CONTENTS

List of Figures page x

Foreword xi
Preface xiii
Acknowledgements xiv
Acronyms and abbreviations xv

1 Introduction 1
1.1 The purposes of customs valuation 1
1.1.1 What is customs valuation? 1
1.1.2 The importance of customs valuation 2
1.2 History 4
1.2.1 Before common valuation rules 5
(a) Brussels Definition of Value 6
(b) Positive value systems 6
(c) Early GATT initiatives on common valuation rules 7
(d) Precursor to an agreement 10
1.2.2 Tokyo Round negotiations 14
1.2.3 Uruguay Round negotiations 16
(a) Burden of proof 18
(b) Sole agents and minimum values 19
(c) A “single undertaking” 20
(d) Dispute settlement 21
1.3 Agreement overview 22
1.3.1 The WTO standard – transaction value 22
1.3.2 Structure of the Agreement 22
1.3.3 Primacy of transaction value 24
1.3.4 Alternative methods of value 24
1.3.5 Limits of the Agreement 25

2 Transaction value method 27

2.1 Definition 27
2.1.1 “The price actually paid or payable …” 27
(a) Deriving a “price” 30
(b) Direct and indirect payments 31
2.1.2 “… for the goods …” 32
(a) Interest payments 32
(b) Dividend payments 33
(c) Payments for post-importation services and costs 34

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(d) Advertising and marketing costs 34

(e) Software 35
(f) Payments for damaged goods/goods not in
accordance with contract 37
2.1.3 “… when sold for export …” 39
2.1.4 “… adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Article 8” 40
2.2 Required additions to price 41
2.2.1 General considerations 41
2.2.2 Commissions and Brokerage 44
(a) Buyer’s agent – typical duties 44
(b) Seller’s agent – typical duties 44
2.2.3 Containers and packing 46
2.2.4 Assists 48
(a) General principles 48
(b) Assists – categories and conditions 49
(c) Assists – valuation and apportionment 52
(d) Royalties and license fees 54
2.2.5 Proceeds 58
2.2.6 International transport costs 60
2.2.7 No other additions 62
2.3 When transaction value cannot be used 63
2.3.1 Restrictions on distribution and use of goods 65
2.3.2 Price subject to condition 68
2.3.3 Proceeds 70
2.3.4 Related-party transactions 71
(a) Definition of related parties 72
(b) Related parties – tests 78
(c) Transfer pricing and customs valuation 84
2.4 Answer key 87
Test your knowledge – can transaction value be used? 87
Test your knowledge – should these payments be included in
transaction value? 88
Two questions for experts 88
Test your knowledge – “objective and quantifiable evidence” 90
Test your knowledge – apportionment of assists 91
Test your knowledge – royalties and license fees 91
Test your knowledge – proceeds 92
Test your knowledge – transport charges 92
Test your knowledge – do these sales restrictions prevent use of
transaction value? 93
Test your knowledge – circumstances of sale 93

3 Alternative valuation methods 94

3.1 Transaction value of identical or similar goods 94
3.1.1 The valuation principle 94
When are Articles 2 and 3 applied? 95

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3.1.2 What are identical and similar goods? 96

3.1.3 Other conditions 100
(a) Identical or similar goods must have been “exported at
or about the same time” 100
(b) Identical or similar goods should be made by
same producer 101
(c) Identical or similar goods should be sales at the same
level of trade 101
(d) Adjustments for transport charges 102
(e) Goods incorporating design/engineering assists are not
identical or similar 103
(f) Test your knowledge – identify identical
or similar goods 104
3.1.4 Implementation challenges 106
3.2 Deductive value method 108
3.2.1 Importer’s option – bypass deductive value 109
3.2.2 Deductive value conditions 109
3.2.3 The deductive value calculation 111
3.2.4 Deduction for commissions or profit/general expense 112
3.2.5 Deduction for costs of transport in country of importation 114
3.2.6 Deduction for international transport charges 114
3.2.7 Deduction for customs duties and national taxes 114
3.2.8 Superdeductive value – goods processed after importation 115
3.3 Computed value method 116
3.3.1 The concept 116
3.3.2 The cost or value of materials and processing 118
3.3.3 An amount for profit and general expenses 120
3.3.4 The (actual) costs of international transport 122
3.4 Fall-back method 122
3.4.1 The valuation principle 122
3.4.2 Prohibited valuation methods 126
(a) The selling price in the country of importation of goods
domestically produced 126
(b) A system which provides for the acceptance for customs
purposes of the higher of two alternative values 126
(c) Price of goods on the domestic market of the country of
exportation 126
(d) Cost of production other than computed values which
have been determined for identical or similar goods in
accordance with the provisions of Article 6
(computed value) 127
(e) The price of goods for export to a country other than
the country of importation 127
(f) Minimum customs values 127
(g) Arbitrary or fictitious values 127
3.4.3 Article 7 and valuation of used goods 128

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3.5 Answer key 132

Test your knowledge – identify identical or similar goods 132
Test your knowledge – identifying the relevant unit sale price 133
Case study – valuation of used cars under Article 7 134

4 Implementation and operation 135

4.1 Currency conversion 135
4.2 Importer procedural rights 136
4.2.1 Protection of confidential information 136
4.2.2 Right of appeal 137
4.2.3 Right to explanation 138
4.2.4 Publication of laws and decisions 139
4.2.5 Release under guarantee 140
4.3 Customs verification 141
4.3.1 Right to verify truth or accuracy 141
(a) Technical Committee advisory opinions 142
(b) Uruguay Round Ministerial decision 142
(c) “Reasons to doubt” 143
4.3.2 Valuation databases 144
4.3.3 Generally accepted accounting principles 146
4.3.4 Exchange of information between customs administrations 148
(a) Bilateral/regional mutual assistance agreements 149
(b) Nairobi Convention 150
(c) Doha Decision on exchange of information 150
4.4 Special and differential treatment 152
4.4.1 Delay application of the Agreement (Article 20.1 and
Annex III, paragraph 1) 153
4.4.2 Continue use of price lists/official minimum values
(Annex III, paragraph 2) 153
4.4.3 Delay in application of computed value method (Article 20.2
and Annex III, paragraph 3) 154
4.4.4 Apply “super deductive” method, regardless of importer’s
consent (Annex III, paragraph 4) 154
4.5 Answer key 155
Use of valuation databases 155

5 Administration and dispute settlement 157

5.1 WTO and WCO Valuation Committees 157
5.1.1 WTO Committee on Customs Valuation 157
5.1.2 Technical Committee on Customs Valuation 160
5.2 Notifications 163
5.3 Dispute settlement 164

6 Conclusion 170
6.1 A developing–developed country divide? 170

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6.2 Need for customs modernization 172

6.3 New legal rules 174
6.4 The future 175

Appendix 1: WTO Valuation Agreement Text 177

Appendix 2: WTO Uruguay Round Ministerial Decisions 205

Appendix 3: WTO/GATT Valuation Committee Decisions 207

Appendix 4: World Customs Organization Valuation

Database Guidelines 214

Appendix 5: World Customs Organization: Measures to

Combat Valuation Fraud 220

Appendix 6: WTO Handbook on Valuation Notification

Requirements 236

Appendix 7: WTO dispute settlement case summaries –

customs valuation 245

Appendix 8: WTO website and official documents 252

Index 257

ix
 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE PURPOSES OF CUSTOMS VALUATION

1.1.1 What is customs valuation?

Governments have collected customs duties since the beginnings of inter-

national trade. It is recorded that Athens applied 20 percent import duties on
corn and other goods, while the Romans, from well before the time of Julius
Caesar, depended upon customs revenues to support the expansion and main-
tenance of their empire. And, where a tax must be collected, there will be
disputes over rates and methods – the Roman customs collector was accused
of “unfair conduct and vexatious proceedings” against the Roman merchants
who, in all fairness, were said to have been commonly engaged in smuggling
to avoid customs duties.1
Customs valuation – the subject of this book – becomes an issue where import
duties are calculated on an “ad valorem” basis. An “ad valorem” duty rate is
one that is expressed as a percentage of the value of the imported goods. Duties
may also be assessed on “specific” basis, where a fixed amount is charged on
the quantity of goods imported – such as 0.2 cents per liter of imported alcohol.
Or, a duty rate on a particular import might be a combination of ad valorem and
specific rates (a “compound rate”). Nevertheless, ad valorem rates are the most
prominent in international trade, as they are used by WTO Members against all
but a small percentage of goods in their tariff schedules.2
For a particular import, the amount of an ad valorem duty is determined by
multiplying the rate (for example, 17 percent on imports of chocolate milk,
in Figure 1) by the customs value of the imported goods. Thus, how customs
officials determine the customs value is as important to the importer as the rate
of duty specified in the tariff schedule for the goods, as both the basis – the cus-
toms value – and the rate together determine the amount of duty the importer
must pay.

1
W. Smith (ed.), Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (Boston: Little Brown & Co. 1859),
944–45; J. R. McCulloch, A Treatise on the Principles and Practical Influence of Taxation and the
Funding System, third edition (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black 1863), 240.
2
On average, WTO Members use ad valorem rates for more than 97 percent of all tariff lines in their
schedules. A notable exception is Switzerland which uses specific type rates for 80 percent of its tariff.
WTO, Trade Profiles 2007.

1
A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2007)

Annotated for Statistical Reporting Purposes IV
22-3
Heading/ Stat. Unit Rates of Duty
Subheading Suf- Article Description of 1 2
fix Quantity General Special

2201 Waters, including natural or artificial mineral waters and

serated waters, not containing added sugar or other
sweetening matter nor flavoured; ice and snow:
2201.10.00 00 Mineral waters and serated waters................................................... liters........ 0.25 liter Free (A, AU, BH, CA, 2.5 ¢/liter
CL, E, IL, MX, P, S)

2201.50.00 00 Other.......................................................................................... t................. Free Free

Waters, including mineral water and aerated waters,
2202
containing added sugar or other sweetening matter or Specific Duty Rate
flavoured and other nonalcoholic beverages, not including
fruit or vegetable juices of heading 2003:
2202.10.00 Waters, including mineral waters and aerated waters,
containing added sugar or other sweetening matter or
flavoured.......................................................................................................... 0.3 liter Free (A, AU, BH, CA, 4 ¢/liter
CL, E, IL, J, JO, MA,
MX, P, SG)
Carbonated soft drinks:
20 Containing high-intensity sweeteners (e.g.,
aspertame and/or saccharin......................................... 1 liters

40 Other..............................................................................1 liters
60 Other.....................................................................................1 liters
2202.50 Other:
Milk-based drinks:
2202.50.10 00 Chocolate milk drink.......................................................liters ............. 17% Free (A+, CA, D, E, 20%
IL, J, JO, MX, P, CL)
8.5% (8G)
13.6%(MA)
13.6%(BH)
14.1% (AU)

Ad Valorem Duty Rate

Figure 1 US harmonized tariff schedule: ad valorem and specific rates

Today, the rules for valuing imports for purposes of assessing customs duties
are well settled. They are defined in the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement
(the formal name of which is the Agreement on Implementation of Article
VII of the GATT), a system that is designed to promote fairness, neutrality
and uniformity in customs duty assessment, and which is used by more than
150 WTO Member countries worldwide.

1.1.2 The importance of customs valuation

In 1947 – before the GATT – the average tariff rate applied by industrial coun-
tries was between 20 and 30 percent.3 Fifty years and eight GATT rounds of
tariff negotiations later, the average tariff rate applied by industrial countries
on non-agricultural goods is about 5.5 percent.4 With implementation of the
1994 Uruguay Round, for example, the US average tariff on non-agricultural
goods is just 3.2 percent, and nearly half the tariff lines applicable to such
goods are duty free.5 Given these diminishing tariffs, one might ask how
important is customs valuation? If import duties are reduced to trivial levels or

3
WTO, World Trade Report 2007, at 207.
4
WTO, World Trade Profiles 2008 (simple average of applied MFN rates).
5
Ibid.

2
 Introduction

Taxes on International Trade: Non-Industrial Countries v. U.S.,

Australia, Japan
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
ica ia ) st re es an ia
Afr As g EU Ea phe tat Jap stral
din le mis
S Au
cl u M idd He ited
(ex rn Un
rop
e ste
Eu We

Share All Taxes Collected Share of All Government Revenue

Figure 2 Taxes on international trade (IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook

2007)

disappear altogether, what use will remain for the rules that are used for their
calculation?
Despite the successes of the GATT rounds, import duties stubbornly remain
a factor in international trade. This is particularly true in developing countries,
where the average applied rate for all goods is 16.9 percent.6 Even in industrial
countries, where average rates are low, some industrial products and sectors,
and many agricultural products, remain protected by tariffs of 20 percent or
higher.7 Moreover, a number of developing countries continue to depend upon
import duties for a significant portion of the national budget (see Figure 2).
Even if import duties were completely eliminated, the need for customs
valuation rules likely would still exist. One important reason is the use by
a number of countries of value added tax (VAT), excise, or sales taxes on
imported products; these taxes, unlike customs duties are not subject to
GATT/WTO tariff reductions.8 Customs authorities commonly apply the
same customs valuation rules to calculate these kinds of taxes on imports as
they do for customs duties, although they are not obligated by GATT rules
to do so.9

6
Ibid.
7
For example, the simple average duty rate applied by the European Union is just over 5%, among the
lowest of WTO Members. However, the average rates applied to selected products exceeds 20% (i.e.
dairy products (62.4%); sugars and confectionery (29.8%); animal products (25.4%)).
8
VAT systems are now used in over 120 countries; they are said to have been adopted by some countries
to replace the trade tax revenues lost as a consequence of GATT tariff reductions. IMF, Dealing with
the Revenue Consequences of Trade Reform (February 15, 2005).
9
GATT Article VII, Interpretative Note Ad Paragraph 1.

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A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

Apart from tax and duty assessment, customs valuation rules are used by
customs authorities in their administration of non-revenue measures, such as:
• Import quotas based on customs value.
• Rules of origin. For example, a country may allow goods from a spe-
cific foreign country to enter free of duty if 50 percent of the customs
value of the import is contributed by operations carried out in that
foreign country.
• Collection of trade statistics.

Customs valuation and GATT tariff bindings

GATT Article II:3 states “no contracting party shall alter its method of determining
dutiable value … so as to impair the value of any [tariff] concessions” negotiated
among GATT parties.
Under this prohibition, a country may not change its “method of determining duti-
able value” to avoid tariff bindings. But this does not prevent a country from main-
taining a valuation method that itself allows arbitrary assessments. In the absence of
common rules, valuation could thus be (mis)used for trade protection purposes.
“It seems inequitable that while certain countries … apply a liberal [valuation]
system, others continue to apply systems which may raise the actual incidence of the
duties shown in the tariff and carry many uncertainties because of elements which
are arbitrary from the point of view of interested exporters in third countries. Indeed,
the global reciprocity achieved in tariff reductions might be gravely jeopardized.”*
To illustrate the point, consider the following scenario: if the invoice value of an
imported product is $100, and the bound tariff rate agreed by the country is 10%,
then traders might expect a tariff barrier equivalent to $10 ($100 × 10% = $10).
However, customs officials, applying a method of valuation that allows arbitrary
uplifts, assign a value to the product of twice that amount. In that case, the actual
tariff barrier is $20 ($200 × 10% = $20). In practical effect, the importing country
has raised its tariff rate from the 10% tariff ceiling agreed in GATT tariff negoti-
ations to 20%.
Benefits to trade that the exporting country expects from negotiated tariff binding
are considerably diminished by such uncertain or arbitrary valuation methods.

* TN.64/NTB/26 (July 7, 1964) (Statement of the European Community) (emphasis added).

1.2 HISTORY

The WTO Customs Valuation Agreement is a result of the 1986–1994 Uruguay

Round negotiations, but its terms largely repeat the 1979 GATT Valuation Code.
Therefore, to understand the intent underlying the terms of the Agreement,
it is useful to recall the conditions of the pre-1979 trading environment (see
Figure 3). As will be apparent from the retelling, this history also demon-
strates that many of the difficulties of customs valuation that are discussed

4
 Introduction

Customs Valuation – GATT/WTO Timeline

Apr 26, 1984
Valuation Committee
Decision on
November 1, 1979 Interest Charges
GATT Valuation Code
Protocol September 24, 1984
November 1971
January 1, 1948 Report January 1, 1981 Valuation Committee January 1, 1995
GATT Established: GATT Committee on GATT Valuation Code Decision on Software WTO Valuation Agreement
Article VII Principles Trade in Industrial Products Enters into Force + Ministerial Declarations
for Customs Valuation Takes Effect

September 1973 - April 1979 September 1986 - April 1994

Tokyo Round Negotiations Uruguay Round Negotiations

1946 1948 1971 1995

Figure 3 GATT/WTO customs valuation timeline

today – valuation of used goods, questionable invoices, (mis)use of alternative

valuation methods, etc. – are by no means new or unique.

1.2.1 Before common valuation rules

GATT Article VII establishes general principles for national customs valuation
systems. However, it does not mandate a specific valuation method, but allows
countries to develop their own system, subject to these principles.

GATT Article VII Principles

• Customs value shall be based on “actual value”, which is the price of the
imported merchandise, or like merchandise, in sales in the ordinary course of
trade under fully competitive conditions
• If “actual value” cannot be determined, Customs shall use the nearest ascertain-
able equivalent
• Customs value shall not be based on value of merchandise of national origin, or
arbitrary or fictitious values
• Customs value shall not include internal taxes on a product that the country of
origin or export refunds or exempts
• Currency conversion shall reflect effectively current value of currency in com-
mercial transactions
• Where price of imported merchandise is determined by the quantity purchased,
customs value shall be based on prices for comparable quantities or, as long as
the result does not disadvantage the importer, prices involving larger quantities
in sales in trade between the exporting and importing countries
• Governments shall publicize their valuation methods
• Governments shall report on steps they have taken to implement Article VII and
to review the operation of their value methods, upon request of other GATT
parties.

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A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

In fact, there was a large diversity and inconsistency when it came to customs
valuation practices among countries before 1979. Customs valuation systems
generally followed one of two conceptually different approaches: those based
on a “notional” concept of value, and those based on a “positive” concept.

(a) Brussels Definition of Value

The “notional” concept is represented by the 1950 Convention on the Valuation
of Goods for Customs Purposes, commonly known as the Brussels Definition
of Value (BDV).10 The BDV was drafted by customs experts of the European
Customs Union Study Group, and was given to the Customs Co-operation
Council – now known as the World Customs Organization (WCO) – to admin-
ister.11 The BDV had more adherents than any other valuation system. At its
peak, it was applied by as many as one hundred countries, including members
of the (then) European Economic Community (EEC) and most other countries
in Western Europe, as well as Japan and a number of developing countries.
Under the BDV, goods are valued on the basis of their “normal price”:
that is to say, the price which [the imported goods] would fetch at the time
when the duty becomes payable on a sale in the open market between
buyer and seller independent of each other.12
Customs officials would consider the buyer’s actual invoice price paid for the
goods, but were free to reject it in favor of the notional “open market” price for
goods of the same kind.

(b) Positive value systems

A positive system of value was used by the United States and Australia, among
other countries. Under these systems, customs value was generally based on
the actual price paid for the goods, rather than an abstract or notional price that
might be paid under perfect competitive conditions. Typically, these systems
provided for use of secondary valuation methods, in a ranking order, where the

10
December 15, 1950, 171 U.N.T.S. 307 (entered into force on July 28, 1953).
11
Convention Establishing a Customs Co-operation Council, December 12, 1950, 157 U.N.T.S. 130;
GATT Working Party I on the International Chamber of Commerce Resolutions, Statement by Mr.
F. Redmond-Smith, Representative of the European Customs Union Study Group, W.7/8 (October 7,
1952). The CCC Convention was also drafted by the European Union Customs Union Study Group,
a body established in 1947 to consider freer intra-European movement of goods and services in the
context of European recovery from the Second World War. GATT Contracting Parties, The Work
Undertaken by the European Customs Union Study Group on Customs Nomenclature and Questions
of Customs Regulations: Statement Made by the French Representative, GATT/CP.4/45 (April 20,
1950).
12
Annex I, Convention on the Valuation of Goods for Customs Purposes, note 10, above.

6
 Introduction

actual invoice price could not be found or used (such as where the goods were
imported under a lease, and therefore a sale price did not exist).
For example, the US system, which strongly influenced the structure of the
WTO Valuation Agreement, generally required customs to appraise goods first
on the basis of the “export value” or price at which the goods were sold or
offered for sale for export to the United States or, second, on the basis of the
“United States value”, which was the selling price of imported goods in the
US market; and finally, if the preceding methods failed, on the basis of a “con-
structed value” or cost of production of the imported goods.13
There was also diversity in the application of both of these systems. The
BDV was subject to varying interpretations in different countries. Positive sys-
tems were equally diverse: for example, the US primary valuation method was
based on the export value (the price of the goods at the time of exportation to
the United States), whereas Australia used the price paid by the importer or the
price at which the same goods are sold in the export country market, whichever
was higher. Moreover, as noted in the discussion below of the American Selling
Price valuation method, some of the “secondary” valuation methods employed
by these countries were at best complex and at worst explicitly protectionist.

(c) Early GATT initiatives on common valuation rules

In the early GATT years, a few attempts were made toward creation of a com-
mon valuation system. Although ultimately inconclusive, these initiatives
triggered the GATT contracting parties to begin to assess the conformity of
the different valuation systems then in use with Article VII principles.14 The
results of this early work on valuation led to and informed the GATT’s later
valuation initiatives. There is also a direct link in the present WTO Valuation
Agreement to this early history: the “prohibited methods” listed in Article 7 of
the Agreement (the “fall back” method of valuation) references one or another
of these older valuation systems. (More on the prohibited methods of valuation
under the WTO Valuation Agreement at section 3.4.)
The earliest attempt at a harmonized valuation system within the GATT
came in 1951, when the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) proposed
that the GATT contracting parties develop standard worldwide valuation rules.
This ICC proposal was a reaction to the BDV which, at that time, had just been
completed and opened for signature. The ICC – as the representative of busi-
ness – had opposed the BDV, because it was based on the use of a “normal”

13
See GATT Committee on Trade and Development, Trade Barriers Arising in the Field of Customs
Valuation: Note on Implications for Developing Countries of Ad Referendum Solutions, COM.
TD/W/195 (August 2, 1973).
14
Because the GATT was a treaty and not a legally established organization (in contrast to the World
Trade Organization), GATT signatories were called “contracting parties.” See WTO, Understanding
the WTO (2007), at 3.

7
A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

price as determined by customs administrations. Instead, the ICC favored a

simpler “rule-of-thumb method,” whereby customs would be required to use
the invoice price for the goods presented by the trader, absent a reason to sus-
pect fraud.15
This ICC proposal was rejected as premature. With only limited informa-
tion about the valuation methods used by governments, the GATT contracting
parties were, apparently, unwilling to upset the status quo. Moreover, it was
felt that the GATT should not “pass judgment” on the BDV by developing an
alternative international system along the lines suggested by the ICC before the
BDV had been given a reasonable time to operate.16
However, the ICC proposals did have one positive result. They inspired the
GATT contracting parties to obtain detailed information concerning the meth-
ods governments used to determine value and the extent to which these methods
conformed to Article VII principles.17 The results of this study, published three
years later, suggested that there was a significant amount of diversity in valu-
ation practices among GATT contracting parties. In particular, it was found that
governments generally used one of three different criterion to assess value:
(1) the price at which goods comparable with the exported goods are
sold in the internal markets of the exporting country (“current
domestic value”);
(2) the price at which the imported goods are sold from the exporting
country to the importing country (“transaction value”);
(3) the price at which goods comparable with the imported goods
are sold in the markets of the importing country (“import market
value”).18
15
GATT Executive Secretary, Resolutions Submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce
on Valuation, Nationality of Manufactured Goods and Formalities Connected with Quantitative
Restrictions (GATT/CP/123), G/22 (August 29, 1952). In addition to international valuation rules, the
ICC proposed that the GATT contracting parties issue “general recommendations” to governments
based on the following four principles: (i) “systems of valuation should not be used as a method of
increasing protection”; (ii) “primary consideration should be given to the price shown on commer-
cial invoices when determining the dutiable value of goods”; (iii) “regulations should state clearly
and fully the basis of dutiable value, with adequate publicity”; and (iv) “internal duties or taxes from
which exported goods were exempted should not be included in the dutiable value.” GATT contract-
ing parties did not accept this proposal, largely on grounds that these ICC principles were largely
incorporated in GATT Article VII. GATT, Report of Working Party I on the International Chamber of
Commerce Resolutions, G/28 (November 1, 1952).
16
G/28.
17
GATT, Methods of Valuation for Customs Purposes: Request for Information, L/81 (March 12, 1953);
GATT, Valuation for Customs Purposes: Questionnaire for the Ninth Session, L/228 (September 20,
1954).
18
GATT Contracting Parties 9th Session, Comparative Study of Methods of Valuation for Customs
Purposes G/88 (March 2, 1955). The study also found that “apart from the nine countries which are
operating a common definition of value under the Brussels Convention, there are numerous differences
in practice even between countries which are using the same criterion for establishing value for cus-
toms purposes.”

8
 Introduction

In late 1954 and early 1955, governments submitted a number of proposals to

amend Article VII in connection with a general review of the operation of the
GATT Treaty. Most of these Article VII proposals were technical in nature or
narrowly targeted to overcome specific valuation problems.
One proposal did have a broader reach. The Scandinavian countries pro-
posed that the GATT “work toward the standardization as far as practicable, of
definitions of value and of procedures for determining the value of products.”
Under the proposal, this work would have been based upon studies and recom-
mendations of a new “Organization for Trade Co-operation” – which was then
being discussed as the permanent body to administer the GATT.19 However, as
that new trade body never came into being, neither did the Scandinavian pro-
posal for a unified valuation system.20
The last major GATT initiative on valuation in these early years came in
the Kennedy Round of 1964–1967. In that round, for the first time, non-tariff
barriers were included in negotiations.21 One such non-tariff barrier nominated
for negotiation by a number of countries was “customs valuation including
use of arbitrary or excessive values.”22 The “arbitrary” valuation practice that
attracted most criticism was the use by the United States of its “American
Selling Price” (ASP) method of valuation.23 The ASP, explicitly protectionist
19
“Members shall work toward the standardization, as far as practicable, of definitions of value and
of procedures for determining the value of products subject to customs duties or other charges or
restrictions based upon or regulated in any matter by value. With a view to furthering co-operation to
this end, the Organization may study and recommend to Members such bases and methods for deter-
mining value for customs purposes as would appear best suited to the needs of commerce and most
capable of general adoption.” GATT Contracting Parties 9th Session, Review Working Party II on
Tariffs, Schedules and Customs Administration, Proposals Affecting Customs Administration, W.9/46
(November 29, 1954).
20
The Scandinavian proposals were referred to the working party responsible for developing the agree-
ment on the Organization for Trade Co-operation (OTC). GATT Contracting Parties 9th Session, Review
Working Party IV on Organizational and Functional Questions, Scope of the Agreement: Proposals
Referred from Working Party II to Working Party IV, W.9/98 (December 14, 1954). The draft agree-
ment on the OTC included a provision authorizing the OTC to undertake a “study of international
trade and commercial policy and where appropriate make recommendations thereon.” This provision
was explicitly intended to cover the valuation studies foreseen by the Scandinavian proposal. GATT
Contracting Parties 9th Session, Report of Review Working Party IV on Organizational and Functional
Questions, L/327 Rev. 1 (April 4, 1955). However, the Agreement on the Organization for Trade
Co-operation, done at Geneva on March 10, 1955, never entered into force.
21
GATT Meeting of Ministers, May 16–21, 1963, Agreements for the Reduction of Elimination of Tariffs
or Other Barriers to Trade and Related Matters and Measures for Access to Markets for Agricultural
and Other Primary Products: Resolution Adopted 21 May 1963, MIN 63(9) May 22, 1963.
22
GATT Sub-Committee on Non-Tariff Barriers, Non-Tariff Measures to be Brought within the Scope of
the Negotiations: Note by the Secretariat, TN.64/NTB/8 (November 15, 1963).
23
GATT Sub-Committee on Non-Tariff Barriers, The Use of Arbitrary or Excessive Values in Levying
Customs Duties (American Selling Price): Note by the United Kingdom Delegation, TN.64/NTB/21
(June 19, 1964); see also GATT Sub-Committee on Non-Tariff Barriers, Valuation for Customs
Purposes: Note by the Delegation of the EEC Commission, TN.64/NTB/26 (July 7, 1964); GATT Sub-
Committee on Non-Tariff Barriers, The Arbitrary or Excessive Valuation for Customs Purposes: Note
by the Japanese Delegation, TN.64/NTB/32 (July 15, 1964); GATT Sub-Committee on Non-Tariff

9
A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

in design, required certain imports – benzenoid chemical products, rubber

footwear, canned clams and knitted woolen gloves – to be valued on the basis
of the price at which similar US-origin products were sold in the US market,
rather than the actual invoice price for the goods. The use of this method was
said to result in import duties well in excess of the price of the goods them-
selves – reportedly as much as 172 percent in the case of yellow-vat dye, for
example.24 Apart from the prohibitive effect of such rates, the ASP method was
directly contrary to the GATT Article VII:2 proscription against use of customs
valuation methods that are “based on the value of merchandise of national
origin.”25
The United States and European countries reached a conditional agree-
ment in the Kennedy Round, which would have required the European coun-
tries to reduce their duties on US chemical exports if the United States ended
the use of its ASP valuation method.26 However, this agreement never entered
into force. The US use of the ASP remained a major irritant in these contract-
ing parties’ trade relations until finally resolved through the Tokyo Round
agreement.27

(d) Precursor to an agreement

In November 1967, following the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round
earlier that year, the contracting parties met to do a stocktaking of the first
twenty years of the GATT, with a view of setting a work program to enable
further expansion of world trade.

Barriers, The Use of Arbitrary or Excessive Values in Levying Customs Duties: Note by the Danish
Delegation,TN.64/NTB/34 (July 22, 1964).
24
“Toward Agreement,” Time, May 19, 1967, at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,840930,00.
html.
25
If the ASP was contrary to GATT Article VII, how could it have been used by the United States?
The reason is that the ASP predated the GATT. Under the terms of the 1947 Protocol of Provisional
Application of the GATT, by which the United States accepted the GATT Treaty, the United States was
obliged to apply provisionally Part II of the GATT (which included Article VII) only “to the fullest
extent not inconsistent with existing legislation.” Thus, while the ASP contradicted GATT Article VII
principles, as the United States itself freely acknowledged, its use was nonetheless permitted by this
“existing legislation” exception. See GATT Contracting Parties Twenty-Second Session, Definitive
Application of the GATT: Note by the Executive Secretariat, L/2375/Add.1 (March 19, 1965).
26
GATT, Agreement Relating Principally to Chemicals Supplementary to the Geneva (1967) Protocol,
L/2819 (July 17, 1967).
27
The agreement was not implemented due to the failure by the US Congress to enact necessary domes-
tic legislation to eliminate use of the ASP. The US rubber footwear industry opposed elimination as
did the powerful US chemical industry, which was said to be “almost totally opposed to losing ASP
protection and question[ed] the value of it of lower duties abroad.” Memorandum from Secretary of
State Rogers to President Nixon (March 24, 1969) in US Department of State, Foreign Relations,
1969–1976, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Vol IV, docu-
ment 188, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/index.htm.

10
 Introduction

One outcome of that review was a recognition that more focus should
be given to the use of non-tariff, trade-restrictive measures, as these had the
potential to offset the gains that had been made over the years by the GATT
tariff reductions. The contracting parties thus ordered the GATT Secretariat
to establish an “inventory” of non-tariff barriers affecting international trade,
based on information supplied by governments. Once the inventory was com-
plied and analyzed, working groups under the GATT Committee on Trade in
Industrial Products were appointed to “explor[e] … the possibilities for con-
crete action … both with regard to reducing or removing such barriers and to
developing possible rules of conduct.” 28
Customs valuation practices figured prominently in that inventory of non-
tariff barriers: more than thirty valuation complaints were registered against
over twenty countries.29 According to the working group that analyzed the
inventory, the valuation problems notified were primarily the result of the
different “special valuation” or secondary valuation methods that countries
applied where valuation could not be taken from the invoice price:
the great majority of countries currently follow the practice of the
Brussels Convention on Valuation (BCV), which is based on c.i.f. values
[that is, costs of international transport are included in customs value] and
that another smaller group of countries, including some important trading
countries, use systems varying from one to another but based upon f.o.b.
values of mixed in character [international transport costs not included in
customs value]. Both groups use invoice values in most cases. In cases
where no invoice can be produced (for example, where there is no sale) or
where the invoice price appears to be unacceptable or it is not accepted,
the value for custom purposes is established by the two groups according
to widely differing methods.30
Some of the important specific valuation problems listed in the GATT inven-
tory were the following:
1. Use of domestic prices in the country of export as a basis for
valuation.
Certain countries valued imported goods on the basis of invoice price
or the price of similar goods in the export country market, whichever
was higher. This system made it difficult for traders to estimate in
advance their duty liability; it presented particular problems where

28
GATT, Review of the Work of the Contracting Parties through the Last Two Decades and Conclusions
on their Future Work Programme, L/2943 (November 28, 1967); GATT Committee on Trade in
Industrial Products, Report to the Council, L/3298 (December 22, 1969).
29
GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiation, Part 2 of the Inventory of Non-Tariff Measures, Customs and
Administrative Entry Procedures: Note by the Secretariat, MTN/3B/2 (February 12, 1974).
30
GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Report to Council, L/3496, at 33 (February 10,
1971).

11
A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

the goods were not sold in the exporting country market; and it was
said to require exporters to divulge confidential business information
in course of customs price investigations.
It also, apparently, worked to the disadvantage of exporters in devel-
oping countries where, it was claimed, prices could be higher than in
international markets due to “structural imbalances and the supply
scarcities” and “inflationary pressures to which their economies were
often subject.”31
2. Use of arbitrary values determined at the discretion of customs
authorities.
Under certain valuation systems which used the invoice price or price
in the export country market, whichever was higher, customs or other
governmental authorities were authorized to determine the value
where the current price in the exporting country market could not be
ascertained. The claim was made that these determinations of value
were arbitrary or, at the least, not transparent.
3. Valuation based on prices for similar domestic-origin goods in the
country of import.
The US ASP valuation method, discussed previously, was identified
as the main example of this problem.
4. Use of “official” or “minimum” values.
Certain countries established, by decree or regulation, minimum prices
for specified products or range of products. For example, a number of
countries were said to set a minimum value for imports of used cloth-
ing, based on weight. The justification of these practices, which were
more commonly found in developing countries than developed, has
been explained as follows:
The developing countries maintaining “official indicative values” for a
limited number of products have stated that they have found it neces-
sary to adopt such a system to curb “underinvoicing” of goods or similar
unfair practices. It has been stated that apart from such cases, fixing offi-
cial values on the basis of “average prices of imports” may be necessary
for commodities which are subject to wide fluctuations in prices … In
regard to “minimum values”, developing countries fixing such values
have explained that they were being determined for a limited number
of products, in order inter alia, to protect their nascent industries from
competition from well-established industries in other countries.32
Duty is levied on the basis of the “minimum value” or invoice price,
whichever is higher. The complaint of exporters, however, was that

31
Ibid.
32
GATT, Non-Tariff Measures Affecting Trade of Developing Countries: Note by the Secretariat,
MTN/3B/23 (December 31, 1974), at 24.

12
 Introduction

the minimum values set exceeded the actual market values of the
goods, to the extent that import became economically prohibitive.
5. Use of customs valuation to combat dumping.
For example, Australia applied a system of “support values” to a
number of industrial chemicals. If the duty-paid price of the imported
product fell below this value, an extra customs duty was collected
equal to 90 percent of the difference between the two prices. Exporting
countries claimed that this was, in effect, a dumping measure applied
without following the dumping procedures.
6. Lack of transparency in valuation methods and procedures.
7. Inadequate facilities for appeal against decisions by customs
authorities.33
How to resolve these barriers? A group of countries proposed harmonization
of valuation systems based on the BDV, which was then applied by most of
the GATT contracting parties. This proposal was, however, opposed by the non-
BDV countries – viz. the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand – who
believed that their valuation systems were as consistent as the BDV with GATT
Article VII. These non-BDV countries also found objectionable the “extensive
discretion” that the BDV allowed customs officers to reject the invoice price
in favor of a notional value. Moreover, they were concerned about the “exten-
sive distortion of existing competitive relationships among trading partners” that
would result in shifting from a f.o.b.-based system to the BDV’s c.i.f. system,
which would mean that transportation costs would be included in customs value.
On this last point, it was said that increasing the dutiable basis of imported goods
by including costs of international transport would particularly impact traders in
North America due to the large overland distances between ports of entry and
market centers and greater distances from overseas suppliers.34
Accordingly, rather than unified valuation rules based on the BDV, the
working group agreed to develop “draft principles” and “draft interpretative
notes” for the guidance of governments. It was hoped that these would help
to move existing valuation systems into closer alignment and thereby resolve
the specific problems identified in the inventory.35 These “draft principles” and
“draft interpretative notes,” were released to GATT contracting parties in 1971
for their consideration, and later became a starting point of negotiations in the
Tokyo Round. A number of these principles thus surfaced again in the pre-
amble to the Tokyo Round Agreement (and now the current WTO Valuation
Agreement).

33
GATT, Part 2 of the Inventory of Non-Tariff Measures: Customs and Administrative Entry Procedures,
MTN/3B/2 (February 12, 1974).
34
L/3496, at 37–40.
35
GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products, Group 2 On Valuation: Report by Chairman, COM.
IND/W/64 (November 5, 1971).

13
A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

Committee on Trade in Industrial Products

Draft Valuation Principles
1. Valuation systems should be neutral in their effect and in no case be used as a
disguised means of providing additional protection by artificially increasing the
value to which the rate of duty is to be applied.
2. Valuation systems should not be used to combat dumping.
3. Valuation systems should protect trade against unfair competition arising from
undervaluation.
4. Valuation systems should be of general application without distinction as
between sources of supply.
5. Dutiable value should be based on equitable and simple criteria which do not
conflict with commercial practice.
6. Valuation systems should keep formalities to a minimum and valuation should
be based to the greatest possible degree on commercial documents.
7. Valuation systems should not prevent the quick clearance of goods.
8. The legal and administrative provisions concerning customs valuation should be
accessible to the general public and be sufficiently clear and precise to enable
traders to estimate in advance, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the value
of their goods for customs purposes.
9. Valuation systems and practices should take into account the need to safeguard
business secrets.

1.2.2 Tokyo Round negotiations

In the 1973–1979 Tokyo Round, the GATT contracting parties negotiated

a common customs valuation system. Although harmonization on the basis
of the Brussels Definition of Value was again proposed,36 the GATT parties
instead began negotiation of text on the basis of a proposal put forward by
the European Community, which was said to combine the “best features” of
the US, Canadian and European systems. The basic structure of the proposed
agreement was a “positive” concept of value with methods of valuation placed
in a hierarchy – the “good features of the United States valuation system.”37

36
See e.g. GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group “Non-Tariff Measures” Sub-Group “Customs
Matters,” Customs Matters: Communication from the Customs Co-operation Council, MTN/NTM/
W/17 (August 26, 1975); GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group “Non-Tariff Measures” Sub-
Group “Customs Matters,” Customs Matters: Background Note by the Secretariat, MTN/NTM/W/7
(April 29, 1975).
37
GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group “Non-Tariff Measures” Sub-Group “Customs Matters,”
Statement Made by the Commission of the European Communities at the Meeting of the Sub-Group
of November 15, 1977, MTN/NTM/W/126 (November 21, 1977). In the following chapters, we have
noted some of the more obvious influences of the US value law on the text of the WTO Valuation
Agreement, such as the definition of related parties and restrictions on use of transaction value (see
section 2.3) and deductive value (see section 3.2).

14
 Introduction

The final result was the GATT Valuation Code, which is substantially iden-
tical in its terms to the present WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. Like
other “codes” negotiated in the 1979 Tokyo Round, the GATT Valuation Code
bound only those GATT Members that elected to accept its terms. As it turned
out, while all developed countries signed the GATT Valuation Code, the large
majority of developing countries chose not to do so.38
Differences between developed and developing countries were apparent
during the negotiations. For example, there was reportedly “strong opposition”
from developing countries to the treatment of transactions between related
companies under the proposed GATT Valuation Code which, they argued,
favored firms and enterprises from the developed countries. Developing coun-
tries wanted customs authorities to have greater authority to reject related-
party prices where they found the prices to differ substantially from values in
transactions involving like goods and for reasons that could not be justified.
Also, difficulties were foreseen in the use of the deductive and computed value
methods, and there was “outright opposition” to the idea that an importer,
rather than the customs authorities, could choose whether to apply the deduct-
ive or computed value method.39
These differences could not be resolved by the end of the negotiations in
April 1979. Two “competing” versions of a valuation code were thus presented
to the GATT contracting parties for consideration – one favored by developed
country delegations, and a modified version proposed by developing countries
containing “special provisions to meet [their] trade, financial and development
needs.”40
In the end, however, the developing and developed countries compromised
their differences, and in November 1979 adopted a Protocol to the Agreement
on Implementation of Article VII.41 In the Uruguay Round, the terms of this
Protocol were incorporated into the WTO Valuation Agreement itself, where
they now appear as Annex III.

38
Seventeen GATT Members (the (then) EEC counting as one) had signed or accepted the Tokyo Round
Agreement at the time that it entered into force, January 1, 1981. Seven of the original signatories were
developing countries. GATT Consultative Group of Eighteen, MTN Agreements: Legal Status as of 2
March 1981, CG.18/W/46/Supp.1 (March 6, 1981). Over time, however, additional developing coun-
tries would sign onto the GATT Valuation Code.
39
GATT, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Report by the Director-General of GATT,
72–74 (April 20, 1979).
40
GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group “Non-Tariff Measures” Sub-Group “Customs Matters,”
Customs Valuation, MTN/NTM/W/222/Rev.1 (March 27, 1979); GATT Trade Negotiations Committee,
Proceedings of the Session Held at the International Labor Office Geneva, 11 and 12 April 1979,
MTN/P/5 (July 9, 1979); GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Committee, Proces-Verbal, MTN/28
(April 11, 1979).
41
GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group “Non-Tariff Measures” Sub-Group “Customs Matters,”
Customs Valuation: Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, MTN/NTM/W/229/Rev.1/Add.1 (October 22, 1979).

15
A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

Certain of the developing countries’ proposed “special provisions” were

accepted in the Protocol, at least in some form. The Protocol thus allowed
developing countries the possibility to delay the application of the Code
beyond five years (to ease their transition to the new valuation rules); it gave
developing country customs administrations some flexibility in use of the
deductive and computed value methods; and it permitted developing coun-
tries to continue use of minimum value systems on a “limited and transi-
tional” basis.
Other “special provisions,” which were not made part of the Protocol
compromise, would have given developing countries greater leeway to reject
declared transaction values in various circumstances where under-invoicing is
suspected. These included, for example, provisions to put the burden of proving
the validity of a related-party price on the importer; to disallow price discounts
if found to be not “freely available” to other buyers under the same conditions;
to treat sole agents and distributors as related parties; and to allow customs to
reject declared prices, even in transactions involving unrelated parties, if found
not to be consistent with prices in prior transactions of like goods.
As will be seen, these developing-country concerns about the ability of
Customs under the Code to deal with under-invoicing resurface during the
Uruguay Round negotiations.

1.2.3 Uruguay Round negotiations

The goal of the Uruguay Round negotiations, as it related to customs valu-

ation, was to “improve, clarify, or expand, as appropriate,” the Tokyo Round
Code, and thereby win it wider acceptance among the GATT parties.42 At the
time that the Uruguay Round was formally launched, less than one-third of the
GATT contracting parties had signed the GATT Valuation Agreement.43
The limited participation in the valuation and other Tokyo Round Codes,
particularly by developing countries, had been a concern to GATT contracting
parties and became an important focus of GATT activity in the years leading
up to the Uruguay Round.44 Both in the GATT Valuation Committee and the

42
GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round, MIN.DEC (September 20, 1986).
43
GATT, Report (1986) of the Committee on Customs Valuation, L/6094 (November 20, 1986) (report-
ing that twenty-six countries were parties to the Valuation Agreement); GATT, GATT Membership as
at 1 June 1986, GATT/1386 (ninety-one GATT contracting parties).
44
The 1982 Ministerial Declaration, which defined the GATT work program and priorities for the
1980s, mandated a review of the operation of the Tokyo Round Codes, with a focus on “adequacy
and effectiveness … and the obstacles to acceptance of these [codes] … by interested parties.” GATT
Contracting Parties Thirty-Eighth Session, Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 29 November 1982,
L/5424 (November 29, 1982). Two years later, the GATT contracting parties “invited” each GATT
committee responsible for administering a Tokyo Round Code to examine these issues in a special

16
 Introduction

The 35 GATT Valuation Agreement signatories (1994)

Argentina Hong Kong Poland

Australia Hungary Romania
Austria India Slovak Republic
Bolivia Japan Slovenia
Botswana Korea, Republic of South Africa
Brazil Lesotho Sweden
Canada Malawi Switzerland
Colombia Mexico Turkey
Cyprus Morocco United States
Czech Republic New Zealand Yugoslavia
EC Norway Zimbabwe
Finland Peru

Technical Committee in the early 1980s, GATT contracting parties and obser-
vers were consulted, special meetings were held, and surveys were produced
on the “obstacles” developing countries foresaw in adopting the Valuation
Code.45
Broadly speaking, three main factors were said to influence the decision of
countries not yet signatories to the Valuation Code:
1. the need to take the decision collectively or in a coordinated fashion
in the framework of a regional grouping
2. concern that the Agreement might not give customs adequate possibil-
ities to deal with false invoicing and to maintain government revenue
and
3. the legal and administrative requirements to be fulfilled by signator-
ies, for example the need to adapt national legislation and procedures
and to train staff.46
That second point (false invoicing and government revenue) became the
main focus of the discussions in the Uruguay Round negotiating group on
valuation.

meeting, open to non-signatories, and to report the results to a working group specially created to carry
out an overall review. GATT, MTN Agreements and Arrangements: Fortieth Session of the Contracting
Parties, Action taken on 30 November 1984, L/5756 (December 20, 1984).
45
See Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on MTN Agreements and
Arrangements, MTN Agreements and Arrangements: Special and Differential Treatment for Developing
Countries, Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/2 (May 4, 1986).
46
GATT Working Group on MTN Agreements, Adequacy and Effectiveness of the MTN Agreements
and Arrangements and Obstacles to their Acceptance: Consolidation of the Observations Made and
Conclusions Reached in the Committees and Councils, MDF/12 (June 11, 1985).

17
A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

The negotiations on valuation were very much driven by developing-country

concerns. It was made clear at the outset by some members within the nego-
tiating group that a new customs valuation agreement or complete overhaul
of the existing Tokyo Round Code was not on the table.47 Rather, countries
were asked to identify their particular difficulties with the existing agreement
(taking into account the work that had been done in the preceding years in the
GATT Valuation Committee), and to come forward with proposals for change
to the existing text.48
In the end, the main subjects of negotiations on valuation were largely
defined by two proposals. One, which was tabled by India, concerned the
burden of proof in cases of suspected importer fraud.49 The second, sub-
mitted by Kenya on behalf of the members of the Preferential Trade Area
for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA), sought to allow the contin-
ued use by developing countries of certain valuation practices of the BDV
system.50

(a) Burden of proof

The India proposal was motivated by a concern about the efficacy of the
GATT Valuation Code in dealing with valuation fraud, a concern that had
been voiced before by developing country members in the early GATT
Valuation Committee meetings.51 The proposal was supported by Brazil –
who had a particular difficulty with the fraudulent over-invoicing by import-
ers to avoid hard currency controls – and by a number of other developing
countries.52

47
Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on MTN Agreements and Arrangements,
Meeting of 6 March 1987: Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG8/1 (March 23, 1987).
48
Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Fifth Meeting of the Group of Negotiations on Goods: Record
of Decisions Taken, MTN.GNG/5 (February 9, 1987) (negotiating plan set out in annex).
49
Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on MTN Agreements and Arrangements,
Communication from India, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/9 (September 30, 1987); Group of Negotiations on
Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on MTN Agreements and Arrangements, Customs Valuation
Agreement: Justification for India’s Proposal on Burden of Proof, MTN.GNG/NG8/W/54 (October 9,
1989).
50
Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on MTN Agreements and Arrangements,
Proposal Submitted by Kenya on behalf of the Member States of the Preferential Trade Area for
Eastern and Southern African States (PTA), MTN.GNG/NG8/W/73 (March 19, 1990).
51
See GATT Committee on Customs Valuation, Report by the Technical Committee on Customs
Valuation Concerning the Effects of False Invoicing on Customs Valuation, VAL/W/32 (November 7,
1985).
52
Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on MTN Agreements and
Arrangements, Agreement on Implementation of Article VII: Submission by Brazil, MTN.GNG/
NG8/W/57 (November 22, 1989); Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group
on MTN Agreements and Arrangements, Minutes of Meeting 16–18 October 1989, MTN.GNG/
NG8/13 (November 15, 1989).

18
 Introduction

Early practical concerns about

transaction Value
“[T]he price involved may be fictitious. What is known as ‘double-invoicing’ for
Customs purposes is a common example. Such a price, if it were declared to be
the actual price under [the transaction value method], would not be rejected by the
Customs unless they were in a position to prove its falsity by establishing the true
actual sale price. No Customs Administration could accept the onus of such proof.”

Customs Co-operation Council, Different Systems of Valuation and their Comparative Advantages
and Disadvantages 18 (1963).

The general concern was that the GATT Valuation Code placed too great a bur-
den on customs to prove that a declared price was false before it could reject
the transaction value, particularly in cases where importers and their suppliers
acted in collusion to hide the fraud. This problem was particularly acute for
developing countries, it was said, because they did not have access to com-
parative price information, the automated processes and databases, or the tech-
nical expertise needed to detect false declarations. Therefore India proposed
that customs administrations be given more flexibility under the Valuation
Agreement to reject suspect declared values.
The India proposal and the subsequent negotiation in the Uruguay Round
are covered in greater detail in section 4.3, which deals with customs verifica-
tions under the Agreement. In short, however, while India’s proposal did not
result in any alteration of the terms of the Agreement itself, it did produce
the important WTO Ministerial Decision clarifying the burden of proof issue,
namely the Decision Regarding Cases Where Customs Administrations
Have Reasons to Doubt the Truth or Accuracy of the Declared Value.

(b) Sole agents and minimum values

The main concern of the African PTA countries was the impact that use of
the Agreement would have on their government revenue, more than half of
which, it was said, was derived from customs duties. The BDV concept of
value – some form of which all of these countries then used – was considered
more protective of this revenue than the GATT Agreement because it allowed
customs officers greater flexibility to establish or “uplift” customs values when
they found that the importer’s declared transaction price was not consistent
with open market prices.
The PTA countries thus proposed that developing countries should be per-
mitted to include in customs value those discounts that foreign sellers allow to
“sole agents, distributors and concessionaires” or other parties in special trad-
ing relationships, as they were under the BDV.

19
A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

The PTA countries also proposed to extend the right of developing coun-
tries under the GATT Valuation Agreement to continue to apply “minimum
values,” such as official lists of minimum prices for specific goods. The GATT
Valuation Code protocol allowed developing countries the possibility to con-
tinue such practices, but on a limited and transitional basis only, and subject
to terms and conditions agreed by the other Code signatories in ad hoc negoti-
ations. To ensure the utility of this concession to developing countries, the PTA
proposed that minimum value reservations “should not be limited in scope nor
subject to the imposition of restrictive terms and conditions.”
The Uruguay Round response to the PTA proposal was the second of
two WTO Ministerial decisions on customs valuation, the Decision on
Texts Relating to Minimum Values and Imports by Sole Agents, Sole
Distributors and Sole Concessionaires. Essentially, this decision requires the
WTO Valuation Committee to give “sympathetic consideration” to developing
country requests to retain officially established minimum values for a limited
period, and to take into account the “development, financial and trade needs of
the developing country concerned.”
With regard to treatment of sole agent or distributor discounts, the WTO
Ministerial decision makes no change to the text of the Agreement.53 Rather,
the decision asks the WTO Valuation Committee to recommend to the Customs
Co-operation Council (now known as the World Customs Organization) that
it “assist developing country members … to formulate and conduct studies
in areas identified as being of potential concern, including those relating to
importations by sole agents, sole distributors and sole concessionaires.”
The question of “sole agents” is discussed further in section 2.3.4 in con-
nection with the treatment of “related parties” under the Agreement.

(c) A “single undertaking”

What was given by developing countries in exchange for developed coun-
tries’ agreement to these two decisions? To the extent there was a quid pro
quo requested, it was only this: the negotiating group insisted that it should be
explicitly recognized that these decisions were agreed “in the expectation that
consideration of accession to the Customs Valuation Code will be facilitated
and therefore participation in the Code will be increased.”54

53
“With respect to sole concessionaires and discounts, while understanding the revenue concerns and
that the Code might provide an unfamiliar method of valuation for those who had been used to the
[BDV], [one delegation] believed strongly that it was not possible to combine elements of those two
fundamentally different systems. A number of delegations shared these views.” Group of Negotiations
on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on MTN Agreements and Arrangements, Meeting of 1 June
1990, MTN.GNG/NG8/18 (June 14, 1990).
54
Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT), Negotiating Group on MTN Agreements and Arrangements,
Meeting of 29–30 October 1990, MTN.GNG/NG8/22 (November 1, 1990).

20
 Introduction

In fact, the “increased participation” in the Customs Valuation Agreement

sought by the valuation negotiating group was ultimately achieved by the
successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round overall. This was the implica-
tion of the “Single Undertaking” principle that was agreed at the outset of the
Uruguay Round by the GATT contracting parties as the basis for their negoti-
ations on goods.55 Whereas the Tokyo Round allowed GATT contracting par-
ties to pick and choose the multilateral agreements they wished to sign, the
Uruguay Round’s “Single Undertaking” principle required WTO Members to
accept or reject the results of the negotiations as a whole, including all of the
multilateral agreements.56
The Uruguay Round Customs Valuation Agreement – set out as an annex to
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization –
was formally agreed on April 15, 1994 by the 123 governments that partic-
ipated in the negotiations. The Agreement entered into force on January 1,
1995 and is, therefore, binding on each WTO Member (subject, of course, to
any reservation they might have made under the terms of the Agreement; see
section 4.4, below).

(d) Dispute settlement

The text of the GATT Valuation Code was not changed in any substantive
respect in the Uruguay Round, with the important exception of the dispute
settlement provisions.
The GATT Valuation Code included a self-contained, elaborate mechan-
ism for resolution of disputes between signatories on valuation matters. It
provided the GATT Valuation Committee with authority to investigate and
establish panels of experts to adjudicate parties’ disputes, to obtain advice
from the Technical Committee where technical issues were presented, as well
as to enforce panel recommendations. The efficacy of this procedure was never
tested, as the GATT valuation signatories brought no disputes to the GATT
Valuation Committee during the lifetime of the code.57
The dispute procedures defined under the GATT Valuation Code were
largely replaced by the Uruguay Round’s Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes, which WTO Members have
agreed shall apply to all WTO agreements, valuation included. Some additional

55
“The launching, the conduct and the implementation of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated
as parts of a single undertaking.” GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Min.Dec.
(September 20, 1986).
56
“The [Customs Valuation and other Multilateral Agreements] … are integral parts of this Agreement,
binding on all Members.” Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article
II:2.
57
This is according to the GATT Secretariat’s Annual Review of Implementation and Operation of the
Agreement recorded from 1981 until the termination of the Tokyo Round code in 1996.

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A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

provisions that are specific to valuation dispute processing do remain part of

the WTO Valuation Agreement; these mainly concern the role of the Technical
Committee and its use by WTO panels in the dispute settlement process.
The WTO dispute settlement process is further discussed in section 5.3.

1.3 AGREEMENT OVERVIEW

1.3.1 The WTO standard – transaction value

The WTO Customs Valuation Agreement is based on a “positive” as opposed

to a “normative” economic principle: what the value of the goods is, rather
than what the value of the goods should be, is taken as the correct customs
value. Thus, the Agreement’s primary basis of valuation is “transaction value”
which is “the price actually paid or payable” by the buyer for the imported
goods. If the sale was freely negotiated (and the Agreement contains rules for
valuation of sales that are not), the price the buyer pays the seller can be said
to best represent the actual, market value of the product, and should be used
for customs purposes. In other words, it is the buyer and seller, each acting in
their own self-interest to maximize their profit, who will determine the customs
value of the imported goods.
Apart from economic principle, customs valuation based on the price nego-
tiated by the buyer and seller provides certain practical advantages for both
traders and for customs authorities:
• it is transparent, predictable in application, and less open to
discretion
• it conforms closely to real commercial practice
• it can be administered based on ordinary commercial records, nor-
mally available in the country of importation, without requiring
importers and exporters to create and keep additional records only for
customs.

1.3.2 Structure of the Agreement

The WTO Valuation Agreement is comprised of twenty-four articles plus three

annexes.
The technical rules of customs valuation are set out in Articles 1–8 of the
Agreement. The remaining articles of the Agreement mainly concern the
implementation in national legislation and practice (e.g. rights of appeal and
publication requirements, importer’s rights to notifications and release of
goods pending valuation, etc.), as well as the settlement of valuation disputes

22
 Introduction

between WTO Members, and the administration and review of the Agreement
by the WTO Valuation Committee and Technical Committee.

Agreement outline
Articles 1–8 – Valuation methods
Article 9 – Rules for converting currency
Article 10 – Confidentiality of valuation information
Article 11 – Importer’s rights of appeal against customs decisions
Article 12 – Publication requirement
Article 13 – Importer’s right to release of imported goods, pending customs final
decision
Article 14 – Legal effect of Interpretative Notes (Annex I) and other annexes
Article 15 – Definitions
Article 16 – Importer’s right to an explanation from customs
Article 17 – Customs right to question importers on value
Article 18 – Establishes WTO and WCO Committees
Article 19 – Dispute settlement
Article 20 – Special/differential treatment available to developing countries
Article 21 – No reservations without Member’s consent
Article 22 – National legislation to conform to Agreement
Article 23 – WTO Committee annual review
Article 24 – Appoints WTO Secretariat
Annex I – Interpretative Notes
Annex II – Technical (WCO) Committee responsibilities and procedures
Annex III – Reservations and concessions allowed developing countries

Annex I of the Agreement contains the important Interpretative Notes. These,

as well as the General Introductory Commentary elaborate the meaning of
key terms of the Agreement (e.g. “price actually paid or payable,” “identical
goods,” “similar goods,” “related parties”), provide examples of how valuation
methods should be applied to particular cases, and provide a general explan-
ation of the overall purposes of the Agreement.
The commentary and interpretative notes were negotiated during the Tokyo
Round at the same time as the articles of the Agreement itself58 and thus may
be said to indicate a contemporaneous view of the drafters’ intentions. By vir-
tue of Article 14 of the Agreement, the Interpretative Notes are to be consid-
ered an “integral” part of the Agreement, and the articles of the Agreement are
to be read and applied in conjunction with these notes.
Annex II of the Agreement defines the role, responsibility, and working
procedures of the Technical Committee vis-à-vis the administration of the

58
See e.g. GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group “Non-Tariff Measures” Sub-Group “Customs
Matters,” Customs Valuation: Revision, MTN/NTM/W/175/Rev.1 (November 6, 1978) (draft code
circulated by delegations).

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A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

Agreement. Annex III of the Agreement contains provisions that define rights
of developing country Members to delay or make reservations against appli-
cation of certain provisions of the Agreement. As noted above, this Annex III
restates the Protocol to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII that
was negotiated in the Tokyo Round.

1.3.3 Primacy of transaction value

The General Introductory Commentary to the Agreement states that

“the primary basis for customs value under this Agreement is ‘transaction
value’ as defined in Article 1.” The Agreement’s Preamble further states that
Members should recognize “that the basis for valuation of goods for customs
purposes should, to the greatest extent possible, be the transaction value of
the goods being valued.”
In fact, many customs administrations apply the transaction value method to
more than 90 percent of their imports.59

1.3.4 Alternative methods of value

In addition to transaction value, the Agreement defines five alternative valu-

ation methods:
• transaction value of identical goods (Article 2)
• transaction value of similar goods (Article 3)
• deductive value (Article 5)
• computed value (Article 6)
• residual or fallback method (Article 7).
Because transaction value is “primary,” these methods should be used only if it
is not possible to establish a customs value under Article 1.
Unlike some valuation systems of the past, the WTO Agreement’s six valu-
ation methods are to be applied strictly in sequential order rather than concur-
rently. That is, customs authorities must attempt to appraise imports first using
the transaction value method. If – and only if – a transaction value cannot

59
See GATT Committee on Customs Valuation, First Annual Review of the Implementation
and Operation of the Agreement: Background Document by the Secretariat, VAL/W/4/Rev.1
(November 17, 1981) (use of various valuation methods by seven GATT Members, including the
countries of the EEC); GATT Committee on Customs Valuation, Use of Valuation Methods by
Parties: Addendum (Norway), VAL/W/5/Add.8 (March 25, 1982); GATT Committee on Customs
Valuation, Minutes of the Meeting Held on 10–11 November 1983, VAL/M/8, (January 18, 1984)
(paragraph 49).

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 Introduction

be determined for reasons defined in Article 1, then appraisement must be

attempted under Article 2 – transaction value of identical merchandise. If that
is not possible, then valuation under the Article 3 method must be tried, and so
on, through to Article 7.
There is one exception to this sequence: under Article 4 of the Agreement
an importer may request customs to apply Article 6 (computed value) before
Article 5 (deductive value). See section 3.2, below.

1.3.5 Limits of the Agreement

Although the general principles expressed in GATT Article VII – which

the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement implements – refer to imports
and exports, the valuation methods defined in the Agreement refer only to
imported goods.

GATT Article VII

The CONTRACTING PARTIES recognize the validity of the general principles
of valuation set forth in the following paragraphs of this Article, and they under-
take to give effect to such principles, in respect of all products subject to duties
or other charges or restrictions on importation and exportation based upon or
regulated in any manner by value.
WTO Customs Valuation Agreement Article 1
The customs value of imported goods shall be the transaction value …

Incidentally, what if there is a conflict between the terms of the WTO Valuation
Agreement and the terms of GATT Article VII? Which has priority? An inter-
pretative note to the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
indicates that the WTO Valuation Agreement “shall prevail to the extent of the
conflict.”60 This question, however, has not yet been examined in WTO panel
or appellate body decisions.
Finally, as stated in the Preamble to the Agreement, Customs administra-
tions may not use the WTO valuation rules to “combat dumping.” Imports are
“dumped” when a company exports at a price lower than the price it charges
in its home market, and causes injury to competing industries in the importing
country.
A separate WTO agreement – the Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the GATT (otherwise known as the Agreement on Anti-Dumping) –
defines the rights and obligations of WTO Members who wish to take action

60
General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.

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A Handbook on WTO Customs Valuation Agreement

against dumped imports. A country should not misuse the WTO Customs
Valuation Agreement (by, for example, rejecting the declared price) to deal
with dumping, rather than following the detailed procedures laid out in the
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. As strange as it may seem, for purposes of
customs valuation, the price of a dumped import may be in fact an acceptable
transaction value!

26