FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 45130. February 17, 1937.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.

Undersecretary of Justice Melencio for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; INSANITY, AS A DEFENSE. — In the

Philippines, the burden, to be sure, in on the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but sanity is
presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the
defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon
him . . .." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs.
Hontiveros Carmona [1910], 18 Phil., 62; People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil.,
204.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. — In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at
the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of
his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct
testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs.
Wright, 135 Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 M., 205; Rinkard
vs. State, 157 Ind., 234; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim.
Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler,
supra) to establish insanity as a defense.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby,
we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to
determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing,
suffice (People vs. Bascos, supra).
4. ID.; ID. — Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law
from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting
from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar,
however, we are not concerned with connecting two or more attacks of
insanity to show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or
periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack, beginning
with the demonstration of symptoms thereof prior to the commission of the
crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately
following the commission of the act complained of.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. —
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normalcy of the
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 accused at the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called
on policeman D. A. who testified as to certain statements made to him by
the defendant-appellant after his arrest. A detective corroborated the
policeman's testimony. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of
the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is clear from
what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of
Edinburgh, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382),
that in the type of dementia praecox "the crime is usually preceded by much
complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attacks are common,
because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that
their property is being taken."

DECISION

LAUREL, J : p

On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed

an information charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendant- appellant herein,
with the crime of murder, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, with evident premeditation
and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
without any justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one
Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the
different parts of his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the
following injuries, to wit.
"'One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one
cm. into the superior surface of the right lobe of the liver; and three
non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and
lateral lumbar region, and left elbow,' which directly caused the death
of the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards."
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the
accused. The defense counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the
ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time
confined in the Psychopathic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order
requiring the Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental
condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alienist,
rendered his report, Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935,
the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of
the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the
doctor of the Psychopathic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear
and produce the complete record pertaining to the mental condition of the
said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the
court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the
prosecution and the defense asked the court to summon the other doctors of
the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the accused, or to
place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial
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 court then issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the
chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital for his
personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the
true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist
of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11,
1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared
before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused
was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case was
suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the
defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he
was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez,
appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease."
On February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and
trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense
charged in the information above-quoted and sentenced him to life
imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000,
and to pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the
following assignment of errors:
"A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence
establishes that the accused has had dementia only occasionally and
intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the commission
of the offense.
"B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this
case further shows that during and immediately after the commission
of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality either
in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of action showing
that he was mentally deranged.
"C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the
circumstances the burden was on the defense to show that the
accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the
offense, and that the defense did not establish any evidence to this
effect.
"D. The court a quo erred in finding the accused guilty of the
offense charged and in not acquitting him thereof."
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant
Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal
near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at
the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill
you." Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand,
which held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will
pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed
Guison thrice on the left side. The assault was witnessed by policeman
Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took
possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General
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 Hospital where he died two day later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy
performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted,
it does not seen necessary to indulge in any extended analysis of the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being
that of insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether
or not the defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of
the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the
incidental corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind and quantum
of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp conflict.
Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different
theories. (See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et
seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Case, p. 11 et seq.) The
first view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as
such must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. When the commission of a
crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a
reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the
time of committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order
to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State
vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict
of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this
view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According
to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed., vol. I, sec. 338), this is the
rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car.
& K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that the
prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Davis vs. United
States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs.
United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895;
United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States
vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition
that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the
prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime charged, and
hence affirms sanity as one of such essential ingredients, and that a fortiori
where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the
duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view
(People vs. Boscos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime, but sanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in
a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing that fact rests upon him . . .." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil.,
305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona [1910], 18 Phil., 62; People vs.
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 Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant
was insane at the time he killed the deceased, the obligation of proving that
affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine
distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be
presented, the primary inquiry here is: Has there been presented sufficiently
convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the
judicial mind that the accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of
the offense? I order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of
the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a
reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not
required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo. 404;
35 S. W. 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind.,
534; 62 N. E. 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are
specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to establish
insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we
read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to
determine whether this acts conform to the practice of people of sound
mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence, if clear and
convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendant was not
insane at the time of the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted
on the theory that the insanity was only occasional or intermittent and not
permanent or continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are apprised of the
danger of indulging in the presumption of continuity in cases of temporary or
spasmodic insanity. We appreciate the reason for the contrary rule. To be
sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or
eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical
ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however,
we are not concerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to
show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but
with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack, beginning with the
demonstration of symptoms thereof prior to the commission of the crime
charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately
following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand,
there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.
The following considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the
majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion different from that reached
by the court below:
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by
the prosecution, it appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the
periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10,
1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital
suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia praecox. His confinement
during these periods, it is true was long before the commission of the
offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to
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 show that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of the occurrence of the
crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.
( b) All persons suffering from dementia praecox are clearly to be
regarded as having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for
legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico- Legal
Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal
Medicine Toxicology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief
alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia
praecox, in certain periods of excitement, are similar to those ofmanic
depressive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind appears
"deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of
disease, either dementia praecox or manic depressive psychosis, during the
period of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.)
Even if viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manic
depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question of irresistible
impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will have to be considered.
There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and the
case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the
use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster,
Legal Medicine and Toxicology [2d ed., 1926], vol. I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S.
Francisco, at one time an intern at San Lazaro Hospital, for four (4) days
immediately preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the crime was
committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia",
which is one of the symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia praecox (Exhibit
3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
( d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and
taken to the police station on the very same day of the perpetration of the
crime, and although attempts were made by detectives to secure a
statement from him (see Exhibits B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel,
t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic
Hospital the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication
that the police authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the
accused, which doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by
the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr.
Toribio Joson, which report was made within the first month of treatment,
the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic
depressive psychosis. We quote the report in full:
"INSULAR PSYCHOPATHIC HOSPITAL
"MANDALUYONG, RIZAL.
"January 15, 1935.
"MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief Alienist, Insular Psychopathic
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
"SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male, Filipino, 30 years
old, sent by the Secret Service of the City of Manila for mental
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 examination.
"I. MENTAL STATUS:
"(a) General behavior. — The patient is underactive, staying
most of the time in his bed with his eyes closed and practically totally
motionless. At other times, however, but on very rare occasions and at
short intervals he apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and
makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities and other
parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses
to take even the food offered by his mother or sister, so that there
have been days in the hospital when he did not take any nourishment.
On several occasions he refused to have the bath, or to have his hair
cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He would also
sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he
displayed impulsive acts, such as striking his chest or other parts of the
body with his fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck
strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office without apparent
motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands
strongly without provocation.
"(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't
be persuaded to speak, and would not answer in any form the
questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his eyes
closed apparently praying as he was mumbling words but would not
answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition
with a cross made of small pieces of stick in his hand. He at times
during the interviews recited passages in the literature as for example
the following:
"'La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del
hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of
a dependable character.)'
"At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in
the hospital.
"(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent, but
at times he looks anxious and rather irritable. He himself states that he
often feels sad in the hospital.
"(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was accessible
he was found oriented as to place and person but he did not know the
day or the date.
"(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that
during the nights that he could not sleep he could hear voices telling
him many things. Voices, for example, told him that he would be killed,
people were against him and that he should escape. That he was going
to be killed because he was benevolent. That he could sometimes see
the shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital. There are times
however when he could not hear or see at all anything.
"(f) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occasion he
told the examiner that he could not talk in his first day in the hospital
because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks
that he is already dead and already buried in the La Loma Cemetery.
"(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.
"(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for
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 remote events, but his memory for recent events or for example, for
events that took place during his stay in the hospital he has no
recollection at all.

"(i) Grasp of general information. — He has a fairly good

grasp of general information. He could not, however, do simple
numerical tests as the 100 — 7 test.
"(j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he
stated that he might have been insane during his first days in the
hospital, but just during the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly
well. Insight and judgment were, of course, nil during his stuporous
condition. During the last two days he has shown marked improvement
in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
"2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
"The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been
found suffering from a form of psychosis, called Manic depressive
psychosis.
(Sgd.) "TORIBIO JOSON, M. D,
"Assistant Alienist"
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr.
Jose A. Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular Psychopathic
Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:
"I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is
suffering from the Manic Depressive form of psychosis. It might be
premature to state before the court has decided this case, but I believe
it a duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at large. He has a
peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control, overtly
serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world,
taking justice with his own hands and many times executing it in an
impulsive manner as to make his action overproportionate — beyond
normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has
taste and desires as to make him queer before the average conception
of an earthly man.
"He will always have troubles and difficulties with this world of
realities.
(Sgd.) "J. A. FERNANDEZ, M. D,
"Assistant Alienist"
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normalcy of
the accused at the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution
called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the
defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault
and the defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55
and would not pay; that appellant bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55
centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for
Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was
also called and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such
kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during
the commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius
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 Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburgh, said in his work on
Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia
praecox, "the crime is usually preceded by much complaining and planning.
In these people, homicidal attacks are common, because of delusions that
they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-
appellant was demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense
charged in the information and that consequently he is exempt from criminal
liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed,
and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances.
In conformity with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the
defendant shall be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such
other hospital for the insane as many be designated by the Director of the
Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First
Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:

I agree with the dissenting opinions of Justices Diaz and Concepcion.

There is no question as to the facts constituting the crime imputed to
the accused. The disagreement arises from the conclusions which both
opinions attempt to infer therefrom. The majority opinion establishes the
conclusion that the accused was not in his sound mind when he committed
the crime because he was then suffering from dementia praecox. The
dissenting opinions, in establishing the conclusion that the accused was then
in the possession of his mental faculties or, at least, at a lucid interval, are
based on the fact admitted by the parties and supported by expert
testimony, that the accused, before the commission of the crime, had been
cured of dementia praecox and later of manic depressive psychosis. The
majority opinion admits that there is no positive evidence regarding the
mental state of the accused when he committed the crime, but it infers from
the facts that he must have then been deprived of his reason. This inference
is not sufficiently supported by the circumstantial evidence. If it is admitted
that the legal presumption is that a person who commits a crime is in his
right mind (U.S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil., 62; U. S. vs. Guevara, 27
Phil., 547; U. S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil., 218; U. S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil., 305;
People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil., 204), because the law presumes all acts and
omissions punishable by law to be voluntary (art. 1 Penal Code; article 4,
subsection 1, Revised Penal Code), and if, as it appears, there is not
sufficient or satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally
incapacitated when he committed the crime, the conclusion of fact must be
the same presumption established by law, that is, that he was in his right
mind, and the conclusion of law must be that he is criminally liable.

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 There is another detail worth mentioning which is that no credit was
given to the conclusions of fact arrived at by the judge who tried the case.
He observed and heard the witnesses who testified and he had the
advantage of testing their credibility nearby. After weighing all the evidence
he arrived at the conclusion that the accused committed the crime while he
was in his right mind. This court generally gives much weight to the
conclusions of fact of the judge who tried the case in the first instance and
does not reject them unless they are clearly in conflict with the evidence.

DIAZ, J., dissenting:

I do not agree to the majority opinion. The appellant committed the

crime while he was sane, or at least, during a lucid interval. He did not kill
his victim without rhyme or reason and only for the sake of killing him. He
did so to avenge himself or to punish his victim for having refused, according
to him, to pay a debt of P55 after having made him many promises. He so
stated clearly to the policeman who arrested him immediately after the
incident; and he made it so understood to the witness Mariano Yamson, a
friend of both the appellant and his victim, before the commission of the
crime.
The law presumes that everybody is in his sound mind because
ordinarily such is his normal condition. Insanity is an exception which may
be said to exist only when there is satisfactory evidence establishing it and it
certainly is not always permanent because there are cases in which it comes
and takes place only occasionally and lasts more or less time according to
the circumstances of the individual, that is, the condition of his health, his
environment, and the other contributory causes thereof. The law itself
recognizes this, so much so that in establishing the rule that insane persons
are exempt from criminal liability, because they commit no crime, it also
makes the exception that this is true only when they have not acted during a
lucid interval (art. 12, subsec. 1, of the Revised Penal Code).
The appellant was afflicted with insanity only for a few days during the
months stated in the majority opinion: April 1922 and January 1926, but he
was later pronounced cured in the hospital where he had been confined
because he had already returned to normalcy by recovering his reason. For
this one fact alone, instead of stating that he acted during a lucid interval on
said occasion, it should be said on the contrary, taking into consideration the
explanations given by him to the policemen who arrested him and to the
other witnesses for the prosecution with whom he had been talking before
and after the incident, that he acted while in the full possession of his
mental faculties.
The fact that the appellant was afflicted with manic depressive
psychosis after the crime, as certified by Drs. Toribio Joson, J. A. Fernandez
and Elias Domingo who examined him, does not prove that he was so
afflicted on the date and at the time of the commission of the crime, nor that
said ailment, taking for granted that he was suffering therefrom, had
deprived him of his reason to such an extent that he could not account for
his acts.
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 There is no evidence of record to show that the appellant was actually
insane when he committed the crime or that he continued to be afflicted
with said ailment for which he had to be confined in the insane asylum for
some days during the months above-stated, in 1922 and 1926. The most
reasonable rule which should be adopted in these cases is the one followed
by various courts of the United States stated in 32 C. J., 757, section 561,
and 16 C. J., 538, 539, section 1012 as follows:
"If the insanity, admitted or proved, is only occasional or
intermittent in its nature, the presumption of its continuance does not
arise, and he who relies on such insanity proved at another time must
prove its existence also at the time alleged." (32 C. J., 757, sec. 561.)
"Where it is shown that defendant had lucid intervals, it will be
presumed that offense was committed in one of them. A person who
has been adjudged insane, or who has been committed to a hospital or
to an asylum for the insane, is presumed to continue insane; but as in
the case of prior insanity generally, a prior adjudication of insanity does
not raise a presumption of continued insanity, where the insanity is not
of a permanent or continuing character, or where, for a considerable
period of time, the person has been on parole from the hospital or
asylum to which he was committed, or where he escaped from the
asylum at a time when he was about to be discharged." (16 C. J., 538,
539, sec. 1012.)

On the other hand, in Clevenger's Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity

(vol. 1, pp. 482 and 484), the following appears:
"Fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are not presumed to be
continuous. And the existence of prior or subsequent lunacy, except
where it is habitual, does not suffice to change the burden of proof. And
where an insane person has lucid intervals offenses committed by him
will be presumed to have been committed in a lucid interval unless the
contrary appears. The maxim 'Once insane presumed always to be
insane' does not apply where the malady or delusion under which the
alleged insane person labored was in its nature accidental or
temporary, or the effect of some sickness or disease.
"And in order to raise a presumption of continuance it must be of
a permanent type or of a continuing nature or possessed of the
characters of an habitual and confirmed disorder of the mind. And it
most appear to have been of such duration and character as to indicate
the probability of its continuance, and not simply the possibility or
probability of its recurrence. And there should be some evidence
tending to show settled insanity as contra distinguished from
temporary aberration or hallucination, to justify an instruction which
does not recognize such a distinction."
It is alleged that the appellant was suffering from insomnia before he
committed the crime in question. Such condition does not necessarily prove
that on the day in question he was actually insane. Insomnia, according to
Dr. Elias Domingo, is not an exclusive symptom of insanity; other diseases
and ailments also have it (t. s. n., p. 19).
In view of the foregoing considerations and of those stated in the
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 dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion, I vote for the affirmance of the
appealed sentence, because in my opinion it is supported by the evidence
and in accordance with law.

CONCEPTION, J., dissenting:

I dissent: Above all, I wish to state: (1) That the crime committed by the
accused is an admitted fact; and (2) that I adhere to the statement of the
majority that it is settled in this jurisdiction that a defense based upon the
insanity of the accused should be established by means of clear, indubitable
and satisfactory evidence.
On December 12, 1934, the accused stabbed the deceased Carlos
Guison who, as a result of the wounds received by him, died in the hospital
two days after the aggression.
It is alleged that the accused was insane at the time he committed this
crime. What evidence is there of record in support of this defense? Mention
has been made of the fact that the accused had been confined in the San
Lazaro Hospital and later in the Psychopathic Hospital. He was confined in
the San Lazaro from April 11 to April 26, 1922. He returned to the hospital on
January 6, 1926, and left on the 10th of said month and year. Dr. Elias
Domingo, chief alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital was questioned as
follows:
"Q. When he left the hospital, can you state whether he was
already completely cured of his insanity? — A. He was socially
adjustable.
"Q. What do you mean by socially adjustable? — A. That he
could adapt himself to environment."
There is no evidence that from the month of January, 1926, when he
was declared cured at the Psychopathic Hospital, to December 12, 1934, the
date of the crime, he had shown signs of having had a relapse. Therefore it is
a proven fact that during the long period of nine years the accused had been
sane.
It is alleged, however, that four days before the crime the accused was
under treatment by Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco because he was suffering
from insomnia. Dr. Francisco admitted that he was not a specialist in mental
diseases. He is, therefore, disqualified from testifying satisfactorily on the
mental condition of the accused four days before the crime; and in fact
neither has Dr. Francisco given any convincing testimony to prove that when
the accused was under treatment by him he was suffering from dementia
praecox, as the only thing he said was that the accused-appellant had an
attack of insomnia which is one of the symptoms of and may lead to
dementia praecox (Exhibit 3; t. s. n., pp. 13, 14). This is not an affirmation of
a fact but of a mere possibility. The innocence of the accused cannot be
based on mere theories or possibilities. To prove insanity as a defense,
material, incontrovertible facts, although circumstantial, are necessary.
On the contrary the evidence shows that on the day the accused
committed the crime he talked and behaved as an entirely normal man.
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 Policemen Damaso T. Arnoco and Benjamin Cruz testified that the accused,
after having been asked why he had attacked Carlos Guison, replied that it
was because Guison owed him P55 for a long time and did not pay him. The
accused stated that he bought the knife with which he had stabbed Guison
on Tabora Street for fifty centavos and he had been waiting for two days to
kill Guison. The accused took his dinner at noon on December 12th. The
statement of the accused which was taken in writing by detectives Charles
Strubel and Manalo on December 12th was left unfinished because Cruz of
the Bureau of Labor arrived and told the accused not to be a fool and not to
make any statement. Thereafter the accused refused to continue his
statement. All of these show that on that day the accused behaved as a
sane man and he even appeared to be prudent, knowing how to take
advantage of advice favorable to him, as that given him by Cruz of the
Bureau of Labor. Furthermore it cannot be said that the accused had
stabbed Guison through hallucination because it is an established fact that
his victim really owed him money as confirmed by the fact that when Guison
was stabbed he cried to the accused "I am going to pay you", according to
the testimony of an eyewitness. Therefore the motive of the aggression was
a real and positive fact: vengeance.
Some days after the commission of the crime, the accused was placed
under observation in the Psychopathic Hospital because he showed
symptoms of a form of psychosis called manic depressive psychosis from
which he had already been cured when the case was tried. This psychosis is
of course evidence that the accused was afflicted with this ailment after the
commission of the crime. It would not be casual to affirm that the
tremendous nervous shock suffered by him after the commission of the
crime had affect his reason. Nervous shock is one of the causes of insanity
inferred therefrom that the accused was also mentally deranged on the day
of the crime, aside from the circumstance that the evidence shows just the
contrary. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the appealed sentence should
be affirmed.

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