Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine

National aerospace university 'Kharkov Aviation Institute'

Essay

on the topic: “Lockheed Martin F-35”

Compiled by: Alexander VASYLIEV

Verified by:

Scientific advisor:
Language advisor: PhD Olga CHUBUKINA

Kharkiv
2022
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Contents
Introduction...............................................................................................................3

1. Development.........................................................................................................3

Design phase......................................................................................................4

Program cost increases and delays....................................................................6

Concerns over performance and safety...........................................................12

2. Design..............................................................................................................18

Engines............................................................................................................19

Armament........................................................................................................20

Cockpit............................................................................................................24

Sensors and avionics.......................................................................................24

Helmet-mounted display system.....................................................................26

Maintenance....................................................................................................27

3. Specifications (F-35A)........................................................................................28

References...............................................................................................................29
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Introduction
The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II is a family of single-seat, single-
engine, all-weather stealth multirole fighters undergoing final development and
testing by the United States. The fifth generation combat aircraft is designed to
perform ground attack and air defense missions. The F-35 has three main models:
the F-35A conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant, the F-35B short take-
off and vertical-landing (STOVL) variant, and the F-35C carrier-based Catapult
Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) variant. On 31 July 2015,
the first squadron was declared ready for deployment after intensive testing by the
United States.
The F-35 is descended from the X-35, which was the winning design of the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. It is being designed and built by an aerospace
industry team led by Lockheed Martin. Other major F-35 industry partners include
Northrop Grumman, Pratt & Whitney and BAE Systems. The F-35 took its first
flight on 15 December 2006. The United States plans to buy 2,457 aircraft. The F-
35 variants are intended to provide the bulk of the manned tactical airpower of the
U.S. Air Force, Navy and the Marine Corps over the coming decades. Deliveries of
the F-35 for the U.S. military are scheduled to be completed in 2037 with a pro-
jected service life up to 2070.
F-35 JSF development is being principally funded by the United States with
additional funding from partners. The partner nations are either NATO members or
close U.S. allies. The United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, Canada, Norway, Den-
mark, the Netherlands, and Turkey are part of the active development program;
several additional countries have ordered, or are considering ordering, the F-35.
The program is the most expensive military weapons system in history, and
it has been the object of much criticism from those inside and outside government
– in the US and in allied countries. Critics argue that the plane is "plagued with de-
sign flaws," with many blaming the procurement process in which Lockheed was
allowed "to design, test, and produce the F-35 all at the same time, instead of ... de-
fects before firing up its production line." By 2014, the program was "$163 billion
over budget seven years behind schedule." Critics further contend that the pro-
gram's high sunk costs and political momentum make it "too big to kill."
1. Development
The JSF program was designed to replace the United States military F-16,
A-10, F/A-18 (excluding newer E/F "Super Hornet" variants) and AV-8B tactical
fighter and attack aircraft. To keep development, production, and operating costs
down, a common design was planned in three variants that share 80 percent of
their parts:
 F-35A, conventional take off and landing (CTOL) variant.
 F-35B, short-take off and vertical-landing (STOVL) variant.
 F-35C, carrier-based CATOBAR (CV) variant.
 4

An F-35 wind tunnel testing model in the Arnold Engineering Development

Center's 16-foot transonic wind tunnel
George Standridge, Vice President of Strategy and Business Development
for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, and a naval aviator who flew the F/A-18 Hornet
in both the U.S. Navy and the Naval Reserve, predicted in 2006 that the F-35
would be four times more effective than legacy fighters in air-to-air combat, eight
times more effective in air-to-ground combat, and three times more effective in re-
connaissance and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses – while having better range
and requiring less logistics support and having around the same procurement costs
(if development costs are ignored) as legacy fighters. The design goals call for the
F-35 to be the premier strike aircraft through 2040 and to be second only to the F-
22 Raptor in air supremacy.
The JSF development contract was signed on 16 November 1996, and the
contract for System Development and Demonstration (SDD) was awarded on 26
October 2001 to Lockheed Martin, whose X-35 beat the Boeing X-32. Although
both aircraft met or exceeded requirements, the X-35 design was considered to
have less risk and more growth potential. The designation of the new fighter as "F-
35" is out-of-sequence with standard DoD aircraft numbering, by which it should
have been "F-24". It came as a surprise even to the company, which had been re-
ferring to the aircraft in-house by this expected designation.
The development of the F-35 is unusual for a fighter aircraft in that no two-
seat trainer versions have been built for any of the variants; advanced flight simu-
lators mean that no trainer versions were deemed necessary. Instead F-16s have
been used as bridge trainers between the T-38 and the F-35. The T-X was intended
to be used to train future F-35 pilots, but this might succumb to budget pressures in
the USAF.
Design phase
Based on wind tunnel testing, Lockheed Martin slightly enlarged its X-35
design into the F-35. The forward fuselage is 5 inches (130 mm) longer to make
room for avionics. Correspondingly, the horizontal stabilators were moved 2
inches (51 mm) rearward to retain balance and control. The top surface of the fuse-
 5

lage was raised by 1 inch (25 mm) along the center line. Also, it was decided to in-
crease the size of the F-35B STOVL variant's weapons bay to be common with the
other two variants. Manufacturing of parts for the first F-35 prototype airframe be-
gan in November 2003. Because the X-35 did not have weapons bays, their addi-
tion in the F-35 would cause design changes which would lead to later weight
problems.
The F-35B STOVL variant was in danger of missing performance require-
ments in 2004 because it weighed too much; reportedly, by 2,200 lb (1,000 kg) or
8 percent. In response, Lockheed Martin added engine thrust and thinned airframe
members; reduced the size of the common weapons bay and vertical stabilizers; re-
routed some thrust from the roll-post outlets to the main nozzle; and redesigned the
wing-mate joint, portions of the electrical system, and the portion of the aircraft
immediately behind the cockpit. Many of the changes were applied to all three
variants to maintain high levels of commonality. By September 2004, the weight
reduction effort had reduced the aircraft's design weight by 2,700 pounds
(1,200 kg), but the redesign cost $6.2 billion and delayed the project by 18 months.
On 7 July 2006, the U.S. Air Force, the lead service for the aircraft, offi-
cially announced the name of the F-35: Lightning II, in honor of Lockheed's World
War II-era twin-propeller Lockheed P-38 Lightning for the United States Army Air
Forces and the Cold War-era jet, the English Electric Lightning for the Royal Air
Force.
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics is the prime contractor and performs aircraft
final assembly, overall system integration, mission system, and provides forward
fuselage, wings and aircraft flight control system. Northrop Grumman provides ac-
tive electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, electro-optical AN/AAQ-37 Dis-
tributed Aperture System (DAS), Communications, Navigation, Identification
(CNI), center fuselage, weapons bay, and arrestor gear. BAE Systems provides the
Flight Control Software (FCS1), the electronic warfare systems, crew life support
and escape systems, aft fuselage, empennages as well as the horizontal and vertical
tails. Alenia will perform final assembly for Italy and, according to an Alenia exec-
utive, assembly of all European aircraft with the exception of Turkey and the
United Kingdom. The F-35 program has seen a great deal of investment in auto-
mated production facilities. For example, Handling Specialty produced the wing
assembly platforms for Lockheed Martin.
On 19 December 2008, Lockheed Martin rolled out the first weight-opti-
mized F-35A, designated AF-1. It was the first F-35 built at full production speed,
and is structurally identical to the production F-35As that were delivered starting in
2010. On 5 January 2009, six F-35s had been built, including AF-1; another 13
pre-production test aircraft and four production aircraft were being manufactured.
On 6 April 2009, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates proposed speeding up
production for the U.S. to buy 2,443 F-35s.
 6

Program cost increases and delays

The F-35 program has experienced a number of cost overruns and develop-
mental delays. The program's delays have come under fire from the U.S. Congress
and some U.S. Department of Defense officials. The program has undergone a
number of reassessments and changes since 2006. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) warned in March 2006 that excessive concurrency ("an overlap of
flight testing and initial production") might result in expensive refits for several
hundred F-35 aircraft that are planned for production before design testing is com-
pleted. In 2010, acquisition chief Ashton Carter issued an Acquisition Decision
Memorandum restructuring the F-35 program. In November 2010, the GAO found
that "Managing an extensive, still-maturing global network of suppliers adds an-
other layer of complexity to producing aircraft efficiently and on-time" and that
"due to the extensive amount of testing still to be completed, the program could be
required to make alterations to its production processes, changes to its supplier
base, and costly retrofits to produced and fielded aircraft, if problems are discov-
ered." USAF budget data in 2010, along with other sources, projected the F-35 to
have a flyaway cost from US$89 million to US$200 million over the planned pro-
duction run. In February 2011, the Pentagon put a price of $207.6 million on each
of the 32 aircraft to be acquired in FY2012, rising to $304.16 million (a total ac-
quisition cost of $9.7 billion for 32 aircraft) if its share of research, development,
test and evaluation (RDT&E) spending is included.
On 21 April 2009, media reports, citing Pentagon sources, said that during
2007 and 2008, spies downloaded several terabytes of data related to the F-35's de-
sign and electronics systems, potentially compromising the aircraft and aiding the
development of defense systems against it. Lockheed Martin rejected suggestions
that the project was compromised, stating it "does not believe any classified infor-
mation had been stolen". Other sources suggested that the incident caused both
hardware and software redesigns to be more resistant to cyber attack. In March
2012, BAE Systems was reported to be the target of cyber espionage. BAE Sys-
tems refused to comment on the report, although they did state, "Own cyber secu-
rity capability can detect, prevent and rectify such attacks."
On 9 November 2009, Ashton Carter, under-secretary of defense for acquisi-
tion, technology and logistics, acknowledged that the Pentagon "joint estimate
team" (JET) had found possible future cost and schedule overruns in the project
and that he would be holding meetings to attempt to avoid these. On 1 February
2010, Gates removed the JSF Program Manager, U.S. Marine Corps Major Gen-
eral David Heinz, and withheld $614 million in payments to Lockheed Martin be-
cause of program costs and delays.
On 11 March 2010, a report from the Government Accountability Office to
United States Senate Committee on Armed Services projected the overall unit cost
of an F-35A to be $113 million in "today's money." In 2010, Pentagon officials
disclosed that the F-35 program had exceeded its original cost estimates by more
than 50 percent. An internal Pentagon report critical of the JSF project stated that
 7

"affordability is no longer embraced as a core pillar". In 2010, Lockheed Martin

expected they would be able to reduce costs projected by government estimators
by 20 percent. On 24 March 2010, Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, in testi-
mony before Congress, declared the cost overruns and delays "unacceptable," char-
acterizing previous cost and schedule estimates as "overly rosy". Gates insisted the
F-35 would become "the backbone of U.S. air combat for the next generation" and
informed Congress that he had extended the development period by an additional
13 months and budgeted $3 billion more for the testing program, while slowing
down production. In August 2010, Lockheed Martin announced delays in resolving
a "wing-at-mate overlap" production problem, which would slow initial produc-
tion.
In November 2010, as part of a cost-cutting measure, the co-chairs of the
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform suggested cancelling
the F-35B and halving orders for F-35As and F-35Cs. Air Force Magazine re-
ported that "Pentagon officials" were considering canceling the F-35B because its
short range meant that the forward bases or amphibious ships from which it would
operate would be in range of hostile tactical ballistic missiles. Lockheed Martin
consultant Loren B. Thompson said that this ″rumor″ was a result of the usual ten-
sions between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, and there was no alternative other
than the F-35B as a replacement for AV-8B Harrier II. He also confirmed that
there were further delays and cost increases due to technical problems with the air-
craft and software, blaming most of the delays and extra costs on redundant flight
tests.
In November 2010, the Center for Defense Information expected that the F-
35 program would be restructured, resulting in an additional year of delay and in-
creasing the cost by another $5 billion. On 5 November 2010, the Block 1 software
flew for the first time on BF-4. As of the end of 2010, it was said that only 15% of
the software remained to be written, but this was reported to include the most diffi-
cult sections such as data fusion. In 2011, it was revealed that actually, only 50%
of the estimated eight million lines of code needed had been written and that, ac-
cording to the newest schedule, it would take another six years to complete the
software. By 2012, the total estimated lines of code for the entire program (on-
board and offboard) had grown from the previous year's estimate of 8 million lines
to 24 million lines.
In 2011, the program head and Commander of the Naval Air Systems Com-
mand, Vice Admiral David Venlet, confirmed that the concurrency (testing and
production at the same time) built into the program "was a miscalculation". This
was said during a contract dispute, in which the Pentagon insisted that Lockheed
Martin help cover the costs of applying fixes found during testing of aircraft al-
ready produced. Lockheed Martin objected that the cost sharing posed an uninsur-
able, unbounded risk that the company could not cover, and later responded that
the "concurrency costs for F-35 continue to reduce". The Senate Armed Services
Committee strongly backed the Pentagon position. However in December 2011,
 8

Lockheed Martin accepted a cost sharing agreement. The Aerospace Industries As-
sociation warned that such changes would force them to anticipate cost overruns in
the future when bidding on contracts. As of 2012, problems found during flight
testing were expected to continue to lead to higher levels of engineering changes
through 2019. The total additional cost for concurrency in the program is around
$1.3 billion. By the next year the cost had grown to $1.7 billion.
In January 2011, Defense Secretary Robert Gates expressed the Pentagon's
frustration with the rising costs of the F-35 program when he said, "The culture of
endless money that has taken hold must be replaced by a culture of restraint." Fo-
cusing his attention on the troubled F-35B, Gates ordered "a two-year probation",
saying it "should be canceled" if corrections are unsuccessful. Gates had previ-
ously stated his support for the program. Some private analysts, such as Richard
Aboulafia, of the Teal Group said that the F-35 program was becoming a money
pit. Gates' successor, Leon Panetta, ended the F-35B's probation on 20 January
2012, stating "The STOVL variant has made—I believe and all of us believe—suf-
ficient progress."
In February 2011, former Former Pentagon manager Paul G. Kaminski said
that the lack of a complete test plan would add five years to the JSF program. Ini-
tial operating capability (IOC) will be determined by software development rather
than by hardware production or pilot training. As of May 2013, the USMC plans to
have Initial Operating Capability by "mid-2015" for the F-35B, using Block 2B
software, which gives basic air-to-air and air-to-ground capability. It is reported
that the USAF plans to push ahead, expecting to have Initial Operating Capability
with the F-35A in mid-2016, using Block 3I software, rather than waiting for the
full-capability Block 3F software, which is expected to be available by mid-2017.
The F-35C will not enter service with the USN until mid-2018. The $56.4 billion
development project for the aircraft should be completed in 2018 when the Block 5
configuration is expected to be delivered, several years late and considerably over
budget.
Delays in the F-35 program may lead to a "fighter gap" with the United
States and other countries lacking sufficient fighter aircraft to meet their require-
ments. Israel may seek to buy second-hand F-15Es, while Australia has considered
buying additional F/A-18 Super Hornets in the face of F-35 delays.
In May 2011, the Pentagon's top weapons buyer, Ashton Carter, said that the
latest price estimate of $133 million per aircraft was not affordable. In 2011, The
Economist warned that the F-35 was in danger of slipping into a "death spiral,"
where increasing per-aircraft costs would lead to cuts in number of aircraft or-
dered, leading to further cost increases and further cuts in orders. Later that year,
four aircraft were cut from the fifth "Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)" order be-
cause of cost overruns. in 2012, a further two aircraft were cut. Lockheed Martin
acknowledged that the slowing of purchases would increase costs. David Van Bu-
ren, U.S. Air Force acquisition chief, said that Lockheed Martin needed to reduce
manufacturing capacity to match the reduced market for their aircraft. However,
 9

the company said that the slowdown in American orders would free up capacity,
which could be diverted to meet urgent, short-term needs of foreign partners for re-
placement fighters. Air Force Secretary Michael Donley said that no more money
was available and that future price increases would be met with cuts in the number
of aircraft ordered. Later that month, the Pentagon reported that costs had risen an-
other 4.3 percent, in part due to production delays. In 2012, the purchase of six out
of 31 aircraft was conditioned on progress of development and testing. In 2013,
Bogdan repeated that no more money was available, but that he hoped to avoid the
death spiral. In 2014 it was reported that another eight aircraft would be cut from
the following year's order.
Japan has warned that it may halt its purchase of the F-35 if the cost per air-
craft increases and Canada has indicated it has not yet committed to purchase the
aircraft. The United States is now projected to spend an estimated $323 billion for
development and procurement of the F-35, making it the most expensive defense
program ever. Testifying before a Canadian parliamentary committee in 2011,
Rear Admiral Arne Roksund of Norway estimated that his country's 52 F-35
fighter jets will cost $769 million each over their operational lifetime. In 2012, the
total life-cycle cost for the entire U.S. fleet was estimated at US$1.51 trillion over
a 50-year life, or $618 million per plane. In hopes of reducing this high lifetime
cost, the USAF is considering reducing Lockheed Martin's role in contractor logis-
tics support. The company has responded that the Pentagon's lifetime cost estimate
includes future costs beyond its control, such as USAF reorganizations and yet-to-
be-specified upgrades. Delays have also negatively affected the program's world-
wide supply chain and partner organizations as well.
In 2012, General Norton A. Schwartz decried the "foolishness" of reliance
on computer models to arrive at the final design of aircraft before flight testing has
found the problems that require changes in design. In 2013, JSF project team
leader, USAF Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan, said that "A large amount of con-
currency, that is, beginning production long before your design is stable and long
before you've found problems in test, creates downstream issues where now you
have to go back and retrofit airplanes and make sure the production line has those
fixes in them. And that drives complexity and cost". Bogdan remarked on the im-
provement in the program ever since Lockheed Martin was forced to assume some
of the financial risks.
In 2012, in order to avoid further delays that would result from design
changes, the U.S. DoD accepted a reduced combat radius for the F-35A and a
longer takeoff run for the F-35B. As a result, the F-35B's estimated combat radius
was reduced by 15 percent. In a meeting in Sydney, Australia in March 2012, the
United States pledged to eight partner nations that there would be no more pro-
gram delays.
In May 2012, Lockheed Martin Chief Executive Bob Stevens complained
that the Defense Department's requirements for cost data were themselves driving
up program costs. Stevens also said that a strike by union employees might result
 10

in failure to meet that year's production target of 29 F-35s. Striking workers ques-
tioned the quality of work done by temporary replacements, noting that even their
own work had been cited for "inattention to production quality," resulting in a 16%
rework rate. The workers went on strike to protect pensions, the cost of which had
been the subject of negotiations with the Department of Defense over orders for
the next batch of aircraft. These same pension costs were cited by Fitch in their
downgrade of the outlook for Lockheed Martin's stock price. Stevens said that
while he hoped to bring down program costs, the industrial base was not capable of
meeting the government's cost expectations, given the current number of aircraft
on order.
According to a June 2012 Government Accountability Office report, the F-
35's unit cost had almost doubled, with an increase of 93% over the program's orig-
inal, 2001 baseline cost estimates. In 2012, Lockheed Martin reportedly feared that
the tighter policies of the Obama administration regarding award fees would re-
duce their profits by $500 million over the coming five years. This in fact occurred
in 2012, when the Pentagon withheld the maximum $47 million allowed, due to
the company's failure to certify its program for tracking project costs and sched-
ules. The GAO also faulted the USAF and USN for not fully planning for the costs
of extending legacy F-16 and F-18 fleets to cover the delay in acquiring the F-35.
Due to cost-cutting measures, the U.S. Government asserts that the "flyaway" cost
(including engines) has been dropping. The U.S. Government estimates that in
2020 an "F-35 will cost some $85m each, or less than half of the cost of the initial
units delivered in 2009. Adjusted to today’s dollars, the 2020 price would be $75m
each."
In 2013, Lockheed Martin began to lay off workers at the Fort Worth, Texas
plant where the F-35s were being assembled. They said that revised estimates indi-
cated that the costs of refitting the 187 aircraft built by the time testing concludes
in 2016 would be lower than feared. The GAO's Michael Sullivan said that the
company had failed to get an early start on systems engineering and had not under-
stood the requirements or the technologies involved at the program's start. The
Pentagon vowed to continue funding the program during budget sequestration if
possible. It was feared that the U.S. budget sequestration in 2013 could slow devel-
opment of critical software and the Congress ordered another study to be made on
the software development delays. As of 2014, software development remained the
"number one technical challenge" for the F-35.
In June 2013, Frank Kendall, Pentagon acquisition, technology and logistics
chief, declared "major advances" had been made in the F-35 program over the last
three years and that he intended to approve production-rate increases in September.
Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, program executive officer, reported far
better communications between government and vendor managers, and that negoti-
ations over Lot 6 and 7 talks were moving fast. It was also stated that operating
costs had been better understood since training started. He predicted "we can make
a substantial dent in projections" of operating costs.
 11

In July 2013, further doubt was cast on the latest production schedule, with
further software delays and continuing sensor, display and wing buffet problems.
In August it was revealed that the Pentagon was weighing cancellation of the pro-
gram as one possible response to the budget sequestration and the United States
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense voted to cut advanced procure-
ment for the fighter.
On August 21, 2013, C-Span reported that Congressional Quarterly and the
Government Accountability Office were indicating the "total estimated program
cost now is $400 billion, nearly twice the initial cost". The current investment was
documented as approximately $50 billion. The projected $316 billion cost in devel-
opment and procurement was estimated through 2037 at an average of $12.6 bil-
lion per year. These were confirmed by Steve O'Bryan, Vice President of Lock-
heed Martin, on the same date.
In 2013, a RAND study found that during development, the three different
versions had drifted so far apart from each other, that having a single base design
might have come to be more expensive than if the three services had simply built
entirely different aircraft, each tailored to their own requirements.
In 2014, the airframe cost went below $100 million for the first time, and the
Air Force expected unit costs to fall.
A 2014 Center for International Policy study cast doubt on the number of in-
direct jobs created by the program, which has been a key selling point for the F-35
to Congress. Lockheed stood by their job numbers and said that their accounting
was in line with industry norms.
A January 2014 report by J. Michael Gilmore said that new software delays
could delay Block 2B release by 13 months. This estimate was reduced to 4
months in the DOTE report from November 2014. The F-35 program office con-
sidered software to be the top technical risk to the program. The USMC was main-
taining their expectation of an Initial Operational Capability by July 2015.
In 2014, U.S. Senator John McCain blamed cost increases in the program on
"cronyism".
In 2014, the GAO found that the F-35 fleet would have operating costs 79%
higher than the aircraft it was to replace. The latest Selected Acquisition Report
stated that the program cost had increased 43% from 2001, with Program Acquisi-
tion Unit Cost up 68% and Unit Recurring Flyaway up 41%. The F-35A's cost per
flying hour is $32,500 while the F-16C/D is $25,500, but each F-35A is expected
to fly only 250 hours a year, compared to the F-16's 316 hours a year, resulting in
the same yearly operating cost.
In July 2014, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems an-
nounced they would invest a combined $170 million in the program, which was
anticipated to result in a savings of over $10 million per aircraft. This initiative
was said to have set the project on track for an $80M (including engine) price tag
per aircraft (F-35A) by 2018, when full production is scheduled to begin.
 12

The December 2014 Selected Acquisition Report listed a cost decrease of

$7.5 billion against a program cost of $391.1 billion ($320 billion in 2012 dollars).
Lockheed Martin also stated that there would be an estimated decrease of nearly
$60 billion to the operations and support costs.
The 2015 DoD annual report stated that the current schedule to complete
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) and enter Initial Operational Test-
ing and Evaluation (IOT&E) by August 2017 was unrealistic, instead the program
would likely not finish Block 3F development and flight testing prior to January
2018. Based on those projected completion dates for Block 3F developmental test-
ing, IOT&E would not start earlier than August 2018.
The Block 3I software was intended to be a revision of the Block 2B soft-
ware to run on the updated Integrated Core Processor,. Unfortunately, it resulted in
a timing misalignment that reduced stability, requiring reboots in flight.
Concerns over performance and safety
A Lockheed Martin press release points to USAF simulations regarding the
F-35's air-to-air performance against adversaries described as "4th generation"
fighters, in which it states the F-35 is "400 percent" more effective. Major General
Charles R. Davis, USAF, the F-35 program executive officer, has stated that the
"F-35 enjoys a significant Combat Loss Exchange Ratio advantage over the current
and future air-to-air threats, to include Sukhois".
In September 2008, in reference to the original plan to fit the F-35 with only
two air-to-air missiles (internally), Major Richard Koch, chief of USAF Air Com-
bat Command’s advanced air dominance branch is reported to have said that "I
wake up in a cold sweat at the thought of the F-35 going in with only two air-dom-
inance weapons." The Norwegians have been briefed on a plan to equip the F-35
with six AIM-120D missiles by 2019. Former RAND author John Stillion has writ-
ten of the F-35A's air-to-air combat performance that it "can't turn, can't climb,
can't run"; Lockheed Martin test pilot Jon Beesley has stated that in an air-to-air
configuration the F-35 has almost as much thrust as weight and a flight control sys-
tem that allows it to be fully maneuverable even at a 50-degree angle of attack.
Consultant to Lockheed Martin Loren B. Thompson has said that the "electronic
edge F-35 enjoys over every other tactical aircraft in the world may prove to be
more important in future missions than maneuverability".
In an April 2009 interview with the state-run Global Times, Chen Hu, editor-
in-chief of World Military Affairs magazine said that the F-35 is too costly be-
cause it attempts to provide the capabilities needed for all three American services
in a common airframe. U.S. defense specialist Winslow T. Wheeler and aircraft de-
signer Pierre Sprey have commented of the F-35 being "heavy and sluggish" and
possessing "pitifully small load for all that money", further criticizing the value for
money of the stealth measures as well as lacking fire safety measures; his final
conclusion was that any air force would be better off maintaining its fleets of F-16s
and F/A-18s compared to buying into the F-35 program. A senior U.S. defense of-
ficial was quoted as saying that the F-35 will be "the most stealthy, sophisticated
 13

and lethal tactical fighter in the sky," and added "Quite simply, the F-15 will be no
match for the F-35." After piloting the aircraft, RAF Squadron Leader Steve Long
said that, over its existing aircraft, the F-35 will give "the RAF and Navy a quan-
tum leap in airborne capability."
In November 2009, Jon Schreiber, head of F-35 international affairs pro-
gram for the Pentagon, said that the U.S. will not share the software code for the F-
35 with its allies. The US plans to set up a reprogramming facility that will develop
JSF software and distribute it to allies. In 2014 in order to deal with capacity issues
in the creation of mission data packages at the Air Combat Command reprogram-
ming lab at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., plans were announced to open additional
mission data labs to customize mission data packages with terrain and enemy
threat information for different regions and partner nation needs.
In 2011, Canadian politicians raised the issue of the safety of the F-35's re-
liance on a single engine (as opposed to a twin-engine configuration, which pro-
vides a backup in case of an engine failure). Canada, and other operators, had pre-
vious experience with a high-accident rate with the single-engine Lockheed CF-
104 Starfighter with many accidents related to engine failures. When asked what
would happen if the F-35's single engine fails in the Far North, Defence Minister
Peter MacKay stated "It won’t".
In November 2011, a Pentagon study team identified 13 areas of concern
that remained to be addressed in the F-35.
In May 2012, Michael Auslin of the American Enterprise Institute ques-
tioned the capability of the F-35 to engage modern air defenses. In July 2012, the
Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin $450 million to improve the F-35 electronic
warfare systems and incorporate Israeli systems.
In a negative assessment of the Joint Strike Fighter, the think tank Air Power
Australia declared that the Joint Strike Fighter is not designed to perform air supe-
riority roles and also is not adapted to performing the long-range penetration strike
role filled by previous Australian aircraft like the General Dynamics F-111C. Criti-
cally, they also stated that the F-35’s "intended survivability and lethality are mis-
matched against the operational environment in which the aircraft is intended to be
used."
In June 2012, Australia's Air Vice Marshal Osley responded to Air Power
Australia's criticisms by saying "Air Power Australia (Kopp and Goon) claim that
the F-35 will not be competitive in 2020 and that Air Power Australia's criticisms
mainly center around F-35's aerodynamic performance and stealth capabilities."
Osley continued with, "these are inconsistent with years of detailed analysis that
has been undertaken by Defence, the JSF program office, Lockheed Martin, the
U.S. services and the eight other partner nations. While aircraft developments,
such as the Russian PAK-FA or the Chinese J20, as argued by Airpower Australia,
show that threats we could potentially face are becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated, there is nothing new regarding development of these aircraft to change De-
fence's assessment." He then said that he thinks that the Air Power Australia's
 14

"analysis is basically flawed through incorrect assumptions and a lack of knowl-

edge of the classified F-35 performance information."
In a report released in 2013, it was stated that flaws in the fuel tank and fuel-
draulic (fuel-based hydraulic) systems have left it considerably more vulnerable to
lightning strikes and other fire sources, including enemy fire, than previously re-
vealed, especially at lower altitudes. This report updated a separate report from
2010, in which Lockheed Martin spokesman John Kent said that adding fire-sup-
pression systems would offer "very small" improvement to survivability. The same
2010 report also noted performance degradation of the three variants; the sustained
turn rates had been reduced to 4.6 g for the F-35A, 4.5 g for the F-35B, and 5.0 g
for the F-35C. The acceleration performance of all three variants was also down-
graded, with the F-35C taking 43 seconds longer than an F-16 to accelerate from
Mach 0.8 to Mach 1.2; this was judged by several fighter pilots to be a lower per-
formance level than expected from a fourth generation fighter. On 30 August 2013,
it was reported that the F-35B and F-35C models take several complex maneuvers
in order to "accelerate" to their top speed of Mach 1.6, which consumed almost all
of the onboard fuel. The F-35 program office is reconsidering addition of previ-
ously removed safety equipment. In 2012, Lockheed Martin program manager
Tom Burbage said that while the relatively large cross-sectional area of the fighter
that was required by the internal weapons bays gave it a disadvantage against
fourth generation fighters that were operating in a clear configuration, the F-35
armed with weapons carried internally had the advantage over fighters carrying
their weapons outside the aircraft.
In March 2013, USAF test pilots, flying with pre-operational software that
did not utilize the all-aspect infrared AAQ-37 DAS sensor, noted a lack of visibil-
ity from the F-35 cockpit during evaluation flights, which would get them consis-
tently shot down in combat. Defense spending analyst Winslow Wheeler con-
cluded from flight evaluation reports that the F-35A "is flawed beyond redemp-
tion"; in response, program manager Bogdan suggested that pilots worried about
being shot down should fly cargo aircraft instead. The same report found (in addi-
tion to the usual problems with the aircraft listed above):

Current aircraft software is inadequate for even basic pilot training.

Ejection seat may fail, causing pilot fatality.

Several pilot-vehicle interface issues, including lack of feedback on
touchscreen controls.

The radar performs poorly, or not at all.

Engine replacement takes an average of 52 hours, instead of the two
hours specified.

Maintenance tools do not work.
The JPO responded that more experienced pilots would be able to safely op-
erate the aircraft and that procedures would improve over time.
Even in the final "3F" software version, the F-35 will lack ROVER, in spite
of having close air support as one of its primary missions.
 15

In 2014, David Axe stated design flaws related to its single-engine configu-
ration could vex the F-35 for decades to come, forcing the Pentagon to suspend
flying too often for the majority of its fighter fleet.
In November 2014, China unveiled the portable JY-26 Skywatch-U UHF 3-
D long-range surveillance radar system, specifically designed to defeat stealth air-
craft like the F-35. Responding to a reporter's question about the High-Frequency
radar threat General Welsh said "while we may have a new radar developed that al-
lows an acquisition radar to see an airplane, that doesn't mean you can pass the
track off to a radar that will then guide a weapon to be able to destroy the airplane.
As long as we break the kill chain sometime between when you arrive in the battle
space and when the enemy weapon approaches your airplane, you're successful at
using stealth."
A 2014 Pentagon report found these issues:

First two mission data sets available November 2015, after USMC IOC.

Overall operational suitability relies heavily on contractor support and unaccept-
able workarounds.

Aircraft availability reached 51% but short of 60% goal.

Fuel Tanks don't retain inerting for required 12 hours after landing.

High dynamic loads on the rudder at lower altitudes in 20-26 AoA preventing
testing.

82 pounds added to F-35B in last 38 months, 337 pounds below limit.

Transonic Roll-Off (TRO) and airframe buffet continue to be program concerns.

572 deficiencies remain affecting Block 2B capability, 151 of which are critical.

VSim would likely not support planned Block 2B operational testing in 2015.

Maintainability hours still an issue.

ALIS requires many manual workarounds.
A 2015 Pentagon report found these issues:
 The Joint Program Office is re-categorizing or failing to count aircraft failures to
try to boost maintainability and reliability statistics;
 Testing is continuing to reveal the need for more tests, but the majority of the
fixes and for capability deficiencies being discovered are being deferred to later
blocks rather than being resolved;
 The F-35 has a significant risk of fire due to extensive fuel tank vulnerability,
lightning vulnerability and an OBIGGS system unable to sufficiently reduce fire-
sustaining oxygen, despite redesigns;
 Wing drop concerns are still not resolved after six years, and may only be miti-
gated or solved at the expense of combat maneuverability and stealth;
 The June engine problems are seriously impeding or preventing the completion of
key test points, including ensuring that the F-35B delivered to the Marine Corps
for IOC meets critical safety requirements; no redesign, schedule, or cost estimate
for a long-term fix has been defined yet, thereby further impeding g testing;
 16

 Even in its third iteration, the F-35’s helmet continues to show high false-alarm
rates and computer stability concerns, seriously reducing pilots’ situational aware-
ness and endangering their lives in combat;
 The number of Block 2B’s already limited combat capabilities being deferred to
later blocks means that the Marine Corps’ FY2015 IOC squadron will be even less
combat capable than originally planned;
 ALIS software failures continue to impede operation, mission planning, and
maintenance of the F-35, forcing the Services to be overly reliant on contractors
and "unacceptable workarounds";
 Deficiencies in Block 2B software, and deferring those capabilities to later
blocks, is undermining combat suitability for all three variants of the F-35;
 The program’s attempts to save money now by reducing test points and deferring
crucial combat capabilities will result in costly retrofits and fixes later down the
line, creating a future unaffordable bow wave that, based on F-22 experience, will
add at least an additional $67 billion in acquisition costs; and
 Low availability and reliability of the F-35 is driven by inherent design problems
that are only becoming more obvious and difficult to fix.
Three different types of data "massaging" are identified in the DOT&E re-
port: moving failures from one category to another, less important one; ignoring
repetitive failures, thus inflating numbers of failure-free hours; and improper scor-
ing of reliability. Maintenance problems were determined to be so severe that the
F-35 is only able to fly twice a week. To address the issue of wing drop and buffet
maneuvering, the required control law modifications will reduce the maneuverabil-
ity of the F-35, "only exacerbating the plane’s performance problems in this area".
The F-35C's wing drop problem is "worse than other variants". Testing to investi-
gate the impact of buffet and transonic roll-off (TRO or "wing drop") on the hel-
met-mounted display and offensive and defensive maneuvering found that "buffet
affected display symbology, and would have the greatest impact in scenarios where
a pilot was maneuvering to defeat a missile shot." Buffeting also degrades the gy-
roscopes in the inertial platforms which are essential for flight control, navigation,
and weapons aiming. DOT&E explained that this was an ongoing issue: "In heavy
buffet conditions, which occur between 20 and 26 degrees angle of attack, faults
occurred in the inertial measurement units (IMUs) in the aircraft that degraded the
flight control system (two of three flight control channels become disabled), re-
quiring a flight abort."
In early 2015 the AF-2 F-35A, the primary flight sciences loads and flutter
evaluation aircraft, was flown by Lockheed Martin F-35 site lead test pilot David
"Doc" Nelson in air-to-air combat maneuvers against F-16s for the first time and,
based on the results of these and earlier flight-envelope evaluations, said the air-
craft can be cleared for greater agility as a growth option. AF-2 was the first F-35
to be flown to 9g+ and -3g, and to roll at design-load factor. Departure/spin resis-
tance was also proven during high angle-of-attack (AOA) testing which eventually
went as high as 110 deg. AOA. "When we did the first dogfight in January, they
 17

said, ‘you have no limits,’" says Nelson. "It was loads monitoring, so they could
tell if we ever broke something. It was a confidence builder for the rest of the fleet
because there is no real difference structurally between AF-2 and the rest of the
airplanes." "Pilots really like maneuverability, and the fact that the aircraft recovers
so well from a departure allows us to say, ‘you don’t have to clamp down so
tight,’" says Nelson.
With the full flight envelope now opened to an altitude of 50,000 ft, speeds
of Mach 1.6/700 KCAS and loads of 9 g, test pilots also say improvements to the
flight control system have rendered the transonic roll-off (TRO) issue tactically ir-
relevant. Highlighted as a "program concern" in the Defense Department’s Direc-
tor of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 2014 report, initial flight tests
showed that all three F-35 variants experienced some form of wing drop in high-
speed turns associated with asymmetrical movements of shock waves. However,
TRO "has evolved into a non-factor," says Nelson, who likens the effect to a mo-
mentary "tug" on one shoulder harness. "You have to pull high-g to even find it."
The roll-off phenomena exhibits itself as "less than 10 deg./sec. for a fraction of a
second. We have been looking for a task it affects and we can’t find one."
In July 2015, Lockheed Martin confirmed the authenticity of a leaked report
showing the F-35 to be less maneuverable than an older F-16D with wing tanks.
The pilot who flew the mission reported inferior energy maneuverability, a limited
pitch rate and flying qualities that were "not intuitive or favorable" in a major part
of the air-combat regime gave the F-16 the tactical advantage. In general the high
AoA capabilities of the jet could not be used in an effective way without signifi-
cantly reducing follow-on maneuvering potential. In an interview with CBC Radio
broadcast 2 July 2015, military journalist David Axe claimed to have read the
leaked report and stated: "Against a determined foe, the F-35 is in very big trou-
ble." However, the F-35 used was a flight test aircraft with a restricted flight enve-
lope and lacked some features present on the operational aircraft. The Pentagon,
JPO, and defense analysts have defended the F-35's utility in spite of the report's
assertion that it lacks maneuverability by saying it was designed primarily to dis-
rupt the kill chain of advanced air defenses while the F-22 would handle close-in
dogfighting, it poses advanced sensor and information fusion capabilities to detect
and engage enemy aircraft at long ranges before it can be seen and merged with,
and that most air combat in recent decades has focused on sensors and weapons
that achieved long-range kills rather than close combat.
In the report's conclusions and recommendations it was noted that loads re-
mained below limits, which implied there may be more maneuverability available
to the airframe. There were five recommendations made: to increase pitch rate and
available Nz (Normal Acceleration g) to provide the pilot with more maneuverabil-
ity options given the inherent energy deficit; consider increasing alpha onset to
also help offset the energy maneuverability deficit; consider increasing the begin-
ning of the high AoA blended region to 30 degrees or greater to make high AoA
maneuvering more predictable and intuitive; consider increasing pilot yaw rate to
 18

remove the gradual sluggish yaw response; and improve HMD Boresight perfor-
mance to account for dynamic maneuvers and consider improving rearward visibil-
ity by creating more space for helmet motion.
2. Design
The F-35 resembles a smaller, single-engine sibling of the twin-engine
Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and drew elements from it. The exhaust duct design
was inspired by the General Dynamics Model 200 design, proposed for a 1972 su-
personic VTOL fighter requirement for the Sea Control Ship. Although several ex-
perimental designs have been developed since the 1960s, such as the unsuccessful
Rockwell XFV-12, the F-35B is to be the first operational supersonic, STOVL
stealth fighter.
Acquisition deputy to the assistant secretary of the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Mark
D. "Shack" Shackelford has said that the F-35 is designed to be America's "premier
surface-to-air missile killer and is uniquely equipped for this mission with cutting
edge processing power, synthetic aperture radar integration techniques, and ad-
vanced target recognition." Lockheed Martin states the F-35 is intended to have
close- and long-range air-to-air capability second only to that of the F-22 Raptor.
Lockheed Martin has said that the F-35 has the advantage over the F-22 in basing
flexibility and "advanced sensors and information fusion". Lockheed Martin has
suggested that the F-35 could replace the USAF's F-15C/D fighters in the air supe-
riority role and the F-15E Strike Eagle in the ground attack role.
Some improvements over current-generation fighter aircraft are:

Durable, low-maintenance stealth technology, using structural fiber mat instead
of the high-maintenance coatings of legacy stealth platforms;

Integrated avionics and sensor fusion that combine information from off- and on-
board sensors to increase the pilot's situational awareness and improve target iden-
tification and weapon delivery, and to relay information quickly to other command
and control (C2) nodes

High speed data networking including IEEE 1394b and Fibre Channel. (Fibre
Channel is also used on Boeing's Super Hornet.)

The Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment (ALGS), Autonomic Logistics In-
formation System (ALIS) and Computerized maintenance management system
(CMMS) are to help ensure aircraft uptime with minimal maintenance manpower.
The Pentagon has moved to open up the competitive bidding by other companies.
This was after Lockheed Martin stated that instead of costing twenty percent less
than the F-16 per flight hour, the F-35 would actually cost twelve percent more.
Though the ALGS is intended to reduce maintenance costs, the company disagrees
with including the cost of this system in the aircraft ownership calculations. The
USMC have implemented a workaround for a cyber vulnerability in the system.
The ALIS system currently requires a shipping container load of servers to run, but
Lockheed is working on a more portable version to support the Marines' expedi-
tionary operations.
 19

Electro-hydrostatic actuators run by a power-by-wire flight-control system.

A modern and updated flight simulator, which may be used for a greater fraction
of pilot training in order to reduce the costly flight hours of the actual aircraft.

Lightweight, powerful Lithium-ion batteries potentially prone to thermal run-
away, similar to those that have grounded the Boeing 787 Dreamliner fleet. These
are required to provide power to run the control surfaces in an emergency, and
have been strenuously tested.
Structural composites in the F-35 are 35% of the airframe weight (up from
25% in the F-22). The majority of these are bismaleimide (BMI) and composite
epoxy material. The F-35 will be the first mass-produced aircraft to include struc-
tural nanocomposites, namely carbon nanotube reinforced epoxy. Experience of
the F-22's problems with corrosion led to the F-35 using a gap filler that causes
less galvanic corrosion to the airframe's skin, designed with fewer gaps requiring
filler and implementing better drainage. The relatively short 35-foot wingspan of
the A and B variants is set by the F-35B's requirement to fit inside the Navy's cur-
rent amphibious assault ship parking area and elevators; the F-35C's longer wing is
considered to be more fuel efficient.
A United States Navy study found that the F-35 will cost 30 to 40 percent
more to maintain than current jet fighters; not accounting for inflation over the F-
35's operational lifetime. A Pentagon study concluded a $1 trillion maintenance
cost for the entire fleet over its lifespan, not accounting for inflation. The F-35 pro-
gram office found that as of January 2014, costs for the F-35 fleet over a 53-year
life cycle was $857 billion. Costs for the fighter have been dropping and accounted
for the 22 percent life cycle drop since 2010. Lockheed stated that by 2019, pricing
for the fifth-generation aircraft will be less than fourth-generation fighters. An F-
35A in 2019 is expected to cost $85 million per unit complete with engines and
full mission systems, inflation adjusted from $75 million in December 2013.
Engines
The Pratt & Whitney F135 powers the F-35. An alternative engine, the Gen-
eral Electric/Rolls-Royce F136, was being developed until it was cancelled by its
manufacturers in December 2011 due to lack of funding from the Pentagon. The
F135 and F136 engines are not designed to supercruise. However, the F-35 can
briefly fly at Mach 1.2 for 150 miles. The F135 is the second (radar) stealthy after-
burning jet engine. Like the Pratt & Whitney F119 from which it was derived, the
F135 has suffered afterburner pressure pulsations, or 'screech' at low altitude and
high speed. The F-35 has a maximum speed of over Mach 1.6. With a maximum
takeoff weight of 60,000 lb (27,000 kg), the Lightning II is considerably heavier
than the lightweight fighters it replaces.

The STOVL F-35B is outfitted with the Rolls-Royce LiftSystem, designed

by Lockheed Martin and developed by Rolls-Royce. This system more resembles
 20

the German VJ 101D/E than the preceding STOVL Harrier Jump Jet and the Rolls-
Royce Pegasus engine. The Lift System is composed of a lift fan, drive shaft, two
roll posts and a "Three Bearing Swivel Module" (3BSM). The 3BSM is a thrust
vectoring nozzle which allows the main engine exhaust to be deflected downward
at the tail of the aircraft. The lift fan is near the front of the aircraft and provides a
counterbalancing thrust using two counter-rotating blisks. It is powered by the en-
gine's low-pressure (LP) turbine via a drive shaft and gearbox. Roll control during
slow flight is achieved by diverting unheated engine bypass air through wing-
mounted thrust nozzles called Roll Posts.
F136 funding came at the expense of other program elements, impacting on
unit costs. The F136 team stated their engine had a greater temperature margin, po-
tentially critical for VTOL operations in hot, high altitude conditions. Pratt &
Whitney tested higher thrust versions of the F135, partly in response to GE's state-
ments that the F136 is capable of producing more thrust than the 43,000 lbf
(190 kN) of early F135s. In testing, the F135 has demonstrated a maximum thrust
of over 50,000 lbf (220 kN); making it the most powerful engine ever installed in a
fighter aircraft as of 2010. It is much heavier than previous fighter engines; the
Heavy Underway Replenishment system needed to transfer the F135 between ships
is an unfunded USN requirement. Thermoelectric-powered sensors monitor turbine
bearing health.

Armament
The F-35A is armed with a GAU-22/A, a four-barrel version of the 25 mm
GAU-12 Equalizer cannon. The cannon is mounted internally with 182 rounds for
the F-35A or in an external pod with 220 rounds for the F-35B and F-35C; the gun
pod has stealth features. The F-35 has two internal weapons bays, and external
hardpoints for mounting up to four underwing pylons and two near wingtip pylons.
The two outer hardpoints can carry pylons for the AIM-9X Sidewinder and AIM-
132 ASRAAM short-range air-to-air missiles (AAM) only. The other pylons can
carry the AIM-120 AMRAAM BVR AAM, AGM-158 Joint Air to Surface Stand-
 21

off Missile (JASSM) cruise missile, and guided bombs. The external pylons can
carry missiles, bombs, and external fuel tanks at the expense of increased radar
cross-section, and thus reduced stealth.
There are a total of four weapons stations between the two internal bays.
Two of these can carry air-to-surface missiles up to 2,000 lb (910 kg) in A and C
models, or two bombs up to 1,000 lb (450 kg) in the B model; the other two sta-
tions are for smaller weapons such as air-to-air missiles. The weapon bays can
carry AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-132 ASRAAM, the Joint Direct Attack Munition
(JDAM), Paveway series of bombs, the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), Brim-
stone anti-tank missiles, and cluster munitions (Wind Corrected Munitions Dis-
penser). An air-to-air missile load of eight AIM-120s and two AIM-9s is possible
using internal and external weapons stations; a configuration of six 2,000 lb
(910 kg) bombs, two AIM-120s and two AIM-9s can also be arranged. The Terma
A/S multi-mission pod (MMP) could be used for different equipment and pur-
poses, such as electronic warfare, aerial reconnaissance, or rear-facing tactical
radar.
Lockheed Martin states that the weapons load can be configured as all-air-
to-ground or all-air-to-air, and has suggested that a Block 5 version will carry three
weapons per bay instead of two, replacing the heavy bomb with two smaller
weapons such as AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. Upgrades are to allow
each weapons bay to carry four GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) for A and
C models, or three in F-35B. Another option is four GBU-53/B Small Diameter
Bomb IIs in each bay on all F-35 variants. The F-35A has been outfitted with four
SDB II bombs and an AMRAAM missile to test adequate bay door clearance, as
well as the C-model, but the VTOL F-35B will not be able to carry the required
load of four SDB IIs in each weapons bay upon reaching IOC due to weight and
dimension constraints; F-35B bay changes are to be incorporated to increase SDB
II loadout around 2022 in line with the Block 4 weapons suite. The Meteor air-to-
air missile may be adapted for the F-35, a modified Meteor with smaller tailfins for
the F-35 was revealed in September 2010; plans call for the carriage of four Mete-
ors internally. The United Kingdom planned to use up to four AIM-132 ASRAAM
missiles internally, later plans call for the carriage of two internal and two external
ASRAAMs. The external ASRAAMs are planned to be carried on "stealthy" py-
lons; the missile allows attacks to slightly beyond visual range without employing
radar.
Norway and Australia are funding an adaptation of the Naval Strike Missile
(NSM) for the F-35. Under the designation Joint Strike Missile (JSM), it is to be
the only cruise missile to fit the F-35's internal bays; according to studies two
JSMs can be carried internally with an additional four externally. The F-35 is ex-
pected to take on the Wild Weasel mission, though there are no planned anti-radia-
tion missiles for internal carriage. The B61 nuclear bomb was initially scheduled
for deployment in 2017; as of 2012 it was expected to be in the early 2020s, and in
2014 Congress moved to cut funding for the needed weapons integration work.
 22

Norton A. Schwartz agreed with the move and said that "F-35 investment dollars
should realign to the long-range strike bomber". NATO partners who are buying
the F-35 but cannot afford to make them dual-capable want the USAF to fund the
conversions to allow their Lightning IIs to carry thermonuclear weapons. The
USAF is trying to convince NATO partners who can afford the conversions to con-
tribute to funding for those that cannot. The F-35 Block 4B will be able to carry
two B61 nuclear bombs internally by 2024.
According to reports in 2002, solid-state lasers were being developed as op-
tional weapons for the F-35. Lockheed is studying integrating a fiber laser onto the
aircraft that uses spectral beam combining to channel energy from a stack of indi-
vidual laser modules into a single, high-power beam, which can be scaled up or
down for various levels of effects. Adding a laser would give the F-35 the ability to
essentially burn missiles and other aircraft out of the sky. The F-35 is also one of
the target platforms for the High Speed Strike Weapon if hypersonic missile devel-
opment is successful.
The Air Force plans to use the F-35A to primarily take up the close air sup-
port (CAS) mission in contested environments. Amid criticism that the aircraft is
not well suited for the role compared to a dedicated attack platform, Air Force
chief of staff Mark Welsh is putting focus on weapons for the F-35 to employ on
CAS sorties including guided rockets, fragmentation rockets that would shatter
into individual projectiles before impact, and lighter, smaller ammunition in higher
capacity gun pods. Fragmentary rocket warheads would have greater effects than
cannon shells fired from a gun because a single rocket would create a "thousand-
round burst," delivering more projectiles than a strafing run could. Other weapons
could take advantage of the aircraft's helmet-mounted cueing system to aim rather
than needing to point the nose at a target. Institute for the Study of War's Christo-
pher Harmer has questioned the use of such an expensive aircraft for CAS.
Radar
The F-35 has been designed to have a low radar cross-section primarily due
to the shape of the aircraft and the use of stealthy radar-absorbent materials in its
construction, including fiber-mat. Unlike the previous generation of fighters, the F-
35 was designed for very-low-observable characteristics. Besides radar stealth
measures, the F-35 incorporates infrared signature and visual signature reduction
measures.
The Fighter Teen Series (F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18) carried large external
fuel tanks, but to avoid negating its stealth characteristics the F-35 must fly most
missions without them. Unlike the F-16 and F/A-18, the F-35 lacks leading edge
extensions and instead uses stealth-friendly chines for vortex lift in the same fash-
ion as the SR-71 Blackbird. The small bumps just forward of the engine air intakes
form part of the diverterless supersonic inlet (DSI) which is a simpler, lighter
means to ensure high-quality airflow to the engine over a wide range of conditions.
These inlets also crucially improve the aircraft's very-low-observable characteris-
 23

tics (by eliminating radar reflections between the diverter and the aircraft's skin).
Additionally, the "bump" surface reduces the engine's exposure to radar, signifi-
cantly reducing a strong source of radar reflection because they provide an addi-
tional shielding of engine fans against radar waves. The Y-duct type air intake
ramps also help in reducing radar cross-section (RCS), because the intakes run par-
allel and not directly into the engine fans.
The F-35's radar-absorbent materials are designed to be more durable and
less maintenance-intensive than those of its predecessors. At optimal frequencies,
the F-35 compares favorably to the F-22 in stealth, according to General Mike
Hostage, Commander of the Air Combat Command. Like other stealth fighters,
however, the F-35 is more susceptible to detection by Low-frequency radars due to
the Rayleigh scattering resulting from the aircraft's physical size. However, such
radars are also conspicuous, susceptible to clutter, and have low precision. Al-
though fighter-sized stealth aircraft could be detected by low-frequency radar, mis-
sile lock and targeting sensors primarily operate in the X-band, which F-35 RCS
reduction is made for, so they cannot engage unless at close range. Because the air-
craft's shape is important to the RCS, special care must be taken to match the "boil-
erplate" during production. Ground crews require Repair Verification Radar (RVR)
test sets to verify the RCS after performing repairs, which is not a concern for non-
stealth aircraft.
Acoustic
In 2008, the Air Force revealed that the F-35 would be about twice as loud at
takeoff as the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle and up to four times as loud during
landing. Residents near Luke Air Force Base, Arizona and Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida, possible F-35 bases, requested environmental impact studies be conducted
regarding the F-35's noise levels. In 2009, the city of Valparaiso, Florida, adjacent
to Eglin AFB, threatened to sue over the impending F-35 arrival; this lawsuit was
settled in March 2010. In 2009, testing reportedly revealed the F-35 to be: "only
about as noisy as an F-16 fitted with a Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-200 engine...qui-
eter than the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hor-
net." An acoustics study by Lockheed Martin and the Air Force found F-35's noise
levels to be comparable to the F-22 and F/A-18E/F. A USAF environmental im-
pact study found that replacing F-16s with F-35s at Tucson International Airport
would subject more than 21 times as many residents to extreme noise levels. The
USN will need to redesign hearing protection for sailors to protect against the
"thundering 152 decibels" of the F-35. The Joint Strike Fighter program office
found in October 2014 that the F-35B's take-off noise was only two decibels higher
 24

than a Super Hornet, a virtually indistinguishable difference to the human ear, and
is even 10 decibels quieter when flying formations or landing.
Cockpit
The F-35 features a full-panel-width glass cockpit touchscreen "panoramic
cockpit display" (PCD), with dimensions of 20 by 8 inches (50 by 20 centimeters).
A cockpit speech-recognition system (DVI) provided by Adacel has been adopted
on the F-35 and the aircraft will be the first operational U.S. fixed-wing aircraft to
employ this DVI system, although similar systems have been used on the AV-8B
Harrier II and trialled in previous aircraft, such as the F-16 VISTA.
A helmet-mounted display system (HMDS) will be fitted to all models of the
F-35. While some fighters have offered HMDS along with a head up display
(HUD), this will be the first time in several decades that a front line fighter has
been designed without a HUD. The F-35 is equipped with a right-hand HOTAS
side stick controller. The Martin-Baker US16E ejection seat is used in all F-35
variants. The US16E seat design balances major performance requirements, in-
cluding safe-terrain-clearance limits, pilot-load limits, and pilot size; it uses a twin-
catapult system housed in side rails. This industry standard ejection seat can cause
the heavier than usual helmet to inflict serious injury on lightweight pilots. The F-
35 employs an oxygen system derived from the F-22's own system, which has been
involved in multiple hypoxia incidents on that aircraft; unlike the F-22, the flight
profile of the F-35 is similar to other fighters that routinely use such systems.
Sensors and avionics
The F-35's sensor and communications suite has situational awareness, com-
mand and control and network-centric warfare capabilities. The main sensor on
board is the AN/APG-81 Active electronically scanned array-radar, designed by
Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems. It is augmented by the nose-mounted
Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS), it provides the capabilities of an exter-
nally mounted Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod with a reduced radar cross-section.
The AN/ASQ-239 (Barracuda) system is an improved version of the F-22's AN/
ALR-94 electronic warfare suite, providing sensor fusion of Radio frequency and
Infrared tracking functions, advanced radar warning receiver including geolocation
targeting of threats, multispectral image countermeasures for self-defense against
missiles, situational awareness and electronic surveillance, employing 10 radio fre-
quency antennae embedded into the edges of the wing and tail. In September 2015,
Lockheed unveiled the "Advanced EOTS" that offers short-wave infrared, high-
definition television, infrared marker, and superior image detector resolution capa-
bilities. Offered for the Block 4 configuration, it fits into the same area as the base-
line EOTS with minimal changes while preserving stealth features.
Six additional passive infrared sensors are distributed over the aircraft as
part of Northrop Grumman's electro-optical AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture
System (DAS), which acts as a missile warning system, reports missile launch lo-
 25

cations, detects and tracks approaching aircraft spherically around the F-35, and re-
places traditional night vision devices. All DAS functions are performed simulta-
neously, in every direction, at all times. The electronic warfare systems are de-
signed by BAE Systems and include Northrop Grumman components. Functions
such as the Electro-Optical Targeting System and the electronic warfare system are
not usually integrated on fighters. The F-35's DAS is so sensitive, it reportedly de-
tected the launch of an air-to-air missile in a training exercise from 1,200 mi
(1,900 km) away, which in combat would give away the location of an enemy air-
craft even if it had a very low radar cross-section.
The communications, navigation and identification (CNI) suite is designed
by Northrop Grumman and includes the Multifunction Advanced Data Link
(MADL), as one of a half dozen different physical links. The F-35 will be the first
fighter with sensor fusion that combines radio frequency and IR tracking for con-
tinuous all-direction target detection and identification which is shared via MADL
to other platforms without compromising low observability. The non-encrypted
Link 16 is also included for communication with legacy systems. The F-35 has
been designed with synergy between sensors as a specific requirement, the air-
craft's "senses" being expected to provide a more cohesive picture of the bat-
tlespace around it and be available for use in any possible way and combination
with one another; for example, the AN/APG-81 multi-mode radar also acts as a
part of the electronic warfare system. The Program Executive Officer (PEO) Gen-
eral Bogdan has described the sensor fusion software as one of the most difficult
parts of the program.
Much of the F-35's software is written in C and C++ due to programmer
availability, Ada83 code also is reused from the F-22. The Integrity DO-178B real-
time operating system (RTOS) from Green Hills Software runs on COTS Freescale
PowerPC processors. The final Block 3 software is planned to have 8.6 million
lines of code. In 2010, Pentagon officials discovered that additional software may
be needed. General Norton Schwartz has said that the software is the biggest factor
that might delay the USAF's initial operational capability. In 2011, Michael
Gilmore, Director of Operational Test & Evaluation, wrote that, "the F-35 mission
systems software development and test is tending towards familiar historical pat-
terns of extended development, discovery in flight test, and deferrals to later incre-
ments."
The electronic warfare and electro-optical systems are intended to detect and
scan aircraft, allowing engagement or evasion of a hostile aircraft prior to being
detected. The CATbird avionics testbed has proved capable of detecting and jam-
ming radars, including the F-22's AN/APG-77. The F-35 was previously consid-
ered a platform for the Next Generation Jammer; attention shifted to using un-
manned aircraft in this capacity instead. Several subsystems use Xilinx FPGAs;
these COTS components enable supply refreshes from the commercial sector and
fleet software upgrades for the software-defined radio systems.
 26

Lockheed Martin's Dave Scott stated that sensor fusion boosts engine thrust
and oil efficiency, increasing the aircraft's range. Air Force official Ellen M. Paw-
likowski has proposed using the F-35 to control and coordinate multiple unmanned
combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Using its sensors and communications equip-
ment, a single F-35 could orchestrate an attack made by up to 20 armed UCAVs.
Helmet-mounted display system
The F-35 does not need to be physically pointing at its target for weapons to
be successful. Sensors can track and target a nearby aircraft from any orientation,
provide the information to the pilot through their helmet (and therefore visible no
matter which way the pilot is looking), and provide the seeker-head of a missile
with sufficient information. Recent missile types provide a much greater ability to
pursue a target regardless of the launch orientation, called "High Off-Boresight"
capability. Sensors use combined radio frequency and infra red (SAIRST) to con-
tinually track nearby aircraft while the pilot's helmet-mounted display system
(HMDS) displays and selects targets; the helmet system replaces the display-suite-
mounted head-up display used in earlier fighters. Each helmet costs $400,000.
The F-35's systems provide the edge in the "observe, orient, decide, and act"
OODA loop; stealth and advanced sensors aid in observation (while being difficult
to observe), automated target tracking helps in orientation, sensor fusion simplifies
decision making, and the aircraft's controls allow the pilot to keep their focus on
the targets, rather than the controls of their aircraft.
Problems with the Vision Systems International helmet-mounted display led
Lockheed Martin-Elbit Systems to issue a draft specification for alternative pro-
posals in early 2011, to be based around the Anvis-9 night vision goggles. BAE
Systems was selected to provide the alternative system in late 2011. The BAE Sys-
tems alternative helmet was to include all the features of the VSI system. However,
adopting the alternative helmet would have required a cockpit redesign, but in
2013 development on the alternative helmet was halted due to progress on the
baseline helmet.
In 2011, Lockheed Martin-Elbit granted VSI a contract to fix the vibration,
jitter, night-vision and sensor display problems in their helmet-mounted display. A
speculated potential improvement is the replacement of Intevac’s ISIE-10 day/
night camera with the newer ISIE-11 model. In October 2012, Lockheed Martin-
Elbit stated that progress had been made in resolving the technical issues of the
helmet-mounted display, and cited positive reports from night flying tests; it had
been questioned whether the helmet system allows pilots enough visibility at night
to carry out precision tasks. In 2013, in spite of continuing problems with the hel-
met display, the F-35B model completed 19 nighttime vertical landings on board
the USS Wasp at sea, by using the DAS instead of the helmet's built-in night vision
capabilities, which offer at best 20/35 vision.
 27

In October 2013, development of the alter-

nate helmet was halted. The current Gen 2 helmet
is expected to meet the requirements to declare, in
July 2015, that the F-35 has obtained initial opera-
tional capability. Beginning in 2016 with low rate
initial production (LRIP) lot 7, the program will
introduce a Gen 3 helmet that features an im-
proved night vision camera, new liquid crystal
displays, automated alignment and other software
enhancements.
In July 2015, an F-35 pilot commented that
the helmet may have been one of the issues that
the F-35 faced while dogfighting against an F-16 during a test; "The helmet was
too large for the space inside the canopy to adequately see behind the aircraft.
There were multiple occasions when the bandit would've been visible (not blocked
by the seat) but the helmet prevented getting in a position to see him (behind the
high side of the seat, around the inside of the seat, or high near the lift vector)
Maintenance
The program's maintenance concept is for any F-35 to be maintained in any
F-35 maintenance facility and that all F-35 parts in all bases will be globally
tracked and shared as needed. The commonality between the different variants has
allowed the USMC to create their first aircraft maintenance Field Training Detach-
ment to directly apply the lessons of the USAF to their F-35 maintenance opera-
tions. The aircraft has been designed for ease of maintenance, with 95% of all field
replaceable parts "one deep" where nothing else has to be removed to get to the
part in question. For instance the ejection seat can be replaced without removing
the canopy, the use of low-maintenance electro-hydrostatic actuators instead of hy-
draulic systems and an all-composite skin without the fragile coatings found on
earlier stealth aircraft.
The F-35 Joint Program Office has stated that the aircraft has received good
reviews from pilots and maintainers, suggesting it is performing better than its pre-
decessors did at a similar stage of development, and that the stealth type has
proved relatively stable from a maintenance standpoint. This reported improve-
ment is attributed to better maintenance training, as F-35 maintainers have received
far more extensive instruction at this early stage of the program than on the F-22
Raptor. The F-35's stealth coatings are much easier to work with than those used
on the Raptor. Cure times for coating repairs are lower and many of the fasteners
and access panels are not coated, further reducing the workload for maintenance
crews. Some of the F-35's radar-absorbent materials are baked into the jet's com-
posite skin, which means its stealthy signature is not easily degraded. It is still
harder to maintain (due to its stealth) than fourth-generation aircraft.
 28

However, the DOT&E Report on the F-35 program published in January

2015 determined that the plane has not, in fact, reached any of the nine reliability
measures the program was supposed to achieve by this point in its development
and that the Joint Program Office has been re-categorizing failure incidents to
make the plane look more reliable than it actually is. Further, the complexity of
maintaining the F-35 means that, currently, none of the Services are ready to keep
it in working order and instead "rely heavily on contractor support and unaccept-
able workarounds." DOT&E found that the program achieved 61 percent of
planned flight hours and that the average rate of availability was as low as 28 per-
cent for the F-35A and 33 percent for the F-35B. The program created a new
"modeled achievable" flight hour projection "since low availability was preventing
the full use of bed-down plan flight hours." According to the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Financial Management, in FY2014, each non-test F-35 flew only
7.7 hours per month, which amounts to approximately one sortie every 5.5 days—
for combat purposes, a sortie rate so low as to be crippling. Mean flight hours be-
tween removal (MFHBR) have increased, but are still only 59 percent to 65 per-
cent of the required threshold. DOT&E found that mean corrective maintenance
time for critical failures got worse for the F-35A and the F-35C over the last year.
Structural cracking is also proving to be a recurring and enduring problem that is
not yet resolved.
3. Specifications (F-35A)
General characteristics
 Crew: 1
 Length: 50.5 ft (15.67 m)
 Wingspan: 35 ft (10.7 m)
 Height: 14.2 ft (4.33 m)
 Wing area: 460 ft² (42.7 m²)
 Empty weight: 29,098 lb (13,199 kg)
 Loaded weight: 49,540 lb (22,470 kg)
 Max. takeoff weight: 70,000 lb (31,800 kg)
 Powerplant: 1 × Pratt & Whitney F135 afterburning turbofan
o Dry thrust: 28,000 lbf (125 kN)
o Thrust with afterburner: 43,000 lbf (191 kN)
 Internal fuel capacity: 18,498 lb (8,382 kg)
Performance
 Maximum speed: Mach 1.6+ (1,200 mph, 1,930 km/h)
 Range: >1,200 nmi (2,220 km) on internal fuel
 Combat radius: 625 nmi (1,158 km) on internal fuel
 Wing loading: 107.7 lb/ft² (526 kg/m²; 745 kg/m² max loaded)
o With full fuel: 0.87
o With 50% fuel: 1.07
 Maximum g-load: 9 g
 29

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