1944 21

Portland State University
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Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses
1991
The collapse of the German army in the East in the

summer of 1944 (Volume 2)
Stephen Ariel Veal
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(1991). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 4302.
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THE COLLAPSE OF THE GERMAN ARMY
IN THE EAST IN THE SUMMER OF 1944
Volume 2
by
STEPHEN ARIEL VEAL
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
HISTORY

1991
445
JULY 10, 1944
3rd Panzer Army

Fortress Wilna. Strong Soviet attacks supported by artillery
and mortar fire were beaten back during the night. However, the
Soviets had managed to infiltrate the German lines and establish
several strong points in the city equipped with light machine guns,
mortars and anti-tank rifles.536 Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf west of the
city was under attack from the east, south and southwest by
approximately 40 Soviet tanks (see Figure 145). Rykonty was
entered during the night by Soviet armor. Maj. General
Heidkaempfer informed Lt. General Krebs of the threatening
situation faced by Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf at 0545 hrs. The very
serious situation west of Wilna was complicated by Soviet armored
attacks since Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf had no anti-tank weapons to
stop the armored thrust in the direction of Kauen (see Figure 145).
Nevertheless, Kampfgruppe T olsdorf was ordered by Field Marshal
Model to hold the Landwarow bend (see Figure 145). Therefore, the
3rd Panzer Army requested the use of the Luftwaffe "Panzerjaeger"
air support.537 Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern smashed a
Soviet infantry battalion east of Meyszagola, but the Soviets
continued to reinforce this area constantly (see Figure 143).
"Fortress Wilna" requested supply drops especially of
ammunition. A Stuka attack at 1230 hrs was reported effective
and another Stuka attack was requested. The Commandant of
"Fortress Wilna" reported that the Soviets inside the city were
446
strong and that they had infiltrated the eastern part of the city by
coming through a hole on the rail line in the south (see Figure 145).
Presently, the Soviets were attacking from the north across the
bridge on the right (see Figure 145). The Commandant requested
that strong pressure be applied on the Soviets from the outside.
Wilna was reported at 1535 hrs under heavy attack from
practically every side (see Figure 145).538 The Commandant
informed the High Command that the terrain in the east must be
evacuated tonight. The garrison under command of General Stahel
had fought on all sides and even had to beat back an attack in hand
to hand combat within the German artillery position. Despite
heroic defensive efforts not all breakthroughs could be avoided so
that as a result of German losses the defenders were pressed back
into a tighter ring in the inner city (see Figure 145) .539 "Fortress
Wilna" reported heavy casualties during the day's fighting and two
holes in the defensive line. One hole was at the mouth of the
Wileika river and a 2 km wide hole in the south on both sides of the
railway underpass. These penetrations allowed the Soviets to
infiltrate the thin defense line and transfer the battle into the
inner city.540 The plugging of these holes was not possible because
of continued combat losses. Therefore, the defense line was pulled
back under the cover of darkness. The Soviets had transferred
strong forces south and north of Wilna further to the west while
attacks had been launched against the city all day (see Figure 144).
IX Army Corps. The 212th and 252nd Infantry Divisions
occupied the new position after Grenadier Regiment 279 cleared it
447
of Soviet troops. The north wing of the Corps had already been
outflanked by the Soviets and Buitunai (3.5 km southeast of
Kuktiskes) was occupied (see Figure 146). The 3rd Panzer Army
requested Army Group North to expedite the disengagement of the
225th Infantry Division. The division was ordered directly to send
all its motorized elements and truck mounted infantry to Wilkomir.
Tauragnai was under attack in the morning from the east and the
west (see Figure 146). The Soviets had gotten behind the left wing
of the IX Corps at Buitunai and were attacking south which meant
that the left wing would have to be pulled back since Army Group
North had failed to close the gap by attacking south.
Three battalions from the 225th Infantry Division were
attacking in the hills of Alauso lake and were supposed to
breakthrough to Utena. The 3rd Panzer Army hoped to employ the
225th Infantry Division on the south wing of the Corps once it had
fought through to Utena. However, later in the day it became
apparent that the 225th Infantry Division was bogged down at
Utena and could not link up with the left wing of the IX Corps.
Army Group North decided to retain the division to close the hole
between 3rd Panzer Army and Army Group North on the left wing of
the IX Corps. The 225th Infantry Division had reached to within 7
km northeast of Utena when the promised use of the Tiger Tank
Battalion was withdrawn. Army Group North informed Army Group
Center that approximately 7 Soviet divisions and armored
formations of unknown strength were attacking and had partly
outflanked the outermost right wing of Army Group North south of
448
Duenaburg. Therefore, the continuation of the attack to restore

contact with the north wing of the 3rd Panzer Army was no longer
possible.541 The Soviets advanced without hindrance to the north
and northwest between Kuktiskes and Tauragnai (see Figure 146).
The 212th Infantry Division was broken through in several
positions and was pulled back to a new defensive line on the line of
lakes: tip of Orinos lake - lsnarusee - southwest of Kraujaliai lake
- southeast of Paseksciai (see Figure 146). Contact with the 252nd
Infantry Division at this position was to be secured.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Panzer Army was preparing to stop the
Soviet advance east of Kauen. Field Marshal Model was assembling
Kampfgruppe Kauen consisting of the new XXVI Army Corps, the
first elements of the 6th Panzer Division, one parachute battalion,
69th Infantry Division, and 93rd Infantry Division.542 The 63rd
Infantry Division was also unloading in Jonava.
4th Army
Kampfgruppe Weidling. The Soviets were advancing on the
rail line and road Lida-Grodno against Kampfgruppe Weidling (see
Figure 144). The Soviets achieved numerous breakthroughs and
forced the defensive line back to Orla -Lebioda - Pielasa (see
Figure 144).
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The Corps was attacked on both flanks
and threatened by Soviet forces west of Wilna attacking south into
the Solcza sector and arriving in the rear of the 4th Army. The
Corps withdrew to the line Radun-Eischischken.
449
9th Army
Kampfgruppe von Vormann was restored to Army level status.
Kampfgruppe von Vormann became the resurrected 9th Army (see
Figure 147).543 The command authority over the units was
transferred from the 2nd Army to the restored 9th Army.544
The Szczara front was broken through north of Byten and
north of Slonim (see Figure 144). The 9th Army formations were
forced to withdraw to the Hrwyda river. The 28th Jaeger Division
was recovering behind the front line and was currently not combat
effective. The division was building a second defensive line at the
Zelwianka river and on both sides of Zelwa (see Figure 144). The
12th Panzer Division was on the left wing of the 9th Army.
JULY 11 , 1944
3rd Panzer Army

Fortress Wilna. The garrison of Wilna succeeded in
shortening the front during the night and closing the 1 km hole on
the south edge of the city.545 German troops fought throughout the
night to clean up Soviet resistance inside the city. The situation
had become critical in Wilna with the increasing casualties and
shortage of water. Hitler issued a "Fuehrer Befehl" at 1528 hrs:
Fight your way out over the Wilja river to the left wing
of Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf at the mouth of the Waka
river.546
General Stahel requested aerial reconnaissance to determine
the route with the least enemy resistance. Radio communications
450
to "Fortress Wilna" were heavily jammed during the entire day and
completely ceased at 2130 hrs.547 There were no further reports
for the day from "Fortress Wilna." Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf pushed
the Soviets back at Woly in a counterattack. However, Soviet armor
during the course of the day succeeded in cutting off the
Kampfgruppe's supply road to the northwest by taking Vievis.
Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf was as a result likewise encircled since
partisans were located on its western front. SS Parachute
Battalion 500 with the first elements of the Panther Battalion of
the Gross Deutschland Division organized a blocking position on
both sides of the road to Kowno (see Figure 148).
IX Army Corps. The Soviets thrust deeply into the flank west
of Dubingiai to the north which threatened the rear of the IX Corps
(see Figure 149). Kuktiskes on the outermost left wing was lost
after bitter fighting in the town. The north wing of the Corps was
threatened by the unhindered advance of Soviet Divisions on both
sides of the Utena-Wilkomir road (see Figure 149).548 The IX Corps
Command Post moved during the evening to Sventupe (2 km
northeast of Vidiskiai) (see Figure 149). The strength of the IX
Corps divisions with the exception of the 212th Infantry Division
had fallen significantly:
252nd Infantry Division: approximately 900 men

Corps Detachment D: 550 men
391 st Security Division: 1200 men.549
451
The left wing and center of the IX Corps were to be pulled back that
night to the following line: the lakes east of Moletai - northern tip
of Virinto lake - Kanjukai - Rubikai lake (see Figure 149).
Colonel General Reinhardt addressed three vital questions to
Field Marshal Model:
1 . The relief of Wilna.
2. The hole to Army Group North after the II Army

Corps retreats up to 25 km northeast of Utena.
3. The preparation of a position from Kauen to the

north, where no natural obstacle can be found up to the
Memel river north of Kauen.550
The answers to these questions were vital to 3rd Panzer Army's
defensive preparations.
Field Marshal Model responded that the mission of the 3rd
Panzer Army was to prevent a widening of the hole between the 3rd
Panzer Army and Army Group North. Field Marshal Model ordered
the following:
1 . The Nieman front south of Kauen is to be blocked.
2. The battle at Kauen and to the northeast is to be

conducted so Kauen, Janow and Wilkomir can be held.
Mobile elements of engaged units are to intercept
enemy armored spearheads rapidly and establish
defensive lines.
3. Contact with Army Group North is to be restored.

The IX Army Corps is to maintain firm contact with the
west within the Army's front. The II Corps will t?e
requested to close the hole at Utena with the 22Sth and
87th Infantry Divisions. The border between 3rd Panzer
452
Army and 16th Army has been proposed as the rail line
Svencionelai-Utena.551
4th Army
Kampfgruppe Lt. General Floerke was attacked by the Soviets
northeast of Wawiorka and broke through 1O km to the southwest.
Kampfgruppe Weidling was forced to pull back its north wing to the
line Wawiorka-Sobakinze (see Figure 150). The 5th and 7th Panzer
Divisions were withdrawn under the cover of the 170th Infantry
Division to the northwest (see Figure 150). The 5th Panzer Division
and a reinforced Panzer Grenadier Regiment from the 7th Panzer
Division attacked the Soviets entering the line Daugai-Valkininkai
(see Figure 150).
9th Army
The resurrection of the 9th Army from "Kampfgruppe von
Vormann" resulted in a new assignment. The 9th Army was
directed to conduct the construction of a rear defensive position
along the line Brest-Grodno.552 It was hoped by Army Group Center
that the Soviet advance could finally be stopped on this line. The
Soviets had broken through again on the 9th Army front east of the
Polish border (see Figure 151 ).
453
JULY 12, 1944
3rd Panzer Army

Fortress Wilna. Radio communications from "Fortress Wilna"
had ceased at 2130 hrs on July 11th and were later resumed at
0345 hrs by General Stahel. General Stahel reported that his
Kampfgruppe would begin the breakout to the west along the north
bank of the Wilja river tonight beginning approximately at 2230
hrs.ss3 Losses were reported as lighter than in previous days.
Stronger Soviet forces were reported crossing the Wilja river at
Lesniki moving in a northwestern direction. The Soviets had also
constructed a floating bridge east of the north bridge in Wilna with
the intention of advancing north. General Stahel requested by radio
that Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf assign a detachment with heavy
weapons to hold the town at the junction of the Waka river with the
Wilja river.
Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf reported that the Soviets succeeded in
forcing their way across a bridge north of Rykonty and penetrated
the wooded terrain northwest of Rykonty. Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf
was ordered at 0822 hrs to hold the southern front and the area
around Woly under all circumstances. Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf and
Kampfgruppe Stahel were to join together.ss4 The area on the Wilja
river bank in the area of Woly was to be held for the breakout of the
Wilna garrison.sss Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf requested Luftwaffe air
support at 1530 hrs for the woods south of Landwarow and the hills
454
northeast of Pietuchowo. Air support was requested at 2100 hrs

for the hills east of Woly and the woods south of the town.
Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf announced by radio at 2015 hrs that
relief was on the way. The 6th Panzer Division was ordered to
attack in the direction of Landwarow at 0600 hrs the next
morning.556 The 6th Panzer Division was to be reinforced by a
Panzer battalion from the Panzer Division "GrossDeutschland," SS
Parachute Battalion 500 and 1112 companies from Parachute
Regiment 16.557 This attack was to assist the breakout of
Kampfgruppe T olsdorf and the garrison of Wilna to an area east of
Kauen. Luftwaffe support was secured to support this attack.
The 3rd Panzer Army had transferred its Command Post to
Babtai, 21 km northwest of Kauen (see Figure 151 ). The further
withdrawal of the 225th Infantry Division during the course of the
day widened the hole between the 3rd Panzer Army and the 16th
Army through which a Soviet tank brigade entered. However, the
16th Army was organizing Kampfgruppe Kleffell consisting of the
225th Infantry Division, 61 st Infantry Division and SS Panzer
Reconnaissance Battalion 11 for the purpose of attacking to restore
contact to the north wing of the 3rd Panzer Army.558 Olita was
taken by Soviet attack during the day (see Figure 152).
Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern attacked from
Sirvintos to the east and destroyed 26 Soviet anti-tank guns, 2
tanks and 2 assault guns in Griedraiciai leaving the town in flames.
But the Brigade was cut off from its supply elements by Soviet
attacks in the rear and was forced to fight its way back to
455
Sirvintos where Kampfgruppe Schmidt was located (see Figure

152).
Lt. General Krebs informed Major General Heidkaempfer that
even though the second half of the 6th Panzer Division had not
arrived other units would be coming. Therefore, the 3rd Panzer
Army had two missions:
1 . The present area was to be held.
2. The hole to Army Group North was to be bridged by

offensive action after the arrival of further units.559
4th Army
Kampfgruppe Weidling was pushed back to the line Szecuzyn-
Ostryna by Soviet cavalry forces (see Figure 153). Further Soviet
penetrations on the north wing of the Kampfgruppe forced another
withdrawal to the line Niemen-Kotra sector (see Figure 153).
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The 5th Panzer Division attacked to the
north and delayed the Soviet advance from Wilna (see Figure 152).
Defensive battles raged with the focal point west of the rail line
Wilna-Grodno (see Figure 152). Thirty Soviet tanks broke into
Varena, but were repulsed in a counter stroke (see Figure 152). The
5th and 7th Panzer Divisions were employed on both sides of the
Dugai lake against the flank of the Soviet armor that had entered
Olita (see Figure 152).
456
2nd Army
The withdrawal movement of the XX Corps progressed as
planned. Soviet attacks on Pinsk were beaten back on the north
wing of the XXlll Army Corps. A deep breakthrough was achieved on
the 129th Infantry Division's sector (see Figure 153). The
penetration reached the Jasiolda river north of Sielek and
Smolanica whereby a wide hole was ripped to Kampfgruppe
Harteneck (see Figure 153). The Soviet attack on the front of
Kampfgruppe Harteneck and the LV Army Corps achieved several
penetrations up to a depth of 5 km.
JULY 13, 1944
3rd Panzer Army

Fortress Wilna. There were no reports since 2230 hrs
yesterday concerning the breakout of the garrison from Wilna.
Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf reported combat activity coming from the
direction of Wilna during the early morning hours. Colonel General
Reinhardt drove to the 6th Panzer Division in the morning and
ordered an attack at 0745 hrs toward Landwarow using the present
units and the artillery from Panzer Division "GrossDeutschland."560
Finally, Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf reported at 0955 hrs that the uneasy
wait was over. The radio message read:
Stahel reached me with about 400 men initially. Stahel

reports: Breakthrough with 3000 men
succeeded ... Enemy very quiet.561
457
The most difficult phase of treeing the garrison of Wilna

appeared to be successful, but Kampfgruppe Tolsdort still remained
encircled (see Figure 154). The Soviets continued to attack
Kampfgruppe Tolsdort from the west. The location of the relieving
force at 1020 hrs was uncertain. The spearhead of the group
consisted of the Panther Battalion of the Panzer Division
"Grossdeutschland" and the Kampfgruppe of the 6th Panzer
Division.562 Koschedoren was reported cleared of Soviets at 0840
hrs and the Panther Battalion of Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland"
had passed Vievis at 1205 hrs. The Panther battalion "GD" radioed
the 6th Panzer Division that contact had been made with
Kamptgruppe Tolsdort at 1300 hrs (see Figure 155).563 The route of
retreat for the group would be in the rear northeast of Ziezmuriai
which was under Soviet fire. Kampfgruppe Tolsdort reported that
approximately 3000 men as of 2030 hrs of Kampfgruppe Stahel had
arrived (see Figure 155).564 They had crossed the Wilja river twice
and were mostly lacking clothes. The 6th Panzer Division secured
the line at Vievis and Ziezmariai for the transportation to the rear
of the combat veterans of Wilna. According to Soviet sources the
Battle of Wilna which ended on July 13th resulted in 8000 Germans
killed and 5000 taken prisoner.565
4th Army
Kampfgruppe Weidling was outflanked on the north and the
Soviets tried to take Grodno by a surprise attack which was
defeated by rapidly concentrated forces (see Figure 156). Soviet
458
armor that had broken into the city was destroyed. Weak police
forces were holding the city against strong Soviet attacks from the
north and northeast. The 5th Panzer Division was ordered to Grodno
to mop up Soviet resistance.566
The XXXIX Panzer Corps completed its withdrawal to the
expanded bridgehead at Merken. Nevertheless, Soviet penetrations
made it necessary to withdraw from the contracting bridgehead.
Weak Soviet units succeeded in reaching the west bank of the
Niemen river at Olita (see Figure 156).
2nd Army
The last units of the XX and XXlll Army Corps on the right
wing of the 2nd Army had crossed over the Jasiolda river. The
Soviets attacked the right wing of Kampfgruppe Harteneck and
broke through the front of the 129th Infantry Division at several
positions and forced the division back (see Figure 156).
Kampfgruppe Harte neck and the LV Army Corps were withdrawn
during the-night of July 13-14th to the line Kuklicze - east of
Wolkowysk - to along the Ros river. The 12th Panzer Division on
the left wing of the L V Army Corps smashed an encircling attack by
two Soviet rifle divisions.567
JULY 14-31, 1944
The Soviet advance began to slow down as they advanced

further to the west. German resistance stiffened as German forces
459
fell back toward East Prussia and Poland. German reinforcements

were poured into Army Group Center to stabilize the front which
had been ripped wide open. There was only one more major loss by
Army Group Center which involved Corps Detachment E in the
encirclement of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk." Brest-Litovsk was a
major rail junction and therefore was designated a "Fortress." (see
Figure 157).
FORTRESS BREST-LITOVSK
2nd Army
The defense of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" was conducted by the
203rd Security Division and Corps Detachment E (see Table XXXVll)
(see Figure 158).568 Corps Detachment E consisted of three weak
divisional groups: 86th, 137th and 251 st Infantry Divisions.569 Lt.
General Felzman, Commander of Corps Detachment E was appointed
Commandant of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" on July 21, 1944.570
This "Fortress" like all the other "Fortresses" on the Eastern
Front suffered the same fate. Soviet forces broke through
northwest and southwest of the city cutting it off and encircling
its garrison. Field Marshal Model recognized that holding "Fortress
Brest-Litovsk" was pointless when it could not be given adequate
supplies and sufficient troops.571 The fate of "Fortress Brest-
Litovsk" would not be decided by the outer or inner defensive rings,
but by events north of the city and behind the city west of the Bug
river.
460
July 25, 1944
2nd Army
Soviet armor forces advancing south of Siedlice were beaten
back during the morning by the attack of assault guns. Strong
Soviet forces from the area of Lukow advancing in a northern
direction arrived south of the Siedice-Miedzyrzec road (see Figure
159).
The VI II Army Corps was thrown back to the line Miedzyrzec-
Biala Podlaska. Soviet forces broke through the 168th Infantry
Divisions sector but elements of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade succeeded
in a counterattack in restoring communications between Biala
Podlaska and the west front of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" (see Figure
159). The withdrawal of the 541 st Infantry Division from the Bug
river line was pursued by the Soviets to the northeast.
The Soviets attacked the north wing of the 5th SS Panzer
Division "Wiking" in the XXll I Army Corps sector from the northeast
and southwest and forced the Division from Kleszczele to the south
(see Figure 159).572 The 4th Panzer Division was unable to parry
the Soviet attack by an armored thrust along the rail line to
Kleszczele because of a Soviet attack from the east (see Figure
159).
461
JULY 26, 1944
2nd Army
The 2nd Army was engaged by the concentrated attacks of 7
Soviet Armies and 5 Mobile Corps.573 Soviet attacks were repulsed
from the west, south and southeast by the garrison of Siedlce
which had been reinforced by elements of the 3rd SS Panzer
Division "Totenkopf." (see Figure 160). The Soviets, however,
crossed over the road east of the city and took Mordy (see Figure
160). The front from west of Miedzyrec to Brest and the continuous
southern front of the 2nd Army had been broken through by Soviet
armor supported attacks in numerous places (see Figure 160).
Miedzyrzec and Biala Podlaska were lost (see Figure 160).574 The
3rd Cavalry Brigade counterattacked and destroyed 2 Soviet
battalions northeast of Biala Podlaska and threw the advancing
Soviets back over the road to the south.575 The Soviet attacks
during the evening with infantry and armor achieved a deep
breakthrough 20 km east of Biala Podlaska to the north and pushed
forward on the Terespol-Janow Podlaski road (see Figure 160).
Soviet cavalry from the wooded terrain north of Mielnik pressed to
the southeast in the direction of Wysokie Litewski. The Soviet
advance continued despite the best efforts of the German 1st
Flieger Division which attempted to interdict from the air the
Soviet advance in the area of Siedlce - Lukow and the area of
Bialystok (see Table XXXVlll).
462
The Soviets attacked the XXlll Army Corps north of Brest with
armor support and achieved a partial breakthrough up to the rail
line Brest-Bielsk Podlaski (see Figure 174). The 5th SS Panzer
Division "Wiking" had fended off Soviet attacks from the west,
north and east in the area south of Kleszczele (see Figure 160).
Fortress Brest-Litovsk. Soviet attacks on the outer defenses
of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" broke through and the Soviets entered
the inner defense ring of the city which lead to an extremely
threatening situation (see Figure 174).576 The breakthrough into
the inner defense ring combined with the progressive encirclement
from the west placed the "Fortress" in an untenable position. There
was only enough ammunition for 10 days at maximum and food
supplies for 14 days.577 There were also 700 wounded which could
not be evacuated and Junker 52 transport aircraft were
requested.578 The Commandant of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" strived
to acheive contact with the left wing of the 223rd Infantry
Division Kampfgruppe by rapidly pulling out troops from the eastern
front of Brest-Litovsk and transferring them to the west in the
general line Dobryn Wik. - west of of Wolka - Dobryniska - west of
Dobrynka (see Figure 161 ). However, the disengagement of troops
from the east front of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" weakened the outer
defense ring sufficiently that the Soviets achieved several
penetrations in the defense line.
"Fortress Brest-Litovsk" was only connected to the west by
radio. The Soviets pressed their attacks in several sectors with
units up to battalion strength. The Germans managed to liquidate
463
the penetrations at Kostomoloty, Zakije and Jamno. Nevertheless,

the Soviets succeeded by advancing from the west and south
against "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" achieving deep breakthroughs in
the fortress defense line at Wolka Dobrynska.579 The 2nd Army
granted permission for withdrawal to the inner defense ring of the
fortress. 580
German commanders had become sensitive to the disasters
that had resulted from the encirclement of Hitler's so called
fortresses. Colonel General Weiss, Commander of the 2nd Army
expressed his concerns about the encirclement of Brest-Litovsk at
121 O hrs to Lt. General Krebs, Chief of Staff Army Group Center. He
informed Krebs that the situation was getting worse. The enemy
had broken into Miedzyrzec from the south (see Figure 160). The
enemy at Biala Podlaska could not be stopped after the loss of the .
12th Hungarian Division and the cavalry (see Figure 160). Col.
General Weiss stated:
The crisis on the south flank of the Army has

intensified. Brest cannot remain standing under these
circumstances. It could come any minute when a
situation that is not supposed to happen will appear
terribly similar to the situation of Bobruisk ... Today it
is necessary to pull back the garrison of Brest to the
inner ring. I will order this action. Brest must be
evacuated en masse as early as possible tonight. It is
important that the first elements of the movement are
rapid. It is important to deliver forces to the
threatened positions. 581
Lt. General Krebs responded that he did not believe that the
issue could be settled today.582 Col. General Weiss responded:
464
We have not lost our nerves and also the essential

experience gained in previous battles. Therefore, you
can believe us, that it is essential. A relief of the XXlll
Corps by the 541st Division is not possible. The 2nd
Army is presently being attacked by 8 armies.583
Colonel General Weiss informed Lt. General Krebs at 1230 hrs
that the Soviets were in Biala Podlaska and were advancing from
there towards the west.584 The Soviets were also forcing their
way into Miedzyrzec from the south (see Figure 160). Colonel
General Weiss stated that a "major decision was urgent. "585 He
requested freedom of movement to the line Siedlce-Orla. Lt.
General Krebs responded that Field Marshal Model had planned for a
withdrawal to the line Miedzyrzec-Kleszcze but that would soon be
difficult. Col. General Weiss informed Krebs that the forces in
"Fortress Brest-Litovsk" were being pulled back to the inner
defense ring (see Figure 161 ). He further stated that the forces in
Brest needed to be evacuated tonight so that the troops could be
freed for further use.586 Lt. General Krebs responded that he did
not believe Brest could be evacuated tonight.587
Lt. General Krebs responded at 1250 hrs that with the
occupation of the inner defense ring Field Marshal Model had
approved the release of two battalions from "Fortress Brest-
Litovsk" to clear the road to Biala Podlaska.588
465
JULY 27, 1944
2nd Army
Colonel Lassen, General Staff Operations Officer for the 2nd
Army informed Colonel General Weiss that Corps Detachment E
would be cutoff tonight. Col. General Weiss responded that the
moment had not yet arrived for complete freedom of movement.
Finally, Lt. General Krebs informed the 2nd Army at 0025 hrs that
Field Marshal Model had approved the objectives of the 2nd Army
including the withdrawal of Corps Detachment E from Brest-
Litovsk.589 Colonel Lassen informed Lt. General Krebs at 0850 hrs
that the Brest units would be pulled back to the following line:
northwest of Biala - east of Janow Podlaski - along the Pulwa to
the rail line. The order had been transmitted to the XX Army Corps.
Lt. General Felzmann, Commandant of "Fortress Brest-
Litovsk" sent a radio message describing the breakout. Two Soviet
attacks each consisting of 1000 troops from the southwest were
repulsed. Then the garrison of Brest after 45 minutes of artillery
preparation and the demolition of the airport commenced the
breakout through the west ring of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" at 1805
hrs through T erespol over the Bug river against 3 Soviet
Divisions.59o The breakout had begun just prior to the complete and
total isolation of the city had been completed by the Soviets (see
Figure 162). The Commandant of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk"
organized the breakout to the west based upon two assault
groups.591 The assault groups encountered stiff resistance despite
466
45 minutes of artillery preparation. The assault group on the right

reached Krzyczew while the left group got bogged down in the
Krzna sector of Beresowka. The main difficulty encountered in the
fighting withdrawal of Kampfgruppe Felzmann was not frontal
resistance but Soviet fire from both flanks along the route of
retreat which inflicted heavy losses in men and material.592 Lt.
General Felzmann reported that the last German soldier evacuated
Brest shortly after midnight.593
JULY 28, 1944
2nd Army
The garrison of Brest-Litovsk which had made its breakout
was according to the last radio message engaged in heavy battle
with the lead elements located at Kolosz and Zaczopki (see Figure
163). The southern assault group reported strong Soviet pressure
from the south along the entire route of march.594
The XX Army Corps formed a Kampfgruppe from the 102nd
Infantry Division and the 223rd Divisional Group which was
assembled for an attack on July 28, 1944 at 1300 hrs at Wierzchlas
(see Figure 163).595 The attack was to proceed through Biony-
Zaczopki. This attack was successful and broke through the Soviet
defense line and permitted the relief of Kampfgruppe Felzmann (see
Figure 164).596 The first group to reach German lines was the
448th Regimental group in a column with more than 600 wounded
men.597 The remnants of the 137th Infantry Divisional Group and
467
the 167th Regimental Group also broke through with severe losses
of men and equipment.
JULY 29, 1944
2nd Army
The garrison of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" reached German
lines, but had suffered severe losses in men and equipment.598
Elements of Corps Detachment E managed to reach the German
defense line along the west edge of Niemojki to the west edge of
Hadynow (see Figure 164).599 Elements of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade
secured the retreat route of Kampfgruppe Felzmann to the west
where elements of Corps Detachment E were placed back into the
front (see Figure 165).
According to Soviet sources the German losses from the three
divisions attempting to escape amounted to 15,000 killed and 2000
taken prisoner between July 29-30, 1944.600 The 86th, 137th and
251 st Infantry Divisional Groups were for the most part destroyed
in the battle and subsequent retreat from "Fortress Brest-Litovsk."
The 86th Infantry Divisional group was destroyed but some
remnants were absorbed into the 251st Infantry Division which had
also been smashed but was later reformed as the 251 st
Volksgrenadier Division.601 The 137th Infantry Divisional Group
appears to have been disbanded.602
468
THE CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE OF ARMY GROUP CENTER
AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GERMAN LOSSES
TO THE EASTERN FRONT
The causes of the collapse of Army Group Center were a

result of Soviet strengths and German Weaknesses. The Soviets had
changed their tactics and the Germans as a result of their
weaknesses could not counter the new Soviet tactics successfully.
The Soviet and German factors combined produce an explanation for
the collapse of Army Group Center in the summer of 1944. There
were six significant Soviet factors that contributed to the success
of the Red Army in Belorussia:
1 . The Soviets possessed numerical superiority in every
category of combat strength: troops, tanks, trucks, artillery,
aircraft and supplies.
2. The Soviets employed massive concentrations of artillery
for the initial breakthrough on the Belorussian Front. The mass and
numbers of artillery employed for the initial artillery barrage was
unprecedented.
3. Soviet offensive tactics were developed to exploit their
numerical superiority for maximum effect. The Soviets
concentrated their forces on narrow frontages with closely
concentrated infantry and attached armored brigades employed in
the first wave to make the initial breakthrough. Soviet tank and
mechanized corps strength was preserved by holding them in
reserve till the hole in the German lines was made by the initial
469
first wave of infantry. Then the tank and mechanized corps were
deployed through the broken German line into the depth of
battlefield toward distant objectives.
4. Soviet air superiority based on the 5 air armies employed
was used effectively against the German front lines, directly
behind the front, and in all areas where the Soviets were mounting
a major breakthrough.
5. The vast quantity of ammunition supplies gave the Soviets
the capability to use firepower from artillery, mortars and fighter
aircraft continuously for days without pause. Artillery barrages
could be maintained for days. The Soviets were not restricted like
their German counterparts by the supply of ammunition.
6. The extensive motorization within the tank and
mechanized corps (see Figures 166 & 167) permitted the
formations to drive great distances into the depth of the German
front. They could carry more fuel and infantry to accompany the
tanks because of the vast quantities of American trucks supplied to
the Soviets through lend-lease. The Soviets empowered by such a
high level of mobility were able to advance behind German lines
without regard to their rear or flanks especially since Soviet
numerical superiorty in the air permitted units operating in depth a
sense of security. The Soviet deep armored penetrations permitted
the Soviets to achieve certain decisive advantages: occupation of
strategic terrain features, interruption of all German rearward
communications, preventing supply operations to frontline troops,
470
setting the stage for encirclement, and producing detrimental

psychological effects on German troops.603
7. The Soviet use of the "double pincer" maneuver such as in
the case of the German 4th Army. The "outside pincer" was formed
by tank armies driving towards distant objectives and the "inner
pincer" by infantry armies with attached tank brigades which
pressed the German 4th Army into a tighter cauldron in a process of
encirclement which had already been completed by the breakthrough
of the "outside pincer" into the rear area. This technique enabled
the Soviets to successfully encircle entire German armies.
Thus, Soviet strengths were major factors causing the
collapse of Army Group Center, but only provide a partial
explanation of the German defeat. The most serious weakness was
found within the German Army High Command.
German weakness combined with Soviet strengths provides
more complete answers to the causes of the collapse of Army Group
Center. Soviet strengths alone could not have caused the collapse
of Army Group Center. Soviet strengths in the past had been
countered by a resolute German defense such as in the failure of
the Soviet winter offensive of 1943-1944 against Army Group
Center. Therefore, the explanation is found in the mistakes of the
German Army High Command. The German High Command made the
following six grave errors:
1. There was a failure to heed the military intelligence
summaries of Army Group Center which reported obvious Soviet
concentrations and impending signs of a major offensive against
471
Army Group Center. Colonel Gehlen and Foreign Armies East bear a
major responsibility for the inaccurate intelligence assessment
that predicted the major Soviet summer offensive against Army
Group North Ukraine. Gehelen's inaccurate intelligence summaries
lead the German High Command not to take the necessary measures
in Army Group Center's sector to prevent a major collapse. Strong
reserves were not brought up and early withdrawal of the
overextended front to the Dnieper river covering position was not
executed in time. The Army Group was forced to conduct a battle
with an inadequately manned, overextended line without virtually
any reserves. This alone produced a hopeless situation.
2. Hitler, however, taxed the abilities of Army Group Center
to defend itself even further. He forbid the construction of
rearward positions believing that such positions would weaken the
resolve of the German soldiers to fight. Instead they were exposed
during the retreat in Belorussia to continuous Soviet air attacks
and encirclement by Soviet armor in their rear areas. The failure
to construct a Berezina river defense line was an enormous mistake
on the part of Hitler. It would have provided a solid secondary main
defense line in Belorussia. Unfortunately, for the German soldiers
of Army Group Center the Berezina river proved to be instead an
obstacle to their retreat from the Soviet offensive. The Berezina
river proved to be the same problem to the German Army in 1944 as
it had been to Napoleon in 1812. There were not enough bridges for
a large army to cross the river quickly. (see Figure 168).
472
The most shocking fact during the retreat of the 4th Army to
the Berezina river was that there were only two main permanent
bridges between Borissow and Schatkowo (north of Bobruisk) (see
Figure 168). The bridge at Beresino was a wood road bridge 560
meters long and 3.5 meters wide and a wood road bridge 15 km
north of Beresino was 560 meters long and 4.2 meters wide.604
These were the only two large bridges on the Berezina river for
hundreds of kilometers that were available for the retreat of the
4th Army. The Soviet air force consequently could concentrate on
these limited crossing points and the roads leading to them. These
crossings and the roads were subjected to massive bombing and
strafing creating even further chaos for the retreating Germans.
The bridges were subjected to concentrated air attacks which
damaged them and caused even further delays in crossing the
Berezina river facilitating the Soviet encirclement of the German
4th Army. Clearly the need for more bridges across the Berezina
river was necessary for the retreat of the German Army as well as
fortified positions along the river from which to establish a
defense line. However, Hitler had forbid all of this rear area
construction leaving no defensive line in depth for Army Group
Center to fall back on.
3. Hitler failed to permit his generals the freedom of
command to execute a flexible defense. His insistence on a
doctrine of "standing fast" and the medieval notion of fortresses
which he ordered with his Fuehrer Befehl Nr. 11 interfered with the
local commanders decision making authority to respond to the
473
changing circumstances on the battlefield. Bobruisk, Vitebsk,

Orsha, Mogilev and Minsk along with others received the "Fortress"
designation which meant that troops were locked into defending a
fixed position instead of available to be used in a flexible manner.
Generalmajor Peter von der Groeben who was a staff officer
in Army Group Center stated:
Even the smallest move depended on authorization from

Hitler's Field Headquarters. This, in particular
pertained to withdrawal of sectors, evacuation of
cities, etc. Every separate move of this type, no matter
how urgent it may have been, had to be fought for
almost to the point of despair. Due to Hitler's daily
schedule, decisions for requests were made only once
daily, late at night, and consequently if an approval was
given, this usually arrived too late. Authorization for
withdrawals were granted only in the rarest cases.
Misjudging actualities to an almost tragic extent,
Hitler believed to have found the road to victory in his
principle "hold at all costs"605
4. The German weakness in the air proved a decisive factor in
the collapse of Army Group Center. Previously, the German
Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front had been able to supply encircled
units or halt Soviet armored breakthroughs. However, German
Luftflotte 6 (see Table XXXIX) proved unable to halt the
breakthroughs of the Red Army in the summer of 1944 especially
when the breakthroughs were occurring simultaneously. The lack of
German fighter aircraft prevented Luftflotte 6 from interdicting
the 5 Soviet air armies in the skies over Belorussia which meant
that the Soviets had achieved effective air superiority. Luftflotte
474
6 had only 40 combat ready fighters to oppose the massive

numerical superiority of the Soviet Air Force.606
The Soviets were able as a result of their air supremacy to
break the backbone of the German defense which was centered in
their artillery. The German Army in Belorussia depended on
artillery because of the low combat strengths of the German
infantry and the shortage of tanks. Artillery positions had been
sited on exposed foreward slopes or in open positions to reinforce
anti-tank defenses.
Paul Carell described the situation of the German Army in
Belorussia under conditions of Soviet air supremacy:
By means of well-prepared air strikes, the Russians

succeeded in eliminating the previous reconnoitered or
rapidly pinpointed gun positions of the German
artillery. The backbone of the German defense was
broken. The German infantry was helpless against any
motorized or mechanized enemy. The same dilemma
arose in the west. Soviet ground-support aircraft
bombed the retreating columns of the German rearward
services and reserve units at bridges and road
bottlenecks. The effect was devastating. There was
chaos on the roads. No switching of units was feasible.
Faced with this sudden enemy superiority in the air, the
German divisions were desperate and, in view of their
defenselessness, frequently panicked. There was
nothing the German could do.
Nothing revealed more strikingly the turn in the

military situation on the Eastern Front than the
crushing air superiority of the Soviet air force. Thanks
to Eisenhower, Stalin had conquered the Russian skies.
Without a protective roof overhead no front on earth
could be held in the long run. The Russians had learned
this in 1941 and 1942. Now this law of modern warfare
475
was being proved against the German armies--in both

East and West.607
5. The German High Command failed to supply their troops
with adequate supplies of hand-held anti-tank weapons. The
Germans had developed the Panzerfaust, a hand-held recoiless anti-
tank grenade launcher which could be fired from 30 yards with a
penetration of 200 mm of armor.6os The Panzerschreck or Ofenrohr
was an 88 mm rocket launcher similar to the American Bazooka
which had also been developed and had a range of 130 meters.609
Both of these weapons were the most effective hand-held anti-tank
weapons in the German arsenal and if the German infantry in
Belorussia had been supplied with these weapons in quantity it
would have increased their anti-tank capability dramatically.
However, the German infantry was supplied instead with large
quantities of anti-tank mines which required the infantry to deploy
the mines before their defensive positions or actually place the
mine on the tank or under the tank so that it would detonate. This
of course required the German infantry to expose themselves to
Soviet fire. Therefore, the lack of hand-held anti-tank weapons
contributed significantly to the demise of the German Army in
Belorussia.
6. The last major weakness of the Germans was their
hesitancy to move in reserves on time and in sufficient numbers.
Hitler failed to permit the reinforcement of Army Group Center on a
massive scale even after the attack against Army Group Center had
been identified as the major Soviet summer offensive.
476
Reinforcements only trickled into Army Group Center while it was

virtually disintegrating. Eventually, the German High Command had
to pour in massive reinforcements to plug the hole left by the
destruction of 28 German divisions in Army Group Center.610 The
total number of replacement divisions to reconstruct the front
amounted to 29 divisions and 7 brigades (see Table XXXX). If only
half of these formations had been available as reserves in the rear
area of Army Group Center the disaster for most of Army Group
Center could have been averted and the debacle of the collapse of
Army Group Center avoided.
The collapse of Army Group Center constituted the most
decisive defeat of the German Army in the summer of 1944 and it
set the the stage for the weakening of other Army Groups on the
Eastern Front because the divisions to shore up Army Group Center
came mostly from Army Group North, Army Group North Ukraine and
Army Group South Ukraine (see Table XXXX). The subsequent
weakening of the other Eastern Front armies to reinforce Army
Group Center facilitated the remaining Soviet offensives launched
during the summer of 1944 against the other Army Groups. The
collapse of Army Group Center resulted in the destruction of 28
German divisions and the loss of 31 generals (see Table XXXXI). The
defeat of the German Army in Belorussia was greater than the
defeat at Stalingrad and constituted one of the greatest disasters
in the history of the German Army.611
477
TABLEXXXV
ARMY GROUP CENTER ORDER OF BATTLE

JUNE 22, 1944
Army Group Center Formations Commanders

Army Group Center Field Marshal Busch
And OKH Reserve Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen. Krebs
14th Motorized Infantry Lt. Gen. Floerke
Division
20th Panzer Division Lt. Gen. Von Kessel
60th Panzer Grenadier Division Maj. Gen. Von Steinkeller
"Feldherrnhalle"
390th Field Training Division Lt. Gen. Bergen
707th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Gihr
White Ruthenia Military

District:
52nd Security Division Maj. Gen. Newiger
221 st Security Division Lt. Gen. Lendle
391 st Security Division Lt. Gen. Von Monteton
3rd Panzer Army Col. Gen. Reinhardt

Reserves:
95th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Michaelis
201 st Security Division Lt. Gen. Jacobi
IX Army Corps Gen. d. Arty. Wuthmann

Corps Detachment D Maj. Gen. Pamberg
(combined 56th & 262nd
Infantry Divisions)
252nd Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Melzer
LI II Army Corps Gen. d. Infantry Gollwitzer

4th Luftwaffe Field Division Lt. Gen. Pistorius
6th Luftwaffe Field Division Lt. Gen. Peschel
206th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Hitter
246th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Mueller-Buelow
478
TABLEXXXV

JUNE 22, 1944
(continued)
Auny Group Center Formations Commanders

3rd Panzer Army
VI Army Corps Gen. d. Arty. Pfeiffer
197th Infantry Division Col. Preu (acting)
256th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Wuestenhagen
299th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Graf Von Oriola
Fortress Vitebsk Gen. d. Inf. Gollwitzer
4th Army Gen. d. Inf. Tippelskirch

Reserves:
286th Security Division Lt. Gen. Oschmann
XXVll Army Corps Gen. d. Inf. Voelckers

25th Panzer Grenadier Division Maj. Gen. Schuermann
78th Assault Division Lt. Gen. Traut
260th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Klammt
XXXIX Panzer Corps Gen. d. Arty. Martinek

12th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Bamler
31st Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Ochsner
110th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Von Kurowski
337th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Schuenemann
XI I Army Corps Lt. Gen. Vincenz Mueller

18th Panzer Grenadier Division Lt. Gen. Zutavern
57th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Trowitz
267th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Drescher
Fortress Orsha Lt. Gen. Traut

Fortress Mogilev Maj. Gen. Erdsmannsdorf
479
TABLE XX.XV

JUNE 22, 1944
(continued)
Army Group Center Formations Commanders

9th Army Gen. d. Inf. Jordan
XXXV Army Corps Lt. Gen. Von Luetzow
6th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Heyne
45th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Engel
134th Infantry Division Lt. Gen Philipp
296th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Kullmer
383rd Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Hoffmeister
XXXXI Panzer Corps Gen. d. Arty. Weidling

35th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Richert
36th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Conrady
129th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Larisch
LV Army Corps Gen. d. Inf. Herrlein

102nd Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Von Bercken
292nd Infantry Division Lt. Gen. John
Fortress Bobruisk Maj. Gen. Hamann
2nd Army Col. Gen. Weiss

Reserves:
1st Hungarian Cavalry Division
4th Cavalry Brigade
5th Hungarian Reserve Infantry
Division
23rd Hungarian Reserve Infantry
Division
XXlll Army Corps Gen. d. Pion. Tiemann

7th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Von Rappard
17th Infantry Brigade
203rd Security Division Lt. Gen. Pilz
480
TABLEXXXV

JUNE 22, 1944
(continued)
Army Group Center Formations Comm~rs

2nd Army
XX Army Corps Gen. d. Arty. Freiherr Von Roman
Corps Detachment E Lt. Gen. Felzmann
(Combined 137th & 251st
Infantry Divisions)
3rd Cavalry Brigade
VII I Army Corps Gen. d. Inf. Hoehne

5th Jaeger Division Lt. Gen. Thum
211th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Eckhardt
12th Hungarian Reserve Infantry
Division
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen

Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol.
1O (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502, 509-523;
Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction Of
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense
Publisher's, 1987), pp. 29-31; Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch
Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944, pp. 286-288;
Kriegstagebuch (KTB) Heeresgruppe Mitte,
Fuehrungsabteilung, Gliederung der Grossen Verbaende.
4.6.44. NAMP T-311, Roll 228; Werner Haupt, .Qi§_
Schlachten Der Heeresgruppe Mitte 1941-1944 (Friedburg:
Podzun-Pallas-Verlag GmbH, 1983), p. 266.
481
TABLEXXXVI
OVERVIEW OF THE COMBAT READINESS, STRENGTH AND RESERVES

OF THE 4TH ARMY ON JUNE 20, 1944
Total CQmbat Read~

Combat Assault Panzer Heavy SP
Strength Sector Km per Artillery Guns II IV VI Guns
!..!~!IS Qer Qiv. in Km SQldier !,,ighUHea~
XXVll Army 27 24 45
Corps
78th Sturm 5712 32 178 46 55 31 18
Division
25th Panzer 2686 17 158 27 32 45 10
Grenadier
Division
260th 2554 32 80 46 13
Infantry
Division
XXXIX 58 43
Panzer Corps
110th 2590 27 96 33 9 6
Infantry
Division
337th 3775 22 172 46 35 10
Infantry
Division
12th 3604 32 113 36 11 10
Infantry
Division
31st 2488 23 108 30 12 10
Infantry
Division
XII Army
Corps
18th Panzer 2787 24 116 36 16
Grenadier
Division
267th 2498 26 96 35 11 9
Infantry
Division
57th 2136 24 89 27 11 6
Infantry
Division
482
TABLE XXXVI
OVERVIEW OF THE COMBAT READINESS, STRENGTH ANO RESERVES

OF THE 4TH ARMY ON JUNE 20, 1944
(continued)
Total C~mibat Read~

Combat Assault Panzer Heavy SP
Strength Sector Km per Artillery Guns II IV VI Guns
UNITS gee Qil£. in Km SQldier L.igbt/Hea,~
Army
Reserves:
Heavy 29
Panzer Tiger
Battalion
501
Army Group
Reserves:
Panzer Grenadier 26 11
Division
"Feldherrnhalle"
14th 8
Infantry
Oivison
--
Ti:21a!LA~rage 30SJQ 259 119 ~§2 2Q5 2~§ 24 11 29 l 1§
Source: Lt. Colonel Von Wienskowski, Die Entwicklung der Lage bei
der 4. Armee waehrend der russischen Sommeroffensive
1944 und die Vorgaenge bei den abgesprengten Verbaenden
22.6. bis 5.7.44. National Archives Microfilm Publication
T-312, Roll 1365, p. 4.
483
TABLE XXXVll
BATILE STRENGTH OF CORPS DETACHMENT E

ON JULY 25, 1944
UNITS BATTLE STRENGTH

203rd Security Division 3,573
137th Infantry Division 1,563
251st Infantry Divisional Group 960
86th Infantry Divisional Group 760
Miscellaneous Artillery Units 900
Total Battle Strength 7,756
Source: Anneeoberkommando 2, Gliederung der Kampfverbaende am

25.7.1944. Korps Abteilung E National Archives Microfilm
Publication T-312, Roll 1318.
484
TABLE XXXVlll
COMBAT REPORT OF THE 1ST FLIEGER-OIVISION

FOR JULY 26, 1944
COMBAT STRENGTH: 235 Attack Aircraft

23 Anti-Tank Aircraft
73 Fighter Aircraft
25 Reconnaissance Aircraft
TOTAL AIRCRAFT: 356
AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION:
11 Close Support Air Attacks 145 FW 190

6 Close Support Air Attacks 90 JU 87 "Stukas"
5 Anti-Tank Air Attacks 23 JU 87 "Anti-Tank Stukas"
Fighter Patrols ·and Air Cover
for the JU 87 44 FW 190
29 ME 109
Reconnaissance of
2nd Army Front 14 ME 109
11FW189
TOTAL AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION: 356 Aircraft
OPERATIONAL AREA: Siedlce - Lukow and area of Bialystok
SOVIET LOSSES INFLICTED BY 1ST FLIEGER-DIVISION:
6 tanks destroyed
1 tank probably destroyed
5 tanks and 1 armored personnel carrier damaged
67 trucks destroyed
6 trucks and 1 half-track carrier destroyed by incendiary fire
5 trucks damaged
·3 towed vehicles destroyed
1 automobile destroyed
4 artillery guns destroyed
1 anti-tank gun destroyed
3 anti-tank guns damaged
3 anti-tank and 1 mortar platoon effectively strafed
485
TABLE XXXVlll
COMBAT REPORT OF THE 1ST FLIEGER-DIVISION

FOR JULY 26, 1944
(continued)
1 Flak gun was silenced.

2 Flak guns were put out of action
2 Soviet aircraft (1 Lagg-5 & 1 JAK-9) were sbot down
1 JAK-9 effectively strafed
A direct hit on a position containing 4 Flak guns
Numerous infantry positions and vehicles and towns were
attacked with resulting fires and explosions
GERMAN LOSSES: 1 ME 109 failed to return
Source: A.H. Ou., 26.7.44, Einsatzmeldung der 1. Flieger-Division

vom 26. 7 .44 National Archives Microfilm Publication T -
312, Roll 1318.
486
TABLEXXXIX
OPERATIONAL ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FLYING FORMATIONS

OF LUFTFLOTIENKOMMANDO 6, JUNE 28, 1944
Formations Locations
Luftflottenkommando 6 HQ Minsk-Priluki
2. Staffel Mi nsk-Priluki
IV Flieger Korps HQ Brest/Bug
Kampfgeschwader 1 HQ See rap pen

11./Kampfgeschwader 1 Prowehren
Kampfgeschwader 4 HQ. (Ju 88) Bialystok

11./Kampfgeschwader 4 Baranowitsche
111./Kampfgeschwader 4 Bialystok
Kampfgeschwader 27 HQ Kross no
I ./Kampfgeschwader 27 Kross no
111./Kampfgeschwader 27 Mielec
Kampfgeschwader 53 HQ Radom
I./Kampfgeschwader 53 Radom
11./Kampfgeschwader 53 Pia stow
111./Kampfgeschwader 53 Grojec
Kampfgeschwader 55 HQ Deblin-lrena
l./Kampfgeschwader 55 Deblin-Ulez
11./Kampfgeschwader 55 Deblin-lrena
111./Kampfgeschwader 55 Podlodowka
Transport Staffel IV Flieger Korps Warschau-Bielany
1 . Flieger Division Command Post Baranowitsche

2. Staffel Lessna
Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 15 (AOK 2 & 9) Baranowitsche

1 ./ 4 (Bf 109) Baranowitsche
11 ./11 (FW 189) Baranowitsche
487
TABLEXXXIX

(continued)
Formations Lo~ns
11 ./12 (FW 189) Baranowitsche
12./12 (Hs 126) Pinsk-Halewo
12./13 (FW 189) Brest/Nord
Schlachtgeschwader 1 HQ. (FW 190) Baranowitsche

111./Schlachtgeschwader 1 (FW 190) Baranowitsche
11./Schlachtgeschwader 77 (FW 190) Pinsk/West
1O.(Pz.)/Schlachtgeschwader 3 Puchowitschi
1O.(Pz.)/Schlachtgeschwader 77 Puchowitschi
Jagdgeschwader 53 HQ Baranowitsche
l./Jagdgeschwader 51 (Bf 109) Puchowitschi
111./Jagdgeschwader 51 (Bf 109) Matschulitschi
IV ./Jagdgeschwader 54 (FW 190) Baranowitsche
14.(rail)/Kampfgeschwader 3 Pinsk/West
l./Eins.Gr.2.Flg.Sch.Division Pinsk/West
l./Nachtschlachtgeschwader 2 Pinsk-Halewo
4 Flieger Division Command Post Minsk
Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 1O (AOK 4) Shodino

2./Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 4 (Bf 109) Shodino
3./Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 4 (Bf 109) Shodino
3./14 (FW189) Shodino
Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 4 (Pz.AOK 3) Parafjanowo

2./Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 5 (Bf 109) Parafjanowo
4./31 (FW189) B~w
488
TABLEXXXIX

OF LUFTFLOTTENKOMMANDO 6, JUNE 28, 1944
(continued)
Formations Locations
Schlachtgeschwader 1O HQ. (FW 190) Parafjanowo
l./Schlachtgeschwader 1O (FW 190) Wilna
111./Schlachtgeschwader 10 (FW 190) Parafjanowo
I./Schlachtgeschwader 1 Matschulitschi
1O.(Pz.)/Schlachtgeschwader I Matschulitschi
Jagdgeschwader 51 HQ Minsk/Sued
Stabsst./Jagdgeschwader 51 (FW 190) Minsk/Sued
111./Jagdgeschwader 51 (FW 190) Minsk/Sued
IV./Jagdgeschwader 51 (Bf 109) Shodino
111./Jagdgeschwader 52 (FW 190) Parafjanowo
4 ./Nachtschlachtgeschwader 2 Lida
Fliegerfuehrer 1 Command Post Minsk
Nachtschlachtgruppe 2 HQ Lida
3./Nachtschlachtgruppe 2 Lida
Stab/Eins.Gr.2.Flg.Sch.Div Chotzow
2. and 3. Staffel Chotzow
Schleppgruppe 3 HQ Bialystok
1.(DFS)/Schleppgruppe 3 Bialystok
2.(Go)/Schleppgruppe 3 Bialystok
3.(Go)/Schleppgruppe 3 Bialystok
Eins.Kdo.Schleppgruppe 3 Bialystok
Eins.Gr.z.b.V.7 Pruzcana/Ost
1. and 2. Staff~I Pruz~ana/Ost
489
TABLEXXXIX

(continued)
Fonnations Locations
I. Ostfliegerstaffel Lida
Bildkette 12./12 Minsk/Ost
Jagdfliegerfuehrer 6 Command Post Minsk

Stab I ./Nachtjagdgeschwader 100 Baranowitsche
1./Nachtjagdgeschwader 100
I.Schwarm Biala Podlaska
II.Schwarm Baranowitsche
Ill.Schwarm Pinsk/West
3./Nachtjagdgeschwader 100 Radom
I.Schwarm Baranowitsche
ll.u.111.Schwarm Radom
4./Nachtjagdgeschwader 100 Biala Podlaska
F ernaufklaeru ngsgruppe 2 Baranowitsche

1. (F)/100 (Ju 88) Pinsk/West
4. (F)/11 (Ju 188) Pinsk/West
4. (F)/14 (Ju 188) Baranowitsche
Eins.Kdo.l.(F)/122 (Me 410) Baranowitsche
Nachtaufklaerungsstaffel 2 (Do 217) Baranowitsche
Verb.Staffel Lfl.Kdo.6 Minsk/Sued
Transport Staffel Lfl.Kdo.6 Minsk/Ost
Stab I ./Transportgeschwader 3 Matschulitschi

·1. - 3.!Transportgeschwader 3 Matschulitschi
Source: Luftflottenkommando 6, Einsatzmaessige Gliederung der

fig. Verbaende des Lfl.Kdo.6. Stand 28.6.44. 00.00 Uhr
National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, Roll 228.
490
TABLEXXXX
REINFORCEMENTS FOR ARMY GROUP CENTER

JUNE-AUGUST 1944
Reinforcements Sour~
PANZER DIVISIONS:
1st Fallschirm Panzer Division Southwest Theater, Italy
"Hermann Goering"
3rd SS Panzer Division Army Group South Ukraine
"Totenkopf"
4th Panzer Division Army Group North Ukraine
5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking" OKH Reserve
6th Panzer Division OKH Reserve
12th Panzer Division Army Group North
14th Panzer Division Army Group South Ukraine
Panzer Division "Gross Army Group South Ukraine
Deutschland"
TOTAL PANZER DIVISIONS: 1O Panzer Divisions
INFANTRY DIVISIONS:
1st Infantry Division Army Group North Ukraine
17th Infantry Division Army Group South Ukraine
28th Jaeger Division Army Group North Ukraine
69th Infantry Division Army Group North
73rd Infantry Division Army Group South Ukraine
131 st Infantry Division Army Group North Ukraine
196th Infantry Division AOK Norway
367th Infantry Division Army Group North Ukraine
541 st Volksgrenadier Division OKH Reserve
542nd Volksgrenadier Division OKH Reserve
54 7th Volksgrenadier Division OKH Reserve
548th Volksgrenadier Division OKH Reserve
491
TABLEXXXX
REINFORCEMENTS FOR ARMY GROUP CENTER

JUNE-AUGUST 1944
(continued)
Reinforcements Source
INFANTRY DIVISIONS:
562nd Volksgrenadier Division OKH Reserve
TOTAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS: 19 Infantry Divisions
BRIGADES:
Panzer Grenadier Brigade Von OKH Reserve
Werthern
Lehr Brigade OKH Reserve
Panzer Brigade 102 OKH Reserve
Grenadier Brigade 1131 OKH Reserve
Grenadier Brigade 1132 OKH Reserve
TOTAL BRIGADES: 7 Brigades
TOTAL REINFORCEMENTS TO
ARMY GROUP CENTER:
PANZER DIVISIONS: 1O Panzer Divisions
INFANTRY DIVISIONS: 1i Infantry Divisions
TOTAL DIVISIONS: 29
BRIGADES: 7 Brigades
Source: Kurt Mehner, Geheim Tages Bericht der Deutschen

Wehrmacht Vol. 10, pp. 502-508, Vol. 11, pp. 337-338;
Kriegstagebuch (KTB) Heeresgruppe Mitte,
Fuehrungsabteilung, Kriegsgliederungen National Archives
Microfilm Publication T -311, Roll 228.
492
TABLEXXXXI
THE DESTRUCTION OF ARMY GROUP CENTER
Formations Reorganized Or Commanders

Destroyed Disbanded Units Killed Or Captured
ARMY GROUP CENTER
AND OKH RESERVES:
20th Panzer Division Reorganized
60th Panzer Reorganized Maj. Gen. Von
Grenadier Division Steinkeller Prisoner
"Feldherrnhalle"
707th Infantry Disbanded Lt. Gen. Gihr Prisoner
Division
3RD PANZER ARMY:

95th Infantry Reorganized Maj. Gen. Michaelis
Division Prisoner
LI II Army Corps Disbanded Gen. d. Inf.
Gollwitzer Prisoner
4th Luftwaffe Field Disbanded Lt. Gen. Pistorius
Division Killed
6th Luftwaffe Field Disbanded Lt. Gen. Peschel
Division Killed
206th Infantry Disbanded Lt. Gen. Hitter
Division Prisoner
246th Infantry Reorganized Maj. Gen. Mueller-
Division Buelow Prisoner
VI Army Corps Disbanded Gen. d. Arty. Pfeiffer
Killed
197th Infantry Disbanded Colonel Hahne
Division Missing
256th Infantry Reorganized Maj. Gen.
Division Wuestenhagen Killed
299th Infantry Reorganized
Division
493
TABLEXXXXI

(continued)

Destro~~d Disband~d Unit~ Killed Or Ca1:2tured
4THARMY:
XXVll Army Corps Reorganized Gen. d. Inf. Voelckers
Prisoner
25th Panzer Reorganized
Grenadier Division
78th "Sturm" Reorganized Lt. Gen. Traut
Division Prisoner
260th Infantry Disbanded Maj. Gen. Klammt
Division Prisoner
Gen. d. Arty.
Martinek, Commander
of XXXIX Panzer
Corps Killed
12th Infantry Reorganized Lt. Gen. Bamler
Division Prisoner
31st Infantry Reorganized Lt. Gen. Ochser
Division Prisoner
110th Infantry Disbanded Lt. Gen. Von
Division Kurowski Prisoner
337th Infantry Reorganized Lt. Gen. Schuenemann
Division Prisoner
XI I Army Corps Disbanded Lt. Gen. Vincenz
Mueller Prisoner
18th Panzer Reorganized Lt. Gen. Zutavern
Grenadier Division Suicide
57th Infantry Disbanded Maj. Gen. Trowitz
Division Prisoner
267th Infantry Disbanded Lt. Gen. Drescher
Division Killed
494
TABLEXXXXI

(continued)

4THARMY: Maj. Gen. Von
Erdmannsdorff,
Commandant of
Fortress Mogilev
Prisoner
9THARMY: Maj. Gen. Aurel
Schmidt, Senior
Engineer Commander
Prisoner
XXXV Army Co,Ps Disbanded Lt. Gen. Von Luetzow
Prisoner
6th Infantry Division Reorganized Lt. Gen. Heyne
Prisoner
45th Infantry Reorganized Maj. Gen. Engel
Division Prisoner
134th Infantry Disbanded Lt. Gen. Philipp
Division Suicide
296th Infantry Reorganized
Division
383rd Infantry Disbanded Lt. Gen. Hoffmeister
Division Prisoner
XXXXI Panzer Corps Reorganized
36th Infantry Reorganized Maj. Gen. Conrady
Division Prisoner
Maj. Gen. Hamann,
Commandant of
Bobruisk Prisoner
495
TABLEXXXXI

(continued)

2NDARMY:
Corps Detachment E Disbanded
TOTAL CORPS DESTROYED: 6CORPS

TOTAL DIVISIONS DESTROYED: 28 DIVISIONS
TOTAL COMMANDERS KILLED OR CAPTURED: 32 COMMANDERS
Source: Caren, pp. 508-509, Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen

Tagesberichte Der Deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung Im
Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 10, pp. 502, 509-523;
Mehner, GHTBDW Vol. 11, pp. 337-338; Kriegstagebuch
(KTB) Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fuehrungsabteilung,
Kriegsgliederung NAMP T-311, Roll 228; Rolf Hinze, QM_
Ostfront Drama 1944: Rueckzugskaempfe Heeresgruppe
Mitte, p. 426; Teske, p. 216; OKW/Org. Abt. und
Heerespersonalabt., Zusammenstellung der in diesem
Kriege gefallenen. toetlich. verungluecten. verstorbenen.
vermissten und im Gefangenschaft geratenen Generale
Flensburg 5 June 1945 NAMP T-77, Roll 785; Generalstab
des Heeres, Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht ueber die
grossen Verbaende des Heeres. der Waffen-SS und der
Fallschirm-truppen. Stand 30.7.44 NAMP T-78, Roll 413;
Generalstab des Heeres, Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht
ueber Aufgeloeste Division 1944 NAM P T -78, Roll 41 O;
Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945 Vol. 3,
p. 241; Mitcham, pp. 41-471; OKH Allgemeines Heeresamt,
Abwicklungsstab, H 41/7-H 41/12 NAMP T-78, Roll 139.
German Army files H 4117-H 41 /12 contain the reports of
units destroyed in the Soviet summer offensive of 1944
against Army Group Center.
496
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Figure 63. The Six Staggered Offensives Of The Red

Army During "Operation Bagration." Source: AOK 4,
Beibringung Von Unterlagen ueber die Vorgaenge bei den
Abgesprengten Verbaenden im Sommer 1944 National
Archives Microfilm Publication T-312, Roll 244.
497
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Figure 64. Army Group Center Under Attack, June 22,

1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr.
Mitte Von 21.6.-10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm
498
~ Pz'3'' 590
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ARMY RESERVES:
. :
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Figure 65. 3rd Panzer Army Order Of Battle, June 1944.

Source: Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe Mitte
Fuehrungsabteilung, Gliederung der Grossen Verbaende
4.6.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311,
Roll 228.
499
A, --3.'B:Rnn11 - lo,.. ·~ ;tlJ.~~i IfIf.

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191.
2.S'6.
Figure 66. 3rd Panzer Army - Situation On June 22,

1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 3 Panzer Armee-
Lage am 22. Juni 44. National Archives Microfilm
·s ~£ 110~ '£ ~£-l uoneonqnd Wl!JOJO!W
seAf40J\f 1euo11eN sue6Jow ·vv·g·t~ :pueis •eewJv
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Figure 68. 4th Army Order Of Battle, June 1944.

Roll 228.
502
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Figure 69. 9th Army Order Of Battle, June 1944.

4.6.44., National _Archives Microfilm Publication T-311,
Roll 228.
503
Korutk sso
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Figure 70. 2nd Army Order Of Battle, June 1944.
Roll 228.
504
'
ID ~-
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Figure 71. Army Group Center, June 23, 1944. Source:

OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
Roll 136.
505
•• ... '"I" ...

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Figure 72. The Situation Of The 3rd Panzer Army On

June 23, 1944 At 1000 hrs. Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, .ba9§.
der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand: 23.6.44. 1000 Uhr National
'60£ 1108
Wl!!OJO!~ S0A!40JV reuO!lBN vv6 l '£l !Unr '>tSQ9l!M
1
£ ')t"Q'V'Zd :aomos ·vv6 l '£l aunr '>tSQ9l!J\ '£L aJnD!.::I
90S
507
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Figure 74. 3rd Panzer Army - Situation On June 23,
1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 3 Panzer Armee-
Lage am 23. Juni 44. National Archives Microfilm
508
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509
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June 24, 1944 At 1000 hrs. Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, La9§
der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand: 24.6.44. 1000 Uhr National
510
rR .. 1.B,J:t. Front.
)~. L--..'
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Figure 77. The Hole Between Liii And VI Army Corps,

June 24, 1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, Lage bei 3.
Panzer Armee. 24.6.44., National Archives Microfilm
'G9G
110~ 'l ~£- l UO!lBO!IQ"d Wl!JOJO!!t4 S0A!40JV 1euoneN
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~ FROtfT UHf: BY LND Of 2'6JUHE. f9" ,, ..
Figure 79. The Soviet Breakthrough On The Left Flank
Of The 4th Army, June 24, 1944. Source: Major D.
Saulin, "The Battle of Orsha," Krasnaia Zvezda (Red
Star) 11 October 1944 as translated in Military Review
Vol. 25, No. 2, May 1945, p. 122.
513
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Figure 80. The Hole Between The 337th And 12th

Infantry Divisions, June 24, 1944. Source:
Heeresgruppe Mitte, Lage bei 4. Armee. 24 Juni 44.,
National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, Roll
219.
514
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Figure 81. The Soviet Breakthroughs On The 9th Army

Front, June 24, 1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, S.:.
Armee - Lage am 24.Juni 44. National Archives
Wl!JOJO!W
S9A!40JV l'BUO!~BN sue5JOW 000~ ·vv·s·si :puels •aawJv
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Figure 83. The Encirclement Of The Lill Army Corps,
June 25, 1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 3. Panzer
Armee - Lage am 25.Juni 44. National Archives
Microfilm Publication T-311, Roll 219.
517
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:
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Figure 84. The Hassen and Bear Defensive Lines.

Source: A.0.K. 4, la. Kartenband 1. Anlagen zum KTB Nr.
.2..4. National Archives Microfilm Publication T ~312, Roll
252.
518
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Roll 136.
519
Figure 86. Bridgehead Orsha, Dnieper Covering Position,

Hessen and Bear Lines. Source: A.O.K 4, la. Kartenband
1, Anlagen zum KTB Nr. 24 National Archives Microfilm
520
.......
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Figure 87. Soviet Advance On Bobruisk, June 24-25,

1944. Source: Armeeoberkommando 9, Der Grossangriff
auf die 9. Armee. der Einsatz der Reserven und der
Durchbruch Suedl. d. Beresina. 24. u. 25.6.44. National
521
9..Armu - lag a am· lS'. Ju.nL If It.

n, -p.
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Figure 88. The 9th Army Situation On June 25, 1944.

Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 9. Armee - Lage am 25.Juni
44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, Roll
219.
522
Figure 89. Bobruisk Bridgehead And 9th Army Defensive

Lines. Source: A.0.K. 4, la. Kartenband 1. Anlagen zum
KTB Nr. 24 National Archives Microfilm Publication T-
312, Roll 252.
523
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Armee. Stand: 26.6.44.morgens National Archives
·a~£ 110~ '£ ~£-1 UOHEO!IQnd
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LEGtNO:
RU551Ati FRONT LINE
8trORE THE OHEHSIVE
~~ GERMAN FORCES
~ }slTUATIOH 25 JUNE
DIRECTION OF' ATTACKS
rqn?~ AND SITUATION BY END· ~}SITUATION 26 JUHt
-. • • } OF Zl JUNE
rf.:.:;:;··. :') EHCIRCLEO GERM AH GROUPS
Figure 92. Soviet Encirclement Of Vitebsk. Source:

Colonel S. Shishkin, "The Vitebsk Operation," Krasnaia
Zvezda (Red Star) 25 October 1944 as translated in
Military Review Vol. 25, No. 4, July 1945, p. 95.
526
•
4
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Figure 93. Liii Army Corps And 206th Infantry Division
On June 26, 1944. Source: Oberkommando Heeresgruppe
Mitte, Fester Platz Witebsk 21.6.44. National Archives
527

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Figure 95. The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division's Sector

On June 22, 1944. Source: Abwicklungsstab
Heeresgruppe Mitte, Bericht ueber den Anteil der 25. Pz.
Gre. Div. an den Kaempfen der Heeresgr. Mitte ab 20. 6.
1944. 12.9.1944 National Archives Microfilm
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Figure 97. Soviet Control Of Titowka Road Junction.

Source: Oberkommando Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fester
Platz Bobruisk 21.6.44. National Archives Microfilm
531
q J 10 1.1 20 ZS
Kl\.OME.TtR~
Figure 98. Soviet Operations Against The 9th Army,

June 24-27, 1944. Source: Colonel P. Boldyrev, "The
Bobruisk Operation," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) 28
September 1944 as translated in Military Review Vol.
24, No. 12, March 1945, p. 107.
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June 27, 1944. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz.
535
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Figure 102. Soviet Breakthrough Into Rear Of 4th Army,

June 27, 1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei
Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-10.8.44., National Archives
·a~l
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Figure 105. The Impending Encirclement Of The 4th

Army, June 27, 1944. Source: Armeeoberkommando 4,
Die Entwicklung des russischen Grossangriffs gegen die
Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Sommer 1944. Karte 1 National
539
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Figure 106. The Soviet Encirclement Of Bobruisk, June
27, 1944. Source: Armeeoberkommando 9, Die
Einschliessung Von Bobruisk 26. u. 27.6.44. National
540
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Figure 107. The 9th Army Situation On June 27, 1944.

Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 9. Armee • Lage am 27.Juni
44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, Roll
219.
541
Figure 108. The Eastern Acess Into Bobruisk: The Road

And Railway Bridges Across The Berezina River.
Source: Oberkommando Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fester
Platz Bobruisk 21.6.44. National Archives Microfilm
Publication T -311 , Roll 218.
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June 28, 1944. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz.
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July 1, 1944. Source: A.0.K. 4, la. Kartenband 1.
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2, 1944 At 1200 Hrs. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, Lasm
H.Gr.Mitte am 2.7.44. 1200 National Archives Microfilm
560

July 5, 1944. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. Armee.
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1944 In The Evening. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz.
Armee. Stand: 7.7.44.Abs. National Archives Microfilm
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Panzer Grenadier Brigade Von Werthern, July 9, 1944.
Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand:
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Roll 318.
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Figure 145. Fortress Wilna And Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf,

July 10, 1944. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz.
Armee. Stand: 10.7.44. National Archives Microfilm
·e~&
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10, 1944. Source: Lt. Weller, Gefechtsbericht der 9.
Armee ueber die Schlacht in Weissruthenien 24.6.-
10.7.1944 National Archives Microfilm Publication T-
312, Roll 339.
581
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Figure 148. SS Parachute Battalion 500 And Panther

Battalion Of The Panzer Division "Gross Deutsch land."
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von
21.6.-10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication
T-78, Roll 136.
582
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Figure 149. IX Army Corps, July 11, 1944. Source:

Pz.A.O.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand: 11.7.44.
318.
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585
Figure 152. Panzer Grenadier Brigade Von Werthern's

Attack On Griedraiciai And The Soviet Advance To Olita,
July 12, 1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei
Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-10.8.44., National Archives
586

Roll 136.
587
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Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand:
13.7.44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T-313,
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Figure 157. Fortress Brest-Litovsk. Source:

Oberkommando Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fester Platz Brest
228.
591
Figure 158. The Garrison Of Fortress Brest-Litovsk.

Source: Armeeoberkommando 2, Lagenkarte Brest-
Litowsk Stand 26.7.44. 9 Uhr. National Archives
592
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Of Fortress Brest-Litovsk, July 25, 1944. Source: OKH,
Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-10.8.44.,
National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136.
593
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Figure 160. Soviet Attacks Southwest, Northwest And

East Of Fortress Brest-Litovsk, July 26, 1944. Source:
Roll 136.
594
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Figure 161. The Situation Of Fortress Brest-Litovsk On

The Morning Of July 26, 1944. Source:
Armeeoberkommando 2, Lagekarten A.O.K. 2 National
595
Figure 162. The Encirclement Of Fortress Brest-

Litovsk On July 27, 1944. Source: Armeeoberkommando
2, Lagekarten A.O.K. 2 National Archives Microfilm
596
Figure 163. The Breakout Of The Garrison Of Fortress

Brest-Litovsk On July 28, 1944. Source:
Armeeoberkommando 2, Lagekarten. A.O.K. 2 National
597
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Figure 164. The Relief And Arrival Of Kampfgruppe

Felzmann At The German Western Defense line, July 28,
1944. Source: Armeeoberkommando 2, Lagekarten
A.O.K. 2 National Archives Microfilm Publication T-312,
Roll 1325.
598
Figure 165. The 2nd Army, July 29-30, 1944. Source:

Roll 136.
599
Stand Marz 1944 .
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Figure 166. Soviet Tank Corps. Source: Oberkommando

H.Gr. Mitte, Beispiel fuer Kriegsgliederung eines
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~; 5\ 6r.W.0(uo. .. J::;>~~'.t16 Sturmgesch. (II.,•) ·• . .lll...£L 50 PKW
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Figure 167. Soviet Mechanized Corps. Source:

Oberkommando H.Gr. Mitte, Beispiel fuer
Kriegsgliederung eines Mech Korps. Stand Maerz 1944
230.
601
_.,,,.;,,:
~. '.!!
{'.).
Figure 168. Rail And Road Bridges In Belorussia.

Source: Luftgaukommando XXVll, LSOK Uebersichtskarte
Eisenbahn u. Strassenbruecken im Bereich Luftflotte 6
Stand 12.2 .1944 National Archives Microfilm
Publication T -311, Roll 225.
602
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX
1 WoltgangSchuman and Olaf Groehler, Deutschland Im Zweiten Weltkrieg Vol. 6

(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1988), p. 52.
2Hermann Gackenholz, "The Collapse of Army Group Centre in 1944," Decisive

Battles of World War II: The German View Ed. H.A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer (New York:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), p. 382.; Hermann Gackenholz, "Zurn Zusammenbruch Der
Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Sommer 1944," Vierteljahrshette fuer Zeitgeschichte Vol. 3,
July 1955, p. 317.
31bid.
4Walter Goerlitz, "The Battle for Stalingrad 1942-3," Decisive Battles of

World War II: The German View Ed. H.A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer (New York: G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 1965), p. 243.
51bid.
61bid.
7Paul Carel!, Scorched Earth Vol. 2 (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd,
1970), p. 508.
8Qrganisationsabteilung, Verluste der Heeresgruppe Mitte in der Zeit von 22.6.

bis 15.7.1944 NAMP T-78, Roll 421.
91bid.
101bid.
11 William B. Breuer, Hitler's Fortress Cherbourg (New York: Stein And Day
Publishers, 1984), p. 252.
121bid., p. 248.
13William B. Breuer, Death Of A Nazi Army (New York: Stein And Day
Publishers, 1985), p. 289.
141bid., p. 294.
15John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc.,
1989), p. 410.
603
16Rolf Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944

{Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1980), p. 42; Gackenholz, "The Collapse of Army Group
Centre in 1944," p.366; Gerd Niepold, Mittlere Ostfront Juni'44 (Herford: Verlag
E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1985), p. 72; Carell, p. 492.
17P.N. Pospelov et al.History Of The Great Patriotic War Of The Soviet Union
1941-1945 Vol. 4 translated by the Foreign Technology Division, Air Force Systems
Command, (Moscow: Publishing House "Voyennoye," 1962), p. 320; G. Zhukov,
Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov: Reminiscences And Reflections (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 275; S.M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff At War
1941-1945 Vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), p. 332.
18P.N. Pospelov et al, p. 320; G. Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.

Zhukov: Reminiscences And Reflections, p. 274; Marshal Ivan K.H. Bagramian, "The
Liberation of Byelorussia (Operation Bagration")," Soviet Generals Recall World War
ll Ed. Igor Vitukhin (New York: Sphinx Press, Inc., 1981), p. 298.
19P.N. Pospelov et al, p. 320.
201bid., Kriegstagebuch der Panzerarmeeoberkommando 3. 22.6.44., NAMP T-

313, Roll 316, p. 2.
21Kriegstagebuch der Panzerarmeeoberkommando 3. 22.6.44., NAMP T-313,

Roll 316, p. 3.
221bid., p. 2.
23Kriegstagebuch der Panzerarmeeoberkommando 3, 22.6.44., NAMP T-313,

Roll 316, p. 9.
24 1bid., p. 6.
251bid.
261bid.
271bid., p. 10.
28Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of Army Group Centre, p.
73.

Roll 316, p. 10.
604
30Lt. Colonel Von Wienskowski, Die Entwicklung der Lage dei der 4. Armee
waehrend dedr Russischen Sommeroffensive 1944 und die Vorgaenge bei den
abgesprenaten Verbaenden 22.6. bis 5.7.44. NAMP T-312, Roll 1365, p. 4; Niepold,
Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of Army Group Centre, p. 75.
31 Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimtagesberichte Der Deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung

Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945, (hereafter GHTBDW) VOL. 10, P. 286.
32Gackenholz, "Zurn Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Sommer

1944," p. 323.
33Mehner, GHTBDW Vol. 10, p. 286.

Roll 316, p. 1.
351bid.
361bid., p. 3'.
371bid., pp. 4-5.
381bid., p. 5.
391bid.
401bid., p. 9.
41 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
421bid., pp. 6-7.
431bid., p. 7.
441bid.
451bid., p. 8.
461bid., p. 10.
471bid., p. 11.
481bid.
49Wienskowski, p. 3.
605
50Mehner, GHTBDW VOL. 10, P.289.
s1wienskowski, pp. 5-6.
521bid., p. 6.
531bid.
541bid.
551bid.
561bid., p. 4.
57Kriegstagebuch der Panzerarmeeoberkommando 3, 24.6.44., NAMP T-313,

Roll 316, p. 1.
581bid., p. 5.
591bid., p. 7.
601bid., p. 11.
61 Ibid., p. 5.
621bid., P. 7.
631bid.
641bid.
65tbid.
661bid., p. 8.
671bid.
681bid.
691bid., p. 9.
701bid., p. 10.
711bid.
72tbid., p. 12.
606
731bid.. pp. 13-14.
74(bid .. p. 14.
76(bid., p. 7.
771bid., p. 8.
78(bid., p. 7.
79(bid., p. 8.
80(bid.
81(bid., p. 10.
82(bid.
83Mehner, GHTBDW VOL. 10, P. 292.
84 Lt. Weller, Gefechtsbericht Der 9. Armee Ueber Die Schlacht In

Weissruthenien 24.6.-10.7.1944. NAMP T-312, Roll 339, p. 4.
85(bid., p. 5.
86KTB der Panzerarmeeoberkommando 3. CPAOK 3) 25.6.44. NAMP T-313,

Roll 316, p. 1.
87(bid.
88(bid., p. 5.
89(bid., p. 8.
90(bid., p. 9
91 (bid.
92(bid., p. 5.
93Pospelov et al, pp. 320-321.
94KTB PAOK 3. 25.6.44., p. 12.

607
951bid.
961bid., p. 8.
971bid.
981bid., p.12.
99Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction Of Army Group Centre
June 1944, p. 103.
100KTB PAOK 3. 25.6.44., p. 12.
1011bid.
1021bid., p. 13.
1031bid.
104wienskowski, p.12.
1051bid., p. 11.
1061bid.
1071bid., p. 13.
1081bid.
1091bid.
1101bid.
1111bid.
1121bid.
1131bid.
114Weller, p. 6.
1151bid.
1161bid., p. 5.
608
1171bid., p. 6.
1181bid.
June 1944, p. 110.
120KTB PAOK 3. 26.6.44., p. 1.
1211bid., p. 7.
1221bid., p. 1.
1231bid., p.2.
1241bid.
1251bid., p. 4.
1261bid., p. 6.
1271bid.
128Colonel S. Shishkin, "The Vitebsk Operation" Krasnaia Zvezda (Red Star) 25

October 1944 as translated in Miiitary Review Vol. 25, No. 4 July 1945, p. 96.
1291bid.; Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944,

p. 65.
130Shishkin, p. 97.
131 Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944, p. 61.
132Rueckkaempfer Major Willi Voss, Vernehmung 6.9.1944. NAMP T-78, Roll

141, p. 3.
1331bid.
1341bid.
1351bid.
1361bid., p. 4.
1371bid.
609
1391bid., p. 16.
1401bid., pp. 16-17.
141Lt. Thedor Deutscherr, Auszugsweise Von Abschrift 7.9.44. NAMP T-78,

Roll 141
1431bid., p. 20.
1441bid.
1451bid.
146Major D. Saulin, ''The Battle of Orsha" Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) 11

October 1944 as translated in Military Review Vol. 25, No. 2, May 1945, p. 123.
1481bid., p. 19.
1491bid., p. 20.
1501bid.
151Weller, p. 7.
152Rolf Hinze, Hitze. Frost und Pulverdampf: Der Schicksalsweg der 20.
Panzer Division (Bochum: Heinrich Poeppinghaus Verlag, 1981 ), p. 291.
1531bid.
1541bid., p. 292.
155Weller, p. 7.
1561bid.
1571bid.
1581bid., p. 8.
610
June 1944, p. 120.
June 1944, p. 124.
162Pospelov et al, pp. 330-331.
163Major Klassen, Erfahrungsbericht 6.7.44. NAMP T-311, Roll 217.
164tbid.
165tbid.
166KTB PAOK 3. 27.6.44., p. 1.
1671bid., p. 3.
1681bid., p. 7.
1691bid., p. 9.
1701bid., p. 11.
171 Ibid., p. 2.
172Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944, p. 64;

Carel!, Scorched Earth: Hitler's War on Russia, p. 508.
173Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944, p. 65;

OKW/Org. Abt. und Heerespersonalabt., Zusammenstellung der in diesem Kriege
gefallenen. toetlich verunglueckten. verstorbenen, vermissten und im Gefangenschaft
geratenen Generale. Flensburg 5 June 1945, NAMP T-77, Roll 785.
174Pospelov et al, p. 325
17Scarell, Scorched Earth: Hitler's War on Russia, p. 508; OKW/Org. Abt. und
Heerespersonalabt., Zusammenstellung der in diesem Kriege gefallenen. toetlich
verunglueckten. verstorbenen. vermissten und im Gefangenschaft geratenen Generate.
Flensburg 5 June 1945, NAMP T-77, Roll 785.
176Carell, Scorched Earth: Hitler's War on Russia, p. 499.

611
1771bid., p. 508; OKW/Org. Abt. und Heerespersonalabt., Zusammenstellung

der in diesem Kriege getallenen, toetlich verunglueckten. verstorbenen, vermissten
und im Gefangenschaft geratenen Generale. Flensburg 5 June 1945, NAMP T-77, Roll
785.
178carell, Scorched Earth: Hitler's War on Russia, p. 508; Hinze, Der

Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944, p. 68.
179Hermann Teske, Die Silbernen Spiegel (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag,

1952), p. 216; Rolf Hinze, Das Ostfront-Drama 1944 (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag,
1987), pp. 425-426; KTB der Heeresgruppe Mitte Fuehrungsabteilung, Gliederung
der grossen Verbaende 15.7.44. NAMP T-311, Roll 228; Generalstab des Heeres,
Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht ueber Aufgeloeste Divisionen 1944 NAMP T-78,
Roll 41 O; Generalstab des Heeres, Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht ueber die grossen
Verbaende des Heeres der Waffen-SS und der Fallschirm-Truppen, Stand 30.7.44.
NAMP T-78, Roll 413; Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Army
Order of Battle . World War II (New York: Stein And Day, 1985), pp. 157, 162, 181,
429; Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945 Vol. 3 (Frankfurt am
Main: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GMBH, 1969), p. 241.
1aowienskowski, p. 22.
1811bid.
1821bid., p. 23; Pospelov et al, p. 327.
183wienskowski, pp. 27-28.
1841bid; Lt. Colonel Von Wienskowski, Bekundungen des Generalmajors

Schuermann. Kommandeurs der 25. Pz. Gr. Div. 27.8.1944, NAMP T-78, Roll 141, p.
3.
185Lt. Colonel Von Wienskowski, Die Entwicklung der Lage dei der 4. Armee
waehrend dedr Russischen Sommeroffensive 1944 und die Vorgaenge bei den -
abgesprengten Verbaenden 22.6. bis 5.7.44. (hereafter: Entwicklung der 4. Armee),
p. 28.
1861bid., p. 23.
1871bid., p. 24.
1881bid.
1891bid., p. 26.
1901bid.
612
191 Ibid., p. 29.
1921bid.
193weller, p. 8.
194Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction Of Army Grouo Centre
June 1944, p. 133.
1951bid.
1961bid.
197Marshal G. Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov Reminiscenes And

Reflections (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), p. 277.
198Marshal K. Rokossovsky, A Soldier's Duty (Moscow: Progress Publishers,

1985), p. 277.
1991bid.' pp. 242-243.
2001bid., pp. 243-244.
201 tbid., p. 244.
202tbid.
203weller, p. 12; Heeresgruppe Mitte, Bemerkung: 9. Armee-Lage am 27.

Juni 44. NAMP T-311, Roll 219; OKW/Org. Abt. und Heerespersonalabt.,
Zusammenstellung der in diesem Kriege gefallenen. toetlich verunglueckten.
verstorbenen. vermissten und im Gefangenschaft geratenen Generate. Flensburg 5 June
1945, NAMP T-77, Roll 785; Carell, p. 509.
204zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov Reminiscenes And

Reflections, p. 277.
2oswe11er, p. 9.
2061bid.
2071bid.
208KTB PAOK 3. 28.6.44., p. 3.
2091bid.
613
2101bid., p. 9.
2111bid.
212wienskowski, Entwicklung der 4. Armee, p. 37.
2131bid., p. 33.
2141bid., p. 31.
2151bid., p. 33.
2161bid., p. 34.
2171bid., pp. 33-34.
2181bid., p. 35.
2191bid., p. 36.
2201bid., p. 31.
221 Ibid., p. 33.
2221bid., p. 35
2231bid, p. 34.
2241bid.
2251bid.
2261bid.
2271bid.
2281bid., p. 36.
229Weller, p. 12.
2301bid.
231Major Klassen, 383rd Infantry Division, Erfahrungsbericht 6.7.44. NAMP

T-311, Roll 217, p. 5.
614
232tbid.
June 1944, p. 143.
234tbid.
235weller, p. 17.
June 1944, pp. 145-146.
237Rokossovsky, A Soldier's Duty, p. 244.
239KTB PAOK 3. 29.6.44., p. 8.
240Wiensko~ski, Entwicklung der 4. Armee, p. 38.
241 tbid., p. 43.
242tbid., p. 38.
2431bid., p. 40.
2441bid., p. 39.
2451bid.
2461bid.
2471bid., p. 43.
2481bid.
249tbid.
2501bid., p. 41.
251 Ibid., p. 37.
2521bid., p. 42.
2531bid.
615
2541bid., p. 43.
2551bid., p. 44.
2561bid.
2571bid.
2591bid.
260Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944, p.

197.
261Colonel P. Boldyrev, "The Bobruisk Operation," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)

28 September 1944 as translated in Military Review Vol. 24, No. 12, March 1945, p.
107.
2621bid.
2631bid.
2641bid.
265Major Wurdak, Bericht ueber die Durchbruchskaempfe bei Bobruisk

13.10.1944. NAMP T-78 Roll 139.
June 1944, p. 159.
267Major Wurdak, Bericht ueber die Durchbruchskaempfe bei Bobruisk

13.10.1944. NAMP T-78 Roll 139.
26Bsoldyrev, p. 108.
269Weller, p. 13.
271 Ibid.
272KTB PACK 3. 30.6.44., p. 1.
2731bid., p. 3.
616
2741bid., p. 4.
276Wienskowski, Entwicklunq der 4. Armee, p. 44.
2771bid.
2781bid.
2791bid.
2801bid.
281 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
2821bid., p. 46.
2a31bid.
2841bid., p. 47.
2851bid.
2861bid.
2871bid., pp. 47-48.
2881bid., p. 48.
2891bid., p. 49.
2901bid.
291 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
2921bid., p. 51.
2931bid.
2941bid.
2951bid., p. 45.
2961bid.
617
2971bid., p. 49.
2981bid.
2991bid.. p. 52.
3001bid., p. 48.
301 Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944, p.

200.
3021bid., p. 201.
3031bid.
June 1944, pp. 168-169.
305tbid., p. 169.
3061bid.
3071bid.
3081bid.
3091bid., p. 169.
3101bid.
311 Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944, p.

202.
3121bid., p. 204.
3131bid., p. 203.
314Carell, p. 509; OKW/Org. Abt. und Heerespersonalabt., Zusammenstellung der in
diesem Kriege gefallenen. toetlich verunglueckten. verstorbenen. vermissten und im
Gefangenschaft geratenen Generate. Flensburg 5 June 1945, NAMP T-77, Roll 785.
June 1944, p. 172.
316KTB PAOK 3. 1.7.44., pp. 2-3.
3171bid., p. 3.
618
318tbid.
3191bid., p. 4.
3201bid., p. 5.
321 Ibid., p. 7.
3231bid., p. 53.
3241bid.
3251bid.
3261bid.
3271bid., p. 54.
32a1bid.
3291bid.
ssorbid., p. 55.
331 Ibid.
3321bid.
3331bid.
3341bid., p. 56.
3351bid., pp. 56-57.
3361bid., p. 57.
3371bid., p. 59.
3381bid.
339rbid.
340tbid., p. 60.
619
341 Ibid.
3421bid.
3431bid.
3441bid.
3451bid., p. 61
3461bid., p. 58.
3471bid., p. 61.
3481bid., pp. 58-59
349Hinze, Hitze. Frost und Pulverdampf: Der Schicksalsweg der 20. Panzer
Division ,p. 297.
3501bid.
351Weller, p. 13.
June 1944, p. 178.
353weller, p. 13.
354AOK 9, Femspruch nach Heeresgruppe Mitte 3. 7.1330. NAMP T-311, Roll

217. German text: Aus Bobruisk bisher aufgenommen: Etwa 25,000 Soldaten aller
teile 9. Armee. Einzelheiten nicht festzustellen.
356KTB PAOK 3. 2.7.44., p. 5.
3571bid., p. 8.
3581bid.
3601bid.
361 Ibid, p, 63,

I
620
3621bid.
3631bid.
3641bid., p. 65.
3651bid., p. 66.
3661bid.
3671bid.
3681bid.
3691bid.
3701bid.
371 Ibid., p. 67.
3721bid.
373weller, p. 15.
374Wienskowski, Entwicklung der 4. Armee, p. 65.
376weller, p. 16.
3771bid.
378KTB PAOK 3. 3.7.44., p. 1.
3791bid.
3801bid., p. 2.
381 Ibid.
3821bid., p.3.
3831bid., p. 5.

621
385Pospelov et al, p. 341.
3861bid.
3891bid., p. 341.
391 Ibid., p. 69.
3921bid., p. 70.
393Wienskowski, Bekundungen des Generalmajors Schuermann der

25.Pz.Gr.Div .. 27.8.1944 NAMP T-78, Roll 141.
3941bid.
3951bid.
3961bid.
3971bid.
3981bid.
3991bid.
401 Ibid., p. 72; Field Marshal Model, Obkdo H.Gr. Mitte, Fuer die weitere
Kampffuehrung der 4. Armee. 3.7.44 NAMP T-311, Roll 299.
4031bid., p. 73.
4041bid.
4051bid.
4061bid.
622
4071bid.
408Luftwaffenverbindungskommando beim Obkdo. H.Gr.Mitte,

Kampferfahrungen im Bereich Lfl.-Kdo. 2. 12.6.44 NAMP T-311, Roll 229.
409von der Groeben, Obkdo H.Gr. Mitte, Flugabwehr mit Handwaffen auf
Eisenbahnzuegen NAMP T-311, Roll 229.
410weller, p. 19.
4111bid., p. 20.
4121bid., p. 18; Field Marshal Model, Fernschreiben An A.O.K. 2. Kgr. 9.

Armee. 3.7.1944 1020 Uhr NAMP T-311, Roll 230.
413Niepotd, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction Of Army Group Centre
June 1944, p. 200.
414weller, p. 18.
415A.0.K. 9, Fernspruch Nr. 522. An Heeresgruppe Mitte. 3.7.44. 1330 Uhr

NAMP T-311, Rott 217.
416KTB PAOK 3. 4.7.44., p. 1.
417tbid.
4181bid., p. 3.
4191bid.
4201bid., p. 5.
421 Ibid.
422Wienskowski, Entwicktung der 4. Armee, p. 75.
423tbid.
424tbid.
425tbid.
426Wienskowski, Bekundungen des Generatmajors Schuermann der

25.Pz.Gr.Div .. 27.8.1944 NAMP T-78, Rott 141.
623
427 Abwicklungstab, Heeresgr.Mitte, Bericht ueber den Anteil der 25. Pz. Gren.
Div. an den Kaempfen der Heeresgr.Mitte ab 20.6.1944. 12.9.1944 NAMP T-78, Roll
139.

4291bid.
430weller, p. 20.
431 Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction Of Army Group Centre
June 1944, p. 212.
4321bid.
433KTB PAOK 3. 5.7.44., p. 1.
4341bid., p.4.
4351bid.
4361bid., p. 5.
4371bid.
4381bid.
4391bid., p. 6.
4401bid.
4431bid., p. 76.
4441bid.
445Field Marshal Model, Fernschreiben an A.O.K. 4. 5.7.44., NAMP T-311,

Roll 229.
446tbid.
624
447Wienskowski, Bekundunqen des Generalmajors Schuermann der

448(bid.
4491bid.
4501bid.
451 Ibid.
4521bid.
4531bid.
4541bid.
455(bid.
4561bid.
4571bid.
4591bid.
461 Ibid.
462Weller, p. 21.
463KTB PAOK 3. 6.7.44., p. 1.
4641bid., p. 2.
4651bid.
4661bid.
4671bid.
4681bid., p. 3.
4691bid.
625
4701bid., p. 5.
471 Ibid., p. 6.
472tbid., p. 7.

476Abwicklungstab, Heeresgr.Mitte, Bericht ueber den Anteil der 25. Pz. Gren.
Div. an den Kaempfen der Heeresgr.Mitte ab 20.6.1944. 12.9.1944 NAMP T-78, Roll
139.

4781bid.
479tbid.
4801bid.
481 Pospelov et al, p. 348.
482Qberleutnant Janetzko, Auszug aus Vemehmung Rueckkaempfer

OberGefreiter Karl Augner 20.9.1944 NAMP T-78, Roll 141.
483tbid.

25.Pz.Gr.Div., 27.8.1944 NAMP T-78, Roll 141.
485Mehner,GHTBDW Vol. 10, p. 321.
486KTB PAOK 3. 7.7.44., p. 1.
4871bid., p. 3.
4881bid.
489tbid., p. 4.
626
4901bid.
491 Ibid., p. 6.
4921bid.
4931bid.
4941bid.
4951bid., p. 9.
4961bid.
4971bid.
4981bid., p. 10.
5001bid.
5011bid., pp. 111-112.
502Field Marshal Model, Oberkommando H. Gr. Mitte, Fernschreiben An Kgr.

A.0.K. 4. 7.7.1944 NAMP T-311, Roll 230.
504KTB PAOK 3. 8.7.44., p. 1.
506KTB PAOK 3. 8.7.44., p. 1.
5071bid., p. 3.
5081bid.
5091bid.
5101bid., p. 5.
5111bid.
627
513pospelov et al, p. 355.
5141bid.
5151bid., p.349.
516Weller, p.21
518KTB PACK 3. 9.7.44., p. 1.
5191bid.
5201bid., p.2.
521 Ibid.
5221bid.
5231bid., p. 3.
5241bid., p. 4.
526KTB PACK 3. 9.7.44., p. 9.
5271bid.
5281bid., p. 10.
5291bid., p. 8.
5301bid., p. 11.
June 1944, p. 253.
533tbid.
628
534Field Marshal Model, Fernspruch an 2. Armee. 4. Armee, 9. Armee, 3. Pz.

Armee 9.7.1944 2100 Uhr NAMP T-311 Roll 229.
536KTB PAOK 3, 10.7.44., p. 1.
5371bid.
5381bid., p. 4.
5391bid., p. 7.
5401bid.
541 tbid.
5421bid., p. 3.
543Weller, p. 22.
5441bid.

Roll 317, p. 1.
5461bid.
5471bid., p. 2.
548KTB PAOK 3. 11.7.44., p. 3.
549tbid., p. 4.
550tbid., p. 6.
551 Field Marshal Model, Fernschreiben an Pz. A.O.K. 3. 11.7.44. NAMP T-

311, Roll 230.
552Weller, Kriegstagebuch 9. Armee Nr. 11. 11. 7.44. NAMP T-312, Roll
343, p. 1.
553KTB PAOK 3. 12.7.44., p. 1.
554tbid.
629
5551bid.
5561bid., p. 3.
5571bid.
5581bid., p. 5.
5591bid., p. 6.
560KTB PACK 3. 13.7.44., p. 1.
561 Ibid.
5621bid.
5631bid.
5641bid., p. 3.
565w.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, The Russian Campaigns Of 1944-45 (New
York: Penguin Books, 1946), p. 120.
5671bid.
568Armeeoberkommando 2, Gliederung der Kampfverbaende am 25.7.1944.

Korps Abteilung E NAMP T-312, Roll 1318; Rolf Hinze, Das Ostfront Drama 1944:
Rueckzugskaempfe Heeresgruppe Mitte (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1987), p. 371.
569Hinze, Das Ostfront Drama 1944: Rueckzugskaempfe Heeresaruppe Mitte,

p. 365.
5701bid., p. 370.
571 Ibid., p. 374.
5731bid.
5741bid.
5751bid.
630
577 Armeeoberkommando 2, Versorgunqslage des Festen Platzes Brest am

26.7.1944. NAMP T-312, Roll 1318.
578tbid.
579Hinze, Das Ostfront Drama 1944: Rueckzuqskaempfe Heeresgruppe Mitte,

p. 374.
580Gen. Oberst Weiss, Fernqespraeche vom 26.7.44. 12.30 NAMP T-312,

Roll 1318.
581Gen. Oberst Weiss, Ferngespraeche vom 26.7.44. 12.10 NAMP T-312,

Roll 1318.
582tbid.
583tbid.

Roll 1318.
585tbid.
5861bid.
587tbid.

Roll 1318.
589Generalleutnant Krebs, Ferngespraeche vom 27.7.44. 00.25 NAMP T-312,

Roll 1318.
5900berkommando der Heeresgruppe Mitte, Tagesmeldung 27.7.1944 NAMP T-

312, Roll 1318.
591 Hinze, Das Ostfront Drama 1944: Rueckzugskaempfe Heeresqruppe Mitte,

p. 376.
592tbid.
5930berkommando der Heeresgruppe Mitte, Tagesmeldung 27.7.1944 NAMP T-

312, Roll 1318.
631
595Hinze, Das Ostfront Drama 1944: Rueckzugskaempfe Heeresgruppe Mitte,

p. 377.
5961bid.
5971bid.
5981bid., p. 390.
5991bid., p. 377.
soow.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, p. 140.
601samuel W. Mitchum, Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of

Battle, World War II (New York: Stein And Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 102-103,
183-184.
6021bid., p. 127.
603Generalmajor Peter von der Groeben, "Collapse Of Army Group Center: And
Its Combat Activity Until Stabilization Of The Front (22 June to September 1944), "
World War II German Military Studies Vol. 16 Ed. Donald S. Detwiler, Charles B.
Burdick and Juergen Rohwer (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979), p. 47.
604Luftgaukommando XXVll, Feldgaukommando XXVll ueberreicht in der Anlage

Objektive und Planpause der Eisenbahn und Strassenbruecken im Bereich der Luftflotte
6. 12.2.1944 NAMP T-311, Roll 225.
605von der Groeben, p. 49.
606Franz Kurowski, Luftwaffe ueber Russland (Rastatt: Verlag Arthur Moewig

GmbH, 1987), p. 286; Williamson Murray, Strategy For Defeat The Luftwaffe 1933-
1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 286; Kurt Von
Tippelskirch, Geschichte Des Zweiten Weltkriegs (Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag, 1956),
p. 462.
607carell, pp. 502-503.
608united States War Department, Handbook On German Military Forces

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. Vll-11-12.
6091bid.
632
610carell, p. 508; Gackenholz, "The Collapse of Army Group Centre in 1944,"

Decisive Battles of World War II: The German View, p. 382; Gackenholz, "Zurn
Zusammenbruch Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Sommer 1944," Viertaljahreshefte tuer
Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 3, p. 317.
611Ueutenant-General Siegfried Westphal, "The End Draws Near," The Fatal

Decisions Ed. Willaim Richardson and Seymour Freidin (London: Michael Joseph LTD,
1956), p. 211; Gackenholz, "The Collapse of Army Group Centre in 1944," Decisive
Battles of World War II: The German View, p. 382; Gackenholz, "Zurn Zusammenbruch
Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Sommer 1944," Viertaljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte,
Vol. 3, p. 317.
CHAPTERX
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE

AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE XIII ARMY CORPS,
JULY 13-23, 1944
Marshal Ivan Koniev launched the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive

against Army Group North Ukraine on July 13, 1944.1 The Soviets
had concentrated sufficent forces on the 1st Ukrainian Front to
achieve their objectives of reoccupying the Ukraine and in taking
southern Poland. The First Ukrainian Front consisted of 7 infantry
armies, 3 tank armies, 2 cavalry-mechanized groups, and 2 air
armies (see Table XXXXll).2 This force gave Marshal Koniev a total
of 80 divisions, 1O tank and mechanized corps, 4 independent tank
brigades, and the 1st Czechoslovak Corps.3 The strength of the 1st
Ukrainain Front amounted to 843,000 men, 2,200 tanks and self-
propelled guns, 14,000 artillery guns and mortars, and 2,806
aircraft.4 This gave the Soviets a margin of superiority of
approximately 1.4:1 in combat troops, 2.2:1 in artillery and
mortars, 2.2:1 in tanks and assault guns and 4.4:1 in combat
aircraft (see Table XXXXlll).
Army Group North Ukraine under the command of Colonel Josef
Harpe contained the 4th Panzer Army, 1st Panzer Army, and the 1st
Hungarian Army (see Table XXXXIV) Army Group North Ukraine
634
possessed 36 Infantry Divisions, 5 panzer divisions, two Panzer

Grenadier divisions, and 2 infantry brigades (see Table XXXXIV).S
These forces amounted to 600,000 combat troops, 6,300 artillery
guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, and 700 aircraft.6
Army Group North Ukraine, therefore, despite the transfer of 3
panzer divisions to Army Group Center remained very strong.7
Marshal Koniev's plan to break up Army Group North Ukraine
was based on the concept of two main blows and one secondary
blow. Stalin had argued for one main blow from the center of the
front toward Lvov.s However, Marshal Koniev was persistent and
received permission for his own plan, but if it failed Stalin would
hold him personally responsible.9 Koniev's plan called for one main
blow on the right flank on the axis toward Rava Ruska and the other
main blow centered on Lvov with a secondary attack in the south on
the left flank toward Stanislav.10 The following Soviet formations
were deployed for the attack toward Rava Ruska on July 13, 1944:
3rd Guards Army; 13th Army; 1st Guards Tank Army; Baranov's
Cavalry-Mechanized Group consisting of the 1st Guards Cavalry
Corps and the 25th Tank Corps.11
The attack in the center toward Lvov on July 14, 1944
employed the following Soviet formations: 16th Army; 38th Army;
3rd Guards Tank Army; 4th Guards Tank Army; S.V. Sokolov's
Cavalry-Mechanized Group consisting of the 6th Guards Cavalry
Corps and the 31st Tank Corps.12
635
The secondary attack toward Stanislav on July 21 , 1944

employed fewer Soviet formations: 1st Guards Army and 18th
Army.13
The Germans had established strong defensive positions in
depth. There were 3 defensive belts. The infantry was deployed in
the first two defensive lines and the armor was held in reserve
approximately 1O miles from the forward positions.14
Nevertheless, a general lack of reserves weakened the German
defense in depth. The Soviets had become masters of breakthrough
operations employing concentration of forces against narrow
attack sectors to achieve breakthroughs in depth. Thus, the
Germans were faced again with a battle to avoid encirclement.
The Germans had studied the new Soviet style of offensive
operations and reached some conclusions about countermeasures to
be employed to counteract Soviet operational measures. The 4th
Panzer Army Headquarters noted some characteristics of the Soviet
attack based on the experiences of Army Group Center. The Soviet
attack groups consisted on an average of 12-15 rifle divisions and
1-2 tank corps.15 Four major Soviet characteristics were noted:
(1) Considerable improvement in the employment of artillery; (2)
New concentrated employment of ground attack aircraft; (3) New
method of armor employment; (4) Operational extension.16
The Germans observed that the Soviets had concentrated their
artilllery on the point of their planned breakthrough with the
objectives of eliminating German artillery as the main firepower
and backbone of the defense, engaging the reserves, and covering
636
the flanks of the attack. 11 The artillery commanders had also

responded flexibly and rapidly to the development of the situation.
The German countermeasures adopted were: (1) frequent artillery
changes of location before the beginning of the offensive; (2)
Employ numerous dummy positions; (3) camouflage; (4) When the
attack is finally recognized change all earlier positions.1 s
The Soviets had employed the Anglo-American model of air
attack in groups of often more than 100 aircraft working together
with Soviet artillery.19 The objectives were the the elimination of
German artillery during the day, pinning down of reserves, and the
preventing of their movement. German countermeasures were
proposed: (1) employment of twilight and darkness for combat and
movement; (2) Use of all weapons for anti-aircraft defense
including rifles; (3) Good camouflage and cover in the front lines as
well as for the reserves, assembly areas, fire positions, and
command posts; (4) slit trenches were needed on both sides of the
roads and tracks, at command posts, and assembly areas; (5) Radios
were to be in separate locations from the command posts; (6)
Frequent changes of command post were necessary; (7) Fire
positions were to be layed out so they could not be knocked out by a
carpet bombing attack; (8) Light Flak artillery was to be redeployed
from already destroyed and unimportant objects to important
positions; (9) Combat vehicles in the rear areas were to maintain
large intervals; (10) Tracked vehicles were to disperse; (11) Main
roads were to be bypassed; and (12) Roads were to be cleared of
damaged vehicles.20
637
The Soviet attack in the beginning was characterized by small

numbers of tanks. However, after the breakthrough had been
achieved on the battlefield Soviet armor was employed en masse
with far ranging objectives. German countermeasures
recommended were: (1) Organization of an armor defense in depth
in the main battle line; (2) Mobile armor defense in the depth of the
battlefield; (3) Passive armor defense (obstacles, mines, trenches,
etc.) in depth with concentrations on the roads and not in the
terrain.21
The Soviet operational expansion with far ranging objectives
in depth posed a challenge to the German defense. Soviet forces
previously were used on a limited short range scale. Currently,
Soviet forces instead had objectives deep in the German rear area
and pursued these objectives without regard to threats on the
flanks. Combined operations of the operational groups in the depth
of the battlefield was paramount. This action denied the German
Command sufficient time to rebuild the front. The only German
countermeasures available remained foresight and planning ahead
for the employment of German reserves.22
The effect of the Soviet artillery in the major offensive
against Army Group Center was noted in the report
Grosskampfgliederung 4.7.1944 by the 4th Panzer Army.23 The
extremely heavy barrage fire during the beginning of the Soviet
offensive against Army Group Center was directed against the
forward trenches inflicting high losses of personnel and material
which was decisive in the defense of the main battle line.
638
Therefore, in order to preserve defensive capabilities new

countermeasures were developed based on the experiences of Army
Group Center. The structure of the battle area was to be organized
with lines in depth. The defense was to be transferred to the lines
in depth shortly before a major Soviet attack. The attack was then
to be smashed in the depths of the defense and the old main battle
line retaken. If the beginning of a major attack was not recognized
in time and barrage fire had already begun then the defense was to
be conducted from the old main battle line.
The enlarged battle area was to consist of a main battle line
which was located behind the most forward trench or the second
trench. Behind the enlarged battle area the main line of a new
battlefield was to be established. The previous main battle line
was to be held with the first trench containing only a light security
line manned with combat ouposts. Soviet forces that got into the
first trench prior to the actual attack were to be thrown out by a
counterattack. The purposes of the enlarged battlefield concept
could only be realized if the approaches to the obstacles before the
main battle line remained under German control so the Soviets
could be deceived as to the real intentions of the Germans prior to
the major attack. The enlarged battlefield area was to be prepared
so that all command posts, the majority of observation posts and
heavy weapons possessed communications to the rear and could be
transferred behind the new main battle line. When an alert was
sounded the infantry were to occupy the enlarged battlefield
positions before dawn. The most forward trench of the previous
639
main battle line was to remain manned by only a weak security line.
These combat outposts were assigned the mission to repulse the
Soviet reconnaisance troops. Complete observation of the
battlefield was to be maintained from under cover before and
during Soviet barrage fire and when there was an unequivocal sign
that the Soviet infantry and armored formations were attacking
then these troops could withndraw to the new main battle line.24
The new tactics adopted by the German Army may have
increased its tenacity and ability to resist the new Soviet
offensive measures. However, the overwhelming superiority
exerted by the ·Soviets along the designated narrow attack sectors
on the battlefield continued to achieve outstanding results in
breaking open the German defenses.
JULY 13, 1944
4th Panzer Army

The Soviets attacked during the morning hours on a wide front
and broke through the main battle line and took Horochow and
Cechow (6 km south of Horochow).25 Battalions from the 16th and
17th Panzer Divisions were used in a counterattack to liquidate
this breakthrough (see Figure 169). The Soviets advanced into the
woods west of the main battle line on the northern sector of the
291 st Infantry Division and were brought to a halt before the
German artillery position (see Figure 169). The 214th Infantry
Division was busy clearing out the Soviet penetration into the
640
combat outpost positions (see Figure 169). The Soviet

breakthrough north of Dolsk was met by a counterattack from the
LVI Panzer Corps. However, the counterattack ran into heavy Soviet
artillery barrage fire and was halted.26
JULY 14, 1944
4th Panzer Army

XXXXll Army Corps And XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The Soviets
attempted to expand their breakthrough areas in both corps sectors
to the southwest and west. The Soviets broke through on the left
sector of the 340th Infantry Division in several places.27 The 17th
Panzer Division was locked into battle all day east of the
Druzkopol-Horochow road and repulsed the Soviets in a successful
counterattack.28 The 291 st Infantry Division established a
blocking position west of Horochow. The 16th Panzer Division
forced the Soviet spearheads back in the region 8 km southeast of
Zawidow in a counterattack. The 40-50 Soviet tanks which had
broken through were mostly destroyed. Thirty Soviet tanks were
confirmed as destroyed and contact to the right wing of the 88th
Infantry Division was restored (see Figure 169).29 Strong Soviet
attacks were mostly repulsed on the right and left wing of the 88th
Infantry Division and the entire sector of the 72nd Infantry
Division. However, the bridgehead at Lokacze was evacuated and
the left wing of the 72nd Infantry Division's forward security on
the main battle line was pushed back to the Turja sector (see
641
Figure 169).30 The Soviets established a bridgehead over the Turja

river in the center of the 214th Infantry Division's sector.
1st Panzer Army

XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. The Soviet major offensive began at
0345 hrs with an extremely massive artillery barrage on the
German lines from 0400-0930 hrs.31 The attack hit the 357th
Infantry Division's sector and the south wing and center of the
349th Infantry Division.32 The Soviet attack pushed the entire
front of the 337th Infantry Division back to the artillery covering
position. The Soviet breakthrough of 3 km behind the main battle
line during the afternoon was sealed off. But the Soviets renewed
their attack in the afternoon against the 357th Infantry Division
and after heavy artillery preparation with strong tactical air
support failed to achieve further success. The attack was launched
again in the evening against the left wing of the division with
approximately 90 tanks in the direction of Zborow. The 349th
Infantry Division after liquidating a deep breakthrough had its right
wing pushed back 6 km west of the previous main battle line.
Ill Panzer Corps. The Ill Panzer Corps counterattacked with
the 1st Panzer Division and the 8th Panzer Division.33 The 1st
Panzer Division was employed at 1100 hrs south of Zloczow.
Panzer Grenadier Regiment 113 and the reinforced Panzer Grenadier
Regiment 1 formed Kampfgruppe Neumeister under the command
Colonel Neumeister and advanced along the Tarnopol-Lemberg road
to the area northwest of Zborow. 34 The Soviets had achieved on the
642
southern edge of their breakthrough a penetration 1-3 km west of

the old main battle line. The Soviets had taken the town of Mszana,
but Kampfgruppe Neumeister stormed the town and retook it and
forced the Soviets back out of the German lines. 35 The 8th Panzer
Division counterattacking from the northwest was delayed by
strong Soviet tactical air attacks.
JULY 15, 1944
4th Panzer Army

XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The 340th Infantry Division was forced
back to the south bank of the Sudolowka river despite tenacious
resistance and Soljanow was lost (see Figure 170).36 The 16th and
17th Panzer Divisions held the newly established main battle line
from the west edge of Druzkopol to the north against heavy Soviet
pressure. However, local penetrations could not be prevented.
XXXXll Army Corps. The Soviets also attacked the southern
wing of the Corps with armored support and broke through the front
of the 88th Infantry Division in several places. The Soviets
penetrated 12 km behind the main battle line. However, a
concentrated counterattack by 20 German tanks pushed the Soviets
back, but the 88th Infantry Division's southern wing still remained
4 km behind the main battle line (see Figure 170).37 All other
attacks in the corps sector were repulsed except for the battle
underway in a breakthrough area on the boundary between the 72nd
and 214th Infantry Divisions (see Figure 171 ).
643
1st Panzer Army
XXXXVll I Panzer Corps. Fierce Soviet attacks were launched
against Jezierna and to the north of the town, but were repulsed
and the penetration liquidated with the knocking out of 6 Soviet
tanks.38
Ill Panzer Corps. The counterattack by the Ill Panzer Corps
gained ground in the south and stopped on the line Jezierna to 15
km east of Zloczow.39 The 1st Panzer Division succeeded during
the counterattack in taking Otegjow and halting the Soviet attack. 40
The 8th Panzer Division to the north got bogged down using the
main rail line in its advance and was subjected to continuous
Soviet air attacks which caused heavy tosses (see Figure 170). 41
The situation became even worse when the Soviets broke through on
the left wing of the Ill Panzer Corps and forced the right wing of
the 349th Infantry Division back which permitted the Soviets to
advance further to the west. 42
JULY 16, 1944
4th Panzer Army

XXXXVI Panzer Corps. Soviet attacks from the northeast and
north resulted in the toss of Radziechow (see Figure 172).43 The
340th Infantry Division was thrown back to the west in the region
6 km southeast of Radziechow. The 20th Panzer Grenadier Division
rapidly occupied the elevated terrain 6 km northeast of Chotojow
and Witkow Nowy to cover the assembly of the 340th Infantry
644
Division (see Figure 172).44 The Soviets advanced with infantry

and armor forces through the hole between the 340th Infantry
Division and the 17th Panzer Division and occupied Pawlow (4 km
north of Cholojow) during the evening. The Soviets now posed a
threat to the Bug River bridges. The bridges at Rudasielecka (6 km
northeast of Kamionka Strumilowa) and Dobrotwor (13 km north of
Kamionka Strumilowa) were blocked. The Soviet forces supported
by armor attacked the front of the 17th Panzer Division, 291 st
Infantry Division, and the 16th Panzer Division throughout the day.
The Germans were pushed back to the line 6 km west of Druzkopol -
6 km northwest· of Druzkopol - 5 km southeast of Zawidow (see
Figure 172).45
XXXXXll Army Corps. The 88th Infantry Division's front was
ripped apart on the right by approximately 100 Soviet tanks
advancing in a western and northwestern direction.46 A
counterattack was launched with a heavy tank battalion from the
area of Poryck (see Figure 172). The 72nd and 214th Infantry
Divisions repulsed most of the breakthroughs in their respective
sectors.
1st Panzer Army

XXIV Panzer Corps. The 1OOth Jaeger Division liquidated a
local breakthrough at Kupczynce (see Figure 173).
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. The Ill Panzer Corps was placed under
the command of the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. A successful defense
was conducted throughout the day by the north wing of the 96th
645
Infantry Division, 1st Panzer Division, 357th Infantry Division and

8th Panzer Division (see Figure 173). 47 The 8th Panzer Division
launched an attack to the north, but was halted by tenacious Soviet
resistance. A blocking position was established by the 8th Panzer
Division on its left wing west of Zloczow. Nevertheless, the
Soviets made a hole in the front between the left wing of the 8th
Panzer Division and the right wing of the 349th Infantry Division at
Kottow and were able to attack Zloczow with armor and infantry
(see Figure 172).48 Soviet forces north of Zloczow had crossed the
Zloczow-Sasow road to the west and were advancing against a
village 6 km northwest of Zloczow.
XIII Army Corps. The 349th Infantry Division which had its
right wing pushed back to Kottow was now placed under the
command of the XIII Army Corps.49 The XIII Army Corps received
the order to withdraw to the Prinz Eugen position as a result of the
deteriorating situation along its flanks.so
Corps Detachment C received the following orders:
The Division was to disengage during the night of July

16-17, 1944 beginning at 00.00 hrs to the Prinz Eugen
position. The junction point on the right to the 14th SS
Volunteer Division "Galizien" was at the tip of the
woods 1.5 km southwest of Wolochy and on the left to
the 361 st Infantry Division on the rail line 1.5 km
northeast of the white church at Zablotce. The
Divisional Group 217 would be deployed on the right and
the Divisional Group 183 on the left. The Divisional
Group 339 minus the 691 st Grenadier Regiment was
held in the corps reserve and was assembled in Konty.
Fusilier Battalion Corps Detachment C was transferred
to the disposal of Corps Detachment C in the area
646
southwest of Podhorce. Combat elements of all units

were to remain as rearguards till July 17th at 1000 hrs
in the old positions and when the first Soviet pressure
was encountered they were to conduct a fighting
withdrawal to the new line. Artillery Regiment 219
was to provide artillery support for the rearguards
with individual batteries. The 1st Engineer battalion of
Engineer Regiment 219 was to destroy the bridges at
Ponikwa, Boratyn, Suchodoly and Holoskowics once the
last units had passed them. The command post for
Corps Detachment C on July 17th was to be in the
woods east of Brachowka.51
According to the army records the Soviets had lost 123 tanks
since the offensive began in the area northwest of Tarnopol.52
JULY 17, 1944
4th Panzer Army

XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The 20th Panzer Grenadier Division held
the Bug River bridgehead northeast of Kamionka Strumilowa against
heavy assaults by Soviet mounted infantry attacking from the
northeast and north (see Figure 174).53 The Soviet attacks were
repulsed and 25 Soviet tanks were destroyed. Soviet armor and
infantry forces attacked the right flank of the 17th Panzer
Division. The attack was repulsed southeast of Tartakow and 10
Soviet tanks were knocked out. However, approximately 20 Soviet
tanks broke through to Krystynopol and crossed the Bug river north
of the town (see Figure 174). 54 Soviet attacks against the east
front of the 17th Panzer Division were weak and repulsed with only
local losses of terrain.
647
XXXXll Army Corps. The 88th Infantry Division's line was

attacked by the Soviets with 40 tanks at Poryck (see Figure 174).
The 214th Infantry Division was also under attack east of
Wlodzimierz and local penetrations were achieved by Soviet armor
(see Figure 174).
VIII Army Corps. The 12th Hungarian Reserve Division was
broken through in several locations which required a counterattack
by a battalion from the 211 th Infantry Division and 168th Infantry
Division to shore up the 12th Hungarian Reserve Infantry Division's
line (see Figure 175).
1st Panzer Division

XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. The Soviets pursued the German
withdrawal movement into the Prinz Eugen position south of
Zborow slowly. A massive Soviet attack north of Zborow forced a
local withdrawal from the main battle line. Both the 1st and 8th
Panzer Divisions launched a counterattack and reached the region 9
km southeast of Kottow by midday despite unfavorable weather and
tenacious Soviet resistance.55 However, Soviet defensive fire from
tanks, artillery and anti-tank guns from the northeast and east as
well as a regimental attack on the right flank brought the attack to
a halt and the Panzer Divisions regrouped.56 A renewed attack by
the 8th Panzer Division gained 3 km to the north. But Soviet
infantry, armor and artillery formations moved through the hole
between the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and XIII Army Corps and reached
the line Busk-Gliniany.57
648
XIII Army Corps. The 340th Infantry Division was pushed back
by the Soviets to the south on the line Hutaszklana-Ohladow-
Babinie {9 km northwest of Toporow).58 The withdrawal of Corps
Detachment C to the Prinz Eugen position was completed without
Soviet pressure.
The threatening situation that had developed from the
southeastern direction in the area of Busk caused the XIII Army
Corps in the early morning hours of July 17th to assemble the
Divisional Group 339 in the area of Olesko which was brought
forward by motor transport to hold open the highway toward
Busk.59 The increasing threat to the rear of the XIII Army Corps at
Busk caused the corps to establish a defensive line at Wierzblany -
east of Czuczmany - Humniska with the Engineer Battalion 219 and
a heavy anti-tank platoon from the Panzerjaeger Battalion 219.
Soviet armor was already 1 km east of Busk. Divisional Group 339
received the order to reconnoiter through Bialy-Kamien. Corps
Detachment C was ordered around midday by the XIII Army Corps to
transfer the Fusilier Battalion to secure the highway in the area of
Jasionowce against the Soviets advancing in the direction of
Majdan Pieniakkie and this position was occupied at 1400 hrs. The
SS Field Replacement Battalion 14 stationed near Busk was caught
between the Soviet spearheads advancing toward Busk and was
mauled.so The remnants managed to retreat to the west.
649
JULY 18, 1944
The Soviet forces advancing through the existing holes in the

German line at Zloczow and between the 4th Panzer and 1st Panzer
Armies advanced deeper into the breakthrough areas. The Soviets
reached the region west of Busk with strong armored forces and
made contact with the Soviet forces from the north that had broken
through on both sides of Kamionka Strumilowa and completed the
encirclement of the XIII Army Corps (see Figure 176).61
4th Panzer Army

The 20th Panzer Grenadier Division repulsed Soviet attacks
supported by armor against Kamionka Strumilowa from the north,
east and southeast throughout the day (See Figure 176). 62 The
Germans withdrew north of Kamionka Strumilowa to Mosty-Wielkie
and held this town against numerous attacks from the north (see
Figure 176).
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. Soviet armor was crossing the Bug
river at Krystynopol and north of the town. German forces knocked
out at least 25 Soviet tanks halting the advance and Krystynopol
was retaken by German forces (see Figure 176).63
XXXXll Army Corps. Poryck was lost and the Germans were
'thrown back to the woods west of the town (see Figure 176).64 The
new main battle line followed the west bank of the Bug river and
along the course of the rail line.
650
LVI Panzer Corps. The Soviets launched their anticipated

attack after very heavy artillery preparation combined with
tactical air support. The 342nd and 26th Infantry Divisions were
broken through on a wide front despite tenacious resistance (see
Figure 176).65 The Soviets advanced on both sides of the rail line
Kowel-Luboml and southwest of Maciejow 1O km to the west (see
Figure 176). The Soviets then assembled for a renewed attack
south of the rail line against the secondary defense line of the
253rd Infantry Division.66 The units of the 342nd and 26th Infantry
Divisions continued to conduct defensive battles in the depth of the
defensive postions (see Figure 176).
1st Panzer Army

XXXXYlll Panzer Corps. The Soviets attacked Glinna with
armor and achieved a 3 km wide and approximately 1 km deep
bridgehead over the Strypa river which was sealed off temporarily,
but during the evening the Soviets broke through again in a
southwestern direction (see Figure 176). 67 Several Soviet attacks
supported by armor were repulsed north of Zborow.
The German counterattack to the north to close the hole
between the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and the XIII Army Corps gained
little ground against Soviet artillery barrage fire and had to be
halted. Army reports indicated that 18 Soviet tanks had been
knocked out.
651
Ill Panzer Corps. The Soviets pushed the German line back to
the west. The 101 st Jaeger Division was brought up and employed
in the line Gliniany to the northwest.
XIII Army Corps. Busk was lost to a heavy Soviet armored
attack and 50-60 Soviet tanks had already advanced 1O km west of
Busk (see Figure 176).68 The German line held against repeated
attacks from the south against Bialy Kamien, but Sasow was lost to
a Soviet armored attack from the south (see Figure 176).69 The
349th Infantry Division attacked from the area northeast of
Zloczow and forced its way into the woods south of Kottow.
Meanwhile, the Soviets achieved a breakthrough on the eastern
front of the XIII Army Corps on the Sasow-Brody road. The German
withdrawal movement in the north was followed by a Soviet
advance toward Toporow which continued past the town to the west
1O km north of Busk. 10
The previous orders of Divisional Group 339 were changed
during the night of July 17-18, 1944 and it was ordered to advance
toward Ruda Koltowska beginning at 0200 hrs. There it was to
combine with the 349th Infantry Division along with 6 assault guns
for an attack to the south to take Obertasow.71 The junction with
the 8th Panzer Division attacking to the north was to be
accomplished in the area of Obertasow.72 Divisional group 339
advanced out of the area of Chmielowa at 1400 hrs toward
Obertasow and reached the hills north of Obertasow during the
afternoon without the support of artillery from the 349th Infantry
Division. The attack by the 8th Panzer Division, however, failed to
652
breakthrough and the pocket remained close. 73 Strong Soviet forces

advancing mostly on the Lemberg-Brody highway and on both sides
of the Holoskowice-Wysoko road were partially repulsed in hand to
hand combat with extremely high casualties. The northern and
southern Soviet pincers met just north of Busk and completed the
encirclement of the XIII Army Corps (see Figure 176). Meanwhile,
the 340th Infantry Division attempted to breakthrough to
Kamionka-Strumilowa which was still in German hands.
The XIII Army Corps decided on the afternoon of July 18th to
make a thrust to the south in the hills of the Lemberg-Zloczow road
to breakout of the Soviet encirclement and establish a connection
with the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps.74 The XIII Army Corps gave the
following orders to Corps Detachment C:
Corps Detachment C was to disengage from the front

during the night of July 18-19th and assemble on July
19th in the woods on both sides of the road to Bialy
Kamien. Corps Detachment C's sector was to be
assumed by the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien"
and the 361 st Infantry Division by a simultaneous
withdrawal to the line Zahorce-Czyski-Czechy-hills
northeast of Gaje Konteckie. 1s
Corps Detachment C responded with orders for the deployment
of its units for the breakout:
Divisional Group 217 will withdraw during the night of

July 18-19th with Grenadier Regiment 311 to the line
Zahorce-Czyski-Czechy and wait to be relieved by the
14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien". All remaining
units of the Divisional Group were to asemble in the
area of Gawareczyzna.
653
Divisional Group 183 will be relieved by units of the
361 st Infantry Division and assemble in the woods
south of Ozydow; The Fusilier Battalion will assemble
in the area of Gorna.
Ski-Jagd Kommando with the T-34 armor platoon will

go to the new division command post at the forester's
house 1 km northwest of Gorna.
Artillery Regiment 219 is to move into position in the

area north of Bialy-Kamien so that it can provide
effective artillery support for the planned attack over
the Bug river.
Supply troops will transfer to the woods south of

Ozydow.76
The breakout of the XII I Army Corps to reach the 1st and 8th
Panzer Divisions in the southwest would have to cover 24-32 km of
heavily wooded and swampy terrain, and the Bug river would also
have to be forded. 77
JULY 19, 1944
4th Panzer Army

Gruppe Major General v.d. Meden was pushed back by the
Soviets to the line Przemyslow (north of Belz) - Wojslawice (6 km
west of Olwowek) where it was on the defense against attacks on
the right wing (see Figure 177).78 Belz was occupied by the
Soviets after losing 17 tanks.79
XXXXll Army Corps. The Soviets achieved a breakthrough on
the right wing against the 88th and 72nd Infantry Divisions. The
654
Soviets continued their advance to the west from their

breakthrough area engaging the German forces.
LVI Panzer Corps. The Soviets pushed the defensive front
back to the Bug river on a wide front and pursued the withdrawal of
the corps closely (see Figure 177).80
VIII Army Corps. Soviet attacks supported by armor were
repulsed at Holowno and Zgorany. The 168th Infantry Division held
the line north of Mokrany against Soviet company strength attacks.
1st Panzer Army

XXXXVlll .Panzer Corps. The Soviets penetrated the thin
defensive line southwest of Glinna and were then pushed back in a
counterattack. Soviet infantry breached the main battle line
southwest of Zborow.81 The 96th and 357th Infantry Divisions
were attacked by Soviet forces supported by armor throughout the
day. The Soviets achieved only local gains north of Gologory
loosing 4 tanks.
II I Panzer Corps. The 101 st Jaeger Division repulsed a Soviet
attack supported by armor east of Dziedzilow (see Figure 178) 82
The 68th Infantry Division staged a local withdrawal 4 km
southwest of Zoltance after conducting a defense against Soviet
attacks supported by armor.
XIII Army Corps. The relief of Divisional group 183 went
according to plan. Divisional Group 183 reached the woods south of
Ozydow by noon. The German Army official report on the
655
destruction of the XIII Army Corps criticized the fighting ability of

the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" severely stating:
The 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" had already

shown with their first actions only an exceptionally
inferior ability to standfast. The Galicians proved in no
way to be the fanatical defenders of their homeland
against Bolshevism, as one had supposed, so that their
first-rate equipment and armament had hardly any
impact and was finally only in the hands of a
completely undisciplined, disordered mass on which the
small number of German command personnel despite
their utmost efforts had hardly any control over.83
Furthermore, the numerous supply vehicles of the 14th SS
Volunteer Division "Galizien" alerted the Soviets to the direction of
the breakout of the XIII Army Corps by their movement in the
direction of Bialy Kamien in the daylight.84 The Soviet responded
by obstructing all the roads and paths so that decisive troop
movements were seriously delayed.
The XII I Army Corps faced the danger of having the current
pocket in which they were located being split in half with the loss
of Podhorce and Chwatow. The XIII Army Corps assigned the
Grenadier Regiment 311 and the Fusilier Battalion of Corps
Detachment C to clear up the situation. However, before the
assigned units could be deployed both Podhorce and Chwatow were
retaken by the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" with the
support of assault guns.85 Apparently, the Galician SS were not as
much of a disordered mob as the German Army claimed.
General Hauffe, Commander of the XIII Army Corps and his
Chief of Staff, Colonel von Hammerstein on the morning of July
656
19th at the Corps Command Post issued the orders for a breakout of
the XIII Army Corps to reach the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps in a three
day operation.as The main burden of the attack was assigned to
Corps Detachment C which the most combat worthy formation.87
Corps Detachment C was to advance on July 20th at dawn on both
sides of Bialy Kamien over the Bug river and after crossing the
Zloczowka sector occupy and hold the tand between Skwarzawa and
Chilozyce with a strong defense line to the southeast.SB The
Fusilier battalion 361 and Assault Gun Brigade 249 were placed
under the command of Corps Detachment C for the breakout.
Engineer Battalion 219 was also brought up for the assault.
The 349th Infantry Division was ordered to protect the east
flank of Corps Detachment C and also take hill 334 and the hills
southwest of it. The 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien''i 361 st
Infantry Division and 454th Security Division were to provide the
rear cover for the withdrawal and breakout. 89
On July 21, 1944, the XIII Army Corps plan called for making
solid contact with the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps by Corps Detachment
C between Lackie and Jasionowce and at Zloczow with the 349th
Infantry Division.90 This would open the cauldron for the escape of
the XIII Army Corps.
On July 22, 1944, the plan provided for the rear echelon,
supply troops and wounded to be sent out of the cauldron through
the openings made by Corps Detachment C and the 349th Infantry
Division. The remaining order of withdrawal from the pocket was
to be the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien", 361st Infantry
657
Division followed by the 454th Security Division.91 This order of

withdrawal was to be followed as long as Corps Detachment C and
the 349th Infantry Division with the support of opposite units from
the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps could hold open the cauldron. Corps
Detachment C was assigned to assemble later in the area of
Wisniowozik-Gologory.
Corps Detachment C's adjutant received the orders for the
attack on July 20th at noon. Divisional Group 183 and Fusilier
Battalion 361 on the right of Corps Detachment C were to advance
from the area of Bialy Kamien and take Belzce and Poczapy along
with the hills south of the town and hold them.92 Divisional Group
217 was to advance from the area of Czeremosnia over hill 366.1
and Zulice to reach Chilozyoe on the left flank of Corps Detachment
C. Assault Gun Brigade 249, Corps Detachment C's armored platoon
and the motorized 1st Engineer Battalion of Regiment 219 were to
asemble in Bialy Kamien. They were to cross the Bug river and
occupy the hills south of the river with infantry. This armored
group was then to advance on both sides of the highway to Poczapy
and seize the crossings and block the Zloczow-Busk road.93
The Soviet pressure on the XIII Army Corps continued
throughout the day as it withdrew to the south. The corps assumed
a new defense line of Olesko-Sokolowka. The 340th Infantry
Division and 454th Security Division were closely pursued by the
Soviets and separated by the Soviets from the rest of the XIII Army
Corps (see Figure 178).94 Both divisions fought their way through
to the west at Kamionka Strumilowa (see Figure 178).95
658
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The 20th Panzer Grenadier Division was

engaged the entire day in defensive battles against Soviet armor
from the northeast and north (see Figure 178). The 168th Infantry
Division's line southeast of Turyzka held against a Soviet attack
supported by armor.96 The 16th Panzer Division was at Kulikow (9
km southeast of Zolkiew).
JULY 20, 1944
4th Panzer Division

A hole in the front emerged between the 1st and 4th Panzer
Armies through which the Soviets advanced to the west and took
Rawa Ruska and Uhnow and then proceeded further to the west and
southwest (see Figure 179).97 Soviet armor engaged German units
at Lubycza Krolewska and attacked Tomaszow during the evening
(see Figure 179).98
XXXXll Army Corps. The Soviets attacked this corps on a wide
front with overwhelming infantry and armor achieving several
breakthroughs and pushing the entire front back 3 km (see Figure
179).99 The corps was forced to withdraw to the line Laszcow-
Krylow-to 4 km northwest of Horodlo.
LVI Panzer Corps. The Soviets pursued the withdrawal of the
corps to the west bank of the Bug river and attacked the newly
occupied defense line on the Bug river (see Figure 179). The
Soviets despite firm German resistance forced a crossing over the
Bug river on both sides of the Kowel-Lublin rail line (see Figure
659
179).100 Once the Soviets had established their bridgehead they

attacked the remnants of the German 253rd and 26th Infantry
Divisions. The Soviet advance was halted here after the Germans
employed every available man in the battle.
VIII Army Corps. The 5th Jaeger Division was engaged in
heavy combat at Zberez, but could not prevent the Soviets from
crossing the Bug river.101 The corps withdrew its eastern front
during the night to the Zlota-Lipa sector.
1st Panzer Army

XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. The Soviets broke through the sector
held by the 254th Infantry Division and were met with a
counterattack by the 1st Panzer Division. The 8th Panzer Division
attacked to the north through wooded terrain south of Zloczow (se~
Figure 180).
XIII Army Corps. The beginning of the breakout attack of the
XIII Army Corps had been set for 0330 hrs.102 However, the supply
vehicles of the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" clogged the
road and combined with rainy weather delayed the deployment of
certain units into their attack positions. Grenadier Regiment 311
and the Fusilier Battalion from Corps Detachment C had not reached
their start positions by 0330 hrs. Divisional Group 183 reported at
0435 hrs movement difficulties and requested that the beginning of
the attack be postponed. The quartermaster of Corps Detachment C
took charge of traffic at 0500 hrs in an attempt to restore some
order.
660
Nevertheless, the attack of Corps Detachment C commenced

at 0500 hrs.103 Divisional Group 183 with Grenadier Regiment 351
on the right and Grenadier Regiment 330 on the left overcame
Soviet resistance and were north of Hill 24 7 at 0545 hrs. The
northwest edge of Belzec was reached at 0725 hrs. 104 Divisional
Group 217 minus Grenadier Regiment 311 along with the Fusilier
Battalion of Corps Detachment C ran into stiff Soviet resistance at
Hill 366.1 and the attack was brought to a standstill as of 0900
hrs.1os The armored task force consisting of Assault Gun Brigade
249 and the captured Soviet T -34 tanks of Corps Detachment C
were delayed in advancing from their attack positions till 0800 hrs
as a result of strong Soviet anti-tank fire from Hill 366.1.1os It
was needed to advance against Poczapy since Grenadier Regiment
351 of Divisional Group 183 had already advance through Belzec to
the southeast and was encountering strong Soviet resistance from
the direction of Poczapy.
The armored task force reached the bridge at Poczapy at 1200
hrs. after engaging in a heavy battle with Soviet armor and self-
propelled guns in which 20 were destroyed. The 3rd Engineer
Company of Engineer Battalion 219 and elements of Grenadier
Regiment 330 had to take Poczapy in a bitter house to house battle
and the town was finally secured at 1500 hrs.101 Grenadier
Regiment 351 had occupied Hill 251 3 km southwest of Poczapy and
Divisional Group 217 arrived in the area of Zulice. Divisional Group
339 under the command of the 349th Infantry Division took Hill 334
at dawn and was fighting for Hill 234 at noon.
661
The attack objectives had almost all been reached. Three

batteries of Artillery Regiment 219 of Corps Detachment C were
pulled back over the Bug river during the morning hours. They were
deployed into a position east of the road to Poczapy to provide a
screen to the southeast.
The favorable conditions set the stage for a further advance.
Divisional Group 183 received the order to advance and take Kniaze
at 1300 hrs and establish a screen to the west and southwest.
Divisional Group 217 received orders at 1200 hrs to take Chilozyoe
with Grenadier Regiment 389 as well as Hill 274.4 and occupy the
area northeast of it and establish a defense to the east and
southeast. Corps Detachment C moved its command post at 1255
hrs to the woods 1.5 km southeast of Bialy-Kamien.1os
The course of the battle began to change during the afternoon
when increased Soviet air attacks brought the advance to a halt.
Roads, artillery positions and the battlefield were subjected to
continuous attack by Soviet bombers and attack aircraft which
dropped bombs and strafed continuously.109 Heavy losses in men
and material developed especially among the rear echelon troops.
The German Luftwaffe did not even appear over the battlefield. The
1st Battalion of Artillery Regiment 217 shot down one Soviet
aircraft with rifles. Three armored flak guns from Jaeger
Battalion 219 shot down three Soviet aircraft.
Nevertheless, Divisional Group 217 entered Chilczyce at 1309
hrs and with a unit of the armored task force and the motorized 1st
Company of Engineer Battalion 219 and took the town and the hills
662
to the southwest by 1600 hrs. Divisional Group 183 encountered

major difficulties at Kniaze as a result of terrain and the Soviet
defense. The Division Command Post was transferred to the woods
north of Kniaze at 2200 hrs.
A serious threat to the entire breakout emerged during the
afternoon on the eastern flank. The 349th Infantry Division
managed to occupy Hills 289 and 274.4 but the defensive screen to
the east and southeast was too weak and the Soviets captured Hill
334 which then changed hands several times before it was finally
lost to the Soviets during the evening. Corps Detachment C
dispatched the Fusilier Battalion to the heavy fighting around
Zulice. However, the Fusilier Battalion was stopped by a Soviet air
attack on the west edge of Zulice. Later in the afternoon Zulice had
to be abandoned.110 A Soviet battalion advancing through Zulice to
the north attempted to take Hill 268, but was brought under direct
fire by the 8th Battalion of Artillery Regiment 219 and shot to
pieces. The Germans, however, counterattacked throughout the
night and managed to retake a portion of Zulice as far as the church
by 0700 hrs the next morning.111
The breakout of the XIII Army Corps had been opposed by
strong Soviet forces north and northwest of Zloczow. The breakout
attempt had destroyed at least 32 Soviet tanks and numerous
artillery guns, but had not yet succeeded .112 The entire front of the
XIII Army Corps was compressed into an even tighter ring of
encirclement with about 85,000 men encircled north and west of
Zloczow (see Figure 180).113
663
Ill Panzer Corps. The defensive line on the Zloczow-Lemberg

road was pushed back to the west by Soviet armor. The 1st Panzer
Division withdrew toward the west in the direction of Pomercany
and Wicyn.114 The retreating elements of the 1st Panzer Division
were subjected to repeated heavy bombing by the Soviet Air
Force. 115 The 1st Panzer Division's Reconnaissance Battalion
reported at noon that the Soviets had occupied Przemyslany,
Zaszkow and Zukow (see Figure 179).116 Meanwhile, the 8th Panzer
Division was attacking to the north to relieve the encircled XII I
Army Corps in the area north and west of Zloczow (see Figure
179).117 The 101 st Jaeger Division and 68th Infantry Division
repulsed weak attacks against the northern front of the corps
knocking out 5 Soviet tanks (see Figure 180).118
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The corps repulsed repeated attacks
against Kulikow, but could not prevent the Soviet advance on the
road south of the town to the west. 119 The integration of the 20th
Panzer Grenadier Division and elements of the 340th Infantry
Division were completed today. The 168th Infantry Division and
16th Panzer Division suffered heavy losses.
JULY 21, 1944
4th Panzer Army

Colonel Hoffman's unit holding Tomaszow was attacked by
strong Soviet infantry and armor and pushed out of the town to the
hills south of Tarnawatka (see Figure 181 ).120
664
XXXXll Army Corps. Soviet attacks against the right wing of

Corps Group Major General v.d. Meden were repulsed. However, the
Soviets broke into Krylow and made several penetrations to the
north of the town (see Figure 181 ).121 German counterattacks
blocked the penetrations north of the town inflicting severe losses
on the Soviets.
LVI Panzer Corps. The Soviets achieved penetrations on a
wide front which could barely be sealed off (see Figure 181 ). The
26th Infantry Division which had reached a state of exhaustion by
continuous fighting over the last few days could not prevent the
Soviet advance·to Sawin (see Figure 181).122
VIII Army Corps. The Soviets on the south wing of the corps
advanced out of their bridgehead Zabuze-Zberez to the west and
crossed over the Chotm-Wlcdawa road. The 5th Jaeger Division was
engaged in battle on its right wing at Osowa and Soviet pressure
forced it to withdraw to the Bug river .123 The Soviets pushed back
the 211th Infantry Divisions's sector at Piszcza to the southwest
and were advancing on Wlodawa. The 12th Hungarian Reserve
Division on the left wing of the corps was retreating with the
Soviets in close pursuit. The Soviets reached the Bug river
occupying the east bank at Slawatycze and proceeded to cross the
river 6 km northeast of the town.124
1st Panzer Army

XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and XIII Army Corps. The combined
attack on both sides of the cauldron from the south and north
665
restored contact between the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and the XIII
Army Corps (see Figure 181 ).12s Soviet attacks continued against
the eastern front of the XIII Army Corps. A breakthrough was
achieved against the 96th Infantry Division north of Pomorzany
requiring a local withdrawal of the main battle line.
XIII Army Corps. The XIII Army Corps gave Corps Detachment
C and the 349th Infantry Division the following order:
8th Panzer Division has reached Wereniaki. Advance at

night through Zloczow further to the north. 1st Panzer
Division advancing from the area of Gologory early in
the morning to the north. The spearhead of Corps
Detachment C and the 349th Infantry Division are to
continue their flank attack at night. Attack objectives
for Corps Detachment C the area Lackie-Jasionowce;
349th Infantry Division, Zloczow.126
The beginning of the night attack for Corps Detachment C was
set for 0100 hrs.121 Divisional Group 183 was to attack Lackie and
Divisional Group 217 was to attack Jasionowce. Both divisional
groups were to seek contact with the formations of the XXXXVlll
Panzer Corps. The new command post for Corps Detachment C was
to move to the woods north of Kniaze at 0300 hrs, but was delayed
by terrible road congestion. The traffic on the roads was rendered
near impossible by the numerous supply vehicles plugging up the
roads. Artillery Regiment 219 managed to cross the Zloczowka
stream by traveling along byways during the early morning hours.
Corps Detachment C Headquarters arrived in Poczapy at 0500
hrs.12a Major Pacher, Commander of Grenadier Regiment 330
secured the town with the assistance of a few assault guns. Major
666
Pachar reported that Divisional Group 183 in the battle for Kniaze
during the night had been thrown back to the north by a Soviet
counterattack.129 The command post of Divisional Group 183 was
now located on Hill 257 southwest of Poczapy. Radio
communications had apparently been lost to Divisional Group 217.
Grenadier Regiment 311 and 389 assembled for the attack
during the night southwest of Chilczyce. The attack was delayed
till 0400 hrs and was reinforced by various units from other
divisions and two assault guns. The main assault was launched
directly east of Jasionowcze and the town was taken from the
south .130 The attack progressed and the hills were taken and the
attack objectives accomplished. However, the 8th Panzer Division
was not located. Both regimental commanders decided to seek
contact further to the south. The terrain was unsuitable for
vehicles and they had to be abandoned. The 1st Panzer Division was
finally reached after numerous battles around midday at Zukow.131
The entire fate of the XIII Army Corps hung in the balance based
upon the changing situation of the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps.
The 1st Panzer Division took command of Grenadier
Regiments 311 and 389. Divisional Group 217, elements of Assault
Gun Brigade 249 and the 1st Company of Engineer Battalion 219
which had advanced through Boniszyn made contact with the 1st
Panzer Division. Kampfgruppe Neumeister of the 1st Panzer
Division had launched a relieve effort during the early morning
hours and succeeded in opening a small hole on the western side of
the cauldron. This opening permitted 400 men of the 14th SS
667
Volunteer Division "Galizien" and about 3000 troops from various

other XIII Army Corps units to escape.132 The 1st and 8th Panzer
Divisions restored contact with the XIII Army Corps west of
Zloczow at 1400 hrs (see Figure 181). 133 German forces captured
Prezemyslany in an attack from the south and east after a difficult
battle.
The battle for the survival of the XII I Army Corps was waged
during the day to the south. Corps Detachment C moved its
headquarters after arriving in Poczapy to the woods east of Belzec.
Divisional Group 183 was employed again against Kniaze without
success. Divisional Group 217 had also been locked into battle
around the town most of the day. Major Von Bonin, Commander of
Divisional Group 217, even became separated from his staff in the
course of the battle. The 2nd and 3rd Companies of Engineer
Battalion 219 were subjected to severe bombing attacks in
Poczapy. The 2nd Engineer Company despite the bombing
participated in the renewed attack of Divisional Group 183 against
Kniaze and managed to breakout of the ring of encirclement and
advanced to the south. These elements made contact with the 8th
Panzer Division in the area of Gologorky.134 Grenadier Regiment
330 after a repeated effort to take and occupy Kniaze withdrew
with the onset of darkness to the east of the town. Elements of
Corps Detachment C's Fusilier Battalion remained in heavy
defensive battles at Zulice. Divisional Group 339 under the
command of the 349th Infantry Division secured Hill 274.4 on the
left flank of the XIII Army Corps. Corps Detachment C assumed
668
command of the 454th Security Division at noon. It was pulled out

of the northern front and was assigned to relieve Fusilier Battalion
361 in the area of Belzec-Skwarzawa.
The XIII Army Corps on the afternoon of July 21, 1944 gave
the following order to Corps Detachment C and its subordinate
units:
The division was to assemble with 3 assault groups

after the onset of darkness:
Right Flank: Fusilier Battalion 361 in the area of

Skwarzawa is to advance over the rail line Zloczow-
Lemberg to Lackie and to the south to occupy the hill
terrain.
454th Security Division follows as right flank security

for the corps.
Center: Divisional Group 183 with Engineer Battalion

219 and Ski-Jagd Kommando in the area of Kniaze--
Completely capture the town with a further advance in
the direction directly east of Lackie and pass by on the
southeast side of the town's high terrain--the middle
assault group shall contain Corps Detachment C's
Headquarters with Felders Battalion 219 and the
division's combat school.
Left Flank: Divisional Group 217 with Fusilier

Battalion of Corps Detachment C was to move from the
area southwest of Chilczyce to capture Boniszyn and
the high terrain south of the town. Artillery Regiment
219 was to provide close support.
The 349th Infantry Division east of Corps Detachment C

was to thrust toward Zloczow.
The supply troops were to be transferred during the

course of the day to the area of Belzec and would
669
follow Corps Detachment C Headquarters to the

assembly area.
The assembly area of Corps Detachment C after

breaking through the ring of encirclement was to be
Wisniowszyk and Gologory for the 454th Security
Division .135
This order was given by the XI 11 Army Corps based upon the
belief that the Corps would make contact with the armored
spearheads of the XXXXVll I Panzer Corps directly south of the
Zloczow-Lemberg road.136 The Corps Detachment C Headquarters
assembled at 2100 hrs near Hill 257 southwest of Poczapy. Lt.
General Lange, Commander of Corps Detachment C and Major General
Nettwig, Commander of the 454th Security Division had a
conference at the command post of the 454th Security Division in
Belzec during the atternoon.137 General of the Infantry Hauffe,
Commander of the XIII Army Corps, also appeared with his staff af
this meeting. 138 The plans were laid out for the breakout of the
XI II Army Corps that night.
The departure to the assembly areas occurred just before the
onset of darkness. Reconnaissance had determined that Kniaze was
again completely occupied by the Soviets. Therefore, Lt. General
Lange assembled his group directly northwest of Boniszyn along
with Major Pacher, Commander of Grenadier Regiment 330.139
.Major Pacher informed Lt. General Lange that based upon his
experience a repeated attack on Kniaze would not guarantee
success. Boniszyn on the other hand was already occupied by
German troops. Therefore, Lt. General Lange decided to attack to
670
the south with Grenadier Regiment 330 through Boniszyn.140

Boniszyn was reached by 0100 hrs. Grenadier Regiment 330, the
division's combat school and the Felders Battalion of Corps
Detachment C assembled on the railway embankment south of
Boni syn.
The 349th Infantry Division along with most of the
subordinate Divisional Group 339 and Grenadier Regiment 912 had
also selected the route through Boniszyn and joined the assembly
area to the east. The attack through Zloczow had, therefore, been
abandoned since it would have been necessary to occupy the town
for the vehicles to get through following in the rear.141
The assembly area was not noticed by the Soviets until 0300
hrs. The assault group of Corps Detachment C and the 349th
Infantry Division with the subordinate Divisional Group 339 began
to attack shortly after 0300 hrs.142 Lt. General Lange described the
attack:
The enemy which had remained completely silent

suddenly opened up heavy fire from their well prepared
positions in the hills. Armor, anti-tank guns, self-
propelled guns, anti-aircraft guns, mortars and machine
gun fire attempted to pin down the attacking German
troops. A battle commenced which was rivaled by only
few examples in the history of war and was comparable
with the assault of our grandfathers, fathers and
brothers on the Spieherner hills and at Lange mark ... 143
The officers and grenadiers lead by their two Generals,

Lt. General Lasch and Lt. General Lange assaulted the
Soviet positions with unheard of bravery and fearless
defiance of death with ringing yells of "Hurra" and the
force of pounding waves which broke through regardless
671
of numerous casualties and like the raging elements

themselves advanced to the highway. Several blocking
tanks were destroyed in close combat and the
increasing artillery fire from the west and east and
later the northern direction into the flanks and rear of
the attacking troops was not capable of damming up the
force of the assault. Wave after wave surged through
the enemy positions. The hills south and west of
Jasionowce were taken at 0500 hrs. The town itself
and also Zalesie were taken by German troops. The
officers and men honored their two generals with a
ringing "Sieg Heil" on the edge of the woods south of
Zalesie. The anticipated contact with units of the
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps was not established.144
The left assault group of Corps Detachment C and the 349th
Infantry Division punctured the encirclement ring at Jasionowce
and directly west of the town which proved decisive.145 However,
the middle and right assault groups failed to breakout of the Soviet
encirclement. The middle assault group of Corps Detachment C
contained the commanding general of the XIII Army Corps, General
of the Infantry Hauffe, along with his staff, and units of the 361st
Infantry Division.146
The middle assault group's assembly area was 1 km east of
Kniaze and deployment into the assembly area was completed by
0100 hrs. Major Schliep, Commander of Engineer Battalion 219,
received the order personally to attack at 0200 hrs directly from
General Hauffe.147 The attack was supported by 4 assault guns, 3
captured T -34 tanks and 6 armored personnel carriers. The
armored assault group broke into Kniaze and advanced further into
swampy terrain while the Soviets sealed off the breakthrough
behind the assault group with armor and mounted infantry. 148 The
672
units following the assault group could not breakthrough and the
assembly area east of Kniaze and between Boniszyn was brought
under artillery barrage fire.
Major Schliep advanced with the 3rd company of Engineer
Battalion 219 during the attack along a railway embankment bridge
built further to the east and managed to enter the breakthrough
area of the left assault group and advanced to the southwest.
However, the whereabouts of the the Headquarters of XIII Army
Corps and its staff are uncertain after the failure of the middle
assault group.149
Essentially, the fate of the right assault group remains
unkown. It appears to have been deflected from its route of attack
in the same way as the attack on Kniaze. The 454th Security
Division's Headquarters with Major General Nettwig was probably
annihilated.150 There was no trace of the Major General and
Fusilier Battalion 361.
The Soviets responded rapidly and tightened the ring around
the XIII Army Corps during the night of July 21-22, 1944. The
Soviets closed the ring again at Jasionowce with strong armored
forces during the early morning hours.151 The Soviets were even
attacking Boniszyn in strength by noon. Poczapy in the north was
lost.152 Vehicles and heavy weapons were no longer able to get
through and the swamp south of Boniszyn could not be traversed.
Various assorted units managed to pry open the Soviet ring a third
time west of Jasionowce and others managed to successfully
673
defend the woods west of Boniszyn till the end of July 23rd and
then later broke out in small groups.1 s3
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and Ill Panzer Corps. The Soviets
advance with strong armored forces through the hole between the
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and the Ill Panzer Corps past Bobrka and
reached the region of Dawidow with armored spearheads where the
German line finally halted the Soviet advance (see Figure 181).154
Weak Soviet attacks against the 101 st Jaeger Division and the
168th Infantry Division were repulsed. Soviet units which had
managed to infiltrate between the 168th Infantry Division and the
16th Panzer Division southwest of Kulikow were in the process of
being destroyed by a counterattack of the 68th Infantry Division
from the northeast and the 16th Panzer Division from the south
(see Figure 181).155
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The corps repulsed Soviet attacks
supported by armor against Turynka. The Soviets advanced through
the hole between the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies in the direction of
Jaroslau on the San river (see Figure 181).156 Soviet armored
spearheads were reported 5 km east of Jaroslau by aerial
reconnaissance.
JULY 22, 1944
The Soviets advanced rapidly through the hole between the

1st and 4th Panzer Armies as well as between the LVI Panzer Corps
674
and the VIII Army Corps to reach the San and Weichsel rivers. The
most forward Soviet units reached the San river at Jaroslau and
Lublin as well as the region 15 km northwest of Lublin (see Figure
182) .157 The 1st Panzer Army was broken through again southeast
of Lemberg (see Figure 183). 158 There were only a few units of the
XIII Army Corps which had broken out of the Soviet encirclement
while the majority of the XIII Army Corps remained within the
Soviet encirclement (see Figure 183).
4th Panzer Army

XXXXll Army Corps and LVI Panzer Corps. Soviet attacks
against the XXXXll Army Corps were repulsed (see Figure 182). The
right wing of the LVI Panzer Corps was pressed back to the
Teratyn-Cholm road. Chaim was lost to the Soviets and they
achieved a 50 km wide breakthrough advancing to Lublin (see Figure
182).159 The Soviets forced their way into the eastern portion of
Lublin and reached the region 15 km northwest of the city (see
Figure 182).160 The 26th Infantry Division as a result was cutoff
30 km northwest of Chaim and had to fight its way back to the
southwest (see Figure 182).
VIII Army Corps. Soviet armor and cavalry forces pushed the
right wing of the corps back southwest of Wlodawa. The Soviets
then advanced to the north and occupied Parczew.
675
1st Panzer Army
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. Soviet attacks from the east and
northeast achieved deep breakthroughs forcing the 8th Panzer
Division back to the southwest and northwest of Zukow. 161 Contact
with the XIII Army Corps was completely severed as a result (see
Figure 183).162 1000 men from the XIII Army Corps were rescued
before contact with the XIII Army Corps was lost (see Figure
183).163
XIII Army Corps. The XIII Army Corps ceased to exist as an

effective combat formation on July 22, 1944.164 Assault groups
broke through individually without heavy weapons and advanced
toward their ordered assembly areas. The assault group of Corps
Detachment C under the command of Lt. General Lange along with
numerous dispersed units from other divisions split into two
groups in the woods south of Zalesie 165 The command of the second
group was assumed by Lt. Colonel l.G. von Prittwitz. The various
small assault groups gained an awareness of the hard facts during
the day that units of the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps could not be
expected to meet them in the breakout. In fact, the assigned
assembly areas were occupied by the Soviets during the evening.
Therefore, the troops of the XIII Army Corps organized in various
assault groups fought their way out of the Soviet encirclement to
the southwest under unprecedented difficulties without support
from outside of the cauldron. Lt. General Lange's assault group was
almost entirely annihilated.166
676
A successful breach was made in the Soviet encirclement

which allowed other units of the XIII Army Corps to escape. A
corridor was opened between Kniaze and lasenivtsi.167 The narrow
escape corridor was only 137 to 205 meters wide and was defended
as long as possible to allow as many German troops to escape as
possible.168 The 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" defended
Pochapy, Belzets and Skvariava with the assistance of assault guns
from the 8th Panzer Division which had broken into the cauldron
from the outside.169 General Lindemann, Commander of the 361 st
Infantry Division apparently was responsible for the successful
breakout of this portion of the XIII Army Corps. 110 Brigadefuehrer
Freitag with his staff and 800 troops of the 14th SS Volunteer
Division "Galizien" along with the 361 st Infantry Division escaped
from the pocket.111 Unfortunately, General Lindemann failed to
breakout with the elements of the 361 st Infantry Division and was
captured along with General Nedtwig, Commander of the 454th
Security Division.112 General Hauffe, Commander of the XIII Army
Corps, was killed during the course of the breakout on July 22,
1944.173
Ill Panzer Corps. The Germans launched attacks from the east
and west to attempt to close the hole on the Ill Panzer Corps front.
Meanwhile, the right wing of the Ill Panzer Corps had been
penetrated and the Soviets had reached the east and southeast edge
of Lemberg (see Figure 183). Bobrka was lost to the Soviets.
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The corps had closed the hole to the Ill
Panzer Corps by an attack of the 16th Panzer Division to the
677
south.174 The Soviets advanced through the hole between the 1st
and 4th Panzer Armies to the San river on both sides of Jaroslau
(see Figure 182).175 Crossings over the San river were in progress.
July 23, 1944
4th Panzer Army

XXXXll Army Corps. The Soviets during the early morning
hours took Krasnobrod on the right wing of the corps and advanced
further to the northwest and were attacking Rudka (18 km
northwest of Krasnobrod) by evening.176 Soviet attacks north of
Tomaszow were smashed. The 17th Panzer Division launched a
rapid thrust to the north from Krasnystaw and advanced over the
Cholm-Lublin rail line to Pawlow engaging Soviet armored and
motorized columns advancing to the west.
LVI Panzer Corps. The garrison of Lublin repulsed numerous
Soviet attacks from the north and south knocking out 38 Soviet
tanks (see Figure 184).177 The Soviets advanced from Lublin to the
northwest to the Weichsel river and reached Kurow. 11s
1st Panzer Army

Soviet attacks supported by armor and tactical air power
pushed the front of the the XXIV Panzer Corps and the right wing of
the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps back along the entire front (see Figure
184). The 8th Panzer Division picked up approximately 10,000
troops from the XIII Army Corps equipped with only hand-held
678
weapons since the heavy weapons had to be abandoned during the

breakout from the cauldron.179 The 1st Panzer Division and the
75th Infantry Division's attack on Przemyslany gained little ground.
XIII Army Corps. The mass of the units which had broken
through during July 22-23, 1944 made contact with units of the
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps on the Zlota-Lipa river at Wiesniowczyk or
on the Gnila-Lipa river at Wolkow.180 The troops coming out of the
pocket were completely exhausted and were sent to Chodorow.
Grenadier Regiment 311 of Corps Detachment C under the command
of Knights Cross holder, Captain Loer was placed under the
command of the 1st Panzer Division and arrived later on July 28th
at the new assembly area in Synowodsko Wyzne. A total of
approximately 5,000 troops of Corps Detachment C had survived the
encirclement battle and had brought out their light infantry
weapons, but heavy equipment, vehicles and horses had been lost.181
The part of the supply troops of Corps Detachment C which were
fortunate to have been outside the cauldron were almost totally
intact. Corps Detachment C reported the loss of the following
commanders: Lt. Colonel Simons, Commander of Divisional Group
183 was missing; Major Kaupert, Commander of Artillery Regiment
219 was missing; and Captain Zinge, Commander of Fusilier
Battalion Corps Detachment C was missing.182 There were another
78 officers and 4,059 non-commissioned officers and troops
reported killed or missing.183
Ill Panzer Corps and XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The hole between
these two corps was closed (see Figure 184).184
679
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and Ill Panzer Corps. The Soviets

advancing through the hole between these two corps broke into
Lemberg from the east, southeast and west and the German garrison
was forced back to the defense of the city center (see Figure
184). 185 Soviet reconnaissance forces attempted to establish a
small bridgehead across the San river in the sector of Gruppe Lt.
General Freiher von Edelsheim (see Figure 184). The Germans,
however, managed to partially eliminate the bridgehead. Soviet
units further to the east blocked the Lemberg-Przemysl road at
Sadowa Wisznia.
GERMAN LOSSES IN THE BATTLE OF BRODY,

JULY 13-23, 1944
The Germans lost five divisions in the encirclement of the

XIII Army Corps at Brody (see Table XXXXV).186 Soviet sources
claim that the German losses were 8 divisions destroyed, 38,000
killed, and 17, 175 captured.187 The discrepancy between Soviet
claims of 8 divisions destroyed and actual German losses results
because the Soviets claim the actual divisional groups within Corps
Detachment C as divisions destroyed. Corps Detachment C
contained the 183rd, 217th and 339th Divisional Groups. The
Soviets apparently also counted the 349th Infantry Division which
was also encircled with the XII I Army Corps, but achieved a
successful breakout with heavy losses.
680
Major General Lindemann, Commander 361 st Infantry Division

and Major General Nedtwig, Commander 454th Security Division
were captured.188 However, Soviet and German sources disagree
about the fate of General d. Inf. Hauffe, Commander of the XIII Army
Corps. Soviet sources reported him captured and German sources
reported him killed.189 Soviet claims about German losses appear
to be exaggerated since according to German sources the XIII Army
Corps contained between 32,000 and 35,000 troops.190 German
losses appear to be more like 20,000 troops in the Brody pocket
since 5,000 men of Corps Detachment C escaped along with 3000
troops of the 14th SS Grenadier Division "Galizien". Nevertheless,
there was an overall loss of 25,000 to 30,000 troops in the Battle
of Brody.191 The losses of Army Group North Ukraine were mostly
replaced by transfers of divisions from Army Group South Ukraine
(see Table XXXXVI) which weakened this Army Group for the next
major Soviet offensive. Thus, the Battle of Brody constituted a
significant defeat in the chain of defeats that resulted in the
collapse of the German Army in the East in the summer of 1944.
681
TABLE XXXXll
SOVIET ORDER OF BATTLE,

JULY 13, 1944
Soviet Formations
1st Ukrainain Front:
1st Guards Army

3rd Guards Army
5th Guards Army
13th Combined Arms Army
Mobile Formations:
1st Guards Tank Army

3rd Guards Tank Army
4th Tank Army
Baranov's Cavalry Mechanized Group:
1st Guards Cavalry Corps
25th Tank Corps
S.V. Sokolov's Cavalry Mechanized Group:
6th Guards Cavalry Corps
31st Tank Corps
Front Reserves:
XL VI I Rifle Corps
Source: Colonel T.N. Dupuy & Paul Martell, Great Battles on the
Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War 1941-1945 (New
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1982), p. 171.
682
TABLE XXXXll I
SOVIET NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY
Men and Equipment 1st Ukrainian Army Group

Ratios Front North Ukraine
Personnel (combat) 843,000 600,000

1.4:1
Guns and Mortars 13,825 6,300
2.2:1
Tanks and Assault Guns 1,979 900
2.2:1
Combat Aircraft 3,052 700
4.4:1
Source: Colonel T.N. Dupuy & Paul Martell, Great Battles on the
Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War 1941-1945 (New
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1982), p. 178.
683
TABLE XXXXIV
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE,

ORDER OF BATTLE,
JULY 15, 1944
Axis Formations Commanders

Army Group North Ukraine Col. Gen. Harpe
4th Panzer Army Col. Gen. Harpe
Reserves:
168th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Schmidt-Hammer
213th Security Division Lt. Gen. Lendle
253rd Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Becker
XXXXVI Panzer Corps Gen. d. Inf. Schulz

16th Panzer Djvision Maj. Gen. Back
17th Panzer Division Maj. Gen. v.d. Meden
291 st Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Eckholt
340th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Ehrig
XXXXI I Army Corps Lt. Gen. Recknagel

72nd Infantry Division Col. Arning
88th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Graf v. Rittberg
214th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. v. Kirchbach
LVI Panzer Corps Gen. d. Inf. Hossbach

1st Ski Jaeger Division Col. Berg
26th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. de Boer
342nd Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Nickel
VII I Army Corps Gen. d. Inf. Hoehne

5th Jaeger Division Lt. Gen. Thumm
12th Hungarian Reserve Division
211th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Eckhardt
684
TABLE XXXXIV

ORDER OF BATILE,
JULY 15, 1944
(continued)

1st Panzer Army Gen. d. Pz. Tr. Raus
Reserves:
14th SS Grenadier Division Brigadefuehrer Freitag
"Galizien"
20th Panzer Grenadier Division Lt. Gen. Fries
LIX Army Corps Lt. Gen. Roehricht

1st Infantry Division Lt. Gen. v. Krosigk
20th Hungarian Division
208th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Piekenbrock
XXIV Panzer Corps Gen. d. Pz. Tr. Nehring

75th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Beukemann
1OOth Jaeger Division Lt. Gen. Utz
254th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Thielmann
371 st Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Niehoff
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps Gen. d. Pz. Tr. Balck

96th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Wirtz
349th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Lasch
359th Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Arndt
111 Panzer Corps Gen. d. Pz. Tr. Breith

1st Panzer Division Maj. Gen. Marcks
8th Panzer Division Maj. Gen. Friebe
685
TABLE XXXXIV

ORDER OF BATTLE,
JULY 15, 1944
(continued)

XI 11 Army Corps Gen. d. Inf. Hauffe
Corps Detachment C: Maj. Gen. Lange
183rd Infantry Divisional Group
21 ?th Infantry Divisional Group
339th Infantry Divisional Group
361 st Infantry Division Lt. Gen. Lindemann
454th Security Division Maj. Gen. Nedtwig
1st Hungarian Army

Reserves:
1st Hungarian Infantry Division
2nd Hungarian Panzer Division
1st Hungarian Moutain Brigade
2nd Hungarian Moutain Brigade
18th SS Panzer Grenadier Division
"Horst Wessel"
VI Hungarian Corps
27th Hungarian Light Division
XI Army Corps Gen d. Inf. Buenau

24th Hungarian Infantry Division
101 st Jaeger Division Lt. Gen. Vogel
VII Hungarian Corps

68th Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Scheuerpflug
686
TABLE XXXXIV

ORDER OF BATTLE,
JULY 15, 1944
(continued)

TOTAL FORMATIONS:
PANZER DIVISIONS 5 Panzer Divisions

PANZER GRENADIER DIVISIONS 2 Pz. Gren. Divisions
INFANTRY DIVISIONS 36 Infantry Divisions
INFANTRY BRIGADES 2 Infantry Brigades

10, p. 504.
687
TABLEXXXXV
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF BRODY
Reorganized
Formations Disbanded Commanders
XI 11 Army Corps Gen. d. Inf. Hauffe
killed
14th SS Division Reorganized
"Galizien"
340th Infantry Division Reorganized
361 st Infantry Division Reorganized Maj. Gen. Lindemann
prisoner
454th Security Division Disbanded Maj. Gen. Nedtwig
prisoner
Corps Detachment C Disbanded
TOTAL DIVISIONS DESTROYED: 5 Divisions
Source: Generalstab des Heeres, Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht

ueber Aufgeloeste Division 1944 NAMP T-78 Roll 41 O;
OKW/Org. Abt. und Heerespersonalabt., Zusammenstellung
der in diesem Kriege gefallen. toetlich verunglueckten.
verstorbenen. vermissten und im Gefangenschaft geratenen
Generale Flensburg 5 Juni 1945 NAMP T-77 Roll 785.
688
TABLE XXXXVI
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE REINFORCEMENTS

FROM AUGUST 1-31, 1944
Formations Source
3rd Panzer Division Army Group South Ukraine
23rd Panzer Division Army Group South Ukraine
24th Panzer Division Army Group South Ukraine
78th Volkssturm Division OKH Reserve
97th Jaeger Division Army Group South Ukraine
154th Reserve Division OKH Reserve
TOTAL REINFORCEMENTS: 9 Divisions:

6 Infantry Divisions
3 Panzer Divisions

10, pp. 504-507; Vol. 11, p. 337.
689
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Figure 170. Army Group North Ukraine Under Attack On
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Anny Corps, July 16, 1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse
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Figure 176. The Encirclement Of The XIII Army Corps On

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697
Figure 177. The 4th And 1st Panzer Armies, July 19,
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698
Figure 178. The Encircled XIII Army Corps, July 19,

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Figure 183. The XIII Army Corps, July 22, 1944.

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705
NOTES TO CHAPTER X
1 Colonel
T.N. Depuy & Paul Martell, Great Battles On The Eastern Front: The
Soviet-German War 1941-1945 (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc.,
1982), p. 169.
2John Erickson, The Road To Berlin (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,

1983), p. 232.
31bid.
41bid.
6oupuy, p. 167.
71bid.
8Erickson, p. 231.
9(bid.
10oepuy, p. 167; Erickson, p. 232.
11 (bid.
12(bid.
131bid.
14Erickson, p. 231.
150berkommando der 4. Panzer Army, Kriegstagebuch A.H.QU. 2. Juli 1944

NAMP T-313 ROLL 410.
16(bid.
171bid.
18(bid.
191bid.
201bid.
211bid.
706
221bid.
23General Oberst Harpe, Oberbefehlshaber der H.Gr. Nordukraine,

Grosskampfgliederung. A.H.QU. 4.7.1944 NAMP T-313 ROLL 410.
241bid.
261bid.
271bid. I p. 343.
281bid.
291bid.
301bid.
31 Rolf Stoves, Die 1. Panzer Division (Bad Nauheim: Verlag Hans-Henning

Podzun, 1961), p. 620.
331bid.
34stoves, p. 620.
351bid.
371bid.
381bid.
391bid.
40stoves, p. 621.
41 Ibid.
42Mehner,GHTBDW VOL. 10, P. 346.
431bid., p. 349.
707
44tbid.
45tbid.
46tbid.
47tbid.
48tbid.
49Lt. General Lange, Korpsabteilung C in der Kesselschlacht des XIII A.K.

Suedwestlich Brody vom 13.-22. Juli 1944 NAMP T-78 Roll 139.
S01bid.
51 tbid.
53tbid., p. 352
541bid.
SS Ibid.
561bid.
571bid.
58Lange
59tbid.
60Richard Landwehr, Fighting For Freedom: The Ukrainian Volunteer Division

Of The Waffen-SS (Silver Spring, Maryland: Bibliophile Legion Books, Inc., 1985),
pp. 77-78.
61Mehner, GHTBDW, Vol. 10, p. 355.
621bid.
631bid.
641bid.
708
651bid.
661bid.
67fbid.
681bid.
691bid.
701bid.
71Lange
721bid.
731bid.
741bid.
75tbid.
761bid.
77Landwehr, p. 79.
79tbid.
80tbid.
811bid.
821bid.
83Lange
84 1bid.
851bid.
861bid.
871bid.
709
88(bid.
89tbid.
90(bid.
91(bid.
92(bid.
93(bid.
95(bid.
961bid.
97(bid., p. 362.
98(bid.
99(bid.
100(bid.
1 0 1 1bid.
102Lange
103(bid.
104(bid.
105(bid.
106(bid.
107(bid.
108(bid.
1 09rbid.
110(bid.
710
111 Ibid.
113Stoves, p. 625.
1141bid., p. 624.
11slbid.
1161bid.
1171bid.
1191bid.
1201bid., p. 365.
1211bid.
1221bid.
123rbid.
1241bid.
12s1bid.
126Lange
127 1bid.
12a1bid.
1291bid.
1301bid.
13 11bid.
132 Stoves, p. 625.

711
134Lange
1 351bid.
1361bid.
1371bid.
1381bid.
1391bid.
1401bid.
1411bid.
1421bid.
1431bid.
1441bid.
1451bid.
146fbid.
1471bid.
1481bid.
1491bid.
1501bid.
151fbid.
152tbid.
153tbid.
154tbid.
156tbid.
712
157tbid., p. 368.
158tbid.
159fbid.
160tbid.
161fbid.
162tbid.
163tbid.
164Lange
165tbid.
166f bid.
167Landwehr, p. 83.
168tbid.
169tbid.
170tbid.
171 tbid.
172tbid.
173tbid., p. 84.
175tbid.
176tbid., p. 371.
177tbid.
178tbid.
179tbid.
713
180Lange
181 Ibid.
1821bid.
1831bid.
1851bid.
1sew.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, The Russian Campaigns of 1944-45 (New
York: Penguin Books, 1946), p. 159.
187P.N. Pospelov, p. 405.
1881bid.; Org. der Wehrmacht 2. OKW/Org. Abt. und Heerespersonalabt,

Zusammenstellung aer in diesem Kriege gefallenen. toetlich verunglueckten.
Verstorbenen. Vermissten und in Gefangenschaft geratenen Generale. Flensburg 5 June
1945 NAMP T-77 Roll 785.
1891bid.
190Landwehr, p. 84.
191Alex Buchner, Ostfront 1944 (Friedberg: Podzun - Pallas - Verlag GMBH,

1988), p. 260.
CHAPTER XI
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE

AND THE DEBACLE IN RUMANIA
Stavka issued the formal order for an attack on Rumania on

August 2, 1944. 1 Marshal Timoshenko was assigned by Stavka to
coordinate the attack on Rumania by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian
Fronts.2 The 2nd Ukrainian Front was commanded by General
Malinovskiy and covered a 330 km sector stretching from
Chernovtsy to Orgeyev (see Figure 185). The 3rd Ukrainian Front
under the command of General Tolbukhin extended 260 km along the
Dniester River from Orgeyev to the Black Sea (see Figure 185).3
Both fronts were to breakthrough on their respective sectors and by
means of a double envelopment encircle the German 6th Army in the
area of Kishinev by linking up together in the German rear.4 The
2nd Ukrainian Front was to breakthrough the German defenses
northwest of lasi (Jassy) and seize the Pruth river crossings on the
west bank depriving the Germans of a retreat route. The Soviets
would also seize Bacau, Vaslui and Husi in the encirclements The
3rd Ukrainian Front was to breakthrough the German defenses south
of Bendery taking Leovo and Tarutino while advancing toward
Opachi and Husi where the encirclement would be completed from
715
the southwest in conjunction with the 2nd Ukrainian Front.6 Once

the encirclement was completed the 3rd Ukrainian Front was to
advance south crossing the Danube and the 2nd Ukrainain Front was
to move southwest taking Ploesti, Bucharest and the passes in the
Carpathians and Transylvanian alps.7
The Soviets employed the same battle proven techniques that
had been successful in White Russia. The Soviets established
numerical superiority over Army Group South Ukraine and
concentrated this superiority on narrow attack sectors to
guarantee successful breakthroughs (see Table XXXXVll). The
combined 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts contained 90 Infantry
Divisions, 6 Tank and Mechanized Corps, 1 Cavalry Corps and
numerous independent formations.a This amounted to 1,250,000
troops, 16,000 artillery guns and mortars, 1870 tanks and self-
propelled guns and 2,200 aircraft (see Tables XXXXVlll & L).9
Army Group South Ukraine contained the German 6th and 8th
Armies along with the Rumanian 3rd and 4th Armies. This
amounted to 43 infantry divisions, 3 Panzer divisions, 1 Panzer
Grenadier division and 5 infantry brigades (see Table XXXXIX).10 The
German and Rumanian forces amounted to approximately 900,000
personnel (see Table L). The Rumanians accounted for 22 divisions
and 5 brigades. 11 The Germans had 25 divisions with about 360,000
troops stationed in Rumania.12 The Axis forces had 7600 artillery
guns and mortars, 400 tanks and self-propelled guns and 81 O
combat aircraft (see Table L).13 'Therefore, a comparison of Soviet
to Axis forces reveals a substantial Soviet numerical superiority.
716
The Soviets enjoyed a superiority of 1.4 to 1 in troops, 2.1 to 1 in

artillery, 4.6 to 1 in tanks and self-propelled guns and 2. 7 to 1 in
aircraft (see Table L).14
Army Group South Ukraine was deployed along a 671 .7 km
front with an average divisional sector of 17.223 km (see Table
Ll).15 The 3rd Rumanian Army held a total of 121.5 km with an
average divisional sector of 20.25 km (see Table LI). The German
6th Army held a total of 220 .3 km with an average divisional sector
of 13. 76 km. The German 8th Army held a total of 329.9 km of the
front with an average divisional sector of 19.4 km (see Table LI).
The weakest sectors of the front were held by the Rumanian troops
on the flanks of German divisions. Rumanian divisions in Army
Group Dumitrescu held 140 km out of 342 km of the front (see
Table Lii). Rumanian divisions in Army Group Woehler held 128 km.
out of 330 km of the front (see Table Lii). Therefore, the
Rumanians held 268 km out of 672 km or 40°/o of the entire frontage
held by the combined Army Groups Woehler and Dumitrescu (see
Table Lii).
Soviet strategy was to attack the Rumanian divisions on the
flanks of the German divisions. The newly organized German 6th
Army which replaced the 6th Army lost at Stalingrad was deployed
along the front similiar to the old 6th Army at Stalingrad with
Rumanian divisions holding its flanks and without adequate
reserves. Soviet strategy was to concentrate its attack on the
junction between neighboring German and Rumanian divisions.16
The initial penetrations were to be made against Rumanian
717
divisions on the flanks of the German 6th Army with the objective
of driving deep into the German rear area and encircling it.
The Soviets concentrated their forces on narrow breakthrough
sectors. The Soviets concentrated 73% of the 3rd Ukrainian Front's
artillery to support the breakthrough sectors of the 57th, 37th and
46th Armies on an 18 km wide breakthrough sector.11 This
permitted the Soviets to achieve a density of 250 guns, mortars
and rocket launchers for each kilometer of the breakthrough
sector.1 a The 2nd Ukrainian Front's breakthrough sector was 16 km
wide with 25 divisions assigned for the breakthrough (see Table
XXXXVll). The 3rd Ukrainian Front had 24 divisions concentrated on
its 18 km wide breakthrough sector (see Table XXXXVll). The Soviet
formula of concentration of forces on narrow breakthrough sectors
which had proven successful in Belorussia was once again employed
in Rumania.
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE
FAILURE IN RUMANIA
Foreign Armies East

Colonel Gehlen's intelligence organization which had failed to
accurately predict the main Soviet offensive in Belorussia in June
1944 was also forecasting Soviet military activity opposite Army
Group South Ukraine. Foreign Armies East (FHO) intelligence
summary on July 30, 1944 stated:
718
Altogether the impression emerged that the Soviet High

Command for the immediate future had dropped the
ideas about a major offensive against the Army Group. 1 9
However, FHO on August 7, 1944 noted an increase in Soviet
reconnaisance efforts over the preceeding days which could serve
as preparation for local attacks.20 On August 8, 1944, FHO noted
that the date of the possible Soviet attack could not be forseen
with certainty, however, the situation permitted the Soviets to
attack after only brief preparations.21 FHO on August 11, 1944
noted significant changes on the front. It recognized that for the
last 10 days on Army Group South Ukraine's front from Tiraspol to
the Carpathians that extensive Soviet regrouping was underway and
the purpose was not yet definitely recognizable. Soviet forces
were concentrating on both sides of the Pruth river, but the date of
the attack had not yet been determined.22 The assessment by FHO
on August 15, 1944 reiterated the view that a major offensive
against Army Group South Ukraine was unlikely. Soviet operations
into the Balkans were viewed as limited, local attacks designed to
prevent the transfer of German divisions to the central front where
the major Soviet efforts were expected to continue (see Figure
186). Once again Foreign Armies East had predicted the wrong
front for the next major Soviet operation.
FHO on August 16, 1944 noted that regrouping and departures
of Soviet units were occurring on Army Group South Ukraine's front.
Aerial reconnaisance indicated reinforcements in the area south of
Tiraspol and in the area of Jassy. Attacks on a local scale to
secure territory were probable.23 The last three days preceeding
719
the Soviet offensive against Army Group South Ukraine were filled
with observations by FHO of Soviet preparations for an offensive.
The FHO assessment on August 17, 1944 indicated that the
preparations by the Soviets in the area south of Tiraspol could be
expected to only result in local attacks. The stronger Soviet forces
were noted to be assembling on the northern front of the Army
Group in the sector of Jassy-Targul Frumos. However, FHO
calculated that the amount of Soviet forces available for the attack
was insufficent for operations with far ranging objectives.
Therefore, strong local attacks were to be expected in the Jassy-
Targul Frumos sector. Both attacks against Army Group South
Ukraine were forecasted as local attacks and not a major offensive
(see Figure 186).24
FHO on August 18, 1944 continued to predict the main attack
on the Dniester front in the area south of Tiraspol. Stronger Soviet
attacks were expected soon to begin in the area of Jassy-Targul-
Frumos. Two Soviet tank corps were expected to participate in the
attack in the Jassy area and the concentration of artillery was
reaching levels of 150 guns per kilometer .2s Soviet activity on
August 19, 1944 preceeding the major offensive was marked by
numerous attacks against the entire front of Army Group South
Ukraine which served to partly contain and distract German forces.
In the area of Tiraspol and to the south and between the Pruth and
Sereth rivers attacks were noted as preliminary before the
anticipated stronger attacks. The Soviet 5th Air Army was noted
to have regrouped in the area west of the Pruth river. The
720
objective of the Soviets could only be estimated when a clearer

picture of the employment of Soviet armored formations was
available.26 In the area of Jassy-Targul Frumos and also on the
east bank of the Pruth river attacks exceeding a local scope now
had to be regarded as a greater possibility.21 Thus, on the day
preceeding the major Soviet offensive FHO began to revise its
forecast of Soviet intentions but this was already too late.
RUMANIAN RELIABILITY
Hitler and the German High Command overestimated Rumanian

resolve to continue the war against the Soviet Union. False
intelligence reports were transmitted through OKW concerning
Rumanian loyalty to the Axis cause.28 The German minister to
Rumania, von Killinger and Erik Hansen, Chief of the German
Military Mission sent reports affirming Marshal Antonescu's loyalty
to Hitler and the German cause. However, Antonescu's personal
loyalty was confused with the loyalty of the Rumanian country to
the continuation of the war.29 Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop,
however, distrusted the reports he was receiving from Ambassador
Killinger regarding the stability of the Antonescu regime and
wanted a Panzer division stationed in Bucharest to guarantee the
continued survival of the Antonescu government.30 However,
Colonel General Guderian could not make a panzer division available
because of the continual crisis on the Eastern Front.31 Guderian
721
instead wanted to send the 4th SS Polizei Division from Serbia to

Rumania, but Jodi fobid it and Hitler did not act to overrule him.32
Therefore, a German combat division was not stationed in a
strategic location in Bucharest to ensure Rumanian loyalty.
Colonel General Schoemer, Commander of Army Group South
Ukraine, wrote Hitler on July 21, 1944 that the leadership in
Rumania was wavering in its support of the continued war effort
and Antonescu was loosing control.33 He recommended that Hitler
personally interview Antonescu. Hitler apparently was displeased
with Colonel General Schoerner's pessimistic attitude about
Rumania and on July 23, 1944 he was transferred to the command
of Army Group North. The High Command and in particular the new
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Guderian was displeased with
Colonel General Friessner's pessimistic attitude about the position
of Army Group North in the Baltic area.34 Therefore, The
Commander of Army Group North, Colonel General Friessner was
ordered to trade places with Schoemer and took over command of
Army Group South Ukraine in a message received on July 23, 1944
from Adolf Hitler which stated:
Both Commanders of Army Group North and South

Ukraine are to mutually change commands immediately.
I promote General d. Inf. Friessner to Colonel General.35
Colonel General Friessner made the following annnouncement on
July 26, 1944 to the soldiers of Army Group South Ukraine:
I have been appointed to the command of the Army Group

with the confidence of the Fuehrer and I have assumed
the command today.
722
I expect from every soldier from the oldest General to

the youngest Grenadier that as before he will do more
than his duty at his post.
The apparent quiet on our front shall not deceive us.

The war has entered its decisive stage. Any day the
assault of the Bolshevik masses could begin against us.
The unshakable belief in the Fuehrer and the Volk will
give us the power to break the enemy in a fanatical
battle of determination side by side with the brave
soldiers of King Michael and the Marshal of Rumania.
In these decisive hours we look to the Fuehrer and

promise him with immutable soldier's loyalty to follow
him to the final victory. Long live the Fuehrer!36
Colonel General Friessner on August 1, 1944 flew to
Bucharest and was briefed by the German Ambassador von Killinger,
Chief of the German Military Mission in Rumania, General d. Kav.
Hansen, the commander of the German Luftwaffe in Rumania and
Luftwaffe General Gerstenberg. General Gerstenberg in his briefing
expressed his opinion that in case of unrest one German Flak
battery would be sufficient to smash any putsch in Bucharest. 37
Ambassador von Killinger informed Friessner that "Marshal
Antonescu has the people and the government behind him. "38
However, Friessner was not convinced and he asked von Killinger if
the German government had prepared any measures in case of a
governmental crisis. Von Killinger replied that "up to now none."
"There is no governmental crisis to fear. "39
Colonel General Friessner dissatisfied with the situation in
Rumania sent Colonel Trotha with his personal letter by airplane to
Hitler at the Fuehrer's Headquarters which stated:
723
According to my earlier personal orientation at the

front and in the rear territory since assuming command
of Army Group South Ukraine and especially after the
August 1st informational visit to the German and
Rumanian Headquarters in Bucharest that occurred
which confirmed the impression that the political and
military circumstances in Rumania are not sufficiently
secure to be able to lead the fighting troops without
apprehension.
Subsequently, I am very disturbed on the basis of many

rumors because of the uncertainty of the Rumanian
troops and especially their higher commanders
subordinate to my command, the German Ambassador
and the German General with the Rumanian government
in Bucharest claim to be informed about the political
situation, but I have gained no reassuring impression.
No one could give me a clear answer to my questions and
minimized the insecure position of the Rumanian
government. What happens when the many
rumors already reported in the Army Group prove to be
true and the Rumanian Government changes sides? The
German Ambassador in Bucharest could not give me an
answer to this question. It appears to me that to
protect the troops under my command that it is an
absolute necessity that the absolute security in the
rear area be guaranteed. This can only be obtained by
placing all German Headquarters, troops, and
organizations under my command and allow me to
operate our own intelligence service in the entire
Rumanian area.
Should symptoms of insecurity of the Rumanian troops

at the front be further confirmed, then, there must be
an immediate withdrawal of the front behind the Pruth
and the line Galatz-Focsani-edge of the Carpathians
will be established.40
Colonel Trotha reported to Friessner on August 8, 1944 the
outcome of his visit to Hitler's Headquarters. He indicated that
724
Colonel General Guderian instructions were that in event that

further forces were withdrawn and particularily when the
Rumanian troops became unreliable the present front was not to be
held against Russian attacks; therefore when no reinforcements
could be secured then a withdrawal to the First World War position
of Danube-Sereth-Carpathians must occur and all preparations be in
place. Guderian stated that he hoped, "when the situation developed
in this direction that the Army Group could be given the necessary
orders in time. "41
The concerns of Marshal Antonescu were relayed by Major
General Garbea, Inspector of Rumanian Armored Forces to Colonel
General Guderian on August 3, 1944 at 1840 hrs.42 Major General
Garbea expressed Antonescu's major concern about the withdrawal
of numerous German formations from Rumania. However, Guderian
attempted to alleviate Antonescu's concerns by reassuring Garbea
that additional German formations would be sent to Rumania. The
20th Panzer Division had been transferred to Army Group South
Ukraine and 6-8 assault gun units were to arrive in August.43 Major
General Garbea informed Guderian that the new commander of Army
Group South Ukraine, Colonel General Friessner had made a good
impression in Bucharest.44 Garbea also announced the visit of
Marshal Antonescu for August 5, 1944.45 The meeting between
Hitler and Antonescu was positive. Field Marshal Keitel of OKW
informed Army Group South Ukraine that Rumania was with
Germany "Through thick and thin."46 Keitel dismissed Colonel
Trotha with the following message to Friessner concerning his
- --- -------------------------------------------~
725
request for complete authority in Rumania: "You hold the front

will keep the rear area open."47 German Ambassador von Killinger
on August 10, 1944 reported to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that
"the situation was completely secure, King Michael guarantees the
alliance with Germany."48 According to Colonel General Friessner
his efforts were in vain:
Despite all reports and warnings from the Army Group

to withdraw the front behind the Pruth or into the
Carpathian border position permission was denied. My
request for authority over the Wehrmacht in the rear
area was also not imparted.49
THE STATUS OF GERMAN AND RUMANIAN

FORCES PRIOR TO THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE
ON AUGUST 20, 1944
Army Group South Ukraine during the summer of 1944 had

served as a reserve from which OKH pulled divisions to replace the
losses by other Eastern Front Army Groups. The last transfer of a
division from Army Group South Ukraine ocurred on August 13,
1944. Total transfers from Army Group South Ukraine since June
amounted to 11 divisions or nearly one-third of the entire Army
Group's strength.50 Army Group South Ukraine contained 25 German
divisions and approximately 22 Rumanian divisions divided into two
Army Groups: Army Group Woehler and Army Group Dumitrescu (see
Figure 187).51
726
However, the quality of the German divisions had declined.

The German divisions now contained only 15% combat seasoned
troops while the other 85% had essentially no significant combat
experience. 52 The infantry divisions also lacked motorization and
depended on horses for movement (see Zustand der Divisionen der
Heeresgruppe Suedukraine in Appendix C). The Rumanian divisions
were also depleted and had serious morale problems. The combat
readiness of Rumanian units was also low (see Zustand der
Divisionen der Heeresgruppe Suedukraine in Appendix C). The
Germans lacked armor on this front due to the withdrawal of panzer
divisions to other Army Groups on the Eastern Front. The
Rumanians had almost half of all the operational tanks in Army
Group South Ukraine concentrated in the Rumanian Panzer Division
"GrossRumaenien" (see Zustand der Divisionen der Heeresgruppe
Suedukraine in Appendix C). The German Luftflotte 4 contained only
232 combat operational aircraft: 60 reconnaissance aircraft, 43
bombers, 57 ground attack and night ground attack aircraft, 41
fighters and 31 night fighters.53
The only additional support the German High Command had to
offer was the traditional exhortations to the soldiers for discipline
and sacrifice. Colonel General Friessner, Commander of Army Group
South Ukraine, issued the following proclamation to all German and
Rumanian Commanders on August 18, 1944:
1. In the coming days our front can also expect the

beginning of major attacks that in separate sectors will
727
be accompanied by numerous deceptions and containing

attacks.
we can brace for these attacks with resolute confidence

shoulder to shoulder with our proven Rumanian
comrades in the confidence of our training, our weapons
and our good, improving defensive works.
The mission remains: Defense of the ordered main

battle line with all available means. From responsible
troop commanders to the last man, every penetration of
his position must be defended to the last with grim
determination. In the main battle line enemy
breakthroughs are to be smashed in the counterstroke or
counterattack.
2. It will depend in the coming days on continuously

increased observation of reconnaissance probes and
raids to determine where the main effort of the enemy's
attack objectives are. We must make this point strong
by considering the weakening of forces in the sectors
which are not attacked.
I make in this context all commanders and troop leaders

responsible for relevant, unvarnished and continuous
reports. Invented reports will falsify the command's
situation assessment. The forces will hereby be pulled
from the true main points of attack,
where every single man counts.54
AUGUST 20, 1944
The Jassy-Kishinev operation commenced on the morning of

August 20, 1944 in the area south of Tiraspol and in the area
northwest of Jassy.55 The Soviets achieved deep breakthroughs on
both frontal sectors against Rumanian units which put up
728
surprising little resistance. These breakthroughs were only

partially sealed off by employing the available reserves en masse.
The Kriegstagebuch of Army Group South Ukraine prophetically
noted that the "burden of the battles in the days ahead were placed
almost solely on the shoulders of German troops. "56
Army Group Dumitrescu

The Soviets attacked after 90 minutes of artillery
preparation on both sides of the boundary between the 3rd
Rumanian Army and the German 6th Army with infantry and armor
supported by strong tactical air support. The attack succeeded and
the front of the 4th Rumanian Moutain Division was broken through
on a wide front and the division was routed (see Figure 188).57 The
21st Rumanian Infantry Division after the loss of Rascaeti was
thrown out of its positions along the entire length of its front (see
Figure 188).58 A weak defensive line was established by evening
with employment of reserves from the 9th Infantry Division,
remnants of the 21st Rumanian Infantry Division and the 4th
Rumanian Moutain Division. The line extended from Rascaeti to
northwest of Festelita.
The main effort of the Soviet attack consisting of 4-5 rifle
divisions and masses of armor was directed against the right wing
of the XXX Army Corps where despite the employment of all
reserves and tenacious defense the Soviets succeeded in the
afternoon at Plopstiubei with a breakthrough by 50 tanks.59 This
729
forced a withdrawal of the front to the hills south of Popeasca and

forced the abandonment of Carnateni.
The 13th Panzer Division on the right wing of the XXX Army
Corps was employed to restore the situation east of Causenil (see
Figure 188). The Soviet attack against the center and left wing of
the 15th Infantry Division lead to a 6 km wide and 3 km deep
penetration which was in the process of being liquidated. The
Grenadier Regiment 81 of the 15th Infantry Division was overrun
and an assault gun battery from the Assault Gun Brigade 239 was
deployed to restore the situation (see Figure 188).60
A Soviet attack in regimental strength against the center of
the Lii Army Corps west of Taslik was repulsed with heavy Soviet
losses. A limited penetration in the 14th Infantry Division's sector
was in the process of being mopped up. Soviet breakthroughs at
Redeni on the 106th Infantry Division's sector were being
liquidated.
The situation of the German 6th Army was serious by 2005
hrs in the evening. The 21st Rumanian Infantry Division and the 4th
Rumanian Moutain Division had completely disintegrated and no
longer existed.61 However, the main Soviet attack against the right
wing of the XXX Army Corps in the sectors of the 306th Infantry
Division and the right wing of the 15th Infantry Division was
pushed back. The 13th Panzer Division was employed in a
counterattack at Popeascu against Soviet armor and had knocked
out 17 Soviet tanks. Nevertheless, the situation remained serious
730
with the loss of two Rumanian divisions and the breakthrough on

the 306th and 15th Infantry Divisions' sectors (see Figure 188).
Army Group Woehler

The Soviets attacked with infantry and armor after 90-120
minutes of continuous artillery barrage fire and strong tactical air
support northwest of Jassy between Rediu Mitropoliei and Erbiceni
achieving very rapid, deep penetrations on the 7th and 5th Rumanian
Infantry Division sectors because the Rumanians partly deserted
their positions (see Figure 188).62 The 7th Rumanian Infantry
Division during the course of battle lost Vultur and Rediul lui
Tataru.63 The failure of the 3rd Rumanian Infantry Division to
enter the battle except with small units enabled the Soviets to
advance around Rediul lui Tataru to the south. The 5th Rumanian
Infantry Division completely disintegrated when it was swept back
by the Soviet offensive and the two most forward battalions of the
18th Rumanian Moutain Division were also swept away by the
Soviet steamroller. The Commander of Army Group Woehler
responded by forming an attack group from the 18th Rumanian
Moutain Division, Artillery Brigade 959, Panzer Division
"Grossrumaenien", formation Kessel and Assault Gun Brigade 286 to
throw back the Soviets which had advanced south of Hoisesti.
Meanwhile, the hole left on the 5th Rumanian Infantry Division's
sector permitted the Soviets to enter the western part of Jassy
where heavy street battles developed in which the population
participated. The Commandant of Jassy encircled in the northern
731
part of town was extricated by a counterattack from the north by a

battalion with Assault guns. s4 A counterattack succeeded
northeast of Jassy and a new defensive front was built to the west
to protect the 11th Rumanian Infantry Division and the 79th
Infantry Division which were holding their positions. Directly west
of Jassy the Soviets had crossed with their most forward elements
to the south bank of the Bachluim sector and were met by the 10th
Panzer Grenadier Division in a counterattack from the southwest of
Jassy (see Figure 188).
The breakthrough area in the VI Rumanian Army Corps was a
result of the failure of the 5th Rumanian Infantry Division which
permitted the Soviets to advance very rapidly through the Bachluim
sector to the area southeast of Podul lloaci. The Soviet
breakthrough area was constricted by a counteratttack of the
Panzer Division "Grossrumaenien" out of the area Popesti to the
northeast. The 76th Infantry Division between the 7th Rumanian
and 5th Rumanian Infantry Divisions was outflanked on both sides
and had to withdraw to the hills south of Letcani and built a new
defensive front on the line Cobiasca-Harpasesti (see Figure 188).
The battle persisted between Jassy and the counterattacking Axis
forces while the Soviets maintained strong frontal pressure to the
south against the withdrawing 76th Infantry Division which was
attempting to establish a defensive front along the rail line and
southwest of it with elements of the 18th Rumanian Moutain
Division.
732
There were only local penetrations on the right wing of the V

Rumanian Army Corps. Nevertheless, a counterattack by the 1st
Rumanian Infantry Division to liquidate yesterday's penetration
southwest of Belcesti did not succeed. The 1st Rumanian Moutain
Division was locked into a seesaw battle around a hill 8 km west of
Stranya.
The liquidation of the penetration in the I Rumanian Army
Corps on the 6th Rumanian Infantry Division's sector was not
successful. However, the Soviet penetration against the XVII Army
Corps southwest of Solca was liquidated in a counterattack.
The situation on Army Group Woehler's front had become more
critical by the evening. Contact with the 76th Infantry Division had
not been restored and its request to withdraw to Voinesti had been
denied. It was ordered to hold its forward positions to prevent the
Soviets from reaching the Trajan line (see Figure 189).65 The
Commanding General of Gruppe Kirchner reported at 2230 hrs that
the Panzer Division "Grossrumaenien" had been attacked in the rear
and routed. The Commander of Army Group South Ukraine stressed
that the Soviets under all circumstances must be prevented from
reaching the Trajan line (see Figure 189) and likewise the hole to
the VI Rumanian Army Corps must be closed. 66 A withdrawal of the
front to the Trajan line as proposed by the 4th Rumanian Army in
Army Group Woehler was out of the question.
German fighter and ground attack aircraft made 300 sorties
against the Soviets in the area of Jassy. 67 Luftflotte 4 was
advised that the main effort for tomorrow must again be directed
733
to the support of Army Group Woehler. An attack against Jassy

tonight was recommended to destroy important military
installations within the city. Air support for the counterattack of
the 13th Panzer Division would also be important.
AUGUST 21, 1944

The Soviets continued their attack around noon with new
mobile forces and armor in the breakthrough area. Weak Soviet
attacks were repulsed on the right wing of the XXIX Army Corps, but
Soviet armored forces broke through the weakly occupied security
line in the afternoon and after routing the 21st Rumanian Infantry
Division and the 4th Rumanian Moutain Division advanced to the
southwest and bypassed Grenadier Regiment 77 of the 153rd Field
Training Division north of Volintiri (see Figure 190).68 Then the
Soviets after defeating Panzer Grenadier Regiment 66 of the 13th
Panzer Division at Festefita advanced to the fine Paufeni-Frumusica
Veche-Nicofaeni. The 13th Panzer Division prevented one Soviet
armored breakthrough onf y to be outflanked and forced back to the
west in heavy fighting
Further north the Soviets made little headway against
tenacious resistance by the XXX Army Corps and the 13th Panzer
Division. A Soviet armored thrust west of Popeasca resulted in a
heavy armored engagement and a Soviet armored breakthrough was
prevented at Causanii Noui. However, the 13th Panzer Division
734
suffered serious losses and was later pushed back to the hills west
of Brezoaia by enveloping attacks. The Soviets later in the evening
staged a breakthrough on the outermost right wing of the 15th
Infantry Division and to the north broke through the remnants of the
306th Infantry Division into the wooded terrain southeast of Zaim
and reached the Botha sector by the evening.69 The southern part of
Hadgimus was lost.
The Chief of Staff of the 6th Army reported that the situation
in the south of the breakthrough area was developing very
unsatisfactorily. Chizil, Adjiler, Marianca and Festilta were lost
and the 13th Panzer Division was pushed back to the hills of
Simionesti (see Figure 190). There was a large hole from the left
wing of the 9th Infantry Division to the west (see Figure 190).70
The situation continued to worsen during the afternoon with the
loss of Slobozla, Ganeasa, Siminnesti and Ursoaia. The 13th Panzer
Division's losses were so heavy that it hardly had any tanks
remaining. 50 Soviet tanks had reached Causanii Mari. The front of
the 15th Rumanian Infantry Division was pushed back to Cara Hasan
and from there to the west to connect with the 9th Infantry
Division. The Soviet Air Force had achieved complete freedom of
action on this front which caused numerous losses of vehicles and
delayed all movement.
Army Group Woehler
The Soviets exploited yesterday's success in the breakthrough

area at Jassy (lasi) during the early morning hours by breaking
735
through the Trajan line to the south with strong infantry and armor
forces. Meanwhile, the rapidly concentrated Kampfgruppe on the
left wing of the VI Rumanian Army Corps succeeded in repelling
Soviet attacks that were supported by more than 60 Soviet tanks
(see Figure 190). The attack against the 101 st Rumanian Moutain
Brigade with 20 tanks resulted in 12 tanks being knocked out and
the attack failed. However, the Soviets achieved a breakthrough
into the Trajan line in the late afternoon with 30 tanks and
mounted infantry south of Lungeni and penetrated the Trajan line
east of Voinesti.71 The Soviets reacted rapidly by widening the
breakthroughs to the south and southwest with 2nd echelon forces.
Soviet armored spearheads advanced through Hadambul to the
southeast, south and southwest on both sides of the Voinesti-
Garbesti road. Units from the Panzer Division "Grosssrumaenien"
reinforced with one army engineer battalion moved to engage the
oncoming Soviet armored spearheads. However, the attack of the
Panzer Division "Grossrumaenien" was brought to a halt by a Soviet
flank attack out of the area of Podul lloaei-Cositeni and the
division was routed. The 10th Panzer Grenadier Division launched
an attack against the east flank of the Soviet breakthrough area and
was brought to a halt by a Soviet counterattack supported by 100-
150 tanks. Nevertheless, the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division during
the afternoon managed to hold the following line: the south edge of
Galata-west edge of Balciu-the hill terrain west of Dancasa and
knocked out 40-50 Soviet tanks before being pushed back to the
east during the evening hours along the Jassy-Vaslui road (see
736
Figure 190). Similarly, the 11th Rumanian Infantry Division and

79th Infantry Division northeast of Jassy were thrown back to the
the southeast in the Bachlui sector after the Soviets broke through
their positions during the night. The Soviets attacked Targul
Frumos on a broad front during the morning from the west flank of
the breakthrough area with approximately the strength of a tank
corps. Targul Frumos was bombed by 70 Soviet aircraft around
noon. The Axis forces improvised an anti-tank line with units from
the Assault Gun Brigade 286 and Kampfgruppe von Kessel. The
Soviets were successfully blocked on the general line Sinesti-
southwest of Crucea-Lugani-Baltati.
The Soviets achieved penetrations on the right wing and
center of the 1st Rumanian Infantry Division. The Soviets
attempted to widen their breakthrough on the 1st Rumanian Guards.
Division's sector but failed. There were only Soviet company
strength attacks against the 3rd Moutain Division in the XVII Army
Corps sector.
Army Group South Ukraine

A report issued by the commanding general of Gruppe Mieth
and the VI Rumanian Army Corps stated that the following units
could no longer be counted as combat effective because of losses of
men and material in the battles of August 20th and 21st: the 3rd,
5th and 7th Rumanian Infantry Divisions and most of the 5th
Rumanian Cavalry Division. 72
737
The Chief of Staff of Army Group Woehler recommended

replacing the Rumanian tank crews in the Panzer Division
"Grossrumaenien" and the 2nd Rumanian Panzer Division with
German crews to make the units more effective. 73 The Panzer
Division "Grossrumaenien" reported only 20 tanks and 1O assault
guns available for action. A total of 5 Rumanian divisions had
disintegrated in the last 24 hours.74 The Trajan line was ordered
to be held under all circumstances. The situation had become more
critical with Soviet armor attacking out of the breakthrough area
on both sides of the Jassy-Targul Frumos road. The Soviets had
even breached the Trajan line with 20 tanks south of Lungani.75
The German and Rumanian air forces had staged 500 sorties for
August 21, 1944.
Marshal Antonescu met with Colonel General Friessner and
conveyed to him that he was with the "Fuehrer and Germany to the
end." 7 6 Colonel General Friessner in his meeting with Marshal
Antonescu on August 21-22, 1944 engaged him in the following
discussion:
The present could still be overcome when the Rumanian

troops and the Rumanian people with unshakeable,
strong conviction were willing to see through through
the common struggle and bring together the Rumanians
and the Germans against the great danger that a
predominant Soviet Russia represents for Europe.
We sit here together in a boat on a stormy sea. Whoever

bails out brings not only himself and his nation into
danger, but the entire European world. 77
738
Marshal Antonescu responded to Friessner with an

affirmation of loyalty:
I declare anew that despite all the Rumanian people out

of complete conviction and as the sincerest and loyalist
ally march at Germany's side and also will continue to
march.78
The parting words of Marshal Antonescu on August 21, 1944
indicated a sense of inevitable defeat when he declared to
Friessner:
When the Russians cross over the line Galatz-Focsani,

Rumania is lost for all time.79
Marshal Antonescu aware of the disappointing performance of
the Panzer Division "Grossrumaenien" ordered the division to be
divided into two groups. One group was to be commanded by the
Rumanian General Corne and deployed at Voinesti and the other
group was to go to Sinesti to Kampfgruppe von Kessel to be
replaced by German crews.BO
AUGUST 22, 1944

The Soviets advanced from both sides of Volontiri to the
southwest and west with motorized and armored forces and
reached the area Paris-Tarutino-Leipzig-Taraclia-Cainari (see
Figure 191 ). The 9th Infantry Division was pushed back 6 km to the
southwest to lvanesti Vechi. Meanwhile, the 13th Panzer Division
repulsed the Soviets southwest of Causanii. German and Rumanian
739
units held at Romanesti against the attacking Soviet armor. A

defense line was under construction in the Cogalnicul sector
southwest of Romanesti. The Soviets on the outermost left wing of
the 6th Army broke through the 376th Infantry Division sector with
infantry and armor forces and took Ungheni and the village 9 km
northeast of Ungheni (see Figure 191 ).
Army Group Woehler

The Soviets continued their breakthrough of the Trajan line
south of Lungani and east of Voinesti with infantry and armor.8 1
The breakthrough developed rapidly to the south and southeast
resulting in a further breakthrough at Vasluiui pushing the German
forces back.
Korpsgruppe Mieth continued to hold their positions southeast
of Jassy against superior Soviet forces.
Gruppe Kirchner was thrown out of their positions directly
east and northeast of Roman by a Soviet attack supported by armor.
But the Germans managed to repulse weaker attacks against the
Trajan line south and southwest of Targul Frumos (see Figure 191 ).
A total of 32 Soviet tanks were in Negresti 30 km south of the
Trajan line at 0925 hrs and 50 Soviet tanks had reached the area of
Garbesti-Titanesti (see Figure 191 ). German antitank positions at
Dragesti were smashed by Soviet aircraft and the Panzer Division
"Grossrumaenien" was attacked by 80 Soviet tanks. Army Group
Woehler reported that it now only had 45 tanks, 78 assault guns and
2 self-propelled howitzers available for action.82
740
Army Group South Ukraine

The Chief of Staff of Army Group Woehler stressed that the
Soviet thrust to the southeast must be prevented and the Pruth
river crossings must be held open.83 The Soviet armor had to be
channeled. The Trajan line must be held as much as possible and
the hole must be closed by an attack from the east and west.
Panzer Group Braun was dispatched from the Army Group in the
direction of Vaslui to stop the Soviet armored thrust. Panzer Group
Braun contained 30 tanks and 21 assault guns.
The main effort of Luftflotte 4 was to be directed against the
Soviet armored breakthrough of the Trajan line which was
advancing south in the sector of Army Group Woehler toward Vaslui
(see Figure 191).84 Presently, 20 Soviet tanks were reported in
Vaslui. The remainder of the aircraft were to be used against the
Soviet armored spearheads in Army Group Dumitrescu's sector.
Luftflotte 4 aircraft destroyed 16 Soviet tanks and 140 vehicles in
the 6th Army sector (see Figure 191 ).
Soviet intentions were clear to the Germans by the end of the
day. The Soviets continued their breakthrough operations in both
breakthrough areas with the obvious objectives of capturing the
Pruth river crossings and cutting off the German forces on both
sides of Kischinew.85 Two Soviet assault groups were moving into
the rear in the 6th Army sector. One assault group was moving
west toward the Pruth river crossings and the other was advancing
in the direction of Galatz. Two Soviet assault groups were also
breaking through in the sector of Army Group Woehler (see Figure
741
191 ). One assault group was advancing toward Husi and the other
to the south. The 6th Army was to be pulled back into the Trajan
line tonight and then tommorrow into the Stefan line when possible
(see Figure 189).86 The Soviets had also landed in the early
morning hours in the area of Akkerman and pushed their way into
the Axis defensive positions.
The Chief of Staff of Army Group South Ukraine sent the order
to withdraw to the 6th and 8th Army which had been approved by
the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer had approved the withdrawal of the 6th
Army to the Ferdinand-Carol-Trajan line.87 Army Group Woehler
was ordered to· withdraw in conjunction with Army Group
Dumitrescu. The withdrawal movement was to be conducted
maintaining contact with the 376th Infantry Division and the west
wing of the 6th Army to the Trajan line and the communication line
southwest of Targul Frumos with contact at Harmaneasa to the old
main battle line.88 This order further stated:
It is of decisive importance that there is sufficiently

strong mobile reserves available on the west wing to
defend the general line Targul Frumos to Targul Neamt
against a possible enemy breakthrough toward Roman.
It must be clear to All troop leaders and every
individual that the fate of their comrades east of the
Pruth river is dependent upon their tenacity and
resistance in holding this line.89
742
AUGUST 23, 1944
3rd Rumanian Army. Soviet armored spearheads from the

breakthrough area south of Tiraspol and east of the Pruth river
reached the area around and west of Comrat. Soviet units had
turned south and seized Tatar Bunar and Furmanca. Consequently,
the bulk of the Ill Rumanian Army Corps including the German 9th
Infantry Division was encircled.90 These units were ordered to
attack to the west and southwest in order to fight their way out of
the encirclement. Soviet armored spearheads advancing to the
southwest were halted at Cubei northeast of Bolgrad from
advancing further by elements of the 13th Panzer Division.
6th Army. The withdrawal movement proceeded as ordered
without notable Soviet pressure. Soviet armor was reported
advancing southeast in the direction of Hancesti. Korpsgruppe
General Mieth was placed under the command of the 6th Army as of
noon on August 23, 1944 and was withdrawing in the line Grozesti-
Ciortesti (30 km northwest of Husi).91 The 10th Panzer Grenadier
Division was currently engaged in battle with strong Soviet armor
forces in the hills at Coadesti. The German defense line at Crassna
repulsed attacking Soviet armor spearheads after the loss of
Vaslui.92 A Soviet armored thrust against Barlad entered the town
before it was repulsed with the loss of 9 tanks by Panzer Group
Braun. Soviet attacks against Barlad were resumed in the evening
with battalion strength infantry attacks. Soviet armor was
reported west of Barlad moving south. Soviet armor reached the

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Portland State University

Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses

The collapse of the German army in the East in the

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

Portland State University

JULY 10, 1944

3rd Panzer Army

Duenaburg. Therefore, the continuation of the attack to restore

3rd Panzer Army

252nd Infantry Division: approximately 900 men

1 . The relief of Wilna.

2. The hole to Army Group North after the II Army

3. The preparation of a position from Kauen to the

1 . The Nieman front south of Kauen is to be blocked.

2. The battle at Kauen and to the northeast is to be

3. Contact with Army Group North is to be restored.

JULY 12, 1944

3rd Panzer Army

northeast of Pietuchowo. Air support was requested at 2100 hrs

Sirvintos where Kampfgruppe Schmidt was located (see Figure

1 . The present area was to be held.

2. The hole to Army Group North was to be bridged by

JULY 13, 1944

3rd Panzer Army

Stahel reached me with about 400 men initially. Stahel

The most difficult phase of treeing the garrison of Wilna

JULY 14-31, 1944

The Soviet advance began to slow down as they advanced

fell back toward East Prussia and Poland. German reinforcements

JULY 26, 1944

the penetrations at Kostomoloty, Zakije and Jamno. Nevertheless,

The crisis on the south flank of the Army has

We have not lost our nerves and also the essential

JULY 27, 1944

45 minutes of artillery preparation. The assault group on the right

JULY 28, 1944

JULY 29, 1944

The causes of the collapse of Army Group Center were a

setting the stage for encirclement, and producing detrimental

changing circumstances on the battlefield. Bobruisk, Vitebsk,

Even the smallest move depended on authorization from

6 had only 40 combat ready fighters to oppose the massive

By means of well-prepared air strikes, the Russians

Nothing revealed more strikingly the turn in the

was being proved against the German armies--in both

Reinforcements only trickled into Army Group Center while it was

ARMY GROUP CENTER ORDER OF BATTLE

Army Group Center Formations Commanders

White Ruthenia Military

3rd Panzer Army Col. Gen. Reinhardt

IX Army Corps Gen. d. Arty. Wuthmann

LI II Army Corps Gen. d. Infantry Gollwitzer

ARMY GROUP CENTER ORDER OF BATTLE

Auny Group Center Formations Commanders

Fortress Vitebsk Gen. d. Inf. Gollwitzer

4th Army Gen. d. Inf. Tippelskirch

XXVll Army Corps Gen. d. Inf. Voelckers

XXXIX Panzer Corps Gen. d. Arty. Martinek