Murtaḍā Muṭahharī

An Introduction to Islamic Sciences: Logic

Translated into English by

Mohammad Mehdi Baghi

1. Logic

Logic was introduced to the Islamic culture through the

translation of Greek texts, mainly via Syriac translations, into
Arabic, gained general acceptance, and even served as an
introduction to Islamic sciences. Aristotle is recognized as the
progenitor of writing treatises on logic. Logic was amazingly
disseminated in the Muslim world and Muslim scholars
conducted valuable studies on logic and attained perfection in
this domain. Avicenna’s (d. 428/1037) Mantiq al-Shifāʼ, i.e.
the logical sections of his al-Shifāʼ (Cure), is the greatest of
Aristotelian logical works penned by a Muslim scholar,
transcending in volume Aristotle’s Organon. The Greek
originals as well as Arabic and other translations of the
Organon into other languages, e.g. those of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq
- acknowledged by scholars as some of the most precise
renderings - survive today.

Aristotelian logic, bitterly critiqued by Francis Bacon

(1561-1626) and René Descartes (1596-1650), was termed as
unfounded and useless. Such attacks lost their vehemence in
two to three centuries. We are supposed to neither
acknowledge it blindly nor condemn it uncritically, but we
must examine the value accorded to it in Aristotelian logic.
To assay its true value, we must define it and examine its
goals. In the chapter devoted to deduction (qiyās), mention
will be made of such critiques and our final judgment.

2
 Definition of Logic

Logic is ‘the standard of reasoning accurately’, in that

logical laws serve as a set of standards used in validating scientific
and philosophical reasoning to avert unfounded conclusions.
Logic resembles a plumb-line used by masons and builders to
determine verticality and depth.

Logic is defined as ‘an instrument governed by laws the

application of which keeps the mind from erring in reasoning1.

Applications of Logic

As reflected in the above definition, logic serves as an instrument

wherewith erring in reasoning may be averted; however, the
manner of averting such errors is not specified in the above
definition. An exposition of the issue requires some acquaintance,
though brief, with logical principles.

First, we need to define ‘reasoning’, since a logical definition of

reasoning may clarify the instrumentality of logic in reasoning and
its application in averting errors. reasoning is the process whereby
some known or given facts are intertwined to reach another given
fact and thereby turn something unknown into a known fact.
reasoning is the process whereby the mind proceeds from some
unknown entity toward a series of known preliminaries from

1
Ālatun qānūniyatun taʻṣimu murāʻātuhā al-dhihna ‘ani ʼl-khaṭāʼi fī ʼl-fikri,
Avicenna [Ibn Sīnā], al-Ishārāt wa ʼl-Tanbīhāt [Hints and Instructions], 1403/1982,
pp. 8-9.
2
Tartību umūrin maʻlūmatin li-taḥṣīli amrin majhūlin; mulāḥaẓatu ʼl-maʻqūli

3
which the mind proceeds toward the unknown to turn it into
known facts.2

When the mind is in the process of reasoning, intending to render

something unknown into a known fact through the composition of
facts, it has to produce some specific arrangement and form; in
other words, known facts only develop into productive forms
when some specific form is accorded to them. Logic is the
instrument that expresses the laws governing such order and form,
in that our logic clarifies to us that known facts arranged logically
may only be productive.

The process of reasoning is essentially ordering the known facts

and making use of them as a basis for discovering new facts.
Accordingly, when it is stated that logic consists of the laws
governing valid reasoning, or when it is said that reasoning is the
process whereby the mind proceeds from premises toward
conclusions, it is intended that the function of logic is to
demonstrate the laws governing the accurate procedure of the
mind which is but accurately giving order and form to known
facts. Thus, logic controls the operations of the mind in the
process of reasoning.

Errors of the Mind

When the mind, in the process of reasoning, uses premises to draw

conclusions, it may function accurately or inaccurately. Inaccurate
conclusions may arise from one of the following instances: 1. The
premises used as basis for developing ideas may be inaccurate, i.e.
the premises used as the subject matter of reasoning may be
unfounded; 2. The arrangements and forms accorded to such

2
Tartību umūrin maʻlūmatin li-taḥṣīli amrin majhūlin; mulāḥaẓatu ʼl-maʻqūli
li-taḥṣīli ʼl-majhūli; al-fikru ḥarakatun ilā ʼl-mabādiʼ / wa min mabādiʼ ilā ʼl-
murādi.

4
premises may be inaccurate, i.e. the subject matter of reasoning
may be accurate, but the form of reasoning may be unfounded.

Reasoning, in the domain of the mind, may be likened to a

building which is complete when its materials are faultless and the
form of construction is based on accurate construction principles.
Such building would be unreliable when each of the two is
defective. For instance, if we state, ‘Socrates is a man, and all men
are unjust, so Socrates is unjust’, this line of reasoning is accurate
in terms of form, but it is defective in terms of materials, since ‘all
men are unjust’ is defective. However, if we say, ‘Socrates is a
man, Socrates is knowledgeable, so man is knowledgeable’, the
material used in our line of reasoning is accurate, but its form and
arrangement are illogical; hence the inaccurate conclusion. The
logicality or illogicality of the form and arrangement will be
discussed in the chapter devoted to deduction.

Assessment of Aristotelian logic is restricted to the form of

reasoning, but assaying the errors in the material of reasoning is
beyond it. That is why Aristotelian logic is termed as formal logic.
Does there exist a logical system in the world to assess the
material of reasoning? This question will be discussed in the
chapter on deduction.

Therefore, Aristotelian logic assays the errors in the process of

reasoning; in other words, it assesses the forms of human
reasoning. A detailed study of logic will demonstrate the laws of
accurate reasoning.

5
 2. The Subject of Logic

What is the subject of logic? First, let us see what is intended by

subject. Second, let us see if any science requires a subject. Third,
let us see what constitutes the subject of logic.

The subject of any science consists of the topics discussed in it,

and any of the topics discussed in that science is an exposition of
one of its states, properties, or effects. Logicians and philosophers,
in defining the subject of science, state that the subject of any
science consists of the topics whose essential accidents are treated
therein.3

Instead of saying that the subject of any science is what whose

states, properties, and effects are discussed in that science, the
‘states and effects’ are substituted with the pedantic term ‘essential
accidents’. Why? Is this substitution futile? No, it is not futile.
These scholar notice that the states and effects attributed to
anything fall into two categories: they are at times really
intertwined with it, and at times they are not so, but they are
related to something wherewith they are identified.
3
Mawḍūʻu kulli ‘ilmin huwa mā yubḥathu fī-hi ‘an ‘awāriḍi-hi ʼl-dhātiyyati.

6
For instance, in discussing the states of ‘man’ we have to deal with
his aspect as an animal and his identification with an animal, and
the fact that animal properties are to be found in him; hence the
usage of the term essential accident, which is determined by some
specific definition to avoid that confusion and it may, in logical
terms, be dissociated from non-essential accidents (‘awāriḍ al-
gharibah). The definition of essential accidents is beyond the
scope of this textbook.

Should any science treat a specific subject? It goes without saying

that scientific problems, in terms of interrelations, are dissimilar.
Similar to human beings, some of them belong to a specific family
and some others to further families; likewise, a group of families
may belong to a clan and some other groups belong to further
clans.

For instance, a series of problems, termed as ‘arithmetical

problems’ are so closely connected that they belong to a family,
and some other problems, termed as ‘geometrical problems’
belong to another. The families of geometry and arithmetic are
intimately related and belong to the clan of mathematics.

Accordingly, scientific problems are certainly intertwined. Now,

what is the root of such interrelations? How is it that arithmetical
problems are so closely related that they belong to the same family
and all of them bear the same term, and they are considered as a
separate and independent science? There are two theories in this
respect:

1. The reason is that the problems of any science discuss

some specific facts. For instance, arithmetical problems
belong to the same family, since they all deal with
numbers and their properties and effects. Similarly, the
family relationship of geometrical problems is that they all

7
 treat quantity. Accordingly, the subject of a science, i.e.
what is treated in the problems of that science, intertwine
with the problems of sciences; otherwise, the problems of
sciences would not be closely connected, in which case,
the relation between two arithmetical problems would
have been on a par with that of an arithmetical problem
with a medical or physical one. Therefore, any science
requires some subject and the distinction among sciences
lie in that of the subjects of those sciences.
2. Based on the second theory, the interrelation among
sciences arises from their applications and effects. Given
that a specific subject be not surrounded by a series of
problems and every problem belong to a different subject,
in case those problems share certain applications, subjects,
and goals, they are considered as interconnected and
distinctions may be drawn between them and further
problems treated in further sciences.
Nonetheless, this theory is unfounded. The homogeneity
and identity of a series of problems in terms of effects,
applications, and goals arise from the essential similarity
of those problems which in turn stems from the fact that
all those problems constitute the states and accidents of a
specific subject.

Now, let us consider the subject and problems of logic. The

subject of logic consists of definientia (sg. definiens, muʻarrif, a
word or phrase that defines the definiendum, pl. definienda;
muʻarraf) and arguments (ḥujaj, sg. Arabic ḥujjah, Persian ḥujjat);
in other words, logical problems treat either the definientia, or the
arguments. We may be content for the time being to know that all
sciences share two functions: first, definitions are provided for a
series of things; second, arguments are presented to establish a
series of laws.

8
Logic demonstrates the accurate method of definition and
argumentation. Definiens and argument, the subject of logic, will
be further treated below.

3. Conception and Judgment

Muslim logicians open their logical discussions with definitions of

knowledge (‘ilm) and perception (idrāk). Thus logic falls into two
categories of conception (taṣawwur) and judgment (taṣdīq), each
of which is further divided into the following categories: 1.
necessary (ḍarūrī, badīhī, bayyin); 2. theoretical (naẓarī) or
acquired (iktisābī, muktasab).

In the process of reasoning - the laws governing their accuracy

are, according to Aristotelian logic, demonstrated by logic – the
mind proceeds from necessary conceptions and attains to
theoretical or acquired conceptions, and may make use of acquired
conceptions to reach a series of theoretical or acquired
conceptions. It further makes use of necessary judgments to
discover a series of theoretical or acquired judgments, which may
in turn be used to lead to a series of further judgments.

Accordingly, it would be better to present definitions of

‘knowledge and perception’, ‘conception and judgment’, and
‘necessary and theoretical’ before treating further topics.

Knowledge and Perception

Man finds a state in himself which he terms as knowledge, and

perception and the like. The antonyms of knowledge and

9
perception are ignorance and denseness respectively. When we see
someone whom we have not seen earlier, or we visit a city which
we have not visited before, we feel that we have something which
we formerly lacked which is a conception of that person or that
city.

The former negative state wherein we lack such conceptions is

termed as ignorance, and the later positive state wherein we have
those conceptions which establish connections between us and
those objects which are external realities are termed as knowledge
and perception.

Accordingly, our mind receives impressions of external objects;

however, the impressions of objects do not connect them to
external objects, but the impressions and forms conceived in the
mind relate us to external objects and create consciousness. Why?
What is the difference? It is philosophy, rather than logic, which
provides a response to these questions.

Knowledge is a form of some known fact conceived in the mind.

As a result, knowledge and perception are defined as ‘Knowledge
(perception) is a form of an object conceived in the mind.’4

Classification of knowledge into conception and judgement is

justified by the fact that our knowledge of external objects is at
times such that our mind makes a judgement as to the existence or
inexistence of some relation between objects; but at times it is not
so; instances of which include: our knowledge of hot or cold
weather, the goodness of truth and the badness of falsehood.
Judgment lies in the arbitration of the mind between two objects
and such judgmental state of the mind is termed as judgement.

4
Al-‘ilmu huwa ʼl-ṣūratu ʼl-ḥāṣilatu min al-shayʼi ‘ind al-‘aqli.

10
However, mind, in its perceptive relation to objects, does not
assume a judgemental state. It happens that it perceives them
without passing any judgement on them. In cases where it assumes
a judgemental state and passes a judgement between two objects,
the opinion formed is termed as judgement and the judged
(maḥkūmunun ‘alayhi) and the object of judgment (maḥkūmunun
bihi) - i.e. the two objects judged by mind, which are formed in
the mind – are different things. Conceptions are the forms between
which the mind judges.

Therefore, when one judges in his mind that the weather is hot,
that feedback is judgement, but the mentally posited forms of
weather and heat are conceptions.

The classification of knowledge into conception and judgment was

first introduced by the prominent Muslim philosopher, Abū Naṣr
Muḥammad ibn Ṭarkhān Fārābī (d. 339/950-951), which was
acknowledged by later logicians and philosophers. Muslim
logicians later on introduced, based on Fārābī’s classification, the
categorization of logical topics into conceptions and judgements.

Necessary and Theoretical

As mentioned above, ‘necessary’ (ḍarūrī/badīhī) and ‘theoretical’

(naẓarī) are among the frequently used logical and philosophical
terms. Conception and judgment, in their own right, are either
necessary or theoretical. A necessary conception does not require
reasoning, but theoretical is not as such. In other words, a
necessary conception is known per se, whereas a theoretical one
may be known through some other object or objects. We do not
need to think in order to know a necessary conception, but we
need to think to know a theoretical conception.

11
For instance, the conceptions of heat and cold require no
reasoning, hence their necessity; however, we need to think to
conceive angels and jinn, hence their theoretical nature.

But the fact is that there exists no difference between the

conceptions of heat and cold on the one hand, and those of angels
and jinn on the other. Similar to heat and cold, the conceptions of
angels and jinn require definitions. Nonetheless, the difference
between heat and cold on the one side and angels and death on the
other lies in judgement. A judgment on the existence of heat and
cold require no reasoning, but we need to think in order to judge
on the existence of angels and jinn.

Necessary conceptions are unambiguous and clear conceptions,

whereas theoretical ones are in need of clarification and
exposition.5

As to judgements, the mind may or may not need evidence to

judge between two things; i.e. the conception of both terms of
relation (Arabic nisbah, Persian nisbat) may at times be sufficient
to enable the mind to gain certainty as to the existence or
inexistence of a relation; however, the mind may at times require
evidence to judge between the two terms of a relation.

For instance, we do not need to think or reason to know that ‘5 >

4’, but we need to think and reason to know that ’15 ˣ 15 = 225.
Likewise, the impossibility of the coexistence of two contraries
(ijtimāʻ al-naqīḍayn) is a necessary judgement, but the finitude or
infinitude of the universe is theoretical.

5
Ambiguity and disambiguity of conceptions were treated in the footnotes of
the second volume of our Uṣūl-i Falsafah (Principles of Philosophy), wherein it is
discussed that they arise from simplicity and composition. Simple mentally posited
elements are clear and necessary, but composite ones are theoretical and in need of
definition. Necessary conceptions are like those of existence, inexistence, necessity,
possibility, and impossibility. Theoretical ones are like those of man, animal, heat,
cold, triangle, square, and the like.

12
 4. Universal and Particular

Further preliminary logical discussions include universal (kullī)

and particular (juzʼī). This discussion is firstly and essentially (bi-
ʼl-dhāt) related to conceptions, and secondly, and accidentally (bi-
ʼl-‘araḍ) to judgments; in that judgments, to be treated below,
follow conceptions and are modified by universality (Arabic
kulliyyah, Persian kulliyyat) and particularity (Arabic juzʼiyyah,
Persian juzʼiyyat).

Conceptions of objects, expressed in words, fall into two

categories: particular conceptions and universal conceptions.
Particular conceptions consist of a series of forms applicable but
to one single member (fard). Words like ‘several’ and ‘which
one(s)’ are not applicable to such conceptions, instances of which
include our conceptions of specific members like Ḥasan, Aḥmad,
and Maḥmūd and each of these conceptions is only applicable to
one specific member. Each of the names referring to such
members, e.g. Ḥasan and Aḥmad, is termed as proper noun. Our
particular conceptions further include those of Tehran, Iran,
Mount Damāwand, and Masjid-i Shāh in Isfahan.

Further conception are formed in the mind for which there exist a
series of names to signify those meanings and conceptions,
instances of which include conceptions of man, fire, city,
mountain, and the like. General (‘āmm) nouns are used to
designate such conceptions which are termed as ‘universal’, since

13
they are applicable to many an member and they are even
potentially applicable to an infinite number of members.

In our everyday life we deal with particulars. For instance, we say,

Ḥasan came; Ḥasan went; Tehran is a densely populated city;
Mount Damāwand is the highest of mountains in Iran.
Nonetheless, when we treat scientific problems, we deal with
universals. For instance, we say, a triangle or a circle is such and
such; man is endowed with such and such instincts; such and such
is the significance of a mountain; a city should be such and such.

Such universal perception is indicative of human growth and

development. In contrast to animals, the key to human
achievements lie in the perception of universals, in that he
endeavours to perceive the laws governing the universe and
employs those laws and establishes industries and founds cultures
and civilizations. Logic, as an instrument of reasoning accurately,
deals with both universals and particulars, though it mainly treats
universals.

The Four Relations (Nisab-i Arbaʻah)

The relation between two universals (each including different

members) may be one of the following four relations: exclusion
(tabāyun); equivalence (tasāwī); complete inclusion (‘umūm wa
khuṣūṣ-i muṭlaq, indirāj-i tāmm); partial inclusion (‘umūm wa
khuṣūs-i min al-wajh).

Exclusion implies that none of these two universals is applicable

to any of the members of the other universal and the domain of
each of them is totally different from the domain of the other.
These two universals are called the two mutually exclusive
(mutabāyinayn).

14
Equivalence denotes that each of the two universals applies to all
the members of the other; i.e. these two universals share the same
domain, in which case the relation between the two universals is
equivalent and the two universals are termed as the two
equivalents (mutasāwiyayn).

Complete inclusion is that one of the two is applicable to all the

members of the other and it includes its domain in its entirety, but
the other partially, rather than completely, includes the domain of
the former. In this case, the relation between the two universals is
complete inclusion and the two are termed as complete general
and particular (‘āmm wa khāṣṣ-i muṭlaq).

Partial inclusion implies that each of the two universals is

applicable to some members of the other universal, and they share
some of their domains; however, each of the two universals
applies to some members, but not the other members, in that each
of them has a different domain. These two universals are termed
as partially general and particular (‘āmm wa khāṣṣ-i min al-wajh).

The first is like man and tree. No man is a tree and no tree is a
man. Man does not include the tree members. Neither man
includes tree members, nor human members are included by tree.
Neither man includes anything from the domain of the tree, nor a
tree includes anything from the human domain.

The second is like man and surprised. Any man is surprised and
any surprised is man. The human domain is the same as the
surprised’s domain and the domain of the surprised is the same as
the human domain

The third is like man an animal. Any man is an animal, but any
animal is not a man. For instance, a horse is an animal, but not a

15
man. Some animals are men, like human members who are both
human and animal.

The fourth is like man and white. Some men are white and some
whites are men (men of the white race), but some men are not
white (like men of the black and yellow races) and some whites
are not men, like snow which is white, but not human).

Two mutually exclusive universals are actually like two separate

circles which do not intersect. Two equivalent universals are like
two totally overlapping circles. Two completely inclusive
universals are like two circles of different sizes and the smaller
one is encircled by the larger one. Two partially inclusive
universals are like two intersecting circles, transecting each other
by two arcs.

These four relations are only applicable to universals. A fifth

relation, which is impossible, would be that one universal does not
include any member of the other universal, but the other includes
all or some of the members of that universal.

The Five Universals (Arabic Kulliyāt al-Khamsah, Persian

Kulliyāt-i Khams)

The preliminary discussions on the five universals are treated in

philosophy, rather than logic. They are treated in details in
philosophical discussions on quiddity (Arabic māhiyyah, Persian
māhiyyat); however, since an acquaintance with the five universals
is required in discussing definitions (ḥudūd, taʻrīfāt), logicians
term it as introduction (madkhal, muqaddimah, muqaddamah) in
their discussions on definitions.

16
It is stated that when any universal is considered in relation to the
members of that universal and its relation to its members be
considered, it falls into one of the following five categories: 1.
Species (nawʻ); 2. Genus (jins); 3. Differentia (faṣl); 4. General
accident (‘araḍ-i ‘āmm); 5. Particular accident (‘araḍ-i khāṣṣ).

That universal is either identified with the essence and quiddity of

its members, or it is included in the essence, or it is beyond the
essence. The one which is included in the essence of its members
is either included by the essence, or it is equivalent to the essence.
The universal which is beyond the essence is either more general
(aʻamm) than the essence, or it is equivalent to the essence.
Species is the universal which completely includes the essence and
quiddity of the members. Genus is the universal which is included
by the essence of its members, but it is more generally included.
Differentia is the universal which is included in the essence of its
members, but it is equally included. General accident is the
universal which is beyond the essence of, but more general than,
its members. Particular accident is the universal which is beyond
the essence of its members, but it is equivalent to the essence.

The first is like man that the meaning of humanity (Arabic

insāniyyah, Persian insāniyyat) completely includes the essence
and quiddity of the members; i.e. whatever is in the essence and
quiddity of human members is included in the concept of man.
Another instance is the meaning and concept of line (khaṭṭ) which
completely includes the essence and quiddity of its members.

The second is like animal which is included in the essence of its

members, since animal members, e.g. Zayd, ‘Amr, horse, and
sheep, are animals and something else, i.e. animal constitutes their
essence and quiddity, plus something else, like rational (nāṭiq) in
case of men. Another instance is quantity (kamm) which is

17
included by the essence of its members, e.g. line, surface, and
volume. They are all quantities plus something else; in other
words, quantity is partially, rather than completely, included in
their essence, rather than anything beyond their essence.

The third is like rational (nāṭiq) which is another particular of

man’s quiddity and it is one dimensionally connected which is
another particular of the quiddity of line.

The fourth is like walking (Arabic māshiʼ, Persian rāh-rawandah)

which is beyond the quiddity of its members; in other words,
walking is neither a particular nor a general characteristic of
walkers, but it is their state or accident; however, this accident is
not particular to a species, but it is applicable to some animal
species and it is applicable to any member whose essence and
quiddity are more general than that member.

The fifth is like surprised (mutaʻajjib) which is beyond the

quiddity of human members and it exists as a state or accident in
them and this accident is specific to the members of an essence, a
species, and a quiddity, i.e. man.6

6
As mentioned above, if a universal be particular to essence, it is either more
general than essence or it is equal to it; in that if a universal be particular to essence,
it may possess one two relations from among the four relations, i.e. complete
generality and equivalence. A question arises here: What about the other two
relations? Could a universal be particular to essence and be simultaneously exclusive
to essence or more general than partial inclusion to essence? The answer is negative.
Why? The answer fall in the domain of philosophy and the answer is philosophically
clear, but we do not treat it for the time being.
It is also worthy of note in passing that the relation of complete inclusion
between particular to essence and essence is always such that it is particular to
essence and more general than essence and the more particular to essence than
particular to essence, but it is impossible vice versa, in that it is not possible for
essence to be more general than particular to essence. This is also discussed in the
domain of philosophy.

18
 5. Definitions

The discussion on universal, mentioned above, serves as an

introduction to definitions (ḥudūd, taʻrīfāt), i.e. it is logic that
presents the manner of defining a meaning or the valid method of
producing a demonstration (burhān, pl. barāhīn) to substantiate an
argument. The former falls into the domain of conceptions, i.e.
making known a conceptual unknown out of conceptual facts; and
the latter belongs to judgments, i.e. making known a judgmental
unknown out of judgmental facts.

Definition of objects, in general terms, is to provide responses to

their quiddity or whatness, i.e. when a question arises like, ‘What
is such and such object? We try to provide a definition of it. It
goes without saying that any question addresses some unknown
object. When we inquire about the quiddity and reality of an
object, the enquiry touches upon the quiddity and reality of that
object, its semantic boundaries, and the inclusion of its members.

When we have not conceived a valid conception of some object,

its reality and quiddity are unknown to us. Asking questions like
what is a line? What is surface? What is matter? What is
potentiality? What is life? What is movement? indicates that we
do not have a complete and comprehensive conception of the
realities of those things, but we need to have a valid conception of
them. In other words, the definition of a concept in terms of
boundaries is unknown to us, in that when we doubt the inclusion
of some members in that concept we need to clarify it such that it
includes the members and excludes the others.

19
It goes without saying that preliminary discussions of any
discipline treat a series of definitions of the subjects dealt with in
that field; nonetheless, definitions used in any discipline are
different from its problems, in that they are extraneous to that
discipline but they are employed for conceptual clarification.
Logical judgements provide us with an authentic method to define
concepts.

Inquiries

It is worthy of note that the inquiries made as to what is unknown

to man are of a diverse nature. There exists an array of questions,
but each question is applicable to itself, hence the various words
used in different languages to imply question, i.e. there are
different question words in different languages. Varieties of
question words are indicative of diversity of questions which
reflect the diversity of unknown facts. Each and every question
may have a different answer. The questions are as the following:
1. What is it? (mā huwa?); 2. Is/Does ...? (hal?); 3. How is it?
(kayfa?); 4. How many/much? (kamm?); 5. Where? (ayna?); 6.
When? (matā?); 7. Who? (man huwa?); 8. Which one? (ayyu?); 9.
Why? (li-ma?).

Therefore, it is obvious that when we inquire about some unknown

object, it may be of diverse kinds and our inquiry should follow
that diversity. For instance, we ask, ‘What is A?’; ‘Does A exist?’;
‘How is A?’; ‘What is A’s quantity?’; ‘Where is A?’; ‘When is
A?’; ‘Who or what is A?’; ‘Which one is A?’; ‘What is the reason
or application of A?’

It is not for logic, but for philosophy and sciences, to address such
inquiries which concern extraneous objects. However, logic is
concerned with the answers provided by philosophy and sciences;
i.e. such questions are not addressed by logic, but it provides the

20
manner of producing valid answers. In fact, only one of the
qualities is addressed by logic and that is the quality of valid
reasoning; nonetheless, this quality concerns how it should be,
rather than how it is.7

Considering the fact that all questions, but the first and the last
ones, may be asked by the interrogative particle hal in Arabic or
āyā in Persian, all these questions may be reduced to three main
questions: ‘What is it?’ (Arabic mā, Persian chīst); ‘Is / Does ...?’
(Arabic hal, Persian āyā); ‘Why?’ (Arabic li-ma, Persian chirā).

In his didactic poem on logic (Manẓūmat al-Manṭiq) Mullā Hādī

Sabziwārī says, ‘The basis of the matter is [to gain] knowledge
[on] three things: what, is ..., why.’8

Accordingly, it is not for logic (but for philosophy) to define an

object, but it demonstrates the authentic method of definition, and
its instructions are based on divine wisdom.

Definition by Essence (Ḥadd) and Definition by Accident

(Rasm)

A perfect definition (ḥadd-i tāmm) may be achieved when one is

able to distinguish the constituents of an object’s quiddity, i.e. its
genera (ajnās) and differentiae (fuṣūl). However, if some, rather
than all, of the constituents of the quiddity of some object be

7
Which science is supposed to provide answers to these questions? It is
proved in theology that theology is supposed to answer the first two questions, i.e.
whatness and existence. Regarding the ninth question, i.e. whyness, if the question
addresses the primary causes, i.e. the causes not caused by causes, the answer is
supposed to be provided by theology, but if the inquiry concerns immediate and
particular causes, the sciences are supposed to answer them. The sciences are
supposed to reply to a large number of questions concerning, the manners, quantities,
places, and times, and the sciences are diversified by the number of the subjects
investigated therein.
8
Ussu ʼl-maṭālibi thalāthatu ‘ilmi / maṭlabu mā, maṭlabu hal, maṭlabu lim.

21
achievable, our definition would be imperfect definition (ḥadd-i
nāqiṣ). Now, when the accidents and judgements, rather than the
constituents of essence and quiddity of an object be achievable, or
if we simply intend to delineate the boundaries of a concept, as to
what is embodied by it, and we have sufficient judgments and
accidents to distinguish between it and other concepts, such
definition would be a perfect definition by accident (rasm-i tāmm),
but if such distinction may not be neatly drawn, it would be
imperfect definition by accident (rasm-i nāqiṣ).

For instance, if man be defined as, ‘a corporeal [having

dimensions], growing (Arabic nāmin, Persian nāmī), animal,
rational substance (jawhar),’ its perfect definition is stated;
however, if man be defined as ‘a corporeal, growing, animal,
substance, it would be imperfect definition. The definitions ‘a
walking existent of erect stature and wide nails’ and ‘a walking
existent’ would be a perfect definition by accidents and an
imperfect definition by accident respectively.

The best definition is perfect definition by essence, but

philosophers acknowledge that it is no easy task to produce it
since it requires discovering the essential constituents of objects;
in other words, it requires the penetration of reason into the most
profound aspects of objects. Accordingly, what is termed as
perfect definition by essence in defining objects like man is rather
imprecise.9

Our discussion on definitions comes to an end here, since

philosophy, whose function is to provide definitions, fails to do so
and logical laws governing perfect definition by essence naturally
lose their validity.

9
For further details, see Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī’s annotations on the logical
sections of the commentary on Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.

22
 6. Judgments: Propositions

In our discussion on judgments, first we need to define the term

proposition (qaḍiyyah, pl. qaḍāyā), classify them, and make
mention of their relations (aḥkām, sg. ḥukm). Accordingly, we
pass through three stages: definition, classification, and relations.
A definition of proposition must be preceded by some
acquaintance with the relevant terms (alfāẓ, sg. lafẓ).

Logic deals with meanings and perceptions, but does not directly
touch upon terms (in contrast to grammar), and any logical
definition, classification, or statement is intertwined with
meanings and perceptions, but it inevitably treats, at times, the
definitions and classifications of terms for their semantic
relevance; in other words, those terms are classified in terms of
their meanings and definitions.

Students who had taken up logic were formerly taught the

following lines:

A logician does not bother with discussing terms

But such discussions were ancillary to his art.10

The term discourse (qawl, pl. aqwāl) is applied to any term

implying a specific significance (maʻnā). However, the words
made use of in daily conversations which are indicative of our
intentions are termed as discourse. Any term lacking significance
is called a non-significant or indefinite (muhmal) discourse. For
instance, the term horse is a discourse, since it implies a specific

10
Manṭiqī dar band-i baḥth-i lafẓ nīst / līk baḥth-i lafẓ ū rā
‘āriḍī ʼst.

23
animal, but esroh is non-significant or indefinite and it is not a
discourse.

Discourses fall into two categories: simple (mufrad) and

composite (compound, complex, murakkab). A discourse is
termed as composite when it consists of two significant or
meaningful constituents; but a simple discourse has one element.
For instance, water is simple, but watermelon is composite; box is
simple, but strongbox is composite.

Composites divide into perfect (tāmm) and imperfect (nāqiṣ). A

perfect composite (murakkab-i tāmm) is a complete sentence, i.e.
it expresses an intention in its entirety, such that the addressee
understands it without waiting for the remaining constituent(s). It
is said that understanding it is affirmed by silence. For instance,
‘Zayd went’; ‘‘Amr came’; ‘Go!’; ‘Come!’; ‘Are you coming with
me?’ These complete sentences are termed as perfect composite.

Imperfect composite, in contrast, is an incomplete sentence and it

implies no complete meaning. For instance, if it is simply said,
‘watermelon’ the address will not understand the message and will
wait for a complete sentence by asking, ‘Watermelon, what?’

An incomplete sentence or an imperfect proposition may run to

one line or even one page. For instance, ‘Today, it was around 8
am that I, in trousers, but not wearing a coat, went onto the roof of
our house, looking at my watch and accompanied by my friend,
Mr. A ... .’ the sentence is incomplete, since there is a subject
(mubtadāʼ) but it is not followed by a predicate (khabar). But if he
says, ‘The weather is cold’, it is a complete sentence and a perfect
proposition.

Perfect composite falls into two categories: declarative (khabar)

and non-declarative (inshāʼ). A perfect declarative composite

24
indicates some reality, something that happened, is happening, or
is to happen, something that was, is, or will be. For instance, ‘I
went to pilgrimage to Mecca last year’; ‘I will take the MA
entrance exams next year’; ‘I am ill now’; ‘Iron expands as it is
heated’.

A non-declarative composite is a sentence that produces some

meaning, rather than declaring something. For instance, ‘Go!’;
‘Come!’; ‘Don’t talk!’; ‘Are you coming with me?’ These
imperative, injunctive, and interrogative sentences do not declare
anything.

A perfect declarative composite may or may not be in accord with

the declared message; for instance, ‘I went to pilgrimage to Mecca
last year’ may be true (ṣādiq) or false (kādhib). However, a non-
declarative composite is not declaring anything, but it originates
some meaning; hence, there is no accord between it and some
extraneous entity, and it would be meaningless to say whether it is
true or false.

A proposition (qaḍiyyah), in logical terms, is a declarative perfect

composite discourse; accordingly, it is defined as, ‘a discourse
which may be true or false, because, first, it is a composite, rather
than a simple, discourse; second, it is a perfect, rather than
imperfect (ghayr tāmm) composite; third, a perfect composite is
declarative, rather than non-declarative, since a simple discourse,
an imperfect composite discourse, and non-declarative perfect
composite discourse are not subject to truth or falsehood.

It was mentioned above that logic, firstly and essentially deals

with meanings, and secondly and accidentally treats terms.

What has been mentioned so far concerns discourse and term, but
meanings are mainly intended herein. Any verbal proposition

25
(Arabic qaḍiyyat al-lafẓiyyah, qaḍiyyat al-malfūẓah, Persian
qaḍiyyah-yi lafẓī, qaḍiyyah-yi malfūẓah) is equal to a mentally
posited (dhihniyyah) and intelligible (maʻqūlah) proposition. In
other words, the term proposition is applied to the verbal form of
‘Zayd is standing’ and the meaning that is in our mind is also
referred to as proposition. The verbal form of this sentence is
termed as verbal proposition and the meaning is termed as
intelligible proposition.

Our discussion on the definition of proposition comes to a close

here and we will proceed with the classification of propositions
below.

26
 7. Classification of Propositions

Propositions are classified on the following bases: relation of

judgment or copula (Arabic nisbat al-ḥukmiyyah, Persian nisbat-i
ḥukmiyyah, rābiṭah); subject (mawḍūʻ); predicate (maḥmūl);
quantifier (sūr); modality (Arabic jahah, Persian jahat).

Categorical and Conditional

Based on the relation of judgment or copula, propositions fall into

two categories: categorical or attributive (ḥamliyyah) and
conditional (sharṭiyyah). A categorical proposition consists of
subject, predicate, and relation of judgement or copula.

When we conceive a proposition and make a judgment about it, at

times we regard it as subject, i.e. we ‘place’ it in mind and regard
another constituent as predicate, i.e. we ‘load’ (ḥaml) it on the
subject; in other words, in a categorical proposition we make a
judgment as to the affirmation of something for something else.
Thus, ‘placing’ a subject and ‘loading’ something on it creates a
‘relation’ between them and thus a proposition emerges.

For instance, in ‘Zayd is standing’ or ‘ʻAmr is sitting’, ‘Zayd’ is

the subject and ‘standing’ is the predicate and ‘is’ is copula or
relation of judgment. In fact, we have placed Zayd in mind and
have ‘loaded’ standing on him, and we have created a copula and a
relation between Zayd and standing, and thus we have produced a
proposition.

The subject and the predicate are the two terms (ṭaraf, dual
ṭarafayn, pl. aṭrāf) of a categorical proposition. These two terms

27
should always be simple (mufrad) and/or imperfect composite. If
we say, ‘Watermelon is useful’ the subject of the proposition is an
imperfect composite, but a perfect composite may never be one
term or both terms of a categorical proposition.

The relation or copula in categorical propositions is unificatory

(ittiḥādī). For instance, if we say ‘Zayd is standing’ we have
actually stated that ‘Zayd’ and ‘standing’ have united and formed
the same extraneous entity.

Nonetheless, the case is different when we conceive the

proposition in mind and then we make a judgment about it; i.e.
something is not ‘loaded’ on something else. In other words, the
proposition does not affirm something for something else, but a
judgment has been made as to the conditionality of the contents of
a proposition on the contents of another proposition, a statement
has been made concerning the dependence (taʻlīq) of the contents
of a proposition on another proposition. For instance, when we
say, ‘If Zayd is standing, ‘Amr is sitting’ or ‘Either Zayd is
standing or ‘Amr is sitting’ the meaning actually is: ‘If Zayd is
standing, ‘Amr is not sitting and if ‘Amr is sitting, Zayd is not
standing.’ These are termed as conditional propositions (Arabic
qaḍāyā al-sharṭiyyah, Persian, qaḍāyā-yi sharṭī).

Similar to categorical propositions, conditional ones have two

terms and a copula; but, in contrast to categorical propositions,
each of the two conditional terms is a perfect declarative
composite, i.e. it is one proposition, and two propositions are
connected with a copula; in other words, two propositions and a
copula have created a complex proposition.

A conditional proposition, in turn, falls into two categories:

conjunctive (muttasilah) and disjunctive (munfaṣilah), since the
copula connecting the two terms of a conditional proposition is

28
either a relation of compatibility (mutual implication or
equipollence, talāzum) or one of incompatibility (taʻānud).

Compatibility implies that one term requires another; they both

occur in the same position. For instance, ‘When lightning flashes
in the clouds, then thunder will be heard’ or ‘When Zayd is
standing, ‘Amr is sitting’, i.e. lightning requires thunder and
‘Amr’s sitting requires Zayd’s standing. In contrast,
incompatibility implies that there exists some incompatibility or
disassociation between the two terms, i.e. if something is in one
term, it is not in the other, and vice versa; for instance, ‘A number
is either even or odd’, i.e. a specific number may not be both odd
and even. Another instance would be, ‘Either Zayd is standing, or
‘Amr is sitting’, i.e. it is impossible that Zayd be standing and
‘Amr be sitting simultaneously.

In conjunctive conditional propositions wherein the relation

between the two terms is compatible, it obviously involves a kind
of dependence (taʻlīq) and conditionality (ishtirāṭ). For instance,
when we say, ‘If lightning flashes in the clouds, thunder will be
heard’, we intend to state that hearing the thunder is conditional
and dependent on lightning. Thus the conditionality of conjunctive
propositions is clear.

However, dependence and conditionality in disjunctive

propositions, whose relation is incompatible, e.g. ‘A number is
either even or odd’, do not lie in the form of the words, but each of
the two terms is actually dependent and conditional on the
exclusion of the other term; i.e. when the number is even, it is not
odd and when it is odd, it is not even, and when it is not even, it is
odd, and when it is not odd, it is even.

29
Accordingly, propositions, in the former classification, fall into
categorical (or attributive) and conditional; conditional
propositions, in turn, divide into conjunctive and disjunctive.

The smallest unit of propositions is the categorical proposition,

since they consist of the composition of imperfect simples or
composites, but conditional propositions are composed of some
categorical propositions or some smaller conditional propositions,
and the smaller conditional propositions are further composed of
categorical propositions.

The two terms of a conditional proposition are termed as

antecedent (muqaddam) and consequent (tālī); i.e. the first
constituent is antecedent and the second is consequent; in contrast
to a categorical proposition whose first constituent is subject
(mawḍūʻ) and the second is predicate (maḥmūl).

Conjunctive conditional propositions include particles like ‘if’,

‘any time’, and ‘as’; and disjunctive conditional propositions
include particles like ‘or’.

Affirmative and Negative

As mentioned above, classification of propositions into categorical

and conditional is based on copula or the relation of judgment.
However, when the copula is unificatory (ittiḥādī), the
propositions are categorical and when the copula is compatible or
incompatible, the propositions are conditional.

Classification of propositions on the basis of copula or the relation

of judgment may be of further categories, i.e. the relation (whether
unificatory, compatible, or incompatible) is affirmed or negated.
The former is termed as an affirmative (mawjibah) proposition and
the latter is termed as a negative (sālibah) proposition. For

30
instance, when we say, ‘Zayd is standing’, it is an affirmative
categorical proposition. When we say, ‘This is not the case that
Zayd is standing’, it is a negative categorical proposition. ‘If it
rains abundantly, crops will be abundant’ and ‘If it does not rain
on the mountains / Tigris will dry out’ are affirmative conjunctive
conditional propositions. ‘It is not true that if it rains abundantly,
crops will be scarce’ is a negative conjunctive conditional
proposition. ‘A number is either even or odd’ is an affirmative
disjunctive conditional proposition. ‘It is not true that a number is
either even or another number’ is a negative disjunctive
conditional proposition.

Quantified (Maḥṣūrah) and Non-Quantified (Ghayr Maḥṣūrah)

Propositions

Categorical propositions may also be classified according to the

subject, since the subject of a categorical proposition is either
denotative particular (juzʼī ḥaqīqī), i.e. it denotes one member, or
a universal meaning.

When the subject of a proposition is one single member, it is

termed as singular (shakhṣiyyah) proposition; for instance, ‘Zayd
is standing’ and ‘I went to pilgrimage to Mecca’. Such
propositions are frequently used in everyday conversations, rather
than in sciences; i.e. problems of sciences are universal (kulliyyah)
propositions.

When the subject of a proposition is a universal meaning, it, in

turn, divides into two categories: either that universal, because of
its universality and its conception in the mind, is the subject, or it
mirrors further members. In other words, there are two types of
universals conceived in the mind: a universal per se is at times
intended and conceived in the mind (mā fī-hi yunẓar), or the
members of a universal, rather than itself, are intended and

31
conceived in the mind (mā bi-hi yunẓar), and the universal
conception serves as a means to express some judgment or
statement about the members of a universal. The former may be
likened to a mirror which is seen and the latter resembles a mirror
wherein reflections are seen.

When we say, ‘Man is species’ or ‘Animal is genus’, we intend to

state that the nature of man, as it is conceived in the mind and is
universal is species, and the nature of animal, as it is conceived in
the mind and is universal is genus; it is obvious that we do not
intend to state that the members of man and those of animal are
species or genera.

When we say, ‘Man is surprised’ or ‘Man laughs’, we intend that

the members of man are surprised; it goes without saying that we
do not intend to state that universal nature of man, conceived in
the mind, is surprised.

The former category of propositions, i.e. those whose subjects are

of universal nature, and the universal nature serves as a subject in
terms of universality and conception in the mind, is termed as
physical propositions (Arabic qaḍāyā al- ṭabīʻiyyah, Persian
qaḍāyā-yi ṭabīʻī). For instance, ‘Man is universal’; ‘Man is
species’; ‘Man is more particular than animal’; ‘Man is more
general than Zayd.’

Physical propositions are simply used in theology wherein

quiddities are being studied, but they are of no use in other
disciplines.

Universal nature, when it serves a means of stating the members,

falls, in turn, into two categories. When we say, ‘Man is hasty’;
‘All men are born with an innate monotheistic disposition’; ‘Some
men are white’ the quantities of all or some of the members are

32
either being mentioned or not. If there is no mention of such
quantities, we will have an indefinite proposition (Arabic qaḍiyyat
al-muhmalah, Persian qaḍiyyah-yi muhmalah). Such propositions
lack independent validity in sciences and philosophy and they
should be classified as quantified particular propositions; for
instance, when we say, ‘Man is hasty’, we do not clarify if all or
some of men are hasty.

When the quantities of all or some of the members are mentioned,

we have quantified propositions. When our proposition states that
all the members are such and such, it is termed as a universal
quantified proposition. But, when it states that some of the
members are such and such, it is a particular quantified
proposition.

Accordingly, quantified propositions (Arabic qaḍāyā al-

maḥṣūrah, Persian qaḍāyā-yi maḥṣūrah) fall into universal
(kulliyyah) and particular (juzʼiyyah). Since any proposition may
be either affirmative or negative, quantified propositions fall into
the following four categories:

Universal affirmative, e.g. ‘Any man is an animal’ (kullu insānin

ḥayawānun);

Universal negative, e.g. ‘Nothing of the man is of stone’ (lā

shayʼa min ʼl-insāni bi-ḥajarin);

Particular affirmative, e.g. ‘Some animals are men’ (baʻḍu ʼl-

ḥayawāni insānun);

Particular negative, e.g. ‘Some animals are not men’ (baʻḍu ʼl-
ḥayawāni laysa bi-insānin).

Termed as the quarter quantifieds (Arabic maḥṣūrāt al-arbaʻah,

Persian maḥṣūrāt-i ‘arbaʻah), these four categories of propositions

33
- rather than singular, physical and indefinite ones - are used in
sciences.

The term proposition quantifier (Arabic sūr al-qaḍiyyah, Persian,

sūr-i qaḍiyyah) is applied to what indicates whether all the
members or some of them are being intended in quantified
propositions. ‘Any’ in ‘Any man is an animal’, ‘some’ in ‘Some
animals are human’, ‘no’ in ‘No plant grows in a salt marsh’, and
some ... negative’ in ‘Some trees do not grow in hot climates’ are
instances of proposition quantifiers.

Propositions fall into further categories, e.g., privative (with

negative particles, maʻdūlah); non-privative (without negative
particles, muḥaṣṣalah); actual / external (khārijiyyah); mentally
posited (dhihniyyah); true (ḥaqiqiyyah). Their definitions are to be
found in books on logic, but they are beyond the scope of our
textbook since it is simply devoted to generalities.

There are other classifications, e.g. assertoric (muṭlaqah) and

modal (muwajjahah), the latter divides into necessary
(ḍarūriyyah), perpetual (dāʼimah), probable (mumkinah), etc.
Although brevity impedes us from touching on them, but it may be
mentioned in passing that the relation between two entities in, for
instance, ‘Any A is B’ is at times necessary and its existence is
impossible, in which case, it is said, ‘Any A is necessarily B’, but
at times its inexistence is probable, in which case it is said, ‘Any A
is potentially B’.

Necessity falls into different categories, but we may not deal with
them here. Necessity and probability constitute the modality of
propositions (Arabic jahat al-qaḍāyā, Persian jahat-i qaḍāyā) and
a proposition wherein modality is attested is termed as modal
proposition (qaḍiyyat al-muwajjahah, Persian qaḍiyyah-yi
muwajjahah), but when modality is not to be attested therein, it is

34
termed as assertoric proposition (Arabic qaḍiyyat al-muṭlaqah,
Persian qaḍiyyah-yi muṭlaqah).

Disjunctive conditional propositions fall into different categories:

true (ḥaqīqiyyah), incompatible (māniʻat al-jamʻ), and exclusive
(māniʻat al-khuluww) whose definitions and examples are to be
found in books on logic, but we do not treat them for brevity’s
sake.

35
 8. Relations between Propositions

As discussed above, propositions fall into various categories based

on an array of factors. In this section, we treat the relations
between propositions. Similar to simples (mufradāt), propositions
bear relations to each other. It was mentioned in the section on
simples that there are specific relations between universals which
are termed as the four relations. When we compare two universals,
one of these relations exists between them: mutual exclusion
(tabāyun); equivalence (tasāwī); complete inclusion (‘āmm wa
khāṣs muṭlaq); partial inclusion (‘āmm wa khāṣṣ min al-wajh).
There is one of the four relations between propositions in
comparison as well: contradiction (tanāquḍ); contrariety (taḍādd);
subalternation in contrariety (dukhūl taḥt al-taḍādd);
subalternation (tadākhul).11

Two propositions are termed as contradictories (mutanāqiḍayn)

when they share the same subject, predicate, and modalities,
except quantity and quality, but they differ in terms of quantity as

11
In comparison, two propositions either share or do not share their subjects
and/or predicates. If they do not share anything, e.g. ‘Man is a surprised animal’ or
‘Iron is a metal and expands as it is heated’, there is no common denominator
between these two propositions and they are mutually exclusive. When they simply
share their subject, e.g. ‘Man is surprised’ and ‘Man is crafting’, they are equivalents
and they may be termed as the mutually corresponding propositions
(mutamāthilayn). When they only share their predicate, e.g. ‘Man is a mammal’ and
‘Horse is a mammal’, they are similar (mutashābihayn).
However, logicians, in discussing the relations between propositions, do not
attend to whether they share a common denominator or not. In their discussions on
the relations between propositions, they simply consider if two propositions both
share the same subject and predicate, and whether they differ in quantity (kamm), i.e.
universality and particularity, or in quality (kayfiyyah), i.e. affirmation (ījāb) and
negation (salb), or both. Such propositions are termed as the two opposites
(mutaqābilayn), which fall, in turn, into contradictories (mutanāqiḍayn); contraries
(mutaḍāddayn); subalterns (mutadākhilayn); subalterns in contrariety (dākhilayn taḥt
al-taḍādd).

36
well as quality, i.e. they differ in terms of universality and
particularity as well as affirmation and negation; instances of
which include: ‘Any man is surprised’ and ‘Some men are not
surprised’.

When they differ in quality, i.e. one is affirmative and the other is
negative, and they also share quantity, i.e. universality and
particularity. They fall into two categories: they are either both
universal or both particular. If they are both universal, they are
termed as contraries (mutaḍāddayn), e.g. ‘Any man is surprised’
and ‘No man is surprised’. But, in case they are both particular,
they are termed as subalterns in contrariety (dākhilayn taḥt al-
taḍādd), e.g. ‘Some men are surprised’ and ‘Some men are not
surprised’.

When the two propositions differ in quantity, i.e. one is universal

and the other is particular, but they are identical in terms of
quality, i.e. both of them are affirmative or are negative, they are
termed as subalterns (mutadākhilayn), e.g. ‘Any man is surprised’
and ‘Some men are surprised’; ‘No man has a beak’ and ‘Some
men have no beak’.

It goes without saying that a fifth alternative, i.e. differing neither

in quality nor in quantity, may not be supposed, since our
supposition is that we discuss two propositions which are identical
in terms of subject, predicate, and further modalities, e.g. time and
place. Such propositions, identical in terms of quantity and
quality, are in fact one proposition rather than two propositions.

In the first category, the relation between two propositions is

mutual exclusion, in that if one of them is true, the other is
certainly false and when one of them is false, the other is true; i.e.
it would be impossible for them to be both true or both false. The
affirmative and negative forms of such improbable propositions

37
are termed as coexistence of contraries (Arabic ijtimāʻ al-
naqīḍayn, Persian ijtimāʻ-i naqīḍayn) and negation of contraries
(Arabic irtifāʻ al-naqīḍayn, Persian irtifāʻ-i naqīḍayn)
respectively. This is the law of contrariety which is frequently
discussed these days.

It is argued by Hegel that his dialectic logic is based on the

negation of the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded
middle, which will be discussed in the sections on generalities of
philosophy.

The relation between the two propositions in the second category

is that asserting each of them requires denying the other, but the
denial of none of them necessitates the assertion of the other; in
other words, both of them cannot be true, but both of them can be
false. For instance, both of these two propositions: ‘Any A is B’
and ‘No A is B’ cannot be asserted, i.e. it is impossible that both
propositions be asserted, in that any A be B and no A be B;
however, both propositions can be false, in that no A be B and no
A be not B, but some A’s be B and some B’s be A.

The relation between the propositions in the third category is that

the denial of each requires the assertion of the other, but the
assertion of none of the two requires the denial of the other; i.e.
both of them cannot be false, but it is not impossible for both to be
asserted. For instance, the propositions ‘Some A’s are B’ and
‘Some A’s are not B’ may be both asserted, but it is impossible for
both to be denied, since if they both be false, the falsity of ‘Some
A’s are B’ is that no A be B, and the falsity of ‘Some A’s are not
B’ is that any A is B, and it was mentioned in the second category
that it is impossible for two propositions, identical in terms of
subject and predicate to be both universal and be affirmative and
the other negative and both be asserted.

38
In the fourth category, both propositions are either affirmative or
both are negative, but one is universal and the other is particular. It
is worthy of note that in propositions, in contrast to simples, the
particular is always more general than the universal. In simples the
universal is always more general than the particular. For instance,
man is more general than Zayd, but in propositions, the
proposition ‘Some A’s are B’ is more general than the proposition
‘Any A is B’, since if any A be B, some A’s are certainly B, but if
some A’s be B, all A’s are not necessarily B. Asserting the more
general proposition does not necessarily require the assertion of
the more particular proposition, but the assertion of the more
particular necessitates the assertion of the more general
proposition, and the denial of the more particular proposition does
not necessitate the denial of the more general proposition;
however, the denial of the more general proposition necessitates
the denial of the more particular proposition.

Accordingly, these propositions are subalterns (mutadākhilayn),

but in that the universal proposition is always the subaltern of the
particular proposition; i.e. wherever the universal be asserted, the
particular is asserted as well, but a particular proposition may be
asserted in some instances, but the universal proposition may not
be asserted.

Further light may be shed by considering ‘Any A is B’ and ‘Some

A’s are B’ and also by reflecting on ‘No A is B’ and ‘Some A’s
are not B’.

39
 9. Contradiction – Conversion

The principle of contradiction is the most significant and the most

practical. It was mentioned above that the relation of contradiction
implies that two propositions are identical in terms of subject and
predicate, rather than quantity and quality, i.e. in terms of
universality and particularity as well as affirmation and negation.
Such two propositions are termed as contradictories
(mutanāqiḍayn). It was also stated above that the relation between
the contraries is such that the assertion of one of the two
necessitates the denial of the other and the denial of one requires
the assertion of the other. In other words, coexistence of two
contraries and the negation of contraries are both impossible.

Accordingly, universal affirmative and particular negative are

contraries as universal negative and particular affirmative are
contradictory. Besides the unity of subject and predicate,
contraries are conditioned by some other unities, e.g. unity of the
time, unity of the place, unity of condition, unity of relation, unity
of particular and universal, and unity of potentiality (quwwah) and
actuality (fiʻl). These unities or identities are enumerated in these
Persian lines:

Know that there are eight unities in contrariety:

Unity of subject and predicate and place,

Unity of condition and relation, particular and universal,

40
Potentiality and actuality and finally time.12

When we say, ‘Man laughs, horse does not laugh’ there is not an
instance of contradiction (tanāquḍ), since the subjects are not
identical. When we say, ‘Man laughs, Man is not quadruped’ there
is no contrariety, since the predicates are not identical. When we
say, ‘If moon eclipse occurs, it will be obligatory to establish the
prayers for the occurrence of natural phenomena (ṣalāt al-āyāt),
but if it does not occur, it will not be obligatory to establish such
prayers, there is no contrariety, since the conditions are different.
If we say, ‘Man is not scared in the day, man is scared at night,
there is no contradiction, since the times are different. If we say,
‘The weight of a litre of water is one kilogramme on the earth and
it is, for instance, half a kilogramme in the atmosphere [i.e. in the
high altitudes], there is no contradiction, since the places are not
identical. ‘Human knowledge is variable, divine knowledge is
invariable’ is not contradictory, since the relations, ad hoc, the
second or governed nouns of the genitive constructs, muḍāfun
‘alayhi, of the two subjects, are not identical. There is no
contradiction in ‘The total area of Tehran is 1,600 km2 and some
part of the area of Tehran, e.g. east of Tehran, is not 1,600 km2’,
since they are different in terms of particularity and universality.
There is no contradiction in ‘Any human infant is potentially
diligent and some human infants are not diligent in actuality’,
since they are not identical in terms of potentiality and actuality.

12
Dar tanāquḍ hath waḥdat sharṭ dān,

waḥdat-i mawḍūʻ u maḥmūl u makān,

waḥdat-i sharṭ u iḍāfah, juzʼ u kull,

quwwah u fiʻl ast, dar ākhir zaman.

41
The same conditions apply to the contraries (mutaḍāddayn),
subalterns in contrariety (dākhilayn taḥt al-taḍādd), and subalterns
(mutadākhilayn), in that two propositions are contraries or
subalterns in contrariety, or subalterns if they share the above said
unities.

The Principle of Contradiction

Early logicians maintained that the principle of contradiction

served as the basis for propositions (umm al-qaḍāyā), in that not
only logical problems, but also the propositions of all sciences and
all the propositions used by man, even in common usage
(‘urfiyyāt), were based on that principle. This principle constitutes
the foundation of all human thoughts and if it collapses, all
thoughts will collapse as well. Aristotelian logic would be totally
invalid if the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded
middle be not asserted.

What is the view of earlier logicians? Is this principle subject to

doubt? We could say by way of introduction that what is termed in
logic as contradictory (naqīḍ) in ‘The universal affirmative is the
contradiction of particular negative, and the contradiction of
universal negative is the particular affirmative, intends to say that
these are the locum tenentes (sg. locum tenens, qāʼim maqām, lit.
substitute) of contradiction and the relation of contradiction is
applied to them. The actual contradiction of any thing is its
negation, in that two things that the constituents of one are the
exact negation of the other constitute a contradiction. ‘All men are
animals (kullu nisānin ḥayawānun), which is the universal
affirmative, is the contradiction of ‘All men are not animals’ (kullu
insānin ḥayawānan), and when we say, ‘Some of men are not
animals’ (baʻḍu ʼl-insāni laysa bi-ḥayawānin) is its contradiction,
it is intended to say that contradiction applies to it.

42
Similarly, ‘Nothing of the man is of stone’ (lā shayʼa min ʼl-insāni
bi-ḥajarin), which is the universal negative, is the contradiction of
‘It is not the case that nothing of the man is of stone’ (laysa lā
shayʼa min ʼl-insāni bi-ḥajarin), and when we say, ‘Some
constituents of man are of stone’ is its contradiction, by which we
intend to say that the relation of contradiction applies to it.

Now, we are acquainted with the actual contradiction of any

proposition and we could say that it would be impossible for a
proposition and its contradiction that they be simultaneously
asserted or denied and it is self-evident. Is it acceptable to one who
claims that ‘the principle of contradiction is not impossible’ that
this proposition, along with its contradiction, be both true and/or
false?! In other words, the principle of contradiction is possible
and impossible, or the principle of contradiction is impossible and
possible. It would be better to quote earlier logicians’ view
according to which the law of non-contradiction and the law of
excluded middle constitute the basis of the propositions (umm al-
qaḍāyā) in order to shed further light on the issue.

In reflecting on a proposition, e.g. finitude of the dimensions of

the universe, we encounter one of the following three states:

1. We doubt the finitude or infinitude of the universe, in that

we encounter two propositions: 1. The universe is finite;
2. The universe is infinite. These two propositions, similar
to the dishes of scales, are conceived in balance, wherein
neither of the propositions exceeds in weight, i.e. we think
of two equal possibilities in respect to these two
propositions and this state is termed as doubt (shakk).
2. We assume that one of the two sides exceeds the other in
weight; for instance the possibility of the finitude of the
universe exceeds in weight against the infinitude of the

43
 universe, or vice versa. In this case, the state of preferring
one of the alternatives over the other is termed as opinion
(Arabic and Persian ẓann, Persian gumān).
3. In the third case, one term is totally negated and regarded
as impossible in its entirety, and the mind exclusively and
certainly inclines toward one term, and this state is termed
as certitude (yaqīn).

When we reflect on theoretical problems, as opposed to self-

evident or apodeictic problems, we initially doubt them, but when
we find decisive evidence, we attain certitude, or at least we form
such opinion about them.

For instance, inquired about the expandability of a hard metal like

iron as it is heated, a student may not have a ready answer and
might say, ‘I don’t know.’ He doubts as to the veracity of the
issue, but when he learns the experimental evidence, he will attain
certainty that iron expands as it is heated. Such is the attitude of a
student in dealing with mathematical problems. Accordingly,
attaining certainty about some proposition requires the negation of
the possibility of the opposite term.

Certainty about the assertion of a proposition is incompatible with

asserting the possibility of its opposite. Likewise, forming an
opinion about some proposition requires the negation of the equal
possibility of the opposite and it is incompatible with equal
possibility; nonetheless, it is not incompatible with some unequal
possibility.

Forming a decisive, scientific, and even preferred opinion as to a

problem depends on the fact that our mind already asserted the law
of non-contradiction, otherwise our mind will not be free from
doubts; in other words, there will be no impediment to the
expandability or unexpandability of iron as it is heated, since it

44
may be assumed that they both apply simultaneously.
Accordingly, both terms of the proposition are equal to our mind;
consequently, our mind may never attain certitude, since attaining
certitude is dependent on the decisive inclination of the mind
toward one of the two terms and the total negation of the other
term.

The fact is that the law of non-contradiction and the law of

excluded middle are not open to debate, and reflecting on the
arguments of those who deny them is indicative that in denying it,
they designate something else by this term.

Conversion

Conversion (‘aks) is another relation wherewith any asserted

proposition may have two asserted converses: a simple (mustawī)
converse and a contraposition (naqīḍ).

In simple conversion, the subject and the predicate are

interchanged. For instance when we say, ‘Man is animal’, the
converse of this proposition would be ‘animal is man’. There are
two types of contrapositions: one is that the contraposition of the
subject substitutes the predicate and the predicate is replaced by
the subject, provided that they differ in quantity, i.e. on the
condition that they be different in affirmation and negation.
Accordingly, ‘No animal is no man’ is the contraposition of ‘Man
is animal’.

The examples mentioned for simple conversion and contraposition

were not quantified (maḥṣūrah), since, as mentioned above, a
quantified proposition implies the quantity of the members;
accordingly, it must be preceded by a quantifier (sūr), e.g. ‘any’,
‘all’, and ‘some’, instances of which include: ‘Any man is an
animal’, or ‘Some of animals are men’. We know that valid

45
propositions used in sciences are quantified ones. Now, we must
take into account the quantified propositions in stating the
conditions of simple converses and contrapositions.

The simple converse of a universal particular is a particular

affirmative, and the converse of the simple converse of a particular
affirmative is a particular affirmative. For instance, the simple
converse of ‘Any walnut is round’ is ‘Some round things are
walnuts’ and the simple converse of ‘Some of the round things are
walnuts’ is ‘Some walnuts are round.’

The simple converse of a universal negative is universal negative;

for instance, the simple converse of ‘No wise man is talkative’ is
‘No talkative man is wise’; but there is no converse for particular
negative.

However, a contraposition (naqīḍ), according to the first

definition, resembles a simple converse in terms of affirmation
and negation, but it is dissimilar to a simple converse in terms of
universality and particularity;13 in that the affirmatives here, in
terms of relations, resemble the negatives there, and the negatives
here, in terms of relations, resemble the affirmatives there. The
converse of a universal affirmative and a particular affirmative
there are particular affirmative; the converse of universal negative
and particular negative here are particular negative. We mentioned
above that the converse of universal negative is universal negative,
but here, the converse of universal affirmative is universal
affirmative. We mentioned there that there is no converse for a
particular negative, and similarly, there is no converse for a
particular affirmative here.

13
In other words, when the simple converse of a proposition be affirmative,
the contraposition of it would also be affirmative, and when the simple converse of a
proposition be universal, its contraposition would be affirmative and vice versa.

46
According to the second definition, [simple conversion and
contraposition] differ in terms of affirmation and negation, i.e. the
converse of a universal affirmative is a universal negative, and the
converse of a universal negative is a particular affirmative, and the
converse of a particular negative is a particular affirmative, and
there is no converse for a particular affirmative. Examples are
mentioned here for the sake of brevity.14

14
What has been mentioned so far regarding the classifications and relations
of propositions are applicable to categorical/attributive as well as conditional
propositions. However, the fact that we have so far provided examples from
categorical/attributive propositions should not lead to the passivity of the mind. It is
to be noted in passing that conditional propositions, whether conjunctive or
disjunctive, are governed by a series of particular relations, termed as requirements
of conjunctions and disjunctions (Arabic lawāzim al-muttaṣilāt wa ʼl-munfaṣilāt,
Persian lawāzim-i muttaṣilāt wa munfaṣilāt), but they are not touched upon herein
for brevity’s sake.

47
 10. Syllogism

Discussions on propositions serve as an introduction to syllogism,

as discussions on the five universals served as an introduction to
definiens (muʻarrif). As was mentioned in the opening chapter,
definiens and argument constitute the subject of logic, and it will
be mentioned below that syllogism is the most significant
argument. Accordingly, all logical discussions revolve around
definiens and syllogism.

It was discussed above that philosophers maintain that it is no easy

task and at times impossible to make use of definitions to present
comprehensive and complete definitions, and to use the logical
term, to discover the perfect definitions of definienda;
accordingly, the discussions on definiens are not quite appealing
to logicians. Nonetheless, taking into account that definiens and
argument constitute the subject of logic and the brevity of
discussions on definiens, and considering that syllogism is the
most significant argument, it becomes known that syllogism is the
focal point of logic.

What is a syllogism?

Syllogism is defined as a series of several propositions converted

into one single unit such that asserting one necessitates the
assertion of another.15

Reasoning will be defined in details below in our discussion on the

validity of syllogism, but now we suffice to state that reasoning is
15
Qawlun muʼallafun min qaḍāyā bi-ḥaythu yalzamu ‘an-hu
li-dhātihi qawlun ākharu.

48
a mental operation whereby prior facts and knowledge are used to
obtain a conclusion and convert something unknown into
something known. Our definition of syllogism indicates that it is a
kind of reasoning.

Reasoning includes both conceptions and judgments. In dealing

with judgments, it may have three forms, one of which is
syllogism. Accordingly, reasoning is more general than syllogism.
Further, reasoning is applied to the operations of the mind,
whereas syllogism is applied to the contents of reasoning, i.e. a
series of propositions with specific arrangements and
interrelations.

Categories of Arguments

Arguments (ḥujaj, sg. Arabic ḥujjah, Persian ḥujjat) fall into three
categories, in that our mind may take three courses in proceeding
from a known proposition or some known propositions toward an
unknown proposition:

1. From particular to particular, in better terms, from mutual

exclusion toward mutual exclusion, whereby our mind
takes a horizontal course, i.e. from a certain point to
another point at the same level.
2. From particular to universal, in better terms, from specific
(khāṣṣ) to general (‘āmm), whereby our mind takes an
ascending course, i.e. it proceeds from smaller and lower
to larger and higher or from included (mashmūl) to
including (shāmil).
3. From universal to particular, in better terms, from general
to specific, whereby our mind takes a descending course,
i.e. it proceeds from larger and higher to smaller and more
limited or from including (shāmil) to included (mashmūl).

49
Proceeding from particular to particular and from mutually
exclusive to mutually exclusive is termed as tamthīl by logicians
and qiyās by jurisprudents and uṣūlīs.16 Proceeding from particular
to universal is termed by logicians as induction (istiqrāʼ) and
proceeding from universal to particular is termed by logicians and
philosophers as deduction (qiyās).17

The following points may be derived from what was mentioned

above:

1. Acquisition of knowledge through either direct

observation or observational study whereby the mind
simply receives sense perceptions or the mind operates
through reasoning on the basis of prior acquisitions. Logic
does not deal with the former, but its function is to present
the laws of valid operations of the mind in the process of
reasoning.

16
Logicians use the term tamthīl and jurisprudents and uṣūlīs,
i.e. experts in the principles of jurisprudence, use the term
deduction (qiyās). It is reported that Abū Ḥanīfah made use of
analogy in jurisprudence, i.e. he used logical analogy or tamthīl.
17
A question arises here concerning an assumed fourth
category: proceeding from universal to universal. How should it be
termed? What would be its validity? The answer is that two
universals are either mutually exclusive or equivalent or complete
inclusion or partial inclusion. The first of these four categories falls
into analogy, since, as mentioned earlier, analogy is not specific to
particular; proceeding from particular to particular is termed as
analogy since whereby the mind proceeds from mutual exclusion to
mutual exclusion. Nonetheless, if two universals are instances of
complete inclusion and partial inclusion and the mind proceeds
from specific to general, it falls into the category of induction, but if
it proceeds from general to specific, it is a category of deduction. If
two universals be equivalent, they are instances of deduction, and if
they be instances of partial inclusion, they fall into the category of
analogy.

50
 2. The mind is able to reason validly or invalidly when it has
access to some known facts, in that it is unable to reason,
even to reason invalidly, with access to one known fact. In
deduction, it even deals with more than one known fact.
3. Prior knowledge paves the path for the operations of the
mind and reasoning, even invalid reasoning, when the
acquired knowledge is not purely inconsistent. A new
thought may not emerge from a multitude of knowledge
lacking middle terms.

Accordingly, the necessity of a multitude of knowledge and that of

middle terms pave the path for reasoning, and these two conditions
only enable the mind to reason validly or invalidly.

However, there is a series of further conditions whereby the mind

is enabled to reason validly, in that the mind is able to reason, but
it may reason invalidly and obtain invalid conclusions. It is logic
that expresses these conditions whereby the mind averts invalid
reasoning.18

18
A question arises here: Based on the aforesaid points,
knowledge is acquired through either direct observation or
reasoning, and reasoning falls into analogy, deduction, induction.
What is the role of experiment and into which category does it fall?
The answer is that experiment (tajribah) falls into the category of
deductive reasoning aided by observation, but the deduction formed
therein, as maintained by prominent logicians, is enthymeme
(qiyās-i khafiyy), which is formed by the mind per se, and it will be
treated elsewhere in our discussions. Some later authors have
invalidly classified experiment as a type of induction.

51
 11. Syllogistic Categories

Syllogism basically falls into two categories: conjunctive (iqtirānī)

and hypothetical (istithnāʼī).

It was mentioned above that any syllogism consists of at least two

propositions; i.e. one proposition does not constitute a syllogism,
and that one proposition may never be productive. It was said that
two propositions constitute a syllogism and produce a conclusion
when they are consistent with the conclusion similar to a child
who becomes his parents’ heir and his nucleus emerges out of
them, a conclusion is the heir to its premises. The conclusion is at
times implied by the premises, i.e. each constituent (subject and
predicate in the categorical proposition, and antecedent or
consequence in the conditional proposition) is attested in one of
the premises, and at times the conclusion is to be found in both
premises. In the former case, i.e. when the conclusion is attested in
both premises, it is termed as conjunctive syllogism, but if it is
attested in one of the premises, it is termed as hypothetical
syllogism.

If we say, ‘Iron is metal’ (minor); ‘Any metal expands when

heated’ (major); ‘Therefore, iron expands when heated
(conclusion), we have three propositions: the first two propositions
are the two premises (muqaddamatayn), and the third proposition
is termed as conclusion (natījah). A conclusion, in turn,
constitutes two main constituents: subject and predicate. The
subject and the predicate of a conclusion are termed as minor

52
(aṣghar) and major (akbar) respectively, and each of the two is
attested in one of the two premises.

The premise including the minor is termed as the minor term of

the syllogism and the premise which includes the major is termed
as the major term of the syllogism.

However, when the conclusion is attested in one of the two

premises and it is preceded by a word like ‘if’, ‘any time’, or ‘but’,
it is a hypothetical syllogism. For instance, one may say, ‘If iron
be a metal, it expands as it is heated. But, iron is a metal. Then, it
expands as it is heated.’ The third proposition, which is the
conclusion is attested in the first proposition, and the first premise
is a conditional proposition, and the conclusion of the syllogism is
the consequent of that conditional proposition.

Hypothetical Syllogism

Let us begin our discussion with the hypothetical syllogism. The

first premise of a hypothetical syllogism is always a conditional,
conjunctive or disjunctive, proposition and the second premise is a
hypothesis (istithināʼ, i.e. assertion or negation of an antecedent or
a consequent in a conditional syllogism). A hypothesis, in general
terms, may fall into four types, since it may serve as either the
antecedent or the consequent, and it may be affirmative or
negative. These four forms are the following: 1. Assertion (ithbāt)
of the antecedent (muqaddam); 2. Denial (nafy) of the antecedent;
3. Assertion of the consequent (tālī); 4. Denial of the consequent.19

19
Now let us consider this question: Does a hypothetical
syllogism in any of its forms - i.e. whether with a conjunctive or
disjunctive premise, and whether with a hypothetical antecedent or
a hypothetical consequent, whether asserting or denying the
antecedent or the consequent – leads to a conclusion or it is
concluding (muntij) in some of these forms? The answer is that it is

53
Conjunctive Proposition

As mentioned above, the conclusion is attested in both premises of

a conjunctive syllogism: a premise which includes the minor term
(ṣughrā), and a premise which includes the major term (kubrā).
The two concluding premises may not be inconsistent (ajnabī), as
a middle term (Arabic ḥadd al-mushtarak, ḥadd al-wasaṭ, Persian
ḥadd-i mushtarak, ḥadd-i wasaṭ, i.e. relation, copula) must
necessarily be added to play the major role; in other words, the
middle term connects the minor and the major.

For instance, in this syllogism:

‘Iron is a metal.’

‘A metal expands as it is heated.’

‘Therefore, iron expands as it is heated.’

Metal plays the role of the middle term. The middle term should
be attested in both the minor and the major. Accordingly, the
terms of syllogism are the following: 1. Minor term; 2. Major
term; 3. Middle term.

The middle term, serving as a nexus between the minor and the
major, is attested in both premises and renders them consistent.

A conjunctive syllogism, in terms of the position of the middle

term in the minor and the major, may have four different forms or
figures (ashkāl, sg. shikl), which are termed the Four Figures
(ashkāl al-arbaʻa).

First Figure

concluding in some of the forms, but we cannot elaborate on it for

the sake of brevity.

54
In the first figure, the middle term occurs as the predicate in the
minor and as the subject in the major. ‘Any Muslim believes in the
Qur’an. Any believer in the Qur’an acknowledges the equality of
races, asserted by the Qur’an. Therefore, any Muslim
acknowledges the equality of races’ is an instance of the first
figure, since the middle term (believer) is the predicate in the
minor and the subject in the major. This is the most natural of
conjunctive syllogisms. The conclusion of the first figure is self-
evident; i.e. when the two premises are true and they occur in the
first figure, their conclusion will be evidently true. In other words,
when we assert the two premises and they occur in the first figure,
they will evidently and decisively be concluding. Accordingly,
there would be no need to produce demonstrations for the
conclusiveness of the first figure; in contrast, the conclusiveness
of the other three figures requires demonstration.

Conditions of the First Figure

The first figure, as mentioned above, evidently produces

conclusions, but there are two conditions or requirements to be
met: 1. The minor should be affirmative, rather than negative; 2.
The major should be universal, rather than particular.

‘Man is not a metal. Any metal is expandable as it is heated.’ This

is a non-concluding (or inconsequent, ‘aqīm), rather than a
concluding (or productive or consequent, muwallid) syllogism,
since our syllogism falls into the first figure and the minor is
negative, whereas it should be affirmative. When we say, ‘Man is
an animal. Some animals are ruminant.’ Our syllogism is once
more non-concluding, since it is the first figure and the major is
particular, whereas the major term of the first figure should be
universal.

Second Figure

55
In the second figure, the middle term is the predicate of both
premises, an instance of which is: ‘Any Muslim believes in the
Qur’an. No fire worshipper believes in the Qur’an. Therefore, no
Muslim worships fire.

The second figure is not self-evident, but it may be asserted by

demonstration meeting the conditions which will be enumerated
below, though mention will not be made of the demonstration.

Conditions of the Second Figure

There are two conditions in the second figure: 1. Difference of the

two premises (minor and major) in quality, i.e. assertion and
denial; 2. Universality of major. Nonetheless, our syllogism would
not be concluding when the two premises are affirmative or
negative, or when the major is particular. For instance, ‘Any man
is an animal; any horse is an animal’ is not concluding, since both
premises are affirmative, whereas one should be affirmative and
the other be negative. ‘No man is ruminant; no pigeon is ruminant’
is not concluding, since both premises are negative. ‘Any man is
an animal; some bodies (ajsām) are not animals’ is non-
concluding, since the major term of the proposition is particular,
rather than universal.

Third Figure and Its Conditions

In the third figure the middle term serves as the subject of both
premises; an instance of which is ‘Any man seeks knowledge by
his innate disposition. Any man seeks justice by his innate
disposition. Therefore, some of those who seek knowledge seek
justice as well.’

The conditions governing the third figure are the following: 1.

Affirmativeness of the minor premise; 2. Universality of one of

56
the two premises. Nonetheless, this is a non-concluding syllogism:
‘No man is ruminant; any man is a writer’, since the minor term is
negative. ‘Some men are knowledgeable; some men are just’ is
non-concluding, since both premises are particular, but one of the
two premises should be universal.

Fourth Figure and Its Conditions

In the fourth figure, the middle term is in the subject of the minor
premise and in the predicate of the major premise. This is the most
far-fetched of the figures. This is perhaps for this very low
frequency that this figure is not attested in Aristotle’s Organon,
but it was added later by logicians. The conditions of this figure
are not uniform, i.e. it may occur in any of these two forms: 1.
Both premises are affirmative and the minor term is universal; 2.
Both premises differ in terms of affirmation and negation; one of
the two premises is universal. Since we deal with the principles
and generalities of logic rather than elaborating on logical
syllogisms, we will not touch upon examples which are
concluding and non-concluding syllogisms.20

20
This mnemonic poem is mentioned in some books on logic
to help students memorize the four figures:
When the middle term is the predicate of the minor
And the subject of the major we have the first figure.
When the middle term serves as the predicate of both
[premises], it is the second [figure]; when the middle term serves as
the subject of both premises, it is the third [figure].
The fourth figure is the converse of the first [figure].
awsaṭ agar ḥaml yāft dar bar-i ṣughrā u bāz,
waḍʻ bih kubrā girift shekl-i nakhustīn shumār.
ḥaml bih har du duwwum, waḍʻ bih har du siwwum
rābiʻ-i ashkāl rā ‘aks-i nakhustīn shumār.

57
 12. Validity of Syllogism (1)

Generalities of logic are supposed to deal with the validity of

logic. We discuss the validity of syllogism, since the majority of
doubts about and denials of the validity of logic concern the
validity of syllogism. As a result, having treated syllogisms, we
proceed to discuss the validity of syllogism which concerns the
application of logic and it is usually assumed that a book on logic
should be opened with it.21

Syllogism, as mentioned above, is an operation, but it is an

operation of the mind. It is a specific type of reasoning and the
procession of the mind from the known to the unknown in order to
convert the latter into the former. It goes without saying that
syllogism is not a part of logic, as it is not a part of any other
discipline, since it is an operation rather than knowledge, though it

21
Syllogisms are used in many a discipline. Experimental
sciences are not deprived of syllogism, but according to precise
studies of logicians like Avicenna and Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, a
syllogism is to be found in any experiment (we have dealt with it in
the footnotes of the second volume to Principles of Philosophy,
Uṣūl-i Falsafah). If it is asserted that syllogism is invalid, all
sciences, rather than only those evidently employing it in their
reasoning and argumentation, will lose their validity. It is worthy of
note that in such case, philosophy is the first discipline to lose its
validity, since it is more syllogistic than any other discipline. Logic
will be invalid as well, since: 1. Syllogisms are employed in logical
reasoning and argumentation; 2. The majority of logical laws,
directly or indirectly, concern the quality of syllogism and when
syllogism be invalid, most of logical laws would be stripped of
subject.

58
is an operation of the mind. However, it is discussed as a subject
of logic, since it is a type of argument which constitutes one of the
two subjects of logic. What is a part of logic and is termed as the
gate to syllogism consists of the laws governing syllogism, stating
that a syllogism is supposed to have such and such conditions and
requirements; similar to the human body which is no part of any
discipline, but the scientific problems are related to the human
body which is a part of physiology or medicine.

Two Types of Validity

The validity of logic has been discussed from two viewpoints: 1.

In terms of verity; 2. In terms of practicality. Some have basically
denied the validity of logical laws, but some have stated that logic
is not invalid, but it is useless and it would be equal to know or not
to know logical laws. Those denying the validity of logic maintain
that the advantage mentioned by some scholars for logic, i.e.
serving as a means or instrument for sciences and preserving the
mind from error is not applicable to it and it would be fruitless to
spend time on it.

Many scholars in the Muslim world as well as in Europe have

negated the validity of logic in terms of verity and/or practicality.

There are mystics, theologians, and traditionists who deny its

validity, from among whom mention may be made of Abū Saʻīd
Abū al-Khayr, Sīrāfī, Ibn Taymiyyah, Jalāl al-Dīn Suyūṭī, and
Amīn Astarābādī. Mystics generally maintain that ‘the feet of
those who reason are wooden [i.e. producing unfounded
arguments]. It is reported that Abū Saʻīd Abū al-Khayr negated the
first figure by terming it as a vicious circle (dawr) which was
countered by Avicenna (which will be critiqued below). Although
Sīrāfī is more well-known as a grammarian, but he is a theologian
as well. In his book, al-Imtāʻ wa ʼl-Muʼānasah, Abū Ḥayyān

59
Tawḥīdī reports a scholarly debate on the validity of logic between
Sīrāfī and Mattā ibn Yūnus, the Christian philosopher, in the
presence of Ibn al-Furāt. This report is recounted in Muḥammad
Abū Zahrah’s monograph, Ibn Taymiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah, a
prominent Sunni jurisprudent and traditionist and the main
progenitor of Wahhābism wrote a refutation on logic entitled al-
Radd ‘alā ʼl-Manṭiq.

Jalāl al-Dīn Suyūṭī also penned a refutation of logic and theology

entitled Ṣawn al-Manṭiq wa ʼl-Kalām ‘an al-Manṭiq wa ʼl-Kalām
(Preservation of Rationality and Discourse from Logic and
Theology). Amīn Astarābādī, a prominent Shiʻah scholar, one of
the most prominent Shiʻah Akhbārīs who flourished under the
Ṣaffavids, authored Fawāʼid al-Madaniyyah, whose eleventh and
twelfth chapters are devoted to an elaborate discussion on the
invalidity of logic.

Aristotelian logic has been attacked in Europe as well. Some

maintain that this is as obsolete as Ptolemaic astronomy. However,
experts know that Aristotelian logic, in contrast to Ptolemaic
astronomy, has still its adherents. Its opponents also hold that
some of it is valid. Contrary to the claims of some proponents of
mathematical logic, it is supplementary, complementary, and
parallel to Aristotelian logic, rather than abrogating it. Given that
the critiques of mathematical logicians were not considered by
Aristotle, those who originally commentated on and developed
Aristotelian logic, e.g. Avicenna, had years ago considered those
critiques and rectified the inadequacies.

The most important figures in Europe who critiqued Aristotelian

logic include Francis Bacon (1561-1626), René Descartes (1596-
1650), Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873),
and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970).

60
Before we embark upon suggesting the critiques and the responses
to them, we need to define thinking, whose definition we
deliberately postponed. We need to define them since syllogism is
a type of reasoning and we also mentioned above that the debates
between the proponents and opponents of Aristotelian logic
concern the validity of syllogism and in fact concern the validity
of this type of reasoning. The opponents maintain that this
accurate type of reasoning is invalid and the proponents hold that
syllogistic reasoning is not only valid, but any other type of
reasoning is consciously or unconsciously based on syllogistic
reasoning.

Definition of Thinking

Thinking is one of the most amazing operations of human mind.

The operations of the mind will be enumerated below to shed light
on the process of thinking and also present a specific definition of
it.

1. The first operation of the mind is to be impressed by the

external world. It is through sense perception that the
mind is connected to external objects and thereby collects
some forms of those objects. In this respect, the mind
functions like a camera which reflects the forms on films.
Put the case that we travel to Isfahan for the first time and
visit its historical monuments. Our mind conceives a
series of pictures by observing those monuments. Our
mind is simply passive in this function, i.e. it merely
accepts those depictions.
2. Having collected a series of forms in our memory through
sense perception, our mind is not content with simply
storing the forms, but based on specific occasions, it
retrieves them from its archives. This process is termed as

61
 recollection. It is quite ordered. It is as if the
reminiscences of our mind are intertwined like the links of
a chain. The links emerge sequentially and in
psychological terms, there is some association (tadāʻī).
Such association is reflected in the proverb, one word
leads to another (al-kalāmu yajurru ʼl-kalām). It is the
same as association of ideas and sequence of thoughts.
Accordingly, besides its simply passive impressionability
and collection and preservation, the mind is also engaged
in operations, in that it retrieves or reminisces the
collected forms based on a series of specific laws, as
discussed in psychology. It operates on the collected
forms through association of ideas without significant
changes made to them.
3. Analysis is the third operation of the mind, in that in
addition to the two above said operations, it analyses a
specific form impressed on it from the external world. The
mind decomposes and analyses it, whereas such
decomposition and analysis do not occur in the external
world. There are different forms of analysis. A form may
be at times decomposed into several forms or it may be
decomposed into several meanings. In the former, the
mind decomposes a form into several forms like the
mental decomposition of an organ which is a combination
of constituents and such function is based on the capacity
of the mind and whereby it is connected to other things. In
the latter, the mind decomposes one form into several
meanings; for instance the mind defines ‘line’ as a one-
dimensional continuous quantity, i.e. it decomposes the
quiddity of the line into three constituents: quantity,
continuity, single dimension; nonetheless, these three
constituents do not exist in the external world. The mind

62
 at times composes and there are different types of
composition. One type is to intertwine several forms, like
depicting a horse with a human face. Philosophers deal
with the decomposition, analysis, and composition of
meanings. In contrast, a poet and an artist deal with the
decomposition and composition of forms.
4. Specification (tajrīd) and generalization (taʻmīm).
Another operation of the mind is to specify the particular
and conceived forms received through sense perception,
i.e. it separates or parcels up several things which always
collocate and the mind has received them as a whole. For
instance, it receives a number through some noun
determined by the number (maʻdūd) and along with a
material object, but it later decomposes and parcels up the
number from its determined noun.
Generalization is a more advanced process whereby the
mind converts the particular and receives forms into
universal concepts. For instance, it receives the forms of
specific individuals, like Zayd, ‘Amr, Aḥmad, Ḥasan, and
Maḥmūd, through sense perception, but converts all of
them into man, a general and universal concept.
It goes without saying that the mind never perceives the
universal concept of man through the senses, but having
perceived particular human beings, like Ḥasan, Maḥmūd,
and Aḥmad, it converts all of them into a general and
universal form. Accordingly, in decomposition and
composition as well as in specification and generalization,
the mind makes alterations in sense perceptions, at times
through decomposition and composition, and at times
through specification and generalization.
5. Our main goal lies in the fifth operation of the mind –
thinking and reasoning whereby a series of known things

63
are intertwined in order to discover an unknown thing.
Thinking is actually a type of coupling and procreation of
ideas; in other words, thinking is a type of thought
investment aiming to gain benefits and to increment the
capital. The operation of thinking is a type of composition,
but a generative and concluding one, in contrast to
poetical and wishful compositions which are sterile and
non-concluding
In discussing the validity of syllogism, one should
consider this problem: Is the mind actually able to achieve
a new known thing through the composition of facts and
thereby convert something unknown into something
known, or the only approach to gain knowledge and
convert the unknown into known is to add to its
knowledge through direct relation with the external
world? Is it possible to gain knowledge through
intertwining the knowledge inside the mind?
The different views of experimentalists and sensationalists
on the one hand and those of rationalists and analogists on
the other lie in this point. Experimentalists hold that the
only approach to gaining new knowledge is to connect to
external objects through the senses and the valid method
of investigating the objects is to make use of experiment.
However, rationalists and analogists maintain that
experiment is one of the possible approaches, but new
knowledge may be gained through intertwining the known
facts and also previous knowledge and establishing such
knowledge aiming to gain further knowledge is termed as
definition by essence (ḥadd), deduction (qiyās), and
demonstration (burhān).
Acknowledging the validity of experiment and
recognizing it as one of the six principles of deduction,

64
Aristotelian logic further presents the laws governing
syllogisms which include the employment of the known
for discovering the unknown and converting the unknown
into known. It goes without saying that Aristotelian logic
would be meaningless and fruitless if the approach to the
acquisition of knowledge were restricted to direct contact
with the unknown, and the known may not be employed to
discover the unknown.
We herein decompose and analyse a simple example
which is usually presented as a puzzle to the students so
that it may be clarified that the method through which the
mind at times makes use of the known to unravel some
unknown. Put the case that there are five hats, three of
which are white and two of them are red. Three
individuals are sitting on different steps of a ladder and
the one who is on the third step sees the other two, the one
sitting on the second step only sees the one sitting on the
first step, and the one sitting on the first step does not see
the other two. The first and the second individuals are not
allowed to look behind them. They are blindfolded when
one of the hats is put on the head of each of them and the
other two hats are concealed. Then, the blindfolds are
removed and each of them is inquired about the colour of
the hat that he is wearing. The one on the third step,
having looked at the hats of the other two, thinks for a
while and says, ‘I don’t know.’ The one sitting on the
second step, having looked at the hat of the one sitting on
the first step discovers the colour of his own hat and says
that he is wearing a white hat. The one sitting on the first
step immediately says, ‘My hat is red.’
Now, we may inquire about the methods of the first two
individuals who discovered the colours of their hats

65
without seeing them. Did they use any type of reasoning
other than deduction? Why was the third individual unable
to discover the colour of his hat?
The answer to the last question is that the colours of the
hats of the first and the second individuals did not provide
him with any evidence, since one was white and other was
red. Besides those two hats there were three other hats one
of which was red and two were white and his hat could be
either white or red. Therefore, he said that he did not
know. He could discover the colour of his hat only if the
hats of the other two were both red. In that case, he could
say that his hat was white, since he saw that the other two
individuals were wearing red hats, and since he knew that
there were only two red hats, he could discover that his
hat was white. However, since the other two wore red and
white hats, he was unable to discover the colour of his
own hat. The second individual, having heard that the
third one said that he did not know, discovered that the
first one and himself were not wearing red hats, unless the
third one would not have said that he did not know, but
could discover the colour of his hat. Accordingly, his own
hat and that of the first one should be white or one of them
should wear white and the other red. Since he saw that the
first individual’s hat was red, he discovered that his hat
was white; i.e. he discovered, from the fact that none of
the hats were red (based on what the third one had said)
and that the first one was wearing a red hat discovered that
his own hat was white.
The first one succeeded in discovering that he was
wearing a red hat, since he learned from the third one that
his hat and that of the second one were not both red, and
he learned from what the second individual had said that

66
he was wearing a white hat that his hat could not be white,
since if it were white, the second individual could not
have succeeded in discovering the colour of his own hat,
and it was by knowing those two facts that he discovered
the colour of his hat which was red.
This is a student game, but it is a good example for the
operations of the mind whereby without the aid of
observation, it discovers something unknown simply
through deduction and analysis. The mind, in such
instances, forms a syllogism and attains to a conclusion. If
one reflects on the point, he will perceive that the mind, in
such instances, does not only deduce, but it forms various
syllogism; nonetheless, the mind forms them and comes to
a conclusion so instantaneously that one does not notice
the numerous mental operations. It is useful to know the
logical laws governing syllogisms in that man knows the
valid methods of employing analogies and averts
numerous pitfalls.
The analogies formed by the second individual in
discovering the colour of his hat are the following: If the
colour of my hat and that of the first person were both red,
the third person would not have said that he did not know.
Nonetheless, he said that he did not know, so my hat and
that of the first person are not red (it is a hypothetical
syllogism and its conclusion so far is that the hats of the
first and the second persons are not red).
Now that my hat and that of the first one is not red, they
are either white or one is white and the other is red, but
they are not both white, since we notice that the first
person’s hat is red, so one is white and the other is red.
My hat is either white and that of the first person is red, or
the first person’s hat is white and mine is red.

67
Nonetheless, the first person’s hat is red; therefore, my hat
is white.
The abstract deduction of the first person are the
following: If my hat as well as the second person’s hat
were both red, the third person would not have said that he
did not know. Therefore, my hat and that of the second
person are not both red (hypothetical syllogism).
Now that they are not red, they are either white or one is
white and the other red. However, they are not both white,
since if both were white, the second person would have
been unable to discover that his hat was white. Therefore,
one hat is red and the other is white (another hypothetical
syllogism).
Now that one is white and the other red, either my hat is
white and that of the second person is red, or the second
person’s hat is white and mine is red. However, if my hat
were white, the second person would not have been able
to discover that his hat was red. Therefore, my hat is not
white, but red.
Observation lies in one of the premises of one of the three
syllogisms used by the second person, but it is not
employed in any of the syllogisms formed by the first
person.

68
 13. Validity of Syllogism (2)

Practicality or Impracticality of Logic

As was mentioned above, the validity of Aristotelian logic and/or

its practically have been denied by some people. Let us first touch
upon the practically of logic. Such critiques are as the following:

1. If [Aristotelian] logic were practical, the scholars and

philosophers equipped with it would not have erred nor
would have they been in disagreement; however, we
notice that they have made numerous errors and they have
held contrary and contradictory views.

The response to this critique is that firstly logic only

clarifies the validity of the forms and figures of syllogism.
Human error may arise from the materials constituting the
propositions and such materials may be valid, but the
form, arrangement, and structure of reasoning may be
erroneous.

Logic, as reflected in its definition which was mentioned

above, safeguards the validity of reasoning from the latter
view. However, in terms of the former view, there exists
no law or principle to safeguard the validity of reasoning,
which may only be guaranteed by the attention and
precision of the reasoning person. For instance, certain
syllogisms may be formed on the basis of perceptual
and/or experimental propositions, but those experiments

69
 and/or perceptions might be faulty and unreliable and their
unreliability may be asserted. Aristotelian logic which is
termed as formal logic on this account is not responsible
for such unreliability, but it is responsible for presenting a
valid form of such propositions that disarrangement and
confusion may not lead to error.

Second, simply being equipped with logic is insufficient

for preservation from invalid syllogistic forms. It is the
precise application of formal logic that may avert error.
Similarly, it is insufficient to be equipped with medical
knowledge, but one has to apply it to maintain health or
cure some ailment. The errors committed by scholars
equipped with logic arise from haste and negligence in the
application of logical laws.

2. It is said that logic is the instrument of sciences, but

Aristotelian logic is not a good instrument at all; i.e.
equipment with logic does not lead to gaining further
knowledge and Aristotelian logic may not reveal to us the
secrets of nature. The only real instruments which may
assist us in making new discoveries are experiment,
induction, and direct observation of nature, rather than
logic and syllogism. It was in the new era when
Aristotelian logic was rejected as an impractical
instrument that the inductive and experimental methods
led to successive and amazing achievements.

These critiques actually suffer from instances of fallacious

reasoning. Such critics have assumed or pretended to
assume that logic is the instrument of sciences and their
acquisition, i.e. the function of logic, is to provide us with
facts and sciences and it serves like an axe for a wood

70
chopper who collects materials; whereas logic is simply
an instrument of assessment in that it draws a distinction
between valid and invalid forms and figures of reasoning
rather than as material used in reasoning, hence its
likening to a plumb-line and a level wherewith a mason
measures the verticality and depth of a wall. These
instruments are neither used as those of collecting
construction materials, e.g. bricks, soil, lime, and cement,
nor as a means of assessing the quality of such materials.

Syllogism, logical deduction, and induction serve as

means of the acquisition of thought material, but, as
mentioned above, these are not parts of logic. Logic
simply provides us with the laws governing them and
asserts their validity.

It may be said that those who deny Aristotelian logic as a

means of acquiring knowledge aim to deny the validity of
syllogism, but, as mentioned above, if logical problems be
the laws governing syllogism and although Aristotelian
logic is the instrument of assessment, rather than
acquisition, but syllogism is the instrument of assessment
and recognizes syllogism as the only instrument of the
acquisition of sciences; syllogism, as will be discussed
below, is by no means efficient in the acquisition of
modern science. Experiment and induction constitute the
only instrument of the acquisition of knowledge.

This is the best justification for the denial of logic, but as

it was mentioned above, Aristotelian logic recognizes
deduction as one of the instruments, rather than the only
instrument, of the acquisition of sciences. Further, as
mentioned above and will be discussed below, syllogism

71
 is indubitably the instrument of the acquisition of
knowledge.

Analogists maintain that the value of deduction lies in its

determining validity, in that it draws new conclusions and
determines their validity.

The validity of logical deduction lies in opinions, but a

perfect induction leads to certainty, but if it be imperfect,
its validity would be based on opinions. Nonetheless, the
validity of experiment, which is frequently confused with
induction, is certain. Any experiment involves some
deduction. Experiment emerges out of premises of evident
(jalī) syllogism which includes concealed (khafī)
syllogism. As mentioned by Avicenna in his Shifāʼ,22
experiment is a composition of sense perception, direct
observation, and the reasoning operation which is
deductive rather than inductive or analogical. Despite
mathematical logicians’ claim, there is no other category.

The validity of experiment is by no means denied in

Aristotelian logic. Experiment, which involves a kind of
deduction, although it is not a part of logic like deduction,
but validity of experiment forms the basis of Aristotelian
logic and constitutes one of the six principles of
demonstration.23

Modern scholars’ achievements did not arise from their

repudiation of Aristotelian logic, but from valid selection
of induction, rather than deduction, as well as the

22
See the section on demonstration (burhān) of Manṭiq al-
Shifāʼ, Egypt, p. 223.
23
See the section on demonstration in Manṭiq al-Shifāʼ, pp.
95-97, 223, 331.

72
 experimental method, which is a composition of pure
deduction, induction, and sensationalism, in discovering
nature. Former scholars’ discovery of nature, similar to
their treatment of metaphysical problems, was impeded by
their method of pure deduction. Neither former scholars
rejected induction and experiment in their adherence to
Aristotelian logic, nor later scholars refuted Aristotelian
logic, since it does not recognize deduction as the only
valid method to be applied to all the sciences so that
turning to induction and experiment be considered as
rejecting Aristotelian logic.24
3. Aristotelian logic accords particular significance to
syllogism which consists of two premises; for instance,
conjunctive syllogism, consisting of a minor and a major
syllogism, is not fruitful per se, since when the premises
of syllogism are known, the conclusion is self-evident, but
when the premises are unknown, the conclusion is

24
It is to be noted in passing that turning toward experiment
and turning away from the fetters of deduction began centuries ago
by Muslims, and European scholars continued this approach. Roger
Bacon, one of the forerunners of experimentalism who adopted that
approach three or four centuries before Francis Bacon, had
acknowledged his debt to his Muslim Andalusian teachers. The
other point is that when modern scholars turned toward the
experimental method for the first time went from one extreme to the
other, assuming that induction and experiment were the only means
of acquiring knowledge and thereby totally rejected the deductive
method. However, it became obvious after the passage of two to
three centuries that deduction, induction, and experiment (which
were in the Avicennan terms a composition of those two) were each
fruitful and necessary in their own right, and the significance should
be accorded to knowing their applications. Accordingly,
methodology, a quite fruitful discipline, came into being which
clarifies the applications of each of those methods, though this
discipline is still in its initial stages of development.

73
 unknown as well. Thus, what is the application of
syllogism?
The response to this question is that the mere evidence of
the premises is not adequate to know the conclusion. The
conclusion becomes known when the premises are
conjunctive. Conjunction leads to conclusion, like
procreation without which no child may be born. The
point is that validly applied, a conjunction will lead to a
valid conclusion, and it is the function of logic to draw a
distinction between valid and invalid conjunctions.
4. Valid premises may only lead to valid conclusions, and
logic may not affect the rectification of errors, since the
validity of conclusions only lies in the application of valid
premises.
The response is that premises may be purely valid, but the
conclusions may be invalid owing to the application of
invalid figures and conjunctions. These errors may be
rectified by logic. This counterargument, like the previous
one, arises from not considering the role of proper forms,
figures, and structures in drawing valid conclusions. The
third and fourth counterarguments were suggested by
Descartes.25
5. Logic may at best impede the errors of the mind affecting
the form of syllogism, but it lacks any laws to impede the
penetration of error in the material of syllogism.
Accordingly, logic may assure us of the validity of the
form of syllogism, but it is unable to make us certain as to
the material of syllogism. Thus, error may find its way
into syllogism, hence the impracticality of logic. It would
be like closing, in winter, only one door of a house with

25
Furūghī, Muḥammad ‘Alī, Siyr-i Ḥikmat dar Urūpā
(History of Western Philosophy), vol. 1, pp. 138, 163.

74
two doors. It is evident that cold comes in from the open
door and closing one door is insufficient to keep the cold
out of the house. This counterargument was suggested by
Sīrāfī, the grammarian and theologian, in his debate with
Matā ibn Yūnus, and a good exposition of it is to be found
in Amīn Astarābādī’s Fawāʼid al-Madaniyyah.
The response is that impeding the penetration of error in
the form of syllogism is a relative use. The occurrence of
error in the material of syllogism, which may not be
safeguarded through logical laws, may be impeded by
sufficient precaution and consideration supported by the
application of logical laws in the form of syllogisms.
Likening the penetration of error through material and
form to that of cold from two doors is a fallacious
statement per se, since cold may find its way into the
house from each of the doors and make the house nearly
as cold as outdoors and closing one of the doors would be
in vain; nonetheless, it is impossible for the errors of the
form to penetrate through material or vice versa.
Accordingly, granted that we are not able to safeguard
syllogism from material errors, we will be able to
safeguard them from formal errors and thus gain some
relative advantage.

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 14. Validity of Syllogism (3)

The counterarguments against the practicality of Aristotelian logic

were discussed above. Now, we discuss the arguments against its
validity in order. However, it is to be noted herein that students
must be acquainted with nearly all those arguments, but we have
to be content with responses to some of them, since further
responses would require some acquaintance with philosophy.

1. The validity of logic is dependent on the validity of

syllogism, since they embody the laws governing valid
syllogisms. The majority of syllogisms are conjunctive
which have four figures. The first figure is the main one,
since other three figures are dependent on it. The first
figure which is the main pillar of logic is a vicious circle
and fallacious. Thus, logic is basically invalid.

It is argued that when in the first figure we say, for

instance:

Any man is an animal (minor); any animal is corporeal

(major); therefore, man is corporeal (conclusion). The
proposition ‘Any man is corporeal’ is the conclusion of
the other two propositions, and our knowledge of it will be
dependent on knowing the two premises, i.e. the major
and the minor. In other words, knowledge of the
conclusion depends on that of the major. On the other
hand, the major, since it is a universal proposition, will be
known to us when we know its particulars. Accordingly,

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knowledge of the proposition, ‘Any animal is corporeal’
depends on knowledge of animal species, including man,
wherewith we may know that they are animals. Thus,
knowing the major, i.e. any animal is corporeal, depends
on knowing a conclusion whose knowledge is dependent
on the knowledge of the major, knowing which is
dependent on knowing the conclusion. This is a vicious
circle.

According to the book Nāmah-yi Dānishwarān, Abū Saʻīd

Abū al-Khayr used this counterargument in his debate
with Avicenna to which the latter responded. Since,
Avicenna’s response is too concise and may not be
intelligible to some readers, we present an exposition of it
and then quote his response. Our response is that first, this
line of reasoning is the syllogism of the first figure which
in short is as follows:

The first figure is a vicious circle.

Vicious circles are fallacious.

The first figure is fallacious.

On the other hand, since the first figure is fallacious,

according to the syllogism ‘Any syllogism based on
falsity is false’, all other syllogistic figures depending on
the first figure are false as well. We notice here that Abū
Saʻīd’s counterargument against the validity of the first
figure is a syllogism of the first figure. Granted that the
first figure is false, Abū Saʻīd’s argument which is based
on the first figure would be false. He intended to apply the
first figure to counter the first figure and it is a proof by
reductio ad absurdum (khulf).

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Second, we should analyse the argument that knowledge
of the major is dependent on that of its particulars. If it is
intended that knowledge of the major depends on detailed
knowledge of its particulars, i.e. one has to first apply
induction to individual particulars to gain knowledge of a
universal, such argument is unfounded, since gaining
knowledge of a universal is not restricted to the
application of induction to particulars; since we have
knowledge of some universals without prior experiment
and induction, instances of which include our knowledge
of the impossibility of a vicious circle. Further, we gain
knowledge of universals through the experiments of few
individuals as to particulars and there is no need to
experiment further instances, instance of which include a
physician’s knowledge of the properties of medicine and
his patients’ complications. When some universal is
known through experimentation of few instances, it may
be generalized to further instances through a syllogism.

Nonetheless, if it is intended that knowledge of the major

is some general knowledge of all the particulars including
the conclusion, i.e. knowledge of the conclusion is
embedded in the knowledge of the major, this argument is
valid, but what is intended in the conclusion for which a
syllogism is formed is detailed knowledge of the
conclusion rather than simply non-detailed and partial
knowledge. Accordingly, gaining detailed knowledge of
the conclusion in any syllogism is dependent on non-
detailed and partial knowledge of the conclusion as
embedded in the major, and this is not a vicious circle,
since these are two types of knowledge. Avicenna’s
response to Abū Saʻīd is that knowledge of the conclusion
embedded in the conclusion is detailed and knowledge of

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 the conclusion as embedded in the major is non-detailed
and partial.

2. Any syllogism is either the reiteration of some known

thing or is an instance of petitio principii (begging the
question, Arabic muṣādarah bi-ʼl-maṭlūb, Persian
muṣādirih bih maṭlūb), since the syllogism says, ‘Any
man is an animal; any animal is corporeal; therefore, any
man is corporeal; or it may be embedded in the major, any
animal is corporeal, whence we either know that man is an
animal species and corporeal or we do not know. When
the conclusion is included in the major and it is reiterated
in the conclusion, it does not embody anything new. If it is
unknown, then we have regarded something unknown as
some argument to substantiate it and it is embodied in the
major and it is petitio principii, i.e. an unknown thing
serves as a proof for itself.
This counterargument was suggested by John Stuart Mill
(1806-1873).26
This argument embodies nothing new and it shares the
contents of Abū Saʻīd Abū al-Khayr’s criticism, according
to which knowledge of the major depends on the
knowledge of conclusion through induction.
The response to this criticism was mentioned above. It is
inquiring, ‘Is the conclusion embodied in the major known
or unknown?’ As Avicenna responded to Abū Saʻīd, the
conclusion is partially known and elaborately unknown;

26
Al-Nashshār, ‘Alī Sāmī, al-Manṭiq al-Ṣūrī, pp. 21-22;
Furūghī, Muḥammad ‘Alī, Siyr-i Ḥikmat dar Urūpā, vol. 3, the
biography and philosophy of Stuart Mill; Khwānārī, Muḥammad,
Manṭiq-i Ṣūrī, vol. 2, p. 183.

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 therefore, there would be a reiteration of the known, nor
petitio principii.
3. Aristotelian logic is deductive and in deduction the mind
descends at all times, in that the mind proceeds from the
universal to the particular. It was formerly believed that
the mind initially understands the universals and it is
through the universals that it understands the particulars;
however, recent studies demonstrate that it is vice versa,
i.e. the mind ascends from the particular to the universal.
Nonetheless, the deductive method is rejected in recent
psychological studies on the mind and its operations. In
other words, deductive reasoning is unfounded and
induction is the only valid method of reasoning.
This critique is the scientific exposition of the criticisms
mentioned above. The response is that it is by no means
accurate to restrict the procession of the mind to its
descending course, since, first, as frequently mentioned
above, experiment and scientific conclusion derived from
experimental material demonstrates that the mind
proceeds in ascending as well as descending courses, since
it is through conducting several experiments of a general
law that the mind makes inferences and thereby proceeds
in an ascending course and deductively generalizes that
universal law in further instances in its proceeding in its
descending and deductive course.
Further, all the decisive laws of human mind are not based
on experiment and sense perception. Mental judgements
as to ‘A vicious circle is false’ or ‘One body may not be
present simultaneously in two different places’ and tens of
other similar judgements as to necessity or negation may
not be based on sense perception, induction, or
experiment.

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 How amazing! The argument ‘Deduction is proceeding
from the universal to the particular and the procession
from the universal to the particular is false and
impossible’ is a deductive argument per se and it moves in
a descending course. How may one employ deduction,
which is assumed by him to be false, to reject deduction?!
If deduction is false, this deduction is also false.
Accordingly, there is no argument to substantiate the
falsity of deduction.
4. It is assumed in Aristotelian logic that the relation
between two things in a proposition is in the form of
subsumption (indirāj). Therefore, deduction is restricted
to hypothetical and conjunctive and the latter is restricted
to the four figures, whereas there exist other relations
other than subsumption – equality, majority, and minority
which are applied in mathematics. For instance, it is said,
‘Angle A is equal to angle B; angle B is equal to angle C;
therefore, angle A is equal to angle C.’ This syllogism
does not fall into any of the four figures, since the middle
term is not repeated. In the second proposition, the
predicate is the concept of equality and in the second
proposition, the subject is the angle, rather than equality,
and this proposition is concluding. This criticism is
suggested by mathematical logicians in modern times like
Russell.
The response is that this syllogism is known by logicians,
at least by Muslim logicians, who term it as syllogism of
equipollence (Arabic qiyās al-musāwāh, Persian qiyās-i
musāwāt). They maintain that it consists of several
conjunctive syllogisms whose relations are subsumptive
(indirājī). For further details, books on logic, e.g.
Avicenna’s Ishārāt, may be consulted.

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5. This logic is formally inadequate, since no distinction is
drawn therein between affirmative [and negative]
categorical propositions [e.g.] ‘Any man has a heart’
whose deep structure is: ‘If something comes into
existence and happens to be human, it should necessarily
possess a heart.’ Such failure to distinguish between the
two has led to colossal metaphysical errors.
The response is that Muslim logicians focus on this issue,
make such distinctions, and accordingly specify the
requirements of syllogism. These discussions fall beyond
the scope of our book.
6. Aristotelian logic is based on concepts and universals of
the mind, whereas universal concepts are not real and
concepts of the mind are particular, and universal is but a
meaningless term. This criticism is suggested by Stuart
Mill and this theory is known as nominalism. The
response is convincingly provided by philosophy.
7. Based on ipseity (Arabic huwiyyah, Persian huwiyyat),
Aristotelian logic considers that anything is itself at all
times, hence the fixity and invariability of concepts in this
logical system. Nonetheless, motion, the law governing
realities and concepts, is the alteration of something into
something else and this logical system is not in accord
with reality. The only valid logic is the one that inspires
motion into concepts and averts the principle of ipseity
and that is dialectic logic. This criticism is suggested by
the proponents of Hegelian logic, particularly those of
dialectic materialism. Discussions on these logical schools
are to be found in both volumes of our Uṣūl-i Falsafah
(Principles of Philosophy). Discussing this criticism is
also beyond the scope of our book.

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8. Aristotelian logic is based on the law of non-contradiction,
whereas the law of contradiction is the most significant
law governing the mind and reality. This argument is
countered in both volumes of our Uṣūl-i Falsafah
(Principles of Philosophy). The law of non-contradiction
was also discussed above in section 8. Relation between
Propositions. It will be discussed below in Generalities of
Philosophy.

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 15. The Five Arts

The materials of syllogisms were frequently discussed above. For

instance in the syllogism ‘Socrates is a man; any man is mortal;
therefore, Socrates is mortal’ the two minor and major
propositions constitute the material of syllogism; however, these
two propositions have a specific form here in that first, the middle
term is repeated; second, the middle term is the predicate in the
minor and subject in the major; third, the minor is affirmative;
fourth, the major is universal. These qualities have accorded a
specific form to these two propositions and the form of syllogism
consists of these two.

In terms of applicability, syllogisms fall into five categories which

involve their material rather than their forms. Syllogistic reasoning
aims at different goals which are commensurate with the five
categories. One of the goals is certitude, in that something
unknown becomes known and thereby some truth may be
discovered. This is the aim of forming such syllogisms in
philosophy and sciences. However, the materials used in such
syllogisms should be indubitable and arrive at certitude.

Nonetheless, syllogisms may aim at convincing the addressees in

which cases there would be no need to make use of certain
materials, but it would be adequate to use what is asserted by the
person who forms the syllogisms, even if the material be not
certain

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Syllogisms at times aim to persuade the addressee to do or not to
do something; in which case it would be sufficient to make use of
opinions and non-decisive material. When we intend to prevent
somebody from committing some vice, we express the risks
involved in committing them.

Syllogisms may simply aim at depicting something in an

appealing or repellent manner in the addressee’s mirror of
imagination; in which case the line of reasoning is adorned with
agreeable or disagreeable attire.

Finally, syllogisms may aim to lead the addressee astray; in which

case, a certain or asserted thing is substituted with something
uncertain or some opinion.

Accordingly, syllogisms aim at discovering the truth, or

subjugating the addressee and impeding his reasoning, or
persuading him to do or not to do something, or simply playing
with his imagination and sentiments to make something
disagreeable appealing to his imagination, or simply leading him
astray.

In terms of these goals, syllogisms are inductively restricted to

these five categories and the materials are different in terms of
meeting these goals.

1. Demonstration (burhān) is applied to a syllogism that

leads to the discovery of some truth. The material of such
syllogism may consist of: sense perceptions, e.g. ‘The sun
is a shining body’; empirical data, e.g. ‘Penicillin destroys
the focal point of infection’; self-evident data, e.g. ‘Two
things equal to a third object are equal themselves.’ There
are certain propositions, but there is no need to touch upon
them herein.

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2. A subjugating syllogism should consist of materials
asserted by the addressee, whether of certitude or not, be
acceptable or not. This type of syllogism is called dialectic
(jadal); for instance, somebody asserts the words of a
philosopher or jurisprudent and by making references to
that authority’ words, somebody is overcome in debate,
even if we do not acknowledge those words. Dialectic
syllogism may be illustrated by numerous examples, but
we suffice to relate an anecdote.

There was a debate, in a meeting convened by al-Maʼmūn,

the ‘Abbāsid Caliph, which was attended by scholars from
different religions and denominations, between Imam
Riḍā, representing Muslims, and a Christian scholar about
the godhead or servanthood of Jesus. The latter believed
in the godhead of Jesus. Imam Riḍā said, ‘Jesus Christ
excelled in all nobilities but he, in contrast to other
prophets, was not interested in worshipping God!’ The
Christian scholar said, ‘It is surprising to hear such words
from you. He excelled all people in worshipping God.’ As
soon as he confessed to Jesus’ devotion to God, the Imam
asked, ‘Whom did he worship? Is his worshipping God
not a proof for his being a servant of God? Do you not
assert servanthood as a proof against godhead?’ Thus, he
made use of what had been asserted by the Christian
scholar [as well as him] to overcome him in debate.

3. Rhetoric (khiṭābah) is a type of syllogism whereby the

addressee is persuaded and it leads to assertion, even if
that assertion be based on opinion (ẓannī). Such syllogism
persuades the addressee to do or not to do something. The
material of rhetoric should lead the addressee to form

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 some opinion; for instance, ‘A liar is publicly disgraced’;
‘A coward is deprived and unsuccessful.’
4. Poetry implies a syllogism aiming at simply adorning [the
object] with beautiful and imaginary adornments. Similes
and metaphors embody all the poetical devices. Poetry is
directly related to imagination and since conceptions and
sentiments are intertwined, i.e. any conception awakens
the sentiments and whereby poetry controls sentiments
and may thus lead one to perform amazing things or it
may prevent one from doing them.
The best example would be Rūdakī’s (d. 329/940) poem
addressed to the Sāmānid ruler encouraging him to return
to Bukhārā:
O Bukhārā! Be happy and live happily!
The king is coming toward you as a guest.
The king is a cypress and Bukhārā is a garden,
The cypress is going toward the garden.
The king is the moon and Bukhārā is the sky,
The moon is going toward the sky.

5. Sophistry or fallacy is applied to syllogisms aiming at

leading the addressee astray. Acquaintance with fallacy
resembles knowing harmful microbes, blights, and
poisons wherewith one may keep away from them or be
not deceived by one attempting to poison him, or be able
to cure the poisoned. Knowledge of fallacies may help us
to be not lured by fallacies or be able to save others from
being lured into asserting them.

Thirteen categories of fallacies are enumerated by

logicians, but we should be content here with a reference
to few of them.

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Fallacies are either verbal (lafẓī) or material (maʻnawī).
The former arises from the form of syllogism, in that a
homonym (mushtarak-i lafẓī) with two different senses
serve as the middle term, bearing a sense in the minor and
bearing another in the major; accordingly, the form, rather
than the meaning, is reiterated and the conclusion arrived
at will be necessarily invalid.

For instance, the word ‘bear’ denotes ‘a large animal with

thick fur that feeds on flesh, fruit, and insects’ and it also
connotes ‘a rude and bad tempered person.’ Now, if
someone says, ‘A bear is an animal. A bad tempered
person is a like a bear. Bears are bad tempered.’ This is an
instance of verbal fallacy.

When we metaphorically say that such and such a person

is as strong as an elephant, this is another fallacious
proposition: ‘Zayd is an elephant; an elephant has tusks;
Therefore, Zayd has tusks.’ This is material fallacy which
is concerned with the formal, rather than material aspect.
Another instance is the counterargument against the
validity of syllogism quoted above from Descartes and
others, according to which, when the premises of a
syllogism are known, the conclusion is known as well and
there would be no need for a syllogism; but if the premises
are unknown, they may not become known by syllogism,
hence its impracticality.

The fallacy lies in saying, ‘If the premises be known, the

conclusion would be known per se’, but the fact is when
the premises are known the conclusion may not
necessarily be known as well. Conjunction of premises
may lead to arriving at a conclusion and the conjunction

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should be governed by logical laws. Accordingly, this
type of fallacy emerges from the substitution of some
valid material with invalid material in a syllogism. It is
important to know different types of fallacies. It may be
stated that philosophers’ statements abound in fallacious
syllogisms, hence the significance to distinguish different
types of fallacies and their application to instances of
fallacious syllogisms.

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