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University of Mississippi
Jacob Parker
April 2018
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
2
Abstract
In the year 2005, the nation experienced a natural disaster that document its way into
history books for years to come. The category five Hurricane Katrina was said to be one of the
most costly and deadly that experience over $108 billion and 1,833 fatalities. It is important to
note that this storm did not take the citizens of Gulf Coast States (Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida) by surprise, but was well monitored resulting in a call to evacuate.
Unfortunately, those that decided to remain in their households experienced a nightmare that will
not leave the memory of those who were forced to experience. Structures that were designed to
protect cities such as New Orleans ultimately failed and resulted in mass flooding that sent
residents to the rooftops of their disaster stricken homes. Luckily, the call for resources and
boots on the group was abundant while federal, state and local relief efforts were carried out. In
the aftermath of the hurricane, agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency
were able to reminisce on their relief and recovery efforts that paved the way for alterations that
could better prepare them for future disasters. Because of this, more efficient understandings
who is in charge, coordination with nongovernmental organizations and housing efforts were
addressed.
Background
Nearing the end of the day on August 25, 2005, the dreaded weather sirens began to
sound as one of the most deadly and damaging hurricanes began to set its roots along the Gulf
Coast Border of Louisiana and Mississippi. Those of the older generation were there to describe
the nightmares of Hurricane Camille (1969) and the impact that it had on the area. However, the
introduction of Hurricane Katrina would then revisit the nightmares that was experienced so long
ago.
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
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At approximately 5:30 p.m. CST, the large capacity storm reached landfall and
immediately inflicted havoc on the area. Days before, the residents of these states were
forewarned about the impact that this hurricane possessed. Although thousands of individuals
evacuated the area, as professionals had recommended, many remained in their poorly built
homes and structures to “ride out the storm.” These types of natural disasters occur on a yearly
basis and for many residents of both Louisiana and Mississippi, this so called superstorm would
be same.
Flooding in New Orleans was not introduced during the span of Hurricane Katrina, but
had been studied and discussed years prior. One year before the disastrous storm, a joint federal,
state and local study was conducted on the fictitious Hurricane Pam that was directed at the
degrading levee and flood control methods of New Orleans at that time (Boyd, Jonkman, Levitan
& Maaskant, 2009). At the conclusion of this study, it was determined that because of current
conditions, 1.1 million would experience long term displacement, 400,000 would suffer from
illness or injury and 60,000 would perish (Boyd, Jonkman, Levitan & Maaskant, 2009). It has
been noted that economic, such as disasters, take their greatest toll on those with the fewest
resources (Angle, Bell, Beausoleil & Lein, 2012). This fact for the Lower Ninth Ward of New
Disaster Unfolds
It is safe to say the states of Mississippi and Louisiana were not adequately prepared for a
storm of this capacity. It is obvious that mitigation and preparedness efforts had evolved over
the years from previous hurricanes and that emergency personnel were not stagnant, but in the
end certain factors led up to mass chaos. The object of negligence became apparent as numerous
dams and levees were left damaged and need of repair. In previous years, there had been issues
of flooding, but were never addressed for future disasters. Along the 170 mile stretch of
Surge flooding became prevalent throughout the state of Mississippi that ultimately
devastated the area. More so in New Orleans, the breaching and overtopping of dams resulted in
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
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floods that resulted in residents of the city left stranded on their rooftops with limited supplies.
Certain regions of the city are constructed in a bowl fashion which left the water only to collect
instead of flowing outward. Along the Industrial Canal, which borders the Lower Ninth Ward,
breaches began to occur releasing a rather large amount of water through with no other defense
in its path. Two major breaches along the southern portion of the canal resulted in catastrophic
flooding in the central areas of this particular portion of New Orleans which arguably saw the
most destructive effects of the storm. Covering an areas of around 260 km, parts of the region
experienced more than 4 meters of flood water (Boyd, Jonkman, Levitan & Maaskant, 2009).
Over 40 days of “de-watering” the areas was crucial in order to return these individuals lives
back to normalcy.
One of Homeland Security’s top missions throughout the United States is to prevent the
loss of the life at all costs. So now that the storm has taken place and moved on from the coast
jurisdiction of these two states, emergency managers on the federal, state and local level had to
come up with a plan to rescue and transport as many human lives as necessary. It was
understood that the objectives that would follow would not be simple, but rather extremely
complicated due to the amount of individuals who had decided to remain in the area. Hospitals,
nursing home and residencies that had utterly crumbled beneath the once home owners who
sought safety from reaching higher ground. The iconic images of this disaster support this claim
as house after house from a bird’s eye view consist of make shift signs that read “SOS” while
Five days that followed the devastating hurricane that would change lives entirely, there was an
estimated 62,000 operation help to rescue those from water, roof and attic by either boat or
helicopter (Boyd, Jonkman, Levitan & Maaskant, 2009). In order for this amount of search and
rescue missions, there was an all-out call for boats and helicopters that could assist the first
responders at this time. Over 100 boats and 600 helicopters were utilized and made repeated
trips back and forth that transported indviduals to shelters or areas of higher ground (Boyd,
Jonkman, Levitan & Maaskant, 2009). That statistic alone portrays the pure helplessness of
those particularly in New Orleans. Once the individuals have been retrieved from these
locations, the Emergency Managers then had to decide what facilities and locations were going
to be deemed rallying points for survivors. Essentially major highways that towered over the
flood waters bellowed were chosen which only caused mass chaos due to disbanded families and
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
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lack of resources. It was then decided that the Mercedes-Benz Superdome, the home of the New
Orleans Saints football team, would be utilized as an oasis of catastrophe. Lack of food, clean
drinking water and plumbing difficulties became issues among others once survivors of the
storm arrived. The structure of the stadium itself were also questionable as portions of the roof
began to let loose and expose individuals to the outside conditions. Three days after this
nightmare of events, buses began to evacuate individuals from the Superdome to temporary
housing units consisting of tents and trailers that were provided from the Federal Emergency
Emergency personnel were now left with the question, what needs to happen in order to
assist thousands of displaced residents among multiple states that have little if anything to return
to? The issue of solidifying a unified command system became a struggle amongst the totality of
relief efforts that took place. Did this require leadership from state emergency personnel, FEMA
or the military? It was decided that General Russel L. Honore would accept the role of sole
One could say that the largest target was on the backs of FEMA as it was evident their
relief efforts could not match with this scale of disaster and required immediate attention. The
agency was at that time making significant adjustments to the National Response Plan (NRP)
that in return affected the Federal Response Plan that had ultimately shaped the federal
government’s response to most disasters (FEMA, 2006). Headquarter officials were torn on this
issue as some said the NRP was being used to its greatest possible extent while others claimed it
contained unrealistic requirements and unclear language that only made matters worse among
execution. State official’s opinions were also heard as they supported the lack of clarity and that
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
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it was not well understood across a broad spectrum of emergency responders (FEMA, 2006).
Although mass scrutiny was evident, it was decided that it did not possess a positive or negative
effect on the states because local response were most familiar with the NRP’s predecessor, the
Federal Response Plan. It is important to note in this section that all disasters are local no matter
the scale of the event. State and federal assistance might be crucial to an area recovery from a
disaster, but in the end that at the local level is what consistently supports relief efforts and has
During this time of recovery, there were also issues regarding coordination with other
nongovernmental partner. It was noted that FEMA made major efforts to coordinate with these
forms of relief and improve its ability to pride housing resources in its response to Hurricane
Katrina (FEMA, 2006). However, when this process was conducted some efforts became more
effective than others. For instance, FEMA and the American Red Cross (commonly a partner in
disaster relief) experienced difficulty in identifying the number and location of evacuee’s
because both held different expectations for coordinating the mass care function (FEMA, 2006).
Issues also began to arise when FEMA attempted to staff Disaster Recovery Centers with
experienced personnel. It is one thing to inherit volunteer in mass numbers, but picking out the
ones who possess useful abilities to adequately respond to the various needs of these individuals
is another. For example, at these locations there might be a need for medical personnel to assist
in minor injuries that were inflicted during or post the disaster. It was evident that FEMA and
the Red Cross had not aligned this mentality which caused additional struggles in providing
relief efforts.
Finally, the efforts of FEMA to adequately identify and establish housing resources was
also a controversial topic during this time. Their overall strategy was to use shelters, hotels,
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
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motels, cruise ships, tents, applicants staying with friends and relatives, tarping of roofs so
applicants could remain in place where possible and other available housing resources to address
immediate housing needs of disaster victims (FEMA, 2006). They were basically using anything
and everything that temporarily housed individuals while other means of housing could be
addressed. This consisted of transitioning victims to travel trailers and mobile homes and finally
to apartments to address longer-term housing needs (FEMA, 2006). However, some components
of this strategy were not well planned or coordinated which caused additional stress while other
components to address and support the housing needs of displaced disaster victims were not as
effective or efficient as FEMA had anticipated. Because of the utter devastation that Hurricane
Katrina left behind, FEMA personnel could not wait around to act, but rather required immediate
attention. On August 31, 2005, it provided 20,000 manufactured housing units for
approximately $1 billion as 100,000 units were distributed (FEMA, 2006). On into early
September of the same year, the agency continued to assess available housing resources such as
hotels and other federal owned properties to secure temporary housing for those in need. It is
rather disheartening to note that even currently, in the year 2018, recovery efforts continue to
take place in area that could be changed until the end of time.
Conclusion
The title of this paper refers to the common reference of Homeland Security methods of
operation on the federal, state and local level. It is evident that a natural disaster of this scope
and capacity had far more the impact than the average citizens of coastal states imagined. One
can only wonder what the devastation would have resulted in if thousands had not listened to
emergency personnel and evacuated the region. It is certain that this disaster will go down in
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
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history as the most devastating and deadly (1,833) of this era and will ultimately continue to be
References
Angel, R., Beausoleil, J., Bell, H. & Lein, L. (2012). Community Lost: The State, Civil Society, a
Displaced Survivors of Hurricane Katrina. New York City, New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Boyd, E., Jonkman, S., Levitan, M. & Maaskant, B. (2009). Loss of Life Caused By the Flooding
Of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Relationship between Flood
Carriere, B., Covarrubias, J., Lansford, T. & Miller, J. (2010). Fostering Community Resilience:
Company.
Agency’s Continuing Efforts in the Gulf Coast and Response to Recent Disasters.
Security.
Hurricane Katrina: The Posterchild for Modern Natural Disasters
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