Journal of Risk Research

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Risk governance

Marjolein B.A. van Asselt & Ortwin Renn

To cite this article: Marjolein B.A. van Asselt & Ortwin Renn (2011) Risk governance, Journal of
Risk Research, 14:4, 431-449, DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2011.553730

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Journal of Risk Research
Vol. 14, No. 4, April 2011, 431–449

Risk governance
Marjolein B.A. van Asselta* and Ortwin Rennb
a
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands;
b
Institut für Socialwissenschaften, University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart, Germany
(Received 27 May 2010; final version received 8 January 2011)
Taylor and Francis
RJRR_A_553730.sgm

Journal
10.1080/13669877.2011.553730
1366-9877
Original
Taylor
02011
00
Professor
marijke.hermans@maastrichtuniversity.nl
000002011
&ofArticle
Francis
Marjoleinvan
Risk
(print)/1466-4461
ResearchAsselt(online)

The term ‘governance’ has been used in political science to describe the multitude
of actors and processes that lead to collective binding decisions. The term ‘risk
governance’ involves the translation of the substance and core principles of
governance to the context of risk-related decision-making. Does it involve a major
change on how risks are conceptualized, managed, and communicated, or it is just
a new fashion? In this paper, we aim to delineate the genesis and analytical scope
of risk governance. In our view, risk governance pertains to the various ways in
which many actors, individuals, and institutions, public and private, deal with risks
surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity. It emphasizes that not
all risks are simple; they cannot be calculated as a function of probability and
effect. It is more than a descriptive shorthand for a complex, interacting network
in which collective binding decisions are taken around a particular set of societal
issues. The ambition is that risk governance provides a conceptual as well as
normative basis for how to deal responsibly with uncertain, complex, and/or
ambiguous risks in particular. We propose to synthesize the body of scholarly
ideas and proposals on the governance of systemic risks in a set of principles: the
communication and inclusion principle, the integration principle, and the
reflection principle. This set of principles should be read as a synthesis of what
needs to be seriously considered in organizing structures and processes to govern
risks.
Keywords: risk governance; uncertainty; complexity; ambiguity; paradigm shift

1. Introduction
A new proposal in professional risk assessment and management communities is to
combine the terms ‘governance’ and ‘risk’ into the compound ‘risk governance’. Does
this shift signal a major change on how risks are conceptualized, managed, and
communicated, or it is just a new fashion? In this paper, we aim to delineate what risk
governance is all about.
The term ‘governance’ has been used in political science to describe the multitude
of actors and processes that lead to collective binding decisions. Governing choices in
modern societies is generally conceptualized as an interplay between governmental
institutions, economic forces, and civil society actors (such as NGOs). As most defi-
nitions state, governance embodies a horizontally organized structure encompassing
state and non-state actors bringing about collectively binding decisions without
superior authority (c.f. Rosenau 1992; Wolf 2002). In this perspective, non-state

*Corresponding author. Email: marjolein.vanasselt@maastrichtuniversity.nl

ISSN 1366-9877 print/ISSN 1466-4461 online

© 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2011.553730
http://www.informaworld.com
432 M.B.A. van Asselt and O. Renn

actors play an increasingly relevant role due to their decisive advantages of

information and resources compared to single states.
The term ’risk governance’ involves the translation of the substance and core
principles of governance to the context of risk and risk-related decision-making
(IRGC 2005; Renn 2008; Renn and Walker 2008). It refers to a body of scholarly
ideas on how to deal with demanding public risks. These ideas have been informed by
40 years of interdisciplinary research drawing from sociological and psychological
research on risk, Science and Technology Studies (STS) and research by policy scien-
tists and legal scholars.1 This body of knowledge provides a convincing, theoretically
demanding, and empirically sound basis to argue that many risks cannot be calculated
on the basis of probability and effects alone and that regulatory models which build
on that assumption are not just inadequate, but constitute an obstacle to responsibly
dealing with risk. In our view, risk governance pertains to the various ways in which
many actors, individuals, and institutions, public and private, deal with risks
surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity.2 It includes formal institu-
tions and regimes and informal arrangements. It refers to the totality of actors, rules,
conventions, processes, and mechanisms concerned with how relevant risk informa-
tion is collected, analyzed, and communicated, and how regulatory decisions are taken
(IRGC 2005, 2007; van Asselt 2007). However, risk governance is more than just a
descriptive shorthand for a complex, interacting network in which collective binding
decisions are taken around a particular set of societal issues. The ambition is that risk
governance provides a conceptual as well as normative basis for how to deal respon-
sibly with uncertain, complex and/or ambiguous risks in particular.
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the further conceptual development of risk
governance. To that end, we first describe the birth of the concept. We will also
discuss the broader concept of governance to provide a sufficient basis for applying
and specifying this concept to complex risk situations. How is governance inter-
preted? We will argue that central to risk governance is the recognition that many risks
reach beyond the notion of exposure to a hazard and the experience of harm (simple
causation). Many risks are pervaded with uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity.
What is needed to treat uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks adequately? We
propose to synthesize the various ideas and proposals pertaining to risk governance in
a set of principles: the communication and inclusion principle, the integration princi-
ple, and the reflection principle. This set of principles should be read as a synthesis of
what seems wise to consider in organizing structures and processes to govern risks.

2. The birth of risk governance

The notion ‘risk governance’ has been coined only recently. The origins of the compo-
sition ‘risk governance’ and its introduction to the scholarly literature can be traced
back to different sources. Most notably, however, is the link to ‘TRUSTNET-
concerted action on risk governance’ (Amendola 2001; Elliott 2001; Heriard-Dubreuil
et al. 2002). This was a three-year (1997–1999) program with seminars financed by
the European Commission. In total, about 80 people from a wide range of disciplines
(technical, natural, and social sciences) and societal sectors (industry, policy-makers,
regulators, and civil servants) participated. Next to the seminars, a number of so-called
‘mini case studies’ (Elliott 2001) were performed in order to get some overview on
how various European countries deal with local, national, and transboundary risks
(Amendola 2001).
 Journal of Risk Research 433

In 2001, the first articles with risk governance in its title appeared in peer-reviewed
scientific journals, namely the Journal of Hazardous Materials (Heriard-Dubreuil
2001) and Science and Culture (Elliott 2001). The article ‘Present challenges to risk
governance’ authored by Gilles Heriard-Dubreuil, which was included in a special
issue called ‘Risk and Governance’, can be characterized as a summary of the
conclusions and insights from the TRUSTNET project. Dave Elliott’s paper ‘Risk
governance: Is consensus a con?’ is a critical discussion of the conclusions drawn in
the context of TRUSTNET. Neither one of them, however, provides a definition of
risk governance, notwithstanding the fact that it is discussed in terms of a new para-
digm (see also Amendola 2001; Heriard-Dubreuil et al. 2002). Only it is clear that the
notion ‘risk governance’ is introduced in opposition to the classical notions of risk
assessment and risk management. Risk governance is apparently different. The issues
discussed in the above-mentioned early papers on risk governance involve the
complexity of modern risks, the role of science and experts, and the importance of
trust and stakeholder participation. The notion ‘risk governance’ has been further
endorsed by the successor to TRUSTNET, namely TRUSTNET-IN-ACTION
(www.trustnetinaction.com), a network of experts, presenting itself as a think tank in
the field of risk, environmental and health issues, financially supported by the
European Union (EU).
The notion ‘risk governance’ appeared also in the European Commission’s
Science & Society action plan (2001); Section 3.2. is entitled ‘Risk governance’, with
reference to TRUSTNET. As discussed above, in the TRUSTNET context risk
governance was propagated as an alternative paradigm. The commission, however,
used risk governance more traditionally as an umbrella notion ‘embracing risk
identification, assessment, management, and communication’. Also in the EU sixth
framework program, a call for research proposals entitled ‘risk governance and ethics’
was launched. Against this background, it is no surprise that a number of EU-financed
projects, such as MIDIR (midir.eu), RISKGOV (www.riskgov.com), SAFE FOODS
(www.safefoods.nl) and the Marie Curie research training networks Mountain Risks
(mountain-risks.eu), and GoverNat (Governance of Natural Resources), entertained
the notion ‘risk governance’.
So risk governance is a notion introduced to the academic discourse via European
networks on risk at the turn of the millennium. It is rooted in transdisciplinary work
in the interface between risk assessment, risk management, regulatory sciences, and
policy analysis, especially at the level of the EU. It is important to stress that other
endeavors preceding TRUSTNET in a way paved the way for coining the notion. The
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) work on
systemic risk (OECD 2003) and the Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin (2001) book on the
government of risk are examples of key trailblazers.
In the early days, the notion ‘risk governance’ was proposed, however, in a rather
loose way. It was used as a label, without explicit consideration of the content. Risk
governance was more a notion than a concept. It has been brought to a new level by
the establishment of International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) in 2003. IRGC,
based in Switzerland, presents itself as an independent think tank, aiming to contribute
to ‘the anticipation and governance of global, systemic risk’ (www.irgc.org). It estab-
lished a working group under the chairmanship of Ortwin Renn who also participated
in TRUSTNET and mandated the group to write a White Paper on risk governance.
This White Paper, which appeared in 2005, is the first scholarly effort to develop risk
governance conceptually.3 The paper is also published as lead chapter in the book
434 M.B.A. van Asselt and O. Renn

Global Risk Governance: Concept and Practice using the IRGC Framework (Renn
and Walker 2008; see also similar chapters in Bouder, Slavin, and Löfstedt (2007) and
Bischof (2008)), in which next to the framework itself critical reviews and case studies
have been included. Subsequently, some agencies and national regulatory bodies have
partially adopted the framework and designed manuals of how to use it for their
specific purpose (Dreyer and Renn for EFSA 2009 and the handbook for risk assess-
ment and policy advice of the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority
[version 10 July, 2009]). In 2007, the first chair in Risk Governance was established
at Maastricht University, the Netherlands.

3. Governance
Risk governance as an emerging concept should be understood also in the context of
the broader ‘governance’-turn in the policy sciences (Versluis 2003). The notion
‘governance’ came into fashion in the 1980s in circles engaged with development
(Stern 2000) and was soon adopted in other domains. During the last decade, the term
has experienced tremendous popularity in the literature in the fields of, among others,
international relations, various policy sciences (among others in subfields referred to
as European studies and comparative political science), and environmental studies and
risk research. The idea of governance has been (re-)introduced4 to enlarge the
perspective on policy and politics by acknowledging that government is not the only,
and may be not even the most important, actor5 in managing and organizing society.
The shift to governance is best understood as response to new challenges, such as
globalization, increased international cooperation (such as the EU), societal changes,
including the increased engagement of citizens and the rise of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), changing role of the private sector, an augmenting complexity
of policy issues, and the resulting difficulty in taking decisions with confidence and
legitimacy (Pierre and Peters 2000; Walls et al. 2005).
Many classical policy theories share a hierarchic orientation with government as
the central actor. In policy theories – inspired by economics – that central role is
awarded to the market. Both clusters of theories are single-actor in their perspective
on power and control. That is different in the governance perspective. In that view,
collective binding decisions are generated and implemented in complex multi-actor
networks and processes. Power is distributed, as multi-actor networks involve a wide
variety of actors. The governance perspective considers also various social actors
next to state and market, including new civic actors, such as NGOs and ad hoc coali-
tions of civilians, of whom it is unclear who their supporters are and whom they
represent. This view also includes the role of non-elected actors, such as civil
servants, experts, think tanks, and all kinds of committees active in various ways in
policy processes. The governance perspective thus draws attention to the diversity of
actors, the diversity of their roles, the manifold relationships between them, and all
kind of dynamic networks emerging from these relationships. Scholars subscribing to
the governance perspective examine actor-networks, the dynamics, and the roles of
the various actors in these dynamics as a way to understand policy development and
political decisions.
Some authors differentiate between horizontal and vertical governance (Benz and
Eberlein 1999; Lyall and Tait 2004). The horizontal level includes relevant actors in
decision-making processes within a defined geographical or functional segment (such
as all relevant actors within a community, region, nation, or continent). The vertical
 Journal of Risk Research 435

level describes the links between these segments (such as the institutional relation-
ships between the local, regional, state, and international levels). When various levels
are involved, which is often the case, the notion ‘multi-level governance’ is advanced.
In such a context also, ‘government’ is no longer a single entity (Rauschmayer,
Paavola, and Wittmer 2009).
The notion ‘governance’ is used both in a descriptive and in a normative sense. In
a descriptive use of the term, the idea of a complex web of manifold interactions
between heterogeneous actors is used to describe the current state of affairs in general
terms or to describe and understand the state of affairs pertaining to a particular policy
dossier or policy domain. Governance is then an observation and an approach. The
description of governance as structures and processes for collective decision-making
involving governmental and non-governmental actors (Hagendijk and Irwin 2006;
Keohane and Nye 2000) is an example of a descriptive definition. In a normative use,
the notion of governance refers to a model or framework for organizing and managing
society. In the famous 2001 White Paper of the European Commission on governance,
such a normative perspective is propagated. In the White Paper, which can be read as
a response to the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, governance is
presented as an alternative model, in which transparency, stakeholder participation,
accountability, and policy coherence are key principles. Also the definition of gover-
nance as ‘a horizontally organized structure of functional self-regulation encompassing
state and non-state actors bringing about collectively binding decisions without supe-
rior authority’ (Rosenau 1992; Wolf 2002) hints at treating governance in terms of a
normative model (horizontally organized, self-regulation, and egalitarian) for how
societal decision-making should be organized. Often this distinction between descrip-
tion (of the state of affairs) and (policy) model is not made, with the consequence that
it is unclear whether governance serves as reference to the framework guiding the
analysis, or whether it has the status of a (proposed) policy theory.
This is true also for risk governance. The term is used both in a descriptive and in
a normative sense. We would like to argue that the interdisciplinary body of literature
on risk endorses that the state of affairs pertaining to the regulation of many risks is
adequately described in terms of governance. Decisions about risks are taken in
complex webs of actors, rules, conventions, processes, mechanisms, institutional
arrangements, and political cultures. Risk decisions can be understood only as the
upshot of complex interplays between multiple actors. The governance perspective is
needed to sensibly examine and explain the societal dynamics around issues framed
as risk issues. So risk governance ‘combines two concepts that are apparently sepa-
rate, but belong instead to spheres of investigation and practical interest that are
strictly intertwined and partially overlapping’ (de Marchi 2003, 171).
However, many of the authors, more or less explicitly, argue that in regulatory
practice this state of affairs is not adequately accommodated. They emphasize that the
nature of many risks requires cooperation, coordination, and trust between a range of
stakeholders who have diverging interests and different perceptions of the (potential)
risks involved. These scholars, loud and clear or in more diplomatic terms, contend
also that otherwise risks are not responsibly managed, with Ulrich Beck’s notion of
‘organised irresponsibility’6 as probably the most radical stance (1992). So a number
of these scholars propagate ideas, principles, or frameworks for how to deal with risks
in a more adequate and more responsible manner. Many of them do so without using
the term ‘risk governance’ explicitly. We take the liberty to synthesize their proposals
under the capture of risk governance. In doing so, governance is used no longer only
436 M.B.A. van Asselt and O. Renn

in a descriptive, but also in a normative sense. It proposes a new form, or at least new
principles, of handling risks. So in this paper, risk governance is a hybrid of an analyt-
ical frame and a normative model. Another example of such a hybrid can be found in
decision theory where the various stages of decision-making, that the theory suggests,
can be used as a checklist of how decisions are made (descriptive use), and at the same
time functions as a guideline of how to organize the decision process when complex
decision have to be made (normative model) (Keeney 1992, 2004a; North 1968).

4. The nature of risk

Central to risk governance is the recognition that there are various types of risk. Or as
the Dutch Health Council phrased it back in 1995: ‘Not all risks are equal’. Since the
economist Knight (1921) presented his definition of risk in the early twentieth
century, risks have been treated in terms of probability and effects, dose and response,
and agent and consequences. This dominant framing of risk is underlying what has
been referred to as the technocratic, decisionistic, and economic models of risk assess-
ment and management (c.f. Löfstedt 2005; Millstone et al. 2004). However, this
framing of risk assumes that risks can be captured by a simple cause (or dose)-
response model. For simple risks, the cause for the risk is indeed well known, the
potential negative consequences are obvious, the uncertainty is low, and there is
hardly any ambiguity with regard to the interpretation of the risk. Simple risks are
recurrent and not affected by ongoing or expected major changes. As a consequence,
statistics are available, and application of statistics to assess the risks in statistic terms
is meaningful. Examples involve car accidents and regularly recurring natural events,
such as seasonal flooding.
But many risks are not simple and cannot be calculated as a linear function of
probability and effects. This view on risk, shared among an increasing group of risk
scholars, explicitly challenges the idea of risk inherited from scholars as Knight
(1921) in which the use of the notion of risk is restricted to numerically defined
probability distributions (Aven and Renn 2009). Many risks are systemic (OECD
2003). The term ‘systemic’ describes the extent to which a risk is embedded in the
larger contexts of societal processes. Systemic risks require a more holistic approach
to hazard identification, risk assessment, and risk management because investigating
systemic risks goes beyond the usual agent-consequence analysis. Instead, the analysis
must focus on interdependencies and ripple and spillover effects that initiate impact
cascades between otherwise unrelated risk clusters (Hellstroem 2001). A well-known
example is BSE which had effects not only on the farming industry, but also on the
industry of animal feed, on the economy as a whole, and on politics (see De Bandt
and Hartmann 2000, 11; OECD 2003, 2f.; Renn and Keil 2009; Vos 2000). The
transmission effects were globally diffused to all areas of the world, even to those
which were not immediately affected by the crisis. Systemic risks have therefore a
growing potential of harm (see OECD 2003, 2f.) since effects can be amplified or
attenuated throughout the prolongation of effects based on a complex system of
interdependencies (see Renn 2008). Systemic risks are not confined to national
borders or a single sector and do not fit the linear, mono-causal model of risk. They
are complex (multi-causal) and surrounded by uncertainty and/or ambiguity (Klinke
and Renn 2002; Renn 2008). It is difficult to identify, let alone to quantify, multi-
causal, usually non-linear, links between a multitude of potential causal agents and
specific effects. The difficulty of measuring individual contributions when risks are
 Journal of Risk Research 437

the results from a combination of several causes is another symptom of complexity

(Roca, Gamboa, and Tàbara 2008). Complexity can be caused by interactive effects
among agents (synergisms or antagonisms), long delay periods and the associated
latency lacunae,7 inter-individual variation, etc. Due to the complexity, it is impossi-
ble to achieve complete deterministic knowledge of cause–effect relationships. Exam-
ples of complex risks involve possible failures of interconnected infrastructures.
In very general terms, risk refers to the possibility8 of damage, whether in health,
environmental, economic, or other terms. Or following the IRGC framework paper
(2005, 20–1), risk refers to tolerated or unintended consequences of purposeful human
actions which may occur that violate something that humans value. At stake is some-
thing of value to at least some humans. As long as such consequences have not mani-
fested themselves, the threat is potential. Although risk analysis can be, and has been,
used for explaining existing or even past phenomena (for example, the occurrence of
special diseases), it is also applied to characterize future consequences of activities,
decision options, or interventions (such as introducing new technology). Those assess-
ing or appraising risks pertaining to future events or consequences are necessarily
confronted with uncertainty (compare van Asselt et al. 2010). There are no future facts
(de Jouvenel 1967), and if the future would be ‘either predetermined or independent
of present human activities, the term “risk” makes no sense whatsoever’ (Rosa 2003,
55). Take the example of nanotechnologies: the risk assessment for this new techno-
logical development depends first on hypothetical ideas about causal relationships
between exposure(s) and effect(s) on human health and environment, on the decisions
that humans make about the use, application, exposure barriers, and safety culture
with respect to these technologies, and the context such as the level of trust in the
regulators, major accident(s) elsewhere, and coincidences between exposure to nano-
particles and detrimental effects. Understanding these various aspects of uncertainty
in a complex system is extremely difficult.
In addition to complexity and uncertainty, the risk governance literature mentions
a third component that is typical for systemic risks: ambiguity. This means that there
are different legitimate viewpoints from which to evaluate whether there are or could
be adverse effects and whether these risks are tolerable or even acceptable. So
ambiguity refers to the existence of multiple values. Risks are acceptable in case they
are considered low or non-existing; so, additional regulatory efforts are considered
unnecessary. Activities are tolerable if they are considered as worth pursuing for the
benefit that they carry (Bouder, Slavin, and Löfstedt 2007). In cases of tolerable risks,
additional regulatory efforts for risk reduction or coping are welcomed. Actors,
however, respond to risks according to their own risk constructs and images, yielding
several meaningful and legitimate interpretations of risk assessment outcomes
(Keeney 2004b). As a consequence, whether risks are acceptable, tolerable, or not
could be subject of considerable debate and intense controversy. Ambiguity is used to
refer to such social situations around risk issues. It results from divergent and
contested perspectives on the justification, severity, or wider meanings associated
with a perceived threat (compare Stirling 2003). As a consequence, views differ on the
ways to assess and appraise the risks, and more in particular on the relevance, mean-
ing, and implications of available risk information and on which management actions
should be considered. Examples involve controversies pertaining to passive smoking
(although the health risks of active smoking are uncontroversial).
In theory, it is possible to distinguish between uncertain, complex, and ambiguous
risks. However, uncertainty often results from complexity (van Asselt 2000). High
438 M.B.A. van Asselt and O. Renn

complexity and uncertainty favor the emergence of ambiguity. Ambiguity is usually

fuelled in case risks are uncertain and complex, as the interpretative flexibility9
increases. An illustrative example is the case of the introduction of genetically modi-
fied species in the environment. It is generally accepted that the risks to the environ-
ment and/or human beings are highly uncertain. Krayer von Kraus, Casman, and
Small (2004) and Krayer von Kraus (2005) analyzed how experts view such risks.
From his analysis detailing the varying ideas on which variables matter and which
mechanisms should be included in the causal scheme, it is also clear that GMOs
constitute an example of complex risks. Furthermore, taking into account that the risks
are evaluated differently in various political cultures, as has been convincingly
demonstrated by Jasanoff (2005), it is clearly also an example of ambiguous risks. So
risks associated with genetic modification, and agro-biotechnology in particular, are
best characterized as risks that are uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. The same is
true for such risks such as nuclear energy or climate change.10
We would like to argue that uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity point to
different reasons why many risks defy simple concepts of causation. Our ability to
understand risk ranges from putatively certain, simple, and clear to the totally
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (Rosa 2003). Consequently, simple risks should
be treated as the special case, in which uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity are low
(WRR 2009 (Dutch version: 2008); see also De Vries et al. this issue). Each of the
three characteristics of risks contributes to a better understanding of the situation in
which systemic risks emerge and manifest themselves.
Risk governance highlights the importance of uncertain,11 complex, and/or ambig-
uous risks. However, it is a consistent finding that in most of these cases, the risks are
treated, assessed, and managed as if they were simple. The assessment and manage-
ment routines in place do not do justice to the nature of such risks. The consequences
of this maltreatment range from social amplification or irresponsible attenuation of the
risk, sustained controversy, deadlocks, legitimacy problems, unintelligible decision-
making, trade conflicts, border conflicts, expensive re-bound measures, and lock-ins.
The main message from the interdisciplinary body of research on risk is that it is
urgently needed to develop better conceptual and operational approaches to under-
stand and characterize non-simple risks.

5. Risk governance principles

What is needed to treat uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks adequately?
First of all, it is important to accept scientific controversy as the state of affairs.
Secondly, in case of risks associated with a particular technology, the question
whether more acceptable alternatives are available (what Jasanoff (2005) describes
as ‘product framing’) or whether or not the technology is contested independent of
its risks (to which Jasanoff (2005) refers as ‘process framing’) needs to be tackled.
In many cases the governance of risks will involve precaution in the sense of a
cautious and flexible strategy that enables learning from restricted errors, new
knowledge, and visible effects, so that adaption, reversal, or adjustment of
regulatory measures is possible (see also De Vries et al. this issue and Van Dijk
et al this issue). Precaution entails also the responsibility for early warning and
monitoring in order to facilitate systematic searching for new hazards by institutions
of government, business, or civil society (Charnley and Elliott 2002). Governing
risks is concerned not just with minimizing the risks, but also with stimulating
 Journal of Risk Research 439

resilience (or decreasing vulnerability), in order to be able to withstand or even

tolerate surprises (Collingridge 1996).
Risk governance endorses highly contextualized practices of dealing with risks. So
it is not a model in the strict sense of the word. The idea of risk governance aims to
serve a paradigm shift that helps risk professionals to familiarize themselves with a
broader concept of risk. We propose to synthesize the various ideas and proposals in
a set of principles, which can inform thinking about how to deal with uncertain,
complex, and/or ambiguous risks in various contexts. The principles are thus not of
the command-type (‘you have to’), but they should be read as synthesis of what seems
wise to do, or at least what needs to be seriously considered, in organizing structures
and processes to govern risks.
We propose three principles:

● communication and inclusion;

● integration;
● reflection.

All three principles are discussed in more detail in the following sections. We would
also like to emphasize that the three principles – communication and inclusion, inte-
gration, and reflection – should not be considered as separate steps or stages, but as
principles that should be considered at every step or stage in the risk governance
process. Without paying attention to these principles, the term ‘risk governance’
becomes meaningless.

5.1. The communication and inclusion principle

In the context of risk governance, communication is used in the two-way sense of the
term. Effective mutual communication is one of the key challenges in risk governance.
It is not a separate stage (in contrast to how it is often treated), but central to the whole
endeavor. Positively framed, communication is at the core of any successful risk
governance activity. Negatively framed, a lack of communication destructs risk gover-
nance. Initially, risk communication has been approached in terms of educating and
persuading the public (Fischhoff 1995). However, this deficit model has been
questioned. As Pidgeon et al. (2005, 467) phrased it:

One of the most consistent messages to have arisen from social science research into risk
over the past 30 years is that risk communication … needs to accommodate far more than
a simple one-way transfer of information … the mere provision of ‘expert’ information
is unlikely to address public and stakeholder concerns or resolve any underlying societal
issues.

Research on risk controversies has demonstrated that in general the public does not,
by definition, misunderstand science and that experts and governments may also
misunderstand public perceptions (Horlick-Jones 1998; Irwin and Wynne 1996).
Furthermore, risk communication and trust are delicately interconnected processes.
Communication breakdowns may damage trust, while on the other hand, communica-
tion strategies that misjudge the context in terms of the level of, and reasons for,
(dis)trust may boomerang back and actually increase distrust (Löfstedt 2005).
Notions of communication proliferate. We refer to communication as meaning-
ful interactions in which knowledge, experiences, interpretations, concerns, and
440 M.B.A. van Asselt and O. Renn

perspectives are exchanged (c.f. Löfstedt 2003). Communication in the context of

risk governance refers to exchanges between policy-makers, experts, stakeholders
and the general public, and among themselves. The aim of communication is to
provide a better basis, also in terms of trust and social support, for responsible
governing of uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks. To that end, dependent on
the nature of the risks and the context for making governing choices, communica-
tion will serve various purposes. Communication might serve the sharing of infor-
mation about the risks and possible ways of handling them. It might support
building and sustaining trust among various actors through which particular arrange-
ments or risk management measures become acceptable. It might result in actually
involving people in risk-related decisions, through which they gain ownership.
However, communication in the context of risk governance is not simple. It is not
just a matter of bringing people together. Social learning is required in order to find
ways to discuss uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity. It is not enough that
communication is organized. The key challenge is to facilitate that various actors from
different backgrounds succeed in interacting meaningfully in the face of uncertainty,
complexity, and/or ambiguity. Communication, at the heart of the process, also does
not mean that everyone is communicating with everyone during the whole process.
Social learning is required also to figure out which type of communication with whom
is important in which phase. Furthermore, such communication requirements may
differ dependent on the context such as the political culture, the dominant social
values, and the trust-relationships between actors.
The above reflection on communication already features multiple actors. As the
term ‘governance’ implies, analyzing and managing risk cannot be confined to private
companies or regulatory agencies. It rather involves the various actors in modern
plural societies, such as governments, economic players, scientific experts, and civil
society. Inclusion means accepting that risk governance is a multi-actor process, and
it calls for facilitating this multi-actor process. The 1996 US National Research
Council report (Stern and Fineberg 1996) is generally considered an important
milestone in the recognition of the need of risk decision-making as an inclusive multi-
actor process. Scholars using the term ‘risk governance’ share the normative position
that it is good and needed to involve interested and affected parties in collective
decision-making about risk (see, e.g., de Marchi 2003; Stirling 2007).
Inclusion has deep implications. Contrary to the current state of affairs in which
risk topics are usually identified by experts, public values, and social concerns may
act as the driving agents for identifying risk topics. Inclusion does not just mean that
various actors are included, but that they play a key role in framing (or pre-assessing)
the risk (IRGC 2005; Renn 2008; see also Roca, Gamboa, and Tàbara 2008). Inclusion
should be open and adaptive at the same time (Stirling 2004). Crucial issues in this
respect are (see also Renn and Schweizer 2009):

● Who is included?
● What is included?
● What are the scope and mandate of the process?

Inclusion can take different forms: roundtables, open forums, negotiated rule-making
exercises, mediation, or mixed advisory committees, including scientists and stake-
holders (Amy 1983; Renn 2008; Rowe and Frewer 2000; Steelman and Ascher 1997;
Stoll-Kleemann and Welp 2006). Social learning is required to find out what level and
 Journal of Risk Research 441

type of inclusion are appropriate in view of the context and the type of risk, as there
is lack of agreement on methodologies; they have contrasting strengths and weak-
nesses (Pidgeon et al. 2005).
Inclusion is defended for several reasons (compare Roca, Gamboa, and Tàbara
2008). First, it is argued that in view of uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity, it
is needed to explore various sources of information and to identify various perspec-
tives. It is important to know what the various actors label as risk problems. In that
view, inclusion is a means to an end: integration of all relevant knowledge and inclu-
sion of all relevant concerns. Second, it is argued from a democratic perspective that
actors affected by the risks and/or the ways in which the risks are governed have a
right to participate in deciding about those risks. In that view, inclusion is not just a
means, but an end in itself. At the same time, inclusion is a means to agree on princi-
ples and rules that should be respected in the processes and structures of collective
decision-making. Third, it is argued that the more actors are involved in weighing the
essentially heterogeneous pros and cons, the more socially robust the outcome. When
uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity reign, there is no simple decision rule. In
that view, inclusion is also a way to organize checks and balances. Inclusion is thus
supposed to support the co-production of risk knowledge, the coordination of risk
evaluation, and the design of risk management.
Also here, social learning is required. It is not a matter of degree: more inclusion
does not equal better risk governance. The degree and type of inclusion may vary
depending on the phase and context. In each phase and context, it has to be thought
through what kind and degree of inclusion is needed. So differentiation is not an
exception, but rather the rule.
The challenge is to organize productive and meaningful communication with, and
inclusion of, a range of actors which have complementary roles and diverging interests.
The available empirical analyses suggest that the attempt to include different stake-
holders, to consider and deliberate their concerns, and to provide a platform for the
exchange of arguments can help to de-escalate conflicts and to legitimize the final deci-
sion that will always disappoint some actors in society (Beierle and Cayford 2002; US
National Research Council of the National Academies 2008). Inclusion does, however,
not necessarily reduce conflict or lead to more widely accepted decisions (Kinney and
Leschine 2002). Participation procedures themselves can become a source of conflict
(Wiedemann and Femers 1993). Not every relevant actor might be interested in partic-
ipating. Some actors might try to impose their framing on the process from the very
beginning. For example, those who consider themselves sensitive to electromagnetic
fields will insist that meetings pertaining to risks of wireless telecommunication take
place in meeting places free of electromagnetic fields. In this way, their risk-framing
gets embodied (Soneryd 2007). So it is important to accept and address conflict.
Consensus-building, in other words closure on risk assessment, evaluation and regu-
latory measures, facilitates decision-making, but in many cases conflicts cannot be
settled, nor should that be the aim. Critical evaluations12 and meta-analysis of such
evaluations are needed to learn how communication and inclusion can be effectively
organized in various contexts. Lack of evaluation will hamper such social learning.

5.2. The integration principle

Integration refers to the need to collect and synthesize all relevant knowledge and
experience from various disciplines and various sources including uncertainty
442 M.B.A. van Asselt and O. Renn

information and articulations of risk perceptions and values. Scientific expertise

should therefore not be regarded as a panacea to provide clear-cut solutions to non-
simple risk problems. Scientific knowledge plays a role in risk governance, yet it is
far away from being sufficient. Uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks cannot be
treated just in terms of likelihood (probability) and (quantifiable) effects. The
integration principle emphasizes that also values and issues such as reversibility,
persistence, ubiquity, tolerability, equity, catastrophic potential, controllability, and
voluntariness should be integrated in risk assessment and evaluation. Furthermore,
risk governance is not just about risks and usually not about a single risk. Risk gover-
nance requires risk(s)-benefit(s) evaluations and risk-risk trade-offs. The integration
principle reflects the importance of such multi-dimensional evaluations.
Systemic risks cannot be fully understood, but in order to understand them as well
as possible, it is needed to transcend disciplinary boundaries and to involve
knowledge and experience not certified as academic. It is recommended to include
experiential and often tacit (indigenous) knowledge into the analysis, and it is prudent
to reflect variability in social and cultural values, preferences, and worldviews. Such
an extended perspective will lead to a set of consistent and coherent scenarios of
future option and decision opportunities on which the relevant actors of society can
make informed choices.
Integration also refers to the process itself. Risk governance advances a holistic
approach to framing, appraising, characterizing, evaluating, and managing risks (Zinn
and Taylor-Gooby 2006). This implies that a strict separation between risk assessment
and risk management is counterproductive. Risk governance is not a linear, sequential
three-stage process of risk assessment, management, and communication, but it is
dynamic and requires interlinked and iterative processes. Although it may still be useful
to distinguish assessment (examining the risks and benefits) from management (iden-
tifying regulatory options), it is important to realize that they can and should not be
viewed as unconnected activities to be carried out in different realms. Jasanoff (2005)
as well as van Asselt and Vos (2008) have argued that boundary work is an effective
way to make problems appear to be simple. Defining risk assessment and management
as separate realms enables analysts to ignore uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.
The integration principle calls attention to the need to consider the interconnections,
both content-wise and in terms of process, between the various risk-related activities.

5.3. The reflection principle

Unfortunately, risk governance cannot be routinized. It is important that the actors and
institutions involved reflect on what they are doing (c.f. Schön 1983; Beck, Giddens,
and Lash 1994) and continue to emphasize that the risks considered are uncertain,
complex, and/or ambiguous, as the temptation to treat them as simple and to apply
familiar routines remains huge (van Asselt and Vos 2006, 2008; Wynne 2002). Needed
is a collective reflection about balancing pros and cons. Nowadays, risks are associated
with human interventions with a purpose in mind, normally a benefit at least to those
who initiate them (Renn and Walker 2008, 340). Van Dijk et al. (this issue) refer to
this balancing act as ‘prudent precaution’. If too much protection is sought, innova-
tions may be prevented or stalled; if too little protection is provided, society may
experience unmanageable unpleasant surprises. The classic question ‘How safe is safe
enough?’ is replaced by the question ‘How much uncertainty is the collective willing
to accept in exchange for some benefit(s)?’. So the focus shifts from safety to
 Journal of Risk Research 443

uncertainty (c.f. De Vries et al. this issue). The communication and inclusion principle
holds that various actors take part in this reflective discourse and discuss how deci-
sions could and should be made in the face of irresolvable uncertainty, complexity, and
ambiguity. The reflection principle emphasizes that there are important difficult issues
(uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, and balancing act) that need repeated consider-
ation of all actors throughout the process. Otherwise, the process risks to (re)introduce
the familiar frames and routines developed for simple risks.

6. Conclusion and discussion

In this paper, we have attempted to explore the genesis and analytical scope of the new
term: risk governance. We described the history and background of this compound in
the context of a broader turn from government to governance. We argued that in the
context of risk the notion ‘governance’ is used in a descriptive and a normative sense:
both as a description of how decisions are made and as a model for how to improve
decision-making structures and processes. Risk governance draws the attention to the
fact that not all risks are simple; they cannot all be calculated as a function of proba-
bility and effect. Many risks which require societal choices and decisions are
adequately characterized as complex, uncertain, and/or ambiguous. It is a consistent
finding, however, that in most cases they are treated, assessed, and managed as if they
were simple. The many failures to deal adequately with risks such as genetic engineer-
ing, nuclear energy, financial crisis, cyber-terrorism demonstrate an urgent need to
develop alternative concepts and approaches to deal with uncertain, complex, and/or
ambiguous risks.
We cannot provide a model in the strict sense of the word. In this paper, we
propose to synthesize the state-of-the-art thinking on risk governance in a set of prin-
ciples: the communication and inclusion principle, the integration principle, and the
reflection principle. These principles can inform thinking and decision-making about
non-simple risks in various contexts. They should be read as synthesis of what seems
wise to do, or at least what needs to be seriously considered.
Risk governance can be defined in two ways: (1) as the critical study of complex,
interacting networks in which choices and decisions are made around risks and (2) as
a set of normative principles which can inform all relevant actors of society how to deal
responsibly with risks. We argued that either way risk governance is not a fancy
buzzword, but that it should be understood as a plea for a paradigm shift. Paradigms
and reforms do not shift in the abstract, but shift in practices. It is not an easy passage.
Yet, we hope that our taking stock helps to stimulate and facilitate a shift in risk practices.

Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Livia Smits for her support in preparing the paper and reviewing first
ideas and first versions of the paper. We, furthermore, benefited from comments on drafts from
Ragnar Löfstedt, Esther Versluis, Tessa Fox, Marijke Hermans, and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes
1. Including Ravetz ([1971]1996, 2006; see also Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992); Nowotny
(1976, 2008); Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons (2001); Fischhoff, Watson, and Hope (1984);
Fischhoff et al. (1978); Slovic (1987, 2000); Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1980);
Wynne (1980, 1982, 2001, 2002, 2010); Irwin and Wynne (1996); O’Riordan (1982);
444 M.B.A. van Asselt and O. Renn

O’Riordan, Cameron, and Jordan (2001); O’Riordan and McMichael (2002); Beck
([1986]1992, 2009); Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994; Jasanoff (1987, 1993, 1998, 2005);
Tesh (1988 [reprinted in 2000]); Kasperson and Kasperson (1991, 2005a, 2005b; see also
Pidgeon, Kasperson, and P. Slovic 2003); Löfstedt (1996, 2003, 2005; see also Linnerooth-
Bayer, Löfstedt, and Sjöstedt 2001); Stirling (1998, 2003, 2004); Vos (2000); van Asselt
(2000, 2005); van Asselt and Vos (2006, 2008; see also Everson and Vos 2009); Fischer
(2002); Fisher, Jones, and von Schomberg (2006); Huitema (2002); Mourik (2004); and so-
called cultural theorists (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Rayner 1992; Rayner and
Cantor 1987; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Adams 1995).
2. With ambiguity, we refer to the plurality of legitimate viewpoints for evaluating decision
outcomes and justifying judgments about their tolerability and acceptability. So ambiguity
refers to the existence of multiple values and perspectives.
3. See also the recent IRGC report on risk governance (2009).
4. The etymology of the term dates back to the Ancient Greek times (Halachmi 2005; Kjaer
2004). Plato used the term ‘kuberman’ as a reference to leadership, which assimilated in
Latin to ‘gubernanre’. This notion evaluated along various trajectories. Next to English, it
is part of, among others, the French, Spanish, and Portuguese vocabulary.
5. There is also a perspective on governance, provocatively termed ‘governance without
government’ (Rosenau 1995; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), which emphasizes the
decreased and decreasing role of the nation state.
6. Beck (1992) did not explicitly define organized irresponsibility. Van Asselt and Vos (2008)
provide the following definition: ‘society’s ill-preparedness and inability to deal with
surprises, negative consequences, and/or long-term impacts which are associated with
uncertain risks, notwithstanding all institutions and procedures in place’.
7. This notion has been introduced to the risk literature by Harremoës et al. (2002). Latency
lacuna refers to the fact that technologies are improved while the health and/or environ-
mental impacts are studied. When such monitoring and impact studies identify risks, the
question is whether those findings still hold for the newer generation of the technology.
8. Compare Rosa (2003, 55) who argues that risk is about ‘certain states of the world which
are possible and not predetermined’ and as ‘an outcome that is possible’ (2003, 56).
9. Central notion in the social constructivist theory of technology of Bijker, Hughes, and
Pinch (1984). It means that there is flexibility in interpretation, while it is not infinite.
10. Roca, Gamboa, and Tàbara (2008) provide another example of a multifaceted risk which is
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous: coastal erosion risks.
11. Some like-minded authors prefer to re-conceptualize risk in a way that renders the addi-
tion ‘uncertain’ superfluous. For example, Aven and Renn (2009, 2) suggest to redefine
risk as a reference to ‘uncertainty about and severity of the consequences (or outcomes)
of an activity with respect to something that humans value’. See also Rosa (2003). We
agree with such definitions, and we use them as well. In this paper, however, we prefer
to highlight the element of uncertainty because in our view the deep acknowledgment of
uncertainty is one of the major shifts compared to what has been referred to as the posi-
tivist, modernist, or Knightian risk paradigm. So the use of the notion ‘uncertain risk’ in
this paper should be understood as a way to underscore the importance of uncertainty in
risk governance. Compare a large giant: all giants are large, but large giants are really
huge.
12. See, for example, Kinney and Leschine (2002) and Santos and Chess (2003). These authors
emphasize that outcome as well as process variables and theoretical as well as participant-
based criteria should be included in the evaluations (see also Pidgeon et al. 2005).

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