S&S Quarterly, Inc.

Guilford Press

Bertrand Russell on War and Peace

Author(s): Irving Louis Horowitz
Source: Science & Society, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter, 1957), pp. 30-51
Published by: Guilford Press
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 BERTRAND RUSSELL ON WAR AND PEACE

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ

writings ofBertrand Russellhavespannedourcentury;

covering in their courseeverymajorarea of humanand
scientificendeavor.His popularimpact,whileuneven,is
beyonddispute.He combineswhathas becomea raregiftfora
philosopher: a luciddevelopment of ideaswitha finewriting style.
In truth,Russellis a philosophical descendant of David Hume in
formas well as content.One immediately, almostintuitively, at-
temptsto understand Russell'spoliticalthoughtin termsof his
commitment to logicalempiricism. A consideration of the positi-
vistconceptionof politicaltheory,however,quicklydispelsthe
notionthatRussell'sphilosophy formsa coherentpatternembrac-
ing bothman and nature. For example,in The Development of
Logical Empiricism, Joergensen, the
following concept of Otto
Neurath, provides a listof names supposedto comprise thepositivist
anti-metaphysical tradition in "eudaemonism and positivistic soci-
ology." They includeEpicurus,Hume, Bentham,Mill, Comte,
Feuerbach, Marx,Spencer,amongothers.1Considering thatthede-
velopment of the views of these theorists more often than notpro-
ceededin conflict withone another,and thattheircommitments
variedwidely,anyhope of gainingan appreciation of Russell'spo-
liticalwritingsthrough analysis of his logicalempiricism is,witha
singleexception, baseless.The exception is thattheveryeclecticism
and lackof a structured of
philosophy history is in itselfa guideto
his
understanding conception of war and peace.
Russellhimselfhas madeclearthathis is a compartmentalized
philosophy. In histheory ofhumanknowledge Russellis underthe
directinfluence of Berkeleyian empiricism. As he putsit: "All the
rawmaterialofourknowledge consists ofmentaleventsin thelives
i JoergenJoergensen,"The Development of LogicalEmpiricism,"International
Ency-
clopediaof UnifiedScience,Vol. II, No. 9 (Chicago,1951),p. 6.

SO

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 BERTRANDRUSSELLON WARANDPEACE 31
of separatepeople/'2At thesametime,Russellspeaksof thedire
consequences mentalism and atomismhave forsocial philosophy.
"Subjectivism, thehabit of directing
thought and desireto ourown
statesof mindratherthanto something objective,inevitably makes
lifefragmentary and unprogressive."3In manywaysRussellis his
own bestcritic.Bothstatements, whichclearlycannotbe trueof
thesamethingsat thesametime,reveala fundamental truthabout
Russell.The verysubjectivepositivism he adheresto makesit im-
possible for him to presenta unifiedpictureofmanand hisworld.
And thisdichotomy makeshis ideason warand peace often"frag-
and
mentary unprogressive/'
It is notaccidentalthatwhileRussell'sphilosophy ofnaturehas
remained basicallythesamefromthetimehe wroteThe Principles
of Mathematics (1903)to The Analysis ofMatter(1927)toHuman
Knowledge:Its Scopeand Limits (1948),thereverseis thecasefor
his socialphilosophy.In advancingpracticalformulaeforcuring
worldlyailments,thereis Russellthe advocateof Proudhonand
Kropotkin in ProposedRoads to Freedom(1919),Russellthepro-
ponent Malthus,Keynesand Churchillin UnpopularEssays
of
(1950),and Russellthe spokesman forBenthamite utilitarianism
and Gandhianinternationalism in Human SocietyIn Ethicsand
Politics(1955).Considering thefactthatRussellhasrunthegamut
in social thoughtfromPlato to Marx and Nietzsche,takingthe
positivist searchfora politicaltradition veryliterally, it becomes
evidentthatsomething otherthan Russell'sempiricism mustac-
countforhis changing viewson peace and war; that something is
Englishsociety, its economicstructure and worldrelations.
Frombirth,Russellwas initiatedin thewaysof thearistoi.His
familytree showedremarkableingenuityin makingthe "great
compromise" with the Englishhaute bourgeoisie. As his pub-
lisherscontinually remindus, his grandfather,Lord JohnRussell,
was BritishForeignSecretary to Americain theCivil War period.
A numberofotherfamily tookpartin highgovernmental
relations
service.Russellhimself went from an aristocraticcradleto Cam-

2 Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York, 1948), p. 53.
3 Why Men Fight (New York, 1916), 1930, p. 263.

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32 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
bridge.His grandmother, Countess Russell,gavehima classicaledu-
cationby governesses and tutorslest his tastesbecomecorrupted
by populareducation.From the timehe enteredCambridgeto
the present,Russellhas partakenof whatevershockingdoctrines
were currentamong the intelligentsia. Earlier in the century,
the wealthyscionscould still affordthe luxuryof revolutionary
fads,attackson Christian pietism, Victorianmorality, and theethics
of businesssociety.As longas thesecriticisms couldnotculminate
in a different socialorder,Utopianpleas,if not sanctioned, were
at leasttolerated.But withthepassingof time,moreexactly, with
thecomingintobeingofa laboralternative to colonialism, English
officialsociety became self-conscious and atrophied. To contradict
its economicambitionsor its personaland businessethosbecame
sinful.Russellcameto be viewedas something insofar
ofa liability,
as he continuedto centerhis barbson the foiblesof a business
civilizationlongafterit was propitious to do so. But thealarums
have provenunfounded.Russellcame moreand moreto see the
beautiesof laisserfaireliberalism and thehorrors of collectivism.
His returnto the orthodox fold which originally nurtured himwas
happilyreceived.Withoutdetracting fromRussell'sindependence
ofjudgment, it is an inescapablefactthathispresent relianceupon
thepossibilities ofcoexistence is in largemeasurebasedon theclear
and presentdangerofnuclearwarfare to England.Russell'sreturn
to pacifism, like his wavingof the atomicwand fiveyearsago, is
morea reflection of the needsof Englishofficial societythanany
basicshiftin his philosophictheory.To understand Russell,one
cannot overlook his station as a foremost spokesman theimpe-
for
rial lion. The correlation, whilefarfromprecise,is oftena more
accurateguide in judginghis shiftsthanthe generaldemandsof
logicalempiricism.
Thereare tworootelements in Russell'sresearches in warand
peace. The first is a core of thought that he has evolved overthe
centuryin a relatively consistent way. This bodyof thoughtis
present in all his politicalessays.The secondis the startlingly
different conclusions he drewfromrelatively simplepremises.One
becomesimpressed notonlywiththebifurcation exhibitedbetween
histheory ofnatureand theory ofpolity,butwithan equallyatom-

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 BERTRAND RUSSELL ON WAR AND PEACE 33

ized theoryof societyand practiceof society.There is littlepoint

in reconciling thesetwo elements,becausesuch a reconciliation
wouldbe arbitrary at best. Russellneverconsidered consistencya
virtuein politicaltheory.Andit is notthetaskofanalysis to impose
consistencywherecontradiction is therule.

Russell'stheory of conflict beginswitha premiseon thenature

of humannatureheld throughout his careerand basedon an in-
stinctualist psychology. "It is the nature of man to be in conflict
withsomething."4 ForRusselltherearethreebasictypesofwarfare.
Thereis firsttheconflict betweenmanand nature,whichis most
since
fundamental "victory in thiscontestis essentialto survival."5
As mansucceedsoverthecourseof centuries in mastering external
nature, as he expends less and less in
energy wresting immediate
necessities fromnature,hisinherent leadshim
driveto be in conflict
to directhisskillstowards killingothermen. The freeplayof the
instincts in Hobbes' theoryof heliumomniumcontra
is fulfilled
omnes,just as longas theconflict doesnotjeopardizetheposition
of the victoror the vanquished.However,this pointhas come
intobeingwithadvancedscienceand technology. Thus,theinstinc-
tual desireof menforwarmustbe realizedin a distinctively con-
temporary fashion,namely,bywarringon himself.Russelladmits
thatthisinternal conflict of man withhimselfis in its originsa
reflection ofthewarsbetweenmenand nations.But history hasin-
vertedthisrelationship.The "internalwar of the soul" in true
Freudianmanneris conceivedofas the"sourceofthewarfare with-
out."6It is Russell'sbeliefthatthesourceofworldconflict is rooted
in thehumanpersonality. This beingthecase,we findin Russell
as in Jamesbeforehim,a prolonged searchfora moralequivalent
ofwar;something whichwillsatisfy thepassionforconflict without
destroying theuniverse in the process offulfillment.
It is Russell'sdesirethat"eachkindof warshouldend in har-
a theory ofhistory a movement fromcon-
mony."He offers involving
flictto harmony to a new stage of socialevolution, which in turn

4 New Hopes For A Changing World (New York, 1951), p. 13.

5 ibid.,p. 13.
6 ibid.,p. 14.

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34 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
manifests a similarpatternof its own. The conflict of man with
natureis harmonious "in proportion as man learnsthesecretsof
" of menwitheach otheris natural
nature. Likewise,theconflict
and inevitableas long "as thereis no possibility of adequatefood
supply forall." When and if such a supply available,thenthe
is
questforharmony can takeon theenlarged proportions ofsearching
out waysof unifying theworldeconomically and politically.But
universalpeace will only be assuredwhenman is broughtinto
harmony withhimself.7And since "real obstaclesto world-wide
social cohesion are in individualsouls/'8worldpeace ultimately
restsupona solutionto thepathology of theindividualsoul. That
Russell,for the mostpart,does not entertainthe possibility of
achievingpeace prior to the reconstruction of the individual's at-
titudesand beliefs,indicatesthe degreeto whichhe centeredthe
issueof warand peace on thefeelings of thealienatedindividual.
While in his politicalphilosophy Russell was committed to a
searchforequivalents towar,hishighregardfortheeconomicteach-
ingsof Malthus tended to curbhis enthusiasm forsucha search.
Sincea necessary consequence ofwarfare is thedecreasein popula-
tionit tendsto keepthosewhoremainalivefromstarving to death
in accordance with Malthus' geometric-arithmetic ratio. This was a
particularly pregnantformulafor Russell the Englishman, since
his nation could not long survive without imports from the rest
oftheworld,particularly itscolonies with whom it has particularly
favorable traderelations.The Malthusian strainiji Russell'sthink-
ingis notinfrequently therootof his rashstatements on theneed
forwarsto preserve westerncivilization.However, it is significant
to notethathe has repudiated theconsequences of his Malthusian-
ism,whichfounditsmostovertformin UnpopularEssays.What
is evenmorenoteworthy is thevigorwithwhichhe hasreconsidered
itsassumptions as well. This remainsa morecomplicated and pro-
longedtaskbecauseit involves Russell in a reconstruction of his
pastfaithin theeconomicsof scarcity and thepsychology of indi-
vidualinstincts.
Even in his mostradicalphase,at the timeof his opposition

7 ibid.,p. 14.
8 ibid.,p. 65.

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 BERTRANDRUSSELLON WARAND PEACE 35
to theFirstWorldWar,Russellwascriticalof thesocialistalterna-
tiveto war. Like Deweyin America,Russellbeganhis careerby
attempting to movebeyondthecanonsof classicaland theological
idealism.However,becausein the presentcenturythe challenge
ofsocialismhas beenthemostformidable opponentof middleclass
liberalism,Russellhas attempted to framea sociological positivism
thatwouldbe a liberalcounter-challenge to theclaimsofdialectical
materialism. To Russell,socialismis erroneousin that"it is too
readyto supposethatbettereconomicconditions will ofthemselves
makemenhappy."9Russellhas alwaystendedto reduceMarxism
to an economicdeterminism thatis morecharacteristic of thehis-
toricalschoolof CharlesA. Beard. For the"panacea"of socialism
Russellsuggests a panaceaof "voluntary cooperation."In opposing
economicdeterminism Russelladoptsa moralvoluntarism charac-
of Englishpoliticalpluralism.The customary
teristic viewis "that
theonlyneedswithwhichpolitics is concerned areeconomic needs."
And to Russell,theeconomicmotivation of war is "to a greatex-
tentmythical, and its truecausesmustbe soughtforoutsidethe
economicsphere/'10 What these"truecauses"are, as opposedto
the"mythical" economiccauses,we shallnowfindout. Beforethis,
however,we must firstbe briefedon the natureand object of
warfare.
The natureofwaris to Russella "conflict betweentwogroups,
each of whichattempts to kill and maim as manypossibleof the
othergroupsin orderto achievesomeobjectwhichit desires."11
Since a familyand a tribe,no less thannations,fitthisdefi-
nition,we are led to concludethatforRussellwar is simplyan
antagonism of interests, emotiveor objective, thatleadsto physical
destruction oflife. Russellcontinually reiterates hisidea thatwaris
and
as naturalto manas drinking eating. "But war,likeall other
naturalactivities, is notso muchprompted by theendwhichit has
in viewas by an impulseto theactivity itself."12And again,"the
ultimatefactfromwhichwar results is the factthat a largepro-

9 WhyMen Fight,p. 41.

10 ibid.,p. 40.
li ibid.,p. 79.
12 ibid., p. 80.

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36 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

portionof mankindhave an impulse to conflictratherthan har-

mony."13By makingwar the naturalstatusof mankind,Russell is
compelledto ignorethe available anthropologicaldata which indi-
cate that this is not so. He makes the achievementof peace con-
tingenton the militarysuperiorityof one nation,preferablya na-
tionwhichmeetsRussell'scriteriaof beingcivilized. In his "Happy
World" peace will be safeguardedwhen thereis "only one armed
forcein the world."14In his world,as in the world of Santayana,
poweris the rulingfactor.
The object of war, in Russell's view, "is generallyeitherpower
or wealth."15It does not cause Russell any anguishthathe has al-
ready explained the "mythical"characterof the view that war is
related to economicwealth and political power. No more so than
does his appeal to the value of reasonin securingharmonyafterhe
has dethronedreasonin the name of instinct.These inconsistencies
are relativelyminor. It is when he comes to gripswith the causes
of conflictthathis oppositionto politicalrealismbecomesmanifest.
Russellboldlyaffirms thatit is not "reason"but "impulse"thatis
responsible for war. "There is an impulseof aggression, and an im-
pulse of resistance to aggression. Either may, on occasion, be in
accordancewith reason, but both are operativein many cases in
whichtheyare quite contraryto reason."16The "impulse" to war
leads to the formationof "beliefs" to justifythe impulses. As an
example Russell citesthe commonbeliefthatone groupis superior
to anothergroup morallyand intellectually.Imperialismand na-
tionalismare in Russell'sview contemporary expressionsof this in-
nate attitude. This attitudeis founded on belief,which in turn
is rootedin impulse. Hence we are presentedwitha pyramidwhose
base is the impulsewhichradiatesin all directions,thatis, to colo-
nialism and nationalism. And however much Russell may hold
such featuresof westernsocietyin contempt,he mustconcludewith
the belief that these are only modern political formsexpressing
innate human drives.

13 ibid.,p. 113.
14 New Hopes For A ChangingWorld,p. 209.
15 WhyMen Fight,p. 79.
16 ibid., p. 14.

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 BERTRANDRUSSELLON WARANDPEACE 37
To further compoundhis dilemma,Russellopposesanycurb-
ing of such instincts and impulsesin thenameof reason.A pur-
posefullifethatwouldcheckimpulsive activityis "tiring."It would
rendercivilization "indifferent to the verypurposeswhichit has
been tryingto achieve."17 This beingthe situation,a solutionto
war foundedon a community plan or thesocialreorganization of
industry would "dryup the springs of life." We are assuredthat
ultimately social changesonly produce"new impulses (which)
are apt to be worsein theireffectthan thosethat have been
checked."18 Such a viewfirmly commitsRussellto thatconserva-
tismforwhichthe only foundation can be the maintenance of
as
things they are.
The situationposed by Russellwould appearhopeless,since
socialchangein no waytransforms theemotivedrivestowardcon-
flict.In thefaceof thissituation, Russell,like Jamesin America,
positeda moralequivalentto war,namely,theimpulseforpeace.
Wherethereis "impulsethereis hope." Impulseis "theexpression
of life." It is Russell'sequivalentforHenri Bergson'selan vital.
The peace-seeker is one in "whomsomeimpulsesto whichwar is
hostileisstrong enoughtoovercome theimpulses thatlead towar."19
If Russelllocatesthecause of war in impulse, can onlylocate
he
the cause of peace in a still morepowerfulimpulseto harmony.
The impulsesto warand peaceare opposites.Hatredand destruc-
tiveness are instincts generating conflict,whileinstincts oflove and
constructiveness generatepeace. The survivalof mankinddepends
on thecultivation of thelatterinstincts. It shouldnotbe thought
thatRussellhasabandonedhisinstinctualist psychology evenat this
latedate. He continuesto regardthebasisof humansurvivalin a
nuclearera as restingon "changingthe sourcesof happinessand
the unconsciousimpulseswhichmould our moral phrases."20
In treating instincts in muchthesamemanneras he does im-
pulses,Russell reveals a faithin subjective psychologies thatinvolve
himin thesametypeof anthropocentric, egocentric universehe so

17 ibid.,p. 13.
18 ibid.,p. 13.
19 ¡bid.,p. 17.
so New Hopes For A ChangingWorld,p. 66.

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38 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
severely criticized Deweyforfostering. Like Dewey,Russellbuilds
a world"in whichhumanbeingsoccupythe imagination* ' while
the worldoutside"thoughof courseacknowledged to exist,is at
mosttimesignored."21 In examining whata nationis,forexample,
Russellsurrenders to his opponentsall objectiveand historically
groundedcriteria;instead,he makesthe nationa matter"of in-
stinctive likingforcompatriots and a commoninstinctive aversion
It
fromforeigners."22is not thatinstincts are immutable or all cut
fromthesamecloth.Russellclearlyadmitsthatan externalworld
mayinfluence thecourseofinstincts. Butin recognizing themallea-
bilityof instincts, he failsto makeclear the objectivederivation
of such changingforms.Yet,his onlylegitimate escapefromthe
instinctualist is to the
ambiguity recognize omnipotence ofthesocio-
politicalworld,and to that"economicorganization" whichRussell
formerly assuredus was largelya myth.Russellis continually con-
fronted withthechoiceofspeaking as a subjectivist
politicalphiloso-
pher, or as a practicalman of social conscience. The factis that
Russellin his roleas an honnêtehommeis superiorto Russellthe
philosophe.He triesin everyconceivable wayto unifyhis theory
and practice,but the resultis alwaysthe posingof the polarity
in a different form.Thus, he attemptsto reacha synthesis by
placingthe issuesin termsof the conflict between authority and
theindividual, betweenthefeelingpersonand theunfeeling insti-
tution. But all Russellactuallysucceedsin accomplishing is re-
stating,in termsmorenativeto nineteenth century philosophic ro-
manticism, the dilemmaof idealismwhen confronted with the
natural world of economics and industry.
To replacetheconcretehistorical categories of society, Russell
resortsto a devicemadefamiliar byromanticism. It is theidea that
the conflicts of men are best understood as the conflict between
authority, thatis, society, and theindividual.It is his belief that
"all our institutions have theirhistoricbase in Authority."23 De-
pendingon theconcrete situation,church, state,king,or even father
represents authority. The multitudes represent atomizedegoswhose

21 A History of WesternPhilosophy (New York, 1945), p. 827.

22 Why Men Fight, p. 35.
23 ibid., p. 23. See also Proposed Roads To Freedom (New York, 1919),p. 32-36,202-03.

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 BERTRANDRUSSELL ON WARAND PEACE 39
main energiesare devoted to a destructionof institutionsfostered
by authority.The authority,which is simply societywrit large,
representsunity,while the individualrepresentsboth diversityand
apartness."The hardeningand separationof the individualin the
courseof the fightforfreedomhas been inevitableand is not likely
everto be whollyundone."24Russell,however,devotesconsiderable
attentionto healing thisdichotomybetweensocietyand man. Since
he does not consider the possibilityof opposing authoritiesand
opposingsocial influenceson human behavior,Russell can either
takehis standwith the Ego and end up as a partisanof anarchism,
or, tryto restoreorganicunityto societythroughthe principleof
"voluntaryassociation." Althoughmakingfrequentflightsinto the
realm of philosophicanarchy,Russell returnsto the fold of ortho-
doxy by predictingthe possibilityof happinesson a more demo-
craticand integratedunion of the individualand authoritywithnj
the framework of privatepropertyrelations. In the presentperiod,
Russellsees the road to peace as the "substitutionof orderlygovern-
mentforanarchy."25This positionis predicatedon the assumption
thatthe human race is simplyan agglomerationof individualsand
authority,somethingstandingover and above people. The claims
of the individualon societyare not deduced fromits processesbut
fromthe alleged relationshipof metaphysicaldualismssuch as in-
dividualityand authority.One need simplyexplain the atomized
individual as an embodimentof individualityand abstractsociety
as the embodimentof authorityand the transformation is accom-
plished. Russell has been sharply criticalof system-buildingphiloso-
phers for similar transformations.26
Russellcontendsthattheindividualdesiresnot a separationfrom
authority,but its restoration.This is so deeplyingrainedthatmen
make war with thisas an end. "One of the reasonswhichled many
men to welcome the outbreakof the presentwar," Russell said in
examiningthe First World War, "was that it made each nation
again a whole communitywith a single purpose."27The fact that

14 ibid.,p. 25.
25 New Hopes For A Changing World, p. 7«.
26 A History of WesternPhilosophy (New York, 1945), p. 736-739.
t7 WhyMen Fight,p. 24f.

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40 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
war to Russell was the only way a senseof communitycould be re-
storedto westerncivilizationis itselfa disturbingelementin his past
outlook. His oppositionto thiswar had littlein commonwith the
actual contentof the war. His was a rebellionof the man of sensi-
bility against the bestialitiesof warfare. For Russell, the "con-
scious and deliberate forces leading to war" are nothing more
than "feelings"of superiorityand righteousnessin defendingor
attackingthe status-quo.28In addition to articulatedfeelingsthere
are the "inarticulatefeelingsof common men, which, in most
civilizedcountries,are alwaysready to burstinto war feverat the
biddingof statesmen."29 It was his beliefthatordinarypeople desire
war for no other purpose than the eliminationof drudgeryin
theirlives; thatis, to secure theirmeasureof "adventure,imagina-
tion,risk." Since the life of the poor is "unadventurousand dull,"
the instinctualdesiresforadventureand thrillcan best be fulfilled
in the extraordinaryconditionsof battle. To the wage earner,
"this victimof order and good organizationthe realizationcomes,
in some momentof sudden crisis,thathe belongsto a nation,that
his nation may take risks,may engage in difficult enterprise,enjoy
the hot passion of doubtfulcombat."30In this way, Russell made
clear his belief that the genesis of war is inherentin thieherd-
impulsesof the masses,while the impulse for peace is the special
preserveof thjethoughtful.It should be added that this view has
been modifiedunderthe impactof modernscience.
The individualwho began the trektowardsfreedomby oppos-
ing existingauthorityis thusin the end happy to do battleforthe
authorityhe despises; because only authoritycan provide the ego
witha sense of belonging.Russell attemptsto prove thatno escape
existsfromsocial domination. For "when the oppressedwin free-
dom theyare as oppressiveas their formermasters."31 Experience
would indicate that Russell is correctin maintainingthat the ex-
tensionof libertiesfor one class or group has usually meant the
curtailmentof the libertiesof past masters.However,the factthat

28 ibid.,p. 87-90.
29 ibid.,p. 91£.
30 ibid.,p. 93f.
31 tbid.,p. 26f.

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 BERTRAND RUSSELL ON WAR AND PEACE 41

those newly in possessionof freedomtend to be as oppressiveas

their formerrulers does not necessarilymean that libertyis an
illusion fosteredby the sentimental.Russell operateswithin the
utilitariantheoryof libertydevelopedby Mill. But Mill, in listing
the basic cornerstones of democraticsociety,did not accountforthe
historicalformsthesedemocraticcornerstones may take. The same
holds true for Russell's approach to the relation of authorityto
freedom.It is disconcertingto findRussell ignoringthe historical
goals of social reconstruction in a futileeffortto restorethe power
of establishedauthorityto a positionof esteemby revealingto the
massesthe benefitsof "belonging" to a societywhose institutions
deprive them of the much soughtafterideal of completeliberty.
Over the years,the latent philosophicanarchyof Proposed Roads
To Freedomhas been replacedwith a farmore conservativetheory
of the individual's relation to society. His cyclical,and perhaps
cynical,theoryof historyfitsin farmorewitha conservativerather
thanwithan anarchisticorientation.
The conceptionof freedomthatRussell inheritedfromthe em-
pirical tradition,particularlyfromLocke and Mill, essentiallycon-
ditionshis theoryof national and internationalsovereignty. Russell
is particularlyemphaticin demonstrating his regard for Lockian
political theory. He notes that his is an "attemptto go as far as
possible towardsstatingsomethinglike Locke's theoryin untheo-
logical terms."82It is his contentionthatEnglishpoliticalpluralism
was adequate for a pre-industrial age, and indeed, if the state of
nature is consideredas existingbetweensovereignstatesas well as
individuals,Lockian philosophyis still largely adequate. If the
developmentof the national Statewas the inevitablepowerequiva-
lent of the strugglebetween individuals,then in our age the de-
velopmentof an internationalgovernmentis the only possible
resolutionof the conflictbetweennational States.83The empirical
traditionin political philosophyposes both the problem and the
solutionforRussell. In testingthe adequacyof his politicalphiloso-
phy,or at least those portionsconcernedwith the problemof war

32 A Historyof WesternPhilosophy, p. 627.

33 Freedomand Organization, 1814-1914,London 1934.This is Russell'sfullestexpla-
nationof his theoryof theState,and its relationto theempiricaltradition.

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42 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

and peace, it is necessaryto test the premisesof political empiri-

cism in the lightof modernpolitical realism.
The State is for Russell both a good and an evil. His analysis
of the State closely parallels a series of parliamentarychecksand
balances. This is an approach Russell is compelled to take since
forhim "the essenceof the State is that it is the repositoryof the
collectiveforceofitscitizens."34Now Russell is disenchantedenough
withthe status-quoto realize thatthe Staterepresentsthe collective
forcemoreof a class thanof the citizenryas a whole. For if all the
power of the State to oppressis sanctioned,"what becomesof the
attemptto rescue individual libertyfromits tyranny?"35 But for
Russell,the oppressivefeaturesof the Stateare onlya partialaspect
of its truenature. In definingthe Stateas the collectiveforceof all
its citizens,Russell is in a position to maintainthat althoughthe
State mayserve particulareconomicinterests,it is nonethelesssus-
tained by the "tribal feelings"of the masses. His approach is a
view of the State as a pluralityof interests,public and private,
vyingwith each other for domination. The democraticState, on
thisview, makes provisionsfor this pluralityof interests;while to-
talitarianStatesdo not. It is evidentthatRussell's idea of the State
is relatedmore to politicalpsychology than to politicaleconomy.
A catalogingof what Russell thinksis evil in the State as it has
evolvedin westernsocietyshowshim to be an astuteobserver,how-
evercontradictory his viewpointtendsto be. The polaritystemsin
part from Russell the social scientistbeing out of sympathywith
Russell the defenderof economic privilege. The basic evil pro-
motedby the State is "efficiency in war." To Russell,the scientific
observer,"it is of the essence of the State to suppressviolence
withinand facilitateit without."36In otherwords,the Statein our
societysuppressesthe economic conflict,but impiouslypromotes
internationalconflict. Instead of having the popular welfareas
its primarygoal, the existingStatehas poweras to both meansand
ends. To Russell the spokesmanof entrenchedwealth, however,
the State is somethingelse again. The increasedauthorityof the

34 WhyMen Fight,p. 43.

35 Ibid., p. 72.
36 Ibid., p. 59.

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 BERTRAND RUSSELL ON WAR AND PEACE 43

Statehas broughtabout "a greatachievement/'namely,"the inter-

nal orderlinessof a civilizedcommunity/'37 This orderlinessstems
fromthe "one purposewhichis on thewhole good,namely,thesub-
stitutionof law for force in the relationsof men."38 Such con-
trarinessmakesit difficult to knowwhen Russell is to be takenseri-
ously. For immediatelyafterhe proclaimsthat the dominion of
law is the greatachievementof the State,he returnsto a position
Hobbes enunciatedwith great clarity,and writesthat "it is sheer
cant to speak of a contestof mightagainstright,and at the same
time to hope fora victoryof the right."39If this is the case, it is
equal cant to speak of the triumphof law over force,when as Rus-
sell himselfindicates,law is foundedon force. Law is the codifi-
cationof thosein possessionof power. Russell'sformof Hobbesian
politicaltheoryis truncatedto make roomforhis social sympathies.
The power of the national State frightensRussell's implicit
faithin individualism.The State can put men to death or order
themto war with impunity.It punishesunpopularopinionswhile
placing a premiumon obedience. It can seize propertyand private
earnings.It determinesthelivesof people even in so personala way
as determining whatconditionsformarriageshall be deemedlawful.
It dictatesthelivesof theinnocent,and promoteswhatRussell terms
"the politics of Bedlam." To support the aims of the State, the
individualis forcedto surrenderinternationaltiesthatare based on
other,oftenmore worthygrounds. In wartimethe State is a dis-
torting,irrationalforce;developingin the individuala falsesense
of politicalvalues and no sense of human values. "A Frenchartist,
indifferent to politics,attentiveonly to his painting,suddenlyfinds
himselfcalled upon to shoot Germans,who his friendsassurehim,
are a disgraceto the human race. A German musician,equally
unknowing,is called upon to shoot the perfidiousFrenchman.
Whycannotthe twomen declarea mutualneutrality"? asksRussell.
"Why not leave war to those who like it and bring on? Yet if
it
the two men declared a mutual neutralitytheywould be shot by
theircompatriots.To avoid this fate theytryto shoot each other.

37 ibid.,p. 53.
38 ibid., p. 66.
39 ibid., p. 67.

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44 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
If the world loses the artist,not the musfcian,Germanyrejoices; if
theworldloses the musician,not the artist,Francerejoices. No one
remembersthe loss to civilization,which is equal whicheveris
killed."40 It is too bad that Russell does not considerthat other
communitiesof interest,such as economicclassesand racial groups,
are equally valid illustrationsof interestswhose horizonsconflict
with State power. He does not considerany but individual inter-
ests as opposed to State interestsfor very importantreasons,pri-
maryof which is thathe would be compelled to abandon his illu-
sion of democracyas absolute freedomfromsocial and political
responsibilities.
The frameworkof Russell's critique of the State is along the
lines of opposing its claims of ultimateexternalor international
force,and supportingits claims of unrestricted sovereigntywithin
the internalor national sphere. Ethically,the State is both su-
premelyevil and absolutelygood dependingon the politicalcontext
involved. The State is evil "by the factthat,whereverit embarks
upon aggressivewar, it becomesa combinationof men formurder
and robbery."41But when the Statepursuesa similarcourseagainst
the people of the nation it has sovereignty over, the same acts be-
come, if not quite virtuous, then at least justifiable. Russell is
aware of the incongruity in such a position. He thereforerelates
the negativeaspectsof the State to actual eventsand relegatesthe
virtuousaspectsof the State to a futureought. Thus: "What the
State does for the care of children at presentis less than what
ought to be done, not more." And again: "The second kind of
powerswhichthe Stateoughtto possessare thosethataim at dimin-
ishing economic injustice."42What Russell does is note the vast
oppressivemachinerythat is the State,while explaining that this
power mechanismought to be used to promotehuman happiness.
The difficulty is that Russell does not provide an explanationof
what characteristicsof the State preventit fromcontributingto
human happinessnow. To do this would require Russell to de-
lineate the economicfoundationsof sovereignty.And this he was

40 ibid.,p. 47.
41 ibid.,p. 60. See also,ProposedRoads To Freedom,p. 111-38.
43 ibid.,p. 70f.

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 BERTRAND RUSSELL ON WAR AND PEACE 45

notin a positionto do simplybecausehe relateseconomics to myth-

making.
Russell'sobjectionto the Statepossessing absolutesovereignty
stemsfroma humanerealization thatit is a causativefactorin pro-
ducingconflict. But thoseelements in theLeviathanwhichgiverise
to conflict are leftin the realmof the mysterious. His theoryof
theStateis essentially a restatement ofhistheory ofman,raisedtoa
new levelof abstraction. It is simplya composite of thosehuman
instincts and impulsesthatcause friction.Russell'stheoryof the
State, less thanhis conceptionof individualpsychology,
no rests
upona theory ofrawpower.Littlewonder therefore that his solu-
tionis alsoin terms ofphysical power.To bringaboutworldpeace
a
bydeveloping supermilitary titan,preferably one whichwill up-
hold the traditions of westerncivilization, maywell resultin the
destruction of the nationalStateas a threatto peace,as Russell
suggests, but a likelierconsequenceis thatfewhumanbeingswill
live to avail themselves of thisblessing.For the development of
politicalsociety to a point where there would be an uncontested
monolithdedicatedto preserving theharmony of a businesscivili-
zation,presuming it could succeed,would markthe end of the
life
humanera,the ofprogress, and thecommencement ofan age of
learnedbarbarism. The attempt byfascism to achieve such a mono-
lithicunityamongstthe empowered shouldbe adequatedemon-
stration of theconsequences of belief in a super-state.
The affirmation of worldgovernment presented by Russellis a
consequenceof his criticism of the nationalState. Onlya supra-
nationalorganization cansubduethewarofmanagainstman.43 How-
ever,even such an organization cannotguaranteepeace because
it is an external mechanism which cannotalterthewarrior instincts
and hedonistdrivesof ordinary men. Because Russellconsiders
an economicinterpretation of history a myth,his resolution must
a
be politicalwith vengeance. It is his beliefthat with thegrowth
of capitalism, withthe replacement of the bartersystemby mer-
cantilism,"politicsmore and more comes to predominate over
economics."This has occurred because "there is something which

80-100.
43 Justicein War Time (Chicagoand London,1947),csp. p.

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46 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

peopledesireevenmorestrongly (thanriches),and thatis to keep

otherspoor."44To thisend,nationsexpandthemilitary scopeof
theiroperationsceaselessly.And forRussell,the military activi-
tiesof theStatebecomebasic,placingeconomicsin theserviceof
politicalgoals. Thus, the growthof conflict has been facilitated
by theexpandingpoliticalrole of thenation-State.
War,historically, has notalwaysled to disastrous consequences.
On thecontrary, Russellproperly indicatesthatwarcan stimulate
thegrowth ofnewsocialforms.And it goeswithoutsayingthatin
theage of limitedwarfare, it has oftenbroughtthevictora finere-
turnon therisk. But Russellattempts to indicatethatthisis also
thecase in warsin the industrial age. He citesas examples,his
beliefthat modern conflagrations lessdestructive
are of populations
thanin thepast. He presents thefactthatduringtheSecondWorld
War the populationof Japanincreased, whileduringthe Thirty
Years'War thepopulation Germany halved.Whileall this
of was
is written to showthatcivilization has littleto worry about,Russell
is himself notso easilydissuadedby Russellthepropagandist. The
increased skillsin theart ofmassive destruction perfectedby mathe-
maticalphysics andappliedtechnology, haveled toa situation where
be to
it will impossible distinguish the victorfrom the vanquished
in anyfuturecombat.Even Russell'sillustration of thegrowthin
the populationof Japanwould have been ludicroushad the im-
perialJapaneserulersdecidedto continuethe war despitepossi-
bilityof atomicslaughter.Becauseof this,Russellthescientist is
convincedthat "the prevention of war has becomenecessary if
civilizedlifeis to continue." The imminence of totaldestruction
makesit,in theeyesofRussell,imperative to movebeyonda polity
of antagonistic sovereign States. "There is onlyone wayin which,
theworldcan be made safe from war, and thatis thecreationof
a singleworldwideauthority, possessing a monopoly ofall themore
seriousweapons."45 This world organization would have absolute
dominionover the powersconnected with the employment of
armaments and military personnel, not as is now thecase,diversi-
fiedcontrol.Generally, Russell's comprehension of worldgovern-

44 New Hopes For A ChangingWorld,p. 90.

45 ibid.

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 BERTRAND RUSSELL ON WAR AND PEACE 47

ment is no more concrete than Maritain's and no less Utopian

than the plan of H. G. Wells; unless one considersRussell's shift
of emphasisfromwesterncivilizationto menofgood will everywhere
an expressionof increasingconcretenessand realism. It is towards
"minds risen beyond the daily considerationsof momentaryex-
pediencyin a narrowcontestforbriefpower" thathe now focuses
his hopes on.46 However,this shiftin politico-ethicalinterestshas
not alteredthe subjectivebasis of his political philosophy.
Like Emery Reves, Russell views his universalismas being a
futurenecessity.It will come about throughconsentor conquest.
The world State will probablycome about through"a world war
betweentwo groupsof nations,it may be thatthe victoriousgroup
will disarmthe defeatedgroupand proceedto governthe worldby
means of unifyinginstitutionsdeveloped during the war. Gradu-
ally the defeatednationscould be admittedto partnershipas war
hostilitycooled. I do not believe thatthe human race has sufficient
statesmanshipor capacity for mutual forebearanceto establisha
worldGovernmenton a basisof consentalone. That is whyI think
an elementof forcewill be needed in its establishment and in its
preservation throughthe earlyyearsof its existence."47In thisform
Russell presentsan unholy paradox: great world wars cannot be
avoided until thereis a worldgovernment, and furthermore, world
governmentcannot come about unless or until anotherlarge scale
conflictis waged. The paradox collapses once it is realized that
Russell predicateshis view on a false psychology, on the Humean
notion that "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the pas-
sions."48 This view not only succeeds in atomizingthe human
situation,but animalizeshuman political conduct. In the recent
period, Russell himselfhas been willing to surrenderhis atavistic
approachto human nature in favorof a more maturescientism.49
There is one additional elementin Russell's thinkingthatcan-
not go unmentioned.His perennialleit-motif of populationgrowth

46 Human Society in Ethics and Politics (New York, 1955), p. 227.

47 New Hopes For A Changing World, p. 93 f.
48 Human Society In Ethics and Politics-,Preface,p. vu.
49 Science and Human Life, m What Is Society?edited with an introductionby J. R.
Newman (New York, 1955), p. 16 f.

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48 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
as a sourceof conflict,
leads him to a pointwhereeven if everyother
conditionforpeace were fulfilled,harmonywould still elude man-
kind. This is so since peace is not possible in a world in which
"every importantcountryhas a nearly stationarypopulation."50
Again Russell offersa stark dilemma of his own invention: the
worldas presentlyconstitutedmakespopulationgrowthinevitable;
yetas long as thistendencyexists,peace is jeopardized. Russell en-
visionsa worldsocietyof abundance as the only durable resolution
to the problemof war and peace. Unfortunately, he has spentmuch
of his energiesopposing any shiftsin the socio-economicmatrix
that would enable men to move past the realm of scarcityto that
of abundance. Russell expressesthe acute difficulty of modern
liberalism.He wantsto be a heraldof a happiersocial order,some-
one capable of risingabove the ideological strugglefor the minds
of men, withoutsurrenderinghis positionas philosopher-advocate
of a middle course.51He wants everyoneto believe that modern
man is masterof his fate,but insistson advocatinga psychology
whichhas fora keypremisethe idea thathuman reasonis subordi-
nate to animal passions. It is little wonder that Russell in order
to live as an influenceabandons his philosophicsystemon many
fronts.
One can approachRussell'svariousstatements on war and peace
as the outlookof a steadilychangingmind. In thatcase all one can
do is catalogue his contradictory pronouncementsover the years.
A more profitableapproach seems to be affordedby considering
Russell's position on the great issue of our times as approximat-
ing the dominant political opinions of English orthodoxy.Con-
sidered in this light,one can chart the shiftsin Russell's outlook
as expressiveof these dominantsentiments.In Authorityand the
Individual, The Impact of Science on Society, and Unpopular
Essays,Russellspeaksas the championof Americanhegemonyas the
path to world and Britishsecurity.The English-speaking people,
expressingthe highestdevelopmentof civilization,must save the
world from Soviet barbarism and Oriental despotism. At this

50 New Hopes For A ChangingWorld,p. 95.

51 Human SocietyIn Ethicsand Politics,p. 226 f.

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 BERTRAND RUSSELL ON WAR AND PEACE 49

stage (1945-1951),Russell reflectedthe well-groundedfears of a

businesscivilizationat the immenseupsurge that swept through
Asia and Africa,and moved Eastern Europe out of the orbit of
colonial influence.Russell acceptedat face value the Churchillian
thesis that only America could save the British Empire. It was
duringthisperiodthathe posedthealternative:eitherwe destroythe
socialist spectre,or find the systemof benevolentcapitalism de-
stroyed.Between 1951 and 1953, when the scientificand military
strengthof the Soviet bloc reachedequal statuswith the West and
no lesssignificantly,the periodin whichit became clear thatAmeri-
can businessinterestshad little intentionof preservingEngland's
empire but only of relievingEngland of it, Russell adopted a less
bellicose position. At this point, the United Statesand the Soviet
Union are consideredparallel "fanaticisms."62 The growthof po-
litical repressionin both nationsstrengthened this conviction.
If in the earlypost-waryearsRussell viewedthe conflictbetween
East and West as a specificillustrationof the battle between de-
mocracyand tyranny,by the time Human Societyin Ethics and
Politicsappeared,he became unsureof thevalidityof thisapproach.
At thispoint,he reassuredhimselfthatthe obstaclesto co-existence
weremainlypsychological. "I do not pretendthatwhile the existing
tensioncontinueseitherside can be expected to relax its war-like
preparations.What I do say is that the way out of the troubleis
psychologicaland consistsin making men realize, on both sides
of the Iron Curtain,that neitherside can hope to win any good
thinguntil thereis mutual rapprochement.And in bringingabout
such a lesseningof tensionI can thinkof nothingmore effective
than the realizationof the happiness that the whole human race
mightenjoy if only it would allow itselfto do so."53During this
period Russell observedthatfearwas permeatingthe world powers.
Whethersuch a fearwas universalor not, it cannot be ignoredin
evolvinga satisfactory solutionto the problemof conflict.The in-
terestingthingabout Russell'spositionis thathe is able to shiftthe
ground of his theoryfromways of incitingthe martial spirit to

52 ibid., p. 221, also p. 215-17.

Vol. 177, JNo.19.
53 A World I'd Like, in The Nation, Nov. 7, 1953,

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50 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
waysof stimulating thepacifistspiritwithoutalteringhis commit-
mentsto intuitionism.
Having now acquaintedhimselfwiththe scientific data con-
cerningthepossibility ofsurvivalin a nuclearconflict, Russellpro-
poses a commission of neutrals to explore the possibilities of a
modusvivendibetweencapitalismand socialism.It is his present
opinionthatthebelligerents cannotbythemselves bringaboutpeace
because "to do so gives an impression of weakness/'In other
words,themajorobstacleto sucha rapprochement is psychological.
At thispointRussellcalls intoplaytheneutralpowers,his third
force. "Neutralshave two advantagesover the powersin either
camp. The first advantageis thattheycan urgethedestructiveness
and futility of warwithoutincurring theodiumof seemingto ad-
vocatecowardly submission. The secondadvantage is thattheycan
speakto governments on bothsideswithoutbeingthoughtto be
actuatedby bias."54The difficulty withthispositionis thatpower
residesnotin thehandsofneutrals, butin thoseof thebelligerents.
And acceptingRussell'sbeliefthatsolutionsto politicalproblems
are primarily powersolutions,it seemsimprobablethatneutrals
could in factbringabouta rapprochement.
The sentiment of peace is not thepreserve of a neutral,but a
sentiment sharedby mostordinary people. To dependupon neu-
tralism to mediatetheclaimsofEastand Westis to placeourhopes
in a sentimental illusion,whichalthoughwell-intentioned will not
produce the desired politicaloutcome. Russell gives India as an
exampleof a neutralpower. Now whileit is truethat India re-
mainsideologically uncommitted to eithertheSovietUnionor the
it
UnitedStates, is by no means the casethatIndiais a neutralpow-
er. Can it be maintained thattherelationofIndiato Britainis neu-
tralwithregardto theissueof independence and sovereignty when
as a matter ofrecordIndianaffairs can bestbe interpreted con-
as a
stantstruggle againstcolonialism?Nor can it be said thatIndia is
neutralin respectto the typeof economicsystem it shouldhave.
a
It is clear that Indian economyis basically private-enterprise
economy; and byvirtueofthis,itsleadershavebeencriticalofcol-
lectivizationwithinits borders.Celestialbodies may indeed be
neutral,but not terrestrial bodies. If peace is to be secured,the

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 BERTRAND RUSSELL ON WAR AND PEACE 51

nationsof the worldmustcome to realizethatco-existence does

not negatebut impliescompetition forthemindsand loyaltiesof
men. The growingacceptanceof thispositionis a steadierguide
to peace thanRussell'sneutralism becauseit providesforfuture
change. While his neutralism is to accept,fewcan dispute
difficult
thewisdomof his judgmentthat"no problemis insolublewhere
thereis mutualgood-willand whereconcessions are not regarded
byone sideas a triumph and bytheotheras disgrace.The truth
a
is so plainand simplethatit seemsas ifgovernments mustin time
becomeawareof it: Communist and non-Communist worlds liveto-
getheror die together. Thereis no otherpossibility/'55
At present,Russell,whileretaining hisfaithin thepossibility of
politicalneutralism as leading the drive for co-existence,has come
to
increasingly relyupon the universal desire forsurvival.No
longer the Cambridgeprodigy, Russell now speaksas a human
beinglivingon theprecipiceof disasterdesperately urginghis fel-
low mento preserve thegloriesof thehuman,notsimplybusiness
or proletariansociety.Under the impactof eventsRussellhas
alteredhis viewson peacein our time,substituting mutualunder-
standing for mutual annihilation.56 There is an human-
irrepressible
ismto hisurgings thatmust be taken seriously.
"I cannotbelievethatthisis to be theend. I wouldhavemen
forget theirquarrelsfora moment andreflect that,iftheywillallow
themselves to survive, thereis everyreasonto expectthetriumphs
of the futureto exceedimmeasurably the triumphs of the past.
Therelies beforeus, if we choose, continual in
progress happiness,
knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death,because
we cannot our I
forget quarrels? appeal as a human beingtohuman
beings:remember and
yourhumanity, forget the If youcan do
rest.
so, thewaylies opento a newparadise;if youcannot,nothinglies
beforeyoubutuniversal death."57
New YorkCity

54 Commission For Peace, in The Nation,Dec. 18, 1954,Vol. 179,No. 25.

55 ibid.
56 Human SocietyIn Ethicsand Politics,p. 209-14.
57 Man's Duel WithThe HydrogenBomb,in SaturdayKevtew,Apr. 2, 1955,vol. 50,
No. 14.

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