Ijosper Vol. 9 Issue 1, 22
Ijosper Vol. 9 Issue 1, 22
Ijosper Vol. 9 Issue 1, 22
https://doi.org/10.46291/IJOSPERvol9iss1pp67-79
Af Sigit Rochadi
Department of Sociology, Universitas Nasional, Pasar Minggu South Jakarta, Indonesia
Email: sigitrochadi@yahoo.com
Abstract:
This study discusses the conversion of agricultural land in Karawang Regency, West Java, which was known
as the national rice granary for almost a century. However, the role of agriculture has decreased drastically since the
regency was designated as an industrial area replaced by the secondary sector. This study aims to explain the actions
of farmers during and after land conversion in rice-producing areas in Muslim community, Indonesia. A quantitative
method and data analysis with cross-tabulation using google sheets were used. The results showed that the conversion
of agricultural land involves capital and political power. Peasants are actively persuaded by accomplices in different
ways to give up land. Lack of support and guidance by government officials and investors, causes land conversion to
take place less transparently and it is detrimental to farmers. About 30 percent are getting poorer and failing to adapt
in the process of transition to an industrial society. Around 28 percent become temporary workers or disguised
unemployment. Therefore, a transparent conversion process, fair compensation, as well as effective and targeted
Page | 67
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
government with business strategies are needed to prevent farmers from falling into poverty. The land conversion only
fosters potential conflicts that can turn into riots at any time without such strategies.
Keywords: Adaptation Failure, Agricultural Land Conversion, Global Industry, Industrial Transition, Poverty.
1. Introduction
The role of agriculture in labor absorption and food production in developing countries
continues to decline as global business investment increases in the region. For example, in
countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the population working in agriculture
has decreased by 8.5 percent over the last two decades (SESRIC, 2020). The main cause is the
decrease in the availability of agricultural land, which is not attractive to the younger generation.
Borras et al. (2011) described the rapid conversion by global companies as the movement of a
Tornado hurricane sweeping through poor farmers. Land acquisition is associated with the
production of flexible commodities with high commercial relevance that can be moved from one
country to another. The rapid increase in agricultural land functions outsources production and the
new sites for capital-intensive industries (https://grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-
landgrab). Meanwhile, the scale differs according to authoritative sources, for example between
2004-2009, the International Food Policy Research Institute / IFPRI estimated 20 million hectares
of agricultural land converted. The World Bank predicted 45 million hectares between 2007-2008
and Oxfam recorded 227 million hectares of land converted between 2000-2010 (TNI Agrarian
Justice Programme, 2013). In 2018 only 36.9% of agriculture remained due to its continuous
decrease (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.AGRI.ZS).
There are policies in developing countries that support the entry of investors and do not
protect the interest of farmers. Certain areas are designated as industrial zones and are given to
investors by the government. They use such land to erect infrastructures for the mobility of goods
and services. Industrialization and infrastructure development reduce agriculture and accelerate
the economic and industrial growth of a country. This is supported by policies such as education,
employment, and land. Urbanization and the formation of metropolitan buffer cities are
consequences that cannot be avoided (Rondhi et al., 2018).
Several factors promote the conversion of agricultural lands, such as industrialization,
construction of settlements, offices, and infrastructure. The entire process is a land trading activity
since the government initiated and failed to effectively control it (Firman, 2000). Syahyuti (2018)
considered the very strategic position of the food economy, and it becomes a new 'gold field'
Page | 68
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
followed by a wave of investment in the crop sector. This causes land conversion in developing
countries to take place on a large scale. For example, in 1950-2000, forest conversion reached 99.6
million ha in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the area of agricultural land decreased from 36.8 million ha
in 2014 to 34.8 million ha in 2018 (Kementerian Pertanian, 2019).
The study of agricultural land conversion in rice-producing areas explains the farmers'
actions during and after land conversion. Furthermore, it compares their economic conditions of
income and post-conversion work and analyzes their adaptability in industrial transition societies.
2. Literature Review
Previous studies on the conversion of agricultural land have led to a variety of causes. The
study conducted by Agus and Irawan (2006) in early 2000 concluded that people still ignore the
meaning of multifunctional agriculture such as environmental functions, food security, and socio-
culture events that increase conversion of agricultural land. In the Indochina region, changes from
agricultural to non-agricultural land are taking place very quickly, and it is driven by the desire of
the government and its people to build cities. The cost of urban development is cheaper on
agricultural land than in the suburbs (Nguyen et al., 2016). While in Indochina and China, the land
is jointly owned, and the state has the right to govern it. When the land in an area is decided to be
used for a development project, the people are obliged to obey the order. The government's
hegemony in land management cannot be separated from the experience of being led by socialist
and communist parties.
In contrast to the Nguyen et al. (2016), Gellert (2015), Dell’Angelo et al. (2017) only found
the keywords 'coercion' and 'violent', especially for small farmers. Land conversion is not done
voluntarily, but by coercion. The same is also shown by Borras et al. (2011), TNI Agrarian Justice
Programme (2013), Syahyuti (2018), Gonda (2019), and Dell’Angelo et al. (2021). It was pointed
out that land grabbing for transnational business expansion has become a global phenomenon.
However, the scale is different since the pattern is similar from one region to another. There is a
level of cooperation between transnational and local investors that is supported by dominant
political forces to condition land grabbing. The role of local power is decisive in new democracies
due to the spread of political power. Also, the strong role of money politics in legislative elections
and the evolution of investors as cukong (boss) or dealer for politicians increased the looting of
farmers' land for agribusiness and global industrial interests.
Page | 69
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
Meanwhile, the land conversion concept was used by Firman (2000), Agus and Irawan
(2006), Rondhi et al. (2018), and Duong et al.(2020). There is evidence that land status changes
are conducted by coercive and violent means (TNI Agrarian Justice Programme, 2013), (Gellert,
2015), (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017), (Dell’Angelo et al., 2021). Most of the conversion is conducted
by coercion either by state officials, investors, brokers, or cooperation between them. Meanwhile,
the sought land is strategically located for businesses with lower prices. The capitalist are also
tricky by buying farmers' land which is far from the highway since they have no other choice
besides selling. Usually, the investors cooperate with state officials that understand regional spatial
planning to know the short-term and medium-term plans for land use in an area. They use this
information to hunt for land from farmers that are generally economically and politically weak.
Faced with such conditions, the most common response of farmers is to refuse conversion because
agricultural land is the only source of life. The Lack of cooperation, weak resources, networks,
and leadership decrease the survival level of farmers.
Theories about the expansion of investor investment in developing countries have long
involved local actors, both state and businessmen. They act as partners or intermediaries such as
the use of the comprador and triple alliances concept in dependency theory that triumphed in the
1970s. The concept of oligarchs was brought up in the early 2000s and developed in the 1950s to
show how business elites, politicians, and rulers work together to maintain and increase prosperity.
This concept is also increasingly used to explain the behavior of local elites in helping global
investors to obtain land. The study of Visser et al. (2012) in Russia stated that the behavior of
oligarchs in obtaining and controlling land did not impoverish farmers. This is because a lot of
lands were abandoned after the Soviet Union. In contrast, Ananta (2016) study in Karawang found
that land grabbing by oligarchs was prohibited since some farmers were forced to suffer both
physically and economically. They do not have a medium-term plan in utilizing the compensation
money due to limited resources. Meanwhile, a lack of experience in managing large sums of money
worsened the economy of the farmers. This is because many of them fall into poverty and face
increasingly fierce competition with migrants having stronger resources in fighting for jobs.
3. Methods
A quantitative approach is used in this study where the researcher prepares a questionnaire to
be given to the respondents. The questionnaire measures the variables of agricultural land
Page | 70
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
conversion, economic conditions before and after conversion, and the main occupation before and
after conversion.This study was conducted in Karawang, known as the Indonesian rice granary.
The regency is about 70 km from Jakarta and takes 2 hours drive, and was chosen because land
conversion in this area is relatively fast. This is because of its designation as an industrial area by
Presidential Decree no. 53 in 1989. Between 2014 and 2018, the area of rice fields decreased by
1,916 hectares even though this regency is the mainstay in supplying rice to the provinces of
Jakarta and West Java.
The data published by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) on the agricultural area of
Karawang Regency differs from that of the Ministry of Agriculture. The area of agricultural land
has increased by 4521 hectares in the last 5 years. This study uses data published by BPS Karawang
since it is more up-to-date and detailed. Of the 30 districts in Karawang Regency, there are 8 where
agricultural land conversion is more than 100 hectares per district between 2010-2018. Klari and
Cikampek districts are the largest, with 915 and 225 hectares, respectively. Therefore, the study
focused on the Klari and Cikampek districts. There are 117 heads of families (KK) where
agricultural lands have been converted. These families were tracked down and became potential
respondents. However, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, only 93 families were managed as
respondents. During data collection (March to May 2021), the Karawang regency was declared a
red zone for the Covid-19 pandemic. The data collection is carried out by closed questionnaire and
the analysis by frequency and cross-tabulation.
For agricultural land conversion variables, indicators of rice field type, area of rice fields,
information on land conversion will be carried out, and reasons for selling the land. For economic
condition variables, indicators of the use of money from agricultural land conversion, income
before and after land conversion are used. While the work mobility variable is used as the
respondent's main occupation indicator before and after land conversion. Failure of work mobility
is also called failure to adapt to industrialization because the Karawang district has become an
industrial area.
Page | 71
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
follows that the growth of the informal sector in urban areas is rapid and shows the appearance of
structural deformations, and these symptoms persist. Besides the decline in agricultural land and
productivity, which cannot meet demand, another important factor is the continued decrease in the
motivation of young people trained to work in this sector. The next implication is the continued
reduction in the contribution of the primary sector in the formation of gross domestic product. In
the early 1980s the contribution of the agricultural sector was around 52 percent; at the end of
2018 it was only 13.04 percent (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2020).
Over the last 5 years, the area of rice fields has decreased by 12.97 percent, the most
extensive compared to dry fields, and land that is temporarily not cultivated. The overall reduction
in agricultural land reached 24.66 percent in 2014-2018. At the end of 2018, Indonesia's
agricultural land area was only 34.8 million hectares (Kementerian Pertanian, 2019). In the study
location, the reduction is much smaller, and over the last 5 years, it has decreased by 2 percent or
1916 hectares (BPS Kabupaten Karawang, 2021). The reduction occurred in strategic locations for
industry, housing, offices, and warehousing, and the determination of Karawang as an industrial
area makes it difficult for the regency since its status as a national rice granary should be
maintained.
Over 54 percent of farmers that released land had low education (no school and did not
finish elementary school), and only 2 percent had higher education. Meanwhile, 58 percent of the
land that was converted is irrigated. Therefore, the position of farmers and efforts to maintain
irrigated fertile land are less successful since rice fields are annually narrowed. The results of the
2018 Agricultural Census showed that the average Indonesian farmer owns 0.8 hectares of land.
The number that owns less than 1 hectare of land reaches 74.92 percent of households (Badan
Pusat Statistik, 2018). Such fragmentation also occurs in the study location since 75.3 percent of
respondents own less than 1 hectare of land. The inheritance system by dividing family land to
sons and selling part for business capital, performing the pilgrimage, and seeking medical
treatment are the dominant causes of fragmentation.
Page | 72
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
officials, community leaders, and capital owners. About 69.9 percent sold because of 'pressure
from other parties, while some 'requires business capital'. Observing the conversion of rice fields
into foreign company buildings proves that the agricultural land in the study location is part of the
global industrialization agenda. These findings support the results of Gonda (2019), and
Dell’Angelo et al. (2021). The involvement of the capital apparatus is very intensive since they
visit farmers' houses, persuade them with electronic and automotive goods that are the dreams of
young people. These include motorbikes, mobile phones, gadgets, and promising their children to
work in the companies they build. The role of 'company peoples' reached 52.6 percent and 'housing
developer' was 27 percent while 'village apparatus' and 'community leaders' were 12.9 percent.
The data above shows the role of the authorities and the owners of capital in pressuring
farmers to control their land. In contrast to the Soeharto era (1966-1999) where the oligarchs were
still shy about appearing under the guise of development or for the public interest, they openly
mobilize their accomplices to acquire farmer lands currently. They work closely with village
officials, youths that are members of various local organizations, and community leaders. About
19.3 percent of farmers were persuaded by village officials and community leaders involving
Hamlet's heads. Land brokers were the most active among the hunters, and they persuaded about
52.6 percent of farmers. They consist of local village people that have information on land use
plans. Furthermore, teachers, religious leaders, even district officials may be land brokers. About
26.8 percent of farmers were persuaded by employees of housing companies, and when faced with
such greater economic and political power, they had no bargaining power.
Page | 73
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
and workers in Karawang. It explains the less attractive work of farming for young people. The
poverty line indicator of the Central Statistics Agency of IDR. 454652/capita/month showed that
23 percent of farmers are poor after land conversion.
The decline in the economic conditions of post-conversion farmers is also indicated by the
loss of income sources. Of the 61.9 percent of respondents, only 15.9 percent were left after land
conversion with the main occupation as farmers. Meanwhile, the number of non-permanent or
disguise unemployment increased 2 times from 20.4 percent to 43 percent. They become involved
in any kind of work, such as motorcyclists (ojek), masseurs, foragers for cattle, and housemaids.
Their position is more vulnerable because they do not have income certainty. Meanwhile, many of
their children that are growing up are trapped in human trafficking. This is conditioned by the
decline in job opportunities, changes in the lifestyle of young people, the proliferation of shopping
and entertainment centers.
Figure 1 The Change in Peasants’ Income (IDR) Figure 2 Work Changes of Peasants having
≤ 1 ha of Land Converted
Before After
47,4
30,1 25,8
16,2
10,8 6,5
2,1 4,3 0 1,2
Peasant poverty raises a more serious problem of unrest and tension. This is because
inequality occurs in a striking way between rural communities where farmers live in industrial and
residential areas. Around 60 percent of the workers in the manufacturing industry, with better lives,
come from outside Karawang. When respondents were asked to name the most troubling situation,
it turned was not the problem of drugs just like in other cities. They stated that 'immigrants took
over the work of the natives and 'conflicts between residents', the figures were 50.5 percent and
26.8 percent, respectively. This unrest has been felt since 2014 through demands from village
heads and Youth Organization administrators (Karang Taruna) that urged the regent to limit the
entry of workers from outside Karawang. By the Singaperbangsa Labor Union, these concerns
were aggregated and articulated into regional issues. At the urging of village officials and social
Page | 74
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
organizations, such as the Farmers' Union, the Pangkal Perjuangan Labor Coalition issued decree
number 8 of 2016 concerning the Expansion of Employment Opportunities in Karawang Regency.
This decree requires every company to employ Karawang natives at least 60 percent. By the
Supreme Court, the regent's decision was annulled because it was against the principles of
openness and justice.
10,8 3,2
8,6 9,7
5,4 4,3
2,1 1,2 3,2 2,1 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2
0 0 0
4.3.Failure to Adapt
Farmers that their land was converted to industrial and residential areas failed to adapt as
an integral part of industrial society. The promises of intermediaries, developers, and village
officials to employ farmers or one of their families in the company did not materialize. Meanwhile,
Regent Decree No. 8/2016 which was expected to become legally binding was annulled by the
Supreme Court. All groups of farmers failed to succumb to actors with secondary education. The
ability to survive and increase income occurs for landowners that are not mainly farmers. Figure
2 below shows the relationship between land area conversion and adaptation to off-farm work.
The farmers with a land area less than or equal to 1 ha suffer the most. This group has the
largest proportion as temporary workers or unemployed in disguise (46.3 percent). This data
proves that farming is their only job and their source of income is lost when their land is converted.
Off-farm work is more attractive to farmers that have lost their land due to higher wages. Figure 5
presents data showing that job mobility only occurs from farmers to non-farmers. The theory of
job mobility which is characterized by the movement of jobs between sectors is not proven in the
study location even though the area was industrialized. Also, the direction of change is still linear
as suggested by classical and modernization theories. Only 2.0 percent of farmers managed to find
Page | 75
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
work in the formal sector. Meanwhile, about 16.0 percent switched professions as small traders
such as sellers of meatballs, fried rice, fruit sellers, and various other commodities. The premature
swelling of the service sector by modernization theory is called structural deformation. They call
themselves 'entrepreneurs' even though they do not have sufficient innovation and capital like
entrepreneurs.
Permanent buildings and excavations replace the expanse of green rice fields which is
beautiful and cool scenery. Farmers stand by the roadside watching their land been turned into a
housing complex, factory, and office area. They were eliminated from the industrialization process
since their education and skills do not qualify as a global industrial apparatus. Nguyen et al. (2016)
in Vietnam, showed that they have opportunities to work in the non-agricultural sector since they
are faced with various difficulties in working in the non-agricultural sector, in finding stable
alternative livelihood activities, and in using compensation for investment. This is seen from their
failure to choose the type of investment and eventually become temporary workers. Only 16
percent managed to survive as small traders, while 28 percent became underemployed. Small
trading becomes a rational choice due to limited capital. The type of commodity traded is common
and easy to produce, and 33.3 percent switch this profession.
Structural pressures on farmers are getting harder because local sources of financing are
starting to decline. Figure 6 showed that arisan (saving) developed in rural Java in the late 18th
century (Wertheim, 1956), was only followed by 31 percent of farmers with certain income. The
circulation of money between residents acts as social security when facing a crisis or having a
celebration such as marrying a child, tuition fees, or when a family member is sick. Various
instruments of social cohesion such as cooperation and security system also declined. In contrast,
Page | 76
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
the recitation forum which emerged in the late 1990s when Indonesia was hit by a
multidimensional crisis is still running well. However, these religious ties have a little economic
impact due to a continual decrease in participation. As a Muslim community, religion has not
played a role in the economic empowerment of farmers since the land conversion process is
dominated by pressure from officials and owners of capital. This condition exposed the farmers
openly to the power of capital and politics, and they did not succeed in adapting to the industrial
environment. They choose to be migrant workers due to this structural pressure and the penetration
of global capital and labor from outside the region, although many are victims of human
trafficking.
5. Conclusion
Industrialization conducted by converting agricultural land does not always have a positive
impact on farmers. This is because they mostly lose their only source of income, live in poverty,
and have difficulty adapting to their new environment. They also find it hard to choose alternative
jobs because of weak resources and a lack of attention from the authorities to prepare early for the
conversion process. In this study, farmers' land is targeted by global investors through village
officials and their accomplices. Various efforts were made to acquire the land without assistance
in adapting to the new environment. Structural transformation theories do not fully explain the
conversion of agricultural land. The industrial sector is growing rapidly, and the development of
the tertiary has resulted in a structural deformation.
In contrast to the results of Borras et al. (2011), and Dell’Angelo et al. (2021), which showed
that the looting of farmers' lands is carried out by force and violence, they are persuaded by
financiers, community leaders, and village officials in various ways. They have high trust in village
officials because of the good relationship for many years. Farmers have high hopes for these
officials since they are the traditional authority holders. In such cases, attention should be paid to
the future of farmers. Compensation and targeted strategy of support from the government and
entrepreneurs to prevent farmers from getting poorer should also be encouraged. This is because
the land conversion only fosters potential conflicts that can turn into riots at any time without such
strategy.
Conflict of Interest
Page | 77
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the rector Universitas Nasional for the financial support in this
research.
References
Agus, F., & Irawan. (2006). Agricultural Land Conversion As a Threat To Food Security and
Environmental. Jurnal Penelitian Dan Pengembangan Pertanian, 25(3), 90–98.
Ananta, D. D. (2016). Politik Oligarki dan Perampasan Tanah di Indonesia : Kasus Perampasan
Tanah di Kabupaten Karawang Tahun 2014. Jurnal Politik, 2(1), 101–135.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v2i1.83
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2018). Hasil Survei Pertanian Antar Sensus 2018. Badan Pusat Statistik.
Badan Pusat Statistik. (2020). PDB Indonesia Triwulanan 2016-2020. In BPS RI. BPS RI.
https://doi.org/9301003
Borras, S. M., Hall, R., Scoones, I., White, B., & Wolford, W. (2011). Towards a better
understanding of global land grabbing: An editorial introduction. Journal of Peasant Studies,
38(2), 209–216. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2011.559005
BPS Kabupaten Karawang. (2021). Kabupaten Karawang dalam Angka 2021. BPS Karawang.
https://doi.org/32150.2101
Chowdury, S. R. H., Alam, M. S., Numani, A. J. M. Q. I., & Göktaş, V. (2021). COVID-19
Pandemic: An Islamic Analysis. CenRaPS Journal of Social Sciences, 3(1), 13-32.
Dell’Angelo, J., D’Odorico, P., Rulli, M. C., & Marchand, P. (2017). The Tragedy of the Grabbed
Commons: Coercion and Dispossession in the Global Land Rush. World Development, 92, 1–12.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.11.005
Dell’Angelo, J., Navas, G., Witteman, M., D’Alisa, G., Scheidel, A., & Temper, L. (2021).
Commons grabbing and agribusiness: Violence, resistance and social mobilization. Ecological
Economics, 184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107004
Duong, M. T. T., Samsura, D. A. A., & van der Krabben, E. (2020). Land conversion for tourism
development under vietnam’s ambiguous property rights over land. Land, 9(6), 1–22.
https://doi.org/10.3390/land9060204
Page | 78
International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2022, 67-79
Firman, T. (2000). Rural to urban land conversion in Indonesia during boom and bust periods.
Land Use Policy, 17(1), 13–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0264-8377(99)00037-X
Gellert, P. K. (2015). Palm oil expansion in Indonesia: Land grabbing as accumulation by
dispossession. Current Perspectives in Social Theory, 34(November 2015), 65–99.
https://doi.org/10.1108/S0278-120420150000034004
Gonda, N. (2019). Land grabbing and the making of an authoritarian populist regime in Hungary.
Journal of Peasant Studies, 46(3), 606–625. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2019.1584190
Kementerian Pertanian. (2019). Statistik Lahan Pertanian Tahun 2013-2017 (O. Hakim, Luthful
M. and Wiratno (ed.)). Center for Agriculture Data and Information System Secretariat General –
Ministry of Agriculture. http://epublikasi.setjen.pertanian.go.id/arsip-perstatistikan/167-
statistik/statistik-lahan
Nguyen, T. H. T., Tran, V. T., Bui, Q. T., Man, Q. H., & Walter, T. de V. (2016). Socio-economic
effects of agricultural land conversion for urban development: Case study of Hanoi, Vietnam. Land
Use Policy, 54, 583–592. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.02.032
Rochadi, A. S. (2020). Gerakan Buruh Indonesia Perlawanan dan Fragmantasi (Indonesian
Labor Movement, Resistance and Fragmentation). Bumi Aksara.
Rondhi, M., Pratiwi, P. A., Handini, V. T., Sunartomo, A. F., & Budiman, S. A. (2018).
Agricultural land conversion, land economic value, and sustainable agriculture: A case study in
East Java, Indonesia. Land, 7(4). https://doi.org/10.3390/land7040148
SESRIC. (2020). Agricultural and Food Security in OIC Member Countries 2020. SESRIC.
www.sesric.org
Syahyuti, S. (2018). Fenomena Global Akuisisi Lahan (Land Grabbing) dan Dampaknya bagi
Kesejahteraan Petani Lokal. Forum Penelitian Agro Ekonomi, 36(1), 1–12.
https://doi.org/10.21082/fae.v36n1.2018.1-12
TNI Agrarian Justice Programme. (2013). A Global Land-Grab A Primer. In
http://www.tni.org/work-area/agrarian-justice (2nd ed.). TNI. http://www.tni.org/work-
area/agrarian-justice
Visser, O., Mamonova, N., & Spoor, M. (2012). Oligarchs, megafarms and land reserves:
Understanding land grabbing in Russia. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3–4), 899–931.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.675574
Wertheim, W. . (1956). Indonesia Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change. van Hoeve.
Page | 79