Course Paper

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 13

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/326882262

Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters

Research · April 2018

CITATIONS READS
0 162

1 author:

Jacob Glenn Parker


University of Mississippi
2 PUBLICATIONS 0 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Jacob Glenn Parker on 07 August 2018.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.


Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
1

HURRICANE KATRINA: THE POSTERCHILD FOR MODERN NATRUAL DISASTERS

University of Mississippi

Master of Criminal Justice (CJ 610)

Jacob Parker

April 2018
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
2

Abstract

In the year 2005, the nation experienced a natural disaster that document its way into

history books for years to come. The category five Hurricane Katrina was said to be one of the

most costly and deadly that experience over $108 billion and 1,833 fatalities. It is important to

note that this storm did not take the citizens of Gulf Coast States (Louisiana, Mississippi,

Alabama, Florida) by surprise, but was well monitored resulting in a call to evacuate.

Unfortunately, those that decided to remain in their households experienced a nightmare that will

not leave the memory of those who were forced to experience. Structures that were designed to

protect cities such as New Orleans ultimately failed and resulted in mass flooding that sent

residents to the rooftops of their disaster stricken homes. Luckily, the call for resources and

boots on the group was abundant while federal, state and local relief efforts were carried out. In

the aftermath of the hurricane, agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency

were able to reminisce on their relief and recovery efforts that paved the way for alterations that

could better prepare them for future disasters. Because of this, more efficient understandings

who is in charge, coordination with nongovernmental organizations and housing efforts were

addressed.

Background

Nearing the end of the day on August 25, 2005, the dreaded weather sirens began to

sound as one of the most deadly and damaging hurricanes began to set its roots along the Gulf

Coast Border of Louisiana and Mississippi. Those of the older generation were there to describe

the nightmares of Hurricane Camille (1969) and the impact that it had on the area. However, the

introduction of Hurricane Katrina would then revisit the nightmares that was experienced so long

ago.
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
3

At approximately 5:30 p.m. CST, the large capacity storm reached landfall and

immediately inflicted havoc on the area. Days before, the residents of these states were

forewarned about the impact that this hurricane possessed. Although thousands of individuals

evacuated the area, as professionals had recommended, many remained in their poorly built

homes and structures to “ride out the storm.” These types of natural disasters occur on a yearly

basis and for many residents of both Louisiana and Mississippi, this so called superstorm would

be same.

Flooding in New Orleans was not introduced during the span of Hurricane Katrina, but

had been studied and discussed years prior. One year before the disastrous storm, a joint federal,

state and local study was conducted on the fictitious Hurricane Pam that was directed at the

degrading levee and flood control methods of New Orleans at that time (Boyd, Jonkman, Levitan

& Maaskant, 2009). At the conclusion of this study, it was determined that because of current

conditions, 1.1 million would experience long term displacement, 400,000 would suffer from

illness or injury and 60,000 would perish (Boyd, Jonkman, Levitan & Maaskant, 2009). It has

been noted that economic, such as disasters, take their greatest toll on those with the fewest

resources (Angle, Bell, Beausoleil & Lein, 2012). This fact for the Lower Ninth Ward of New

Orleans, Louisiana proved to the case as absolute destruction followed.


Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
4

Image taken from the Global Security Organization’s website.

Disaster Unfolds

It is safe to say the states of Mississippi and Louisiana were not adequately prepared for a

storm of this capacity. It is obvious that mitigation and preparedness efforts had evolved over

the years from previous hurricanes and that emergency personnel were not stagnant, but in the

end certain factors led up to mass chaos. The object of negligence became apparent as numerous

dams and levees were left damaged and need of repair. In previous years, there had been issues

of flooding, but were never addressed for future disasters. Along the 170 mile stretch of

coastline, mass flooding and destruction did indeed occur.

Surge flooding became prevalent throughout the state of Mississippi that ultimately

devastated the area. More so in New Orleans, the breaching and overtopping of dams resulted in
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
5

floods that resulted in residents of the city left stranded on their rooftops with limited supplies.

Certain regions of the city are constructed in a bowl fashion which left the water only to collect

instead of flowing outward. Along the Industrial Canal, which borders the Lower Ninth Ward,

breaches began to occur releasing a rather large amount of water through with no other defense

in its path. Two major breaches along the southern portion of the canal resulted in catastrophic

flooding in the central areas of this particular portion of New Orleans which arguably saw the

most destructive effects of the storm. Covering an areas of around 260 km, parts of the region

experienced more than 4 meters of flood water (Boyd, Jonkman, Levitan & Maaskant, 2009).

Over 40 days of “de-watering” the areas was crucial in order to return these individuals lives

back to normalcy.

One of Homeland Security’s top missions throughout the United States is to prevent the

loss of the life at all costs. So now that the storm has taken place and moved on from the coast

jurisdiction of these two states, emergency managers on the federal, state and local level had to

come up with a plan to rescue and transport as many human lives as necessary. It was

understood that the objectives that would follow would not be simple, but rather extremely

complicated due to the amount of individuals who had decided to remain in the area. Hospitals,

nursing home and residencies that had utterly crumbled beneath the once home owners who

sought safety from reaching higher ground. The iconic images of this disaster support this claim

as house after house from a bird’s eye view consist of make shift signs that read “SOS” while

helicopters and air support hover by.


Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
6

Image taken from the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s website.

Five days that followed the devastating hurricane that would change lives entirely, there was an

estimated 62,000 operation help to rescue those from water, roof and attic by either boat or

helicopter (Boyd, Jonkman, Levitan & Maaskant, 2009). In order for this amount of search and

rescue missions, there was an all-out call for boats and helicopters that could assist the first

responders at this time. Over 100 boats and 600 helicopters were utilized and made repeated

trips back and forth that transported indviduals to shelters or areas of higher ground (Boyd,

Jonkman, Levitan & Maaskant, 2009). That statistic alone portrays the pure helplessness of

those particularly in New Orleans. Once the individuals have been retrieved from these

locations, the Emergency Managers then had to decide what facilities and locations were going

to be deemed rallying points for survivors. Essentially major highways that towered over the

flood waters bellowed were chosen which only caused mass chaos due to disbanded families and
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
7

lack of resources. It was then decided that the Mercedes-Benz Superdome, the home of the New

Orleans Saints football team, would be utilized as an oasis of catastrophe. Lack of food, clean

drinking water and plumbing difficulties became issues among others once survivors of the

storm arrived. The structure of the stadium itself were also questionable as portions of the roof

began to let loose and expose individuals to the outside conditions. Three days after this

nightmare of events, buses began to evacuate individuals from the Superdome to temporary

housing units consisting of tents and trailers that were provided from the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA).

Governmental Response to the Disaster

Emergency personnel were now left with the question, what needs to happen in order to

assist thousands of displaced residents among multiple states that have little if anything to return

to? The issue of solidifying a unified command system became a struggle amongst the totality of

relief efforts that took place. Did this require leadership from state emergency personnel, FEMA

or the military? It was decided that General Russel L. Honore would accept the role of sole

leadership when conducting recovery efforts in the disaster stricken areas.

One could say that the largest target was on the backs of FEMA as it was evident their

relief efforts could not match with this scale of disaster and required immediate attention. The

agency was at that time making significant adjustments to the National Response Plan (NRP)

that in return affected the Federal Response Plan that had ultimately shaped the federal

government’s response to most disasters (FEMA, 2006). Headquarter officials were torn on this

issue as some said the NRP was being used to its greatest possible extent while others claimed it

contained unrealistic requirements and unclear language that only made matters worse among

execution. State official’s opinions were also heard as they supported the lack of clarity and that
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
8

it was not well understood across a broad spectrum of emergency responders (FEMA, 2006).

Although mass scrutiny was evident, it was decided that it did not possess a positive or negative

effect on the states because local response were most familiar with the NRP’s predecessor, the

Federal Response Plan. It is important to note in this section that all disasters are local no matter

the scale of the event. State and federal assistance might be crucial to an area recovery from a

disaster, but in the end that at the local level is what consistently supports relief efforts and has

the most value to recovery.

During this time of recovery, there were also issues regarding coordination with other

nongovernmental partner. It was noted that FEMA made major efforts to coordinate with these

forms of relief and improve its ability to pride housing resources in its response to Hurricane

Katrina (FEMA, 2006). However, when this process was conducted some efforts became more

effective than others. For instance, FEMA and the American Red Cross (commonly a partner in

disaster relief) experienced difficulty in identifying the number and location of evacuee’s

because both held different expectations for coordinating the mass care function (FEMA, 2006).

Issues also began to arise when FEMA attempted to staff Disaster Recovery Centers with

experienced personnel. It is one thing to inherit volunteer in mass numbers, but picking out the

ones who possess useful abilities to adequately respond to the various needs of these individuals

is another. For example, at these locations there might be a need for medical personnel to assist

in minor injuries that were inflicted during or post the disaster. It was evident that FEMA and

the Red Cross had not aligned this mentality which caused additional struggles in providing

relief efforts.

Finally, the efforts of FEMA to adequately identify and establish housing resources was

also a controversial topic during this time. Their overall strategy was to use shelters, hotels,
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
9

motels, cruise ships, tents, applicants staying with friends and relatives, tarping of roofs so

applicants could remain in place where possible and other available housing resources to address

immediate housing needs of disaster victims (FEMA, 2006). They were basically using anything

and everything that temporarily housed individuals while other means of housing could be

addressed. This consisted of transitioning victims to travel trailers and mobile homes and finally

to apartments to address longer-term housing needs (FEMA, 2006). However, some components

of this strategy were not well planned or coordinated which caused additional stress while other

components to address and support the housing needs of displaced disaster victims were not as

effective or efficient as FEMA had anticipated. Because of the utter devastation that Hurricane

Katrina left behind, FEMA personnel could not wait around to act, but rather required immediate

attention. On August 31, 2005, it provided 20,000 manufactured housing units for

approximately $1 billion as 100,000 units were distributed (FEMA, 2006). On into early

September of the same year, the agency continued to assess available housing resources such as

hotels and other federal owned properties to secure temporary housing for those in need. It is

rather disheartening to note that even currently, in the year 2018, recovery efforts continue to

take place in area that could be changed until the end of time.

Conclusion

The title of this paper refers to the common reference of Homeland Security methods of

operation on the federal, state and local level. It is evident that a natural disaster of this scope

and capacity had far more the impact than the average citizens of coastal states imagined. One

can only wonder what the devastation would have resulted in if thousands had not listened to

emergency personnel and evacuated the region. It is certain that this disaster will go down in
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
10

history as the most devastating and deadly (1,833) of this era and will ultimately continue to be

studied for many years to come.


Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
11

References

Angel, R., Beausoleil, J., Bell, H. & Lein, L. (2012). Community Lost: The State, Civil Society, a

Displaced Survivors of Hurricane Katrina. New York City, New York: Cambridge

University Press.

Boyd, E., Jonkman, S., Levitan, M. & Maaskant, B. (2009). Loss of Life Caused By the Flooding

Of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Relationship between Flood

Characteristics and Mortality. Ebscohost. 29(5). pp 676.

Carriere, B., Covarrubias, J., Lansford, T. & Miller, J. (2010). Fostering Community Resilience:

Homeland Security and Hurricane Katrina. Burlington, Vermont. Ashgate Publishing

Company.

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives. (2009). Post-

Katrina Disaster Response and Recovery: Evaluating Federal Emergency Management

Agency’s Continuing Efforts in the Gulf Coast and Response to Recent Disasters.

Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office.

Office of Inspector General. (2006). A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management

Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina. Washington D.C. Department of Homeland

Security.
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
12

View publication stats

You might also like

pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy