Upon defeating the Republicans in 1939, Francisco Franco initiated a dictatorship which

would last 36 years, one marked by bloodshed, compulsory Catholicism, and control.

Considering the length of his rule, it is perhaps unsurprising that the nature of his regime

‘underwent significant changes’ (Ross 79) from its start to Franco’s death in 1975. The

period from 1939 until the end of the Second World War marks some of the regime’s

harshest persecution and intense promotion of Spanish nationalism; however, Spain after

1959 shows apparent differences from its beginnings.

Nevertheless, we might ask, to which extent were these changes a reflection of

developing global affairs, and to which extent were they based on evolutions within Franco’s

own ideologies and directions for Spain? It seems that the alteration of Franco’s regime can

be significantly attributed to external stimuli, such as the beginning and end of the Second

World War, the Cold War, and global economic and social post-war trends. In light of this,

many of the regime’s shifts resulted from circumstances outside Spain rather than purposeful

modifications directed by Franco. This essay will examine some critical elements of Franco’s

rule from 1939 until the early 1940s and compare them later with the subsequent changes

from 1942 onwards. Mainly, it will consider Franco’s initial semi-fascist rhetoric, notions of

a Spanish autarky, and the economy in line with world events or ‘stimuli.’ Finally, these will

be juxtaposed with transformations made in these respective categories in response to

international politics, such as the Cold War and the defeat of fascism. 

Franco’s ascent to power in 1939 extended one of the bloodiest times Spain had ever

encountered. Those who disappeared without a trace, either killed or captured, amount to ten

times the disappearances under Pinochet’s Chile (Preston 305). In an effort to stamp out

Republicanism and any trace of communism, Spain underwent a violent purge led by the

regime, coupled with the intense persecution of liberals. The regime relegated left-wing

Spaniards of any form into a ‘subhuman’ category, ostensibly justifying Franco’s ‘sweeping
physical, economic and psychological repression’ (305). The regime sought to undo any

advancements of the Second Republic, therefore placing all organisations under government

control while prioritising the interests of social elites (Romero Salvadó 126) and unifying

Spain under ‘cultural homogeneity’ (Conversi 109). This included a vicious attack on

regionalism, including a systematic oppression of Catalanism, which could never be

reconciled with a Francoist vision of the Spanish national identity (Nash 294). This was

perhaps the regime’s most authentic form, one whose sole purpose was to purify and control

Spain through a crushing authoritarian rule while establishing a concrete, indisputable

Spanish identity without a shred of ethnopolitics or subculture. Reinforcement of these

ideologies and the regime’s policies were often carried out by the Falange Española de las

Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (Spanish Phalanx of the Councils of the National

Syndicalist Offensive) –a useful pawn at the time. Repurposed by Franco after the death of

its original leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the Falange were Spain’s local ‘version of

fascism’ (Ross 81), an element that Franco wished to capitalise on while the Axis powers

dominated the World War. Many parts of Franco’s regime up until 1942 had overt fascist

implications, ranging from the blue Falange uniform, the compulsory fascist salute and

stringent censorship to Franco’s self-declared Spanish ‘New state’ (81, 82).

While technically neutral, Franco aimed to place Spain in what he believed was the

winning camp at the outset of the Second World War. This raises questions about whether

this affiliation with fascism was part of Franco’s original intent for Spain or simply a reaction

to global occurrences. Though the regime was not fascist, it must be acknowledged that Spain

took a semi-fascist direction in 1939. However, this move towards a fascist-style regime

could also have been one of convenience. After all, it was much easier to reconcile his

‘reactionary dictatorship’ (81) with the Axis’ principles of fascism than the Allies’

democratic policies. Moreover, many elements of fascism were already in harmony with
Franco’s nationalistic vision of a clear Spanish identity, the regime’s violent suppression of

any opposition, and government control of commerce and industry.

In addition, an undercurrent of fascism also affected the Spanish economy of the late

30s and early 40s, boosted by the rhetoric of Spanish auto-sufficiency, inherent strength and

overseas conspiracies against the regime itself (87,88). This tied in with the regime’s push for

autarky – another potential affiliation with Nazi Germany – as it involved the notion of a self-

sustaining economy, isolated from global affairs and independent from foreign interference.

Still, this is another instance where Franco could have taken advantage of the harmony

between his own ideas for Spain and the fascist principles Germany had incorporated.

Independently of world events or stimuli, Franco was determined to reinvent the greatness of

the past sixteenth century, rid Spain of ‘symbols of modernity’ (Preston 320) and insist on its

natural abundance, indicating that the country would not need economic or material aid to

survive. However, Franco’s vision of a self-reliant Spanish economy never coincided with

reality; deaths from starvation and malnutrition marked the 1940s, so much so that they

became known as the ‘years of hunger’ (Morcillo 178). In fact, by the end of the 1940s,

Franco’s self-sufficient regime had garnered Spain the title of a Third World country by the

United Nations (Ross 82).

 Alongside the concept of autarky and national isolation, Spain before the 1960s was

characterised by ‘extreme cultural isolation’ (Nash 293), where censorship, control of media

and propaganda were not unlike that of Stalin’s Soviet Union. Anti-republican and anti-

communist propaganda, as well as the glorification of sixteenth-century Spain, praise for

Franco and his regime dominated the press, cinemas, and books (Folch-Serra 228,232). At

the same time, cultural and regional variety was utterly prohibited - especially in Catalunya

and the Basque country (I.A.L. 399). This led to a lack of authentic cultural representation, as

Spain was historically multicultural and ethnically diverse, and it also meant it remained
isolated from external cultural influences. During these years, regime intervention in the

economy involved soaring tariffs and heavy restrictions on international investment,

effectively shutting Spain off from foreign capital and tourism. Extortionate currency

exchange rates and ‘large barriers to free travel’ (Pack 6) dissuaded many from visiting, and

international travel agencies were only permitted to consult with specific licensed Spanish

agencies. This ensured that all fees would be paid in foreign currencies and that tour groups

would be directed to nationalist zones where there was less visible damage and hardship

resulting from the regime and civil war (5,6). It is clear that in the 1940s, Franco’s regime

pushed for Spanish homogeneity and insulation even at the cost of stunting the country

economically, socially, and culturally during this period.  

The world scene encountered more dramatic changes with the attack on Pearl Harbour

towards the end of 1941, spurring America to join the World War. This set off a chain of

events that ultimately spelt disaster for the Axis powers. In spite of his regime’s fascist

inclination, by 1942, Franco perhaps realised that he had misjudged the future outcome. From

1942 onwards, the regime scrambled to find ways to minimise all it had previously promoted,

from eradicating the use of the fascist salute, relinquishing the term ‘New State’, and

diminishing the Falange’s prominence (Ross 83). Despite holding fast to extreme Spanish

nationalism, Franco’s regime now had the task of finding ways to align itself – however

insincerely – to some semblance of democracy. Rather than edging nearer to fascism, Franco

aimed to distance himself from it, even reinstating the Spanish Parliament with the 1942

‘creation of Parliament Act’ (83). Still, the vast majority of its members were chosen by

Franco himself, with the primary purpose of presenting the illusion of change to the outside

world (Conversi 115). The Falange was also rebranded into the Nationalist Movement

(Britannica para.4) with the goal of eliminating any resemblance to fascism. Franco’s facade

of quasi-liberalist progression involved the unthinkable from a 1939 perspective - allowing

banned Catalan literature began to resurface slowly beginning in 1946 (Conversi 115,116).

Small cracks of hope appeared, enabling a clandestine resurgence of Catalan culture bolstered

by the victory of democracy in Europe (117). However, the regime was by no means over,

and Franco still held fast to his anti-regionalist, pro-nationalist vision of Spain. Nevertheless,

uncontrollable world events stimulated the dictator to re-fashion his regime, at least on the

outside, which inevitably chipped away at some of the unshakable cornerstones of his

regime. 

Yet another event beyond Spanish borders was to reshape the regime in

unprecedented ways. With the initiation of the Cold War in 1947, America found Spain to be

an ideal potential military base for long-range strikes against the Soviet Bloc (Ross 88).

Despite being refused admission into the UN based on its allegiance to Nazi Germany,

Franco’s Spain found itself unexpectedly in the spotlight. All notions of autarky and

militaristic self-sufficiency were waved away with America’s promise of a treaty, which

came to be known as the Pact Of Madrid in 1953. Spain had suddenly acquired the world’s

most powerful ally at the time, breaking the regime away from the international isolation it

had sought for itself in earlier years. In addition, the economy under the regime suddenly

soared with the influx of American financial and military aid, the slight relaxation of trade

restrictions, and pre-war levels of growth were finally achieved (88).

Nevertheless, another unthinkable shift occurred. Spain was now heavily indebted to

America, leaving the regime subject to any pressures the superpower might impose. With

growing trade gaps and skyrocketing import bills, Spain’s situation became precarious once

more — causing the US to persuade the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation

(OEEC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to loan Spain funds. Yet, this assistance

was conditional; Spain had to eliminate the multiple exchange rate system that restricted
imports (Ross 89). By the late 1950s, not only had the regime accepted international aid and

capital – which had previously been anathema – but it also consciously agreed to the

devaluation of the Spanish currency. By 1958, Spain had joined the OEEC and, within

several years, was acting in harmony with West-European customs procedures, facilitating

another unlikely phenomenon within the regime – tourism and foreign cultural influence

(Pack 7). The opening up of Spain to foreigners and their customs was incompatible with the

regime’s initial focus on the past, traditionality, and autarky. Evidently, post-1959, Spain

could no longer follow the same rhythm as it had in 1939, and the regime gradually began to

modernise itself in certain areas along with the European demand. 

Much of the regime’s evolution can be assigned to chance occurrences outside of

Spain. Franco’s regime could have taken a different direction if the Allies had never won the

war. If fascism had prevailed in Europe, there might never have been a need for Franco’s

dictatorship to evolve as it did. Had America never sought out Spain, the regime may not

have become as susceptible to liberal changes. Nevertheless, although Spain in 1975 was

markedly different from the country in 1939, Franco’s essential nature and ideology had not

altered. Brutality and arrests characterised the regime even in its latest stages, and until the

very end, regionalism was officially prohibited, and the polarisation of the civil war was

encouraged (Preston 305). Still, alongside Franco’s personal decision-making, which directly

affected Spain’s fate, it cannot be negated that outside events beyond Franco’s control greatly

impacted his regime. 

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Estella". Encyclopedia Britannica, 20 Apr. 2022,

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Conversi, Daniele. The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist

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Folch-Serra, Mireya. “Propaganda in Franco’s Time.” Bulletin of Spanish Studies, Routledge,

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Morcillo, Aurora G. “(In)Visible Acts of Resistance in the Twilight of the Franco Regime: A

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