Incorporating Change 1, 20 November 2014. Relevant material from JP 3-13 has been
incorporated into the main body and appendices of this publication. Accordingly, JP 3-13,
Information Operations, will be removed from the joint doctrine hierarchy.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,

please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to
js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.

E-1
Appendix E

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collections, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness
of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are
routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the
development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil
(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Releasability

LIMITED. This JP is approved for limited release. The authors of this publication
have concluded that information in this publication should be disseminated on an as-needed
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7. Printing and Distribution

Before distributing this JP, please e-mail the Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Branch, at
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a. The Joint Staff does not print hard copies of JPs for distribution. An electronic
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b. Access to this unclassified publication is limited. This JP can be locally reproduced

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E-2 JP 3-04
 GLOSSARY
PART I—SHORTENED WORD FORMS
(ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS)

ACPD Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (DOS)

AOR area of responsibility
ARCYBER United States Army Cyber Command
ASD(HD&GS) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Global Security
ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
/Low-Intensity Conflict
ATSD(PA) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs
CAG civil affairs group (USMC)
CCDR combatant commander
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCMD combatant command
CCP combatant command campaign plan
CDRUSCYBERCOM Commander, United States Cyber Command
CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command
CFT cross-functional team
CIO chief information officer
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMF Cyber Mission Force
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
CO cyberspace operations
COA course of action
COG center of gravity
CO-IPE cyberspace operations-integrated planning element
COM chief of mission
COMCAM combat camera
CONOPS concept of operations
COS chief of staff
CTF counter threat finance

DCO defensive cyberspace operations

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DJS Director, Joint Staff

GL-1
Glossary

DMA defense media activity

DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DODIN Department of Defense information network
DODM Department of Defense Manual
DOM Directorate of Management
DOS Department of State

EGT Evolutionary Governance Theory

EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EMSO electromagnetic spectrum operations
EW electromagnetic warfare
EXORD execute order

FFIR friendly force information requirement

HN host nation

IADS integrated air defense system

IC intelligence community
IE information environment
IM information management
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IT information technology

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff
JAIC Joint Artificial Intelligence Center
JCB Joint Capabilities Board
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JEMSO joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
JEMSOC joint electromagnetic spectrum operations cell
JFC joint force commander
JFHQ-DODIN Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense
Information Network
JIACG joint interagency coordination group
JIATF joint interagency task force
JIOC joint intelligence operations center
JIOWC Joint Information Operations Warfare Center
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment

GL-2 JP 3-04
 Glossary

JISE joint intelligence support element

JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JPG joint planning group
JPP joint planning process.
JPSE Joint Planning Support Element (USTRANSCOM)
JPSE-PA Joint Planning Support Element-Public Affairs
(USTRANSCOM)
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JS Joint Staff
JTF joint task force

KLE key leader engagement

KM knowledge management

LOE line of effort

LOO line of operation

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

MARFORCYBER Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command
MCEN Marine Corps Enterprise Network
MCIOC Marine Corps Information Operations Center
MIG Marine expeditionary force information group
MILDEC military deception
MISO military information support operations
MNF multinational force
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVIFOR Naval Information Forces
NGO nongovernmental organization
NSC National Security Council
NSS national security strategy

OCO offensive cyberspace operations

OE operational environment
OIE operations in the information environment
OPCON operational control
OPE operational preparation of the environment
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA public affairs
PAG public affairs guidance

GL-3
Glossary

PAO public affairs officer

PIR priority intelligence requirement
PMESII political, military, economic, social,
information, and infrastructure
POLAD policy advisor

RFF request for forces

RFI request for information

SAP special access program

SecDef Secretary of Defense
SJA staff judge advocate
SME subject matter expert
SPOC Space Operations Command (USSPACECOM)
STO special technical operations

TA target audience
TAA target audience analysis
TIOG theater information operations group (USA)

USACAPOC United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological

Operations Command
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USC United States Code
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
USD(A&S) Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
USD(I&S) Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
USD(P) Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
US FCC United States Fleet Cyber Command
USG United States Government
USINDOPACOM United States Indo-Pacific Command
USMC United States Marine Corps
USSF United States Space Force
USSPACECOM United States Space Command
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VI visual information

GL-4 JP 3-04
 PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations, 14 September 2022, Active Terms and

Definitions

information environment. The aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological,

technical, and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive
meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information, including the individuals,
organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information. Also
called IE. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

knowledge management. A discipline that integrates people and processes to create

shared understanding, increased organizational performance, and improved decision
making. Also called KM. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

operations in the information environment. Military actions involving the integrated

employment of multiple information forces to affect drivers of behavior. Also called
OIE. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

relevant actor. Individual, group, population, or automated system whose capabilities or

behaviors have the potential to affect the success of a particular campaign, operation,
or tactical action. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

target audience. An individual or group selected for influence. Also called TA.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-04 as the Source JP.)

2. Terms Removed from the DOD Dictionary

 Supersession of JP Supersession of JP 3-13, Information Operations, 27

November 2012; Incorporating Change 1, 20 November 2014: information
operations; information operations intelligence integration; information-related
capability; information superiority

GL-5
Glossary

Intentionally Blank

GL-6 JP 3-04
 JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1

JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

COMMUNICATIONS
PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS SYSTEM

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-04 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:

STEP #4 - Maintenance STEP #1 - Initiation

lJP published and continuously l Joint doctrine development community
assessed by users (JDDC) submission to fill extant
lFormal assessment begins 24- operational void
27 months following publication l Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end
lRevision begins 3.5 years after analysis
publication l Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
lEach JP revision is completed validation
no later than 5 years after l Program directive (PD) development
signature and staffing/joint working group
l PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship
l JS J-7 approves and releases PD to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
Maintenance command, JS directorate)

Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION

Approval Development

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

l JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7 l LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first
l JS J-7 prepares publication for signature draft (FD)
l PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
l JSDS prepares JS staffing package
l FD comment matrix adjudication
l JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature l JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC
and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
l Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrix
l FC joint working group