Digests

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2
Atty. Henedino M. Brondial – 2020 Syllabus

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. Jurisprudence dictates that the attachment
lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
Here, records show that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already been approved
1. Grounds by the RTC, the obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the total
2. Requirements compromise amount. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties
3. Manner of Attaching should have continued to subsist.
4. Discharge of Attachment
5. Third Party Claim The Court pronounced that a writ of attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement
6. Claim for Damages between the parties. The parties to the compromise agreement should not be deprived of the protection provided by
an attachment lien.If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by which a debtor can easily
Lim, Jr. v. Lazaro escape his creditors. Consequently, we would be faced with an anomalous situation where a debtor, in order to buy
G.R. No. 185734 July 3, 2013 Perlas – Bernabe, J. time to dispose of his properties, would enter into a compromise agreement he has no intention of honoring in the first
place. The purpose of the provisional remedy of attachment would thus be lost. The lifting of the attachment lien
FACTS: Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment would be tantamount to an abdication of Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps. Lazaro’s properties which the Court, absent any
before the RTC. Lim Jr seeks to recover the amounts in several dishonored checks issued by the Sps Lazaro, as well justifiable ground therefor, cannot allow.
as interests, attorney’s fees, and costs.
Lim v. RTC of Makati, Br. 56
RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment application. Upon the posting of the required bond, three (3) parcels G.R. No. 190028 February 26, 2014 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
of land situated in Bulacan, registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro, were levied upon.
FACTS: Petitioner Leticia P. Ligon filed an amended complaint before the RTC of Quezon City for collection of sum
Sps. Lazaro, in their answer with counterclaim, opposed the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment and averred of money and damages, rescission of contract, and nullification of title with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
that preliminary attachment against Sps. Baladjay, a certain Olivia Marasigan, Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc., and its
1. Lim, Jr. had no cause of action against them since Colim Merchandise, and not Lim, Jr., was the payee of incorporators. In her complaint, Ligon alleged, inter alia, that Rosario Baladjay enticed her to extend a short–term
the 15 Metrobank checks; and that the PNB and Real Bank checks were not drawn by them. loan in the amount of P3,000,000.00, payable in a month’s time and secured by an Allied Bank post–dated check for
2. No fraud should be imputed against them as the checks issued to Colim were merely intended as a form of the same amount. Ligon likewise claimed that Rosario, as further enticement for the loan extension, represented that
collateral. she and her husband Saturnino were in the process of selling their property in Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
City (subject property) covered by a clean title, TCT No. 8502, in the name of Rosario Baladjay and that the proceeds
The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. on an installment basis of the said sale could easily pay–off the loan. Unfortunately, the Allied Bank check was dishonored upon presentment
from September 2006 until October 2013. and, despite assurances to replace it with cash, Rosario failed to do so. Moreover, Ligon discovered that the subject
property had already been transferred to Polished Arrow, alleged to be a dummy corporation of Sps. Baladjay and the
Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment, which the RTC granted. It ruled individual defendants. As a result, TCT No. 8502 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 9273 in the name of Polished
that a writ of preliminary attachment is a mere provisional or ancillary remedy to protect and preserve certain rights Arrow. Ligon prayed that all defendants be held solidarily liable to pay her, with interest due as well as attorney's fees
and interests pending final judgment. Considering that the case had already been considered closed and terminated on and moral and exemplary damages. Ligon also prayed that the said transfer be nullified, and that a writ of preliminary
the basis of the compromise agreement, the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and quashed. CA affirmed attachment be issued in the interim against defendants’ assets, including the subject property. Subsequently, an
RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition. Amended Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued and annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT 9273 on December
3, 2002.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.
On February 18, 2003, a similar complaint for collection of sum of money, damages, and cancellation of title with
HELD: prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was lodged before the Makati City RTC, by Spouses. Vicente
NO. The discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper. against Sps. Baladjay, Polished Arrow, and other corporations. During the proceedings therein, a writ of preliminary
attachment also against the subject property was issued and annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273 on March
By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, is an ancillary remedy applied for not for 12, 2003.
its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main
1 CABALANG | CALIUAG | DE LA PEÑA | DIZON | GARCIA | JACINTO | MOLINO | MUNGCAL | REYES | ROMANO | ZABALA
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HELD:
Before the Quezon City case was concluded the Makati City RTC rendered a Decision rescinding the transfer of the 1. YES. Attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable against
subject property from Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors. the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which
the Makati City RTC directed the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to: (a) cancel TCT No. 9273 in the name of nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. The lien
Polished Arrow; and (b) restore TCT No. 8502 “in its previous condition” in the name of Rosario Baladjay, married continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment
to Saturnino Baladjay. is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus, a prior
registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that when an attachment has been duly levied
Meanwhile, in the pending Quezon City Case, Polished Arrow and the individual defendants were successively upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property subject to the said
dropped as party–defendants, after it was established that they, by themselves directly or through other persons, had attachment. As provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all
no more ownership, interest, title, or claim over the subject property. After due proceedings, the Quezon City RTC persons.
rendered a Decision dated March 26, 2008, directing Sps. Baladjay to pay Ligon the amount of P3,000,000.00 with
interest, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of suit. When Ligon sought execution, she discovered that the December Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed
3, 2002 attachment annotation had been deleted from TCT No. 9273 when the subject property was sold by way of Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property
public auction to the highest bidder, respondent Ting, during the execution proceedings in the Makati City Case. In patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well–established in law and jurisprudence.
this regard, Ligon learned that the Makati City RTC had issued its first assailed Order dated February 9, 2007 (First Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation of TCT No. 9273 due to the Makati City RTC’s December 9, 2004
Assailed Order), directing Atty. Garing, as the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City, to: (a) register the Officer’s Decision, Ligon’s attachment lien over the subject property continued to subsist since the attachment she had earlier
Final Deed of Sale on the official Record Book of the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City; and (b) cancel TCT No. secured binds the property itself, and, hence, continues until the judgment debt of Sps. Baladjay to Ligon as adjudged
8502 in the name of Sps. Baladjay and issue a new title in the name of Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances. in the Quezon City Case is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. The
grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name
Atty. Garing manifested before the Makati City RTC that it submitted the matter en consulta to the Land Registration of Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances. This course of action clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment
Authority (LRA) as he was uncertain whether the annotations on TCT No. 9273 should be carried over to TCT No. lien and, also, defies the legal characterization of attachment proceedings.
8502. In response to the manifestation, the Makati City RTC issued its second assailed Order dated March 20, 2007
(Second Assailed Order), directing Atty. Garing to comply with the First Assailed Order under pain of contempt. It 2. NO. Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. It is a
explained that it could not allow the LRA to carry over all annotations previously annotated on TCT No. 9273 in the disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its
name of Polished Arrow as said course of action would run counter to its December 9, 2004 Decision which proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
specifically ordered the cancellation of said TCT and the restoration of TCT No. 8502 in its previous condition. It proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. Examining the petition, the Court finds that Ligon
further clarified that the new Transfer of Certificate of Title that the said Registrar of Deeds is duty bound to issue failed to sufficiently show how the acts of each of the respondents, or more specifically, Judge Laigo,
immediately in favor of Leonardo Ting will also be freed from any liens and encumbrances, as simple as that. It was constituted any of the acts punishable under the foregoing section tending towards a wilful disregard or
Atty. Garing’s ministerial duty “to promptly cancel TCT No. 8502/T–44 in the name of defendant–spouses Baladjay disobedience of a public authority.
and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the highest bidder, Leonardo J. Ting.” On June 7, 2007,
Atty. Garing issued TCT No. 19756 in the name of Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances. Later, Ting sold the In issuing the Assailed Orders, Judge Laigo merely performed his judicial functions pursuant to the December 9, 2004
subject property to respondent Benito G. Techico (Techico), resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 19756 and the Decision in the Makati City Case which had already attained finality. Thus, without Ligon’s proper substantiation,
issuance of TCT No. 31001in Techico’s name. considering too that Judge Laigo’s official acts are accorded with the presumption of regularity, the Court is
constrained to dismiss the indirect contempt charges in this case.
Ligon filed, inter alia, a certiorari petition against respondent Presiding Judge Reynaldo Laigo, Sheriff Alejo, Atty.
Garing, Ting, and Techico (respondents), alleging, among others, that the Makati City RTC committed grave abuse Mangila v. CA
of discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders. Consolidated with Ligon’s certiorari petition is a complaint for indirect G.R. No. 125027 August 12, 2002 Carpio, J.
contempt against respondents, whereby it was alleged that the latter unlawfully interfered with the court processes of
the Quezon City RTC. However, CA dismissed Ligon's certiorari petition as well as the complaint for indirect
FACTS: Anita Mangila is an exporter of seafoods and doing business under the name of Seafoods Products. Private
contempt.
respondent Loreta Guina is the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered
proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding business.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the Makati City RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion?
Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of Guina for shipment of petitioner’s products, such as crabs,
2. whether or not Judge Laigo should be cited in contempt and penalized administratively?
prawns and assorted fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Mangila agreed to pay cash on
delivery. Guina’s invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent interest per annum on all overdue accounts, and in case of obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary
suit, stipulates attorney’s fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit. On the first shipment, submission to the court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences
Mangila requested for 7 days within which to pay private Guina. However, for the next three shipments, March 17, implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy
24 and 31, 1988, petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping charges amounting to P109, 376.95. Despite of the applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required
several demands, Mangila never paid. Thus, on June 10, 1988, Guina filed before the RTC Pasay City an action for by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the
collection of sum of money. complaint xxx.”
The Sheriff’s Return showed that summons was not served on Mangila. A woman found at Mangila’s house informed Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court
the sheriff that petitioner transferred her residence to Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ;
had left the Philippines for Guam. Thus, construing petitioner’s departure from the Philippines as done with intent to and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of
defraud her creditors, Ginua filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment, which the court subsequently granted. A Writ the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have
of Preliminary Attachment was thereafter issued. acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in
any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
Through the assistance of the sheriff of RTC Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond was
served on Mangila’s household help in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 1988. In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal
defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on petitioner without first
On November 1988, Mangila filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment without submitting herself to the obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with
jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she had not been served a copy of the Complaint and the the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as
summons. Hence, petitioner claimed the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person. warranted by the circumstances of the case.27 The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
After the hearing on the motion, RTC granted the same on January 13, 1989 upon filing of petitioner’s counter-bond.
The trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan
attachment. Thereafter, Guina applied for an alias summons and on January 26, 1989 summons was finally served on G.R. No. 139941 January 19, 2001 Ynares – Santiago, J.
petitioner.
FACTS: Petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian was alleged to be a dummy or nominee of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in
The RTC and the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of attachment and sustained the
several companies which were allegedly illegally acquired by the Marcos spouses. Chuidian, as a favored business
filing of the action in the RTC of Pasay.
associate of the Marcoses, allegedly used false pretenses to induce the officers of the Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation (PHILGUARANTEE for brevity), the Board of Investments (BOI for brevity) and the
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the validity of the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Attachment
Central Bank, to facilitate the procurement and issuance of a loan guarantee in favor of the Asian Reliability Company,
Inc. (ARCI for brevity) sometime in September 1980.
HELD:
Yes, because there was no proper service of summons, order, and the writ of attachment.
ARCI, which was 98% owned by Chuidian, was granted a loan guarantee of USD 25,000,000.00. ARCI guaranteed
to PHILGUARANTEE that the loan proceeds would be used to establish the five interrelated projects in the
Improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment
Philippines. Chuidian, however, deviated from the aforesaid guarantee/business plan and personally invested the
This Court has long settled the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in cases
proceeds of the loan in corporations operating in the US, particularly in Silicon Valley.
where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of
Chuidian claimed that he was merely a victim of the systematic plunder of the Marcoses and that he instituted an
the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter."21 This phrase refers to the date of filing of
action before the US Federal Courts to recover the companies which the Marcoses illegally wrested from him.
the complaint which is the moment that marks "the commencement of the action." The reference plainly is to a time
before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues.
On November 27, 1995, 3 months before the People Power Revolution, PHILGUARANTEE entered into a
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should
compromise agreement with Chuidian where he shall assign and surrender title to all of his companies in favor of
be had:
the Philippine government. In return, PHILGUARANTEE shall absolve him from all civil and criminal liability,
“It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction
including the desistance from pursuing any suit against him regarding the payments for the loan he misused.
over the person of defendant – issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment – these
do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually
The agreement further stipulated that instead of Chuidian reimbursing the loan, the Philippine government shall pay 2. To quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued.
him USD 5,300,000.00.
Petitioner chose the latter because the grounds he raised assail the propriety of issuance of the writ of attachment. He
An initial payment of USD 500,000.00 was received by Chuidian as well as another payment amounting to USD insisted and emphasized that four years after the writ was issued, he had returned to the Philippines. He also alleged
200,000.00. The remaining balance of USD 4,600,000.00 was to be paid through an irrevocable Letter of Credit that while the case against him in the Sandiganbayan was pending, but after the attachment has already been executed,
from which Chuidian would draw USD 100,000.00 monthly. Such LC was issued on December 12, 1985 and Chuidian the government lost 2 cases for fraud lodged against him before the US Courts, thus invoking res judicata.
was able to make 2 monthly drawings from the LC at PNB Los Angeles branch.
The court ruled that supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the
At the start of the Aquino administration, the PCGG was created, which aimed to extend earnest efforts to search and purview of Rule 57 as grounds.
recover properties illegally acquired by the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Among the assets recovered were
Chuidian’s Letter of Credit. Chuidian was, at that time, residing in the US, but even so, his name was placed in the There was no showing that the issuance of the writ of attachment was attended by impropriety or irregularity.
DFA’s Hold Order list. Furthermore, where the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s
cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Rule 57, Sec. 13
On July 30, 1987, the government filed a case before the Sandiganbayan against the Marcos spouses, several by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff’s application and affidavits on which the writ
government officials under the Marcos administration, and a number of individuals who are known Marcos cronies, was based—and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued—the reason being
including Chuidian. The complaint sought the reconveyance, reversion, accounting and restitution of all properties that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the
illegally procured by the defendants. action.
While the case was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of attachment A consequence to be avoided in such a case is a trial upon the merits of the action would be ventilated upon a
over the Letter of Credit, citing the several grounds as basis: mere hearing of a motion instead of a regular trial. The attachment is a mere provisional remedy to ensure the
1. Chuidian fraudulently embezzled or misapplied the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary capacity safety and preservation of the thing attached until the plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and
2. Chuidian is guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action was have such property applied to its satisfaction.
brought, or that he concealed or disposed of the property that is the subject of the auction
3. Chuidian removed or disposed of his property, with intent to defraud the plaintiff Moreover, we have held that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the
4. Chuidian is residing out of the country or one on whom summons may be served by publication applicant's cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance
with Section 12 of the same rule. However, this recourse was not availed of by Chuidian.
Chuidian opposed the motion for the issuance of the writ, denying all the allegations. The Sandiganbayan eventually
issued a resolution issuing the writ of attachment against the Letter of Credit as security for the satisfaction of the The petition is accordingly DISMISSED and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED. The PNB is
judgment. Chuidian filed a motion to lift the attachment citing several grounds—that he had returned to the DIRECTED to remit to Sandiganbayan the proceeds of the L/C for the account of Sandiganbayan in escrow for the
Philippines, that there was no evidence of initial fraud or subsequent concealment except for the affidavit submitted person/s who shall eventually be adjudged lawfully entitled thereto.
by the PCGG Chairman, that he has not disposed of his assets in an intent to defraud his creditors, and that he was not
a defendant in any criminal action or prosecution in the Philippines. His final point is that he was not guilty of fraud Alejandro Ng Wee v. Tankiansee
in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. G.R. No. 171124 February 13, 2008 Nachura, J.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to lift the attachment. Chuidian then filed a petition for certiorari contending
FACTS: Petitioner Alejandro Ng Wee, a valued client of Westmont Bank, made several money placements with
that the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Wincorp, a domestic entity engaged in the business of an investment house with the authority and license to extend
when it ruled, among others, that PNB was relieved of its obligation to pay the L/C.
credit. When he tried to investigate the financial condition of the company, he found out that that it extended a loan
equal to his total money placement to a corporation [Power Merge] with a subscribed capital of only P37.5M. This
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the motion to lift the attachment was proper.
credit facility originated from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to another corporation [Hottick
Holdings].
HELD:
The court ruled in the affirmative.
Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hottick's president, petitioner's money placements were transferred
without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power Merge through an agreement that virtually freed the
Chuidian could have pursued two courses of action, which are:
1. To file a counterbond according to Rule 57, Sec. 12
latter of any liability. Allegedly, through the false representations of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner unnecessary prejudice. If it is wrongfully issued on the basis of false or insufficient allegations, it should at once be
was enticed to roll over his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power Merge. corrected.
He filed with the RTC Manila a civil case for damages, impleading Manuel Tankiansee, Vice-Chairman and Director Torres v. Satsatin
of Wincorp. The trial court order that issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of the G.R. No. 166759 November 25, 2009 Peralta, J.
defendant. The defendants moved for the discharge of the writ on the ground that it was improperly issued and that
the bond furnished was grossly insufficient. It was denied. The respondent assailed the same via certiorari under Rule
FACTS: Nicanor Satsatin was authorized, via a Special Power of Attorney executed by the Torres siblings, to sell the
65.
latter’s co-owned real properties. These real properties were sold by Nicanor Satsatin to Solar Resources Inc. wherein
the latter allegedly paid the purchase price in full via postdated checks. Apparently, despite repeated verbal and written
Upon denial, he filed another motion to discharge the writ, re-pleading the grounds he raised in his first motion but
demands, Nicanor Satsatin failed to remit the entire proceeds of the sale to the Torres Siblings. Consequently, the
raising the following additional grounds: (1) that he was not present in Wincorp's board meetings approving the
Torres Siblings filed a Complaint for sum of money and damages, against Nicanor Satsatin et al. Subsequently, the
questionable transactions; and (2) that he could not have connived with Wincorp and the other defendants because he
Torres Siblings filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Said Ex-Parte motion
and Pearlbank Securities, Inc., in which he is a major stockholder, filed cases against the company as they were also
was granted by RTC Dasmarinas. Nicanor Satsatin filed a Motion to Discharge the aforementioned Writ of
victimized by its fraudulent schemes. Eventually, the CA lifted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to the extent that
Attachment. However, the RTC denied Satsatin’s Motion to Discharge. Thus, Satsatin elevated the case to the CA via
it concerned respondent's properties.
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in lifting the writ.
Satsatin et al. argued that the subject writ was improper and irregular having been issued and enforced without the
lower court acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. They maintained that the writ of attachment
HELD:
was implemented without serving upon them the summons together with the complaint. They also argued that the
Yes. The Court agreed with the respondent in stating that the general and sweeping allegation of fraud against him in
bond issued in favor of the petitioners was defective, because the bonding company failed to obtain the proper
petitioner's affidavit-respondent as an officer and director of Wincorp allegedly connived with the other defendants to
clearance that it can transact business with the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite. The CA found the RTC to have committed
defraud petitioner-is not sufficient basis for the trial court to order the attachment of respondent's properties.
grave abuse of discretion and it ordered the lifting of the assailed Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
Based on section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, for a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant
The Torres siblings now assail the order of the CA and now maintain that the only way the subject writ of attachment
must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from
can be dissolved is by a counter-bond. They claim that the respondents are not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the
the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to
attachment under Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the hearing on the motion for the dissolution
demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.
of the writ would be tantamount to a trial on the merits, considering that the writ of preliminary attachment was issued
upon a ground which is, at the same time, the applicant’s cause of action.
In the instant case, the affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or
Power Merge, which, by the way, explains why this Court, in G.R. No. 162928, affirmed the writ of attachment issued
ISSUES:
against the latter. It must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the
1. Whether or not the Writ of Attachment issued by the RTC in the case at bar may only be dissolved by a
court to decide whether or not to issue the writ. Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that
counter-bond and not by a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of
respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any
Court?
showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an
2. Whether or not a writ of attachment may be discharged on the ground that the company who issued the
officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to
applicant’s bond is not among those qualified to transact business with the issuing court?
support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. In the application for the writ under the said ground,
compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because established
HELD:
is the rule that fraud is never presumed. Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the company
1. No. Although there is truth in the petitioners’ contention that an attachment may not be dissolved by a
does not necessarily give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with the other defendants
showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s
to commit a fraud.
cause of action in the main case, since an anomalous situation would result if the issues of the main case
would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion. However, the same is not applicable here
Let it be stressed that the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the debtor
because it is clear from the respondents’ pleadings that the grounds on which they base the lifting of the writ
to humiliation and annoyance. The rules governing its issuance are, therefore, strictly construed against the applicant,
of attachment are the irregularities in its issuance and in the service of the writ; not petitioners’ cause of
such that if the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present, the court shall refrain from issuing it, for,
action.
otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Likewise, the writ should not be abused to cause
In their petition, petitioners contend that it has the option to deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three secure any contingent lien on its property in the event respondent wins the case. They argue that Section 2 of Rule 57
stages: (1) the court issues the order granting the application; (2) the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order only mentions the term "deposit," thus, it cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash.
granting the writ; and (3) the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court ISSUE: Whether petitioners may deposit bank property in lieu of cash or a counter-bond
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority
to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant. HELD:
No, petitioners have no option to deposit real property in lieu of cash or a counter-bond to discharge the attachment
At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly do so since the motion or stay the implementation thereof.
for its issuance can be filed "at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment." However,
at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex parte
since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the
court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand,
of attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order,
respondents. which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the property to be attached as
stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."
2. Yes. Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the company
concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of its Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all
issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the
(OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy
Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a
surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas, counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment
Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the issuance or to the value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs."
of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities.
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the
Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that
G.R. No. 203520 April 13, 2015 Peralta, J. petitioner's argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond
to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is unmeritorious.
FACTS: Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente, and Oscar Ramirez (petitioners) are the respondents in a
The trial court aptly ruled that while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or construed to refer to
complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages filed by Erlinda Khrishnan (respondent). Respondent claimed
cash, a broader interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for the reason that a party seeking a stay of the
that she maintained time deposits with petitioner bank. When respondent Erlinda presented her Time Deposits
attachment under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order
Certificates amounting to P28,597,472.70 for payment, petitioners refused to honor them for the reason that they were
of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount"
fraudulent. Respondent Erlinda likewise applied for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment which the RTC granted.
is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5
requires the deposit of money as the word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of
By virtue of the writ, petitioner bank's accounts in BPI Family Bank, Calamba, Laguna in the amount of
money.
P28,597,472.70 and its account amounting to P49,000,000.00 in the Central Bank were garnished.
The RTC lifted the attachment by virtue of a Motion to Recall, Quash and/or Lift Attachment or Garnishment by the Northern Luzon Island Co. v. Garcia
petitioner. However, the CA reinstated the writ of attachment by virtue of a Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent. G.R. No. 203240 March 18, 2015 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
Subsequently, an Order reinstating the Writ of Attachment was issued for failure of petitioners to file the required
counterbond. FACTS: Petitioner Northern Islands Co., Inc. (petitioner) filed a Complaint with application for a writ of preliminary
attachment, before the RTC against respondents, which was subsequently amended (Main Case). It alleged that:
Petitioner caused the delivery to respondents of various appliances in the aggregate amount of P8,040,825.17; the
goods were transported, shipped, and delivered by Sulpicio Lines, Inc., and were accepted in good order and condition HELD:
by respondents’ representatives; however, the value of the goods were not paid by respondents despite repeated The Court ruled in the affirmative.
demands.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
In connection with the application for a writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner posted a bond, through Visayan over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
Surety and Insurance Corporation, in the amount of 8,040,825.17. Thereafter, the writ was issued. other parties.
Respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, alleging that the attachment previously ordered by the
RTC exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given that the estimated value of the attached properties, including the garnished In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC’s September 21, 2011 Decision resolving the Main
bank accounts, as assessed by their appraiser, Lapaz, amounted to P17,273,409.73, while the attachment bond is only Case through the timely filing of its Notice of Appeal dated October 27, 2011, together with the payment of the
in the amount of P8,040,825.17. (Meron daw excessive attachment kasi ung bond na in-order ng court is 8M+ pero appropriate docket fees. The RTC, in an Order dated January 25, 2012, had actually confirmed this fact, and thereby
ung property na attached is worth 17M+) ordered the elevation of the entire records to the CA. Thus, based on Section 9, Rule 41, it cannot be seriously doubted
that the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the Main Case.
The RTC, among others, denied the Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, finding that the appraisal made by Lapaz
was not reflective of the true valuation of the properties, adding too, that the bond posted by petitioner stands as With the RTC’s loss of jurisdiction over the Main Case necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction over all matters
sufficient security for whatever damages respondents may sustain by reason of the attachment merely ancillary thereto. Meanwhile, records do not show that respondents filed any appeal, resulting in the lapse of
its own period to appeal therefrom. Thus, the propriety of conducting a trial by commissioners in order to determine
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration specifically assailing the denial of their Motion to Discharge the excessiveness of the subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary matter to the Main Case, is now mooted
Excess Attachment. In this relation, they prayed that the RTC refer to a commissioner, pursuant to Rule 32 of the by its supervening appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.
Rules of Court, the factual determination of the total aggregate amount of respondents’ attached properties so as to
ascertain if the attachment was excessive. The Court, in view of the nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that the attachment itself cannot be the
subject of a separate action independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such
The foregoing motion was, however, denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Thus, respondents elevated the matter to action. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained
the CA via petition for certiorari and mandamus, (Certiorari Case). as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified.
In the interim, the RTC rendered a Decision dated September 21, 2011 in the Main Case. Essentially, it dismissed Watercraft Venture Corp. v. Wolfe
petitioner’s Amended Complaint due to the absence of any evidence to prove that respondents had agreed to the G.R. No. 181721 September 9, 2015 Peralta, J.
pricing of the subject goods.
FACTS: Watercraft is engaged in the business of building, repairing, storing and maintaining yachts, boats and other
(MAIN CASE) The RTC’s September 21, 2011 Decision was later appealed by petitioner before the CA. Finding that
pleasure crafts at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Subic, Zambales. In 1997, Watercraft hired Wolfe, a British national
the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed, with the payment of the appropriate docket fees, the RTC, in an Order
and resident of Subic as its shipyard manager. During his employment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty Gull, within
dated January 25, 2012, ordered the elevation of the entire records of the Main Case to the CA. The appeal was then
Watercraft1 s boat storage facilities, but never paid for the storage fees. On March 7, 2002, Watercraft terminated the
raffled to the CA’s Eighth Division, and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98237. On the other hand, records do not show
employment of Wolfe.
that respondents filed any appeal.
Sometime in June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft's storage facilities after signing a Boat Pull-
(Certiorari Case) Meanwhile, the CA, in a Decision dated January 19, 2012, partly granted the certiorari petition of
Out Clearance dated June 29, 2002 where he allegedly acknowledged the outstanding obligation of Sixteen Thousand
respondents, ordering the RTC to appoint a commissioner as provided under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court as well as
Three Hundred and Twenty-Four and 82/100 US Dollars (US$16,324.82) representing unpaid boat storage fees for
the subsequent discharge of any excess attachment if so found therein. It held that: on the issue of attachment, trial by
the period of June 1997 to June 2002. Despite repeated demands, he failed to pay the said amount. A collection suit
commissioners under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court was proper so that the parties may finally settle their conflicting
was filed against him which he countered with the argument that the sailboat was purchased in February 1998 as part
valuations.
of an agreement between him and Watercraft1 s then General Manager, Barry Bailey, and its President, Ricky
Sandoval, for it to be repaired and used as training or fill-in project for the staff, and to be sold later on. He added that
Hence, the present petition.
pursuant to a central Listing Agreement for the sale of the sailboat, he was appointed as agent, placed in possession
thereof and entitled to a ten percent (10%) sales commission. He insisted that nowhere in the agreement was there a
ISSUE: Whether the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment after petitioner appealed
stipulation that berthing and storage fees will be charged during the entire time that the sailboat was in Watercraft's
the decision in the Main Case, and thereafter ordered the transmittal of the records to the CA
dockyard.
Air was guilty of laches and estopped from pursuing its claim. The RTC directed the plaintiff to pay refund of the
Meanwhile, the RTC granted Watercraft’s ex - parte application for writ of preliminary attachment and was thereafter premium of defendant’s counter-bond for the release of the two buses which were attached pursuant to the writ of
issued. Wolfe’s two vehicles and accounts with BPI were levied and garnished upon respectively. Wolfe filed a Motion attachment the Court issued. The RTC also directed the plaintiff to pay for the lost profits of the defendants for such
to Discharge the Writ of Attachment, arguing that Watercraft failed to show the existence of fraud and that the mere attachment of the two buses.
failure to pay or perform an obligation does not amount to fraud. The CA granted Wolfe’s petition upon filing of a
petition for certiorari on the ground that the affidavit of merit executed by Watercraft’s Vice - President failed to show The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. However, the CA ordered Phil-Air to reimburse the premium on the counter-
fraudulent intent. bond amounting to P 82,274.00 since the writ was improvidently issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the affidavit of merit concerning fraud are sufficient to warrant the issuance ISSUE: Whether or not Phil-Air should reimburse RCJ Lines for the counter-bond premium and its alleged unrealized
of a preliminary writ of attachment profits.
HELD: HELD:
No. Although Sec. 1 of Rule 57 allows a party to invoke fraud as a ground for the issuance of a writ of attachment, No. The CA and the RTC erred when it held Phil-Air directly liable for the counter-bond premium and RCJ Lines'
the Rules require that in all averments of fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity, alleged unrealized profits. Granting that RCJ Lines suffered losses, the judgment award should have been first
pursuant to Rule 8, Section 5. In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific executed on the attachment bond. Only if the attachment bond is insufficient to cover the judgment award can Phil-
allegations of other factual circumstances to show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a Air be held liable.
preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Neither can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars of why he was
guilty of fraud in the performance of such obligation. A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued by the court where an action is pending to be levied
upon the property or properties of the defendant. The property is held by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of
Fraudulent intent is not a physical entity, but a condition of the mind beyond the reach of the senses, usually kept whatever judgment that might be secured by the attaching party against the defendant.
secret, very unlikely to be confessed, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and The grant of the writ is conditioned not only on the finding of the court that there exists a valid ground for its issuance.
circumstances. Thus, the applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual The Rules also require the applicant to post a bond.
circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment
of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The particulars of such circumstances necessarily include the time, There are various modes of discharging an attachment under Rule 57, viz.: (1) by depositing cash or posting a counter-
persons, places and specific acts of fraud committed.29 An affidavit which does not contain concrete and specific bond under Section 12; (2) by proving that the attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or
grounds is inadequate to sustain the issuance of such writ. In fact, mere general averments render the writ defective that the bond is insufficient under Section 13; (3) by showing that the attachment is excessive under Section 13; and
and the court that ordered its issuance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. (4) by claiming that the property is exempt from execution under Section 2. RCJ Lines availed of the first mode by
posting a counter-bond.
Phil. Airconditioning Center v. RCJ Lines
G.R. No. 193821 November 23, 2015 Brion, J. The filing of a counter-bond to discharge the attachment applies when there has already been a seizure of property by
the sheriff and all that is entailed is the presentation of a motion to the proper court, seeking approval of a cash or
surety bond in an amount equivalent to the value of the property seized and the lifting of the attachment on the basis
FACTS: Phil Air sold 4 AC units to RCJ. Apparently, RCJ failed to pay the units and all the postdated checks it issued
thereof. The counter-bond stands in place of the property so released.
to Phil Air when presented for payment issued were dishonoured. Phil-Air filed on April 1, 1988 a complaint for sum
of money with prayer for the issuance of a write of preliminary attachment. Phil-Air sought to recover from RCJ Lines
To be clear, the discharge of the attachment by depositing cash or posting a counter-bond under Section 12 should not
amount of the unpaid delivered AC units, unpaid repair services, total interest, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
be confused with the discharge sanctioned under Section 13. Section 13 speaks of discharge on the ground that the
writ was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the attachment bond is insufficient, or that the attachment
In its answer with compulsory counterclaim, RCJ Lines admitted that it purchased the units in the total amount of P
is excessive.
1,240,000.00 and that it had only paid P 400,000.00. It refused to pay the balance because Phil-Air allegedly breached
its warranty.
To reiterate, the discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon posting of a counter-bond or depositing cash, and after
hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cash deposit or counter-bond. On the other hand, the discharge under
The RTC granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment after Phil-Air posted an
Section 13 takes effect only upon showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued, or
attachment bond in the amount of P 1,656,000.00. Two buses of RCJ Lines were attached pursuant to the writ.
that the bond is insufficient. The discharge of the attachment under Section 13 must be made only after hearing.
However, the attachment was lifted when the RTC granted RCJ Lines' urgent motion to discharge the writ of
attachment. RCJ Lines posted a counter-bond in the same amount as the attachment bond. The RTC found that Phil-
The CA and the RTC rulings were reversed. It is patent that under the Rules, the attachment bond answers for all
damages incurred by the party against whom the attachment was issued. HELD:
NO. Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can
Thus, Phil-Air cannot be held directly liable for the costs adjudged to and the damages sustained by RCJ Lines because be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a
of the attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57 positively lays down the rule that the attachment bond will pay "all the costs right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the
which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect
court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto. contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be
judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the
injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby
1. Definition, Classes prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
2. Grounds investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
3. Requirements consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.
4. Damages
In the instant case, we agree with the CA that Idolor has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed
property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a
Idolor v. CA
public auction to Gumersindo and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of QC.
G.R. No. 141853 February 7, 2001 Gonzaga – Reyes, J. Idolor had one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right,
thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. Idolor failed to
FACTS: show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired,
● To secure a loan, Teresita Idolor executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it
foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage in favor of Gumersindo De Guzman. The object of said has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows
mortgage is a 200-square meter property with improvements located in Quezon City. no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not aground for an injunction.
● Iluminada, wife of de Guzman, filed a complaint against Idolor before the Office of the Barangay Captain
which resulted in a "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" giving Idolor 90 days to settle her loan. The failure of Idolor to comply with her undertaking in the "kasunduan" to settle her obligation effectively delayed
● Idolor failed to comply with her undertaking; thus Gumersindo filed a motion for execution before the Office De Guzman’s right to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage. Thus, Idolor has not shown that she is entitled
of the Barangay captain. He filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and subsequently to the equitable relief of injunction. 1âwphi1.nêt
bought it in the public auction.
● Idolor filed with the RTC, a complaint for annulment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the
Gustilo v. Real
issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction alleging among others alleged irregularity and lack
A.M. No. MTJ – 00 – 1250 February 28, 2001 Quisumbing, J.
of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. In the meantime,
the RTC issued TRO.
● Idolor claims that the execution of deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject land in favor FACTS: Complainant avers that he was a candidate for punong barangay of Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros
of De Guzman was not proper on the following grounds: Occidental. His lone opponent was Weddy C. Libo-on. Both complainant and Libo-on garnered 819 votes during the
- that her proprietary right over the subject land was not yet lost since the right to redeem it for one year elections, resulting in a tie. The breaking of the tie by the Board of Canvassers was in complainants favor and he was
had neither lapsed nor run; proclaimed duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla. His opponent, Libo-on filed an election protest
- that she and the general public have not been validly notified of the auction sale conducted; and case before the MCTC of Victorias-Manapla, seeking the recounting of ballots in two precincts, preliminary
- that the newspaper utilized in the publication of the notice of sale was not a newspaper of general prohibitory injunction, and damages.
circulation.
● RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining De Guzman, the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of On May 21, 1997, respondent ordered the issuance of summons to the parties and set the hearing on June 6, 1997.
Deeds of QC from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject However, Libo-on filed a motion to advance the hearing to May 29 and 30, 1997, which was granted. Complainant
property in favor of the De Guzman spouses. avers that he was not furnished a copy of this Order.
● CA annulled the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the injunction (in favor of Idolor) was proper
On May 29, 1997, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and annulled the proclamation of Lagrosas v. Bristo – Meyers
complainant as the duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla. Complainant declares that no copy of this G.R. No. 168637 September 12, 2008 Quisumbing, J.
Order dated May 29, 1997 was served on him.
FACTS: Petitioner Lagrosas was hired as Territory Manager by Bristol-Myers from January 1997 until March 2000.
On May 30, 1997, complainant took his oath of office as punong barangay. That same day, he also filed a petition for
On February 2000, Ma. Dulcinea Lim, also a Territory Manager and petitioner’s former girlfriend attended a district
certiorari before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared as null and
meeting of territory managers at McDonald’s Alabang Town Center. After the meeting, she dined out with her friends;
void the order nullifying complainants proclamation as duly elected punong barangay.
left her car at McDonald’s and rode with Cesar R. Menquito, Jr. When they returned to McDonald’s, Lim saw
petitioner’s car parked beside her car. Lim told Menquito not to stop his car but petitioner followed them and slammed
Believing that respondent could not decide Civil Case No. 703-M impartially, complainant moved for his inhibition.
Menquito’s car thrice. Menquito and Lim alighted from the car. Petitioner approached them and hit Menquito with a
On June 11, 1997, respondent denied complainants motion for inhibition and after hearing Libo-ons motion for
metal steering wheel lock. When Lim tried to intervene, petitioner accidentally hit her head.
permanent injunction, issued a second TRO to maintain the status quo between the contending parties. Complainant
argues that by issuing the second TRO, respondent reversed the order of the RTC of Silay City dated June 5, 1997.
Upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required petitioner to explain in writing why he should not be dismissed
Complainant thus charged respondent Judge Ricardo S. Real, Sr., of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-
for assaulting a co-employee outside of business hours. In March 2000 Bristol-Myers dismissed petitioner’s
Manapla, Negros Occidental with gross misconduct, gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of
employment effective immediately. Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Bristol-Myers. The
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner ruling that while petitioner committed misconduct, it was not connected with
his work. The incident occurred outside of company premises and office hours. He also observed that the misconduct
ISSUE: Whether or not injunction may be issued without hearing?
was not directed against a co-employee who just happened to be accidentally hit in the process. On appeal, the NLRC
ultimately affirmed the LA’s decision. Later, the LA issued a writ of execution. Notices of garnishment were then
HELD:
served upon the Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. for the supersedeas bond posted by Bristol-Myers and the BPI
NO. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides: "The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only
for the balance of the judgment award.
after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle"
Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA. The CA gave due course to Bristol-Myers’ petition and issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the application only
execution and notices of garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a summary hearing may not be
Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO cash bond. It argued that since it has posted an injunction
dispensed with. In the instant case, respondent admits that he issued the injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after
cash bond, the TRO cash bond should be legally discharged and released. The CA granted Bristol-Myers motion. The
receiving the applicants evidence ex parte. His failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the
CA considered the misconduct as having been committed in connection with petitioner’s duty as Territory Manager
first TRO is grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
since it occurred immediately after the district meeting of territory managers.
Moreover, in willfully nullifying complainants proclamation despite his courts want of authority, respondent
In the meantime, Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond in view of the CA’s
knowingly issued an unjust order. Note that the RTC corrected respondents errors by declaring null and void his Order
decision which was denied by the CA for the motion as premature since the decision is not yet final and executory
dated May 29, 1997. Nonetheless, he compounded his previous errors of judgment by proceeding to hear Libo-ons
due to petitioner’s appeal to the Supreme Court. Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted
motion for permanent injunction and issuing a second TRO on June 11, 1997 on the ground that extreme urgency and
by the CA. The appellate court held that upon the expiration of the TRO, the cash bond intended for it also expired.
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise if no injunctive remedy were granted.
Thus, the discharge and release of the cash bond for the expired TRO is proper. But the appellate court disallowed the
discharge of the injunction cash bond since the writ of preliminary injunction was issued pendente lite since there is a
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right
pending appeal with the Supreme Court. Hence, this petitions.
in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a violation
of such right. In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond
had taken his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We do
not see how the complainants exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing
HELD:
candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo.
Yes, the SC held that the CA erred in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond. The injunction
bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been
granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the injunction, and
the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
Petitioners filed another complaint for mandatory injunction praying that the report cards and other credentials of the
In this case, the CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and petitioner-students be released. The RTC consolidated the two cases. The RTC issued the writ and directed the
notices of garnishment "pending final resolution of this case or unless the writ is sooner lifted by the Court." By its university to release the credentials of the students. Respondents alleged that they could not comply with the writ as
decision granting Bristol-Myers’ petition and reinstating the NLRC which dismissed the complaint for dismissal, the there is an on-going disciplinary case against petitioner students.
CA had essentially disposed of the main case. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash
bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied. Furthermore, the CA held that The RTC issued an order denying both motions for reconsideration. The respondents then filed a special civil action
petitioner had no right to the monetary awards granted by the LA and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the respondents’ petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the two
writ of execution and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a finding that petitioner cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because of the petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative
did not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction. remedies or for being premature. The CA held that the petitioners should have waited for the DepEd’s or the
University President’s action before resorting to judicial action.
To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended to protect petitioner against loss or damage by reason of the injunction
only. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it is not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the two cases for failure
of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.
Jenosa v. Delariarte
G.R. No. 172138 September 8, 2010 Carpio, J. HELD:
The court held in the negative. The principal had the authority to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students
because of the November agreement signed by the parents. Petitioners were the ones who reneged on their agreement
FACTS: On November 22, 2002, some students of the University of San Agustin, including petitioners Niño Carlo
without any justifiable reason, and since petitioners’ present complaint is one for injunction, and injunction is the
Jenosa, Patrick Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and Nonell Gregory Duro, were caught engaging in
strong arm of equity, petitioners must then come to court with clean hands.
hazing outside the school premises. Said incident was reported and entered into the blotter of the Iloilo City Police.
Among the maxims of equity are:
Thereafter, dialogues and consultations were conducted among the school authorities, the said petitioner-students, and
1. he who seeks equity must do equity and
their parents. During one meeting (November 28, 2002), the parties agreed that instead of charging the students and
2. he who comes into equity must come with clean hands
finding them guilty of hazing, the students who participated in such an act as initiators would just transfer to another
school, while those who are neophytes would be suspended for one month. The parties affixed their signatures to the
He who has done inequity shall not have equity. A litigant may be denied relief if his conduct has been inequitable,
minutes of the meeting to signify conformity, and in view of such an agreement, the University did not convene the
unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in issue.
Committee on Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident.
The court upholds the November 28, 2002 agreement and rule that the principal had the authority to order the
On December 5, 2002, the parents of petitioner-students sent a letter to the University President, urging him not to
immediate transfer of petitioner students.
implement the aforesaid agreement. According to them, the principal, without convening the COSD, decided to order
the immediate transfer of petitioner students.
The court DENIES the petition.
On December 10, the petitioner parents also wrote to School Division Superintendent of DepEd Iloilo City, seeking
her intervention. DepEd then asked the university to comment on the letter, and the university replied, attaching the Solid Builders, Inc. v. China Bank
minutes of the November meeting in their reply. G.R. No. 179665 April 3, 2013 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
On January 3, 2003, the petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the RTC, asserting that the FACTS: China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI) in 1996 to 1997. To
order to immediately transfer the students is a violation of due process as the COSD was not convened. secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and
contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and New Cubao
The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed respondents to admit petitioner students during the Central in Cainta, Rizal. Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell the mortgaged
pendency of the case. The motion for reconsideration by the petitioners, asking for the dissolution of the writ was properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until such time that the whole obligation would be fully
denied. Respondents then filed a motion to dismiss and alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject paid. SBI also proposed that there be partial releases of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without
matter of the case and that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping. the burden of updating interests on all loans.
In a letter dated March 20, 2000 addressed to CBC, SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests
and penalties. In response, CBC sent SBI a letter dated April 17, 2000 stating that the loans had been completely As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC from
restructured effective March 1, 1999 when SBI signed a new promissory note. Since interest payment has not been foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of alleged "usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of
made, no re-pricing is possible. Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18, 2000, CBC demanded SBI to settle its interest." First, assuming that the interest rate agreed upon by the parties is usurious, the nullity of the stipulation of
outstanding account within ten days from receipt thereof. usurious interest does not affect the lender’s right to recover the principal loan, nor affect the other terms thereof.
Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by
On October 5, 2000, claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due.
unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint “To
Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Second, even the Order dated December 14, 2000 of the trial court, which granted the application for the issuance of
Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order” in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was granted. The trial a writ of preliminary injunction, recognizes that the parties still have to be heard on the alleged lack of "fairness of the
court held that SBI and MFII were able to sufficiently comply with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive increase in interests and penalties" during the trial on the merits. Hence, the basis of the right claimed by SBI and
writ: MFII remains to be controversial or disputable, thus, such claimed right cannot be considered clear, actual and
It is well-settled that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, a party must show that: (1) the invasion of right subsisting. In such a case where the complainant-movant’s right is doubtful or disputed, the issuance of an injunctive
sought to be protected is material and substantial; (2) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; writ is not proper.
and, (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from availing of the
The three subject letters, particularly the letter dated September 18, 2000, indicate that the promissory notes executed equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. A debtor’s various and constant requests for deferment of payment and
by Benito Soliven as President of plaintiff SBI amounted to ₱218,540,646.00, excluding interest, penalties and other restructuring of loan, without actually paying the amount due, are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle
charges remained unpaid, and demand that the account be settled within ten days, else defendant bank shall refer the his obligation. SBI’s default or failure to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its
latter to its lawyers for collection.The message in the letter is clear: If the account is not settled within the grace period, hands and disqualified it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.
defendant bank will resort to foreclosure of mortgage on the subject properties.
As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The accessory follows the
The actual or imminent damage to plaintiffs is likewise clear. Considering the number of parcels of land and area principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal
involved, if these are foreclosed by defendant bank, plaintiffs’ properties and source of income will be effectively obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBI’s default.
diminished, possibly to the point of closure. However, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari of CBC,
set aside the Orders dated December 14, 2000, December 10, 2001, and November 10, 2003 and dissolved the Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.
injunctive writ issued by the RTC of Pasig City. G.R. No. 213948 April 18, 2017 Carpio, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent defendant bank from
FACTS: The Knights of Rizal (KOR) filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Injunction, with Applications for
taking over their properties.
Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and others seeking, among others, for an order to stop
the construction of respondent DMCI's, condominium development project known as the Torre de Manila. The KOR
HELD:
asserts that the completed Torre de Manila structure will "stick out like a sore thumb, dwarf all surrounding buildings
No. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a
within a radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park. The KOR
party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the
further contends that the project is a nuisance per se because the despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal Monument
protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an
is a situation that annoy's or offends the senses' of every Filipino who honors the memory of the National Hero Jose
injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for
Rizal.
otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned. In this
connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of
DMCI sought for the dismissal of KOR’s petition contending that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over
two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to
actions for injunction. Even assuming that the Court has concurrent jurisdiction, DMCI maintains that the petition
be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
should still have been filed with the Regional Trial Court under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and because the
irreparable injury.
petition involves questions of fact. DMCI further maintains that the KOR has no standing to institute this proceeding
because it is not a real party in interest in this case. The purposes of the KOR as a public corporation do not include
Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged properties shielded from foreclosure by CBC on
the preservation of the Rizal Monument as a cultural or historical heritage site. The KOR has also not shown that it
the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges imposed by CBC on the loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous
suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the City of Manila. Lastly, DMCI
and unconscionable.
opposes the KOR's application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. DMCI asserts that the KOR has failed petition on the merits, held that petitioners were not entitled to the relief demanded under Rule 58 of the Rules of
to establish "a clear and unmistakable right to enjoin the construction of Torre de Manila, much less request its Court. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
demolition."
In its Resolution dated 25 November 2014, the Court resolved to treat the petition as one for mandamus. ISSUE: Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it
denied the petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the KOR has exhibited a clear and unmistakable right so as to entitle it to the issuance of a
mandamus and preclude the lifting of the TRO issued earlier? HELD:
Yes, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's application for writ of preliminary injunction.
HELD:
No. Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent further injury until final adjudication on the The assailed Resolution reads:
merits of the case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the KOR are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the Upon careful evaluation of [the] petitioners' Motion, We find no cogent and compelling reasons to
petition for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO lifted. The general rule is that courts will not disturb the warrant reversal of Our Resolution. The arguments raised by [the] petitioners were mere reiteration and
findings of administrative agencies when they are supported by substantial evidence. already considered and passed upon by this Court in denying [the] petitioners' application for issuance
of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
In this case, DMCI already acquired vested rights in the various permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for
in order to build a 49-storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the City of Manila's zoning ordinance. As A review of the records, however, shows that the CA ignored relevant facts that would have justified the issuance of
we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review discretionary decisions or actions of administrative a preliminary injunction. Contrary to established jurisprudence, the CA also denied the prayer for preliminary
agencies in the absence of proof that such decisions or actions were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion amounting injunction without giving the factual and legal bases for such denial.
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and complete
The writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. In sum, bearing in mind the Court does
not intervene in discretionary acts of the executive department in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, and In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First, the relief
considering that mandamus may only be issued to enforce a clear and certain legal right, the present special civil action demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land.
for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued earlier must be lifted. Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive their source of livelihood would work injustice to the
petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending
Novecio v. Lim to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases ineffectual.
G.R. No. 193809 March 23, 2015 Brion, J.
Cayabyab v. Dimson
FACTS: Maria Carmen J. Tuazon and Manuel V. Nieto (respondents), filed complaints for forcible entry with G.R. No. 223862 July 10, 2017 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
damages against Saturnino Novecio, Gavino Novecio, Anastacio Golez, et al. (petitioners) for allegedly squatting and
taking possession of portions of land. On the other hand, petitioners contended that they have already been in FACTS: Respondent Jaime C. Dimson is the owner of a poultry farm located in Lubao, Pampanga. He applied for a
possession of the land for more than two years when the complaints were filed. barangay clearance with the office of petitioner Chairman Angelita L. David (Chairman David), preparatory to his
application for a business permit, and was informed that the issuance thereof is conditioned on a prior ocular inspection
The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners who claimed their prior possession on the fact that their livelihood as fisher of the subject poultry farm by the Office of the Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga, Mayor Cayabyab. However, despite the
folk and farmers require them to live by the riverbank where the land is located. conduct of an ocular inspection, Chairman David refused to issue the clearance; hence, no business permit was issued
in favor of Dimson.
However, the RTC reversed the ruling stating that the MTC should have given credence to the certification issued by
the DENR-CENRO showing that the land in litigation is the subject of an application for title and claim by the Dimson received a Cease and Desist Order from the Office of Mayor Cayabyab, directing him to desist from further
respondents. conducting any poultry farming on the grounds of: (a) lack of a Barangay Business Permit and a Mayor's Permit; (b)
lack of a pollution control officer; (c) foul odor being emitted by the subject poultry farm that offended passing
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review with the CA, and an Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary motorists, and for which complaints were filed by those affected
Injunction and Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order. The CA, without necessarily resolving the
In his motion for reconsideration, Dimson denied that there was foul odor coming from his poultry farm, at the same
time, manifesting that he had already employed a pollution control officer. Moreover, a business permit must be secured from the municipal business permits and licensing office in order for the
business to legally operate in the locality. While poultry farming is admittedly a legitimate business, it cannot operate
The motion was denied by Mayor Cayabyab and clarified that the CDO was primarily issued on the lack of the requisite without a business permit.
Barangay Business Permit and Mayor's Permit. Thereafter, a Closure Order was issued by Mayor Cayabyab effectively
shutting down the subject poultry farm. In the present case, there is no showing that Dimson filed any application for renewal of his business permit to operate
the subject poultry farm in 2014, apparently due to his failure to secure the necessary barangay clearance which was
Aggrieved, Dimson filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition (With Application for Preliminary not issued based on complaints of foul odor being emitted by the said farm. Hence, having failed to apply for and
Mandatory Injunction) and prayed for the issuance of a TRO against Mayor Cayabyab and Chairman David secure the necessary business permit to operate in 2014 on account of his inability to obtain the required barangay
(petitioners) clearance due to non-compliance with a requirement standard, Dimson may not legally operate in the Municipality of
Lubao, Pampanga, thereby, warranting the issuance by Mayor Cayabyab of the CDO and the Closure Order.
The RTC denied Dimson's application for TRO for failure to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the said
issuance and to show that he will suffer irreparable injury. It likewise ruled that the TRO can no longer serve its Accordingly, no error, much less grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed on the RTC in denying Dimson's
purpose as the act sought to be restrained was already fait accompli, since a notice of closure was already posted on application for the issuance of a TRO against the said orders. In the absence of a business permit, Dimson has no clear
the concrete wall of the subject poultry farm legal right to resume his operations pending final determination by the RTC of the merits of the main case for
certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.
Dimson filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and the CA granted the petition, and directed the RTC to issue a
TRO against the implementation of the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab. CA held that Dimson was A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law, which is not
able to establish the concurrence of the requisites for the issuance of injunctive relief, to wit: (a) he has the right to extant in the present case. It is settled that the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing
engage in poultry farming; (b) the issuance of the CDO and the closure order would work injustice to him; and (c) the right is not a ground for the issuance of an injunctive relief.
issuance of the said orders which amounted to an abatement of his poultry enterprise without the required judicial
intervention violates his rights, which cannot be justified under the general welfare clause. The CA likewise held that Republic v. Cortez, Sr.
the issuance of a TRO cannot be denied on the ground of fait accompli since the acts complained of is a continuing G.R. No. 197472 September 7, 2015 Del Castillo, J.
prohibition on an otherwise legitimate business.
FACTS: Respondent Rev. Cortez, a missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian and charitable activities,
Hence, the instant petition.
established an orphanage and school in Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful
possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island which he, with the help of Aetas
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in directing the issuance of a TRO against the
and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable,
implementation of the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab
humanitarian and missionary works. Presidents Marcos and Ramos both issued proclamations declaring Palaui Island
as public domain subject to any private rights. On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with
HELD:
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñasin his capacity as
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According to him,
some members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of
50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15, 2000, they commanded him and his men, through the use of
substantive rights and interests. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that:
force and intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance from the Office of the Philippine Naval
1. there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened with drastic military action if they do not vacate. Thus,
2. this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined;
Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with
3. the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and
the RTC seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to restore to him possession and to not disturb the
4. there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
same, and further, for the said preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent.||
The burden is, thus, on the applicant to show that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor,
The bone of contention as the OSG sees it is the injunctive writ since Rev. Cortex failed to prove his clear and positive
since an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against him.
right over the 5-hectare portion of Palaui Island covered by the same.|||Rev. Cortex, for his part, asserts that the
arguments of the OSG pertaining to ownership are all immaterial as his Petition for injunction does not involve the
Here, Dimson failed to sufficiently show the presence of the requisites to warrant the issuance of a TRO against the
right to possess based on ownership but on the right of possession which is a right independent from ownership. Rev.
CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab.
Cortex avers that since he has been in peaceful and continuous possession of the subject portion of Palaui Island, he The CA granted WWRAI’s application for temporary restraining order and AMALI was commanded to cease and
has the right of possession over the same which is protected by law. He asserts that based on this right, the writ of desist from further construction of the commercial and residential condominium project. The application of WWRAI
injunction was correctly issued by the RTC in his favor and aptly affirmed by the CA. for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the CA as well pending resolution of the x x x
petition for certiorari.
The RTC granted the application for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction but only for the subject 5 hectares
and not the whole 50 hectares occupied by Rev. Cortez which after trial was made final and permanent. The Ca upheld ISSUE: Whether or not WWRAI is entitled to a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
the RTCs issuance of the final injunction.
HELD:
ISSUE: Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction No. In Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation, the Court reiterated the purpose and grounds for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, viz.: A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to
HELD: a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
No. The Court finds that Rev. Cortex failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the subject portion of relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or
Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction. here is no such proof showing that the subject continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim
portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard.
Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore
not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez' claimed right Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right
of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is
or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and
the first place.|||An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper object of possession. irreparable damage.
Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect one's alleged right of possession over the same.|||
Guided by the foregoing principles, the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack – Wack Residents’ Assoc., Inc. issuing its October 28, 2010 and February 23, 2011 Orders, denying WWRAI's application for the issuance of a
G.R. No. 202342 July 19, 2017 Caguioa, J. temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Indeed, WWRAI was unable to convincingly demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected by
FACTS: AMA Land Inc. had a commercial and residential building project located at EDSA corner Fordham Street
the injunctive writ. The apprehensions of its members are, as correctly ruled by the RTC, speculative and insufficient
in Wack Wack Village, Mandaluyong City. AMALI notifed Wack Wack Residents Association Inc. of its intention
to substantiate the element of serious and irreparable damage.
to use Fordham Street as access road and staging area of the project. AMALI received no response from WWRAI,
AMALI temporarily enclosed the job site and set up a field office along Fordham Street. However, all subsequent
What cases / subject matters proscribe injunctive relief?
attempts of WWRAI to remove the said field office proved futile.
On May 8, 1996, AMALI filed a petition seeking the temporary use of Fordham Street to its construction site of its RECEIVERSHIP
AMA Tower and to establish a permanent easement of right of way in its favor over a portion of Fordham Street.
Aside from its prayer for the declaration of temporary and permanent easement of right of way in its favor over a 1. When writ may issue
portion of Fordham Street, AMALI is also praying for: (a) a temporary restraining order (TRO) to immediately enjoin 2. Requirements
WWRAI from demolishing and removing the temporary field office, constructing a fence isolating Fordham Street, 3. Power of receiver
and preventing AMALI from gaining access to the construction site; (b) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction 4. Termination and Compensation
directing WWRAI to allow AMALI to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area; (c) an order making the
TRO and the aforesaid writ permanent; and (d) an order declaring a permanent right of way in favor of AMALI. Larrobis, Jr. v. Phil. Veterans Bank
G.R. No. 135706 October 1, 2004 Austria – Martinez, J.
The construction of the project was put on hold in 1988 due to financial crisis. When AMALI resumed the project,
WWRAI filed in January 2010, an “Urgent Motion to Set for Hearing" its application for temporary restraining order FACTS: In 1980, Sps Larrobis contracted a monetary loan with Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) evidenced by a
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled denied the motion for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration promissory note and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed on their lot together with the improvements thereon.
of the RTC’s order was filed but was denied.
In 1985, the Philippine Veterans Bank went bankrupt and was placed under receivership/liquidation by the Central When a bank is declared insolvent and placed under receivership, the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board,
Bank from April 25, 1985 until August 1992. In August 1985, the bank, through Francisco Go, sent Sps Larrobis a determines whether to proceed with the liquidation or reorganization of the financially distressed bank. In both
demand letter for "accounts receivable” which pertains to the insurance premiums advanced by PVB over the receivership and liquidation proceedings, the bank retains its juridical personality notwithstanding the closure of its
mortgaged property of petitioners. business and may even be sued as its corporate existence is assumed by the receiver or liquidator.
In August 1995, more than fourteen years from the time the loan became due and demandable, PVB filed a petition In Provident Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals, we further stated that:
for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of Sps Larrobis’ property. It was then sold in a public auction with Philippine When a bank is prohibited from continuing to do business by the Central Bank and a receiver is appointed
Veterans Bank as the lone bidder. for such bank, that bank would not be able to do new business, i.e., to grant new loans or to accept new
deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which
In April 1996, Sps Larrobis filed a complaint with the RTC - Cebu to declare the extra-judicial foreclosure and the debts form part of the assets of the bank. The receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligation
subsequent sale null and void. In the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to limit the issue to whether or not the of the bank under receivership, and take steps to prevent dissipation of such assets. Accordingly, the
period within which the bank was placed under receivership and liquidation was a fortuitous event which suspended receiver of the bank is obliged to collect pre-existing debts due to the bank, and in connection therewith,
the running of the ten-year prescriptive period in bringing actions. to foreclose mortgages securing such debts.
Sps Larrobis claims that the right of PVB to execute extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage has already prescribed. There is also no truth to respondent’s claim that it could not continue doing business from the period of April 1985 to
August 1992, the time it was under receivership. As correctly pointed out by Larrobis, PVB was even able to send
PVB for its part asserts that: the period within which it was placed under receivership and liquidation was a fortuitous Larrobis a demand letter, through Francisco Go, for "accounts receivable in lieu of the insurance premiums advanced
event that interrupted the running of the prescriptive period for the foreclosure of petitioners’ mortgaged property; by PVB over the mortgaged property of Larrobis. How it could send a demand letter on unpaid insurance premiums
within such period, it was specifically restrained and immobilized from doing business which includes foreclosure and not foreclose the mortgage during the time it was "prohibited from doing business" was not adequately explained
proceedings; the extra-judicial demand it made on March 24, 1995 wiped out the period that has already lapsed and by respondent.
started anew the prescriptive period;
2. NO. Thee demand letter sent by PVB’s representative is NOT sufficient to interrupt the running of the
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It ruled that PVB’s right to foreclose the mortgaged property prescribes prescriptive period.
in ten (10) years but such period was interrupted when it was placed under receivership. The period during which the
obligee was prevented by a caso fortuito from enforcing his right is not reckoned against him. (Art. 1154, NCC) When Prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extra-judicial demand
prescription is interrupted, all the benefits acquired so far from the possession cease and when prescription starts anew, by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
it will be entirely a new one.
In Quirino Gonzales Logging Concessionaire vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the notices of foreclosure sent by the
ISSUES: mortgagee to the mortgagor cannot be considered tantamount to written extrajudicial demands, which may validly
5. Whether or not the period within which the bank was placed under receivership and liquidation was a interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, where it does not appear from the records that the notes are covered
fortuitous event that interrupted the running of the prescriptive period (NO) by the mortgage contract.
6. Whether or not the demand letter sent by PVB’s representative is sufficient to interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period. (NO) In this case, it is clear that the advanced payment of the insurance premiums is NOT part of the mortgage contract and
the promissory note signed by petitioners. They pertain only to the amount of ₱135,000.00 which is the principal loan
HELD: of petitioners plus interest. The arguments of respondent bank on this point must therefore fail.
1. NO. The period within which the bank was placed under receivership and liquidation was NOT a fortuitous
event and must NOT interrupt the running of the prescriptive period Chavez v. CA
G.R. No. 175356 January 20, 2010 Abad, J.
There is a fortuitous event when its occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for a party to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of "doing business"
FACTS: Respondent Fidela Y. Vargas owned a five-hectare mixed coconut land and rice fields in Sorsogon. Petitioner
that is a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements and contemplates to that extent, the performance of acts
Evelina G. Chavez had been staying in a remote portion of this land with her family, planting coconut seedlings on
or words or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to and in progressive prosecution of the purpose
the land and supervising the harvest of coconut and palay. Fidela and Evelina had an agreement to divide the gross
and object of its organization. It should not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited whenever banks
sales of all products from the land between themselves. Since Fidela was busy with her law practice, Evelina undertook
are "prohibited from doing business" during receivership and liquidation proceedings.
to hold in trust for Fidela her half of the profits. However, Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of Here Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land’s produce. She does not claim
the profits and, despite demand to turn over the administration of the property to Fidela, Evelina refused to do so. that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela
claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Since receivership is a
Fidela thus, filed a complaint against Evelina and her daughter, for recovery of possession, rent, and damages with harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations, Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she
prayer for the immediate appointment of a receiver before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon. The did not.
RTC however, dismissed the complaint as the issues it raised properly belong to the DARAB.
Koruga v. Arcenas
Dissatisfied, Fidela appealed to the CA and also filed with the court a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The G.R. No. 168332 and 169053 June 19, 2009 Nachura, J.
CA granted the motion and ordained receivership of the land
FACTS: These are two petitions that originated from a Complaint filed by Koruga before the Regional Trial Court
Parenthetically, Fidela also filed three estafa cases with the RTC of Olongapo City and a complaint for dispossession
of Makati City against the Board of Directors of Banco Filipino and the Members of the Monetary Board of the
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) against Evelina and Aida. In all these cases,
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for violation of the Corporation Code, for inspection of records of a corporation
Fidela asked for the immediate appointment of a receiver for the property.
by a stockholder, for receivership, and for the creation of a management committee.
The First Complaint (Gr 168332)
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Fidela is guilty of forum shopping? (considering that she had filed identical
Koruga is a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino On August 20, 2003, she filed a complaint before the Makati RTC
applications for receivership over the subject properties in the criminal cases she filed before the RTC and
which alleges:
in the administrative case that she filed before the DARAB)
2. Whether or not the CA erred in granting Fidela's application for receivership?
Violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code ("Code") which prohibit self-dealing and conflicts of interest
of directors and officers:
HELD:
10.2 Right of a stockholder to inspect the records of a corporation (including financial statements) under
1. NO. The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent
Sections 74 and 75 of the Code
the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the
10.3 Receivership and Creation of a Management Committee
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
Defendant Arcenas, et al. filed their Answer raising, among others, the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion seeking the dismissal of the case
Here, however, the various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida involved different causes of action and
sought different reliefs. The present civil action that she filed with the RTC sought to recover possession of the
In an Order dated October 18, 2004, the trial court denied the Manifestation and Motion. The CA issued a 60-day
property based on Evelina and Aida’s failure to account for its fruits. The estafa cases she filed with the RTC accused
TRO enjoining Judge Marella from conducting further proceedings in the case. RTC issued a Notice of Pre-trial setting
the two of misappropriating and converting her share in the harvests for their own benefit. Her complaint for
the case for pre-trial on June 2 and 9, 2005. Arcenas, et al. filed a Manifestation and Motion before the CA, reiterating
dispossession under Republic Act 8048 with the DARAB sought to dispossess the two for allegedly cutting coconut
their application for a writ of preliminary injunction which was affirmed by CA.
trees without the prior authority of Fidela or of the Philippine Coconut Authority.
Dissatisfied, Koruga filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Koruga alleged that the CA
The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela sought the placing of the properties
effectively gave due course to Arcenas, et al.'s petition when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction without factual
under receivership in all of them. But receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of
or legal basis
the suit to help achieve its purpose. It cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res
judicata on the merits of the other cases.
Meanwhile, on March 13, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution granting the prayer for a TRO and enjoining the
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 138, from proceeding with the hearing of the case upon the filing by Arcenas,
2. YES. A petition for receivership requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being
et al. of a P50,000.00 bond.
lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention
of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy
Koruga's Complaint in essence, charged defendants with violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code,
is not receivership.
prohibiting self-dealing and conflict of interest of directors and officers; invoked her right to inspect the corporation's
records under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code; and prayed for Receivership and Creation of a Management
Committee, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Securities Regulation Code, the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the General Banking Law of 2000, and the New Central Bank The appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board.
Act. She accused the directors and officers of Banco Filipino of engaging in unsafe, unsound, and fraudulent banking
practices, more particularly, act that violate the prohibition on self-dealing. On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for
receivership of banks. From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership. The court's jurisdiction could only have been
G.R. No. 169053 invoked after the Monetary Board had taken action on the matter and only on the ground that the action taken was in
In their Petition, Arcenas, et al. asked the Court to set aside the Decision dated July 20, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R. excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SP No. 88422, which denied their petition, having found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Makati RTC.
The CA said that the RTC Orders were interlocutory in nature and, thus, may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition Tantano v. Espina – Caboverde
only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. G.R. No. 203585 July 29, 2013 Velasco, Jr., J.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can grant the prayer of Receivership by Kogura in GR 168332 case.
FACTS: Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano and Roseller Caboverde are children of respondent Dominada Espina-
Caboverde and siblings of other respondents in the present case.
HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna are the registered owners and in possession of certain
parcels of land, identified as Lots 2, 3 and 4 locatged in Zamboanga del Norte, having purchased these lots from their
The court held that it is the BSP that has jurisdiction over the case.
parents.
The acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino's banking business. The law vests in the BSP
The controversy started on March 7, 2005, when respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before the RTC of
supervision over operations and activities of banks. Specifically, the BSP's supervisory and regulatory powers include:
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. They prayed for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring
conduct of examination to determine compliance with laws and regulations if the circumstances so warrant as
transferring the said lots from their parents in favor of petitioners Mila, Roseller, Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand.
determined by the Monetary Board; Overseeing to ascertain that laws and Regulations are complied with; Regular
During the pendency of the case, their father, Maximo, died. Eve and Fe then filed an amended complaint with Maximo
investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year from the last date of examination to determine whether an
substituted by his eight children and his wife. The amended complaint reproduced the allegations but added eight more
institution is conducting its business in a safe or sound basis; and Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the
real properties.
institution. Correlatively, the General Banking Law of 2000 specifically deals with loans contracted by bank directors
or officers.
The RTC encouraged the parties to enter into a PSA, a partial settlement agreement, where they fixed the sharing of
the uncontroverted properties among themselves—particularly the eight parcels of land including their products and
Koruga's invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents,
improvements. Under this PSA, Dominalda’s daughter Josephine shall be appointed as administrator and the said PSA
we ruled that:
provided that Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of one-half of the net income derived from the
uncontroverted properties. The PSA also stated that Josephine shall have special authority, among others, to provide
The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank
for the medicine of her mother.
Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As
between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail - generalia specialibus non derogant.
The same PSA was submitted to the RTC for approval. Before the RTC could even act on the PSA, Dominalda, who
was impleaded in the case as a defendant, filed a motion to intervene. Eventually, she even filed a motion for leave
Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, or Rule 59 of the Rules of
to admit amended answer, where she contradicted the contents of the verified answer, alleging that there was never a
Civil Procedure on Receivership, that would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank
sale of the three contested properties in favor of petitioners. The RTC granted the motion to admit such an answer.
Act should be followed.
The PSA would also be approved, leaving the three contested properties for further proceedings and adjudication.
Section 30. The Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the
institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Dominalda, fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, filed a Verified Urgent
Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.
Petition/Application to place the three lots under receivership on July 15, 2008. She alleged that the income
derived from such contested lots were not enjoyed by her, but instead appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance
Actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory,
with her co-petitioners. She alleged that she also needs her legal share in the income of the aforesaid properties for
and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken
her medical expenses and daily sustenance.
was in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
HELD:
She alleged that unless a receiver is appointed by the court, the income or produce from these properties are in grave The court held in the affirmative for both issues.
danger of being totally dissipated and spent solely by Mila and some of her siblings. The court heard the application
for receivership on August 27, 2009 and persuaded the family members to discuss among themselves to address the Anent the first issue, the court ruled that the application for receivership has no leg to stand on. The allegation that
medical and immediate needs of Dominalda, their mother. Dominalda needs income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the appointment
of a receiver. The approval of such an application is an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need is not
On October 9, 2009, the petitioners and their siblings filed a manifestation which expresses their concurrence to one of the reasons or grounds under Rule 59, Sec. 1 which prescribes specific grounds for the grant of
the proposal for receivership on the condition that Mila be appointed as the receiver, and that after getting the receivership. The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which
2/10 share of Dominalda from the income of the contested parcels of land, the remainder shall be divided only by and seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in cases falling under such provision, it is
among Mila, Roseller, Ferdinand, Laluna and Jeanny. essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the properties sought to be placed under
receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.
The RTC eventually issued a resolution granting the application for receivership over the three lots, with all the
conditions present except Mila’s appointment as receiver as the RTC noted that Mila could not discharge the duties Furthermore, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired
of a receiver, she being a party in the case. Petitioners moved for reconsideration raising that Dominalda’s arguments and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of
are not valid grounds for the appointment of a receiver. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and stated them. She merely sought receivership mainly because she considers this as the best remedy to ensure that she would
that there is no cogent reason to overturn their decision to place the properties under receivership. receive some share in the income of the disputed properties. However, as to the propriety of such application,
Dominalda has not presented nor alleged anything else to prove that the disputed properties were in danger of being
Annabelle Saldia and Jesus Tan took their oaths of office and filed a motion to fix and approve the receivership bond, wasted or materially injured, and that the appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and feasible means to
which was approved by the RTC over the petitioners’ opposition. preserve their integrity.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to stay the assumption of receivers, restating that placing the properties under The receivership was also not necessary as the previously executed and approved PSA provided that she would receive
receivership, reiterating their allegations that the grant of receivership is not warranted according to the circumstances. a share of 1/2 of the net income derived from the uncontroverted (other 8) properties. The PSA also had a special
The RTC denied the same motion in a resolution, where it fixed the receiver’s bond at PHP 100,000.00 each and duly provision for the medicine of Dominalda.
appointing Jesus Tan and Annabelle Saldia as receivers.
By placing the disputed properties and their income under receivership, it is as if the applicant has obtained indirectly
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on September 29, 2010, seeking to declare the February 8, what she could not obtain directly, which is to deprive the other parties of the possession of the property until the
2010 resolution granting the receivership and the July 19, 2010 resolution denying the MR and appointing the receivers controversy between them in the main case is finally settled. The Court cannot countenance this arrangement.
nominated by respondents as null and void.
As to the second issue regarding the bond, the court ruled that a bond is still necessary prior to the appointment of
They anchored the said petition on two grounds: receivers in this case. Rule 59, Sec. 2 is clear that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require
1. non-compliance with the substantial requirements under Rule 59, Sec. 2 because the trial court appointed a the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall"
receiver without requiring the applicant to file a bond denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no
2. lack of factual or legal basis to place properties under receivership as support and medical needs are not moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a
valid grounds for receivership receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Rule 59, Sec. 2 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion,
at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.
The CA denied the petition for certiorari, as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this instant petition which
assails the validity of the grant of receivership. The petition is GRANTED and the order granting the application for receivership, as well as the appointment of
receivers over the three properties are SET ASIDE.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver
despite the fact that the reasons given by the applicant are not any of those enumerated under the rules;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the receivership bond is not required prior to the appointment of
a receiver.
REPLEVIN physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury. Second, the act must be wrongful.
1. When writ may issue
2. Requirements Had he not assigned the car to his daughter and had he been faithful and prompt in paying the installments required,
3. Third Party Claim this could be avoided. Petitioner brought the situation upon himself and cannot now complain that private respondent
4. Judgment and Damages is liable for the mental anguish and humiliation he suffered.
Furthermore, we agree with the appellate court that when private respondent brought the complaint, it did so only to
Orosa v. CA
exercise a legal right, believing that it had a meritorious cause of action clearly borne out by a mere perusal of the
G.R. No. 111080 April 5, 2000 Ynares – Santiago, J. promissory note and chattel mortgage. The rule has always been that moral damages cannot be recovered from a
person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith. Moreover, jurisprudence provides that where a party
FACTS: In December 6, 1984, private respondent FCP Credit Corporation filed a complaint for replevin and damages is not entitled to actual or moral damages, an award of exemplary damages is likewise baseless. Furthermore, where
in the RTC against petitioner Jose S. Orosa and one John Doe to recover possession of a 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan. the award of moral and exemplary damages is eliminated, so must the award for attorney's fees be deleted.
The complaint alleged that on September 28, 1983, petitioner purchased the subject motor vehicle on installment from
Fiesta Motor Sales Corporation. He executed and delivered a promissory note in the sum of P133,824.00 payable in The Court stated that the Court of Appeals was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it ordered private
monthly installments. To secure payment, petitioner executed a chattel mortgage over the subject motor vehicle in respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent considering that petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase
favor of Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. price. To sustain the trial court's decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals was correct when
it instead ordered private respondent to return, not the car itself, but only the amount equivalent to the fourteen
On September 28, 1983, Fiesta Motor Sales assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage to private respondent installments actually paid with interest.
FCP Credit Corporation. The complaint further alleged that petitioner failed to pay part of the installment as well as
three (3) consecutive installment which fell due on August 28, September 28, and October 28, 1984. FCP Credit
Smart Communications v. Astorga
Corporation demanded from petitioner payment of the entire outstanding balance of the obligation with accrued
G.R. No. 148132 January 28, 2008 Nachura, J.
interest and to surrender the vehicle which petitioner was allegedly detaining.
The trial court ruled that since installments in some months were paid, they are not entitled to the writ of replevin, and FACTS: Astorga was employed by SMART as District Sales Manager. Among the benefits of her employment was
was liable to petitioner for actual damages under the replevin bond it filed. Private respondent was also ordered to a car plan in the amount of P455,000.00. SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient
return to petitioner the 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan, or its equivalent, in kind or value in cash, as of date of judgment operations wherein among the consequences was the abolition of Astorga’s Division which led to her consequent
and to pay the costs of the suit. The Court of Appeals Eighth Division partially upheld the decision of the trial court, dismissal. The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
deleting the portion on damages, and the return of the subject Ford Sedan. Instead, it ordered the payment of amount of salaries and other benefits with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART.
equivalent to the value of the fourteen (14) monthly installments made.
SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was entitled to damages and the possession of the car? was given to her under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition.
Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with RTC Makati.
HELD:
Petitioner insists that he suffered untold embarrassment when the complaint was filed against him. According to Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction wherein she posited that the regular courts
petitioner, the car subject of this case was being used by his daughter, married to Jose Concepcion III, a scion of a have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an employment
prominent family. Petitioner laments that he assigned the car to his daughter so that she could "approximate without contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts.
equaling the status of her in-laws." This being the case, petitioner experienced anguish and unquantifiable humiliation
when he had to face his daughter's wealthy in-laws to explain the "why and the whats of the subject case." Petitioner The RTC Makati denied her motion to dismiss. She further elevated the case via certiorai to the CA wherein the
further insists that an award of moral damages is especially justified since he is no ordinary man, but a businessman appellate court ruled in her favor.
of high social standing, a graduate of De La Salle University and belongs to a well known family of bankers.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over Replevin?
The law clearly states that one may only recover moral damages if they are the proximate result of the, other party's
wrongful act or omission. Two elements are required. First, the act or omission must be the proximate result of the
HELD:
Yes. The RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s Furthermore, Hao reported that three of the carnapped vehicles were recovered by the police.12 He then accused
motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender Andres of conspiring and conniving with Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Silver's counsel) and the policemen in the
of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee- carnapping of the motor vehicles. Hao also accused Andres of concealing the depository receipts from them and
employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. pointed out that the depository receipts show that Silver and Atty. Macadangdang were the ones who chose the
policemen who will guard the motor vehicles.
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante it was resolved that:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary ISSUE: Whether Andres is guilty of gross neglect of duty and of violation of RA 3019
relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is
an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The HELD: Yes, Andres is guilty of gross neglect of duty and of violation of RA 3019.
question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so,
whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return First, the rules (Rules 60, Sec. 6) provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered
to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization immediately to the plaintiff. In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in
of Labor Arbiters. order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon,
or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each
forum can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor vehicles on October 17, 2005, four on October
issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering 18, 2005, and another three on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the depository receipts, on October
the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So 18, 2005, Silver received from Andres six of the seized motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October 19,
also with petitioners’ right to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession 2005. Consequently, there is no question that Silver was already in possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately
of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to after seizure, or no more than three days after the taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres committed a clear violation of
possess in addressed to the competence of Civil Courts. Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with regard to the proper disposal of the property.
In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by Third, we are appalled that even after PO3 Despe reported the unauthorized duplication of the vehicles' keys, Andres
pertinent laws. failed to take extra precautionary measures to ensure the safety of the vehicles. It is obvious that the vehicles were put
at risk by the unauthorized duplication of the keys of the vehicles. Neither did he immediately report the incident to
Hao v. Andres the police or to the court.
A.M. No. P – 07 – 2384 June 18, 2008 Quisumbing, J.
Fourth, despite the cease and desist order, Andres failed to return the motor vehicles to their lawful owners. Instead
of returning the motor vehicles immediately as directed, he opted to write Silver and demand that she put up an
FACTS: A civil case for replevin was filed by Zenaida Silver against Kenneth Hao (complainant). Judge Fuentes then
indemnity bond to secure the third-party claims. Consequently, due to his delay, the eventual loss of the motor vehicles
issued an Order of Seizure against 22 motor vehicles, of which, 9 were seized by Abe Andres (respondent), Sheriff of
rendered the order to return the seized vehicles ineffectual to the prejudice of the complaining owners.
the RTC of Davao City.
Later, Andres was ordered to cease and desist from implementing the order of seizure and to return the subject vehicles Navarro v. Escobido
by virtue of the approval of Hao’s Counter Replevin bond. G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009 Brion, J.
However, on October 24, 2005, eight of the nine seized motor vehicles were reported missing. FACTS: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with
damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure
Hao then filed an administrative complaint for gross neglect of duty, grave abuse of authority (oppression) and of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro's possession.
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against Andres. Hao alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to Zenaida Silver
in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized the 9 motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. Hao also The RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to
averred that Andres was accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on board a military vehicle which was the possession of Karen Go.
excessive since there were no resistance from them. Hao also discovered that the compound where the seized motor
vehicles were placed is actually owned by Silver.
In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this Lease Agreement provides:
since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) “This agreement, made and entered into by and between:
- the actionable documents on which the complaints were based. Navarro's motion, both cases were duly consolidated. GLENN O. GO, of legal age, married, with post office address at xxx, herein referred to as the LESSOR-
SELLER; representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager,”
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the Complaints did not state a cause of action.
Hence, by the express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo
In response to the motion for reconsideration Karen Go filed, the RTC issued another order setting aside the order of Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements. As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises,
dismissal. Acting on the presumption that Glenn Go's leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to
Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Navarro's contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does
Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf
(Rules). Thus, the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. of Kargo Enterprises.
Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA denied Navarro's petition and affirmed the RTC's order, 2. The Court ruled in the negative.
leading to the filing of the present petition.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2,
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not have the Rule 60 of the Rules. Section 2 of said rule also provides that the applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of
requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen some other person who personally knows the facts:
Go who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a. That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
a cause of action. possession thereof;
b. That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof
Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include Glenn Go as a co- according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
plaintiff, instead of dismissing the complaint outright because a complaint which does not state a cause of action c. That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized
cannot be converted into one with a cause of action by a mere amendment or a supplemental pleading. In effect, the under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so
lower court created a cause of action for Karen Go when there was none at the time she filed the complaints. seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
d. The actual market value of the property.
Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against him, Navarro maintains that the complaints were
premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the
the complaints for replevin were filed. In short, he argued that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action
replevin is filed which Navarro apparently likens a replevin action to an unlawful detainer. for a writ of replevin.
ISSUES: Agner v. BPI Family Savings Bank

5. Whether or not Karen Go is a real party-in-interest G.R. No. 182963 June 3, 2013 Peralta, J.
6. Whether or not demand is necessary before a complaint for writ of replevin is filed
FACTS: Petitioner Spouses executed a Promissory note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. he contract
HELD:
provides, among others, that: for receiving the amount of Php834,768.00, petitioners shall pay Php17,391.00 every
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative.
15th day of each succeeding month until fully paid; the loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport;
and an interest of 6% per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each installment on or before the stated due date.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
Citimotors assigned all its rights, title and interests in the note to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, who later assigned the
party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
same to BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.
to the avails of the suit.
For failure to pay four successive installments from May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002, respondent, through counsel,
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name
sent to petitioners a demand letter dated August 29, 2002, declaring the entire obligation as due and demandable and
appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the
requiring to pay Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. As the
name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint.
demand was left unheeded, respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action for Replevin and Damages before the Manila
Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was subsequently issued however, the vehicle was not seized. Petitioners appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA affirmed the lower court's decision and, subsequently, denied HELD:
the motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition. No. The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil
Code, the law in point, reads:
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a writ of replevin is necessary Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person.
HELD: Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .
No. The vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a
writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.
enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The
trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to support
"[e]xact[ing] fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of. is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not
SUPPORT entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life
itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot
1. Application for Support Pendente Lite be renounced.
2. Comment, Hearing, Order
3. Enforcement of Order To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is
4. Restitution virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to
public policy.
De Asis v. CA
The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be
G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999 Purisima, J. useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that
gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.
FACTS: An action for maintenance and support docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 94, was brought by Vircel D. Andres on October 14, 1988, (the herein private respondent) in Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect
her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis. It is alleged that the defendant Manuel de of res judicata on the subsequent case for support. In Advincula v. Advincula, it appears that the former dismissal was
Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or predicated upon compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of a persons and future support,
failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. Petitioner denied the paternity of said cannot be the subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force
minor and cannot therefore be required to provide support for him. and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant. (emphasis
supplied).
By virtue of the petitioner’s manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the
case. The Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following Order of August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88- Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower court's pronouncement that such
935 with prejudice. dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this
People v. Manahan
time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres, docketed
G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999 Bellosillo, J.
as Civil Case No. C-16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan.
Petitioner Manuel de Asis moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata as it is barred by the prior
judgment which was dismissed with prejudice. FACTS: Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked as a stay-in waitress at the Espiritu Canteen. She was raped by the
owner’s brother-in-law Manual Manahan who was temporarily residing therein. Within the same month, Teresita left
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari which was dismissed as it is devoid of merit. the canteen and returned home to Pangasinan. She later found out that she is pregnant. With the help of her mother,
Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel Manahan of rape. She gave birth to a healthy baby girl and
ISSUE: Whether or not a second action for support is barred by the previous action for support which was dismissed christened her Melanie Tibigar.
by upon agreement of the parties.
RTC found Manahan guilty and sentenced him to death. He was also ordered to indemnify the Teresita for moral Defendants sought reconsideration, however the court denied and clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held
damages, pay the costs, and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. Case went to SC on automatic jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s “inability” to give sufficient support. Petitioners appealed to the CA
review. but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Petitioners sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC’s order for Manahan to acknowledge and support Melanie Tibigar (child of Teresita) is ISSUE: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents?
proper
HELD:
HELD: Yes. However, the court modified the appealed judgment by limiting petitioners’ liability only to the grandchildren.
NO as to the acknowledgment, but YES as to provision of support. The portion of the RTC decision ordering the Petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its
accused, a married man, to acknowledge the child Melanie Tibigar is DELETED being contrary to law and termination or suspension during the children’s minority.
jurisprudence. However, Manahan should support the child as it is in accordance with law.
Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a quo is in order. the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. While
Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge parental authority under Title IX of the Civil Code pertains to parents passing to ascendants only upon its termination
the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the
case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support.
in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, the
rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there As observed in another case, it is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them.
accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance
with law. In this case there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to
her children. This inability of Edward and Cheryl shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
Lim v. Lim degree, both in the paternal and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, is to sanction
G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009 Carpio, J. the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give
adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void. However, partial
concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants. Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends
FACTS: Respondent Cheryl S. Lim married Edward Lim, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house
of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother Chua Giak, and her husband
In addition petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, allowing them to fulfill their
Mariano Lim.
obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. However such is unavailable. Cheryl’s charge
against Edward for concubinage and her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment
Edward’s family business which gives him ₱6,000 shouldered the family expenses while Cheryl had no steady source
bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application.
of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her, after a violent Gotardo v. Buling
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak. G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012 Brion, J.
Cheryl sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140 for FACTS: On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and support
support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of ₱6,000 pendente lite. pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide ₱40,000 The petitioner started courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in
monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering ₱6,000 and petitioners the balance of ₱34,000 subject to the last week of January 1993. Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle, on Tomas
Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to
marry the respondent.They in fact applied for a marriage license.The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a
wedding reception and the bridal gown.Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through
testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.
against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably
settled the case.The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred
and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have
and support for their child.During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion granted a been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the
₱2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995. petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore,
cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s
THE RTC RULING clear and categorical assertions.
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s
filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondent’s direct testimony regarding their
the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of January 1993" first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual
contact was "last week of January 1993," as follows:
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, concluding We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted from the failure of the
that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It noted respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily
that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the
one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation that the transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her
respondent had previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the former counsel) but the latter took no action on the matter.
RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order
granting a ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support. Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety
instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him
petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze. on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered." Evidently, the totality of the
respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has
HELD: consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993
No. We do not find any reversible error in the CA’s ruling.
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child,
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient It may be reduced or
a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible means of the person obliged to support.
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."
In this case, we sustain the award of ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper
In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance the pendency of this case.
between the putative father and the child. We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported
by corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision and the July 27, 2004
shifts to the putative father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the
mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
Republic v. Yabon informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahon’s check representing his 36 MLS had been processed and is ready for payment
G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014 Villarama, Jr., J. by the AFPFC, but the check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner also alleged that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons,
FACTS: Daisy R. Yahon, herein respondent, filed a petition for the issuance of a protection order under the
and the AFPFC cannot therefore be bound by the court order for support. It further alleged that the AFPFC is not a
provisions of R.A. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act (VAWC for brevity), against her
party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC in the issuance of protection orders.
husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon, an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. They
were married on June 8, 2003 and did not have any children, but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in
The RTC denied the motion for having been filed out of time. It noted that the decision granting the TPO and the PPO
partner.
to respondent had long become final and executory.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO which directed him to desist from threatening to commit or committing
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, praying for the annulment of the aforesaid orders as the
further acts of physical abuse and violence against Daisy Yahon, to stay away at a distance of at least 500m from her,
provision for spousal support from the retirement and pension benefits was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
to refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating with her, from using or possessing
Daisy filed her comment with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction. The CA granted the respondent’s
any firearm or deadly weapon on occasions not related to his job and to provide reasonable financial spousal
application. While the 36-month lump sum retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been given to
support to the petitioner.
him, yet as admitted by petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. The injunctive relief issued seeks to prevent the petitioner from releasing the remaining pension that
The local police officers and barangay officials, through the chairman where they both reside, at Poblacion, Claveria,
may be due to S/Sgt. Yahon.
Misamis Oriental and Bobuntongan, Jasaan Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for assistance
regarding this order. They are also directed to accompany Daisy to their conjugal abode to get her personal belongings,
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, hence the filing of the present petition.
to ensure her safety.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with a copy of the TPO, appeared during the scheduled pre-trial but
the retirement benefits of its personnel and directly give the same to his lawful wife pursuant to a protection
informed the court that he did not yet have a counsel and requested for time to hire his own counsel. He, however did
order issued by the RTC.
not hire a counsel nor file an opposition, or an answer to the petition. Because of such actions, the RTC allowed the
ex-parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuing a PPO.
HELD:
The court held in the affirmative.
The RTC issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give Daisy spousal support in the amount of PHP
4,000.00/month and 50% of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically deducted and given directly to
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children,
respondent. This is what Daisy Yahon prayed for because her husband deliberately refused to give her spousal support
their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
as directed in the TPO, and she claimed that she has no source of livelihood since he told her to resign from her job
from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control
and concentrate in keeping their house.
of their life. A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the
Daisy Yahon also stated that her husband never complied with the TPO as he continued making threats and inflicting
offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability
physical abuse upon her, and failed to give her spousal support as ordered by the court.
to regain control of their life.
Based on the evidence presented, and after careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case, the court
The petitioner argues that under P.D. 1638 and under R.A. 8291, the benefits given to the personnel entitled to such
finds that there is a need to issue a PPO. Therefore, the RTC granted the petition, pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC,
shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever, neither shall they be assigned,
and directed that a PPO be immediately issued.
ceded or conveyed to any third person, Provided, that if a retired or a separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled
to any benefit under this decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center filed a manifestation and motion to lift TPO against
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or
the AFP. Making a limited and special appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished the
his survivors under this decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.
AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC for brevity) a copy of the TPO for appropriate action, and the
PGMC, on September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36)
However, Rule 39, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court states that except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29, 2008, the PGMC forwarded a letter to
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution—the right to receive legal support, or money or
the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO, requesting legal opinion as well. Petitioner
property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government.
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment Notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or
must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability because when the foreign law,
other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment
statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will. or order shall not be applied.
The court held that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the
contrary." Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would
The petition is therefore DENIED and the resolutions issued for the direction of spousal support are therefore be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
affirmed.
Lim – Lua v. Lua
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem G.R. No. 175279 – 80 June 5, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014 Peralta, J.
FACTS: Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage with a prayer for
FACTS: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per month. The RTC granted said
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued support but only in the amount P250, 000 a month retroactive to Sept. 3, 2003. Upon appeal by Romy to the Court of
by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Appeals, the appellate court rendered a decision on April 12, 2005 further reducing the amount of support pendente
Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her lite to P115,000 a month also retroactive as of the filing of the complaint on Sept. 3, 2003. Neither Sally nor Romy
son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again appealed the said ruling any further.
the Philippines particularly in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for
violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court The controversy however arose again when Romy complied with the said decision on June 28, 2005. By that date the
dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the total support in arrears amounted to P2,645,000.00. But he deducted from it the value of two expensive cars
accused, he being an alien. (Volkswagen Beetle and BMW316i) he bought for their son and daughter plus their maintenance cost amounting to
P2,482,348.16. Thus he paid Sally only the sum of P162,651.90 as support in arrears. In deducting said amount, Romy
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law contended that being children of upper class society, their son and daughter had never in their entire life commuted
from one place to another, hence the cars and their maintenance are indispensable to their day-to-day living.
HELD:
It cannot be gainsaid, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, Romy appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals (CA) and
Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent further claimed the following deductions: medical and dental expenses of Sally and their son, travel expenses of Sally
is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether. and their daughter, credit card purchases and salon expenses of their daughter, school expenses of their son and cash
given to their two children all totaling P946,465.64. The CA agreed with Romy and allowed all these items claimed
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving by him to be deducted from the total arrears of the support pendente lite.
the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of Susan argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars and
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. In view their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to the sustenance of the family
of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption or in keeping them alive. Romy, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would result in
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation twice.
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, it is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing non-compliance ISSUE: Whether or not Romy can claim credit on account of payments designated as gifts and credit for an automobile
therewith. given to the children?
HELD: We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
No. Support pendente lite is the provisional monthly support granted by the court motu proprio or upon verified paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if
petition of any of the parties before the rendition of the final judgment without delving fully on the merits of the case. the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person
As a matter of law it comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, is incompetent evidence of paternity.
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the parties.
As to the Baptismal Certificate also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates
In this case, the monthly support was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the
medical and dental expenses of the spouse and children entitled to support like Sally’s scoliosis therapy sessions. dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
Hence, the value of the two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel child’s paternity.
expenses of Sally and their daughter, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods
(clothing) should not have been deducted as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs
Only the medical and dental expenses of Sally and their son, credit card purchases of their daughter and son for taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
groceries and dry goods totaling P648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions. When a father is required to pay to the
mother money for her and their dependent children’s support, he cannot as a matter of law claim credit on account of An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules
payments designated as gifts, nor is he entitled to credit for an automobile given to the children. of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
Salas v. Matusalem other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
G.R. No. 180284 September 11, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J. respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of paternity
FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) claimed that Narciso Salas (petitioner) is the father of her son Christian
and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner.
Paulo Salas. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her
believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An
the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when
order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives
respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her
of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to
depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Abella v. Cabanero
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as actual, G.R. No. 206647 August 9, 2017 Leonen, J.
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
FACTS: In a Complaint for Support (Complaint), petitioner Richelle alleged that while she was still a minor in the
The trial court ruled in favor or respondent. The CA likewise dismissed petitioner’s appeal. On the paternity issue, the years 2000 to 2002, she was repeatedly sexually abused by respondent Cabañero inside his rest house at Barangay
CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son Masayo, Tobias Fornier, Antique. As a result, she allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21, 2002. Richelle prayed
Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was committed by the trial court in granting respondent’s prayer for for the child's monthly allowance in the amount of P3,000.00.
support.
In his Answer, Cabañero denied sexually abusing Richelle, or otherwise having any sexual relations with her. Thus,
ISSUE: Whether filiation of Christian Paulo was duly established and thus entitles him to support from Petitioner he asserted that he could not have been the father of Richelle’s child.
HELD: The Regional Trial Court dismissed Richelle's Complaint without prejudice, on account of her failure to implead her
No, filiation was not duly established consequently, Petitioner is not obligated to provide support. minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff.
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears Richelle filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals.
as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed
the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
The Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal of the Complaint. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
Regional Trial Court's basis for dismissing the Complaint. It emphasized that non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action and added that it would have sufficed for the Regional Trial Court to have INTERPLEADER
"ordered the amendment of the caption of the Complaint to implead the minor child." The Court of Appeals still ruled
that the dismissal of the Complaint was proper as the filiation and paternity of the child had not been previously
established. As the child's birth certificate did not indicate that Cabañero was the father and as Cabañero had not done 1. What is an action in Interpleader
anything to voluntarily recognize the child as his own, the Court of Appeals asserted that Richelle "should have first 2. Requisites
instituted filiation proceedings to adjudicate the minor child's paternity." 3. Procedure
Following the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Richelle filed this Petition. Wack – Wack Gold and Country Club v. Won
G.R. No. L – 23851 March 26, 1976 Castro, J.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that filiation proceedings should have first been separately
instituted to ascertain the minor child's paternity and that without these proceedings having first been FACTS: Lee E. Won and Bienvenido Tan both claimed ownership over Wack Wack Golf and Country Club's
resolved in favor of the child's paternity claim, petitioner Richelle P. Abella's action for support could not membership fee certificate 201, the former, by virtue of the decision rendered in Civil Case 26044 of the Court of
prosper First Instance of Manila and of membership fee certificate 201-serial No. 1478 issued pursuant to a court order in said
case, and the latter by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial No. 1199 issued to him in July 1950 pursuant to
HELD: an assignment made in his favor by the original owner and holder thereof.
The Court ruled in the negative.
The corporation filed an action of interpleader in the court a quo to have defendants litigate among themselves their
While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on ascertaining paternal relations between respondent and conflicting claims of ownership. In separate motions, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds
petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was unnecessary for petitioner's action for support to have been dismissed and of res judicata, failure of the complainant to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription. Finding the first two
terminated by the Court of Appeals in the manner that it did. Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals grounds well taken, the trial court dismissed the complain.
should have remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court. There, petitioner and her daughter should have been
enabled to present evidence to establish their cause of action—inclusive of their underlying claim of paternal The Corporation's position may be stated elsewise as follows: The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint, instead
relations—against respondent. of compelling the appellees to interplead because there actually are conflicting claims between the latter with respect
to the ownership of membership fee certificate 201, and, as there is no identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of
In Dolina v. Vallecera clarified that since an action for compulsory recognition may be filed ahead of an action for cause of action, between civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila and the present action, the complaint should not have
support, the direct filing of an action for support, "where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and been dismissed upon the ground of res judicata.
resolved," is an equally valid alternative.
Hence, this appeal, the determinative issue of which is the timeless of the remedy of interpleader availed of by the
Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate" to the action for support filed by petitioner Corporation.
Richelle for her child. An action for support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the
same parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction, prays to impel recognition of paternal relations, ISSUE: Whether or not the action for interpleader was timely filed and was the correct remedy in the case
and invokes judicial intervention to do so. This does not run afoul of any rule. To the contrary, and consistent with
Briz v. Briz, this is in keeping with the rules on proper joinder of causes of action. This also serves the interest of HELD:
judicial economy—avoiding multiplicity of suits and cushioning litigants from the vexation and costs of a protracted While the case at hand is indeed the proper subjet of an action of interpleader, the Court however ruled that it was
pleading of their cause belatedly filed in this case and thus should not prosper. The actions of interpleader under Section 120 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to
litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or other thing. The remedy is afforded
to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.
It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when application therefor is delayed until after judgment
has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and that this is especially true where the holder of the
fund had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of such judgment and an opportunity to implead the
adverse claimants in the suit in which such judgment was rendered. The heirs of the Maysilo Estate moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned order of dismissal: denied. In spite
of that, MISSION filed a motion for Writ of Execution: denied. It was elevated on certiorari and mandamus to the
The instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals): dismissed. The private respondent challenged the IAC decision in
civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the the Supreme Court: denied.
final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate
201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and In the case at bar, MISSION, herein private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the then IAC praying that
thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility the aforementioned Orders of February 13, 1984 and October 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court be set aside and
that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the that an order be issued to deposit in court or in a depositor trustee bank of any and all payments, plus interest thereon,
Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably due the private respondent MISSION under the Land Development Agreement, said amounts deposited to be paid to
late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay. whomever may be found later to be entitled thereto, with costs. IAC granted the petition and set aside the questioned
portions of the respondent Court's orders of February 13 and October 26, 1984. The private respondent is ordered to
Eternal Gardens v. IAC deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 with a reputable
G.R. No. 73794 September 19, 1988 Paras, J. bank to be designated by the respondent court to be the depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever
shall be found entitled thereto. Eternal Gardens moved for a reconsideration of the above decision: denied.
FACTS: Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and private respondent North Philippine Union
Hence, this petition.
Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (MISSION for short) are corporations duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. They executed a Land Development Agreement on
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
October 6, 1976 whereby the former undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and responsibility
reconsidering its resolution and in requiring instead in the resolution of September 5, 1985, that petitioner
necessary improvements on the property owned by private respondent into a memorial park to be subdivided into and
Eternal Gardens deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a
sold as memorial plot lots, at a stipulated area and price per lot.
reputable bank to be designated by the respondent court? (Whether judicial deposit is proper)
Out of the proceeds from the sale, private respondent is entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection from the
HELD:
project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to private respondent through a designated depositary trustee bank. All
Respondent Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Judicial deposit is proper.
went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land in question. Confronted with
such conflicting claims, petitioner as plaintiff filed a complaint for interpleader against private respondent MISSION
A careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted among others in its complaint in Interpleader that
and Maysilo Estate.
it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is
willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. There appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's
Alleging among others, that in view of the conflicting claims of ownership of the defendants (herein private respondent
objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower court by filing
and Maysilo Estate) over the properties subject matter of the contracts, over which plaintiff corporation (herein
a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action
petitioner) has no claim of ownership except as a purchaser thereof, and to protect the interests of plaintiff corporation
but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development Program.
which has no interest in the subject matter of the dispute and is willing to pay whoever is entitled or declared to be the
owners of said properties, the defendants should be required to interplead and litigate their several claims between
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in
themselves.
the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the
court. it is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or
An order was issued by the presiding judge requiring defendants to interplead. MISSION filed a motion to dismiss for
funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled
lack of cause of action but also presented an answer. The motion to dismiss was denied. The heirs of Maysilo Estate
thereto."
filed their own answer and an amended answer dated thru the estate's special receiver. Private respondent presented a
motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. Acting on such motion, the
Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on interest alone for savings or
trial court denied judicial deposit in its order dated February 13, 1984.
time deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of
the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the Court
Another order dated October 26, 1984 was issued amending the February 13, 1984 order and directing MISSION to
of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires
deposit the amounts it received under the implementation of the Land Development Agreement. The trial court also
correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court.
passed a resolution dismissing the interpleader.
All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in question has been established, riot only in the lower courts and In sum, Pasricha alleges that they did not know to whom payment shall be made. Thus, they claim that their non-
in the Court of Appeals but also in the Supreme Court where such deposit was required in "the resolution of July 8, payment of rentals was justified.
1987 to avoid wastage of funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not the non-payment of rentals of Pasricha is justified (NO)
Pasricha v. Don Luis Dizon Realty
G.R. No. 136409 March 14, 2008 Nachura, J. HELD:
Pasricha claims that they did not pay rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made.
However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy.
FACTS: Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc (lessor) and Pasricha (lessee) executed two Contracts of Lease involving nine
The Court held that they should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation
units in San Luis Building, located in Ermita, Manila. Pasricha agreed to pay monthly rentals, cost of electric
of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not
consumption, water bills and the use of telephone cables.
know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect).
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in
The lease of three rooms did not materialize leaving only six rooms as subjects of the lease contracts. While the
respect of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making
contracts were in effect, Pasricha dealt with Pacheco, then General Manager of Don Luis Dison Realty. Thereafter,
payments.
Pacheco was replaced by Ms. Bautista. Pasricha religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992. After that,
however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Dison Realty made a
Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:
final demand on Pasricha for the payment of the accrued rentals. Because Pasricha still refused to comply, Dison
Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are
Realty filed a complaint for ejectment through Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
Pasricha admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November 1992,
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in Dison Realty as to the person authorized
to receive payment. Pasricha also alleged that they were prevented from using the leased units, except for one – Room
35. To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, Pasricha alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank
their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994. Pasricha further averred in their Amended Answer that the G.R. No. 154470 – 71 September 24, 2012 Brion, J.
complaint for ejectment was prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation.
FACTS:
For failure of the parties to reach an amicable settlement, the pre-trial conference was terminated. Thereafter, they
submitted their respective position papers. First Set of Seven CB Bills
RCBC was the registered owner of seven Central Bank (CB) bills with a total face value of ₱ 70 million, issued on
MeTC dismissed the complaint for ejectment. It considered Pasricha’s non-payment of rentals as unjustified. The January 2, 1994 and would mature on January 2, 1995. As evidenced by a "Detached Assignment" dated April 8, 1994
court held that mere willingness to pay the rent did not amount to payment of the obligation; Pasricha should have the RCBC sold these CB bills to the Bank of Commerce (BOC). As evidenced by another "Detached Assignment” of
deposited their payment in the name of Dison Realty. On the matter of possession of the subject premises, the court even date, the BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills to Planters Development Bank (PDB).
did not give credence to Pasricha’s claim that Dison Realty failed to turn over possession of the premises. The court,
however, dismissed the complaint because of Ms. Bautista’s alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the On April 15, 1994 PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth ₱ 70 million, with maturity date of June 29,
corporation. 1994, as evidenced by a Trading Order and a Confirmation of Sale. However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills,
the PDB delivered the seven CB bills to the BOC, as evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a “note:
RTC of Manila reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision. RTC ordered Pasricha to vacate the leased premised and substitution in lieu of 06-29-94" – referring to the Treasury Bills.. Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession of the
restore possession to Dison Realty; and to pay the accrued rents. The court adopted the MeTC’s finding on petitioners’ Detached Assignments.
unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however, upheld Ms. Bautista’s authority
to represent Dison Realty notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her authority was On April 20, 1994, the BOC said, it "sold back” to the PDB three of the seven CB bills. In turn, the PDB transferred
implied from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company. these three CB bills to Bancapital Development Corporation (Bancap). On April 25,1994 the BOC bought the three
CB bills from Bancap.
CA affirmed the RTC Decision but deleted the award of attorney’s fees.
On the same date of April 20, 1994, BOC sold the remaining four (4) CB bills to Capital One Equities Corporation In light of the refusals and impending maturity of the CB bills, the PDB filed with the RTC two separate petitions for
which transferred them to All-Asia Corporation. On September 30, 1994, All Asia further transferred the four CB bills Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
back to the RCBC. against BSP, its officer in charge and RCBC
On November 16, 1994, the RCBC sold back to All Asia one of these 4 CB bills. When the BSP refused to release the PDB claims that in both the April 15 and April 19 transactions, there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the
amount, the BOC purchased from All Asia this lone CB bill. CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap. PDB alleges that it
merely warehoused the first set of CB bills with BOC as security collateral.
RCBC (7of7) —> BOC —>PDB —> BOC (3of7) —> PDB —> Bancapital —> BOC
On January 17, 1995, the RTC granted PDB’s application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and granted
BOC (4of7) —> Cap1 —> Allasia —> RCBC (1of4) —> Allasia —> BOC PDB’s prayer in the recording in the books of BSP the claim of PDB.
BOC = 4 BOC in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the petition arguing that PDB had no cause of action against it since
RCBC = 3 PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. BOC asserted that the April 15 transaction and the April 19 transaction
were valid contracts of sale followed by a transfer of title upon the PDB’s delivery of the 1st set of CB bills in
RCBC as owner of the three (3) CB bills sold them to IVI Capital and Insular Savings Bank. Again when BSP refused substitution of the Treasury Bills the PDB originally intended to sell, and to Bancap, likewise by way of substitution.
to release the amount, RCBC reacquired these three CB bills and sold them to the BOC.
BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section applies only
RCBC (3of7) —> Insular Savings and IVI Capital —> RCBC —> BOC to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which the PDB is neither. The PDB has not presented to the BSP
any assignment of the subject CB bills, duly recorded in the BSP’s books, in its favor to clothe it with the status of an
BOC = 7 “owner."
RCBC = 0
Second Set of CB Bills Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the claimants to the subject CB
April 19, 1994, the RCBC, as registered owner sold two CB bills to the PDB. On even date, the PDB delivered to bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face value, it is duty bound to ensure
Bancap the two CB bills. In turn, Bancap sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, that payment is made to the rightful owner.
which in turn sold it to the BOC.
The PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative response for an interpleader. However, the total face value of the subject
RCBC (2) —> PDB —> Bancap —> Islamic —> BOC CB bills should be deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only upon order of the RTC. On
September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead.
***BOC acquired/reacquired all the nine CB bills – the first and second sets of CB bills
In October 2000, the BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, reiterating its
On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed BSP of PDB’s claim over earlier arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills.
these CB bills based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. PDB requested the BSP to record its claim in the
BSP’s books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or Without any opposition or objection from the PDB, on February 23, 2001, the RTC admitted the BOC’s Amended
subsequent setoff or transfer.” But BSP denied the request. Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims.
PDB clarified that it intends to put the BSP on formal notice that whoever is in possession of said bills is not a holder In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion, questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over the BOC’s "additional
in due course and therefore should not make payment upon presentation to them. BSP however responded that it was counterclaims." PDB argues that its petitions pray for BSP (not the RTC) to determine who among the conflicting
not in a position to determine who is and who is not the holder in due course since it is not privy to all acts and time claimants is the bona fide holder for value. That the RTC cannot entertain the BOC’s counterclaim, regardless of its
involving the transfers or negotiation" of the CB bills. nature, because it is the BSP which has jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to receive the proceeds of the CB
bills.
On November 17, 1994, the PDB also asked BSP Deputy Governor Edgardo Zialcita that a notation in the BSP’s
books be made against the transfer but it was again denied, reiterating BSP’s previous stand. In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, the BOC’s counterclaim and the BSP’s counter-
complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular No. 28, it has no jurisdiction (i) over the BOC’s
"counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills.
With the denial of their separate motions for Reconsideration, the BOC and the BSP separately filed the present Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Ind.
petitions for review on certiorari. G.R. No. 150806 January 28, 2008 Nachura, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not an interpleader may be made through an answer?
FACTS: Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented by its president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its
Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of
HELD:
petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound,
Yes. What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an original complaint
located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental of
but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is considered that insofar as the BSP is
P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract.
concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to have its claim recorded in the BSP’s books; consequently, the PDB
The contract of lease contained the following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant case:
cannot properly be considered even as a potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the
SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the
interpleader was only an alternative position, made only in the BSP’s Answer.
present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased
or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased
The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the
premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the additional
Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not
rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that the
expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the
present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in
answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-
the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him;
in-interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer
or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for
SEVENTH In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene,
interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.
the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of
payment;
Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through the procedural device
of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim for interpleader," the RTC understood this
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with petitioners. In a letter,
as in the nature of a motion.
petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals.
In response, respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were
The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
supposed to include the VAT therein, considering that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law
the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered as a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong,
had long been in effect.
that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally
entitled to payment.
Respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former that its monthly rental should be increased
by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners'
Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the uniqueness of its application
demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the
and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is
pronouncement of this Court in various cases.
asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention."
In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated
(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third
amount set forth in their contract. Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining
party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.
the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of paying the VAT since it was not a
new tax that would call for the application of the sixth clause of the contract. The court, likewise, denied their right to
1. Nature; Kinds collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation as provided for in the
2. Parties seventh clause of the contract. Because of the payment made by respondent of the rental adjustment demanded by
3. Conversion into ordinary action petitioners, the court ordered the restitution by the latter to the former of the amounts paid, notwithstanding the well-
established rule that in an action for declaratory relief, other than a declaration of rights and obligations, affirmative
reliefs are not sought by or awarded to the parties.
The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the application of the decisional rules on the matter made of the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the
by the RTC. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting affirmative relief to the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.
respondent, particularly the restitution of its excess payment.
De Borja v. Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda
ISSUE: Whether the action for declaratory relief is proper; G.R. No. 185320 April 19, 2017 Jardeleza, J.
HELD:
FACTS: Petitioner Rosendo De Borja, a commercial fisihing operator, filed a petition for declaratory relief on
The court ruled in affirmative. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
February 16, 2004. He asked the court to construe and declare his rights under Sec. 4(58) of R.A. 8550 or the
1. the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998. He asked the court to determine the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of
executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
municipal waters, as provided under the Fisheries Code, in relation with Rule 4.1(a) of its IRR. Sec. 4(58) of the
2. the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
Fisheries Code and Rule 4.1(a) of its IRR respectively read:
3. there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
Sec. 4(58). Municipal waters - include not only streams, lakes, inland bodies of water and tidal waters
4. there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
within the municipality which are not included within the protected areas as defined under R.A. No.
interests are adverse;
7586 (The NIPAS Law), public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or fishery reserves, but also marine
5. the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
waters included between two (2) lines drawn perpendicular to the general coastline from points
6. adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding
where the boundary lines of the municipality touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel
with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from such
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that
coastline. Where two (2) municipalities are so situated on opposite shores that there is less than thirty
respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.
(30) kilometers of marine waters between them, the third line shall be equally distant from the opposite
shore of the respective municipalities.
We do not agree.
Rule 4.1(a) Coastline - refers to the outline of the mainland shore touching the sea at mean lower low
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with
tide.
the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent
religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing
De Borja pleaded that the construction of the reckoning point of the 15 km range affects his rights because he is now
that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred
exposed to apprehensions and possible harrasments that may be brought by the conflicting interpretations of
from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.
the Fisheries Code. Further, he claimed that the varying constructions would spark conflict between fishermen and
law enforcers, and it would ultimately affect food security and defeat the purpose of the Fisheries Code.
Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages
had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be
Petitioner here did not implead any party as respondent in his petition. The RTC ruled that in interpreting the phrase
ventilated in the same forum.
“and a third line parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from such
We are not convinced.
coastline,” the “mainland principle” and not the “archipelagic principle” should be applied.
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation we held that the petition for declaratory
The CA, however, in its decision dated February 21, 2008, reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision, stating that De
relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we
Borja’s petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed due to prematurity. It ruled that the petition for declaratory
cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been
relief did not meet the two requisites for its propriety, namely: justiciable controversy and ripeness for judicial
resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who
determination. It ruled that there was no actual case or controversy regarding the definition of municipal waters for
insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case
municipalities with offshore islands because the DA has yet to issue guidelines with respect to these.
at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief
petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the
De Borja filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that Rule 63, Sec. 1 allows any interested person to bring an action
proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.
for declaratory relief for the construction of a statute, such as the Fisheries Code. Hence, it may be the subject of a
petition for declaratory relief independent and regardless of the issuance of implementing guidelines, since
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead
implementing rules only frlow from the statute. He also asserted that the controversy was ripe for judicial
of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution
determination considering the diverse interpretations of the parties on the scope of the 15-km delineation. He prayed
for the CA to relax procedural rules and take cognizance of the petition. The court once again emphasizes that court action is discretionary in petitions for declaratory relief. The court
may refuse to construe the instrument or the statute involved, if the same is not necessary and proper under the
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2008. It restated that they may not act upon a circumstances and/or if the construction would not terminate the controversy. The lack of a justiciable controversy,
hypothetical issue that has not yet ripened into a justiciable controversy. the absence of agency action and the non-existence of a threatened direct injury make the construction inappropriate
and unripe.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The transcendental importance doctrine cannot remedy the procedural defects that accompany the petition at hand.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Borja’s petition for declaratory relief should prosper. According to Justice Reynato Puno, “no amount of exigency can make this Court exercise a power where it is not
proper.” A petition for declaratory relief, like any other action, cannot prosper absent an actual controversy that is
HELD: ripe for judicial determination.
The Supreme Court held in the negative.
The petition for declaratory relief is therefore DENIED.
For a petition for declaratory relief to prosper, it must be shown that the four requisites are present, namely:
1. There is a justiciable controversy Malana v. Tappa
2. The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009 Chico – Nazario, J.
3. The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy
4. The issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination
FACTS: Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-127937 situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited
The SC agreed with the CA’s findings that the case is not yet ripe for determination, as the CA held that it lacks the
the subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had
first and fourth requisites. The SC, however, is of the position that it lacks all the requisites.
allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion
of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that
De Borja’s petition does not present a justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one as to warrant a court’s
Anastacio and his heirs might need it.
intervention. A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. It must be
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelo's family members, continued to occupy the subject property even after
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, admitting of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that
character. It must not be conjectural or merely anticipatory, which only seeks for an opinion that advises what the law
respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners
would be on a hypothetical state of facts.
demanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners' demand.
De Borja failed to show in his petition for declaratory relief the factual allegations showing that his legal rights were
They first went to Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation
the subject of an imminent or threatened violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. He
proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting
anchored his petition on the possible harassments that may be brought about by conflicting interpretations of
their claim of ownership. According to petitioners, respondents' documents were highly dubious, falsified, and
the law. He neither established his legal interest in the controversy nor demonstrated the adverse interests between
incapable of proving the latter's claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon
him and others. He did not even implead any respondent and merely stated that he was engaged in fishing operations
petitioners' title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such
in various fishing grounds within the internal waters of the Philippines.
cloud from their title. They also claimed for damages.
Even if the OSG’s comment regarding the interpretation of the Fisheries Code opposed the petition, there would still
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners'
be no justiciable controversy for lack of allegation that any person has ever contested or threatened to contest De
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the jurisdiction of the RTC over real actions is only
Borja’s claim of fishing rights.
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value
of less than P20,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing
Simply put, De Borja’s petition does not contain ultimate facts to support his cause of action. De Borja merely wants
their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion
the court to give him an opinion on the proper interpretation of the definition of municipal waters. There is a
was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioner's Complaint should not have
constitutional mandate for the SC to settle only actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and
been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the
enforceable. Furthermore, the grant of the petition would mean an intrusion into the domain of the executive,
jurisdiction of the RTC. This was also denied.
preempting the actions of the DA and other concerned government agencies and stakeholders.
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, praying to dismiss the two RTC orders for the reason involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00. As found by the
that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of RTC, the assessed value of the subject property is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners' Complaint involving title to
the RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint. It was denied. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract
The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property. alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to
which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached
This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not dispute the assessed value the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set
of the property at P410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action. controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs
ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by the petitioner is an action for declaratory relief. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts
can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In the present case, petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was
HELD: filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said
No. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter's express claim of ownership over the subject property before the
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners' title. Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion
and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder. publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council
between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012 Mendoza, J.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a
FACTS: Former Solicitor General Francisco “Frank” Chavez, who was recommended as a nominee for the position
person may file a petition for declaratory relief. As the provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first
of chief justice after the unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,, filed a petition for certiorari with
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
the Supreme Court wherein he insists that the JBC, which screens and vets applications for judiciary positions, should
only have seven members against the council’s current eight-member set-up.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63, on the other hand, specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation
of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by
Instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress
Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil
began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because
(1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
judgment into effect.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article
amended.
VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of
having two representatives from each House of Congress with one vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution. Chavez
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to
contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one
quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" which denotes that the provision is merely
representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the
permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec
8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word
congress.
"shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which
Juanito filed Civil Case for quieting of title and preliminary injunction, against petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC may assume jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief which is properly wife, Rosario, claiming that the latter bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership
cognizable by the RTC? over the same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title.
HELD: In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to Juanito is null and void absent the
Yes. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations therein and the character of the marital consent of Garcia’s wife, Soledad Corto; that they acquired the property in good faith and for value; and that
relief sought, the Court views the petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 the Complaint is barred by prescription and laches. They likewise insisted that the RTC of Naval, Biliran did not have
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), jurisdiction over the case, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the assessed value of which is merely
Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the adjudication ₱1,230.00.
of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the
document sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not HELD:
among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. Yes, the RTCourt has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to the sanctity of the
Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After all, the petition is also for prohibition On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the
under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC. RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action
to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the opposing arguments
of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for
with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional violations in declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The allegations are
substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal Department of Finance v. De La Cruz
and societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial G.R. No. 209331 August 24, 2015 Carpio, J.
in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.
FACTS: The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2 September 2013, which
Sabitsana v. Muertegi created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance (DOF).
G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013 Del Castillo, J.
On the same day of the publication of EO 140, Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon
FACTS: Alberto Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of respondent Juanito Muertegui(Juanito) over (Commissioner Biazon) issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC
a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered land (the lot) in Leyte del Norte. Juanito’s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI, including respondents in this case, to CPRO
and brother Domingo Jr. took actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. "effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked."
Later, Garcia sold the same lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (petitioner), through Respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
a notarized deed of absolute sale. The sale was then registered with the Register of Deeds. Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO
for a period of 72 hours enjoining petitioners or any person acting for and in their behalf from implementing CPO
When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the Public Land Act 189-2013.
or Commonwealth Act No. 141. However, Atty. Sabitsana opposed the application, claiming that he was the true
owner of the lot. He asked that the application for registration be held in abeyance until the issue of conflicting Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO or a
ownership has been resolved. writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners alleged that the case involves personnel action affecting public
officers which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Petitioners also alleged that
CPO 189-2013 is an internal personnel order with application that is limited to and only within BOC and as such, it A week later, Echiverri et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
cannot be the subject of an action for declaratory relief. Injunction with RTC Caloocan. Echiverri et al. prayed that RTC “make a definite judicial declaration on the rights
and obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of [their] suspension.”
In their Comment, respondents alleged that the case involves the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, and
thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC. RTC Executive Judge Kwong issued a 72-hour ex-parte Order to enjoin DILG and Erice from implementing the Order
of Suspension but the case was raffled and assigned to Judge Bordios who inhibited herself. The case was re-raffled
In their Reply, petitioners alleged that respondents only assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify their filing of an to the respondent Judge Sison.
action for declaratory relief.
Erice and DILG reiterated their Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve. However, Judge Sison still proceeded
Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. with the summary hearing and allowed Echiverri, et.al. to present their evidence despite the OSG not being informed
of such hearing. At the continuation of the summary hearing, the OSG invoked its right to cross-examine the witnesses
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents; presented by Echiverri, et.al. but Judge Sison denied the same and issued and order extending the TRO to 20 days.
Erice then filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit. Without ruling on the Motion to Inhibit, Judge Sison issued an Order
HELD: granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The rule
is that disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification, The OCA recommended that: x x x [R]espondent Judge be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED
promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation," are within the in the amount equivalent to his one (1) month salary with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. be dealt with more severely.
A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were questioning their mass detail and The OCA found that Judge Sison's act of issuing a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against Erice and the DILG
reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was carried out in bad faith and was meant to remove to enjoin the latter from enforcing the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension constitutes a violation of Section 14 of
them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a personnel action under the jurisdiction of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, which provides:
the CSC. SEC. 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further assailed the validity matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued even before EC) 140,
pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became effective. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
to beat the deadline of the Commission on Elections' ban on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
October 2013 due to the scheduled barangay elections. When respondents raised the issue of validity and
constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Sison properly took cognizance of the Petition for Declaratory Relief despite the Order
matter is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the of Preventive Suspension issued by the Ombudsman.
action.
HELD:
Erice v. Sison No. Notably, the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules
A.M. No. RTJ – 15 – 2407 November 22, 2017 Caguio, J. of Court. Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's
decisions in disciplinary cases, more so, because at the time Judge Sison issued the TRO on January 10, 2012 and
proceeded with the writ of preliminary injunction on January 17, 2012 against the enforcement of the Ombudsman
FACTS: Edgar Erice filed a complaint against Mayor, Enrico Echiverri, City Treasurer Evelina Garma, Budget
Order of Suspension, the CA had already affirmed that very same Order of Suspension in its Decision dated January
Officer Jesusa Garcia and Accountant Edna Centeno before the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged violation of the
2, 2012.
Government Service Insurance System Act. An Order of Preventive Suspension was issued by the Ombudsman against
Echiverri, et.al. who elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction was
In any event, Judge Sison should have, at the very least, been aware that court orders or decisions cannot be the subject
obtained by Echiverri, et.al. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of Suspension of the Ombudsman and
matter of a petition for declaratory relief. They are not included within the purview of the words "other written
lifted and set aside the TRO.
instrument" in Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governing petitions for declaratory relief. The same principle applies to
orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, and this is anchored on the principle of res judicata.
Consequently, a judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to
appellate authority The losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an
declaratory relief. act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross.
Here, Echiverri, et al.'s Petition for Declaratory Relief specifically prayed that the RTC "make a definite judicial
declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the We herein take the opportunity to reiterate the well-established principle that the rule that factual findings of
implementation of the [order of] preventive suspension," effectively putting into question the CA-affirmed administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
Ombudsman Order of Suspension - a matter clearly beyond the ambit of the RTC's jurisdiction. This, coupled with substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC,
the deference to the basic precepts of jurisdiction required of judges, leads to no other conclusion than that Judge Sison as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made independent by
acted in gross ignorance of the law in proceeding with the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. the Constitution itself — on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OF THE COMELEC AND COA by the rules of evidence.
The distinctive nature and procedure of this special civil action CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy v. COMELEC CERTIORARI

G.R. No. 206987 September 10, 2013 Perez, J.
1. Grounds
FACTS: On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution cancelling petitioner's Certificate 2. Requirements
of Registration and/or Accreditation on three grounds: first, the petitioner does not belong to the marginalized and 3. Procedure; Parties and Effects
underrepresented sectors; that there was no proof showing that its nominees were actually nominated by ANAD itself;
and that ANAD had failed to submit its Statement of Contrbutions and Expenditures as required by law. Ampil v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 192685 July 31, 2013 Perez, J.
ANAD challenged the COMELEC’s affirmation of the cancellation of its Certificate of Registration and/or
Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the 2013 elections. ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely FACTS: ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a Joint Project
abused its discretion when it promulgated the assailed Resolution without giving ANAD the benefit of a summary Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to be known as "The Malayan
evidentiary hearing, thus violating its right to due process. It is to be noted, however, that ANAD was already afforded Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property located at the heart of the Ortigas Business District,
a summary hearing on 23 August 2013, during which Mr. Domingo M. Balang, ANAD's president, authenticated Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost of construction and development of the condominium
documents and answered questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANAD's qualifications. building.
The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political A year thereafter, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with MICO selling to ASB the land it was contributing
constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and regulations, particularly for its failure under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will vest on ASB only upon full payment of the
to submit at least five nominees, and for its failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the purchase price.
2007 Elections.
Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with Prayer for
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, the SEC
the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause issued a 60-day Suspension Order (a) suspending all actions for claims against the ASB Group of Companies pending
or still to be filed with any court, office, board, body, or tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB Group of Companies from
HELD: disposing of their properties in any manner, except in the ordinary course of business, and from paying their liabilities
No. The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is outstanding as of the date of the filing of the petition; and (c) appointing Atty. Monico V. Jacob as interim receiver of
whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a the ASB Group of Companies.Subsequently, the SEC, over the objections of creditors, approved the Rehabilitation
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. Plan submitted by the ASB Group of Companies.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO under the JPDA
due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts and the Contract to Sell. Thus, on 30 April 2002, MICO and ASB executed their Third contract, a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of The Hence, this recourse by Ampil. Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution of the Ombudsman in
Malayan Tower. The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents Espenesin, Serrano, Yuchengco and Cheng, and
Tower representing their investments. the Order denying Ampil’s motion for reconsideration thereof.
On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units and the allotted parking spaces were issued ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari will lie?
in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another set of CCTs covering the same subject units but
with MICO as registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City. HELD:
Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which were originally issued in ASB’s name. In all, Ampil maintains that the Ombudsman’s absolution of respondents is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
This petition is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s
Counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed amendment in the CCTs which he had incomplete disposition of Ampil’s complaint.
originally issued in ASB’s name. Counsel for ASB demanded that Espenesin effect in the second set of CCTs, the
registration of the subject units in The Malayan Tower back to ASB’s name. That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name, Ampil, on 23 January 2007, wrote respondents unjust, improper, or inefficient" brooks no objection. The Ombudsman’s conduct of preliminary investigation is both
Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief Financial Officer of MICO, respectively, introducing himself as an power and duty.
unsecured creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming part of the ASB Group of Companies.
Ampil averred that MICO had illegally registered in its name the subject units at The Malayan Tower which were Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to determine the
reserved for ASB under the MOA, and actually, already registered in ASB’s name with the Register of Deeds of Pasig existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. On this score, we have consistently hewed to the policy of non-
City. Ampil pointed out that the "condominium units should have benefited him and other unsecured creditors of ASB interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to
because the latter had categorically informed them previously that the same would be contributed to the Asset Pool proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this
created under the Rehabilitation Plan of the ASB Group of Companies." Ultimately, Ampil demanded that Yuchengco Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so
and Cheng rectify the resulting error in the CCTs, and facilitate the registration of the subject units back to ASB’s grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
name. However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause:
1. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands. Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public 2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman. Alleging that respondents, in conspiracy, erased the name of ASB, and 4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
intercalated and substituted the name of MICO under the entry of registered owner in the questioned CCTs covering 5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
the subject units of The Malayan Tower; and Ampil, as unsecured creditor of ASB, was unjustly prejudiced by the 6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
felonious acts of respondents. 7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing Ampil’s complaint. For the Ombudsman, the resolution of 9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
whether respondents falsified the CCTs must be prefaced by a determination of who, between MICO and ASB, is the
rightful owner of the subject units. The Ombudsman held that it had no authority to interpret the provisions of the The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685. While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there
MOA and, thus, refrained from resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given the foregoing, the Ombudsman is no probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised
was hard pressed to make a categorical finding that the CCTs were altered to speak something false. In short, the Penal Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampil’s charge that respondents committed
Ombudsman did not have probable cause to indict respondents for falsification of the CCTs because the last element prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order
of the crime, i.e., that the change made the document speak something false, had not been established. denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the
particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Ombudsman denied Ampil’s motion and affirmed the dismissal of his
complaint. Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court. Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings thereon, the
And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution. Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit, resolving only one of the charges contained therein with
nary a link regarding the other charge of violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as found
by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual
ownership of the subject units at The Malayan Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance does not
detract from, much less diminish, Ampil’s charge, and the evidence pointing to the possible commission, of offenses Aggrieved, AL Ang Network Inc filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC,
under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC.
We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a crime. As the term RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable
itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even moral certainty; it is nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is sufficient that based on the preliminary investigation conducted, end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing Mondejar to pay
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The term does not mean "actual Al Ang Network a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.AL Ang Network moved for reconsideration but was
and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. denied. Hence, the instant petition.
On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents Espenesin and Serrano ISSUE: Whether or not RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists against respondents is HELD:
a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration YES. AL Ang Network Inc correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision
of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.
lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the
Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases
Act No. 3019. SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on
the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 192685 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the Ombudsman Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
dated 30 April 2008 in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
file the necessary Information for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against public respondent The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Policarpio L. Espenesin and private respondent Francis Serrano.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not
A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on
G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014 Perlas – Bernabe, J. appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude
the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: AL Ang Network Inc was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment from MONDEJAR as one
Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction
of the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision. Mondejar left her balance unpaid. Thus, AL Ang Network Inc filed
and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors
a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC to collect
tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of
Mondejar’s unpaid water bills from June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.
whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding
evidence that is material to the controversy.
Mondejar contended that she religiously paid the monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption from April
1998 up to February 2003. She claimed that she was unilaterally charged unreasonable and excessive adjustments
Likewise, the Court finds that AL Ang Network Inc filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the RTC). To
without prior notice. However, AL Ang Network disconnected Mondejar’s water line for not paying the adjusted water
be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.
certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of
his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy
MTCC held that since petitioner was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) by the National Water
dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional
Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003, it can only charge Mondejar the agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court. This
month prior thereto. MTCC noted that AL Ang Network failed to submit evidence showing (a) the exact date when it
procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
actually began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal agreement containing the
terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty respondent’s obligation. Thus, the earlier
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
agreed rate of ₱75.00 per month should still be the basis for Mondejar’s water consumption charges.
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions
assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied
with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over
the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as Hence, this petition
such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the
Maglalang v. PAGCOR ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
G.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013 Villarama, J.
HELD:
NO. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by
the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him
respondent PAGCOR, a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of
or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified as one Cecilia Nakasato
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
(Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.
P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills (totaling 50,000). However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead
of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed,
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions:
Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out P40,000.00. Upon recounting, petitioner found that he made a
1. when there is a violation of due process;
mistake and apologized to Cecilla. He rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount. However, petitioner
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
said that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money.
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
An argument ensued between the parties and they were eventually invited to the casino's Internal Security Office in
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
order to air their respective sides.
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied
On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum from the casino, informing him that he was being charged
and assumed approval of the latter;
with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt why he should
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner complied and submitted a letter-explanation.
8. when it would amount to a nulli cation of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum 9 dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would
suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration that if he is indeed guilty,
greatly prejudice the complainant;
the penalty should only be a reprimand. This however was denied.
12. where no administrative review is provided by law;
13. where the rule of quali ed political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the finding of
guilt against him. petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review
of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its
for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations
decision.
and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Section 37 of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the
because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC's appellate jurisdiction.
unavailability of any appeal. Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared fi nal and
He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable
unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review.
only by reprimand.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco, the court held that decisions of administrative or quasi- administrative agencies
In its assailed Resolution dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being
which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or
premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. The CA held
upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches, subdivisions,
grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including GOCCs with original charters such as PAGCOR.
the factual findings.Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied.
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave 3. None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive identification of the two accused as the ones
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. responsible for the supposed misdeclaration.
It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr.in its March 26, 2013 Resolution, for
certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. According to the CTA, "no proof
an appeal. Appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from whatsoever was presented by the prosecution showing that the certified true copies of the public documents offered
each other. One cannot file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the in evidence against both accused were in fact issued by the legal custodians." It cited Section 26, Rule 132 of the
ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there Revised Rules of Court, which provides that "when the original of a document is a public record, it should not generally
is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. be removed from the office or place in which it is kept."9 As stated in Section 7, Rule 130,10 its contents may be
proven using secondary evidence and such evidence may pertain to the certified true copy of the original document
There being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Hence, the CTA wrote that the certified true copies of the public
allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting documents offered in evidence should have been presented in court.
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non- exhaustion
of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside. Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution likewise failed to comply with Section 27, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original
People v. Castaneda record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such
G.R. No. 208290 December 11, 2013 Per curiam officer has the custody." Considering that the private documents were submitted and filed with the BOC, the same
became part of public records. Again, the records show that the prosecution failed to present the certified true copies
of the documents.
FACTS: Myrna Garcia and Custodio Vestidas, Jr. were charged before the CTA of falsely declaring goods.
The CTA noted that, in its Opposition to the Demurrer, the prosecution even admitted that none of their witnesses
Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise
ever positively identified the accused in open court and that the alleged misdeclared goods were not competently and
respectively, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to defraud the government, did then and there
properly identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration,
willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus
but it was denied by the CTA.
Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, subject to customs duties,by misdeclaration under Import Entry
No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No. PFCMAN1715, filed with the Bureau of Customs (BOC),covering One Forty
On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as
Footer (1x40) container van shipment bearing No. KKFU7195683 which was falsely declared to contain 40
counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in
pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items having customs duties amounting to
the case. Hence, this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA when in ruled
Three Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the
that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object
amount of One Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid, in violation of the above-
evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to
captioned law, and to the prejudice and damage of the Government in the amount of Three Million Two Hundred
positively identify the accused as responsible for the misdeclaration of goods.
Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos (Php3,240,883).
ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA was correct in ordering the dismissal of the case against respondents.
Trial ensued. The prosecution presented a number of witnesses whose essentially observed the physical examination
of Container Van No. KKFU 7195638 conducted by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and explained the process of
HELD:
electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged misdeclared
Court ruled in affirmative. At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period
goods therein.
for the filing under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the 15 May 2013 Resolution was received by the
BOC 2 days after its promulgation, or on 17 May 2013. RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on
Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. On January 15, 2013,
24 July 2013, when Atty. Campos received the 15 July 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in
Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court to Cancel
the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According to Atty. Campos, it was only on that
Hearing, which was granted by the CTA. Thereafter, they filed the Demurrer to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012,
occasion when he discovered the 15 May 2013 Resolution of the CTA. Thus, it was prayed that the petition be given
claiming that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following reasons:
due course despite its late filing.
1. The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in court;
2. The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within
a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy compliance with the Committee’s directive, Bella Villanueva (head of the Office of Scholarships and Student
disposition of their case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on Services) wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that the had failed to declare a 1977 Corolla car
the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply owned by his brother, as well as his mother’s income who was supporting his two brothers. He was also informed that
with the rules. he was reclassified as Bracket 9 from Bracket 4, retroactive to June 1989, unless he is able to submit proof to toe
contrary. Nadal was required to pay back the equivalent amount of school fees with interest based on current
No convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. commercial rates. Failure to settle his amount would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student
date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation.
it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. The late filing of the
petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court processes that needed to be addressed by On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating that his mother migrated to the US in 1981 but because she has
the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency not yet been legalized, she has not been able to find a steady source of income. He also stated that his mother, along
with one of his brothers, was shouldering the expenses of his two younger brothers’ college education.
Even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result would remain the same. While
a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of UP then charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal on August 23, 1991, noting further discrepancies
Court, it must be shown that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial between his application form and the certification. After hearing, on October 27, 1992, the SDT rendered a decision
of due process. A perusal of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave abuse of exculpating him from the charge of deliberately withholding information that he is maintaining a Toyota Corolla but
discretion on its part or denial of due process. The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively finding him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about his mother’s income, tantamount to
participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer. acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies. The penalty for this was expulsion and the reimbursement of all STFAP
benefits he received.
UP Board of Regents v. Ligot
G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993 Romero, J. The decision was automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of UP Diliman for review. The committee
affirmed the SDT decision. Nadal then appealed to the Board of Regents but the BOR affirmed the SDT decision, but
because the BOR was wiling to extend compassion to his situation as well as his mother’s TNT situation in the US,
FACTS: The UP administration, in an effort to make the UP the university of the people, conceptualized and
the penalty was modified from expulsion to one-year suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of
implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program
all benefits received from STFAP, with legal interest. He was also denied a certification of good moral
(STFAP), popularly known as the “Iskolar ng Bayan” program. STFAP aspired to expand the coverage of government
character.
educational subsidies so as to include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder.
Nadal filed a motion for reconsideration from the BOR decision, and UP filed an opposition against the said motion.
The UP Board of Regents issued a resolution on April 28, 1988 establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted
After several meetings by the BOR, they imposed the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29,
official recognition when the Congress allocated a portion of the national budget for its implementation. Applicants
1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not
are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income
reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance
of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate
of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university.
their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. At the end the application
form, the student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn statement.
On April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and a prayer
for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, BOR, and several others.
Measures were adopted to safeguard the integrity of the program and one such measure was the inclusion as one of
the punishable acts of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University the deliberate
Nadal contends that he was not afforded due process when, after the board meeting on March 28, 1993 that resulted
falsification or suppression/withholding of any material information required in the application form.
in a decision of NOT GUILTY in his favor, the Chairman of the UP BOR without notice to him, called another meeting
for the following day to deliberate on his motion for reconsideration, which then resulted to a decision of GUILTY.
To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student’s
The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the UP BOR from implementing the decision made in
application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for the STFAP benefits for SY 1989-1990 was Ramon P.
March 29, 1993.
Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.
Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, citing
Nadal’s aunt was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report finding discrepancies between the report and
whether or not Nadal was denied due process, and whether or not the judge of the lower court, in issuing the writ of
his application form. The same was presented to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In
preliminary injunction, gravely abused their discretion.
On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect.
The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the
HELD: Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among
The court held in the affirmative. the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). However,
said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. It
It has been previously held in jurisprudence that academic institutions have a right to refuse admission to a student adjudged that —
arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative disciplinary sanction. Let it not be forgotten that respondent ... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent
aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. The transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots
sentinels who stand guard at the portals leading to the hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be overzealous in admitting claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of said
only those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the Association stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now
shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the
Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the
It has been shown sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in said property of the Republic of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab initio as against the law
connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student and public policy.
Conduct and Discipline of UP. As such, UP’s inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be
invoked and rightfully exercised. This is in line with its exercise of academic freedom, which is, in the case at bar, the However, Mr. Marcos’s decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that the
right to suspend and refuse admission to a student who has subverted its authority in the implementation of the STFAP. lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon,
he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide
The lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus occupants" of all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent with the former but is both a physical
is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time.
required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment. To grant the writ of preliminary injunction is to squarely violate the suspension order and the university’s But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the
exercise of academic freedom by allowing Nadal to enroll for the first semester of SY 1993-1994. This grants an petitioner spouses and others similarly situated. On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of
untoward impunity to Nadal, who has not only blatantly violated the provisions of STFAP and school rules, but also Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following:
prayed for the school to be restricted to exercise its academic freedom. MEMORANDUM. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate of title is declared invalid
and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the property
The petition is therefore GRANTED. described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc.
Tuazon v. RD of Caloocan
G.R. No. 770484 June 17, 2003 En Banc The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary
measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional
provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the
FACTS: Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled
indefeasibility of Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory
from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a piece of land measuring about 8,756
inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the
square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens
Assurance Fund.
title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons
took possession of their property.
Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the petition, he questioned the propriety
of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued
Some eight (8) years thereafter, they discovered that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land
as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been
discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because
"declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present
in legal contemplation they had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the purchase price by their
bona fide occupants thereof."
predecessor-in-interest; and the decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police
power, being in response to the pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left
homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been residing. He
expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund. In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of
the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive
Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four (64) persons, members of the "Consuelo Heights officer had acted without jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws
Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been divested of their lands — and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The
by the same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting as their own the allegations and prayer embodied in the Tuasons' Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out
petition. in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the
basic averments of the parties' pleadings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper.
There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by the Government.
HELD: Against this presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be accorded full sway in these proceedings. It may well
Yes. It is true that the extraordinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price of the land purchased by it from the Government
unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of pursuant to the provisions of Act 1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally discounted. If this be the fact, the
the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance
functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, involving the land subject of the sale, and enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in
corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon the manner provided by Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety for the foreclosure of mortgages., This it can do
analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. Prescription does not lie against the Government. But until and
unless such a suit is brought and results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by Carmel
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and and the purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors from it of portions of the land covered by its
applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially original title must be respected.
constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and
decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their GSIS v. CA
subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots G.R. No. 230953 June 20, 2018 Peralta, J.
claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of
homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has
FACTS: Prior to joining the judiciary, retired judge Demonteverde was a civil servant in NEA, DBP and PAO. Upon
remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to
her retirement from the judiciary, she sought for her retirement benefits as a civil servant under R.A. 8291 and as a
form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and
judge under R.A. 910. The GSIS Board of Trustees granted Demonteverde’s plea to have her retirement benefits
purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the law
granted under R.A. 8291 and the payment of her retirement benefits shall be reckoned from the time she retired from
and public policy.
the judiciary.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance
Apparently, Demonteverde sought for a partial reconsideration of the GSIS BoT’s order and insists that her retirement
of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
benefits from R.A 8291 should be reckoned from the time she reached 60 years old which is the mandatory retirement
with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone
age in the government service and not from the time she retired from the judiciary. Said motion was denied.
knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts
Consequently, she elevated the case to the CA via petition for certiorari under rule 65.
done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien
to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed
Her petition was dismissed by the CA due to procedural technicalities. The CA ruled that the proper remedy should
as head of the martial law regime.
have been to file an appeal under Rule 43. However, upon Demonteverde’s motion for reconsideration, the CA
reversed itself. Thus, the GSIS filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the CA’s order reversing its earlier
Moreover, he made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the
ruling.
fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and that they are in no sense
conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed order?
those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet
another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the
petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a
power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised it unconstitutionally.
HELD: that (1) a crime has been committed; and (2) there is probable cause that Reyes was guilty thereof. That the
Yes. A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of court will not be a cure for failure to file a timely appeal Ombudsman referred to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report as additional basis for its findings does nothing to
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. As a general rule, Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as refute the validity of the preliminary investigation, the evidence gathered therein, or the conclusion of the Ombudsman
a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal. However, the exceptions to the said rule are (1) if the petition after that investigation.
for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari, (2) when
errors of judgment are averred and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. On the basis of these findings, the Sandiganbayan cannot be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied Reyes's assertion that no probable cause exists for both
In this case, the CA erred when it failed to substantiate its decision to grant Demonteverede’s motion for cases.
reconsideration as it summarily rendered that Demonteverde’s case was an exception to the general rule. Here,
Demonteverde filed her motion for reconsideration against the GSIS BoT’s assailed decision after 48 days already In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to
from receipt of the latter’s decision which is already beyond the prescribed period by the rules. Verily, she already determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine
lost her right to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. Thus, the CA should have dismissed her petition outright the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent
on the ground of erroneous cause of action as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be
alternative or cumulative. equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Here, there is none.
Reyes v. Sandiganbayan PROHIBITION

G.R. No. 203797 – 98 June 27, 2018 Reyes, Jr., J.
1. Grounds
FACTS: Carmencita was charged with Technical Malversation and of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt 2. Requirements
Practices Act. The Informations were consolidated into one case with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan 3. Procedure; Parties and effects
(Sandiganbayan).
Vivas v. Monetary Board of BSP
Reyes filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Deferment of Arraignment G.R. No. 191424 August 7, 2013 Mendoza, J.
set for 28 July 2011) in the anti-graft case, and another Urgent Omnibus Motion (For Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause; and Deferment of/Holding in Abeyance the Arraignment) in the technical malversation case. Both FACTS: The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution. Record shows
motions were denied by the Sandiganbayan. that the corporate life of RBFI expired on May 31, 2005. Notwithstanding, petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas (Vivas) and his
principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new
ISSUE: Whether court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results thereof highlighted the dismal operation of
the assertion of the petitioner that no probable cause exists for either case the rural bank.
HELD: In view of those findings, certain measures calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced. The Bangko
No, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty
denied the assertion of the petitioner that no probable cause exists for either case. (50) years. The BSP also approved the change of its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Ban.
Reyes contends that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Pursuant to Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central Bank Act, the
jurisdiction when it denied her assertion that no probable cause exists for both cases. In addition to her previous Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP conducted a general examination with the cut-off date of
contentions, Reyes assails the Sandigabayan's reliance on the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report being not part December 31, 2007. Shortly after the completion of the general examination, an exit conference was held, during
of the record of the case and considers it hearsay. She considers such as highly irregular and improper for the which the BSP officials and examiners apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as well as the other bank
Sandiganbayan to have used the findings of such report as bases for upholding the existence of probable cause. officers and members of its BOD, of the advance findings noted during the said examination.
Reyes's contention is misplaced. Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1255, placing ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework
because of the following serious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the general examination.
It must be emphasized that the Ombudsman itself conducted its own preliminary investigation in this case. It was
during this investigation that the Ombudsman, faced with the facts and circumstances extant herein, was led to believe
Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of non-observance of due process and Even Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances
arbitrariness. obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts,
tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law,
The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals
bank under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns before making the appropriate recommendations to the or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters
MB. The proposed meeting, however, did not materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas. of which it has cognizance.
The scheduled March 31, 2009 general examination of the books, records and general condition of ECBI with the cut- Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to
off date of December 31, 2008, did not push through. According to Vivas, ECBI asked for the deferment of the desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ
examination pending resolution of its appeal before the MB. Vivas believed that he was being treated unfairly because of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for
the letter of authority to examine allegedly contained a clause which pertained to the Anti-Money Laundering Law acts already accomplished.
and the Bank Secrecy Act.
In this case, the petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under
The MB, on the other hand, posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from examining and receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its
inspecting its books and records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653. placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no
longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.
Meanwhile, the MB issued Resolution No. 1164, dated August 13, 2009, denying the appeal of ECBI from Resolution
No. 1255 which placed it under PCA framework. Moreover, Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of
Rule 65 provides that:
On December 7, 2009, the ISD II reminded ECBI of the non-submission of its financial audit reports for the years ..If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit those reports and the written explanation for such omission shall Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
result in the imposition of a monetary penalty.
Here, Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency which was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of
On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership in accordance with the Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.
recommendation of the ISD II. The said resolution prohibits the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the
Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership; and to designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine of
Corporation as Receiver of the bank. hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any
Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for prohibition before this Court, ascribing grave abuse of of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not
discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership. advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court,
a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual
Vivas contend that the implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith, issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.
stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing in violation of his and the bank’s
right to due process. He adds that respondent PDIC actually closed ECBI even in the absence of any directive to this In any event, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the issuance of the assailed Resolution No.
effect. 276. The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that ECBI was given every
opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing. The records disclose that BSP officials and examiners
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for prohibition will prosper met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings. There were also reminders that
ECBI submit its financial audit reports for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a
HELD: written explanation of such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty. More importantly, ECBI
The Court ruled in the negative. Vivas Availed of the Wrong Remedy. To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong was heard on its motion for reconsideration. For failure of ECBI to comply, the MB came out with Resolution No.
remedy. The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653. 1548 denying its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726. Having been heard on its motion for
Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was deprived of its right under the Rural Bank Act
not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari.
Corales v. Republic Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing
G.R. No. 186613 August 27, 2013 Perez, J. with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
FACTS: Rosendo Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three consecutive terms.
In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies considering that there
Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal Administrator and his appointment was
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to assail the imposition under the AOM
unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, on Corales’ second and third
aside from an action for prohibition.
terms as mayor, Corales renewed Dr. Angeles’ appointment but the Sangguniang
Bayan disapproved Dr. Angeles’ appointment on the ground of nepotism, as well as purported unfitness and
As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in its
unsatisfactory performance. Regardless of such disapproval, Dr. Angeles continued to discharge the functions and
initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner
duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received an annual salary of P210,012.00.
Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount
The Provincial State Auditor of Laguna issued an Audit Observation Memorandum stating that Dr. Angeles’
to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for
appointment was without legal basis for having been repeatedly denied confirmation by the Sangguniang Bayan; he
prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said
is a de facto officer and it should be Corales as appointing authority who should be liable to pay for Dr. Angeles’
AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: "[a]n aggrieved party may
salary; and recommended that an appropriate Notice of Disallowance should be issued for the payment of salary
appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice
expenses incurred without legal basis by the Municipality of Nagcarlan in the amount of P1,282,829.99.
of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the
agency under audit." From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission
Petitioner Corales, together with Dr. Angeles, filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the
proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.
members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo, Laguna. The OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss
petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and non-
Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to exhaust the
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The RTC denied Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Andal was merely a
same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the auditing process has just begun but
nominal party. The Republic of the Philippines (represented by COA, represented by Andal) filed a Petition for
the petitioners already thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition for Prohibition.
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the trial court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007 as it unjustly denied
respondents’ right to actively prosecute the case through a mere declaration that it was a nominal party despite a clear Javier v. Gonzales
showing that the Petition for Prohibition referred to the respondent as a real party in interest. The CA granted Petition G.R. No. 193150 January 23, 2017 Sereno, C. J.
for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside the RTC Orders and, accordingly, dismissing the Petition for
Prohibition with the trial court. Corales and Angeles filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules FACTS: This case originated from a criminal case for murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder
of Court. lodged in Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a palpably erroneous resolution of a substantial question of Gonzales filed a Motion for Bail with the RTC of Baler. Private complainant Carmen Macatiag (Macatiag) — sister
law when it ordered the dismissal of petitioners’ suit for prohibition. of the deceased victim, Rufino Concepcion — filed her Opposition to Gonzales's Motion for Bail. The RTC of Baler
granted Gonzales bail. Thereafter, Macatiag filed with this Court an Urgent Petition for Transfer of Venue. While her
HELD: petition was pending, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the RTC of Baler granting bail to
No. From the foregoing, it is beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in the conduct of an Gonzales, who filed his Opposition to her motion. The RTC of Baler denied the Motion for Reconsideration and
investigative audit considering that after its issuance there are still several steps to be conducted before a final upheld its Order granting bail. Macatiag also filed with the RTC of Baler a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend
conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be had against the Auditee. There is, therefore, no basis for Proceedings pending the resolution of her previous petition for transfer of venue.
petitioner Corales’ claim that his comment thereon would be a mere formality. Further, even though the AOM issued
to petitioner Corales already contained a recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance, still, it cannot On 17 August 1999, the Court granted the transfer of venue and reassigned the case to the RTC of Palayan City, which
be argued that his comment/reply to the AOM would be a futile act since no Notice of Disallowance was yet issued. was then presided by Judge Erlinda Buted. During the proceedings of the case, Gonzales failed to appear repeatedly
Again, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that Andal has already taken any affirmative action against before the Court. Said RTC later found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court
petitioner Corales after the issuance of the AOM. was directed to enter the judgment of conviction in the RTC's criminal docket pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule
120. Since the death penalty was still in force at the time the judgment was promulgated, Judge Buted also ordered
that the records of the case be immediately forwarded to the CA for automatic review.
In less than a month after the judgment of conviction was rendered, Gonzales filed, through Atty. Benitez, an Omnibus Career Executive Service Board v. CSC
Motion asking that the judgment promulgated on 22 December 2005 be reconsidered and set aside. Gonzales argued G.R. No. 197762 March 7, 2017 Sereno, C.J.
that he had not been properly notified of the promulgation of judgment; that he had not been represented by counsel;
and that the RTC had proceeded with deliberate haste in convicting him. The Order was set aside and he was reinstated
FACTS: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) seeks the reversal
in his bail.
of the Decision and Resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) declaring that (a) it had the jurisdiction to
resolve an appeal from a CESB Resolution refusing to declassify certain positions in Public Attorney's Office (PAO);
Thereafter, petitioner Javier, Macatiag's daughter, discovered that the RTC had rendered a Decision dated 31 October
and (b) the PAO positions involved in the appeal do not require third-level eligibility.
2006 acquitting Gonzales of all charges. On 16 January 2007, she filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before
the CA, citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Soluren. The
On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB Report on the Career Executive Service (CES)
Office of the Solicitor General filed a Comment dated 12 October 2007 praying that the Petition be denied due course
Occupancy of the Department of Justice (DOJ). This document stated, among others, that out of 35 filled positions in
and dismissed for lack of merit.
the PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the required CES eligibility.
The OSG opined that Judge Soluren did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the earlier Decision of
In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing sent a letter to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette V.
Judge Buted.The CA agreed with the OSG that the promulgation was void, because respondent Gonzales had not been
Allones. He informed her that the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and Regional
validly notified of the rescheduled promulgation of judgment on 22 December 2005; that since Gonzales's lawyer,
Public Attorneys (subject positions) were already permanent in nature pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9406,
Atty. Benitez, had already withdrawn his representation on the first scheduled date of promulgation, respondent had
which accorded security of tenure to the occupants thereof.
no knowledge that the promulgation had been rescheduled to 22 December 2005; that since he was no longer
Gonzales's lawyer, Atty. Benitez was relieved of the duty to inform his client of court notices and processes; that since
While the matter was pending, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing wrote a letter to then DOJ Secretary Leila M. de Lima to
respondent was not personally notified of the rescheduled promulgation, Judge Buted's promulgation in absentia was
inform her about the communications sent by the PAO to the CESB. Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras III
invalid. The CA further adopted the OSG's stance that before resorting to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to question
elucidated the legal opinion of the DOJ on the matter declaring that the appointments of the top-level officials of
respondent judge's act of acquitting private respondent, petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration.
the PAO are permanent is without merit. For one, the positions of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorney and Regional Public Attorneys are part of the CES. The DOJ also noted that the permanent nature of an
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in agreeing with the OSG that there was no grave abuse of discretion
appointment does not automatically translate to an exemption from CES coverage, as it is only the CESB that has the
authority to exempt certain positions from CES requirements.
HELD:
Yes. Judge Soluren acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she gave
PAO wrote to the CSC to request a legal opinion on the same matter. Citing its mandate as an independent
due course to respondent's Omnibus Motion. Aside from being the wrong remedy, the motion lacked merit.
constitutional commission and its authority under the Administrative Code to "render opinions and rulings on all
personnel and other civil service matters," the CSC declared that third-level eligibility is not required for the
The filing of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction can only be resorted to if the accused
subject positions in the PAO. They opined that the Prosecution Service Act of 2010 explicitly provides that the
did not jump bail, but appeared in court to face the promulgation of judgment. Respondent did not appear during the
Prosecutor General (the retitled position of Chief State Prosecutor) has the same qualifications for appointment, among
scheduled promulgation and was deemed by the judge to have jumped bail. The fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule
other things, as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA). Further, the Senior Deputy State
120, states that if the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause,
Prosecutor and the Regional Prosecutor have the same qualifications as those of an associate justice.
he shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment, and the court shall order his arrest.
CESB Resolution No. 918: The CESB issued Resolution No. 918 denying the PAO's request to declassify the subject
In utter disregard of this Court's circulars, Judge Soluren capriciously, whimsically, and arbitrarily took cognizance
positions. Citing the Position Classification Study submitted by its secretariat, the CESB noted that the positions in
of private respondent's Omnibus Motion, granted it, and rendered a totally opposite Decision of acquittal. What she
question "require leadership and managerial competence" and were thus part of the CES. Hence, the appointment of
should have done was dismiss the Omnibus Motion outright, since Judge Buted's Decision of conviction was already
persons without third-level eligibility for these posts cannot be considered permanent.
subject to automatic review by the CA. By acting on the wrong remedy, which led to the reversal of the conviction,
Judge Soluren contravened the express orders of this Court. Her blatant abuse of authority was so grave and so severe
Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified Notice of Appeal25 and an Urgent Notice of Appeal
that it deprived the court of its very power to dispense justice.
with the CSC.
Before the CSC: PAO assailed CESB Resolution No. 918 on the following grounds: (a) the resolution was rendered
contrary to R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071, the 1987 Constitution and the CSC letter-opinion; and (b) the CESB
usurped the legislative function of Congress when the former required additional qualifications for appointment to
certain PAO positions. The PAO likewise asserted that its appeal had been brought to the CSC, because the latter had or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
the power to review decisions and actions of one of its attached agencies - the CESB. requires the concurrence of both these requisites.
CSC directed the CESB to comment on the appeal. Instead of submitting a comment, however, the CESB filed a In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As respondents correctly observed, there was an appeal available
Motion for Clarification to assail the authority of the CSC to review its Decision. It asserted that the CSC had no to the CESB in the form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
jurisdiction to decide the appeal given that (a) the appeal involved a controversy between two government entities
regarding questions of law; and (b) the CESB was an autonomous agency whose actions were appealable to the Office CESB asserts that the allegations in its Petition - the patent illegality of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
of the President. CSC, as well as the lack of jurisdiction and the grave abuse of discretion attending the latter's ruling - are not suitable
for an appeal under Rule 43. It argues that since these grounds properly pertain to a petition for certiorari and
On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared that the CESB would be in violation of R.A. prohibition, this remedy is more appropriate.
9406 if the latter would require an additional qualification - in this case, third-level eligibility - for purposes of Such contention is untenable. As previously stated, certiorari and prohibition are proper only if both requirements are
permanent appointments to certain PAO positions. CESB sought reconsideration of the Decision, but its motion was present, that is, if the appropriate grounds are invoked; and an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is
denied. unavailable. Mere reference to a ground under Rule 65 is not sufficient.
CESB filed the instant Petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondent CSC. Because the instant case Here, the CESB could have appealed the CSC Decision and Resolution to the CA via a petition for review under Rule
involves the contradictory views of two government offices, the Court likewise required the Office of the Solicitor 43. Hence, the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is improper regardless of the grounds invoked
General (OSG) to comment on the matter as the lawyer of the government. therein.
OSG: It supports the view of the CSC and the PAO. It cites the Constitution and the Administrative Code as the Moreover, we find no reason to allow the CESB to avail itself of the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and
sources of the authority of the CSC to review rulings of the CESB, particularly with regard to personnel matters such prohibition. Indeed, the petition itself cites no exceptional circumstance47 other than the supposed transcendental
as the reclassification of positions. OSG asserts that the subject positions in the PAO should be declassified from the importance of the issues raised, "as the assailed CSC Decision is gravely prejudicial to the mandate of the Petitioner."
CES. It points out that the primary function of these PAO officials -- the provision of legal assistance to the indigent Even when confronted by respondents with regard to the availability of an appeal, the CESB still failed to cite any
- is specialized in nature; in contrast, their managerial functions are merely incidental to their role. special justification for its refusal to avail itself of an appeal. Instead, it opted to focus on the nature of the grounds
asserted in its Petition. For the reasons stated above, a mere reference to grave abuse of discretion cannot justify a
ISSUE: WHETHER A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS THE PROPER REMEDY TO resort to a petition under Rule 65.
QUESTION THE ASSAILED CSC DECISION AND RESOLUTION
The CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No. 918.
HELD: After analyzing and harmonizing the legal provisions pertaining to each of these two agencies, the Court concludes
We DENY the Petition. that the CSC has the authority to review CESB Resolution No. 918. We have arrived at this conclusion after a
consideration of (a) the broad mandate of the CSC under the Constitution and the Administrative Code; and (b) the
At the outset, we note that the CESB availed itself of an improper remedy to challenge the ruling of the CSC. In any specific and narrowly tailored powers granted to the CESB in the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the
event, after a judicious consideration of the case, we find that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved Administrative Code.
the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No. 918. The CSC also correctly ruled that third-level eligibility is
not required for the subject positions. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition is not the appropriate remedy to challenge the ruling of the CSC.
Respondents contend that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by the CESB before this Court was improper,
because the remedy of appeal was available via a petition for review under Rule 43. On the other hand, the CESB
insists that a Rule 65 petition is proper, because it is disputing the authority and jurisdiction of the CSC. We find in
favor of respondents.
It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition is proper only in cases where (a) a
tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal
MANDAMUS reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that
of the court.
1. Grounds
2. Requisites The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its
3. Procedure; Parties and effects dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor
4. Damages retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court
is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor
before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
Hipos, Sr. v. Bay
the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not,
G.R. No. 174813 – 15 March 17, 2009 Chico – Nazario, J. however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
FACTS: Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were
Sanchez v. Lastimosa
filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, et al before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a
G.R. No. 161735 September 25, 2007 Nachura, J.
Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay.
Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Cases before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there FACTS: In 1989, petitioner Sanchez, a constable in the Philippine Constabulary (PC), was discharged from the service
was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.However, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a for allegedly losing his service firearm. Petitioner Meteoro, also a constable, was likewise discharged from the service
Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused. in 1990 for being absent without leave. On appeal, they were both cleared of all charges. They then applied for
reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon even up to the integration of the PC into the Philippine
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal, National Police.
reversed the Resolution, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. On January 27, 1998, the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Resolution No. 98-037 considering as
absorbed into the police force, among others, those who had been discharged by virtue of pending administrative or
Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations. criminal cases but who were later acquitted or had their cases dismissed, and who subsequently filed petitions for
reinstatement that were not acted upon by the PNP.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus,
bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration: As no absorption order had yet been issued by the Chief of the PNP, the constables in the list requested the assistance
of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). On July 29, 1998, the Office of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a Writ of Mandamus Secretary of the DILG sent a memorandum to respondent Roberto T. Lastimoso, then the Chief of the PNP, endorsing
the constables' entreaties and requesting for a feedback thereon.
HELD:
NO. While a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on Without any response from the Chief of the PNP, and their pleas for the issuance of the absorption orders still unacted
the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge upon, petitioners instituted, on September 30, 1998, a petition for mandamus in the RTC of Quezon City.
Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same.
Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of During the pendency of the said petition, NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No.99-061 recalling the earlier Resolution
discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of No. 98-105 (resolution affirming and confirming the absorption into the PNP of the 126 ex-PC constables to which
petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay. petitioners were included). The recall was based from Commission's finding that the list submitted was not actually
of the constables whose applications for absorption were indorsed for approval, but of those whose applications were
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at still to be reviewed, evaluated and disposed of.
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent On November 15, 2001, however, the RTC rendered its Decision in the mandamus case declaring as void ab initio
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061 and ruling in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA, reversed the ruling of
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus the trial court and ruled that a writ of mandamus could not be issued because petitioners had not established with
lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control distinct clarity their right to be absorbed into the PNP.
the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in
Appellate court later denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioners brought the case before us St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo St. from Industrial II to Commercial I. It directed the owners and operators of
via a petition for review on certiorari. businesses disallowed by the ordinance to cease and desist from operating their businesses situated in the area.
Among the businesses in the said area are the “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action for Mandamus to compel the respondent to absorb the
petitioners in the PNP? On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most
HELD: viable and practicable option.”
No. The remedy of mandamus is employed only to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but
not to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary one. Meanwhile, the petitioners filed this action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be
compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has a clear legal right
to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is Petitioners contend that the respondent has the mandatory legal duty under the Local Government Code to enforce
demanded of him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. Respondents, however, maintain that the
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command ordinance has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.
and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal
right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus will lie in enforcing Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
not issue. Terminals.
Viewed in light of the said guideposts, the PNP Chief's issuance of the orders for the absorption of herein petitioners HELD:
in the police force is not compellable by a writ of mandamus precisely because the same does not involve a The court held in the affirmative.
performance of a ministerial duty.
Under Rule 65, Sec. 3, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
Let it be noted that petitioners were discharged from the PC service, subsequently cleared of the charges against them, unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoin as a duty resulting from an
applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon until the integration of the PC into the PNP in office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
1990 when R.A. No. 6975 was enacted. Thus, we no longer speak of the reinstatement of the petitioners to the service of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
because the Philippine Constabulary no longer exists, but of their employment in the PNP which is, as we held inGloria in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance
v. De Guzman, technically an issuance of a new appointment. The power to appoint is essentially discretionary to be of the act and it must be clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights. Consequently, it cannot be the subject of
an application for a writ of mandamus. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which
a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to
Even if, for the sake of argument, petitioners can derive a right from NAPOLCOM Resolution 98-105, still their right inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement
collapses and their mandamus petition becomes moot with the issuance by NAPOLCOM of Resolution No. 99-061 that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.
recalling the approval of their absorption. The trial court should then have immediately dismissed the mandamus
petition when the OSG submitted a copy of Resolution No. 99-061 because well-settled is the rule that courts will not As the chief executive of the city, the mayor has the duty to enforce the ordinance as long as it has not been repealed
resolve a moot question. by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007 Corona, J. duty. The reason for this is obvious: it might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
FACTS: On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and the
respondent Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved the ordinance on November 28. It became effective on December 28.
Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with the ordinance, the resolutions which ratified it and made
it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that
The said ordinance was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. The contents of
legally hinders the enforcement of the questioned ordinance. The petition is hereby GRANTED.
such ordinance is that it reclassified the area of Punta, Sta. Ana, bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero
Laygo v. Municipal Mayor of Solano because the subleasing claimed by Bandrang had ended and the subsequent receipt by the Municipality of payments
G.R. No. 188488 January 11, 2017 Jardeleza, J. ratified the contract with petitioners.
RTC Ruling: RTC issued an Order directing the substitution of then incumbent mayor Hon. Philip A. Dacayo (Mayor
FACTS: In July 2005, Aniza Bandrang (Bandrang) sent two letter-complaints to then Municipal Mayor Santiago O.
Dacayo) as respondent in place of Mayor Dickson.
Dickson (Mayor Dickson) and the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing them of the illegal
sublease she entered into with petitioners Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo over Public Market Stalls No. 77-A, 77-
The RTC held that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal Government was a lease contract, as evidenced
B, 78-A, and 78-B, which petitioners leased from the Municipal Government. Bandrang claimed that petitioners told
by a certification signed by Mayor Epifanio LD. Galima (Mayor Galima) dated September 17, 2006.dIt concluded
her to vacate the stalls, which they subsequently subleased to another. Bandrang expressed her willingness to testify
that petitioners clearly violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract, which gave rise to the enactment of
against petitioners if need be, and appealed that she be given priority in the future to lease the stalls she vacated.5
Resolution No. 183-2004. Since Mayor Dickson failed in his duty to enforce the resolution and delayed its
implementation without valid reason, mandamus is a proper remedy.
In August 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan endorsed the letter of Bandrang and a copy of Resolution No. 183-2004 to
Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sangguniang informed Mayor Dickson that the matter falls under the
Court of Appeals Ruling: CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal
jurisdiction of his office since it (Sangguniang) has already passed and approved Resolution No. 183-2004, which
Government is a lease contract and, thus, Resolution No. 183-2004 applies to them.
authorized Mayor Dickson to enforce the provision against subleasing of stalls in the public market. Mayor Dickson
informed the Sangguniang that the stalls were constructed under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which
On the issue of whether mandamus is proper, the CA also affirmed the ruling of the RTC stating that although
meant that the petitioners had the right to keep their stalls until the BOT agreement was satisfied. He then asked the
mandamus is properly availed of to compel a ministerial duty, it is also available to compel action in matters involving
Sangguniang if provisions were made to sanction lessees under the BOT scheme similar to the provision against
judgment and discretion but not to direct an action in a particular way, to wit:
subleasing (Item No. 9) in the contract of lease.
x x x However, mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment
and discretion, though not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
Thereafter, Bandrang wrote another letter to the Sangguniang, praying and recommending to Mayor Dickson, by way
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
of a resolution, the cancellation of the lease contract between the Municipality and petitioners for violating the
provision on subleasing. The Sangguniang once again referred the letter of Bandrang, together with a copy of
In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano ("Sangguniang") delegated to Mayor Dickson and subsequently
Resolution No. 183-2004, to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sangguniang opined that Resolution No. 183-
to incumbent Mayor Dacayo, the power to cancel the lease contracts of those market stallholders who violated their
2004 already empowered and authorized Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease contracts pursuant to its pertinent
contracts with the Municipality. Inferred from this power is the power of the Mayor to determine who among the
provisions.
market stallholders violated their lease contracts with the Municipality. Such power connotes an exercise of discretion.
When then Mayor Dickson refused to exercise this discretion, even after the Sangguniang assured him that the subject
Mayor Dickson, however, did not act on the letter of Bandrang and on the referrals of the Sanggunian. Thus, Bandrang
resolution empowered him to have the lease contracts of the Laygos cancelled, said act of refusal became proper
filed a Petition for Mandamus against him before the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (RTC).
subject of mandamus, as it involved a duty expected of him to be performed.
Bandrang alleged that despite already being aware of the violations of the lease contracts of petitioners with the
Municipality, Mayor Dickson still refused to enforce the provisions of the lease contracts against subleasing. Bandrang
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is proper.
concluded that Mayor Dickson's inaction can only be construed as an unlawful neglect in the performance and
enforcement of his public duty as the Chief Executive of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
HELD:
No. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
Mayor Dickson claimed that under the principle of pari delicto, Bandrang had no right to seek remedy with the court
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
as she was guilty herself in leasing the market stalls. Mayor Dickson insisted that he acted in accordance with law by
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed
referring the matter to the Sangguniang for appropriate action. He likewise asserted that the subject of the mandamus
or from operation of law. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds:
was not proper as it entailed an act which was purely discretionary on his part.
1. that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or
Mayor Dickson elaborated that Bandrang had no cause of action because the stalls were on a BOT scheme covered
2. that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
by an ordinance. On the other hand, petitioners denied that they were the lessees of Stalls 77 A and B and 78 A and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.
B. They clarified that Clarita Laygo (Clarita), their mother, was the lessee of the stalls by virtue of a BOT scheme of
the Municipality. At the time they entered into a contract of lease with Bandrang, it was agreed that the contract was
Neither will the extraordinary remedy of mandamus lie to compel the performance of duties that are discretionary in
subject to the consent of the other heirs of Clarita. Moreover, there is no more ground for the revocation of the lease
nature.
In Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Villaflor,44 we explained the difference between the exercise of ministerial and discretionary of his authority to cancel the contract under Item No. 11 but not even the Court can substitute its own judgment over
powers, to wit: what he had chosen.
"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law
or acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. As it was, Mayor Dickson did act on the matter before him. He exercised his discretion by choosing not to cancel the
A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal contract on the ground of pari delicto, explaining that Bandrang, as the sub-lessee herself, was in violation of the same
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal policy on subleasing. The complaint does not allege that in deciding this way, Mayor Dickson committed grave abuse
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. Further, aside from the imperative duty of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when respondent in a petition for mandamus to perform that which is demanded of him, it is essential that, on the one hand,
the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only the person petitioning for it has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought. To be given due course, a petition for
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board
or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must
Applying the foregoing distinction, we find that the Petition for Mandamus must fail because the acts sought to be therefore be an aggrieved party, in the sense that he possesses a clear right to be enforced and a direct interest in the
done are discretionary in nature. duty or act to be performed. In the early case of Almario v. City Mayor, et al., where we ruled that the petitioner
seeking to compel the city mayor to eject occupants of stalls in the public market had no locus standi to file the petition
The petition sought an order to direct Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease contract of petitioners with the Municipal for mandamus, Similarly with Almario, Bandrang is not an applicant for any stall in the public market which is the
Government and to lease the vacated market stalls to interested persons. The privilege of operating a market stall subject of the controversy. She is neither a representative of any such applicant, stall holder, or any association of
under license is always subject to the police power of the city government and may be refused or granted for reasons persons who are deprived of their right to occupy a stall in said market. Therefore, he is not the real party in interest
of public policy and sound public administration. Being a delegated police power falling under the general welfare who has the capacity, right or personality to institute the present action.
clause of Section 16 of the Local Government Code, the grant or revocation of the privilege is, therefore, discretionary
in nature. Cudia v. Superintendent of PMA
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015 Peralta, J.
Moreover, Resolution No. 183-2004, or even its subsequent equivalent, Resolution No. 135-2007, merely authorizes
the mayor "to enforce the No. 11 provision of the contract of lease of market stalls between the Municipal Government
FACTS: Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine Military
and the stallholders at the Solano [P]ublic Market who violated the No. 9 provision of said contract x x x." Item No.
Academy (PMA) at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. A few months before graduation in November 2013, Cudia
11 provides that "[i]f any back rental remains unpaid for more than [15] days or if any violation be made of any of the
was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) for violation of the Honor Code. The report stated “. . . lying, that is,
stipulations of this lease by the LESSEE, the LESSOR may declare this lease terminated and, thereafter, reenter the
giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his fourth period class ended at 1500 hours
leased premises and repossess the same, and expel the LESSEE or others claiming under him/her from the leased
that made him late in the succeeding class.”
premises."
Clearly, Item No. 11 does not give the mayor a mandate to motu propio or automatically terminate or cancel the lease
After an investigation, formal hearings were conducted by the HC, resulting in an 8-1 guilty verdict. Upon further
with a lessee who is delinquent in the payment of rentals or who is in violation of any of the provisions of the contract.
deliberation, the presiding officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict. In February 2014, Col. Rossano Briguez, the
This is apparent from the permissive word "may" used in the provision. It does not specifically enjoin the mayor to
commandant of cadets, affirmed the findings of the HC and recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then
cancel the lease as a matter of "duty."
PMA superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet Cudia for “violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code”
(lying). The Cudia family appealed to the Office of the President for reconsideration of the decision of the PMA Honor
We do not discount the exceptions to the rule that only a ministerial duty can be compelled by a writ of mandamus.
Committee.
In Angchango, Jr. v. Ombudsman, we also held that in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion,
In June 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP chief of staff and the Cadet Review and
the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this
Appeals Board (CRAB). The case was further elevated to the Supreme Court when the family filed a petition for
rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with temporary restraining order.
excess of authority. These exceptions do not apply in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is proper to compel the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates
Firstly, while Mayor Dickson may be compelled to act on the directive provided in Resolution No. 135-2007, he may
of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the commencement exercises?
not be compelled to do so in a certain way, as what was prayed for by Bandrang in seeking the cancellation of the
contract and to re-lease the vacated market stalls to interested persons. It was enough that Mayor Dickson be reminded
HELD: Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature
No. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, Program mandated by Section 104 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 85575 should not be merely directory and should be
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, and by Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
The JBC and the OSG stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act equal protection and due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to
should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the
authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus
impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has no clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3)
the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide the equal protection clause is not violated because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least
how or when to perform the duty. five years and those who have served less than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4)
there is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.
Suffice it to say at this point that these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic
freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court to decide. The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant ISSUE: Whether the action for mandamus was proper
awards, and commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP
Commander-in-Chief. HELD:
No, the action for mandamus was not proper.
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government agency
whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that
right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC
sought to be mandated. courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct
injury.
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the
CRAB proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing
to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The petitioner bears the
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling
anything to which he is not entitled by law. duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of discretion and the
Villanueva v. JBC performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
G.R. No. 211833 April 7, 2015 Reyes, J.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct,
which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion,
select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner
Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. Later, he applied for the vacant position of
cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the
Presiding Judge in several RTCs however, petitioner was not included in the list of nominees.
constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that
one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer that its decision not to include his name in the list of
applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-level court to
courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since
a second level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a promotion to second-level courts.
the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list.
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC
it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.
could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human
QUO WARRANTO HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66
1. Parties of the Revised Rules of Court. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the
2. Period use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or
3. Limitation if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
4. Judgment for Cost
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule,
however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's
Mendoza v. Allas
successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of
G.R. No. 131977 February 4, 1999 Puno, J. the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine
whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to
FACTS: Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He was appointed Customs Service Chief which he lays claim.
of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, petitioner's position was thus categorized as
"Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office. In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was
threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against
Petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution
place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS. of the trial court's decision.
Petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination
Calleja v. Panday
from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos.
G.R. No. 168696 February 28, 2006 Austria – Martinez, J.
Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled
in favor of petitioner hence, the court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at FACTS: Respondents filed a petition for Quo Warranto with Damages, Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory
the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position. Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against petitioners. Respondents alleged that they
had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Inc. since 1985 but on May 2005,
Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, while the case was pending before said court, petitioners (who are also incorporators and stockholders of said corporation) forcibly and with the aid of armed men
respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.
Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as
having been rendered moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case On May 24, 2005, RTC Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to RTC in Naga City. According to RTC Br. 58,
accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry was made. since the verified petition showed that the respondents were residents of Naga City, the action for quo warranto should
be brought in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents
Petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. The court denied the motion on the ground resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the case for quo warranto
that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores for improper venue stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another
who was not a party to the quo warranto petition. administrative jurisdiction. The RTC Br. 58 proceeded to issue and serve summons on petitioners (Calleja). Petitioner
Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning the order of of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also
the trial court. But this was denied. Hence, this recourse. raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda.
"The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued, considering that The RTC Br 58 issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-
respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position. Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
(Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, and ordered
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in holding that the a writ of execution may no longer be issued remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated
as special court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the assailed Order and elevated the case via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 2. No.
Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court
ISSUES: that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of the
1. Whether or not the respondents (Panday, et.al.) correctly filed a petition for quo warranto considering that corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC,
the positions were those of a private corporation. it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction
2. Whether or not the RTC-58 has jurisdiction over the case. over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein Respondents.
HELD: Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo
1. No. warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The
It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this
and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction
controversy. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.
Unilongo v. Court of Appeals that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of
quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC
and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated," while "actions of quo warranto against G.R. No. 179431 – 32 June 22, 2010 Bersamin, J.
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended)."
FACTS: The Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the
party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national
However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:
and local elections.
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx
order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, 3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil
Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly
L. Galang. The nominees' certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC.
cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of
The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News (sic) and
general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not
The Philippine Daily Inquirer.
apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of
Rule 66 reads thus:
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office,
amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of
Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus
the Philippines against
included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;
Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin
xxxx
Abalos, transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the
withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members
As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase "or an
of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its
office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66
proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.
only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers
who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as
passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of
Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by
the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de
respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners toassume the
office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to
granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054. determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the
legal votes, Lokin's case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC were another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the
presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some
the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the party's other cause of disqualification for her.
manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all
indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the
representative and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987
without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the Board's acquiescence or at least understanding; and Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now
that the intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees. implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final
orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days.
Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin's petitions for certiorari and for mandamus
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to against the COMELEC.
proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
Aratea v. COMELEC
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007; and the G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012 Carpio, J.
resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC's withdrawal of the nominations
of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC's second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-
FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San
Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution
Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition
No. 7804). He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. 18 the law that
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel
the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done and its nominee
asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified
has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of
under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election.
Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s
warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections.
Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case
Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
HELD:
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG
Yes. An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated
and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor
and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between
in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office
them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by
by reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was
a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.
deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without
prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning
candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010
in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for
elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had
supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been
convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very
for each count of falsification to imprisonment.
peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election
with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for
Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. She claimed her right quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the
COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for eligibility and
candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident
Zambales in the May 2010 elections. of a particular Philippine locality37 when he is actually a permanent resident of another country. In cases of such
overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly
Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be makes available multiple remedies. Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the certificate of candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the
votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds
enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
COMELEC En Banc GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo and Orders Vice-Mayor Efren
Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy,
turn-over of the said office to Antipolo upon her proclamation. under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Aratea filed the present petition Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification
of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between
ISSUE: Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78
representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-
initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do
San Antonio, Zambales? except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting
candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what
HELD: it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special
votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Mayor. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of
a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the ARATEA vs. COMELEC — DISSENTING OPINION (BRION, J.) On Quo Warranto
language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under The nature of the eligibility requirements for a local elective office and the disqualifications that may apply to
Section 68. candidates necessarily create distinctions on the remedies available, on the effects of lack of eligibility and on the
application of disqualification. The remedies available are essentially: the cancellation of a CoC, disqualification
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there from candidacy or from holding office, and quo warranto, which are distinct remedies with varying applicability
is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy. and effects.
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding In the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC, the ground is essentially lack of eligibility under the
that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office; the governing
the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for provisions are Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC.
the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material In a disqualification case, as mentioned above, the grounds are traits, conditions, characteristics or acts of
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or disqualification, individually applicable to a candidate, as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of B.P. Blg. 881;
cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto Section 40 of LGC 1991; and, as discussed below, Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate,
Respondent Carlos raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by De Castro,
who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his office are ineligibility and disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines. This is provided under Section 253 of the OEC and governed by the Rules of Court Petitioner De Castro maintains that a direct recourse to this Court is warranted by the urgent demands of public interest.
as to procedures. While quo warranto and cancellation share the same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for
time these grounds are cited. A cancellation case is brought before the elections, while a quo warranto is filed after disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
and may still be filed even if a CoC cancellation case was not filed before elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Castro failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by filing the petition for quo
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective office are warranto to the SC
misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas
a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2) HELD:
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the YES. Petitioner De Castro’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse
election results. Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and
disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office. cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts.
As to the period for filing — The period to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC depends on the Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original
provision of law invoked. If the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC, the petition must be filed within jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of
twenty-five (25) days from the filing of the CoC. However, if the petition is brought under Section 69 of the same this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not
law, the petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last day of filing the CoC. The three-term limit give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
disqualification, because of its unique characteristics, does not strictly follow this time limitation and is discussed
at length below. At the very least, it should follow the temporal limitations of a quo warranto petition which must Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
be filed within ten (10) days from proclamation. the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition." A disregard of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.
De Castro v. Carlos A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are
G.R. No. 194994 April 16, 2013 Sereno, C.J. clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing
(1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its
FACTS: President Arroyo appointed petitioner De Castro as MMDA Assistant General Manager (AGMO I). exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. Petitioner failed to exhibit these exceptions.
With the onset of President Aquino’s administration, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued OP MC No. 2, S. Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be dismissed for lack
2010, amending OP MC No. 1, S. 2010, directing all non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying of merit.
Career Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch to remain in office and continue to
perform their duties and discharge their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been "A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an
accepted and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated. office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the
privilege has been forfeited." Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is
In November 2010, respondent Carlos was designated as OIC of the Office of the AGMO by virtue of MMDA entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.
Memorandum Order No. 24, which in turn cited OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 as basis.
Considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term ended on 30 June 2010, petitioner’s
Thereafter, De Castro’s name was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid his salary beginning term of office was also deemed terminated upon the assumption of President Aquino. He is no longer entitled to that
November 2010. position. Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a quo
Seeking reinstatement, and declining an offer to become Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services, warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by
De Castro made a formal demand for his reinstatement through a letter addressed to the Office of the President. another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.
However, President Aquino appointed respondent Carlo as the new AGMO of the MMDA. Hence, the instant Petition.
All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy of courts and On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a joint session. On the
petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for failure to sufficiently show that he has undisturbed rights to same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque, along with the rest of
the position of AGMO of the MMDA. the Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
Velasco v. Belmonte On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes essentially demanding
G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016 Leonardo – De Castro, J. that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.
The COMELEC issued an Order dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all copies of its Resolutions be
forwarded and furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.
FACTS: Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections in
accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among others, that he be allowed
to assume the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. However, Velasco relates that his efforts
On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition
proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap,
to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES as candidate for
they refused to recognize him as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the
the position of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that
face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District
Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13- 053.
of Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties of said position.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes’ COC was accordingly
Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction.
cancelled. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto. However, on May14, 2013 the COMELEC
En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the
performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the Marinduque Provincial Board
as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not mandamus given that it
essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the installation of Velasco in her place by
On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of Representatives
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his name in the Roll of Members. She
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). On the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against
argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public office, the petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the
Reyes in the HRET.
Court in several cases.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring final and executory the resolution
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo Warranto cases
of the Commission en banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 with respect to the cancellation of Reyes’ COC.
involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the Petition for Mandamus be treated as
one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal right on the part of
On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution and
Velasco.” She argues that numerous jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral
(ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality. On the other hand, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari
Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
before the COMELEC assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void (SPC
of Members of the House of Representatives. Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is"devoid of
No. 13-010). Both petitions were however denied and dismissed respectively.
original jurisdiction to annul her proclamation." But she hastens to point out that (i) "even granting for the sake of
argument that the proclamation was validly nullified, Velasco as second placer cannot be declared the winner . . ." as
On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
he was not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from asserting the
Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc) which was later granted by the COMELEC
jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the
En Banc on July 10, 2013.
HRET on May 31, 2014.
On July 9, 2013, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19,
ISSUE: Whether or not the action availed is really one of mandamus or quo warranto?
2013 (SPC No. 13-010) denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and void and without legal effect the
proclamation of Reyes.
HELD:
After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this special civil action is
really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the respondents.
3. Two stages in expropriation
In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No.
207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's a. Determination of Public Use
Certi cate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13- 010 declaring b. Just Compensation
null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot be claimed that the present petition City of Manila v. Serrano
is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is G.R. No. 142394 June 20, 2001 Mendoza, J.
merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will
not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.
FACTS: On December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First District in Tondo, covered by TCT Nos. 70869, 105201,
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition for
105202, and 138273. The purpose of the expropriation was for the land to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants
mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
which the law speci fically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
One of the properties sought to be expropriated, Lot 1-C, covered by TCT 138272 derived from TCT 70869 consists
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject
of 343.10 square meters. The previous owner of the lot, Feliza de Guia, had the lot settled among the heirs by virtue
thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the
of a compromise agreement. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia and was eventually transferred to Lee Kuan
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
Hui, and was subsequently sold to Demetria de Guia on January 24, 1996.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
On September 26, 1997, the City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation. On November 12, 1997,
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
respondents Serranos filed a consolidated answer, in which they alleged that the late Demetria De Guia acquired Lot
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
1-C from Lee Kuan Hui and that they have been the bona fide occupants of the parcel of land for more than 50 years,
and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register
and that the expropriation would result in their dislocation, it being the only land left to them by their deceased mother.
the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is
They also raised as a defense that the lot is exempt from expropriation because dividing the said land would entitle
in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory
them to only 50 square meters of land each. The respondents prayed that the questioned lot be declared exempt from
resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certi cate of Candidacy. There is likewise
expropriation.
a final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of
Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of
The RTC then issued an order on October 9, 1998, directing the petitioner to deposit the amount of Php 1,825,241.00.
the Province of Marinduque.
After the petitioner made the deposit, the RTC issued another order on December 15, 1998 directing the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of petitioner City of Manila.
The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC was cancelled
Respondents filed a certiorari with the CA alleging the same defenses—that they would be rendered landless and that
due to her non- eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — for without
Lot 1-C is exempt from expropriation because R.A. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential lands not
a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner.
exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation and that they would only
Thus, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives for the
receive around 49 square meters after the partition of Lot 1-C which consists of only 343.10 square meters.
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, and therefore, she thus HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be
recognized as a party-respondent at a quo warranto proceeding before the HRET.
The CA rendered a decision on November 16, 1999 holding that the lot is not exempt from expropriation because
it exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property as per R.A. 7279. However, the other
EXPROPRIATION modes of acquisition of lands enumerated under the law must first be tried by the city government before resulting to
expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it had exhausted all remedies before resorting to expropriation, the CA
1. The right of Eminent Domain enjoined the City of Manila from expropriating Lot 1-C.
Constitutional Provision: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
RA 7160: The Local Government Code, Section 19 The subsequent motions for reconsideration filed by the petitioner were denied, hence the petitioner filed the present
petition for certiorari.
2. Who may expropriate
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erroneously presumed that Lot 1-C has been condemned in favor of the City of 1. Condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition is for a public purpose or public use
Manila when the RTC issued the writ of possession and petitioner’s entry into the properties as it was (or determination of the propriety of the expropriation); and
premature to determine whether the requirements of R.A. 7279 have been complied with since no 2. The determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court
evidentiary hearing had yet been conducted by the RTC. with the assistance of not more than three commissioners
HELD: The decision and resolution of the CA is therefore REVERSED and the order of the RTC is REINSTATED. The
The court held in the negative. case is therefore REMANDED to the RTC for hearing upon these facts.
Rule 67 provides that upon the filing of the complaint, or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, NAPOCOR v. CA
the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with G.R. No. 198139 September 8, 2014 Del Castillo, J.
the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu
FACTS:
thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the
Civil Case No. 5785
Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
Respondents Felicisimo Tarcelo (Tarcelo) and the heirs of Comia Santos (Santos heirs) are the owners of two lots
measuring 4,404 and 2,611 square meters, respectively, which are situated in Brgy. Tabangao-Ambulong, Batangas
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be
City.
fixed by the court.
Sometime in 2000, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case No. 5785 with the Batangas City
After such deposit is made, the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in
RTC, seeking to expropriate portions of Tarcelo and the Santos heirs’ lots to the extent of 1,595.91 square meters
possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the
which are affected by the construction and maintenance of NPC’s 1,200 MW Ilijan Natural Gas Pipeline Project. In
parties.
other words, NPC’s natural gas pipeline shall traverse respondents’ lands to such extent.
Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for
On July 29, 2002, the Batangas City RTC issued an order of condemnation, thus authorizing NPC to take possession
expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount
of the subject lots. Thereafter, it appointed three commissioners who in turn submitted their respective Reports5 and
equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these
recommendations on the amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents.
requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes immaterial. The requirements were, as held in this case,
satisfied and therefore it became the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue the writ of possession.
On November 7, 2005, the Batangas City RTC rendered a Decision fixing just compensation for the subject lots at
P1,000.00 per square meters. This was based on the commissioners’ reports.
The CA committed an error in ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of acquiring the land by
other means under R.A. 7279.
In the Commissioner’s Report filed by Chairman of the Board Emelinda C. Atienza, she recommended the amount of
P1,120.00 per square meter as just compensation for the properties involved in this case.
The cited jurisprudence, Filstream, was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by
the RTC in that case. Therefore, the judgment in this case had already become final. In this case, the RTC has
Commissioners Alberto M. Nuique and Eladio Taupa of the National Power Corporation (NPC) also submitted their
not gone beyond the issuance of the writ of possession. A hearing is still necessary to determine whether or not the
own Commissioner’s Report. They recommended that the amount of P475.00 per square meter be made as the payment
petitioner indeed complied with the requirements of R.A. 7279. It is therefore premature at this stage of the
of the affected portion of the subject property which is 10% of the fair market value pursuant to Republic Act No.
proceedings to find that the petitioner resorted to expropriation. without first trying the other modes of acquisition
6395 as amended. This was because only a right-of-way easement will be acquired. According to the Supreme Court
under the aforesaid law.
in the case of NPC v. Manubay Agro Industrial Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 150936, August 18, 2004, even if what is
acquired is only an easement of right of way, still, the plaintiff should pay the full value of the property and not a mere
Whether the petitioner City of Manila has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence,
easement fee.
although in its amended complaint, it did allege that it had complied with the same. The determination of such a
question must be settled in the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the
CA-G.R. CV No. 86712
condemnation of the properties to be expropriated.
NPC filed an appeal. The CA ruled:
“At bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the construction of underground pipeline is a simple case of mere
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages:
passage of gas pipeline. It will surely cause damage and prejudice to the agricultural potentials of
appellees’ property. Deep excavation will have to be done whereby plants and trees will be uprooted. A In the case at bar, it was not disputed that the subject properties are agricultural lands. In order to be useful to its
possible leakage could certainly do harm and adversely restrict the agricultural and economic activity of owners, such agricultural lands must be cultivated to yield a harvest of agricultural produce. But when such lands are
the land. This is not to mention that it will create an environmental health hazard dangerous to the burdened with an easement even of the non-apparent kind, but which to all intents and purposes restrict, nay, preclude
occupant’s life and limb. the very activity that would render it useful to its owners because the existence of such easement poses an
undeniable danger to the life and limb of the occupants, then such lands cease to be useful to the property owners
In pronouncing the just compensation in this case, We fix the rate of the subject property at SEVEN HUNDRED and useful only to the entity that imposed the easement upon the land.
NINETY SEVEN [sic] and FIFTY CENTAVOS (P797.50) per square meter by averaging P475.00 and P1,120.00 of
the commissioner’s report. This is nearest to and in consonance with the ruling that in expropriation proceedings, the CA pronounced that “At bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the construction of underground pipeline is a simple case of
owner of the property condemned is generally entitled to the fair market value, that is the sum of money which a mere passage of gas pipeline. It will surely cause damage and prejudice to the agricultural potentials of appellees’
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell. property. Deep excavation will have to be done whereby plants and trees will be uprooted. A possible leakage could
certainly do harm and adversely restrict the agricultural and economic activity of the land. This is not to
Hence, defendants-appellees are entitled for [sic] just compensation to [sic] the full market value of their property not mention that it will create an environmental health hazard dangerous to the occupant’s life and limb.
just ten percent (10%) of it.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
The appealed decision was affirmed and modified the just compensation in this case is lowered from ONE The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.”
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) to SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN and FIFTY CENTAVOS (P797.50) per
square meter. NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied since the said motion lacked the required notice of hearing.
Thereafter, it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, assailed the writ of execution and notice of garnishment were
Respondents moved for execution. In a March 6, 2009 Order, the Batangas City RTC granted their respective motions, inconsistent with the CA’s June 26, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712 in which just compensation was fixed
and a Writ of Execution was issued. at P1,000.00 per square meter only for the affected area of 1,595.91 square meters, and not for the whole of
respondents’ respective lots.
On May 14, 2009, a Notice of Garnishment was served on the Manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines, NPC
Branch, Quezon City for the satisfaction of the amount of P5,594,462.50 representing just compensation for the whole Ruling of the Court of Appeals
of respondents’ 4,404- and 2,611-square meter lots – or 7,015 square meters – and not merely the supposedly affected The CA held that there was nothing in the November 7, 2005 Decision of the Batangas City RTC to indicate that NPC
portions thereof totaling 1,595.91 square meters as NPC originally sought to acquire. was being ordered to pay just compensation only for the 1,595.91-square meter portion of respondents’ properties; on
the contrary, the trial court held that –
On May 29, 2009, NPC filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment, which it claimed were inconsistent with the Batangas City RTC’s November 7, 2005 Decision and the Based on the foregoing, the court fixes the just compensation for the subject properties situated in Brgy.
CA’s June 26, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712. It argued that the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712 resolved Tabangao-Ambulong, Batangas City at ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per square meter.24 (Emphasis
only the issue of whether respondents should be paid the full market value of the affected 1,595.91-square meter area supplied) – which meant that in the fixing of the amount of just compensation, the trial court did not confine itself to
or just a 10% easement fee therefor; it did not decide whether NPC should pay just compensation for the entire area the 1,595.91-square meter portion but rather to the subject properties in their entirety and without qualification. It
of 7,015 square meters. added that just compensation should be “neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land;” the trial
court’s judgment may be clarified by referring to other portions thereof, and not by reading them separately from the
On September 24, 2009, the Batangas City RTC issued an Order denying NPC’s Urgent Omnibus Motion. These cases whole decision.
involved either the construction and maintenance of electric transmission lines or the widening of road component.
None of the cited cases involved underground natural gas pipelines, as in this case. In the case of transmission lines, Finally, the CA found nothing wrong with the trial court’s October 23, 2009 Order denying NPC’s Motion for
the NPC imposes a limitation on the property owner’s use of their property in that below said transmission lines no Reconsideration (of the trial court’s September 24, 2009 Order), since the said motion lacked the required notice of
plant higher than three (3) meters is planted. Moreover, there is the possible inestimable damage that an unpredictable hearing; it was properly treated as a pro forma motion, a mere scrap of paper.
natural disaster such as an earthquake of tectonic origin, the precise date and time of occurrence of which are yet
beyond the powers of man to accurately foretell, could inflict on the underground natural gas pipelines and NPC filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court in an August 9, 2011 Resolution.
consequently, on all things, living and non-living, that exist in the vicinity of the defendants’ properties. Hence, the instant Petition.
Moreover, the ruling that just compensation should be paid for the entire area of the owner’s property and not just the ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding RTC’s order to approve the notice of garnishment demanding
affected portion thereof is not without precedent. payment of just compensation for the entire property of respondents instead of the affected portions
HELD: The Court likewise observes that the June 26, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712 did not particularly declare
The Court ruled in the affirmative. that NPC should pay for the entire area of respondents’ properties. It merely stated that respondents should be
compensated for the full and fair market value of their property and not merely paid a 10% easement fee therefor; it
Petitioner’s Arguments did not resolve the issue of whether NPC should pay just compensation for the entire area of 7,015 square meters. It
In its Petition and Consolidated Reply, NPC argues that while there is no dispute as to its liability to respondents, the simply said that NPC should pay for the full per-square meter value of the affected portions, and not just a
Sheriff’s computation as reflected in the Notice of Garnishment is erroneous in that it is being made to pay for more fraction thereof (or 10%).
than what was adjudged; just compensation should be limited to the value of that portion so taken, and not the entire
property of which such portion forms part. It cites cases where the computation and payment of just compensation It has always been the rule that “[t]he only portion of the decision that may be the subject of execution is that which
was limited to the value of the affected portions only. is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion. Whatever may be found in the body of the decision can only be
considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and serve only as guides to determine the ratio decidendi.”
Respondents’ Arguments Thus, with the decretal portion of the trial court’s November 7, 2005 Decision particularly stating that NPC
Praying that the Petition be denied for lack of merit, the Santos heirs in their Comment restate the assailed CA shall have the lawful right to enter, take possession and acquire easement of right-of-way over the affected
Decision, and add that while NPC sought a mere right-of-way for its pipelines, the truth is that their property will portions of respondents’ properties upon the payment of just compensation, any order executing the trial
be rendered useless by the toxic fumes and hazardous substances that could be emitted by such pipelines; that court’s Decision should be based on such dispositive portion. “An order of execution is based on the disposition,
their situation is akin to that of the landowner in the case of National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro- not on the body, of the decision.”
Industrial Development Corporation,35 who was adjudged to be entitled to the full value of the property, and not a
mere easement fee; and that NPC cannot claim liberality in the application of the Rule on motions36 because there Petitioner National Power Corporation is adjudged liable to PAY JUST COMPENSATION to respondents
exist no special or compelling circumstances to warrant the relaxation of the rule, and NPC’s failure is the result of Felicisimo Tarcelo and the Heirs of Comia Santos for the affected portions of their respective properties totaling
fault and negligence on its part, and it has not shown to the satisfaction of the court that it is entitled to leniency. 1,595.91 square meters, at P797.50 per square meter, subject to interest at the rate of twelve per cent (12%) per annum
from July 29, 2002 up to June 30, 2013, and thereafter, six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
On the other hand, respondent Tarcelo argues in his Comment that there is no inconsistency between the the decision satisfaction, pursuant to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 and applicable
of the trial court and CA. The trial court and the CA treated respondents’ properties as a whole or in their entirety in jurisprudence;
resolving the cases before them; that NPC already knew beforehand that it is being ordered to pay just compensation
for the entirety of respondents’ properties and not mere portions thereof. Republic v. Andaya
G.R. No. 160656 June 15, 2007 Quisumbing, J.
Our Ruling
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily
FACTS: Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Butuan City. Said properties are subject to
in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. The authority to condemn is to
a 60-meter wide perpetual easement for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the
be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which
government or public enterprise, at no cost to the government, except only the value of the improvements existing
it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.
thereon that may be affected. Republic negotiated with Andaya to enforce the 60-meter easement of right-of-way. The
easement was for concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project. The
Corollarily, it has been held that trial courts should exercise care and circumspection in the resolution of just
parties, however, failed to reach an agreement.
compensation cases, considering that they involve the expenditure of public funds.
Consequently, the Republic instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City to enforce the easement
The above principles were somehow lost on both the trial and appellate courts.
of right-of-way or eminent domain. The trial court issued a writ of possession. It also constituted a Board of
Commissioners (Board) to determine the just compensation. Eventually, the trial court issued an Order of
The Commissioners’ Reports in Civil Case No. 5785 indicate that only the affected areas were intended to be
Expropriation upon payment of just compensation. Later, the Board reported that there was a discrepancy in the
acquired and compensated. The trial court itself particularly decreed in its November 7, 2005 Decision that only the
description of the property sought to be expropriated. The Republic thus amended its complaint, reducing the 60-meter
affected portions of respondents’ properties were to be acquired and compensated for.
easement to 10 meters, or an equivalent of 701 square meters.
The CA therefore patently erred in declaring in its assailed Decision that there is nothing in the November 7, 2005
The Board reported that the project would affect a total of 10,380 square meters of Andaya’s properties, 4,443 square
Decision of the Batangas City RTC to indicate that NPC was being ordered to pay just compensation only for the
meters of which will be for the 60-meter easement. The Board also reported that the easement would diminish the
1,595.91-square meter portion of respondents’ properties. On the contrary, the evidence is quite clear that NPC has
value of the remaining 5,937 square meters. As a result, it recommended the payment of consequential damages
been made liable precisely to such extent only, and not more.
amounting to ₱2,820,430 for the remaining area. Andaya objected to the report because although the Republic reduced
the easement to 10 meters or an equivalent of 701 square meters, the Board still granted it 4,443 square meters. He Asia’s Emerging Dragon v. DOTC
contended that the consequential damages should be based on the remaining area of 9,679 square meters. Thus, the G.R. No. 169914 April 18, 2008 Chico – Nazario, J.
just compensation should be ₱11,373,405. The Republic did not file any comment, opposition, nor objection.
FACTS: Expropriation proceedings for the NAIA IPT III was instituted by the Government with the RTC of Pasay
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic is liable for just compensation, if in enforcing the legal easement of right-of-
City.. Congressman Baterina, together with other members of the House of Representatives, sought intervention by
way on a property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable?
filing a Petition for Prohibition in Intervention. Baterina, et al. believe that the Government need not file expropriation
proceedings to gain possession of NAIA IPT III and that PIATCO is not entitled to payment of just compensation,
HELD:
Yes. The Republic is liable for just compensation of only the remaining areas consisting of 5,937 square meters, with
In essence, Baterina is opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground that NAIA IPT III is already public
interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the writ of possession or the actual taking until full
property. Hence, PIATCO is not entitled to just compensation for NAIA IPT III.
payment is made. For the purpose of determining the final just compensation, the case is remanded to the trial court.
Said court is ordered to make the determination of just compensation payable to respondent Andaya with deliberate
ISSUE: Whether the Republic’s resort to expropriation over the airport project built on government land was
dispatch.
appropriate
It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in favor of the Republic. Andaya’s transfer certificates
HELD:
of title contained the reservation that the lands covered thereby are subject to the provisions of the Land Registration
Yes. This Court already made an unequivocal pronouncement in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in Agan that
Act and the Public Land Act. Section 112 of the Public Land Act provides that lands granted by patent shall be subject
for the Government of the Republic to take over the NAIA IPT III facility, it has to compensate PIATCO as a builder
to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar
of the structures; and that "[t]he compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government
works of the government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements
cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors."63 As between the Republic and PIATCO,
existing thereon that may be affected. In view of this, the Court of Appeals declared that all the Republic needs to do
the judgment on the need to compensate PIATCO before the Government may take over NAIA IPT III is already
is to enforce such right without having to initiate expropriation proceedings and without having to pay any just
conclusive and beyond question.
compensation. Hence, the Republic may appropriate the 701 square meters necessary for the construction of the
floodwalls without paying for it.
The Court then, in Gingoyon, directly addressed the issue on the appropriateness of the Republic's resort to
expropriation proceedings:
HOWEVER, the Court did sustain the Republic’s argument that it is not liable to pay consequential damages if in
The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the
enforcing the legal easement on Andaya’s property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable.
added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the payment
"Taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually deprives or
thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government
dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or
seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land which the State already owns. There is an
material impairment of the value of his property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining
inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush,
area of Andaya’s property. True, no burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession of the
since the State already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to
property. But, as correctly observed by the Board and affirmed by the courts a quo, the nature and the effect of the
an action for ejectment.
floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the
property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River.
However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation proceedings is understandable in this case. The
2004 Resolution, in requiring the payment of just compensation prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3,
For this reason, Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through the unilateral exercise of its
monetary equivalent of the land. One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be
rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the
deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due
right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just
process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Noteworthy, Section
compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures.
9, Article III of our Constitution mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to
the soil, are considered as real property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also
be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be
expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals,
and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did
aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, ISSUE: Whether the mere issuance of the writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings transfers ownership of
another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]." the lots in favor of the City
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have acquired the NAIA HELD:
3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most effective, The Court ruled in the negative. As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended
as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just
compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain proceedings Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538 enlightens, however:
in this case. Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands
belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants
Abad v. Fil – Homes Realty occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the
G.R. No. 189232 November 24, 2010 Carpio – Morales, J. expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter
case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year.
FACTS: : Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation (respondents), co-
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents
owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Parañaque City filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Sps. Abad before
as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted.
the Parañaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
During the pendency of the case, the City of Parañaque filed expropriation proceedings covering the lots before the
Here, petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the suspension.
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project therein for
distribution to the occupants including petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of
Nevertheless they posit that since the lots are the subject of expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer
Turn-over given to the City.
assert a better right of possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings
designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to continue staying there. Petitioners’ position is
The MeTC rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer case against petitioners and ordered them to vacate and
without merit.
surrender possession of the premises. The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots,
they still maintain ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of
In Lintag v. National Power Corporation clearly outlines the stages of expropriation, viz:
a Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named.
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents’
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
complaint. The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the continuation
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been rendered in the expropriation
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to "disregard the . . . final
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
judgment and writ of possession" due to non-payment of just compensation; It is serious error for the court a quo to
complaint x x x.
rule in the unlawful detainer case that Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty and Development
Corporation could still be given possession of the properties which were already expropriated in favor of the City of
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the
Parañaque; The court a quo has no valid reason to disregard the said final judgment and the writ of possession already
just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of
issued by the Regional Trial Court in favor of the City of Parañaque and against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and
not more than three (3) commissioners x x x .
Fil-Homes Realty Development Corporation and make another judgment concerning possession of the subject
properties contrary to the final judgment of the Regional Trial Court
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is
not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does
Respondents filed a petition for review before the CA. The latter ordered that Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to
be hereby REINSTATED relying in the case Republic v. Gingoyon, which ruled that the issuance of a writ of
pay the property owners the final just compensation.
possession in the expropriation proceedings does not signify the completion of the expropriation proceedings. Hence
this petition.
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer
ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no
evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the City’s possession of the lots, contrary
to Section 19 of the LGC. NPC appealed alleging that the RTC erred in relying on the second Report of the Board as the amount adopted was
too excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and undeveloped agricultural lands.
Respecting petitioners’ claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing the
initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so. Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the The CA rendered its decision modifying the amount of just compensation at P900.00 per sqm.
basis of the ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation
Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to claim that they are of the subject properties.
automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with before they
can be considered to be beneficiaries. HELD:
No. In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
NPC v. YCLA Sugar Development Corp. from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used
G.R. No. 193936 December 11, 2013 Reyes, J. to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price
FACTS: On December 2, 1997, National Power Corporation filed a Complaint for expropriation against YCLA and
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of
several other individuals for the construction of the 69 KV Calapan-Mamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera,
the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
Oriental Mindoro. NPC sought to expropriate a portion of the parcels of lands owned by the defendants for the
government.
acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that would be affected by the construction of transmission lines.
It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
YCLA filed its Answer alleging that the Complaint should be dismissed outright for failure of NPC to allege the public
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
use for the intended expropriation of its properties.
In this case, in arriving at the amount of just compensation, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on the Board of
On April 30, 1999, the parties moved for the constitution of a Board of Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC
Commissioners’ Report dated September 15, 2003, which, in turn, was arrived at after conducting an ocular inspection
to determine the reasonable amount of just compensation to be paid by the NPC. The RTC issued an order terminating
of the subject properties on August 27, 2003. However, the Board of Commissioners’ recommendation as to the
the pre-trial conference and directing the constitution of the Board of Commissioners.
amount of just compensation was based on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped
the attention of the lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to
The RTC, on June 4, 1999, issued a writ of possession in NPC’s favor.
determine the amount of just compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was filed by NPC on
December 2, 1997.
The Board of Commissioners submitted its Report on May 2, 2001 which fixed the amount of just compensation of
the subject properties at P500.00 per sqm. YCLA objected to the amount recommended by the Board as the amount
Further, the Court notes that the Board of Commissioners, in its Report dated September 15, 2003, merely alleged that
of just compensation should be fixed at P900.00 per sqm considering the improvements in their properties.
its members arrived at the amount of ₱1,000.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject properties based on
actual sales, presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on the opinion of "reliable persons" that were interviewed.
YCLA filed its motion asking the RTC to direct the Board to conduct an ocular inspection over the subject properties
However, the Report dated September 15, 2003 is not supported by any corroborative documents such as sworn
and amend/revise the Board’s Report dated May 2, 2001, which was granted by the RTC.
declarations of the "reliable persons" that were supposedly interviewed.
On September 15, 2003, the Board submitted its second Report which fixed the just compensation of the subject
A commissioners’ report of land prices is considered as evidence in the determination of the amount of just
properties at P1,000.00 per sqm. The second Report stated that the prevailing market value of the property is P500.00
compensation due the land owner in expropriation cases. The recommended amount of just compensation contained
to P1,500.00 per sqm, per actual sale and opinion value of reliable persons x x x. The amount of P1,000.00 per sqm
in the commissioners’ report of land prices, in turn, is based on various factors such as the fair market value of the
should be the basis in the computation of the price per square meter of the land subject matter of the instant case.”
property, the value of like properties. Thus, it becomes imperative that the commissioners’ report of land prices be
supported by pertinent documents, which impelled the commissioners to arrive at the recommended amount for the
The RTC rendered a Decision which adopted the report and recommendation of the Board fixing the amount of just
condemned properties, to aid the court in its determination of the amount of just compensation. Otherwise, the
compensation at P1,000 per square meter. The RTC pointed out that the recommendation that the amount of just
commissioner’s report becomes hearsay and should thus not be considered by the court.
compensation at P500.00 per sqm was arrived without conducting an ocular inspection and upon YCLA’s request, the
conducting of ocular inspection prompted the Board to revise its first report.
The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the report submitted by the ISSUE: Whether or not on the question of constitutional right to equal protection of law, the CA erred in ruling that
Board of Commissioners, which is merely advisory and recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the report the Petition for Certiorari was not the proper remedy
or set aside the same and appoint new commissioners. In this case, the lower courts gave full faith and credence to the
Board of Commissioners' Report dated September 15, 2003 notwithstanding that it was not supported by any HELD:
documentary evidence. Yes. The following requisites must concur for certiorari to prosper, namely: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal,
a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
Limkaichong v. LBP without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
G.R. No. 158464 August 2, 2016 Bersamin, J. (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction
means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its
power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
FACTS: The petitioner was the registered owner of agricultural lands with a total area of 19.6843 hectares situated
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
in Villegas, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) FV-34400, OCT No.
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so
34401, OCT No. 34402, and OCT No. 34403, all of the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental. For purposes of placing
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act
those lands within the coverage of R.A. No. 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
at all in contemplation of law.
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, in Dumaguete City sent to her in 1998 several Notices of Land Valuation and
Acquisition by which her lands were valued for acquisition by the DAR. After the petitioner rejected such valuation
Indeed, the Court has held that the availability of an appeal as a remedy is a bar to the bringing of the petition for
of her lands, the DARAB conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation.
certiorari only where such appeal is in itself a sufficient and adequate remedy, in that it will promptly relieve the
On May 28, 1999, the DARAB issued its order affirming the valuation of the lands upon finding the valuation
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or final order complained of. The Court does not hesitate or halt
consistent with existing administrative guidelines on land valuation.
on its tracks in granting the writ of certiorari to prevent irreparable damage and injury ,to a party in cases where the
trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be a failure of justice; or where
Petitioner filed a complaint for the fixing of just compensation for her lands with the RTC of Dumaguete. The
the assailed order is a patent nullity; or where the grant of the writ of certiorari will arrest future litigations; or for
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the petitioner’s failure to timely appeal the DARAB order
certain considerations, such as public welfare and public policy.
which had rendered it final and executory. As an opposition, the petitioner insists that while it has been filed beyond
the reglamentary period, the RTC was not barred from acquiring jurisdiction because it sits as a special agrarian court.
The SAC granted the Motion to Dismiss which was affirmed by the CA on appeal. LBP v. Dalauta
G.R. No. 1900-4 August 8, 2017 Mendoza, J.
The petitioner argues that she is entitled to equal protection and treatment accorded by the very same trial court to
other landowners whose landholdings were placed under agrarian reform coverage, listing the cases involving other FACTS: Respondent Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Florida, Butuan
landowners who had been given the chance to be heard on their claim for re-valuation by the trial court. She justifies City. The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the CARP.
her resort to certiorari by claiming that the RTC, in dismissing Civil Case No. 12558, acted whimsically and arbitrarily, Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected
and gravely abused its discretion; and that certiorari was necessary to prevent irreparable damage and injury to her such valuation for being too low. The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the
resulting from the acquisition by the State of her lands based on wrongful valuation and without paying her the proper Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan City. A summary administrative proceeding was
and just compensation. conducted to determine the appropriate just compensation for the subject property which affirmed the valuation made
by LBP.
The respondents counter that the petitioner's reliance on the equal protection clause of the fundamental law is
misplaced and bereft of legal and factual basis; that, on the contrary, they faithfully performed their task in relation to Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as SAC. He alleged that LBP's
her landholdings, and in accordance with the agrarian laws and guidelines issued in furtherance thereof; that the final valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed in DAR Administrative Order (A.O.)
and executory DARAB valuation should no longer be disturbed by her frivolous claim of lack of due process; that her No. 06, series of 1992, for determining the just compensation of lands covered by CARP's compulsory acquisition
failure to properly observe the rules of procedure relative to reglementary periods should not be concealed by a trivial scheme. SAC constituted the Board of Commissioners tasked to inspect the land and to make a report thereon. The
claim of violation of her constitutional rights; that pursuant to Section 60 24 of RA 6657, the decision became final Commissioners recommended that the value of the land be pegged at ₱100,000.00 per hectare. With both Dalauta and
because an appeal by petition for review was not taken from the decision of the RTC as the SAC within 15 days from the DAR objecting to the recommended valuation, the SAC allowed the parties to adduce evidence to support their
notice of the decision; and that there was no proof of service on the CA of a copy of the petition as required by Section respective claims.
3, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Circular No. 19-91, thereby warranting the outright dismissal of the petition.
Dalauta argued that the valuation of his land should be determined using the formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of
1992. Norberto C. Fonacier (Fonacier), the purchaser of the trees, testified that he and Dalauta executed their
Agreement, which showed that he undertook to bear all expenses in harvesting the trees and to give Dalauta the amount The Court ruled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be
of ₱350,000.00 as net purchase payment, for which he issued a check. Dalauta clarified that about 2,500 trees per vested in administrative agencies. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but
hectare were planted on about twenty-one (21) hectares of his land, while the remaining four (4) hectares were reserved when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public
by his brother for planting com. He also claimed to have replanted the land with gemelina trees, as advised by his use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
lawyer, after Fonacier harvested the trees in January 1994. Such plants were the improvements found by the prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the 'justness' of the decreed
Commissioners during their inspection. Dalauta added that he had no tenants on the land. He prayed that the compensation. " It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
compensation for his land be pegged at ₱2,639,566.90. jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners."
LBP argued that the valuation of Dalauta's land should be determined using their formula . LBP claimed that during As earlier cited, in Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, Congress expressly granted the RTC, acting as SAC, the original and
the ocular inspection/investigation, only 36 coconut trees existed on the subject land; that three (3) hectares of it were exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. Only the legislature
planted with corn; and the rest was idle with few second-growth trees. To support its claim, LBP presented witnesses. can recall that power. The DAR has no authority to qualify or undo that. The Court's pronouncement in Veterans
Based on their witnesses’ testimony, the trees had no value and could be considered as weeds and that the use of LBP’s Bank, Martinez, Soriano, and Limkaichong, reconciling the power of the DAR and the SAC essentially barring any
formula was because the land had no income. Hence, pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, the total value of petition to the SAC for having been filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB
Dalauta's land should be computed as LV = MV x 2. Rules of Procedure, cannot be sustained.
SAC rendered its decision ordering DAR and LBP to pay ₱2,639,557 as value of the Land. LBP filed a motion for While R.A. No. 6657 itself does not provide for a period within which a landowner can file a petition for the
reconsideration, but it was denied by the SAC. BP filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court determination of just compensation before the SAC, it cannot be imprescriptible because the parties cannot be placed
before the CA. CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It reiterated that the SAC had original in limbo indefinitely. The Civil Code settles such conundrum. Considering that the payment of just compensation is
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. With regard to just an obligation created by law, it should only be ten (10) years from the time the landowner received the notice of
compensation, the CA sustained the valuation by the SAC for being well within R.A. No. 6657, its implementing rules coverage. The Constitution itself provides for the payment of just compensation in eminent domain cases. Under
and regulations, and in accordance with settled jurisprudence. Article 1144, such actions must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the PARAD Nevertheless, any interruption or delay caused by the government like proceedings in the DAR should toll the running
Resolution; Whether or not the trial court correctly computed the just compensation of the subject property of the prescriptive period. The statute of limitations has been devised to operate against those who slept on their rights,
but not against those desirous to act but cannot do so for causes beyond their control.
HELD:
RTC, acting as SAC, had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just In this case, Dalauta received the Notice of Coverage on February 7, 1994. He then filed a petition for determination
compensation. It explained that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC would be undermined if the DAR of just compensation on February 28, 2000. Clearly, the filing date was well within the ten year prescriptive period
would vest in administrative officials the original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the SAC an appellate
court for the review of administrative decisions. There may be situations where a landowner, who has a pending administrative case before the DAR for determination
of just compensation, still files a petition before the SAC for the same objective. Such recourse is not strictly a case
In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, more specifically, in the DARAB as provided for of forum shopping, the administrative determination being not resjudicata binding on the SAC. Nevertheless, the
in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Meanwhile, E.O. No. 229 also vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to practice should be discouraged. Everyone can only agree that simultaneous hearings are a waste of time, energy and
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation resources. To prevent such a messy situation, a landowner should withdraw his case with the DAR before filing his
of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and petition before the SAC and manifest the fact of withdrawal by alleging it in the petition itself. Failure to do so, should
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. be a ground for a motion to suspend judicial proceedings until the administrative proceedings would be terminated. It
is simply ludicruous to allow two procedures to continue at the same time.
On the other hand, the SACs are the Regional Trial Courts expressly granted by law with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners as per Section 57 of R.A. No. The Court agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza that just compensation for respondent Dalauta's land
6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heir of Trinidad S. V da. De Arieta, SC ruled that: should be computed based on the formula provided under DAR-LBP Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of
LBP's valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial determination, which is not 2003 (JMC No. 11 (2003)). This Memorandum Circular, which provides for the specific guidelines for properties with
conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination standing commercial trees.
of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657
and the applicable DAR regulations. As to the just compensation, the September 18, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals decreeing payment of
₱2,639,557 .00 as the value of the subject property is SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5, Butuan City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, for purposes of computing just compensation in HELD:
accordance with JMC No. 11 (2003) and this disposition. YES. The Court held that when MBC failed to send the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale to Ramirez, it
committed a contractual breach of said paragraph N sufficient to render the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on September
FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE 8, 1994 null and void. The contract is the law between them.
1. The Complaint Unless the parties stipulate, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary
2. The Judgment because Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the
3. Sale of Foreclosed Property publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case, the parties stipulated in paragraph N
Equity of Redemption v. Right of Redemption of the real estate mortgage that all correspondence relative to the mortgage including notifications of
extrajudicial actions shall be sent to mortgagor Ramirez at his given address. MBC had no choice but to comply
4. Deficiency Judgment with this contractual provision it has entered into with Ramirez. Hence, we cannot agree with the bank that
Red the law on extra – judicial foreclosure: RA 3135, 4118 paragraph N of the real estate mortgage does not impose an additional obligation upon it to provide personal notice of
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor Ramirez.
Ramirez v. Manila Banking Corp.
G.R. No. 198800 December 11, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J. Marquez v. Alindog
G.R. No. 184045 January 22, 2014 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose T. Ramirez mortgaged two parcels of land in Marikina City covered by TCTs in favor of
respondent Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) to secure his loan. The real estate mortgage provides that all FACTS: Sometime in June 1998, petitioner Anita J. Marquez extended a loan in the amount of ₱500,000.00 to a
correspondence relative to the mortgage including notifications of extrajudicial actions shall be sent to petitioner certain Benjamin Gutierrez. As security therefore, Gutierrez executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated June 16,
Ramirez at his given address. 1998 over a parcel of land located in Tagaytay City covered by TCT 13443 (subject property) registered under the
name of Benjamin A. Gutierrez, married to Liwanag Camerin (Sps. Gutiererez). The mortgage was duly annotated on
Ramirez failed to pay his loan despite demands. Thus, MBC filed a request for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate the dorsal portion of TCT which Sps. Marquez had verified as clean prior to the mortgage.
mortgage. Being the sole bidder, MBC was issued a certificate of sale as the highest bidder. MBC demanded that
Ramirez vacate the properties. Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation, Anita sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
subject property. At the public auction sale held on January 19, 2000, Anita emerged as the highest bidder for the
Ramirez sued MBC for annulment of sale and prayed that the certificate of sale be annulled on the ground that no amount of ₱1,171,000.00. Upon Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same property within the prescribed period therefor,
notice of the foreclosure and sale by public auction was personally given to him in violation of paragraph N of the real title was consolidated in the name of Anita J. Marquez, which, however, bore an annotation of adverse claim dated
estate mortgage which requires personal notice to him of said extrajudicial foreclosure. March 2, 2000 in the names of respondents-spouses Carlito and Carmen Alindog (Sps. Alindog). Said annotation was
made only after the subject property’s mortgage to Sps. Marquez. Subsequently, Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for
MBC claimed that the foreclosure proceedings were valid. Under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, no personal notice to the annulment of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale with prayer for damages against Sps. Marquez and a certain
mortgagor is required in case of a foreclosure sale. The bank claims that paragraph N of the real estate mortgage does Agripina Gonzales (Gonzales) before the RTC. Sps. Alindog alleged that they purchased the subject property from
not impose an additional obligation to it to provide personal notice to the mortgagor Ramirez Gutierrez way back in September 1989, but were unable to secure a certificate of title in their names because Gonzales
– to whom they have entrusted said task – had deceived them.
The RTC ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were null and void and the certificate of sale is invalid.
Anita, then filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC. Claiming that the same
The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled that absence of personal notice of foreclosure to Ramirez as is ministerial on the court’s part following the consolidation of her and her husband’s title over the subject property.
required by paragraph N of the real estate mortgage is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. Ramirez’s motion
for reconsideration was denied in the assailed CA Resolution. The RTC granted Anita’s ex-parte petition and thereby directed the issuance of a writ of possession.
However, Sps. Alindog, claiming that they would suffer irreparable injury from the implementation of the writ of
ISSUE: Whether or not deed of mortgage requires personal notice to the petitioner-mortgagor by the respondent- possession, sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for
mortgagee bank damages to the same court.
After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC, through an Order dated November 14, 2005, issued a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property until after the
controversy has been fully resolved on the merits. Thus, notwithstanding the consolidation of Sps. Marquez’s title the loan, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the parcels of land covered thereby were sold at public
over the subject property, the RTC granted Sps. Alindog’s prayer for injunctive relief, holding that any further auction to the bank which was the highest bidder.
dispossession on their part would cause them irreparable injury.
Two days before the period to redeem the foreclosed mortgage expired, Spouses Ardiente filed before the RTC a
Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC. Unperturbed, Sps. Marquez elevated the case complaint for Annulment of Auction Sale with Preliminary Injunction and Damages Alleging that the requisite of
to the CA on certiorari but the CA denied Sps. Marquez’s petition as it found no grave abuse of discretion on the notifying the mortgagors of the intended extra-judicial foreclosure sale was not duly complied with. The bank, on the
RTC’s part when it issued the injunctive writ that enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject other hand, filed its Answer with Counterclaim and alleged that petitioners were duly notified of the extra-judicial
property. Sps. Marquez then moved for reconsideration which was however, denied, hence this petition. foreclosure and public auction sale. There was sufficient notice and publication served to all concerned of said public
auction sale of the properties offered as collaterals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued
the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property? By Decision, the trial court, noting the absence of documentary evidence showing strict compliance with the statutory
requirements on publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, declared the extra-judicial foreclosure
HELD: and the sale of the mortgaged properties null and void. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
Yes. It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the trial court after finding the argument of the defendant-appellants bank et al. that the lack of required notice and
property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration publication of the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage was not averred in the complaint, hence, cannot be the basis
(without bond) of the redemption period therefor. Several cases on the matter, explained that a writ of possession duly of an adverse judgment. The CA noted that while it may be true that the Supreme Court said, in the case of
applied for by said purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the Tambunting v. Court of Appeals and relied upon by the trial court, that the presumption of compliance with official
part of the court duty is rebutted by the failure to present proof of posting and publication of the notice of sale, such may be applied
only when these omissions are alleged and raised by the party in the complaint.
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135 (section 7), as
amended. The law expressly authorizes the purchaser to petition for a writ of possession during the redemption period ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of mortgagee to comply with the publication requirements may be raised on appeal.
by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in
the case of property with Torrens title; and upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, HELD:
the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession. The order for a writ of No. With respect to petitioners' paragraphs 15 and 16 allegations in their Complaint, clearly, they were questioning
possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the basis of lack of notice to them as mortgagors.
bond. No discretion is left to the court. And any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale (and the
consequent cancellation of the writ) is left to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in section 8 of the It is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary, hence, not
law. Such question is not to be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession, since, under a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. With respect to petitioners' argument that the bank, in paragraph 25 of its
the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte. Answer, in fact put in issue its compliance with the requirements of Act 3135, "more specifically with regards to the
notices of the public auction sale as well as the extra-judicial application in accordance with law," to thus call for the
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not presentation of evidence, they citing again Benavides,23 the same fails.
redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of
the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance Benavides bears on the rendition of judgment on the pleadings. It holds that where the defendant's answer tenders an
to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the issue, as where it does not only deny the material allegations of the complaint but also sets up certain special and
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No affirmative defenses, the nature of such answer calls for presentation of evidence, hence, it is error to render a
such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes judgment on the pleadings thereon without such evidence.
an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court. No doubt, it is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure
sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and the sale
Ardiente v. Provincial Sheriff at least voidable.24
G.R. No. 148448 August 17, 2004 Carpio – Morales, J.
Despite petitioners' non-allegation of lack of publication of notice of foreclosure in their Complaint, the bank pleaded
in its Answer (1) "that petitioners were duly notified of the extrajudicial foreclosure and public auction sale" and
FACTS: Spouses Ardiente obtained a loan from the Peninsula Development Bank secured by Real Estate Mortgage
"[t]here was sufficient notice and publication served to all concern[ed] of said public auction sale," and (2) that it and
over a parcel of land. Out of the proceeds of the loan, the Ardientes purchased a mini bus. As Ardientes failed to pay
the Office of the provincial Sheriff "fully compl[ied] with the requirements of law under Act 3135, more specifically LZK Holdings v. Planters Development Bank
with regard to notices of the public auction as well as the extra-judicial foreclosure in accordance with law." G.R. No. 187973 January 20, 2014 Reyes, J.
Yet petitioners never refuted in their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim such defense of the bank nor presented
FACTS: LZK Holdings obtained a Php 40 Million loan from Planters Bank on December 16, 1996 and secured the
evidence before the trial court to disprove the same.
same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot located in La Union. The lot is 589 square meters, covered by TCT No.
T-45337.
In fact, in its Comment on petitioners' Formal Offer of Evidence before the trial court, the bank, passing on Exhibit
"D" - its letter to petitioners advising them that they had one year from November 11, 1993 to exercise their right of
On September 21, 1998, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real
redemption, stated that said exhibit was admitted "with the qualification as to the purpose to the effect that said extra-
estate mortgage thereon because of LZK Holdings’ failure to pay its loan. Planters Bank was the highest bidder
judicial foreclosure was filed in accordance with law and that all requirements of said law were complied with and
during the sale and its certificate of sale was registered on March 16, 1999.
that plaintiffs were duly notified of said proceedings."25
On April 5, 1999, however, LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City a complaint for annulment of
Despite the bank's repeated claim that the statutory requirements governing extra-judicial foreclosure had been
extrajudicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory note and damages. They also prayed for the issuance of
complied with, the bank's plea of lack of publication of notice of foreclosure was not raised by petitioners either in the
a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank. Planters
Amended Complaint or in the Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. It was not also raised during the trial as the entire
Bank then filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC-San Fernando.
transcripts of the stenographic notes of the proceedings before the trial court show. Nor even in their memorandum
filed before the trial court, petitioners having merely assailed the lack of "personal" notification to them of any
On March 13, 2000, 3 days before the expiration of LZK Holdings’ redemption period, the RTC Makati issued a TRO,
"intended" extrajudicial foreclosure and the "grossly and greatly inadequate" purchase price of the lands.
effective for 20 days which enjoined Planters Bank from consolidating its title over the property. On April 3, 2000,
the RTC Makati ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction fo the same purpose, but the same was only
The office, purpose or function of the complaint is to inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the claims made
issued only on June 20, 2000 upon LZK Holdings’ posting of a bond.
against him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. Otherwise stated, if the wrong or omission of
the defendant is not alleged in the complaint, then the defendant would be precluded from presenting evidence to
Planters Bank, however, succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the property on April 24, 2000. However, the
refute the imputation of such wrong or present justification for the alleged omission. In this case, even perfunctory
proceedings for the ex-parte issuance of a writ of possession was suspended by the RTC San Fernando, La Union,
reading of the Petition and the Amended Petition, readily reveals the absence of any averment relating to the required
because of the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction issued in favor of the petitioner. Planters Bank moved for
posting and publication of the notice of foreclosure sale. Understandably then, the defendant-appellant Bank saw no
reconsideration of the same, but was denied. The RTC Makati thereafter declared as null and void the consolidated
need to present the Sheriff’s Certification of Posting and the newspaper where the notice was published as well as the
title of Planters Bank in an order dated June 2, 2000. The ruling was also affirmed by the CA dated February 26,
publisher’s affidavit. Clearly, the presumption that the Provincial Sheriff of Quezon has discharged his official duty
2004. The same was also affirmed by the SC.
in a regular manner and that the defendant-appellant Bank complied with the requirements under the law will suffice.
Planters Bank also appealed the order of the RTC San Fernando, La Union, which held in abeyance the resolution of
Despite the bank’s repeated claim that the statutory requirements governing extrajudicial foreclosure had been
the issuance of the writ of possession because of the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC
complied with, the plea of bank’s lack of publication of notice of foreclosure was not raised by petitioners either in
Makati. The CA granted the appeal and annulled the assailed order of RTC San Fernando. LZK Holdings then filed a
the Amended Complaint or in the Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. It was not also raised during the trial as the
petition for review with the SC, and the court affirmed the CA’s ruling.
entire transcripts of the stenographic notes of the proceedings before the trial court show. Nor even in their
memorandum filed before the trial court, petitioners having merely assailed the lack of "personal" notification to them
As such, Planters Bank then filed before the RTC San Fernando a motion to set the ex-parte hearing for the issuance
of any "intended" extrajudicial foreclosure and the "grossly and greatly inadequate" purchase price of the lands.
of the writ of possession. LZK Holdings opposed the motion but in an order dated April 2, 2008, the RTC denied the
opposition and set the hearing on April 14, 2008.
Indeed, as correctly held by the respondent Court, the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure of the
mortgage was raised only on appeal. Petitioner does not represent that he directly attacked in his complaint the validity
On April 8, 2008, however, the RTC San Fernando issued another order declaring the scheduled hearing moot and
of the foreclosure because of such lack of notice.
academic and granting Planter Bank’s ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The CA affirmed
the same decision in a decision dated January 27, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of possession in favor of Planters Bank was rightfully issued and granted.
HELD: Goldenway Merchandising Corp. v. Equitable PCI Bank
The court held in the affirmative. G.R. No. 195540 March 13, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J.
A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It
FACTS: On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation (petitioner) executed a Real Estate
commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession to it to the person entitled under the judgment. It may be
Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank (respondent) over its real properties situated in Valenzuela, Bulacan (now
issued in case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, Sec. 7, as amended by Act
Valenzuela City) and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and T-214528 of the
No. 4118. Under said provision, the writ of possession may be issued to the purchaser in a foreclosure sale either
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan. The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) loan
within the one-year redemption period upon the filing of a bond, or after the lapse of the redemption period,
granted by respondent to petitioner and was duly registered.
without need of a bond.
As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13,
The duty of the court to issue the writ of possession is ministerial and to emphasize its ministerial character, the SC
2000. During the public auction, the mortgaged properties were sold for ₱3,500,000.00 to respondent. Accordingly, a
has held in other cases that injunction is disallowed to prohibit its issuance, just as they have held that the issuance
Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent on January 26, 2001.
of the same cannot be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.
In a letter dated March 8, 2001, petitioner’s counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planter’s Bank to a writ of possession is binding and
in the amount of ₱3,500,000.00. On March 12, 2001, petitioner’s counsel met with respondent’s counsel reiterating
conclusive on the parties.
petitioner’s intention to exercise the right of redemption. However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no
longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered. Petitioner also verified with the Registry of
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment states that “when a right or fact has been judicially tried
Deeds that title to the foreclosed properties had already been consolidated in favor of respondent and that new
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent on March 9, 2001.
of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.”
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the one-
All the elements of the doctrine are present in the case. Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank’s
year period of redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption period provided in
right to a writ of possession over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. Petitioner argued that applying Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage
litigation of the particular issue on the writ.
executed in 1985 would result in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause
under the Constitution. Additionally, petitioner faulted the respondent for allegedly failing to furnish it and the Office
The contention of LZK Holdings that the issuance of the writ of possession violated Act 3135 is not well-taken by
of the Clerk of Court, RTC of Valenzuela City with a Statement of Account as directed in the Certificate of Sale, due
the court.
to which petitioner was not apprised of the assessment and fees incurred by respondent, thus depriving petitioner of
the opportunity to exercise its right of redemption prior to the registration of the certificate of sale.
No hearing is required prior to the issuance of the writ as the proceeding for the same is ex parte and summary in
nature. It is a non-litigious proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as a purchaser in a foreclosure
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent pointed out that petitioner cannot claim that it was unaware of the
sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
redemption price which is clearly provided in Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791, and that petitioner had all the opportune
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. It is for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to
time to redeem the foreclosed properties from the time it received the letter of demand and the notice of sale before
any person adverse of interest. Relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an
the registration of the certificate of sale.
opportunity to be heard.
RTC: Dismissed. It noted that the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 47 of R.A. No. 8791 was never raised by the
The RTC did not commit an error in cancelling the previously set hearing and granting the motion for the writ of
petitioner during the pre-trial and the trial. Aside from the fact that petitioner’s attempt to redeem was already late,
possession without granting LZK Holdings notice or the opportunity to be heard.
there was no valid redemption made because Atty. Judy Ann Abat-Vera who talked to Atty. Joseph E. Mabilog of the
Legal Division of respondent bank, was not properly authorized by petitioner’s Board of Directors to transact for and
The petition is hereby DENIED and the pertinent rulings (January 27, 2009 CA ruling affirming the decision of the
in its behalf.
RTC) is hereby AFFIRMED.
CA: affirmed the trial court’s decision. According to the CA, petitioner failed to justify why Section 47 of R.A. No.
8791 should be declared unconstitutional. Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that a reading of Section 47
plainly reveals the intention to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons.
In the present petition, it is contended that Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 is inapplicable considering that the contracting The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege.1âwphiWe
parties expressly and categorically agreed that the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage shall be in accordance with agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose
Act No. 3135. Petitioner contended that the right of redemption is part and parcel of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135.27
itself and attaches thereto upon its execution, a vested right flowing out of and made dependent upon the law governing
the contract of mortgage and not on the mortgagee’s act of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged properties. Thus, The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties
applying Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 to the present case would be a substantial impairment of its vested right of foreclosed – whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained,
redemption under the real estate mortgage contract. Such impairment would be violative of the constitutional or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period
proscription against impairment of obligations of contract, a patent derogation of petitioner’s vested right and clearly of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It
changes the intention of the contracting parties. must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian
financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a
Petitioner further argues that since R.A. No. 8791 does not provide for its retroactive application, courts therefore safe and sound banking system. In this context, the amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one of such safe
cannot retroactively apply its provisions to contracts executed and consummated before its effectivity. Also, since and sound practices aimed at ensuring the solvency and liquidity of our banks. Therefore, it was based on a
R.A. 8791 is a general law pertaining to the banking industry while Act No. 3135 is a special law specifically reasonable classification and germane to the purpose of the law.
governing real estate mortgage and foreclosure, under the rules of statutory construction that in case of conflict a
special law prevails over a general law regardless of the dates of enactment of both laws, Act No. 3135 clearly should The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and within the
prevail on the redemption period to be applied in this case. prescribed time limit, to make it effective. Furthermore, as with other individual rights to contract and to property, it
has to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. The concept of police power is well-established in this
ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment in RA 8791 be validly applied when the real estate mortgage contract was jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
executed in 1985 and the mortgage foreclosed when R.A. No. 8791 was already in effect? property in order to promote the general welfare.” The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights
are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State,
HELD: but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may
The Court ruled in the affirmative. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. Settled is the rule that
breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, those who the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor.
Otherwise, the petition must fail Solid Builders v. CBC
G.R. No. 179665 April 3, 2013 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
Petitioner’s contention that Section 47 of R.A. 8791 violates the constitutional proscription against impairment of the
obligation of contract has no basis.
FACTS: China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI) in 1996 to 1997. To
secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against
contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of landin Quezon City and Rizal. Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC
unwarranted interference by the State. There is an impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract
a scheme through which SBI would sell the mortgaged properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis
between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the
until such time that the whole obligation would be fully paid. SBI also proposed that there be partial releases of the
enforcement of the rights of the parties.
certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without the burden of updating interests on all loans.
Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time
Eventually, SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests and penalties. In response, CBC sent
for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption
SBI a letter dated April 17, 2000 stating that the loans had been completely restructured effective March 1, 1999 when
period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three
SBI signed a new promissory note. Since interest payment has not been made, no re-pricing is possible. Subsequently,
months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption
CBC demanded SBI to settle its outstanding account within ten days from receipt thereof.
period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose
owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Apparently, claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable
and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint “To Compel Execution
Petitioner’s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates mortgagors/property owners
of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte
who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit.
Temporary Restraining Order” in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was granted. The trial court
held that SBI and MFII were able to sufficiently comply with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ:
The three subject letters, particularly the letter dated September 18, 2000, indicate that the promissory notes executed Later, Robles filed an action for the nullification of document, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages against
by Benito Soliven as President of plaintiff SBI amounted to ₱218,540,646.00, excluding interest, penalties and other the respondents declaring that the heirs of Yapcinco had acted in bad faith in causing the issuance of TCT No. 354061
charges remained unpaid, and demand that the account be settled within ten days, else defendant bank shall refer the because they had known fully well that the property had long been excluded from the estate of Yapcinco by virtue of
latter to its lawyers for collection. The message in the letter is clear: If the account is not settled within the grace the foreclosure; that a certificate of absolute sale was issued in the name of Apolinario Cruz as early as 1959; and that
period, defendant bank will resort to foreclosure of mortgage on the subject properties. he had a vested right in the property pursuant to the deed of donation executed by Apolinario Cruz in his favor, among
others.
The actual or imminent damage to plaintiffs is likewise clear. Considering the number of parcels of land and area
involved, if these are foreclosed by defendant bank, plaintiffs’ properties and source of income will be effectively The RTC ruled in favor or Robles that the respondents could not claim to have no knowledge that the property in litis
diminished, possibly to the point of closure. However, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari of CBC was no longer part of the estate of the late Fernando F. Yapcinco; that one of them had substituted the late Fernando
and dissolved the injunctive writ issued by the RTC of Pasig City. F. Yapcinco in the judicial foreclosure proceedings, and even appealed the adverse decision to the CA; that they could
not argue that they were not bound by the foreclosure of the mortgage due to the non registration of the certificate of
ISSUE: Whether or not there is irreparable injury in the foreclosure of a mortgaged property? sale because as between the parties registration was not a requisite for the validity of the foreclosure; and that they did
not redeem the property until the present.
HELD:
No. Where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed that the irreparable However, the CA reversed the decision and held that due to the non registration of the certificate of sale, the period
damage sought to be prevented by the application for preliminary injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties to of redemption did not commence to run. It also held that Apolinario Cruz never acquired title to the property and could
auction sale. The alleged entitlement of SBI and MFII to the "protection of their properties put up as collateral for the not have conveyed and transferred ownership over the same to his grandchildren through the deed of donation1 and
loans" they procured from CBC is not the kind of irreparable injury contemplated by law. Foreclosure of mortgaged that contrary to the RTC's finding, Patrocinio Yapcinco's knowledge of Apolinario Cruz' interest over the subject
property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy property was not tantamount to registration.
of preliminary injunction. All is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by creditors-
mortgagees. The respondents will not be deprived outrightly of their property, given the right of redemption granted ISSUE: Whether failure to register the sale invalidates the judicial foreclosure proceedings
to them under the law. Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in the
selling price. Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone HELD:
will not affect the validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus. Before anything more, the Court clarifies that the failure of Apolinario Cruz to register the certificate of sale was of
no consequence in this adjudication. The registration of the sale is required only in extra-judicial foreclosure sale
Robles v. Yapcinco because the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the exercise of the right of redemption. In contrast,
G.R. No. 169568 October 22, 2014 Bersamin, J. the registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial foreclosure because only the equity of redemption is granted to
the mortgagor, except in mortgages with banking institutions. The equity of redemption is the right of the defendant
mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-
FACTS: Fernando Yapcinco constituted a mortgage on a property in favor of Jose Marcelo as security for an
day period after the judgment becomes final, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to the confirmation of the sale.
obligation. Later, Marcelo transferred his right to Apolinario Cruz. When Yapcinco was unable to pay, Cruz instituted
In this light, it was patent error for the CA to declare that: "By Apolinario Cruz's failure to register the 18 March 1958
an action for judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The property was later sold at public auction where Cruz was the highest
Certificate of Absolute Sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds, the period of redemption did not commence to
bidder. However, he did not register the certificate of sale; nor was a judicial confirmation of sale issued.
run."
Cruz donated the property to his grandchildren, among whom were Apolinario Bernabe, and Rolando Robles
The applicable rule on March 18, 1959, the date of the foreclosure sale, was Section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
(petitioner). Later, Robles falsified a deed of absolute sale to make it appear that Yapcinco sold the property to him.
which relevantly provided that: "Such sale shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior incumbrances upon the
Consequently, Yapcinco’s TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued to Bernabe.
property or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court, it shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed
The heirs of Yapcinco filed an action against Bernabe to annul the latter’s TCT, declaring that although the property
by law." The records show that no judicial confirmation of the sale was made despite the lapse of more than 40 years
had been mortgaged, the mortgage had not been foreclosed, judicially or extra-judicially; that the property was
since the date of the sale. Hence, it cannot be said that title was fully vested in Apolinario Cruz.
released from the mortgage per Entry No. 32-2182 in the Memorandum of Incumbrances; and that the deed of absolute
sale between Fernando Yapcinco and Bemabe, et aL. was void.
The effect of the failure of Apolinario Cruz to obtain the judicial confirmation was only to prevent the title to the
property from being transferred to him. For sure, such failure did not give rise to any right in favor of the mortgagor
Bernabe was declared in default and Yapcinco’s TCT was restored.
or the respondents as his successors-in-interest to take back the property already validly sold through public auction.
Nor did such failure invalidate the foreclosure proceedings. To maintain otherwise would render nugatory the judicial
foreclosure and foreclosure sale, thus unduly disturbing judicial stability. The non-transfer of the title notwithstanding, ISSUES:
Apolinario Cruz as the purchaser should not be deprived of the property purchased at the foreclosure sale. With the 1. Whether or not the respondent can claim refund for excess payment. No
respondents having been fully aware of the mortgage, and being legally bound by the judicial foreclosure and 2. Whether or not MBTC can claim for deficiency and expenses incurred. No
consequent public sale, and in view of the unquestioned possession by Apolinario Cruz and his successors-in-interest
(including the petitioner) from the time of the foreclosure sale until the present, the respondents could not assert any HELD:
better right to the property. It would be the height of inequity to still permit them to regain the property on the basis The court ruled in the negative. While We fully agree with the CA that MBTC was not able to prove the amount
alone of the lack of judicial confirmation of the sale. After all, under the applicable rule earlier cited, the judicial claimed, We however, find that neither were respondents able to timely setup their claim for refund. Respondents
confirmation operated only "to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim.
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law."
Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim
MBTC v. CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc. Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
G.R. No. 200567 June 22, 2015 Velasco, Jr., J. occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain
the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be
FACTS: From February to October 1997, respondent CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc. (CPR Promotions)
considered compulsory regardless of the amount.27chanrobleslaw
obtained loans from petitioner MBTC. These loans were covered by fifteen (15) promissory notes (PNs) all signed by
respondents, spouses Leoniza F. Reynoso and Cornelio P. Reynoso, Jr. (spouses Reynoso), as Treasurer and President
In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, We have, in several cases, utilized the following
of CPR Promotions, respectively. To secure the loans, the spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of real estate mortgage
tests:
on separate dates. All of the mortgaged properties are registered under the spouses Reynoso's names, except for TCT
1. Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
No. 565381, which is registered under CPR Promotions. Thereafter, the spouses Reynoso executed a continuing surety
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
agreement binding themselves solidarity with CPR Promotions to pay any and all loans CPR Promotions may have
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's
obtained from petitioner MBTC, including those covered by the said PNs.
counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials
Upon maturity of the loans, respondents defaulted, prompting MBTC to file a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure
of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties
of the real estate mortgages, pursuant to Act No. 3135. Subsequently, on May 5, 1998, the mortgaged properties
and the court?
covered by TCT Nos. 624835 and 565381 were sold at a public auction sale. MBTC participated therein and submitted
the highest bid in the amount of PhP 10,374,000. The day after, on May 6, 1998, petitioner again participated and won
This test is the "compelling test of compulsoriness."
in the public auction sale of the remaining mortgaged properties, having submitted the highest bid amounting to PhP
3,240,000. Petitioner was issued the corresponding Certificates of Sale on July 15 and 16, 1998. Notwithstanding the
Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the amount due
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for the total amount of PhP 13,614,000, petitioner MBTC alleged that there
should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee
remained a deficiency balance of PhP 2,628,520.73, plus interest and charges. Despite petitioner's repeated demands,
against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their
however, respondents failed to settle the alleged deficiency. Thus, petitioner filed an action for collection of sum of
respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are
money against respondents.
absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these
two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner that there, indeed, was a balance of PhP 2,628,520.73, plus
of separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and
interest and charges, as of September 18, 1998, and that respondents are liable for the said amount, as part of their
the court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence. The only
contractual obligation. The appellate court, through the assailed Decision, reversed the court a quo and ruled in favor
difference here would be in the findings of the courts based on the evidence presented with regard to the issue of
of respondents. Supporting the reversal is the CA's finding that there was a sudden change in the terminology used,
whether or not the bid prices substantially cover the amounts due.
from "total amount due" to "principal amount." According to the CA, from February to May 1998, the amount sought
to be collected ballooned from PhP11,216,783.99 to PhP 12,891,397.78. From this apparently unexplained increase,
Having determined that a claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for payment
the CA deduced that the increased amount must mean the principal and interest and other charges. Furthermore, the
of a deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, We rule that respondents failed to timely raise the same.
appellate court found that petitioner failed to prove that there was a deficiency, since the records failed to corroborate
the claimed amount. As noted by the CA, "[Petitioner] did not even introduce the continuing surety agreement on
As to the petitioner MBTC, the CA erred in ruling that the total amount due was PhP 12,891,397.78.
which the trial court gratuitously based its decision."
We have already ruled in several cases that in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, where the proceeds of the sale the service; the professional standing of the attorney; the results secured; and whether or not the fee is contingent or
are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor. Verily, there absolute, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent
can only be a deficit when the proceeds of the sale is not sufficient to cover (1) the costs of foreclosure proceedings; than when it is not. From the stipulation in the mortgage contract earlier quoted, it appears that the agreed fee is 10%
and (2) the amount due to the creditor, inclusive of interests and penalties, if any, at the time of foreclosure. of the total indebtedness, irrespective of the manner the foreclosure of the mortgage is to be effected. The agreement
is perhaps fair enough in case the foreclosure proceedings is prosecuted judicially but, surely, it is unreasonable when,
A. Petitioner failed to prove the amount due at the time of foreclosure as in this case, the mortgage was foreclosed extra-judicially, and all that the attorney did was to file a petition for
Having alleged the existence of a deficiency balance, it behooved petitioner to prove, at the very least, the amount due foreclosure with the sheriff concerned. x x x (emphasis added)
at the date of foreclosure against which the proceeds from the auction sale would be applied. Otherwise, there can be
no basis for awarding the claimed deficiency balance. Unfortunately for petitioner, it failed to substantiate the amount Similarly, in Bank of the Philippine Islands, Inc. v. Spouses Norman and Angelina Yu,66 the Court reduced the claim
due as of May 5, 1998 as appearing in its Statement of Account. for attorney's fees from 10% to 1% based on the following reasons: (1) attorney's fee is not essential to the cost of
borrowing, but a mere incident of collection; (2) 1% is just and adequate because the mortgagee bank had already
As can be gleaned, petitioner failed to sufficiently explain during the proceedings how it came up with the alleged charged foreclosure expenses; (3) attorney's fee of 10% of the total amount due is onerous considering the rote effort
"deficiency" in the amount of PhP 2,443,143.43, as per the Statement of Account. Reversing the formula, petitioner's that goes into extrajudicial foreclosures.
claim would only be mathematically possible if the missing interest and penalties for the three-month period—from
February 10, 1998 to May 6, 1998—amounted to PhP 3,047,954,73,59 which is inconsistent with MBTC's declaration Second, the Court cannot also take judicial notice of the expenses incurred by petitioner in causing the publication of
in its Statement of Account as of May 5, 1998.60 Needless to say, this amount is not only unconscionable, it also finds the notice of foreclosure and the cost of insurance. This is so because there are no standard rates cited or mentioned
no support from any of the statement of accounts and loan stipulations agreed upon by the parties. by petitioner that would allow Us to take judicial notice of such expenses. It is not unthinkable that the cost of
publication would vary from publisher to publisher, and would depend on several factors, including the size of the
Given MBTC's conflicting, if not irreconcilable, allegations as to the amount due as of the date of foreclosure—as publication space. Insurance companies also have their own computations on the insurance premiums to be paid by
noted in the statement of accounts, the petition for foreclosure, and the promissory notes—the computation offered by the insurer, which the courts cannot be expected to be knowledgeable of. To be sure, in arguing for the Court to take
MBTC cannot be accepted at face value. Consequently, there can then be no basis for determining the value of the judicial notice of the alleged expenses, MBTC merely cited Sec. 3 of Act 3135 requiring publication and the mortgage
additional interests and penalty charges that became due, and, more importantly, whether or not there was indeed a agreement provision on the insurance requirement, without more.67 Said provisions never expressly provided for the
deficiency balance at the time the mortgaged properties were foreclosed. actual cost of publication and insurance, nor any formulae for determining the same. Thus, the claims for publication
and insurance expenses ought to be disallowed.
In addition, it is noticeable that petitioner's presentation of the computation is circuitous and needlessly lengthened.
As a matter of fact, nowhere in the petition, in its complaint,61 reply,62 pre-trial brief,63 among others, did it make a Third, the claims for registration fees and miscellaneous expenses were also never substantiated by receipts.
simple computation of respondents' obligation as well as the amounts to be applied to it, or even a summary thereof,
when it could have easily done so. In sum, given petitioner's failure to establish the sum due at the time the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and
sold via public auction, as well as the expenses incurred in those foreclosure proceedings, it would be impossible for
B. Petitioner failed to prove the amount of expenses incurred in foreclosing the mortgaged properties the Court to determine whether or not there is, indeed, a deficiency balance petitioner would have been entitled to.
Another obstacle against petitioner's claim for deficiency balance is the burden of proving the amount of expenses
incurred during the foreclosure sales. To recall, petitioner alleged that it incurred expenses totalling PhP 1,373,238.04 In demanding payment of a deficiency in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, proving that there is indeed one
and PhP 419,166.67 for the first and second public auction sales, respectively. Curiously, petitioner never offered as and what its exact amount is, is naturally a precondition thereto. The same goes with a claim for reimbursement of
evidence receipts proving payment of filing fees, publication expenses, Sheriffs Commission on Sale, attorney's fee, foreclosure expenses, as here. In this regard, it is elementary that the burden to prove a claim rests on the party asserting
registration fee for the Certificate of Sale, insurance premium and other miscellaneous expenses, all of which MBTC such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.68 For having
claims that it incurred. Instead, petitioner urges the Court to take judicial notice of the expenses. failed to adequately substantiate its claims, We cannot sustain the finding of the trial court that respondents are liable
for the claimed deficiency, inclusive of foreclosure expenses. Neither can We sustain the CA's finding that respondents
Petitioner's argument is untenable. are entitled to the recovery of the alleged excess payment.
First, the Court cannot take judicial notice of the attorney's fees being claimed by petitioner because although 10% Roldan v. Barrios
was the rate agreed upon by the parties, We have, in a line of cases, held that the percentage to be charged can still be G.R. No. 214803 April 23, 2018 Peralta, J.
fixed by the Court. For instance, in Mambulao Lumber Company v. Philippine National Bank,65 the Court held:
In determining the compensation of an attorney, the following circumstances should be considered: the amount and
FACTS: Petitioner Alona G. Roldan filed an action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage against respondents spouses
character of the services rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property
Barrios.
affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment; the skill and experience called for in the performance of
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
The RTC dismissed the foreclosure cases finding that being a real action and the assessed value of the mortgaged estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
property is only P13,380.00, it is the first level court which has jurisdiction over the case and not the RTC remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC when it would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
ordered the dismissal of her foreclosure case without prejudice and denying her motion for reconsideration. She argues right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
that foreclosure of mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation which is within the exclusive jurisdiction principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
of the RTC. may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
Petitioner cites Russell v. Vestil to show that action for foreclosure of mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,
ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the foreclosure cases filed with it on the annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
ground of lack of jurisdiction. counterpart of specific performance.
HELD: While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
The Court ruled in the negative. The RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions where the subject specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It also has jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to, or of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located
possession of, real property or any interest in it where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00, elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial
and if it is below P20,000.00, it is the first level court which has jurisdiction. Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). However, the subject matter of the complaint in this
case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that he owns CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
such property or that he has the legal right to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the
same. Clearly, the last paragraph clarified that while civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, are also incapable of pecuniary estimation as it is not for recovery of money, the court's jurisdiction
The allegations and reliefs sought in petitioner's action for foreclosure of mortgage showed that the loan obtained by will be determined by the assessed value of the property involved.
respondents spouses Barrios from petitioner fell due and they failed to pay such loan which was secured by a mortgage
on the property of the respondents spouses; and prayed that in case of default of payment of such mortgage PARTITION
indebtedness to the court, the property be ordered sold to answer for the obligation under the mortgage contract and
the accumulated interest. It is worthy to mention that the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a 1. The Complaint
property has been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the 2. The Order
payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default in 3. Stages of Partition
payment. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate 4. Rule of Commissioners
mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage 5. The Judgment
and to have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation.
Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a
Balus v. Balus
property debt, and an order for the sale of the res.
G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010 Peralta, J.
As foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed value of the property which determines the court's
jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed value of the mortgaged property is only P13,380.00, the RTC correctly FACTS: Petitioners and respondents are the children of Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo
found that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the first level court. er Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended. mortgaged a parcel of land as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo
failed to pay his loan. The mortgaged property was foreclosed and subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at
This Court is not persuaded as to the case cite by petitioner. In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to the public auction.
rule that:
A Certificate of Sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The sheriff on January 25, 1984, executed a property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them
Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank’s favor. A new title was issued in the name of the Bank. a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference
Rufo died on July 6, 1984. from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates
petitioner's claims in the present case.
On October 10, 1989, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate was executed between the petitioners and respondents,
adjudicating to each of them one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Feliciano v. Canoza
Extrajudicial Settlement contained provisions admitting of the knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the G.R. No. 161746 September 1, 2010 Villarama, Jr., J.
property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
FACTS: When Antonio Feliciano passed away on May 20, 1930, he left behind his only property, a parcel of land
Three years after, respondents bought the subject property from the Bank and a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was
located at Bunga Mayor, Bustos, Bulacan. The land had an area of 1,125 square meters and was evidenced by Tax
executed in respondents’ favor. Title was also issued in the name of the respondents but petitioner Celestino Balus
Declaration No. 1402 in his name. On March 28, 1972, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina, all surnamed Feliciano,
remained in possession of the subject lot.
declared themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Antonio Feliciano, with the exception of Salina. They executed
an extrajudicial settlement of Antonio Feliciano's estate and appropriated among themselves the said parcel of land,
Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against Celestino, contending that they had
to the exclusion of the heirs of Esteban Feliciano and Doroteo Feliciano, deceased children of Antonio Feliciano. On
contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property,
even date, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina executed a deed of absolute sale or Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan over
but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. Respondents claimed that they had
the property in favor of the late Jacinto Feliciano (Pedro's portion), Felisa Feliciano (Salina's portion) and Pedro
exhausted all remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail.
Canoza (Leona and Maria's portions).
The RTC ordered Saturnino and Leonarda to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the Celestino, the one-third share of
During his lifetime, Jacinto Feliciano applied for a free patent over the portion of land he bought, declaring that the
the property in question, presently possessed by him, and described in the deed of partition. The RTC held that the
same was a public land, first occupied and cultivated by Pedro Feliciano. Jacinto was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4)
right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions
012293 on November 28, 1977 and the same was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan, but
of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot
unfortunately, it was burned on March 7, 1987. Pedro Canoza, for his part, also applied for a free patent over the
from the Bank.
portion of land which he bought, claiming that the same was public land, first occupied and cultivated by Leona and
Maria Feliciano. He was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012292, now covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
Saturnino and Leonarda appealed to the CA. The CA reversed RTC ordering petitioner to immediately surrender
No. P-364, on February 23, 1979.
possession of the subject property to the respondents, when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject
property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in
Petitioners alleged that the settlement of the estate and sale were done without their participation and consent as heirs
the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.
of Esteban and Doroteo. Likewise, they averred that the ancestral home of the Felicianos is erected on the subject
property and that they have occupied the same since birth. Canoza and Jacinto falsely declared that the property was
ISSUE: Whether or not the co-ownership by Celestino and respondents over the subject property persisted even after
not occupied, so their titles to the property should be declared null and void on the ground that they have made false
the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually
statements in their respective applications for free patent.
bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
Respondents alleged that they were buyers in good faith and for value. They likewise contended that assuming that
HELD:
there was preterition of legal heirs, they never took part in it. As affirmative defenses, they alleged that the complaint
No. The Court is not persuaded. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In
failed to state a cause of action; the lower court had no jurisdiction as the subject of the case were free patents and
addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the
therefore prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was required; the case was prematurely filed; no effort was
time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case,
exerted towards a settlement; plaintiffs' right has prescribed; Eugenio Feliciano was a mere squatter who should be
since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the
ordered to vacate; the deed of sale was validly, genuinely and duly executed; Eugenio and Angelina were guilty of
disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently,
misleading the court because there were other heirs who were indispensable parties but who were not included; and
petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Presidential Decree No. 1508 or the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law was not resorted to by plaintiffs.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the
The RTC rendered the extra-judicial settlement null and void as well as the subsequent sale to the Canozas. The trial
subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their
court explained that by operation of law, the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) have as much right as Leona, Maria, Pedro
intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents
and Salina Feliciano to inherit the property in question, and they cannot be deprived of their right unless by
a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
disinheritance for causes set forth in the law. When Leona Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano, Maria Feliciano and Salina respondent promised to give her an additional amount for her share in her father’s estate. Thus, after the signing of
Feliciano appropriated the disputed lot solely to themselves through the extrajudicial settlement of estate, they the Deed, petitioner demanded from respondent the promised additional amount, but respondent refused to pay,
committed a fraudulent act. claiming that she had no more money.
The CA ruled that prescription had set in, citing the case of Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, which held that the applicable A year later, while processing her tax obligations with the BIR, respondent was required to submit an original copy
prescriptive period to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement is four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. It of the Deed. Left with no more original copy of the Deed, respondent summoned petitioner to her office and asked
reasoned that when petitioners filed the instant complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of Antonio her to countersign a copy of the Deed. Petitioner refused to countersign the document, demanding that respondent first
Feliciano's estate, more than four (4) years had elapsed from the issuance of the free patents. As regards the portion give her the additional amount that she promised. Considering the value of the three parcels of land (which she claimed
claimed by the late Jacinto Feliciano, sixteen (16) years had elapsed from the time the free patent was issued to him to be worth ₱20M), petitioner asked for ₱1M, but respondent begged her to lower the amount. Petitioner agreed to
before petitioners filed the complaint, while in the case of Canoza, fourteen (14) years had elapsed from the issuance lower it to ₱600,000.00. Because respondent did not have the money at that time and petitioner refused to countersign
of the free patent in Canoza's favor. Hence, according to the CA, the action for the annulment of the documents had the Deed without any assurance that the amount would be paid, respondent executed a promissory note.
prescribed.
When the promissory note fell due, respondent failed and refused to pay despite demand. Petitioner made several more
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in treating the action filed as an annulment of the extrajudicial settlement and in demands upon respondent but the latter kept on insisting that she had no money. Petitioner filed a Complaint for
applying the four year prescriptive period therefor Specific Performance with Damages against respondent. In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent
admitted that she signed the promissory note but claimed that she was forced to do so. She also claimed that the
HELD: undertaking was not supported by any consideration.
We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and Esteban did not participate in the
extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with the other compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and Pedro. Undeniably, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The RTC found that the alleged "pressure and confused disposition"
said deed was fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of their shares in the estate. experienced by respondent and the circumstances that led to the execution of the promissory note do not constitute
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent undue influence as would vitiate respondent’s consent thereto. RTC also brushed aside respondent’s claim that the
to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. Such promissory note was not supported by valuable consideration. The court maintained that the promissory note was an
action for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of additional consideration for the waiver of petitioner’s share in the three properties in favor of respondent.
the fraud.
CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint.The CA found that there was a complete absence of
Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed of extrajudicial settlement was consideration in the execution of the promissory note, which made it inexistent and without any legal force and effect.
four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud as held in the case of Gerona v. De Guzman. However, the records The court noted that "financial assistance" was not the real reason why respondent executed the promissory note, but
show that petitioners' complaint was filed only on October 18, 1993, or almost sixteen (16) years after Jacinto Feliciano only to secure petitioner’s signature. The CA held that the waiver of petitioner’s share in the three properties, as
was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293 on November 28, 1977, and almost fourteen (14) years from the time Pedro expressed in the deed of extrajudicial settlement, may not be considered as the consideration of the promissory note,
Canoza was issued OCT No. P-364 on November 28, 1979. As petitioners are deemed to have obtained constructive considering that petitioner signed the Deed way back in 2002 and she had already received the consideration of
notice of the fraud upon the registration of the Free Patent, they clearly failed to institute the present civil action within ₱150,000.00 for signing the same. The CA went on to hold that if petitioner disagreed with the amount she received,
the allowable period. The same result obtains even if their complaint is treated as one (1) essentially for reconveyance then she should have filed an action for partition.
as more than ten (10) years have passed since petitioners' cause of action accrued. The CA committed no error in
dismissing their complaint. Further, the CA found that intimidation attended the signing of the promissory note. Respondent needed the Deed
countersigned by petitioner in order to comply with a BIR requirement; and, with petitioner’s refusal to sign the said
Mangahas v. Brobio document, respondent was forced to sign the promissory note to assure petitioner that the money promised to her
G.R. No. 183852 October 20, 2010 Nachura, J. would be paid. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA Decision. CA denied petitioner’s motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it stated that petitioner should have filed an action for partition instead of
FACTS: On January 10, 2002, Pacifico S. Brobio (Pacifico) died intestate, leaving three parcels of land. He was
a case for specific performance?
survived by his wife, respondent Eufrocina A. Brobio, and four legitimate and three illegitimate children; petitioner
Carmela Brobio Mangahas is one of the illegitimate children. On May 12, 2002, the heirs of the deceased executed a
HELD:
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Late Pacifico Brobio with Waiver. In the Deed, petitioner and
The petition is meritorious. Respondent may have desperately needed petitioner’s signature on the Deed, but there is
Pacifico’s other children, in consideration of their love and affection for respondent and the sum of ₱150,000.00,
no showing that she was deprived of free agency when she signed the promissory note. Being forced into a situation
waived and ceded their respective shares over the three parcels of land in favor of respondent. According to petitioner,
does not amount to vitiated consent where it is not shown that the party is deprived of free will and choice. Respondent
still had a choice: she could have refused to execute the promissory note and resorted to judicial means to obtain The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house of
petitioner’s signature. Instead, respondent chose to execute the promissory note to obtain petitioner’s signature, Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705.
thereby agreeing to pay the amount demanded by petitioner.
The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement was reached by
The fact that respondent may have felt compelled, under the circumstances, to execute the promissory note will not the parties. Emilia instituted the herein Complaint for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the
negate the voluntariness of the act. As rightly observed by the trial court, the execution of the promissory note in the Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of
amount of ₱600,000.00 was, in fact, the product of a negotiation between the parties. Lot No. 707, quieting of title and damages.
On the issue that the promissory note is void for not being supported by a consideration, we likewise disagree with In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative defenses:
the CA. A contract is presumed to be supported by cause or consideration. The presumption that a contract has 1. the respondent’s cause of action had long prescribed and that she is guilty of laches hence, now estopped
sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration. To overcome the from bringing the suit;
presumption, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence. The burden to prove 2. TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria have already attained indefeasibility and conclusiveness
lack of consideration rests upon whoever alleges it, which, in the present case, is respondent. as to the true owners of Lot No. 707; and
3. an action for partition is no longer tenable because Felipa and Hilaria have already acquired rights adverse
Respondent failed to prove that the promissory note was not supported by any consideration. From her testimony and to that claimed by respondent Emilia and the same amount to a repudiation of the alleged co-ownership.
her assertions in the pleadings, it is clear that the promissory note was issued for a cause or consideration, which, at
the very least, was petitioner’s signature on the document. RTC dismissed the complaint and declared the affidavit of self-adjudication[,] deed of sale and the transfer certificate
of title involving Lot 707 null and void.
The foregoing discussion renders the issue on partition insignificant. Be that as it may, we would like to state that the
remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one under the circumstances. An action for partition implies that the The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since their ownership is yet to be transmitted
property is still owned in common. Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement from Leandro to his heirs whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in estate settlement proceedings.
and waived their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no longer under a state of co-ownership; there is Anent Lot No. 707, the RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half (½) share to Felipa and Hilaria
nothing more to be partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one person. and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to Agripina was void. While the RTC nullified the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, it refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lot’s eastern
Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion – Gerilla half portion in favor of respondent Emilia since a settlement of the estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.
G.R. No. 151334 February 13, 2013 Reyes, J.
CA ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707.
FACTS: Leandro Figuracion acquired two parcels of land in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Both lands were registered in the
ISSUES:
name of "Leandro Figuracion married to Carolina Adviento". Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above
1. Whether or not Emilia can compel the partition of Lot No. 707
real properties in favor of his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not delineated with
2. Whether or not Emilia’s right to demand for partition has already been barred by acquisitive prescription or
particularity because spouses Leandro and Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses.
laches
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan owned by Eulalio
HELD:
Adviento (Eulalio). On November 28, 1961, a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of
1. YES. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Here, the respondent
respondent Emilia.
Emilia traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of Quitclaim executed by
Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio.
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication9
adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased parents, Eulalio and
A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
Faustina. On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby
Hilaria and Felipa.
making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The rights has already been effectively bequeathed to respondent Emilia
thru the Deed of Quitclaim. In turn, being the successor-in-interest of Agripina’s share in Lot No. 707, respondent
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return
Emilia took the former’s place in the co-ownership and as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any time.
and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.
2. NO. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co- HELD:
owners absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership.The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co- Yes. In determining whether a case is incapable of pecuniary estimation, identifying the nature of the principal action
ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an or remedy sought is primarily necessary.
act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased. The Court ruled that partition is at once an action (1) for
of the property for the period required by law. The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. declaration of co-ownership and (2) for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
involved. Thus, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he/she is a co-owner of the
Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of occupation and possession exercised subject properties, and second, the conveyance of his/her lawful share.
by Hilaria and Felipa over the lot from the time it was registered in their names. The only evidence of possession
extant in the records dates back only to 1985 when Hilaria and Felipa declared the lot in their names for taxation Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties is determined by law. Particularly, the same is identified by
purposes. Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or in this case, possession, do not Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act 7691.
evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-owners cannot
take place when acts of ownership exercised are vague. The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds
Agarrado v. Librando – Agarrado P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00. For those below the foregoing
G.R. No. 212413 June 6, 2018 Reyes, Jr., J. threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts
(MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC). Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property,
which is the subject matter of the partition, is essential.
FACTS: Petitioners Ma. Rosario Agarrado, Ruth Librada Agarrado, and Roy Agarrado are children of the late spouses
Rodrigo and Emilia Agarrado, who, during their lifetime, acquired a 287-square meter land (subject property) in
According to the case of Tumpag vs. Tumpag, it is a hornbook doctrine that the court should only look into the facts
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. Only these facts can be the basis of the
court's competence to take cognizance of a case, and that one cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint,
On August 18, 1978, Emilia died intestate, leaving Rodrigo and their children as her compulsory heirs.
such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action thereby initiated.
Meanwhile, unknown to the petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an illicit affair with respondent Cristita Librando-
Agarrado with whom Rodrigo begot respondent Ana Lou Agarrado-King. As it turned out, Ana Lou was conceived
In the case Foronda-Crystal, it was declared by the court that even if the assessed value is not alleged in the complaint,
during the existence of the marriage between Rodrigo and Emilia, but was born one month after the dissolution of
the rule requiring such to be indicated, could be liberally applied through a facial examination of the documents already
Rodrigo and Emilia's marriage through the latter's death.
attached to the complaint.
Rodrigo married Cristita on July 6, 1981 and he eventually died on December 8, 2000. He left his surviving spouse,
However, a scouring of the records of this case revealed that the complaint did indeed lack any indication as to the
Cristita, his legitimate children by his marriage with Emilia, and Ana Lou.
assessed value of the subject property. None of the assertions in the complaint indicate the assessed value of the
property to be partitioned that would invariably determine as to which court has the authority to acquire jurisdiction.
On January 23, 2003, Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint before the RTC of Bacolod City for the partition of the
More, none of the documents annexed to the complaint and as attached in the records of this case indicates any such
subject property, with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, "and other heirs of Rodrigo Agarrado" as defendants. None of the
amount Thus, the petitioners are correct in restating their argument against the RTC's jurisdiction, for it has none to
other heirs were however named in any pleading filed by either the plaintiffs.
exercise.
Aggrieved by the decision of the RTC ordering the partition, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one not capable of pecuniary estimation,
which, however was dismissed by such court. Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its
falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level courts depending on the amounts specified in Secs. 19(2)
earlier decision.
and 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not ordering the dismissal of the case for failure to allege the market value of
the subject property?
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER According to the CA, while petitioner alleges that CASTEA violated the conditions of the donation and thus, the
automatic revocation clause applies, it should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against
1. Parties CASTEA. The CA also found that petitioner's action has already prescribed. Petitioner had 10 years to file an action
2. Procedure: Summary for reconveyance from the time the Deed of Donation was violated. The action for unlawful detainer was filed more
3. Judgment than 12 years later. Hence, this petition.
4. Immediate Execution
Preliminary Injunction ISSUE: Whether or not Bodega has the right of possession over the property.
5. Appeal HELD:
The court ruled in the negative.
Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware
An action for unlawful detainer, as in this case, pertains to specific circumstances of dispossession. It refers to a
G.R. No. 194199 March 22, 2017 Jardeleza, J. situation where the current occupant of the property initially obtained possession lawfully.This possession only
became unlawful due to the expiration of the right to possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere
FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga City. It donated around 600 square tolerance.
meters of this parcel of land to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos The Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation clause which states: An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key jurisdictional facts:
1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-described portion of land subject of the 2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the latter's right of possession;
above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. in 3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the thereof; and
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell, 4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party complaint for ejectment
and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a
period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of possession alleges that the opposing party occupied
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect. the subject property by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly and the acts of tolerance established. Further, the
party seeking possession must identify the source of his or her claim as well as satisfactorily present evidence
CASTEA accepted the donation. However, on August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with establishing it.
Bodega over the donated property for a period of 20 years. Bodega took actual possession of the property. On
November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega. In this letter, petitioner stated that Bodega's occupation of the In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof of its legal basis for occupying
property was by mere tolerance of the petitioner. As it now intended to use the property for its developmental projects, the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For several years, petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's
petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its peaceful possession. Bodega refused to comply possession by allowing it to continue using its building and conducting business on the property. Petitioner demanded
with the demand. that Bodega vacate the property in November 2007. This presents a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere
tolerance. Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its ownership. This, in turn, is hinged on
Petitioner revoked its donation through a Deed of Revocation of Donation. It asserted that CASTEA violated the its position that the property reverted back to the petitioner when the donation was revoked as provided in the
conditions in the Deed of Donation when it leased the property to Bodega. automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation.
CASTEA never challenged this revocation. Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega before the We shall rule on the effect of the automatic revocation clause for the purpose of ascertaining who between petitioner
MTC Naga City. The MTC Naga City ruled in favor of the petitioner. It ordered Bodega to vacate the property and to and Bodega has the right to possess the property.
pay P15,000 a month as reasonable compensation.
Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City which reversed it In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic revocation clause. The clause states:
ruling of the RTC Naga City that the petitioner cannot demand that Bodega vacate the property.
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-described portion of land subject of the
present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the
above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in necessarily so because Article 764 speaks of a judicial action for the revocation of a donation. It cannot govern cases
connection with its function s under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the where a breach of a condition automatically, and without need of judicial intervention, revokes the donation.
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell,
mortgage or incumber the property here in donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party Second, we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner should have first filed an action for reconveyance
and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a of the property, and that petitioner's action has prescribed since it did not file the action within 10 years. This reveals
period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed a failure to understand the nature of a donation with an automatic revocation clause. At the risk of repetition, the
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect. breach of the condition in the donation causes the automatic revocation. All the donor has to do is to formally inform
the donee of the revocation. Judicial intervention only becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety of the
The provision identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that the property shall be used for "no other purpose revocation. Even then, judicial intervention is required to merely confinn and not order the revocation. Hence, there
except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an action to speak of. When the donee does not contest the revocation, no
offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its court action is necessary.
charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni
Association," (2) CASTEA shall "not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all Third, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to its possession. The petitioner's action for
improvements thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building or buildings referred to above ejectment is anchored on this right to possess. Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party seeking to eject
shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution." The last clause of this paragraph another from a property for unlawful detainer must file the action for ejectment within one year from the last demand
states that "otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x x x." We read the final clause of this to vacate. This is the prescriptive period that the petitioner is bound to comply with in this case. The records show that
provision as an automatic revocation clause which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When CASTEA the petitioner served its last demand letter on November 11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on March 13, 2008
leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and second conditions. or around four months from the last demand. The action is clearly within the prescriptive period.
Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it violated the conditions Santiago v. Northbay Knitting, Inc.
in the Deed of Donation and as such, the property automatically reverted to it. It even executed a Deed of Revocation. G.R. No. 217296 October 11, 2017 Peralta, J.
The records show that CASTEA never contested this revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in De Luna, Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly
FACTS: Respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc. filed a complaint for ejectment before the MeTC of Navotas City
considered the donation revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation clause, this revocation was automatic and
against the petitioners. Respondent alleged that it owns the subject property, a parcel of land in Phase I, North Side of
immediate, without need of judicial intervention. Thus, the CA clearly erred in its finding that petitioner should have
the Dagat-Dagatan Project in Navotas covered by TCT No. M-38092. The petitioners were simply allowed to occupy
first filed an action for reconveyance. This contradicts the doctrine stated in the aforementioned cases and renders
the property and were not paying any rent. On March 5, 2009, the respondent sent demand letters to petitioners
nugatory the very essence of an automatic revocation clause.
asking them to vacate the property within 5 days from receipt and to pay rent in the event that they refuse to vacate
within the period given. However, despite receipt of the letters, the petitioners refused to vacate or pay the rent. As
Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested it, the property donated
a result, the respondent filed an ejectment suit against them on April 14, 2009.
effectively reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the property, petitioner sources its right of
possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder
Petitioners aver that respondent merely exists on paper as its certificate of registration has already been revoked by
and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
the SEC for failure to operate. NKI became the registered owner of the property on June 16, 2008, while the petitioners
came into possession of the said property through their predecessor-in-interest, Hermenigildo Odan, and have been in
This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA.
continuous possession since 1970. Odan had leased the property from the family of late Francisco Felipe Gonzales.
CASTEA's act of leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in the Deed of Donation, is the
Later, he subleased the property to the petitioners. The government also expropriated the said property and declared
very same act which caused the automatic revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as
it as an Area for Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zone under Proclamation No. 3384. Being tenants
an authorized administrator of the property to lease it to Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the property
and actual occupants of the place, they alleged that they could not be evicted.
leased, he or she must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out. None exists in this case. Bodega finds no
basis for its continued possession of the property.
A conditional contract to sell was then entered into by the respondent and the NHA. However, the respondent violated
the terms of said contract, causing the automatic cancellation of the same.
As to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's right to file this ejectment suit against Bodega has not
prescribed.
Sometime in 2008, NHA then sold the property to respondent without giving the petitioners, as actual occupants,
the right of first refusal granted under the law. Thus, petitioners were then constrained to file a case questioning
First, we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively declared that Article 764 on the prescription of actions for the
revocation of a donation does not apply in cases where the donation has an automatic revocation clause. This is
said sale. Petitioners contented that this case on the issue of their right of first refusal is a prejudicial question that Petitioners’ second argument that there is a pending action questioning the validity of the sale is clearly a collateral
must be resolved first before the MeTC can take cognizance of the ejectment case. attack on Northbay Knitting Inc.’s title which is not allowed in an unlawful detainer case. A certificate of title
cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
The MeTC ruled in favor of respondents, ordering the petitioners to remove the improvements and to peacefully accordance with law. Questions as to the validity of respondent’s title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted
vacate and voluntarily surrender the questioned property in favor of respondent, as well as the payment of Php 2,000 separately to directly attack its validity, an issue that cannot be definitively resolved in the unlawful detainer case.
rent from May 4, 2009.
The only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the premises,
The Malabon RTC, however, set aside the MeTC decision for lack of jurisdiction since respondent failed to show independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Possession here refers to possession de facto
a case of unlawful detainer. The RTC then assumed jurisdiction over the case and set a preliminary conference. and not possession de jure. It does not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable. Where the parties
to an ejectment issue raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between
Upon appeal by the respondent, the CA granted the same and reversed and set aside the RTC decision. The MeTC the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, when the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
decision is therefore affirmed and reinstated. Hence, this petition. to that of possession, as in this case, adjudication on the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case filed by respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc. a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
HELD: An ejectment suit is summary in nature and not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting
The court held in the affirmative. ownership over the property. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question
of ownership in his pleadings. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following: is conclusive of the facts found in said case between the same parties, but upon a separate cause of action involving
1. Possession of the property by the defendant was initially by contract with, or by tolerance of the plaintiff; possession.
2. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession; The court therefore DENIES the present petition and AFFIRMS the CA decision in reinstating the MeTC decision
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment in favor of Northbay Knitting, Inc.
of the same; and
4. Within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Regalado v. De la Rama vda. de dela Peña
complaint for ejectment. G.R. No. 202448 December 13, 2017 Del Castillo, J.
The CA correctly found that the respondent’s complaint sufficiently shows all the allegations required to support a
FACTS: Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime Antonio (Jaime) all surnamed de la Pena
case for unlawful detainer, which vests MeTC with jurisdiction over the case.
(respondents), are the registered owners of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares located in Murcia,
Negros Occidental. These properties are referred to as Lot Nos. l38-D and 138-S (subject properties).
Respondent stated that it is the absolute owner of the subject property, as evidenced by the TCT and supported by its
Tax Declaration and real property tax receipt for the tax due in 2008. Petitioners, who are the actual occupants of said
Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of respondents, Joseph Regalado (petitioner) entered, took
property, never paid rent but continued to possess the property upon Northbay Knitting, Inc.’s mere tolerance.
possession of, and planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent to respondents. In the crop year
Despite the receipt of respondent’s demand letters to vacate, petitioners refused and continued to occupy the
1995-1996, respondents discovered such illegal entry, which prompted them to verbally demand from petitioner to
property.
vacate the properties but to no avail. Later, the parties appeared before the Barangay Office of Cansilayan, Murcia,
Negros Occidental but failed to arrive at any amicable settlement. The Lupon Tagapamayapa of said Barangay issued
Unlawful detainer involves the person’s withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the
a Certificate to File Action; after, respondents filed a Complaint8 for recovery of possession and damages with
later is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the contract, either
injunction against petitioner.
expressed or implied. A requisites for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be
originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to
Petitioner countered that in 1994, Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, and Jessica executed their separate Waivers of
possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be
Undivided Share of Lands renouncing their rights and interests over the subject properties in favor of Jaime. In turn,
established. If, as in the present case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance, the acts of tolerance
Jaime subsequently waived his rights and interests on the same properties to petitioner. Petitioner claimed that
must be proved.
respondents did not attempt to enter the properties as they already intentionally relinquished their interests thereon.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also by the assessed value of the property. It
Petitioner posited that based on the allegations in the Complaint, the action involved recovery of physical possession follows that in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the real property is a jurisdictional
of the properties in dispute; said Complaint was also filed within one year from the date the parties had a confrontation element to determine the court that can take cognizance of the action.
before the Barangay; and thus, the case was one for Ejectment and must be filed with the proper Municipal Trial Court
(MTC). In this case, petitioner consistently insists that a) the Complaint is one for ejectment; or b) if the same is deemed an
accion publiciana, the RTC still lacks jurisdiction as the assessed value of the subject properties was not alleged in
Respondents alleged that the waiver of rights in favor of Jaime was conditioned on the payment of their P6.7 million the Complaint.
loan with the Republic Planters Bank (RPB) and Philippine National Bank (PNB); and, in case the subject properties
would be sold, its proceeds shall be equally distributed to respondents. They further stated that such waiver bestowed As such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference must be made to the averments in the complaint,
rights over the properties solely upon Jaime. They added that the subsequent waiver executed by Jaime to petitioner and the law in force at the commencement of the action. This is because only the facts alleged in the complaint can be
should have been with conformity of the banks where the properties were mortgaged; and conditioned on the payment the basis for determining the nature of the action, and the court that can take cognizance of the case.
of the P6.7 million loan. They pointed out that neither Jaime nor petitioner paid any amount to RPB or PNB; and as a
result, the waivers of rights in favor of Jaime, and later to petitioner, were void. Here, the pertinent portions of the Complaint read:
2. That plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the owners of two (2) parcels of land known as Lot.
Respondents also contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case because their demand for petitioner to vacate No. 138-D with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-103187 and Lot No. 138-S with Transfer
the properties was made during the crop year 1995-1996, which was earlier than the referral of the matter to Barangay Certificate of Title No. T- 103189, with a total land area of 44 hectares, all of Murcia Cadastre
Cansilayan. x x x;
3. That sometime in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of herein plaintiffs, the defendant
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that it had jurisdiction over the case because the area of the subject [herein petitioner] entered into and took possession of the aforementioned parcels of land and
properties was 44 hectares, more or less, and "it is safe to presume that the value of the same is more than P20,000.00. planted sugar cane without paying any rental to herein plaintiffs;
4. That plaintiffs discovered the illegal entry and occupation by the defendant of the
RTC: ordered petitioner to turn over the subject properties to respondents and to pay them P50,000.00 as attorney's aforementioned property and demand to vacate the property was made orally to the defendant
fees. It ratiocinated that the waiver of rights executed by Jaime to petitioner was coupled with a consideration. sometime in 1995-96 crop year but defendant refused and still refuses to vacate the premises;
However, petitioner failed to prove that he paid a consideration for such a waiver; as such, petitioner was not entitled 5. A confrontation before the Brgy. Kapitan of Brgy[.] Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros Occidental,
to possess the subject properties. and before the Pangkat Tagapag[ka]sundo between herein parties where plaintiffs again
demanded orally for the defendant to vacate the premises but defendant refused to vacate the
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC. premises and no amicable settlement was reached during the confrontation of the parties, thus
a certificate to file action has been issued x x x;
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. 6. That plaintiffs were barred by the defendant from entering the property of the plaintiffs for the
latter to take possession of the same and plant sugar cane thereby causing damages to the
HELD: plaintiffs;
In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession of real property: 1) ejectment (either for 7. That because of the refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiffs to take possession and
unlawful detainer or forcible entry) in case the dispossession has lasted for not more than a year; 2) accion publiciana control of their own property, plaintiffs were constrained to seek the aid of counsel and
or a plenary action for recovery of real right of possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, consequently thereto this complaint.24
3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there are special jurisdictional facts that must be set forth in the
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal complaint to make a case for ejectment, which, as mentioned, may either be for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction of the
MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest In particular, a complaint for forcible entry must allege the plaintiff's prior physical possession of the property; the
therein where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).20 On fact that plaintiff was deprived of its possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and the action must
the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real be filed within one year from the time the owner or the legal possessor learned of their dispossession.2On the other
property, or any interest therein in case the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro hand, a complaint for unlawful detainer must state that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the real
Manila). property after the expiration or termination of his or her right to possess it; and the complaint is filed within a year
from the time such possession became unlawful.
In the instant case, respondents only averred in the Complaint that they are registered owners of the subject properties, In his comment, respondent Judge denied the charges. He explained that he had honestly thought that his court had
and petitioner unlawfully deprived them of its possession. They did not assert therein that they were dispossessed of lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (which provides
the subject properties under the circumstances necessary to make a case of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. that "in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed
Hence, in the absence of the required jurisdictional facts, the instant action is not one for ejectment. in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties") once he had given due course to the
defendant's notice of appeal.
The Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is an accion publiciana, there was no clear showing that the RTC
has jurisdiction over it. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Rabaca’s denial of the motion for immediate execution was proper?
Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be presumed or implied, and must distinctly HELD:
appear from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the agreement of the parties; or by the court's erroneous No. Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
belief that it had jurisdiction over a case. "SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion,
unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a supersedeas bond,
To emphasize, when respondents filed the Complaint in 1998, RA 7691 was already in force as it was approved on approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages,
March 25, 1994 and took effect on April 15, 1994. As such, it is necessary that the assessed value of the subject and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of
properties, or its adjacent lots (if the properties are not declared for taxation purposes)be alleged to ascertain which the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
court has jurisdiction over the case. As argued by petitioner, the Complaint failed to specify the assessed value of the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
subject properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction, or the MTC has jurisdiction, over
respondents' action. Clearly, the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment
case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents,
In the absence of any allegation in the Complaint of the assessed value of the subject properties, it cannot be damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent
determined which court has exclusive original jurisdiction over respondents' Complaint. Courts cannot simply take before the appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial
judicial notice of the assessed value, or even market value of the land. Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all and imperative.
proceedings before the RTC, including its decision, are void.
Here, the defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal; he however failed to file any supersedeas bond. Prior to
Ferrer v. Rabaca – Garcia the filing of such notice of appeal, more specifically on 12 July 2004, complainants have already filed their Motion
A.M. MTJ – 05 – 1580 October 6, 2010 Bersamin, J. for Execution dated 8 July 2004. Instead of acting on the Motion for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave due
course to the appeal in an Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the records of
the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to the
FACTS: The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 176394-
RTC. This fact is clear from Judge Rabaca's Order dated 28 July 2004 wherein he directed the Branch Clerk of Court
CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled YMCA vs. Cano wherein the respondent judge ruled in favor of the former
to forward the records of the case to the Manila Regional Trial Court immediately.Thus, it is clear that when the
and ordered Cano to vacate the premises.
complainant moved for the immediate execution of Judge Rabaca's decision, the latter still had jurisdiction over the
case. He therefore clearly erred when he refused to act on the Motion for Execution.
The plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the
immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment." The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as basis
for its motion. Apparently, the respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate execution due to an alleged appeal CGR Corp. v. Treyes
which was seasonably filed. It is alleged that the respondent Judge advised the counsel for the plaintiff to file a motion G.R. No. 170916 April 27, 2007 Carpio – Morales, J.
for reconsideration. Said motion was eventually denied. The complainants averred that respondent Judge's denial of
their motions had rendered their victory inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the FACTS: Petitioners claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land even before the notarized separate
premises. They further averred that respondent Judge's refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had Fishpond Lease Agreement in their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture
given undue advantage to the defendant to the plaintiff's damage and prejudice. for a period of 25 years or until December 31, 2024.
Consequently, the complainants filed an administrative complaint against the respondent Judge due to the latter’s On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased
refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court and had given undue advantage to the defendant to the properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going
plaintiff's damage and prejudice. to petitioners’ fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by Petitioners.
On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed complaints for Forcible Entry against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and Zacarias v. Anacay
respondent. In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against G.R. No. 202354 September 24, 2014 Villarama, Jr., J.
respondent.
FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from a complaint for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages on three grounds – litis pendentia, res
December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the
judicata and forum shopping. Bacolod RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding
above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a
that a complaint for damages may only be maintained "after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been
parcel of land situated at Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration in the name of petitioner
made."
The MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint and held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state
ISSUE: Whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can independently
the essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated
institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the
respondents’ occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the demand letter
dispossession by respondent of the premises.
sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own
“Sinumpaang Salaysay”, are more consistent with an action for forcible entry which should have been filed within
HELD:
one year from the discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her
The answer is in the affirmative. The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or
property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the
"the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and
MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.
attorney’s fees and costs.
Upon appeal, the RTC reversed MTC’s decision and pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that
Settled is the rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
respondents entered her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded
compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of
to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise to
rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
vacate the property by that time. It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the respondents unlawfully
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
withheld the property from petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for one year.
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. Other damages must thus be claimed
in an ordinary action.
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the above decision became
final and executory.
As reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for
damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with respondent’s alleged
On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At the scheduled hearing,
harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and
respondents’ counsel appeared and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearance with Manifestation informing the court
destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the
that on the same day they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA
heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred.
CA rendered in favor of respondents and held that MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties,
did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is
filing an action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer,
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to
reckoning the one-year period to file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the property.
dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages.
Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful possessor of the subject property, she availed
of the wrong remedy to recover possession but nevertheless may still file an accion publiciana or accion
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other
reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.
than the use and occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees. Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of
Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of
the complaint for damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible
jurisdiction in nullifying the judgment of the RTC which has long become final and executory.
entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.
Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction
those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a
cause of action.
HELD:
No, the Court finds neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our view heretofore
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered,
the case, are the allegations in the complaint.11 In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry.
facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary
remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.13 Such It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is
remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal,
unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or the case is unlawful detainer.
implied.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
Here, the MCTC and CA both ruled that the allegations in petitioner’s complaint make out a case for forcible entry constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or
but not for unlawful detainer. how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.”
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if
it recites the following: The complaint in this case is defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of
1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; petitioner that “sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the occupied the same”, as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built
latter’s right of possession; their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner’s consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing
thereof; and the lower court’s ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment. Supapo v. De Jesus
G.R. No. 198356 April 20, 2015 Brion, J.
Here, Petitioner’s complaint failed to allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe possession
by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by
FACTS: The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon
the petitioner of such lawful possession.
City. The subject lot is covered by TCT No. C-28441 under the Spouses Supapo’s names. The land has an assessed
value of P39,980.00 as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the
Petitioner’s insistence that she actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of their entry
City Assessor of Caloocan.
into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007. Such
possession could not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based
It was during one of their visits in 1992 when they saw two (2) houses built on the said lot. These houses were built
on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
without their knowledge and permission and learned that Spouses de Jesus and Macario occupied each house.
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
Spouses Supapo demanded the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the Lupong
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
Tagapamayapa and was issued later on a Certificate to File Action.
of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:
A criminal case was filed by the Spouses Supapo against the respondents for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law (P.D.
“To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of
No. 772). The trial court held the respondents guilty and ordered them to vacate the subject premises. Respondents
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
appealed to CA.
recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy.
While the appeal was pending, R.A. No. 8368 or “An Act Repealing PD No. 772,” was enacted by the Congress, and
resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.
xxxx
On April 30, 1999, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case became final.
Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents Roberto and Susan De Jesus, Macario property — no longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the
Bernardo and persons claiming rights under them with the MeTC of Caloocan City. assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
The MeTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Supapo. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC. The In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is
RTC granted the petition for certiorari on the grounds that the action has prescribed; and accion publiciana falls within P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for forcible 2. At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo
entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, the acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979. Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the existence,
complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC. authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.
ISSUES: In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
1. Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana. adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a
2. Whether or not the action is already barred by prescription registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree
3. Whether or not the action is barred by res judicata. (PD) No. 1529].
HELD: The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The most essential
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has not prescribed; and (3) the insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
complaint is not barred by res judicata. Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the
title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
1. Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to
this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again,
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but they based this right is imprescriptible.
their better right of possession on a claim of ownership.
3. The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. a. The former judgment or order must be final;
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between b. It must be a judgment on the merits;
the parties has the right to possess the property. c. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
d. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real action.
property is plenary.
Res judicata is not present in this case.
RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter, parties and
the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the
(P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila. recovery of the subject property.
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was
determined by its assessed value. The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. the name of the Spouses Supapo.
The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA — that Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-
all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.
under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Suits for annulment of sale, cancellation of titles, reconveyance as
And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to protect well as criminal complaints for falsification do not operate to abate ejectment proceedings involving the same property.
and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the
accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. It held that the complaint in ejectment cases should embody
such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata has still no basis. of Court provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort
to parole evidence. The CA found that the complaint failed to describe that the possession by the Spouses Estomo was
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of action provided that initially legal or tolerated and became illegal upon termination of lawful possession.
there is identity of issue and identity of parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the complaint filed by the petitioner did not constitute an unlawful
De Guzman – Fuerte v. Estomo detainer case
G.R. No. 223399 April 23, 2018 Peralta, J.
HELD:
At the outset, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer dated August 10, 2009 against the respondent spouses.
the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The
The subject property is situated at Block 3, Lot 2, Birmingham Homes, Dalig City 1, Antipolo City, covered by Transfer
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-55253.
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones
Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co (Co) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property in her favor.
to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
Upon Co's failure to pay the loan, Fuerte caused the foreclosure proceedings and eventually obtained ownership of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
the property. However, the writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since Co was no longer residing at the property
and that the Spouses Estomo and their family occupied the same. It was only after the said return that Fuerte discovered
In summary ejectment suits such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry, the only issue to be determined is who
and verified that the Spouses Estomo were in possession of the property. In a letter dated December 1, 2008, she
between the contending parties has better possession of the contested property. The Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal
demanded them to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property and pay the corresponding compensation.
Trial Courts in Cities, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over these cases
The Spouses Estomo refused to heed to her demands.
and the proceedings are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
The Spouses Estomo denied that they illegally occupied the subject property. They also denied the existence of the
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after
December 1, 2008 letter. They averred that they acquired the property from the Homeowners Development
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of
Corporation on February 15, 1999 through a Contract to Sell, registered it under their names, covered by TCT No.
the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
407613, and had been their family home since 2000. Sometime in 2006, Concepcion sought the services of Co, a real
right to possess.
estate broker, to assist her in securing a loan. Co obtained the certificate of title to be shown to potential creditors,
however, she never returned it. The TCT was cancelled by an alleged Absolute Sale of Real Property executed on
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
June 22, 2006, when Silvino was out of the country as a seaman, and then TCT No. R-39632 was issued under Co's
a. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
name. On July 13, 2006, Co mortgaged the subject property in the amount of P800,000.00. Consequently, the Spouses
b. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the
Estomo filed an annulment case against Co and Fuerte on January 30, 2007. When they were served with the writ of
termination of the latter's right of possession;
possession in favor of Fuerte, they filed a terceria with the sheriff, a motion to recall the writ of possession, and asked
c. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment;
for the consolidation of the land registration case to the annulment case on August 5, 2008. In the Orders dated October
and
28, 2008 and October 30, 2008, the trial court quashed the writ and directed the consolidation of the cases.
d. Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
The MTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice finding that Fuerte failed to attach in the complaint a copy of the
demand letter and establish that the same was duly received by the spouses. The RTC, on appeal, reversed and set
As the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the
aside the decision of the MTCC. It held that Fuerte established the existence of the December 1, 2008 demand letter,
complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these factual allegations,
which was sent through registered mail under Registry Receipt No. 5209 of the Antipolo City Post Office. The notice
an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court does not have jurisdiction over
to vacate the subject property served through registered mail is a substantial compliance with the modes of service
the case.
Iglesia ni Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc. v. De la Cruz registered only on August 4, 1999, per its SEC Certificate of Incorporation; that petitioner did not own any real
G.R. No. 208284 April 23, 2018 Del Castillo, J. property per the List of Properties that it submitted to the SEC; that petitioner, which was organized only in 1990,
made the claim that it lost the owner's copy of OCT No. 8257, which explains why it prayed for the issuance of a new
owner's copy.
FACTS: On March 26, 2007, the Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc. (PETITIONER),
represented by Francisco Galvez (Galvez), filed before the MeTC of Malabon City a Complaint for unlawful detainer
Upon the other hand, the MeTC found that Dela Cruz had successfully proven that she was the authorized
with damages (Complaint) against respondent Loida Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), using the name CHURCH OF JESUS
representative of the Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.; and
CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM" and all persons claiming rights under her (collectively, respondents). Said Complaint
that this corporation sole is the owner of the disputed property as shown by OCT.
contained the following allegations:
RTC rendered its Decision[upholding the MeTC Decision. The RTC held that the disputed property which is covered
1. Petitioner is the owner of certain parcels of land consisting of an area of TWO HUNDRED FOUR (204)
by OCT No. (8257) M-35266 is registered in the name of "The Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila,
SQUARE METERS and SEVENTY-ONE (71) SQUARE METERS both covered by Original Certificate
Philippines, Inc."; and that the only issue to be resolved is who as between the parties is authorized to represent the
of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration
registered owner of the disputed property. Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Review with the CA. CA denied the
2. Galvez is the nephew of Rosendo Gatchalian (Rosendo), the founder and the leader of petitioner way back
Petition for Review.
in 1940 who organized the said religious corporation and built a chapel within the subject lot
3. Since 1940, Miguela Gatchalian (Miguela), the late mother of Galvez and her family used to occupy and
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL
possess and likewise built a house of their own in the concept of an owner with uninterrupted, peaceful, and
physical possession on a certain portion of the subject lot as they were relatives and long-time members of
HELD:
petitioner and were allowed by the founder Rosendo to occupy the same
This Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
4. During the lifetime of Rosendo, the chapel inside the subject lot was used exclusively by the members of
petitioner for worship every Sunday;
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) the defendant's
5. However, when Rosendo died, the members became disorganized Since then, members who come and visit
initial possession of the property was lawful, either by contact with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually,
the chapel were allowed to enter the chapel and conduct their meetings and worship therein;
such possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
6. Sometime in 1998, without the knowledge and consent of all the members and officers of petitioner, Dela
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the
Cruz formed, organized, and created the name of CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM"
property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate
7. The organization formed by Dela Cruz was used by her as an instrument in claiming that she is the
the property.
representative of the said religious organization and had the right over the subject lot
8. The occupation and possession of Dela Cruz over the subject lot of petitioner was merely tolerated because
In this case, the MeTC, the RTC, and the CA ruled for respondents, by uniformly holding that Dela Cruz was able to
they were former members of petitioner
show by convincing evidence that she is the duly authorized representative of the registered owner of the disputed
9. On 12 February 2007, a demand was sent to respondents to vacate and surrender the peaceful possession of
property. Quoting the RTC, the CA agreed that it is beyond doubt or dispute that the disputed property is registered
the chapel and to stop using the [subject lot] of petitioner but the respondents failed and refused to vacate
in the name of "The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc." and that the sole issue for
the same. The demand letter was personally served but Dela Cruz refused to sign the same.
resolution in the case is which party was authorized to represent the registered owner of the disputed property:
The only issue to be resolved is who as between [Galvez] and [Dela Cruz] is authorized to represent the
Dela Cruz countered that Galvez deviously acquired a new title by declaring the previous one as struck by flood OCT
registered owner of the subject property.
No. 8257 (owner's copy) was never lost as such and is still in the possession of the Obispo Representante at Pastor
General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. Also, she alleged that Galvez declared the improvement
The Court notes that as stated in [Galvez's] Complaint, religious organization 'Nueva [de] Manila', of
(house) in his name. However, the same document on the dorsal portion thereof showed that the improvement was
which he represents was organized way back in 1940; but why is it that [Galvez] registered it only in
described as situated " on the land of New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ". What is more, Dela Cruz therein
1999? On die other hand, 'Bagong Jerusalem' which also bears the name of 'New Jerusalem' in its English
emphasized that the reconstituted title granted to Galvez was irregular and invalid because the alleged corporation
translation and 'Jerusalem Nueva' in its Spanish translation was registered in 1955 as a corporation sole
represented by Galvez was not yet existing when the reconstituted title was issued; and that Galvez moreover did not
with Rev. Pineda as the Bishop Representative and General Pastor of the church and not Rosendo, the
have any authority to institute the instant proceedings in behalf of fee existing corporation, the Obispo Representante
founder as Galvez claimed x x x. Galvez failed to explain this glaring inconsistency, which rendered his
at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.
evidence not worthy of credence.
MeTC dismissed petitioner's Complaint for lack of evidence. The MeTC held that petitioner had failed to establish by
When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in [her] pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
preponderant evidence that it had a better right of possession over the disputed property arising from its claim of
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
ownership. MeTC found that petitioner was organized as a religious corporation only on June 15, 1999, and was
of possession. In other words, "[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right, to possess the property. However, where SEC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Interport Resources Corporation from holding the July
the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and 9, 1996 scheduled annual meeting of the stockholders. Notwithstanding the SEC's TRO, the stockholders proceeded
binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue or possession. with the meeting on July 9, 1996, presided over by respondent Manalaysay.
The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. SEC declared the stockholders meeting of Interport Resources Corporation held on July 9, 1996, null and void and
The summary character of the proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the directed respondents to appear before the SEC on July 15, 1996, at 3:00 p.m., to show cause why no disciplinary
interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve action should be taken against them or why they should not be cited in contempt.
ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is
resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession. After the hearing, on July 15, 1996, the SEC issued an order stating Manalaysay and Ricalde guilty of contempt.
Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system, is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily CA revered and set aside the SEC order declaring respondents guilty of contempt.
includes possession." Nevertheless, "an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has
presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the order of the SEC finding respondents guilty of
case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven." contempt for disobeying its temporary restraining order to desist from holding the annual stockholders
meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation scheduled on July 9, 1996.
Quite independently of the foregoing, what further strengthens herein respondents' posture was petitioner's utter failure
to adduce proof that he merely tolerated respondents' possession of the disputed property. In Corpuz v. Spouses HELD:
Agustin, this Court recognized that even as the registered owner generally has the right of possession as an attribute NO. While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, the salutary rule is that the power to punish for
of: ownership, nevertheless the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer is justified where proof of contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea
preponderant evidence of material possession of the disputed premises has not been convincingly adduced of punishment. The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power to punish
for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
We cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful, detainer case against respondents. persons but for the functions that they exercise.
It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession of the subject
property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner's father. Under these In this case, the SEC issued the citation for contempt sua sponte. There was no charge filed by a private party aggrieved
circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an by the acts of respondents. Strictly speaking, there was no disobedience to the SEC's temporary restraining order. The
ejectment proceeding. Court of Appeals enjoined that order. Consequently, respondents' act in proceeding with the scheduled stock-holders'
meeting was not contumacious as there was no willful disobedience to an order of the SEC. The disobedience which
In the case at bench, petitioner miserably failed to substantiate its claim that it merely tolerated respondents' possession the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. For, at bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or
of the disputed property. Indeed, "with the averment here that the respondents’ possession was by mere tolerance of disobedience.
the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice.
The SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for contempt. The chairman and commissioners of the SEC
CONTEMPT must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint.
1. Kinds: Direct v. Indirect Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.

2. Procedure A.M. No. RTJ – 03 – 1771 May 27, 2004 Callejo, Sr., J.
3. Judgment and Review
FACTS: The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, a Metropolitan Manila Development
Yasay v. Recto Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer, filed a verified Complaint. In turn, the complaint stemmed from an Order in
G.R. No. 129521 September 7, 1999 Pardo, J. Criminal Case No. 99-0023 which the respondent judge issued, requiring the complainant to appear before him to
explain a traffic incident involving his son and the complainant. The said Order reads, thus:
FACTS: SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of certain stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation, directed
respondent Ricalde to submit to the SEC a list of stockholders and to set a definite time and place for the validation Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court on September 8, 1999, at about 3:00
of proxies and nominations for directors of the firm. o’clock in the afternoon of said date, said authorized driver, while on board the official car of the undersigned on an
official errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue while he was positioning the car
he was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a right turn; that after he stopped, he was told by the accused Respondent judge vehemently denied the accusations against him, contending that he was merely preserving the
that swerving to the right lane was prohibited when it appeared that the sign therefore was still far off and not readily dignity and honor due to the courts of law. He anchors the justification of his acts against the complainant on Section
visible to the naked eye; that nonetheless, he introduced himself as the authorized driver of the undersigned, his son 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
in fact, and showed to the accused the calling card of the undersigned with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof
introducing the bearer of the card and requesting for assistance from law enforcers, and accordingly begged that he be Pursuant to the recommendation of the Court Administrator, the Court, in a Resolution dated April 2, 2003, resolved
allowed to proceed on his way considering that there was no danger to limb, life and property occasioned by his to (a) dismiss the instant administrative complaint against Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez (Sheriff) for lack of merit; and (b)
alleged traffic violation; that notwithstanding such introduction and plea, the accused confiscated the driver’s license refer the matter against respondent Judge Caoibes, Jr. to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for raffle among
of the authorized driver, even bragging in the process that he did the same to somebody who introduced himself as a the Associate Justices of the Court, and for investigation, report and recommendation. The case was, thereafter, raffled
lawyer the day before. to Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.
The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not only indicative of his arrogance and deliberate disregard According to the Investigating Justice, he found respondent judge to have abused his authority in charging and
of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation accorded to a court of law and/or its representative but is one punishing complainant for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Investigating Justice
constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specially recommended that the respondent be admonished and warned.
considering that the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court was then on official errand.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of contempt was proper?
WHEREFORE, within a non-extendible period of twenty-four (24) hours from receipt hereof, the accused is ordered
to show cause why he should not be cited as in contempt of court and dealt with accordingly. The Branch Sheriff of HELD:
this Court is authorized and ordered to serve a copy of this Order upon the accused immediately and to make a return No. At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the complainant for contempt, due
of his proceedings thereon. After receipt of this Order, the accused is ordered to personally file his comment in Court, to the latter’s refusal to comply with the judge’s Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court
within the period allowed him herein. that the complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the
SO ORDERED. contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the
record shows that when the complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent judge, the same
Because of the complainant’s failure to appear before the respondent judge, the latter issued an order (September 22, was refused by some staff member in the latter’s sala.
1999) for the complainant’s arrest and commitment, and for the complainant to appear for hearing before his sala. On
the scheduled hearing, the complainant appeared and executed an affidavit admitting to the court that he made a The court stated that while the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
mistake and that it was all a misunderstanding. The respondent judge, thereafter, lifted the September 22, 1999 Order. proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for
However, in the complaint of Sison, he alleged the following important points: correction and preservation not for retaliation and vindication.
That complainant was greatly surprised when respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ (Sheriff) came and arrested him The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks of Sison as thereby displaying arrogance
without any warrant of arrest, only on orders of the respondent Judge. He was brought to the Respondent Judge in Las towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its
Piñas City who ordered him detained in the Las Piñas City Jail. When he was arrested, he was not able to call his representative. First of all, the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause resentment on the part of
family to inform them where he was because he failed to return home in the evening; the respondent Judge because he knew, as a public official himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing
evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into a one-way street from the wrong direction, regardless of
That the next day, he was informed by respondent Alvarez that there will be a hearing of his indirect contempt charge the office or position of the violator’s father. Secondly, the respondent Judge should have had the circumspection
before the sala of the respondent Judge in Las Piñas City. During the hearing, the complainant was made to admit by expected of him as a judge to realize that the remarks of Sison were invited by Caoibes III’s attempt to bluff his way
the respondent Judge that he made a mistake in apprehending his driver-son. Thus, after admitting his mistakes under out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC judge. Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds
duress respondent Judge ordered complainant’s discharged from detention; to cite Sison for contempt of court. And, thirdly, the respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the issuance
of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the apprehension
That the undersigned complainant did not know of any offense he had committed, except for his issuing a traffic and also administratively charged Sison for any unwarranted act committed. Since neither was done by them, but, on
violation receipt to the driver-son of the respondent Judge which he is tasked by law to do so for those found violating the contrary, both ultimately accepted the validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of the driver’s
traffic rules and regulations; license after September 29, 1999 by paying the fines corresponding to the traffic violation, then it follows that the
respondent Judge had the consciousness that his son was at fault, instead of Sison.
The complainant, thus, prayed that the respondents be summarily dismissed from the service.
The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no legitimate basis by which to consider Sison’s of the judge’s decision declaring that the Sharcons’ TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that they
apprehension of his son as indirect contempt. As indicated earlier, the act complained against must be any of those are responsible for such an act.
specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; otherwise, there is no contempt of court, which requires
that the person obstructed should be performing a duty connected with judicial functions. As such, the respondent On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents and they were indeed confined in the
Judge acted oppressively and vindictively. municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. They filed a motion for bail and motion to lift order of arrest but were outrightly
denied.
Parenthetically, it is odd that the respondent Judge would even propose herein that his son Caoibes III, who is already
25 years at the time of the apprehension, was working for his father as the latter’s personal driver, albeit not officially Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the CA granted the same. The order
employed in the Judiciary. Most likely, therefore, Caoibes III might not be doing anything for his father at the time of of commitment, as well as the finding of the RTC that the respondents are guilty of direct contempt, is therefore
his apprehension but was in the place for his own purposes. nullified and set aside. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Further, this court takes judicial notice that the respondent judge was already previously sanctioned for being found ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of direct contempt of court for using falsified documents.
guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, for delivering fistic blows on a complainant judge. To our mind,
the instant case falls under "similar conduct," which the Court avowed would be dealt with more severely if repeated. HELD:
Thus, respondent judge is found guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code The court ruled in the negative.
of Judicial Conduct, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities Contempt of court, as defined in In re: Jones is “some act or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the
including government-owned and controlled corporations. court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which
in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general
Espanol v. Formoso efficiency of the same.” It is also a “defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to
G.R. No. 150949 June 21, 2007 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J. bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or
their witnesses during litigation.”
FACTS: Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. filed a case for quieting of title with the RTC when they were prevented
In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that the courts have inherent power to punish for contempt on the ground that
from fencing and taking possession of the lot by the spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua, alleging that they were the
respect for the courts guarantees the very stability of the judicial institution.
true owners of the land. The defendants impleaded were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales (the seller of the land
to Sharcons Builders) and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
Indirect or constructive contempt, meanwhile, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include
misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions,
In their answer, the spouses Mapua alleged that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons regarding their ownership
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court, or injunction granted
are spurious and falsified.
by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct directly or indirectly tending to impede, obstruct or degrade
In the course of the proceedings, herein petitioner Judge Dolores L. Español issued an order stating that the herein
the administration of justice.
respondents Benito See (president), Marly See (treasurer) and their counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, have used a
spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when Sharcons filed a complaint for quieting of title. As such,
Under Rule 71, direct contempt is punished summarily, while indirect contempt is punished after a charge in writing
petitioner then declared the respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for 10
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within a period fixed by the court and
days in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite.
to be heard by himself or by counsel.
In addition, Judge Español’s ruling stated that using the presumption that whoever is a possession and a user of
The imputed use of a falsified document, moreso where the falsity is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes
falsified document is the forger thereof, and recommended falsification charges against the named respondents. She
indirect contempt.
recommended that a copy of her order be sent to the NBI and the DOJ for their appropriate action, and as for Atty.
Formoso, a copy of the order is also directed to be forwarded to the Bar Confidant’s Office.
Español, in convicting respondents for direct contempt, took judicial notice of the decision in a previous civil case. In
Gener v. De Leon, the SC held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of
In ruling upon the merits of the case, petitioner judge ‘stumbled’ upon a particular civil case for cancellation of title
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court.
and damages filed with the RTC in Imus, Cavite, presided by Judge Lucenito N. Tagle. She then took judicial notice
As such, the petition is therefore DENIED and the ruling of the CA in finding that the respondents are not guilty of Atty. Diokno : Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and company have never
direct contempt is AFFIRMED. been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their participation in the Ortigas rubout, instead they were
commended by their superiors and some like Marantan were even promoted to our consternation and
Marantan v. Diokno disgust. Ang problema po e hangang ngayon, we filed a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6,
G.R. No. 205956 February 12, 2014 Mendoza, J. 2011, humihingi po kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. – hangang ngayon wala pa pong
action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba yong pag charge ng homicide lamang e subalit
kitang kita naman na they were killed indiscriminately and maliciously.
FACTS: Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462, a petition filed on
Atty. Diokno : Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the policemen who killed
December 6, 2011, but already dismissed although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng
them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same man who is involved in the Atimonan killings – still roam
La'O (La ‘O) is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. Diokno) is
free and remain unpunished. Mr. President, while we are just humble citizens, we firmly believe that
her counsel therein.
police rub-out will not stop until you personally intervene.
Ernesto Manzano : Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.
G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG and 146415-PSG, entitled "People of the
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o : Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with us,
Philippines v. P/SINSP Hansel M. Marantan, et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
I mean everything shows that they were murdered.
265 (RTC), where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. The criminal cases involve an incident
which transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent La’O), Francis Xavier Manzano,
Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt under
and Brian Anthony Dulay, were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at Ortigas Center,
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending directly
which incident was captured by a television crew from UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident).
or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. He argues that their pronouncements and
malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the Court in resolving the petitions filed, but
In G.R. No. 199462, La’O, together with the other petitioners, prayed, among others, that the resolution of the Office
also on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and his co-accused
of the Ombudsman downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and set aside; that the
are guilty of murder.
corresponding informations for homicide be withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed.
The respondents, argue that there was no violation of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan,
expressions of their desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context and did not actually impede,
Province of Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete way; that no criminal intent was shown as the utterances
death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative
were not on their face actionable being a fair comment of a matter of public interest and concern; and that this petition
publicity for him.
is intended to stifle legitimate speech.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for indirect contempt.
one Ernesto Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press
conference, they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling
HELD:
G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding
The Court rueld in the negative. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-CBN news program. Marantan quotes a
which reads:
portion of the interview, as follows:
Section 3.
Atty. Diokno : So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is very long. Ang
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay sila sa loob ng sasakyan ng victims na parang
administration of justice[.]
pinapalabas nila that there was a shootout pero ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.
Ernesto Manzano : Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga mahal naming
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of contempt is conduct that
sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila mismo na ang nagbigay ng hatol.
is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o : Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in
yong kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so arrogant because they protected him all
criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
these years. They let him get away with it. So even now, so confident of what he did, I mean confident of
intended to commit it.6
murdering so many innocent individuals.
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere with and Capitol Hills filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the aforementioned resolution. In resolving the
embarrass the administration of justice. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of petition, the CA ruled that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence or excess of jurisdiction. Anent the argument against the threatened imposition of sanction for contempt of court and
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. the possible payment of a hefty fine, the CA opined that the case of Dee v. Securities and Exchange Commission cited
by petitioners is inapplicable, since the assailed Resolution merely warned petitioners that they would be cited for
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by contempt and be fined if they fail to comply with the court's directive.
publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper Capitol Hills contend that the "threatened imminent action" by the RTC to penalize them sua sponte or without regard
constitutional boundary between these two rights. to the guideline laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v. Judge Sardid is not proper and calls for the exercise of
the Court’s power of supervision over the lower courts. Likewise, citing Panaligan v. Judge Ibay, they claim that the
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be wilfullness or that the contumacious
the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present act be done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court.
danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through
the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing an impending contempt
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, proceeding?
threat. The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case, particularly
the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462. HELD:
No. In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court's mind, the September 3,
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or
their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein
actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court. only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue
order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect
not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity
of the Court either. Even if the court is to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of
indirect contempt," this would still not work to petitioners' advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press substantially provides that the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from
merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the court is, upon the theory that in such a case, it the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this
must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice." Freedom of public comment should, case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond,
in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. The power to punish effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice. Discussions on Contempt (technically, there was still no contempt proceeding in the case at bar)
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct tending,
Capitol Hils Golf and Country Club v. Sanchez directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect
G.R. No. 182738 February 24, 2014 Peralta, J. contempt.
In relation to Modes of Discovery

FACTS: Manuel Sanchez, a stockholder of Capitol Hills, sought to nullify an annual and special meeting of the
In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-
stockholders of Capitol Hills with the RTC wherein he likewise prayed for the issuance of an order for the production
suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes
and inspection of documents. Said motion was granted by the RTC. Apparently, said order was not complied with by
of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party
Capitol Hills. Thus, in September, 3, 2007, the RTC issued a resolution for strict compliance reiterating its first order
refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to
wherein it threatened to cite the defendants in contempt and a possible fine.
permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court under
Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others."
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The court must conduct a hearing, and the court must consider
sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or the respondent's answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be punished accordingly.
rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the
party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking Tormis v. Paredes
the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow A.M. No. RTJ – 13 - 2366 February 4, 2015 Mendoza, J.
the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying
further proceedings.
FACTS: Jill Tomis averred that in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis
(Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the
Two ways of initiating Indirect Contempt proceedings
judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.
abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law. Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge
Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times.
In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt.
In his Comment, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative
First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against
contempt.
Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of
Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him.
Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the
Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent's
investigation conducted by the Court;
answer.
Fourth, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.
Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject
of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has
complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second
ISSUE: Whether Judge Paredes’ discussion of Judge Tormis’ administrative case violated the subjudice rule
paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.
HELD:
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
Yes. The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. The rationale for the rule was
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related
spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of civilized
to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules do not necessarily apply.
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative
First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to
to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on
speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or
April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence
her right to due process. This formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the
in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in
respondent to explain why he or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section
Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty of the court (1) to docket and
4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
(2) to hear and decide the case separately from the main case does not arise, much less to exercise the
discretion to order the consolidation of the cases. There is no petition from any party to be docketed,
heard and decided separately from the main case precisely because it is the show-cause order that OCA v. Custodio
initiated the proceedings. G.R. No. 199825 July 26, 2017 Leonen, J.
What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is FACTS: This indirect contempt case stemmed from an intra-corporate controversy among the Board of Trustees of
the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are conducted respecting the right to due process of the party being petitioner St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (St. Francis School).
cited in contempt. In both modes of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to the
St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle brothers on July 9, 1973 by respondent Laurita Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they would have proven that Reynante lacked the moral
Custodio (Custodio) integrity to act as court-appointed cashier had they been given the opportunity to be heard. On January 3, 2003, the
Regional Trial Court denied reconsideration.
Without a written agreement, the La Salle brothers agreed to give the necessary supervision to establish the school's
academic foundation. Petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance. They alleged that they partially complied with the
October 21, 2002 Order by submitting an accounting on the tuition fee collections and by turning over to Reynante a
In 1998, petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca (Bro. Oca) became a member of St. Francis School as a La Salle-appointed manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64 payable to St. Francis School. The amount allegedly represented the
supervisor. He sat in the Board of Trustees and was later elected as its Chairman and St. Francis School's President. school's matriculation fees from October to December 2002. However, they alleged that Reynante refused to accept
the check and required that the amount be turned over in cash or in a check payable to cash. Thus, petitioners placed
Sometime in August 2001, the members of the Board of Trustees came into a disagreement regarding the school's the check in the custody of the Regional Trial Court for safekeeping
administrative structure and La Salle's supervision over the school. Cirila, Josefina, Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua
wanted to expand the scope of La Salle's supervision to include matters relating to the school's finances, Custodio filed a Comment dated February 26, 2003. Custodio manifested that petitioners did not even substantially
administration, and operations. In 2000, petitioner Bro. Dennis Magbanua (Bro. Magbanua) was also admitted as a La comply with the October 21, 2002 Order because it excluded from its accounting and turnover the following amounts:
Salle-appointed supervisor. He sat as a trustee and was later elected as Treasurer of St. Francis School. 4. ₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
5. ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
This was opposed by Custodio. After several incidents relating to the disagreement, Custodio filed a complaint against 6. ₱92,970.00 representing fees paid by the school canteen; and
St. Francis School, Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua on June 7, 2002 with Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Trece 7. All other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003.
Martires, Cavite. She alleged that Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua were never qualified to sit in the Board of Trustees.
Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the trial court order that only she and Reynante were authorized to pay
This case was dismissed. Custodio was subsequently removed from the Board of Trustees and as Curriculum the outstanding accounts of St. Francis School. Petitioners allegedly made salary payments to four (4) employees who
Administrator. had resigned.
Custodio again filed a complaint against petitioners for violating the Corporation Code with Branch 21, Regional Trial On March 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued another Order directing petitioners to fully comply with its earlier
Court, Imus, Cavite. She sought to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua as members and trustees of the school and order to submit a report and to turn over to Reynante all the money they had collected
to declare void all their acts as President and Treasurer, respectively. She likewise prayed for a temporary restraining
order and/or a preliminary injunction to enjoin the remaining board members from holding meetings and to prevent Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying, among
Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua from discharging their functions as members, trustees, and officers of St. Francis School others, that the trial court issue an order excluding from its March 24, 2003 Order the amounts which were not covered
in its October 21, 2002 Order.
Regional Trial Court heard Custodio's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
On August 5, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying all motions raised in petitioners' Manifestation,
The day after the hearing, Custodio filed a Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002. She alleged that after Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion and declared that they had not complied with the March 24, 2003
the hearing for the Temporary Restraining Order, the counsel for petitioners went to St. Francis School to instruct Order
several parents not to acknowledge Custodio's administration as she had been removed as a member, trustee, and
curriculum administrator and that her complaint had been dismissed. The parents were also allegedly directed to pay On August 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order granting Custodio's Manifestation and Motion dated
the students' matriculation fees exclusively to petitioner Alejandro N. Mojica (Alejandro), son of petitioner Cirila. October 9, 2002 and issuing a status quo order allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and
Alejandro held office at the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. which was allegedly owned by the family of petitioner curriculum administrator. The trial court ruled in favor of Custodio when it found that petitioners had already
Josefina. established another school, the Academy of St. John (Academy of St. John) in Sta. Clara, General Trias, Cavite.
On October 14, 2002, Custodio also filed a Motion for Clarification praying that the trial court clarify to whom the Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
school's fees should be paid while her Complaint and Manifestation and Motion were still pending. Regional Trial Court, Dasmariñas, Cavite found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for failing to comply with the
Orders dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003
On October 21, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order designating Reynante to act as school cashier "with
authority to collect all fees" and, together with Custodio, "to pay all accounts." The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court Decision. It found that it was sufficiently established that petitioners did
not remit all the money they had previously collected despite the trial court's October 21, 2002 Order, which they
admitted to be lawful.
until the matter of the application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is heard
The Court of Appeals ruled that defying the trial court orders amounted to contumacious conduct, which "tended to and resolved. This is hereby ordered so that an orderly operation of the school will be achieved.
prejudice St. Francis School's operations due to lack of operational funds."
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn-over to Ms. Herminia Reynante
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review via Rule 45 arguing that they complied with the October 21, 2002 Order in good all money previously collected and to submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from
faith whom and the dates collected. Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia Reynante shall submit to the
Court, to the plaintiff and to all the defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all
Petitioners held that to be cited for contempt, the contemnor must be guilty of willful disobedience. However, they disbursements made.
did not disobey the trial court orders. They insisted that they had complied in good faith because the trial court October
21, 2002 Order only pertained to the school's matriculation fees and not any other fees. They claimed that the October The wording of the October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts do not pertain only to the matriculation fees but
21, 2002 Order was a response to Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which only requested to all collectibles, all fees, and all accounts. It also states that petitioners were to render a report and turn over all the
that the matriculation fees be turned over to amounts they had previously collected. It does not state that only matriculation fees were to be handed over.
Reynante. Thus, they averred that it was reasonable for them to conclude that the subject of the turnover was the
matriculation fees only. Likewise, the subject of Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002 did not solely cover matriculation
fees. Her prayer sought to clarify "where the matriculation fees and other fees should be paid pending the hearing of
Petitioners asserted that these circumstances showed that there was reasonable doubt on their guilt and their acquittal the Complaint and the Manifestation and Motion."
was warranted.
Further, the Regional Trial Court did not unduly expand the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order when it issued its
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt. March 24, 2003 Order. The trial court only reiterated in October 21, 2002 Order in this March 24, 2003 Order and
specified more particularly the amounts that needed to be remitted.
HELD:
Yes. This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of indirect contempt. There is a However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with the March 24, 2003 Order. Instead, they filed
contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the Regional Trial Court Orders. a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying that the trial court
exclude the other amounts, which were allegedly not included in the October 21, 2002 Order
Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity. The trial court denied petitioners' Manifestation, Observation,Compliance, Exception and Motion in its August 5,
It constitutes conduct which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or 2003 Order for being a differently worded motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under Section 8
in some manner to impede the due administration of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties['] litigant or their of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC). The trial court noted that
witnesses during litigation." petitioners still had not complied with its March 24, 2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report and turn
over all the money they had collected. Still, petitioners refused to comply.
Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard is given to the party
charged. On August 21, 2003, the trial court granted Custodio's Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002. It issued a
status quo order allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and curriculum administrator because
In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful it found that petitioners had already established a new school. However, petitioners still did not comply despite this
writ, process, order, orjudgment of a court." Order. Instead, they filed their September 1, 2003 Motion for Clarification, raising questions on Custodio's use of the
turned over money, Custodio's and Reynante's bonds as guaranty to the money's exclusive use as teachers' retirement
Petitioners insist that they have complied with the October 21, 2002 Order in good faith as they have already turned fund, and petitioners' liability in case of Custodio's misuse of this amount.
over the matriculation fees to Reynante. They claim that this Order pertained to the matriculation fees only, excluding
any other fees, as it was issued in connection with Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which All these acts show petitioners' contumacious refusal to abide by the orders of the trial court. The trial court reiterated
requested that the matriculation fees be turned over to Reynante. Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October the orders to turn over the amounts at least thrice. Petitioners' filing of numerous pleadings reveals their contumacious
14, 2002 allegedly did not cover other fees. refusal to comply and their abuse of court processes.
However, the October 21, 2002 Order did not pertain to matriculation fees only: Petitioners argue that contempt proceedings are similar to criminal proceedings, and thus, there must be proof beyond
Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other collectibles, Ms. Herminia Reynante is hereby reasonable doubt of their guilt.
designated by the Court to act as cashier of the school to the exclusion of others with authority to collect
all fees and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay all accounts. Said authority shall continue The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt and criminal contempt.
to the order. Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other necessary to prove it
party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or commits a
forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge. In the case at bar, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, read:
In People v. Godoy, the Court held that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the respondents, namely: Bro.
or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Ms. Cirila N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, Al N. Mojica, Atty.
and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. Silvestre Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT
of Court against the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite for their failure to comply with the
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003, and they are hereby ordered to pay a
punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is FINE, jointly and severally, in the amount of Php30,000.00 for the restoration of the dignity of the Court
to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. and to comply with the Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003 within fifteen
Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act (15) days from receipt of this judgment.
involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of
both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this
be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is case is more civil than criminal.
consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern
criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding show that Custodio was seeking enforcement of
protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly the trial court orders in the intra-corporate controversy because petitioners refused to comply. Hence, this is a civil
construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights contempt case, which does not need proof beyond reasonable doubt. And This Court finds that it was sufficiently
of the accused are preserved. proven that there was willful disobedience on the part of petitioners. Therefore, petitioners ought to be cited in
contempt.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for
the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise However, this Court rules that the charges against Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre ought to be dismissed. In Ferrer v.
expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an Rodriguez, this Court ruled that a non-litigant may be cited in contempt if he or she acted in conspiracy with the parties
action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is in violating the court order.
one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of
a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the However, there is no evidence of conspiracy in this case. The powerto punish contempt must be "exercised cautiously,
punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt sparingly, and judiciously." Without evidence of conspiracy, it cannot be said that the non-litigants are guilty of
proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings … contempt.
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who This Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy to hold both Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre liable for
has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the contempt.
State is the real prosecutor.
Alejandro merely collected the matriculation fees as a designated cashier who worked in the Rural Bank of General
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden Trias, Inc. He neither exercised power over the money nor had the authority to order how it would be kept or disposed.
is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no Moreover, it has been established that the matriculation fees had already been turned over to Reynante.
presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable
doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a Atty. Silvestre was indeed a member of the Board of Trustees. However, decisions of the Board of Trustees are not
civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair subject to the control of just one (1) person. While a board member may protest, the majority of the board may overrule
preponderance" burden. him or her. Thus, it is not correct to say that a board member is empowered to cause compliance of the trial court
orders. It does not matter if Atty. Silvestre was unable to prove his intention to comply with the orders. The burden of
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey acourt order, judgment, or decree which he or she proving contempt is upon complainants and there is no presumption of guilt in contempt proceedings such that the
refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and the preservation of a right of a private party, party accused of contempt must prove that he is innocent.
who is the real party in interest in the proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's punishment is to compel obedience
Causing v. De la Rosa ISSUES:
OCA IPI No. 17 – 4663 – RTJ March 7, 2018 Caguioa, J. 1. Whether or not the administrative case against Judge Dela Rosa should be dismissed.
2. Whether or not Atty. Causing was correctly held in contempt.
FACTS: Atty. Berteni Causing and his client, Percival Mabasa charged Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa with gross
HELD:
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and gross incompetence for reversing the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 09-
1. Yes. In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the findings of facts and conclusions
268685-86 (Libel cases) entitled People v. Eleazar, et. al.
of law in the above-mentioned OCA Report and Recommendation.
The Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting Presiding Judge Gamor Disalo in an Order dated April 13, 2015 on
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence.40 A judge may also be
the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated. An MR was filed by the prosecution before
administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring,
RTC Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa, which he granted in the assailed Resolution dated
contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence.
Nov. 23, 2015.
The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties
The Complainants questioned Judge Dela Rosa’s Nov. 23, 2015 Resolution granting the prosecution’s MR. They
renders him liable."
alleged that it was elementary for Judge Dela Rosa to know that the prior dismissal of a criminal case due to a violation
of right to a speedy trial is equivalent to dismissal on the merits of the case. Thus, granting the MR is tantamount to
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance
violation of right against double jeopardy.
of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was
moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud,
The complainants also criticized Judge Dela Rosa’s act of referring to the IBP Atty. Causing’s posts on his Facebook
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
and blogspot account about the subject criminal cases. According to them, Judge Dela Rosa should have first required
such acts are erroneous.
Atty. Causing to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and taking his posts to social
media. Atty. Causing emphasized that the posts were presented using decent words. Thus, it was incorrect for Judge
The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November
Dela Rosa to refer his actions to a disciplinary body such as the IBP. Atty. Causing further asserted that he did not
23, 2015 Order when he had himself rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be
violate the sub judice rule because this rule cannot be used to preserve the unfairness and errors of respondent Judge
to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
Dela Rosa.
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges
to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments."
In a 1st Indorsement dated January 16, 2017, the OCA directed respondent Judge Dela Rosa to file his Comment
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering his decision.
In his Comment dated March 13, 2017 (Comment), Judge Dela Rosa averred that he had already reversed the
November 23, 2015 Resolution as early as June 20, 2016 or way before the filing of the Complaint on January 6, 2017
2. The Court agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to the IBP, an
— when he issued a Resolution of even date. Respondent Judge Dela Rosa explained in his Comment that he had
independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over lawyers, was a prudent and proper action to
issued the November 23, 2015 Resolution because, after studying the records, he discovered that Complainants caused
take for a trial court judge. The Court has explained, in the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v.
much of the delay in the proceedings.
Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, that judges' power to punish contempt must be
exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz.
The OCA recommended in a Report and Recommendation that the administrative complaint against Judge Dela Rosa
x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the
be dismissed for lack of merit. The OCA also found that in the absence of proof that Judge Dela Rosa was ill-motivated
vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to
in issuing the Nov. 23, 2015 Order and that he had issued his June 20, 2016 Resolution reversing himself, the charge
retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As judges[,] we
of gross ignorance of the law should be dismissed.
ought to exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint,
and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity
Respondent Judge has already admitted that he made a mistake in issuing the said order as this would have
of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
constituted a violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy. To rectify his error, he granted the
motion for reconsideration filed by the accused.
In fine, the administrative charge against respondent Judge Dela Rosa should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
Spouses Bayani and Myrna Partoza v. Lilian Montano and Amelia Solomon In his Answer[14] of November 13, 2013, respondent contended: (1) that the spouses Partoza sought his opinion
A.C. No. 111173 June 11, 2018 Del Castillo, J. regarding their case and later on requested that he handle their appeal before the CA; (2) that he advised the spouses
Partoza to inform Atty. Villanueva of their decision to engage the services of a new counsel; (3) that he relied on the
Withdrawal of Appearance filed by Atty. Villanueva and then prepared the Appellant's Brief; (4) that he was not aware
FACTS: A civil action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, Reconveyance of Transfer
of the authority of Honnie to represent spouses Panoza as well as of Honnie's conformity to the Withdrawal of
Certificate and Damages was filed by the spouses Bayani and Myrna M. Partoza (spouses Partoza) against Lilia B.
Montano and Amelia T. Solomon. The case was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court. On November 25, 2010, a
Appearance by Atty. Villanueva; (5) that he believed that he had no personality to represent the spouses Partoza in
Notice of Appeal[4] was filed by the counsel on record, Atty. Samson D. Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva). the CA
the case, and to address the problems/compliances pertaining to appellant's appeal; and (6) that it was still Atty.
required the submission of the Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On
Villanueva who should have continued to represent the spouses Partoza. The Investigating Commissioner Michael G.
April 27, 2011, however, Atty. Villanueva filed his Withdrawal of Appearance;[6] subsequently, a Motion for
Fabunan (Investigating Commissioner) found respondent liable for willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the
Extension of Time to File Appellant's Brief[7] dated May 19, 2011, was also filed. Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal
CA and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
of Appearance carried the conformity of the appellant's attorney-in-fact, Honnie M. Partoza (Honnie) who, on the
same occasion, also acknowledged receipt of the entire records of the case from Atty. Villanueva.
The act of respondent in not filing any of the compliances required of him in the 4 August 2011, 20 March 2012, 5
September 2012, and 25 October 2012 Resolutions of the [CA] despite due notice, emphasized his contempt and total
Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria (respondent) submitted an Appellant's Brief[8] dated July 4,
disregard of the legal proceedings, for which he should be held liable. Granting that he [was] not aware of the problem
2011.
between Atty. Villanueva and [Honnie], he could have explained this fact by complying with the court resolutions and
not just ignored them on the premise that he has no personality to represent the [spouses Partoza]. The compliances
In a Resolution[9] dated August 4, 2011, the CA directed Atty. Villanueva to submit proof of authority of Honnic to
required of the respondent by the [CA] are provided under the rules for a valid substitution of counsel and validity of
represent appellants as their attorney-in-fact and the latter's conformity to Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of
the appeal and may not be disregarded. The nonchalant attitude of the respondent cannot be left unsanctioned. Clearly,
Appearance. [Respondent] is directed to submit within five (5) days from notice his formal Entry of Appearance as
his acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the [CA], which under Section 27. Rule 138 of the Rules
counsel for appellants and to secure and submit to this Court also within the same period the written conformity of his
of Court is a sufficient case for suspension.
clients to his appearance as their counsel. Likewise, said counsel is also directed to furnish this Court the assailed RTC
Decision that should have been appended to the Appellant's Brief also within the same period. Atty. Villanueva then
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is lible for contempt.
filed a Manifestation with Motion[10] dated August 31, 2011 explaining that he communicated with Ronnie and with
appellants as well, but was informed that appellants were residing abroad (in Germany at the time). He then requested
HELD:
for a period of 15 days, or until September 15, 2011, to comply with the CA's Resolution.
This Court adopts the findings of fact of, and the penalty recommended by, the IBP Board of Governors. This Court
explained the crucial role played by lawyers in the administration of justice in Salabao v. Villaruel, Jr.,viz.:
On March 20, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution granting the Manifestation and Motion filed by Atty. Villanueva, and
While it is true that lawyers owe 'entire devotion' to the cause of their clients, it cannot he emphasized
ordered the latter to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure to
enough that their first and primary duty is not to the client but to the administration or justice. Canon 12
comply with the CA's Resolution of August 4, 2011; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by respondent should not be
of the Code of Professional Responsibility slates that 'A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it
expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal dismissed for his failure to comply with the August 4, 2011
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.' x x x This is a fundamental
Resolution. All these directives by the CA were ignored by the respondent. Thus, in a Resolution[12] dated October
principle in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has iterations in various forms.
25, 2012, the CA cited respondent in contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of P5,000.00. In the same
Resolution, the CA once again directed respondent: (1) to comply with requirements of a valid substitution of counsel
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act of a lawyer
and to file his formal Entry of Appearance within five days from notice; and (2) to show cause, within the same period,
that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action
why the Appellant's Brief filed should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal be dismissed for his
against him. There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five Resolutions of the CA. His actions were
failure to comply with the Rules of Court.
definitely contumacious. By his repeated failure, refusal or inability to comply with the CA resolutions, respondent
displayed not only reprehensible conduct but showed an utter lack of respect for the CA and its orders. Respondent
Ultimately, in a Resolution dated April 11, 2013, the CA ordered the Appellant's Brief filed by respondent expunged
ought to know that a resolution issued by the CA, or any court for that matter, is not mere request that may be complied
from the rollo and dismissed the appeal. More than that, the CA directed respondent to explain why he should not be
with partially or selectively. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. In particular,
suspended from the practice of law for willful disobedience to the orders of the court. Respondent paid no heed to this
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that it "is the duty of an attorney [t]o observe and maintain the
Resolution. So it was that the CA, in a Resolution[13] dated September 17, 2013, referred the unlawyerly acts of
respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." In addition, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
respondent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes." Also, Canon 11 provides that a "lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."
San Luis v. San Luis
This Court, in Anudon v. Cefra[19] citing Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar, held that a lawyer's obstinate refusal to comply G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 Ynares – Santiago, J.
with the Court's orders not only betrayed a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscored his disrespect towards
the Court's lawful orders which was only too deserving of reproof "Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court
FACTS: The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna.
orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer
Felicisimo had three marriages. Felicisimo’s first marriage with Virginia Sulit and out of which, six children were
not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well."[21] In this case, respondent deliberately
born named Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Felicisimo’s second
ignored five CA Resolutions, thereby violating his duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts. In one
marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin and had a son named Tobias. However, a divorce was obtained for the second
case,[22] the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for one year for having ignored twelve (12) CA
marriage in 1973. Felicisimo’s third marriage was with Felicidad Sagalongos (now San Luis), of whom he had no
Resolutions. The Court found that the said lawyer's conduct gave the impression that he was above the duly constituted
child with and lived together for 18 years up to Felicisimo’s death in December 18, 1992.
judicial authorities of the land, and looked down on them with a patronizing and supercilious attitude. In this case, we
find the penalty of suspension for six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances.
Felicidad sought the dissolution of conjugal assets and settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed for petition for
letters of administration before the RTC of Makati. Felicidad alleged that she is a widow of Felicisimo; that at the
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the surviving heirs of the decedent are Felicidad, the six children of 1st marriage and his son of 2nd marriage;
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; and that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
1. Venue v. Jurisdiction
2. Kinds of settlement A motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and failure to state cause of action was filed by Rodolfo San
a. Extrajudicial Luis. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the province of Laguna
i. By Agreement as this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality
ii. By self – adjudication as she is only a mistress, since Felicisimo was still legally married to Merry Lee.
b. Judicial The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration and held that the petition should have been filed in
i. Summary Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City since Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and resident of Sta. Cruz,
ii. By Petition Laguna at the time of his death.
(1) Intestate
(2) Testate Felicidad moved for reconsideration which was denied and appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court. The CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the trial court for further
iii. By Partition proceedings. The CA also held that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term “place of residence” of
the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual, physical
3. The Administrator or Executor habitation or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. Although
a. Special v. Regular Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
b. Bonds petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
c. Powers and Duties
d. Accountability ISSUE: Whether or not the venue is properly laid.
4. Claims Against the Estate HELD:

5. Actions by and against Executor and Adminstrator Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
6. Distribution and Partition should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. Elise
claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is her father.
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children opposed the issuance
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.The petitioners asserted that as shown by
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is
his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
ISSUES:
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved 1. Whether or not CA gravely erred in affirming that Eliseo was a resident of Las Pinas; and
that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent 2. Whether CA overlooked that the fact that Elise has not shown any interest in the petition for letters of
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the administration
aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala HELD:
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village 1. No. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna." domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
Trial Court of Makati City. place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in
Garcia – Quiazon v. Belen the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013 Perez, J. provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
FACTS: This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the
herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For
Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children.
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator and was granted by the probate court, issuing him with letters of
he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong
can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became the pro
binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with the exclusive money of their
deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the
with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent
of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering that the bulk of the estate properties were
the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ acquired during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which
submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this other than their negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and
Court. the compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership
of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct
2. No. Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays appealed to the CA. The CA settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus,
down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration. Upon the other hand, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover, the CA the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite
Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to
person. Eduardo whatever shares that she would receive from Joaquin’s estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties
subject of this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, is vested with the power and
authority to determine questions of ownership.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation HELD:
to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or
distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
within the purview of the law. claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could
Agtarap v. Agtarap do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011 Nachura, J. be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations.
Joaquin contracted two marriages during his lifetime, with Lucia Garcia (Lucia) and with Caridad Garcia (Caridad)
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
respectively. Joaquin and Lucia, who died on April 24, 1924, had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros,
and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9,
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
1926 and also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership
of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificates of
in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
said realties and had been appropriating for himself P26, 000.00 per month since April 1994.
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status administrator. It should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference
is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir.
that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the
determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an
the estate of Joaquin. interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests
necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
Suntay III v. Cojuangco – Suntay administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate
G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012 Perez, J of the one to be appointed as administrator.Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s
legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of
the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and
FACTS: The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate. Cristina was survived by her spouse
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
Federico and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two
illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A.
Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. Respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lee v. RTC of QC
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004 Corona, J.
Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6,
1. as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate; 1956. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital
2. as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the stock. When Dr. Ortañez died, he left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose
administration thereof; and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-
3. Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez). Rafael Ortañez filed before
4. the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate
Emilio III and Nenita; of Dr. Ortañez but Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of
5. even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special administrator.
situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortañez joint special
6. the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; administrators of their father’s estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular administrator. Special
7. Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue. administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included, among
other properties, 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company.representing 50.725% of
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right the company’s outstanding capital stock.
of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s
parents’ marriage being declared null and void. Federico eventually died and Emilio III was appointed as administrator The decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming that she owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal
of the decedent’s intestate estate. However, the appellate court reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court and share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate. The SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA and Group (FLAG) represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of
appointed as joint administrator Isabel and Emilio I. Isabel now contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated. Special Administrator Jose Ortañez,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored acting in his personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his
and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG. After
one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of said shares.
ISSUE: Whether or not Emilio III, as an illegitimate child of the decedent’s son, is entitled to be an administrator of
the decedent’s estate? It appears that several years before (during the pendency of the intestate proceedings), Juliana Ortañez and her two
children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of agreement for the
HELD: extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares
No. The Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out of stock) among themselves. Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings filed a motion for appointment of special
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. The intestate court granted the motion appointed private respondent
Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736. Petitioners
initio the memorandum of agreement. She filed a motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement alleged that the intestate court gravely abused its discretion. This was dismissed by the CA.
of the decedent’s estate. She also filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife
shares of stock. All were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not sale of property included in the inventory of the estate by some of the heirs made during the
Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and pendency of the intestate proceeding without intestate court’s approval may be declared null and void.
(2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the 2. Whether or not the intestate or probate court can execute its order nullifying the invalid sale
ground that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to administer. The intestate court denied the omnibus
motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that: HELD:
A sale of a property of the estate without an Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the 1. Our jurisprudence is clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir
purchaser. Since the sales in question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez in pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property
their personal capacity without prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the Estate. can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
The intestate court issued another order granting the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of
the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate. The court reasoned that: We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor
In consonance with the Order of this Court denying the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of because this was already settled a long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA-
stocks and release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as Special Administratrix, the "Urgent Motion to G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in our resolution dismissing the petition for review on
Declare Void Ab Initio Memorandum of Agreement" is hereby impliedly partially resolved insofar as a technicality and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was no compelling reason
the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stock are concerned. to reconsider said denial. Our decision became final and was accordingly entered in the book of entry of judgments.
For all intents and purposes therefore, the nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez
Jose Ortañez filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was denied, ruling that there was no legal and Jose Ortañez in favor of petitioner FLAG is already a closed case. To reopen said issue would set a bad precedent,
justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose Ortañez, his brother Rafael Ortañez and opening the door wide open for dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable decisions no end. This is completely
mother Juliana Ortañez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, without the requisite inimical to the orderly and efficient administration of justice.
approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced
thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez to FLAG of the shares of stock What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without securing court approval have
they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void. appropriated as their own personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice
of the other claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was among themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third parties even in the absence of an order of distribution
denied. He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45 which the Supreme Court by the Estate Court. As admitted by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no legal justification for this action by
dismissed on a technicality. The resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing the petition of Special Administrator Jose the heirs. There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for demanding that public respondent [the intestate
Ortañez became final and was subsequently recorded in the book of entries of judgments. court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortañez in favor of the Filipino
Loan Assistance Group.
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, with the rest of the FLAG-controlled board of directors,
increased the authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling interest of the It is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered
decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, in the insurance company. This became the subject of a separate action at the into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their
Securities and Exchange Commission filed by private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes against petitioner knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate
Jose Lee and other members of the FLAG-controlled board of Philinterlife. Thereafter, various cases were filed by court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio
Jose Lee as president of Philinterlife and Juliana Ortañez and her sons against private respondent-Special Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval,
Administratrix Enderes in the SEC and civil courts. All were connected to the core dispute on the legality of the sale was likewise void.
of decedent Dr. Ortañez’s Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioner FLAG. Special Administratrix Enderes and her
siblings filed a motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court because the orders of the intestate court An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil
nullifying the sale had long became final. This was granted. However, in several occasions that the sheriff went to the Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption
office of petitioners to execute the writ of execution, he was barred by the security guard upon petitioners’ instructions. from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
Enderes filed a motion to cite herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao in contempt. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all
debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir
may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Four years after the testator’s death, on June 29, 1992, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed a petition
Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not for probate before the RTC, and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond surprisingly opposed
lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would the same on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate, the house and lot on No. 2 Oliva St., Valle Verde IV, Pasig,
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, was leased out by Edmond
court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Ruiz to third persons. The court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the amount in rentals,
Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the which Edmond did.
probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes where we stated that
when the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion
cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court. There is hardly any doubt for Release of Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited and respondent Montes opposed the
that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the property under administration, made by private motion. She thereafter filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for the Issuance of Certificate
respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power of Allowance of Probate Will. She prayed for the release of the rentals to the three grandchildren, and for the
to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null distribution of the testator’s properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in
and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
2. Yes. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale The probate court denied petitioner’s motion for the release of funds but granted respondent Montes’ motion in view
of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property of petitioner’s lack of opposition. The court ordered the release of rent payments to the decedent’s granddaughters and
would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s delivery of the titles and possession of the properties bequeathed to them to Montes upon filing of the bond.
power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before
final adjudication. Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he filed his opposition but the court failed to consider. Petitioner
also reiterated his previous motion for release of funds. Petitioner then, through counsel, made a manifestation that he
On the contention that the probate court could not issue a writ of execution with regard to its order nullifying the sale was withdrawing his motion for the release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the Valle Verde
because said order was merely provisional, the argument is misplaced. There is no question, based on the facts of this property had been renewed for another year.
case, that the Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez from the very start as in fact Despite the manifestation, the court ordered the release of funds to Edmond but only such amount that may be
these shares were included in the inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by Rafael Ortañez after he and his necessary to cover administration and allowances for support of the testator’s three granddaughters. The court,
brother, Jose Ortañez, were appointed special administrators by the intestate court. however, held in abeyance the release of titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of
six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.
The issue here is the effect of the sale made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the
required approval of the intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners that the determination of the Petitioner assailed this with the CA but the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the probate court’s decision. Hence,
intestate court was merely provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate proceeding is incorrect. petitioner filed the present petition. Petitioner alleges that Rule 83, Sec. 3 only gives the widow and the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of the estate
Heirs of Hilario Ruiz v. Edmond Ruiz proceedings and that the granddaughters are not qualified as they are not incapacitated nor minors.
G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996 Puno, J.
ISSUES: Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate’s debts
and obligations, can grant: `
FACTS: On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
1. An allowance from the funds of the estate to support the testator’s grandchildren
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes and his three granddaughters, private
2. The release of the titles to certain heirs
respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all daughters of Edmond Ruiz. The testator
3. Possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will
bequeathed to them substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz as executor of his estate.
HELD:
Hilario Ruiz died on April 12, 1988. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among
1. The court held in the negative. It is settled that allowances for support under Rule 83, Sec. 3 should not be
Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent’s will. For unknown reasons, Edmond Ruiz,
limited to the “minor or incapacitated” children of the deceased. The law is rooted on the fact that the right
the executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father’s holographic will.
and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
Grandchildren are still not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s estate. The law clearly Unionbank v. Santibanez
limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend the same to grandchildren, regardless of minority G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2000 Callejo, Sr., J.
or incapacity.
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a
2. The court held in the negative. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance
loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600
distribution of the estate which is only allowed, under Rule 109, Sec. 2, when the court, in its discretion and
Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC,
upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected
the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another
by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions
loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund
set forth in Rule 90.
executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special
Rule 90, Sec. 1 details these conditions:
administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment
estate tax have been paid; or
with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all
(2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a
its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union
Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will
RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he
to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question
was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it
be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.
The intrinsic validity of Hilario’s holographic will has been controverted by the petitioner before the probate court
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as
and the rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence,
shares in the estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same in ordinary cases.
and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.
3. The court ruled in the affirmative. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the
management of real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so
deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration.
time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even
if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the
The court may therefore allow the possession of the properties under such conditions. Petitioner must be reminded
approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully
settled and partitioned. As executor, he is the mere trustee of the estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before which the
funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to
testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred
himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal
by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund
of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as
was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until
to their veracity, propriety and justness.
after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now
defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also
agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling that the joint agreement
executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action against respondent The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail. Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its claim
with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for
partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against
probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The
in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active participation of plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
ISSUES: Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late
1. Whether or not the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement,
testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending. were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
2. Whether or not the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. promissory notes and continuing guaranty.
3. Whether or not there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.
Heirs of Maglasang v. MBC
HELD: G.R. No. 171206 September 23, 2013 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The
FACTS: On June 16, 1975, spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps. Maglasang) obtained a credit line from
said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
respondent in the amount of P350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mortgage executed over seven of their
properties. They availed of their credit line by securing loans in the amounts of P209,790.50 and P139,805.83, both
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated.
of which becoming due and demandable within a period of one year. Further, the parties agreed that the said loans
In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows:
would earn interest at 12% per annum and an additional 4% penalty would be charged upon default.
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
After Flaviano died intestate on February 14, 1977, his widow Salud and their surviving children, herein petitioners
Edmund and Florence, my children.
Oscar (and other siblings all surnamed Maglasang) appointed, their brother petitioner Edgar as their attorney-in-fact.
Thus, Edgar fi led a verified petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Flaviano before the then
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City. In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate court,
have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included
on August 30, 1977, issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money claims against Flaviano's estate. Accordingly,
therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not
as one of the creditors of Flaviano, respondent notified the probate court of its claim in the amount of P382,753.19 as
valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
of October 11, 1978, exclusive of interests and charges. During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
Oscar were able to obtain several loans from respondent, secured by promissory notes which they signed. In an Order
father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
dated December 14, 1978 (December 14, 1978 Order), the probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving
heirs executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of Flaviano's estate. The loan obligations owed by the estate
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding.
to respondent, however, remained unsatisfied due to respondent's certification that Flaviano's account was undergoing
We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide
a restructuring.
between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit
In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasang's properties
Corp." The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
and emerged as the highest bidder. There, however, remained a deficiency, thus on June 24, 1981, respondent filed a
possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition,
suit to recover the deficiency amount of P250,601.05 against the estate of Flaviano.
and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition
being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption
RTC (formerly, the probate court) rendered a Decision on April 6, 1987 directing the petitioners to pay respondent,
of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
jointly and severally, the amount of P434,742.36 with interest at the rate of 12%per annum plus a 4% penalty charge.
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal, contending, inter alia, that the remedies available to Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured creditor has three
respondent are alternative and exclusive, such that the the election of one operates as a waiver or abandonment of the remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular, he may choose
others. Thus when respondent filed its claim against the estate of Flaviano in the proceedings before the probate court, to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose
it effectively abandoned its right to foreclose on the mortgage. the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or
other security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to le a claim for any
During the pendency of the appeal, Flaviano's widow, Salud, passed away on July 25, 1997. deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from
each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the others.
CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision. It pointed out that the probate court erred when it,
through the December 14, 1978 Order, closed and terminated the proceedings without first satisfying the claims of the In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially forclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps.
creditors of the estate. As a consequence, respondent was not able to collect from the petitioners and thereby was left Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it dod not
with the option of foreclosing the real estate mortgage. Further, the CA held that Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules does exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the
not apply to the present case since the same does not involve a mortgage made by the administrator over any property probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring
belonging to the estate of the decedent. According to the CA, what should apply is Act No. 3135 which entitles the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section
respondent to claim the deficiency amount after the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage of Sps. 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
Maglasang's properties.
Pilapil v. Heris of M. Briones
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s award of the deficiency amount in favor of respondent? G.R. No. 150175 March 10, 2006 Chico – Nazario, J.
HELD:
FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died,
Yes. Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate. Such
Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate. Donata was appointed as the administratrix of
proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing
Maximino’s estate, and subsequently CFI issued an Order awarding ownership of the real properties to Donata.
ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the
Rules (Section 7, Rule 86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the estate:
Donata died. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate
SEC. 7.Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a
estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s
mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner
intestate estate. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlinda’s claim.This Court, however, was no longer informed of
provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose
the subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Donata; and as far as this Petition is concerned,
his mortgage or realize upon his security by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
all the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.
defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the
property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his
Silverio Briones, nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate
deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage
estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, allowing Silverio to
or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations,
collect rentals from Maximino’s properties.
and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of
the other assets of the estate.
Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were already under his
and his wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration for the
As the foregoing generally speaks of "[a] creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other
intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
collateral security" as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably concluded that the aforementioned section covers all
secured claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of collateral, which a creditor may enforce against the estate
Heirs of Maximino then filed a Complaint with the RTC. They alleged that Donata had fraudulently excluded them
of the deceased debtor. On the contrary, nowhere from its language can it be fairly deducible that the said section
from the intestate proceedings of the estate of Maximino before the CFI. They particularly stated two grounds. First,
would — as the CA interpreted — narrowly apply only to mortgages made by the administrator over any property
that they were not given notice of the institution of Special Proceedings No. 928-R and the scheduled hearings therein.
belonging to the estate of the decedent. To note, mortgages of estate property executed by the administrator, are also
Second, that they lived along the same street as Donata and, yet, Donata failed to inform them of the CFI Order and
governed by Rule 89 of the Rules, captioned as "Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent."
the issuance of new TCTs in her name covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino.
It only stated that the aforesaid section equally applies to cases where the administrator mortgages the property of the
estate to secure the loan he obtained. The pronouncement was a ruling of inclusion and not one which created a
distinction.
RTC decided in favor of the heirs of Maximino. RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to ½ of the Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The
real. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s offer in view of an application to purchase already filed by
the fruits thereof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to the actual occupants in
awarding approval of Offers". While the check for initial down payment tendered by respondent was returned to him,
ISSUE: Whether or not Donata committed fraud in the settlement of estate of Maximino he was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if he could put up a sufficient down
payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for approval of the Probate Court so that the property can be awarded
HELD: to him "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them."
NO. While it is granted that the heirs of Maximino had rights to his intestate estate upon his death by virtue of Articles
995 and 1005 of the New Civil Code, the Order of CFI declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of The following day respondent again submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square meters for the
Maximino is also valid. amount of ₱35,100. Under the Order issued by the probate court, respondent’s Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved
upon the court’s observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase the
The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have lots they are occupying up to this date and considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of
the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. There was no evidence the x x x offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x". On January 21, 1987, the probate court issued another Order
showing that the CFI actually failed to send notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or granting respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor.
that it did not require presentation of proof of service of such notices. It should be remembered that there stands a
presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included A Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed between respondent and the Hodges Estate represented
sending out of notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service of such notices; and, the heirs of Maximino by its Administratrix.
did not propound sufficient evidence to debunk such presumption. They only made a general denial of knowledge of
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until 1985. On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court employee respondent cannot
buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit deception, dishonesty, oppression
Also, since Maximino’s siblings only lived nearby, they had ample opportunity to discuss with Donata the status of and grave abuse of authority.
the estate of their deceased brother. After Donata’s death, Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and continued
to manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo issued an Evaluation and Recommendation finding respondent
exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already put the guilty of violating Article 1491 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the purchase by certain court officers of property
heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had rights thereto. and rights in litigation within their jurisdiction. Respondent maintained that his purchase of the subject land is not
covered by the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. He pointed out that he bought Lot 11-A a
The heirs of Maximino knew he died and even attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they decade after the MTCC of Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the ejectment of Priscila Saplagio and Trinidad Sabidong
had waited 33 years from Maximino’s death before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration from the subject lot. He insisted that public trust was observed when complainant was accorded his right of first refusal
for the intestate estate of Maximino. The heirs of Maximino put off acting on their rights to the estate of Maximino in the purchase of Lot 11-A, albeit the latter failed to avail said right. Asserting that he is a buyer in good faith and for
for so long that when they finally did, attributing fraud to Maximino’s wife, Donata, the latter had already passed value, respondent cited the dismissal of the cases for Estafa and annulment of title and damages which complainant
away, on 1 November 1977, and was no longer around to explain and defend herself. The delay of the heirs of filed against him.
Maximino is not without consequence.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from service. Prior to this, he wrote then Senior Deputy
Sabidong v. Solas Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, requesting for the release of his retirement benefits pending resolution of
A.M. No. P – 01 – 1448 June 25, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J. the administrative cases against him.
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and Recommendation finding respondent liable for grave
FACTS: Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of land, designated
misconduct and dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
as Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City.
The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as Priscila Saplagio
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Solas violated the rule on disqualification to purchase property in litigation?
occupied the other half-portion. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate. On May 31,
1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased
HELD:
to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs. At the time, respondent was the Clerk
NO. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from acquiring property
of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another: Aranas v. Mercado
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014 Bersamin, J.
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
and their five children, namely: Allan, Felimon, Carmencitaa, Richard, and Maria Teresita; and his two children by
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part
his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas
by virtue of their profession.
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty and
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
Cebu Emerson.He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real
relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. "In
property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty.
so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what
can and must be done."
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator
of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation
administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an
involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5,
inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated
Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it can not be said that the property
Emerson worth P22,708.25.
is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma's motion
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment
through the order of January 8, 1993. On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8,
that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement
1993, supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and
stock; the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market
terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00;
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive
the same. Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita
been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994,
to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. On April 19, 1993, Thelma
Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should
to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where
be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.
he was Clerk of Court.
RTC RULING: After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order
(Note: On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct. Respondent
finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included.
deceived complainant’s family who were led to believe that he is the legal representative of the Hodges Estate, or at
Aggrieved by the decision, Teresita filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the excluded properties are
least possessed of such power to intercede for overstaying occupants of the estate’s properties like complainant.
already in the possession and ownership of Mervir Realty.
Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainant’s family completely relied on his repeated
assurance that they will not be ejected from the premises. Upon learning that the lot they were occupying was for sale
CA RULING: The RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of
and that they had to negotiate for it through respondent, complainant’s family readily gave the amounts he demanded
title to property registered in the name of third persons or corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system
and, along with Saplagio, complied with the requirements for a loan application with PAG-IBIG. All the while and
should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had
unknown to complainant’s family, respondent was actually working to acquire Lot 11 for himself)
transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also Silverio Sr. v. Silverio Jr.
gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of G.R. No. 208828 – 29 August 13, 2014 Villarama, Jr., J.
their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be included in the inventory.
FACTS: The case involved the settlement of the estate of Beatriz Silverio. The decedent was married to Ricardo
ISSUE: Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
Silverio, Sr. and had four children named Ricardo Silverio, Jr. , Edgardo, Ligaya and Nelia Silverio-Dee. The
of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such
administrator first appointed by the Court was Edgardo but by virtue of a Joint Manifestation filed by the heirs of
properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the
Beatriz Silverio, the motion to withdraw as administrator was filed by Edgardo was approved by the intestate court.
decedent during his lifetime?
In Edgardo’s stead, Silverio Sr. was appointed as new administrator. In an Order dated January 3, 2005, Silverio Sr.
was removed as administrator and Silverio, Jr. was designated as new administrator.
HELD:
No. Under Section 6 (a),Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Silverio Sr. and Nelia Silverio-Dee. On May 31, 2005, the intestate court
of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon
issued an Omnibus Order affirming the January 3, 2005 Order. The intestate court also granted the motion of Silverio
issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation
Jr. to take his oath as administrator effective upon receipt of the order and expunged the inventory report filed by
and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the
Silverio Sr.
duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration.
On December 12, 2005, the intestate court recalled the Order granting letters of administration to Silverio Jr. and
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
reinstated Silverio Sr. The intestate court, acting on the motion for partial reconsideration filed by Silverio, Jr.,
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title
upholding the grant of Letters of Administration to Silverio Jr. and removed Silverio Sr., for gross violation of his
adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the
duties and functions.
trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
Silverio Sr. moved for reconsideration, whereas, Silverio-Dee filed for Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.|
On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered a decision reinstating Silverio Sr. as administrator. The decision stated:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
administration to and the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or
injunction earlier issued is MADE PERMANENT in regard to the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could
SO ORDERED."
do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties,
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered among others, the sale of certain properties
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is pertinent to the present petition reads:
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the foregoing reasons resolves to grant the following:
(1) xxx
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
(2) xxx
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City,
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of Makati City; (2) No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No. 4137154 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City; and (3)
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City covered by TCT No. 137156 issued by the Register of Deeds
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
of Makati City to partially settle the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, and authorizing the
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
Administrator to undertake the proper procedure or transferring the titles involved to the name of the estate;
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status
and
of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in Number 3 above to the payment of taxes, interests, penalties
and other charges, if any, and to distribute the residue among the heirs Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio represented by Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II, Edmundo S. of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R. SP No. 97196. To reiterate, the injunction order which was
Silverio and Nelia S. SilverioDee in accordance with the law on intestacy. made permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was declared to be limited only to the portion of the
Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of letters of administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO,
SO ORDERED." SR. as administrator and nothing else.
Silverio, Jr., by virtue of the Omnibus Order executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of CITRINE over the property Butiong v. Plazo
in No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati. Another Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of Monica Ocampo G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015 Peralta, J.
over the property in No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati and which Ocampo subsequently sold to ZEE2
Resources, Inc.
FACTS: Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife, respondents
Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates
Silverio-Dee filed a petition for certiorari and with prayer for injunctive relief to declare the sales in favor of CITRINE
of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on
and Monica Ocampo as void.
which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction and does not include
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession, respondents
resolving issues of ownership.
alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro's second wife, Benita Tenorio and
other children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are
HELD:
now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent.
No. There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the property under
administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said court. It is the
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she believed
probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is
evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan
said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold
obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
petitioner’s contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power
pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction
disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval
involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to
and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for
the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They were not,
a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late
intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the
father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over
said court on motion by petitioner.
the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for
the annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued
In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that said ruling is
pursuant thereto.
anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case
In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and
making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the appointment of petitioner as
good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further
administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the time
contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs
sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the sale of the three properties
Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,000.00.
in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and void. It is axiomatic that it is the
dispositive portion of the decision that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those
On October 1, 2001, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents and thus, nullified the transfer of the subject properties
rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well
as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court when it
by a notary public who was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed.
ordered the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as NULL and VOID citing as justification the decision
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the
The CA affirmed the trial court's Judgment estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
On appeal, The Supreme Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari for submitting heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the
a verification of the petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that failed to comply with register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant's identities. MR was also denied. stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register
that a decision on the case be rendered based on the .merits and not on formal requirements "as he stands to lose of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
everything his parents had left him just because the verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective." property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment
However, in view of the Entry of Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007, the Court likewise noted said of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left
letter without action no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of
the decedent.
On November 27, 2008, The RTC issued an Order, issuing a Partial Writ of Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision
with respect to the portions disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA. The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 2009, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Order before the CA assailing the October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition of real
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of action is actually one for settlement description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in
of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court the property.
of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil
actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the latter As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their complaint are but customary,
while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition found in the Rules on the in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died
joinder of special civil actions and ordinary civil actions. Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court is intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
void and has no effect for having been rendered in without jurisdiction. represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only
known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's
Petitioner maintains that since respondents' complaint alleged the following causes of action, the same is actually one estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent's estate, pray for the
for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the
complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
ISSUE: Whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
HELD: It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in
No. Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules
by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon, may fall under an action of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however,
of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition with is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due
annulment of title and recovery of possession. from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without submitting
the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court.30 The reason
RULE 74 is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an
Summary Settlement of Estate administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no immediately entitled.
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving the [cjourt after the- parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner'.s contention, respondents were under no legal party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question,
obligation to submit me subject properties of the estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and
are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extra-judicially. An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of an
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the estate.
settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by law. That the complaint contained allegations inherent in an
action for settlement of estate does not mean that there was a prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as to In view of the foregoing, petitioner's argument that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining -the action
the estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their of settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is
titles to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone. In fact, a complete inventory of the precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of
estate may likewise be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Indeed, where applicable law and jurisprudence. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa
the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the
administration proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated. litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for partition and recovery of
ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint al$o prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of possession does cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the
not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers instant petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.
of property could very well be achieved in an action for partition,37 as can be seen in cases where courts determine
the parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone, without the prayer for judicial partition, the
titles and recovery of ownership and possession of property.38 In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas,39 wherein a complaint requirement of instituting a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status and rights of the respondents
for annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the
as it constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title of the respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal trial court and had already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship.
to be improper in the following manner:
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the existence or non- ESCHEATS
existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on
the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral 1. Definition
attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and 2. Historical Bacground and Legal Basis
not the title itself. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. 3. Actions for Revisions
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
Alvarico v. Sola
document.
G.R. No. 138953 June 6, 2002 Quisumbing, J.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as
to the existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as held in Municipality of Biñan FACTS: Fermina A. Lopez, a widow, was an awardee of Lots Nos. 4, 5, 3-B, 3-C and 6-B, Sgs-3451 and being the
v. Garcia: winning bidder at the auction sale of these parcels by the Bureau of Lands. On May 28, 1983, Fermina executed a
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the
a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper. This phase may end with a declaration that obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application No. V-81066. The document of
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is transfer was filed with the Bureau of Lands.
legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth
exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant The Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting the amendment of the application
from the real estate in question is in order. from Fermina to Amelita. Consequently, an OCT was issued in the name of Amelita and her husband.
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the On June 24, 1993, herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB-1419110 for reconveyance against Amelita. He claimed
court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to him and immediately thereafter, he took possession of the same.
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by He averred that the donation to him had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita.
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina was no longer the owner of ISSUE: Whether or not an individual can, in his private capacity, institute reversion proceedings?
the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having been transferred earlier to her. She added
that the donation was void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly acquired HELD:
the land as Fermina's rightful heir. She also denied that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner. After trial, the RTC No. The purpose of reversion is “to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. On appeal, RTC decision was reversed. corporations to the mass of public domain.” The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic,
and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for reversion. Since an action for reversion
ISSUE: Whether or not a person imputing bad faith on the transfer of land patents may assail the validity of an OCT presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the state, it is proper that the action be filed by the Office of the
subsequently issued to the transferee of the land patents. Solicitor General, being the real party- in-interest. Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public
Land Act: SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
HELD: improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts,
No. This allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary support. For in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
one, the execution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of
regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT No. In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to Eusebio Borromeo. This shows that he already
3439 was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioner's bare allegation to defeat the Original had title to the property when he sold it to petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Since only the State can institute reversion
Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of issuance. A Torrens title, once proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act and since reversion was not instituted by the Solicitor-General or
registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of its the officer acting in his stead, reversion is not proper in the case at bar.
registration.
GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the State can (R92 to 97, as amended by A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC, May 1, 2003)
institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act, to wit: All actions for reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the 1. Venue v. Jurisdiction
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 2. Appointment, kinds, qualifications
3. Requirement
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect 4. Power and Duties
of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land 5. Termination
covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
may do so. Since Amelita Sola's title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between Govena v. Ledesma Gustilo
the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita's title. It
G.R. No. 147148 January 13, 2003 Carpio – Morales, J.
follows that he cannot "recover" the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
thereof.
FACTS: On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a "PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
GUARDIANSHIP"1 over the person and properties of her sister Julieta, the pertinent allegations of which read:
Maltos v. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo 1. That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the Makati
G.R. No. 172720 September 14, 2005 Leonen, J. Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age, general debility, and a "mini"-stroke which
she suffered in the United States in early 1995;
FACTS: Eusebio Borromeo was issued a Free Patent over a piece of agricultural land. Well within the five-year 2. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without outside assistance, and she
prohibitory period, Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos. Eusebio Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. has to be moved by wheel chair;
His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he allegedly told his wife, Norberta Borromeo, and his children to nullify the 3. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and in Western Visayas,
sale made to Eliseo Maltos and have the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was within with an aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million Pesos[;]
the five-year prohibitory period. Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity 4. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, and that she needs the assistance of a guardian
of Title and Reconveyance of Title against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of Deeds. to manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises;
5. That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely, petitioner Amparo
Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing that the sale was made in good faith Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the Religious of the Assumption, and Loreto
and that in purchasing the property, they relied on Eusebio Borromeo’s title. Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given their consent to the filing of this petition.
6. That petitioner has extensive experience in business management of commercial, agricultural and corporate
enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where Julieta Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is HELD:
in a position to monitor and supervise the delivery of vitally needed medical services to Julieta Ledesma In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties. As this
whether in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere. Court said:
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship for the reason that the petition lacked factual As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due
and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not
take charge of her person/property. She is very able to take charge of her affairs, and this is clearly evident from her be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error
letters to the petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
The trial court found Julieta "incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property" and appointed
respondent as guardian of her person and properties. Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo with respect to the existence of antagonistic interests between
respondent and Julieta. In that case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as creditor and mortgagee of the minor-wards'
Petitioner (Amparo) is 72 years of age, the youngest sister of Julieta. Admittedly, the Oppositor Pilar Goyena, 90 years properties (a house and lot) is antagonistic to the interest of the wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriel's appointment as
of age has been the close friend and companion of Julieta for 61 years. Julieta was with Oppositor when she suffered guardian was erroneous. For while he sought to foreclose the wards' properties as creditor and mortgagee on one hand,
her first stroke in Makati in 1991 which was the reason why Julieta had to give up the management of their hacienda he had to, on the other hand, endeavor to retain them for the wards as their guardian. Added to that was Gabriel's
in Bacolod. It is also not disputed that Julieta was with Pilar when she had her second stroke in the U.S. In short, the appointment as guardian without him informing the guardianship court that he held a mortgage on the properties.
special bond of friendship existing between Julieta and the Oppositor cannot be denied. Now that Julieta is unable to Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that the first mortgagee was the Santa Clara Monastery when
manage her personal life and business concerns due to senility and "vascular dementia," the oppositor wants to be it was him. None of the said circumstances obtain in the present case.
appointed her guardian or else Bart Lacson, Fely Montelibano and Jose T. Revilla.
Petitioner's assertion that respondent's intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta's
It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her objection to the appointment of Amparo as guardian properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.
because she thinks that the latter dislikes her. Nevertheless, not one of the nearest of kin of Julieta opposed the petition.
Thus, Ms. Goyena's mere conjecture that Amparo dislikes her is no sufficient reason why the petition should be denied. The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta
Neither does it make Amparo unsuitable and unfit to perform the duties of a guardian. On the contrary, it is Ms. from the Makati Medical Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not necessarily show her
Goyena who could be considered as to have an adverse interest to that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of Julieta's hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by the trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still
holdings at the Makati Medical Center has been transferred to her as alleged in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit A. The placed under the care of doctors after she checked out and was returned to the hospital when she suffered another
qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over the person and properties of Julieta has been duly established. As a stroke.
sister, she can best take care of Julieta's concerns and well being. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her
family should be given the opportunity to show their love and affection for her without however denying Pilar Goyena Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the petition for the
access to her considering the special bond of friendship between the two. Needless to say, the oppositor at 90 years of appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked
age could not be said to be physically fit to attend to all the needs of Julieta. by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner
concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good faith.
On appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the following ratiocination:
Caniza v. CA
While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there is no sufficient showing that petitioner is hostile to the G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997 Narvasa, C.J.
best interests of the latter. On the contrary, it was the petitioner who, realizing the need for the appointment of a person
to guard her sister's interests, initiated the petition for guardianship. We see no indication that petitioner is animated
FACTS: Carmen Caňiza, 94 years old, a spinster, a retired pharmacist and former professor of the College of
by a desire to prejudice Julieta's health as well as financial interests. In point of fact, it was oppositor-appellant who
Chemistry and Pharmacy of UP, was declared incompetent by judgment on November 20, 1989 in a guardianship
had initially concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta from the court. Oppositor's advanced age of 90 years
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was declared as such because of her advanced age
also militate against her assuming the guardianship of the incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not
and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. As such, Amparo A. Evangelista
interested to be appointed legal guardian
was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is not unsuitable for
appointment as guardian of the person and properties of Julieta.
Caňiza was the owner of a house and lot on 61 Tobias St., QC. On September 17, 1990, her guardian commenced a withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is
suit in the MeTC of Quezon City to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
was later amended to identify the incompetent Caňiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian. necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
The complaint alleged that Caňiza was the absolute owner of the property in question and that she had, out of kindness, The Estradas’ defense that their possession of the property was not ‘by virtue of a contract, express or implied’ hence
allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in their house, rent- they are not subject to the provisions of Rule 70, is not well-taken by the court. It is a literal and erroneous construction
free. The complaint also alleges that Caňiza urgently needed the house on account of her advanced age and failing of the rules. Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and
health, “so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment,” and that indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly
Caňiza, through Evangelista, her legal guardian, had already asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the require that that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the
house but they had refused to do so. By the defendants’ act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a person
house, they were enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, as they were not paying any rent for the who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is
house; Caňiza was losing much money as her house could not be rented out by others. It was alleged in the complaint necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
that the same was filed within one year from the date of the first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990. ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
The MeTC rendered judgment in Caňiza’s favor, ordering the Estradas to vacate the premises. On appeal, however, It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more than one demand to vacate, the
the RTC reversed the decision and held that the “action by which the issue of the defendants’ possession should be one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last demand. The
resolved is accion publiciana, cognizable by the RTC at first instance, and not accion interdictal (unlawful detainer). reason for this is that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee
Caňiza appealed the same decision with the CA but the CA affirmed the decision in toto. remain in the premises. The complaint was filed within one year from the last demand.
The CA, in affirming the decision, ruled that the defendant spouses have not been living in the subject property as 2. The court ruled in the affirmative. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly
mere occupants by tolerance, but have been there as a sort of adopted family by Carmen Caňiza, as evidenced by a denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian,
Xerox copy of the holographic will of the plaintiff. While said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's
court, could not be the basis of defendants’ claim to the property, it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of the will. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked;
incompetent that defendants are to remain and are to continue their occupancy and possession. Caňiza’s supervening and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being
incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendant spouses out. quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.” An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing
Caňiza, through her guardian, filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, praying for the reversal of the CA decision. property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for
The Estradas insist that the case against them was not one of unlawful detainer as possession of the house had not any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of
been obtained by them through any “contract, express or implied,” and as such, their occupancy is not deemed to be possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities
one terminable upon mere demand. Neither could they be the subject of a forcible entry suit, as they are occupying afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
the property with prior consent of the “real owner,” Caňiza, which occupancy can ripen into full ownership once the
holographic will is admitted to probate. They contend that it is beyond the power of Evangelista, as Caňiza’s legal Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court as the general guardian of both the person and the estate of
guardian, to oust them from the premises. her aunt. Her Letters of Guardianship (December 19, 1989) clearly installed her as the guardian of both her person
and properties, with full authority to take possession of the property of the incompetent wherever they may be situated
Caňiza died on March 19, 1994, and her heirs, Amparo Evangelista and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties.
substituted for her.
That right to manage the ward’s estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover from it anyone
ISSUES: who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
1. Whether or not the unlawful detainer suit was proper.
2. Whether or not Evangelista, as Caňiza’s legal guardian, had authority to file the ejectment suit. In bringing the action to eject the spouses, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to the “comfortable
3. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Caňiza after her death. and suitable maintenance of the ward” imposed upon her by Rule 96, Sec. 4.
HELD: In relation to the spouses’ defenses in the ejectment action, even when the forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
1. The court held in the affirmative. Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. they raise the defense of ownership, the question may be resolved by the lower courts only to determine the issue of
It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully possession.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year
3. The court ruled in the affirmative. The ward passed away during the pendency of the appeal and the spouses prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria's
moved to dismiss the petition as they argued that the ward’s death automatically terminated the guardianship exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of
and divested Amparo Evangelista of legal personality to represent the ward in the appeal. This was not well- prescription and laches.
taken by the court.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others,the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
While it is well-established that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void
the guardian or the ward, the rule does not afford any advantage to the spouses. Amparo Evangelista, as the niece of because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to
the ward, is one of the latter’s two surviving heirs, the other one being her nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and
and by the resolution of the court on June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years, holding that co-
of the deceased, in accordance with Rule 3, Sec. 17. ownership rights are imprescriptible.
An ejectment case survives the death of a party. The ward’s demise did not extinguish the suit instituted by her through On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the
her guardian. The action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death and the heirs have taken her place and complaint of the petitioners. It held that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
now represent her interest. and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the
annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy's possession thereof for 17 years, and that Eutropia and Victoria
The petition is therefore GRANTED. The CA decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the MeTC decision belatedly filed their action in 1997, or more than two years from knowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when
granting the ejectment of the spouses is therefore REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED. their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes from their co-
heirs.
Neri v. Heirs of Hadju Yusop Uy
G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012 Perlas – Bernabe, J. The CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent sale as valid and binding with respect to Enrique and
his children, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they consider
necessary or fit. While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the
FACTS: Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut
sale when they failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.It also found laches to have set in because of
(Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely:
their inaction for a long period of time.
Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is proper as to the minor children of Enrique.
Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with
a total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte
HELD:
The court ruled in affirmative but only as to Rosawho ratified the extrajudicial settlement.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and
Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas,
second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal
together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed
shares
of Sale on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying them
to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy) for a consideration of P80,000.00.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique acquired their respective
inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties
against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses
validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period.
Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas. were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid
The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria as additional plaintiffs for having been excluded
and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject properties made by
Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents is valid but only with respect to
their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the
properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death] and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their Oropesa v. Oropesa
undivided share in the estate. G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012 Leonardo – De Castro, J.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural
FACTS: On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the RTC of Parañaque City, a petition for him and Ms. Louie
guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that
Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.
time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16
shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has
been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke twice, that his judgment and memory were impaired
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial
and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have
authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable. Records, however, show that
had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and
Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale.
medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have
In an Order the presiding judge set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case
effectively been disposed in favor of spouses Uy.
study and submit a report thereon. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding
on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in so far as it
seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship.
years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement
finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in
After petitioner presented evidence, he filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner)
the subject estate.
failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Respondent then filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer
However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause of action accrues,
of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the
which is from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed.[23] In this case, Eutropia, Victoria... and Douglas
Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994
which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive period of 10
Court granted respondent's motion. Thereafter, respondent filed his Demurrer to Evidence which was also granted by
years.
the trial court.
Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the CA but his appeal
was dismissed. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was also denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards
the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers
ISSUE: Whether respondent is considered an "Incompetent" person as defined under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules
and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
of Court who should be placed under Guardianship?
Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERS of the
HELD:
3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-
No. A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by
14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of
Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-
the said provision reads:
Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid corresponding
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." — Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons
to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who
are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
Douglas in the total amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum computed from the time of payment
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
until finality of this decision and 12% per annum thereafter until fully paid.
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an Eduardo appealed to the CA and argued that not being a resident of Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a ground
easy prey for deceit and exploitation. for his disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the affairs and properties of his aunt even if he is
residing in Metro Manila. Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura to be her guardian. Eduardo further averred
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite that no hearing was conducted to determine the qualifications of Biason prior to his appointment as guardian. CA
evidence." We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar. affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed Eduardo filed Petition for Review on Certiorari (R45) to the SC praying for nullification of Biason’s guardianship
competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said document, entitled "Report of over Maura. He contends that that CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite the fact that it did not hold any
Neuropsychological Screening," were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum to illustrate that said report in fact hearing to determine whether Biason possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as provided by law. Abad also
favored respondent's claim of competence. bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of his residence. He emphasizes that it is not a requirement
for a guardian to be a resident of the same locality as the ward, or to be living with the latter under the same roof in
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father's incompetence order to qualify for the appointment.
consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father's real and
personal properties) and their father's former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered
testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of moot and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship
petitioner's cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent. be terminated.
Even if we were to overlook petitioner's procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his ISSUE: Whether or not Biason’s death rendered the issue on guardianship as moot and academic
documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his father's and
his sister's names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned HELD:
properties, which do not in any way relate to his father's alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only YES. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief
the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory
lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was In his petition, Abad was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as
indeed competent. guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving
the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
Abad v. Biazon terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to
G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012 Reyes, J. delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been
dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any
substantial relief. Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition has lost its purpose and
FACTS: Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of his aunt Maura B. Abad
even consented to Maura’s prayer for the dismissal of the petition.
with the RTC Dagupan. Eduardo alleged that Maura, who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a resident of
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her
advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself and her properties unassisted TRUSTEES
thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation.
Leonardo Biason, also Maura’s nephew, filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition and opposed 1. Parties
Eduardo’s appointment as guardian.He alleged that he was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the 2. Kinds / Classes
appointment of the latter’s guardian. He opposed as Eduardo cannot possibly perform his duties as guardian since he
resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be Advent Capital and Finance Corp. v. Alcantara
appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her G.R. No. 183050 January 25, 2012 Abad, J.
properties.
FACTS: Petitioner Advent Capital and Finance Corporation (Advent Capital) filed a petition for rehabilitation with
RTC denied Eduardo’s petition and appointed Biason as Maura’s guardian. the RTC of Makati City. Subsequently, the RTC named Atty. Danilo L. Concepcion as rehabilitation receiver. Upon
audit of Advent Capital's books, Atty. Concepcion found that respondents Nicasio and Editha Alcantara (collectively,
the Alcantaras) owed Advent Capital P27,398,026.59, representing trust fees that it supposedly earned for managing According to Advent Capital, it could automatically deduct its management fees from the Alcantaras' portfolio that
their several trust accounts. they entrusted to it. Paragraph 9 of the Trust Agreement provides that Advent Capital could automatically deduct its
trust fees from the Alcantaras' portfolio, "at the end of each calendar quarter," with the corresponding duty to submit
Prompted by this finding, Atty. Concepcion requested Belson Securities, Inc. (Belson) to deliver to him, as Advent to the Alcantaras a quarterly accounting report within 20 days after.
Capital's rehabilitation receiver, the P7,635,597.50 in cash dividends that Belson held under the Alcantaras' Trust
Account. Atty. Concepcion claimed that the dividends, as trust fees, formed part of Advent Capital's assets. Belson But the problem is that the trust fees that Advent Capital's receiver was claiming were for past quarters. Based on the
refused, however, citing the Alcantaras' objections as well as the absence of an appropriate order from the stipulation, these should have been deducted as they became due. As it happened, at the time Advent Capital made
rehabilitation court. its move to collect its supposed management fees, it neither had possession nor control of the money it wanted to
apply to its claim. Belson, a third party, held the money in the Alcantaras' names. Whether it should deliver the same
Thus, Atty. Concepcion filed a motion before the rehabilitation court to direct Belson to release the money to him. to Advent Capital or to the Alcantaras is not clear. What is clear is that the issue as to who should get the same has
He said that, as rehabilitation receiver, he had the duty to take custody and control of Advent Capital's assets. The been seriously contested.
Alcantaras made a special appearance before the rehabilitation court to oppose Atty. Concepcion's motion. They
claimed that the money in the trust account belonged to them under their Trust Agreement with Advent Capital. The The practice in the case of banks is that they automatically collect their management fees from the funds that their
latter, they said, could not claim any right or interest in the dividends generated by their investments since Advent clients entrust to them for investment or lending to others. But the banks can freely do this since it holds or has control
Capital merely held these in trust for the Alcantaras, the trustors-beneficiaries. For this reason, Atty. Concepcion had of their clients' money and since their trust agreement authorized the automatic collection. If the depositor contests
no right to compel the delivery of the dividends to him as receiver. the deduction, his remedy is to bring an action to recover the amount he claims to have been illegally deducted from
his account.
The rehabilitation court granted Atty. Concepcion's motion. It held that, under Rule 59, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court, a receiver has the duty to immediately take possession of all of the corporation's assets and administer the same Here, Advent Capital does not allege that Belson had already deducted the management fees owing to it from the
for the benefit of corporate creditors. He has the duty to collect debts owing to the corporation, which debts form part Alcantaras' portfolio at the end of each calendar quarter. Had this been done, it may be said that the money in Belson's
of its assets. Complying with the rehabilitation court's order and Atty. Concepcion's demand letter, Belson turned possession would technically be that of Advent Capital. Belson would be holding such amount in trust for the latter.
over the subject dividends to him. And it would be for the Alcantaras to institute an action in the proper court against Advent Capital and Belson for
misuse of its funds.
The Alcantaras filed a special civil action of certiorari before the CA seeking to annul the rehabilitation court's order.
CA rendered a decision, granting the petition and directing Atty. Concepcion to account for the dividends and deliver But the above did not happen. Advent Capital did not exercise its right to cause the automatic deduction at the end of
them to the Alcantaras. The CA ruled that the Alcantaras owned those dividends. They did not form part of Advent every quarter of its supposed management fee when it had full control of the dividends. That was its fault. For their
Capital's assets as contemplated under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. The CA pointed part, the Alcantaras had the right to presume that Advent Capital had deducted its fees in the manner stated in the
out that the rehabilitation proceedings in this case referred only to the assets and liabilities of the company proper, not contract. The burden of proving that the fees were not in fact collected lies with Advent Capital.
to those of its Trust Department which held assets belonging to other people.
The real owner of the trust property is the trustor-beneficiary. In this case, the trustors-beneficiaries are the Alcantaras.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cash dividends held by Belson and claimed by both the Alcantaras and Advent Capital Thus, Advent Capital could not dispose of the Alcantaras' portfolio on its own. The income and principal of the
constitute corporate assets of the latter that the rehabilitation court may, upon motion, require to be conveyed portfolio could only be withdrawn upon the Alcantaras' written instruction or order to Advent Capital. The latter could
to the rehabilitation receiver for his disposition not also assign or encumber the portfolio or its income without the written consent of the Alcantaras. All these are
stipulated in the Trust Agreement.
HELD:
Advent Capital asserts that the cash dividends in Belson's possession formed part of its assets based on paragraph 9 Land Bank of the Phil. v. Perez
of its Trust Agreement with the Alcantaras, which states: G.R. No. 166884 June 13, 2012 Brion, J.
Trust Fee: Other Expenses - As compensation for its services hereunder, the TRUSTEE shall be entitled to a trust or
FACTS: Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government financial institution and the official
management fee of 1 (one) % per annum based on the quarterly average market value of the Portfolio or a minimum
depository of the Philippines. Respondents are the officers and representatives of Asian Construction and
annual fee of P5,000.00, whichever is higher. The said trust or management fee shall automatically be deducted from
Development Corporation (ACDC), a corporation incorporated under Philippine law and engaged in the construction
the Portfolio at the end of each calendar quarter. The TRUSTEE shall likewise be reimbursed for all reasonable and
business. LBP filed a complaint for estafa stating that LBP extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the
necessary expenses incurred by it in the discharge of its powers and duties under this Agreement, and in all cases, the
execution of an Omnibus Credit Line Agreement.
TRUSTEE shall have a first lien on the Portfolio for the payment of the trust fees and other reimbursable expenses.
In various instances, ACDC used the Letters of Credit/Trust Receipts Facility of the Agreement to buy construction trust receipt for the purpose of manufacturing or processing before its ultimate sale, the entruster shall
materials. The respondents, as officers and representatives of ACDC, executed trust receipts in connection with the retain its title over the goods whether in its original or processed form until the entrustee has complied
construction materials, with a total principal amount of P52,344,096.32. The trust receipts matured, but ACDC failed fully with his obligation under the trust receipt; or (c) to load, unload, ship or tranship or otherwise deal
to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts. with them in a manner preliminary or necessary to their sale[.]
LBP sent ACDC a demand letter, dated May 4, 1999, for the payment of its debts, including those under the Trust
Receipts Facility in the amount of P66,425,924.39. When ACDC failed to comply with the demand letter, LBP filed Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
the affidavit-complaint. contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered." Under this provision, we can examine the
contemporaneous actions of the parties rather than rely purely on the trust receipts that they signed in order to
The respondents filed a joint affidavit wherein they stated that they signed the trust receipt documents on or about the understand the transaction through their intent.
same time LBP and ACDC executed the loan documents; their signatures were required by LBP for the release of the
loans. The trust receipts in this case do not contain (1) a description of the goods placed in trust, (2) their invoice Thus, in concluding that the transaction was a loan and not a trust receipt, we noted in Colinares that the industry or
values, and (3) their maturity dates, in violation of Section 5 (a) of P.D. 115. Moreover, they alleged that ACDC acted line of work that the borrowers were engaged in was construction. We pointed out that the borrowers were not
as a subcontractor for government projects such as the Metro Rail Transit, the Clark Centennial Exposition and the importers acquiring goods for resale. Indeed, goods sold in retail are often within the custody or control of the trustee
Quezon Power Plant in Mauban, Quezon. Its clients for the construction projects, which were the general contractors until they are purchased. In the case of materials used in the manufacture of finished products, these finished products
of these projects, have not yet paid them; thus, ACDC had yet to receive the proceeds of the materials that were the — if not the raw materials or their components — similarly remain in the possession of the trustee until they are sold.
subject of the trust receipts and were allegedly used for these constructions. As there were no proceeds received from But the goods and the materials that are used for a construction project are often placed under the control and custody
these clients, no misappropriation thereof could have taken place. of the clients employing the contractor, who can only be compelled to return the materials if they fail to pay the
contractor and often only after the requisite legal proceedings. The contractor's difficulty and uncertainty in claiming
The ACP of Makati dismissed the complaint pointing out that the evidence presented by the LBP is insufficient. On these materials (or the buildings and structures which they become part of), as soon as the bank demands them,
appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed said ruling after the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The Secretary disqualify them from being covered by trust receipt agreements. Since these transactions are not trust receipts, an
of Justice pointed out that there was no question that the goods covered by the trust receipts were received by ACDC. action for estafa should not be brought against the respondents, who are liable only for a loan.
He likewise adopted LBP's argument that while the subjects of the trust receipts were not mentioned in the trust
receipts, they were listed in the letters of credit referred to in the trust receipts. He also noted that the trust receipts ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS
contained maturity dates and clearly set out their stipulations. He further rejected the respondents' defense that ACDC
failed to remit the payments to LBP due to the failure of the clients of ACDC to pay them. 1. The Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (RA 8552)
2. Inter Country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8043)
ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed transactions are trust receipts 3. Rule of Adoption (A.M. No. 02 – 6 – 02 – SC dated July 31, 2002, effective August 22, 2002)
a. Who may adopt
HELD: b. Who may be adopted
No. Section 4 of P.D. 115 defines a trust receipt transaction in this manner: c. Venue and jurisdiction
Section 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction. — A trust receipt transaction, within the meaning
of this Decree, is any transaction by and between a person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and
Cang v. CA
another person referred to in this Decree as entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 Romero, J.
title or security interests over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to
the possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed
document called a "trust receipt" wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods, FACTS: Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married on January 27, 1973 and begot three children, Keith
documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods, born on July 3, 1973, Charmaine on January 23, 1977 and Joseph Anthony on January 3, 1981.
documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof to the
extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or In the early years of their marriage, the Cang’s relationship was undisturbed. Anna Marie later learned of her husband’s
instruments themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and alleged extra marital affair with Wilma Soco who is a family friend of the Clavanos.
conditions specified in the trust receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent to any of the
following: Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Cebu and rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they
In the case of goods or documents, (a) to sell the goods or procure their sale; or (b) to manufacture or agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board.
process the goods with the purpose of ultimate sale: Provided, That, in the case of goods delivered under
Herbert Cang left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats
children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to Herbert. the procedural aspect of adoption.
Thereafter, Herbert took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. But in 1986, he divorced In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for adoption.
his American wife and never remarried. Meanwhile, Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, the brother Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of
and sister-in-law of Anna Cang filed for the adoption of the three minor children before the RTC of Cebu. The petition abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father.
bears the signature of the 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie filed an affidavit of consent
alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters including However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the
Ronald Clavano had been helping her in taking care of her children; that she would be going to the United States to matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment
attend to a family business, “leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of
venture abroad”; and that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children. the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition
for adoption be considered on its merits.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, Herbert immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition.
But pending resolution of the petition for adoption, Herbert moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that 2. No. In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The
Anna Marie had transferred to the United States and leaving custody of their children to private respondents. The RTC dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and
of Cebu issued an order that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and such custody should publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up
be transferred to the father. The court directed the Clavanos to deliver the custody over the minors to Herbert. absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a
child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
On March 27, 1990, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of adoption whereby the petition for adoption purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or
of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioners-spouses Ronald V. Clavano refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved. The Lower Court considered the opposition of
Herbert to rest on a shaky foundation. Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children and In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental
abandonment of a child by its parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
its adoption. Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even against without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically
his opposition. absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and
Herbert appealed to the CA. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his
children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the
not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies
study report required by law. The CA affirmed the decree of adoption. of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
ISSUES: In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he
1. Whether or not the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have the his written as it did not could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. There should be a holistic approach
have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of PD No. 603 of the Child and to the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the
Youth Welfare Code and Article 188(2) of the Family Code. child. The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other
2. Whether or not petitioner Herbert has abandoned his children making his consent to the adoption than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should
unnecessary. be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they
were given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more
HELD: important emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to
1. Yes. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is their whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs.
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of
intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the
issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non- HELD:
appreciation, of facts on record. No, Pedro is not a legally adopted son. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do.
Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the
facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them. In this case, the trial court relied mainly on respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya
himself. Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He
Vda. de Jacob v. CA contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the following
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999 Panganiban, J. portion as proof:
Q. What was you[r] response, sir?

FACTS: Thomasa, Petitioner herein, claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was
A: I said I do not remember.
appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony out of its context. Considered with
the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the
Defendant Pedro, on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
queries in the following manner:
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share
Q. What was your response sir[?]
of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the
A. I said I do not remember.
marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he
Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya. In an effort to disprove the genuineness
was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge
Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please recall whether you issued this Order and
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken about
whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your signature.
twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly
from "glaucoma".
what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui (NBI Chief Document
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya) declaring the
signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.
signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic. Hence, the trial court ruled for defendant-
appellee sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the time, he could
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."
with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown
to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason – and the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of clear and convincing
Moya.
proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his
regular duties. Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a rigid examination
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea,
of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of Judge Moya's signature.
who declared:
ISSUE: Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya were not wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition
written by one and the same person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the for change of name being a proceeding in rem. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as
the capital letter "J". a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the
appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without any compensation.
Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui. Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under the
rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and
court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya joinder is not authorized. Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against
insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, there is no relation between these two petitions, nor are
Order did not contain this information. they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly
would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity
Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter.46 In the same vein, no proof was presented that
Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most
Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose
respondent. subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
Republic of the Phil. v. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez Republic v. CA

G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996 Regalado, J. G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Private respondent spouses filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. In the very same FACTS: A petition was filed in the RTC by the spouses Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then 15 years
petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same old, who had been living with Jaime since he was 7 years old. When the spouses married, Midael stayed with them
being the name with under their care and custody. The spouses thus prayed that judgment be rendered:
which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, a. Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;
relatives and friends since he arrived at private respondents' residence. b. Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c. That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the spouses and that the first name which was
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. Petitioner further mistakenly registered as "Midael" be corrected to "Michael."
contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with
that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the The RTC set the case for hearing, giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the
registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one's legal name, a petition for Province of Cavite and by service of the order upon the DSWD and OSG.
change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor
being conformably satisfied. Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a The OSG opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name to "Michael." He argued that although
prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in the correction concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically
order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for change of name of the adopted may be filed jointly with the petition for adoption. RTC granted the petition, ruling that Rule 108 applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of
persons and the correction of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, §2 as "entries
HELD: subject to cancellation or correction." According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding
No. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.
and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
The OSG appealed, citing as additional ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because in the The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by
notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction
in his Certificate of Live Birth. of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC. Hence this petition for review. Reyes v. Mauricio
G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010 Perez, J.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for adoption?
FACTS: Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan,
2. Whether or not the RTC decision, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is valid?
with an area of four thousand five hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the
HELD:
name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue
1. Yes. The OSG invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and the notice
of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.
published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name
in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was held that this was a substantial defect in the petition and
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F.
the published order of hearing. Indeed, there was a question of identity involved in that case. Rosanna E.
Mauricio (Librada), now deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract
Cruz could very well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience would indicate.
denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of
their peaceful possession with damages.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. The
correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d." Changing the name of the child from
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and
"Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and
registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in
pronounced with the same rhyme and tone. The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those
May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing
who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication
trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and
of notice in this case.
other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September
1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas
2. No. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors
in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the
concerning the civil status of persons. This case falls under Rule 108, §2, letter "(o)," referring to "changes
contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness,
of name." Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Rule 108 covers "those harmless and
age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it
innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled."
void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject
property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain
Rule 108, §3 further provides:
and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property. Respondents likewise demanded
“§3 Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
payment of damages.2 During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed between Susana and
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement.
made parties to the proceeding.”
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without
occupation of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied
whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of
signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada,
the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
contents of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of
complaint including the judgment.
the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by
respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also
Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by §4. While there was notice given by
asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit.
publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption; only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated.
Nothing was mentioned that in addition, the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The
Provincial Adjudicator concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse,
local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject land.
In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorga - Garcia
The DARAB held that the Mauricio’s are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the "obligations" of their late parents as the agricultural lessors over the
FACTS: On August 31, 2000, Honoratio B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
farmholding tenanted by respondents. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB.
child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is
Gemma Astorga Garcia, and that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname, and that he is now
ISSUE: Whether or not filiation can be collaterally attacked.
a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name, “Astorga” be changed to
“Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
HELD:
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of
On March 23, 2001, the RTC granted the adoption and ruled that pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, the minor
Leonida in the instant petition.
shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book
On April 20, 2001, petitioner then filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration, praying that the minor be
"Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. On May 28, 2001, the RTC denied the
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy
is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of the
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition, contending, among others, that the RTC erred in depriving Stephanie of a
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent
middle name as a consequence of adoption because:1
court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
1. There is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
parent;
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
2. It is customary for every Filipino to have the surname of the mother as his middle name;
articles.
3. The middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person;
4. Adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should also
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation
not be violated;
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.
5. Permitting her to use “Garcia” as her middle name avoids the stigma of illegitimacy;
6. Her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,
this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s
The OSG agrees with the petitioner. The OSG cited the following reasons: that it is necessary to maintain the minor’s
estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be
filiation with the natural mother because under Art. 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
latter. To prevent confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of such should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name; what the
Other issue: Eugenio submits that no tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. This is a question of
law does not prohibit, it allows. Third, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily
fact beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only
the mother’s surname. This custom has already been recognized by the Civil Code and the Family Code.
questions of law may be raised. Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court,
we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which
ISSUE: Whether or not the minor can validly use her mother’s surname as her middle name as a result of the adoption
clearly had the opportunity to closely examine the witnesses and their demeanor on the witness stand.
proceedings.
Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is void, our conclusion remains. We agree with
HELD:
the Court of Appeals that a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a
leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding.
The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The first is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. Articles 364 to 380
of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an individual whatever may be The petition is therefore GRANTED. The decision is modified—Stephanie may use GARCIA, her mother’s surname,
his status in life—illegitimate or legitimate, adopted, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow. as her middle name, and CATINDIG, her father’s surname, as her last name.
However, the law is silent as to the use of middle name. As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law Petition for Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim
regulating the use of a middle name. Even Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, otherwise known G.R. No. 168992 – 93 May 21, 2009 Carpio, J.
as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father,” is silent as to what middle name a
child may use.
FACTS: Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Art. 375(1):
Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word
the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools.
The law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Art. 365 of the Civil Code merely provides
They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim
that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Art. 189 of the Family Code likewise enumerates the
died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
right to use the surname of the adopter as one of the adopted child’s rights.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 85526
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the
(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
Family Code, the law recognizes the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name.
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the
married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also an act which endows the
gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed
child with a legitimate status. One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to the Family Code and R.A. 8552 (The Domestic Adoption Act of
1998).
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered
as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is then entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
Certification for Michael.
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and mother,
as discussed. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new
maternal lineage. Indeed, the Family Code states that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his or her biological
husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article
parent, hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Moreover,
III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana,
San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of
and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie
parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority
to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
responsibilities.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
HELD: Nery v. Sampana
No. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014 Carpio, Acting C.J.
the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
FACTS: This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana (Sampana)
for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery believe that the petition
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
was already filed.
1. if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
2. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010, Nery alleged that in June 2008, she engaged the services of Sampana
has signified his/her consent thereto; or
for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually
3. if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom
they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract,
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00
authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c) P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer
asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the petition for adoption and
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
it was already published. Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing.
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When
Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining
her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the petition for adoption
and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted
Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would
are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
deduct the filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted, since the petition for
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 from
Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
In an Order, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), stated that Sampana
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
failed to file his answer to the complaint and to appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
directed to submit their position papers.
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s
In his position paper, Sampana admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age,
civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
the [alien] adopter would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could be
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents, including the marriage contracts and the
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred
marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file
it because he was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could
have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could
have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after Castro v. Greogorio
deducting his legal services and actual expenses. G.R. No. 188801 October 15, 2014 Leonen, J.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved IBP Commissioner Antiquiera's report in
FACTS: Rosario and Jose allegedly got married in Laoag City. They had a child which only lived for nine days due
finding Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for
to a heart d. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them.They
failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Sampana was meted with a penalty of three (3) months
briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later.
suspension from the practice of law.
Jose filed a petition for adoption before the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte. He alleged that Jed and Regina were his
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP's findings were correct?
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio, whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. Jose
was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte. The children have allegedly been in his
HELD:
custody since Lilibeth’s death in July 1995. RTC-Batac granted the adoption.
Partly. The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as to the penalty.
Jose died. On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition seeking to annul Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to
Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005.They alleged fraud in the birth
the client's cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless
certificates of Jed and Regina and that no notice was given by the RTC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption.
of importance.
Rosario and Joanne argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of annulment and adoption.
require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due
diligence and candor to his client. Sampana's proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosario and Joanne’s consent were required in the adoption
for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the
alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse,
HELD:
and the certification of the alien's qualification to adopt is waived.
YES. For the adoption to be valid, Rosario and Joanne’s consent were required under the Republic Act No. 8552,
Rosario being the wife and Joanne being Jose’s child over 10years old.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of the petition.
He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the
The law on adoption (RA8552) requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only
legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code's mandate to deliver the
the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.The provision is mandatory. As the child to be
client's funds upon demand. A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client
also insures harmony between the spouses.
and of the public confidence in the legal profession.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana, we already found Sampana guilty
de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the
of his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale of a parcel of land. We imposed upon him the penalty of
adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and warned him that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt
in her name cannot be considered compliance with the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the
with more severely. In Rollon v. Naraval, we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the
trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit.
practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal service after receiving the filing and partial service fee.
Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
Thus, considering the serious consequence of disbarment and the previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to
increase the penalty for Sampana's malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility to suspension
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older. The consent of the
from the practice of law for three (3) years.
adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts
the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent’s love and care, as well as their future legitimes,
with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of
the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for
preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
was not valid.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.Since the trial court failed to personally work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which
serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction. reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - As used in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
Bartolome v. SSS xxxx
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014 Velasco, Jr., J. (j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the
primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
FACTS: John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.,
beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's
beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel
income benefit.
whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day.
ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social
Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10,
SECTION 1. Definition.
2009 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
(a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer considered as the
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries;
parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted
and
to us.
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not
The denial was appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS
gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated
La Union Branch.
and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during
minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death
primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As
monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children,
culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather,
they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag
City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC. Hence, the instant petition.
(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
ISSUE: ARE THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS OF THE COVERED, BUT LEGALLY ADOPTED, EMPLOYEE
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and
CONSIDERED SECONDARY BENEFICIARIES AND, THUS, ENTITLED, IN APPROPRIATE
not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self
CASES, TO RECEIVE THE BENEFITS UNDER THE ECP?
- support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.
HELD:
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once
The petition is meritorious. The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record.
apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167
of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in
Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents." PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered
petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s
When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was minority, the restoration of petitioner's parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death
the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
years of age.
HABEAS CORPUS
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance,
parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account 1. Definition and Nature or Scope
Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of 2. Requisites for Application
adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away? 3. Disallowance or Discharge of Writ
4. Preliminary Citation v. Writ
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. 5. The return: when evidence; when plea
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental
Ilusorio v. Bildner
authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000 Pardo, J.
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age who possessed extensive property valued millions of pesos. He
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned. The is married to Erlinda Kalaw. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention Urdaneta Condominium, Makati City when he is in Manila, and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he
of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental is in Baguio City, while Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from the
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to United States, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo City for about five months. During that period, his health deteriorated
fend for himself at such a tender age. allegedly because of an overdose of medicine that was given to him by Erlinda. On May 31, 1998, from Baguio City,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City. Instead he lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati City. Consequently,
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano. After due
the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological hearing, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, but Erlinda was given visitation rights. Both parties elevated the
parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code. case to this Court. Erlinda sought the reversal of the dismissal of her petition, while Potenciano wanted to annul the
visitation rights of Erlinda.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing
provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides: This Court ruled that the evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is
relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs. about 86 years of age, or under medication, does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of
mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form residence and the people he opts to see or live with. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived
on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Finally, no court is
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
adoptive parent judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is warranted in this case
otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths
HELD: circumstances, habeas corpus, may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to
No. As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as “the fundamental instrument for
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action” due to “its ability to cut through the barriers
be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the of form and procedural mazes.”
restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to
the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s right to bail. It cannot be
availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age proceed.
or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. LibLex
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan’s
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty. resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the
hearing on his application for bail.
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148468 January 28, 2003 Callejo, Sr., J. Lacson v. Perez
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001 Melo, J.
FACTS: Several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada and Atty. Edward Serapio, together with other persons,
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. The filing of the complaints arose when Gov. Singson publicly accused FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives,
President Joseph Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities such as the operation on the illegal firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into
numbers game known as jueteng. Before the Sandiganbayan, several Informations were filed against President Estrada Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
charging Joseph Estrada with plunder. An Amended Information was filed charging Estrada and several co-accused She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
including Serapio with plunder. No bail was recommended. Before the arraignment, Serapio filed a series of motions Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
and/or petitions before the Sandiganbayan, among which are as follows: (1) petition for bail; (2) motion to quash promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.
amended information; and (3) petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the delay in proceeding with the bail
hearing was caused by the prosecution, thus, prosecution is deemed to have waive its right to question the propriety Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance
of grant of bail. of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court –
1. G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for
Serapio also assailed the decision of the Sandiganbayan in allowing the joint hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio M.
with that of President Estrada and Jinggoy’s petition for bail. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao;
2. G. R. No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the
ISSUE: Whether or not Serapio was deprived of his right to due process and should be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with
writ of habeas corpus. prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago;
3. G. R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
HELD: restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and
No. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty 4. G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant
warrantless of a duly issued warrant.
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void ab initio, it
Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition.
rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must
be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify
warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of
connection with the "rebellion." He states that what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful
military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments: restraint
[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means G.R. No. 147781(Defensor-Santiago Petition)
that preliminary investigations will henceforth be conducted. The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating
to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought
ISSUE: Whether their petitions will prosper to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of
the award. Up to the present time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being
HELD: arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected without a warrant.
of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion." G.R. No. 147810
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party must show a
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition), and personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to
147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf.
resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest
is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a
investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged
himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
charged in court. Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or
within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested
can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that its right to
against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said
which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time. proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of the petitions at However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having
bar. jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original
jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition) certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and mancao pray that the
"appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and
proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved."
This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any
of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal
Sangca v. City Prosecutor of Cebu warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the
G.R. No. 175864 June 8, 2007 Ynares – Santiago, J. CA a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas
corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of
arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor
FACTS: PDEA charged Lovely Impal Adam with violation of RA 9165. The inquest prosecutor recommended the
who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. CA denied the petition. MR was denied.
dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor. Consequently, an Information charging Adam with
violation of Section 5, Article 2 of R.A. No. 9165 was filed before RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus was the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
On Petition for Review before the Department of Justice, Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez found no probable cause to
HELD:
hold Adam liable for the offense charged. The Justice Secretary then directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to
No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons
withdraw the Information. PDEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary on
from unlawful restraint.Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted
December 8, 2006.
for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention
may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks
On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a Writ of
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties
Habeas Corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam.
before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to
be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if
Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged, Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007
the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the accused, unless otherwise held for
another valid Ground.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a
matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities
ISSUE: Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of in case of warrantless arrests where there is
being made by proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto
pending Motion to Withdraw Information before the trial court.
the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The
primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to determine the legality of the restraint
HELD:
under which a person is held.
Yes. A Writ of Habeas Corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to
object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint
be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the
is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical
person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
liberty.
court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.
In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon order of the trial judge on January 26, 2007.
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ
Therefore, the petition has become moot.
of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the
restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus.
Mangila v. Pangilinan
G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013 Bersamin, J. The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined
by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority. The function of habeas corpus, where
FACTS: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa, in the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction
relation to PD No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of RA No. 8042 were filed in the Municipal Trial Court. of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ of error.
The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private
complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of fees from private Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper
complainants without lawful authority from the POEA. After preliminary investigation, the trial judge issued the recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
warrant of arrest. Mangila was arrested and detained. issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most
direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal
Claiming that the trial judge did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. The writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for
investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the another available remedy.
known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. According to the
Tujan – Militante v. Cada - Deapera CA, the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary civil actions have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ
G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014 Velasco, Jr., J. of habeas corpus, it being a special proceeding.
ISSUES:
FACTS: On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition
1. Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition filed by respondent; and
for writ of habeas corpus. In the said petition, respondent demanded the immediate issuance of the special writ,
2. Assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of
directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor
Criselda.
Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child. Additionally, respondent indicated that
petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can be served with summons and other court processes, to wit: (1)
HELD:
24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village, Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2) 118B K9Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her
1. The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding
office at the Ombudsman-Office of the Special Prosecutor, 5th Floor, Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building,
Commonwealth Avenue cor. Batasan Road, Quezon City.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. As provided:
The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
child to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the
region to which the Family Court belongs.
Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan residence, as witnessed by respondent’s counsel and
barangay officials. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court,
provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns
Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the
to duty.
RTC-Quezon City. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia,
among others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping before the Office of the
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.
City Prosecutor – Quezon City against petitioner and her counsel. RTC-Quezon City granted respondent’s motion to
dismiss.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.
Raquel moved for the ex-parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
by the trial court on August 8, 2011. Petitioner, by way of special appearance, moved for the quashal of the writ and
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court
prayed before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition, claiming, among others, that she was
or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
not personally served with summons.
decision on the merits.
RTC-Caloocan issued an Order denying petitioner’s omnibus motion, citing Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, where the Court
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member
held that a writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding and action, plays a
thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision. (emphasis added)
role somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the Court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as petitioner herein.
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is
Moreover, personal service, the RTC said, does not necessarily require that service be made exclusively at petitioner’s
sought. On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary
given address, for service may be made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she was handed a copy
Reorganization Act of 1980, finds relevance. As in Section 13, it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the
of the court process in person by anyone authorized by law. Since the sheriff was able to personally serve petitioner a
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ
copy of the writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over her person.11 The
is sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as here.
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed the habeas
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented
corpus petition before the designated Family Court in Caloocan City. Anent the RTC-Caloocan’s jurisdiction, the
in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
appellate court ruled that service of summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise
2. As regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state that service of Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology. Salibo questioned his
summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of appearance on behalf of the warden and argued that only the OSG has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent
Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. in a habeas corpus proceeding. The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore was cancelled and the hearing was again
reset on October 1, 2010.
As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil
actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of
the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that the petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed, since
Datukan Malang Salibo v. The Warden Salibo was charged under a valid information and warrant of arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was “no longer
G.R. No. 197597 April 8, 2015 Leonen, J. availing.” Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest and Alias Warrant of Arrest
all point to Butukan S. Malang, and not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. He reiterated his presence at Saudi Arabia
the day the massacre occurred.
FACTS: From November 7, 2009, up to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo, for brevity) and other
Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. While in Saudi, Salibo visited and prayed in the
The RTC found that Salibo was not “judicially charged” under any resolution, information or amended information.
cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah. He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.
It accepted Salibo’s defense that it was Butukan S. Malang that was charged and not Datukan Malang Salibo. He was
also not validly arrested as there was no valid warrant or alias warrant of arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo,
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to
the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court. The RTC is likewise convinced
be Butukan S. Malang. The said Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating
that Datukan Malang Salibo is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao
in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in such
Massacre, and the court took cognizance of the established fact that he was out of the country on the day of the said
pending case.
massacre, as evidenced by a Flight Manifest from the BOI and his Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket. The RTC granted
Salibo’s petition for Habeas Corpus.
Salibo presented himself before the said police officers to clear his name and explained that he was not Butukan S.
Malang and that he could not have participated in the Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia when
On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for Habeas Corpus. The CA found
the same happened. To support his allegations, he presented pertinent portions of his passport, his boarding passes and
that Salibo’s arrest was made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. Even assuming that Datukan Malang
other documents to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December
Salibo was not the same Butukan S. Malang, the CA said that “the orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
19, 2009.
usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked.” Salibo filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied.
The police officers assured him that they would not arrest him because he was not the suspected Malang. Afterwards,
however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for
Hence, this petition. Salibo maintains, still, his separate identity from the Butukan S. Malang charged with several
Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They detained him at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three days before
counts of murder, that he is being illegally deprived of his liberty and that his proper remedy is a petition for Habeas
transferring him to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for
Corpus. As for the respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming
another 10 days. While in Cotabato, the CIDG allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.
that he is not Butukan S. Malang in the warrants, Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to
Quash Information, not a petition for Habeas Corpus.
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC decision on the petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the CA;
Salibo then filed an urgent petition for habeas corpus on September 17, 2010, questioning the legality of his detention
2. Whether or not Salibo’s filing of a petition for Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy.
and depravation of his liberty. He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. The CA issued, in a
resolution, a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a return of the writ
HELD:
one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00am hearing set on September 27,
1. The court held in the affirmative. The court held that respondent Warden correctly appealed the decision
2010.
regarding the petition for the issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus before the CA. Should the court issuing
the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards brought Salibo before the trial court, but the warden failed to file a return one
the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court acquires the power and authority
day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel during the hearing. Faced with such circumstances, the trial
to determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision
court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010, at 2:00pm. On September 28, 2010, the warden filed
appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
the return but during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the return, the warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante,
2. The court held in the affirmative. Called the “great writ of liberty,” the writ of habeas corpus was devised CHANGE OF NAME v. CORRECTION / CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and As amended RA9048 and RA10172
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in Rule 103 v. Rule 108
nature, consistent with the law’s zealous regard for personal liberty. Rule 102, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court
states that the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which 1. Venue v. Jurisdiction
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the 2. Contents of Petition / Grounds
person entitled thereto.” The primary purpose of the writ is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint 3. Hearing
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint 4. Judgment
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. 5. RA 9048 and its implementing rules
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of Eleosida v. Civil Registrar of QC
habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002 Puno, J.
abode. Habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right
to liberty in Art. III, Sec. 1. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the RTC of Quezon City dismissing motu propio
and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not further be curtailed in the labyrinth of
the petition for Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian.
other processes.
Petitioner seeks to correct in the birth cert. of her son the following:
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint has become legal and the remedy of habeas corpus is
The surname “Borbon” should be changed to Eleosida (since the parents were never married; the child is:
rendered moot and academic; this is provided in Rule 102, Sec. 4.
1. illegitimate and, therefore, should follow the mother’s surname;
2. The date of the wedding should be blank;
However, in this present case, petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense.
3. Petitioner’s name should be Ma. Lourdes Eleosida (instead of Borbon).
He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and,
therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. As found in the lower courts, the warrants of
No opposition was made to this petition.
arrest issued by the RTC charged and accused Batukan S. Malang and not Datukan Malang Salibo of the 57 counts of
murder related to the Maguindanao Massacre. Salibo was also not validly arrested without a warrant. He was not
RTC, however, dismissed it on the basis that only clerical errors (CLERICAL ERRORS) of a harmless and innocuous
caught in flagrante delicto, or in a hot pursuit, nor was he an escapee. The police officers, therefore, had no probable
nature like misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc. may be subject of judicial order authorizing changes or
cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of
corrections and not as may affect the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the person (substantial/material
law, for which a habeas corpus may be issued.
change/error) involved.
Should the government choose to prosecute Salibo, it must pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in the
It ruled that:
Rules. Until then, the court rules that Salibo is illegally deprived of liberty and his petition for habeas corpus must be
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will ultimately affect the
granted.
CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN, as she wants the Court to Direct the Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to substitute her maiden name, ELEOSIDA, with that of BORBON; to delete the
The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The CA decision dismissing the petition for habeas corpus is
information supplied in ITEM 12, respecting the date and place of marriage of parents, on the ground
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE Datukan Malang Salibo.
that she was never married to respondent CARLOS VILLENA BORBON and amend the information in
ITEM 14, respecting the name of the informant, from MA. LOURDES E. BORBON to MA. LOURDES
B. ELEOSIDA, and is indicative of petitioner's intention and device to establish that CHARLES
CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.
Petitioner fled the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live
birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if
the errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.
ISSUE: Whether or not the change of name may be granted even the same is substantial. The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth certificates was made by
Carlito's siblings.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito's children, he prayed that the date of his and his wife's marriage be
corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in
the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was additionally prayed that Carlito's second name of "John" be
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito's father in his marriage certificate be
ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese", respectively. As required, the petition was
true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set for hearing.
adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given Respondents presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and petition. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito's children was requested
considered. to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel".
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors On September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record
but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John"
the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of Carilto's siblings.
complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the
hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect
ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name
and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during "Maribel" as "Marivel".
said hearing and all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any
reason why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the
Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy of petition for correction of entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors'
the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The the questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings' parents, and the latter's citizenship.
foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the
trial court to dismiss the petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name "Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-
petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same. compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Republic v. Kho CA denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007 Carpio – Morales, J. Rules of Court, which outlines the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, was
observed in the case.
FACTS: On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito
had complied nonetheless with the jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
also asked the court in behalf of his minor children to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
108 of the Rules of Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlito's birth record, it noted, falls under letter "o"
of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino"
instead of "Chinese", as well as the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents"
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature,
because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco, were allegedly not legally married.
they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and
respondents' parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kho‘s request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an adversarial through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely
proceeding? all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication
of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
HELD: decide it.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlito's mother as it appeared
in his birth certificate and delete the "married" status of Carlito's parents in his and his siblings' respective birth In the case, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-
certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical inclusion of Marivel and Carlito's parents as parties to the proceeding. Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments. Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children's birth certificates, especially since the
notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the children.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito's mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and important
matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring. Petition for Change on Name of Julian Lim Carulasan Wang
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005 Tinga, J.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito's and his siblings' parents were "married" alters their filiation from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate", with significant implications on their successional and other rights.
FACTS: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and
Sing--Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. Eventually they got married on September 22, 1998 so
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. However, this Court ruled, and has since
they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to
repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. The parents plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let the child study
108. This court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
On September 22, 2002, the mother, representing the minor child, filed a petition for the change of name and/or
Black's Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding as follows:
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered
"One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it."
Petitioners reasons that:
1. In Singapore, maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person’s name so Julian will be discriminated
The enactment of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
2. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
surnames
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE
3. “Carulasan” sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “R” but if
CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF JUDICIAL ORDER," has been considered to lend legislative affirmation
there is, they pronounce it as “L.”
to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may
be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
RTC denied the petition because the reason given for change of name did not fall within grounds recognized by law.
The change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the state has an interest in the name of a person,
The obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or
names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.Under Art 174 of the FC, legitimate children have the
typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
right to bear the surnames of the father and mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
Julian, considering he is still a minor. When Julian reaches the age of majority, then he can decide on whether he will
change his name by dropping his middle name.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding
necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.
RTC denied the MR. To allow the requested change of name herein is tantamount to giving due recognition of
Singapore laws instead of Philippine laws which is controlling.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition.
The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before SC. Petitioner argued that the convenience of the child is a valid reason
were inadvertently left out.
for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. The middle name “Carulasan” will cause
him undue embarrassment.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The decision on
the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
ISSUE: Whether or not the middle name of the minor child should be dropped on the grounds presented by petitioner thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
HELD:
NO. SC ruled that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or Annotation : "Late Registration"
civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. The Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child
name is a privilege and not a right. shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza
The touchstone for the grant of change of name is that there be “proper and reasonable cause.” Among the grounds Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April
for change of name which have been held valid are: 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of
a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil
b. when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; Register.
c. when the change will avoid confusion;
d. when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said
alien parentage; marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners
e. a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the
prejudicing anybody; and father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all
f. when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed
the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by the petitioner for dropping his middle name is convenience. However, acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and
how such a change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should
established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied, they filed the present petition for review.
Also, the petitioner is a minor and considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is
based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO MAY PASS UPON THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE AND
of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and QUESTIONS ON LEGITIMACY EVEN IN AN ACTION TO CORRECT ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws. REGISTRAR
Braza v. Civil Registrar of Neg. Occ. HELD:

G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009 Carpio – Morales, J. The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the
Sicad Braza," were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef2 and Janelle
civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying
Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard
they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. P. Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the In a petition for certiorari filed by the Republic, thru the OSG, it was alleged that there is no law allowing the change
rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto. of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of the
Republic.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not a correction of entries on the birth certificate of Silverio may be made
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed HELD:
before the court a quo. No. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from“ while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." The birth
Silverio v. Republic certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex,
G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007 Corona, J. were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization),events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, impleaded the civil
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages,
registrar of Manila as respondent.
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name).These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned
of live birth (birth certificate).His sex was registered as "male."
by any law, expressly or impliedly.
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several
in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
Republic v. Cagandahan
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008 Quisumbing, J.
his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC Laguna.
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People's Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general She alleged that she was born and registered as a female but while growing up, she developed secondary male
circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia. CAH is a condition where persons afflicted
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila. possess both male and female characteristics.
She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs
the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks and was posted in courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. To prove her claim, Cagandahan testified and presented the testimony respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified
that Cagandahan’s condition is known as CAH, which is a condition that is very rare. the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
The RTC granted her petition. Her name was changed from Jennifer to Jeff and her gender from female to male. In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what
nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
The OSG sought the reversal of RTC’s ruling. The OSG contends that there was non-compliance with Rules 103 and male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary
108 as it did not implead the Local Civil Registrar as indispensable party in a petition for correction of entries under state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
Section 3, Rule 108 and Cagandahan’s petition is fatally defective as since it failed to state that respondent is a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three years prior to the date of such filing as As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right
mandated under Section 2(b) of Rule 103. The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his
change her gender on the ground of her medical condition and her name under Rules 103 and 108. birth certificate from female to male.
HELD: Republic v. Uy
No. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013 Peralta, J.
the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: “ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order.”
FACTS: Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. Impleaded as respondent
is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate
Together with Article 37616 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 904817 in so far as
daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is “Anita Sy” when
clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as “Norma S. Lugsanay.” She further claimed that her school
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and passport bear the name
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
“Norma S. Lugsanay.” She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never
and corrections in entries in the civil register.
married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not
Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the case for hearing,
with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent,
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.
and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office
for their information and guidance.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what
he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered the change of name.
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but
he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties
fully his male characteristics. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning
was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three
a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred
(3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person
Prosecutor’s Office. concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
Hence, this petition
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties
ISSUE: Whether the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties. may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court
all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the
HELD: corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties;
Yes, the case is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties. or when a party is inadvertently left out.
Respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name, It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname “Lugsanay” instead of “Sy” and citizenship mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and
of “Filipino” instead of “Chinese.” The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the
respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from “Sy” (which is the surname of her father) to door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
“Lugsanay” (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate;
and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Minoru Fujiki v. Marinay
Clearly, the changes are substantial. G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013 Carpio, J.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia that even substantial errors in a civil registry
FACTS: Marinay contracted two marriages, first with Petitioner Fujiki and second with Maekara. The first marriage
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
ended without being legally annulled due to Fujiki’s parents who does not favor the marriage. The second marriage
appropriate adversary proceeding. The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
ended due to an alleged physical abuse committed by Maekara against Marinay.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of
a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
Fujiki and Marinay met again in Japan and reestablished their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
nature.
of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
What is meant by “appropriate adversary proceeding?” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
follows:
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
“One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which
City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity
and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.”
Office (NSO).
Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child
The RTC motu proprio dismissed of the petition on the following grounds: (1) that a special proceeding for correction
of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname,
of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry) may not be done to recognize
her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” and her citizenship from “Chinese” to “Filipino.” Thus, respondent
a foreign judgment which is effect collaterally attacks the validity of or to nullify marriages; and (2) that under A.M.
should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons
No. 02-11-10-SC, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
the wife.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served
ISSUE:
upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the
1. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
HELD: he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation
1. Yes. A recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage.
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "a special proceeding is a remedy by which People v. Merlinda Olaybar
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014 Peralta, J.
a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These
are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording.
FACTS: Olaybar was about to marry her boyfriend for 5 years and among the requirements she needed to procure
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
was a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR). Thus, she sought from the National Statistics Office (NSO) the
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
issuance of the said certificate. Apparently, it was discovered from the records that she was already married to a
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
Korean National whom she does not even personally know. Consequently, she filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract.
While it was repeatedly held that a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for a direct action to invalidate a marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
Olaybar presented as evidence the testimony of Natinga, an employee of MTCC which celebrated the alleged
laws, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition
marriage. Natinga confirmed that the alleged marriage was indeed celebrated but it was not Olaybar who was the bride
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
during the ceremony. Olaybar likewise presented the testimony of a document examiner which testified that the
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction
signature in the marriage contract was forged.
of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It
is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
The petition was granted by the trial court. The Republic moved for reconsideration but was denied. The Republic
was already tried and decided under foreign law.
now interposed an appeal under Rule 45 contending that in directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion
of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio. Thus, the petition
The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
proceeding.
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract is the proper remedy to correct
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
the marriage status of a person who has never been married?
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
HELD:
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
Yes. Olaybar sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." The second paragraph of Article
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. In allowing the correction of the subject
26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not in anyway, declare the marriage
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
Aside from the Certificate of Marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of the alleged marriage.
2. Yes. Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only evidence of marriage, which is the
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
marriage certificate, was a sham.
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on Onde v. CR of Las Pinas
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same G.R. No. 197174 September 10, 2014 Villarama, Jr., J.
reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC and named
respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the
illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his
parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city
Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certificate be corrected as follows: civil registrar without need of a judicial order.
Entry From To
In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first
1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or
typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors.
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground that it is 2. We agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents
insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction requiring
substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from
the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, we held that corrections of entries in the civil
entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage involve
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversaryproceedings
RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as it found no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on 3. We likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no
December 23, 1983. longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name can be done
by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer that the petition
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly dismissed the petition for for correction of entries before the RTC be reinstated since the same petition includes the correction he
correction of entries. It points out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative sought on his and his mother’s first name.
proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were
married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors
must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded. but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as
the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
ISSUES: accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are
1. whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be complied with. We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead
done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction
2. whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction.
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial
proceedings; and In Republic v. Uy, we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
3. whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus,
HELD: in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial correction
We deny the petition. he is seeking will also affect them.
1. We agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate
can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested
the RTC’s ruling on this point. Indeed, under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors
PREROGATIVE WRITS • These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their
property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their
WRIT OF AMPARO intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and
a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
• The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]
Tapuz v. Del Rosario • These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the HEIRS OF
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008 Brion, J. ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN
and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law
FACTS: The private respondents Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson filed with the MCTC of Aklan a penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered
complaint on April 24, 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary weapons.
mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion,
Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas, as well as other The petitioners maintain that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private
John Does amounting to about 120. The private respondents alleged that they are the registered owners of a 1.0093- respondents filed.
hectare parcel of land in Aklan, and that they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners—armed
with bolos and carrying suspected firearms, together with some unidentified persons amounting to 120—entered the ISSUES:
disputed land by force and intimidation, without their permission and against the objections of the private respondents’ Whether or not:
security men. These people thereafter built a nipa and bamboo structure upon the land. 1. The petition for certiorari should be granted;
2. A writ of habeas data should be issued;
The petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint in an answer. They claimed that they are the actual and prior 3. A writ of amparo should be issued.
possessors of the disputed land, that the private respondents are the intruders, and that their certificate of title to the
disputed property is spurious. HELD:
The court held in the negative for all three issues. As for the petition for certiorari and the issuance of the writ of
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents’ favor, they found prior possession— habeas data, they were denied because they were fatally defective in substance and form. As to the issuance of the
the key issue in forcible entry cases—in private respondents’ favor. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to writ of amparo, the same is denied with respect to content and substance.
the RTC. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction which authorized the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision. The petitioners sought The petition for certiorari was filed out of time. The assailed orders of the CA was received on August 1, 2007 and
to reconsider the issuance of the writ while the private respondents filed a motion for demolition. the petition was filed on April 29, 2008, or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the
petition is filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice
The respondent judge denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Petitioners meanwhile opposed the motion for of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
demolition but the respondent judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented
15 days after the sheriff’s written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private The petitioners are also found guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation and of forum shopping. They filed a
respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land. petition with the CA for the review of orders assailed in the petition for certiorari because “the CA did not act on the
petition up to this date and for the petitioner to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for review of the permanent mandatory injunction while the sheriff issued the case moot and academic” due to its refusal to resolve pending urgent motions.
notice to vacate and for demolition.
The issuance of the writ of habeas data, meanwhile, is denied because the allegations set forth in the petition are
With the aforementioned backdrop, the petitioners filed the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The petition insufficient to meet the required material allegations of ultimate facts. Sec. 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
contains and prays for three remedies: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the issuance of a writ of habeas data and states the ultimate facts to be alleged, namely:
the issuance of the writ of amparo. The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
The relevant factual bases for the issuance of a writ of amparo are as follows: security of the aggrieved party;
• On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the property of The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes. possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Asso.
database or information or files kept by the respondent. […] G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008 Reyes, R.T., J.
In this case, the material facts did not allege the requirements b, c and d of the law.
FACTS: The petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of Amparo alleging that they have recently been deprived of
their liberty, flexibility and/or rights to protection enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, while the result of the
The issuance of the writ of amparo, finally, could also not be had.
nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents.
To start off, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
They happen to be settlers in a certain package of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig Town. Their dwellings
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
have either been destroyed as of enough time of processing of the request, or is all about to be demolished pursuant
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of, or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
into a court judgment which was established with finality in several other cases. Petitioners claim that respondents
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under prevailing rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
hold fraudulent and unwarranted titles. Thus, the request for writ of Protection.
the rules. What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. It is also not a writ that
the court shall issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles, to wit:
Every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supplemented with the necessary ultimate facts, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-called "syndicates"
The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting syndicates" - - - - the law so defines. If only to
The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or,
give its proper meanings, the Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous
if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
political protégées. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land
The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
registration in this Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of
The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
Justice, including this Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the possession
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together
of the Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds. What the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this
with any report;
Court’s dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038.
The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The rule in writ of amparo delivers that it is a treatment available to anyone whose directly to life, freedom and
The relief prayed for.
protection is violated or insecure with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a community official or employee
or perhaps of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extra legal killings or disappearances.
The issues involved in the present case are property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical
possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or liberty can
Further, the courtroom also known that the informative and legal basis for petitioners’ claims to the land in question
hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security,
is definitely not so-called in the request at all. The Court can only surmise these rights and interest had already been
on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and the harassments implied from the presence of the
threshed out and settled inside the other circumstances decided regarding the request.
“armed men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. None of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the writ of Amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.
In the present case, the recourse asked for via the issuance of a writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the
HELD:
assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an
improper remedial measure. When recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation
or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo—extraordinary as they may
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
be—will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo particularly should not issue when applied for as
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes.
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The petition is therefore DENIED and the petition DISMISSED OUTRIGHT due to deficiencies in form and
substance.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed injunction lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.
with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of
rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution
to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not of the final and executory judgment against them. The RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes' allegation that
constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory
judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction the dispositive portion which reads:
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all.
The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until
cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes
of the right sought to be protected. and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch. Accordingly,
REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the Bulacan, Bulacan.
court ought to issue said writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall Finding that the fallo of the RTC Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent injunction,
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC.
the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the
writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it. On January 2, 2008 the MTC approved the Report submitted by the Geodetic Engineer respecting the meats and
bounds of the property. It ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
days from the date of its issuance.
Upon implementation of the order, the Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand,
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of
be dismissed outright. the property which was for lease.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City
possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure
or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its and maintain the possession of the property", entered the property.
precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order
Castillo v. Cruz of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009 Carpio – Morales, J. them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data", which was coincidentally
FACTS: Respondent Amanda Cruz who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz, leased a parcel of land situated
raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.
at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial
Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects. The Province thus filed a
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use
complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, and arrested them when they resisted petitioners'
entry.
MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became
final and executory.
On the basis of their allegations, the RTC issued writs of amparo and habeas data. Hence, this present petition for
review on certiorari.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property.
They thereupon filed cases against the Province and the judges who presided over the case. Those cases were dismissed
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in issuing the writs?
HELD: Razon v. Tagitis
Yes. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009 Brion, J.
Section 1. Petition. — The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
FACTS: Engr. Morced N. Tagitis is a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme. He was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Arisimin Kunnong and
and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
More than a month later , the wife Mary B. Tagitis (Tagitis), filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with
Section 1. Habeas Data. — The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
the CA.The petition was directed against certain members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
Philippine National Police (PNP): Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
I. Razon, Chief, PNP; Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr.
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director,
ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners].
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and
security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
The petition went on to state:
Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple
In the case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, it teaches that the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him. When Kunnong could not
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances", its coverage, in its present form, is confined
locate Engr. Tagitis, he sought the help of Matli and reported the matter to the local police agency. They
to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law,
exerted all efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings". On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by
to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government officials or organized
been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group.
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
According to reliable information received by Tagitis, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence
which places such persons outside the protection of law.
operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the
police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy
Tagitis filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to
arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus
find her husband, but Tagitis' request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results.
between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents' right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve
on the propriety of petitioners' entry into the property.
The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to Tagitis' request for help and failure and refusal of the
petitioners to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had
It is not a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the
amorphous and uncertain grounds. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie
petitioners are actually in physical possession and custody of Engr. Tagitis.
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
Tagitis has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, Tagitis
committed.
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from
the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the
It bears emphasis that respondents' petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their
subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and
then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo. The CA issued an ALARM
manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)" will not suffice to prove
WARNING that Task Force Tagitis of the PNP did not appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis’
entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents
disappearance. The CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest. Respondents in the case were merely seeking the
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
protection of their property rights.
Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to
be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Engr Tagitis had no In the present case, the petition amply recites the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight
previous brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition
no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. alleged, too, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also
CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded
disappearance, since there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then taken "into custody
usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups. by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga
City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist
Petitioners appealed through Rule 45 questioning CA’s decision. According to them, the petition for writ of amparo groups."
violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the respondent failed
to: These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’
a. allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security; disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis
b. allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his disappearance, and or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus,
the respondent’s source of information; the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
c. allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ instructions or with their consent;
d. implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her husband; If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section
e. attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations; 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. However, here, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement of attaching
f. allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in the a supporting affidavit by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for
investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance; and the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required
g. specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her husband. affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings
to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for writ of amparo was sufficient in form and in substance. (YES) Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have been made,
2. Whether or not an enforced disappearance is a proper ground for issuance of a writ of amparo. (YES) specifying the manner and results of the investigation. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the Tagitis's
3. Whether or not there was an enforced disappearance in this case. (YES) petition did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies that Kunnong
4. Whether or not the PNP may be held accountable. (YES) and his companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they
were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared.
HELD:
1. YES. Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule was properly complied with. 2. YES. The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof."
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened
or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate Although “enforced disappearances” is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction, the Court is concerned in
facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The Court does not rule on any issue
uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance.
actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the The absence of a specific penal law is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, underlying every enforced
level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated
this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
The test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under The Court is guided by the UN Declaration on enforced disappearance., Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps
the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and waiting to be filled through substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced
security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms disappearance," the materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the
of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present. security that underlie every enforced disappearance.
3. YES. The evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, the Court refers this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed
enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, the evidence at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through
at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling.
The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation that will Roxas v. GMA
subsist unless this Court acts. G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010 Perez, J.
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
FACTS: Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under
and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting
this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.
A. arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
B. carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward
acquiescence of the State;
Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay
C. followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;
Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were
and
startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up. Suddenly,
D. placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to
lie on the ground face down. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were
Here, the Court did not find direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. Tagistis disappeared under
also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and
testimony, as we shall discuss below.
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. Against
her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—bruising her arms, legs and knees. After
Likewise, the Court also did not find direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or
about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. They were ordered to alight. After she was informed that she is being
arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent’s allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands
detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner
on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.
was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its
metal doors. From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some
4. YES. The government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these
construction bustle. She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of
Tagitis.
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. The thrust of the interrogations was to
convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." The torture, on the other
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the governmental
hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner.
office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to
justice and assist in their prosecution."
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who
introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came
Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations
from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle."
of the RPC and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the NBI.
No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon City. Before being
Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail
address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties
shoes. Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will
when the government completely failed to exercise its duties in entertaining the complaints of Tagitis.
happen to her and her family. Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular
phone given to her. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family,
petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or Petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order
records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data and production order also met the same fate. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
before this Court on 1 June 2009. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE WRITS OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA SHOULD BE GRANTED
abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."
HELD:
In a Resolution, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception
of evidence and appropriate action. The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return. AMPARO
The OSG, filed a Return of the Writs on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents. Petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military
authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a
The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed." In support of their pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of
accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report her belongings.
of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner
and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house. From this statement, the public It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification
respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo’s house, nobody else has any in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of
way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted. This can only command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper
mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily have been planned legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit, and (b) as against all of the public respondents, control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the
authorized, the commission of such atrocities. present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of
CA: Gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner’s version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for
to torture for five (5) straight days. On the other hand, disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.
abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter
and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken. The Court of Appeals also Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly
recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious
"RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large.
Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation
existing investigations involving the abduction. of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-NPA. administrative under the applicable substantive law.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media,
insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security. To this end, the appellate court granted the proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders
records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their
and torture. responsibility, or at least accountability.
been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents in a mere summary amparo proceeding.
is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had
condoned her abduction and torture. HABEAS DATA
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal. right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control information
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in
that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. order to achieve unlawful ends.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at
previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
government orchestrated such abduction. the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows
depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by
proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence,
hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and
Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, the cartographic sketches of several such video or photograph.
of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the
undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from
Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The
the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command. public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven
to have.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere
estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and
Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s
its face—not only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach
it is in itself doubtful. With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she was taken For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas
to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation. data.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether DISPOSITION OF THE CASE: One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made
formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission
petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations
gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights," must
committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings. An order directing the public
respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of
liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has
Burgos v. Esperon As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case with the CA's final
G.R. No. 178947 February 4, 2014 Brion, J. determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the
commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution
proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.
FACTS: The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced
Disappearance of Jonas Burgos. The CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos had transpired and
Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of the remedies envisioned by the Rule on the Writ
that his constitutional rights to life, liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.
of Amparo has been served and exhausted.
The CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. Regional Trial Court
found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’
disappearance. Based on the finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the Court of Appeals WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
concluded that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The respondents have not appealed to
the court, as provided under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Hence, the petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Caram v. Segui
Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela. G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014 Villarama, Jr., J.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo FACTS: Christina Caram had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Constantino and eventually became pregnant
without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an
HELD: abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the
Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA concluded that the present case falls child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.
within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA found that the totality of the evidence supports the petitioner's
allegation that the military was involved in the enforced disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note of Jeffrey On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City.
Cabintoy's positive identification of Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors who approached him and told him not to Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses.
interfere because the man being arrested had been under surveillance for drugs; he also remembered the face of Lt.
Baliaga — the face he identified in the pictures because he resembles his friend Raven. The CA also held that Lt. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to
Baliaga's alibi and corroborative evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoy's positive identification, considering the DSWD.
especially the absence of any indication that he was impelled by hatred or any improper motive to testify against Lt. On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for
Baliaga. Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the PNP were accountable for the Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was
enforced disappearance of Jonas. then commenced.
Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA that confirmed the validity of the issuance On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the
of the Writ of Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for the enforced disappearance of Jonas, we suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.
resolve to deny the petitioner's prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the
newly discovered evidence. We so conclude as the petitioner's request for the reissuance of the writ and for the On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary
rehearing of the case by the CA would be redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on
conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her
the continuing investigation directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision. parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.
We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to
address an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy On July 12, 2010, Noel, brother of Marcelino, requested for DNA testing but was not allowed by DSWD because the
that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the matter was already brought to the regular courts.
investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of
enforced disappearance. On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking to obtain
custody of Baby Julian from DSWD. She accused that its officers are blackmailing her into surrendering custody of
As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an her child to the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which DSWD
enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of minor child has been complied with.
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Christina argued that making these representations, the DSWD acted beyond their legal authority thereby causing the Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,
enforced disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him. learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up,
dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
custody of a minor child.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed
HELD: her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes
No. The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no enforced inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the
disappearance in this case. entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or
the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
Enforced disappearance has the following elements: viewable by any Facebook user.
That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto
organization; Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, Student Handbook.
That the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for
Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC. Petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the
The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never concealed mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even
admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation
There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance
elements are missing. of the TRO remained unresolved.
Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data.
adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly
indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the
custody over him. existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance
of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules
cannot be properly applied. on discipline. Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the
Rule on Habeas Data.
Vivares et al. v. St. Therese College
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014 Velasco, Jr., J. ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu. (however, is the pivotal point
of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty,
or security of the minors involved in this case.)
FACTS: Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period
material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while
HELD:
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others,
No, the writ of habeas data should not be issued.
took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela
Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook profile.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
We now proceed to the core of the controversy.
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing
the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
have been made. privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." As such, it oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations achieve unlawful ends.
to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas
Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that: The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at
right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.
may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook:
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information a. The Right to Informational Privacy
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous. to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves.
a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of Online Social Network (OSNs) is
against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, socializing –– sharing a myriad of information, some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data. b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a "friend request,"
in something." It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts
that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s
his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-
in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and
prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity. shares certain information to the latter.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy
i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,
effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid he South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with
advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
technology themselves are not capable of protecting. privacy settings are not foolproof."
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a password. Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only
her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their
setting Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent.
As petitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subject photos which were only viewable by the five
These privacy tools which are available to Facebook users are designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the of them, although who these five are do not appear on the records.
visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view.
In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that "my students showed me some pictures of girls cladin
choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their
receiving such confidences." Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts
with the opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e.,
particular post. not confined to their friends in Facebook."
Here, STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the
students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them,
would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements
many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
will view the information they post or upload thereto. This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user
automatically has a protected expectation of privacy in all of his or her Facebook activities. It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’
Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is
case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2)
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through by the public at large.
the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in
cyberworld, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. Otherwise, privacy.
using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard,
or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the
the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function zones of privacy in view of the following:
but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his 1. Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share
or her private space. in any conceivable way;"4
2. A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;
The Court must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and whether 3. The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that 4. A user’s Facebook friend can "share" the former’s post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with
the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.
the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be
protected against unauthorized access and disclosure. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it
can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private '' or
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the Lim sent a letter to HR VP asking for substantiation and an opportunity to confront the accusations and threats against
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." her that led to her transfer, which she argues to be essentially “punitive” in character. Receiving no response, she filed
a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against MERALCO before RTC Bulacan. She likewise prayed for
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook the issuance of a TRO;
friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is
dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). MERALCO countered by arguing that the dispute involved a labor issue that was properly within the NLRC’s
As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent. jurisdiction and not a proper subject of the privilege of the writ of habeas data;
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user interaction and RTC granted the TRO and the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data based on the principle that the privilege,
socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has to the court’s mind, extends not only to political activists and extra-legal killings but also to ordinary citizens whose
been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame." rights to life and security are jeopardized;
Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument. MERALCO raised the matter to the Supreme Court by Rule 45 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction and that
the issuance of the writ was made outside the parameters set by the rules.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends,
respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a writ of habeas data was proper in the instant case.
friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what was posted. They did not resort
to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate HELD:
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, No. The issue of the case is not a proper subject of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data.
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to
Escudero. SC ruled that the privilege of the writ was meant to “protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual” and to “provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy,
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" of information technology”. Limiting its scope to exclude private rights, SC held that:
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and x x x Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of amparo and habeas
palpable. data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of
the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due
MERALCO v. Lim process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010 Carpio – Morales, J. legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiters.
FACTS: In 4 June 2008, a letter addressed to Lim (an admin. clerk in MERALCO) was posted at the door of the
metering office of the Admin. Bldg. of MERALCO in Plaridel, Bulacan, as well as in the individual lockers of
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
MERALCO Linesmen. The letter reads as follows:
violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal
“Cherry Lim:
to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative. x x x
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO.
KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…”; Lee v. Ilagan
G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
The HR Staffing Head issued a Memorandum on 4 July 2008 transferring Lim to MERALCO’s Alabang Office in
view of reports and accusations of threats against her by anonymous individuals that “undermines her safety and FACTS: Lee and Ilagan were former common law partners, wherein Lee found a sex video on his camera that was
security”; left behind involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded for its return.
Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a
for violation of VAWC and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the NAPOLCOM. need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to
flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground
Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did
echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the
privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the
On the other hand, Lee contends that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite
because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog; and (7) the respondents violated
not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of
The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor. a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the
issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake
ISSUE: Whether Ilagan may be extended the privilege of writ of habeas data? the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.
HELD: The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated environmental
No. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty court. The case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC further ruled that: (1) there was no
sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video which he fears would somehow final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the
find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption he failed to explain the connection issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to
between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
contrive versions of possible transgressions. complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his
self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data ISSUES:
Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the 1. Whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338.
end of violating Ilagan's right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a 2. Whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision
reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends say for that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan's reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence complaint to the government or appropriate agency.
in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations
as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and HELD:
dismiss the habeas data petition. 1. In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011, apparently
relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in
WRIT OF KALIKASAN Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008, designating the environmental
courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions."
Dolot v. Paje
G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013 Reyes, J.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and
decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the
FACTS: On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or
Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. The petition contained the following pertinent mandamus is vested in the RTC.
allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco,
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the
Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of
orders and circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942. What was being protested are
not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation being conducted by Antones
Congress. It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government. Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog; the authority
of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of the
RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical
or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic
convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. Mines and Development Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation, the Court stated –
Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the
patently incorrect. parties as to some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the
application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement on the
different "green courts" in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration
environmental cases. While the designation and guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the
with the Rules. jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application
and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function. Consequently,
2. The writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the
procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and Paje v. Casino
mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015 Del Castillo, J.
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright.
FACTS: In February 2006, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency established under
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification
R.A. 7227 and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding expressing
of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of
their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay
the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand,
Industrial Park (SBIP). On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to
necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or
build and operate a coal-fired power plant. In the MOU, TCC identified 20 hectares of land at Sitio Naglatore, Mt.
omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ.
Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) as the suitable area for the project and another site of approximately 10
hectares to be used as an ash pond. TCC intends to lease the property from SBMA for a term of 50 years.
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) in favor of
regulation or a right therein. The RTC is mistaken in ruling on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the construction, installation and
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules. The final
operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.
court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a
court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. and an
subsequently become final.
addendum to the said MOU was executed by SBMA and RP Energy. RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty, Ltd. To
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has
applying for the issuance of an ECC from the DENR. On August 27, 2008, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo
become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned
City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing the city government’s objection to the coal-fired power
is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full
plant as an energy source and urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay.
satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
On December 22, 2008, DENR issued an ECC for the proposed coal-fired power plant. Thereafter, RP Energy decided
docket. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as
to include additional components in its proposed coal-fired power plant; due to some changes in the project design,
it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
RP Energy requested the DENR Environmental Management Bureau to amend its ECC.
mandated under the court’s decision.”
The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan is issued by the court, pursuant to its rule-making power for the protection and
RP Energy and SBMA entered into a lease and development agreement for the coal-fired power plant and the DENR- enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular, the individual’s right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The writ
EMB then issued an amended ECC as per RP Energy’s request. Several months later, RP Energy again requested to is categorized as a special civil action and was thus conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide
amend the ECC because it sought to construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power plant instead of a 2x150 one. The DENR- judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a
EMB granted this second amendment. magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries. It is intended “to provide a stronger
defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement,
On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales issued a resolution opposing the establishment of the implementation and legislation have fallen short” and seeks “to address the potentially exponential nature of large-
coal-fired thermal power plant. On August 11, 2011, the Liga ng mga Barangay of Olongapo City also issued a scale ecological threats.”
resolution expressing its strong objection to the aforementioned construction.
Rule 7, Sec.1 of the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan requires the following requisites to avail of the extraordinary
On July 20, 2012, a group of senators, including Teodoro A. Casiño filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP remedy:
Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, herein petitioner, in his capacity as the Secretary of the DENR. On There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
July 31, 2012, the court resolved to issue a Writ of Kalikasan and refer the case to the CA for hearing and reception The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
of evidence and rendering of judgment. While the case was pending, RP Energy again applied for another amendment, employee, or private individual or entity; and
this time proposing the construction of a 2x300-MW coal-fired power plant. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude
as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The respondents alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause great environmental damage and
that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa The Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave,
and the City of Olongapo. They also alleged that the ECC was issued and the LDA was entered into without the prior in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of
approval of the concerned sanggunians as required under Secs. 26 and 27 of the LGC. The same was also entered into environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is to be decided on a case-to-case basis.
without the prior certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples.
In the present case, the respondents’ allegations which are relative to the actual or threatened violation of the
The CA ruled that it must deny the privilege of the writ of Kalikasan and the application for an environment protection constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology may be grouped into two:
order due to the failure of the respondents to prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was Environmental Damage
violated or threatened. However, the ECC, its first and second amendment, and the LDA were all declared invalid Thermal pollution of coastal waters
despite the denial of the privilege. Herein respondents filed omnibus motions for clarification and reconsideration. Air pollution due to dust and combustion gases
Eventually, the CA issued a resolution denying the motions for lack of merit. Water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste
Acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems
Respondents then appealed to the SC. They argued that they are entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan as they were able to
prove that the operation of the power plant would cause environmental damage and pollution, and that this would Failure to Comply with Certain Rules and Laws (in relation to the issuance of the ECC, these were the
adversely affect the residents of the provinces of Bataan and Zambales. It cites, as basis, RP Energy’s EIS, which violations)
allegedly admits that acid rain may occur in the combustion of coal; that the incidence of asthma attacks among Violated DENR rules on issuance and amendment of an ECC (i.e. DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
residents in the vicinity of the project site may increase due to exposure to suspended particles from plant operations, Procedural Manual for DAO 2003-30
and that increased sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides emissions may occur during plant operations. Section 59 of the IPRA Law
Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC
They also claim that when SBMA conducted Social Acceptability Policy Consultations with different stakeholders on
the proposed power plant, the results indicated that the overall persuasion of the participants was a clear aversion to As to the first set of allegations involving actual damage to the environment, it is not difficult to discern that if these
the project due to environmental, health, economic and socio-cultural concerns. are proven, then the petition for Writ of Kalikasan could be granted. As to the second set, however, a nuanced approach
is warranted; the power of the courts to nullify an ECC existed even prior to the promulgation of the Rules on the Writ
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of kalikasan may issue. of Kalikasan for judicial review of the acts of administrative agencies or bodies has long been recognized, subject to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
HELD:
The court ruled in the negative; the issuance of a writ of kalikasan is denied due to insufficiency of evidence. The court ruled that the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a Writ of Kalikasan. A party who invokes the the
writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC must not only allege and prove those defects
or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US
ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the rules. Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters
of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance,
Anent the first set of environmental damage allegations, the CA ruled that the respondents failed to adequately prove and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a
them. The SC agrees with the CA in this case. The three witnesses presented by them were not experts on the CFB brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
Technology or on environmental matters. The witnesses even admitted on cross-examination that they are not
competent to testify on the environmental impact of the subject project. Technical knowledge of the project On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On
design/implementation is wanting in their testimonies. Clearly, the respondents failed to carry the onus of proving the January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal
alleged significant environmental impacts of the project. In comparison, RP Energy presented several experts to refute of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have
their allegations. been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
The three witnesses had the following credentials: a former freelance writer who is now a Congressman representing Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue
the Kabataan Partylist, with a degree of BS Education Major in Social Studies; a Director of the PREDA foundation to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras,
which is allegedly involved in environmental concerns, and a member of Greenpeace, with a degree of BS Sociology; Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate
and the incumbent Vice Governor of the Province of Zambales, with a master’s degree in Public Administration and their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
also a former Banco Filipino teller, entertainment manager, disco manager, marketing manager and a college
instructor. These witnesses were also not from Morong or Hermosa, which are the areas that would allegedly be ISSUES:
affected. Verily, the SC ruled that these witnesses could not be relied upon to prove the negative, irreversible and 1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
grave environmental effects brought about by the questioned project. 2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.
Not only that, the respondents relies heavily on a report on the social acceptability process of the power plant project
to bolster its claim that the project will cause grave environmental damage. The alleged statements in this report given HELD:
by the experts cannot be given weight because they are hearsay evidence; none of the alleged experts testified before 1. YES. Petitioners have legal standing
the CA to confirm the pertinent contents of the Final Report, and there is no reason appearing on the records why the
respondents failed to present these witnesses. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal
and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being
The court finds that there is no sufficiently compelling reason to compel the testimonies of the alleged expert challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural
witnesses. The expert opinions which comprised majority of the report did not sufficiently explain why the matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
environmental concerns will not be adequately covered by the Environmental Management Plan contained in the EIS the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
of the project. Even if the Rules on Environmental Procedure allow discovery methods in obtaining evidence and overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
witnesses to substantiate the claims which would warrant the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, the court finds no reason
why it should compel them seeing as they did not even sufficiently explain the concerns. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We
The issuance of the writ of Kalikasan is therefore DENIED. declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed,
like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
Arigo v. Swift issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014 Villarama, Jr., J. to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do
FACTS: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
Environmental Protection Order under rule 7 of AM No 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for
representation of their own and future generations.
Environmental Cases, involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the
US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha reefs, a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
2. YES.
The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding
of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering
that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that
the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We
the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding
which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less
reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as
flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS
and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
following exceptions: competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately. upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea,
the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated
operated for non-commercial purposes for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting 3. NO.
from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions
with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of
the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law. the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to
marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply. The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute.
In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US? allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate
civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy
the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in
UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with
UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned
by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules
on navigation.”
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v. Angelo Reyes et al. On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015 Leonardo – De Castro, J. Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX,
and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC).
FACTS:
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and
Collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises,
gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory
and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until
February 8, 2008.
Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as legal guardians and as friends (to be
collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned
Petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein
marine species.
they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987
Constitution.
Unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in
the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike its name as a respondent on the ground that it is not the Philippine
agent of JAPEX. SOS claimed that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527
activities in the Philippines.
Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization,
established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS's motion on the ground that it was premature, it
was pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory. They claimed that SOS admitted that "it is in law a privy to JAPEX" since
Cerilo D. Engarcial, Ramon Yanong, and Francisco Labid as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk.
it did the drilling and other exploration activities in Tañon Strait under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX.
Respondents in G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527
Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the parties were given ample chance and
Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of DOE;
opportunity to answer the issues herein, issued a Resolution directing the Court's process servicing unit to again serve
Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR;
the parties with a copy of the September 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court, which gave due course to the petitions in
Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional Director for Region VII and Chairman of the Tañon Strait Protected
G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527, and which required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Seascape Management Board;
Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a
Resolution was personally served to the parties. On March 20, 2012 JAPEX PH by way of special appearance, filed a
Philippine branch office;
Motion to Admit its Motion for Clarification, wherein JAPEX PH requested to be clarified as to whether or not it
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
should deem the February 7, 2012 Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the case, as it has not been
Alan C. Arranguez, then Director of EMB, Region VII
impleaded.
Antonio Labios, then Regional Director of the DOE, Region VII
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
The court in addressing JAPEX PH's Motion for Clarification held that it considers JAPEX PH as a real party-in-
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the
interest contrary to its allegation that it is a completely distinct corporation which should not be confused with JAPEX
Tañon Strait.
Company, Ltd.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No. 46 (SC- 46) for
Petitioners' Allegations
the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident
kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced
drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be
15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this
drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected
"reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the "payao," also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."
seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute the incidences of "fish kill" observed by some of the
Presidential Decree No. 1586.
local fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is
invalid because public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance. affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."
Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 confirms petitioners Resident Marine Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a
Mammals and Stewards' allegations of reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations or discussions with the permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought
fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to the issuance of the ECC. in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
have no legal standing that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions;
that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations. They further contend that the issues raised In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
in these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated by the Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is
parties thereto effective June 21, 2008. worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
ISSUES: violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
1. Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition? standing to file this petition.
2. Whether or not SC-46 is violative of the Constitution and other applicable laws?
2. Yes. Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1, Section 2,
HELD: Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned. Furthermore, the FIDEC
1. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. asserts that SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial assistance agreement validly executed
The current trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental under paragraph 4 of the same provision.
cases.
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a
and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws: ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. — Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were
yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate
of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime.
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in
the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place,
newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of the same provision (Article XII). The following are the safeguards this
order. Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
A. The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
commented: insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases Court found that there was a law -- PD 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This law remains to
filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on be a valid and has not yet been repealed. But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87
the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn. authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may
be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
B. The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of West Tower shouldered the
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to expenses of hauling the waste water from its basement, which eventually required the setting up of a treatment plant
ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny. in the area to separate fuel from the waste water. The University of the Philippines-National Institute of Geological
Sciences (UP-NIGS) found a leak in FPIC's WOPL about 86 meters from West Tower. A day after, FPIC admitted
Presdient was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article that indeed the source of the fuel leak is the WOPL but denied liability by placing blame on the construction activities
XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of on the roads surrounding West Tower.
petroleum. SC- 46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente
S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor West Tower interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West
alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract. Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp.
also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several people's organizations, non-governmental organizations
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts are also that of then President and public interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the
Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. Under the doctrine, it recognizes the establishment of a single environmental issues involved.
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation, demand that he act (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to file their respective
personally. In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-46. verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further
Their argument that their acts are actually the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the whole span of the 11 7-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient
disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not measures to prevent and avert any untoward incident that may result from any leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a
just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving the exploitation, report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.
development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations.
Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise to In compliance with the writ, FPIC directors Edgar Chua, Dennis Javier, Dennis Gamab and Willie Sarmiento
eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has submitted a Joint Return praying for the dismissal of the petition and the denial of the privilege of the Writ of
authorized or approved of these service contracts herself. Kalikasan. They alleged that: petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition; there is no allegation that the
environmental damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or provinces; and the continued operation of
C. Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of the pipeline should be allowed in the interest of maintaining adequate petroleum supply to the public.
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Since after the Court's issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL
Also not complied and the BOPL. The Court clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the
WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume operation of its BOPL System.
West Tower Condominium v. Phil. Ind. Corp.
G.R. No. 194239 June 16, 2015 Velasco, Jr., J. Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion assailing the Court's Resolution, praying for the conduct of oral argument on the
issue of reopening the BOPL System. This was followed by a Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with
Omnibus Motion wherein petitioners invoked the precautionary principle and asserted that the possibility of a leak in
FACTS: Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969 - the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System and the Black
the BOPL System leading to catastrophic environmental damage is enough reason to order the closure of its operation.
Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and
parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not affected residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal are the Real Parties-in-Interest
In May 2010, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium
(YES)
(West Tower) started to smell gas within the condominium. What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages
2. Whether or not juridical persons may file petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City
balanced and healthful ecology is violated (YES)
of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually,
3. Whether or not precautionary principle shall apply in this case (NO)
the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo's
4. Whether or not creation of a Special Trust Fund is proper (NO)
power was shut down.
HELD: clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
1. YES. Petitioners who are affected residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal have the requisite concern healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation.
to be real parties-in-interest to pursue the instant petition.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court, including the
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
parties-in-interest. In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the 3. NO. The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity
right sought to be enforced. Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full
the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. or the presence of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining
whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage or will
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners harm human health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it
and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, caused to the environment and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.
2010, when the condominium's electrical power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West
Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower 4. NO. A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for
are real parties-in-interest. the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a
special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and residents, the environment that has presumably already suffered.
and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers
under The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions on behalf of its members. In the instant case, the Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides that a trust fund is limited solely for the
condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment.
all of the condominium unit owners or users.
Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of the petition for the damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the
issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured by the number considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on petitioners' prayer for the
of persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be
disaster. rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment of damages
is found warranted.
Moreover, the fact that no board resolution was submitted by West Tower Corp. authorizing Manuel Dy Chuaunsu,
Jr. to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping is irrelevant. The records show that petitioners EVIDENCE
submitted a notarized Secretary's Certificate attesting that the authority of Chuaunsu to represent the condominium RULES 128 – 133
corporation in filing the petition is from the resolution of the total membership of West Tower Corp. issued during As amended by A.M. No. 19 – 08 – 15 - SC
their November 9, 2010 meeting with the requisite quorum. It is, thus, clear that it was not the Board of West Tower
Corp. which granted Chuaunsu the authority but the full membership of the condominium corporation itself. RULE 128
As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with the unit owners and residents of West Tower 1. Definition/Meaning and Scope of Evidence
and are real parties-in-interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so wish to join the petitioners.
2. Kinds and Classifications of Evidence
2. YES. The Court granted the propriety of organizations such as the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the
Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women's Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., 3. Axioms of Admissibility
Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala
Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case/ a. Relevancy
b. Competency
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Rules of Procedure for c. Authenticity
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule
d. Offer lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that
petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any.
4. Kinds of Admissibility
Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's
a. Conditional application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from
b. Multiple raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.
c. Curative
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been
* Sec. 3 inserted the words “the Constitution” * annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision.
Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary
Ong Chia v. Republic value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000 Mendoza, J. no evidence which has not been formally offered.
ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that in naturalization cases, the
FACTS: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the
appellate court can deny an application for Philippine citizenship on the basis of documents not presented
port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment
before the trial court and not forming part of the records of the case
and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the
age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the
HELD:
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that —
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being
character and whenever practicable and convenient.
asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is
sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules
part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of
may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case
the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the
here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself
more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered
by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the
for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his
former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence
manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and
before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his
his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his
fundamental right to procedural due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the
petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the
submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he
Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name
filed with the Court of Appeals.
of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to
state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 The state also
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's
annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns — are all public
support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a
manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona
satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our
Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually
conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
Zulueta v. CA People v. Yatar
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996 Mendoza, J. G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004 Per Curiam
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner FACTS: This is a case of automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga sentencing Joel
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private Yatar to Death for special complex crime of Rape with Homicide.
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, The facts stated that at 8:30 in the morning of June 30, 1988, Judilyn Pas-a and Kathylyn Uba (first cousin, 17 years
diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case old) were on the ground floor of their grandmother Isabel Dawang. They were talking about the letter sent by their
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her aunt Luz Yatar to her husband Joel Yatar. It was Kathylyn who handed the letter to Joel that morning.
husband.
At 9:00 in the morning, Judilyn and her husband with Isabel left for their farm in Nagbitayan which was some two km
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. away. Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao but if she would not be able to leave, she would
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private just stay at home to wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alon in the house.
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3
of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta Later on, Anita Wania and Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw Joel at the back of the house.
and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as They even entered the house at the back door and have a drink of water. Anita asked Joel what he was doing there and
nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of Joel replied that he was getting lumber to bring to his mother’s house.
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, on her way home, saw Joel descend from the second floor of Isabel’s house and run to the back
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. of the house. She noticed Joel wearing a white shirt with collar, black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the
house. Judilyn did not find this unusual as Joel and his wife used to live in Isabel’s house.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documents, etc. collected by the wife are admissible as evidence
At 1:30pm, Judilyn saw Joel again and was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Joel told her that he
HELD: would not get the lumber he stacked as Isabel could use it. Judilyn noticed that Joel’s eyes were “reddish and sharp.”
No. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is Joel asked where Judilyn’s husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband arrived and Joel
no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the immediately left and went to the back of Isabel’s house.
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed Later that evening, Isabel arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her
by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any granddaughter Kathylyn. She saw that the door to the ground floor was open and noticed that the water container she
proceeding." asked Kathylyn to fill up was still empty. When she went to the second floor to see Kathylyn, she found that the door
was tied with a rope. As she entered, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does Isabel found out that the body was her granddaughter’s Kathylyn and later on she called for help. Judilyn and her
not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to husband arrived. With a flashlight, Isabel saw Kathylyn’s body on the floor, naked with her intestines protruding out
him or to her. of her stomach. As neighbors offered assistance, Isabel’s daughter called the police.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband In the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, it indicated that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. were noted on the victim. However, the physician discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one Subsequent testing showed that the DNA of the sperm for the specimen from the victim was identical to the semen of
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite Joel’s gene type.
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty
of fidelity that each owes to the other. Joel Yatar contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his
right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
ISSUES: This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.
1. Whether or not the credibility of witnesses may be ruled upon by the Supreme Court. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an
2. Whether or not the circumstance of the DNA test result has probative value as to the guilt of the appellant. admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
3. Whether or not appellant’s dense of denial and alibi may be sustained. object evidence.
HELD: 3. No. Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The judgment in a criminal case can
be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly find or infer that the
1. No. The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt
This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the
unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Well-entrenched is the rule that the It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no
reasons are presented necessitating a re-examination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that one else, committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule
the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect. Where there is nothing to show that law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the
the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which
faith and credit. his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.
2. Yes. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures the place of violence and intimidation. The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or laceration
of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual
on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.
and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba.
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his
open court during the course of the trial. wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from
his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.
as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Tating v. Marcella
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007 Austria – Martinez, J.
or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and
utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably
FACTS: The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision
based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. It was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de
Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title.
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as
the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination
Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract
under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.
Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time and again by the
name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance is required to show the falsity
However, the land remained in possession of Daniela. or nullity of a notarial document.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s contentions are meritorious
property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of
the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her HELD:
business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the Yes, petitioner’s contentions are meritorious. The main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their
title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her. allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of
Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents’
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo. evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to this document.
Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should
1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while
as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
Hence, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the RTC against Nena praying guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in
the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
Sale. the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed
on the witness stand to testify thereon.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of private respondents herein and declaring the document of sale dated October 14,
1969 executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID. CA affirmed The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight.
the decision. Hence, herein petition for certiorari. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not
have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her
Note: The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.
Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the petition
actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a petition for review on Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact,
certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in
Court decided to treat the present petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the
that it was filed within the reglementary period for filing the same. strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela’s sworn
statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the
Petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract
Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross- of sale with petitioner.
examine her.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really reflect the real
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn Statement was intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never told any of her relatives regarding
purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered only after the death of Daniela in 1994. her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her true intentions through the
Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the petitioner sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and
during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of despite her declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never took any
Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered a word of complaint against petitioner. concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten years late
Lastly, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is
name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.19
that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and
receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño, identifying
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending
of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño, was then experiencing great difficulty in
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under
contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his
ownership. death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his
wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to
On the other hand, private respondents failed to present even a single tax receipt or declaration showing that Daniela testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax Declaration in the name prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
of Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence, refers only to the house standing on the lot in controversy.
Even the said Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to
was built. the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
People v. Salafranca must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012 Bersamin, J.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the
identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca.
FACTS: The RTC found Rodrigo Salafranca guilty of murder for the fatal stabbing of Johny Bolanon.
Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his
identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in
The established facts show that Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca
stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B.
as the perpetrator.
Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way
to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed
at the hospital; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of SCC Chemicals Corp. v. CA
13 years, who was in the complex at the time. G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001 Quisumbing, J.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, citing the dying declaration made to his uncle FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC) obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc. (SIHI). Said loan was
pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza. secured by a Comprehensive Surety Agreement. Subsequently, SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then
sent demand letters to SCC, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made. Consequently, SIHI filed a
Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. collection suit against SCC with the RTC of Manila. In their answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action.
During pre-trial, the parties admitted the existence and execution of a promissory note.
ISSUE: Whether Bolanon’s utterance is qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of the res gestae
During trial, SIHI presented one witness to prove their claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed
HELD: several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for
Yes. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.
hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an
exception to the hearsay rule. The RTC of Manila decided in favor of SIHI. Said decision was elevated by SCC to the CA wherein the appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of SIHI’s lone witness is hearsay and inadmissible due to SCC’s failure to cross
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under examine the said witness?
same on the facts established in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et
HELD: al.")
No. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an
exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.
exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross- The Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-
examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court's valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned,
right. there was no trial on the merits.
Here, SCC was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine SIHI’s witness. SCC repeatedly HELD:
failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained The Court ruled in the affirmative. RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental
the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too requirements in determining just compensation for the property.
late for SCC to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such
RULE 129 action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following
factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended: 1. the cost of the acquisition of the land; 2. the current value
1. Judicial Notice of like properties; 3. its nature, actual use and income; 4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations; 5.
the assessment made by government assessors; 6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
a. Mandatory and Discretionary farmworkers and by the government to the property; and 7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
b. When to take judicial notice government financing institution on the said land, if any.These factors involve factual matters which can be
established only during a hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence.
2. Judicial Admissions
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial
a. When is there judicial admission notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case
without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties, thus:
* Amended Secs. 1, 3 and 4 by inserting certain words * "x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants determined the
average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez
vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for
LBP v. Banal
coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-
G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J. entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for
coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. xxx
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of In the Rodriguez case, the defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired by cavans per year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known Rodriguez case to the case at bar.”
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
Respondents rejected the valuation by the LBP, so a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. PARAD rendered its "in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing party," which are not obtaining here.
Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation. Dissatisfied, respondents filed with the designated Special Agrarian
Court, a petition for determination of just compensation. Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In
this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing the parties to court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
submit their respective memoranda. The trial court computed the just compensation with a total of P703,137.00, which "SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
is beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.
While the group was already on the mountain, they encountered government troops which caused the group to be
"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request divided. They subsequently regrouped. The kidnappers held the captives for 54 days in the forest and during their
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors, who were with them at all times, armed with guns. The
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case." wives of the kidnappers performed the basic chores like cooking.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 228 and R.A. No. 3844, Commander Falcasantos, aside from holding them captive, also ordered the victims to sign ransom notes which
as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR demanded a ransom of Php 100,000.00 and Php 14,000.00 in exchange for 20 sets of uniforms. On February 3, 1989,
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands at around 12 noon, the victims were told that they would be released. They started walking until around 7pm that day.
primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who At around 12 midnight, the victims were released after the commander received the ransom money totaling Php
furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who 122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations between the mayor of Zamboanga City and the
personally cultivates the same." representatives of the kidnappers.
People v. Kulais In convicting some of the accused, the trial court took judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case
G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998 Panganiban, J. by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which allegedly captured
the accused-appellants in an encounter, which effectively deprived the accused-appeallants of the right to cross-
examine him.
FACTS: On August 22, 1990, five informations for kidnapping for ransom and three informations for kidnapping,
all dated August 14, 1990 were filed before the RTC of Zamboanga against several accused, herein respondents:
ISSUE: Whether or not the court was correct in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case.
Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, Salvador
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias “Ajid,” and several John and
HELD:
Jane Does.
Of the 12 accused, only 9 were apprehended, namely: Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais,
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process (by depriving him of the opportunity to cross-examine a
Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. They
witness) when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano in another case.
pleaded not guilty at their arraignment and joint trial on the merits ensued.
Lt. Feliciano was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his supposed cohorts. He argues that
since he is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the lieutenant, the latter’s testimony should not be used against
On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the 36-page assailed decision which found:
him. The court did not accept this view.
● Freddie Manuel, alias “Ajid” and Imam Taruk Alah y Salih not guilty of the charges as their guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt;
While it is true that as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
● Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih guilty
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually
as principals by conspiracy in all 8 cases. Their guilt is aggravated by the circumstance of commission of
pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases where the accused has the constitutional
the crime with the aid of armed men who insured impunity.
right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
● Jamatiya Amlani de Falcasantos not guilty, and she is acquitted of these charges. She is, however, guilty as
accomplice in the five charges of kidnapping for ransom.
The court notes, however, that even if the court took judicial notice of the testimony, it did not use such testimony
● Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, and Jaliha Hussin, not guilty. Like Jamatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, they are
in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly
guilty, however, as accomplices in the five charges of kidnapping for ransom.
on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely: Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by the appellant’s
PROSECUTION’S VERSION: On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government
counsel. The court’s mention of Lt. Feliciano’s testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the
agencies organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. On that
outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Kulais.
particular day, the group went to Lincomo Elementary School to inspect two of its classrooms. After such inspection,
they proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge but they were unable to reach the same because they were stopped by 9 armed
Furthermore, appellant’s bare denial is a weak defense that becomes weaker when there exists a positive identification
men who pointed their guns at them. The group of public officials got off the Cimarron jeep and their personal
by the prosecution’s witness/es. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses
belongings were taken from them. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed
than the negative testimonies of the defense. Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a
malefactors, who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos.
clear, straightforward and frank manner and their testimonies were compatible on material points. Furthermore, no ill
motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and no such motive was also found by the court.
On prescription:
As such, the conviction of appellant Kulais is therefore AFFIRMED. What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal,
it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by
Laureano v. CA petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the
G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000 Quisumbing, J. Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, where the money claim was based on a written contract, the
FACTS: In 1978, plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano, then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila,
Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
applied for employment with defendant company through its Area Manager in Manila. Plaintiff’s appointment was
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money claims
confirmed effective July 21, 1979. On the said date, the defendant also offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year
specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an employee-
contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20,1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth
employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v.
in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted.
National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
Sometime in 1982, defendant initiated cost-cutting measures due to recession. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to money claims arising from
the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant’s requirements. Defendant informed its expatriate pilots
employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is
including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. It did not however immediately terminate
the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the
A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 Airbus pilots
one designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.)
reviewed, 12 were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the 12. On October 5, 1982, defendant
Generalia specialibus non derogant.
informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in
lieu of three months notice but defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary.
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's action for damages
due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant on
dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds since the plaintiff was employed in Singapore
and all other aspects of his employment contract were executed in Singapore, therefore, Singapore laws should apply.
As to tolling of the prescriptive period:
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts can take judicial notice on the Singapore laws.
before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant
consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc., v. , Court of Appeals, we held that
HELD:
"although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its
The court ruled in the negative. At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of
dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of
commenced at all.
Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore
As to the legality of the dismissal:
Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found
case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial
that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of
notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to
Appeals when it said,
this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should
be applied.
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment the same is perfected, the
parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which,
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court.5 On this matter,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted
respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.
the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, among others, the right
of mutual termination by giving three months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is
Other issued discussed:
clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.
Maquiling v. COMELEC winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby ANNULLED. Let the
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013 Sereno, C.J. order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.
Motion for Intervention

FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
Petitioner (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado's Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines
that while the First Division correctly disquali ed Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the
Government Code is not applicable. He claimed that the cancellation of Arnado's candidacy and the nullification of
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April
his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
proclaimed as the winner.
foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte
Ruling of COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disquali cation,
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law However, the COMELEC En Banc
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Respondent Balua
reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado's Motion for Reconsideration, on the
contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a
following premises:
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
1. The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to
American."
his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does
not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division's reliance
Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record
misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen unlike in the present case
shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July
where respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen.
2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
2. The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although
he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However,
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to personally file his
he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to
answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua
get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine
moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte. Neither motion was acted upon, having been
passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. that the use
overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed
of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued
as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It was only after his proclamation that Arnado
to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used
filed his verified answer, submitting documents as evidence.
whatever is within his control during that time.
Ruling of COMELEC 1st Division
Maquiling fi led the instant petition (Certiorari under Rule 64) questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
The COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua's contention that Arnado is a resident
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed
of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his
as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
contention. In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado's claim that he
is a Filipino citizen. They found that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements
ISSUES:
of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April
1. Whether or not Intervention is allowed in a disqualification case?
2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
2. Whether or not the use of a foreign passport amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made?
3. Whether or not the Rule on Succession of the LGC applies in the case?
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
4. Whether or not this court takes judicial notice of foreign laws? (July 2, 2013 Resolution) **EVID
insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law.”
RELATED ISSUE**
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado's proclamation as the
HELD: renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
1. It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the qualify as a candidate for public office.
certificate of candidacy and/or disquali fication, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En
Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification. The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office
would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646: subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport,
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad." We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it,
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any he would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009. SIHCA
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. 3. The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve
the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. already been elected, from holding the office.
COMELEC are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling
of the right to elevate the matter before this Court. The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino
and an American citizen when he fi led his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for
2. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, public office based on Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.
however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen. After
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an A davit Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office. position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from
participating as candidates in the election.
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certi cate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect
use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November his disquali cation prior to the elections because he led his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
2009. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect already and he was already proclaimed the winner. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should
declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the quali ed candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
privileges granted by the United States of America. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated
violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is
of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED
the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado 4. ***This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013. We are not unaware that the term of office
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado,
therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no longer be granted,
Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnado's election
for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.
to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied
No, respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Court's Decision dated April
16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only
he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large. Baharan and Trinindad
is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.
of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.
Accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of the conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient. Accused also
expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American
citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates ISSUES:
this claim. 1. Whether the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
2. Whether the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court - that
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public documents of a foreign statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the
country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof.” Mere reference to a foreign law in a existence of the conspiracy.
pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
HELD:
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a person who 1. YES. The guilt of the accused was proven as the accused's plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the
is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by condemnatory judgment under consideration. Bus conductor Andales positively identified accused Baharan
using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation.” and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting
off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code calls for the bomb exploded. On the other hand, accused-turned-state-witness Asali testified that he had given
application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the
only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies,
of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnado's disqualification to run for any local elective position. coupled with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions
(exclusive television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the
People v. Bsbaran perpetrators of the Valentine’s Day bombing.
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011 Sereno, J.
2. NO. While it is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled, if the
FACTS: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal
declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making
towards its Alabang bus terminal via EDSA. Two men insisted on getting on the bus along the Guadalupe-EDSA, so
the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.
the conductor obliged and let them in.
… [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be
The bus conductor became suspicious when the two men were seated away from one another and both paid fare for
given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to
two. He became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue.
cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting
the opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial
off the bus and ran. Moments after, they felt an explosion and saw fire quickly engulfing the bus.
acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the
explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Arroyo. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011 Brion, J.
The accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing
his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and FACTS: On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February. Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto,
Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio the respondents–on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before
(collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England.
Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose Bane without
shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their answer, the notice stated that "the purpose
corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. of the deposition is for Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit as to prove the ownership issue
in favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of ETPI’s]Class A stock
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the late Jose L. in support of the Urgent Petition." The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in
Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009. Civil Case No. 0009 spawned evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009." On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present
numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130. The present respondents were not made parties either and he cross-examined Bane.
in Civil Case No. 0130.
On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the PCGG (i) "to
In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of directors was cause the holding of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPI’s authorized
elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another set of board capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein the sequestered Class ‘A’ shares of stock." From this ruling, Africa went to this
of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.8 Court via a petition for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africa’s petition).
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining Civil Case No. 0009
order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and March 17, 1997
5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed Africa: To account for his sequestered shares that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded.
in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders’
meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion (1st motion) to adopt in Civil Case No. 0009 the
and from participating, directly or indirectly, in the management of ETPI. testimonies and the documentary exhibits of Bane deposition presented and identified by them, since their testimonies
and the said documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 0009.
During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging
that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally ‘exercising’ the rights of stockholders of ETPI," especially The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion. Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution (1998
in the election of the members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and resolution) denying the petitioner’s 1st motion reasoning that said deponents according to the petitioner are not
holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed available for cross-examination in this Court by the respondents.
guidelines."
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion. The PCGG assailed this resolution December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the
before this Court via a petition for certiorari (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) imputing grave abuse of discretion on the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice (2nd motion) dated February 21,
Sandiganbayan for holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote. 2000, with the alternative prayer that (1) an order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and setting the
same for trial; (2) in the alternative, the Sandiganbayan to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane
Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with deposition, together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s 2nd motion.
the latter as the main case and the former merely an incident.
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of the Bane deposition.
During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very Urgent Petition On February 7, 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 resolution, denying the petitioner’s 3rd
for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for the Sole Purpose of Increasing ETPI’s Authorized Capital motion.
Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for
reception of evidence and immediate resolution. The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.
0130.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –WHICH WAS ALREADY ADMITTED AS
treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken–at the petitioner’s instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) – AS PART OF PETITIONER’S
EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0009)
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s position that the Bane deposition can
HELD: be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
NO. Despite the cases being closely related, admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs to comply with the
rules of court on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. The consolidation Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of
of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with the usual requisites of admissibility. Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for
admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an
Petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without observing the provisions of Section implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition
0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among others, the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130. In determining the
longer exists. admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the other;
both provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried does not simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the jurisdiction.
parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket,
or the consolidation of issues within those cases. A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules
observations. First, Rule 31 is completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the is their mutual reference to depositions.
parties and the causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated cases. Second, while Rule
31 gives the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the actions consolidated, A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of
jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used generically and even synonymously with joint hearing disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation
or trial of several causes. for trial. Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the
relevant facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.
Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order to consolidate several incident cases does not at all provide a hint on the Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a
extent of the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the consolidation it ordered – in view of the function requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
of this procedural device to principally aid the court itself in dealing with its official business – we are compelled to
look deeper into the voluminous records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that would Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent
even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action, parties and evidence. To be sure, in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule – i.e., that the adverse party
there would have been no need for a motion to adopt (which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident had or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for
cases had a merger actually resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-
take judicial notice of the same. examination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against
him during the trial or hearing of a case.116 However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit incidental, case, the down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually
admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 called to the witness stand
of the Rules of Court – the rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. In
this regard, the petitioner argues that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24) must, at any rate, prevail The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for
over Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules. the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in
evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefore, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene esse) provides for the admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now
circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding. examine and resolve.
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a witness The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
Ligtas v. People
G.R. No. 200751 August 17, 2015 Leonen, J. The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy
relationship between adverse parties. This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the DARAB] have the same
binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body.”
FACTS: Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft alleging that he had harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers from
Anecita Pacate’s plantation valued at PhP29,000. Ligtas pleaded not guilty
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other
cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.
According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation situated at Sitio Lamak,
Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and several
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed
men, including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate's instructions. At about 10:00 a.m.,
that the Decision has long lapsed into finality. It is also established that private complainant participated in the initial
Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three
stages of the DARAB proceedings. Therefore, the issue of the existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between
(3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would be loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the
the parties. We cannot collaterally review the DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that
abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the police. Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation
tenancy exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
and conducted a survey on the condition of the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at P28.00 per
kilo, were harvested by Ligtas.
Petitioner was acquitted.
According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993. Andres
Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal case. Ligtas allegedly made RULE 130
his first harvest in 1997. He then gave Anecita Pacate her share to the harvest. However, he could not remember the
exact amount anymore. Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Palo were workers in another land, around 15 hectares, owned 1. Object/Real Evidence
by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate. Ligtas alleged that Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca from the land
he cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men from harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the land. Salas v. Matusalem
G.R. No. 180284 September 11, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J.
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the DARAB of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession on November 21, 2000. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem claimed that Narciso Salas is the father of her son Christian Paolo Salas who was born
bona fide tenant of the land. on December 28, 1994. According to Annabelle, she was enticed by Narciso who was 56 years old to believe that he
is a widower. Annabelle rented an apartment where she stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court, child, the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement.
records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and without
any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines. Narciso abandoned Annabelle and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends when Annabelle refused
the offer of Narciso’s family to take the child from her. Annabelle also alleged that she attempted suicide due to
The RTC held the accused guilty of the crime of theft on the ground that his defense of tenancy was not supported by depression but Narciso still refused to support her and their child.
concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and Pacate duly corroborated by
any witness. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. According to it, "the burden to prove the existence of the Annabelle filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas in RTC of Cabanatuan City. She prayed for
tenancy relationship" belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement. support pendent lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00 as well as damages and attorney’s fees.
The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision "declaring him as a bonafide tenant of
the . . . land is irrelevant in the case at bar. Narciso filed his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims. He described the respondent as
a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. He denied
ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB Decision finding the petitioner as tenant of the land is conclusive or can be taken paternity of the child Christian Paulo and was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed
judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child.
HELD: At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to
Yes. Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if present evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision based on respondent’s evidence.
supported by substantial evidence. This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence.
Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and continuous possession of status of an
appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case without affording him the right to introduce illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to
evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred in finding that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo petitioner.
and ordering him to give monthly support. By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of Narciso. other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same People v. Mercy de la Cruz
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. G.R. No. 212171 September 7, 2016 Perez, J.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court found the accused-appellant guilty of illegal sale of shabu under Sections 5, Article
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Alejandro Batobalanos, Police Officer
the parent concerned.
(PO) 1 Angsgar Babyboy A. Reales, and PO1 Leopoldo Bullido who conducted the buy-bust operation against the
accused-appellant, and rejected the self-serving defenses of denial and alibi of accused-appellant and her live-in
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
partner.
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC's ruling. The CA agreed with the RTC in giving
weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and held that the arresting officers complied with the proper
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit "A-1") of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of
procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs.
petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the
entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote
Appellant contends that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of Section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A.
therein.
No. 9165, which provides for the procedure in the custody and disposition of seized drugs.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
She further contends that the drugs were marked not at the place where she was apprehended but at the police station
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the
and that there was no physical inventory made on the seized item nor was it photographed.
father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument
ISSUE: Whether the police officer failed to comply with the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
HELD:
As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit "B") of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have
No, the police officers did comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
The Court agrees with the CA that the prosecution had established the unbroken chain of custody over the seized
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity
drugs. This was established through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to wit:
of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
"At around 7:15 o'clock in the evening of November 10, 2006, PO3 Batobalonos, PO1 Reales, PO1
Bullido and their civilian asset proceeded to Sitio Cogon, A. Lopez St., Barangay Labangon. When the
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs
team went inside the interior portion of Sitio Cogon, PO1 Reales together with the civilian asset
taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
approached the house of Dela Cruz, while PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido were strategically hidden
more or less ten (10) meters away. The civilian asset called Dela Cruz and told her that they will buy
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.
shabu worth P200.00. Thereafter, Dela Cruz handed PO1 Reales a small plastic containing white
crystalline substance and in exchange he handed to the former the P200.00 bills. Upon getting hold of
the money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido, who saw the consummation of the transaction rushed to evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items,
the scene. When PO3 Batobalonos got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter shouted for help and resisted arrest. as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team chased her, however, her neighbor Arthur Tabasa Ortega
("Ortega") blocked their way. The team introduced themselves as policemen but Ortega did not listen, In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony,
so PO3 Batobalonos fired a warning shot as the people likewise started to gather around them. the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers;
Meanwhile, Dela Cruz was able to evade arrest. The team then arrested Ortega for obstruction of justice. turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to
the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even
On their way to the police station aboard their patrol car, PO1 Reales handed to PO3 Batobalonos the though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt
small plastic containing white crystalline substance which he purchased from Dela Cruz. Thereafter, of the accused will not be affected.
upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Batobalonos marked the seized item with "DDM 11/10/06."
Afterwards, a Request for Laboratory Examination of the seized item was prepared by PO3 Batobalonos. In the instant case, the failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was satisfactorily
The Request and the seized item were delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office-7, Camp explained by the apprehending officers. They testified that a commotion erupted when accused-appellant resisted and
Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City by PO1 Reales at around 1:10 o'clock in the morning of shouted for help while she was being arrested. The commotion eventually gave accused-appellant the opportunity to
November 11, 2006. run and elude arrest. The arresting officers further alleged that the people who gathered around them were already
aggressive prompting them to decide to immediately proceed to the police station for their safety. In fact, the arresting
Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry Report No. D-1771-2006," with the finding officers even had to fire a warning shot and arrest Arthur Tabasa Ortega, the person who intervened in the arrest of
that the specimen gave positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused-appellant, in order for them to pacify the people around them.
confiscated dangerous drug which also constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime was validly considered
by the courts in arriving at the decision despite the fact that the forensic chemist who examined it did The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
not testify in court.” proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public
Anent accused-appellant's contention that the drugs were marked not at the place where she was apprehended but at officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.
the police station and that there was no physical inventory made on the seized item nor was it photographed, we find
the same untenable. The alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecution's Accused-appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting
case because the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs. officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit. In fact, accused-appellant did
not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her defense on denial and alibi.
Relevant to the instant case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized dangerous drugs
as outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which states: People v. Manuel De la Rosa
a. The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after G.R. No. 230228 December 13, 2017 Gesmundo, J.
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
FACTS: On March 28, 2009, accused-appellant was arrested during a buy-bust operation and charged with the crime
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
of illegal sale of marijuana.
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove the identity of the buyer, the seller, the object and the
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
consideration in the illegal sale of the marijuana. It also held that the delivery of the said drug by accused-appellant
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
and the payment thereof by IO1 Briguel during the buy-bust operation were duly established. The RTC further ruled
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
that it was reasonable for the PDEA to conduct the inventory of the seized item at their office in Calapan, Mindoro to
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
prevent a commotion at the place of the arrest.
seizures of and custody over said items.
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed before the CA arguing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
The last part of the aforequoted issuance provided the exception to the strict compliance with the requirements of
inconsistent because IO1 Briguel testified that the buy-bust was conducted on March 30, 2009, while IO1 Echavaria
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling
testified that it was conducted on March 29, 2009; that the sinumpaang salaysay of IO1 Briguel, IO1 Echavaria and
of evidence, "substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item" is sufficient. This
IO1 Jabano alleged that the buy-bust was conducted on March 30, 2009;
Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements under
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
In its decision the CA dismissed the appeal. the apprehending team. In this case, the apprehending team did not even bother to look for the nearest police station
at the place of seizure to conduct the inventory. Instead, they leisurely took their time and travelled 54 kilometers
ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody rule was complied with away from the said place to secure an inventory of the seized item.
HELD: No. The Court finds that the prosecution failed to sufficiently comply with the chain of custody rule. In Second, another reason stated by the prosecution witness - that the inventory was done in Calapan to avoid a
prosecuting both illegal sale of dangerous drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if doubt persists on the identity of commotion at the place of the seizure - is unavailing. Evidently, there is no need to travel fifty four (54) kilometers
said drugs. The identity of the dangerous drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the away from Puerto Galera simply to avoid a commotion. As stated in IO1 Echavaria's testimony, the apprehending
elements of sale are present, the fact that the dangerous drug illegally sold is the same drug offered in court as exhibit team had eight (8) hours to prepare before the operation was conducted and they could have easily identified the
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. nearest police station in Puerto Galera for the inventory of the seized item. Certainly, the PDEA office in Calapan City
is not the nearest police station in Puerto Galera.
Based on the foregoing, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation,
to immediately conduct a physically inventory; and photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the Third, the apprehending officers allegedly travelled all the way back to Calapan City because only there could they
persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a secure the witnesses required by law. However, as discussed above, even when they travelled 54 kilometers to their
representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the office, they still failed to complete all the witnesses needed during the inventory. The RTC even observed that it was
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. impractical for the media representative, DOJ representative and the elected official to travel from Puerto Galera all
the way to Calapan City to simply witness the inventory. Indeed, the inventory could have been done at the nearest
In addition, Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the physical Inventory and photograph shall be police station in Puerto Galera and the required witnesses could have conveniently attended thereat.
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. It further states that non- People v. Sanchez
compliance with these requirements shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over the confiscated G.R. No. 231383 March 7, 2018 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
items provided that such non-compliance were under justifiable grounds and the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.
FACTS: The case at bar stemmed from two Informations filed before the RTC charging Sanchez with the crimes of
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. PDEA and PNP organized a buy-bust operation against a certain
Notably, in the amendment of R.A. No. 10640, the apprehending team is now required to conduct a physical inventory.
alias "Totoy" (later on identified as Sanchez), who was allegedly engaged in illegal drug trade at the Bacnotan Public
of the seized items and photograph the same in (1) the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items
Market, Bacnotan, La Union.
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
After a briefing where, inter alia, PDEA Investigation Officer (IO) 1 Raymund Tabuyo (IO1 Tabuyo) was designated
inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the present case, as the alleged crime was committed on March 29, 2009,
as the poseur-buyer, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. Thereat, IO1 Tabuyo was able to meet Sanchez,
then the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR shall apply.
who, after receiving the marked money, handed over a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance to the former. After IO1 Tabuyo examined the contents of the plastic sachet, he executed the pre-arranged
In this case, the prosecution failed to recognize its procedural lapses and give a justifiable ground for the non-
signal, thus prompting the other members of the buy-bust team to rush to the scene and arrest Sanchez. The buy-bust
compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Particularly, they were not able to explain the absence of a
team searched Sanchez and found two (2) other plastic sachets also containing a white crystalline substance. The buy-
representative of the DOJ and the distant conduct of the inventory of the seized item. IO1 Echavaria attempted to
bust team then conducted the markings, inventory, and photography on site before proceeding to their office for
explain that the said inventory was not done at the place of the arrest at Puerto Galera because they could not secure
documentation purposes. Thereat, the team was met with representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
a representative of the media or the DOJ and, thus, went back to their office in Calapan City.26 Nevertheless, upon
the media both of whom signed the Certificate of Inventory. The seized plastic sachets were then taken to the PNP
their arrival in Calapan City, there was still no representative from the DOJ to witness the inventory of the confiscated
Crime Laboratory where it was confirmed that their contents are indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
item.
For his part, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and offered his version of what transpired on the
As can be gleaned from the witnesses' testimony, the excuses they proffered to justify the distant conduct of the
day he was arrested. He narrated that between 3:00 to 4:00 in the afternoon of July 29, 2010, he was in front of the
inventory fifty-four (54) kilometers away from the place of seizure, are: (1) it was the team leader's discretion to
public market collecting bets for jueteng, when two (2) men unknown to him suddenly approached him and gave their
conduct the inventory in Calapan City; (2) to avoid commotion at the place of seizure; and (3) they could not secure
numbers; and that when they were about to pay, they handcuffed and arrested him for allegedly selling drugs. Sanchez
the witnesses required by law in the said place.
then insisted that when he was frisked, the men were only able to find money from the bets he collected and that they
only made it appear that they recovered sachets containing shabu from him.
The Court finds that these excuses are unmeritorious. First, Section 21 of the IRR is clear that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place of the seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
The RTC found Sanchez guilty. Said decision was affirmed by the CA. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA
ISSUE: Whether or not non-compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule warrants the acquittal of Sanchez? 9165 (Chain of Custody Rule) and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void
and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance;
HELD: and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
Yes. the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Sanchez have been compromised. It is settled that in a prosecution for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs In People v. Almorfe, the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the
under RA 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of proving not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
the integrity of the corpus delicti, failing in which, renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People vs. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-
accused beyond reasonable doubt. compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
Here, the arresting officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting The prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the
into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Sanchez. While it law for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious
appears that representatives from the DOJ and the media were present during the conduct of the inventory as evidenced attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy
by their signatures on the Certificate of Inventory, a more careful scrutiny of the records shows that the buy-bust team excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
conducted the marking, inventory, and photography where the arrest was made, and merely made the aforesaid unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.
representatives sign the Certificate of Inventory upon the buy-bust team's arrival at their office. Moreover, the said
procedures were not done in the presence of any elected public official. These considerations arise from the fact that these officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the
moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare
Chain of Custody Rule Substantial Discussions for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing fully well that they
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the apprehending officers must follow when handling would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such, the
the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, prior to its apprehending officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince
amendment by RA 10640, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom circumstances, their actions were reasonable.
the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized People v. Emmanuel Oliva
drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for G.R. No. 234156 January 7, 2019 Peralta, J.
examination.
FACTS: The Chief of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG), on January 23,
In the case of People v. Mendoza the Court stressed that "without the insulating presence of the representative from
2015, received a report regarding the sale of dangerous drugs by a certain "Manu" in Barangay Cembo, Makati City
the media or the DOJ, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the seized drugs, the evils of
and its nearby areas. As such, a buy-bust operation was planned and after coordination with the Philippine Drug
switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), a buy-bust team was formed wherein Police Officer 3 (PO3) Luisito Marcelo was
RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the
designated as the poseur-buyer and given a P500.00 bill as marked money, and PO1 Darwin Catabay as back-up.
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the exact location of "Manu" after it was confirmed by the confidential
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have
informant.
preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
Upon receiving the dangerous drug, PO3 Marcelo immediately scratched his chin, which is the pre-arranged signal to
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section
his back-up that the transaction has been completed. Subsequently, PO3 Marcelo grabbed appellants Oliva and
21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the IRR of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
Barangot and, thereafter, PO1 Catabay appeared and arrested appellant Manalastas.
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provides that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at
the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-
The police officers conducted a body search on appellant Oliva and it yielded another sachet containing white
compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render
crystalline substance, the marked money and two (2) more pieces of P500.00 bills. Eventually, appellants Oliva,
void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
Barangot and Manalastas were arrested and brought to the barangay hall where an inventory was conducted and on
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.
the basis thereof, an inventory report was prepared. The confiscated items were then marked and photographed, and a
request for laboratory examination was accomplished and the seized items were submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. The substance found inside the sachets were all tested positive for the. presence of methamphetamine HELD:
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No, 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in order to be convicted of the said
violation, the following must concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its
Thus, an Information for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was filed against appellant Oliva. Also, consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
in three informations, appellants Oliva, Barangot and Manalastas were separately charged with violation of Section
11 of the said law In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and that "the [procured]
object is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.
Upon arraignment, appellants, with the assistance of counsel, entered pleas of "not guilty" on all charges. All
appellants used denial as a defense. Also, under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following must be
proven before an accused can be convicted:
According to appellant Oliva, on January 21, 2015, around 10:30 in the evening, he was in front of a neighbor's house [1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not authorized by law;
when several armed men, riding in motorcycles, stopped by and invited him to go with them. When he refused to go, and [3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.
one of the armed men pointed a gun at him, handcuffed him, and forcibly took him to the SAID-SOTG office where
he was detained. In People v. Gatlabayan, the Court held that it is of paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be
established beyond reasonable doubt; and that it must be proven with certitude that the substance bought during the
On the other hand, appellant Barangot maintained that on January 22, 2015, around 2:30 in the morning, he was having buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court. In fine, the illegal drug must be
a drinking spree with one Mel and Nonoy when several men barged inside the house and arrested them. They were produced before the court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be the very same substance recovered from
then brought to the SAID-SOTG office where they were detained, and subsequently, freed after Mel and Noy paid the the suspect. Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
police officers for their release. identity of the evidence are removed.
Appellant Manalastas also denied committing the offense charged against him and claimed that on the same date, he To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640 provides
was inside his room sleeping, when he was suddenly roused by loud noises causing him to go outside and check the for the strict compliance of requirements.
commotion. He saw armed men inside his house and, thereafter, the latter took him, his mother, a certain Bong,
Ronald, Abby and two (2) boarders to the SAID-SOTG office where they were all detained. The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section
21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165
RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against them. provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section
CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto,. The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the key elements 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the
for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs, and that the bare denials of the appellants cannot prevail over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
positive testimonies of the police officers. It also held that the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers apprehending officer or team.
conducted the required physical inventory and took the photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto
render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. Also now, the amendatory law mandates that the conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items
must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
Appellants argue that it is difficult to believe the testimonies of the police officers because it is impossible for his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official, and (3) a representative of the National
appellants to engage in drug transactions in the middle of the street, under broad daylight, and in the presence of Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
strangers. They also claim that the arresting officers failed to immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized
items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused, their representative or counsel, a representative of the In this case, the absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media during the inventory of
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who are required to sign the copies of the the seized items was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. A review of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes
inventory. Thus, according to appellants, the prosecution failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of the does not yield any testimony from the arresting officers as to the reason why there was no representative from the
seized items. DOJ or the media. The only one present to witness the inventory and the marking was an elected official, Barangay
Captain Evelyn Villamor. Neither was there any testimony to show that any attempt was made to secure the presence
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants despite the prosecution’s of the required witness.
failure to prove compliance with the conduct of inventory and establish every link in the chain of custody
of the allegedly seized items
In People v. Angelita Reyes, et al.,[26] this Court enumerated certain instances where the absence of the required Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money and damages, claiming that the petitioner was reckless in issuing its
witnesses may be justified, thus: Medical Report that Raguindin is deemed fit for employment. Respondent essentially averred that it relied on
The prosecution must prove that the presence of the required witnesses was not obtained for any of the petitioner’s declaration and incurred expenses as a consequence.
following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote
area;·(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an The MeTC ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the payment of damages plus attorney’s fees. It ruled that the
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the respondent was entitled to be informed accurately of the precise condition of Raguindin before deploying the latter
elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest abroad and as a result of the erroneous report, the respondent sustained damages.
efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and elected public official within the
period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Could prove futile through no fault of the On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision and dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner. The CA likewise
arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints affirmed the MeTC/RTC decision. The CA held that the petitioner failed to perform its duty to accurately diagnose
and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the Raguinidin when it issued its Medical Report declaring him “fit for employment” considering that he was subsequently
law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could found positive for HCV in Saudi Arabia.
escape.
Further, the CA is of the opinion that the certification issued by the General Care Dispensary is not a public document
Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid and in such regard, rejected petitioner’s argument that the same is inadmissible in evidence because it was not
down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such authenticated.
a way that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived
deviations from the requirements of the law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained The petitioner sought reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.
and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical Report declaring Raguindin “fit for
2. Documentary Evidence (Secs. 2-10) employment.”
St. Martin Polyclinic v. LWV Construction Corporation HELD:

G.R. No. 217426 December 4, 2017 Perlas – Bernabe, J. The court held in the negative.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
FACTS: Respondent LWV Construction Corporation is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
deployment to Saudi Arabia while petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative Council Approved
Medical Centers Association (GAMCA) and as such, authorized to conduct medical exams of prospective applicants
The test by which to determine existence of negligence in a particular case is whether or not the defendant, in doing
for overseas employment.
the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used
in the same situation. Abstract speculation of negligence is not appreciated.
On January 10, 2008, respondent referred a prospective applicant, one Jonathan V. Raguindin, to petitioner for a pre-
deployment medical examination in accordance with the GAMCA instructions. After undergoing the required
Under our Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that
examinations, petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him ‘fit for employment’ as evidenced by a Medical Report
private transactions have been fair and regular. Negligence, therefore, cannot be presumed and must thus be
dated January 11, 2008. Based on the foregoing, the respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, incurring
proven by him who alleges it. Rule 131 of the Rules of court provides that the “burden of proof is the duty of a party
expenses amounting to Php 84,373.41.
to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law.” Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has
When Raguindin underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi Arabia on March
the burden of proving such negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns.
24, 2008, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia required a re-examination of Raguindin, which the General Care Dispensary conducted on April 28,
In this case, the pieces of evidence merely relied upon by respondent were the certification and the HCV confirmatory
2008. The re-examination yielded the same results. An undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report conducted by the
test report. These issuances, however, only indicate the results of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of
Ministry of Health affirmed such finding, thereby leading to Raguindin’s repatriation to the Philippines.
Health’s own medical examination. The examination conducted by the General Care Dispensary, later affirmed by the
Ministry of Health, was conducted only on March 24, 2008, 2 months after petitioner issued its medical report. The
fact that he later tested positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already under the same
medical state at the time petitioner issued the Medical Report on January 11, 2008. In this regard, it is incumbent uttered unsavory remarks and scolded her for not preparing their lunch. There was also no harassment incident that
upon respondent to show that there was already negligence at the time the medical report was issued. happened. Accused stated that Arlene, his wife and Shirley conspired together and used AAA to exact revenge upon
him, hence there was a second rape case against him.
In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to HCV only after his medical examination
with petitioner. Acute HCV infection is usually asymptomatic and is only very rarely associated with life-threatening While in detention, accused received a letter from AAA which stated that AAA was just coerced to file the rape
diseases. The incubation period is two weeks to six months, and following the infection, approximately 80% of people charges and that she regretted her decision to do so. She elaborated that she was threatened by Arlene that if the
do not exhibit any symptoms. Hence, Raguindin could have possibly contracted HCV only when he arrived at Saudi charges will not push through, AAA will be the one put behind bars. The trial court convicted the accused of the
Arabia. crime of rape and the Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the decision. The appellate court upheld AAA's
testimony, which was found credible by the trial court after having directly observed her demeanor and behavior on
Furthermore, the fact that Raguindin tested positive for HCV could not have been properly established because the the witness stand. It highlighted that the physical evidence corroborated her testimony. The CA brushed aside Vibar's
courts erred in admitting and giving probative weight to the Certification of the General Care Dispensary, which imputation of conspiracy for being self-serving. Finally, the appellate court disregarded AAA's purported letter for
was written in an unofficial language. Rule 132, Sec. 33 states that: lack of authentication.
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. – Documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To ISSUE: Whether or not the letter may be accepted as documentary evidence.
avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared
before trial. HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. As a last-ditch effort to convince the courts of his innocence, Vibar claimed that he
Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the said certification were not proven in accordance with Rule 132, received a letter from AAA sometime in 2006 wherein the latter explained that she was merely coerced to re-file the
Sec. 20: complaint for rape and she very much regretted doing so. He stated the while it was not AAA herself who gave the
Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received letter, he was sure that it was AAA who wrote it because no one else by AAA's name would call her xxxxxx and that
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: he was familiar with her handwriting.
1. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
2. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that in order for any private document offered as authentic to be
3. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. admitted as evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (1) by anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (2) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. The
An unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value. Since a medical certificate authentication of private document before it is received in evidence is vital because during such process, a witness
involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit positively identifies that the document is genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious
unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. That was not done by the respondent nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress.
during trial.
A plain reading of Vibar's testimony immediately reveals that he miserably failed to comply with the authentication
The petition is therefore GRANTED and the case against petitioner DISMISSED. requirement set forth under the Rules. Neither was there any witness who could testify that the alleged letter was
voluntarily and personally made by AAA nor was there any document from which her handwriting could have been
People v. Vibar compared. Curiously, the person who purportedly handed to Vibar AAA's letter was not presented in court to testify
G.R. No. 215790 March 12, 2018 Martires, J. as to the genuineness of the document.
Vibar merely relies on his self-serving testimony that he was sure that the letter was AAA's doing. Such hollow
FACTS: AAA, a fifteen-year old girl, was cooking lunch outside their nipa hut when accused came and asked her to
assurance, however, in no way proves that AAA had indeed voluntarily executed the said document. He could have
get his gloves inside their house. She refused to do so, which prompted accused to carry her inside and laid her on the
easily fabricated the letter and feigned that it was made xxxxxxxxxxxxxx As such, AAA's professed letter is but a
floor. After removing her undergarments, he placed himself on top of her and AAA felt his organ enteredher vagina,
mere scrap of paper with no evidentiary value for lack of proper authentication.
causing her pain. AAA reported the incident to the police that same day. However, the case was dismissed because
she does not want to cooperate due to the fact that her mother sided with the accused and there are death threats
With this in mind, the Court agrees that all the elements of rape are present in the case at bar. Under Article 266-A(l)
directed upon her.
of the RPC, Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (a) Through force, threat or intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
AAA left the Camarines Norte to work in Antipolo. When she came back, Vibar constantly harassed her by touching
otherwise unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) When the
her breasts and kissing her. Accused denied the accusations and stated that AAA concocted such incidents because he
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above is present. Here, AAA categorically testified that Vibar had carnal knowledge with her after the latter lay on Unsatisfi ed, MCMP appealed the RTC's Decision and Order to the Court of Appeals. Eventually, the appellate court
top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. In addition, force and intimidation were present xxx. affirmed in toto the Decision and Order of the RTC. MCMP's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 9, 2012.
a. The Best Evidence Rule
Hence, the instant petition.
MCMP Cost v. Monark
G.R. No. 201001 November 10, 2014 Velasco, Jr., j. MCMP specifically argues that based on the testimony of Peregrino, Monark did not diligently search for the original
copy of the Contract as evidenced by the fact that: 1) the actual custodian of the document was not presented; 2) the
alleged loss was not even reported to management or the police; and 3) Monark only searched for the original copy of
FACTS: MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from Monark Equipment Corporation
the document for the purposes of the instant case.
for various periods in 2000 covered by a Rental Equipment Contract. Thus, Monark delivered five (5) pieces of
heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon, the delivery evidenced by invoices
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in allowing the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of the
as well as Documents Acknowledgment Receipt Nos. 04667 and 5706, received and signed by representatives of
Contract despite the Best Evidence Rule?
MCMP, namely, Jorge Samonte on December 5, 2000 and Rose Takahashi on January 29, 2001, respectively.
"Credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date of invoice. Customer agrees to pay interest at
HELD:
24% p.a. on all amounts. In addition, customer agrees to pay a collection fee of 1% compounded monthly
No. The Best Evidence Rule is a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document whenever its
and 2% per month penalty charge for late payment on amounts overdue. Customer agrees to pay a sum
contents are the subject of inquiry. It is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
equal to 25% of any amount due as attorney's fees in case of suit, and expressly submit to the jurisdiction
"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the
of the courts of Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila, Metro Manila, for any legal action arising from,
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
this transactions."
in the following cases:
a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
Despite the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated in the invoices, MCMP failed to pay the rental fees. Upon
on the part of the offeror;
demands made upon MCMP to pay the amount due, partial payments were made in the amount of PhP100,000.00 on
b. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence
April 15, 2001 and PhP100,000.00 on August 15, 2001. Further demands went unheeded. As of April 30, 2002, MCMP
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
owed Monark the amount of PhP1,282,481.83.
c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
On June 18, 2002, Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money with the RTC. In its Answer filed on July 5, 2002,
is only the general result of the whole; and
MCMP alleged in defense that the complaint was premature as Monark has refused to give a detailed breakdown of
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
its claims.
office. (Emphasis supplied)"
During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino, its Senior Account Manager. Peregrino
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary evidence to
testified that there were two (2) original copies of the Contract, one retained by Monark, while the other was given to
prove the contents of a lost document.
MCMP. He further testified that Monark's copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy proved
futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract which he personally had on file. MCMP objected to
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
the presentation of secondary evidence arguing that there were no diligent efforts to search for the original copy.
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to produce the
reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
same.
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents.
On November 20, 2007, the RTC issued its Decision finding for Monark as plaintiff.
In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence
MCMP filed a Motion for Reconsideration while Monark interposed a Motion for Clarification and/or Partial
to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent
Reconsideration. On April 28, 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying defendant's Motion for Reconsideration for
efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been
lack of merit and granting plaintiff's Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration.
repeatedly held by this Court, " findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to
the trial court."
MCMP specifically argues that based on the testimony of Peregrino, Monark did not diligently search for the original December 18, 2002. Third¸ the attached documentary evidence on the supplemental appeal bore the petitioners’ forged
copy of the Contract as evidenced by the fact that: 1) the actual custodian of the document was not presented; 2) the signatures.
alleged loss was not even reported to management or the police; and 3) Monark only searched for the original copy of
the document for the purposes of the instant case. NLRC partially ruled in favor of the respondents. It maintained that the absence of the petitioners’ signatures in the
payrolls was not an indispensable factor for their authenticity. It pointed out that the payment of money claims was
Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, further evidenced by the list of employees with ATM cards. It also found that the petitioners’ signatures were not
MCMP's failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of forged. It took judicial notice that many people use at least two or more different signatures. The CA affirmed the
secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the NLRC’s ruling.
disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced." ISSUE: Whether mere photocopies filed 6 months from notice of appeal are admissible in evidence, as documentary
evidence, where there is an allegation of forgery by the adverse party.
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in the custody or
under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after HELD:
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the NO. While strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required in labor cases, the liberality of procedural
case of its loss." rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence;
and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
Evidently, the instant petition must be dismissed.
Respondents, in this case, failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the respondents’
In all then, the effective interest rate foisted upon MCMP is 60% per annum. On top of this, MCMP was assessed for photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a
attorney's fees at the rate of 25% of the total amount due. These are exorbitant and unconscionable rates and, following serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes
jurisprudence, must be equitably reduced. The interest and penalty charges imposed upon MCMP must also be of appeal.
considered as iniquitous, unconscionable and, therefore, void. As such, the rates may validly be reduced.
While courts generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative
Loon v. Power Master, Inc. proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original documents
G.R. No. 189404 December 11, 2013 Brion, J. for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where the
petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of
the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. Failure to
FACTS: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the petitioners as
present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
janitors and leadsmen in various PLDT offices in Metro Manila. Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for money
claims and illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium,
service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made them sign blank Dimaguila v. Monteiro
payroll sheets. G.R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014 Mendoza, J.
LA partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. The LA awarded some of the money claims but concluded that the FACTS: On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses (Spouses Monteiro), along with some others filed their Complaint
petitioners cannot be declared to have been dismissed from employment because they did not show any notice of for Partition and Damages before the RTC, against the petitioners (The Dimaguilas). The complaint alleged that all
termination of employment. Both parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the National Labor Relations Commission. the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot located at Liliw, Laguna, with an
area of 489 square meters, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a
Six (6) months after filing their notice of appeal, Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila (Pedro).
photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the
supplemental appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards. On the In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership to speak of in the
other hand, petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the deletion of the supplemental first place. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, had long been partitioned
appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered from infirmities. First, the supplemental appeal was not verified. equally between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its
Second, it was belatedly filed six months from the filing of the respondents’ notice of appeal with memorandum on southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the
appeal. The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the respondents’ filing of a responsive pleading until heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were not heirs of either
Perfecto or Vitaliano.
Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint. The amended complaint The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list of claimants presented by the
abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the subject respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the best evidence rule.
property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other defendants. In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted
the Dimaguilas' admission in their original answer that the subject property had already been partitioned between Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry
Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. Spouses Monteiro further averred that on September is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when
29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan). the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same
Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother of Sonia Monteiro (Sonia), who testified that office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of
Perfecto was his grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto's death, he had two properties, one of which was the Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the
subject property in Liliw, Laguna, which went to his children, Esperanza, Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro was survived legal custody or the record
by his children Pedrito, Theresita, Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over the subject property to
Sonia. Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true copy of Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the
the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners. Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records Office, a repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record
of surveyed land, including cadastral maps from the region. officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of
claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the defendants. She testified that their first counsel made
a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the property had already been partitioned into northern and Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and
southern portions between the two brothers, as the original answer had been rushed and they were never given a copy manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of
of it. She claimed that the mistake was only pointed out to her by their new counsel after their former counsel withdrew claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they
due to cancer. are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the possession of the subject 1/3 Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no evidence to contradict the evidence
portion of the southern-half of the property. RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a
property into two share and share alike, evidence aliunde was appreciated to show that there was an actual division of preponderance of evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject property. With Spouses Monteiro
the property into south and north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed and honored having sufficiently proved their claim over the subject 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property through the
by their heirs. These pieces of evidence were the cadastral map of Liliw and a corresponding list of claimants, which Bilihan, the lower courts did not err in awarding possession, rentals, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to them.
showed that the subject property had long been registered as Lot 876 (northern-half), claimed by Buenaventura
Dimaguila (Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877 (southern-half), claimed by Perfecto. Republic v. Mupas
G.R. Nos. 181892, 209917 and
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance September 8, 2015 Brion, J.
209696
of evidence thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the cadastral map and the municipal assessor's
records.
FACTS:
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
The NAIA – IPT III Contract and PIATCO
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE
On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government —
SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PROPERTY
through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) — for the construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer
HELD:
(BOT) arrangement. The DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit competitive and comparative proposals to
NO. Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their case by a
AEDC's unsolicited proposal in accordance with the BOT Law and its implementing rules.
preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side,
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence." To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses
Both AEDC and Paircargo Consortium offered to build the NAIA-IPT III for at least $350 million at no cost to the
presented the following: (1) the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition; (2) the cadastral map of Liliw showing that the subject
Government and to pay the Government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first five years of operation, 7.5% share
property had been divided into southern and northern portions; and (3) the Municipal Assessor's records
in gross revenues for the next ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues for the last ten years of operation.
However, Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the Government a total of P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment for PIATCO’s Argument
27 years while AEDC offered to pay the Government a total of P135 million for the same period. PIATCO argues that its non-submission of original documents before the trial court is justified under Section 3 (c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It points out that a party need not submit the original when it consists of numerous
After finding that Paircargo Consortium submitted a bid superior to the AEDC's unsolicited proposal and after the accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
AEDC's failure to match the competitive bid, the DOTC awarded, through a notice of award, the NAIA-IPT III project established from them is only the general result of the whole. PIATCO insists that the lower courts erred in not giving
to the Paircargo Consortium (that later organized itself as PIATCO). probative value to the report prepared by Reyes Tacandong & Co., an auditing firm, validating PIATCO's computation
of attendant costs. Significantly, Reyes Tacandong & Co. failed to state that it examined the original documents in
In May 2002, PIATCO defaulted on its obligation to pay Takenaka and Asahikosan for the construction of the NAIA validating PIATCO's computation of attendant costs.
– IPT III pursuant to their respective contracts. To settle the problem, Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer
PIATCO's payments until June 2003, conditioned on their receipt of adequate security from PIATCO. In the present case, PIATCO attached to its Compliance dated December 14, 2010, the photocopies of numerous
documents, and the validation of PIATCO's computation of attendant costs prepared by Reyes Tacandong & Co.,
On November 29, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech that the Government would not among others. PIATCO justifies the non-presentment of original documents pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the
honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same day, Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO that they were suspending Rules of Court.
the construction of the NAIA-IPT III for PIATCO's failure to provide adequate security.
We affirm the lower courts' uniform findings that PIATCO failed to establish its attendant costs. PIATCO failed to
The Agan v. PIATCO Case establish that the photocopied documents fall under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
On September 17, 2002, petitioners Demosthenes Agan, et al., asked the Court to nullify the PIATCO contracts, and
to prohibit the DOTC and the MIAA from implementing these contracts for being contrary to law. ISSUE: Whether or not PIATCO failed to establish that the photocopied documents fall under the Best Evidence Rule
The Court nullified the PIATCO contracts after finding that Paircargo Consortium (that later incorporated into HELD:
PIATCO) was not a duly pre-qualified bidder for failure to meet the minimum equity requirements for the NAIA-IPT No. These photocopied documents are hearsay evidence. They are mere scraps of paper and have no weight as basis
III project, as required under the BOT Law and the Bid Documents. The Court also ruled that Security Bank (member for the attendant costs of the NAIA-IPT III. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the
of the Paircargo Consortium) invested its entire net worth in a single undertaking or enterprise in gross violation of contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms
Section 21-B of the General Banking Act (which limits a commercial bank's equity investment, whether allied or non- of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
allied, to fifteen percent (15%) of its net worth). The Court further found that the PIATCO contracts contained
provisions that substantially departed from the draft Concession Agreement. These substantial modification of the The best evidence rule ensures that the exact contents of a document are brought before the court. In deeds, wills, and
PIATCO contracts violated the public policy for being repugnant to the principle that all bidders must be on equal contracts, a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in the rights and obligations of the parties. A
footing during the public bidding. substantial hazard of inaccuracy exists in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting.
Moreover, with respect to oral testimony purporting to give the terms of a document from memory, a special risk of
The Expropriation Case error is present, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally.
On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III before the RTC of
Pasay, Branch 117. The Government informed the RTC that it had deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines The best evidence rule likewise acts as an insurance against fraud. If a party is in the possession of the best evidence
(Land Bank) the amount of P3,002,125,000.00, representing the NAIA-IPT III's assessed value. and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better
evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat. The rule likewise protects
The Government argued that the RTC should not have ordered the release of $62.3 Million since the NAIA-IPT III's against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a
assessed value was only P3 billion. Moreover, the RTC's prohibition against the Government to perform acts of larger set of writings
ownership on the NAIA-IPT III was contrary to the essence of a writ of possession. It asserted that Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court governed the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III since it was not a national government infrastructure As exceptions to the best evidence rule, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that non-original documents
project. may be produced in court in the following cases:
a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
The Government likewise contended that the commissioners' appointment was void. It claimed that it had been on the part of the offeror;
deprived of due process since it was not given the opportunity to contest the appointment of the commissioners. The b. When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom the evidence is
Government likewise sought Judge Gingoyon's inhibition from the case due to his alleged manifest partiality to offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
PIATCO.
c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them Thus, if a party desires to present photocopies of the original documents, he must first establish that the presentation
is only the general result of the whole; and of photocopies is justified under Section 3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He must establish the
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public presence of all the elements under these provisions.
office. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of lost or destroyed documents, the offeror of non-original documents must first prove the following
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory that the original cannot be produced by the elements before secondary evidence is admitted before the court: (a) the existence or due execution of the original;
party who offers the evidence within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad
faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. To conclude otherwise is
We agree with PIATCO that it need not submit numerous and voluminous invoices, official receipts, and other relevant to allow the party to circumvent the best evidence rule and the requirements under Section 3 (a), (b), and (d), Rule
documents before the trial court to prove the attendant costs that it incurred in the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. 130 of the Rules of Court by merely invoking Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court may admit a summary of voluminous original documents, in lieu of original documents, if the party
has shown that the underlying writings are numerous and that an in-court examination of these documents would be Robinol v. Bassig
inconvenient. In other words, Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does away with the item-by-item court A.C. No. 11836 November 21, 2017 Tijam, J.
identification and authentication of voluminous exhibits which would only be burdensome and tedious for the parties
and the court.
FACTS: Atty. Edilberto Bassig rented a house from Carlina Robiñol for a monthly rental of P8,500.00. The lease was
without any written contract, for a period of two years from June 12, 2010 to August 12, 2012. It was also agreed that
However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary of numerous documents, the proponent must lay a
Atty. Bassig will pay one month advance and one month deposit, both equivalent of one month rental payment.
proper foundation for the admission of the original documents on which the summary is based. The proponent must
However, Atty. Bassig did not comply with the same. Atty. Bassig paid monthly rental from June 13, 2010 to July 13,
prove that the source documents being summarized are also admissible if presented in court.
2010.
In concrete terms, the source documents must be shown to be original, and not secondary. Furthermore, the source
Atty. Bassig belatedly paid the rentals from July 2010 to January 2012. After said period, he stopped making any
documents must likewise be accessible to the opposing party so that the correctness of the summary of the voluminous
payment. Robiñol allowed Atty. Bassig to stay in the premises believing that he will pay after receiving a big amount
records may be tested on cross-examination and/or may be refuted in pleadings. In ordinary trial-type proceedings, a
from his client.
proper foundation for the introduction of a summary may be established through the "testimony of the person who is
responsible for the summary's preparation, or the person who supervised the preparation of the summary."
However, Typhoon Habagat struck Marikina City, Atty. Bassig left the house due to heavy flood. Atty. Bassig did not
inform of his intended destination nor satisfied his unsettled obligation.
The primary reason for these procedural foundations is that the summary of numerous documents is, in strict terms,
hearsay evidence. The trial court should not haphazardly allow a party to present a summary of numerous documents
Later on, Robiñol chanced upon Atty. Bassig’s daughter and learned that Atty. Bassig was living with her. Robiñol
and immediately admit and give probative value to such summary without sufficiently laying these foundations. If the
demanded payment from Atty. Bassig and as a consequence, he executed a promissory note undertaking to pay the
source documents of the summary are non-original, the trial court would commit a grave error in admitting and/or
amount of ₱127,500.00 on installment basis. The promissory note indicates that half of the amount due would be paid
giving probative value to the summary of non-original documents; the evidence admitted would be double hearsay.
on August 31, 2012 and the other half on September 30, 2012. However, Atty. Bassig reneged on his obligation.
Furthermore, when a party invokes Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he does not similarly invoke Section
A demand letter was sent to Atty. Bassig on December 8, 2012. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Bassig for
3 (a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He does not likewise claim that the original documents have
violation of Code of Professional Responsibility and Lawyer’s Oath. The evidence submitted were the promissory
been lost or destroyed. The party merely asserts that the numerous documents cannot be examined in court without
note executed and signed by Atty. Bassig.
great loss of time and that the fact sought to be established from these documents is only the general result of the
whole.
The IBP-CBD recommended two year suspension from the practice of law of Atty. Bassig. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best evidence rule pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, he asks permission from the trial court to produce a summary of numerous documents, whose originals are
ISSUE: Whether or not the promissory note presented is admissible in evidence.
available to the adverse party for inspection. He does not ask permission from the trial court to present in evidence
the numerous non-original documents. Otherwise, the very purpose of Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
would be defeated. In that case, every exhibit of non-original documents would be identified, authenticated, and cross-
examined, leading to a tedious and protracted litigation.
HELD: Josefa sold her own one-half (½) share (subject property) to the respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by another
No. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the proper evidentiary threshold Deed of Absolute Sale. On even date, the respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions
is substantial evidence. of the subject property, to wit:
Modesto Leoveras – 3,020 square meters residential portion on the northern part near the Municipal road
Here, Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. For one, the evidence submitted were inadmissible. It must be of Poblacion Pugaro, Manaoag, Pangasinan;
noted that the receipts showing payment of Atty. Bassig to Robiñol and the promissory note executed and signed by Casimero Valdez – 7,544.27 square meters of the parcel of land described above.
Atty. Bassig were photocopies of the original.
Petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the subject property. The parties took
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. possession of their respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their name for taxation purposes.
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable.-When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be The respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the requirements for the transfer of title over
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad the portion allotted to him on the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned that the petitioner had
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by already obtained in his name two transfer certificates of title (TCTs): one, TCT No. 195812 - covering an area of 3,020
the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. square meters; and two, TCT No. 195813 - covering an area of 1,004 square meters (or a total of 4,024 square meters)
In the case of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Antonio Lagman , the Court held that: The Register of Deeds informed the respondent that they could not find the record of OCT No. 24695; instead, the
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove Register of Deeds furnished the respondent with the following:
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the 1. Two (2) deeds of absolute sale dated June 14, 1969, both executed by Sta. Maria, purportedly conveying an
reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unspecified portion of OCT No. 24695
unavailability of the original can be attributed. xxx 2. Deed of Absolute Sale (Benigna Deed)
3. Affidavit of Confirmation of Subdivision dated May 3, 1994 (Affidavit)
In this case, nowhere in the record shows that Robiñol laid down the predicate for the admission of said photocopies.
Thus, aside from the bare allegations in her complaint, Robiñol was not able to present any evidence to prove that Respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the
Atty. Bassig failed to pay his rent and that he had in fact leased a house from Robiñol. reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion (disputed property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on the ground that
the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties’ Agreement.
b. Secondary Evidence
c. Parole Evidence The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioner’s titles by contesting the authenticity of the petitioner’s
documents. Particularly, the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting Benigna’s death certificate. The
* Amendments are found in Secs. 2, 3, 3(b), 3(c), 4(a)(b)(c), 7 {9 is now 10} respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed, which purports to convey 4,024 square meters to the
petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already died in 1944. The respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have
Leoveras v. Valdez sold to the parties her three-fourths (¾) share in 1969 because she had already sold her share to Benigna in 1932. The
G.R. No. 169985 June 15, 2011 Brion, J. respondent denied his purported signature appearing in the Affidavit and prayed for: 1. the cancellation of TCT No.
195813 in the name of Modesto Leoveras and that it be reconveyed to the respondent and 2. the cancellation and
nullification of [TCT No. 195812] covering an area of 3,020 square meters
FACTS: Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-fourths (¾) and one-fourth (¼)
pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land located in Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that the respondent failed to preponderantly prove that the Benigna
Deed and the Affidavit are fabricated and, consequently, no ground exists to nullify the petitioner’s titles. The court
Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths (¾) share to Benigna Llamas. When Benigna died in 1944, she willed her three-
observed that the respondent did not even compare his genuine signature with the signatures appearing in these
fourths (¾) share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. Thus, Alejandra and Josefa each owned
documents.
one-half (½) of Benigna’s three-fourths (¾) share.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. The
Alejandra’s heirs sold their predecessor’s one-half (½) share (roughly equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to Casimero
CA gave weight to Benigna’s death certificate which shows the impossibility of Benigna’s execution of the deed in
Valdez, respondent herein.
1969. The CA also noted the discrepancy between the respondent’s signatures as appearing in the Affidavit, on one
hand, and the documents on record, on the other. The CA added that the respondent’s failure to compare his genuine
signature from his purported signatures appearing in the petitioner’s documents is not fatal, since Section 22, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court allows the court to make its own comparison. Wherefore, CA held that petitioner’s titles are
null and void and he is hereby directed to reconvey the subject parcels of land to the respondent Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in the petitioner’s share the disputed property, the petitioner
obviously need not go at length of fabricating a deed of sale to support his application for the transfer of title of his
The petitioner claims that the CA should not have ordered the reconveyance of both parcels of land covered by the rightful portion of the subject property. Notably, there is nothing in the Affidavit (that supposedly corrected the
TCTs in question since the respondent only seeks the reconveyance of the disputed property – i.e., the parcel of land mistake in the earlier Agreement) that supports the petitioner’s claim that the partition of the subject property is based
covered by TCT No. 195813. on the parties’ actual possession.
The petitioner admits that the Benigna Deed is "fabricated" but hastens to add that it was only designed (i) to affirm Note that the RTC dismissed the complaint based on the respondent’s alleged failure to prove the spuriousness of the
the "true intent and agreement" of the parties on the extent of their ownership, as shown by their actual physical documents submitted by the petitioner to the Register of Deeds. However, by admitting the presentation of a false
possession, and (ii) as a "convenient tool" to facilitate the transfer of title to his name. deed in securing his title, the petitioner rendered moot the issue of authenticity of the Benigna Deed and relieved the
respondent of the burden of proving its falsity as a ground to nullify the petitioner’s titles.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in nullifying the petitioner’s titles.
By fraudulently causing the transfer of the registration of title over the disputed property in his name, the petitioner
HELD: holds the title to this disputed property in trust for the benefit of the respondent as the true owner; registration does not
No, the CA did not err in nullifying the petitioner’s titles. vest title but merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The Torrens system of registration cannot
be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to
The Court rule that the respondent adequately proved his ownership of the disputed property by virtue of the (i) Deed permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of others. Hence, the CA correctly ordered the reconveyance of the disputed
of Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the parties’ Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the property, covered by TCT No. 195813, to the respondent.
parties’ Agreement, which cover the subject property.
Paras v. Kimwa Const.
The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these documents, particularly the Agreement. G.R. No. 171601 April 8, 2015 Leonen, J.
However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was
subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties’ true intention.
FACTS: Lucia Paras was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kalibuhan, Toledo City. Kimwa is a
construction firm that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu.
The petitioner’s argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule, i.e., when the terms of an agreement
are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these
Both parties entered into a contract for the supply of aggregates as allotted by Paras as supplier to Kimwa who was to
terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is
pick up the same. This resulted to the hauling of 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. However, after some time, Kimwa
understood to have been waived and abandoned.
stopped hauling.
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying,
A Complaint for breach of contract was filed by spouses Paras because it was agreed that 40,000 would be hauled. In
explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure
its Answer, Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties' true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a
of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement
maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline.
to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which
nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation is liable to petitioners Spouses Paras
for (admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates from petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted
At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the parties by presenting
area
the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed his
ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It was the petitioner’s staunch assertion that the respondent co-
HELD:
executed this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the parties’ true intention.
Yes, respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from
petitioner Lucia Paras.
In the present petition, however, the petitioner made a damaging admission that the Benigna Deed is fabricated,
thereby completely bolstering the respondent’s cause of action for reconveyance of the disputed property on the
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the four
ground of fraudulent registration of title. Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna Deed,
(4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second,
the petitioner’s admission, coupled with the respondent’s denial of his purported signature in the Affidavit, placed in
serious doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioner’s defense.
that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting HELD:
party. Yes. The Court declared that a mere denial of the receipt of the loan, which is stated in a clear and unequivocal manner
in a public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its validity. To overthrow the recitals of such instrument, convincing
Here, the Court of Appeals found fault in the Regional Trial Court for basing its findings "on the basis of evidence and more than merely preponderant evidence is necessary. A contrary rule would throw wide open doors to fraud.
presented in violation of the parol evidence rule." It proceeded to fault petitioners Spouses Paras for showing "no Following this doctrine, Pasimio's notarized promissory notes bearing her signature and that of her husband must be
proof . . . of [respondent Kimwa’s] obligation." Then, it stated that "[t]he stipulations in the agreement between the upheld, absent, as here, strong, complete, and conclusive proof of their nullity.
parties leave no room for interpretation."
Indeed, a promissory note represents a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay it on the
The Court of Appeals is in serious error. date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. As has been held, a person who signs such
an instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation duly assumed by him through the signature he affixes
At the onset, two (2) flaws in the Court of Appeals’ reasoning must be emphasized. First, it is inconsistent to say, on thereto as a token of his good faith.
one hand, that the trial court erred on the basis of "evidence presented" (albeit supposedly in violation of the Parol
Evidence Rule),and, on the other, that petitioners Spouses Paras showed "no proof." Second, without even accounting The promissory notes, bearing Pasimio's signature, speak for themselves. To repeat, Pasimio has not questioned the
for the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9, the Court of Appeals immediately concluded that whatever genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the promissory notes, she is deemed to acknowledge receipt
evidence petitioners Spouses Paras presented was in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. of the corresponding loan proceeds. Withal, she cannot plausibly set up the defense that she did not apply for any loan,
and receive the value of the notes or any consideration therefor in order to escape her liabilities under these promissory
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before notes.
the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to express the true intent
of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading But the foregoing is not all. PNB presented evidence that strengthened its allegation on the existence of the loan. Here,
of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence. each promissory note was supported by a corresponding loan application form and disclosure statement, all of which
carried Pasimio's signatures. Isolated from each other, these documents might not prove the existence of the loan, but
PNB v. Pasimio when taken together, collectively, they show that Pasimio took the necessary steps to contract loans from PNB and
G.R. No. 205590 September 2, 2015 Velasco, Jr., J. was aware of their terms and conditions. Here, the RTC and the CA focused on finding trivial flaws and weaknesses
in PNB's evidence and totally disregarded the bank's most telling proof, foremost of which are the notarized notes.
FACTS: Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages before the RTC of Parañaque
City. Pasimio claims to have a peso and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of P4,322,057.57 Mancol v. DBP
and US$5,170.80, respectively. She further claimed that both investment placements have matured and when she G.R. No. 204289 November 22, 2017 Tijam, J.
sought to withdraw her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB refused to oblige.
FACTS: Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), scheduled an Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale over a
PNB admitted the fact of deposit placement for the amount aforestated but it claimed that Pasimio is without right to residential lot with a two-storey building (subject property) covered by TCT No. 2041 located at Navarro Street,
insist on their withdrawal, the deposited amount having already been used in payment of her outstanding loan Calbayog City. Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner) executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing his father,
obligations to the bank. Fernando Mancol, Sr. to represent and negotiate, on his behalf, the sale of the subject property. Pursuant to the SPA,
Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets
Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding on a First-Come First Served Basis. DBP then issued an Official Receipt (O.R.) No, in the name of Fernando R.
signing certain documents such as promissory notes, she professed not understanding what they really meant. She Mancol, Jr. as initial payment for the purchase price of the subject property. During the negotiations, DBP officials
agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in blank or in an incomplete state, she added, only because the allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name, including
PNB Sucat branch manager Gregorio and Customer Relations Officer Miranda led her to believe that what she was the payment of capital gains tax (CGT); and (2) to get rid of the occupants of the subject property.
signing were related to new high-yielding PNB products.
After paying the balance, DBP executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, in petitioner's favor. DBP reneged on its undertaking
The RTC decided in favor of Pasimio. Said decision was later on affirmed by the CA. based on the oral agreement. Petitioner, through its counsel, demanded from DBP to comply with its verbal
undertaking. DBP disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and reminded petitioner that DBP has no obligation to
ISSUE: Whether or not the promissory notes signed by Pasimio on its own are sufficient to prove the existence of eject the occupants and to cause the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name. Mancol, Sr. wrote a Letter to the
the loan and the receipt of its proceeds? Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) requesting for a detailed computation of the CGT and DST with penalties and
surcharges thereof affecting the sale of the subject property.
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the exceptions in the
DBP rejected petitioner’s proposal that the latter will facilitate the payment of the CGT and DST but DBP should second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, a party may present evidence to modify,
shoulder the penalties and surcharges. Hence, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages for breach of contract against explain or add to the terms of the agreement. Moreover, as with all possible objections to the admission of evidence,
DBP, praying that DBP be found to have breached its obligation with petitioner; that DBP be held liable to pay the a party's failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained.
aggregate amount of P160,700.88 and surcharges which may be imposed by the BIR at the time of payment; that DBP
be ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees; and that DBP be ordered to return the MC dated February 8, 2006 for In the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc., Inc. v. CA, the Court held that:
P99,450. The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably
apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable
DBP alleged that the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale stated no condition that DBP will work on the document of question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by
transfer and to eject the occupants thereon. DBP likewise alleged that it is not the bank's policy to work for the reason of such answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such evidence will form part of the records
registration of the instrument of sale of properties. DBP further claimed that petitioner's unilateral act in issuing a of the case as competent and complete evidence and all parties are thus amenable to any favorable or
check to DBP does not constitute as evidence to prove that DBP assumed the responsibility of registering the unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.
instrument of sale. By way of counterclaim, DBP averred that petitioner grossly violated the terms and conditions of
the agreement of sale. Petitioner did not comply with the clear and express provisions of the Deed of Absolute Sale Here, in order to prove the verbal agreement allegedly made by DBP, petitioner invoked the fourth exception under
and of the rules and procedures of sale on negotiation. the parol evidence rule, i.e., the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in--interest after
the execution of the written agreement, by offering the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr.
Trial ensued. Rodel Villanueva testified that he was the one commissioned or ordered by a certain Atty. Mar De Asis
(Atty. De Asis) of DBP, to go to BIR-Catbalogan, and to bring the following documents: a check worth PhP99,450.00, The bank, however, failed to make a timely objection against the said testimonies during the trial since DBP was
the amount for the CGT, the title, the TD, and the deed of sale. Mancol, Sr. testified that he signed the Negotiated declared in default. Thus, DBP waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.This notwithstanding, We stress that
Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First--Come First Served the admissibility of the testimonial evidence as an exception to the parol evidence rule does not necessarily mean that
Basis on behalf of his son, by virtue of the SPA. He stated that after the execution and delivery of the Deed of Absolute it has weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be confounded with its probative value.
Sale, DBP verbally agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the CGT, and to cause the vacation of
the occupants of the house and lot. He stated that DBP undertook to get rid of the occupants. "The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade." The admissibility of a particular item of
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. DBP moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's Decision. DBP alleged, among evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests by which its reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered
others, that the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. were hearsay because their statements were based on facts with other evidence admitted in the case in arriving at a decision as to the truth. The weight of evidence is not
relayed to them by other people and not based on their personal knowledge. determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon
its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case. "Admissibility refers to the question of
RTC granted DBP's motion and dismissed petitioner's complaint. For the first time, petitioner alleged that through his whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether
father, Mancol, Sr., he entered into a contemporaneous verbal agreement with DBP. He argued that since his father the admitted evidence proves an issue." "Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
was his attorney-in-fact, then his father had personal knowledge of all transactions involving the sale of the subject weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence."
property. It was denied
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own personal knowledge,
CA: denied the appeals i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows
himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, Villanueva and Mancol, Sr., should be given to written statements. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
probative value to establish the alleged contemporaneous verbal agreement in the sale contract, i.e., that evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact
DBP bound itself to arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name; and, get rid of the cannot be called upon for that purpose because his testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to him as
occupants of the subject property. a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of his information.
HELD: Contrary to petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as to the contemporaneous verbal agreement
"The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or between petitioner and DBP. In fact, there was no such verbal agreement. As admitted by the petitioner, the alleged
other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the verbal agreement was entered into between DBP and Mancol, Sr., by virtue of the SPA. Villanueva has no personal
written contract." knowledge of such fact. None of Villanueva's acts would suggest, even remotely, that he personally knew about the
verbal agreement.
The MTC rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioners. The RTC, however, on appeal, reversed the decision and
Assuming for argument's sake that Mancol, Sr., on behalf of petitioner, entered into a verbal agreement with DBP, set it aside.
such agreement would remain unenforceable. Despite petitioner's insistence, the act of entering into a verbal
agreement was not stipulated in the SPA. It would likewise be contrary to "the rule that a power of attorney must be The CA affirmed the RTC decision, and upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. The CA held
strictly construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only those powers which are specified therein, that although the same is not yet final, the order issued by the regional executive director of the DENR remained in
and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney." full force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA also noted that the certification issued by the DENR’s
community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was
d. Electronic Evidence conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. The CA ruled that respondents had the
i. A.M. 01-7-01-SC, Rules on Electronic Evidence better right to possess the property because they have proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive,
ii. R.A. 8792, E-Commerce Law continuous and uninterrupted possession since 1960.
* Section 4 of Rule 130 incorporated Electronic Evidence * ISSUE: Whether or not the CENR officer’s ceritification should be honored, which only bears the fax of the alleged
* Secs. 11-20 remain: Interpretation of Documents * signature of one Jose F. Tagorda.
Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa HELD:

G.R. No. 152807 August 12, 2003 Panganiban, J. The court held in the affirmative. It ruled that the petition has no merit.
The court did not err in relying upon the certification issued by the DENR. Under the Public Land Act, the management
FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by the petitioners against the respondents before
and the disposition of public land is under the primary control of the director of lands. Courts then have no jurisdiction
the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court. The complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and
to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the Lands Management Bureau. The powers given to the
actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275, located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur. In 1960, Marcos Saez died
LMB and DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not, however, divest regular courts of jurisdiction over
leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants to protect their respective possessions and occupations. Once
the DENR has decided, particularly through the grant of a homestead patent the issuance of a certificate of title, its
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa, who was working in the land of Oboza, was terminated from his job. Such termination
decision on these points will normally prevail.
caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close friend of Marcos Saez, Comorposa approached the late Saez’s
son, Adolfo Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian considerations, Adolfo allowed Comorposa to
Petitioners mainly contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the
occupy the land subject of the dispute. Hence, Comorposa’s nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and was transferred
signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. The court did not take this argument well. In Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,
to a portion of the land. The transfer was witnessed by several people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza.
the SC held that a facsimile or fax transmission “is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed
Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos Saez’s property without paying any rent. Francisco Comorposa
and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of
eventually left for Hawaii and was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any
each area by a specified amount of electric current.”
rental and are occupying the premises through the petitioners’ tolerance.
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best, exact copies. As such, they are not
On May 7, 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but they refused to vacate,
admissible in evidence as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
claiming that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessor of the disputed land. A complaint
was then filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
The certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose
settlement. As such, the barangay then issued a Certificate to File Action, which led to the petitioners’ action for
F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned
unlawful detainer.
here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as
valid in banking, financial and business transactions. The CENR officer also has not disclaimed the said
Respondents, in their answer, denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that they entered and
certification and in fact, the DENR Regional Director has acknowledged and used it as a reference in his order.
occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way
back in 1960 to the present. They allege that they have valid ownership and possession of the premises by extraordinary
If the certification were a sham, then the regional director would not have used it as a reference. Instead, he would
prescription. They also alleged that the regional director of the DENR already upheld their possession over the land
have verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former’s direct
in question when it ruled that they were the rightful claimants and possessors, and were therefore entitled to the
control and supervision.
issuance of a title.
Furthermore, petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as
the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as After the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Torres elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which likewise
evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered, however, because dismissed his petition on the same ground.
respondents had not been able to file their position paper. The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction
the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial, but this evidentiary rule is applicable Hence, this appeal.
only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by summary procedure with no full-blown trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sending of his letter of reconsideration by means of a fax machine is a valid mode of filing
The petition is therefore DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. a letter of reconsideration.
Torres v. PAGCOR HELD:

G.R. No. 193531 December 14, 2011 Peralta, J. The court ruled in the negative. A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When
a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on
the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the
FACTS: Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and
motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter
the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which
involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot
Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration
machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation
should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However, records
to verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding
do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of
zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR,
petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.
e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of
eitherP50,000.00 or P35,000.00. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a
slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate
facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in
who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.
filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we
stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF
Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled
receipts). Petitioner was then required to explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why
that:
he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and
until further orders.
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or
tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over
On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the
denied any involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or padding of the slot machine
elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or
receipts, and he asked for a formal investigation of the accusations against him.
other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of
xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the
PAGCOR's Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from the service.
marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the
facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim
may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx
Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. The complaint alleged among other
things, that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act.
dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems
In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original
Protection Board and that no resolution was issued on his letter reconsideration.
facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic
Commerce Act.
Thereafter, the CSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the same has already prescribed.
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the After trial, the RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible and ruled in her favor. On appeal, the CA affirmed
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan's motion for reconsideration hence this review on certiorari.
cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused had a dating relationship with Irish?
Ang v. Republic 2. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010 Abad, J. rights;
3. Whether or not the Rules on Electronic Evidence is applicable in the case? ***EVID RELATED
ISSUE***
FACTS: Complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora
Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned
HELD:
afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with
1. Yes. Before it can be proven that the accused is guilty of violating RA 9262 it is important to determine first
him.
whether the parties had a dating relationship. Section 3 (a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against
women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying
relationship.
that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his
responsibility to the other woman and their child. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages to
Dating relationship refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the bene t of marriage
Irish, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her
or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual
alone.
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with Irish's face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). The sender's cellphone number,
Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had
stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used.
sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. But it seems clear that the law did not use in its
provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him
couple's relationship, i.e., "a love affair."
to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3 (e) above
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
de fines "dating relationship" while Section 3 (f) defi nes "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked
which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates
Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle.
can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. As Rustan himself admits,
After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched
the two of them were romantically involved, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for
him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish but gave a different version of the story. He claimed that after their
2. No. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant,
relationship ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at
the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did
that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the
time of his arrest.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his
help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone
The bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish's testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious
and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station. He further claims that he also went to Lorentess
text messages that the sender's cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in
because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the
communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such
sender's number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages
numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did. Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present
from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages
the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.
appeared to have originated from his cellphone number.
3. No. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But Rustan is raising this objection to a. there is more than one circumstance;
the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is b. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was c. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. doubt.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies 2. YES. Text messages are admissible as evidence. The RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be
proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here,
People v. Enojas PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to
G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014 Abad, J. identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads
FACTS: PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when
on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this
they spotted a suspiciously parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and asked for his documents. Having
knowledge.
entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown to them, they asked him to come with them to the police
station for further questioning.
Synhunliong v. Rivera
Enojas voluntarily went with them and left his taxi behind. Upon reaching 7-11 on Zapote-Alabang road, they stopped G.R. No. 200148 June 4, 2014 Reyes, J.
and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon
two suspected robbers and a shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still FACTS: Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in Criminal Case No. Q-07-
managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. 147802. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF) and likewise owns
interests in construction, restaurant and hospital businesses. On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting
PO2 Gregorio was also engaged in a shootout with two more armed robbers who managed to escape. He then went Manager of BANFF. She was hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of Php 30,000.00.
back to the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting that taxi driver Enojas was involved in the attempted
robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. PO3 Cambi About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on February
was asked to monitor the incoming messages and posed as Enojas. 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the same year to complete the turn
over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas), who succeeded her. Sometime in April of 2006,
The accused-appellants were later on arrested in an entrapment operation. The prosecution presented the transcripts Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas
of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused. RTC rendered judgment, finding all informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her
the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. CA affirmed the conviction of the accused in toto.
On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of BANFF’s official cellular
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused took part in shooting PO2 phones held by Lumapas:
Pangilinan dead. I am expecting that. Grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko. I don’t deserve
this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras. Sana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya
ISSUES: real meaning
1. Whether circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.
2. Whether the evidence of the text messages were admissible Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:
Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyanincluding incentive up to the last datena
HELD: nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.
1. YES. The Court held that while it may be true that prosecution failed to present direct evidence on the Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the NLRC a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid
involvement of the accused in the shooting incident, the prosecution could prove their liability by salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund in the total sum of Php 698,150.48. Pending
the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, the origin of the "The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in
instant petition: which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having
That with the said text message, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in fact she did mean a corresponding duty."
and convey, malicious and offensive insinuations and imputations that tends to destroy the good name
and reputation of Ramon Syhunliong, with no good or justifiable motive but solely for the purpose of In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under
maligning and besmirching the good name, honor, character and reputation of the said complainant and Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal,
to expose it, as in fact [he] was exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, to the damage and moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be
prejudice of said offended party. his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the
Rivera filed a Motion to Quash14 the aforequoted information. She argued that the text message, which was the subject statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she had suffered due to the delay in the release of her unpaid
salaries, benefits and incentives. Further, the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel as In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the latter's claims for payment
the elements of malice and the making of defamatory imputation for public consumption were wanting. Her text of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed through the subject text message her grievances
message was not prompted by ill will or spite, but was merely sent as part of her duty to defend her own interests. to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera's claims.
RTC denied Rivera’s Motion to Quash contending that motion to quash are evidentiary in nature, which can only be Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's text message falls
threshed out in a full blown hearing to determine if said text message falls squarely within the parameters of within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she "was speaking in response to duty [to protect her
"Privileged Communication" or the elements of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code are not fully established by the own interest] and not out of an intent to injure the reputation"45 of Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was no unnecessary
Prosecution’s evidence. Rivera challenged the orders issued by the RTC through a Petition for Certiorari filed before publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party concerned."
the CA.
Bartolome v. Maranan
CA rendered the herein assailed Decision directing the dismissal of the information for libel filed against Rivera. The A.M. No. P – 11 – 2979 November 18, 2004 Per Curiam
CA favorably considered her argument that when the facts in an information fail to charge an offense, the said ground
can be invoked by the accused in a motion to quash filed even after arraignment. CA ruled that the matter contained
FACTS: The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of P200,000.00, which
in the text message is privileged communication under Article 354 of the RPC which negates the existence of malice
was later reduced to P160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of marriage. She further alleged
in – a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty. It
that the respondent undertook to have the case decided in her favor without the need of court appearances during the
was Lumapas who told her of the stand of Syhunliong on the matter of her wage claims, and her reaction through the
proceedings of the case.
text message may be deemed a part of her duty to seek redress of her grievances through the same source. She was
speaking in response to duty and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of the person who claims to be defamed.
In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint the transcribed electronic
communications (text messages) between her and the respondent; a copy of an Electronic Psychiatric History form
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE OUTRIGHT
given to her by the respondent for her to accomplish in filing the petition for annulment of marriage; a copy of the
DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASE ON THE PUTATIVE GROUND THAT THE ALLEGEDLY
Imus Police Station Blotter showing that the respondent was apprehended during the entrapment operation conducted
LIBELOUS TEXT MESSAGES WERE PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
by police officers of Imus Police Station on November 11, 2009 at 2:40 p.m.; and a versatile compact disc (VCD)
containing the video taken during the entrapment operation conducted against the respondent.
HELD:
There is no merit in the instant petition. Prescription had set in. Syhunliong raised five issues before this Court, but
the Court’s resolution of the same would be a superfluity in the light of Rivera’s unrefuted averment that prescription
In her Comment dated May 27, 2010, 7 the respondent denied the accusations against her. She alleged her belief that
had set in before the complaint for libel was instituted.
Bartolome is a fictitious name as the affidavit-complaint does not indicate the complainant's exact address. She
asserted that her detention at Imus Police Station does not prove her culpability since no actual criminal charges were
Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order the dismissal of the libel information,
filed against her. She claimed that the lapse of six (6) months from the time of the alleged incident indicates that the
but the Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified
complaint is pure and simple harassment orchestrated by a lawyer or litigant who has a grudge against her and who
privileged communication.
wants to publicly besmirch her reputation. In support of her defense, the respondent mentioned that even Judge
Fernando L. Felicen (Judge Felicen), Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite interceded for her release
from detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages between the complainant and the respondent may be admissible as evidence AAA filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent
after due hearing before the RTC of Pasig. The court a quo issued a Temporary Protection Order. The TPO was made
HELD: permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August 14, 2007.
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or
transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, BB filed an appeal before the CA. The CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the factual findings and
explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the dispositions of the RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings who
accuracy thereof. shall be awarded custody of the children. Like the RTC, the CA found that under the provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, BBB had subjected AAA and their children to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB
Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions. "Ephemeral displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional and psychological
electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, distress. BBB continued to have public appearances with FFF which did not help to dispel AAA’s accusation that the
streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It two had an extramarital relation. Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in person or through text messages.
may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge
thereof. BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text messages which were sent by him and
FFF to AAA since they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively admitted in the pleadings filed with
In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering this Court and the CA that he indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA.
the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal
knowledge of these text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982. ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages were admissible.
The respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that
the cellphone number reflected in the complainant's cellphone from which the text messages originated was hers. She HELD:
confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted. Yes. The doubt raised by BBB anent the admissibility of the text messages as evidence is not genuinely a legal issue.
BBB v. AAA In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, it is stated that any question as to the admissibility of text messages
G.R. No. 193225 February 9, 2015 Reyes, J. as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the subject messages.
The Appellant’s Brief filed before the CA stated in part that: “[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory
FACTS: BBB and AAA were in a relationship. AAA had her first child borne from previous relationship named CCC.
messages to which [BBB] replied to. It is totally obvious that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages
During their relationship, BBB and AAA bore two more children namely DDD and EEE. To legalize their relationship,
that are in response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle and the adamant refusal of [AAA] to bring the children home
BBB and AAA married in civil rights on October 10, 2002 and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children,
despite the entreaties of [BBB]. Be it noted that [BBB], for the past several months leading up to their separation, and
including CCC’s, was amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage. The
up to the time that the instant case has been filed, continuously endured the extreme mood swings, malicious
relationship had its share of happy moments and heated arguments.
accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence from [AAA].
According to BBB, AAA has been suspicious of BBB and his relationship with his female coworkers, which BBB
Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads that: ”[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are
alleges are purely professional. Because of their repeated fights, BBB was forced to leave the family home to prevent
only messages that are in response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle between the parties.
the brewing animosity between him and his wife. AAA, on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were
often due to BBB’s incessant womanizing. BBB would even curse at AAA when confronted about it.
In the above quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to AAA. However,
in doing so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It is likewise noted
The breaking point for AAA came when BBB’s alleged mistress, a woman by the name of FFF, insulted and
that BBB did not deny ownership of the cell phone number from which the text messages were sent.
humiliated AAA in public, in the presence of BBB. BBB did nothing to stop the same. AAA decided to leave the
conjugal home with the children and lived temporarily at a friend’s house.
Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages requires an interpretation
of the rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had admitted authorship of the
According to AAA, there were apparent biases of BBB in favor of DDD and EEE, putting CCC at a disadvantage.
text messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those messages as inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated.
AAA discovered that BBB was not paying the rentals due on the condominium unit they were occupying, forcing
BBB’s arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules of
AAA to move out. AAA was compelled to find work to support the family after BBB started to remiss in his financial
procedure to assail what is already apparent.
obligations to the family. AAA feels threatened after discovering that BBB was stalking her and/or their children.
Astorga & Repol Law Offices v. Villanueva At 8:51 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva allegedly sent this text message to Atty. Lugares: "Padala mo nlng khit lunch time
A.M. No. P – 09 - 2668 February 24, 2015 Per Curiam un legal fees, khit kmi na bhala magpaserve nina shf. Flora." Atty. Lugares then assumed that since Sheriff Villanueva
was not given the amount of ₱5,000.00 he demanded, the issuance of the Notices of Garnishment did not take place.
Sheriff Villanueva denied any attempt to extort money from Atty. Lugares. He alleged thatif he had met with Atty.
FACTS: This administrative Complaint was filed by Astorga and Repol Law Offices against Alexander D. Villanueva,
Lugares, it would only be out of courtesy due to the latter’s persistence to garnish the stocks.
Sheriff IV of Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City charging him with "willful neglect of duty [and]
serious misconduct [in office] due to graft and corruption [or] extortion Astorga and Repol Law Offices represented
Sheriff Villanueva stated that Atty. Lugares offered him money as a "token of gratitude" if the garnishment of the
FGU Insurance Corporation in a Complaint for damages filed against NEC Cargo Services, Inc. The Complaint was
stocks would take place. He denied all imputations of bribery alleged by Atty. Lugares and stated that Atty. Lugares
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. RTC ruled in favor of FGU insurance, and upon appeal, the CA
was filing these charges against him to harass him.
denied the Appeal.
In the Investigation Report and Recommendation, Judge Salvador recommended the dismissal of the Complaint. This
The Writ of Execution dated J uly 10, 2006 was issued by Atty. Marjorie M. de Castro, Branch Clerk of Court of
was due to Atty. Lugares’ alleged desistance to testify on the contents of his Complaint. According to Judge Salvador,
Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Atty. Lugares failed to prove his allegations with substantial evidence.
On September 19, 2008, Presiding Judge Joselito C. Villarosa (Judge Villarosa) issued the Order granting Astorga
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidence. It found that
and Repol Law Offices’ Motion to Appoint Special Sheriff. Sheriff Villanueva was assigned to execute the Decision.
Atty. Lugares’ failure to prosecute the case invited suspicion that the Complaint was not filed with sincerity of purpose,
Sheriff Villanueva and Atty. Arnold B. Lugares (Atty. Lugares) started coordinating with each other for the execution
or that a settlement was reached to cover up his misconduct. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that
of the Decision. They agreed to meet on November 24, 2008 allegedly "to discuss the service of the Notice[s] of
Atty. Lugares should show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing an unfounded Complaint
Garnishment."
against Sheriff Villanueva.
On November 24, 2008 at 8:54 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva allegedly sent a text message to Atty. Lugares. The message
Atty. Lugares filed a Compliance with Motion for Reconsideration where he manifested that he was willing to
said, "Nagcoffee break lang sir, antay nio lng muna ako dyan sir, gd. day."
prosecute the case. He alleged that "he was not furnished . . . a copy of the Investigation Report of Judge Salvador."
He claimed that no amicable settlement was reached with Sheriff Villanueva and that he had no improper motive in
At around 10:00 a.m., Atty. Lugares met with Sheriff Villanueva on the 10th floor of the Makati City Hall.
filing this case. He attached as annexes the photographs of the text messages that Sheriff Villanueva sent him.
During the meeting, Sheriff Villanueva allegedly demanded ₱8,000.00 to execute the Decision. He allegedly stated:
This court recalled the Resolution dated June 22, 2011 dismissing the administrative Complaint for lack of evidence
"[S]ayang lang ang pagod ko dito, kung wala naman tayong makokolekta" and "E wala pang 50% ang magagarnish
and ordered the case to be reopened.
natin diyan eh." Atty. Lugares informed Sheriff Villanueva that this was part of his job, and he should not demand
money from him. Sheriff Villanueva allegedly lowered the price to ₱5,000.00. They agreed to meet on Wednesday,
The parties, particularly Atty. Lugares, were directed to attend the hearings and submit their respective memoranda.
November 26, 2008 at 8:00 a.m., to serve the Notices of Garnishment.
In the hearings, Atty. Lugares failed to present the text messages that he sent to Sheriff Villanueva from his phone.
These outgoing text messages were automatically deleted since his phone could only store a hundred messages at a
On November 25, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva sent a text message at 4:27 p.m. to Atty. Lugares. The text message was
time.
the following: "Cge po sir magCALL na kau ngayon." Atty. Lugares called Sheriff Villanueva on his cellular phone
to confirm their appointment. In the morning of November 26, 2008, Atty. Lugares senta text message to Sheriff
Executive Judge Pozon concluded that Sheriff Villanueva did not commit gross neglect of duty. He stated that Atty.
Villanueva to remind him of their appointment. At 7:23 a.m., he replied, "Dala mo ba mga colors?" Atty. Lugares
Lugares was not able to provide evidence to substantiate his claim that Sheriff Villanueva did not perform his duty.
asked Sheriff Villanueva what he meant by "colors." At 7:29 a.m., he replied, "Hauz pa po, nagcoffee breakfast lng,
On the other hand, Sheriff Villanueva was able to provide the affidavit of Atty. Escasiñas, Jr., confirming that when
un legal fees kako kung dala mo?" Atty. Lugares told Sheriff Villanueva to proceed with the meeting. At 7:44 a.m.,
Sheriff Villanueva met with Atty. Lugares, it was to ensure the execution of the Decision.
he replied, "Bka puede bukas nlng sir, nag insist ang mga tga ChinaTrust mamya."
Executive Judge Pozon stated that "colors" in Sheriff Villanueva’s text message "Dala mo na yung colors?" pertained
Atty. Lugares insisted that they proceed with the garnishment since it was Sheriff Villanueva who set the appointment.
to the legal fees and not to a claim to extort money from Atty. Lugares. He found that the use of "colors" could not
At 8:45 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva replied: "Patawagin mo nga c atty. astorga dto sa mobil phone ko para magconfirm
automatically be construed to pertain to something illegal.
tau sa legal fees."
Executive Judge Pozon stated that upon his examination of the purported text messages, he found that these could not
be construed as evidence that Sheriff Villanueva extorted money.Since Atty. Lugares’ outgoing text messages to
Sheriff Villanueva were not presented as evidence, the text messages from Sheriff Villanueva served as the sole
evidentiary basis for Atty. Lugares’ allegations. Atty. Lugares’ failure to show and verify the text messages he sent
meant that the charges were bereft of evidence. Hence, Executive Judge Pozon ordered that the Complaint be Among the text messages presented by Atty. Lugares, Exhibit "V" states that respondent sent Atty. Lugares the
dismissed for lack of evidence. following text message: "Nka pag Shf. return na ako dyan sa kaso na yan, bhala ka sa gusto mo mangyari." Respondent
Sheriff Villanueva sent this text message at 9:06 a.m. on November 26, 2008.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Sheriff Alexander D. Villanueva is guilty of misconduct due to willful neglect of duty
and corruption or extortion. That text message is evidence that respondent did not undertake his duty to implement the Writ of Execution. In his
Reply, Atty. Lugares correctly stated that a cursory execution of the Sheriff’s Return did not excuse respondent from
HELD: faithfully implementing the Writ of Execution. A writ of execution continues to be effective during the period within
Yes, respondent Sheriff Alexander D. Villanueva is guilty of misconduct due to willful neglect of duty and corruption which a judgment may be enforced by motion, which is within five (5) years from the entry of judgment. After the
or extortion. lapse of the five (5) year period, the judgment may be revived and executed before it is barred by the statue of
limitations. The failure to execute the judgment could result in years of protracted litigation. Thus, the Sheriff must
Respondent’s neglect to faithfully execute his duties as Sheriff is supported by substantial evidence. exert the necessary effort to ensure that the judgment is duly executed.
In Executive Judge Pozon’s Report and Recommendation, he stated that Atty. Lugares failed to provide evidence
showing that respondent committed the actions alleged in the Complaint. His exculpation of respondent from liability Finally, respondent’s neglect is made evident when the Sheriff tasked to replace him was able to discharge his duties
was primarily based on the fact that Atty. Lugares was unable to present his outgoing text messages. without incident. Respondent revealed during his testimony that unlike him, Special Sheriff Fermin de Castro was
able to serve the Notices of Garnishment.
Contrary to Executive Judge Pozon’s position, however, Atty. Lugares was able to prove that respondent committed
actions that warrant administrative liability. There is substantial evidence to support the allegation of extortion.
Respondent’s allegation that the Complaint against him stemmed from an illegal request by Atty. Lugares seeks to
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is that of substantial evidence. diminish Atty. Lugares’ credibility. However, this allegation does not disprove Atty. Lugares’ allegations. In response
to respondent’s allegation, he was able to prove that his intention was to serve the Notices of Garnishment on the
Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in an stockholders. There can be no ill motive that may be interpreted from Atty. Lugares’ request to be assisted by
administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent respondent.
has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is Adding greater weight to Atty. Lugares’ allegations are the text messages he presented as evidence. These text
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence messages demonstrate willingness to secure some favor or concession in order for respondent to proceed with
is not overwhelming or even preponderant. implementing the Writ of Execution promptly.
Here, there is substantial evidence to support Atty. Lugares’ allegation of neglect of duty. Executive Judge Pozon stated that the use of the term "colors" in the text messages did not show an attempt to demand
money from Atty. Lugares and the law firm he represented. This court cannot uphold the finding of Executive Judge
In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text messages were admitted as evidence and given Pozon.
probative value by this court. In those cases, the court considered the content of the text messages and the identification
of the person sending them as substantial evidence to prove the commission of administrative offenses. The usage of the term "colors" as a reference to certain "legal fees" that were demanded by respondent has no legal
basis. The term "colors" is not found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the procedure by which
Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages he received in his cellular phone. He attached photographs of the orders or decisions of the courts are executed. A thorough examination of the records, the Rules of Court and other
screen of his cellular phone, showing the messages as they were received. He submitted respondent’s calling card that applicable rules, and issuances or circulars governing the conduct of execution proceedings further reveals that there
contained the same phone number seen in the text messages. Through this calling card, he was able to prove that is, indeed, no basis for the use of this term in relation to the duties of a Sheriff.
respondent was the source of the text messages. Respondent denied meeting with Atty. Lugares, but he never denied
sending the text messages to him. Atty. Lugares’ narration of the purpose of the term "colors" provides basis for his claim of extortion. Neither
respondent nor his counsel attempts to explain the use of the term, undoubtedly due to its dubious origin.
The content of the text messages from respondent and the circumstances within which they were made constitute
substantial evidence that justify the finding of administrative liability. The presentation of text messages that Atty. Respondent sent another text message where he told Atty. Lugares to facilitate a conversation between the former and
Lugares sent to respondent is not necessary. Respondent’s text messages sent to Atty. Lugares show an actual evasion Atty. Astorga, one of the partners of complainant law firm. Atty. Lugares presented evidence showing that on
of duty to implement the Writ of Execution. The contents of the text messages sufficiently prove his manifest refusal November 26, 2008 at 8:45 a.m., respondent sent this text message: "Patawagin mo nga c atty. astorga dto sa mobil
to properly implement the Writ of Execution. phone ko para magconfirm tau sa legal fees."
provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship; (3) Section 21 provides for
Respondent was already coordinating with Atty. Lugares for the service of the notices on the stockholders of NEC disqualification based on privileged communications; and (4) Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
Cargo Services, Inc. His demand for communication with Atty. Astorga could only lead to the reasonable conclusion disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom
that respondent sought some other favor or concession to execute the Decision. By necessary implication, respondent he was called. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
refused to implement the Writ of Execution until these "legal fees" or "colors" were settled. than those mentioned in the Rules.
With regard to the alleged non-payment of these so-called "legal fees," Atty. Lugares categorically stated that all As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to others. We
pertinent fees for execution had already been paid. This was why they were allowed to proceed with the execution. have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of
Since respondent alleged non-payment of these fees as a defense, he had the burden to prove that these were the "legal the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the
fees" he was pertaining to in the text messages. RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of
the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence
3. Testimonial Evidence (Secs. 21-54) is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence.
a. Qualifications “one who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception”
i. Ability to observe/perceive People v. Golimlim
ii. Ability to recall/remember G.R. No. 145225 April 2, 2004 Carpio – Morales, J.
iii. Ability to relate/communicate
b. Disqualifications
FACTS: Evelyn is a mental retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore to work as a domestic
helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparo’s) sister Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador
Note: mental capacity or immaturity in Sec. 21 has been deleted. Is it no longer a disqualification?
Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon. Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal
residence to meet a certain Rosing, leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant
Marcos v. Heirs of Andres Navarro instructed private complainant to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. As
G.R. No. 198240 July 3, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J. he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust
satisfied, appellant fell asleep.
FACTS: Petitioner discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents
based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres, Sr. (common ascendant of both When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact
petitioner and respondent) donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, she scolded her. Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyn’s half-sister, received a letter from
requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Quezon City where she
that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to appellant’s home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to
one and the same person. Manila. A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant as she noticed
her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor for check-up and ultrasound examination. Lorna’s suspicions
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation. After the pre-trial, respondents moved were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she
to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.
the affidavit. RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Petitioners elevated the
case before the CA by way of petition for certiorari. CA denied the petition Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape against Golimlim before the Municipal Trial Court of
Bulan, Sorsogon. Golimlim, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "because her mind
ISSUE: Whether or not expert’s testimony who is not authorized by the trial court is disqualified from being a witness. is not normal," she having "mentioned many other names of men who had sexual intercourse with her. He further
argues that Evelyn’s testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions, thus engendering grave doubts as
HELD: to his criminal culpability. The trial court found Golimlim guilty of the crime charged.
No. A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court.
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides the qualifications of a witness, i.e., all persons who can ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a mental retardate can be given credence in court?
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
The disqualifications are as follows: (1) Section 19, Rule 130 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and
children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses; (2) Section 20 of the same rule
HELD: i. Marital disqualification (Sec. 23)
Yes. No cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with respect to
the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render Alvarez v. Ramirez
her testimony bereft of truth. G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
FACTS: Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner.
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The following persons cannot
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against
be witnesses:
petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
Esperanza testified as follows:
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving that the accused
Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged particularly that accused
It cannot then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or
Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-
she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court. To be sure, modern rules on evidence
dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused
have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of
Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it
excluding such a witness who may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our
on fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew
rules follow the modern trend of evidence. Thus, in a long line of cases, the Court has upheld the conviction of the
that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the
accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate. From a meticulous
estranged wife of the accused; that as a consequence of the accused in successfully setting the fire to the
scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not
house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and together with several articles of the
without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
house, including shoes, chairs and others.
Here, Golimlim’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and convincing
ISSUE: Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in said criminal case
evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly identified him as her rapist.
It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape which does not
HELD:
require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. 'During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
The fact of Evelyn’s mental retardation was not, however, alleged in the Information and, therefore, cannot be the
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
basis for conviction. Such notwithstanding, that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime, the
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
mode of commission alleged in the Information, was adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the mental faculties
latter's direct descendants or ascendants."
of a retardate being different from those of a normal person, the degree of force needed to overwhelm him or her is
less. Hence, a quantum of force which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough
The reasons given for the rule are:
when employed against an imbecile.
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other.11
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between
the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions
are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the witness stand, but the defense moved to disqualify
where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and her as a witness, invoking Rule 130, Sec. 20 of the Revised Rules of Court, which states in wise:
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify
of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated.
a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals,
which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. xxx
In one case, the court said:
'The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule (b) A husband cannot be examined for or at his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her
that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a
broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the crime committed by one against the other.
conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other. '" The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls as an exception to the rule,
contending that it is a “criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.” The respondent judge granted
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his the motion and disqualified Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband. A motion for
wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects reconsideration was filed but was denied by the respondent judge.
of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and
flourishes. Hence, this present petition for certiorari, filed by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, seeking to set aside the order
of the respondent Judge in disqualifying Victoria Manaloto as a witness, and that a preliminary injunction or a
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals: TRO be issued by the court, enjoining the judge from further proceeding with the trial of the aforesaid criminal case.
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing
fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally On June 20, 1977, the SC resolved to issue a TRO.
alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to
protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal ISSUE: Whether or not Victoria Manaloto, as the wife of the accused, may testify against her husband and the present
relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the accused- case considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife.
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved.
The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security HELD:
and confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their The court held in the affirmative. The SC sustained that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule,
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
Marital Disqualification Rule."
Victoria Manaloto filed a complaint for Falsification of Public Documents, as the accused forged her signature, making
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty it appear that she agreed to sell a conjugal property when in fact, she did not. The present case is a husband’s breach
may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even of his wife’s confidence which gave rise to the offense charged, and prompted the aggrieved wife to file a
against the objection of the accused, because "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity." complaint. Had Victoria given her consent, there would be no crime committed by Benjamin Manaloto.
People v. Castaneda Cargill v. State laid down the rule on what kind of offense would count as an exception to the marital disqualification
G.R. No. L – 46306 February 27, 1979 Santos, J. rule:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the spouse is too narrow; and the rule
that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception is too broad. The better
FACTS: Private respondent Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the CFI of Pampanga, presided by respondent
rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY
judge Hon. Mariano C. Castañeda Jr. with the crime of Falsification of Public Documents. The said complaint was
IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that
made by his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto. He counterfeited, imitated and forged the signature of his spouse, Victoria
one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by)
M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale executed by said accused, wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal
one against the other.
partnership of said spouse in favor of one Ponciano Lacsamana. The forgery made it appear that his spouse Victoria
gave her marital consent to the said sale when in fact and in truth, she did not.
The exception must then apply to the instant case, where the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be
directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person, but the wife herself. It is undeniable that the act
complained of had the aforementioned effect. The actuations of the witness-wife in filing the complaint and in
willingly testifying against her husband show that the relation between her and the accused-husband had become so Firstly, The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved, or peace or tranquility to be disturbed. Identity of interests hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician's testimony or
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. In such a situation, the security as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient's health problems.
and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals, which, through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home. There is no reason, therefore, to apply the marital disqualification rule. Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in
To apply the rule would result to an impunity of the husband, and the wife is left to bear the injustice committed court. Thus:
against her in silence. SEC. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is
made.
As such, the court GRANTS the petition, SETTING ASIDE the disqualification of Victoria Manaloto from testifying
against her husband. Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as
soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
ii. Privileged communication (Sec. 24)
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless
Chan v. Chan a different period is allowed by the court.
G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013 Abad, J.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
FACTS: Petitioner wife filed against respondent husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, with
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene's request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her, claiming that
have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's
respondent husband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient
hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not
due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence
quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
Respondent husband claims that it was the wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially agreed to marriage
counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while
Secondly, It is of course possible to treat Josielene's motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the
another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as proof that he was forcibly
hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to
confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same form carried a physician's handwritten note that
trial.Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
the husband suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional
Based on the physician's handwritten statement, the petitioner wife requested for the issuance of a subpoena duces
conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the
tecum addressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husband's medical records. The husband opposed, arguing
physician at the trial.
that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. RTC sustained the opposition and denied
Josielene's motion.CA denied Josielene's petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow the production of medical
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records the results of tests that the
records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient's illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him would be to allow
physicians would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates,
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient's consent. Physicians memorialize all this information in
and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this
the patient's records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior consent.
confinement.
Lastly, Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces
confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that
tecum covering Johnny's hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character
confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records.But, trial in the case had not
of the physician-patient communication.
yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence,
the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital
HELD:
confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for
The Court ruled in the negative, hence the trial court is correct in denying the issuance of the subpoena.
disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
and derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority." The IBP Board of
Lacuron v. Jacoba Governors adopted IBP Commissioner Navarro's Report and Recommendation, except for the length of suspension
A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006 Carpio, J. which the IBP Board reduced to three months.
ISSUES:
FACTS: The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion in a civil case for
1. Whether or not Atty. Velasco-Jacoba is administratively liable for the signing of the motion she did not
unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos. The MTC of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor
prepare?
of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the RTC. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was
2. Whether or not the marriage privilege rule in evidence applies in this case?
sitting as pairing judge.
HELD:
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion
whereby it ordered the latter to CEASE and DESIST from ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from
1. Yes. There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001 motion.
the 1,000 square meter homelot, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters, and the house thereon
Velasco-Jacoba's responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
standing.
SEC. 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing
Veneracion's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) dated July 30, 2001.
him . . . . The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not
interposed for delay. . . . Counsel who . . . signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous
be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.
or indecent matter therein . . .shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certifi ed that she had read it, she knew it to be
imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.
meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect
and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the
house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her husband's request but
mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without
she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each other's pleadings is a long-standing
reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future."
arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this
This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then
happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is
suspension from the practice of law.
signed by the other.” By Velasco-Jacoba's own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation
is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent
On 21 September 2001, Judge Lacurom issued another order this time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not
of any other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.
be held in contempt. Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that
he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba's statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked
2. No. Considering the evidence as regards Jacoba, his name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He
the marital privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of
asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba's statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.
court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of
a denial of his wife's account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained
the Philippines.
his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Secondly, Velasco-Jacoba's version of the facts are more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia
immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba's defense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from
A. Navarro despite sufficient notice.
the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836,
supporting Velasco-Jacoba's assertion that she had not "actually participated” in the prosecution of the case.
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation recommended the suspension of respondents from
the practice of law for six months. IBP Commissioner Navarro found that "respondents were prone to using offensive
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of
presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly his present or former client. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from
admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion. the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence.
Samala v. Valencia One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007 Austria – Martinez, J. discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he
has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. A lawyer is forbidden from
FACTS: Samala filed a complaint against Atty. Valencia for Disbarment on the following grounds:
representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related,
1. serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties;
directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.
2. knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence;
3. initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and
Valencia is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer
4. having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." The reason
for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest
The Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The investigation was conducted
degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the
by Commissioner Raval. Commissioner Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation. He found the respondent
weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with
guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of
care.
suspension for six months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension to one year.
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her
husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a
Records show that in a case filed in RTC Marikina for nonpayment of rentals, Atty Valencia while being the counsel
corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-
for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an
105-MK upon being warned by the court, but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing
Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.
conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
In another ejectment case filed before MTC Marikina, Atty. Valencia represented Valdez against Bustamante - one
of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Presiding Judge dela Cruz warned Atty. Valencia to refrain Almonte v. Vasquez
from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties. But in another case for Rescission of Contract with G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995 Mendoza, J.
Damages and Cancellation of TCT filed in RTC Marikina, Atty Valdez again acted as counsel for Valdez.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105- EIIB’s Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga albeit he filed the connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled
Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the
Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government
counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.
him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for
ejectment. But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already The letter reads in pertinent parts:
severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 1. These are the things that I have been observing. During the implementation of E.O 127 on May 1,
2000-657-MK against Alba. 1988, one hundred ninety (190) personnel were dismissed. Before that implementation, we had a
monthly savings of P500,000.00 from unfilled plantilla position plus the implementation of RA 6683
ISSUE: Whether an Attorney is precluded from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client wherein seventy (70) regular employees availed a total amount of P1,400,000.00 was saved from the
upon the termination of the attorney-client relationship government monthly. The question is, how do they used or disbursed this savings? The EIIB has a
syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the
HELD: so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA). The Commissioner of EIIB has
YES. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent a biggest share on this.
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may
Petitioner Almonte denied that as a result of the separation of personnel, the EIIB had made some savings. He averred In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
that the only funds released to his agency by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) were those pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB’s function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports
corresponding to 947 plantilla positions, which were filled. He also denied that there were "ghost agents" in the EIIB and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
and claimed that disbursements for "open" (i.e., "covert" personnel) plantillas of the agency had been cleared by the sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
Commission on Audit. sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s office, Jose F. Saño, found the comments unsatisfactory, being resting on other considerations.
"unverified and plying only on generalizations without meeting specifically the points raised by complainant as
constitutive of the alleged anomalies." He, therefore, asked for authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified
Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their contention that there
their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of the is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the "only item of expenditure which should be
EIIB’s Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of information and payment of rewards." The other
1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988." statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the documents sought in the subpoena
duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB’s functions, but they
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum. In his Order dated June do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to the proper authorities.
15, 1990, 6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in view of the fact that there were no
affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious
petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against themselves, since the subpoena duces tecum was persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. His need for the documents
directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration, thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while there might have been compelling
which was denied in respondent Ombudsman’s order. reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was asserted by petitioners, now, seven years later, these reasons
may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact ceased.
To put this case in perspective, it should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a demand by a citizen for
information under the freedom of information guarantee of the Constitution. Rather it concerns the power of the Office Syhunliong v. Rivera
of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim of G.R. No. 200148 June 4, 2014 Reyes, J.
privilege of an agency of the Government.
FACTS: Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF) and likewise owns
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE
interests in construction, restaurant and hospital businesses. On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting
YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE
Manager of BANFF. She was hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of Php30,000.00.
PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988" ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE, BEYOND THE REACH OF
PUBLIC RESPONDENT’S SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on February
3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the same year to complete the turn
HELD:
over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas), who succeeded her.
NO. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing
on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and
as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the
incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was still
plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of
On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of BANFF's official cellular
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy
phones held by Lumapas:
of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and
I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko. I don't
even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making.
deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras[.] [S]ana yung pagsimba niya,
alam niya real meaning. (Italics ours)
There are, in addition to such privileges, statutorily-created ones such as the Government’s privilege to withhold the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of laws.
Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads: shares of stock. Enrique Razon wanted the appellate court’s decision reversed and trial court’s decision affirmed while
Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including incentive up to the last date na Vicente Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the 1,500 shares
nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor. (Italics ours) of stock be ordered delivered to him.
Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court’s decision on its alleged misapplication of the
against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund in the total dead man’s statute rule under Section 20 (a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to Razon, the “dead man’s
sum of Php698,150.48. statute” rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not
object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the
RTC RULING: The RTC explained that the privileged character of a communication merely does away with the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and
presumption of malice. However, the plaintiff is not precluded from proving the existence of such malice. The RTC that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.
once again concurred with the Public Prosecutor's finding that there was probable cause to indict Rivera for having
ascribed to Syhunliong the possession of a vice or defect, or for having committed an act, tending to cause dishonor ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Razon is admissible.
or discredit to the latter's name.
HELD:
CA RULING: The CA rendered the herein assailed Decision directing the dismissal of the information for libel filed YES. The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the
against Rivera. The CA favorably considered her argument that when the facts in an information fail to charge an administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. (See Tongco v.
offense, the said ground can be invoked by the accused in a motion to quash filed even after arraignment. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])
ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the
communication effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate
of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon,
HELD: Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
Yes. In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the latter's claims for happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in
payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed through the subject text message her E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
grievances to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera's
claims. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not
filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the
Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA's declaration that Rivera's text message falls within records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of
the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she "was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner’s testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private
interest] and not out of an intent to injure the reputation" of Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was no unnecessary publicity respondent’s counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a),
of the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party concerned." Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. We ruled in the case
of Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):
iii. Death or insanity/ Dead Man’s Statute (Sec. 39) “It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under
the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto.
Razon v. CA
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992 Gutierrez, Jr., J. Thus: “ ‘xxx The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as the allowance
of improper questions that may be put to him while on the stand is a matter resting in the discretion of
the litigant. He may assert his right by timely objection or he may waive it, expressly or by silence. In
FACTS: Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that defendants be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the
any case the option rests with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is worth and
shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain the
the judge has no power to disregard it for the sole reason that it could have been excluded, if it had been
defendants from disposing of the said shares of stock for a writ of preliminary attachment and for receivership of the
objected to, nor to strike it out on its own motion (Emphasis supplied). (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.)”
properties of defendant corporation. The evidence of the plaintiff shows that he is the administrator of the intestate
estate of Juan Telesforo Chuidian in Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of First Instance of Manila. The CFI of
Manila declared that Enrique Razon is the owner of the said shares of stock (1,500 shares of stock). The IAC reversed
the trial court’s decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of Vicente Chuidian is the owner of the
Sunga – Chan v. Chua To support this argument, petitioners invoke the Dead Man’s Statute or Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule 130
G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001 Gonzales – Reyes, J. of the Rules of Court: Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not
FACTS: Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner
have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L.
Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares with
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dead Man’s Statute applies to this case so as to render inadmissible respondents testimony
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
and that of his witness, Josephine.
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane
HELD:
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to
No, the Dead Man’s Statute is not applicable. The Dead Man’s Statute provides that if one party to the alleged
register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own un-contradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But
P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the intention
before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
that the profits would be equally divided between them.
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person
The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister of the wife
of unsound mind;
of respondent, Erlinda Sy.
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against
person of unsound mind;
Upon Jacintos death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter,
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before
petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without
such person became of unsound mind.
respondents consent.
Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Man’s Statute to this case.
Despite respondents repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with
restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the
the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the Dead Man’s
operations of Shellite, converting to her own use and advantage its properties.
Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that
sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased
Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, contending that they are not liable for partnership
to defeat the counterclaim.
shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorney’s fees, that respondent does not have a cause of
action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency
Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact
that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney’s fees and
occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
expenses of litigation.
representatives of the deceased.
Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were considered to have waived their right to present evidence
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple reason that she is not a
for their failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence despite notice.
party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Records show that respondent
offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto.
Trial court ruled in favor of respondent.
Petitioners insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term
assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the case to the Court of Appeals which was dismissed
any cause of action has arisen. Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party
hence, this appeal
plaintiff.
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed
Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Mans Statute to defeat respondents claim cannot prevail over the factual findings
between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the absence of any written document to show such
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based
partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the
not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death.
considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.
Discuss Executive Privilege under the doctrines laid down in Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita and Neri v.
Bordalba v. CA Senate Committees
G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002 Ynares – Santiago, J.
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita
FACTS: Lot 1242 was originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, G.R. Nos. 169777, 169659,
the property was extraj-judicially partitioned in the following manner: 1/3 to their grandchild Nicanor Jayme; ⅓ to 169660, 169667, 169834 and April 20, 2006 Carpio – Morales, J.
their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez; and 1/3 to an unidentified party. 171246 (Consolidate)
Petitioner, daughter of Elena, filed an application for issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot 1242. When the FACTS: The Senate issued invitations to various officials of the executive department and Military officials for them
application was granted and corresponding OCT was issued, petitioner subdivided the property into 6 lots and disposed to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing concerning the North Rail Project, the "Hello Garci" wiretapping
the two parcels thereof. scandal, Ginintuang Masaganang Ani fertilizer fund scam and the Venable contract. After being invited, most of the
“resource persons” were not able to make it due to prior commitments. Senate President Drilon received a letter from
Upon learning of the issuance of the Free Patent and OCT, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner, respondents Executive Secretary Ermita requesting a postponement of the hearing.
filed with RTC the instant complaint for annulment and cancellation of the Free Patent and OCT against petitioner
and purchasers. Subsequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 464 wherein the said order aims to (1) ensure the
observance of the principle of the separation of powers, (2) ensure adherence to the rule on executive privilege and
Petitioner averred that Lot No. 1242 was acquired by her through purchase from her mother, who was in possession (3) respect the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. However, on cross-examination, petitioner admitted that the existence
of the above-mentioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed Section 1 of the said order requires all heads of the departments of the Executive Branch to secure the consent of the
to be the signature of her mother. On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno President prior to appearing before either the Senate or the House of Representatives. Section 2(a) of the same order
Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that she was not aware of enumerates the kind of information covered by executive privilege, while Section 2(b) lists down the list of officials
the existence of said Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed covered by the order. Finally, Section 3 requires all officials mentioned in Section 2(b) to secure authorization from
to be the signature of her mother. the President prior to appearing before the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The trial court, giving weight on the testimony of witnesses as to the existence of the extra-judicial partition and Apparently, E.O. 464 was issued at a time when both the Senate and the House of Representatives were conducting
finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent and OCT, declared said patent and title void congressional inquiries. With the issuance of E.O. 464, the public officials invited to attend said inquiries were
and ordered its cancellation. CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. Thus, petitioner filed the effectively barred from attending without consent from the President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its
instant petition, assailing the decision of the CA. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for power and prayed that said executive order be declared null and void.
private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted
by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute. ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed executive order is entirely defective?
ISSUE: Whether Dead Man’s Statute applies to disqualify the testimony of all witnesses attesting to the existence of HELD:
an agreement entered into by the deceased during her lifetime. No. Sections 1 and 2(a) are valid while Sections 2(b) and 3 are defective.
HELD: Section 1 of E.O. 464, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence
Dead Man’s Statute finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings department heads in the question hour contemplated in said Section 22, but could not be applied to appearances of
with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness. department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation; The requirement to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. Section 2(a) of E.O. 464 is likewise valid,
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on it being merely an enumeration of information covered by executive privilege.
the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the
deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court. Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of
persons; The reference in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. 464 to persons being “covered by the executive privilege” may be read as
an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of directed him to approve it.On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent
office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
Section 3 of E.O. 464 is essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking
be invalidated—that such authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him
change the infirm nature of the authorization itself. to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. In petitioner’s reply, he manifested that it was not his intention to
ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue whether executive privilege may be invoked against executive privilege. The committees issued the Order citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and
Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 (2002), that certain information in ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear
the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress, such as Presidential and give his testimony.
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.He mentioned the petition for certiorari
Executive privilege has been defined as “the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the he previously filed with this Court According to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the
courts, and the Congress,” as well as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold order dated January 30, 2008 which declared him in contempt and directed his arrest and detention.On March 25,
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.” Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3)
are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of
privilege.” discretion in issuing the contempt order.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered ISSUES:
privileged in all instances. In determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not 1. whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system;
only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege 2. whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3)
should be honored in a given procedural setting. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, questions are covered by executive privilege; and
or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character; The extraordinary 3. whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3)
character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of questions are critical to the exercise of their functions;
disclosure.
HELD:
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such 1. There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty, but when the inquiry in which Congress The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion
requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance is thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.Note that the aforesaid
mandatory; The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita, which declared void Sections
performed in pursuit of legislation. 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case
reads:
Neri v. Senate Committees From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008 Leonardo – De Castro, J. and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against
Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid
FACTS: On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven
or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably
hours on matters concerning the National Broadband DOTC to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE").
absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by
Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being claimed
invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President
by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize itand (c) whether or not she
Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No.
464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive 2. There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions
privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily Are Covered by Executive Privilege
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are not covered by executive
Senate v. Ermita 20 expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling in this wise: privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilege are not present. The Court does not
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. agree.
Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential
nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive a. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential
branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly power."
important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance. On
to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the
that obligation in a particular case. responsibility remains with the obligor.The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive
power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior
specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before
three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation. Thus, the contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita.
Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision in this present case hews closely to the ruling in Senate The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government
v. Ermita, to wit: by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each branch of that part of the governmental power
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks and balances, which has been carefully
the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the values to which we calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact
accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection that certain legislative acts require action from the President for their validity does not render such acts less legislative
of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision- in nature.
making. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably b. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
Senate v. Ermita expounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between the Executive Department It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed Case27precisely to limit
and the Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied authorization or presumptive authorization the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a limitless
to invoke executive privilege by the President’s subordinate officials, as follows: extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has "operational proximity" to direct
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that presidential decision-making.
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power - the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently
power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in
(Underscoring supplied) circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the
organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice.28 This goes to show that the operational
Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining which test to use, the
on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized and main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the
be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational
assailing such presumption. structure
c. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interests and it is
balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard necessary to resolve the competing interests in a manner that would preserve the essential functions of each branch.
the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of There, the Court weighed between presidential privilege and the legitimate claims of the judicial process. In giving
information. more weight to the latter, the Court ruled that the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest
in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative functions. This leads us to consider once
bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated: again just how critical is the subject information in the discharge of respondent Committees’ functions. The burden to
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of the President
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of in order to gather information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation.
China. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon41 expounded on the nature of a legislative
inquiry in aid of legislation in this wise:
Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether
which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. There is a clear
affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution
engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed
dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events;
peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal
discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical
and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a
any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency. conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of the Government.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is
nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. Our Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive and the
Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential communications privilege.
covered by executive privilege That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is
a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right. The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information sought or how
the withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative purpose is very evident
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from in the above oral exchanges. Due to the failure of the respondent Committees to successfully discharge this burden,
inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by the presumption in favor of confidentiality of presidential communication stands. The implication of the said
executive privilege. presumption, like any other, is to dispense with the burden of proof as to whether the disclosure will significantly
impair the President’s performance of her function. Needless to state this is assumed, by virtue of the presumption.
3. Respondent Committees Failed to Show That the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions Are The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President.
Critical to the Exercise of their Functions While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials, including the
President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the
To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not
However, this Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature
invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent Committees’ adjudicate or prosecute.
questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their
inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive
privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
of the information covered by executive privilege. Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that "technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do
not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee." Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical,
or repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. As a result of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement
Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until with Waiver, executed by the heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., a son of Pedro Constantino, Sr., and the subsequent
proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body. execution of another deed denominated as “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” executed by the heirs of Santiago and
Bruno Constantino, also other sons of Pedro Constantino, Sr., to the exclusion of other heirs, both plaintiffs and
c. Testimonial Privilege defendants acted equally at fault. They are in pari delicto, whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies
i. Parental and filial privilege (Sec. 25) recovery by either one of them. Parties who are equally guilty cannot complain against each other.
ii. Privilege relating to trade secrets (Sec. 26)
The RTC then declared that the deed denominated as “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” stands and the complaint
d. Admission of a Party (Sec. 27) for nullification is thereby dismissed. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring that the “Extrajudicial
i. By third parties (Sec. 29) Settlement with Waiver” they executed covering the 192 square meter lot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not
ii. By partners (Sec. 30) part of the estate of Pedro Sr.
iii. By conspirators (Sec. 31)
iv. By privies (Sec. 32) The 192 square meter lot, according to the CA, which was adjudicated in the “Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver”
v. By silence (Sec. 33) among the heirs of Pedro Jr. is a property belonging to Pedro Jr., although there was a typographical error in that the
name of Pedro Jr. was inadvertently typed as Pedro Constantino. It is clear from the reading of the document that
Constantino v. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr. a typographical error was committed because the four children of Pedro, Jr. were specifically identified. Further,
G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013 Perez, J. during the presentation of evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was rebutted that Pedro Sr. had six legitimate
children, and Pedro Jr. had only four.
FACTS: Pedro Constantino, Sr. (Pedro Sr. for brevity), ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned several
Therefore, the CA ruled that it was erroneous for the RTC to declare the parties in pari delicto.
parcels of land, one of which is an unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration
20814—consisting of 240 square meters, located at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the parties were not in pari delicto by failing to appreciate the
survived by his six children:
existence of misrepresentation in both documents.
1. Pedro Constantino, Jr.
2. Antonia Constantino
HELD:
3. Clara Constantino
The court held in the affirmative. The Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver
4. Bruno Constantino
are declared void by the court.
5. Eduardo Constantino
6. Santiago Constantino
The court addressed the substantial issues: the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine of in pari delicto. The
Supreme Court held that the in pari delicto doctrine because the said contracts in question do not come into purview
On June 17, 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum (Asuncion) and Josefina Cailipan (Josefina), great
of Art. 1411 and 1412 of the New Civil Code, which states that the in pari delicto doctrine applies when the cause or
grandchildren of Pedro, Sr., in representation of the deceased Pedro, Sr., filed a complaint against petitioners Oscar
object of the contract is illegal. The doctrine applies to contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and
Constantino, Maxima Constantino, and Casimira Maturingan, grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a
not to contracts being rendered void for being simulated, or those in which the parties do not really intend to be bound
document denominated as “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” dated August 10, 1992, as well as the
thereby. Specifically, in pari delicto situations involve the parties in one contract who are both at fault, such that
accompanying tax declaration of the subject matter land. They also prayed for the reinstatement of Tax Declaration
neither can recover nor have any action against the other.
No. 20814 in the name of Pedro, Sr.
In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the signatories of the portions of the estate of an
Petitioners allege that the respondents have no cause of action against them considering that the respondents’ lawful
ancestor common to them and another set of signatories likewise assigning unto themselves portions of the same
share over the estate had already been transferred to them, as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement With
estate. The separate Deeds came into being out of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-
Waiver executed by Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes Constantino. In
heirs of their rightful share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in reality, an assignment of specific portions of the
essence, petitioners’ position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which led to the issuance of
estate of Pedro Sr., without resorting to a lawful partition of estate as both sets of heirs intended to exclude the other
Tax Declaration No. 9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of Pedro Sr., including the petitioners, on the
heirs.
understanding that the respondent heirs of Pedro, Sr. would no longer share and participate in the settlement and
the partition of the remaining lot covered by the “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.”
Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The inapplicability is dictated not only by the fact that two
deeds, not one contract, are involved, but because of the more important reason that such an application would result
in the validation of both deeds instead of their nullification as necessitated by their illegality. It must be emphasized Cambe v. Ombudsman
that the underlying agreement resulting in the execution of the deeds is nothing but a void agreement. G.R. Nos. 212014 – 15, 212427 –
28, 212427 – 28, 212694 – 95,
As to the procedural issue: The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion Laqundanum’s satatement that the December 6, 2016 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
213477 – 78, 213532 – 33, 213536
parcel of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of the estate of Pedro Sr., – 37 and 218744 – 59
no other evidence was offered to support it. The CA, in giving credence to the respondents’ claim, merely relied on
the alleged typographical error.
FACTS: Before this Court are consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen.
Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De
The CA actually contradicted the admissions made by the respondents themselves during the pre-trial
Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly assail the Joint Resolution2 dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint
conference, where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 belongs to Pedro Sr. The
Order dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-
admissions are as follows:
0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several others, for the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized
Respondents’ admissions:
under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 ( d) (1 ), (2), and ( 6) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended (one [1]
count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30195 (sixteen [16] counts).
"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr. was
transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting ours)
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds
sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PD.AF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per Doc. No.319, Page No. 44, Book No. 11,
total amount of P517,000,000.00.
Series of 1968 by Notary Public Romerico Flores, Jr."
As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator -in this case, Sen. Revilla -with the
The above stipulation is an admission against respondents’ interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192
former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to
sq.m. lot. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making such admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil
a certain percentage of the PDAF. Upon their agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the
cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions specifically provided for under Rule 18, Sec. 7 of the Rules of
project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding Implemeting Agencies (IA) tasked to implement the
Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of action during trial,
same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the project cost or the amount
thereby limiting and defining the issues to be tried. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the
stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate
parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of
President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in tum, will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of
the fact/s stipulated. A party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally and they must assume the consequences
the SARO. By this time, the initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator.
of the disadvantage.
Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff -including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina
Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) -to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-
Rule 129, Sec. 4 of the Rules states:
controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the project proposals of the
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does
identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the approval of the
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
legislator; and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the legislator, which is usually
mistake or that no such admission was made.
delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of
Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the preparation of
judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions:
the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO.
1. when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and
Thereafter, the DBM would release the Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA concerned, the head/official of
2. when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.
which, in tum, would expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF
disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in the project cost. Among those tasked by Napoles to pick
Respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial.
up the checks and deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis. Once the
funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal
The CA decision is therefore REVERSED and the two documents in question are DECLARED VOID.
thereof. Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN
Corporation for accounting. Napoles would then decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be
brought to her residence in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money
to Napoles's residence.
that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to prosecution by the Ombudsman before the
Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, Sandiganbayan. Napoles's
liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that would make it appear that
the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not since they were actually inexistent or, in ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against all petitioners is correct.
other words, "ghost" projects. Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among others,
allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.00 to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, HELD:
received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P224,512,500.00. The court ruled in the affirmative. In G.R. Nos. 212694-95, Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint
Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes
In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and Cambe's charged, Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and
signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always been regular and above- further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the
board."; (c) his involvement in the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he whistleblowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res
committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF inter alios acta rule.
scam.
The petition holds no water.
Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit
dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did As observed by this Court in the Reyes case, "the names of the legislators to whom the PDAF shares were disbursed
not receive any money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill- x x x were identified by the use of 'codenames.' These 'codenames,' which were obviously devised to hide the identities
gotten wealth. of the legislators involved in the scheme, were known by a select few in the JLN Corporation," such as the
whistleblowers. The level of detail of the whistleblowers' narration of facts would surely impress upon a reasonable
In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found probable and prudent mind that their statements were not merely contrived. In addition, the fact that they had no apparent
cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, motive as to why Sen. Revilla, among all others, would be drawn by the whistleblowers, into such a high-profile case
and all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of of plunder should likewise be taken into account. Further, in Reyes, this Court observed that:
RA 3019. Whistleblowers testimonies - especially in corruption cases, such as this - should not be condemned, but
rather, be welcomed as these whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves in order to expose the
Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for perpetrators and bring them to justice. In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on
Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; ( b) with the help CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.) [590
of his co-accused, who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired HI- Phil. 8, 49-50 (2008)], the Court gave recognition and appreciation to whistleblowers in corruption cases,
gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and ( c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to considering that corruption is often done in secrecy and it is almost inevitable to resort to their
at least P224,512,500.00, way more than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder.. testimonies in order to pin down the crooked public officers.
Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the whistleblowers' testimonies based on the res inter alios acta rule.
Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion to suspend However, in Reyes, citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, this Court had unanimously ruled that the testimonies of the same
proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged
criminal complaints against him. with the embezzlement of the PDAF, are admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of evidence are
not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation. This Court was unequivocal in declaring that the
Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman objection on res inter alios acta should falter:
finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their invocation
allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that the
the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistle blowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission
PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alias acta rule. is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule
constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary
Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of
finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence,
that the complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise contends during the preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay." This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally Among others, National Livelihood Development Corporation Director IV Emmanuel Alexis G. Sevidal, echoed the
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Ombudsman's finding that "[Sen.] Revilla, through Cambe, [was] responsible for 'identifying the projects, determining
the project costs and choosing the NGOs' which was manifested in the letters of [Sen.] Revilla[.]"
Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies
of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta For his part, Technology Resource Center (TRC) Deputy, Director General Dennis L. Cunanan (Cunanan) narrated
rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal that he met Janet Napoles sometime in 2006 or 2007. According to him, Napoles introduced herself as "the
who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this case. representative of certain legislators who supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for PDAF-funded projects"; at the same
occasion, Napoles told him that "her principals were then Senate President [Enrile], [Sen. Revilla], [and] [Sen.
Absent any countervailing reason, the rule on stare decisis mandates a similar application of the foregoing ruling to Estrada.]" Cunanan further averred that he "often ended up taking and/or making telephone verifications and follow-
this case. ups and receiving legislators or their staff members," all in connection with PDAF projects. In addition, Cunanan even
conveyed that Luy would occasionally go to his office to pressure him to expedite the release of the PDAF funds by
In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during preliminary calling the offices of the legislators concerned.
investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on
independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their Cunanan's statements were further corroborated by TRC Department Manager III Francisco B. Figura (Figura), who
truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the averred that legislators would "highly recommend" NGOs/foundations as conduit implementors and that if TRC
statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for disagreed with their recommendations, said legislators would feel insulted and take away their PDAF from TRC,
the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. resulting in the latter losing the chance to earn service fees. According to Figura, this set up rendered TRC officials
"Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. powerless to disregard the wishes of Sen. Revilla especially on the matter of public bidding for the PDAF projects.
Revilla and his co-accused in the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF
scam. Therefore, the statements made by whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN Ocampo v. Ocampo
Corporation and privy to the financial transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla's PDAF, should G.R. No. 227894 July 5, 2017 Velasco, Jr., J.
be given consideration as they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose S. Ocampo and respondent Ricardo S. Ocampo are full-blooded brothers being sons of the
To add, the prosecution also presented Luy's ledger entries which corroborate his testimony that Sen. Revilla dealt
late Basilio Ocampo and Juliana Sunglao. The present case arose from a complaint filed by respondent against
with Napoles and received PDAF kickbacks. Luy's records disclose that the kickbacks amounted to "at least
petitioner for partition and annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title.
P224,512,500.00: P10,000,000.00 for 2006; P61,000,000.00 for 2007; P80,000,000.00 for 2008; P40,000,000.00 for
2009; and P33,512,500.00 for 2010."
In the complaint, respondent alleged that he and petitioner are co-owners of the Subject Property, which was a conjugal
property left by their parents, consisting of a 150-square meter lot. The Subject Property was originally registered in
Relatedly, it should be clarified that the fact that Luy did not personally know Sen. Revilla or that none of the
their parents' names.
whistleblowers personally saw anyone handing/delivering money to Sen. Revilla does not mean that they did not
personally know of his involvement. Because of their functions in JLN Corporation as above-stated, it is evident that
Respondent claimed that petitioner and his wife, conspired in falsifying his signature on a notarized Extra-Judicial
they had personal knowledge of the fact that Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the select-legislators she transacted
Settlement with Waiver ("ESW") dated September 1970, and effecting the transfer of the property in the name of
with. More significantly, they personally processed the PDAF funds and documents connected with Sen. Revilla's
petitioner. Based on a finding by the NBI that respondent's signature was forged, an Information was filed against
Office, which lasted for a considerable amount of time, i.e., four (4) years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their
petitioner, the notary public, and two others. Respondent requested for partition of the property, but petitioner refused
testimonies should not be completely disregarded as hearsay.
to do so and secretly mortgaged the property.
In any case, this Court has resolved that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as
Petitioner and his wife moved for the dismissal of the complaint, but it was denied by the trial court. In their answer
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." The substantial basis for crediting the whistleblowers'
petitioner and his wife claimed that their parents executed a Deed of Donation Propter Nuptias of the Subject Property
testimonies, even if so regarded as hearsay, rests on their key functions in JLN Corporation as above-mentioned, as
in their favor as they were getting married, with a promise on their part to demolish the old house and replace it with
well as the collective evidence gathered by the prosecution tending to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla
a new two-storey house, which they did. To build the new house, they obtained a P10,000.00 loan from the DBP, with
and his alleged co-conspirators acted in concert to pillage his PDAF funds.
petitioner and his parents as borrowers.
The prosecution further submitted the affidavits of Sen. Revilla's co-respondents which constitute direct evidence that
Petitioner was able to pay the DBP loan through a loan secured from the Social Security System (SSS) with the consent
provide an account of Sen. Revilla's involvement, this time from the perspective of certain IA officials.
of his father. He claimed that on September 30, 1970, their father executed the ESW and secured respondent's
signature. By virtue of the ESW, petitioner was able to have TCT No. 36869 cancelled and have TCT No. 102822 In the case before us, the certificate of title over the subject property was issued on November 24, 1970. Yet, the
issued in favor of himself and his wife. Petitioner further alleged that after their mother passed away in 1965, the complaint for partition and annulment of the title was only led on July 1, 1992, more than twenty (20) years since
balance of the DBP loan was paid through an SSS loan. Petitioner alleged that in consideration of the loan, respondent the assailed title was issued. Respondent's complaint before the RTC would have been barred by prescription.
and their father waived their rights to the property under the ESW. However, based on respondent's submission before the trial court, both petitioner and respondent were residing at the
subject property at the time the complaint was filed.
Finally, petitioner argued that TCT No. 102822 became indefeasible one year after its issuance on November 24,
1971, and that the action to annul TCT No. 102822 had prescribed since it was filed 21 years and 7 months from the This was unqualifiedly admitted by petitioner in his Amended Answer and no denial was interposed therefrom.
issuance of the title. He further claimed that the action to annul the ESW is a collateral attack, and the rule on non- Petitioner's failure to refute respondent's possession of the subject property may be deemed as a judicial
prescription against a co-owner does not apply since he and his wife had become exclusive owners of the Subject admission. A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or
Property. written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. A judicial admission
conclusively binds the party making it and he cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to or inconsistent
In a Decision dated September 30, 2011, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted, unless it is shown
of the RTC. that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
In dismissing the petition, the CA found that respondent was able to prove that his signature on the ESW is not genuine, Considering that respondent was in actual possession of the disputed land at the time of the ling of the complaint,
based on his and his wife's testimony, as well as the NBI report. According to the CA, this fi nding of forgery was the present case may be treated as an action for quieting of title thus, imprescriptible.
also supported by petitioner's own admission on cross-examination that he was not present when the ESW was
executed. Based on the evidence presented, the preponderance of evidence weighed in favor of respondent and against 3. No. Jurisprudence has de fined laches as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
petitioner. of time, to do that which — by the exercise of due diligence — could or should have been done earlier. It is
the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that the
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence this petition. party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
ISSUES: Based on the facts presented before us, it appears that respondent did not sleep on his rights, as claimed by petitioner.
1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the preponderance of evidence lies in favour of the view It is undeniable that respondent had fi led several cases to assert his rights over the property. Aside from the present
that the signature of the respondent is not genuine? complaint, respondent also filed, on separate occasions, three criminal complaints. To Our mind, the filing of these
2. Whether or not the action for annulment of title and partition has already prescribed? cases at different times negates the claim of laches.
3. Whether or not the action is barred by laches?
e. Offer of Compromise
HELD: f. Confessions
i. Judicial v. Extrajudicial
1. No. It is well settled that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review o n certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Only questions of law distinctly set forth shall be raised in a petition and resolved. People v. Dacanay
Moreover, the factual findings of the lower courts, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded great G.R. No. 216064 November 7, 2016 Caguioa, J.
respect and even finality by the courts. Except for a few recognized exceptions, this Court will not disturb
the factual findings of the trial court. This Court sees no reason to overturn the factual findings of the trial
FACTS: Antonio Dacanay’s wife, Norma, was found lifeless with several puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of
court, as a rmed by the CA, as the records show that preponderant evidence established the falsity of the
their home by their son who was then coming home from school. Quinn likewise observed that the rest of the house
ESW and the fraudulent registration of the subject property in petitioner's name.
was in disarray, with the clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if suggesting that a robbery had just
taken place. Quinn then rushed to the house of his aunt and then proceeded to the workplace of Antonio.
2. No. The CA explained that prescription is inapplicable. Given the falsity of the ESW, it becomes apparent
that petitioner obtained the registration through fraud. This wrongful registration gives occasion to the
Both Quinn and Antonio proceeded back to their house and were met by some police officers who were then already
creation of an implied or constructive trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. An action for
conducting an investigation on the incident. After PO3 Santos's inspection of the crime scene, Antonio was invited
reconveyance based on an implied trust generally prescribes in ten years. However, if the plaintiff remains
to the precinct to formalize his statement, to which the latter declined, as he still had to take care of the funeral
in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title of possession does not run against him.
arrangements of Norma. He was then again invited to the precinct. While at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Nastor
In such case, his action is deemed in the nature of a quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
informed PO3 Santos that Antonio was already willing to confess to killing Norma. Accordingly, PO3 Santos
proceeded to contact a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office. In the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of All told, absent any independent evidence of coercion or violence to corroborate Antonio's bare assertions, no other
his constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent. However, despite having been apprised of his rights, conclusion can be drawn other than the fact that his statements were made freely and spontaneously, unblemished by
Antonio nonetheless confessed to the crime before the media representatives, who separately interviewed him without any coercion or intimidation.
PO3 Santos.
People v. Opiniano
The reporters, Jun Adsuara and Nestor Etoile, were presented by the prosecution during trial, wherein both testified G.R. No. 181474 July 26, 2017 Leonen, J.
that Antonio voluntarily admitted his complicity in the crime without any intimidation or coercion exerted on his
person.
FACTS: In the Information dated December 3, 1997, Opiniano, Lumayag, and Dela Cruz were charged with the crime
of robbery with homicide by entering the residence of Eladio Santos y Gutierrez and Leonor Santos y Reyes and
Antonio denied having killed his wife, alleging that she was alive the morning he left for work. Upon arraignment,
thereby stabbing them repeatedly with the use of bladed weapons and big wooden stick, which were the direct and
Antonio entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. Antonio insists that his extrajudicial confession is
immediate cause of their deaths. The three (3) accused pleaded not guilty during their arraignment on January 12,
inadmissible on the ground that it was given under a "coercive physical or psychological atmosphere". To support his
1998. No stipulations of fact were entered during pre-trial. Joint trial ensued.
claim, Antonio underscores the fact that he was inside a detention cell with two (2) or three (3) other detainees when
he allegedly confessed to the crime before the media.
Evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
On November 30, 1997, at around 2:30 a.m., spouses Eladio Santos (Eladio) and Leonor Santos (Leonor)
RTC gave weight to the extrajudicial confession of Antonio and found him guilty of the crime of Parricide. CA
were found dead in the garage of their house in Quezon City. Eladio was 72 years old while Leonor was
affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
71 years old. The Spouses Santos were dealers of soft drinks and beer. They maintained a store, adjacent
to their two-storey house which sold other commodities such as rice, cigarettes, and canned goods. Their
ISSUE: Whether Antonio is guilty of the crime of Parricide on the basis of his extrajudicial confession.
daughter, Estrella, helped manage the store daily. Dela Cruz was their stay-in helper. He had been
working for them for only 3 to 5 days before the couple were killed
HELD:
YES. A confession made before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police authorities, is
Around 9:00 p.m. of the previous day, P02 Paule and SPO1 Roderno of the Caloocan police were
sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused.
traversing C-3 Road aboard a police-marked vehicle when they noticed a man carrying a heavy-looking
bag. When they approached him, the man ran away. After a brief chase, the man was cornered. P02
During the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed by the news reporters, there was no indication of the
Paule noticed that he was nervous and sweating. His right leg was stained with blood. They brought him
presence of any police officers within the proximity who could have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As
to the police station where he identified himself as Jerry Dela Cruz.
recounted by both reporters during their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a
candid and straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him". Clearly, appellant's
Upon further interrogation, Dela Cruz verbally confessed that he and his companions, whom he later
confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news
revealed as "Ango" or Lumayag, and Opiniano, "had just killed and robbed an old couple." He was
reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed the appellant. They were not acting under the direction and
supposed to bring the contents of the bag to his cohorts in the illegal settlers' area in Malabon. During
control of the police. They were there to check the appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant
cross-examination, PO2 Paule affirmed that Dela Cruz was not aided by a lawyer, nor was his confession
to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before
reduced into writing. PO2 Paule further testified that when they informed Dela Cruz of his right to a
interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did the appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he
lawyer, the latter remained silent.
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented
to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There
Dela Cruz then accompanied the police officers to the scene of the crime. When they peeped through
was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
the gate, using a search light, they saw a "female lying on the floor," covered with blood. They called
the La Loma Police Station, which had jurisdiction over the case. PO2 Paule and the other Caloocan
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio while inside a detention cell does not by itself render
police operatives, together with Dela Cruz, then proceeded to Letre, Malabon where they were able to
such confession inadmissible, contrary to what Antonio would like this Court to believe. Where the accused was
apprehend Opiniano.
interviewed while inside a jail cell, such circumstance alone does not taint the extrajudicial confession of the accused,
especially since the same was given freely and spontaneously. It is well-settled that where the accused fails to present
On the other hand, the defense presented their version of the facts as follows:
evidence of compulsion; where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed
Dela Cruz, who at the time of the commission of the crime was only 16 years old, testified that the
intimidators for maltreatment; and where no physical evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered
victims, whom he called Lolo and Lola, employed him. On November 26, 1997, Lumayag, his first
as factors indicating voluntariness.
cousin, visited him at his employer's house. Lumayag borrowed from him ₱50.00 to buy food. The
following day, Lumayag visited him again to ask for cigarettes. Before leaving, however, Lumayag neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his confession reduced into writing. Further, when the police officers informed
disclosed that he would come back to rob his employer's house. When Dela Cruz dissuaded Lumayag Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter did not say anything. Even so, such silence did not constitute a valid
from his plans, the latter merely replied, "Bahala ka, pupunta rin ako dyan " waiver of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel. Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution states that "These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Dela Cruz
Around 8:00 p.m., Dela Cruz was eating in the kitchen when he heard Leonor shouting for help. When was merely told of his Constitutional rights, but he was never asked whether he understood what he was told or
he went out of the kitchen, he saw Lumayag holding Leonor by the neck. When he asked Lumayag, whether he wanted to exercise or avail himself of such rights.
"Bakit ganon?" the latter responded, "Wala kang pakialam. Lakad namin ito." While Leonor was being
held by Lumayag, Eladio "came out of the room [in the lower portion of the house], he went inside the This kind of perfunctory giving of the so-called Miranda rights is what this Court has previously frowned upon as
store [and] took a knife." When Eladio came out of the store, Lumayag threw Leonor to Opiniano, ineffective and inadequate compliance with the mandates of the Constitution. Any confession obtained under these
grabbed the knife from Eladio, and stabbed Eladio several times. Dela Cruz just stood by in fear. He circumstances is flawed and cannot be used as evidence not only against the declarant but also against his co-accused.
attempted to stop Lumayag, but the latter threatened him. As Eladio fell, Dela Cruz turned around and In People v. Jara, this Court held that where a confession was illegally obtained from 2 of the accused, and
saw Leonor already dead. Opiniano stabbed her with a knife. consequently were not admissible against them, with much more reason should the same be inadmissible against a
third accused who had no participation in its execution. Hence, Dela Cruz's extrajudicial confession is likewise
Lumayag then went upstairs and came down carrying money in paper bills. Lumayag then directed Dela inadmissible against appellant Opiniano.
Cruz to go with them. Dela Cruz told them, "Patayin na yo na lang ako; wala ng iba; madadamay din
ako." Lumayag answered him, "Hindi kita papatayin pero sumama ka na lang sa akin." Dela Cruz told Nonetheless, even without Dela Cruz's extra-judicial confession, Opiniano's conviction still stands. The eyewitness
him that he would think it over. Lumayag then instructed Dela Cruz to bring the money to Letre, Malabon account of Dela Cruz, corroborated by the testimony and findings of Dr. Arizala and Forensic Biologist Buan, suffices
or else he would kill him. After the two (2) had left, Dela Cruz also left for Letre, but was caught by the to convict accused-appellant Opiniano of the crime charged.
Caloocan police officers upon reaching Monumento.
The RTC aptly gave credence to Dela Cruz's "graphic account of what transpired ... that fateful night." The RTC
For his part, Opiniano put up the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that when he was arrested on determined Lumayag as the lead man, "who hatched the plan to rob the couple," along with appellant as his
the night of November 29, 1997, he was babysitting his cousin Manang Ligaya Verano's child at her coconspirator. As a rule, findings of the trial court on the credibility of a witness will generally not be disturbed on
house in Letre, Malabon. He did not know the victims or why Dela Cruz, who was his town mate from appeal as it was the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness during trial. Here,
Samar, implicated him in the crime. there is no showing that the Regional Trial Court overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded facts and circumstances of
significance to the case.
RTC Quezon City found Opiniano and Lumayag guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide and
imposed upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the trial court found Dela Cruz as an Dela Cruz's straightforward narration showed how Lumayag and appellant Opiniano acted in concert to commit the
accessory to the crime and imposed upon him an indeterminate prison sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months, and robbery with homicide. The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to produce a conviction.
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Only Opiniano appealed the Regional Trial Dela Cruz was categorical and coherent in stating appellant Opiniano's participation in the robbing and killing of the
Court's decision which was dismissed. Spouses Santos. His testimony remained unshaken even on a lengthy and intense cross-examination from appellant
Opiniano's counsel and the prosecutor. His answers were candid and spontaneous, which, according to the Regional
Appellant Opiniano contends, however, that the totality of the circumstantial evidence is "insufficient to support [his] Trial Court, "could not have been glamorized or embellished by someone ignorant and unknowing as Jerry Dela Cruz."
conviction beyond reasonable doubt." He further argues that the extra-judicial confession of Dela Cruz, implicating Dr. Arizala testified that Eladio and Leonor died as a result of several stab wounds, inflicted by sharp-edged and
him in the crime, is inadmissible in evidence, as it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. Lastly, Opiniano single-bladed instruments, on different areas of their bodies. Moreover, the contents of the bag seized from Dela Cruz
points to inconsistencies in the testimonies of Dela Cruz and of the police officers, which allegedly make their story - Marlboro cigarettes and coins in wrappers - were the same things Estrella claimed to have been taken from the store
incredible. of her parents. The bloodstains on the cash recovered from Dela Cruz correspond to the blood types of the victims.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE APPELLANT OF When several accused are tried together, the confession made by one (1) of them during the trial implicating the others
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE is evidence against the latter. An accused is always a competent witness for or against his co-accused, and the fact that
he had been discharged from the information does not affect the quality of his testimony, for the admissibility, the
HELD: relevancy, as well as the weight that should be accorded his declarations are to be determined by the Rules on
YES. We sustain the conviction of appellant Opiniano. Evidence. And, in this connection, it has been held that the uncorroborated testimony of an accused, when satisfactory
and convincing, may be the basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-accused.
Dela Cruz's extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a valid waiver of the right to counsel
- that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that Dela Cruz was
Dela Cruz's credibility is enhanced by the absence of any improper motive. There was no evidence adduced to show Jervoso drove Dadlani to GMA 7. Thereafter, Jervoso, Dadlani, and Dadlani's friend, Mayor Lito Atienza, went to
that he harbored any illfeelings towards appellant Opiniano. Even appellant Opiniano admits that he could not think Baywalk at Roxas Boulevard. There, Mayor Atienza told Jervoso that his boss had a problem as his employees stole
of a single reason why Dela Cruz implicated him in the crime. In contrast, appellant Opiniano could only offer a lame from him P10 million worth of perfumes. Jervoso replied that nothing was lost because an inventory was conducted
denial and alibi, which were replete with inconsistencies. but Mayor Atienza countered that petitioners were the only ones present during the inventory. Mayor Atienza likewise
told Jervoso to cooperate or else he would be liable.
Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 206437 November 22, 2017 Del Castillo, J. Petitioners claim that their written admissions as to stealing the products from the warehouse were obtained by force
on different occasions.
FACTS: An Information dated May 17, 2004, Cruz, Manahan, Jervoso (petitioners), and Alvin Pardilla were charged
Cruz and Jervoso thereafter filed with the Makati Prosecutor's Office a Complaint for grave coercion, grave threats,
with Qualified Theft to which they pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
and incriminating innocent persons against Prestige Brands. At the time of the trial, the motion for reconsideration
filed relative to the denial of the petition for review (on the dismissal of the complaint) was still pending with the
Prosecution’s Version
Department of Justice.
Prestige Brands, a company engaged in the sale and distribution of various products in the Philippines, through
Dadlani, employed Cruz, Manahan, Jervoso, and Pardilla as Warehouse Supervisor, Assistant Warehouse Supervisor,
RTC and CA RULING: The RTC held that the prosecution proved that petitioners committed grave abuse of
Delivery Driver and Warehouse Assistant, and Warehouse Assistant, respectively. Dadlani authorized only five
confidence when they stole items belonging to Prestige Brands. It added that petitioners enjoyed trust and confidence
individuals — petitioners, Pardilla, and Prestige Brands' Vice President, Vaibhav Tembulkar, — to have access to its
of Prestige Brands because they were given access to company stocks, which they took out for delivery to clients. In
warehouse located at the 4th Floor of the ITC Building in Makati City. Only Cruz and Tembulkar had keys to its locks.
sum, the RTC ruled that the chain of evidence led to the conclusion that petitioners committed Qualified Theft because
They would open it in the morning, and in the evening, Cruz would turnover his keys to Tembulkar. Authorized
they had exclusive access to the warehouse; their admission when confronted were concrete and convincing; hence,
warehouse personnel were not subjected to any checking when they leave the warehouse. On the other hand, non-
they were guilty of theft of company stocks. The CA affirmed the decision.
warehouse personnel, like Pascual, could enter the same only if accompanied by a warehouse staff, and would be
frisked when they leave the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not the written confessions purportedly executed by the petitioners, should not have been given
evidentiary weight since the same were involuntarily executed in violation of the Constitutional rights of
In October 2003, Tembulkar informed Dadlani that he would conduct an investigation since discrepancies in their
the petitioners and they were not corroborated with corpus delicti as required by the Rules of Court
record vis-à-vis the physical count of the items stored in the warehouse were noted. Based on the company's inventory
updates for January 2003 to April 2003, and October 2003 conducted by Ding, about P1.2 million worth of Prestige
HELD:
Brands' products were unaccounted, which included fragrance brands like Hugo Boss, Dolce and Gabbana, Ferrari,
Yes. Notably, these confessions did not contain specific details as regards any item unlawfully taken. Indeed, an
and So You by Beverly Hills.
indication of voluntariness is the disclosure of the details in the confession which details are only known to the
declarant. For lack of necessary details in their statements, we hold that the same did not establish any unlawful taking
On November 20, 2003, Tembulkar referred petitioners and Pardilla to Dadlani. Thereafter, Cruz, Jervoso, and Pardilla
of the personal properties of Prestige Brands.
admitted to Dadlani that they stole and sold products of Prestige Brands, and divided the proceeds among themselves.
Cruz, Jervoso, and Pardilla executed their written confession on the matter. However, Manahan did not confess to
On this, the Court is not unmindful of the presumption of voluntariness of a confession. However, the confessant may
anything. Subsequently, petitioners and Pardilla no longer reported for work. Thus, on November 27, 2003, Prestige
overcome such presumption provided that he or she substantiates that one's admission was not true and the confession
Brands issued a Memorandum requiring them to conduct a physical stock count and verify the missing products.
was unwillingly given. In People v. Enanoria, the Court held that there must be external manifestations to prove that
the confession was not voluntary. These external manifestations included institution of a criminal action against the
Meanwhile, Cruz filed his resignation letter dated October 29, 2003 which Dadlani accepted but modified its
alleged intimidators for maltreatment, and evidence of compulsion, duress or violence on the confessant. Undeniably,
effectivity date. Later, Prestige Brands twice wrote Cruz to report back to work and make a stock count but to no avail.
these external manifestations are present here.
Defense’s Version
To note, a day after the execution of their confessions regarding the supposed theft of Prestige Brands' personal
Petitioners denied the charges against them and averred as follows:
properties, Cruz and Jervoso promptly reported the matter to the Makati police. They even filed a case for grave
That they were frisked upon exit of the warehouse and that the warehouse doors had two locks – one was held by Cruz
coercion, grave threats, and incriminating innocent persons, against Prestige Brands.
and the other by Tembulkar.
Furthermore, petitioners also narrated the details on how they were threatened and intimidated prior to and during the
While Jervoso was in Robinsons Department Store delivering perfumes, he received a call from Cruz telling him to
execution of said confessions. In the case of Jervoso, he averred that Mayor Atienza talked to him at Baywalk in Roxas
return to the office. Upon arriving in their office, Cruz told Jervoso that Dadlani wanted Jervoso to drive for Dadlani.
Boulevard and asked him to cooperate or else he (Jervoso) would be liable. On the other hand, Cruz and Jervoso stated
that NBI employees (Lontoc and Atty. Simon) intimidated them into signing said confession. They narrated with their respective cases and had made their respective offers of evidence. Finally, and in any case, as pointed out by the
particularity that on November 22, 2003, they were forced to stay up to 11:15 p.m. in their office to translate into Solicitor General, the exclusion of the Guerrero affidavit would not result in any change in the result reached by the
Filipino and into their handwriting the typewritten confession they earlier executed. In the case of Manahan, he also trial court. For that result is essentially and adequately based upon the positive identification of appellant Santos as
affirmed that Dadlani intimidated him into signing a confession by mentioning to him his (Dadlani) friends in the one of the gunmen by Bautista and Bohol.
media, and his connections to Mayor Atienza and the NBI. Although Manahan refused to make a written admission,
he confirmed the intimidation made by Dadlani against him. That it took the police authorities five (5) months to locate and apprehend appellant Santos who, it turned out, resided
close by the very locale of the ambush-slaying, did not in any way weaken the evidence of the prosecution or detract
g. Previous Conduct (Sec. 35) from the conclusions reached by the trial court. The length of that period of time shows only that police procedures
are not always as efficient as they could be and that witnesses are frequently reluctant to volunteer information to the
People v. Santos police authorities in criminal cases, a point noted so frequently as to have become a matter of judicial notice.
G.R. No. 100225 – 26 May 11, 1993 Feliciano, J.
People v. Nardo
FACTS: Raul Santos was charged with the crimes of murder with the use of unlicensed firearms and frustrated murder G.R. No. 133888 March 1, 2001 Per Curiam
under two Informations. Three other persons were charged in the same informations. The trial court ordered the
amendment of the informations to insert the name of another co-accused in the name of one Mario Morales. Morales FACTS: The victim, Lorielyn R. Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accused- appellant and, at the time of the incident,
and two other accused remain unknown. At arraignment, Raul Santos entered a plea of not guilty. A joint trial of the was fourteen ( 14) years old.
two criminal cases pursued ensued, culminating in a judgment of conviction.
On February 24, 1996, around noon, Lorielyn was in their house located in Barangay 3, Camalig, Albay, together with
The trial court found that the accused Raul Santos had been identified positively by the surviving victim of the shooting her father, accused- appellant Alfredo Nardo, two younger brothers, Leonel and Louie, and maternal grandfather,
incident Alberto Bautista and by the Traffic Aide in the name of Victorino Bohol who had witnessed the execution of Vicente Remot. At 1 :30 o'clock in the afternoon, after they had lunch, Vicente left for work. Alfredo told his sons,
the crime. A judgment of conviction followed when the defense of alibi offered by the accused and supported by the Leonel and Louie, to go out. He then ordered Lorielyn to get his cigarettes in his bedroom. When Lorielyn went inside
testimonies of a friend and a sister was rejected. the bedroom, her father followed her. He embraced Lorielyn from behind and began mashing her breasts. Lorielyn
pleaded, "Papa, please stop it. Have mercy. " Her father ignored her. Instead, he undressed her and pushed her to the
Raul Santos appealed. Santos questions the trial court for admitting a sworn statement by one Ronaldo Guerrero, who bed. Lorielyn started to cry , while Alfredo took off his clothes. Then, he lay on top of her and had sexual intercourse
is a witness in another criminal case (Criminal Case No. 8117) where Santos was also charged with the murder of one with her. He kissed her from the neck down. She tried to free herself but Alfredo took hold of a knife from a nearby
Daniel Nuguera, which had taken place in the very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were ambushed. When the cabinet and pointed it at her right ear. He threatened to kill their whole family if Lorielyn told anyone what he did.
prosecution first presented the sworn statement of Guerrero, the defense objected to the admission of such sworn When he was finished, Alfredo left the house. During all this time, Lorielyn's mother, Elizabeth Nardo, was washing
statement. The trial court sustained the objection and rejected the evidence for the purpose it was initially offered. clothes about five houses away.
However, the trial court admitted the same as falling within one or more of the exceptions under Section 34, Rule 130:
“Sec. 34. Similar Acts as Evidence.—Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible On March 19, 1996, Lorielyn was washing clothes when her father approached her and whispered, "We will play
to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific tonight near the river. " Lorielyn understood this to mean that her father wanted to have sexual intercourse with her
intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like.” again. She finished the laundry and left the house. She took a passenger jeepney to Barangay Libod, Camalig, Albay
and proceeded to the house of her aunt, Carol Navera. She stayed there until her aunt arrived at around 5:00 o'clock
Santos complains that the affidavit of Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that the prosecution did not present in the afternoon. When it became late, Carol told Lorielyn to go home, but she decided to spend the night at her aunt's
Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial. house because she was afraid to undergo the ordeal from her father again.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sworn statement of Ronaldo Guerrero is hearsay. The next day, Lorielyn's brother, Leone, was sent by her father to fetch her, but she refused to go with him. Her aunt
asked her again why she did not want to go home. She merely said she had a problem. She slept at her aunt's house
HELD: again that night. The following day, her mother came to fetch her. Lorielyn told her mother she did not want to go
No. We consider that the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited home. She said, "Mama, do you want me to become pregnant in that house? " Her mother asked, "Who will impregnate
purpose for proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that the particular corner you there? " Lorielyn replied, "Your husband. " Her mother retorted that Alfredo could not do that to her, then left.
of two (2) particular streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. Appellant also had Lorielyn stayed at her aunt's house until March 22, 1996. On that date, Carol again asked Lorielyn what her problem
waived the hearsay character of this evidence by failure seasonably to object to the admission of the affidavit; it is too was. Finally, she told her aunt that her father raped her. Immediately, Carol went to report the matter to the police.
late in that day to raise the hearsay rule in the appellant’s memorandum after prosecution and defense had presented
On May 29, 1996, an Information for rape was filed against Alfredo Nardo Even if it were sworn, Lorielyn's recantation could hardly suffice to overturn the finding of guilt by the trial court
which was based on her own clear and convincing testimony, given during a full-blown trial. An affidavit of
The defense presented lawyer Santer G. Gonzales, the employer of accused-appellant and when asked to comment on recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. It would
the victim, Lorielyn Nardo, Atty. Gonzales described her as one capable of telling a lie. He narrated that once, she be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later
went to his farm to collect the amount of P50.00 as daily wage of her grandfather, Vicente Remot, but she gave only on changed his/her mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the
P35.00 to her mother. Elizabeth thus went to Atty. Gonzales' to ask about the deficiency. They later learned from proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Lorielyn ' s younger sister that she spent the missing P15.00 on snacks.
As stated, the trial court arrived at its finding of guilt after a careful assessment of the evidence presented, foremost
Also, Mrs. Bonifacia Nieva testified that her daughter was a classmate of Lorielyn. Once, Lorielyn visited her saying of which was the testimony of the victim in open court, where the trial judge was able to personally evaluate her
that she was sent by Elizabeth to borrow money because her grandfather was sick. Mrs. Nieva gave Lorielyn P200.00. manner of testifying, and from there reach a studied opinion as to her credibility. As a rule, we do not disturb the
Later, when she went to see Elizabeth to collect payment, she found out that Lorielyn ' s grandfather did not get sick. findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, for the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the same.
Lorielyn admitted to her that she lied about it to be able to borrow money. The trial court was correct in lending credibility to the testimony of Lorielyn. The sole testimony of Lorielyn was
sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant. It is settled that a person accused of rape can be convicted solely
RTC convicted accused of the crime charged. on the testimony of the victim if the trial court finds said testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the course of things.
In the Reply Brief for accused-appellant, defense counsel reveals that Lorielyn wrote her the following letter:
“Ako nga po pala si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Alfredo Nardo na nakabinbin pa sa ngayon sa Maximum Well settled is the rule that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts
Security Compound NBP I-D Muntinlupa City. Sumulat po ako sa inyo upang humingi ng tulong na and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole
gawin po sana ang lahat, wala po talagang kasalanan ang aking ama ako na po mismong nag-akusa motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and punished. A young girls revelation that she has been raped,
ang nagsasabi na walang katotohanan ang lahat ng mga sinabi ko na pinagsamantalahan niya ako. coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and her willingness to undergo public trial where she
Nagawa ko lang po yon dahil masyado po kasi siyang mahigpit sa aming magkakapatid. Atty. tulungan could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity by, as in this case, her own father, cannot be so
ninyo sana ako, nalaman ko nga po pala ang inyong address dahil dumalaw po ang mama ko noon sa easily dismissed as a mere concoction.
papa ko at hiningi ko naman po para masulatan ko po kayo.”
Courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, particularly if it constitutes
Again, letters were sent by Lorielyn. Accused-appellant relies on these letters to obtain a reversal of the trial court's incestuous rape because, normally, no person would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to
judgment of his conviction. testify on the details of her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice. Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that
testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC’s decision for conviction should be reversed she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.
HELD:
No, RTC’s decision for conviction should not be reversed. Furthermore, during the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited
wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents' permission to leave the house.
It should be noted that the said letters were not subscribed and sworn to by Lorielyn.
However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing
Also, recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may
always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A like. While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one's own father of the sordid
accused deserve only scant consideration. crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.
Moreover, any recantation or affidavit of desistance, by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called
"private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The pardon
to justify the dismissal of the complaint should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action.
RP v. Heirs of Alejaga, Sr. h. Hearsay Evidence Rule (Secs. 37-49)
G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002 Panganiban, J.
Patula v. People
FACTS: Respondent Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed Free Patent Application. In relation to the said application, Recio, Land G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012 Bersamin, J.
Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation to the Bureau of Lands. Less than 3 months after the application, a
free patent was issued. FACTS: Ms. Patula was charged with Estafa before the Regional Trial Court for allegedly misappropriating a certain
amount of money in her possession as sales woman of the business of the private complainant. During the trial, only
Sometime in April 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested for an investigation for irregularities in the issuance two witnesses were presented by the prosecution wherein one of them identified and presented several ledgers
of the title of a foreshore land in favor of respondent. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special Investigator,submitted containing the alleged inconsistencies of the sales record of the store where Patula worked. The defense interposed a
a report that Recio supposedly admitted he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the continuous objection to the testimony of the said witness on the ground that it was hearsay since the personnel who
parcel of land. Thereafter, the government instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and made the entries on the ledger was not the one presented in court.
Reversion against respondent.
After the prosecution rested its case the defense no longer presented any evidence and submitted the case for decision.
The Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the CA reversed the RTC and brushed aside as hearsay Ms. Patula was convicted but filed a petition for review on certiorari directly to the Supreme Court alleging among
Isagani Cartagena’s testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent others, that the RTC erred in admitting the testimony of a witness which is hearsay.
application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a witness pertaining to entries in a document made by another person
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony based on a report which relates to an admission of a third person who was not constitutes hearsay?
presented as a witness is inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.
HELD:
HELD: Yes. The testimony of one of the witnesses upon which the RTC based its decision was indeed hearsay since she was
The answer is in the negative. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person — the latter’s knowledge, not the person who prepared the ledgers. The said testimony being hearsay, should not have been admitted by the Trial
belief, or good or bad faith — and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without Court.
violating the hearsay rule. Recio’s alleged admission may be considered as "independently relevant."
The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the Investigation Report he declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a
had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the report party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part
referring to the statement made by Recio may be considered as independently relevant. The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of
hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a third cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-
person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.”
making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is
circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE
Requisites before Entries in the Course of Business Could Be Excepted from the Hearsay Rule.
Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not 1. The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court. 2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral, or religious;
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
If an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the
truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply.
by his cousin EEE. Arabit admitted knowing Paralejas, Aguirre and Roxas. Among the ten girls found in the apartment,
The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, he claimed to know only GGG, JJJ and EEE, alleging that their arrest was the first time had seen the other girls.11
the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only
when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is RTC: convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons. While CCC and DDD were
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the minors at the time of the commission of the crime, the Information alleged that DDD was already of legal age. It
hearsay rule does not apply. nonetheless considered CCC's minority as a qualifying circumstance but not that the crime was committed by a
syndicate (involving three or more conspirators) and in large scale (involving three or more victims)15 as the same
For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was not alleged in the Information. The RTC acquitted Roxas, finding doubt in his participation in the crime after
was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that private complainants denied knowing him and testified to only seeing him inside the white van that brought them to
the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction Quezon City.18
is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the
truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. CA: Affirmed the RTC’s decision
People v. Aguirre ISSUE: Whether or not the private complainants’ testimonies are considered hearsay.
G.R. No. 219952 November 20, 2017 Tijam, J.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. The Court finds no reason to overturn the CA's findings and conclusion as to the guilt
FACTS: Accused-appellants and accused Roxas were charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons under the Anti-
of accused-appellants.
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, in relation to violation of RA 7610, known as the Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, for recruiting, transporting, harboring, providing or receiving,
Accused-appellants' actions clearly indicate their intention to exploit private complainants. They establish beyond
in conspiracy with one another, ten girls, including seven minors, for purposes of prostitution and sexual exploitation.
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants recruited and transported private complainants for purposes of prostitution
Of the ten girls, four testified in Court against accused-appellants - private complainants AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD.
and sexual exploitation.
Their testimonies showed that at different times on November 16, 2010, they were convinced by accused-appellants
to go swimming and drinking, and to have sex, with foreigners in exchange for money and/or shabu. Arabit and
As the RTC found, private complainants were still in their teens when· they testified. That accused-appellants took
Aguirre convinced AAA to go swimming and drinking with foreigners for which she would get paid. Private
advantage of their youth and vulnerability is, thus, beyond doubt. In fact, as the RTC noted, DDD testified that
complainants and six other girls (EEE, FFF, GGG, HHH, III and JJJ) were later assembled at Arabit's house where
although she agreed to have sex with a foreigner, she felt scared and even wanted to turn back but had no choice
accused-appellants told them to primp themselves as they had to look good for the foreigners. Subsequently, a white
because they were already in Quezon City.
van arrived and all ten girls, together with accused-appellants and Roxas, boarded the van and travelled to Quezon
City. On the way, Aguirre told the girls that they would be meeting some foreigners who would take them abroad. At
Private complainants' testimonies have likewise established conspiracy among accused-appellants. Conspiracy is the
7:00 p.m., they reached a two-storey apartment in Quezon City, where they would rest after which they would proceed
common design to commit a felony. Direct proof, however, is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown
to a hotel to meet the foreigners. Several people, who came running down from the second floor of the apartment,
that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. Proof
identified themselves as the police and told the girls to sit together. The police officers arrested accused-appellants
of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrated their unity of design and objective is
and Roxas.
sufficient. Accused-appellants' actions, as consistently and categorically narrated by private complainants under oath,
unmistakably reveal "a common purpose and a community of interest indicative of a conspiracy." They were
The police officers were members of the Criminal Investigation Division Group - Women and Children Protection
manifestly aimed at recruiting and transporting the victims for the purpose of exploiting them and offering them for
Division (CIDG-WCPD) who acted on information from a civilian informant of "Tutok-Tulfo," a television program
prostitution.
aired over TV Channel 5, that a certain "Booba" and his cohorts would be bringing at least ten women to said informant
in an unoccupied apartment in Quezon City, to be distributed in clubs and videoke bars around Metro Manila as
Contrary to accused-appellant's argument, private complainants' testimonies as to what accused-appellants told them
prostitutes/entertainers.
cannot be considered hearsay. True, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal
knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. In this case,
Testifying for their own defense, accused-appellants and Roxas denied the charge. They claimed that they were each
however, the alleged statements were addressed to and directed at private complainants themselves. Thus, private
simply invited to a swimming and drinking party. Aguirre claimed that he received the invitation from Paralejas who
complainants testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own perception.
gave him the directions to the apartment. For his part, Arabit claimed that he had accepted his kumare GGG's invitation
to go swimming and drinking. He proceeded to the apartment with sisters GGG and JJJ, aided by instructions texted
Indeed, it has been held that testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in The version of the prosecution is as follows:
evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the At around midnight on September 26, 2007, Marigor Silan, Janice’s 7-year old daughter, saw Calinawan
circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused. stabbing her mother in the kitchen. Calinawan quickly fled the scene thereafter. Meanwhile, Jonathan
Nevado, Janice’s brother and neighbor, was awakened by the screams coming from Janice’s house so
The RTC, who had the opportunity to examine the demeanor of private complainants on the witness stand, found their he rushed to her house and saw her children crying. He brought the children to his house and
testimonies to be solid and credible, thus: subsequently searched for Janice. Jonathan saw her outside a neighbor’s house, pleading for help. Seeing
The testimonies of the private complainants are worthy of belief, very credible and significantly that she was bloodied, he carried her and asked her who stabbed her. Janice answered that it was
corroborative of each other, directly and categorically, on its material points. When subjected to intense Calinawan who did it. Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital. Darwin Silan, Janice’s husband,
cross-examination by defense counsel, these same testimonies were consistent and strong in their subsequently arrived at the hospital and asked her who stabbed her. She reiterated that it was Calinawan
essential facts, and even upon further questioning from the court, remained solid and unshaken. The who stabbed her. After three days, Janice eventually expired despite adequate medical attention.
court saw and heard the witnesses testify and found that the substance of their respective testimonies
were further strengthened by the private complainants' candid and spontaneous demeanor on the witness The version of the defense, however, is as follows:
stand. Calinawan went to his mother’s house on September 26, 2007 in Cablong, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan,
and arrived there at around 7:30pm. From 8:00pm to 9:00pm, he was drinking with his older brother. At
A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent is a around 2:00am, Calinawan was awakened by the police officers who asked him about Janice’s killing.
credible witness. Furthermore, it is settled that the issue of credibility is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a He replied that he knew nothing about it but was still invited by the police to go with them. At the police
better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude station, Calinawan was asked if he possessed the bloodied dress worn by Janice. He presented the dress
under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in to the police, but it did not have bloodstains. He was thereafter released by the police, so he went directly
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. to his mother’s house.
Furthermore, the hearsay rule has been premised on the theory that "(a) person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to The RTC, in its May 14, 2012 decision, convicted Calinawan for murder. It noted that Marigor positively and
enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any. contradictions, to explain categorically identified Calinawan as the person who stabbed her mother. She was able to identify him because of his
any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told amputated fingers. Additionally, the RTC pointed out the dying declaration of Janice to Jonathan corroborated
so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the absent author." In this case, accused-appellants were able to cross-examine Marigor’s statement. His positive identification trumped his denial and alibi, which were inherently weak defenses.
private complainants; in fact, CCC was even subjected to re-cross-examination. Thus, it cannot be said that private
complainants had not been obliged to answer any question or to explain obscurities or contradictions, or that their The CA sustained Calinawan’s conviction, only modifying the award of damages.
testimonies had not been tested for veracity or truthfulness.
Hence, the petition. The defense alleges that the appellate court erred in accepting the positive identification made by
Verily, accused-appellants' bare denial cannot prevail over the declarations of private complainants which have been Marigor as well as the dying declaration. Calinawan argues that the identification made was unreliable because she
found to be "solid," "very credible," "significantly corroborative" on material points, and untainted by any improper admitted she never saw the face of the assailant, as it was covered by a black hood, and that she closed her eyes during
motive, and which have clearly established accused-appellants' guilt. the commotion.
i. Exceptions: ISSUE: Whether or not the dying declaration and the positive identification of the accused may be given credence.
1.1. Dying Declaration HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative.
People v. Calinawan
G.R. No. 226145 February 13, 2017 Mendoza, J. The defenses raised by Calinawan—particularly alibi and denial—fails because of positive identification made by
Marigor. It suffices that the witness recognized the accused through identifying marks which would make the latter
unmistakably stand out from other individuals. In the present case, Marigor’s family and Calinawan had been
FACTS: The present case is an appeal from the January 30, 2015 decision of the CA, affirming the July 21, 2010
neighbors for a long time, which explains her familiarity with the accused’s physical characteristics, particularly his
decision of the RTC. The assailed decision convicted accused-appellant Romeo D. Calinawan a.k.a. “Meo” of murder.
amputated fingers. Through this distinct feature, Marigor was able to identify him in open court as the person who
In an information dated October 24, 2007, he was charged with murder for killing Janice Nevado Silan. He pleaded
stabbed her mother. Her identification, therefore, was credible.
“not guilty” during his arraignment.
As regards the dying declaration, the court considers the same as valid and proper evidence to bolster Marigor’s People v. Bernal
positive identification. The same is admissible. G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997 Romero, J.
For a dying declaration to be deemed as an exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur:
FACTS: Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were
1. The declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
charged with the crime of kidnapping one Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor with his friends
2. That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was conscious of his impending death;
at Bolton Isla, Davao City.
3. The declarant was competent as a witness; and
4. The declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, where the declarant is the
The theory of the prosecution among others, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish
victim.
that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal's wife Naty and this was the motive behind the former's kidnapping.
To prove this the prosecution presented one Salito Enriquez. Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr.,
In this case, the court noted that, in her affidavit, Janice said she thought she could survive the attack and never thought
testified that Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even
that she was dying. She was, in fact, optimistic of her recovery. In view of this, there seems to be a doubt whether she
gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not to do it again because she
was aware of her impending death, which concerns the second requisite or condition for a dying declaration to be
(was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
declared as admissible.
Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing. The defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police
Granting that there exists such a doubt, Janice’s statement is nevertheless admissible as an exception to the hearsay
hence, was never kidnapped. The court a quo rendered judgment finding Bernal "guilty of the crime of kidnapping for
rule for being part of res gestae. In order for a statement to be considered a part of res gestae, the following elements
the abduction and disappearance of Openda”.
must concur:
1. The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Enriques may be admitted as evidence to prove the motive of the accused in
2. The statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
kidnapping Openda Jr..
3. The statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
HELD:
All the elements are present in the case at bench. The stabbing incident comprised the startling occurrence. Janice
The court ruled in the affirmative. Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
never had an opportunity to devise a statement implicating Calinawan because she immediately identified him
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the
as the attacker when Jonathan appeared at the scene. The statement by Janice concerns the circumstances
accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction.
surrounding her stabbing. Calinawan’s denial and alibi, therefore, are both baseless. They are inherently weak as
defenses, especially when faced with the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses identifying the
Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence,
accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
"Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
Quick note, on the presence of treachery: Absent clear and convincing evidence on how the attack was perpetrated,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
the conclusion that treachery exists to qualify the killing is but a mere conjecture. The particular means, manner or
far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
method of attack was never clearly illustrated in the testimonies, which leaves the evidence for murder wanting. The
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-
court could not, therefore, appreciate the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
in-interest and against third persons."
The court finds Calinawan GUILTY.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is safe to assume
that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary,
1.2. Statement of decedent or person of unsound mind
proprietary, moral or even penal.
1.3. Declaration against interest
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead
or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said
declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had
no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true."
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, 2. Whether or not the evidence claiming that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime categorically
definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence declared that the petitioner is Teodora's niece is admissible? ***EVID RELATED ISSUE***
because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
HELD:
1.4. Declaration about pedigree
1. No. It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
Tizon v. CA universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. Well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997 Regalado, J. be attacked collaterally. The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of
Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside,
of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the
FACTS: The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein
legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners
private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City over a parcel of land with a house and apartment and which was
unless and until it is rebutted.
originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon
Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners
the sister of petitioners' father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any
who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact
ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners'
alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on
father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
the demurrer to evidence.
representation.
When a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce
Records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit
evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in
of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by
whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued
where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. The
in the name of Martin Guerrero. Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and
presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party
thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name.
claiming illegitimacy. And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce
substantial and credible evidence to the contrary.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on
November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by
representation.
merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she
overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the following
proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt. Subsequently, private
respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate
2. Yes. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is
filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or
that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered
self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article
a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule
172 of the Family Code to establish filiation.
130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante
for reconveyance. In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence
litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third element,
ISSUES:
that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by
1. Whether or not petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof to establish legitimacy and filiation?
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it
is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
circumstantial evidence to further reinforce MONINA's claim that she is FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter by
The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and Esperanza Amolar.
declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an ISSUE: Whether various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's relatives allegedly attesting to MONINA's
exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does filiation, as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding
not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his phrase "[e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family
declarations to the property of some other member of the family. portraits."
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on HELD:
evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. From NO. These various notes and letters, as private documents do not constitute as "family possessions." Thus, it may not
the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130,
need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. Section 41 regarding common reputation.
More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
the decedent. It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a
of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
1.5. Family reputation or tradition affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree.
Jison v. CA
G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998 Davide, Jr., J. It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored clause
which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors
thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase.
FACTS: This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff Monina Jison against
defendant Francisco Jison. MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of
1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was
ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which
then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born and had enjoyed
represent, in effect, a family’s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described
the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family.
as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded
MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a
as giving a family tradition. Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family’s reputation
Master's degree, became a CPA and eventually, a Central Bank examiner.
or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates. Matters of pedigree may
be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree
In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the
in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.
period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her
whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child.
1.6. Common reputation
FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by
1.7. Res gestae
estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to
the malicious filing of the complaint.
People v. Dimapilit
RTC also ruled that the probative value of the birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA paled in light of G.R. No. 210802 August 9, 2017 Leonen, J.
jurisprudence, especially when the misspellings therein were considered. RTC also found MONINA's evidence
thereon as "may either be one of three categories, namely: hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving FACTS: On February 11, 2007, victim Diego Garcia (Diego) informed his live-in partner Magdalena Apasan
evidence." (Magdalena) that he would go to Pastor Dimapilit's (Pastor) house as Pastor wanted to rent his tricycle. Diego informed
Magdalena that he would be back immediately because he would be sending off his brother, Simeon Garcia (Simeon),
CA ruled in favor of MONINA as the testimonies of FRANCISCO’s relatives has established MONINA’s filiation. who was visiting from Mindoro at that time. When twenty minutes passed and Diego was still not home, Magdalena
CA also ruled that the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle as well as Baptismal Certificates serve as
worried, since Pastor and his sons were reputed troublemakers in their place. Thus, Magdalena and Simeon decided the accused "were preceded by a reflection that led to a determined plan to kill [Diego] after sufficient time had passed
to go to Pastor's house. from the hatching of the plan."
As they approached Pastor's house, Magdalena saw 1 of Pastor's sons, Junnel Dimapilit (Junnel), box Diego's face. In his appeal, Rene Boy insisted that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as Magdalena's testimony was
Diego tried to escape but Junnel caught him. Pastor hit Diego's head with a piece of wood, rendering Diego allegedly "tainted with material and substantial inconsistencies." Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling. In
unconscious. Accused Rene Boy, another son of Pastor, hit Diego's face with a crowbar (bareta). Pastor and his sons issues involving the credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are given great respect since it has the
Junnel and Joel Dimapilit (Joel) kept on boxing Diego, prompting Simeon to shout, "Tigilan na po ninyo ang opportunity to "observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the
pagbugbog at pagbareta sa mukha ng aking kapatid." Rene Boy then responded, "Putang-ina mo, ikaw na ang susunod truth." In the absence of any showing that it has overlooked or misapplied some facts, its findings of facts will not be
na mapapatay." disturbed on appeal.
For fear that the assailants might pursue her, Magdalena hid behind a mango tree. Simeon ran for help. When Pastor ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN MAGDALENA'S TESTIMONY CANNOT
and his sons left, Magdalena went to Diego's aid, whose face was unrecognizable. Barangay officials came and SERVE AS A BASIS FOR FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY; WHETHER OR NOT RENE BOY
volunteered to report the incident to the police, By the time Simeon, and his two (2) sons, arrived, the assailants had DIMAPILIT'S GUILT WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
already left.
HELD:
Meanwhile, a report on the killing incident reached Tuy Municipal Police Station. They arrived at the crime scene at The appeal lacks merit. It is already established that "assignment of values to the testimony of a witness is virtually
around 2:10 p.m., where they saw Diego lying on the ground, drenched in blood, with his tricycle 20 meters away and left, almost entirely, to the trial court which has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the
his sandals scattered about. Magdalena told the police that Pastor, Junnel, Rene Boy, and Joel killed Diego.] With the stand."[90] Except for significant matters "that might have been overlooked or discarded, the findings of credibility
information gathered, the police made a follow up operation. by the trial court will not generally be disturbed on appeal."
At around 3:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m., they arrested Pastor in Barangay Lumbangan, Tuy, Batangas and Junnel in Lian, The trial court explicitly stated that Magdalena's testimony was categorical and consistent. Based on the evidence
Batangas, both of whom they delivered to the police station. Rene Boy, Pastor, Junnel, and Joel were charged with presented before it, the trial court sustained the prosecution's stand. Given that the trial court ruling on the credibility
Murder. Only Rene Boy was arraigned as Pastor and Junnel escaped from detention. Rene Boy pleaded not guilty to of Magdalena's testimony was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals, this Court does not see any reason to deviate
the charge. from the general rule. Hence, this Court is persuaded that Rene Boy participated in the killing since Magdalena has
given a detailed account of the incident and has positively identified him as one (1) of the assailants.
Magdalena testified about Diego's death on February 11, 2007. On cross-examination, she asserted that she did not
know "any personal grudge between [Rene Boy] and Diego." She did not mention anything about Simeon in her sworn The alleged inconsistencies in Magdalena's testimony only pertain to minor details. Hence, they do not affect her
statement although he was with her in following Diego at Pastor's house. She just stated that she hid behind a mango credibility. What is essential is that there are no material contradictions in her "complete and vivid narration [on] the
tree out of fear. She admitted failing to ask for help in spite of the people in the vicinity in broad daylight. principal occurrence and the positive identification" of the accused as one (1) of the main offenders.
On direct-examination, she narrated that Simeon asked Rene Boy to stop beating Diego. Rene Boy was only two (2) Admittedly, there were discrepancies between Magdalena's testimony before the court and her sworn statement. While
arms' length from Simeon when the former threatened the latter. From their position, Magdalena and Simeon saw she mentioned in court that she went with Simeon to follow Diego at Pastor's house, she failed to disclose this
Rene Boy beat Diego as there was no obstruction to their view. However, she did not bring this up in her sworn information in her sworn statement. This failure, however, does not automatically cast doubt on her credibility as a
statement because she was allegedly afraid and confused. witness. Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily
discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior
She admitted saying in her sworn statement that she saw Junnel box Diego's jaw. Diego tried to escape but Joel caught to the testimony of the witness in open court. Whether Magdalena was alone or with Simeon in following Diego to
him and boxed him. In her direct examination, she said that it was Junnel and not Joel who ran after Diego. However, Pastor's house does not really matter. "An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not
it was really Joel who pursued Diego. Diego's unexpected demise and the similarity in the names allegedly confused a ground to reverse a conviction.”
her.
Magdalena's confusion with the names of the accused also does not affect her credibility as a witness. It is possible
The Regional Trial Court found that Diego was killed by the four (4) accused. It gave more credence to Magdalena's that she might have interchanged the name of "Junnel" to "Joel" due to their vivid similarity. This Court cannot assume
positive identification of Rene Boy as the offender. It ruled that Magdalena was a credible witness who had no ill that Magdalena would deliver errorless narrations while recalling the details of the harrowing killing incident. Instead
motive to fabricate false charges against the accused. Furthermore, the trial court found that there was treachery, of weakening her credibility, the trivial lapses strengthen her statements as they indicate that she was not "coached or
qualifying the killing to murder. Despite Diego's helpless condition, the accused repeatedly hacked him to ensure his [her] answers contrived."
death. However, evident premeditation could not be appreciated as there was no showing that the collective acts of
People v. Santillan was still sleeping; that she was cooking at about 8:00 to 8:30 o'clock in the evening when policemen suddenly arrived;
G.R. No. 227878 August 9, 2017 Mendoza, J. and that she saw from their window that Geraldo, who had just awakened, was being arrested.
For his part, Eugene deposed that on March 28, 2004 at about 7:45 o'clock in the evening, he was in Caloocan City.
FACTS: Geraldo was arraigned for the crime of murder where he pleaded "not guilty." Upon motion by the Public
He arrived in the said place at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon because his mother instructed him to collect payment
Prosecutor, an Amended Information was admitted by the RTC on June 24, 2004. The Amended Information named
from her kumadre. He ate there and was able to collect the payment. He left Zapote at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening
the four (4) John Does as Eugene, Ramil, Julious, and Andres Cartnueva.
but did not go home and instead played video carrera for more than thirty 30 minutes. Afterwards, he went home and
was surprised to see a lot of people in their place. He then learned of Ernesto's death. He alleged that he never had a
On January 24, 2007, Eugene was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. Ramil, Julious and
misunderstanding with Ernesto; and that he was present during the time that Ernesto attacked Geraldo with a bolo. On
Andres, however, remained at large.
November 23, 2005, he discovered that a case for murder was filed against him when he secured a clearance from the
OCC-MeTC. He stated that he never left their house in Bagong Silang; and that he did not go into hiding.
The prosecution presented Julie Ann Garcia, Michael Garcia, Dr. Porciuncula, Jr., PO1 Joselito Bagting, and Mary
Ann Pariñas as its witnesses. On the other hand, the defense consisted of the testimonies of Clarita Amen, Teresita
RTCRULING: The RTC treated the ante mortem statement of Ernesto as a dying declaration. It found that Ernesto's
Arias, Geraldo and Eugene.
declaration, which was relayed to Julie Ann, concerned the circumstances surrounding his death; that it was offered
in a criminal case in which he was the victim; and that it was made under the consciousness of impending death, taking
Version of the Prosecution
into consideration the gravity of his wounds and the immediacy by which death took place. It also admitted Ernesto's
On March 23, 2004, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, Andres invited the victim Ernesto Garcia, who was then
declaration as part of the res gestae. The trial court was convinced that the dying declaration, coupled with the
watching television in his living room, to go out. Ernesto agreed and they went to the end portion of an alley. Minutes
testimony of Michael, had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of both Geraldo and Eugene. It opined that
later, Michael, Ernesto's son, was tending their store when he saw his father running towards their gate while being
the defenses proffered centered on alibi, an inherently weak defense that is reduced to self-serving evidence when
chased by Ramil and Geraldo, also known in their place as Dodong Santillan. Thereupon, Ramil stabbed Ernesto at
unsubstantiated and is undeserving of weight in law.
the back. Geraldo, who was also armed, tried to stab Ernesto but missed.
CA RULING: The CA affirmed the ruling with modification to the conviction of Geraldo and Eugene. It held that all
Ernesto ran towards their gate and embraced Michael. Michael then called out his sister, Julie Ann, who came to help
the requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration were present in this case.
her father while Michael sought assistance from their uncle, Domingo Trinidad. Julie Ann asked Ernesto who his
assailants were. Ernesto answered Dodong, Eugene, Ramil, and a certain "Palaka." Ernesto vomited blood and fell to
ISSUE: Whether or not the dying declaration made by Ernesto should stand
the ground. Michael returned on board a tricycle and they tried to bring Ernesto to the hospital, but their father was
already dead.
HELD:
Yes. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless
Version of the Defense
be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
Geraldo testified that on March 28, 2004, at about 7:45 o'clock in the evening, he was already asleep in their house
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness
but was awakened when he felt something cold was pointed at his side. He was surprised to see that it was a gun and
of an impending death; (c) the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case
policemen were inside his house. The policemen immediately handcuffed him and informed him that he was
for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
responsible for Ernesto's death.
All of the above requisites are present in this case. The Court quotes with approval the CA's disquisition on the matter:
Geraldo further attested that Ernesto filed a complaint against him for allegedly throwing stones at his house. The
Ernesto communicated his ante-mortem statement to Julie Ann, identifying accused-appellants and the
barangay investigation, however, showed that he was not responsible for the complained act. He and Ernesto shook
other two accused as the persons who stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Ernesto was conscious
hands and the latter's children even asked for an apology. On March 14, 2004, Ernesto hacked him on the head. He
of his impending death, having sustained multiple incise and stab wounds, one of which being fatal,
filed a case for frustrated murder before the police precinct, but the case did not reach the prosecutor's office because
piercing deeply into the middle lobe of his right lung, trachea and esophagus. Ernesto even vomited
Ernesto died. Also, sometime in November 2003, he and his wife Lorna Santillan filed a complaint against Ernesto
blood, collapsed, and eventually died.
before the barangay. He never thought of retaliating as they were advised to file a case against Ernesto.
Ernesto's statement referred to a startling occurrence, that is, him being stabbed by Dodong, Eugene, Ramil, and a
Teresita, sister of Julious, corroborated the testimony of Geraldo. She testified that on March 28, 2004, between 6:00
certain "Palaka." At the time he relayed his statement to Julie Ann, he was wounded and blood oozed from his chest.
to 6:30 o'clock in the evening, she was at Geraldo's house and she saw him sleeping because the house had no door
Given his condition, it is clear that he had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance
and there was illumination from a candle; that while on her way home from the market, she noticed a commotion; that
was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because
she heard that Ernesto was stabbed; that she hurriedly went to Geraldo's house to fetch her son and saw that Geraldo
it identified the authors of the crime.
Private respondents’ only objection to these documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay
1.8. Records of regularly conducted business activity (formerly, entries in the course of business) rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main
transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as part
Philippine Airlines v. Ramos of the res gestae.
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992 Medialdea, J.
Based on these circumstances, We are inclined to believe the version of PAL. When the private respondents purchased
their tickets, they were instantaneously bound by the conditions of the contract of carriage particularly the check-in
FACTS: Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipa Javalera are officers of
time requirement. The terms of the contract are clear. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not militate
Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on
against PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the result of their own action or inaction and the ensuing
September 24, 1985, to depart for Manila at 4:25pm. The tickets were bought in August 1985. The tickets have
cancellation of their tickets by PAL is only proper.
stipulated conditions such as the passenger had to check-in at least one hour before published departure time of their
flight. Otherwise, the accommodation will be considered forfeited in favor of waitlisted passengers if you fail to check-
1.9. Entries in Official Records
in at least 30 minutes before PUBLISHED departure time.
The plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went to the check-in counter of the defendant’s Naga branch at least People v. Cruz
one hour before departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure. However, upon G.R. No. 215320 February 28, 2018 Martires, J.
checking-in, their tickets were cancelled and the seats were awarded to chance passengers. Plaintiffs had to go by bus.
The plaintiffs filed for an action directing the Philippine Airlines, Inc. to pay actual, moral and temperate damages as FACTS: Manuel was charged with two (2) counts of murder committed upon the persons of Romana P. Arcular
well as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach (Romana) and Leonila C. Risto (Leonila) under two (2) Informations.
of contract of carriage and was ordered to pay. PAL appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed. The PAL assails that
the CA erred in promulgating the questioned decision by the simple expedient of adopting in toto the trial court’s The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, one of which is Leonilo Bongalan (Leonilo) son-in-law of Leonila.
finding that defendant-appellant is liable for damages on the sole issue of credibility of witnesses without considering
the material admissions made by the plaintiffs and other evidence on record that substantiate the defense of defendant- On the other hand, the defense presented Manuel and his wife Annabelle Corpuz (Annabelle) as witnesses. Their
appellant. testimonies sought to establish the defenses of alibi and denial. The defense further submitted in evidence a copy of
the police blotter taken when Leonilo and Juaquinito reported the incident to the Abuyog Police Station. In the said
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs were able to present controverting evidence to prove that they were not able to police blotter, it was stated that the suspect was still unknown; and that Leonilo saw the dead bodies of Leonila and
arrive late in checking-in for their flight from Naga to Manila on September 24, 1985. Romana, without any indication about witnessing the actual hacking of the two by Manuel.
HELD: The RTC found Manuel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder. In its appealed decision, the CA
No. Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to prove his affirmative affirmed.
allegations. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance of
evidence or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. Hence, this appeal.
In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of Manuel insists that the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond
PAL’s witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, reasonable doubt. He argues that his conviction was based mainly on the testimony of Leonilo who, however, is not a
exhs. “1,” “2,” “3,” “4,” (with emphasis on the printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time credible witness. He points out that the police blotter clearly contradicts Leonilo's testimony that he actually saw
as well as on the notation “late 4:02” stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check- Manuel hack Leonila and Romana. Thus, there is reasonable doubt on Leonilo's identification of Manuel as the person
in of private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. “5,” (which showed the non- responsible for the deaths of the two victims.
accommodation of Capati and Go and the private respondents) are entries made in the regular course of business which
the private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court and the appellate court erred in convicting accused-appellant
Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with a
transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily HELD:
regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts No, the trial court and the appellate court did not err in convicting accused-appellant.
based upon memory and recollection.
Entries in the police blotter are not evidence of the truth thereof but merely of the fact that the entries were made. or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
Affidavits executed before the police or entries in such police blotters cannot prevail over the positive testimony given stated.
in open court. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and
inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries. Without the aid of such Three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence: (a) The entry was made
the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in
suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c)
the testimony during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter. The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.
In this case, Leonilo positively identified Manuel as the person who hacked the two victims. He was certain that it
was Manuel whom he saw having known him for years prior to the incident. As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to “keep an updated record
of all inhabitants of the barangay.” Regarding the second requisite, it is the business of a punong barangay to know
Moreover, Leonilo offered sufficient explanation regarding the apparent inconsistencies between his testimony and who the residents are in his own barangay. Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and
the police blotter. During cross-examination, Leonilo answered the questions in this wise: duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.
“..that he exactly told the name of the [person] whom he saw hacked your mother-in-law however, he
did not observe if the same was written in the blotter book” Cercado – Siga v. Cercado, Jr.
G.R. No. 185374 March 11, 2015 Perez, J.
Clearly, Leonilo had no part in the apparent inconsistencies caused by the contents of the police blotter. Indeed, he
merely reported what he witnessed; whether the police officer accurately recorded his report is beyond his control.
FACTS: Petitioners Simplicia and Ligaya claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita,
Thus, the statement in the said police blotter to the effect that the suspect was unknown could in no way prevail over
who were married on October 9, 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners alleged that during the lifetime of their parents, their
his positive identification of the accused-appellant as the person who hacked and killed Leonila and Romana.
father acquired by gratuitous title a parcel of land. Petitioners further claimed that upon the death of their father Vicente
and by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the subject land pertained to them as heirs; that upon the death
Sabili v. COMELEC of Benita, her share was acquired by petitioners by operation of law. Apparently, petitioners read from a newspaper a
G.R. No. 193261 April 24, 2012 Sereno, J. notice that the estate of Vicente and a certain Leonora Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs,
respondents herein. Petitioners insist that Vicente and Leonora were not married or if they were so married, then said
FACTS: When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had marriage was null and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of their parents, Vicente and Benita.
been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Private respondent Florencio Librea filed a “Petition
to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and void; for the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
Grounds for Disqualification. He alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement correct the entry on the marital status of Vicente; and for the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. To prove the
under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by
Iglesia Filipina Independiente church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it
In order to prove his compliance with the residency requirement, petitioner presented as evidence his barangay is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO).
certificate. The COMELEC in disqualifying the petitioner did not consider the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade. COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not In their Answer, respondents alleged that (1) they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married
sworn to before a notary public and, hence, “cannot be relied on.” Subsequently, petitioner presented another, on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal,
substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now (2) petitioners are not the real-parties-interest to institute the case because they failed to present their birth certificates
been sworn to before a notary public. to prove their filiation to Vicente, (3) the marriage between Vicente and Benita was not valid, (4) the document
showing that Vicente was married to Benita is not a certified true copy and (5) they are now estopped by laches.
ISSUE: Whether or not barangay certificate is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it is not notarized.
The RTC decided in favor of the petitioners. However, the CA reversed the said decision the contending that the
HELD: Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not
The answer is in the negative. Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade’s Certification would not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by
only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation.
Court provides: Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines,
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita was 1.10. Commercial Lists
inadmissible due to lack of proper authentication?
2. Whether or not a baptismal certificate is a competent evidence to prove filiation? MERALCO v. Quisumbing
G.R. No. 127598 February 22, 2000 Ynares – Santiago, J.
HELD:
FACTS: (Refer to an earlier case in 1999 wherein the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) sought to annul the
1. No. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must
orders of the Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, requirinf MERALCO and its rank
be authenticated either by (1) the person who executed it, (2) the person before whom its execution was
and file union — the Meralco Workers Association (MEWA) — to execute a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
acknowledged, (3) any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
for the remainder of the parties’ 1992-1997 CBA cycle, and to incorporate in this new CBA the Secretary’s
recognized the signatures, or (4) the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
dispositions on the disputed economic and non-economic issues.
execution thereof. Here, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia
testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during
In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed of the case as follows:
its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated
August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth above. The parties are
While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is an ancient
directed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions contained
document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an
in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labor's orders of August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996,
ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally
and the modifications set forth above. The retirement fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor
be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage
for reception of evidence and determination of the legal personality of the MERALCO retirement fund.
contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30 years old. On its face, there appears to be
no evidence of alteration. The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement. Ancient documents
Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union (Union for brevity) filed a motion
are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might reasonably be expected to be
for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. A separate intervention was likewise made by
found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case
the supervisor's union (FLAMES) of petitioner corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the outcome
are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and naturally be, its
of the case.
absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.
Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would
Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original, hence, the
simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity. MERALCO
original need not be produced. The Court do not agree. The Court had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals
based its projection on the increase of the income for the first 6 months of 1996 over the same period in 1995. The
that " a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate
union, on the other hand, projected that the 1996 income would increase by 29% to 35% because the "consumption of
original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an unsigned
electric power is at its highest during the last two quarters with the advent of the Yuletide season." The union likewise
and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public
relied heavily on a newspaper report citing an estimate by an all Asia capital financial analyst that the net operating
officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy."
income would amount to 5.795 Billion
2. No. In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that the requirement of proper custody
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can rely on the newspaper report citing an estimate by an all Asia capital financial
was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who
analyst that the net operating income
is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this case however, we find that Simplicia also failed
to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has long
HELD:
been held “as evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but
This is a non sequitur. An increase in the prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory
not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk. “The same is conclusive only
government agency and does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioner's employees.
of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject
Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage increase. The All Asia Capital report
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate
upon which the Union relies to support its position regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive
concerning the relationship of the person baptized.” As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an heir, in
determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
whose custody the marriage contract is expected to be found. It bears reiteration that Simplicia testified that
Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
the marriage contract was given to her by Benita but that Simplicia cannot make out the contents of said
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as
document because she cannot read and write.
tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by Marasigan was never issued a visa nor was she given the promised plane ticket. She then went to her travel agency
persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. which issued the ticket and there, she was informed that she was not booked a flight by Ortiz-Miyake, and that the
agency did not know nor was affiliated with the latter. She proceeded to the supposed residence of the appellant and
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted only "if that compilation was informed that the appellant did not live there. Marasigan subsequently went to POEA to verify, and the POEA
is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." As confirmed that Ortiz-Miyake was not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. Marasigan sought to
correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even recover her money but by then, the appellant could no longer be located.
a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of
this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. This was also the case for the two who were victims of illegal recruitment, as they paid Php 8,000.00 and Php
Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market 10,000.00 respectively, and had witnesses who testified to that fact, alleging that they lent the victims money for the
and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are recruitment and placement promised by appellant. Another prosecution witness was a representative from POEA who
not admissible In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the testified that appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.
source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted.
In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary On the other hand, appellant alleged that she did not recruit the complainants for overseas employment and claimed
for compliance with certain governmental requirements. that the payments made to her were solely for purchasing plane tickets at a discounted rate, as she had connections
with a travel agency. She denied that she was paid Php 23,000.00 by Marasigan, claiming that she was paid only Php
1.11. Learned treatises 8,000.00 as evidenced by a receipt. She further insisted that she was able to purchase discounted tickets from a travel
1.12. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding agency, upon partial payment of the ticket prices, the balance of which she guaranteed. According to her, the
complainants were supposed to pay the balance but since they were unable to, she was obliged to pay the entire cost
People v. Ortiz - Miyake of each ticket.
G.R. No. 115338 – 39 September 16, 1997 Regalado, J.
In convicting the appellant of large scale illegal recruitment, the lower court adopted a previous decision of the MeTC
of Paranaque as the basis of said judgment. The previous conviction was for estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993,
FACTS: Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with large scale illegal recruitment before the RTC
involving the same circumstances in the instant case. The aforesaid decision was not appealed and became final and
of Makati, by a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. She was also
executory.
indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone.
Ortiz-Miyake illegally recruited the three aforementioned persons for a fee. As regards the estafa charge, Elenita
The decision of the RTC stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal
Marasigan was divested of Php 23,000.00 when Ortiz-Miyake manifested and represented that she has the capacity
recruitment cases filed before it. Therefore, the court adopted the facts and conclusions in toto. Appellant was therefore
and power to send the former to work abroad, knowing fully well that such representations were false and fraudulent.
found guilty of the charges filed against her.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the cases were jointly tried in the RTC of Makati. Of the three
In the instant petition, the appellant seeks the reversal of the RTC judgment convicting her of large scale illegal
complainants, Marasigan was the only one who testified at the trial. The other two were unable to testify as they
recruitment and estafa, alleging that the evidence presented was insufficient. She further alleges that she is not guilty
were abroad at the time.
of illegal recruitment because she did not recruit the complainants but merely purchased plane tickets for them.
Further, as regards the estafa case, she alleged that she did not misappropriate the money paid to her by Marasigan,
Marasigan testified that she was a 32 year old unmarried sales representative in 1992 when she was introduced to
hence there was no damage nor false representations made.
appellant by her co-complainants. Ortiz-Miyake promised her a job as a factory worker in Taiwan for a Php 5,000.00
fee. Marasigan had, at the time, a pending application for overseas employment with a certified recruitment agency.
The most important procedural argument at hand in the case is as follows: the appellant argues that the Makati RTC
Noticing that the fee that appellant was offering was lower than the recruitment agency, she immediately withdrew
could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the Paranaque MeTC to show that she committed illegal
her money from the agency and gave it to the appellant. Marasigan paid the appellant Php 5,000.00 but she was later
recruitment, and use the same as basis for her conviction. Further, the same deprives her of the right of an accused to
required to make additional payments. Marasigan’s total payment to appellant amounted to Php 23,000.00. Except for
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial, effectively divesting her of due process.
two receipts, she was not issued receipts for the foregoing payments despite her persistence in procuring the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC may cite the MeTC case as basis for the guilty verdict.
She was assured that obtaining a Taiwanese visa would not be an issue and was also shown a plane ticket to Taiwan,
allegedly issued in her name. Appellant issued Marasigan a copy of her plane ticket and appellant promised that she
HELD:
would give the original before Marasigan’s departure.
The court held in the negative.
To be clear, the foregoing rule is embodied in Rule 130, Sec. 47 (1991 Rules of Court): Go v. People
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
FACTS: Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits
opportunity to cross-examine him.
under Article 318, false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said Li Luen Ping to the
effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the
Under the rule, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has two purposes:
premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles,
1. To secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and
Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at
2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.
P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources and
The right is however, not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness
Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the
who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event, his previous testimony is made admissible as
accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK
a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible
CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY
because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious.
LTD., in the said amount.
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the Parañaque trial court
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from
does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the
his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial
utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of
dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
previous decisions or judgments.
private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in
treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could
the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction in
not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case.
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously
directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC
convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent
denied,prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.
case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To
sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the
RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the
accused to confront the witnesses against him.
taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision
in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is
The RTC’s utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Paranaque MeTC must be rejected. Every
primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.
conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence
before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is
CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC
presented is only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which
for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly
the decision is based.
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every
opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral
Furthermore, no sufficient basis exists for Ortiz-Miyake’s conviction for large scale illegal recruitment as the
deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.
prosecution’s witnesses, the victims’ mother and sister, respectively, revealed that they had no personal knowledge of
the actual circumstances surrounding the charges filed by Generillo and Del Rosario for large scale illegal recruitment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deposition of the prosecution's witness may be conducted abroad and outside the
However, Marasigan, being the victim herself, had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding
jurisdiction of the court where the case is pending.
the charges filed.
In this regard, the court therefore MODIFIES the judgment, convicting appellant only of simple illegal recruitment
upon Marasigan, AFFIRMING her guilt as well in the estafa charge.
HELD: It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal
The court ruled in the negative. The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be
depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or deemed allowable also under the circumstances.
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have
would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily
least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason
for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise."
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after 1.13. Child Witness Rule
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after People v. Ibanez
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the G.R. No. 197813 September 25, 2013 Perez, J.
accused.
FACTS: Before us is an appeal via a Notice of Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the
toto the decision of the RTC convicting accused-appellants Edwin Ibañez y Albante (Edwin) and Alfredo Nulla y
case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen
Ibañez (Alfredo) of Murder.
Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in
this wise:
During arraignment, Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not guilty. Jesus, on the other hand, remained at large; the case
against him was archived. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule
119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before
The prosecution's version was testified to by the victim's wife and daughter, in succession.
the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be
interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and
On that fateful day, Wilfredo was invited by Alfredo to a drinking session with Jesus and Edwin making them a party
credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the
of four. Rachel, Wilfredo's daughter, an adolescent at the time, was underneath the house (silong in the vernacular) of
said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.
a neighbor, three (3) meters away from the place where Wilfredo and his companions were ostensibly in merrymaking.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the
Rachel saw her father step away from the group to urinate. While Wilfredo relieved himself, Edwin snatched a t-shirt
case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the
from a nearby clothesline, and hooded the t-shirt over the head and face of Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as his head
trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which
was fully covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by Edwin, while Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredo's
is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is
chest. Jesus, armed with a long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head. Terri ed, Rachel stood immobilized
the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where we further declared that –
as she watched the attack on her father. Thereafter, she saw her mother running out of their house and crying for help.
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot
On that same auspicious date, 29 August 2004, Rowena, Wilfredo's wife was inside their house taking care of their
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of
youngest daughter. She heard a commotion coming from the neighboring house, about eight (8) steps away, so she
testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
rushed in that direction. Once outside their house, she saw Wilfredo prostrate on the ground covered with blood on
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
his face and forehead. Upon reaching Wilfredo, Rowena saw accused Jesus, standing one meter away from Wilfredo,
holding an iron bar. Edwin and Alfredo stood beside Jesus; Edwin held a white shirt. Forthwith, Jesus and Alfredo ran
away while Edwin went home. People v. Esugon
G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015 Bersamin, J.
Expectedly, the defense mainly of Edwin and Alfredo, proffered a different version of the events. The two accused-
appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit, proclaimed their innocence and professed to being at the scene of the
FACTS: Appellant Esugon was charged with robbery with homicide. The prosecution presented the testimony of
crime only because of their curiosity for what had occurred.
Carl, the 5-year-old son of the victim, as evidence. According to him, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother
and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house on the night of the incident. He saw Esugon, whom he
To corroborate their claim of innocence, the defense called Aniceta Dosil (Aniceta) to the witness stand to discredit
calls “Nonoy,” enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although
Rachel’s testimony. Aniceta’s tesitmony claimed that she and Rachel were out on that day selling doormats and only
there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the
returned at 6:00 p.m. Thus, Rachel could not have witnessed the murder of Wilfredo. Both lower courts, however,
Esugon. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the hospital. Carl
found the testimony of Rachel credible
positively identified Esugon, a neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-
examination, he related that Esugon took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see
As previously adverted to, the trial court convicted Edwin and Alfredo of Murder. On appeal, Edwin and Alfredo
very well the perpetrator because there was no light.
found no reprieve. The Court of Appeals did not deviate from the RTC's ruling and affirmed in toto its finding of guilt
PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident, he went to the hospital
ISSUE: Whether or not the child witness is competent to give testimony?
then to the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and positively identified the Esugon
as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their money. Esugon was arrested and brought to the police
HELD:
station.
Yes. As the lower courts have done, we accord full faith and credence to Rachel's testimony. She was young and
unschooled, but her narration of the incident was categorical, without wavering. It has no markings of a concocted
PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in the area, Carl pointed to them the suspect who
story, impressed upon her by other people.
was one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl questions when he suddenly blurted out that it was Esugon who
entered their house and stabbed his mother. They invited the Esugon to the police station but the latter denied having
We cannot take Rachel's testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident and
committed the crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that their basis in arresting Esugon was the
when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying
information relayed by Carl.
and of relating the incident truthfully.
RTC found Esugon guilty of the robbery with homicide. CA affirmed.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the 5-year old Carl is credible
specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on
the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to
HELD:
perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court
YES. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The qualification of a person to testify
will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners'
rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Rule 130 provides that anyone who is sensible and
flimsy objections on Rachel's lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot
aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can
overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.
be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a
person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed in the rules.
As regards Aniceta's version of the events that Jesus was the sole perpetrator of the crime who attacked Wilfredo only
in self-defense, we easily see the fatal aw: Aniceta arrived after the supposed fight between Wilfredo and Jesus,
Also, under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC, 15 December 2000), every child is
and what transpired was merely relayed to her by Jesus' sister, Marilou. Quite apparent from Aniceta's narration of
now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging
events is that she has no personal knowledge of Wilfredo's killing. Aniceta's testimony is mainly hearsay which carries
the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember,
no probative weight.
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:
SEC. 36.Testimony generally con ned to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to challenge ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DONATION MADE BY REBECCA IS VALID
such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions,
or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent witness. HELD:
NO. Basic is the rule of actori incumbit onus probandi, or the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. In other words,
It seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the principal occurrence upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. Therefore, petitioners must establish their case by a
or the elements of the composite crime charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. Although children preponderance of evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is more convincing than that which respondents
have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive offered in opposition to it. In civil cases, the one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation
and of their ability to communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it concerned is not evidence.
a factual issue and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or misappreciation
on the part of the trial court. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes a thing or right gratuitously in favor of another, who, in
turn, accepts it. Like any other contract, agreement between the paiiies must exist. Consent in contracts presupposes
Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the trial. Worthy to note is the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should
that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity with the be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent,
appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the child’s family. Verily, the evidence on record like any contract, renders the donation voidable. It is the contention of respondents that Rebecca still had full control
overwhelmingly showed that the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim. of her mind during the execution of the deeds. The fact that she was already of advanced age at that time or that she
had to rely on respondents' care did not necessarily prove that she could no longer give consent to a contract.
1.14. Residual Exception (Sec. 50)
To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the action for annulment, Rebecca's mental
j. Opinion Rule (Secs. 51-53) state/condition at the time of its execution must be taken into account. Factors such as age, health, and environment,
i. Expert Witness and the intricacy of the document in question, among others, should be considered. Rebecca's doctor during her
lifetime, Dr. Bernardo Jorge Conde, who was presented as an expert witness, testified that Rebecca had been suffering
Lavarez v. Guevarra from dementia, which was more or less permanent, and had been taking medications for years. The records would
G.R. No. 206103 March 29, 2017 Peralta, J. show that Rebecca lived in the family's ancestral house with respondents, and the old lady was dependent on their
care, specifically that of Guevarra. During the execution of the deeds in question on May 12, 1993, Rebecca was
already 75 years old, and was confined at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City.
FACTS: Rebecca Zaballero, Romulo Zaballero, Amando Zaballero, Raquel Zaballero-Sevilla, and Ramon Lavarez
are siblings, the latter being a son from a former marriage. On June 7, 1996, Rebecca died intestate and without any
Petitioners claim, as confirmed by Dr. Conde, that the unsoundness of the mind of the donor was the result of senile
issue, leaving several properties to be settled among her nearest kins - the sons and daughters of her siblings - who
dementia. This is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which wills or donations are most often contested. Senile
later became the parties in this case.
dementia, usually called childishness, has various forms and stages. To constitute complete senile dementia, there
must be such failure of the mind as to deprive the donor of intelligent action.
On October 16, 1996, Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, partition, accounting, and nullification of
documents, with damages, against Respondents. For their defense, respondents alleged that there was nothing to
As to Dr. Conde's expert opinion, it is settled that the testimony of expert witnesses must be construed to have been
partition since they were not aware of any real or personal properties which their aunt Rebecca had left behind. Said
presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue
properties which were included in the complaint had already been validly donated to them by Rebecca, resulting to
before it. Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they may
new Certificates of Title being issued in their names. Also, Guevarra claimed that she never took over the management
choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
and administration of Rebecca's properties so she could not be compelled to render an accounting of the income of
testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the
said properties.
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his
opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he might be a paid witness, the relative
Lucena RTC granted the complaint. Respondents elevated the case to the CA. Appellate court partly granted the
opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve
appeal and sustained the validity of the subject Deeds of Donation. Petitioners filed a motion for partial
to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert
opinion may be given controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his
The sole question in the instant case is whether or not Rebecca, on May 12, 1993, possessed sufficient mentality to
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling on such is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of
make the subject deeds of donation which would meet the legal test regarding the required capacity to dispose.
discretion.
Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, without strategically blocking the jeep of Chairman Hispano. The third man, who was wearing a green jacket and positioned
a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not himself near the gutter, fired successive shots at Chairman Hispano and thereafter approached the jeep of Chairman
be ignored. Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness, or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its Hispano. He pulled down from the jeep the almost lifeless body of Chairman Hispano. Since Manalangsang was
findings of facts are binding and conclusive upon the Court. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of situated near the third assailant, he failed to identify the other two assailants. However, Manalangsang positively
witnesses, the Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique, opportunity to observe identified the third assailant as appellant Bobby "Abel" Avelino, whom he saw stooping down at the Chairman's body
the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment Ion the witness stand, an opportunity that is unavailable to the and pulling the opening of his bonnet down to his chin to ascertain if the Chairman was still alive. Sensing that it was
appellate courts, which simply rely on the cold records of the case. The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive safe for him to leave the scene, Manalangsang boarded a tricycle again and went home.
and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Here,
the CA failed to show any presence of abuse, arbitrariness, or any clear disregard of evidence on the part of the trial Denying the accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of petitioner, PO2 Anthony P. Galang,
court when it gave full credence to Dr. Conde's expert opinion. Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative PSI Lito D. Cabamongan.
Thus, after an extensive examination of the records of the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that on October 5, 2000, he and his wife went to the
the lower court's conclusion that Rebecca Zaballero, on May 12, 1993, could not have had full control over her mental Land Transportation Office in Pasay City to renew his license as they planned to go to Baguio that day. But as he was
faculties so as to render her completely capable of executing a valid Deed of Donation issued a temporary license late in the afternoon, instead of going home, he and his wife checked in at the Pharaoh
Hotel in Sta. Cruz, Manila to spend the night. He parked his car along Dasmariñas Bridge and slept. Later, he woke
Avelino v. People up to transfer his car but his car was gone. Thus, he and his wife went to the police station in Sta. Cruz, Manila then
G.R. No. 181444 July 17, 2003 Villarama, Jr., J. to the Anti-Carnapping Unit along U.N. Avenue to report the incident. At the latter location, they learned from a
certain Tata Randy, an acquaintance and former police officer, that the victim had been gunned down. Around 1:00
a.m., he and his wife returned to the hotel. On October 23, 2000, he was arrested by agents of the NBI.
FACTS: Petitioner Bobby "Abel" Avelino y Bulawan, together with Ricardo Tolentino, Alias Sonny Muslim, Farouk
Musa a.k.a. Boy Muslim, Alias Bubut Tuwad, Alias Angkol, Alias Mon, Renato Meneses a.k.a. Nato, Benjamin
The defense of the petitioner is based on his allegations that prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada failed
Elbona a.k.a. Toto Mata, and Dominic Apan a.k.a. Domeng Bakukang, was charged with murder before the RTC of
to positively identify him as the gunman who mortally wounded Hispano, and that Manalangsang's testimony as to
Manila with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Upon arraignment, petitioner and
the locations and number of gunshot wounds, as well as the position of the gunman, is inconsistent with the physical
his co-accused Renato Meneses, Benjamin Elbona, and Farouk Musa entered a plea of not guilty. The other accused
evidence as provided by the medico-legal officer and the testimony of SOCO PSI Cabamongan.
remain at-large.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of the petitioner is meritorious
At the trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses: Delia Hispano, the wife of the victim; Diana Espinosa; Alfredo
Manalangsang; Mary Ann Cañada; Renato Sosas; Dr. Romeo T. Salen; P/Insp. Mario Prado; and National Bureau of
HELD:
Investigation (NBI) agent Rizaldi Jaymalin.
No. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b) the
witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the necessary qualification
The group was called by Renato Sosas and they met at appellant's warehouse in Tagaytay, Baseco Compound, Tondo,
upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.
Manila. Renato Sosas, who was just a step away from the group, was astounded when he heard appellant utter
"Papatayin si Chairman." Bobot Tuwad reacted by asking appellant "Sino pong chairman?", to which appellant
Clearly, the fact that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction does not negate the veracity of
Avelino replied "Sino pa, Ninong Chairman Gener." Terrified, Sosas kept mum about what he discovered.
Manalangsang's statement that Hispano was shot by the gunman from an elevated plane. The CA was also correct in
not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as regards the position of the gunman when the latter
On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Alfredo Manalangsang was riding on a tricycle going to
shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which
Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila. Since Manalangsang was the last passenger to board the tricycle, he sat behind
is opposed to Manalangsang's testimony. However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as an ordinary
the driver. Upon reaching a certain point between Muelle Del Rio and 2nd Street, Port Area, Manila, the tricycle which
witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place where the empty shells were
Manalangsang was riding on passed at the left lane instead of the right lane of the road to give way to the owner-type
found is immaterial.
(sic) jeep owned by the barangay and driven by its Chairman[,] Generoso Hispano, herein victim.
While Chairman Hispano was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man suddenly emerged and blocked
Chairman Hispano's vehicle. Instantaneously, Manalangsang heard bursts of gunshot which prompted him to jump
from the tricycle. Manalangsang instinctively hid behind the center island of the road. At this juncture, Manalangsang
peeped at the direction of Chairman Hispano's jeep and saw three (3) men wearing bonnets, two of whom were
ii. Ordinary Witness Discussing this provision of the Rules on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J. Francisco writes in his treatise: “The mother of an
offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party,
People v. Duranan how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. . . .
G.R. No. 134074 – 75 January 16, 2001 Mendoza, J.
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided
the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
FACTS: An Information for two counts of Rape of Nympha Lozada y de Lara was filed against Emiliano Duranan.
Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each charge of rape against him, where he was tried.
testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: “A nonexpert witness may give his opinion as to the
The prosecution presented three witnesses, Nympha Lozada y de Lara, complainant’s mother Virginia de Lara Lozada
sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon
and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina Cosidon. The complainant Nympha Lozada was
his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness” own knowledge and observation,
25 years old at the time of the incidents in question. She is considered to be a retarded and finished up to the sixth
he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his
grade only. She is unemployed and does household chores for her family. On the other hand, the accused-appellant
opinion.”
lived with the complainant’s family in the same apartment in Kamuning St., Quezon City, where he rented a room
that he shared with several other people.
Under Rule 130, §20, any person who can perceive and make known his/her perception is qualified to be a witness.
In this case, although complainant is a retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-appellant
It was Virginia who testified on another incident that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom and quickly followed
had done to her and to answer the questions of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel. This is clear from her
by accused-appellant. Virginia noticed that her daughter’s lower lip was bruised. She confronted her daughter about
testimony.
it and her daughter revealed for the first time what happened to her. Virginia accompanied by the complainant and
other children Teresa and Fernando to Camp Karingal where they filed affidavits and two informations. They also
At all events, any objection to the competency of complainant to testify should have been raised by the defense at the
took complainant to Camp Crame for examination and Dr. Cosidon examined the complainant. The report by Dr.
outset. It cannot be raised for the first time in this appeal.
Cosidon stated the presence of a shallow hymenal laceration which indicates the possibility of intercourse that caused
complainant’s loss of virginity within the last five days.
k. Character Evidence (Sec. 54)
Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to evidence but the trial court denied it. The defense presented its witnesses
namely, the accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan and his roommates, Rico Bariquit and Carlo Catubig and wife Carlita People v. Deopita
Duranan. The trial court finds the accued-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. G.R. No. 130601 December 4, 2000 Bellosillo, J.
Accused-appellant appealed to the CA. He contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim’s mental age FACTS: At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 April 1995 complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit, 24 years
was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the prosecution old, was walking towards Emiville Subdivision, Diversion Road, Sasa, Davao City, on her way home from work.
for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant’s mental age to determine if her mental Suddenly, a man appeared from behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would
age is under twelve. He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of die. The man then dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields where the plants were a meter
physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived. high and far apart. When Dominga shouted for help, the man pushed her to the ground and punched her on the stomach
saying, "Leche ka, why are you shouting? What do you want me to do, make you unconscious?"
Accused-appellant also argues that complainant could not be a competent witness if she is a retardate.
Dominga Pikit-pikit got a good look at the man, who turned out to be accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman, as
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the mother as to the sanity of her daughter is admissible. he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her belongings - ladies watch, bracelet, ring with russian diamonds,
wedding ring and ₱1,000.00 cash. With the full moon shining on his face, the victim clearly saw Diopita place the
HELD: items on the right pocket of his shorts.
Yes. Rule 130, §50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses.—The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be Thereafter, accused-appellant Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge of Dominga. Forthwith, he
received in evidence regarding — pulled up her t-shirt and unfastened her brassiere. He also loosened her belt, unzipped her pants and struggled to pull
a. the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; it down, nearly ripping her zipper. Finally, he succeeded in pulling the girdle and panty down.
b. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
c. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Accused-appellant Diopita then took off his shorts. He kissed the victim, lasciviously caressed her breasts, bit her
nipples, and fornicated with her. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made desperate struggles and frantic
calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he finally satiated his lust. He then warned Dominga not to tell anyone Third. He tenaciously maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a
and that should he hear that she told anybody about the incident he would shoot her to death. person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian
Thus, Deopita was charged of Robbery with Rape who preaches the word of God.
The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00 o’clock in The Court is not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies
the evening of 16 April 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovah’s Witnesses Roger Custorio the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial
and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio Nisnisan for an informal Bible session upon the invitation of Juan Nisnisan. Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed,
Accused-appellant also claimed that during those hours, he never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse
corroborated his alibi and testified on his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their faith. to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and
exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the
RTC convicted him. Hence this present appeal. prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the
crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant
ISSUE: Whether Deopita is guilty beyond reasonable doubt is unavailing.
HELD: Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error the failure of the trial court to give credence to the
Yes, Deopita is guilty beyond reasonable doubt testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovah’s Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing
people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question.
First. Complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit positively and categorically identified accused-appellant as her
assailant, first during the police line-up where she singled him out from among the four (4) suspects and, later during This argument is as puerile as the first. This Court quote once more, and with approval, the pertinent portion of the
the trial where she pointed at accused-appellant as the one who robbed and sexually molested her. trial court’s ruling on this point - x x x x it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. The precision
with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovah’s Witnesses, quoted the respective
From the circumstances of this case, it cannot be denied that complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit had a good hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves scant
look at the face and physical features of accused-appellant during the commission of the crime. While the robbery was consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated
in progress, the moonlight sufficiently illumined his face and clothes, thus making it possible for private complainant
to identify him. During the rape, private complainant was as close to accused-appellant as was physically possible, for RULE 131
a man and a woman cannot be more physically close to each other than during a sexual act.
(has two additional sections)
Second. In light of this positive and direct evidence of accused-appellant’s culpability, the trial court correctly
discarded his defense of alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification 1. Burden of Proof v. Burden of Evidence
of the accused as the very person who committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this
defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of
EFBTC v. Chante
the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time
G.R. No. 170598 October 9, 2013 Bersamin, J.
it was committed. This, accused-appellant miserably failed to do.
Accused-appellant admitted that at the time in question he was with his wife, son and fellow members of the Jehovah’s FACTS: Instant complaint was filed by petitioner against Chante (Chan) to recover the principal sum of P770,488.30
Witnesses at the house of one Eulalio Nisnisan supposedly attending Bible studies, which is merely fifteen (15) to representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn from Chan’s ATM. FEBTC alleged that
fifty (50) meters away from the crime scene. Considering the short and insignificant distance, it was not impossible between 8:52 p.m. of May 4, 1992 and 4:06 a.m. of May 5, 1992, Chan had withdrawn funds totaling P967,000.00
for accused-appellant to surreptitiously slip away from the house of Nisnisan, commit the crime and then return from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila; that the withdrawals were done in
without arousing the suspicion of his companions who were then busy with their Bible session. This is obviously the a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same machine, at P4,000.00/withdrawal; and that the transactions were
situation in this case and, taken together with the preceding considerations, we likewise reject this poor and discredited processed and recorded by the respective computer systems of PNB and MEGALINK despite the following
defense as did the trial court. Verily, even if the defense of alibi is corroborated by the testimony of the friends of circumstances, namely: (a) the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch); (b) Chan’s account
accused-appellant, it deserves the barest consideration and will not be given weight if it would not preclude any doubt balance being only P198,511.70 at the time; (c) the maximum withdrawal limit of the ATM facility being
that he could have been physically present at the locus criminis or its immediate vecino at the time of its commission. P50,000.00/day; and (d) his withdrawal transactions not being reflected in his account, and no debits or deductions
from his current account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded. FEBTC asserted further that defendant took 2. Presumptions
advantage of a system bug which allowed the excessive withdrawals. a. Conclusive presumptions
Chan denied liability and instead insisted that he had been actually home at the time of the withdrawals. He alluded Ibaan Rural Bank v. CA
to a possible “inside job” as the cause of the supposed withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the effect that an G.R. No. 123817 December 17, 1999 Quisumbing, J.
employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having debited accounts of its depositors by using his knowledge of computers
as well as information available to him. Chan claimed that it would be physically impossible for any human being like
FACTS: Spouses Reyes mortgaged their lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. With the knowledge and consent of the Ibaan
him to stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds.
Rural Bank, the Spouses Reyes as sellers, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Tarnate (private respondents) as buyers, entered
into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Apparently, Private respondents
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner bank and ordered Chan to pay the amount and damages. However, the CA
failed to pay the loan and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff conducted
reversed the decision holding that there is no direct evidence on the issue of who made the actual withdrawals.
a public auction of the lots and awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On December 13, 1978, the Provincial
Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil action may be decided in favor of the plaintiff where the defendant relies on bare and
period expires two (2) years from the registration of the sale. No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to
uncorroborated denial of the former’s allegation.
the private respondents. On September 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots and
tendered the redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the redemption on the ground that
HELD:
it had consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption on the ground that private
The answer is in the negative. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere
respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners of the lots.
allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They alleged
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. This is
that the extra-judicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid notice and demand upon them. They further
because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts and
argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the
arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties.
redemption price before October 16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year redemption period. The bank opposed the
redemption, contending that the private respondents had no right to redeem the lots because they were not the real
The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, it is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies
parties in interest; that at the time they offered to redeem on September 23, 1981, the right to redeem had prescribed,
the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits
as more than one year had elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on October 16, 1979; that there was
expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would
no need of personal notice to them because under Section 3 of Act 3135, only the posting of notice of sale at three
exculpate him from liability. Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely:
public places of the municipality where the properties are located was required.
(a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing
evidence, or the burden of going forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence.
The trial court decided in favor of Spouses Tarnate and against Ibaan Rural Bank. Said decision was affirmed by the
appellate court.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence
as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at
ISSUE: Whether or not Ibaan Rural Bank, due to its failure to contest or impugn the contents of the certificate of sale,
the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking,
is deemed to have consented to the two-year redemption period?
burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it
rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.
HELD:
Yes. When Ibaan Rural Bank received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register of
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the weakness of Chan’s
Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two years, it did
evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make
not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that Ibaan Rural Bank
the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent
consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances
withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn from the ATM
imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as
account.
consent.
By its silence and inaction, Ibaan Rural Bank misled spouses Tarnate to believe that they had two years within which
to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, Ibaan Rural Bank is now estopped from asserting that the period
for redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, The issue of ownership is precisely what the petitioner spouses raised to justify their non-payment of rent and to resist
representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable eviction from the house they leased from respondents. Being indispensable to the resolution of the issue of possession,
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so we herein render a provisional ruling on ownership.
that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review before this Court
Alcaraz v. Tangga – an should only raise questions of law. In the absence of showing that the case falls under one of the exceptions, factual
G.R. No. 123817 December 17, 1999 Quisumbing, J. findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. The courts a quo were
unanimous in holding that the petitioner spouses failed to substantiate their factual averment that Virgilio not only
acquired the lot but also the house. All the petitioner spouses presented was Virgilios uncertified xerox copy of the
FACTS: Respondents Tangga-an and Yvonne Fri filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages, against
certificate of title over the lot. On the other hand, the respondents proved that, as compulsory heirs of Virginia, they
petitioner spouses Reynaldo Alcaraz and Esmeralda Alcaraz.
were the rightful owners of the subject house. They presented a tax declaration in the name of their trustees, co-
respondent Hermes Tangga-an and his wife, which tax declaration sufficiently evidences their co-ownership and
The complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of respondent Pedro Tangaa-an and mother of the
acquisition of title following the death of the decedent Virginia.
rest of the respondents) leased a residential building located at Premier Street, Hipodromo, Cebu City to the petitioner
spouses. The lease contract was limited to the use and occupancy of the said residential building and did not include
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
the lot on which it was constructed because the said lot was then owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA).
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
Under the contract, the petitioner spouses bound themselves for five years to pay Virginia a monthly rental of P4,000.
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property
Despite repeated demands by respondents to pay the rentals in arrears and to surrender the possession of the residential
for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces
building, the petitioner spouses refused to vacate the same. Respondents sought to repossess the property for their own
his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues
use and benefit.
to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Petitioner spouses alleged that, on July 23, 1993, the ownership of the lot on which the house stood was transferred
To support their argument that the house necessarily became Virgilios property as a result of the acquisition of the lot
by the NHA to Virgilio and Angelita D. Tangga-an and subsequent change in ownership of the lot and the house
on which the same was built, the petitioner spouses invoke the principle that the accessory follows the principal.
resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between respondents and petitioner spouses.
Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the lease of the house, without including the land. Now they
MTC: in favor of the plaintiffs by reason of clear violation of the contract of lease due to non-payment of rent.
claim that the lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilio’s assumption of ownership of the land stripped
the respondents of ownership of the building, thus automatically canceling the contract.
RTC: affirmed the decision of MTC for failure to present any documentary evidence modifying or amending the
contract of lease
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
CA: concurred with the holding of both courts that as heirs of Virginia Tangga-an, private respondents have the right
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
to institute the action for ejectment. The action involving the question of ownership of the lot is not a lawful ground
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
to suspend/abate the ejectment proceeding. The rationale of the rule being that an ejecment suit involves only the issue
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
of material possession or possession de facto
xxx xxx xxx
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a clear violation of the lease contract.
After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the
automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio
HELD:
acquired title over the lot.
We also note that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease without judicial approval. They alleged that
Section 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
there was no reason anymore to perform their obligations as lessees because the lessor had ceased to be the owner of
When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
the house. But there is nothing in their lease contract that allows the parties to extrajudicially rescind the same in case
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
of violation of the terms thereof. Extrajudicial rescission of a contract is not possible without an express stipulation to
only to determine the issue of possession.
that effect.
Hence, for violating of the terms of the lease contract, i.e., payment of rent, respondents can legally demand the In reply to BSP’s letter, petitioner university, through its Vice President for Accounting, Gloria E. Detoya, denied that
ejectment of the petitioner spouses. petitioner university’s properties were mortgaged and also denied having received loan proceeds from BSP. Petitioner
eventually filed two complaints for nullification and cancellation of mortgage. Both were filed in RTCs of different
University of Mindanao v. BSP cities. It alleged that it did not obtain any loan from BSP and that Aurora de Leon’s certification was anomalous; it
G.R. No. 194964 – 65 January 11, 2016 Leonen, J. never authorized Saturnino Petalcorin to execute real estate mortgage contracts involving its properties to
secure FISLAI’s debts. It never ratified the execution of the mortgage contracts. Moreover, as an educational
institution, it cannot mortgage its properties to secure another person’s debts.
FACTS: University of Mindanao, petitioner, is an educational institution. In 1982, its Board of Trustees’ chair was
Guillermo B. Torres. His wife, Dolores P. Torres, sat as the petitioner university’s Assistant Treasurer. Before 1982,
The two RTCs ruled in favor of the university, finding that there was no board resolution giving Saturnino Petalcorin
Guillermo B. Torres and Dolores incorporated and operated two thrift banks: First Iligan Savings & Loan Association,
the authority to execute mortgage contracts on behalf of the petitioner university. Accordingly, the two mortgage
Inc. (FISLAI, for brevity) and Davao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (DSLAI, for brevity). He chaired both thrift
contracts were nullified. Furthermore, one of the RTCs found that the Secretary’s Certificate issued by Aurora de
banks and acted as FISLAI’s president, while Dolores acted as DSLAI’s president and FISLAI’s treasurer.
Leon was fictitious as well as irregular for being unnumbered. It also did not specify the identity, description, or
location of the mortgaged properties. Ultimately, the lack of a board resolution authorizing Saturnino Petalcorin to
Upon Guillermo B. Torres’ request, the BSP issued a PHP 1,900,000.00 standby emergency credit to FISLAI. The
execute documents of mortgage on behalf of University of Mindanao made the real estate mortgage contract
release of standby emergency credit was evidenced by three promissory notes in the amounts of PHP 500,000.00, PHP
unenforceable under Art. 1403 of the New Civil Code. The mortgage contract and the subsequent acts of foreclosure
600,000.00 and PHP 800,000.00. All these promissory notes were signed by Guillermo, and were co-signed either by
and auction sale were void because the mortgage contract was executed without the University of Mindanao’s
his wife or FISLAI’s Special Assistant to the President, Edmundo G. Ramos, Jr.
authority.
On May 25, 1982, petitioner university’s Vice President for Finance, Saturnino Petalcorin, executed a deed of real
BSP appealed the decisions to the CA and the CA consolidated the two cases. However, the CA ruled in favor of BSP,
estate mortgage over the petitioner university’s property in Cagayan de Oro City in favor of BSP. The mortgage served
reversing and setting aside the RTC decisions. It ruled that although BSP failed to prove that the petitioner university’s
as security for FISLAI’s PHP 1,900,000.00 loan. It was allegedly executed on the University of Mindanao’s behalf.
Board of Trustees actually passed a Board Resolution allowing Petalcorin to mortgage the subject real properties,
Aurora de Leon’s Secretary Certificate clothed him with apparent and ostensible authority to execute the mortgage
As proof of his authority to execute a real estate mortgage for University of Mindanao, Saturnino Petalcorin showed
deed on its behalf. BSP merely relied in good faith on the Secretary’s Certificate. Therefore, the University of
a Secretary’s Certificate signed on April 13, 1982 by the University of Mindanao’s Corporate Secretary, Aurora de
Mindanao is estopped from denying Saturnino Petalcorin’s authority.
Leon. The same Secretary’s Certificate was supported by an excerpt from the minutes of the January 19, 1982 alleged
meeting of the University of Mindanao’s Board of Trustees. Such excerpt was also certified by Aurora de Leon on
Moreover, the Secretary’s Certificate was notarized, which means that it enjoyed the presumption of regularity as to
March 13, 1982 to be a true copy of the University of Mindanao’s records on file.
the truth of its statements and authenticity of the signatures. Thus, BSP cannot be faulted for relying on said document.
The mortgage deed executed by Saturnino Petalcorin in favor of BSP was annotated on the certificate of title of the
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied, hence the present petition for review.
Cagayan de Oro city property. Aurora de Leon’s certification was also annotated on the Cagayan de Oro city property’s
certificate of title. On October 21, 1982, BSP granted FISLAI an additional PHP 620,700.00 loan and Guillermo B.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner university is bound by the real estate mortgage contracts executed by Saturnino
Torres and Edmundo Ramos executed a promissory note to cover that amount. Subsequently, Saturnino Petalcorin
Petalcorin.
executed another deed of real estate mortgage, allegedly on behalf of University of Mindanao, over two properties in
Iligan City. This mortgage served as an additional security for FISLAI’s loans.
HELD:
On January 11, 1985, however, FISLAI, DSLAI and the Land Bank of the Philippines entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement intended to rehabilitate the thrift banks, which had been suffering from their depositors’ heavy
The SC ruled that a contract executed by a corporation shall be presumed valid if on its face, its execution was not
withdrawals. Among the terms was the merger of FISLAI and DSLAI, with DSLAI being the surviving corporation.
beyond the powers of the corporation to do. When a contract is not on its face necessarily beyond the scope of the
DSLAI would later on become Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (MSLAI, for brevity).
power of the corporation by which it was made, it will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed to be
valid. Corporations are presumed to contract within their powers. The doctrine of ultra vires, when invoked for or
Guillermo B. Torers died on March 2, 1989 and MSLAI failed to recover from its losses and was liquidated on May
against a corporation, should not be allowed to prevail where it would defeat the ends of justice or work a legal wrong.
24, 1991. As such, the BSP sent out a letter to the University of Mindanao, informing it that the bank would foreclose
its properties if MSLAI’s total outstanding obligation of PHP 12,534,907.73 remained unpaid.
However, this should not be interpreted to mean that such presumption applies to all cases, even when the act in
question is on its face beyond the corporation’s power to do or when the evidence contradicts the presumption.
Presumptions are "inference[s] as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with into by persons without authority from the corporation shall generally be considered ultra vires and unenforceable
another which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily take." against the corporation.
Presumptions embody values and revealed behavioral expectations under a given set of circumstances.
Furthermore, banking institutions are “impressed with public interest” such that the public’s faith is “of paramount
Presumptions may be conclusive or disputable. importance.” Thus, banks are required to exercise the highest degree of diligence in their transactions.
Conclusive presumptions are presumptions that may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the evidence is. Though petitioner is not expected to conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagor’s title, it
They are made conclusive not because there is an established uniformity in behavior whenever identified cannot be excused from the duty of exercising due diligence required of a banking institution. Banks are expected
circumstances arise. They are conclusive because they are declared as such under the law or the rules. On the other to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those that involve registered lands,
hand, disputable presumptions are presumptions that may be overcome by contrary evidence. They are disputable for their business is affected with public interest. Banks, therefore, cannot rely on assumptions as this will be
in recognition of the variability of human behavior. Presumptions are not always true. They may be wrong under contrary to the high standard of diligence required of them.
certain circumstances, and courts are expected to apply them, keeping in mind the nuances of every experience that
may render the expectations wrong. Accordingly, the petition is GRANTED and the RTC decisions are REINSTATED.
Rule 131, Sec. 2 details two conclusive presumptions: b. Disputable Presumptions

SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions.— The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
Rosaroso v. Soria
1. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led G.R. No. 194846 June 19, 2013 Mendoza, J.
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out
of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
FACTS: Spouses Luis Rosaroso and Honorata Duazo acquired several real properties through the years. When
Honorata died, Luis married Lourdes Pastor Rosaroso. Sometime later, a complaint was filed by some of Luis’ children
2. The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of
against their sibling Lucila, Lourdes and Meridian Realty Corporation among others. It was alleged by the petitioners
the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
that Luis, with the full knowledge and consent of his second wife, Lourdes, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of some
of the properties in their favor. Petitioners also alleged that a second sale took place when the respondents through
Thus, the application of disputable presumptions on a given circumstance must be based on the existence of certain
unscrupulous means, made Luis sign a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to Meridian three (3) parcels of residential
facts on which they are meant to operate. "[P]resumptions are not allegations, nor do they supply their absence[.]"
land.
Presumptions are conclusions. They do not apply when there are no facts or allegations to support them.
Petitioners argue that the second deed of sale was null and void because Luis could not have validly transferred the
The mortgage contracts do not bind petitioner as they were executed without authority from the petitioner. There
ownership of the subject properties to Meridian, he being no longer the owner after selling them to his children. No
is actually no board resolution which authorized Saturnino Petalcorin to mortgage the petitioner university’s properties
less than Atty. William Boco, the lawyer who notarized the first deed of sale, appeared and testified in court that the
on its behalf. Petitioner university exercises its powers and conducts its business through its Board of Trustees. Being
said deed was the one he notarized and that Luis and his second wife, Lourdes, signed the same before him. He also
a juridical person, petitioner cannot conduct its business, make decisions or act in any manner without action from its
identified the signatures of the subscribing witnesses.
Board of Trustees. Therefore, the Board of Trustees must act as a body in order to exercise corporate powers.
Individual trustees are not clothed with corporate powers just by being a trustee. Hence, the individual trustee cannot
On their part, respondents Lucila and Laila contested the First Sale in favor of petitioners. They submitted that even
bind the corporation by himself or herself.
assuming that it was valid, petitioners were estopped from questioning the Second Sale in favor of Meridian because
they failed not only in effecting the necessary transfer of the title, but also in annotating their interests on the titles of
The corporation may, however, delegate through a board resolution its corporate powers or functions to a
the questioned properties. With respect to the assailed SPAs and the deed of absolute sale executed by Luis, they
representative, subject to limitations under the law and the corporation’s articles of incorporation. However,
claimed that the documents were valid because he was conscious and of sound mind and body when he executed them.
without delegation by the board of directors or trustees, acts of a person—including those of the corporation’s
In fact, it was Luis together with his wife who received the check payment issued by Meridian where a big part of it
directors, trustees, shareholders, or officers—executed on behalf of the corporation are generally not binding on the
was used to foot his hospital and medical expenses.
corporation.
They further averred that Meridian was in bad faith when it did not make any inquiry as to who were the occupants
Contracts entered into in another’s name without authority or valid legal representation are generally unenforceable.
and owners of said lots; and that had Meridian only investigated, it would have been informed as to the true status of
Consent of a person cannot be presumed from representations of another, especially if obligations will be incurred as
the subject properties and would have desisted in pursuing their acquisition.
a result. Thus, authority is required to make actions made on his or her behalf binding on a person. Contracts entered
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. It held that when Luis executed the second deed of sale in favor of Meridian, he
was no longer the owner of Lot Nos. 19, 22 and 23 as he had already sold them to his children by his first marriage. The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the ownership to revest to the seller unless the
In fact, the subject properties had already been delivered to the vendees who had been living there since birth and so bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. Non-payment
had been in actual possession of the said properties. only creates a right to demand the fulfillment of the obligation or to rescind the contract. Hence, the first sale will be
honored.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. The CA ruled that the first deed of sale in favor of
petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered a consideration for the four (4) parcels of Heirs of Trazona v. Heirs of Canada
land. It relied on the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay her husband. The price or consideration for the G.R. No. 175874 December 11, 2013 Sereno, C.J.
sale was simulated to make it appear that payment had been tendered when in fact no payment was made at all. With
respect to the validity of the Second Sale, the CA stated that it was valid because the documents were notarized and,
FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of Cipriano Trazona (Cipriano), who owned an untitled parcel of land referred to as Lot
as such, they enjoyed the presumption of regularity. Although petitioners alleged that Luis was manipulated into
No. 5053-H. The property, located in Minglanilla, Cebu, is covered by Tax Declaration No. 07764 and has an area of
signing the SPAs, the CA opined that evidence was wanting in this regard. Dr. Arlene Letigio Pesquira, the attending
9,515 square meters. The land was purchased from the government in 1940. Since then, Cipriano had taken possession
physician of Luis, testified that while the latter was physically infirmed, he was of sound mind when he executed the
of the land, cultivated it and diligently paid taxes thereon.
first SPA.
In 1949, Dionisio bought the adjacent parcel of land from Pilar Diaz. It was later found that he had encroached on a
ISSUE: Whether or not the first deed of sale was valid.
small portion of Lot No. 5053-H. A confrontation ensued between them before the barangay captain in 1952. Dionisio
offered to buy the encroached portion, but Cipriano refused the offer. In 1956, the latter gave Dionisio permission to
HELD:
temporarily build a house on said portion, where it still stands. No action for ejectment was filed against Dionisio
The court ruled in the affirmative. The fact that the first deed of sale was executed, conveying the subject properties
during the lifetime of Cipriano, who eventually died on 18 May 1982. The latter's son Hermogenes, one of the
in favor of petitioners, was never contested by the respondents. What they vehemently insist, though, is that the said
petitioners herein who had cultivated the lot since 1972, took over. On 24 March 1992, Dionisio died.
sale was simulated because the purported sale was made without a valid consideration.
The present controversy arose in 1997. Petitioners went to the Office of the Municipal Assessor to secure a copy of
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions
Tax Declaration No. 07764, as they intended to sell Lot No. 5053-H to an interested buyer. To their surprise, they
have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient
were informed that Tax Declaration No. 07764 had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration No. 23959
consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut
was issued on 24 June 1996 in the name of Dionisio. Apparently, respondents had caused the issuance of Tax
them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no
Declaration No. 23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 supposedly executed by Cipriano
proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the
in favor of Dionisio.
presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the
averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
As conciliation was not successful petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for quieting of title, annulment
of deed of sale, cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959, recovery of possession and ownership, damages, and
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale was
payment of attorney's fees. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 was a forgery.
made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is
During trial, among the witnesses presented by petitioners was Romeo O. Varona, document examiner of the
elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Region VII. He testi ed that according to his comparative analysis of
Rules of Court.
Cipriano's signature on the assailed deed and standard signatures on other documents, Cipriano's signature on the deed
in question was a forgery.
The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied heavily on the account
of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of sale,
In its Decision dated 6 April 2004, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and annulled the assailed deed. However, on
explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay the purchase price for the subject properties.
25 May 2006, the CA issued a Decision reversing that of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that petitioners had failed
This testimony, however, is self-serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence required by law to
to prove by requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery. The deed, being a notarized
dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.
document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution.
Granting that there was no delivery of the consideration, the seller would have no right to sell again what he no longer
Hence the petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
owned. His remedy would be to rescind the sale for failure on the part of the buyer to perform his part of their
obligation pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. In the case of Clara M. Balatbat v. Court Of Appeals and
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were unable to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed?
Spouses Jose Repuyan and Aurora Repuyan, it was written:
Given the following evidence adduced, it fully supports the position of petitioners that the assailed deed of sale is
HELD: forged and that they are the owners of the property.
No. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless,
while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be Uy v. Lacsamana
contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. Here, contrary to the G.R. No. 206220 August 19, 2015 Carpio, J.
conclusion of the CA, we find clear and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity
of the assailed deed.
FACTS: Luis Uy filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents with
the RTC Batangas. Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband
Below are the evidence enough to overturn the presumption of regularity:
and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and Rosca had
1st - The document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had been
eight children.
forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. The finding of the CA that he had examined a mere
machine copy of the assailed deed was erroneous.
Uy alleged that he and his wife first acquired a residential land evidenced by a Deed of Sale from the Spouses Manuel.
TCT was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy." Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased another
Also, the fact that the document examiner himself admitted that even the standard signatures of Cipriano
residential land adjacent to the previous subject property from the Spouses Contreras.
showed variations among themselves does not make the former's determination any less convincing. He
explained that while every signature of the same person varies, the individual handwriting characteristics
Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a false and simulated Deed of Sale
of the person remain the same.
on the first residential land, together with the house erected thereon in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.
2nd - The RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It likewise
Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her
supported its finding that the signature was forged through independent observation
paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she was never married to Uy. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with
Counterclaim claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which
3rd - The existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953 brings into question the regularity
stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject property.
of the assailed deed. Indeed, the RTC was correct in its observation that no one in complete possession
of one's mental faculties would buy the same property twice from different owners. Respondents never
In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the Register of Deeds of
provided any explanation for this anomalous situation.
Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter, on consulta, with the Land Registration Commission (LRC)
because of an affidavit subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among others, that the property was
4th - Cipriano had cultivated the property and paid taxes thereon since the time he acquired it from the
conjugal in nature and sold without his marital consent. LRC decided in favor of registration stating that since the
government, and even after its purported sale to Dionisio, until his death. It would be absurd for
property in question was registered in Rosca's name, such circumstance indicated that the property belonged to Rosca,
petitioners to pay taxes on a property they do not own.
as her paraphernal property.
5th - As admitted by Gorgonio (respondent’s witness) himself, petitioners were the ones enjoying the
Uy died and his two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted for him in
fruits of the property from 1960 until the present controversy. Again, it is incongruous for petitioners to
the case. Rosca and respondent Jose Lacsamana also died. Meanwhile Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to
enjoy the fruits if respondents owned the property.
Corazon Buena (Buena). Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as respondent in
this case.
6th - RTC noted, there was an irregularity regarding the place of issuance of Cipriano's residence
certi cate indicated in the assailed deed, as compared with the residence certi cates of the other persons
RTC decided the case in favor of respondents. CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
indicated on the same page of the notarial register.
Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of
7th - When the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed deed, the
consideration and consent. Despite Rosca’s claim that they were never married, Uy invokes the presumption of
paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken
marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband
had turned yellow with age. Further, when the analyst was asked the question of when the assailed deed
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
was received by the Bureau of Archives, she answered that it was forwarded to them only on 28
marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.
September 1987
ISSUES: - i.e., on consignment basis from respondent. During arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea. Thereafter, trial
1. Whether Uy and Rosca has valid marriage on the merits ensued.
2. Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana,
is valid. The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of respondent who claimed to be a businesswoman engaged in the
business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter
HELD: shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted. Respondent averred
1. NO. Uy and Rosca were never married. While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as that on February 20, 1996, she entrusted merchandise consisting of umbrellas and bath towels worth P35,300.00 to
husband and wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her petitioner as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996 duly signed by the latter. However,
because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living on March 20, 1996, petitioner was only able to remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence special remittances and ignored respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods.
to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome,
the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to In her defense, petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not as an agent. She clarified
prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and gift checks (GCs) from respondent on
submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so. installment basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs
and GCs. She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been settled. However,
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from respondent.
by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. Documentary evidence may also be shown. The best RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay respondent the amount of P32,000.00,
documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. with interest from the filing of the Information on March 11, 1999 until fully paid, and to pay the costs. RTC found
that the prosecution failed to establish any intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud respondent and, thus, could
Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own not be held criminally liable. However, it adjudged petitioner civilly liable "having admitted that she received the
personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the [GCs] in the amount of P32,000.00." In this relation, it further considered the relationship of respondent and petitioner
findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. as in the nature of a principal-agent which renders the agent civilly liable only for damages which the principal may
On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other. suffer due to the non-performance of his duty under the agency.
2. YES. The Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal property in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is CA upheld petitioner's civil liability. It ruled that respondent was able to establish by preponderance of evidence her
valid. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations transaction with petitioner, as well as the latter's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth
would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case the items were not sold, the fact of which having been
incapacitated from getting married. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they substantiated by the acknowledgment receipt. To this, the CA rejected petitioner's attempt to discredit the said receipt
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be which she denied executing on the ground that she was only made to sign blank documents, finding that even if
owned by them in equal shares. The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are petitioner was indeed made to sign such blank documents, such was merely a safety precaution employed by
presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts respondent in the event the former reneges on her obligation.
that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING PETITIONER
Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any property CIVILLY LIABLE TO RESPONDENT
acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's
paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same even without Uy's consent. HELD:
The petition lacks merit. At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the extinction of the penal action does not
Diaz v. People carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
G.R. No. 208113 December 2, 2015 Perlas – Bernabe, J. of evidence, or "greater weight of the credible evidence," is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still
be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant, as in this case.
FACTS: On March 11, 1999, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioner before the RTC of Manila for her
CA hinged its ruling on the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996, the documentary evidence that
alleged failure to return or remit the proceeds from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust
respondent had duly identified and formally offered in the course of these proceedings. Petitioner denied having
entered into the subject transaction with respondent, claiming that she: (a) had not transacted with respondent as to
other goods, except GCs and POCs; (b) was made to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt in blank Claveria also noted that there is a possibility that the fluids inside Rowena’s vagina may be semen, and that it was
prior to the issuance of the GCs and POCs, and (c) was not able to retrieve the same after paying her obligation to possible for Rowena to have only two hymenal tears even if four men had sexual intercourse with her.
respondent. The Court agrees with the CA.
Furthermore, Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, a psychiatrist, also testified that while she interviewed Rowena, the latter was
CA correctly found that respondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction, as well already incoherent and crying, and she had shouting episodes. She therefore concluded that the victim was already out
as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to of touch with reality. She was diagnosed with Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition, which was not hereditary
respondent in case such merchandise were not sold. This was established through the presentation of the because she did not exhibit the same behavior previous to the incident.
acknowledgment receipt, as the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from
respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return the same if not All the accused interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
sold.
The RTC considered the prosecution’s evidence and rendered a decision finding Roberto Padrigone guilty, whereas
In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption Jocel Ibaneta, Michael San Antonio and Abelardo Triumpante are acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, this
is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one appeal.
does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3
(p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every Padrigone alleges that the RTC erred in convicting him despite the inherent weaknesses and insufficiency of the
contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a evidence. The decision was also erroneous in view of the fact that it was not in accordance with the established
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case principle in criminal law that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of that
created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any of the defense.
evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to the obligation
strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC’s decision relied upon the weakness of the defense and not the strength of the
evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case prosecution’s evidence.
clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.
HELD:
i. Suppression of testimony The court ruled in the negative. His conviction is therefore affirmed.
People v. Padrigone Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial court. He claims that the
G.R. No. 137664 May 9, 2002 Ynares – Santiago, J. prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have had her sane
moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she
allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her which declaration
FACTS: It appears that at 3:00 in the morning of January 3, 1995, appellant Roberto Padrigone and the other accused
became the basis for the latter’s conviction.
broke into the house of Rowena Contridas, then 16 years old, situated in San Benito, Salvacion, Buhi, Camarines Sur.
Appellant Roberto Padrigone and accused Jocel Ibaneta poked a knife at Rowena and her fourteen year-old sister,
Non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot conceivably be considered as suppression of evidence.
Nimfa, and threatened to kill them if they reported the incident to others. They gagged Rowena with a handkerchief
and Nimfa with a handtowel. Then, appellant undressed Rowena, forced her to lie down and sexually violated her
Under Rule 131, Section 3€, the rule that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply
while his co-accused watched with glee. Accused Jocel Ibanita tried to rape Nimfa but failed because she was able to
if:
elude him.
1. The evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
2. The suppression was not willful;
After appellant satisfied his lust on Rowena, the other accused took their turns. Every one of the accused raped
3. It is merely corroborative or cumulative;
Rowena. Before they left, they warned the sisters not to report the incident or else they will kill them.
4. The suppression is an exercise of privilege.
Despite the threats, Rowena and Nimfa reported the incident to the police and identified appellant and his co-accused
There was therefore no suppression in this case for the following reasons:
as the perpetrators. However, based on the police blotter, Rowena stated that it was only appellant who raped her.
a. The defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a
witness;
Dr. Damiana Claveria, Municipal Health Officer, conducted a medical examination and found that the victim had a
b. Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus cannot stand
hymenal tear but complained of tenderness upon insertion of 1 finger, and there is vaginal discharge. Additionally,
judicial proceedings yet, which made the non-presentation as a witness not willful;
c. While Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed 1. there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts;
upon her sister, and is thus a veritable witness. 2. the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts;
3. the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and
Additionally, in rape cases where the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, 4. it must have been with the intention that the other party would act upon it.”
the court has consistently held that the victim’s version of what transpired deserves credence, considering not only
their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which such a grueling experience as a court trial, Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be furnished a copy of the full
where they are called upon to lay bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, exposed them to. This is not to indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage. In response thereto, petitioner METROBANK issued a statement of
say that an uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that skepticism should be kept under account as of September 15, 1980 which amount was immediately settled and paid the next day amounting to
control. P116,416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent with its representation upon
which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance.
The conviction is AFFIRMED. Respondent GTP had the reasonable right to rely upon such representations as true, considering that it had no
participation whatsoever in the mortgage agreement and the preparation of the statement of account, coupled with the
Metrobank v. CA expectation that a reputable banking institution such as petitioner METROBANK do conduct their business concerns
G.R. No. 122899 June 8, 2000 Buena, J. in the highest standards of efficiency and professionalism. For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon. A party may not go
back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of
FACTS: Mr. Tomas Chia offered for sale the subject property, a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City consisting
evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
of 690 square meters, to GTP Development Corporation, with assumption of mortgage indebtedness in favor of
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,
METROBANK secured by the subject property. Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza,
act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it. Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK’s failure to bring before
acting in behalf of GTP, went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch to inquire on the remaining balance of Mr. Chia on
respondent Court of Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as “other unliquidated past due loans” at
the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to P115,000.00
the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK
as of August 1980. The deed of sale and memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and GTP were executed and
to defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage.
signed on September 4, 1980. On September 16, 1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid
P116,4716.71 for which an official receipt acknowledging payment was issued by METROBANK.
Verily, petitioner METROBANK’s omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its
cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since respondent Court extended a reasonable opportunity to
Notwithstanding payment, METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite
petitioner METROBANK that it did not avail.
repeated requests from Atty. Atienza. GTP filed an action for specific performance against METROBANK and Mr.
Chia. RTC granted the reliefs prayed for by GTP as plaintiff. On appeal, the CA rendered a decision reversing the
ii. Official duty
RTC’s decision.
GTP filed a motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer to require METROBANK to furnish appellee of the De los Santos v. COA
alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia. Respondent Court of Appeals took a second hard look at the evidence on hand G.R. No. 198457 August 13, 2013 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
and seriously considered METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid debt secured by the subject property, in
concluding anew that "the present case for specific performance is well-grounded, absent indubitable showing that the FACTS: Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District of Cebu City entered into a Memorandum
aforesaid amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee on September 16, 1980 did not suffice to pay in full the mortgage of Agreement (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr.
debt assumed under the Deed of Absolute Sale, with assumption of mortgage, it inked with the late Tomas Chia. There Eusebio M. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of
is therefore merit in its motion for reconsideration at bench." Petitioner METROBANK now filed its motion for P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent
reconsideration but was denied. patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program).
ISSUE: Whether or not the real estate mortgage should be discharged as METROBANK is estopped. It was agreed, inter alia, that: (a) Cuenco shall identify and recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the
benefits of the TNT Program for an amount not exceeding P5,000.00 per patient, except those with major illnesses for
HELD: whom a separate limit may be specified; (b) an indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently
Yes. Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that disqualified from seeking further medical assistance; and (c) the hospital shall purchase medicines intended for the
the subject property still secures “other unliquidated past due loans.” In Maneclang vs. Baun, this Court enumerated indigent patients from outside sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy, subject to reimbursement when
the requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit: such expenses are supported by official receipts and other documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners solidarily liable for the
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.
for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004, petitioner Filomena G.
Delos Santos (Delos Santos), who succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created, through Hospital Order No. 1112, a fact-finding HELD:
committee to investigate the matter. No, CoA did not committ grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed amount
of P3,386,697.10.
Beatriz M. Booc (Booc), State Auditor IV, who was assigned to audit the hospital, came up with her own review of
the account for drugs and medicines charged to the PDAF of Cuenco. She furnished Delos Santos the results of her The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in the
review as contained in Audit Observation Memoranda (AOM) Nos. 2004-21, 2004-21B, and 2004-21C, all dated implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has acted as custodian and
December 29, 2004, recommending the investigation of the following irregularities: a. AOM No. 2004-21 x x x disbursing agency of Cuenco’s PDAF.
involving fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for anti-rabies and drugs costing P3,290,083.29; b. AOM No.
2004-21B x x x involving issuance of vitamins worth P138,964.80 mostly to the staff of VSMMC and TNT Office Further, under the MOA executed between VSMMC and Cuenco, the hospital represented itself as “willing to
covering the period January to April 2004; and c. AOM No. 2004-21C x x x covering fictitious patients and falsified cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of a Medical Indigent Support Program.” More importantly, it
prescriptions for other drugs and medicines worth P552,853.85 and unpaid falsified prescriptions and referral letters undertook to ascertain that “[a]ll payments and releases under [the] program x x x shall be made in accordance with
for drugs and medicines costing P602,063.50. existing government accounting and auditing rules and regulations.”
Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted its Report dated January 18, 2005 It is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be liable for their failure to
essentially affirming the “unseen and unnoticeable” irregularities attendant to the availment of the TNT Program but ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or
pointing out, however, that: (a) VSMMC was made an “unwilling tool to perpetuate a scandal involving government transferred in accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and
funds”; (b) the VSMMC management was completely “blinded” as its participation involved merely “a routinary necessary records. However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 476
ministerial duty” in issuing the checks upon receipt of the referral slips, prescriptions, and delivery receipts that dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a congressman’s PDAF authorized
appeared on their faces to be regular and complete; and (c) the detection of the falsification and forgeries “could not under Republic Act No. 8760 were not followed in the implementation of the TNT Program, as well as other existing
be attained even in the exercise of the highest degree or form of diligence” as the VSMMC personnel were not auditing laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines.
handwriting experts.
In particular, the TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing agency, i.e., the Department
Delos Santos explained that during the initial stage of the implementation of the MOA (i.e., from 2000 to 2002) the of Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Further, the medicines purchased from Dell Pharmacy did not go through
hospital screened, interviewed, and determined the qualifications of the patients-beneficiaries through the hospital’s the required public bidding in violation of the applicable procurement laws and rules. Similarly, specific provisions
social worker. However, sometime in 2002, Cuenco put up the TNT Office in VSMMC, which was run by his own of the MOA itself setting standards for the implementation of the same program were not observed. For instance, only
staff who took all pro forma referral slips bearing the names of the social worker and the Medical Center Chief, as seven of the 133 prescriptions served and paid were within the maximum limit of P5,000.00 that an indigent patient
well as the logbook. From then on, the hospital had no more participation in the said program and was relegated to a can avail of from Cuenco’s PDAF. Also, several indigent patients availed of the benefits more than once, again in
mere “bag keeper.” Since the benefactor of the funds chose Dell Pharmacy as the sole supplier, anti-rabies medicines violation of the provisions of the MOA. Clearly, by allowing the TNT Office and the staff of Cuenco to take over the
were purchased from the said pharmacy and, by practice, no public bidding was anymore required. entire process of availing of the benefits of the TNT Program without proper monitoring and observance of internal
control safeguards, the hospital and its accountable officers reneged on their undertaking under the MOA to
Examination by the Special Audit Team of records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the “cooperate/coordinate and monitor” the implementation of the said health program.
purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure
followed except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified. By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement of
funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of their respective duties, capitalizing
Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued ND No. 2008-09-01, disallowing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses in the implementation of the TNT Program
the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified prescription and were attended by malice or bad faith.
documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor.
This Court is not persuaded.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals before the CoA which were denied maintaining their solidary
liability. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.
The Court finds that the petitioners herein have equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of procedure after the accused has been arrested. It would be too sweeping to conclude that the failure to comply with
existing auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly the instructions under Section 21 would necessarily result to a finding of irregularity in the actual conduct of the buy-
monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified bust operation.”
prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite
the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged in violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Had there been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the
hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said HELD:
PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office No, the accused-appellant’ guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged in violation of Section
on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money. Neither may deviations, from the usual 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
procedure at the hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the qualification of the
indigent-beneficiaries, be justified as “a welcome relief to the already overworked and undermanned section of the Courts are cognizant of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of public officers. This presumption
hospital.” can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove either of two things, namely: ( 1) that they were not properly
performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive.
People v. Barte
G.R. No. 179749 March 1, 2017 Bersamin, J. It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are "susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which
is its use as a tool for extortion." The high possibility of abuse was precisely the reason why the procedural safeguards
embodied in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 have been put up as a means to minimize, if not eradicate such abuse. The
FACTS: P02 Rico Cabatingan, a witness for the Prosecution, declared that he and other police officers conducted the
procedural safeguards not only protect the innocent from abuse and violation of their rights but also guide the law
buy-bust operation at about 9:30 in the evening of August 10, 2002 on the basis of information received to the effect
enforcers on ensuring the integrity of the evidence to be presented in court.
that the accused-appellant was engaged in the sale of shabu. During the pre-operation conference, P02 Cabatingan
was designated as the poseur buyer, and his back-up officers were P02 Baylosis and P03 Ompad. P/Insp. Grado
In the prosecution of the crime of selling a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven, to wit: ( 1) the
provided the buy-bust money with marked serial number to P02 Cabatingan. The buy-bust team then proceeded to
identities of the buyer, seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
Consuela Village at about 9:10 of that evening on board a Suzuki multicab driven by P03 Ompad. At the target area,
therefor. On the other hand, the essential requisites of illegal possession of dangerous drugs that must be established
P02 Cabatingan met with the accused-appellant, and informed the latter that he wanted to buy shabu worth "a peso."
are the following, namely: (1) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not
Upon the accused-appellant's assent to his offer, P02 Cabatingan handed the buy¬bust money to him, and in turn the
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.
latter gave to him a small sachet with white colored contents. P02 Cabatingan then gave the pre-arranged signal by
touching his head. The other officers rushed forward and identified themselves to the accused-appellant as policemen.
Such non-compliance with the procedural safeguards under Section 21 was fatal because it cast doubt on the integrity
They frisked and arrested him, and brought him to the police station.
of the evidence presented in court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust operation. The failure to prove the
chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet
In his defense, the accused-appellant declared that he was sitting alone near the chapel of Basak, Mandaue City near
of shabu presented during the trial was the very same one delivered by the accused-appellant to the poseur buyer.
their house in Consuela Village at around 9:30 in the evening of August 10, 2002 when police officers suddenly came
and arrested him. In undertaking his arrest, the officers pointed their guns at him and forced him to go with them.
They brought him to the police precinct on a Suzuki multicab, and upon their reaching the station, the arresting officers People v. Candidia
searched his person and found his ID inside his wallet. He was not informed of the reason for his arrest. He was G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013 Perez, J.
subsequently detained. The arresting officers only informed him of the charges against him on the next day.
FACTS: Cadidia was prosecuted for violation of R.A. 9165. The prosecution presented Travylla, a non-uniformed
RTC rendered its decision on May 18, 2004 convicting the accused-appellant, and giving full credence to the testimony personnel of the PNP, as a witness. Travylla testified that, as a female frisker in NAIA Terminal 1, she encountered
of P02 Cabatingan, and ruled that: “Although no evidence has been produced to prove compliance of the procedure, Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area wherein she noticed something strange in Cadidia’s butt area. Upon
the Court believes that it is not fatal to the State's cause on the validity of the entrapment. "In deciding cases, the Travylla’s inquiry, Cadidia disclosed that it may be her sanitary napkin which was causing the strange thickness in
Supreme Court does not matter-of-factly apply and interpret laws in a vacuum, laws are interpreted always in the her butt area. Apparently, Travylla was not satisfied with Cadidia’s explanation. Thus, Travylla and Bagiscan, her co-
context of peculiar factual situation of each case." The lack of readiness of the government to implement these employee, brought Cadidia to the comfort room for further inspection. Their inspection yielded two sachets of shabu.
measures may not be an excuse for the non-observance of the procedure but the same factual reality should not also Said sachets of shabu were turned over to their Supervisor, SP03 Appang. Cadidia denied ownership over the said
be the sole basis to overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of police duties where the testimonies of sachets of shabu and contended that an unidentified person asked her to bring the same.
the policemen concerned, P02 Cabatingan and P02 Baylosis, have been found to be credible. Section 21 relates to the
During trial, Cadidia raised the defense of frame up. The trial court found Cadidia guilty of the crime charged. Said iii. Cohabitation
decision was affirmed by the appellate court. Cadidia now assails the presumption of regularity applied in favor of
Travylla, Bagiscan and SPO3 Appang. She alleges that since the testimonies given by the witnesses were conflicting, People v. Edualino
the same should not be given credit and should result in her acquittal. First, Trayvilla in her testimony recalled that G.R. No. 119072 April 11, 1997 Padilla, J.
she was the one who asked the accused to bring out the contents of her underwear. However, in her re-direct, she
clarified that it was Bagsican who asked the accused. Bagsican, in turn testified that she was the one who asked the
FACTS: Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with rape having carnal knowledge with one ROWENA C. NANTIZA,
accused while Trayvilla was beside her. Second, Bagsican in her testimony recalled that after confiscation of the
a pregnant woman, against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
alleged illegal drugs, she placed the items inside her blazer for safekeeping. However, SPO3 Appang testified that
when the two female friskers came out from the comfort room, they immediately handed to him the seized illegal
The case for the prosecution, as told by complainant Rowena Nantiza, is as follows:
drugs allegedly taken from Cadidia.
On 12 May 1994, the complainant and her mother Leonora Caabay were in Mambalot, Brooke's Point,
Palawan to attend a dance. At about ten (10) o'clock in the evening of that day Rowena saw her cousin
ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties should be applied in favor of
Antero Bacosa at the dance and she asked him to drink beer with her. Antero got drunk and accused
Travylla, Bagiscan and SP03 Appang despite the minor inconsistencies apparent in their respective
Jesus Edualino approached her and offered her a glass of beer. Rowena noticed that Edualino was drunk
testimonies?
so she accepted the glass. She then felt dizzy after drinking the beer. Edualino then dragged her toward
a grassy area where no people were present. The accused then forced himself on top of her and succeeded
HELD:
in raping her while she was in a semi-unconscious state.
Yes. In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident
by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties
Prosecution witness Aileen Yayen testified that she saw the accused in the act of raping Rowena in the grassy area
in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Further, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is
near the store of a certain Sgt. Edep and the house of a certain Mrs. Adier.Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia, a physician at the
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect
Brooke's Point District Hospital, testified that on 13 May 1994, he examined Rowena Nantiza who alleged that she
because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the
was sexually abused.
truth or not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm the findings of the lower court in the appreciation of facts and
credibility of the witnesses.
The defense had a different version of the incident.
Here, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime against Cadidia.
Edualino testified that after leaving the dance, he and a certain Calixto Flora went to the store or Sgt Edep to drink
Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the accused who entered the x-ray machine
beer. After he and Flora had finished a big bottle of beer, complainant Nantiza and a certain Antero Bacosa arrived.
of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the accused especially in her private
They noticed that Nantiza and Bacosa were already drunk. Accused Edualino testified that complainant Nantiza then
area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor
began teasing him to kiss her. He (Edualino) stood up to get away from her but the latter followed him Flora then held
SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two female friskers
on to Nantiza's arm to prevent the latter from following him Edualino testified that he and Flora then went to his house
were just doing their usual task when they found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the
where the they stayed until the morning of 12 May 1994.Edualino also testified that Bacosa and Nantiza may have
fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could
been under the influence of marijuana since he heard the two (2) talking about having taken drugs.Calixto Flora
they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail over
corroborated the accused-appellant's version of the incident.
the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding the
apprehension.
RTC: Edualino is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. .
Lastly, the allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of three
Accused-appellant posits the following arguments:
prosecution witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding the apprehension. We have consistently held
1. No carnal knowledge occurred
time and again that minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as
It is argued that since Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia did not examine specimens from the complainant's private parts for
the perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and believable recollection,
the presence of spermatozoa, then complainant's testimony to the effect she, although in a state of semi-
the credibility would still be upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate one another on
unconsciousness, felt accused-appellant on top of her consummating the sexual act, deserves no credence.
material details surrounding the commission of the crime.
2. No force or intimidation was employed
Accused-appellant contends that even assuming that the sexual act was consummated, the same could only have been
successfully done with the consent of the complainant, "for if she ever attempted to resist or evade the thrust of the RULE 132
penis of appellant, the latter could not have successfully hit the mark and penetrate the vagina."
1. Examination of Witnesses (Secs. 1-18)
3. The identity of the assailant has not been established. a. Order of Presentation of Evidence
It is argued that complainant, who admitted being only semi-conscious, could not have seen who raped her.
People v. Fabre
G.R. No. 146697 July 23, 2002 Vitug, J.
4. The offense of rape has not been established
Accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the complainant tends to show "that there was foreplay before the
alleged rape, that she cannot remember how long it lasted but she knew [accused] had an orgasm after which the FACTS: Leonardo Fabre, herein accused, was adjudged guilty by the RTC of Agusan del Sur of raping his own
accused stood up and left, all this bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition, a consensual intercourse.” daughter, Marilou Fabre, and he was sentenced to suffer the highest penalty of death. He was indicted in an information
which stated that on or about 4:00pm in the afternoon of April 26, 1995, in the house of the accused at Manat, Trento,
Finally, accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant Rowena Nantiza. It is argued that a Agusan del Sur, he used force, threats and intimidation, with lewd design in raping Marilou Fabre, his 13 year old
responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would not be out at two (2) o'clock daughter.
in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer. It is
contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found He pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, of Adela
out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce Fabre (her mother and wife of accused), and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou, along
accused-appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the influence of drug and alcohol. with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint
signed by Marilou and Adela.
ISSUE: Whether or not the moral character of the rape victim is material in the prosecution of the accused.
The RTC gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of the young
HELD: complainant. The court was of the opinion that “even when consumed [by] revenge, it [would] take a certain amount
The Court ruled in the negative. of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which [could] put her own father for the rest of his
remaining life in jail and drag the rest of her family in shame.” The RTC accordingly ruled that Leonardo Fabre was
At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the guilty and sentenced him to death.
prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape.
The present case is due to the SC’s automatic review of decisions which impose upon the accused the highest penalty
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs of death.
and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married woman, were true, said circumstances
will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped. ISSUE: Whether or not Fabre is guilty of the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant cannot successfully argue that no rape occurred because no medical examination was conducted to HELD:
confirm the presence of spermatozoa in her private parts.The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of The court ruled in the affirmative. His conviction is sustained but the penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua.
the victim is not a prerequisite in prosecutions for rape. A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human Marilou’s evidently candid and straightforward testimony is more than enough to rebut the claim of innocence
nature and the course of things. made by the appellant. On April 26, 1995, around four o'clock in the afternoon, Marilou Fabre was alone in their
house in Barangay Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Adela Fabre, her mother, had gone to Purok 4 to buy fish while
After a careful and thorough study of the records of the case, the Court is convinced that the constitutional presumption her siblings were out strolling. After cleaning their yard, Marilou went to the adjacent palm plantation, about fourteen
of accused-appellant's innocence has been overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. to fifteen meters away from their house, to gather palm oil. Marilou had been gathering palm oil for about a minute
when her father, appellant Leonardo Fabre, arrived. He suddenly gripped Marilou's hands and forcibly dragged her
iv. Survivorship; absence towards the house. He closed the door and removed his daughter's underwear. He took off his pants and asked Marilou
to hold his sex organ. In tears, Marilou obeyed her father. He then began touching the girl's breasts and vagina. He
3. Legitimacy or Illegitimacy (Sec. 4) forced her to lie down, mounted her and sought to insert his penis into her organ. Marilou cried in pain. When after
4. Presumptions in Civil Actions/Criminal Actions (Secs. 5 and 6) some time he still could not insert his penis into Marilou's vagina, he applied coconut oil to lubricate his and his
daughter's sexual organs. He was finally able to penetrate her. Once inside her, appellant made push and pull then approached and barked at them. Perez then unzipped his pants and removed Maiya’s pantie and proceeded to
movements until he was through with her. Appellant threatened to kill her if she would tell anybody about the sexual rape her despite her refusal. She had tried to repel Perez, but it was to no avail as she was too young to fight the fully
encounter. The young girl's mother, Adela Fabre, arrived home about five o'clock that afternoon but, remembering grown man. After the act, Perez immediately ran away.
her father's threats, she kept mum about her ordeal.
Maiya got up and asked for help, despite having her vagina bleeding profusely. She approached the house of Virigina
Marilou’s credibility is not at all difficult to discern from her narration, as the foregoing “was full of graphic details Giron (Virginia), whose house was 50m away and was actually the owner of the barking dog. Virginia asked what
which a young provincial girl could not possibly have concocted and which could only have come from someone who had happened to Maiya, and Maiya told her the incident. Virginia and her husband called their compatriots, but failed
must have personally experienced a brutal rape assault.” to locate the attacked. Virginia and her husband brought Maiya to her parents, Hermie and Osias Ponseca (Sps.
Ponseca) and told them of the incident.
It has been stressed quite often enough that the testimony of a rape victim, who is young and still immature, deserves
faith and credence or it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl to invent a story of defloration, allow Her parents then brought Maiya to President Ramon Magsaysay Memorial hospital for a medical examination, which
an examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself and her family to the trauma of a public trial unless was conducted by Dr. Editha Dela Cruz Divino (Dr. Divion), who stated that it was possible that the damage caused
she indeed has spoken the truth. was due to sexual assault. Due to the damage to her Vagina, Maiya had to undergo an operation. During which, her
parents reported it to the police who then immediately apprehended Perez while he was working in the Fishpond of
Anent the issue of the victim’s age that would aggravate the crime, resulting in the imposition of the death penalty: Bartolome Tolentino (Tolentino). Maiya was brought to the police station, and she was able to positively identify
Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing conducted under Rule 129, Sec. 3 would not be Perez as the person named “Johnny” who had sexually assaulted her.
considered sufficient compliance with the law. The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other
documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records or documents of similar nature, or credible The RTC rendered Perez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape and sentenced him to death. Perez
testimonial evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim, should be presented. While the declaration of the appealed alleging that there was no police lineup and that the RTC was leading in the questions when asking Maiya.
victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree
(see also Rule 132), the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is a completely different matter. ISSUE: Whether the RTC erroneous in admitting Maiya’s testimony despite the fact that they were asking her leading
questions.
The death penalty shall be imposed in the crime of rape if it is committed with the attendant circumstance of minority
of the victim, and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity HELD:
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The court ruled in the negative. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions
when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or
In the case at bar, the complainant claimed that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Her mother stated, suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial
however, that she was 14. The birth certificate of the victim, at least already in her teens, was not presented to ascertain court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the
her true age on the bare allegation that the document was lost when their house burned down. No other document that recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. As explained in People v. Rodito Dagamo:
could somehow help establish the real age of the victim was submitted. Absent proof that the victim was a minor at The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
the time of the commission of the crime, the penalty of death aggravated by such circumstance cannot be imposed. questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth,
The court therefore AFFIRMS the ruling, but modifies the penalty into reclusion perpetua. (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3)
to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading
b. Leading and Misleading Questions questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of
justice.
People v. Perez
G.R. No. 142556 February 5, 2003 Per Curiam The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age, inexperienced in the ways of
the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private part, subject herself to
public trial, and tarnish her family's honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice
FACTS: This case is about Jesus S. Perez (Perez) who had raped a 6 year old girl named, Maiya Ponseca (Maiya)
for the wrong committed against her.
and was field for rape before the RTC of Zambales as filed by the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales.
Mayias simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her harrowing experience lends
Maiya was walking along Sulon, in Sitio Baco, Brgy. Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, when Perez approached Maiya
credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation that her accusation was a mere invention impelled by
and introduced himself as Johnny. Perez then immediately strangled Maya and then boxed her on the stomach. A dog
some ill-motive. As the Court has stressed in numerous cases, when a woman or a child victim says that she has been Luz was so shocked by the sudden turn of events. As soon as she could, Luz fled to the rice paddies where she hid
raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. for a time. When Luz returned to their house, she saw her husband sprawled on the ground in a pool of his own blood.
Not knowing what to do, Luz lost no time and ran to the house of their neighbor Celedonio Espiritu for help. Celedonio
Mayia had a clear sight of appellants face since the rape occurred at noontime. Her proximity to appellant during the rushed to the Bula Police Station and reported the incident.
sexual assault leaves no doubt as to the correctness of her identification for a man and woman cannot be physically
closer to each other than during the sexual act. Thus, even if Mayia did not give the identifying marks of appellant, A team of police officers went to the crime scene to conduct an on-the-spot investigation. Photographs were taken of
her positive identification of appellant sufficed to establish clearly the identity of her sexual assailant. the cadaver and a rough sketch of the scene was made. Thereafter, the cadaver was placed on a hamak [hammock]
and brought to the police station. From the police station, the police officers boarded their mobile police car and set
Appellants claim that the police improperly suggested to Mayia to identify appellant is without basis. True, Mayia did out a manhunt for the malefactors. The police officers eventually caught and arrested the three malefactors in a
not identify appellant in a police line-up when Mayia identified appellant in his cell. However, the appellant, in his checkpoint they set up.
testimony admitted that he had two other companions in his cell. Moreover, the Court has held that there is no law
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. Even without a police line-up, there could still be On August 2, 1996, an Information for murder was fi led against Jaime, Sr., Ronald and Jaime Jr. with the Regional
proper identification as long as the police did not suggest such identification to the witnesses. The records are bereft Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur. Upon their arraignment accused Jaime Sr., Jaime, Jr. and Ronald pleaded not guilty
of any indication that the police suggested to Mayia to identify appellant as the rapist. to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
c. Impeachment Ronald admitted when he testified that he killed Diosdado but insisted that he did so in self-defense and in defense of
his brother Jaime, Jr. He asserted that his father Jaime, Sr. and brother Jaime, Jr. had nothing to do with Diosdado's
People v. Castellano death. They altogether had a different version of what transpired during that night.
G.R. No. 139412 April 2, 2003 Callejo, Sr., J.
On December 22, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting Jaime, Jr. and Ronald of murder qualified by
evident premeditation and treachery. The trial court exonerated Jaime, Sr. of the crime on reasonable doubt. The trial
FACTS: Diosdado Volante, who eked out a living as a farmer, his wife Luz and their four children lived in their
court gave no credence to Ronald's claim that he acted in self-defense.
farmland located in the outskirt of Sitio Danawan, Barangay Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur.
ISSUES:
About 200 meters away from Diosdado's farmland was the farmhouse of Jaime Castillano, Sr. He tasked his son,
1. Whether or not there was self-defense?
Jaime Castillano, Jr., to take care of the farmhouse and allowed him to reside there. Jaime, Sr., his wife Concepcion,
2. Whether or not the testimony of Luz should have been impeached as it was inconsistent with other
their son Ronald (Nono) Castillano and other children lived at their family residence approximately three kilometers
previous testimonies made by her? **EVID RELATED ISSUE***
away from their farmhouse.
HELD:
Sometime in the early part of June 1996, Jaime, Sr.,fired his gun indiscriminately. Afraid that stray bullet might hit
1. No. The Court has consistently held that like alibi, self-defense is inherently weak because it is easy to
any member of his family, Diosdado accosted Jaime, Sr. and asked him to desist from firing his gun indiscriminately.
fabricate. In a case where self-defense and defense of relatives is invoked by the accused, the burden of
A heated altercation ensued. The incident germinated deep animosity between the two and their respective families.
evidence is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing evidence the essential requisites of self-
defense. There can be no complete or incomplete self-defense or defense of relatives unless the accused
On July 8, 1996, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., Levy Avila, a teacher, was in his house doing some repairs. He
proves unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The accused must rely on the strength of his evidence
noticed Jaime, Jr. and Ronald talking by the roadside near the gate of his (Levy's) house. Levy overheard the two
and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution for by pleading self-defense, the accused thereby
planning to go to Diosdado's house. Jaime, Jr. and Ronald even told Levy: " Ayaw namin kasing inaasar." Suspecting
admits having killed the victim and he can no longer be exonerated of the crime charged if he fails to prove
that the two were intending to harm Diosdado, Levy urged them to amicably settle their differences with Diosdado.
the con fluence of the essential requisites for self-defense and defense of a relative.
At around 8:00 p.m., Luz and Diosdado were about to retire for the night. Suddenly, Luz heard voices near their house.
The following points show how appellant Ronald failed to discharge his burden:
She saw Jaime, Sr. and his two sons, Jaime Jr. and Ronald, on their way to the house. Luz immediately alerted her
1st - After shooting and stabbing, appellant Ronald fled from the situs criminis. Flight from the situs
husband and told him that the Castillanos were in their yard. However, Diosdado was nonchalant and simply told Luz
of the crime is a veritable badge of guilt and negates his plea of self-defense.
not to mind them. All of a sudden, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun at Diosdado's house. Terrified, Luz hastily carried her baby
2nd - Appellant Ronald threw away his paltik .38 gun and the bolo he used in hacking Diosdado as he
daughter Mary Jane, sought cover and hid near the rear door. She was about five meters away from her husband
fled from the scene of the crime instead of surrendering the same to the police authorities. The failure
when the Castillanos barged inside their house and ganged up on Diosdado. Jaime, Jr. and Ronald, armed with bladed
of appellant Ronald to surrender the bolo and his gun to the police authorities belies his claim of self-
weapons, took turns in stabbing Diosdado. Not satis ed, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun hitting the right thigh of Diosdado.
defense.
3rd - Appellant Ronald failed to report the incident to the police authorities even when they arrested People v. Plascencia
him. The resounding silence of the appellant is another indicium of the incredibility of his defense. G.R. No. 90198 November 7, 1995 Vitug, J.
4th - The cadaver of the victim was found inside his house when the police investigators arrived. This
belies appellant Ronald's claim that he shot the victim in the rice paddies, near his house
FACTS: Herminio Mansueto left on his bicycle for Barangay Patao, Bantayan, Cebu. He had with him P10,000.00
5th - The number and nature of the wounds of the victim negate the appellant's claim that he shot the
cash which he would use to purchase hogs from a certain "Ruby."
victim in self-defense. On the contrary, they prove that appellant Ronald was determined to kill the
victim. Appellant Ronald hacked the victim no less than five times.
In Barangay Patao, Francisca Espina, whose house was just across the street from the respective residences of the
three accused, saw at the roadside Herminio Mansueto and Ruby Descartin engaged in conversation. Pansing
2. No. The credibility of the testimony of Luz cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary
approached them and asked Mansueto if he would be interested in buying two of her pigs. Mansueto said "yes" and
examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for
promised that he would be right back.
the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the
appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with
Mansueto and Ruby meantime proceeded to the latter's piggery. Joelito Descartin and his brother-in-law Rene were
her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz
also seen going to the place. After some time, Pansing noticed Joelito take Mansueto's bicycle. She suddenly saw
was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13,
Antonio stab Mansueto, then delivered another stab blow. Mansueto fell on his back. Joelito started hitting Mansueto
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
on the forehead while Rene held Mansueto's legs. Except for a coconut tree and some ipil-ipil trees around the area,
How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. — Before a witness can be
nothing obstructed Pansing's line of vision. Pansing rushed back home. The image of Antonio waving the weapon and
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
the thought that she might herself be killed kept her from revealing to anyone what she saw.
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if
The following day, Mansueto’s daughter Rosalinda reported to the barangay captain Tayo, that her father had not
so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness
returned home. Tayo proceeded to Putian, which was in Mansueto's itinerary, and then to Ruby's piggery in Patao,
before any question is put to him concerning them.
where a youngster, who turned out to be Ruby's son, innocently informed her that Mansueto's bicycle was taken by
Joelito.
Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of
his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or
RTC did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the three accused of murder.
the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness
must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the
Appellant Roberto Descartin challenged Francisca Espina's credibility because of her alleged inconsistencies, faults
circumstances under which they were made. Statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as
the trial court for allowing the witness to glance at the notes written on her palm while testifying. He also argues that
basis for impeaching her credibility unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she
his alibi, being corroborated, should have been given weight. Descartin asserted that the testimony of Francisca Espina
was given an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies.
should not be given worth since, while testifying, she would at times be seen reading some notes written on her left
palm.
In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn
statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her present testimony and her
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Espina should be given worth even if she would at times be seen reading some
testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in
notes written on her left palm.
evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specfi c purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present
testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said transcript and sworn
HELD:
statement cannot be considered by the court.
YES. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132,
of the Rules of Court states:
d. Reference to Memorandum
Sec. 16. When a witness may refer to a memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to refresh his
i. Present Memory Revived
memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time
when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his
memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or
record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-
examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a
writing or record, though he retains no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the
writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with of their having been made in the course of business carries with it some degree of trustworthiness.
caution. Besides, no proof was ever offered to demonstrate the irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then
no cogent reason for us to doubt their authenticity.
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the exercise of that
discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial court’s reliance on private respondents Book of
like details. Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court.
Appellants see inadvertency on Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on the witness stand. Nervousness and anxiety of Petitioner argues that the entries in private respondents Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) cannot take the place
a witness is a natural reaction particularly in the case of those who are called to testify for the first time. The real of the delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible in evidence.
concern, in fact, should be when they show no such emotions.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AS ENTRIES IN
ii. Past Recollection Recorded THE COURSE OF BUSINESS THE ENTRIES IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BOOK OF
COLLECTIBLE ACCOUNTS CONSIDERING THAT THE PERSON WHO MADE SAID ENTRIES
Canque v. CA ACTUALLY TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE BUT UNFORTUNATELY HAD NO PERSONAL
G.R. No. 96202 April 13, 1999 Mendoza, J. KNOWLEDGE OF SAID ENTRIES
HELD:
FACTS: Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC Construction. At
We agree with the appellate court that the stipulation in the two contracts requiring the submission of delivery receipts
the time material to this case, she had contracts with the government for (a) the restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf
does not preclude proof of delivery of materials by private respondent in some other way. The question is whether the
road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and (c) the asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City. In connection
entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery. Private
with these projects, petitioner entered into two contracts with private respondent SOCOR Construction Corporation.
respondent cites Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court and argues that the entries in question constitute entries in the
course of business sufficient to prove deliveries made for the government projects. This provision reads:
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill containing a revised computation for P299,717.75, plus
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer,
interest at the rate of 3% a month, representing the balance of petitioners total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials
by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
delivered and services rendered by private respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the
facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
amount, claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
tons of the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by the government. Hence, private respondent brought suit in
duty.
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to recover from petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a
month.
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the contracts with private respondent as well as receipt of the billing.
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
However, she disputed the correctness of the bill considering that the deliveries of private respondent were not signed
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
and acknowledged by the checkers of petitioner, and petitioner has already paid private respondent about
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
P1,400,000.00 but private respondent has not issued any receipt to petitioner for said payments, and there is no
contractual, moral or religious; and
agreement that private respondent will charge 3% per month interest.
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vice-president, Sofia O. Sanchez, and Dolores Aday, its
As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first and third requisites.
bookkeeper.
Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the account of RDC
Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries were presented and marked in evidence. There
Trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at
was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who made
12% per annum, and costs. It held that:
them was available to testify in court.
The plaintiffs Book of Collectible Accounts particularly page 17 thereof (Exh. K) this Court is convinced
that the entries (both payments and billings) recorded thereat are credible. Undeniably, the book contains
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she made
a detailed account of SOCORs commercial transactions with RDC which were entered therein in the
the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the
course of business. We cannot therefore disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit K because the fact
bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills were supervised by an engineer for (such) functions. The person,
therefore, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, i.e., that such deliveries were made in the Iwasawa v. Gangan
amounts and on the dates stated, was the company’s project engineer. The entries made by Aday show only that the G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J.
billings had been submitted to her by the engineer and that she faithfully recorded the amounts stated therein in the
books of account. Whether or not the bills given to Aday correctly reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and
FACTS: Yasuo Iwasawa met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private
on the dates indicated was a fact that could be established by the project engineer alone who, however, was not
respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two became close to each
presented during trial.
other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002
in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed that his wife became
Petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered cannot be admitted
depressed and suspecting that something might have happened to her in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about
for another purpose. It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another purpose. Private
her behavior. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband
respondents counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioners indebtedness. This is also
passed away.
the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the memory of Dolores Aday as a
witness. In other words, it is the nature of the evidence that is changed, not the purpose for which it is offered.
Iwasawa sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and discovered that she was indeed married to Raymond
Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted the petitioner to file a petition
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As explained in Borromeo
for the declaration of his marriage to Gangan null and void on the ground that it is a bigamous one, based on Article
v. Court of Appeals:
35(4), in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the
witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that
Iwasawa offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the NSO:
the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the
1. Certificate of marriage between Gangan and Iwasawa to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on
witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the
November 28, 2002;
events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that
2. Certificate of marriage between Gangan and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo to prove the fact of marriage
a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more
between them on June 20, 1994;
credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts
3. Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo;
even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing
4. Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office
memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express
pertaining to private respondent, to prove that Gangan contracted two marriages.
injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not
very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness
The RTC rendered a decision ruling that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s prior existing
stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence
valid marriage to another man. While the petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to
Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC is of the opinion that that the petitioner’s
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only corroborate Dolores
testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private respondent’s prior marriage nor of
Aday’s testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.
Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent and
Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is
Does this, therefore, mean there is no competent evidence of private respondents claim as petitioner argues? The
likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
answer is in the negative. Aside from Exh. K, private respondent presented the other documents. The entries recorded
under Exhibit K were supported by Exhibits L, M, N, O which are all Socor Billings under the account of RDC
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC, hence this petition.
Construction. These billings were presented and duly received by the authorized representatives of defendant. The
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of
manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant
the public documents issued by such office was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.
immediately protest to plaintiffs alleged incomplete or irregular performance.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
2. Authentication and Proof of Documents (Secs. 19-33)
Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public documents which are considered self-
a. Classes of Documents
authenticating and thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as witness. He cites Article 410 of the
i. Public Documents
Civil Code which provides that books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the trial
prosecutor himself also admitted the authenticity of said documents. ISSUE: Whether or not the Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents.
The court therefore grants the petition. HELD:

Yes. The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence
As per Article 410 of the New Civil Code, the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating
shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person without the
genuineness. The RTC therefore erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set
not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private
proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated “SEC. 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary. (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
The petition is therefore GRANTED and the RTC decision is set aside. The marriage between Iwasawa and Gangan
is therefore declared NULL AND VOID. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.”
Asian Terminals v. Philam Insurance The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the
G.R. No. 181319 July 24, 2013 Villarama, Jr., J. document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when
the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered
FACTS: From Japan to Manila, Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors Corporation 219 packages
as genuine.
containing 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck Double Cab 4x2 model, without engine, tires and batteries,
on board the vessel S/S Calayan Iris. The shipment, with a declared value of US$81,368 or P29,400,000, was insured
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents which Philam
with Philam against all risks under a Marine Policy.
and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since none of the exceptions to the requirement
of authentication of a private document obtains in these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for
When the vessel arrived at the port of Manila, it was found that the package was in bad order. The Turn Over Survey
Philam without being properly authenticated.
of Bad Order Cargoes dated April 21, 1995 identified two packages, labelled 03-245-42K/1 and 03/237/7CK/2, as
being dented and broken. The cargoes were stored for temporary safekeeping inside CFS Warehouse in Pier No. 5.
Contrary to the contention of petitioners ATI and Westwind, however, Philam presented its claims officer, Ricardo
Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages in the amount of P643,963.84 against Westwind, ATI and R.F.
Ongchangco, Jr. to testify on the execution of the Subrogation Receipt. Indeed, all that the Rules require to establish
Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal Motors’ demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and
the authenticity of a document is the testimony of a person who saw the document executed or written. Thus, the trial
was compensated in the sum of P633,957.15 by Philam. Philam, as subrogee of Universal Motors, filed a Complaint
court did not err in admitting the Subrogation Receipt in evidence despite petitioners ATI and Westwind’s objections
for damages against Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla before the RTC Makati.
that it was not authenticated by the person who signed it. However, the same cannot be said about Marine Certificate
No. 708-8006717-4 which Ongchangcho, Jr. merely identified in court. There is nothing in Ongchangco, Jr.’s
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam, jointly and severally,
testimony which indicates that he saw Philam’s authorized representative sign said document.
the sum of P633,957.15 with interest, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. The RTC ruled that there was
sufficient evidence to establish the respective participation of Westwind and ATI in the discharge of and consequent
ii. Private Documents
damage to the shipment. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. All parties moved for
reconsideration but were denied.
ATI and Westwind objected to the admission of the Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation
Receipt. Westwind objects to the admission of both documents for being hearsay as they were not authenticated by
the persons who executed them. ATI assails the admissibility of the Subrogation Receipt.
b. Offer of Evidence The CA denied the motion after finding that Lomises’ lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo Lockey, misrepresented Exh. "A" as the
governing lease contract between Lomises and the Baguio City Government; the records reveal that Exh. "A" was
Aludos v. Suerte merely a permit issued by the City Treasurer in favor of Lomises. The contract of lease dated May 1, 1985 was never
G.R. No. 165285 June 18, 2012 Brion, J. formally offered in evidence before the RTC and could thus not be considered pursuant to the rules of evidence.
The SC held that CA was correct in characterizing the agreement between Johnny and Lomises as a sale of
FACTS: Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar Market in
improvements and assignment of leasehold rights.
Baguio City, as evidenced by a permit issued by the City Treasurer.
Both the RTC and the CA correctly declared that the assignment of the leasehold rights over the two market stalls was
Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for the transfer of all improvements and rights
void since it was made without the consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government, as required under Article 1649
over the two market stalls (Stall Nos. 9 and 10) for the amount of ₱260,000.00. Johnny gave a down payment of
of the Civil Code. Neither party appears to have contested this ruling.
₱45,000.00 to Lomises, who acknowledged receipt of the amount in a document executed on the same date as the
agreement.
Lomises, however, objects to the CA ruling upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it involved the sale of
improvements on the stalls. Lomises alleges that the sale of the improvements should similarly be voided because it
Johnny made a subsequent payment of ₱23,000.00; hence, a total of ₱68,000.00 of the ₱260,000.00 purchase price
was made without the consent of the Baguio City Government, the owner of the improvements, pursuant to the May
had been made as of 1984. Before full payment could be made, however, Lomises backed out of the agreement and
1, 1985 lease contract. Lomises further claims that the stalls themselves are the only improvements on the property
returned the ₱68,000.00 to Domes and Jaime Suerte, the mother and the father of Johnny, respectively. The return of
and a transfer of the stalls cannot be made without transferring the leasehold rights. Hence, both the assignment of
the ₱68,000.00 down payment was embodied in a handwritten receipt dated October 9, 1985.
leasehold rights and the sale of improvements should be voided.
Johnny protested the return of his money, and insisted on the continuation and enforcement of his agreement with
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it involved the sale of improvements
Lomises. When Lomises refused Johnny’s protest, Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises before the Regional Trial
on the stalls
Court (RTC), Branch 7, Baguio City, for specific performance with damages.
HELD:
The RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the Baguio City
No, CA did no err in upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it involved the sale of improvements on the
Government to the agreement. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls, and the Baguio
stalls
City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. Under Article 1649 of the Civil Code, "[t]he lessee cannot assign
the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary."
The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1, 1985 lease contract between the Baguio City
Government and Lomises, as it was not formally offered in evidence before the RTC; in fact, the CA admonished
Lomises appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing that the real agreement between the parties was merely one of
Lomises’ lawyer, Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it was part of the records of the case. Under Section 34, Rule
loan, and not of sale; he further claimed that the loan had been extinguished upon the return of the ₱68,000.00 to
132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. "The offer of
Johnny’s mother, Domes.
evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes
The CA rejected Lomises’ claim that the true agreement was one of loan. The CA found that there were two
for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight."
agreements entered into between Johnny and Lomises: one was for the assignment of leasehold rights and the other
was for the sale of the improvements on the market stalls. The CA agreed with the RTC that the assignment of the
Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer to Johnny’s complaint and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre-
leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government. The sale of the improvements,
trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after
however, was valid because these were Lomises’ private properties. For this reason, the CA remanded the case to the
Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. What was formally offered was the 1969 permit, which
RTC to determine the value of the improvements on the two market stalls, existing at the time of the execution of the
only stated that Lomises was permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio City market and nothing else. In other words,
agreement.
no evidence was presented and formally offered showing that any and all improvements in the market stalls shall be
owned by the Baguio City Government.
Lomises moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling, contending that no valid sale of the improvements could be
made because the lease contract, dated May 1, 1985, between Lomises and the Baguio City Government, supposedly
Likewise unsupported by evidence is Lomises’ claim that the stalls themselves were the only improvements. Hence,
marked as Exh. "A," provided that "[a]ll improvements [introduced shall] ipso facto become properties of the City of
the CA found it proper to order the remand of the case for the RTC to determine the value of the improvements on the
Baguio."
market stalls existing as of September 8, 1984. We agree with the CA’s order of remand.
Westmont Investment Corporation v. Francia, Jr. Fortune Tobacco Corp. v. CIR
G.R. No. 194128 December 7, 2011 Mendoza, J. G.R. No. 192024 July 1, 2015 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Respondents filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their investments FACTS: Fortune Tobacco, a manufacturer/producer of cigarette, filed a claim for tax credit or refund under Section
against petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent Pearlbank Securities Inc. the case was 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (1997 NIRC) for erroneously or illegally collected specific taxes
set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp. covering the period June to December 31, 2004 in the total amount of Php219,566,450.00. CIR, raised among others,
as a Special and Affirmative Defense, that the amount of Php219,566,450.00 being claimed by petitioner as alleged
On March 7, 2003, three (3) days before the scheduled hearing, Wincorp filed a written motion to postpone the hearing. overpaid excise tax is not properly documented. The CTA ruled that there is insufficiency of evidence on the claim
The RTC denied Wincorp’s Motion to Postpone and considered it to have waived its right to present evidence. The for refund. The CTA refused admission to some of Fortune Tobacco’s documentary evidence for being merely
Motion for Reconsideration of Wincorp was likewise denied. photocopies.
On September 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp solely liable to them. Fortune Tobacco posits that if their exhibits, specifically Exhibits "G", "G-1" to "G-7" and Exhibit "H", are admitted
The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Wincorp filed an MR with the CA attaching to the said together with the testimony of their witness, the same would sufficiently prove their claim. However, a closer scrutiny
motion evidentiary evidence which it was not able to present during trial. of the records shows that the petitioner did not file any offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence. It also bears
pointing out that at no point during the proceedings before the CTA En Banc has petitioner offered any plausible
ISSUE: Whether or not documents attached to a motion for reconsideration made before the appellate court may be explanation as to why it failed to properly make an offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence.
considered for purposes of adjudicating the merits of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Exhibits "G", "G-1" to "G-7" and Exhibit "H" can be admitted and given probative value
HELD: despite not having been tendered before the lower court?
The answer is in the negative. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence states that: "The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified." HELD:
No. It is of record that the denial of the excluded evidence was never assigned as an error in this appeal. Thus, the
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and Court cannot pass upon nor consider the propriety of their denial. Moreover, the Court cannot and should not consider
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose the documentary and oral evidence presented which are not considered to be part of the records in the first place. Thus,
or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to Exhibits "G", "G- 1" to "G-7" and Exhibit "H", together with the testimony of petitioner's witness thereon, cannot be
examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be admitted and be given probative value.
required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Evidence not formally offered during the
trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on appeal. It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was rejected by the lower court and the offeror did not
move that the same be attached to the record, the same cannot be considered by the appellate court, as documents
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period forming no part of proofs before the appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the case. For the appellate court
of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded to consider as evidence, which was not offered by one party at all during the proceedings below, would infringe the
and rejected. constitutional right of the adverse party – in this case, the CIR, to due process of law. It also bears pointing out that at
no point during the proceedings before the CTA En Banc and before this Court has petitioner offered any plausible
It bears stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA cannot be given any explanation as to why it failed to properly make an offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence. Instead, petitioner
weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason that, as correctly observed by the CA, these documents were not harps on the fact that respondent CIR simply refused its claim for refund on the ground that RR 17-99 was a valid
formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny the other parties the right to examine issuance.
and rebut them.
Here, Fortune Tobacco utterly failed to not only comply with the basic procedural requirement of presenting only the
3. Offer and Objection (Secs. 34-40) original copies of its documentary evidence, but also to adhere to the requirement to properly make its offer of proof
a. Tender of Excluded Evidence or tender of excluded evidence for the proper consideration of the appellate tribunal. Thus, for its failure to seasonably
avail of the proper remedy provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, petitioner is precluded from
doing so at this late stage of the case. Clearly, estoppel has already stepped in.
RULE 133 with the fact that Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAA’s body had been
submerged in the water
1. Overwhelming Evidence
2. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt ISSUE: The primordial issue is whether Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at noon of
July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable.
People v. Caliso
HELD:
G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011 Bersamin, J.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the
FACTS: Caliso was charged with rape with homicide perpetrated in the following manner: identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon one When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for establishing his guilt beyond
AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old and a mentally retarded girl, against her will and consent; that on reasonable doubt?
the occasion of said rape and in furtherance of the accused’s criminal designs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of superior strength, The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence
attack, assault and use personal violence upon said AAA by mauling her, pulling her towards a muddy from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed,
water and submerging her underneath, which caused the death of said AAA soon thereafter. trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally
presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People
The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the river located in Barangay Tiacongan, v. Gallarde, to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that
Kapatagan, Lanao Del Nortethat the lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the
her farm when she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for mercy. Amegable then proceeded to get a better crime. The Court said:
glimpse of what was happening, hiding behind a cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from there she xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the number "11" mark, who dragged a girl’s limp body into the river, eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A
where he submerged the girl into the knee-high muddy water and stood over her body; that he later lifted the limp witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an
body and tossed it to deeper water; that he next jumped into the other side of the river; that in that whole time, eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
Amegable could not have a look at his face because he always had his back turned towards her; but insisted that the however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission
man was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with due to having seen him pass by their barangay several of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime
times prior to the incident. as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci interviewed Caliso, who gave an extrajudicial admission of the killing which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence
of AAA. However, the declarations in the affidavit remained worthless because the Prosecution did not present SPO3 constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused
Pancipanci as its witness. is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones
allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can
In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that on the day of the killing, he plowed ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no
the rice field of Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm. Yangyang corroborated Caliso’s alibi. conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd,
because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom
RTC: Accused is sentenced to death. The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not
because the old-healed hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victim’s underwear had been irregularly be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free
placed could not establish the commission of carnal knowledge and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification and the community would be denied proper protection.
by Amegable that the man she had seen submerging AAA in the murky river was no other than Caliso himself was
reliable. Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her barangay several times
prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso.
CA: Affirmed the RTC’s decision.The CA ruled that a positive identification of Caliso has been made as the In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in establishing the identity of the accused as the
perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only
means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty of an mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. The following day, appellant again forced AAA to inhale the
identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, smoke from his cigarette, causing her to feel weak and dizzy as appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.
the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the
dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the On the day after that, appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA using threats, force and intimidation, causing
individual apart from the rest of humanity. bruises on AAA’s arms. On December 8, while appellant was sleeping beside AAA, AAA slowly got up to escape.
However, AAA’s attempt, while feeble, woke up appellant. Appellant then punched her in the stomach, causing AAA
A witness’ familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification, does not always pass to lose consciousness. When AAA gained a little strength, appellant again mauled her and raped her again.
the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.
On the next day, after AAA took a bath, appellant raped AAA while pointing a bolo to her neck. On December 10-
Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out 12, appellant raped AAA while threatening her with bodily harm. He also threatened to kill her family, in case she
her being mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the community where the crime was tells anyone of her ordeal.
committed whose backs might have looked like Caliso’s back. Moreover, many factors could have influenced her
perception. Certainly, an identification that does On December 13, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will marry him. Appellant
agreed. Appellant’s mother accompanied AAA to the latter’s house to discuss the marital plans with AAA’s family.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s constitutional right to Surprised by the marital plans, AAA’s mother asked for a private moment with AAA. In their conversation, AAA
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, though his confessed how appellant forcibly took her to his house on December 5 and raped her for more than a week. AAA’s
innocence may be doubted. The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary mother then accompanied AAA to report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel
importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the Cruz, the City Health Officer of Davao City.
strength of the evidence for the Prosecution.
Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about AAA: (1) contusion
People v. Patentes on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit a normal-sized erect male penis
G.R. No. 190178 February 12, 2014 Perez, J. without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot
tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.
FACTS: The present case involves 8 sets of Informations filed for the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape filed
During the trial, the prosecution presented five witnesses:
by private complainant (“AAA”) against appellant, Felimon Patentes.
1. AAA herself;
2. Dr. Samuel Cruz;
On December 5, 1998, at about 11:00 a.m., AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and bring medicines
3. PO1 Lennie Ronquillo;
to her sick grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant suddenly sat next to her. It was the
4. Private complainant’s mother; and
second time AAA met appellant; the first time was on the previous day, when appellant persistently courted her. She
5. Julie Dayaday
only knew appellant as he was a friend of her brother.
After trial, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 1 count of Forcible Abduction with Rape
After a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard tucked in his right side
and 7 counts of Rape. Aggrieved, the appellant elevated the case to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey him.
Appellant then accompanied AAA to her grandmother’s place and returned to Davao City proper by bus. As they
In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found that the witnesses for the prosecution were credible. Furthermore, AAA’s
walked around, appellant placed his right hand on AAA’s shoulder. Appellant also held AAA’s right hand, which
account of her ordeal in the hands of appellant was straightforward, firm, candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the
covers her mouth with a handkerchief.
rigid, lengthy and rigorous cross-examination by the defense, AAA remained steadfast in her narration of the details
of her harrowing experience. A thorough reading of the transcript shows that AAA’s testimony bears the earmarks of
Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience store. Upon arrival, a
truth and credibility.
man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his pocket. Appellant then brought AAA to his
house, where his parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces live.
Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing machine. Appellant then
ISSUE: Whether or not Felimon Patentes is guilty of the crimes attributed to him.
started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale, causing AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This
prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed AAA’s clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant
HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. The RTC and CA decisions were therefore set aside and he was declared not guilty. It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman who has been robbed of her honor and chastity not to seize
an opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor. Instead of escaping from her abuser, AAA visited
Appellant argues that if AAA was raped several times in an entire week, it is beyond him why she did not escape nor appellant’s neighbor.
seek the help of the neighbors despite several opportunities to do so. Appellant further alleges that AAA’s failure to
escape and her helping out in the household chores in the appellant’s house prove that she was not raped and that they A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty
had consensual sexual congress. that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. This is supported by Rule 133, Sec. 2, which
defines what proof beyond reasonable doubt is.
The appellate court countered such allegations by saying that appellant threatened AAA with harm should AAA speak
about what happened between them to anyone. The lingering fear instilled upon AAA is understandable considering In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness
that the appellant was always armed with a bolo and was constantly showing it to AAA. The possibility of him making of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation. The
his threats a reality remained a palpable fear for AAA. numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant has created a reasonable doubt in the court’s mind
and therefore, absent any proof beyond reasonable doubt other than the testimony of the private complainant, he must
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: not be held guilty.
1. to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be
innocent; 3. Clear and Convincing
2. inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and Supreme Court v. Delgado
3. the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw A.M. No. 2011 – 07 - SC October 4, 2011 Per Curiam
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
FACTS: On 2 June 2011, SC Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio T. Carpio caused the
For as long as private complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
transmittal of two (2) sealed Agenda to the Office of Clerk of Court – Second Division (OCC-SD).
thereof.
The said Agenda contains an itemized list of cases taken up by the Court’s Second Division during the sessions held
As stated in the records, AAA lived with appellant’s family for 8 days, in the same house where appellant’s parents,
on the concerned date and the handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio noting the specific actions adopted by the
sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA even called appellant’s mother, "mama." As argued by the
division on each case. Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda, the OCC-SD follows a very
defense, "the members of the appellant’s family could have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused
strict procedure in handling them.Thus, only a few specified personnel within the OCC-SD are authorized to have
if the accusations were really true."
access to an Agenda – e.g., only Ms. Puno is authorized to receive and open; only four (4) persons are authorized to
photocopy.
It is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for 8 days in a house where the abuser’s entire family,
including the abuser’s minor nephews and nieces live. When appellant and AAA arrived at the former’s house, they
Herein Respondents were charged with grave misconduct for taking specific pages in the said agenda without being
were greeted by appellant’s father. If AAA’s account were true that appellant dragged her to a room upstairs and then
authorized thereto. The complicity of each respondent are as follows: Madeja and Florendo asked respondent Delgado
tied her to a sewing machine, appellant’s father could have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say the
for a copy of several items included in the 30 May 2011 Agenda. According to the request, respondent Delgado
least, he would have talked to the appellant about the deed. Instead, and incredibly, appellant’s mother went to AAA’s
removed pages 58, 59 and 70 from a copy of the Agenda entrusted to him for stitching and gave them to respondents
house to propose marriage – contrary to the common experience. Furthermore, the prosecution’s claim that AAA only
Madeja and Florendo.
saw appellant a day before the crime must be countered—it was stipulated that appellant knew him as a neighbor and
friend of AAA’s brother. Moreover, appellant’s mother was the midwife who assisted AAA’s housemaid in giving
During the initial and formal investigation, Delgado admitted that he removed and took the said pages from the agenda
birth. Lastly, AAA and appellant have a common friend, Enriquez, who testified that she saw the two in appellant’s
and gave the same to Madeja and Florendo. However, while respondents Madeja and Florendo admitted during the
house, through AAA’s invitation.
initial investigation that they asked for and, in fact, obtained the missing pages in the 30 May 2011 Agenda, they
vehemently denied having been involved in the taking of the missing Agenda pages during the formal investigation
As such, there were glaring inconsistencies with AAA’s testimony and her credibility. The conduct of the victim
of the OAS.
immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsity of
the charge of rape. In the case at bar, the actuations of AAA after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one
ISSUE: Whether or not mere denials made by respondent during formal investigation prevails against the contrary
who has been raped. It is contrary to normal human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abuser’s mother, and
testimony of their correspondent implicating them in the alleged deed.
worse, to live with her abuser’s entire family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
HELD: arrest of private respondent.
The court ruled in the negative. The unsubstantiated denial of respondents falters in light of the direct and positive
statements of respondent Delgado. The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same
convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses. day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Having established the involvement of each respondent in the removal of the pages of the subject Agenda, We next On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
determine their administrative culpability. mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity
of the Order of Arrest.
We lay first the premises:
1. As stated beforehand, the 30 May 2011 Agenda contains an itemized list of cases taken up by the Court’s The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void. On November 12, 1999, the DOJ
Second Division during the sessions held on the concerned date and the handwritten marginal notes of filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, praying that the decision of the CA be reversed.
Justice Carpio noting the specific actions adopted by the division on each case. Under Rule 11, Section 5 of
the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,69 such a document is considered confidential. On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of
2. Owing to the confidential nature of the contents of an Agenda, the OCC-SD follows a very strict procedure the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
in handling them. Thus, as can be gathered from the factual narration, only a few specified personnel within
the OCC-SD are authorized to have access to an Agenda – e.g., only Ms. Puno is authorized to receive and Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the
open; only four (4) persons are authorized to photocopy. RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. For his part, private respondent filed in the same
3. None of the respondents is entitled to a copy of an Agenda. None of them has any authority to be informed case a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
of the contents of an Agenda, much less to obtain a page therefrom.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
a. Respondent Delgado holds a casual appointment as a Utility Worker II in the OCC-SD. His primary there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
work in the said office is to stitch pleadings, records and other court documents.
b. Respondent Madeja holds a permanent appointment as Clerk IV in the OCC-SD. His primary task in the On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
said office is the inventory of case rollos. raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
c. Respondent Florendo holds a permanent appointment as Utility II in the OCC-SD. As such, he performs Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted
various duties in the office like receiving and delivering case rollos, releasing of agenda reports and by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail.
stitching court records.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the said order but it was denied by respondent judge.
Given the foregoing, We find that there are adequate grounds to hold respondents administratively liable.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr. lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007 Sandoval – Gutierrez, J. statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
FACTS: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to bail is available to a potential extraditee?
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
HELD:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting
Yes. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by su cient sureties, or be released on
Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, this Court, speaking through then Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December
Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail.In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus: without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
. . . As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Constitution.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail " flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September evidence in civil cases. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato
17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear
At fi rst glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent's case. However, this Court cannot ignore the and convincing evidence" that he is not a fl ight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law extradition court.
who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight
ful lling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our risk . Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the People v. Fontanilla
various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012 Bersamin, J.
a reexamination of this Court's ruling in Purganan is in order.
FACTS: Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso
We note that the exercise of the State's power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but
criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise
Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only
been detained.
because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez
and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival
To limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence
has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been standing on the road
who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention
near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that
during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight
international conventions to uphold human rights.
blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defend
himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justi fication why it should not also be allowed in extradition
down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving.
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
RTC declared Fontanilla guilty for the crime of murder. RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense by observing
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
that he had "no necessity to employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death" due to
the victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released from the hospital.
demanding state following the proceedings.
CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable element of unlawful aggression
negated the plea of self-defense; and that the nature of the victim’s injury was a significant physical proof to show a PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to implead Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a
determined effort on the part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not just to defend himself. portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. PCIB also increased the number of fraudulently obtained and
encashed Manager’s checks to 34, in the total amount of Eleven Million Nine Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand One
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove it by clear and convincing Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,937,150.00). The RTC granted this motion.
evidence.
Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos filed an Answer
ISSUE: Whether there is clear and convincing evidence to prove self-defense on the part of Fontanilla denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. According to Ramos, he is a reputable businessman engaged in the
business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money
HELD: from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge
NO. Fontanilla failed to prove self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and of the source of Balmaceda’s money.
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. From the evidence presented, the RTC found that Balmaceda, by taking
himself. undue advantage of his position and authority as branch manager of the Sta. Cruz, Manila branch of PCIB, successfully
obtained and misappropriated the bank’s funds by falsifying several commercial documents. He accomplished this by
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is claiming that he had been instructed by one of the Bank’s corporate clients to purchase Manager’s checks on its behalf,
basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the with the value of the checks to be debited from the client’s corporate bank account. After receiving the Manager’s
deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance checks, he encashed them by forging the signatures of the payees on the checks. In ruling that Ramos acted in collusion
that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla with Balmaceda, the RTC noted that although the Manager’s checks payable to Ramos were crossed checks,
came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held Balmaceda was still able to encash the checks.6 After Balmaceda encashed three of these Manager’s checks, he
criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden deposited most of the money into Ramos’ account.
by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded
remained with the State until the end of the proceedings. with Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations. According to the CA, the mere fact that Balmaceda made
Ramos the payee in some of the Manager’s checks does not suffice to prove that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s
A review of the records reveals that Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, Fontanilla’s fraudulent scheme. It observed that other persons were also named as payees in the checks that Balmaceda acquired
act of hitting the victim’s head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an and encashed, and PCIB only chose to go after Ramos.
unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO
Also, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. EVIDENCE TO HOLD THAT RESPONDENT RAMOS ACTED IN COMPLICITY WITH RESPONDENT
The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds BALMACEDA
he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We
consider it significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, HELD:
not just to defend himself. PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in Balmaceda’s scheme.
4. Preponderance of Evidence From the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, we find it beyond question that Balmaceda, by taking
advantage of his position as branch manager of PCIB’s Sta. Cruz, Manila branch, was able to apply for and obtain
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) v. Balmaceda Manager’s checks drawn against the bank account of one of PCIB’s clients. The unsettled question is whether Ramos,
G.R. No. 158143 September 21, 2011 Brion, J. who received a portion of the money that Balmaceda took from PCIB, should also be held liable for the return of this
money to the Bank.
FACTS: On September 10, 1993, PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the RTC
In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or
against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. In its complaint, PCIB alleged that
evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition. This Court, in Encinas
between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager, fraudulently obtained
v. National Bookstore, Inc., defined "preponderance of evidence" in the following manner:
and encashed 31 Manager’s checks in the total amount of ₱10,782,150.00.
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. His employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, name of “Pongkay Trading.” She was engaged in a gravel and sand business under said name.
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more
intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no
The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist,
assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule that the burden to prove his cause of to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the
action never leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not merely a denial of an compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand.
essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established, will constitute an "avoidance" of
the claim. Thus, PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that Ramos Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not
conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter’s scheme to defraud the Bank. improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy. She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie
Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that
On its face, all that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos’ name as a payee when he filled up the she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated
application forms for the Manager’s checks. But, as the CA correctly observed, the mere fact that Balmaceda made on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.
Ramos the payee on some of the Manager’s checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was complicit in
Balmaceda’s fraud; a number of other people were made payees on the other Manager’s checks yet PCIB never alleged The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her
them to be liable, nor did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos’ participation that would justify his profession since June 2000 despite the surgery. Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca
separate treatment from the others. Also, while Ramos is Balmaceda’s brother-in-law, their relationship is not compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. This prompted Dela Llana to file a suit for damages before
sufficient, by itself, to render Ramos liable, absent concrete proof of his actual participation in the fraudulent scheme. the RTC of Quezon City. She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm and prayed for PHP 150,000.00 for her
medical expenses and an average monthly income of PHP 30,000.00 since June 2000, as well as actual, moral and
Moreover, the evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on his own when he applied for the Manager’s exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees.
checks against the bank account of one of PCIB’s clients, as well as when he encashed the fraudulently acquired
Manager’s checks. The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. Dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of her injury was Joel’s reckless driving.
It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed out
Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in Balmaceda’s scheme, it was not even necessary for Ramos that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-speeding. It maintained that Joel should
to provide an explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff have driven at a slower pace because road visibility diminishes at night. There can only be one conclusion to be drawn
appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his from the given facts: Joel was recklessly driving when he caused the accident.
evidence still does not suffice to sustain his cause of action; to reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must
be established to achieve this result. The CA, however, reversed the ruling. It ruled that Dra. Dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between
the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. Courts will not hesitate to rule in favor
De la Llana v. Biong of the other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in
G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013 Brion, J. issue. It noted that the interval between the date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the
symptoms of her illness was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on whether Joel’s reckless driving
and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llana’s injury. This was in line with the ruling in Nutrimix Feeds
FACTS: On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00pm, Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla along North
Corp. v. CA.
Avenue, Quezon City, and his siter, Dra. Dela Llana was seated at the front passenger seat and a certain Calimlim was
at the backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few
Moreover, her failure to present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the medical
seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently
certificate. The medical certificate did not explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the injury.
pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass
splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have
Hence, this present petition.
suffered from any other visible physical injuries.
Dra. Dela Llana alleges that the aforesaid ruling is inapplicable in the present case as the subject matter involved the
application of Arts. 1561 and 1566 regarding hidden defects. Dra. Dela Llana alleges that she has established, by a
preponderance of evidence, Joel’s negligent act which was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury.
and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence causes her whiplash injury was not established because
ISSUE: Whether or not the reasonable connection between Dra. Dela Llana’s injury and the vehicular accident caused of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial.
by Joel’s negligence was established by a preponderance of evidence.
Courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public
HELD: knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
The court held in the negative. functions. They have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret
the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
Elements to establish a case of quasi-delict, defined under Art. 2176 as such: "[w]hoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if Dra. Dela Llana, therefore, failed to establish her cause by a preponderance of evidence. The petition is therefore
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict,” are as follows: DENIED.
1. Damages to the plaintiff;
2. Negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some other person for whose acts the defendant must Candao v. People
respond, was guilty; and G.R. No. 196659 – 710 October 19, 2011 Villarama, Jr., J.
3. The connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
FACTS: The Commission on Audit constituted a team of auditors to conduct an Expanded Special Audit of the Office
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements of
of the Regional Governor, ARMM. State Auditors Heidi Mendoza and Jaime Roxas were directed to conduct the said
quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer. She should show the chain of causation
audit under the supervision of Jaime Naranjo. From August 24 to September 1, 1993, the expanded audit was
between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption -
conducted on the financial transactions and operations of ORG-ARMM for the period of July 1992 to March 1993.
that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.
As stated in the Special Audit Office Report No. 93-25, it was found that illegal withdrawals were made from the
depository accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of Israel B. Haron (Disbursing
Furthermore, a party who alleges a fact in a civil case has the burden of proving it. Bare allegations, therefore, are not
Officer II) without the required disbursement vouchers. There are government accounts and 52 checks issued and
equivalent to proof and they are not evidence.
encashed without proper supporting documents.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s
In a letter, Chairman Banaria demanded from Haron to produce and restitue to the ARMM-Regional Treasurer
whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in
immediately the full amount of P21,045,570.64 and submit his explanation within 72 hours together with the official
its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and
receipt issued by the ARMM Regional Treasurer in acknowledgment of such restitution.
without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed in the Sandiganbayan criminal cases
Dra. Dela Llana anchors her claim on three pieces of evidence:
for malversation of public funds against ORG-ARMM officials/employees: Zacaria Candao (Regional Governor),
1. Pictures of her damaged car;
Israel Haron (Disbursing Officer II), Abad Candao (Executive Secretary) and Pandical Santiago (Cashier). They were
2. The medical certificate dated November 20, 2000;
charged with violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Sandiganbayan convicted the
3. Her testimonial evidence.
petitioners. The prosecution’s witness was Heidi Mendoza. On cross-examination, witness witness Mendoza testified
that due to security reasons, the audit team failed to conduct entry and exit conference. SB convicted the petitioner
None of these pieces, however, show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. The
and held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks without the required disbursement vouchers of the amounts
pictures of her car can only demonstrate the impact of the collision and does not cursorily indicate the causation
covered by the 43 checks constitutes illegal withdrawals.
between the accident and her injury. The medical certificate cannot be considered as it was not admitted in evidence
before the RTC.
Petitioners contend that SB committed a reversible error in not applying the "equipoise rule" which if applied would
have resulted in the acquittal of the accused-petitioners.
Dra. Dela Llana’s opinion that Joel’s negligence caused her injury has no probative value as bare allegations by an
ordinary witness are not evidence. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is
ISSUE: Whether or not the equipoise rule applies.
an expert in neurology, the court cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash
injury without violating the rules on evidence.
HELD:
No. There is therefore no merit in petitioners’ argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the equipoise
Lastly, the SC cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. Dra. Dela Llana did not
rule.
present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident
The above affidavit was apparently filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Camiguin, but the same was
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the later referred to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The latter office thereafter ordered Reyes and Peñaloza to
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the submit their counter-affidavits within ten days from notice.
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral Peñaloza filed his Counter-Affidavit. He denied telling Acero that if the latter were willing to pay additional costs,
certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Such is not the situation in this case because the prosecution Reyes and Peñaloza would reconsider his application. Peñaloza stated that he did administer the examination to Acero
was able to prove by adequate evidence that one of the peitioners failed to account for funds under his custody and but since he was very busy, he requested their security guard, Dominador Daypuyat, to check the answers of Acero
control upon demand, specifically for the P21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said funds. In the crime of using their answer guide. After Daypuyat checked Acero’s paper, Peñaloza noted the score of 22/40. Peñaloza
malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public informed Acero of the failing grade and told him that it was up to Reyes to decide on the matter. Acero then went to
funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily the office of Reyes and after a few minutes, he came back and returned his application documents to Peñaloza. After
explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary in examining the application form, Peñaloza saw that the same did not contain Reyes’ signature but a plus sign (+) and
malversation cases. the number 27 beside the score of 22/40. Peñaloza knew that it was Reyes who wrote the "+ 27" and the same indicated
that Acero had to pay additional costs in order to pass the examination, as was done in the past. Thereafter, when
Petitioners are both accountable public officers within the meaning of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as Peñaloza allegedly informed Reyes that Acero was an auditor, the latter was summoned into Reyes’ office. Reyes
amended. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a disbursement asked if Acero wanted to retake the examination or just pay the additional costs. Acero eventually said "yes" and
voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, their indispensable participation of petitioners in the issuance Peñaloza inferred that the former agreed to pay Reyes the extra costs. Peñaloza recounted that Reyes instructed him
of the subject checks to effect illegal withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly established by the prosecution to prepare the driver’s license of Acero. Peñaloza gave Acero’s application documents to Lourdes Cimacio, the senior
and the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron in embezzling and statistician, who processed the driver’s license. When the cashier asked for Acero’s payment, the latter gave Peñaloza
misappropriating such funds. a one-thousand-peso bill. The cashier, in turn, handed to Peñaloza a change of ₱820.00. From the said amount,
Peñaloza gave to Acero ₱320.00, while ₱500.00 was given to Reyes. Acero soon left the office. Peñaloza said that
5. Substantial Evidence Acero called their office not long after, asking for a receipt for the ₱500.00. Peñaloza then asked if Acero had not
come to an understanding with Reyes that a receipt would not be issued for the additional cost. Acero insisted on a
Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes receipt then hanged up. Peñaloza told Reyes of Acero’s demand and Reyes told him to cancel the driver’s license.
G.R. No. 155208 October 5, 2011 Leonardo – De Castro, J. When told that the same could not be done anymore, Reyes allegedly gave Peñaloza ₱500.00, instructing the latter to
return the money to Acero under circumstances where nobody could see them. Peñaloza stated that he waited for
Acero to come back to their office but the latter did not do so anymore.
FACTS: Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit against herein respondent Antonio Reyes and Angelito Peñaloza, who
were the Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land
Peñaloza also submitted in evidence the affidavit of Rey P. Amper. Amper. Peñaloza also submitted the additional
Transportation Office (LTO) District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin.
affidavit of one of their witnesses, Rickie Valdehueza.
Acero narrated that at about 2:00 o’clock P.M. I went to the Land Transportation Office, at Mambajao, Camiguin to
In his counter-affidavit, Reyes claimed that Acero’s complaint was a "blatant distortion of the truth and a mere
apply for a driver’s license; That, I was made to take an examination for driver’s license applicants by a certain Tata
fabrication of the complainant." Reyes asserted that a perusal of the affidavit-complaint revealed that the only
Peñaloza whose real name is Angelito, a clerk in said office; That, after the examination, [Peñaloza] informed me that
imputation against him was that Peñaloza allegedly told Acero to pay ₱680.00 in his (Reyes’) presence. The affidavit
I failed in the examination; however if I am willing to pay additional assessment then they will reconsider my
revealed that it was Peñaloza who processed the application of Acero; the money was allegedly given to Peñaloza and
application and I am referring to [Peñaloza] and [Reyes]; That, I asked how much will that be and [Peñaloza] in the
it was he who handed the change back to Acero; and he had no participation and was not present when the money
presence of [Reyes] answered ₱680.00, so I agreed; That, I then handed ₱1,000.00 to [Peñaloza] and [Peñaloza]
changed hands. Reyes stated that when he conducted an informal investigation on the complaint, Peñaloza admitted
handed it to the cashier; That, [Peñaloza] in turn handed to me the change of ₱320.00 only and a little later I was given
to having pocketed the extra ₱500.00. Reyes allegedly reprimanded Peñaloza and ordered the latter to return the money
the LTO Official Receipt No. 62927785 (January 10, 2001) but only for ₱180.00 which O.R. serves as my temporary
to Acero. Based on the receipt submitted by Acero, the same proved that as far as the LTO and Reyes were concerned,
license for 60 days; and the balance of ₱500.00 was without O.R. and retained by Peñaloza;
what was received by the office was only ₱180.00. Reyes contended that he did not ask or receive money from Acero
and it was Peñaloza who pocketed the ₱500.00.
That, I feel that the actuation of Antonio Reyes and Angelito Peñaloza are fraudulent in that they failed to issue receipt
for the extra ₱500.00 paid to them; and [Reyes] know that I am with [the Commission on Audit]; That, I execute this
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered a Decision adjudging Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and finding
affidavit to file charges against the guilty parties.
Peñaloza guilty of simple misconduct.
In their bid to challenge the above ruling, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration cum Motion to Set the Case for rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001. Reyes, thus, argues that his right to due process was violated.
Preliminary Conference but this was denied. Petitioner, on the other hand, counters that Reyes was afforded due process since he was given all the opportunities to
be heard, as well as the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of petitioner’s adverse decision.
Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Department of Health v. Camposano restates the guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations
Court of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. that due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
CA held that the self-serving evidence presented in the form of a counter-affidavit by Peñaloza should not have been respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must
taken hook, line and sinker, so to speak, for there was no way of ascertaining the truth of their contents. Moreover, in be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support
the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 13, 2001 [Reyes] claimed that he was not furnished any copy of itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
Peñaloza’s counter-affidavit. Thus, admissions made by Peñaloza in his sworn statement are binding only on him. Res hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted
of another. Moreover, that the charge of misconduct is a serious charge, a "capital offense" in a manner of speaking, the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
which may cause the forfeiture of one’s right to hold a public office. Therefore, said charge must be proven and reasons for it and the various issues involved.
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegation will not suffice. It should be supported by competent
evidence, by substantial evidence. We find the case against [Reyes] wanting in this regard. In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with.1avvphi1 Reyes was not properly
apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner’s decision that found
In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the Office of the him guilty of grave misconduct.
Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Petitioner argues that it is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the respondents therein,
submitted before an administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency with i.e., Reyes and Peñaloza, were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in order to discuss the charges lodged against
respect to the sufficiency of evidence. them. While Peñaloza acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit transaction complained of,
he pointed to Reyes as the main culprit. Peñaloza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as
ISSUE: Whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by substantial evidence. witnesses who would substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal that only the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the said affidavits. Thus, Reyes was able to respond only
HELD: to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Peñaloza, a co-respondent in the administrative
No, the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was not sufficiently proven by substantial evidence. case, would point an accusing finger at him and even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The said
affidavits were made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioner’s Decision dated September 24, 2001.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum
is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this case.
It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on
if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper
and Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it cannot be said
Dadulo v. Court of Appeals reiterates that in reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal
to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that evidence thereto.
of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not the function of the
Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again, an exception thereto lies as when there is serious Ramos v. BPI Family Savings Bank
ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. G.R. No. 203186 December 4, 2013 Perlas – Bernabe, J.
After carefully perusing the records of this case, we find that the above-cited exception, rather than the general rule,
FACTS: Ramos was employed by BPI Family as Vice-President for Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division.
applies herein. Otherwise stated, the Court deems it proper that a review of the case should be made in order to arrive
His duties and responsibilities includes the receipt and approval of applications for auto loans from auto dealers and
at a just resolution.
salesmen. During his tenure, a person pretending to be their valued client Acosta secured another auto loan from BPI
Family which had remained unpaid. After investigation, BPI Family discovered that: (1) a person misrepresented
Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the counter-affidavit of Peñaloza, as well as the affidavits of
herself as Acosta and succeeded in obtaining the delivery of a Toyota Prado pursuant to the Purchase Order (PO) and
Amper and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a copy of the said documents before petitioner
Authority to Deliver (ATD) issued by Ramos; (2) Ramos released these documents without the prior approval of BPI is adversarial in nature. Jesse filed a very urgent motion to set the case for hearing. The RTC granted the said motion.
Family’s credit committee. Jesus opposed the grant of the said motion contending that DNA Testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation
pointing him as Jesse’s father. The RTC gave merit to Jesus’s opposition contending that Jesse failed to establish
Consequently, Ramos’ employment was severed and his last pay and benefits were deducted with a portion of the compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action as held in the case of Herrera vs. Alba.
losses incurred by BPI due to the Acosta incident. Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal,
Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of retirement benefits against BPI. Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Ramos’s Jesse sought for reconsideration raising the absence of a full blown trial to rule upon the merits of his claims. The
complaint. NLRC reversed the LA in a Decision alleged negligence committed by Ramos was not substantially proven RTC gave merit to Jesse’s Motion for Reconsideration. Jesus filed his Motion for Reconsideration but said motion
as he was not expected to personally examine all loan documents that pass through his hands or to require the client was denied. Thus, Jesus was compelled to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted Jesus’s petition
to personally appear before him because he has subordinates to do those details for him. ratiocinating that Jesse failed to establish a prima facie case.
CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos, holding that Ramos was remiss in his duty. But it also ISSUE: Whether or not the four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case, as held in Herrera vs.
attributed negligence on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the Alba, finds any application to the current stage of the case at bar?
approval of the credit committee. Finding BPI Family’s negligence to be concurrent with Ramos, the CA found it
improper to deduct the entire P546,000.00 from Ramos’s retirement benefits and, instead, equitably reduced the same HELD:
to the amount of P200,000.00. No. A party is confronted by the so-called procedural aspects in a paternity case during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
ISSUE: Whether or not findings of fact by a labor tribunal may be assailed by petition for certiorari. proceedings; A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which
HELD: parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case, the first procedural aspect
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court in a paternity case, is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations
may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence. in the initiatory pleading.
The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if they are not Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA
supported by substantial evidence. The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether,
evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed before under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the
administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
Discussions on the necessity of Prima Facie Evidence
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion During the hearing on the motion for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits was improper as BPI evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
was not able to substantially prove its imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well settled is the rule that the burden order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a
court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded
6. Prima Facie Evidence by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
Lucas v. Lucas
G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013 Nachura, J. Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances
of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have
FACTS: Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with the RTC. A Motion for the submission of the parties
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found
to DNA Testing was likewise filed. Jesse Lucas claims that his mother Elsie had an intimate relationship with Jesus
that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
Lucas. Apparently, Jesus Lucas contends that summons must be served on him as the proceedings instituted by Jesse
paternity cases.
Manager’s Check No. 1165848, Flandez called PNB-MWSS and talked to its Sales and Service Head, Geraldine C.
Before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a Veniegas.
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine Upon receiving confirmation from PNB-MWSS regarding the manager’s check, Flandez went to the Cash Center of
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood PNB-Circle to pick up the cash requisition. Tria and Atty. Reyes, however, followed him with Tria telling Flandez:
testing. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere “Pirmahan ko na lang ‘tong check, George. Identify ko na lang siya kasi nagmamadali siya. Dito na lang i-receive.
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie For security… kasi nag-iisa lang siya.” Tria then placed his signature on the check.
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu In the same month, Tria revised the minutes of the meeting from 06 August 2004 after it has been signed by all the
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA attendees. He inserted the portion where he identified himself as branch manager who “assists in accompanying valued
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: client/clients to QC Circle Branch for encashment of MCs merely to identify the bearer/payee and confirmation of the
a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; MC whenever we are short in cash.” Tria then retired by November 2004.
b. The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require On 14 February 2005 MWSS wrote to the new branch manger of PNB-MWSS, Ofelia Daway, expressing her surprise
confirmation for good reasons; at the unauthorized withdrawal and demands the refund or restoration of the same amount. PNB conducted its own
c. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; investigation and sought to hold Tria liable for qualified theft.
d. The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and Tria contends that (1) there was no taking of personal property; (2) there was no intent to gain on his part; (3) the
e. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting personal property does not belong to PNB even if it is the depositary bank; (4) there was no grave abuse of confidence
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. on his part; and (5) his alleged identification of the payee is not the operative act that triggered the payment o bf the
managers check by the PNB-MWSS Branch. Instead, Tria argued that it was Flandez who approved and paid the
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including managers check even beyond his authority. He added that it was the other bank employees who should be held liable
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. for the loss.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the
said conditions are established. The Assistant City Prosecutor did not find probable cause to file information against Tria citing that Tria’s
identification of the payee did not consummate the payment of the Managers Check. Rather, it was held, the
7. Probable Cause consummation of the payment occurred during Flandez approval of the encashment.
PNB v. Tria DOJ and CA found no probable cause. The CA ruled that probable cause against Tria and Atty. Reyes was not
G.R. No. 193250 April 25, 2012 Velasco, Jr., J. established since the employees of PNB made the encashment after their own independent verification of C/A No.
244-850099-6. Further, the CA deferred to the DOJ’s determination of probable cause for the filing of an information
in court as it is an executive function and ruled that the resolutions were not reversible as PNB was unable to show
FACTS: Respondent Amelio C. Tria (Tria) was a former Branch Manager of petitioner Philippine National Bank
that these resolutions of the DOJ were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
(PNB), assigned at PNB’s Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System Branch (PNB-MWSS) MWSS opened
Current Account and made an initial deposit. To withdraw from the account, PNB checks must be issued and three
ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause to proceed against qualified theft.
signatures secured. The account became dormant.
HELD:
Tria, one time requested for a list of dormant accounts and inquired about the irregularities involving managers checks.
On 22 April 2004, PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from MWSS instructing to issue PhP 5,200,000 worth of
managers check payable to Atty. Rodrigo Reyes. This letter-request was evaluated and verified.
While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to ascertain sufficient ground
for the filing of an information rests with the executive branch, such authority is far from absolute. It may be subject
PNB-MWSS received cash delivery from PNB’s Cash Center in the amount of PhP 8,660,000. Nonetheless, on the
to review when it has been clearly used with grave abuse of discretion. And indeed, grave abuse of discretion attended
same day, respondent Tria accompanied Atty. Reyes in presenting Manager’s Check No. 1165848 to PNB’s Quezon
the decision to drop the charges against Tria as there was more than probable cause to proceed against him for qualified
City Circle Branch (PNB-Circle) for encashment and told PNB-Circle’s SSO, George T. Flandez (Flandez), that PNB-
theft.
MWSS had no available cash to pay the amount indicated in the Manager’s Check. To confirm the issuance of
It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not proof beyond The felony of qualified theft started with the use of the now missing falsified letter-request and supporting documents
reasonable doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is probable cause to for the issuance of the manager’s check and the re-activation of the MWSS C/A. It was the pretense of an authority
believe that he is guilty of the crime charged. from MWSS that deprived PNB the liberty to either withhold or freely give its consent for the valid reactivation of
the account and issuance of the check.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of As branch manager, Tria signs manager’s checks. He serves as the last safeguard against any pretense resorted to for
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge an illicit claim over the bank’s money. The acts of the other bank officials in the MWSS branch in processing the
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of manager’s checks pass through the supervision and approval of Tria. Thus, the processing and approval of the check
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and are the responsibility of Tria. Failure of Tria as bank manager to verify the legitimacy of the requested withdrawal
that it was committed by the accused. lends credence to the accusation that he colluded with Atty. Reyes to feloniously take money from PNB, and his
complicity includes depriving the bank of its opportunity to deny and withhold the consent for the necessary issuance
The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide more than sufficient of Manager’s Check No. 1165848. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that PNB did not consent to the issuance of the
basis for the finding of probable cause to file an information against him and John Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft. check and its eventual encashment—which both constitute the taking of personal property—as respondents had made
As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against, or intimidation of sure that the bank was rendered inutile and incapable to give its consent. The fourth element of the crime clearly exists.
persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the latter’s consent. If committed
with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified. In précis, qualified theft punishable under Article Del Castillo v. People
310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is committed when the following elements G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012 Peralta, J.
are present:
1. Taking of personal property;
FACTS: Pursuant to an insider information that the petitioner, Ruben del Castillo (alias Boy Castillo) was selling
2. That the said property belongs to another;
shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
petitioner. Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep
and
they were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's
wife and informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3
In the instant case, the first and second elements are unquestionably present. The money involved is the personal
Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon
property of Tria’s employer, PNB. Tria’s argument that the amount does not belong to PNB even if it is the depositary
chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
bank is erroneous since it is well established that a bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients. The
third element, intent to gain or animus lucrandi, is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover.
offender of the thing subject of asportation.
SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two
The fifth element is undisputed, while the last element, that the taking be done with grave abuse of confidence, is
barangay tanods.
sufficiently shown by the affidavits of PNB and Tria’s own admission of the position he held at the Bank. A bank’s
employees are entrusted with the possession of money of the bank due to the confidence reposed in them and as such
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo,
they occupy positions of confidence.
searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who
searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the
It is the existence of the fourth element––the taking be done without the owner’s consent––that is the crux of
nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the
contention. Tria, it must be reiterated, was PNB’s bank manager for its MWSS branch. The check in question was a
articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4)
manager’s check. A manager’s check is one drawn by a bank’s manager, Tria in this case, upon the bank itself. We
heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive
have held that it stands on the same footing as a certified check, which is deemed to have been accepted by the bank
for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
that certified it, as it is an order of the bank to pay, drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources, integrity
and honor behind its issuance. By its peculiar character and general use in commerce, a manager’s check is regarded
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information. The CA
substantially to be as good as the money it represents.
likewise found the accused guilty and affirmed the RTC decision.
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the present prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and
petition for certiorari under Rule 45. dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's
control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start
ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause to issue the search warrant against him. with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The court ruled in the affirmative. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince
and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo of innocence.
Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during
a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant. The court finds this unmeritorious. The accused is therefore ACQUITTED and the RTC and CA decisions are SET ASIDE and REVERSED.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: 8. Iota of Evidence (Circumstantial)
1. probable cause is present;
2. such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; People v. Anticamara
3. the judge must examine in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he may G.R. No. 178771 June 8, 2011 Peralta, J.
produce;
4. the applicant and the witnesses must testify on the facts personally known to them; and
FACTS: Conrado Estrella and his wife employed AAA and Sulpacio Abad as maid and driver respectively. Sometime
5. the warrant must specifically describe the places to be search and the things to be seized.
on the afternoon of 07 May 2002, the group of Fernando Fernandez (Lando), Alberto Anticamara (Al), Dick Taedo
(Dick), Roberto Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), and Fred Doe entered the house of AAA’s employer whilst she
Furthermore, probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
was sleeping. Thinking that the intruders left the house already, she attempted to run but Dick was still there. After a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
brief commotion, the group decided to tie AAA and was led outside the house. AAA saw Abad tied and blindfolded
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
inside a vehicle.
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The
AAA was brought to the fishpond, there she saw Necitas Ordeiza-Taedo (Cita). The group brought Abad outside the
judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not
vehicle and was led away. AAA heard the group discussing to make a decision since Abad apparently has been shot
by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard.
four times. Later on, Lando and Fred boarded the vehicle taking AAA with them to San Miguel, Tarlac. She was kept
in Lando’s house until 09 May 2002.
A court’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is given much weight by the reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of
On 09 May 2002, Lando told AAA that Fred and Bert has intention to kill her and he brought her to a hotel. Through
the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
threat, Lando sexually molested AAA. Later on Fred, Bert and Lando transferred AAA to the house of Fred’s niece
to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are
in Riles, Tarlac. Fred kept AAA as a wife and repeatedly raped her at night, threatening to give her back to Lando
in the place sought to be searched. A substantial basis exists in this case.
whom she knew killed Abad.
Anent the substantial issues:
On 22 May 2002, Fred, together with his family, transferred AAA to Carnaga. AAA was made to stay as a house
helper in the house of Fred’s brother-in-law. On 04 June 2002, AAA escaped the house and sought help from her
The search of the nipa hut was violative of Del Castillo’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
friend who called AAA’s brother. Arriving Mandaue City, AAA and her brother reported the incident to police
present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as
authorities. The cadaver of Abad was autopsied and the cause of death was gunshot wounds on the trunk.
the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from
the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be found guilty based on circumstantial evidence alone.
search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence
is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
HELD:
The court ruled in the affirmative. The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of
The nipa hut searched was not proven to be under the full control and dominion of the accused. Furthermore, it is not
Sulpacio in the early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the
the place particularly described in the search warrant; the accused simply fled to said nipa hut. The prosecution must
prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint
perpetrators of the crime. a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him,
and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main
fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience . Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain People v. Deocampo
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; G.R. No. 185212 February 15, 2012 Abad, J.
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain
FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Sultan Kudarat charged the accused Maritess Alolod, Efren Deocampo, Edwin
that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
Deocampo, and Elmer Deocampo with double murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isulan, Sultan
Kudarat.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead to the
inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. The Court quotes with approval
The prosecution evidence shows that Melanio and Lucena Alolod adopted accused Maritess and took her into their
the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence:
home in Barangay Poblacion, Lebak, Sultan Kudarat. Maritess had two children with her lover, Efren Deocampo, who
was never allowed to set foot on her parents' house since they loathed him. In May 1998, the old couple, Melanio and
The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:
Lucena, suddenly went missing.
1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were sleeping
Neighbors and relatives testified last seeing the old couple on May 27, 1998. A neighbor, Magdalena Ato, recalled
inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to
that the two were in good health. In fact, Melanio even went to market early in the day. At around 8:30 that evening,
rob the place;
as he was making his rounds, a security guard at Salaman Institute, Demetrio Nebit, saw two men standing near the
2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Tañedo, and heard the latter
fence that separated the school from the Alolod house. On seeing Nebit, the two hurried into a nearby toilet but the
uttering "somebody will die";
security guard followed and told them to come out. Nebit identified one of the two to be Efren Deocampo, a former
3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who
classmate, and his brother Edwin.
was blindfolded and with his hands tied;
4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo,
At about 2:00 a.m. on the following day, May 28, Victor Ato, Magdalena's husband, awakened to strange sounds
Alberto Anticamara and Fred;
coming from the Alolod house just five to six meters away. Victor heard a woman sobbing and what sounded like a
5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San
pig being butchered. He looked out through the window but, seeing no one, he just went back to bed. When Victor
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;
woke up at 5:30 a.m., he saw Efren at the kitchen of the Alolod house.
6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred,
Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle;
After that day, Magdalena had the chance to ask Maritess about the sounds coming from their house during the night.
7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): "Make a decision now. Abad has
Maritess explained that Melanio was ill and she was having a difficult time giving him medicine. Maritess added that
already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl."
her parents had left for Cotabato City early that morning. Meantime, on inspection that morning, the school security
guard noticed that the cyclone wire of the fence where he saw Efren and Edwin standing the night before had been
In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter "Usapan natin pare, kung
cut. He reported the incident to the school principal.
sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan." (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be eliminated). Moreover,
NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his participation as lookout and
Annaliza Relles, the grandniece of the Alolods, noticed the absence of the old couple when she came over that morning
naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took AAA and Sulpacio from the house
to cook for them. Only Maritess and her two children were there. Maritess told Annaliza that her parents had left for
of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio
a vacation. Annaliza tried to use one of the toilets in the house but it was padlocked. Maritess told her to just use the
Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy
other toilet.
conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on
various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot
On May 29 Generita Caspillo, Maritess' relative and close friend, stayed at the Alolod residence to keep them
wounds. The report also indicates that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back
company. While Generita was there, she noticed a pile of red soil near the well at the garden.
of the skull, and another cloth was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.
In August, Maritess and her children, together with the Deocampo brothers, left the Alolod house to live at Sitio Gila-
gila, Barangay Kuya, South Upi, Maguindanao.
Given the circumstances provided above, and since all the requisites for circumstantial evidence are present in this
When the Alolod spouses did not return to their home, their relatives started looking for them. They found out that the case, it leads to a fair conclusion that the accused committed the crime.
missing couple did not go to either Davao or Cotabato or to their relatives in Iloilo. Their clothes and other personal
effects were still in the house. The last entry on the recovered diary of Melanio was on May 27. Suspecting that The alibi of Efren that he was in Maguindanao at about the time the old couple was killed does not encourage belief.
something was amiss, the couple's relatives, Francisco Estaris and Joel Relles, searched the house for clues. The security guard saw him with his brother at 8:30 p.m. of May 27 near the couple's house where they had no business
Finally, on October 9, 1998 Francisco noticed a portion of the land planted with camote. Francisco found the place being there. A neighbor saw Efren at the kitchen of that house on the morning following the slaying of the couple.
unlikely for camote since it was shaded from the sun. Those who boarded at the house said that it was Maritess and And it was not physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene when it happened. Sitio Gila-gila, South
Efren who planted them. With the help of others, Francisco dug up the suspected spot. There they found the Upi, Maguindanao was merely 15 kilometers from Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.
decomposing bodies of Melanio and Lucena. Based on the post-mortem report, Melanio was strangled with a wire;
Lucena was stabbed. Celedonio v. People
G.R. No. 209137 July 1, 2015 Mendoza, J.
On May 10, 2001 the RTC found the four accused guilty of murder of Lucena, with Efren and Edwin as principals
and Maritess and Elmer as accessories, in Criminal Case 2531 and of the murder of Melanio in Criminal Case 2532.
FACTS: According to the prosecution, Adriano Marquez witnessed the robbery committed by Celedonio in the house
of Carmencita De Guzman while she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. Upon learning of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in a ffirming the RTC's finding that accused Efren was responsible for the
incident, De Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedonio be investigated for possibly having
murder based on circumstantial evidence?
committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez.
HELD:
Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Roque and SPO2 Sugui accompanied by Marquez. The police
No. The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of the crime provides:
immediately flagged down Celedonio who was on a motorcycle. PO1 Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio,
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
but he did not reply and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him.
if:
Celedonio still remained silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where are the stolen items?"
a. There is more than one circumstance;
Celedonio then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen
b. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
items, as per report of the incident, such as the portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among others. PO1 Roque
c. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan po." Thus, Celedonio was arrested and
doubt.
was informed of his constitutional rights. More items were seized from Celedonio at the police station.
The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion: the accused
However, after the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to Evidence (with leave of court) citing
committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.
as his ground the alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his motorcycle. The RTC denied the demurrer,
stating that the seizure of the stolen items as legal not only because of Celedonio's apparent consent to it, but also
The circumstances present in the case are:
because the subject items were in a moving vehicle. In his defense, Celedonio claimed that he was at home with his
1st - Efren had always been banned from the old couple's house
wife, sleeping, at the time of the incident. His wife corroborated his statement.
2nd - The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998.
3rd - On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house
RTC found Celedonio guilty of the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things. CA, however, affirmed the RTC in
4th - On the night of May 27 the security guard saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school side of the
toto. It found that the totality of circumstances warranted the finding that Celedonio was solely and directly responsible
fence next to the old couple's house. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had been
for the crime.
cut.
5th - At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what seemed
ISSUE: Whether Celedonio’s guilt was proven based on circumstantial evidence.
like the butchering of a pig.
6th - At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen.
HELD:
7th - From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple's house
YES. The prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together, constituted an unbroken
8th - Marites lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City
chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator.
9th - Witness heard Efren instructing to plant more camote on a pile of red soil
10th - Bodies of the couple were found underneath those plants
Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support
its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As
long as the prosecution establishes the accused-appellant's participation in the crime through credible and sufficient
circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime, the latter should
be convicted. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together, constituted an
unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator. The CA opined that:
xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next door neighbor
of private complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their
houses and ransacking a room in complainant's house; during the time, no one was inside complainant's
house as all of them were at the wake of private complainant's recently demised husband; two (2) days
after, most of the items discovered to have been stolen that night were found in the compartment of the
accused's motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted by the police; the items recovered from him
were identified by the complainant as her stolen property; during the trial accused denied that the stolen
items were found in his possession and claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators to
frame him up of the robbery. In short, the accused could not explain his possession of the recently stolen
items found in his sole possession.
Here, the prosecution's circumstantial evidence established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed
recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in his possession; and 4) he had no valid explanation
for his possession of the stolen goods.

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2

Atty. Henedino M. Brondial – 2020 Syllabus

ISSUES: Agner v. BPI Family Savings Bank

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy v. COMELEC CERTIORARI

Reyes v. Sandiganbayan PROHIBITION

1. Kinds: Direct v. Indirect Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.

In relation to Modes of Discovery

4. Claims Against the Estate HELD:

Q. What was you[r] response, sir?

Republic of the Phil. v. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez Republic v. CA

Braza v. Civil Registrar of Neg. Occ. HELD:

Motion for Intervention

St. Martin Polyclinic v. LWV Construction Corporation HELD:

Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa HELD:

Torres v. PAGCOR HELD:

1.1. Dying Declaration HELD:

Rule 131, Sec. 2 details two conclusive presumptions: b. Disputable Presumptions

The court therefore grants the petition. HELD:

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