(Constitutional Law I) Judicial Inquiry NPMSTADIFA

Republic of the Philippines presented by petitioners has become moot. Thus, any judgment that this
SUPREME COURT Court may render on the instant petition would be merely an academic
Manila disquisition on a hypothetical problem. Until it can be shown that
an actual controversy exists, courts have no jurisdiction to render a binding
FIRST DIVISION decision.

The Case

G.R. No. 125532 July 10, 1998 This is a petition for review on certiorari to partially set aside the June 28,
1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 which disposed as follows: 2
SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS
JUDE ROMANO, LEAH ARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO CORPUS; the NATIONAL BUREAU hereby DISMISSED for want of merit, and the injunction
OF INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANO ROQUE, petitioners, issued against respondent judges from hearing the
criminal actions against petitioner is hereby LIFTED.
vs.
SO ORDERED.
COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO PINEDA, respondents.
The Court of Appeals upheld the justice secretary's denial on January 11,
1996 of private respondent's "Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of
Potenciano A. Roque to the Witness Protection Program."
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Although Respondent Court ruled in favor of the government, herein
petitioners nonetheless assail the following portion of the said Decision:
This case is an offshoot of the investigation conducted by the government
in the last quarter of 1995, which delved into the alleged participation of
. . . From the explicit terms of the statute, it is at once
national and local officials in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling.
apparent that the presence of such corroborative evidence
Although the Court of Appeals upheld the admission into the Witness
is sine qua non to a witness' admission into the Program.
Protection Program of Potenciano A. Roque, who claimed personal
Being in the nature of a condition precedent [to] his
knowledge of such gambling activities, the secretary of justice nonetheless
admission into the Program, the existence of such
challenges the side opinion of the appellate court that the testimony of the
corroborative evidence must be shown at the time his
witness must, as a condition precedent to his admission into said Program,
application for admission is being evaluated.
be shown to be capable of substantial corroboration in its material points.
The justice secretary claims that such corroboration need not be
demonstrated prior to or simultaneous with the witness' admission into the
Program, as long as such requirement can be demonstrated when he
actually testifies in court. However, inasmuch as Roque has already been The Antecedent Facts
admitted into the Program and has actually finished testifying, the issue

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Petitioners relate the antecedent facts of this case as follows: 3

Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians offered him money
and other valuable considerations, which he accepted,
Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on their
of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation on the respective gambling operations (Annex "B").
alleged participation and involvement of national and local
government officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal On the basis of Roque's sworn statement, the sworn
gambling. statement and supplemental affidavit of one Angelito H.
Sanchez, and the sworn statement of Gen. Lorenzo Mateo
The case was also the subject of a legislative (Annexes "C," "D" and "E"), then NBI Director Mariano M.
inquiry/investigation by both the Senate and the House of Mison forwarded the result of their investigation on the
Representatives. "jueteng" scam to the Department of Justice (DOJ),
recommending the filing of the following charges against
Pineda and other persons . . . .
In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be
an eyewitness to the networking of . . . national and local
politicians and gambling lords, sought admission into the xxx xxx xxx
Government's "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Program." Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in The DOJ Task Force on Illegal Gambling (composed of
his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling the petitioner-prosecutors), created by petitioner Secretary
(TFAG) during the term of former President Corazon C. Teofisto Guingona on November 24, 1995 (Annex "F"),
Aquino until his resignation in 1989. He also revealed that conducted a preliminary investigation of the case and
he and members of his family were in danger of being subpoenaed all the respondents in I.S. No. 95-774, therein
liquidated, facing as he did the formidable world of requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits by
corruption with a well-entrenched hold on Philippine December 22, 1995.
social, political and economic systems.
On December 21, 1995, Roque executed a supplemental
After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, convinced sworn statement relative to I.S. No. 95-774, clarifying
of his compliance with the requirements of Republic Act some of his statements in his first affidavit (Annex "G").
No. 6981, otherwise known as the "Witness Protection, Consequently, the December 22, 1995 setting was
Security and Benefit Act," the Department of Justice cancelled and reset to January 8, 1996 to give Pineda and
admitted Roque to the program, providing him a monthly other respondents time to refute the charges contained in
allowance, temporary shelter and personal and security the supplemental sworn statement.
protection during witness duty.
On January 5, 1996, Pineda filed a "Petition for
On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to
statement before NBI Agents Sixto M. Burgos, Jr. and the Witness Protection Program," which was denied by
Nelson M. Bartolome, alleging that during his stint as petitioner Secretary in a letter-reply dated January 11,
Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG), 1996 (Annexes "H" and "I"). On January 23, 1996, Pineda
several gambling lords, including private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

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with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and information on, the commission of a crime under Section 3; and (b)
Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of a particeps criminis or a participant in the crime under Section 10.
Appeals.
Based on his sworn statements, Roque participated in the commission of
xxx xxx xxx the crimes imputed to private respondent (corruption of public officials) by
accepting bribe money. Necessarily, his admission to the Program fell
In the meantime, petitioner-prosecutors proceeded with under Section 10, which requires that he should not appear to be the most
their preliminary investigation, and on February 2, 1996, guilty of the imputed crimes. Respondent Court found that private
they issued a resolution finding probable cause to charge respondent sought to bribe him several times to prevent him from
private respondent Pineda with several offenses (Annex conducting raids on private respondent's gambling operations. Such
"K"). On February 5, 1996, three (3) Informations for "passive participation" in the crimes did not make him more guilty than
corruption of public officials were filed against him in the private respondent.
Manila and Pasig City Trial Courts (Annexes "L," "M" and
"N"). He was subsequently arraigned on February 28, On the first issue, Respondent Court initially ruled that, by express
1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7 of the City of provision of Sections 3 and 10, the requirement of corroboration is a
Manila presided by Judge Enrico Lanzanes, and on March condition precedent to admission into the Program. A contrary
14, 1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, of Pasig interpretation would only sanction the squandering of the various benefits
City, presided by Judge Benjamin Pelayo. of the Program on one who might later be adjudged disqualified from
admission for lack of evidence to corroborate his testimony.
On March 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals came up with a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining both trial courts However, in the same breath, Respondent Court upheld herein petitioners'
from hearing the criminal actions in the meantime. alternative position that substantial corroboration was nevertheless
actually provided by Angelito Sanchez' and retired Gen. Lorenzo M.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Mateo's testimonies. Hence, it disposed in favor of the government.

In its Decision, Respondent Court addressed mainly the issue of whether Subsequently, this petition was filed. 4

the secretary of justice acted in excess of his jurisdiction (a) in admitting

Petitioner Roque into the Program and (b) in excluding him from the The Issue
Informations filed against private respondent. Private respondent
contended that Roque's admission was illegal on two grounds: first, his The lone issue raised by this petition is worded as follows:
testimony could not be substantially corroborated in its material points;
and second, he appeared to be the most guilty or at least more guilty than Whether or not a witness' testimony requires prior or
private respondent, insofar as the crimes charged in the Informations were simultaneous corroboration at the time he is admitted into
concerned. the witness protection, security and benefit program. 5

Respondent Court also ruled that RA 6981 contemplates two kinds of As noted earlier, this petition is unusual and unique. Despite ruling in their
witnesses: (a) a witness who has perceived or has knowledge of, or favor, Respondent Court is assailed by petitioners for opining that

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admission to the Program requires prior or simultaneous corroboration of "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
the material points in the witness' testimony. involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable." 6 According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist,
Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that Sections courts are mandated to settle disputes between real conflicting parties
3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA 6981 expressly require that corroboration must through the application of the law. 7 Judicial review, which is merely an
already exist at the time of the witness' application as a prerequisite to aspect of judicial power, demands the following: (1) there must be an
admission into the Program. RA 6981 pertinently provides: actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must
be ripe for adjudication; 8 and (3) the person challenging must have
"standing"; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case,
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated
such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury. 9
in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness
for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in
this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case
Program whenever the following are present: calling for the exercise of judicial power. Courts have no authority to pass
upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned
problems 10 or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without
xxx xxx xxx
real adverse interests. 11 Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its challenging. 12 As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power,
material points; an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. 13

xxx xxx xxx An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights
or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the
On the other hand, petitioners contend that said provisions merely require basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is
that the testimony of the state witness seeking admission into the Program distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that
"can be substantially corroborated" or is "capable of corroboration." So the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
long as corroboration can be obtained when he testifies in court, he relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy
satisfies the requirement that "his testimony can be substantially admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character,
corroborated on its material points." whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. 14
The Court's Ruling
Thus, no actual controversy was found in Abbas vs. Commission on
The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners Elections 15 regarding the provision in the Organic Act, which mandates
do not warrant the exercise of judicial power. that should there be any conflict between national law and Islamic Law,
the Shari'ah courts should apply the former. In that case, the petitioner
No Actual Controversy maintained that since the Islamic Law (Shari'ah) was derived from the
Koran, which makes it part of divine law, the Shari'ah may not be
subjected to any "man-made" national law. This Court dismissed
Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the petition
petitioner's argument because, as enshrined in the Constitution, judicial
fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power

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power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights the judiciary, Justice Laurel asserted, "will neither direct nor restrain
which are legally demandable and enforceable. No actual controversy executive [or legislative action] . . . ." 19 The legislative and the executive
between real litigants existed, because no conflicting claims involving the branches are not allowed to seek its advice on what to do or not to do;
application of national law were presented. This being so, the Supreme thus, judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meantime. Before a court
Court refused to rule on a merely perceived potential conflict between the may enter the picture, a prerequisite is that something has been
provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law. accomplished or performed by either branch. Then may it pass on the
validity of what has been done but, then again, only "when . . . properly
In contrast, the Court held in Sabello vs. Department of Education, Culture challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding." 20
and Sports 16 that there was a justiciable controversy where the issue
involved was whether petitioner — after he was given an absolute pardon In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting
— merited reappointment to the position he had held prior to his that this Court reverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow the
conviction, that of Elementary Principal I. The Court said that such dispute admission in evidence of Respondent Roque's testimony, inasmuch as the
was not hypothetical or abstract, for there was a definite and concrete assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their present
controversy touching on the legal relations of parties and admitting of claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed Decision
specific relief through a court decree that was conclusive in character. That would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to
case did not call for mere opinion or advice, but for affirmative relief. come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor
exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension does not give
Closely related to the requirement of an "actual case," Bernas continues, is rise to a justiciable controversy.
the second requirement that the question is "ripe" for adjudication. A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, in PACU vs. prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into the
Secretary of Education, 17 the Court declined to pass judgment on the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court against the private
question of the validity of Section 3 of Act No. 2706, which provided that respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque's admission to the Program is
before a private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not warrant judicial
permit from the secretary of education, because all the petitioning schools review.
had permits to operate and were actually operating, and none of them
claimed that the secretary had threatened to revoke their permit. Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was violated nor any
claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative relief is being sought in this case.
In Tan vs. Macapagal, 18 the Court said that Petitioner Gonzales "had the The Court concurs with the opinion of counsel for private respondent that
good sense to wait" until after the enactment of the statute [Rep. Act No. this action is a "purely academic exercise," which has no relevance to the
4913 (1967)] requiring the submission to the electorate of certain proposed criminal cases against Respondent Pineda. After the assailed Decision
amendments to the Constitution [Resolution Nos. 1 and 3 of Congress as had been rendered, trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque
a constituent body (1967)] before he could file his suit. It was only when testified in all of them. Said counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfy
this condition was met that the matter became ripe for adjudication; prior to his "academic interest on how the State machinery will deal with witnesses
that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. who are admittedly guilty of the crimes but are discharged to testify against
their co-accused." 21
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government
to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch,

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Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be
show a case ripe for adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119
might make in this case would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can does not support the proposition that the power to choose
only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial
actualities. 22 prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the
power to discharge a state witness only because it has
An Executive Function already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the
accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the
exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an
In the present petition, the government is in effect asking this Court to
inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court
render an advisory opinion on what the government prosecutors should do
have never been interpreted to be beyond change by
— when, how and whom to grant or to deny admission into the Program.
legislation designed to improve the administration of our
To accede to it is tantamount to an incursion into the functions of the
justice system. [Emphasis ours]
executive department. From their arguments stated above, both sides
have obviously missed this crucial point, which is succinctly stated
in Webb vs. De Leon: 23 Simply stated, the decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is
executive in character. Only when an information, charging two or more
persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in court will Rule
It is urged that they [the provisions of RA 6918] constitute
119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, come into play, viz.:
". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the
court which has the power under the Rules on Criminal
Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness." Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be
The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 which witness for the prosecution. — When two or more persons
gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the
an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument competent court, at any time before they have entered
lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the upon their defense, may direct one or more of them to be
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole discharged with the latter's consent that he or they may be
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative witnesses for the government when in the judgment of the
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains court:
to the executive department of government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this defendant whose discharge is requested;
power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the
a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends testimony of said defendant;
on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated
by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally (c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially
impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. 6981 vesting in corroborated in its material points;
the Department of Justice the power to determine who can

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(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; c. That such testimony or information can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude. xxx xxx xxx

In the present case, Roque was not one of those accused in the The same tenor was adopted in National Emergency Memorandum Order
Informations filed by the government prosecutors. Rule 119, No. 26 signed by former President Corazon C. Aquino, Section 5 (c) of
Section 9, is therefore clearly not applicable. which provides:

A resort to the progenitors of RA 6981 will yield the same result. Although c. Immunity from Criminal Prosecution. — This applies to
Presidential Decree 1731 and National Emergency Memorandum Order the witness participation or involvement in the criminal
No. 26 state only when immunity from suit attaches to a witness, they do case in which his testimony is necessary and may be
not specify who are qualified for admission into the Program. PD 1731, availed of only upon his actually testifying in court in
otherwise known as a law "Providing for Rewards and Incentives to accordance with his undertaking, and provided that:
Government Witnesses and Informants and for Other Purposes" provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Any such informants or witnesses who shall testify,
or provide vital information, regarding the existence or (3) Such testimony or information can be substantially
activity of a group involved in the commission of crimes corroborated in its material points;
against national security or public order, or of an
organized/syndicated crime or crime group, and/or the xxx xxx xxx
culpability of individual members thereof in accordance
with this Decree shall, upon recommendation of the state
prosecutor, fiscal or military lawyer, as approved by the One may validly infer from the foregoing that the government prosecutor is
Secretary of National Defense or the Secretary of Justice, afforded much leeway in choosing whom to admit into the Program. Such
as the case may be, be immune from criminal prosecution inference is in harmony with the basic principle that this is an executive
for his participation or involvement in any such criminal function.
activity which is the subject of the investigation or
prosecution, in addition to the benefits under Sec. 2 RA 6981 is a much needed penal reform law that could help the
hereof: Provided, that, immunity from criminal prosecution government in curbing crime by providing an antidote, as it were, to the
shall, in the case of a witness offering to testify, attach usual reluctance of witnesses to testify. The Department of Justice has
only upon his actually testifying in court in accordance with clearly explained the rationale for said law: 24
his undertaking as accepted by the state prosecutor,
fiscal, or military lawyer: Provided, further, that the Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation,
following conditions are complied with: usually refuse to appear and testify in the
investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases.
xxx xxx xxx Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have
been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence.

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For a more effective administration of criminal justice,

there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses
and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure
their appearance in investigative bodies/courts.

This Court should then leave to the executive branch the decision on how
best to administer the Witness Protection Program. Unless an actual
controversy arises, we should not jump the gun and unnecessarily
intervene in this executive function.

Closer Scrutiny of the Assailed Decision

Finally, an accurate reading of the assailed Decision will further enlighten

petitioners as to its true message. Respondent Court did sustain Roque's
admission into the Program — even as it held that the first contention of
petitioners was untenable — based on the latter's alternative argument
that Roque's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by that of General
Mateo. While Respondent Court insisted that corroboration must exist prior
to or simultaneous with Roque's admission into the Program, it sanctioned
subsequent compliance to cure this defect. The reason for this is found in
the penultimate paragraph of the Decision, in which Respondent Court
categorically stated that it found no manifest abuse of discretion in the
petitioners' action. There is no quarrel with this point. Until a more
opportune occasion involving a concrete violation of RA 6981 arises, the
Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

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