API 521 UPDATEAPI 521 UPDATE CHANGES TO API 521 THAT WILL BE COVERED IN THIS WEBINAR Additional guidance on use of administrative controls for remote overpressure scenarios Review added content regarding Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) explosions Clarification of check valve failure analysis involving a spare pump and admin controls Additional cautionary statements regarding the hydraulic expansion overpressureAPI 521 UPDATE REMOTE OVERPRESSURE SCENARIOS New in 4.2.2 Use of Administrative Controls if Corrected Hydrotest Pressure Not Exceeded: + It is the responsibility of the user to determine the overpressure scenarios upon which the pressure relief system is designed, and to determine the method of overpressure protection used to mitigate each scenario in accordance with the relevar nt codes. It is the responsibility of theAPI 521 UPDATE REMOTE OVERPRESSURE SCENARIOS + API definition of administrative controls: — Procedures intended to ensure that personnel actions do not compromise the overpressure protection of the equipment.API 521 UPDATE 4.4.6 ENTRANCE OF VOLATILE MATERIAL INTO THE SYSTEM 6" edition had subsections on “Water Into Hot Oil” and “Light Hydrocarbons Into Hot Oil”; these terms are no longer used. The General paragraph (4.4.6.1) now describes possible violent explosions due to mixing water or light hydrocarbons with significantly hotter fluid or contact with hot surfaces. Some terms used for theseAPI 521 UPDATE 4.4.6 ENTRANCE OF VOLATILE MATERIAL INTO THE SYSTEM + Examples where superheat limit explosions are possible include: — Discharge of hot heavies/oil into K-O drum containing a layer of water or light hydrocarbons — Introduction of water into the feed to a hot feed surge drum — Start-up of hot oil systems containing residual water from cleaning/maintenance — Hot oil heat exchanger tube failure Other inadvertent mixing scenarios involving instrument, mechanical or operator errors 2 mci nt eet keAPI 521 UPDATE SUPERHEAT LIMIT TEMPERATURE Experimentally determined; Water SLT = 536 °F at atmospheric pressure Can estimate SLT if critical temperature and pressure are known: an [(o4 1p. \soss| Prot When SLT is exceeded, proper design, commissioning and operation are essential to eliminate the explosion possibility When SLT of the cooler, volatile fluid is not exceeded, PRDs can be considered rattan pee EGE feAPI 521 UPDATE 4.4.6 ENTRANCE OF VOLATILE MATERIAL INTO THE SYSTEM, CONT. + Paragraph 4.4.6.4 provides a list of precautions that may be considered in order to reduce the risk of an RPT event; these were in the previous API 521 edition: = Maintain hot cil flow when in stand-by to minimize water collection — Avoid water-collecting pockets = Installing proper steam condensate traps = Using heat tracing to eliminate condensation = Use double block-and-bleed valves on water connections to hat process lines = Interlocks to trp off sources of heat when water contamination is detected = Start-up procedures te allow for gradual temperature increaseAPI 521 UPDATE NORMAL CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE (4.4.9.3.2.1) Caution regarding the use of administrative controls when considering check valve fllure ~ When lining up a spare pump, admin controls may be used to negate consideration of leakage through the check vale and overpressurng the suction side if there le ms-valving. ~ However this type of admin control would not be credited ifthe same pump stops during normal operation andi subject to backfow, eSAPI 521 UPDATE HYDRAULIC EXPANSION (4.4.12) + Increase in liquid volume when liquid-filed equipment is blocked in and exposed to solar radiation or anather source of heat. + Case can sometimes be eliminated by the institution of administrative procedures to drain Immediately upon isolation ~ CAUTION: Block valves have potential to leak, admitting cold (or hot) fluid into exchanger. ‘+ CAUTION: Vaporization can occur if iquid can be heated above its bubble point at relief pressure. ‘+ CAUTION: I iquid can be heated above its ST, result may be a BLEVE. eames BEAPI 521 UPDATE HEAT TRANSFER EQUIPMENT FAILURE (4.4.14) 4.8.14.3 Double-Pipe Heat Exchangers: A tube rupture contingency does NOT need to be considered for a double-pipe exchanger. However, if pipe walls susceptible to corrosion ‘or erosion, internal failure should be considered. API suggests a hole of 0.25 inches in diameter, 4.8.14.4 Plate-and-Frame, Spiral-Plate, and Welded-Block Heat Exchangers: Previous edition only referred to Plate-and-Frame. New edition added Spiral-Plate and Welded- Block exchangers to the grouping and described the considerations as the same for all 3 categories. ~ Same sereening rule as applied to shell-and-tube exchangers: ifthe low pressure side cannot be exposed to pressures above its hydrotest pressure, pressure relief system need not consider a failure. “failure” is considering a hole size equivalent to a single tube rupture in a S&T exchanger: 0.25 to 1.0-inch diameter. Note that flow is across one hole only.API 521 UPDATE HEAT TRANSFER EQUIPMENT FAILURE (4.4.14), CONT’D. 4.4.14.5 Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU) Thermal Reactor Waste Heat Steam Generators (WHSG): whole new section added. + 44.14.5.1 General Claus sulfur recovery process uses WHSG to cool elemental sulfur gases — sulfur on the tubeside 1S): 2o G:nch tubes, DP «35 0150 pl, may be open te stmcsphere, but may have valves in ele paths — wateretem onthe shade (SOP = $0 to 750 pig + 4.4.14.5.2 Relief Protection Evaluation Procedure PDs may be uneliable due to possible solidification of sulfur pen cooling ~ Safety concerns of an atmospheric release with HS and SO, gases ‘May be appropriate to provide overpressure protection by system design = Failures may occur in mile tubes can be equated to a single fulrbore tbe ruptre ~ Analyte using steady-state techniques, considering tube breaks above and below the waterline on the SS — Whydeotetpresure ie not exceeded, evaluate using the considerations in 44.1453, Whydrtest pressure can be exceeded, use more rigorous dynamic analysis and/or provide overpressure ‘protection by system design (ASME Section Vl, UG140); addess considerations in 4414.53 in analysis p lenaevininstnceris esis FoieAPI 521 UPDATE HEAT TRANSFER EQUIPMENT FAILURE (4.4.14), CONT’D. 4.4.14.5 Sulfur Recovery Unit Thermal Reactor Waste Heat Steam Generators, Cont’d.: + 4.4.18.5.3 Operational Considerations to Mitigate and Reduce the Potential for a WHSG Failure Monitor upstream thermal reactor temperature Malntain integrity of tubesheet refractory protective system ‘erly the thermal reactar temperature is controlled ta not compromise tubesheet refractory system Maintain effective shellede blowsown to ensure impurities are removed Maintain boiler feed water quality Ensure decharge steam check valves are maintained for reliability during posible tube fail event Ensure operators are propery trained regarding maintaining water level onthe shelside (not allowing dry tubes and avoiding eintroducion of water to hot exposed tubes Design and maintain the instrumented protective system to prevent an SAU blocked outlet I utiized, ensure SIS end ignition control system are designed, operated and maintained per ISA 84.01/ lece1si1 #8 exrreitenatoeteteanitiiemee! FGleeAPI 521 UPDATE FLARE SECTION (5.7) CHANGES ‘+ Moved some content to API 537 Flare Detalls for Petroleum, Petrochemical, and Natural Gas Industries = 5.7.2 (partial) - Combustion Properties: Flame Properties, Smoke, Flame Stability = 5.7.3~Combustion Methods: Smokeless Operation Options = 5:7.4—Flare Systems Designs: Ground, Elevated, Burn Pit = 5.7.5~ Sizing: tack Diameter, Height, Flare Tip Pressure Drop = 5.7.6~ Purging: Continuous, Purge-reduction Seals = 5.7.7 ~ Ignition of Flare Gases: Plot Operation & Monitoring ‘+ Moved some main body content to new Annex F (Informative) Flare Background Informati — 5.7.2 (partial) - Combustion Properties: Combustibilty, Gas Velocity at Flare Tip and Calculation of Radiation , EeAPI 521 UPDATE FLARE SECTION (5.7) CHANGES, CONT’D. + Added Section 5.7.5 Freezing and tei Flare Tips = Caution regarding the use of steam injection systems, which may condense and freeze in cold climates, resulting in blockage of the flare stack. — Also caution regarding the use of assist air when flaring vapors with temperatures below 32°F (0°C); the moisture in the assist air may freeze leading to blockage of flare gas flow paths. * Consult with flare vendor; provide all possible conditions of the flare operating envelope for vendor to assess. This caution was added due to a recent incident where an air assisted fare design for LNG tankage /ship loading and unloading resulted ina fate capacity reduction due to icing up the flare tip such that ship loading was severely impacted. This was pally caused by cryogenic liquid vapors condensing/freezing out moisture in the assist at een ee) GE.API 521 UPDATE ANNEX G (INFORMATIVE) VAPOR BREAKTHROUGH INTO LIQUID-CONTAINING SYSTEMS, + New Annex, referred to from vapor breakthrough discussion in paragraph 4.4.8.3, “Inlet Control Devices and Bypass Valves” + Adds criteria on liquid displacement considerations following gas breakthrough, specifically HP liquid bottoms discharging to LP downstream systeAPI 521 UPDATE [ANNEX G (INFORMATIVE) VAPOR BREAKTHROUGH INTO LIQUID-CONTAINING SYSTEMS, CONT'D Loss of liquid level in the high pressure system (HPS) may result in vapor breakthrough across the LCV and/or bypass \apor will push (displace) the liquid into the low pressure system (LPS) until relief path is established + Depending on the HPS and LPS volumes as well as liquid inventories and liquid properties, the LPS may overill with liquid, resulting in aliquid relief case for the PRD + Two potential relief scenarios are presented: © Upstream liquid inventory less than downstream vapor volume. LPS may be able to accommodate liquid. Consider other factors to determine phase quality of relief stream, including possible disengagement analysis © _ Upstream liquid inventory more than downstream vapor volume. Initial relief will be liquid. Vapor breakthrough will lead to liquid displacement at volumetric rate of vapor through LCV or other flow limiting device. May result in impractical relief system design. > seen! BEAPI 521 UPDATE [ANNEX G (INFORMATIVE) VAPOR BREAKTHROUGH INTO LIQUID-CONTAINING SYSTEMS, CONT'D + Factors to consider for determination of phase quality and flowrate of the relieving stream are provided, some of which are: ‘The HPS and LPS fluid properties and compositions Liquid levels in the subject vessels Disengagement regimes (foamy, bubbly, churn-turbulent?) ‘Vessel orientations and nezzle locations Location of the PRD ‘Assumptions involving continuing flows during an overpressure event; both incoming and dischargingAPI 521 UPDATE [ANNEX G (INFORMATIVE) VAPOR BREAKTHROUGH INTO LIQUID-CONTAINING SYSTEMS, CONT'D ‘+ Mitigation options are presented to satisfy or reduce the relief requirements, some of which are: Increasing LPS MAWP's to negate or make the scenario less severe — > Increasing size of LPS vessel to accommodate more liauid Properly size the PRD(s) for possible liquid displacement Providing High-Integrty Protection System (HIPS) to either isolate the flow from the HPS "oF progressively remove liquid from the LPS Use flow-limiting elements (Caution: must be designated safety-critical items) Perform hydraulic analysis to take credit for pressure drop between HPS and LPS Modify liquid levels: Determine if credit can be taken for continuing out-flowing fluids) teeta arec toa FE.API 521 UPDATE ANNEX H (INFORMATIVE) FLOW-INDUCED VIBRATION + New Annex referenced from: 5.0 Disposal Systems + 55 Piping ~ 5.5.12 Acoustic Fatigue + 5.5.12. General: ...“Flow-induced vibration can also be the cause of piping fatigue feilure in pressure relieving systems (see Annex H).” + Turbulence energies increase after tees, reducers, bend, valves, etc. due to vortex formations, resulting in pressure fluctuations + References are cited for screening methods + Common mitigations include enlarging pipe diameter, adding pipe supports and increasing wall thickness Omri tetem niyo amare EGE: