Somali Climate Risk Review

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Review
Somalia
Climate Risk
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Contents
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii governance and conflict [linkages 4, 5, 6] . . . . . . . 30
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 2.4 Vulnerability and social risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Warbixin Kooban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv Clan dynamics and marginalized groups . . . . . . . . 31

Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
C H APT ER 1: CLI M ATE Forced displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
OV ERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Geography and climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
CHAPT E R 3 : R IS K
1.2 Seasonality and variability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 S U M M AR IE S . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
1.3 Climate change: recent past and near future 9 3.1 Climate disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.4 Overview of national climate policies and Drought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Fluvial and pluvial flood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Coastal flooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
C H APT ER 2: CLI M ATE 3.2 Agriculture and livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

C H ANG E , CON FLI CT, A N D Locusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
S OC IAL RI SKS . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 Crop stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.1 Conflict and climate change: an overview . . 19 Crop diseases and pests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Heat stress on livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2 Conflict and social context in Somalia . . . . . 22
Fodder availability and quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A brief history of conflict in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . .22
Livestock pests and diseases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Structural factors influencing the relationship
between climate and conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.3 Renewable natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Terrestrial ecosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Evidence for specific climate and conflict
linkages in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Marine fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Climate impacts on natural resources and rural 3.4 Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

livelihood impacts, driving food insecurity,
Heat stress on humans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
displacement, and conflict outcomes [linkages 1, 2, 3] 27
Vector-borne disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Direct linkage between weak natural resource
Gastrointestinal diseases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
iii
iv l Somalia Climate Risk Review
3.5 Infrastructure and services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 B OX E S , F IG U R E S , M AP S , AN D

Degradation of infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 TAB L E S
Disruption of energy supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Boxes
Disruption of water supply and sanitation services . . 84
3.1 An explanation of heat risk and temperature . . . . . . . . 68
C H APT ER 4: PRI ORI TI ZI N G 3.2 What are urban heat Islands? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
ADAPTAT ION ACTI ON . . . . . . 89 3.3 Recent findings on water access and availability
across 15 regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.1 Adaptation and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 Decoupling climate and conflict . . . . . . . . . . 92
Figures
4.3 Prioritizing risks and adaptation options . . 93
1.1 Composition of Somalia exports, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4 Policy and institutional measures . . . . . . . . 95
1.2 Monthly climatology for temperature and
4.5 Physical investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 precipitation in Somalia, 1991–2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.6 Knowledge agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 1.3 Key livelihood and labor cycles in Somalia’s
seasonal calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
AP P ENDIX: A DA PTATI ON 1.4 Proportion of Somalis reporting experiencing

shocks in the preceding year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
O PT IONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 1
1.5 Observed average annual mean temperature and
A.1 Disaster risk management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
precipitation profiles for Somalia, 1901–2021 . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.2 Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
1.6 Per decade change in mean annual and seasonal
A.3 Agriculture and livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 rainfall in selected districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.4 Biodiversity and forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 1.7 Projected mean temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.5 Fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 1.8 Projected precipitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.6 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 1.9 Somalia climate projections compared to current

climate of other countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.7 Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
1.10 Trends in Somalia’s largest daily maximum
A.8 Cities/urban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 temperature and precipitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.9 Water and sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 1.11 Country Climate Vulnerability Index versus
Readiness Index scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.10 Societal change and development . . . . . . . 120
2.1 Timeline of conflict and extreme weather events in
Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
REF ERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . 1 23
2.2 Conflict incidents in Somalia with and without
al-Shabaab involvement, 2011–21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
l v
2.3 Conceptual framework examining the links between 3.17 Impact of heatwaves on Somalia’s population, under
risk elements directly affected by climate events different climate projections—RCPs 2.6 (blue) and
(blue boxes) and those that may be indirectly 6.0 (red) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
affected (white boxes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.18 Mortality rate attributed to unsafe water, unsafe
2.4 Number of IDPs recorded by UNHCR as requiring sanitation, and lack of hygiene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
food aid, by primary reason of displacement . . . . . . . . 29
3.19 How extreme weather events impact the status of
2.5 Aggregated priority needs of newly displaced waterborne protozoa diseases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
people, summarized across all displacement
3.20 Access to powater for households in Somalia . . . . . . . . 85
reasons, across Somalia during 2016–2021 . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.21 Proportion of households with access to basic
3.1 Explanation of index scales used to assess risk . . . . . . 37
hygiene and sanitation in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2 Weather-related disasters in Somalia, 2008–21 . . . . . . 38
3.22 Somalia: projected precipitation anomalies . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Somalian regions affected by drought in August 2022 40
3.23 Ethiopia: projected precipitation anomalies . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4 Trend of drought-driven internal displacement,
2016–22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Maps
3.5 Projected annual SPEI Drought Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.1 Somalia geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.6 Variability and trends of average largest five-day
cumulative precipitation across seasonal cycle, 1.2 Somalia rainfall and temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1971–2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1.3 Normalized Difference Vegetation Index for Somalia . . . 4
3.7 Somalia: projected rise in sea level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 1.4 Major climate and land use zones in Somalia . . . . . . . . . 5
3.8 Somalia’s agricultural calendar and desert locust 1.5 Population density in Somalia, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.6 Climatological seasonal mean temperature . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9 Schematic of the Somali upwelling and its
associated mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 2.1 Violence, food insecurity, and internal displacement
across Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.10 Linked socioecological risk framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.1 Flood depth simulations for different return periods . . 42
3.11 Conceptual framework of principal impacting
factors of climate change and how they are likely to 3.2 River breakages along Juba and Shabelle Rivers in
negatively influence mangrove communities . . . . . . . . 66 February 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.12 Association between heat events and 3.3 Example of areas under threat to sea level rise . . . . . . 48
cardiovascular events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Drought risk by 2050 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.13 Maximum of daily max-temperature: annual trends
3.5 Long-term average annual heat stress and regional
and trends per decade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
significant trend, 2001–20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.14 Urban heat island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.6 Average frequency of days with severe/danger heat
3.15 Projected days with Heat Index > 35°C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 stress per year for dairy cattle, sheep, poultry, beef
cattle, goats, and swine, 1981–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.16 Projected days with Heat Index > 35°C anomaly . . . . . . 72
vi l Somalia Climate Risk Review
3.7 Predicted areas of suitability for three tsetse fly Tables

groups (subgenera) in Africa, 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.1 Climate-relevant sectoral laws and policies in Somalia . 15
3.8 Epidemic suitability for Rift Valley fever in Africa . . . . . 60
3.1 Summary of damage caused by the 2019 floods . . . . . . 44
3.9 Current habitat suitability in Africa for Ae. aegypti
associated with dengue fever incidences . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 3.2 Total financial costs of loss and damage and
recovery needs of 2019 floods ($) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.10 Future habitat suitability in Africa for Ae. aegypti
associated with dengue fever incidences . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 3.3 Projected impacts of floods with a 25-year return
period, excluding damage to crops and livestock . . . . . 46
3.11 Fishing zones in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 Mogadishu urban agglomeration: annual GDP loss to
3.12 Projections of the annual number of very hot days coastal floods, no adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
(daily maximum temperature above 35°C) for
different greenhouse gas emissions scenarios . . . . . . . 70 3.5 Projected impacts of coastal flooding with a 25-year
return period, excluding damage to crops and
3.13 Prevalence of Plasmodium falciparum malaria in livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
different regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.6 Somalia: population living in low-elevation coastal
3.14 Baseline (current) malaria prevalence in Africa . . . . . . 75 zones by 2030 (millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.15 Modeled output of malaria transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 3.7 Individual component risk scores for Somalia’s
fisheries within its EEZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.16 Somalia’s roads network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.8 Percentage changes in maximum catch potential
3.17 Somalia’s ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
under low and high greenhouse gas emissions
3.18 Somalia: mean windspeed at 50 m (m/s) . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 scenarios, by 2050 and 2100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.19 Somalia: photovoltaic power potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 3.9 Heat impacts on labor productivity, by sector
(percentage change) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.20 Juba–Shabelle river basin average annual rainfall . . . 87
3.10 Epidemiological profile by zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.21 Juba–Shabelle river basin modeled available runoff . . 87
3.11 Potential climate impacts on Somalia’s transport
subsectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.12 Potential climate impacts on water sector . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.1 Summary of Somalia’s climate risks with magnitude

and trend measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Abbreviations
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia masl meters above sea level
cm centimeter mm millimeter
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
ESP energy service provider RCP Representative Concentration Pathway
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of RVF Rift Valley fever
the United Nations t/ha metric ton/hectare
GBV gender-based violence TFG Transitional Federal Government
GDP gross domestic product UHI urban heat island
ha hectare UN United Nations
ICU Islamic Courts Union W watt
IDP internally displaced person WASH water, sanitation, and hygiene
km kilometer WHO World Health Organization
m meter
vii
Executive Summary
Climate shapes Somalia’s past, natural disasters in Somalia are climate related. Major
floods and droughts are extremely frequent, cause losses
present, and future of hundreds of millions—or even billions—of dollars to mil-
lions of people, and are the largest cause of Somalia’s
Somalia’s natural and human geography is shaped by its ever-increasing internal displacement crisis.
harsh climate. Lying at the eastern extremity of the Sahel,
Somalia has an arid to semi-arid climate. Average annual Climate impacts are inextricably linked to Somalia’s
rainfall is under 200 millimeters in much of the country, social and political vulnerabilities. While climate change
although it is significantly more in the northern highlands may not directly drive conflict in Somalia, it complicates
and the south. Mean daily maximum temperatures exceed and exacerbates related stresses and vulnerability. The
30°C in most areas, although they fall much lower in the prevalence of vulnerable populations in the country is in
northern highlands and are tempered by cool offshore part a function of the harshness of its climate. Vulnera-
currents along the eastern seaboard. Most of Somalia’s bility and social divisions are mutually reinforced by weak
land area is covered in desert and semi-desert eco- and unrepresentative institutions and by conflict. Direct
systems, with sparse or seasonal grassland vegetation. and indirect climate impacts disproportionately affect
Over 50 percent of the country supports only extensive, girls and women, who are more likely to forgo education,
nomadic pastoralism; with just 13 percent suitable for cul- engage in risky coping mechanisms, and be exposed to
tivation, including seasonal agropastoralism and a much gender-based violence as a result. Youth are also put at
smaller irrigated agropastoralism zone located along the risk by climate-related displacement, and the resulting
two main river valleys (Shabelle and Juba). These limited hopelessness and marginalization among young men can
agricultural areas, and nearby or coastal cities, support in turn help fuel conflict.
the vast majority of the population.
Climate impacts on natural resources may also fuel
Somalia is in the midst of a prolonged and complex cli- the pernicious cycle of conflict, weakened institu-
mate disaster, which shows little sign of abating. It has tions, and resource degradation and competition.
recently endured its longest drought in four decades, now Where land tenure is weak and resource access is con-
punctuated with renewed flooding. Since 2020, Soma- tested between separate groups dependent on different
lia has experienced five consecutive failed rainy seasons, livelihood systems, climate variability and change are
adversely affecting 46 percent of the population, dis- very likely to disrupt the balance between them and to
placing over a million people, and causing an estimated exacerbate conflict. The history of conflict in Soma-
46,000 deaths in 2022 alone. Droughts have become more lia is indeed related to contestation of climate-limited
intense and frequent in recent decades as annual rainfall resources and marginalization of disadvantaged clans.
has decreased. Thus far in 2023, precipitation has been Widespread land appropriations under the Barre regime
higher, which may relieve current drought conditions, were often facilitated by climate-related agricultural
but is also bringing severe flooding to vulnerable areas policies and contributed to Somalia’s descent into civil
such as the city of Beledweyne. Almost all significant war. Commercialization of the livestock trade also led to
Executive Summary l ix
a reconfiguration of the pastoral economy, with a huge Currently, Somalia’s most critical risks are major cli-
growth in livestock increasing the pressure on grazing mate disasters—drought and inland flooding. These
lands and water resources, even as the number of herders have particularly severe impacts on rural populations,
was reduced. Armed groups have been able to draw on driving much of the internal displacement crisis affecting
both exploitation of natural resources and a large pool of Somalia. They have wide-ranging social and economic
young men, economically disenfranchised in part by the consequences on production and exports, food secu-
precariousness of rural livelihoods. rity, social vulnerability and cohesion, and ultimately help
entrench Somalia’s governance and conflict crises. Man-
Climate change is intensifying a wide variety of risks, aging these risks is imperative to stabilizing the country
including but going well beyond the cycle of acute and facilitating its development. The potential for rural
drought and flooding. By the end of the century, average production systems to contribute significantly to future
temperature in Somalia is likely to exceed that experi- growth will depend on adaptation and climate-proofing
enced by any nation now or across all of human history. of rural livelihoods. Flooding has wider economic impacts
Rainfall trends are uncertain: a moderate increase in because of its effects on urban populations, infrastruc-
rainfall is the most likely outcome over the course of the ture networks, and the delivery of key services.
century, but Somalia could either become significantly
more arid (close to a pure desert country like Qatar) or sig- A second set of risks are currently significant and have
nificantly wetter (becoming a generally semi-arid country the potential to increase. Chronic climate stress on crops
like Kenya). If realized, such changes would have profound and livestock will increasingly affect rural production and
effects on both natural and agricultural ecosystems. may drive some livelihood systems to routine failure,
unless a significant increase in rainfall is realized. Locust
outbreaks are also likely to increase in frequency. Stress
Climate risks will multiply

on other natural resource–based systems will intensify,
with fisheries particularly affected by rising sea tem-
with climate change and peratures. Chronic health impacts will be exacerbated
socioeconomic change by climate change. Gastrointestinal disease will signifi-

cantly increase. The overall effects of changing climate
conditions on vector-borne disease and crop and live-
Somalia faces a wide range of climate risks, including
stock pests and diseases are much harder to predict,
acute climate disasters and chronic challenges like heat
given the specific and complex ecologies involved; it is
stress. Most are high-frequency or chronic risks, affect
almost certain, however, that some pests and pathogens
the poor disproportionately, and are likely to increase
will be greatly boosted by climate change. Addressing
with climate change (table ES.1). Most are strongly linked to
increasing stresses on rural livelihoods will be critical to
poverty, given the high reliance of the poor on rural liveli-
the ability of the agriculture, livestock, and fisheries sec-
hoods and outdoor labor, and their limited ability to avoid
tors to ameliorate rural poverty, improve food security,
the impacts of extreme events. While climate change is
improve the balance of trade, and contribute to over-
expected to directly increase the severity of most risks,
all economic growth. Human health impacts have a set
this increase may not be dramatic in many cases over
of implications for human capital that affect productivity
the coming decades, , and there is significant uncertainty
and growth more broadly, particularly in relation to efforts
due to the very wide range of potential rainfall outcomes.
to industrialize the economy or develop higher-value ser-
Over the medium term, increasing exposure due to popu-
vice sectors.
lation and asset growth will probably be a more important
driver of risk than climate change. Some risks, however, Another set of risks are not currently very prominent
are likely to see very dramatic climate-driven increases, but have the potential to significantly disrupt future
particularly those associated with heat stress. development. Designing resilience to these risks into
future development plans and investments is critical.
Heat stress is expected to increase dramatically with
x l Somalia Climate Risk Review
Table ES.1 Summary table of Somalia’s climate risks with magnitude and trend measures
Risk Frequency Economic cost Mortality Poverty linkage Climate trend

Sector   $   
Drought 3 5 5 5 4
Climate disasters
Fluvial and pluvial floods 3 4 2 5 4
 
Coastal flooding 2 3 2 5 4
Locusts 1 4 5 4
Crop stress 5 3? 5 3
Agriculture and
livestock Agricultural pests & disease 2 3 5 3

Heat stress on livestock 5 4? 5 5
Fodder availability 5 4? 5 4
Livestock pests and disease 5 4 5 3
Natural resources Terrestrial ecosystems 5 2? 5 4
 Fisheries 5 2 4 4
Heat stress 5 3 3 5 5
Health
Vector-borne disease 5 3 5 4 3
 Gastrointestinal disease 5 3? 3 4 5
Infrastructure and Degradation of infrastructure 5 3? 3 4

services
Disruption of energy supply 5 1 3 3
 Disruption of water supply 5 3? 4 4
11 Rare 11 < $1 million 11 < 10 11 Very weak 11 Strong decrease

22 Occasional 22 $1–$10 million 22 10–100 22 Weak 22 Weak decrease
KEY:
33 Frequent 3
3
$10–$100 million 33 100–1,000
3
3 Neutral or 33 No clear trend
4
4 Routine 4 $100 million– 44 1,000–10,000) unclear 44 Weak increase
4 $1 billion 44 Strong
55 Chronic 55 > 10,000 55 Strong increase
55 > $1 billion 55 Very strong
Note: Impact is figured per event, or per year for routine or chronic events, for economic cost and mortality. Frequency ranges from rare (multidecadal), to occasional
(once or twice a decade); to frequent (at least 50% of years); to routine (generally every year); to chronic (constant impact, not discrete acute events). Economic cost is
figured in $ and includes damage and losses; those that are particularly uncertain are denoted with a “?” Mortality is indicated if applicable. Poverty linkage is whether
impact disproportionately affects the poor, with a very weak link meaning the poor are much less affected than others, weak less affected, neutral affected similarly to
others, strong affected more, and very strong meaning the poor are much more affected than others. Climate trend reflects strength of expected change in climate
stressors influencing risk, as well as the strength of their influence on the risk (as most risks will be complex processes involving many drivers).
increasing temperature and precipitation; this could sig- and key services will also be a major drag on the devel-
nificantly reduce labor productivity not only in agriculture opment of trade and urban economies if not tackled in
and rural production systems, but also in construction the planning and design of public and private infrastruc-
and other forms of low-paid urban labor where workers ture. Urban water supply could become a major challenge
have little access to cooling. Disruption of infrastructure in the future, although much of the change will be driven
Executive Summary l xi
by the increase in population and demand rather than cli- biodiversity concerns in policy development and
mate. Over the longer term, coastal flooding could pose a investment planning within key sectors.
significant constraint to trade and urban development if l Water infrastructure. Investment in water infra-
not addressed in the design of port infrastructure and vul- structure will support both disaster risk management
nerable coastal cities. and resilient rural livelihoods; this includes invest-
ment in storage and irrigation infrastructure; flood
and drought–resilient water supply and sanitation
Climate adaptation priorities infrastructure; and flood defenses for critical loca-
tions. These water infrastructure investments should
involve managing existing acute be supported within a wider framework of integrated
climate impacts, disrupting their water resource management planning systems and
links to wider social fragility,

institutions to balance competing water demands,
particularly under the growing pressures of climate
and climate-proofing future change.
development Climate adaptation in Somalia must be rooted in efforts

to disrupt the linkages between climate, social fragil-
Addressing acute and recurrent climate disasters from ity, and conflict. The first step is to do no harm—that is,
drought and flooding primarily requires policy action and to ensure that interventions to address one dimension of
investment in the following areas. the problem do not exacerbate another—by employing
social risk management tools informed by the social and
l Disaster risk management. This includes action and
political context. Peacebuilding and mediation need to be
investment in strengthening the preparedness and
informed by climate and security risks, including through
emergency response architecture, and hydromet and
appropriate social and climate screening. Ensuring that
climate information systems; integrating disaster risk
women, youth, disadvantaged clans, and other vulnera-
management into strategic and spatial planning for
ble groups have full and equitable representation in the
key sectors; adaptive social safety nets; and a national
adaptation planning process is key to avoiding adverse
disaster risk financing strategy.
social impacts of climate investments. Wherever possible,
l Resilient rural livelihoods and natural resources. win-win solutions should be identified to address both the
This includes investment in scaling up soil and water climate and social dimensions of risk in tandem, so cli-
conservation/agroforestry/rangeland management; mate adaption efforts are pro-peace and peacebuilding
sustainable rural energy provision; and protection and initiatives support climate adaptation. Key win-win areas
management of key natural habitats, including estab- are the implementation of sustainable livelihoods and
lishment and management of terrestrial and coastal natural resource management programs that strengthen
protected areas and active restoration of critical hab- local institutions and social structures helping to build
itats. As government builds its regulatory and service social and climate resilience, and tackling the drivers and
delivery capacity, this investment should be comple- consequences of Somalia’s internal displacement crisis.
mented by policy action on climate-smart agricultural Addressing the vulnerability of internally displaced per-
diversification and value chains; policy frameworks sons and expanding youth employment will also disrupt
(e.g., land and resource access and tenure, harvest- the linkage between social crises and conflict.
ing regulations) and support to local and community
institutions for natural resource management and To climate-proof development, diversifying away from
sustainable resource–based livelihoods, particularly rural livelihoods is necessary but not sufficient. Soma-
for rangeland and fisheries management; digital and lia is already undergoing rapid urbanization, driven in part
physical market access infrastructure to help expand by climate impacts on rural livelihoods. To avoid replacing
private investment; and mainstreaming forest and rural vulnerabilities with urban, and for this transition to
xii l Somalia Climate Risk Review
facilitate an economic shift toward trade and small-scale wider context of vulnerability and to identify particu-
manufacturing, climate analysis should be mainstreamed larly harmful interactions.
into development planning. In particular, key investments l Chapter 3: Risk Summaries inventories the major
and policy action are required related to the following. biophysical climate risks across five areas: climate
disasters, agriculture and livestock, natural resources,
l Resilient infrastructure and livable cities. This
health, and infrastructure and services. For each risk, it
includes resilient construction standards and estab-
collates current information and indicates how ongo-
lishment of national building codes covering public
ing climate change will likely affect the intensity of that
infrastructure (ports, roads, water and energy
risk in future.
supply), and private construction and services; and
climate-smart public investment management. Resil- l Chapter 4: Prioritizing Adaptation Action recaps the
ient urban development needs to go beyond reactive overall findings across different risks and links these
construction standards to encompass climate-smart to the broader development agenda within Somalia. It
urban development to reduce disaster risks; ensure identifies broad priorities and approaches for climate
sustainable energy, transport, and water services; and action in relation to policies and institutions, physi-
include green spaces and reduce urban heat island cal investments, and knowledge. This information is
effects. complemented by a more systematic review of adap-
tation options across different sectors in the report’s
l Public health and human capital. This includes health
appendix.
and safety regulations for public buildings and work
spaces, particularly to manage risks of heat stress The report is intended as a reference resource and
and floods; postdisaster emergency health provision basis for informing further analytical work. The invest-
(mobile clinics, screening and prevention programs, ments and actions it highlights will need to be supported
etc.); disease vector monitoring and control programs; by new and detailed analytical work to identify the most
and public awareness campaigns on heat stress, water efficient interventions and the institutional steps needed
supply and sanitation, vector-borne disease, and post- to support them. In particular, new knowledge work
disaster health and safety. should include: (1) analyzing optimal types and scales of
water infrastructure investments, (2) integrating hazard
mapping with spatial infrastructure and urban plan-
Purpose and structure of this ning to identify robust strategies for development of key
services, and (3) assessing the feasibility of various risk
report finance approaches and tools. The World Bank is plan-
ning further analytical work on climate impacts and
This Climate Risk Review aims to systematically sum- adaptation options in major sectors, including rural live-
marize existing knowledge on Somalia’s climate risks in lihoods, resilient infrastructure, and climate-smart urban
an accessible and standardized form. It has developed a development, as well as a climate change institutional
set of semiquantitative metrics to summarize and com- assessment (CCIA) to help identify appropriate climate
pare risks. It contains four chapters: governance actions and tools across government at the
federal and state levels. This work will inform the prepara-
l Chapter 1: Climate Overview outlines Somalia’s cli- tion of a country climate and development report (CCDR)
mate context and how it shapes natural and human for Somalia, a new core World Bank Group diagnostic
geography and rural production systems, as well as that combines key sector analysis and climate-informed
briefly summarizes current climate policies. macroeconomic modeling to identify key investments
l Chapter 2: Climate Change, Conflict, and Social Risks and reforms, and to inform national development and cli-
examines the interaction between climate, armed con- mate change policies.
flict, and social risks, both to better understand the
Warbixin Kooban
Saamaynta Isbeddelka Cimilada u soo daba mareen. Tan iyo 2020, Soomaaliya waxaa isu
soo dabo maray shan abaar oo xiriir ah oo aan dhibic roob
ku hayo Soomaaliya: Xilli hore, ah la arag. Taas oo si ba'an u saammaysay 46% dadwey-
Hadda iyo Gadaalahabo naha, kun-kun oo qofna barakicisay. Sanadki 2022 keli,
waxaa, cunta-yarow (famine) dartii u dhimmatay tiro
lagu qiyaaso 46 kun oo qof. Abaaraha ayaa noqday kuwo
Soomaaliya, dabeecadeeda asalka ah, dal iyo dee-
aad u ba'an dalkana barriinsaday kudhannadi (decades)
gaanbo, waxaa qaabeysa cimilo qallafsan. Asay ku
la soo dhaafay kaddib markay roobabki sanadleha ahaa
taal cirif shishaadka bari ee saaxil, Soomaaliya waa dal
yaraadeen. Haddase, waa sanadka 2023 e, roobabku waa
dhulkiisa meeshaan jidhi oomane (arid) ahayn tahay sool
soo yare kordheen, taas oo la filaya inay lurki abaaraha
oomane-u-eke ah (semi-arid). Waa dal intiisa badan, kolki
wax ka xalliso, iyadoo isla markaas, la oddorosaya, inay
laga reebo, koraadka waaqooyi iyo deexooyinka koonfur,
dhibaatooyin fatahaad iyo daadad meela dagan gaarisiin
roobka ka da'a sanadki ka hooseeya 200 milimiitar. Intiisa
doonaan, sida kuwa magaalada Beledweyne ka dhacay.
badan dalka, isku celcelis heerkulka ugu sarreeya wuxuu
Aalaa, dhibaatooyinka daran ee dabiiciga ah ee Soomaa-
dharaar walba kor u dhaafaa 30°C, in kasta oo koraadka
liya ka dhaca, waa kuwo uu sababo isbeddelka cimilada.
waaqooyi iyo deexooyinka ku teedsan xeebaha bad-
Abaaro iyo abaarsad joogta ah oo qajeel daba yaal-
weynta, heerkulka aalaa, intaas (30°C) aad uga hooseeya.
laan daadad iyo fatahaadyo dad iyo duunyabo aynaba,
Barriga Soomaaliya, intiisa badan, waa barri ka ahaysan
khasaaro boqolaal milyan ama xitaa balaayiin doollar
hab-aagyada hannaska (saxaraha) tooska ah ama kan
gaarayana keena, sababna u ah kor u kaca barakaca joog-
geedgaableydda oommane-u-ekaha (ee marna abaar-
tada noqday ee gudaha dalka ka jira.
sata marna aaranta). In ka badan boqolkiiba 50, dalka
wuxuu un kaafin karaa habnololeedka xoola-dhaqashada
Cimilada ayaa si aan kala hakad lahayn ugu lug leh bay-
ee raacatada guurguurta; meesha uu boqolkiiba 13 keli ku
laha, dhib-u-dagnaanta iyo tabaalaha ay bulshada
habboon yahay dalag beerasho, taas oo ay ka mid yihiin:
Soomaaliyeed la ildaran tahay iyo jahawareerka ajeeyey
beerasho iyo xooladhaqasho laysku dhexwado iyo hab
siyaasadda dalkooda. Iyadoo laga yaabin qaallowgga
beer-biyo-siiska macmalka ah (irrigation) oo laga fuliya
(isbeddelka) cimilada, in si toos ah, colaado Soomaaliya
agaggaarka dooxooyinka waaweyn ee labada webi (Sha-
gudaheeda uga kiciyo, hayeesha e, wuxuu sii adkeyna
beelle iyo Jubba). Dhul buuhoodkaa (beerashada ku fiican)
hayaa duruufta, siina kordhina hayaa walwalka iyo wax-
xaddidan iyo magaalooyinka badda saaran, ayey, intooda
tabashada ka dhalata basanbaaska ka beermo isbeddelka
badan, dadweynaha ku nool yihiin.
cimilada. Baahsanaanta baylaha iyo tiro badnaanta
maatada ay darxumada hayso waa door ay qallafsanaanta
Soomaaliya waxa ay ku sugan tahay dhibaato cim-
cimilada gudato oo ay awggii danyarta mashaqo u gey-
ileed dabo-dheeraatay oo aan u muuqan, mid mar
eysiiso. Waxyeello-u-dagnaanta iyo kala qaybsanaanta
dhow waabsami doonta (dhammaani doonta). Iyada oo
bulshada waxaa si wadaag ah u xoojiya daciifnimada
dhowaan ka soo baxday abaarti ugu darneyd iyo cunta-
hay'adaha aan cidna metelin iyo colaada. Saamaynta
yarowggi ugu dheeraa, afartanki sano ee la soo dhaafay,
cimilada, kuweeda tooska ah iyo kuwaan ahaynba, waxay
ayaa hadda, kaddar oo dibi dhal weeye e, abaarihi daadad
xiii
xiv l Somalia Climate Risk Review
si qiyaas kabbax ah u bartilmaameedsadaan maatada: aan la laysku hallayn karin: inse roobabka soo kordhi doo-
sida haweenka: gabdha iyo dumar waaweynba; kuwaas naan, kordhid dhexdhexaad ah, ayaa ah arrin la fila haya
oo ay u badan tahay in waxbarashada ka qadeen oo ay qarnigan gudihiisa, hase yeesha e, waxaa la saadaa-
ku nool yihiin nolol ku salaysan qasmaamsi iyo u gagsa- lina hayaa, in Soomaaliya laba mid ku soo bixi karta: inay
shada tacaddiga, iyo yaraysiga gaboodfalka kufsiga iwm. noqota meel si weyn oommane u ah, hannas iiyo gabaad-
Da'yartuna waxay eersataa qaxa iyo barakicinta cimilada diir ah (si u dhow saxare dhab ah sida kan dalka Qatar) ama
ka asaasma. Taas oo rajoxumada ka dhalata barbaarta u ku soo baxdo meel si weyn uga roob badan sida ay hadda
horseedda in la gacanbidxeeya, taas oo iyadana keenta tahay; noqotaa oomane-u-eke marna abaarsada marna
in da'yarta kansho looga qaybqaata hurinta colaadaha u aaran noqda (sida qaybo badan oo dalka Kenya). Haddii
helaan. ay isbeddelladan rummoobaan, waxay saammayn weyn
ku yeelan doonaan qaab-aageedyada dalka (kuwooda
Saammaynta xun oo ay cimiladu ku leedahay han- dabiiciga ah) iyo kuwa deegaankabo (ee dhul-beerashada
tida dabiiciga ah, ayaa, sida oo kale, shidaal u noqon aadanaha la xiriira).
kara goobaab ku meeraysigs telefka ah ee colaadaha:
waaxyaha oo itaaldarnaada, kheyraadka oo luufluufa
iyo tartanka. Meesha uu dhulka xaaluf yahay oo khey-
raadkiisana ay ku loollamaan kooxo kala jaad ah oo ku Inta ay cimilada isbeddesho in
kala tiirsan hab-nololeedyo kala duwan, waxaa dhacda la eg ayey korodhaa halista
cimilada, marki laysu eego
in isrogrogga cimilada iyo isbeddelkeeda wax u dhim-
maan isku dheellitirnaanta dhexdooda taalla oo ay sii
hufjiyaan iskahor-immaadyada. Colaadda Soomaaliya, isbeddelka cimilada iyo
waxay runtii, taarikh ahaan, xiriir la leedahay, ku loollanka
kheyraadka ay cimilada xaddidday iyo gacanbidxaynta
isbeddelka dhaqan-dhaqaale
qolooyinka la takoora. Dhulboobki baahsanaa ee taliski
Soomaaliya waxaa soo foodsaara haysa halis ballaaran
Barre waxaa inta badan keenay qorsho-siyaasadyo ku
oo isbeddelka cimilada la xiriirta, oo ay ka mid yihiin,
aaddanaa yahoobbiga dhulka (land grabbing) la beerto,
masiibooyinka ba'an ee cimilada iyo jirrabyada joogtada
kaas oo cimilada xiriir weyn la lahaa, noqdayna mid ka
ah sida dawakh-kulaylka ama hanfi/halaso ruuqa.
mid ah sababihi Soomaaliya u horseeday dagaalka soke-
Dhibaatooyinka halista leh ee cimilada intooda badan
eye. Ganacsiga xoolaha nool, ayaa, sidoo kale, keenay in
waa dhibaatooyin marmar soo dhaca iyo kuwo halistooda
xandhaysiga xoolaha dib loo habeeyo, taas oo sasabtay in
daba-dheeraata, waxay labaduba, si aan la malayn karin,
xooluhu bataan, taas oo iyadana, sii kordhisay culayska
u wiiqaan dadka saboolka ah, waxayna u badan tahay
ay xoolaha ku hayaan carshin (dhulalka daaqa) iyo
in waxyeelladooda u soo badan doonaan in la eg inta
ceelbo (meelaha biyaha laga hela), xataa iyada oo ay
isbeddelka cimilada kordho (jadwalka ES.1). Intooda badan
tirada raacatada yaraatay. Kooxa hubaysan ayaa awood
(dhibaatooyinka halista ah ee isbeddelka cimilada) waxa
u yeeshay inay isku mar helaan fursad looga faa'ideysto
ay si gaar ah u bartilmaansadaan danyarta iyo saboolka,
hantida dabiiciga ah, iyo xoogga tiro badan oo rag da'yar
taas oo uu keeno ku tiirsanaanta aadka ah ee danyarta
oo dhaqaale ahaan dhexda ka baxay (oo baagamuuddo
iyo xantiirka ku tiirsan yihiin hab-noolaleedyo qallafsan
noqday) iyada oo ay shaqo waayiddooda, qayb ahaan, ugu
iyo shaqooyin in qabto, qajeelaa, lagu qasban yahay in
wacnayd luufluufsanaanta hab-nololeedka miyiga.
bannaanka loo baxo; iyo sida ay awood u lahayn inay ka
Isbeddelka cimiladu wuxuu karkarina hayaa habheebyo fogaadaan saammaynta dhacdooyin cimileedka ba'an.
(halisyo) badan oo kala kaan ah, kuwaas oo ay ka mid Iyada oo la fila haya in isbeddelka cimiladu, si dhab ah,
tahay, uguse weynayn, goobaab ku meereysiga abaarta u kordhin doona darnaanta dhibaatooyinka ka dhalan
ba'an iyo daadadka. Dhammaadka qarniga, isku celcelis, doona, waxaa dhici karta in waxyeellada kororkani noqon
waxay u muuqataa in heerkulka Soomaaliya ka sare mari mid aad u ba'an soona degdegsan doonta tobannaanka
doona kan adduunka dhan ama gaari doona heer aan taa- sano ee soo socda, waxaana jira shaki weyn oo ku aaddan
riikhda aadanaha soo marin. Nurarki roobabka waa kuwo ballaarnaanta baaxadda roobabka, inay da'aan, suurowda.
Warbixin Kooban l xv
Shaxda ES.1 Soo koobidda halista iyadoo loo eegayo cabbiridda soo noqnoqda, saammaynta iyo
isbeddellada
Soo Abbaarka
Halista noqnoqodka Qiimaha Dhimashada Xiriirka Faqriga cimilada
Aagga   $   
Abaar 3 5 5 5 4
Aafooyinka
Fatahaadda webiga iyo
3 4 2 5 4
daadadka
 
Fatahaadda Xeebaha 2 3 2 5 4
Ayaxa 1 4 5 4
Wansiixa Dalagga 5 3? 5 3
Beerashada iyo Cayayaanka iyo cudurrada
Dhaqashada 2 3 5 3
beeraha
xoolaha
Dawakhkulayka 5 4? 5 5
 Helitaanka Daaqa 5 4? 5 4
Cayayaanka iyo cudurrada

5 4 5 3
xoolaha
Hantida Dabiiciga Terrestrial ecosystems 5 2? 5 4

ah
Kalluumaysiga
 5 2 4 4
Dawakha kulaylka 5 3 3 5 5
Caafimaadka
Jirrooyinka qaniinka 5 3 5 4 3
 Cudurrada Mindhicirka 5 3? 3 4 5
Kaabayaasha Hoos u dhaca kaabayaasha 5 3? 3 4

Dhaqaalaha iyo
adeegyada Kala dhantaalanka Tamrada 5 1 3 3
Dhantaalanka bixiska biyaha

 5 3? 4 4
Jeedaalo: halista waxaa lagu hayb soocaa miisaanka 5-dhibic ee tilmaame kasta sida soo socota: Saammaynta waxa lagu qiyaasaa dhacdo kasta, ama sanadkiiba
dhacdooyinka la taabuda ama daba dheeraada ee kharash iyo dhimmasho. Soo noqnoqoshada: 1 = naadir (ka badan tobaneeyo sano); 2 = marmar (hal ama laba jeer
tobankii sano); 3 = joogta ah (ugu yaraan 50% sanadaha); 4 = joogto ah (guud ahaan sanad walba); 5 = dabadheeraad ah (saammayn joogto ah, ma aha dhacdooyin degdeg
a h oo aan kala sooc lahayn). Kharashka dhaqaalaha, oo ay ku jiraan burburka iyo khasaaraha: 1 = <$1 milyan; 2 = $1 milyan–$10 milyan; 3 = $10 milyan–$100 milyan; 4 =
$100 milyan–$1 bilyan; 5 = > $1 bilyan. Sicir qiimahiisa aan si gaar ah loo hubin waxa lagu tilmaamayaa "?" Dhimmashada (haddii ay khuseyso): 1 = <10;
2 = 10-100; 3 = 100-1,000; 4 = 1,000-10,000; 5 = > 10,000. Isku xirka saboolnimada (haddii ay saammayntu si aan qiyaas lahayn u saamayso saboolka): 1 = aad u daciif
ah ( sabool ah aad uga yar kuwa kale; 2 = daciif ( danyar yar oo saameeya); 3 = dhexdhexaad ah ama aan caddayn ( saboolka ah ayaa saammeeya si la mid ah kuwa kale /
aan caddayn); 4 = xoog leh (faqiir badan oo saammeeya); 5 = aad u xoog badan (faqiir aad u badan oo saameeya). Isbeddelka cimilada (waxay ka tarjumaysaa xoogga
isbeddelka la filayo ee cimiladu walaacyada saamaynta leh ee khatarta ah, iyo sidoo kale xoogga saammaynta ay ku leeyihiin khatarta, maaddaama halist ugu badan ay
noqon doonto habab adag oo ku lug leh keenayaasha badan): 1 = hoos u dhac xooggan; 2 = hoos u dhac daciif ah; 3 = isbeddel muuqda ma jiro; 4 = koror daciif ah; 5 = koror
xoog leh.
xvi l Somalia Climate Risk Review
Muddadan dhexe, dagnaan ka dhalata sababaha la xiriira Cudurrada daba-dheeraada, iyagana, isbeddelka cim-
(isu dheellitirnaanli'ida) tirada dadka iyo kobaca hantida, ilada waa uu xoojin doona. Jirrooyinka caloosha ayaa si
ayey u badan tahay, inay ka yimmaadaan waxyeellooyin ka weyn u kordhin doona. Saammaynta guud ee xaaladaha
halis weyn kuwa isbeddelka cimilada. Halis-cimileedyada is-beddelka cimilada, ee ku aaddan cudurrada qani-
qaar, si kastabo ha ahaatee, waxay u badan tahay inay, inka laga qaada iyo cayayaanka, iyo cudurrada dalagga
soo kordhin doonaan waxyeellooyin kadis ah oo cimilo- iyo kuwa xoolaha, ayaa aad u adag in la saadaaliyo, kolki
curisay ah, gaar ahaan kuwa la xiriira dawakh-kaliileedka. si gaar ah loo tixgeliyo deegaanka kakan isku jirjira ee
halkan lagaga hadlaya, si kastaba ha ahaatee, waa hubaal
Hadda, halista ugu daran ee Soomaaliya daganti u tahay in qaar ka mid ah cayayaanka iyo cudur-wadayaasha ay
waa masiibooyinka cimilada: abaar iyo fatahaadyo si weyn ugu tarmi doonaan isbeddelka cimilada. Wax
ba0rriga ka dhaca. Kuwaas oo si gaar ah u waxyeel- ka qabadka walaac kordhay ee habnololeedyada miyiga
leeyaan dadka reer miyiga ah, oo abidna sabab u noqda waxa uu muhim u noqon doonaa awoodda iyo tayeynta
barakaca ba'an ee ka jira gudaha Soomaaliya. Waxay waaxyaha beerashada, xandhaysiga xoolaha, iyo kalluu-
leeyihiin waxyeellooyin bulsho iyo kuwa dhaqaale oo aad maysiga, si uu wax uga taro saboolnimada reer miyiga,
u ballaaran, sida carqaladeynta soo saarka iyo dhoofinta; una hirgeliyo geyllan lagu xaqiijiyo sugnaanta cuntada,
salsalinta sugnaanta cuntada; boorrinta baylahsanaanta dheellitirka ganacsiga, iyo ka qaybqaadashada kor u
bulshada, kala dhantaalka midnimada iyo isku-duubnida kaca iyo dhaqaalaha guud. Saammaynta caafimaadka
dadweynaha; ugu dambeyntiina dhabqinta dedaallada bini'aadmigu waxay leedahay jaha-abbaaryo saammeeya
xasilinta dowlladnimada iyo soo afjaridda colaadaha raasamaal aadanaha, kuwaaso si ballaaran u tayeeya wax
Soomaaliya. U caalhelidda dhibaatooyinka halista isbed- soo saarka iyo kobaca dhaqaalaha, gaar ahaan, marka
delka cimilada waxay huriweyti u tahay xasilinta dalka la eego himilada hiigsanaysa in dhaqaalaha la gaarsiiyo
iyo u hayaanka horumarkiisa. In la xaqiijiyo horumarka heer warshado iyo taarufeynta waaxyaha adeegyada
suurtagalka ah ee miyiga iyo habnoolaleedka raacatada nolosha lafdhabarka u ah.
waa in la helo tab wax soo saarka miyiga iyo xandhaysiga
xoolaha xoogga saaro, oo si weyn uga qaybgeliya tabkaca Mid kale oo (dhibaatooyinka) halista leh qayb ka ah oo
iyo koritaanka gadaalaha; dedaalkaas oo guushiisa ku aan hadda ahayn mid aad u muuqata, la filayase inay
xirnaan doonta la qabsi aad ah oo habnololeedka miyiga si weyn u carqaladayso horumarka la hiigsana haya
lala qabsiiya isbeddelka cimilada iyo iska caabbinta gadaalaha: Qabanqaabinta la qabsiga waryeellooy-
dhibaatooyinkiisa. Daadadku waxay leeyihiin saammayn inka halis-cimileedka u geysan doonaan qorshooyinka
dhaqaale oo ballaaran taasoo ka cad waxyeellada ay, had horumarka la hiigsana haya iyo hantiggashiga lagama
iyo jeer, gaarsiiyaan dadweynaha magaalooyinka; kaaba- maarmaanka u ah. Cadaadiska dawakhkulaylka ayaa
yaasha dhaqaale iyo laamaha bixiya adeegyada muhiimka la fila hayaa inuu si aad ah kor ugu kaco, heerkulka iyo
ah. roobabkana sii kordhiya: tani waxay si weyn u yarayn
kartaa ribixa shaqada, intaas un maahan e, waxay naa-
Xirmo labaad oo ka kooban halis-cimileedyo ayaa jira, fayn kartaa tabta wax soo saarka beeraha iyo tabcashada
kuwaas oo awood u leh kana suurowdda inay kord- xoolaha ee habnoolaleedka miyiga, si sidaas la mid ah, ayey
haan. Lur-cimileedyo joogta ah ayaa dalagga iyo xoolaha, u shiiqin kartaa waaxda dhismooyinka iyo jaadadka kale
si isa soo taraysa, u waxyeelleen doona, oo sidaa dart- ee muruqmaalka mush-haar ku noolka ah ee magaalooy-
eed wax soo saarka miyiga hoos u dhigi doonta, taasoo inka. Burburinta kaabayaasha dhaqaale iyo adeegyada
keeni doonta in qaar ka mid ah hab-nololeedyada huriwaaga ah ayaa iyana noqon doona mid waxyeella
miyiga si caadi ah u fashilmaan, waa haddaan la helin weyn u geysata joogtaynta beecmushtarka iyo shuusha-
roobab kuwi hore ka weyn. Ayaxuna, sidoo kale, waxay aminta ganacsiga iyo dhaqaalaha magaalooyinka, haddii
u badan tahay, in faafiddiisa iyo soo noqnoqodkiisaba aan si waafi ah looga baaraandegin qorshaynta dhisidda
kordhi doonaan. Culaysyada cadaadiya habnoolaleedy- hore iyo dib u hagaajinta kaabayaasha guud iyo kuwa
ada ku salaysan hantida dabiiciga ah ayaa sii xoogeysan gaarka ah loo leeyahay. Waxaa kale oo caqabo adag caal-
doona; iyada oo kalluumeysiga, si gaar ah u saammayn saari doona waaxda biyasiinta magaalooyinka, in kasta
doona kor u kaca milicda qorraxda iyo heerkulka badda.
Warbixin Kooban l xvii
oo culayskaas intiisa badan ka imman doona, kor u kaca l Hab-nololeedka miyiga oo taaruf (resilient) ah iyo
tirada dadka iyo baahida la halmaasha. Gadaalaha fog, hantida dabiiciga ah oo gagsi leh: Tan waxaa ka mid
daadadka badda ayaa dhib weyn oo hakiyo ku noqon kara ah maalgelinta lagu tayeynaya habka loo maareeyo
kala socodka ganacsiga iyo hormarka dhaqaale oo la hiig- kaydinta: ciidda, biyaha, dhir-beer-xagnuujiska (agro-
sanaya, waa haddii aan laga sii baaraandegin qaabeynta forestry) ilaalinta carshinta; iyo gaarsiinta miyiga tamar
kaabayaasha iyo dekedaha magaalooyinka xeebta saaran, waarta; iyo ilaalinta iyo maaraynta aagagga dabiiciga
horayna looga sii ildayan waxyeellooyinka la fila kara. ee muhimka ah, oo ay ku jiraan xadaynta iyo xayn-
daabidda dhulqabadka barriga iyo dhul xeebeedka ay
ku nool yihiin ama laga helo dhito-dhuleedyada wax-
La qabsiga waxyeellada
tarka leh oo ilaalinta mudan; ilaalinta iyo dib u soo
celinta kaydinta johorodleydda tafiirgo'a halista u ah.
isbeddelka cimilada waxyaabaha Maaddaama ay dowllladdu xoojinayso awooddeeda
ugu mudnaanta badan waxa ka sharciyeynta iyo tan adeeg bixinta, maalgashigan waa
in lagu kaalo qorsha-hawlleed ka ambabbaxa qaabka
mid ah, basarinta waxyeellada beerqodashada leelgaradka iyo cimila-ka-foofka ah oo
isbeddelka cimilada; iyo kala duduwnaanta beerashada iyo silsilo-qiimeedka

suuq-ballaarsiga ku salaysan, qaab-dhismeedka qor-
caabbinta lurarkeed: iyo shaha (tusaale: dhulka iyo helitaanka kheyraadka iyo
ka baylahtirka bulshada haynta, xeerarka dalag goosashada) iyo taageeridda
basanbaaska ballaaran ee
hay'adaha maxalliga ah iyo kuwa bulshada si loo maa-
reeyo hantida dabiiciga ah oona loo xaqiijiyo ahaysiinta
isbeddelka cimilada iyo ka hab-nololeedyada waaro oo kheyraadka ku salaysan,
ildayashada waxyeellooyinkiisa gaar ahaan maamulidda dhulka daaqa iyo kalluumay-

siga; helidda kaabeyaasha suuqa dhijitaalka iyo ka
mustaqbalka caadiga ah si ay uga fududeeyaan ballaarinta maal-
gashiga gaarka ah; iyo shaacinta danaynta dhirta iyo
Wax ka qabadka dhibaatooyinka cimilada ba'an iyo wadataasha noolaha oo lala fangeliyo dhisidda qor-
kuweeda soo noqnoqda ee abaarta iyo daadadka, wuxuu, shaha iyo jaangooyada maalgashiga ee waaxyaha
ugu horreyn, u baahan yahay qorshe-siyaasadeedyo muhimka ah.
waxtaryo leh iyo maalgelin ku aaddan dhinacyada soo l Kaabayaasha Biyaha: Hantigelinta kaabayaasha
socda: biyaha waxay kaali doontaa maaraynta aafooyinka
halista ah iyo ahaysiinta habnoolaleedyo miyi oo gagsi
l Maaraynta aafooyinka halis-cimileedka: Tan waxaa ka
leh: tani waxaa ka mid ah maalgelinta kaabayaasha
mid ah, hawlgallo iyo maalgelin lagu xoojiyo u tabaabu-
kaydinta biyaha iyo beer-waraabiska; xaqiijinta in la
shaysadka qaabdhismeedka birmadka dhibta lagaga
helo ilo-biyeedyo u gagsan kara daadadka iyo abaar-
falceliya iyo adeegyada xogta cimilada ee hydromet
aha iyo kaabayaasha fayadhowrka iyo moosidda
(Adeegga Hydromet waxa uu bixiyaa xog-cimileedyo
daadadka iyo biyo ka gaaciska goobaha xasaasiga ah.
islamarkaas ah, oo ku aaddan: hawada, biyaha, digni-
Maalgelinyada kaabayaasha biyaha waa in lagu dheel-
inbixisyada ugu horreeyo iyo agabyada xogta cimilada
litiraa qaabdhismeed ballaaran oo isku-dhafa haya
si loo wargeliyo macaammiisha, iyaga oo laga ham-
qaababka qorshaynta maaraynta kheyraadka biyaha
miiqtiraya war wixi hawada, biyaha iyo cimilada ku
iyo laammaha ku hawllan si loo jimmeeya dalabyada
saabsan); isku darka maaraynta halista iyo jar-u-deg-
tartamma ee biyaha, gaar ahaan, kolki la tixgeliyo,
gidda iyo qabanqaabada la xiriirta waaxyaha muhimka
cadaadiska soo kordhaya ee isbeddelka cimilada.
ah; shabakadaha badbaadada bulshada ee la qabsiga
qawjadaha (calamities) cimilada iyo istaraatijiyadda La qabsashada isbeddelka cimilada ee Soomaaliya
maalgelinta halista dhibaatooyinka qaranka. waa in lagu saleeyo dedaallo lagu curyaamiyo xiriirrada
xviii l Somalia Climate Risk Review
u dheexeeyo cimilada, dalaafsanaanta bulshada iyo l Kaabayaal taaruf ah iyo magaalooyin lagu noolaan
colaadda. Jaanqaadka ugu horreeyo waa inaan lur la karo: Tan waxaa ka mid ah dhismooyinka oo heer
geysan- taas oo ah, in la xaqiijiyo xallinta dhibka inuu tayo rasmi ah loo cuskado iyo Qaabdhismeed gagsi
dhib kale ka dhalan- iyada oo la adeegsana haya tabta leh; iyo jideynta anshi iyo xeerar heer qaran ah oo lagu
maaraynta halista bulshada oo lagu wargeliyey xaaladda maareeyo dhisidda kaabayaasha dadweynaha (sida
bulsha iyo tan siyaasaddabo. Nabadaynta iyo dhexdhex- dekedaha, waddooyinka, muulalka qashinqaadka,
aadinta, waxaa loo baahan yahay inay ku salaysnaadaan, dhuumooyinka biyaha iyo xarkaha korantada iwm)
xog wargal ah oo laga haya isbeddelka cimilada iyo halista iyo kuwa gaarka ah; iyo addeegyada iyo muurbulsh-
amniga waajahsan, taas oo loo marayo baanjiyid asaab- eedyada; iyo maamul leelgarad ah oo maalgashiga
boon oo cimilada iyo bulshada lagu baaro. Xaqiijinta dadweynaha lagu maareeya.
in dumarka, da'yarta, qolooyinka laga badan yahay iyo l Magaalo-Dhisid Adkaysi leh: waxa loo baahan yahay
kooxaha kale ee nugulta ah helaan metelaad waafi ah in laga gudbo qaabdhismeedka isaga dayashada
oo sinnaan ku dhisan oo ka qaybgelisa qabanqaabada iyo iska-dhista uun ku salaysan si loo gaaro yeelaal
geeddisocodka qorshaha la qabsiga waxyeellooyinka dhismo-magaaleed caqli-ka-foof ah si loo dhimmo
isbeddelka cimilada, kaa oo ah falka ugu fiican ee looga waxyeellada isbeddelka cimilada; oo loo xaqiijiyo heli-
xayndaaban kara saammayn bulsheedka ba'an ee maal- taanka adeeg-bulsheedya waaro, sida tamarta, muurka
gashiga cimilida. Wada guulaysiga ahmiyadda weyn iyo biyaha; oo ay ku jiraan wahdiyo (parks) cagaaran
leh waxaa lagu gaarayaa hirgelinta milaykufulayaa- si loo yareeyo saammaynta kulayl-shiimeedka (heat
sha (barmaamijta) maaraynta habnololeedyada waara island effects) magaalooyinka waaweyn.
iyo hanti-dhuleedka asalka ah (kheyraadka dabiiciga
l Caafimaadka shicibweynaha iyo raasimaalka dadka:
ah) oo xoojiya ururada deegaanka iyo xarun bulsheedy-
Tan waxaa ka tirsan qaannuunnada caafimaadka
ada gacanta ka geysta dhisidda bulsho u gagsan karta
iyo amniga ee laga rabo dhismooyinka dadweynaha
waxyeellooyinka isbeddelka cimilada oo ka gaacin karta
iyo goobaha shaqada, si loo maareeya halista (ka
wadayaasha barakaca iyo asaayeha qaxa joogtada ah ee
imman karta) dawakh-kulaylka iyo daadadka; bix-
ka aloosan guda Soomaaliya. Wax ka qabashada dayac
inta gargaar caafimaadka degdega ah dhibta kaddib
u dagnaanta iyo baylahsanida dadyowgga barakacay iyo
(goobfayeedyada guurguura, baaritaannka, iyo kahort-
ballaarinta mashruuca shaqaalaysiinta barbaarta, ayaa
agga); Milaykufulayaasha (programmes) la socodka
sida oo kale, dhabqin ama hakin kara isu gooshidda ka
iyo kahortagga cudurrada qanniinka; iyo ololayaa-
dhexaysa dhibaatooyinka bulshada iyo colaadaha.
sha wacyigelinta iyo awaajiga shicibka ee ku aaddan
dawakh-kaliileedka, biyo-siiska iyo fayadhowrka,
Si horumarka la tiigsanaya waxyeellada isbeddelka cimi-
cudurrada ka dhasha dhaqaaqilyada iyo shaafiyidda
lada looga xayndaabo, in laga geddista habnololeedyada
iyo badbaadada dhibka ka danbaysa.
miyiga waa arrin lammahuraan mase filnayn. Soomaa-
liya, haddayba, si xawlli ah, uga socotaa magaaloobid
(magaalo-degid) xad-dhaaf ah, taas oo waxa keenay ka
qayb yihiin, waxyeellooyinka isbeddelka cimilada nolo-
sha miyiga gaarsiiyey. Si aan baylahsanaanti miyiga tu
Ujeeddada iyo Qaab-dhismeedka
magaalo loogu beddelin, iyo inuu marxalad-kala-guurka Warbixintan
fududeeyo u guuridda dhaqan-dhaqaale ku tiirsan
ganacsi, wax-soo-saar iyo warshadaysi baaxad yar, Dib-u-eegistan halista isbeddelka Cimilada waxay
baanjiyidda cimilada waa in lagu sidko qorshooyinka ujeeddadeedu tahay, in si habaysan, oo heer tayo si
horumarka. Gaar ahaan, maalgelinta waafiga ah iyo qor- rasmi ah oo loogu bogay u dhigan, si fududna loo daa-
shefulinta loo bahan yahay waa sida kuwan hoos ku lacan karo, loo soo koobo wixi aqoon ama cilmi ah ee
sharxan: laga og yahay halista isbeddelka cimilada ee Soomaa-
liya. Waxa ay ahaysiisay jiso jaangooyooyin tiro ahaan
cabbir-hoosaadyo ah, si loo soo koobo loona barbardhigo
Warbixin Kooban l xix
waxyeellooyinka halista. Waxayna ka kooban tahay afar Warbixinta waxaa loogu talaggalay inay noqoto il
cutub: laga tixraaco iyo saldhig laga xog-siiyo gorfayn kale
oo tan ka qotodheer. Maalgashiga iyo hawlgallada ay
l Cutubka 1-aad: Dulmar guud oo cimilada Soomaaliya muujinayso waxay u baahan doonaan, in lagu kaalo,
indho-indhaynaya: waxa uu qeexayaa xaaladda itifaallooyin cusub oo faahfaahsan, si loo aqoonsado
cimilada Soomaaliya iyo sida ay u qaabayso juquraafiga faraggelinta ugu waxtarka badan iyo tillaabooyinka
dhulka iyo kan ku jaadan saammaynta falalka dadka qaynuuniga ah ee loo baahan yahay si loo taabbaggeliyo.
iyo hababka wax soo saarka miyiga, waxa ay si la mid Gaar ahaan, camalka aqoonta cusub waa in ay ka mid
ah oo gaaban, u soo koobaysaa qorshooyinka cimilada noqota: (1) gorfaynta jaadadka iyo cabbiraadda ugu
ee hadda jira. fiican ee hantiggelinta kaabayaasha biyaha, (2) isku
l Cutubka 2-aad: Isbeddelka Cimilada, Iskahorimaadka, dhafka xadaynta halista, kaabayaasha deegaanka iyo
iyo halis bulsheedyada: waxa uu baarayaa isdhexgalka qorshe-magaaleedka si loo ogaado sargooyooyinka
ka dhexeeya cimilada, colaadaha hubaysan, iyo halis- taarufka ah ee horumarinta adeegyada muhimka ah,
bulsheedyada, si loo hado ama si waafi ah loogu fahmo, iyo (3) qiimaynta suurtaggalnimada, xeeladaha iyo
macnaha guud ee baylahsanida iyo in la aqoonsado abbaar-maaleedyada kala kaanka ee halista. Bangiga
waxyeellooyinka gaarka ah ee isdhexgallada. Adduunka waxa uu qorsheynayaa baanjiyid dheeraad ah
oo lagu lafaggura saammaynta cimilada iyo khiyaar-la-
l Cutubka 3-aad: Gantoobkan halista cimilada waxa
qabsiga u furan waaxyaha waaweyn, oo ay ku jiraan:
uu koobina hayaa shan aagaag oo halista cimilida
hab-nololeedyada miyiga; kaabayaasha dhaqaale ee
nooleha: aafooyinka cimilada, beer-qodoshada,
taarufka ah, iyo horumar magaaleedyo (leelkas iyo)
xandhaysiga xoolaha, hantida dabiiciga ah,
cimilo-ka-foof ah; iyo sidoo kale qiimaynta iyo tijaabada
caafimaadka, kaabayaasha iyo adeegyada. Halis kasta,
qaannuunnada iyo qaannuunfulinta isbeddelka cimilada
waxay ururisaa xogta hadda jirta waxayna tusinaysaa
(CCIA) si ay u fududayso aqoonsiga tababka iyo hawlgallada
sida isbeddelka cimilada ee socda u saammayn doono
asaabboon ee maamulidda cimilada ee dowlladda heer
darnaanta mustaqbalka ee waxyeellada halistaas.
federaal iyo mid gobolba. Hawshan waxay tixraac laga
l Cutubka 4-aad: Mudnaysiinta waxqabadka la qabsiga,
warqaata u noqon doontaa diyaarinta warbixinta cimilada
wuxuu dib u soo koobayaa xogta guud ee laga helay
iyo horumarinta dalka (CCDR) ee Soomaaliya, baaritaan
halista kala duwan, waxayna kuwan ku xirayaan
cusub oo udubdhexaad u ah kooxda Bangiga Adduunka
ajeendhooyinka horumarineed ee ballaaran ee gudaha
kaas oo isku daraya jeedaalada waaxyaha muhimka
Soomaaliya. Waxayna tilmaamaysaa mudnaan
ah iyo qaabaynta cimili-la-socodka ah ee dhaqaalaha
ballaaran iyo abbaarka wax ka qabadka cimilada marka
baaxadda leh, si loo ogaado maalgashiga muhimka ah iyo
loo eegayo qorshooyinka, ururrada, maalgashiga la
dib-u-habaynta, iyo in laga tixraaco horumarka qaranka
taaban karo iyo aqoonta. Xogta waxaa kaabaya dib-u-
iyo qorshooyinka isbeddelka cimilada.
jalleec habaysan oo ku aaddan fursadaha la qabsiga ee
qaybaha kala duwan ee lifaaqa warbixinta ku cad.
Chapter 1
Climate
Overview
S omalia is an arid to semi-arid coun-
try lying at the eastern extremity of the
Sahel. Its natural and human geography is
shaped by its harsh climate. Intensive agropastoral pro-
duction is only possible in limited wetter areas of the river
valleys and uplands. These areas, and nearby or coastal
cities, support the vast majority of the population. Climate
is also highly variable, with frequent grave consequences
Map 1.1 Somalia geography
IBRD 47327 |
JUNE 2023
This map was produced by the
Cartography Unit of the World
Bank Group. The boundaries,
colors, denominations and any
other information shown on this
map do not imply, on the part of
the World Bank Group, any
judgment on the legal status of any
territory, or any endorsement or
acceptance of such boundaries.
10°N
ERITREA
DJIBOUTI
AWDAL
Baki
REP. OF
YEMEN
WOQOOYI
GALBEED
Hargeysa
S O MAL I A
REGION CAPITALS (PRE-WAR)
NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION BOUNDARIES (PRE-WAR)
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
45°E
Burao
TOGDHEER
Gulf
of
Aden
Ceerigaabo
SANAAG
SOOL
Laascaanood Garoowe
50°E
Boosaaso
BARI
REP. OF
YEMEN
10°N
for the marginal and climate-dependent livelihood sys-

NUGAAL
ETHIOPIA
tems that support much of the population. While the Gaalkacyo
future climate will be hotter, there is profound uncertainty

MUDUG
Dhuusa
Mareeb
over future rainfall projections. 5°N GALGUDUUD 5°N

Beledweyne
BAKOOL
Xuddur
HIRAAN INDIAN
Shabeelle
OCEAN
Garbahaarey MIDDLE
1.1 Geography and climate

Baydhabo SHABELLE
GEDO BAY Jawhar
MOGADISHU
BANADIR
MIDDLE LOWER Marka
Jub
JUBA
a
SHABELLE
Bu'aale S O MAL I A
Somalia has the longest coastline in mainland Africa, K E N YA
LOWER
REGION CAPITALS (PRE-WAR)
NATIONAL CAPITAL
at 3,333 kilometers (km), yet much of its territory lies at
0° JUBA 0°
Kismaayo REGION BOUNDARIES (PRE-WAR) SOMALIA

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
moderate altitude, with a mean elevation of 410 meters 0
REP.50OF 100 150 200 Kilometers
ERITREA 45°E 50°E
above sea level (masl). Maximum elevations in the cen- IBRD 47327 |
JUNE 2023
This map was produced by the
0
YEMEN
50 100 150 Miles
Aden
REP. OF
YEMEN
Cartography Unit of the World
tral and southern parts of the country are well below

Bank Group. The boundaries, of
40°E
colors, denominations and any
other information shown on this
DJIBOUTI 45°E
Gulf
50°E
map do not imply, on the part of
1,000 masl, as the land descends gradually from the

the World Bank Group, any
Boosaaso
Source: World Bank Cartography Unit, June 2023.
judgment on the legal status of any
territory, or any endorsement or
acceptance of such boundaries.
foothills of the Ethiopian highlands to the Indian Ocean,

AWDAL Ceerigaabo
Baki SANAAG BARI

10°N WOQOOYI 10°N
across extensive coastal lowlands. The northern part

GALBEED
Burao
Hargeysa
of the country, comprising Somaliland and Puntland, is areas, although they fall muchTOGDHEER lower Sin
O O L the northern high-
dominated by highlands that form the spine of the Horn of lands and are tempered by cool offshore NUGAAL currents along Laascaanood Garoowe
Africa, including peaks over 2,000 masl, and leaving only a the eastern
E T H I O Pseaboard
IA (map 1.2).
narrow lowland coastal strip in most places (map 1.1).
Gaalkacyo
The north is dominated by large desert zones, with

MUDUG
Dhuusa
limited upland areas experiencing cooler and wetter cli-

Mareeb
Somalia lies at the eastern extremity of the Sahel, and 5°N GALGUDUUD 5°N
has an arid to semi-arid climate. Average annual rain- matic conditions. The BAKOOL
central
HIRAAN
and southern regions
INDIAN
are Beledweyne
mainly semi-arid, with some areas reaching semi-humid

Xuddur
fall is under 200 millimeters (mm) in much of the country,

Shabeelle
OCEAN
conditions.G EA significant portion SHABELLEof Somalia’s land area is
MIDDLE
Garbahaarey
but is significantly higher in the northern highlands and

Baydhabo
DO BAY Jawhar
in the south, where it ranges from 400 mm to 600 mm. therefore covered in desert and MOGADISHUsemi-desert ecosystems,
BANADIR
with very little JUBA or only spare grassland vegetation (map 1.3).
MIDDLE
Mean daily maximum temperatures exceed 30°C in most
LOWER Marka
Jub
a
SHABELLE
The
K E N Yrest naturally grades from sparse scrubland through
Bu'aale
A
LOWER
0° JUBA 0°
Kismaayo SOMALIA
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
3 0 50 100 150 Miles
40°E 45°E 50°E

4 l Somalia Climate Risk Review
Map 1.2 Somalia rainfall and temperature
a. Total annual rainfall b. Average temperature
Source: Original calculations based on TerraClimate.
Map 1.3 Normalized Difference Vegetation Index to areas of dense savanna/open forest, depending largely
for Somalia on rainfall.
Somalia’s biodiversity is generally arid-adapted and

includes a high level of endemic and threatened species.
Somalia lies in the Horn of Africa biodiversity hotspot—the
only global biodiversity hotspot that is entirely arid, apart
from the Succulent Karoo hotspot in southwest Africa.
Acacia-Commiphora shrubland is the dominant vegeta-
tion in much of the country, characterized by bushes 3–5 m
tall with scattered emergent trees up to 9 m. Endemic
and threatened antelopes include the beira (Dorcatragus
megalotis), dibatag (Ammodorcas clarkei) and Speke’s
gazelle (Gazella spekei). The Horn of Africa hotspot also
contains more endemic reptiles than any other region in
Africa. Somalia has no established protected areas, and
much of its habitat is degraded. Acacia bussei, an ever-
green, drought-tolerant tree which has provided fodder to
pastoralists in times of drought, has been placed on the
IUCN Red List of Threatened Species due to pressure from
charcoal production.
Source: Original calculations based on TerraClimate.
Chapter 1: Climate Overview l 5
There are four main land use systems. Over 50 percent Map 1.5 Population density in Somalia, 2020
of the country supports only extensive, nomadic pasto-
ralism. Just 13 percent of the country ‘s total land area
is suitable for cultivation (FRS 2013), including seasonal
agropastoralism and a much smaller irrigated agropas-
toralism zone located along the two main river valleys
(Shabelle and Juba). A limited zone of oasis-based frank-
incense production lies along the central northern coast
(map 1.4b). There is also a small area of denser forest in
the extreme south and scattered pockets of mangroves
mostly along the northern coast. Forests have been sig-
nificantly degraded by large-scale charcoal production
and grazing pressure.
Despite the limited potential, agriculture remains cen-

tral to Somalia’s economic development and poverty
reduction (FAO 2018). Population distribution within the
country is strongly influenced by the location of agricul-
tural zones (map 1.4 and map 1.5). Agriculture is mostly
possible where there are alternative groundwater sources
to support irrigation, particularly within the alluvial plains
where shallow wells and permanent springs provide Source: World Bank Group Spatial Agent using WorldPop data.
Map 1.4 Major climate and land use zones in Somalia
a. Climate zones b. Land use systems
Agropastoral
Irrigated agropastoral
Mangroves
Non-used forest
Oasis/frankincense
Arid Pastoralism
Desert Temporal waterbodies
Humid Urban area
Semi-arid
Sources: Climate zones: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Somalia; land use systems: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Somalia Water
and Land Information Management (SWALIM).
supplementary water for irrigation (Boitt, Langat, and Somalia is also rapidly urbanizing. Around 54 percent of
Kapoi 2018). Most of the northern part of Somalia is dry the population currently live in cities, and over 22 percent
and cannot support rain-fed crop production except for live in the two largest cities, Mogadishu and Hargeysa,
small pockets of land around the settlements of Gebiley alone. For comparison, in neighboring Kenya only around
and Borama (map 1.4a). In the south, rain-fed crop pro- 28 percent of the population is urban. Rural-urban
duction is practiced in the Shabelle and Juba river basins migration is accelerated by both climate disasters and
(Boitt, Langat, and Kapoi 2018). About two-thirds of the conflict. Close to 20 percent of the Somali population
cultivable land is located here. Irrigation is restricted is internally displaced, and around 75 percent of inter-
to the relatively fertile areas around the Shabelle River, nally displaced persons (IDPs) live in cities (World Bank
where the main crops are maize, rice, sesame, cowpeas, 2022c). Moreover, 85 percent of climate-induced IDPs do
bananas, papayas, lemons, grapefruit, and mangoes. not wish to return to rural areas—compared with 74 per-
cent of conflict-induced IDPs, according to a recent study
Cultivable land has long been central to Somali politics. (Samuel Hall 2021). Almost half of IDPs are female, and
It was central to patronage politics during the rule of Siad more than half are below 15 years of age,1 which heightens
Barre (1969–91) and was fiercely contested by different their vulnerability to a range of risks and has conse-
clan-militia in the immediate aftermath of state collapse. quences for access to opportunities in urban areas.
Al-Shabaab continues to be active in these areas, building
on a number of localized grievances (see Majid et al. 2021; Although rapid urbanization is at least partly a response
de Waal 2020). to rural climate vulnerability, it drives an increase in
urban vulnerability. Half of Somalia’s 10 largest cities are
Crop production fell dramatically following the out- exposed to significant river or coastal flood risk, and the
break of the civil war in the 1990s, as many large-scale increase in makeshift and poorly planned housing greatly
irrigation systems ceased to function. Production now amplifies the risk. The challenges of meeting the require-
meets only 22 percent of domestic cereal needs. Only ments of the growing urban population—and ultimately
110,800 hectares (ha) are currently irrigated (IFAD 2021), growing a successful urban economy—are also linked to
and permanent crops (the mostly cash crops and fruits climate. Over 98 percent of urban households cook on
that are grown continually, as opposed to being in fallow traditional charcoal stoves, while most of the rural and
rotation systems) are grown on just 25,000 ha (Jalango et nomadic population use firewood and inefficient biomass
al. 2021). Annual yields for staple crops are low, even by stoves (UNEP 2019). Only 36 percent of the country ‘s pop-
regional standards: 1 metric ton/ha (t/ha) for maize; 0.6 t/ ulation has access to electricity, almost all of whom are in
ha for sorghum and sesame (Jalango et al. 2021). urban areas, where access varies from around 60 percent
in Mogadishu to just 23 percent in smaller cities (RCREEE
Conversely, livestock numbers are at record high levels, 2022). Power generation is fragmented and highly ineffi-
increasing stress on rangelands. Livestock, which cient; it is mostly provided by private sector energy service
remained one of the few viable commercial sectors in the providers through diesel-powered mini-grids at very high
wake of the civil war, are central to Somalis’ economic and cost. Renewables make up only 2 percent of generation
cultural life. They contribute almost 90 percent of total capacity (RCREEE 2022). Water availability for Mogadishu
agricultural output, and provides food and income to more is projected to be insufficient for its population by 2030.
than 60 percent of the population (Maystadt et al. 2013).
Nomadic pastoralism is the predominant livelihood for There is very little service provision by the state. Urban
most rural communities (FRS 2013). Herders rely primarily utilities are generally provided by the private sector, non-
on harvesting rainfall through an extensive network of res- governmental organizations, or foreign agencies; and
ervoirs (berkads), and move closer to the Juba and Shabelle access to services hinges primarily on wealth and kinship
rivers during longer, more severe dry seasons. The most
numerous livestock are sheep, goats, and camels, followed
by cattle which are mostly located in the wetter south. 1
Source: Somali High Frequency Survey - December 2017, Wave 2, which
is representative for “secure” areas in Somalia.
connections (World Bank 2020c). Most neighborhoods in Figure 1.2 Monthly climatology for temperature
Somalia’s major cities are associated with a particular and precipitation in Somalia, 1991–2020
clan, on the basis of historical and current occupancy as
35.0 70
well as demographic size. In cities already marked by a
lack of basic services, newly urbanizing groups that lack a 32.5 60
safety net are vulnerable to shocks; this is particularly the
case for disadvantaged groups such as IDPs, the urban 30.0 50
Precipitation (mm)
Temperature (°C)
poor, members of minority clans, and women and youth.
27.5 40
Reliable data on the composition of Somalia’s economy
are scant, but a large proportion of it is climate affected. 25.0 30
A significant proportion of Somalis are dependent on
22.5 20
climate-sensitive rural livelihoods. Reliable figures on GDP
or employment composition are limited, but rural produc- 20.0 10
tion contributes the majority of Somali exports (figure 1.1).
17.5 0
Nov
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Dec
1.2 Seasonality and variability Minimum Mean Maximum
Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Somalia.
Somalia has four seasons. These are Jilaal: a warm,
sunny and dry season from December to mid-March; Gu:
the primary rainy season, starting in mid-March and run- The seasonal cycle is driven by a complex interaction
ning to June, with median rainfall totals varying between of winds and ocean currents, and their impact is not
384 and 432 mm (Rees, Omar, and Rodol 1991); Xagaa: a uniform across the country. June to September are the
cool, dry, and somewhat cloudy season starting in July hottest months in the northern regions, while tempera-
and lasting until mid-September; and Deyr: the secondary tures peak around March in the southern parts of the
rain season, from mid-September to November. Average country (map 1.6). The Gu rainy season is characterized
temperatures remain high throughout the year, although by the southwest monsoons, which rejuvenate the pas-
they peak at the start of each wet season (figure 1.2). turelands—especially on the central plateau—and briefly
transform the arid landscape with lush vegetation. Pre-
cipitation intensifies in April across the country, except
for the northeastern coastline, which receives the least
rainfall during this season. The Jilaal season is very dry
throughout the country; during the Haggai, however,
Figure 1.1 Composition of Somalia exports, 2021
some weather stations along the southern coast and in
Sheep, goats, cattle, the northwestern regions receive significant amounts of
other live animals rainfall, while others have almost no precipitation.
52%
Gold and other precious
stones, metals, pearls The bimodal rainfall system gives rise to two main agri-
20% Oils, seeds, resins, cultural seasons. The Gu tends to be the more important
$482 million
citrus growing season in the south, and the Deyr is generally the
Fish, crustaceans, main growing season in the north. Pastoralists migrate
mollusks between wet and dry season grazing areas around each
8% 15% transition of the seasons (figure 1.3).
5% Other
Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, Somalia Profile, accessed June 2023.

Map 1.6 Climatological seasonal mean temperature

a. December–February b. March–May c. June–August d. September–November
Figure 1.3 Key livelihood and labor cycles in Somalia’s seasonal calendar
Source: Based on Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Somalia Seasonal Calendar.
Although average precipitation is low across the coun- within and between years. The El Niño Southern Oscilla-
try, it frequently takes the form of localized torrential tion also brings more rainfall and flooding during El Niño
rains. Subject to the complex interaction of air and ocean and droughts in La Niña years. Unpredictability generally
currents in the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone, rain- reduces agricultural yields, and extreme climate events
fall exhibits high spatial and temporal variability, both have become increasingly challenging for food security.
Figure 1.4 Proportion of Somalis reporting experiencing shocks in the preceding year
80
Any shock
60
% of households
40
20
0
Drought or Loss of crop Water shortage High food Reduction Theft Conflict Other natural
irregular rain or livestock for cattle or prices in income disaster
farming
Source: World Bank 2019b.
The cycle caused severe droughts in 1991/92, 2011/12, and

2016/17—exacerbating preexisting vulnerabilities in the
1.3 Climate change: recent past
Somali population (van Oldenborgh et al. 2017). and near future
Drought is Somalia’s costliest disaster and affects Climate change effects are already significant in Soma-
the largest number of Somalis every year (World Bank lia. As figure 1.5 shows, average annual temperatures have
2019b; figure 1.4). In rural areas, higher drought expo- risen over the period for which records are available. The
sure decreased consumption by 19 percent, although period 1991–2015 was on average 1° hotter than prevailing
households are affected by climate shocks throughout ambient temperatures between 1901 and 1930. Precipita-
the country. Flooding affects housing, health, and liveli- tion trends are less distinct, but since the 1980s, the Gu
hoods in both rural and urban areas. In 2020, about 2.1–2.7 rains have been declining in many parts of the country,
million Somalis faced phase 3 (crisis) food insecurity or with a serious impact on climate-sensitive agriculture
worse, primarily occasioned by drought and flood. The and pastoralism (figure 1.6).
hotter weather conditions that year, preceded by strong
vegetation growth, also gave rise to the worst outbreak Current climate projections show the temperature in the
of desert locust swarms in over 25 years, destroying tens Horn of Africa rising by at least 2°C over pre-industrial
of thousands of additional hectares of cropland and pas- levels by 2080. Under a low-mitigation scenario (which
tures (OCHA 2022b). At the start of 2022, following three remains the current global trajectory), average annual
failed rainy seasons and some of the lowest rainfall in 40 temperatures in Somalia may increase by between 3°C
years, drought was already affecting millions of people. and 4°C by 2080 (figure 1.7). Rainfall trends are much less
clear. Models generally predict that an increase in mean
Since 2020, the combination of climate shocks, locust rainfall is most likely, but a wider range of uncertainty
outbreaks, and COVID-19 have created a “triple shock.” remains (figure 1.8). The broad implications are that by
The expected outcome is that the share of the population the end of the century, average temperature in Somalia is
living below the poverty line will rise even higher than the likely to be hotter than any current-day country (the cur-
69 percent estimated in 2019. This triple shock is also likely rent hottest country is Burkina Faso, with a mean annual
to have massive implications for displacement and asso- temperature of almost 29.3°C). Lenton et al. (2023) define
ciated vulnerabilities, such as gender-based violence, mean annual temperature over 29°C as falling outside
exacerbation of marginalization, and exclusion from sup- the historical human climate niche. They estimate that
portive/protective networks. The extent to which these most of the country’s land area—effectively all of south-
shocks interact and drive wider social vulnerability and ern and most of central Somalia—will be exposed to such
institutional dysfunction is explored in the next chapter.
Figure 1.5 Observed average annual mean temperature and precipitation profiles for Somalia, 1901–2021
a. Temperature b. Precipitation
28 500
400
27
300
mm
°C
26
200
25 100
1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2021 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2021
Annual mean 5-year smooth Annual mean 5-year smooth

Figure 1.6 Per decade change in mean annual and seasonal rainfall in selected districts
Source: FRS 2018.

Figure 1.7 Projected mean temperature Figure 1.8 Projected precipitation

34 1,250
32 1,000
30 750
28 500
26 250
24 0
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Historical reference period, 1995–2014 SSP1-1.9 Historical reference period, 1995–2014 SSP1-1.9
SSP1-2.6 SSP2-4.5 SSP1-2.6 SSP2-4.5
SSP3-7.0 SSP5-8.5 SSP3-7.0 SSP5-8.5
Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Somalia. Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Somalia.
Figure 1.9 Somalia climate projections compared to current climate of other countries

Note: Mean annual temperature and rainfall figures are for the current baseline period, 1991–2020, for Somalia (light blue) and other countries. For Somalia projections, 2.6
represents SSP1-2.6, 7.0 represents SSP3-7.0, and 8.5 represents SSP5-8.5 median projections for 2080–2099. “Low” scenario projections represent 10th percentile values
and “high” represent 90th percentile values for rainfall under SSP3-7.0. Note that variation in rainfall outcomes is similar for other scenarios.
“unprecedented heat” within half a century, based on cur- of extreme climate outcome indicate a likely increase in
rent emissions trends and policies. extreme events (e.g., figure 1.10).
Conversely, the feasible range of future rainfall out-

comes includes both a large (greater than 50 percent)
increase or decrease in average annual rainfall (figure 1.9). 1.4 Overview of national climate
While a modest change in rainfall is perhaps most likely, it policies and initiatives
is possible that Somalia could either become significantly
more arid (close to a pure desert country like Qatar) or sig- The newly founded Ministry of Environment and Cli-
nificantly wetter (becoming a generally semi-arid country mate Change (created in August 2022 to succeed the
like Kenya). If realized, such changes would have profound Directorate of Environment and Climate Change) has a
effects on both natural and agricultural ecosystems. national mandate to manage climate change in Soma-
lia. The National Climate Change Committee—comprised
A recent analysis (Ogallo et al. 2018) of climate change
of the prime minister, the director general of the Ministry
projections and the associated impacts on Somalia
of Environment and Climate Change, sectoral ministries,
suggests a decreasing trend in rainfall leading up to
directors of governmental agencies, federal member
2030, followed by an increase in rainfall through 2070.
state ministers for environment, the private sector, and
The drying trend already observed during the Gu rains
civil society organizations—has the mandate for coordi-
in Somalia is part of a regional pattern termed the “East
nating and supervising implementation of the country ‘s
African climate paradox” because of the discrepancy
climate change policy.
between observed decreasing rainfall trends and climate
change model predictions for increasing precipitation. Additionally, the Cross-Sectoral Committee on Climate
Recent research suggests that rainfall trends in the Horn Change brings together officials from across govern-
of Africa are influenced by more than just surface tem- ment working on climate change. The committee is
peratures in the Indo-Pacific oceans (Walker et al. 2020). mainly used as a forum for information exchange, con-
The strength of easterly winds over the Congo basin and sultation, agreement, and support among government
Gulf of Guinea—partly explained by relatively faster warm- circles on climate change and the government’s response
ing in the Sahel than the Congo—may more strongly to climate change. However, mainstreaming of climate
influence outcomes over a number of decades, while vari- responsibilities across multiple relevant agencies in gov-
ation in the Madden-Julian Oscillation activity explains ernment remains poorly defined. In addition, structural
around 18 percent of recent drying.2 It has also been sug- and systemic weaknesses—partly due to funding con-
gested that the East African paradox may exist because straints—restrict the functions of the two committees,
current models underestimate the effects of natural vari- which have only met on an ad hoc basis.
ability on East Africa’s drought cycles (Powell et al. 2015).
The new ministry has adopted the Somalia National
If there is indeed a moderate increase in mean precipi- Environment Strategy and Action Plan (NESAP, 2022–
tation over the remainder of the century, once increased 2026) as a starting point for defining climate adaptation
rainfall variation and evapotranspiration potential are priorities. It aims to accomplish four strategic objectives:
factored in, it is likely that the incidences of both extreme
flooding and droughts will increase, as indicated by l Improving environmental governance and enhancing
the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change resource mobilization for the effective management of
Working Group I report (IPCC 2021). Several measures natural resources and the environment
l Undertaking a comprehensive assessment of the

state of Somalia’s natural resources, environment, and
2
The Madden-Julian Oscillation is the major fluctuation in
tropical weather on weekly to monthly timescales. It is often potential climate risks
characterized as an eastward-moving pulse of cloud and rain-
fall near the equator that typically recurs every 30–60 days.
Figure 1.10 Trends in Somalia’s largest daily maximum temperature and precipitation
a. Temperature b. Precipitation
38 50
40
37
30
36
mm
°C
20
35
10
34 0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Annual daily Trend Trend Trend Annual daily Trend Trend Trend
maximum 1951–2020 1971–2020 1991–2020 maximum 1951–2020 1971–2020 1991–2020
l Undertaking conservation initiatives to address urgent areas: agriculture and food security; water resource man-
challenges in land degradation, biodiversity, aquatic agement and public health; disaster preparedness and
and marine environment, and climate change management; coastal, marine environment, and fisheries;
energy; forestry and environment; human settlements;
l Enhancing public awareness, participation, and behav-
and infrastructure. The first three categories account for
ior change on environmental protection, conservation,
$35 billion of proposed investment. A new National Adap-
and climate change.
tation Plan is currently under development. The Somalia
The Initial National Communication to the United Nations National Climate Change Policy of 2023 outlines the insti-
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2018 out- tutional arrangements for addressing climate change.
lined a national greenhouse gas inventory for Somalia
Somalia is ranked by the Notre Dame Global Adap-
and an analysis of mitigation and adaptation options.
tation Initiative (ND-GAIN) methodology as the most
The Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), filed in
climate-vulnerable country in the world. It is also rated
July 2021,3 outlines a commitment to reduce greenhouse
as being unprepared for climate change (figure 1.11). Its
gases by 30 percent relative to a business-as-usual sce-
readiness ranking is higher than some of its African peers
nario that envisages a doubling of emissions by 2030. Most
because of the inclusion of its relatively high ease of doing
of Somalia’s emissions come from the livestock and forest
business score, which is used as the sole indicator of
sectors, and the bulk of the emissions reduction com-
economic readiness. On all other governance and social
mitments are related to efforts to reduce net forest loss,
readiness indicators, Somalia scores very low.
including some restoration activities. The 2013 National
Adaptation Programme of Action (FRS 2013) identified
The core Somalia climate change policy documents rec-
floods and droughts as the most severe climate risks
ognize Somalia’s dire climate status and reference its
for Somalia, and grouped key adaptation activities into
ranking as one of the world’s most vulnerable countries.
three main areas: sustainable land management, water
The core policies emphasize the need for adaptation,
resource management, and disaster management. Under
particularly focusing on the adoption of climate-smart
the NDC, an estimated budget of close to $50 billion is
livelihoods, including adoption of resilient food crops and
proposed for adaptation across an expanded set of focal
the use of livestock-rearing practices that require less
water. Communities are also encouraged to have contin-
3
Source: UN Climate Change NDC Registry. gency plans and receive training to monitor climate risks
Figure 1.11 Country Climate Vulnerability Index versus Readiness Index scores
Source: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN).

Note: The figure plots Country Climate Vulnerability Index scores against Readiness Index scores. Dots are sized by population. Index values vary from 0 to 1; higher values
indicate higher vulnerability or readiness.
in their area. Somalia’s Ninth National Development Plan merged into the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and
(2020–2024) identifies environmental and climate change Disaster Management. Disaster risk management man-
as one of the most critical drivers of poverty, linked to dates and institutions have been fragmented within the
food insecurity and reliance on food imports. It identi- government. Forecasting and response initiatives are
fies a direct correlation between increasing frequency mostly coordinated and supervised by international part-
of climate emergencies and displacement and calls for ners4 and generally implemented as stand-alone projects
improving the resilience of the traditional livestock and in specific areas, with limited capacity building, par-
crop production sectors while diversifying away from ticularly at the federal member state level. The Somalia
climate-dependent sectors to achieve “climate-proof National Bureau of Standards runs the Food Security and
economic growth.” These climate change adaptation Nutrition Analysis Unit and the Somalia Water and Land
priorities need to be reflected in sectoral plans and strat- Information Management (SWALIM) project with support
egies and in effective action. from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO). These provide a measure of climate-related
Table 1.1 summarizes the climate-relevant content of sec- information that is cascaded down to the federal member
toral laws and policies in Somalia. state level and frequently downscaled—and sometimes
used by the administrations in the member states for gen-
The federal government of Somalia has developed eral response and planning.
a disaster risk management policy framework. This
framework includes a 2016 law to establish the Somalia
Disaster Management Agency, which was subsequently 4
Source: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Somalia
web page.
Table 1.1 Climate-relevant sectoral laws and policies in Somalia
Year enacted
Law, policy, plan or prepared Key climate messages
National Biodiversity Strategy and 2015 Identifies climate change as a key driver of biodiversity degradation/loss and high-
Action Plan lights role of biodiversity in addressing climate change
Somalia National Action Programme 2016 Makes general link between climate change and desertification
for the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification
Somali National Disaster Management 2018 Recommends preparation of a national disaster risk reduction strategy, coordinated
Policy with climate change and sustainable development policies
Power Master Plan for Somalia 2019 Recognizes high greenhouse gas emissions from diesel generators in use nationwide
National Environment Policy 2019 Outlines national guidelines on ameliorating effect of climate change on waste man-
agement, biodiversity loss, coastal pollutions, and general management of Somalia’s
natural resources at both the federal government and federal member state levels
Somalia Social Protection Policy 2019 l Identifies climate risks as key drivers of vulnerability and food insecurity in
Somalia
l Recognizes need for resilience building and diversification of livelihoods, and role
of social protection in building household and community resilience and support-
ing livelihood recovery
Environmental Social Impact 2020 l Require integration of climate change vulnerability assessment and priority adap-
Assessment Regulations tation and mitigation actions by developers and proponents during the preparation
of strategic environmental and social assessments
l Require climate change vulnerability assessment and priority mitigation and
adaptation actions to be included in environmental and social impact audits
National Voluntary Land Degradation 2020 Recognizes that addressing land degradation will contribute toward mitigating and
Neutrality Targets 2020 adapting to climate change
Somalia National Food Fortification 2020 Notes that food security and nutrition has remained critical or stressed over the
Strategic Plan (2019–2024) years, in large part due to climate change and reliance on rain-fed agriculture
National Drought Plan 2020 l Aims to design drought monitoring and early warning system for adoption by
Somali government and relevant stakeholders
l Recognizes role of climate change in intensifying drought
National Water Resource Strategy 2021 l Includes extensive references to the impacts of climate change on water
(2021–2025) resources, including the quality of groundwater
l Assumes that mean annual rainfall shall increase by 1%, 3%, and 4% by 2030, 2050,
and 2080, respectively (using 1981–2000 reference period)
Somalia National Environment Strat- 2022 In one of its four objectives, calls for a comprehensive assessment of the state of
egy and Action Plan (2022–2026) Somalia’s natural resources, environment, and potential climate risks
Somalia Drought Response Plan 2022 Makes links between a changing climate and the occurrence of La Niña resulting in
prolonged, persistent drought and food insecurity
National Environmental Management 2023 Refers to climate change and its management as one of the functions of the act
Act
Food Security Crisis Preparedness 2023 Under preparation with the support of the Somalia Crisis Recovery Project
Plan
Climate and disaster risk management is increasingly Despite the rapid expansion of climate-related policies
featured within the national conversation around politi- supported by international partners, Somalia’s financial
cal stabilization and development trajectories, including and human capacity to convert high-level policies into
in mainstream and social media. This increased interest practical measures, or implement much of this agenda
is reflected in meaningful steps on the ground: on the ground, remains nascent. The federal government
is focused on resolving the fragility crisis first, dedicat-
l In May 2021, the Somali government signed a mem- ing much resources and time to security challenges from
orandum of understanding with the African Risk extremist groups. Government capacity to deliver even
Capacity (ARC) with the aim of helping the country basic services is very low. The new Ministry of Environ-
better prepare and plan for, and respond to, extreme ment and Climate Change is struggling to attend to the
weather events and natural disasters. This agreement enforcement of basic environmental regulations, let
provides access to tools and support for preparing, alone more ambitious climate policies. The ministry has
planning, and responding to extreme weather events no resources or equipment for data collection, and lags
and natural disasters. It also provides the opportu- in the dissemination of climate policies and scientific
nity to ensure financial preparedness is in place, and communication.
to utilize disaster insurance as a member of the ARC
risk pool. According to the government’s own analysis during
the NDC preparation process, there are structural and
l In December 2021, the Ministry of Humanitar-
systemic weaknesses in the management of climate
ian Affairs and Disaster Management launched the
change. The challenges include a lack of financial capac-
National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction. The
ity, given the government’s limited tax revenues, which
aim of establishing the platform is to facilitate a uni-
are 4.4 percent of gross domestic product (Khan and
fied, risk-informed approach to disasters that pulls
Khan 2022), and the ongoing challenges of strengthening
together all relevant knowledge, information, and insti-
the government’s fiscal position. Other challenges include
tutional capacities in Somalia.
the dearth of targeted, actionable climate policies and an
l In August 2022, a prominent Special Envoy for Drought ongoing inability to enforce laws due to the political and
Response was appointed to spearhead government security situation. A stable bureaucracy, effective capac-
efforts to elevate and coordinate drought response ity development, and significant climate finance will be
both nationally and among international partners. needed to realize many of Somalia’s stated climate goals.
Chapter 2
Climate Change, Conflict,

and Social Risks
I n Somalia, climate crises have historically been
influenced by political factors—specifically, con-
flict and political instability (Maxwell and Majid
2016). Impacts of the climate and conflict emergencies
compound and cascade, increasing human insecurity and
limiting in situ adaptation options to the changing climate
(Thalheimer and Webersik 2020). COVID-19 has recently
added another layer of interacting vulnerability. Social
in Somalia. While climate change does not directly
drive conflict, it complicates and exacerbates related
stresses and vulnerability. Climate-induced social
stress may directly trigger conflict and/or the erosion
of institutions that would otherwise mitigate conflict
risks. Climate impacts on natural resources may also
fuel the pernicious cycle of conflict, weak institutions,
and resource degradation and competition.
control measures are more challenging for internally dis-
l Finally, the fourth subsection outlines markers of
placed persons (IDPs) living within densely populated
social vulnerability in Somalia that are interwoven with
camps with low access to running water for handwashing
conflict, climate hazards, and their social outcomes.
(Karamba and Salcher 2020); also, IDPs are more vulnera-
These need to be taken into account to understand
ble to increases in commodity prices as well as to impacts
social implications and to target adaptation and resil-
on relief agencies’ budgets.
ience programs.
This chapter examines the interactions between cli-

mate, armed conflict, and social risks, both to better
understand the wider context of vulnerability and to 2.1 Conflict and climate change:
an overview
identify particularly harmful interactions. The chapter is
organized into four subsections.
l The first briefly summarizes the literature on con- Over the last decade, there has been an explosion of
flict and climate change, which broadly indicates that research on the links between climate change and con-
although there is no general direct causal link between flict (Koubi 2019). The emerging consensus appears to be
climate change and conflict (von Uexkull and Buhaug that there is no robust, uniform connection between cli-
2021), the relationship between the two is shaped mate change and the onset of conflict between states,
by a series of social conditions (e.g., political econ- and perhaps also within states. For every study that finds
omy, state and political interventions, institutions) a clear connection between climate change and war,
and channeled through indirect pathways, particularly another finds no such link (see for instance, Hsiang, Burke,
relating to resource scarcity and displacement. and Miguel 2013; Buhaug et al. 2014).
l The second reviews the recent history of conflict in The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Somalia and the related social conditions that interact (IPCC) finds, with medium confidence, that “At higher
with climate, conflict, and social vulnerability. global warming levels, impacts of weather and climate
l The third subsection examines evidence for spe- extremes, particularly drought, by increasing vulnera-
cific linkages between conflict and climate change bility will increasingly affect violent intrastate conflict”
(IPCC 2022a, 15). Academic authors also find that climatic
19
conditions may lead to the outbreak of violent conflict in in populations that depend on agriculture and natural
some subnational regions, particularly those dependent resources. Climate-related risks are affecting resource
on agriculture, and in combination with other socioeco- availability and intergroup competition across the Horn of
nomic and political factors such as a low level of economic Africa, particularly around water, livelihoods, migration,
development and political marginalization (IPCC 2022b). and political power. Risks of conflict linked to compe-
tition over natural resources are more likely when they
A set of recent studies commissioned by the World happen against the backdrop of a long history of social,
Bank illustrate how conflict and climate crises can economic, and political exclusion and marginalization
lead to the destruction of livelihoods and consequen- (Doti 2010), and in a fragile context where state capacity
tial impoverishment, distress migration, loss of assets, is nascent. By exacerbating scarcity of key resources in
food insecurity, breakdown in social cohesion, and a region where transhumance pastoralism/agropasto-
trauma for communities, households, and individuals. ralism is an important livelihood activity, climate change
More indirectly, conflict and climate crises can lead to the can both aggravate resource-based conflicts and inten-
breakdown in traditional governance institutions—thus sify general social vulnerability and social fractures. All of
fueling future rounds of violence, hindering the ability of these general descriptions fit in Somalia, where they are
communities to resolve resource conflicts, and hamper- layered onto legacies of past conflicts, historical griev-
ing the ability of both formal and informal institutions to ances, and existing intergroup animosities.
address the impacts of climate change. Conflict also con-
tributes to the breakdown in state authority in different The literature on displacement suggests that cli-
parts of the Horn of Africa and reduces the likelihood of mate and conflict shocks have the potential to trigger
cross-boundary cooperation. For instance, a study on migration cascades with implications for international
the outbreak of desert locusts that have affected Soma- security (Abel et al. 2019; Missirian and Schlenker 2017).
lia found that one of the major factors behind the outbreak But whether mobility driven by climate crises increases
across the Horn of Africa (and in the adjoining Republic violence at the destination depends on a number of fac-
of Yemen) was conflict, which had impeded joint action in tors, including linkages between the displaced and host
the front-line countries, and the actual spraying of pesti- communities, the level of economic interrelationship
cides to control swarms (World Bank 2022b). and dependence, and governmental policies (Ide and
Scheffran 2014; Koubi 2019). Causality is typically con-
There are two main pathways through which climate tested. For instance, while Ash and Obradovich (2020)
change shapes social risk and conflict that are most and Kelley et al. (2015) find a positive association between
prominently identified in the literature on links between drought-induced migration and violence in the Syrian
climate change and conflict. These are (1) resource Arab Republic, Selby et al. (2017) and Zhang et al. (2019)
scarcity (which affects social cohesion and creates/ find no evidence of a direct relationship. In Somalia, it is
aggravates group-based tensions) and (2) displacement. clear that displacement increases both the vulnerability
Institutions, including both formal and informal com- of displaced groups and social risk, but there is little clear
munity and civil society organizations, play a key role in evidence of a resultant increase in conflict.
shaping these pathways.1
Correlations between drought and conflict do not nec-
About 40 percent of all intrastate conflicts can be linked essarily imply causation. Drought and conflict coexist
to the exploitation of natural resources (UNEP 2021). mostly in countries or regions that already suffer from
There is growing evidence that links increased tempera- adverse climatic conditions, are highly dependent on
tures and drought to conflict risk in Africa, particularly agriculture for income and food generation, have little
capability to cope with climatic changes, and are char-
acterized by preexisting tensions and conflict (Ide and
1
In fact, the most commonly accepted definition of “institutions” is by Scheffran 2014). In Somalia, even broad spatial or tem-
Douglass North, who refers to institutions as the “rules of the game” or
the “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North
poral correlations between climate shocks and conflict
1991). events are difficult to establish as they are both so
Chapter 2: Climate Change, Conflict, and Social Risks l 21
widespread (figure 2.1 and map 2.1), and detailed socioeco- populations with preexisting vulnerabilities) also increase
nomic data are scant, with efforts on poverty and drought the likelihood of climate–conflict interactions, and are
impact data collection in Somalia having ramped up only further aggravated by armed conflict (Buhaug and von
in the past five years (Pape and Wollburg 2019). However, Uexkull 2021). Identifying specific interactions and causal-
many of the conditions that shape vulnerability to climate ities in an individual setting requires closer examination.
change (such as weak and fragmented institutions and
Figure 2.1 Timeline of conflict and extreme weather events in Somalia
Outbreak of Barre 1996: 2004, 2005, 2005–07: 2011/12:

Civil War government Riverine 2008: Renewed conflict East Africa
1989-1991 overthrown flooding, Drought, food Transitional Fed. drought, food
1991 broken dam shortage Gov’t and militias shortage
1980 2020
2007: 2010: 2013, 2015, 2014, 2015,

Riverine Drought, 2018: 2019:
1983: 1987-89: 2000: Tropical
Drought, water Two droughts, Drought, food flooding, famine Drought, food
broken dam cyclone, shortage
shortages three floods shortage flood
Somali Civil War
(since 2009)
Source: Conflict data (red boxes): ACLED database; disaster data (i.e., extreme weather events) (green boxes): EM-DAT, the International Disaster Database.
Map 2.1 Violence, food insecurity, and internal displacement across Somalia
a. Armed violence b. Food insecurity and internal displacement
Internally Displaced Persons

Fatalities By Region (Q4 2021)
Jan 2019 – Sep 2022
350,000
400
150,000
150
50,000
10
Urban Areas Food Insecurity

Q4 2022
Emergency
Crisis
Urban Areas
Stressed
Rivers
Rivers
Source: NUPI and SIPRI 2022 based on data from ACLED, Africapolis and Natural Earth.
2.2 Conflict and social context through land grabs—depriving thousands of farmers
(many from disadvantaged clans) of their land and liveli-
in Somalia hoods (Menkhaus 2007, 2014; de Waal 2015).
Somalia’s enduring challenges are interconnected Widespread land appropriations followed. These were
and have long historical roots, which preceded the often facilitated by the regime’s agricultural policies
formal collapse of the Somali state in 1991 (Menkhaus and land titling laws, which disrupted customary land
2014). These challenges include emergent state capac- tenure arrangements and traditional agricultural pat-
ity, corruption, remnants of warlordism, predatory armed terns (Norton 2009). Another key change to Somalia’s
groups, fragmented and contested state authority, exclu- political economy, closely linked to both land and cli-
sionary politics, and political violence. Both the specific mate change, was the gradual commercialization of the
history of conflict and the structural factors that influ- livestock trade. Commercialization led to a huge growth
ence it have links to climate. In particular, the shape and in the number of livestock being herded, even as fewer
intensity of competition over natural resources has been people herded livestock. The reconfiguration of the pas-
formed by Somalia’s climate and continues to be affected toral economy increased the pressure on grazing lands
by climate change. This in turn has influenced the social and water resources (Samatar, Salisbury, and Bascom
divisions and hierarchies, and the political economies 1988; Samatar 1987; de Waal 2018). Development inter-
that have driven conflict. The general level of social vul- vention by the state—such as efforts to increase water
nerability is also in part a function of the harshness of the sources—began to be viewed with suspicion, as these
Somali climate. efforts were perceived as encouraging migration by herd-
ers from other clans and land grabs. In the dryland grazing
areas, disputes over access to water cisterns (berkads),
A brief history of conflict in Somalia increasing sedentarization, and enclosure of reserves led
to—and continue to lead to—violent clashes, fueled by the
The former Italian territory of Somalia and the Brit- ready availability of weapons.
ish territory of Somaliland achieved independence
in June–July 1960. Somaliland was independent for a The changes to the social and political economy of pas-
period of four days in June 1960, before the territory ’s toralist livelihoods, combined with land appropriations,
leaders joined former Italian Somalia in a political union and the instrumentalization of clan-based conflict were
following the latter’s independence. After a brief period overlaid on group-based grievances against Barre, and
of multiparty politics, Siad Barre came to power in 1969 led to civil war breaking out in the 1980s. The state col-
in a military coup, and mobilized Somali society in pursuit lapsed, and Somaliland declared independence in 1991. In
of nationalist and modernizing ideals (Majid et al. 2021). the immediate aftermath of Barre’s overthrow, the vari-
By the 1970s, Somalia appeared to be inexorably moving ous opposition factions splintered, and warfare began to
along the path to modern statehood, with expanded edu- focus on control over resources and land, finally resorting
cation, a somewhat capable bureaucracy, and efforts to looting of homes and assets, and then food relief. Par-
to subsume the clan system under the structures of the ticularly ferocious fighting took place around control over
modern state (Lewis 1989). centers of commerce and revenue, such as the Mogadishu
port and airport, Kismayo City, and other local airstrips
This changed after Somalia invaded the Ogaden region (Majid et al. 2021). Those conflicts remained largely unre-
of Ethiopia in 1977 and was resoundingly defeated. As solved, and the fighting shifted to disputes over more local
the brunt of the blame for the military misadventure was issues, such as smaller towns and the farmland along the
attributed to Barre, challenges to his rule increased, and Shabelle River. By the end of 1992, numerous local wars
the regime’s focus changed purely to survival. Much of were being fought across south-central Somalia between
Somalia’s foreign assistance was diverted or stolen. The different armed groups. The leaders of these various mili-
once-professional security services became predatory, tias financed their operations through a combination
advancing the interests of empowered clans—including
of looting and extortion, foreign patronage, and political movement known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in
credit—including offers of future positions. 2006 (Barnes and Hassan 2007). They offered “reputa-
tional benefits and social capital,” and professing piety
Following a year of catastrophic warfare from 1991 and adherence to Islam allowed businesspersons to lower
to 1992,2 United Nations (UN) and U.S. engagement transaction costs and signal trustworthiness through
began. A ceasefire was negotiated, and the UN Operation piety. But most importantly, unlike clan unit–based
in Somalia (UNOSOM) mission was launched, dominat- political-military organizations which were inevitably
ing the political scene until the UN withdrawal in 1995 confined to certain localities and established checkpoints
(Bradbury and Healy 2010). The early 1990s also saw the on their boundaries that exacted payments from traders,
emergence and consolidation of an independent busi- Islamists were able to control larger territories cross-
ness class. As exports of primary goods such as livestock, ing clan or ethnic lines without internal checkpoints, and
bananas, and charcoal grew significantly, businesspeo- were able to establish trust and enforce contracts on
ple began to import consumer goods, including textiles, the basis of common Islamic faith and law (Carrier and
sugar, and cigarettes—but also khat and weapons. With Lochery 2013; Ahmad 2014).
the de-escalation of open conflict in the mid-1990s,
major financial companies from other regions started to The early 2000s were also characterized by multiple
invest or reinvest in Mogadishu, collaborating with war- efforts to create a central state in Somalia. For many
lords to ensure the protection of their property (Marchal elites, state-building was a desirable ongoing proj-
2002). Between the middle and the end of the 1990s, ect, since it was closely connected to the availability of
many businesses re-established themselves in Moga- external resources in the form of developmental, human-
dishu, changing from single-clan ownership models to itarian, and security cooperation funds (Menkhaus 2017).
multiclan shareholding structures (Hagmann and Step- However, the various political groups/organizations
putat 2016). This period saw the establishment of more emerging from externally supported peace talks strug-
advanced industries, including the spread of telecommu- gled to assert legitimacy and authority. The first of these
nication companies and the opening of small factories. was the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), formed
Over time, Somali business owners separated themselves in 2004 through negotiations led by the Intergovernmen-
from the clan unit politicians and warlords who had dom- tal Authority on Development. The ICU took advantage of
inated the political and security arena in the early 1990s. the TFG’s weakness, however, to establish unified control
While at first businesspeople financed armed factions in over Mogadishu for the first time in 16 years; and by Sep-
return for protection, they began to fund their own secu- tember 2006, it controlled most of the country apart from
rity forces, and later on, turned to local Sharia (Islamic) the provisional capital Baidoa, which the TFG managed to
courts. By 1999, the business class had become an inde- hold with Ethiopian military protection (Majid et al. 2021).
pendent political force (Menkhaus 2007; International While the ICU enjoyed a degree of popular support during
Crisis Group 2011). the period that it was in power, it also splintered as mod-
erate and more extreme groups (including the group that
Although Islamists had made sporadic efforts to gain was to become al-Shabaab) vied for leadership. Mean-
a political foothold in Somalia, their efforts had, for the while, away from Mogadishu, some of the federal member
most part, been unsuccessful. This changed with busi- states, most notably Puntland and Jubaland, began to
ness finance for Islamic courts in the late 1990s—motivated take shape
primarily by economic rather than religious or ideological
reasons. The Islamic courts had originally emerged as a In 2006, on the back of a sustained diplomatic cam-
network of Sharia courts exercising lineage-based juris- paign, Ethiopia invaded Somalia and routed the ICU
diction, and later coalescing as a cross-clan umbrella forces, whom they suspected of being under undue
Eritrean influence (Majid et al. 2021; Marchal 2011). With
the approval of the UN Security Council, the African Union
2
In just four months during this time period, an estimated 25,000
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed to the capital
people were killed and 2 million were displaced internally. in 2007 to protect the TFG, sparking violence on the part of
al-Shabaab. In April 2022, AMISOM was succeeded by the Structural factors influencing the
African Union Transition Mission in Somalia. Both the for- relationship between climate and
mation of the TFG in 2004 and its successor, the Federal
conflict
Government of Somalia, in 2012 marked the return of what
is ostensibly a central state institution. After peaceful Despite improvements in political stability, Somalia
elections in 2016, a new government was formed in 2017 remains fragile. Political processes such as elections
committed to embark on a development trajectory (World continue to be overlaid on traditional power-sharing
Bank 2018). A successful election provided for a peaceful arrangements, and politics is persistently transactional
change in administration in May 2022. and monetized in nature. A variety of structural factors
that have shaped past conflict and its links to climate per-
Al-Shabaab, however, continues to be engaged in
sist, and present challenges to building a more inclusive
active conflict against the federal government, carry-
political system.
ing out terrorism attacks in Mogadishu and other major
population centers. It controls large territories in the
southern part of the country, though it has been pushed Vulnerable population
back by recent governmental campaigns. Violent clashes
Large numbers of people in Somalia are dependent
between various power factions also continue to occur
on pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods which are
throughout Somalia (Nunez and Pape 2022), often result-
climate exposed, and there has been little public or pri-
ing from inter-clan cleavages involving localized land
vate investment in the sector (World Bank 2020a). As
ownership disputes, political power, and conflict over
with many other parts of East Africa, large numbers have
resources such as water and pastureland (Barrow 2020).
dropped out of the sector due to the combined effects of
These clashes are exacerbated by the existence of numer-
climatic crises and the constant need to adapt to chang-
ous private militia, loyal to local leaders rather than formal
ing political, economic, and climatic conditions to gain
government institutions (Menkhaus 2014; Webersik,
a living (Lind, Sabates-Wheeler, and Kohnstamm 2016;
Hansen, and Egal 2018). In fact, al-Shabaab accounts for
Maxwell and Majid 2016; Robinson, Zimmerman, and
only a minority of the total recorded conflict incidents
Checchi 2014). As people drop out of pastoralism, large
over the last decade, although with a slight upward trend
numbers also move to Somalia’s underresourced cities,
(figure 2.2).
increasing the environmental pressures on them (World
Bank 2020b). Somalia also imports much of the food that
it consumes and is therefore disproportionately affected
Figure 2.2 Conflict incidents in Somalia with and without al-Shabaab involvement, 2011–21
a. Incidents involving al-Shabaab b. Incidents not involving al-Shabaab

7 Total conflict incidents by year 7 Total conflict incidents by year
6 6
4,982
5 5 4,407
3,929 4,155 3,961
Thousands
Thousands
4 4 3,455 3,621 3,406

3,151 3,223
3 3
2,077 1,947
2 1,735 1,597 1,774 2
1,411
917 1,083 1,293 1,113 1,261
1 560 1
0 0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Source: Original calculations from ACLED data.
by disruptions in global supply chains. This means that when it intersects with regional, gender, class, and reli-
increases in production-related risks to global agri- gious identities:
culture and food prices caused by increased warming
and extreme weather events are likely to have outsized l It plays a key role in military mobilization. Clan identity
impacts on the country (Schewe, Otto, and Frieler 2017). acts as the basis on which financial support is raised
from diaspora donors and provides a way of organiz-
Whether formally numbering among IDPs or not, the dis- ing command structures. This is a legacy of efforts by
placed typically lose social support networks and add to the former dictator Barre to stave off challenges to his
the large numbers of vulnerable people who have been rule by developing kinship-based networks of clients,
affected by conflict and climatic crises. Minority groups, and exploiting local and personal rivalries between
persons living with disabilities, and youth face additional these networks (Reno 2018; Compagnon 1998). Clans
forms of social exclusion. All forms of vulnerability are only became firmly established as political, admin-
deeply gendered, with women and girls confronting sig- istrative, and military entities in the period leading
nificant gender disparities, including high levels of sexual up to civil war and during the external peace-making
and gender-based violence (GBV). Many vulnerabilities interventions that followed (Balthasar 2017). Mobili-
intersect and compound each other; a young female IDP zation of clan affiliations in political conflict had long
belonging to a minority clan is likely to be disadvantaged been a prominent feature of Somali politics, but Barre
on multiple counts. More discussion of vulnerable groups repoliticized, repurposed, and intensified lineage com-
is provided in section 2.4. petition for the purposes of ensuring his own political
survival (Compagnon 2013), transforming the nature of
clan warfare in Somalia, adding deeper antagonisms,
Clan dynamics and creating interlocking cycles of violence aimed at
Despite being one of the most ethnically homogeneous redressing real and perceived injustices.
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia’s popula- l Clan identity and social groupings are a source of
tion is divided into more than 500 clans and subclans, resilience during external shocks and times of hard-
though 4 major clans dominate (The Economist 2013). ship. Social group dynamics acquired increased
The word “clan” is used elastically by Somalis to refer to salience after the dissolution of the state, where per-
lineage groups at different levels of aggregation, where sonal networks have become an important source
these different levels have different social and political of resilience, acting as sources of information, secu-
meanings and characteristics (Majid et al. 2021). Lineage rity, and material support; and allowing for a measure
therefore provides multiple potential identities that can of mutual accountability within social groups (Simons
be drawn upon, depending on circumstance and initiative. 1997). This is described in greater detail below.
In the fighting for resources at the national level immedi- l As external actors and Somalis have tried to
ately after state collapse in 1991, conflict was organized reconstruct a centralized formal state in Somalia
according to the highest level of clan aggregation—that (especially after 1993), they have used clan identity as
is, by dividing fighters into one of the four principal clan a basis for spatial and political organization (Mosley
families: Darood, Diir, Hawiye, and Isaaq. In local politics, 2015; Hoehne 2016). To an extent, the structure of the
other sub-aggregations (clan or subclan) become more federal member states reflect an assumed distribu-
salient (de Waal 2015). During the battles for Mogadishu tion of clan families, and the parliamentary system is
in the immediate aftermath of state collapse, some of the organized according to the 4.5 system, which stipu-
fiercest fighting took place between Hawiye subclans led lates that the four major clan groups receive an equal
by rival warlords (de Waal 2020). share of seats with the other clans sharing the remain-
der. Clan quotas are then further subdivided between
Clan identity retains a great deal of salience within the
subclans (SSF 2017).
organization of Somali politics and conflict in the country,
and in conditioning vulnerability and resilience, especially
Resource competition and political economy of minority groups have not been sufficiently integrated
into humanitarian assessments, thus limiting their access
Control of its scarce arable land has been closely con-
to emergency assistance and rendering their vulnerabil-
nected to power in Somalia’s recent political history in
ity more acute.
ways that intersect with climate change (Jaspars, Adan,
and Majid 2019). During Barre’s government in the 1970s
and early 1980s, there was intensive cash cropping in the Legacy of conflict and institutional weakness
fertile land along and between the rivers, relying on cheap
There is a long history of predatory state intervention
and exploitable labor. Land grabs started with the Italian
in Somalia, as dominant groups have sought to use the
colonizers, and were followed by politicians, civil servants,
mantle of the state to pursue their own narrow eco-
and merchants who could register the land, dispossessing
nomic and political agendas (Hagmann et al. 2018). Since
the clans that inhabited the riverine areas and were not
before the civil war, a small elite has controlled wealth,
well represented politically. Land-grabbing set the scene
politics has remained transactional, institutions are
for the so-called “liberation” of these areas by clan-militia
often co-opted, governmental revenues and aid diverted
at the height of the civil war period, and created persistent
or subverted, and a security stabilization strategy reli-
disputes over land. Land- or resource-based disputes are
ant on African neighbors subordinated to wider regional
very common in Somalia, generally involving clan poli-
security dynamics. Further, corruption levels in Soma-
tics or issues over imagined clan “homelands” (deegaan).
lia are among the highest in the world, with the country
Competing claims of ownership are also common in urban
ranking 178th of 180 on Transparency International’s 2021
areas, frequently over land that was once public or either
Corruption Perceptions Index.3 Low levels of institutional
looted or vacated by fleeing households (RVI and HIPS
capacity and high corruption remain interlinked, and trust
2017).
in the state to deliver services for the general public good
After state collapse in the late 1980s, clan-based mili- is therefore low (World Bank 2021b).
tias fought for control over resources. This resulted in
widespread looting, theft, and the collapse of large-scale
irrigation schemes, as well as displacement and
Local, community, and private institutions
famine among those who had already been marginal- In the absence of a functional state and formal institu-
ized. Finally, after 2000, various forms of Western- and tions, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, clan
Ethiopian-backed governments were introduced, with a support networks, diaspora remittances, and civil soci-
coincident rise of Islamist movements. This in turn led to ety groups have all played a role in helping communities
a resumption of conflict, large-scale displacements, and adapt to, cope with, and mitigate the impacts of diverse
famine or humanitarian crises in 2008, 2011, and 2017. It is shocks for more than 30 years. They have done so in at
in this third period that the impacts of climate crises have least three ways.
been the most visible and have intersected with Somalia’s
history of conflict and predatory governance practices. l Clan support structures act as a basic collective
social insurance system and increase household and
Minority groups today comprise a significant share of community resilience. Clan support structures play
IDPs, who are often concentrated in urban centers and a role in channeling remittances and investments, as
lack adequate access to services, security, and social well as the contributions of expertise from the Somali
and political representation. Underrepresented among diaspora. Remittances represent approximately
the diaspora, marginal groups also lack access to char- 28 percent of gross domestic product (similar to that
ity networks and international remittances—both critical contributed by official development assistance) and
coping mechanisms for better-placed social groups— offer an essential lifeline to many communities and
thereby increasing their vulnerability to economic, households. Remittances are not, however, distributed
conflict, and climate-related shocks. Without sufficient
representation and voice through clan systems, the needs 3
Source: Transparency International 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index .
equally, but “tend to be concentrated within partic- facilities and health care services. These services are
ular social groups, lineages and extended families, not uniformly distributed and tend to be concentrated
especially within Somaliland, Puntland and the central in urban areas. During periods of climatic and eco-
regions of Somalia due to the history of migration from nomic crisis, this results in multiple service providers
these areas” (Majid, Abdirahman, and Hassan 2017). (neighborhood, communal, state, public, and private
Marginalized groups receive less diaspora support actors) offering households and neighborhoods a
and are therefore more vulnerable in times of crisis. range of services, including power, water, education,
The processes involved in the provision of remittances and health care—usually for a fee, complicating any
are underlined by notions of trust and efficiency. Clan distinctions between “private” and “public” and making
and religious networks play an important role in build- it harder for vulnerable households and displaced per-
ing trust, especially in contexts such as Somalia where sons to access these services (World Bank 2020c).
formal financial institutions are limited (Majid et al
2021). The clan lineage system operates both as an
2.3 Evidence for specific

information network and a form of financial guaran-
tee. The Somali hawala or money transfer system, for
example, is also strongly rooted in networks of trust climate and conflict linkages in
based on lineage relations, though many have moved
beyond these affiliations, as they have expanded their
Somalia
businesses domestically, regionally, and globally (Lind-
A highly simplified conceptual framework of linkages
ley 2010).
between risk elements that may be (at least partly) driven
l Community organizations can play a key role in local by climate change impacts and/or influence conflict out-
peace and reconciliation efforts, contributing to comes is presented in figure 2.3.
social cohesion. In the absence of formal justice, tra-
ditional mechanisms governing inter-clan relations This section focuses on reviewing the evidence within
and/or Sharia have served to protect many (although Somalia for linkages 1–3 and 4–6. These roughly cor-
vulnerable groups are often prevented from attaining respond to the two areas of linkage shown in the figure,
justice when facing more powerful groups). Local- that is, climate change (1) causing social impacts (includ-
ized reconciliation efforts throughout the country have ing displacement) that increase civil tensions and
often been led by clan elders, religious leaders, civil exacerbate conflict, and (2) exacerbating conflict over
society activists, and the business community. For scarce resources.
instance, Somali civil society actors played an import-
ant role in supporting international efforts to negotiate
peace in the contested town of Galkayo, with the final Climate impacts on natural resources
agreement being signed by a range of political, military, and rural livelihood impacts, driving
and civil society figures, including prominent women food insecurity, displacement, and
in Galkayo as well as the highest customary author- conflict outcomes [linkages 1, 2, 3]
ity, suggesting widespread buy-in (Majid, Theros, and
Abdirahman 2020). Several studies have examined the role of extreme
l Community and business organizations have played weather on vulnerable populations and conflict in
a role in the provision of public goods and services. Somalia. These studies suggest that changes in weather
The collapse of the state saw the emergence of local and climate-related events adversely affect socioeco-
civil society organizations, nongovernmental organi- nomic conditions, exacerbate displacement situations in
zations, think tanks, media associations, and religious the region (Owain and Maslin 2018), and conflict indirectly
groups, often supported by the business community, through food insecurity (Anderson et al. 2021; Maystadt
to offer public services, many of which continue to this and Ecker 2014).
day. These services include provision of educational
Figure 2.3 Conceptual framework examining the links between risk elements directly affected by
climate events (blue boxes) and those that may be indirectly affected (white boxes)
1 Declines in rural livelihoods and production drive
Climate impacts) can drive resource degrada- poverty, food insecurity and displacement of rural
tion as people fall back on natural resources as 2 and potentially other populations. Climate shocks
a coping strategy. may also directly impact poverty and displace-
6 ment, even where not transmitted through effects
Competition over limited resources may Rural livelihoods on natural resources and/or rural livelihoods.
be a direct driver of conflict, where that impacts
competition spans existing social fault 1 2
7 Poor governance is a major
lines. Climate and other impacts on
9 contributor to poverty and
natural resource stocks are therefore 10 8 more intense socioeconomic
likely to intensify resource-related con-
Natural Poverty, food shocks, which in turn desta-
flict. Natural resources can also provide
resource insecurity and bilize politics and governance
a significant source of financing for degradation 6 7 displacement systems, although community
armed groups, and combatants’ reliance
organization and customary
on natural resource rents may further
authorities may ameliorate
drive resource degradation. 5 3 these shocks to some extent.
Political instability and
5 poor governance tend Weak Where overlaid on existing social divi-
governance 4 Violent conflict sions, poverty and displacement
to be a driver of natural
resources degradation. shocks may drive or sustain conflict,
4 3 which in turn tends to exacerbate both
Civil conflict tends to create political the socioeconomic shocks and social
8 instability and poor governance, which fault-lines. Conversely, conflict also
Violent conflict may also inten- in turn intensifies the chances of social drives scarcity, poverty and displace-
sify the socioeconomic fall out of tensions leading to violent conflict. ment.
rural livelihood shocks because it
may constrain access to coping 9 10
strategies. Resource degradation may also inten-
Rural livelihood impacts
sify the socioeconomic fallout of rural
intensify competition over
livelihood shocks through constraining
resources and therefore
access to coping strategies.
resource-based conflict risks.
Note: Blue arrows (1–7) indicate direct linkages between risk elements (several of which have the potential to become positive feedback loops). Red arrows (8–10) indicate
“intensifiers”—i.e., ways in which a risk element can exacerbate the negative interaction between two other elements.
Somalia has endured multiple severe drought episodes provision of emergency funding and food aid across
since 1965, as well as floods and storms. Since 2012, an Somalia during drought events (Heslin and Thalheimer
average of 1.78 million people per year have been affected 2020).
by extreme weather and associated disasters, with
droughts accounting for the largest share.4 Two consec- Climate shocks are becoming more frequent and severe
utive below-average rainfall seasons (fall 2010 and spring as a result of global climate change and leave less time
2011) devastated livestock and crop production, causing to recover and prepare for the next climate or conflict
an increase in food prices and leading to severe famine.5 shock. The compounding of climate and conflict impacts
Since then, famine conditions have been averted through also occurs because armed groups such as al-Shabaab
make humanitarian work pretty much impossible. Coun-
tries that experience combined crises of extreme weather
and conflict displacement tend to have the worst levels of
4
Source: EM-DAT database.
food insecurity. Individuals forced to flee abandon their
5
Sources: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification IPC-CH
fields and livestock, seeking shelter at displacement sites
Dashboard; World Bank Open Data.
located far from markets. Often, they become trapped in Figure 2.4 Number of IDPs recorded by UNHCR
repetitive displacement and deepening food insecurity as requiring food aid, by primary reason of
(IDMC 2022). displacement
Both conflict and drought have led to large‐scale inter-

nal displacement.6 The 2016/17 drought decreased levels
of already scarce natural resources while leading to the
additional displacement of approximately 1 million Soma-
lis.7 Figure 2.4 displays the number of new IDPs requiring
food aid since 2016 in relation to their primary cause of
displacement (recognizing that multiple causes are often
intertwined). Flood and drought are the first and second
largest peaks and the largest cumulative sources of dis-
placement; displacement due to conflict is more constant
across years.
Statistical analysis of displacement, conflict, and

weather data over 2016–18 shows that temperature
anomalies from 1°C to 2°C (which commonly occur in
Somalia) led to an approximate 10-fold increase in IDPs.
A reduction from 100 mm to 50 mm in monthly rainfall is
associated with an approximate doubling of IDPs, and a
further reduction in precipitation from 50 mm to 0 mm
leads to another fourfold increase in predicted IDPs
(Thalheimer, Schwarz, and Pretis 2023). Conflict events
were also strongly statistically related to displacement.
Although a statistical interaction between climate and
conflict was not found, humanitarian aid has long been
a source of lucrative profit for Somalia’s elites (some of
which is then used to fund armed groups), and humanitar-
ian distribution sites have often been targeted for attacks
(Jaspars, Adan, and Majid 2019; Jaspars and Majid 2021).
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Data Portal,
Somalia Internal Displacement.
IDPs present a range of acute needs, typically domi-
nated by food and livelihood support (figure 2.5), which
can put significant stress on the resources of host areas direct statistical evidence for IDPs contributing to con-
and populations. High youth unemployment associated flict in their destination region remains weak (Thalheimer,
with shocks and displacement is also believed to have Schwarz, and Pretis 2023).
contributed to al-Shabaab recruitment (UNDRR 2022;
El-Bushra and Gardner 2016). Boys have been enticed to Even if a strong direct linkage between adverse social
join armed groups in exchange for food in South Sudan; impacts of climate change and conflict (linkage 3 in the
similar dynamics are likely in Somalia. However, the schema in figure 2.3) has not been clearly established,
it is widely accepted that the combined social impacts
of climate and conflict contribute to maintaining weak
6
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) institutions and governance in Somalia—which in turn
Operational Data Portal, Somalia Internal Displacement.
exacerbates or at least perpetuates conflict. Therefore
7
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Data
linkages 7 and 4 are likely to provide a further, indirect
Portal– Refugee Situations, Horn of Africa Somalia Situation.
Figure 2.5 Aggregated priority needs of newly displaced people, summarized across all displacement
reasons, across Somalia during 2016–2021
800
710,965
700
600
500
429,400 424,320
Thousands
400 385,000
349,576
300
200
100 70,150
0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Livelihood support Food Protection Shelter Water
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Data Portal, Somalia Internal Displacement.
pathway through which social vulnerability exacerbates a high potential to both escalate into violent conflict and
conflict. to further degrade the resource base.
The emergence of piracy illustrates the complex links

Direct linkage between weak natural between natural resource–based conflict, poor natu-
resource governance and conflict ral resource management, and transactional politics
[linkages 4, 5, 6] in Somalia. Some authors argue that piracy originated
from resentment at the presence of both legal and ille-
Small-scale conflict over land resources is widespread gal foreign fishers in Somali waters, combined with weak
in Somalia and is considered to aggravate the existing fisheries governance and an absence of legal recourse to
resource scarcity and humanitarian crisis (Thulstrup address territorial disputes (Devlin et al. 2020). In real-
et al. 2020). Somalia’s history of nationalizing land has ity, the rise and fall of piracy in Puntland was also deeply
allowed for patronage between the state and influen- enmeshed in larger contests between elites over con-
tial clan members and political elites, while marginalizing trol of territory and lucrative receipts from sale of fishing
vulnerable groups such as those living in displacement, licenses (Dua 2017). Elites also instrumentalized the fear
and increasing conflict (Dehérez 2009). Protracted of piracy (in which some members of the administration
land-based conflicts have also weakened customary nat- were complicit; see UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and
ural resource management systems, rendering traditional Eritrea 2013) to extract rents and support from external
dispute resolution mechanisms ineffective or disem- actors. Security actors created ostensibly for anti-piracy
powered (Vivekananda et al. 2019). Customary law has operations in Puntland, for instance, served essentially
become an ineffective tool to settle the growing number as a tool of political dominance for incumbent political
of resource conflicts, often driven by extreme weather leaders (see UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea
and becoming increasingly complex and virulent. In such 2012).
situations, shifts in resource access and competition have
A pernicious cycle of resource scarcity, conflict, and

weak governance is thus well established. It may be fur-
2.4 Vulnerability and social
ther exacerbated by direct impacts of conflict on natural risks8
resources through the reliance of armed groups on nat-
ural capital. During a key period of al-Shabaab control of Despite some progress, social vulnerability and fra-
southern Somalia (2006–12), charcoal production drove gility remain high in Somalia. Social fragmentation is a
the loss of over 7 percent of remaining forest (Rembold prevalent feature of Somali society, and in the absence
et al. 2013), while earning al-Shabaab $38–$56 million, of trusted public institutions, communities increasingly
strengthening its ability to both conduct attacks and rely on informal networks and traditional structures.
expand recruitment (Dek 2021; Ujunwa et al. 2021). Even Certain categories of citizens stand out as more disem-
following a charcoal export ban, Kismayo port is alleged powered and disadvantaged than others. These groups
to be a major conduit for illegal charcoal, involving local are discriminated against in existing legal and politi-
businesspersons, political leaders in the Jubaland admin- cal institutions, through social norms and values, and by
istration, al-Shabaab, and units of AMISOM (Majid and the clan-based system of power relations that under-
Abdirahman 2021). pins social organization. Markers of exclusion—some
of which have already been touched on in this report—
Climate change can further drive this cycle through its include gender, ethnic and/or clan identity, geography
direct and indirect impacts on resource scarcity. Degra- (e.g., rural/urban), social and/or economic class, age, edu-
dation of Somalia’s natural resources is mainly driven by cation, religion, livelihood, family status, displacement,
recurrent droughts and poor natural resource manage- and disability. These markers of exclusion intersect and
ment—and is particularly driven by charcoal production compound each other—access to natural and material
and overgrazing (World Bank 2020b)These are connected, resources, including land and water, livestock, employ-
as recurring droughts have led pastoralist communities ment, self-employment, business development, credit
to turn to the illegal charcoal trade as an income source facilities, wealth creation opportunities depend, to vary-
(Bolognesi et al. 2015). Loss of forests and soils have also ing degrees, on whether an individual is: a man, a woman,
rapidly increased Somalia’s vulnerability to drought, lead- a minority group man or woman, an IDP or a young man,
ing to a vicious cycle (Lwanga-Ntale and Owino 2020; as well as clan kinship network and increasingly, what
Menkhaus 2014). One study shows that one-third of Soma- form of Islam one follows (Musse and Gardner 2013). This
lia’s land degradation stems from the loss of vegetation section discusses aspects of social identity that particu-
and soil moisture declines, which have led to a decline larly impact climate vulnerability.
in crop production. Poor agronomic practices and tree
cutting are major causes of land degradation in Somalia,
which in turn has led to significant declines in agricul- Clan dynamics and marginalized groups
tural productivity (Omuto, Balint, and Alim 2014). Impacts
of drought can also compel pastoralists to change their Historical patterns of clan-based domination have per-
migration patterns, moving into new territories, often petuated systems of marginalization and exclusion of
controlled by hostile clans, with the potential to spark minority groups. These minority groups include, but are
conflict. While community-level conflict resolution mech- not limited to, the Rahanweyn or Digil/Mirifle minority clan
anisms do exist, they are not always successful, especially families; the Bantu; Benadiri; Bajuni; and certain occupa-
when conflicts occur with greater frequency. tional groups. They are either fully agricultural (e.g., the
Somali Bantu group), agropastoral (e.g., the Rahanweyn),
or artisanal specialists (e.g., the Tumaal)—and therefore
have been among the worst affected by climatic crises.
They have historically experienced institutionalized
8
This section draws heavily on World Bank Open Data. Additional refer-
ences are cited where they have been drawn on.
marginalization through land expropriation and resettle- development (Musse and Gardner 2013).9 In the context
ment processes such as under the Barre regime’s Hawl iyo of climate, several aspects of vulnerability are heavily
Hantiwadaag (Program and Resource Sharing) policy— gendered:
which was ostensibly aimed at counteracting the effects
of climate change, but was used as a tool for rewarding l Gendered livelihood risks. Women’s livelihoods are
the regime’s clients. often disproportionately affected by climate change.
Although both Somali men and women are reliant on
They have also experienced serious human rights climate-sensitive economic activities such as agricul-
abuses, and the current 4.5 formula perpetuates ture, livestock, and fisheries, women are more likely
their political exclusion. They have limited access to to be engaged in subsistence-level production. Con-
educational, employment, and sustainable livelihood sequently, their livelihood and food security are more
opportunities and often lack the necessary networks sharply affected by climate-induced downturns in pro-
(including among diaspora) to access other resources, duction (Somalia Institute for Development Research
including physical and political protection and remit- and Analysis 2019). Women are also more likely to
tances. Minority groups also comprise a significant engage in agricultural value chains that require less
share of IDPs, who are often concentrated in urban cen- land and capital due to gender-inequitable inheri-
ters and lack adequate access to services, security, and tance laws, as well as limited collateral availability
social and political representation. As a consequence, compared to men. They also are less mobile and less
they are particularly vulnerable to economic conflict and likely to employ productive inputs or utilize available
climate-related shocks, and receive limited humanitar- extension services. These factors collectively reduce
ian assistance. In the context of intensifying competition women’s agricultural productivity, as well as their
over land and resources, they face a particularly high risk ability to reorganize production in the aftermath of
of dispossession by dominant clan groups. climatic shocks—posing a greater risk to women’s live-
lihoods amid climate change relative to men (FAO 2021;
UN Women 2022). Women and girls typically shoulder
Gender most of the burden for household care-giving tasks and
domestic chores. These burdens often intensify during
Somalia’s socioeconomic indicators are among the climatic disasters and forced displacement events, as
lowest in the world for both males and females, but women are left to care for sick or ailing family mem-
gender disparities are especially stark. The Gender bers while men depart to find work in nearby cities and
Inequality Index for Somalia is 0.776 (1.0 = complete regions. Household coping strategies such as migra-
inequality), and the country performs particularly poorly tion and family separation are extended, contribute to
on health, empowerment, and economic measures. For school dropouts of boys and girls, and require women
almost two decades now, women’s incomes have become to bear disproportionate responsibilities in terms of
crucial for household survival, irrespective of whether care work and to travel increased distances in search
there is a male individual within the household. Nonethe- of water and firewood (FGS 2018). Women consequently
less, women continue to be excluded from political and have less time to engage in productive activities, lead-
public decision making and have limited space (even at ing to a reduction in incomes at a time when other
the community level) to exercise agency and participate livelihood sources are threatened (Chaudhry and Ouda
in society. Despite having played an especially dynamic 2021). According to FAO data, households dependent
role in Somali society as community mobilizers and on women for food security are more likely to have poor
peace builders, women and girls are assigned social and food consumption and are more likely to skip meals
legal status within the clan system, and confront multi- in the context of shock-induced production down-
ple dimensions of disempowerment and discrimination turns (FAO 2021). World Bank data also find that IDP
across most categories of social, economic, and human
9
Minority groups and the internally displaced face similar challenges.
families with single female caregivers are more likely women and girls to arrange household supplies of
to be poor compared to non-IDP families (Hanmer and water and fuel (most commonly woodfuels).10 As cli-
Rubiano-Matulevich 2022). mate change increases the scarcity of these resources,
l Gendered human capital risks. Women and girls in women and girls are pushed to undertake increas-
Somalia contend with several risks to their education ingly arduous and risky journeys. Many have had to
and health in the context of climate change. Increased evolve coping strategies, such as traveling during
domestic workloads can lead to increased likelihood the daytime and in large groups, to reduce their risks
of lowered school attendance or complete dropout for (SIPRI 2019, 2022). Almost 50 percent of households
girls relative to boys. When faced with a choice between in Somalia are female headed, but this number may
educating their daughters or their sons, Somali house- be up to 80 percent among IDP settlements (Hanmer,
holds often prioritize boys’ education. Faced with Rubiano-Matulevich, and Santamaria 2021), where
insecure livelihoods, Somali households have also women face numerous protection risks stemming
been observed to force girls into early marriage, which from increased work outside the home, poor safety
poses a range of risks to their continuation in educa- arrangements in and around camps, limited access to
tion, as well as their physiological development (Coome survivor support services/remedies, and disruption of
and Hussein 2020). Women and girls eat last and least traditional clan mechanisms to handle incidents of vio-
within households affected by drought, which poses lence or harassment. According to a survey of 20 IDP
risks to their health and physiological development settlements, female respondents across the country
(CARE International 2022). This is especially concern- reported being unsafe in locations inside or directly
ing in the context of Somalia, a country with some of outside their settlements, particularly while using
the highest maternal and infant mortality rates in the latrines (cited as unsafe by 63 percent of respondents),
world, coupled with high total fertility and adolescent water access points (cited as unsafe by 51 percent of
childbearing trends (UN Women 2022). Climatic vari- respondents), and aid distribution points (cited as
ability affects women’s and girls’ health in other ways. unsafe by 35 percent of respondents). The weak phys-
Climate-induced water scarcity increases reliance on ical shelters in camps—often constructed from plastic,
unsafe or contaminated water sources, increasing the cloth, or cardboard—serve to heighten protection risks
incidence of waterborne diseases such as cholera and for women and girls in displacement. Aid distribution
diarrhea, especially among women and girls engaged at IDP camps can often be a contested process, leading
in water collection. to tension and conflict between different ethnicities
and clans—which often boils over into violence against
l Gendered protection risks. Increased risk of GBV—
women and girls from rival communities. Lacking
including exploitation, harassment, and abuse—is one
secure or assured access to aid, women—especially
of the major risks Somali women and girls face in the
those from female-headed households and minority
wake of natural disasters, climate-induced environ-
communities—may also engage in precarious liveli-
mental degradation, and displacement. According to
hoods and/or trade (or be forced to trade) sexual acts
reports from service providers, there has been a 10 per-
for food, money, or access to markets or aid (Hanmer,
cent increase in rape in areas affected by the current
Rubiano-Matulevich, and Santamaria 2021; Oxfam
drought, and a 17 percent increase in other forms of
2018). Humanitarian support programs prioritize
reported GBV. Household stress, changing gender
“life-saving” assistance; therefore GBV service provi-
dynamics as women begin taking on bread-winning
sion and survivor support remains low compared to
roles to offset livelihood losses, and men’s use of neg-
the needs, and women’s medium- to long-term needs
ative coping mechanisms, such as khat chewing, all
more generally—such as maternal health and nutri-
increase the already widespread risks of intimate part-
tional care services—are not adequately met.
ner violence. Women and girls further face heightened
risks of nonpartner violence, harassment, and abuse,
particularly amid conditions of climate-induced envi-
10
Sources: Thulstrup et al. (2020); and World Bank Data Portal, People
ronmental degradation. Most households depend on using at least basic drinking water services (% of population).
Youth Forced displacement

Somalia’s population is young: three-quarters of its An estimated 3 million people were internally displaced
population is under the age of 30 (UNFPA 2014). None- in Somalia at the end of 2021,11 and they are among
theless, youth continue to be excluded from both formal the poorest people in the country. Displacement often
and customary institutions, and tend to lack access to worsens socioeconomic marginalization and exclusion.
critical assets such as networks and family support, Forced displacement predominantly affects socially and
education, and employment. An additional layer of vul- politically marginalized groups, which then confront con-
nerability comes from living in a rural environment, at IDP ditions of poverty and deprivation that extend from lost
camps, or pursuing a nomadic lifestyle compared with assets and livelihoods. Minority group status, gender, dis-
living in an urban setting with greater access to resources. ability, and dislocation from clan-based and patronage
Young women are even more disadvantaged than young networks all contribute to entrenched marginalization
men, especially internally displaced women and girls and and wider experiences of exclusion. Disconnected from
those living in rural areas. traditional mechanisms for support and protection, IDPs
are rendered more vulnerable, less able to restore viable
While youth face a number of challenges that prevent livelihoods and living conditions, and less equipped to
their full participation in economic, social, and political integrate into the society of the host community. At des-
life, perhaps the most critical challenge is unemploy- ignated IDP settlements, they risk exploitation under a
ment and underemployment, and more generally the system of “gatekeeping,” where patrons extract bene-
absence of sustainable livelihood opportunities. An fits from the settlement population and its humanitarian
expanding youth population with little education or train- assistance (World Bank 2020c). Three-quarters of IDPs
ing is exerting extreme pressure on already saturated labor (74 percent) live below the poverty line (World Bank 2019b),
markets and is confronting limited opportunities to earn and many confront serious constraints to accessing basic
an income. Unskilled and uneducated youth are most vul- services, including improved water and sanitation; and
nerable to economic shocks and least likely to find work in essential services such as health, education, employment,
the formal economy. These youth are most vulnerable to and markets (World Bank 2019b). IDPs are vulnerable to
climate shocks and likely to embark on irregular migra- disease, GBV, forced eviction, and extortion. Women and
tion journeys (tahriib) as a coping mechanism (Ali 2016) or children comprise 70–80 percent of IDPs (OCHA 2020).
to be recruited into armed groups (El-Bushra and Gardner They are the most vulnerable among the displaced and
2016). Female youth, constrained by mobility restrictions face multiple constraints, including protection challenges,
and sociocultural expectations, may face increased risks lack of access to adequate shelter, limited education, few
of GBV and early/forced marriage. economic opportunities, and lack of control over critical
resources (FGS 2018).
Finally, almost 2 million youth under age 25 live in dis-
placement due to violence, conflict, and extreme The internally displaced are especially vulnerable to the
weather events across Somalia (IDMC 2022). About effects of climate events, such as drought and flooding.
76 percent of displaced boys and 71 percent of displaced Displacement can also compound the effects of drought
girls are enrolled in schools (IDMC 2020). Displaced in areas where IDPs choose to settle by increasing com-
children with disabilities face an additional burden in petition for scarce resources. They faced higher risks
enrolling in schools and receiving needs-specific support during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially because of the
(IDMC 2021). limited space in temporary shelters and internal displace-
ment camps.
11
Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Somalia Country
Profile.
Chapter 3
Risk
Summaries
T his chapter reviews the existing knowl-
edge of climate risks across five broad
themes: climate disasters, agriculture
and livestock, renewable natural resources, health, and
infrastructure and services. It aims to provide a system-
atic and accessible inventory of major biophysical risks in
Somalia related to climate, and to indicate how these are
likely to evolve with climate change.
than others); (2) weak (poor less affected); (3) neutral
or unclear (poor affected similarly to others/unclear);
(4) strong (poor more affected); or (5) very strong (poor
much more affected).
l Climate trend reflects the strength of the expected

change in climate stressors influencing risk, as well as
the strength of their influence on the risk, according to
the following five-point scale: (1) strong decrease; (2)
weak decrease; (3) no clear trend; (4) weak increase; or
To provide a basis for comparison between risks, a
(5) strong increase. Because most risks are influenced
number of semiquantitative indexes are used to assess
them, as described below and summarized in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Explanation of index scales used to
l Frequency is conveyed by a five-point scale denot- assess risk
ing whether risk events are (1) rare (multidecadal); (2)
occasional (once or twice a decade); (3) frequent (at 1 Rare
least 50 percent of years); (4) routine (generally every 2 Occasional
 3 Frequent
year); or (5) chronic (impacts are constant, not associ- Frequency 4 Routine
ated with discrete acute events). 5 Chronic
l Economic cost per event—or per year for routine 1 < $1 million
or chronic events—is assessed on a five-point scale $ 2 $1–$10 million
3 $10–$100 million
according to whether the approximate expected value Economic cost 4 $100 million–$1 billion
of damage and loss falls into the following orders of 5 > $1 billion
magnitude: (1) < $1 million; (2) $1–$10 million; (3) $10– 1 < 10
$100 million; (4) $100 million–$1 billion; or (5) > $1 billion.
 2
3
10–100
100–1,000
l Mortality (where applicable; this only refers to direct Mortality 4 1,000–10,000
human mortality) is assessed on a five-point scale 5 > 10,000
according to whether the approximate expected 1 Very weak
number of lives lost per event—or per year for routine  2 Weak
or chronic events—falls into the following orders of 3 Neutral or unclear
Poverty linkage 4 Strong
magnitude: (1) < 10; (2) 10–100; (3) 100–1,000; (4) 1,000– 5 Very strong
10,000; or (5) > 10,000.
1 Strong decrease
l Poverty linkage assesses whether the impact dispro-  2
3
Weak decrease
No clear trend
portionately affects the poor according to the following Climate trend 4 Weak increase
five-point scale: (1) very weak (poor much less affected 5 Strong increase
37
by a wide variety of factors, this metric focuses only assessment, but rather a best estimate based on currently
the likely change in the climate factors—and not, for available information—which should be subject to further
instance, on socioeconomic factors—that may drive review and improvement in the future. There is also no
exposure or vulnerability to the risk. single or definitive way to categorize risks, as many over-
lap and interact. For instance, this review does not have
Note that although these indexes are based on broad a separate section on risks to water resources, as these
scales, and often orders of magnitude, there is still drive a range of more specific risks, including to crop pro-
considerable uncertainty in their assignment. This cli- duction, livestock, power generation, and water supply.
mate risk review is not intended to provide a definitive
3.1 Climate disasters

Somalia faces a range of climatic hazards. These have 1.17 million displaced since the end of 2021 (IOM 2022).
enormous impacts on the county ‘s population and econ- The main causes of the vast majority of weather-related
omy. Figure 3.2 illustrates the number of weather-related disasters are droughts and floods, with the ongoing
disasters between 2008 and 2021, along with the number drought a key driver of displacement in 2022. Rising tem-
of people newly displaced each year due to these disas- peratures will also increase heat stress, with associated
ters. In 2022, the numbers increased yet further, with over risks to both health and productivity.
Figure 3.2 Weather-related disasters in Somalia, 2008–21
a. Internal displacements b. Disaster events reported

Total: 3.5 million Total: 49
Storm
1,400 2%
1,200
1,000
Thousands
800
Flood Drought
600
44% 54%
400
200
0
2008 2010 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Source: Based on International Displacement Monitoring Centre Dashboard, Somalia.

Chapter 3: Risk Summaries l 39
D ROUG HT
  $   
Risk Distribution Frequency Economic cost Mortality Poverty linkage Climate trend
Drought Whole country Frequent > $1 billion > 10,000 Very strong Weak increase
This section covers the multisectoral impacts of drought drought since 2016; figure 3.3 provides a snapshot of the
events—that is, discrete events where both soil mois- large numbers affected in early April 2022.
ture and the availability of surface water are extremely
limited. The impacts of more general hot and dry condi- The recurrent droughts have had a significant impact
tions that are not specific drought events are covered in on poverty. A World Bank study of the 2016/17 drought
other sections of this chapter. identified significant adverse impacts on poverty, con-
sumption, and hunger (Pape and Wollburg 2019). These
impacts were particularly significant in rural areas, where
Nature of risk the poor rely mainly on agriculture and have limited
access to infrastructure and basic services. The study
Droughts are Somalia’s costliest natural disasters. They
estimated that renewed drought shocks could lead to a
can occur anywhere in the country, as much of Somalia is
significant increase in poverty.
either arid or semi-arid and drought-prone.
Recent droughts have affected the entire country. A postdrought needs assessment of the 2016/17 drought
provides an illustrative snapshot of the economic
Figure 3.3 shows the drought conditions and numbers of
impacts (FGS 2018). Following four poor rainy seasons
people affected in August 2022 and provides an example
in succession, more than half the population needed
of the spatial and human impacts of drought.
humanitarian assistance. Economywide loses totaled
over $3.25 billion, with recovery interventions requiring
Magnitude of impact a further $1.77 billion.1 This level of impact undermined
development gains made in previous years. The drought
In recent years, successive droughts linked to major
severely affected agricultural production—the main driver
changes in climate and weather patterns, combined
of Somalia’s economy—with livestock and crop losses
with high levels of conflict and insecurity, have devas-
affecting 17 out of 18 regions in the country; there were
tated the rural economy. This has resulted in chronic food
significant price increases for key staples. Gross domes-
insecurity and very large numbers of internally displaced
tic product (GDP) growth (which was recovering before
persons (IDPs). In addition, the transhumant corridors
the drought) dropped by around 1.4 percent from the pre-
for livestock have been affected by civil strife, affecting
vious years; and wages temporarily dropped by around
mobility. Mobility is important to Somali pastoralists as a
6.9 percent during the acute drought period, although
strategy to respond to the spatial-temporal heterogeneity
they rapidly recovered (increasing slightly) soon after the
of forage resources. Barriers to mobility have contributed
drought broke.
in a significant way to the increased severity of drought
impacts in the country. Analysis of single drought events does not capture the
compound economic and livelihood impacts of suc-
Extremely large numbers of people have been affected
cessive droughts with only limited recovery periods in
by Somalia’s recent droughts. In August 2022, 7.6 million
people were directly affected by drought, including over
1 million displaced by drought (OCHA 2022a). Figure 3.4 1
In this analysis, losses were only projected until the end of December
2017. In practice, economic recovery and reconstruction after an event
shows the trend in numbers of people displaced by
of this scale requires several years. The recovery cost provided here is
almost certainly an underestimate of the full recovery costs.
Figure 3.3 Somalian regions affected by drought in August 2022

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS AFFECTED
BY DISTRICT POPULATION
WOQOOYI
GALBEED SANAAG Caluula
BY REGION
Qandala
OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL AWDAL Zeylac Laasqoray
PRIORITY 1 PRIORITY 2 PRIORITY 3 Bossaso REGION % OF POPULATION
Lughaye
Iskushuban
AFFECTED
Baki Berbera
Borama Ceel Afweyn Ceerigaabo
NUMBER OF
32 34 8 Gebiley Hargeysa
Sheikh
Qardho Bakool 68%
DISTRICTS Bandarbeyla
Owdweyne Burco
Caynabo
Xudun Taleex BARI Bay 67%
AFFECTED
POPULATION 4.6M 3M 273K Buuhoodle Garoowe
Eyl
Gedo 61%
TOGDHEER Laas Caanood
NUGAAL Mudug 60%
INTERNALLY SOOL Burtinle
DISPLACED 59%
PERSONS
658K 341K 16K Galdogob
Gaalkacyo
Jariiban
Nugaal
GALGADUUD Galgaduud 58%

56%
Cadaado
Lower Juba
BAKOOL Cabudwaaq Hobyo MUDUG
HIRAAN
53%
Dhuusamarreeb
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY ONE Hiraan
GEDO
Indicates severe drought impact for all indicators and 52%
Ceel Barde Xarardheere
Belet Weyne Ceel Buur Middle Juba
low levels of response Rab Dhuure
Areas prioritized for immediate activation of area-based Doolow

Xudur
Waajid Tayeeglow Bulo Burto Ceel Dheer Sool 52%
coordination (ABC) and rapid response mechanism Luuq Adan Yabaal
MIDDLE
(RRM) Belet
Xaawo Garbahaarey Baydhaba
Jalalaqsi
Cadale SHABELLE
Togdheer 50%
Jowhar
Wanla
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY TWO
Ceel Waaq Qansax Dheere
BAY Weyn Bari 49%
Balcad
BANADIR
Indicates moderate drought impact for most indicators Baardheere Diinsoor Buur Hakaba Afgooye
46%
Qoryooley Sanaag
Areas prioritized for phased activation of area-based Kurtunwaarey
Marka LOWER
Saakow
SHABELLE
coordination (ABC) and rapid response mechanism Sablaale Banadir 40%
(RRM) Bu'aale Baraawe
Operational priority 1
Jilib MIDDLE JUBA
Operational priority 2 Middle Shabelle 40%
Afmadow
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY THREE Operational priority 3
Jamaame
Lower Shabelle 37%
Indicates relatively low drought impact for all indicators Kismaayo
LOWER JUBA
Regular cluster response and inter-cluster coordination Badhaadhe
Woqooyi Galbeed 34%
continues
Continuation of monthly monitoring to assess drought impact Awdal 31%
Source: Adapted from OCHA 2022a.
Figure 3.4 Trend of drought-driven internal displacement, 2016–22

2017 2022
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL
61.9K 106.1K 296K 142K 46K 52K 69K 310.8K 115K 74.7K 26.1K 34K 113.5K 83.5K
Source: Adapted from OCHA 2022a.
between. Neither does it adequately account for the joint Mortality rates are unclear but may be extremely high.
impacts of drought and flood occurring in similar time Although UNICEF reports relatively small numbers for the
periods. Because these events can also trigger conflicts, current drought (e.g., around 500 deaths for the first six
the combined economic impact is far-reaching and com- months of 2022), these numbers are acknowledged as
plex. To date, there has been no attempt to quantify these “just the tip of the iceberg” because many deaths go unre-
multiple, multisectoral, multiyear impacts. ported (UNICEF Somalia spokesperson Victor Chinyama,
as cited in Dhaysane 2022). UNICEF (2022a) estimates
that the severe drought-related famine of 2011 killed about
260,000 people in Somalia—more than half of whom were infiltration when rains occur, and therefore magnifying
children. The main causes of death were malnutrition, drought impacts.
diarrhea, and measles. Relief access was also signifi-
cantly hampered by insecurity, mainly due to activities of The projected warming of the next decades indicates the
the al-Shabaab group. Horn of Africa may continue to be drought-vulnerable,
due to increased evapotranspiration and more erratic
While income- and gender-disaggregated figures are precipitation, even if there is a slight increase in mean
scarce, drought predominantly affects livelihoods of rainfall. Severe and prolonged droughts are highly likely
farmers and pastoralists, and therefore some of the to be a prominent feature of Somalia’s future climate for
poorest households are most affected. For a variety of decades to come, although long-term trends are uncer-
reasons, as discussed in chapter 2, livelihood impacts tain due to the range of potential precipitation outcomes
affect women and female-headed households dispro- (figure 3.5).
portionately. Drought is also the biggest single driver of
internal displacement, which creates a raft of additional
vulnerabilities, particularly for women and other vulner- Figure 3.5 Projected annual SPEI Drought Index
able groups.
Climate drivers
While low levels of precipitation are a key driver of
droughts, higher temperatures cause greater evapo-
transpiration, which also contributes to reducing soil
moisture. Generally, in Somalia, evaporation potential is
greater than precipitation across the country. There are
a few localized areas in southern parts of Somalia, around
Jilib and Baidoa, where for a few months of the year higher
rainfall than evaporation can be experienced.
Drought conditions are influenced by patterns of land

use. These are frequently characterized by overgraz- Note: Negative values of the Standardised Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index
ing (e.g., around water points, and more broadly due (SPEI) indicate higher likelihood of drought—i.e., this graph is suggesting out-
come is uncertain, but a slight trend toward increasing drought is more likely.
to restricted grazing patterns often as a result of con-
flict) and localized deforestation (often for fuelwood).
These practices lead to compacted soil structure and
exposed slopes, resulting in increased runoff and reduced
FLUVIA L A ND P LUV IA L F L O O D
  $   
Fluvial and Whole country Frequent $100 million– 10–100 Very strong Weak increase
pluvial flood $1 billion
Somalia is highly vulnerability to fluvial, pluvial, and 20 percent of Somalia’s total population is exposed to a 15
coastal floods. This subsection considers climate risks centimeter (cm) or more flood risk. In the Juba and Sha-
and impacts associated with fluvial and pluvial floods belle basins, this figure rises to between 20 and 30 percent
(including flash floods), which have similar climate driv- (Rentschler and Salhab 2020).
ers. The next subsection considers coastal flooding risk,
which is subject to different climate drivers. Fluvial (river) floods are common along Somalia’s two
major rivers. The Shabelle and the Juba flood regularly after
Nature of risk the Gu (March–June) and Deyr rains (October–December).
These regular flood events have positive impacts and are
The highest flood risk areas include agricultural areas
used for flood recession cultivation in the lowland flood-
and several towns in the Shabelle and Juba basins at
plains of both rivers. The flooding also provides lush pasture
risk of fluvial flooding. However, flash flood risk occurs
for both livestock and wildlife. However, in years when the
throughout the country, and the largest cities are also
rainfall is very heavy, either locally or upstream in Ethio-
exposed albeit to a lower level of risk (map 3.1). In the Juba
pia where both rivers rise, flooding can be far more severe.
and Shabelle river basins—which rise in Ethiopia where
When this occurs, it results in major loss and damage to
the headwaters are subject to different weather patterns
crops, pastures, and settlements in the rivers’ floodplains.
from Somalia—floods can happen even during drought
Flooding is often made worse when riverbanks are deliber-
periods, compounding the adverse impacts of both. A
ately breached to access water for irrigation during the dry
recent World Bank study estimates that between 15 and
Map 3.1 Flood depth simulations for different return periods
a. 10-year flood depth b. 20-year flood depth c. 100-year flood depth
Source: Dartmouth Flood Observatory; flood depth data from EU Joint Research Centre.
season. Map 3.2 shows river breakages during early 2022, markets, floods pit latrines which then contaminate water
illustrating how the flood risks remain even in the middle of sources and spread waterborne disease, while standing
a prolonged drought period. water increases the occurrence of malaria (MEWR 2021).
Limited and/or unmaintained infrastructure, including Pluvial and flash floods are a result of localized rain
retaining walls and water catchment or redirection sys- storms. They can disrupt communications by damaging
tems (Gure 2021), expose communities to the effects of road surfaces and small bridges, and/or causing power
floods annually, often with disastrous results for small- and telephone lines to fall.
holder farmers and rural economies.
Flooding of Beledweyne city (population over 250,000), Magnitude of impact

on the upper reaches of the Shabelle River, is now a reg- Economic impacts of floods can be severe and
ular event. Around 80 percent of the city was flooded in long-lasting. Postdisaster analysis of the 2019 floods
2019, with inundation lasting several weeks and causing estimated loss and damage of over $260 million, with
widespread damage and disruption. Anecdotal evidence recovery needs amounting to around $350 million (FGS
suggests flooding here is increasing in frequency and and World Bank 2019). Economic losses were estimated
extent. Similarly, widespread flooding in the alluvial valley at $72 million in the year immediately following the floods;
around Jowhar, in the middle Shabelle, routinely results in
$39 million the following year; $35.1 million in the third
extensive damage to agriculture as well as closing Jowhar
year; $31.6 million in the fourth year; and $28.4 million in
airport and the Beledweyne-Jowhar-Mogadishu high-
the fifth year. Table 3.1 summarizes the damage to differ-
way. Although there are floods in this area every year, in
ent sectors. Table 3.2 shows the financial cost of both loss
wet years the inundated area is far larger and disruptions
and damage as well as the estimated costs of postflood
far greater. This flooding leads to widespread displace-
recovery.
ment of the local population, stops farmers reaching
Map 3.2 River breakages along Juba and Shabelle Rivers in February 2022
l OPEN (O): Breakage point where a recent (< 1 year) flood origi-
nated is still open, and has no signs of intervention/rehabilitation on
the latest analyzed images.
▲ OVERFLOWS (Of): Portion of the river embankment where water
overflows have recently occurred (< 1 year). Overflows generally take
place along shallow portions of the embankments, which could be
submerged for several hundred meters during the flood.
n POTENTIAL (P): A point along the embankment where there is
potential for flooding to occur. Clear indicators of flood potential-
ity, such as recent vegetation removal, embankment erosion, closed
with sand bags, water spillage or other signs representing a potential
embankment weakness have been identified. These indications are
supported by DTM analysis, multitemporal analysis and/or direct field
observations.
l CLOSED (C): Breakage point where an old (>2 years) flood orig-
inated and that has been fixed using either heavy machinery or
sandbags. No flooding has been detected recently, so this point may
be considered CLOSED as the situation is stable. Interventions by
heavy machinery are permanent, while those by sandbags are tem-
poral, subject to new floods.
Source: FAO SWALIM, Flood Risk and Response Information Management System, Juba and Shabelle River Breakages, accessed February 2022.
Table 3.1 Summary of damage caused by the 2019 floods
Sector Type of damage Comment
Agriculture (crop Crops and livestock assets and lost harvest Less than many other floods events, as these 2019 floods were
production/livelihoods) localized and limited compared with previous major floods
Housing 4,640 fully damaged housing units; 15,613 Urgent and immediate needs for shelter; increased population
partly damaged units displacement
Transport Over 320 km of road and 23 bridges dam- Damage to roads disrupts many economic activities, hinders
aged; 5% of road embankments destroyed school access, and delays relief operations
Water, sanitation, and 64 boreholes; 272 shallow wells; 58 water Immediate impacts on water supply for humans and livestock
hygiene pans damaged
Education Schools in 14 districts damaged by flooding; Losses include those associated with losses of school learning
nearly 34,000 pupils affected materials and equipment, and provision of temporary learning
spaces
Health 15 health facilities damaged Losses include additional costs for treatment of acute watery
diarrhea/cholera cases for the next 12 months, and losses
incurred in replacing health supplies and equipment.
Disaster risk management/ Impacts to relief supplies and warehouses, Losses include relief coordinating and delivery expenses
flood risk management monitoring equipment, and gauging stations
Displacement Damages and losses to infrastructure in 154 Losses include damaged water resources and impeded access to
formal IDP settlements; particularly dam- health services
aged housing and shelter
Food security National levels of food insecurity (IPC3 Data not sufficiently differentiated to provide an exact proportion
and 4) increased from just under 10% to of this increase linked to the floods; the humanitarian response
around 17% immediately following floods required significant additional finance
Source: Adapted from FGS 2020.
Table 3.2 Total financial costs of loss and damage and recovery needs of 2019 floods ($)
Short-term needs Medium term

Sector Damages Losses Total effect (6–12 months) needs (1–3 years) Total needs
Transport 94,806,623 94,806,623 115,382,276
Housing 26,470,853 — 26,470,853 33,657,690
Education 25,951,817 3,094,545 29,046,362 21,242,411 13,581,214 34,823,625
Health 1,239,982 40,999,040 42,239,022 46,015,018
Water, sanitation,
8,895,566 20,480,616 29,376,182 24,801,800
and hygiene
Agricultural and
28,043,377 28,043,377
pastoral livelihoods
Disaster and flood

6,080,400 9,025,000 15,105,400 6,401,400 35,576,900 41,978,300
risk management
Displacement 9,019,500 15,976,763 24,996,263 25,000,000
Grand total 172,464,740 89,575,964 262,040,704 55,687,188 49,158,114 349,702,086
Source: FGS 2020.

Systematic and comprehensive assessment of flood Figure 3.6 Variability and trends of average
risk and costs is challenging. Simple hydrological models largest five-day cumulative precipitation across
can make broad predictions of potential exposure, but seasonal cycle, 1971–2020
detailed on-the-ground data on assets and also the state
of flood defenses are typically lacking.
Agriculturalists and the urban poor are typically the

most exposed to floods. Floods can have a severe
adverse impact on the livelihoods and well-being impact
of poor households. Assets are lost and damaged in
floods, increasing vulnerability. Floods can drive poor
households that are emerging from poverty but have no
savings back into it. Limited access to land and hous-
ing often forces poorer households, in both rural and
urban settings, to live in flood-prone areas (Le Sage and
Majid 2002; Rentschler and Salhab 2020). Floods are also
a major driver of internal displacement, and therefore a
cause of long-term social vulnerability that compounds
other categories of risk.
Table 3.3 shows the projected economic impact of river-
ine floods up to 2080. Note that these figures are for flood
Climate drivers events with a 25-year return period. The rapid increases
Flood risk is primarily driven by rainfall variability. How- in urban damage costs reflect the rapidly increasing
ever, the temporal and spatial scales differ between flood urbanized proportion of Somalia’s population. In addi-
types, with pluvial flooding driven by local and immediate tion, most climate models indicate that by midcentury
events, whereas fluvial flooding responds to precipita- the flood return period in East Africa will halve (Arnell and
tion across river catchments, often accumulating over a Gosling 2016)—that is, a flood event that, based on histor-
period of weeks. ical data, will occur every 25 years, will likely occur closer
to once every 12 years later in the century. So, severe
Somalia already has very high variability in rainfall, and flood events will almost certainly occur more frequently.
this will continue in the future. Interannual variability is In between the 25-year return period events referred to
projected to increase relative to the present day, result- in table 3.3, less severe flooding will likely occur more fre-
ing in more frequent wetter and drier years relative to the quently and more severe flooding less frequently—all with
mean. Heavy rainstorms are projected to increase in fre- significant costs, as discussed above.
quency and intensity. Figure 3.6 shows the upward trend
(and considerable uncertainty) in five-day cumulative Climate projections for Ethiopia show very similar pat-
precipitation. Dry spells may also increase in frequency terns of increased rainfall variability and increased
and duration (Richardson et al. 2022). There is consid- frequency and intensity of rain storms (Richardson et al.
erable uncertainty in flood projections, however, due to 2022). This suggests that heavy rainfalls in the Ethiopian
the wide range of potential outcomes in mean annual headwaters of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers will continue
precipitation. to trigger floods downstream in Somalia, probably with
greater frequency.
Table 3.3 Projected impacts of floods with a 25-year return period, excluding damage to crops and
livestock
Riverine flood impact 2010 (baseline) 2030 2050 2080
Damage (annual, $ million) 270 2,700 10,000 38,000

Affected population (thousand people) 9,300 13,000 16,000 18,000
Affected proportion of total population (%) 7.3 9.6 9.7 9.5
Affected GDP (annual, $ million) 320 1,200 3,000 9,000
Proportion of GDP (%) 7.24 9.57 9.65 9.38
Source: World Resources Institute Aqueduct.

Note: The World Resources Institute’s Aqueduct flood risk tool uses a cascade of models within the Global Flood Risk with IMAGE Scenarios (GLOFRIS) modeling framework.
The methodology is described in full by Ward et al. (2020).
COASTA L F LO O DIN G
  $   
Coastal flooding Whole coastline Occasional > $10–$100 million 10–100 Very strong Weak increase
(individual events)
Nature of risk Table 3.4 Mogadishu urban agglomeration:

annual GDP loss to coastal floods, no adaptation
Much of Somalia’s coast is low-lying and the whole coast
is identified as vulnerable to storm surges. Sea level rise Mean annual loss Mean annual loss
will add to this vulnerability. In future, rising sea levels will (% city GDP) 2005 (% city GDP) 2050
threaten coastal communities, especially in the south of 0.038 0.415
the country, including Mogadishu (PIK/Adelphi 2022).
Source: Hallegatte et al. 2013.
Note: The no adaptation scenario in 2050 takes into account a 40 cm sea level
The whole of Somalia’s coastline is threatened by rising rise and subsidence.
sea levels. The large, and rapidly growing, coastal cities
of Mogadishu and Kismayo are likely to face significant
Saltwater intrusion into coastal areas has a negative
coastal flooding challenges without adaptation measures
impact on fresh water sources (rivers, streams, and
(table 3.4). Possible losses of crops and livestock, along
wetlands). It salinizes both drinking and irrigation water,
with losses to trade and fisheries resulting from damage
making offseason agriculture more challenging. Saline
to ports, jetties, and boats, will increase the economic
water intrusion into drinking increases the risk of high
costs of coastal floods still further.
blood pressure in pregnant women and increases infant
mortality (Scheelbeek et al. 2016). Salinity stemming from
sea level rise can severely damage roads through land climate models combined with known elevations of coastal
subsidence, blistering, cracking, and pulverization, and areas. While these tools indicate that most of Somalia’s
lead to increased maintenance costs (Brookings 2020). shoreline is threatened, they cannot show the degree to
which this affects coastal communities and livelihood
systems and are probably not sensitive enough to indi-
Magnitude of impact cate the impact of individual severe storms and cyclones,
There are already a significant number of people which are likely to increase in severity and frequency. In
exposed to coastal flooding. Around 110,000 live below particular, the tools cannot indicate whether changes are
the high tide mark and 170,000 live below the maximum slow enough for coastal communities to move, adapt to,
storm surge level with a one-year return period (Kulp and and mitigate the potential impacts. Map 3.3 gives an exam-
Strauss 2019). Losses to urban infrastructure are already ple of information for Somalia provided by a sea level rise
estimated to be significant (table 3.5). mapping tool.
Those households most vulnerable to coastal floods are Climate projections point to rising sea levels and
those that do not have sufficient assets to easily move increased likelihood of cyclones and storm surges.
from locations at risk from flooding, particularly the The increases in extreme weather and sea conditions
urban poor. Broader economic impacts may accumulate are linked to rises in sea surface temperature. A warmer
because coastal flooding has the potential to substantially ocean intensifies cyclone activity and heightens storm
increase damages to ports and other coastal infrastruc- surges. The destructive impact will generally be greater
ture, with knock-on impacts on Somalia’s ability to manage when storm surges are accompanied by strong winds and
imports and exports. In smaller coastal settlements, the make landfall during high tides (Brecht et al. 2012).
combination of sea level rise and increasingly frequent and
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) 2.6
severe storms will potentially disrupt livelihood systems
(low greenhouse gas emissions scenario), 4.5 (approx-
based on fisheries and/or the cultivation of coastal areas.
imate current trajectory emissions scenario), and 8.5
(high greenhouse gas emissions) all project sea level
Climate drivers rise of around 20 cm by midcentury. The projections
then diverge, with end-century mean projections for each
There is a lack of research on current and projected
RCP ranging between 60 and 40 cm (figure 3.7). Projected
impacts of sea level rise and coastal inundation in
increases in the frequency and strength of storm surges
Somalia. Very simple projections can be mapped using
is likely to significantly increase Mogadishu’s flood risk by
interactive tools employing global data sets, based on
2050 (CityCORE Africa 2020).
a combination of projected sea level rise under various
Table 3.5 Projected impacts of coastal flooding with a 25-year return period, excluding damage to
crops and livestock
Coastal flood impact Baseline 2010 2030 2050 2080

Urban damage (annual, $ million) 25 200 650 2,500
Affected population (thousand people) 3 10 14 24
Affected GDP (annual, $ million) 1.3 9.2 27 120
Source: World Resources Institute Aqueduct.

Note: These figures are derived from a global data set with limited direct empirical inputs, and hence should be treated with some caution. The World Resources Insti-
tute’s Aqueduct flood risk tool uses a cascade of models within the Global Flood Risk with IMAGE Scenarios (GLOFRIS) modeling framework. The methodology is described
in full by Ward et al. (2020).
Map 3.3 Example of areas under threat to sea level rise
Source: Climate Central Coastal Risk Screening Tool, Somalia, Land Projected to Be Below Annual Flood Level in 2050.
Figure 3.7 Somalia: projected rise in sea level Table 3.6 Somalia: population living in
low-elevation coastal zones by 2030 (millions)
Year Urban Non-urban
2000 0.13 0.45
2030 0.84 0.78
Source: Brookings 2020.
a significant increase in the number of people living in

low elevation coastal zones in Somalia, with the increase
most marked in urban settings—reflecting Somalia’s rapid
urbanization (table 3.6).
Coastal infrastructure (especially ports) will be at

Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Somalia. increased risk from the higher sea levels. Because ports
have long life spans, future sea level rise needs to be incor-
porated into the design of new coastal infrastructure now.
The modest sea level rise projected over the course In Somalia’s major port cities, rapid population growth and
of the rest of the century will not place a significantly the government’s capacity to manage and plan housing
larger land area at risk (Kulp and Strauss 2019). However, and infrastructure are likely to have as great a contribu-
demographic growth will mean that a significantly larger tion to inundation risks as climate-related factors.
population is exposed in future. A recent study indicates
3.2 Agriculture and livestock

Agriculture, including crop production and livestock natural shocks such as drought (FRS 2018). Shortages of
husbandry, is essential to the livelihoods of the major- fodder and water contribute to reduced productivity and
ity of Somalia’s population that lives in rural areas. It is reproductive performance of livestock. This includes slow
also essential to the country ‘s food security and economic growth rate of animals, loss of body condition, reduced
growth prospects. The largest driver of the economy, the milk production, and poor reproductive performance in
sector accounts for up to 65 percent of GDP,2 the great mature animals. Change in temperature may compromise
majority of which comes from livestock. Approximately 49 the quantity and quality of forage by increased lignifica-
percent of Somalis (or 6–7 million people) still live in rural tion of plant tissues and reducing digestibility and rate of
areas. Of this population, slightly more than half derive degradation. Changing climate conditions are also influ-
their livelihood directly from nomadic pastoralism, while encing the abundance of important pests and diseases in
slightly less than half depend on crop cultivation (World the livestock sector.
Bank and FAO 2018). Agricultural extension services and
advice are very limited in Somalia, and productivity is low. Impacts to agriculture and livestock have very direct
poverty implications. Pastoralists have the highest pov-
Animal products are Somalia’s largest exports. Camel erty rates in the country and are poorly integrated into the
milk production had an estimated market value of $3.3 bil- wider national economy, including limited access to vet-
lion before the beginning of the current extended drought erinary services (Plaza and Cerruti 2022). This severely
period (FGS 2018)—which, for livestock, was in 2014. Data limits opportunities to manage climate risk to livestock
from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United effectively and efficiently. Rural poor households’ lim-
Nations (FAO) show that the country had 14 million sheep, ited assets and social networks mean they are unable to
13 million goats, 7 million camels, and 5 million cattle as of substitute for income and subsistence food losses result-
2016, worth approximately $9.6 billion at national market ing from livestock loss and crop failures. Even moderate
prices in Somalia.3 The quantity of hides and skins is com- losses can cause severe hardship, and distress sales can
parable to the late 1980s level, at about 7 million pieces a severely compromise poor rural households’ abilities
year (World Bank and FAO 2018). The country produced to reestablish secure livelihoods. Failure of successive
100,000 tons of beef and approximately 60,000 tons of growing seasons is a major driver of internal displace-
camel meat in 2013. With global demand for livestock ment. Displaced households frequently abandon their
products expected to double by 2050 (Rojas-Downing et agricultural assets, making it very difficult to reestablish
al. 2017), the sector provides significant strategic oppor- their livelihoods at a later stage.
tunities for further growth.
Rural livelihoods are also characterized by specific
However, livestock production is coming under increas- gender roles and considerable gender vulnerability.
ing threat. Reasons include climate change–related water Although both Somali men and women are reliant on
shortages, lack of availability of and access to good pas- climate-sensitive economic activities such as agricul-
ture, invasion of unpalatable plant species, deforestation ture, livestock, and fisheries, women are more likely to
and other forms of land degradation, animal diseases, and be engaged in subsistence-level production, provid-
ing over 60 percent of the labor. Consequently, their
livelihood and food security are more sharply affected
2
According to IFAD (2021); GDP figures are, however, subject to consid- by climate-induced downturns in production (Somalia
erable debate. Institute for Development Research and Analysis 2019).
3
The last livestock census in Somalia was conducted in 1975. Women are also more likely to engage in agricultural
value chains that require less land and capital due to as the current ongoing drought, men migrate looking for
gender-inequitable inheritance laws, as well as limited pastures and water for their livestock or move to urban
collateral availability compared to men. They are less centers looking for work. Women remain at home with
mobile and less likely to employ productive inputs or uti- children and the elderly, sometimes moving to IDP camps
lize available extension services. Women have weak land or to small towns for petty trading. While the aim of these
tenure rights and limited access to extension services, strategies is to access resources and security, in practice
and the most valuable agricultural assets (land and live- they expose women to additional security threats (World
stock) are primarily owned by men. In times of crisis, such Bank and FAO 2018).
LOCUSTS 4
  $  
Risk Distribution Frequency Economic cost Poverty linkage Climate trend
Locusts Whole country Rare $100 million–$1 billion Strong Weak increase
(for major outbreaks)
Nature of risk a day across 350 square kilometers, destroying more than
175,000 acres of farmland in Somalia and Ethiopia alone
Locust infestations in Somalia are periodic and can
(Qasim 2020). As rainfall increases due to climate change
cause massive damage to both crops and pasture. The
in Somalia, locust outbreaks are also expected to rise in
sequences of events that lead to a major outbreak are
frequency.
complex and difficult to predict, but depend on climate
patterns both within and outside the country.
In 2018, two major cyclones dumped rain in a remote

Magnitude of impact
area of Saudi Arabia, leading to an 8,000-fold increase Detailed estimates for losses associated with the recent
in desert locust numbers. By mid-2019, winds had locust outbreak are not available for Somalia, as other
pushed the insects into the Horn of Africa, where a wet major climate impacts were affecting crops and live-
autumn further boosted their population. An unusual stock production at the same time. However, FAO (2020b)
cyclone in Somalia in early December 2019 (Cyclone states that “crop and fodder losses from desert locust can
Pawan) finally tipped the situation into a true plague, the range up to 100 percent.” Also, an assessment of losses
worst of its kind in more than 70 years. By February 2020, from the Republic of Yemen in 2020 came to $222 million,
Somalia declared a national emergency as large swarms over 90 percent of which was related to livestock (Repub-
of locusts spread across East Africa (BBC News 2021; lic of Yemen 2021).
Nuwer 2021) (figure 3.8). Desert locusts were reported to
be eating as much as 1.8 million metric tons of vegetation Desert locust control measures risk contributing to fur-
ther environmental degradation and costs. There is an
overreliance in East Africa and in Somalia on the use of
4
Locust plagues are treated separately from other agricultural and live- persistent organic pollutants, including highly toxic and
stock pests because they affect both on a massive scale, and the climate
drivers are also quite distinct. harmful organophosphates such as Chlorpyrifos, banned
Figure 3.8 Somalia’s agricultural calendar and desert locust life cycle
Rainy season
Dry season
Lean season
Laying eggs
Hatching and
band formation
Immature
swarms
Mature swarms
1st generation of immature 2nd generation of immature

swarms at planting swarms at harvest
Source: FAO 2020a.
in Europe. In much of the region, governments resorted As rainfall increases due to climate change in Soma-
to the use of millions of liters of highly toxic organophos- lia, locust outbreaks are expected to rise in frequency.
phates to control transboundary swarms (Müller et al. Desert locusts generally thrive in wetter conditions, which
2021). allows immature swarms to rapidly complete their mat-
uration (ICRC 2020); and higher rainfall extremes, often
As discussed above, impacts to agriculture and livestock associated with floods, have been more frequent over
are strong drivers of poverty and displacement, and exac- recent decades (Ogallo, Ouma, and Omondi 2017). A new
erbate other forms of vulnerability, particularly gender. study has shown a connection between the 2019/20
desert locust upsurge in East Africa and the role of warm-
ing anomalies in the Indian Ocean (Müller et al. 2021). An
Climate drivers Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report states
While it is not possible to predict desert locust outbreaks that Indian Ocean warming anomalies “are anticipated to
with accuracy, an increase in cyclone activity in the west- occur twice as often, which could also increase the occur-
ern Indian ocean is likely to increase the frequency of rence of pest outbreaks” (IPCC 2022a, 795).
locust swarms in Somalia.
CROP STRES S
  $  
Crop stress Crop agriculture Chronic $10–$100 million Very strong No clear trend
regions
Nature of risk hectare. However, Somalia’s erratic weather patterns and

prolonged dry spells are a constant constraint on produc-
Somalia is already severely water stressed, which is
tion, particularly in the absence of widespread irrigation.
a significant factor in the country ‘s low agricultural
Already, rainfall during the short rainy season has tra-
yields. The agricultural sector faces significant expo-
ditionally been generally low and insufficient to justify
sure to water-related climate risks, and the likelihood of
cropping systems (Rees, Omar, and Rodol 1991). In recent
increasing impacts of water stress.
years, most parts of the country have experienced drought
conditions once every three years (Haile et al. 2019).
Prolonged drought periods, high temperatures,
increased dry spells at critical points in crop grow-
Reliable and systematic data for Somalia’s agriculture
ing seasons, and decreases in rainfall all have negative
sector are limited. It is estimated that crop production
impacts on production. Crop yields are particularly sen-
accounted for 10 percent of Somalia’s GDP between 2013
sitive to water stress in the middle portion of the growing
and 2016 (World Bank and FAO 2018), representing approx-
season. For example, reducing soil moisture by 30 percent
imately $600 million in 2016. World Bank estimates cereal
from historical averages has been linked to an 18 percent
production in 2020 at approximately 177,000 metric tons.5
reduction in global maize yield (Garris 2019).
Other estimates show that gross crop production aver-
aged between $300 million and $700 million in the 2010s
(Zanini et al. 2018).
Magnitude of impact
Somali cereal production levels have not increased in Studies have typically suggested a high level of current
the past 60 years. In fact, from 1972 to 2012, cereal pro- crop losses in Somalia due to climate change of around
duction per capita decreased by 66 percent (Keogh 2021). 30–50 percent. The Somalia Agriculture Technical Group
Sorghum production achieved a peak of 330,000 tons in (SATG) estimates average grain losses in southern Soma-
1988: by 2011, this had fallen to just 50,000 tons (Warsame lia at 20–30 percent of the total harvest and that losses
et al. 2022). The yields of important cereal crops are very may exceed this range in some cases. The SATG notes
low, even by regional standards: sorghum (0.6 tons/hect- that loss is on the order of 50,000–80,000 tons per year,
are) and maize (1 tons/hectare), representing just about which translates to an economic loss of between $15 mil-
half of the average yields in neighboring Kenya and Ethio- lion and $20 million. These figures may include impacts
pia. As a result, Somalia relies significantly on agricultural of extreme events, but given their partial nature, annual
imports to meet the food needs of its people, spending losses most likely lie in the range of $10–$100 million.
nearly $1.5 billion in 2015, up from an annual average of
only about $82 million in the late 1980s (World Bank and As discussed above, impacts to agriculture are strong
FAO 2018). drivers of poverty and displacement, and exacerbate
other forms of vulnerability, particularly gender. More
The largest single reason for the decrease in crop pro- than 6 million people already face acute food insecurity.
duction is probably the collapse of large-scale irrigation Prolonged droughts on the back of heat, and recurring
systems during the war in the 1990s. Lack of agricultural
investment and extension also contribute to low yields per
5
Source: World Bank DataBank, Cereal production (metric tons) Somalia.
famines, are likely to make food security increasingly Map 3.4 Drought risk by 2050
challenging, especially in combination with ongoing and
projected future increases in global food prices.
Climate drivers
Rising temperatures between the months of Sep-
tember and March may cause the soils in Somalia to
become drier. Dry spells may increase in frequency and
duration, and the projected increase in temperature will
also increase evapotranspiration and hence crop water
demand (Richardson et al. 2022). Despite the proba-
bility of modest increases in overall rainfall, the more
pronounced increase in temperature is likely to have a
greater impact on crop production, with an increasing
probability of failed growing seasons (map 3.4). Source: Shiferaw et al. 2014.
Note: Figure shows the probability of a failed growing season due to drought in
2050 under the IPCC’s A1 scenario.
Effects will differ across different crops, and yield pro-
jections show high uncertainties. Staple Somali crops
such as maize, sorghum, and millet will struggle with will be water availability, and the high uncertainty in pre-
rising temperatures. Projections suggest crop yields dictions for Somalia means there are currently no robust
across Sub-Saharan Africa will decrease by 10 percent predictions. Recent models suggested cowpeas are likely
under warming scenarios of 2°C, and up to 20 percent to show a positive trend in yields; rice yields are also pro-
beyond 2°C (Carleton 2022). Beyond a temperature jected to improve. However, projections for millet show
increase of 3°C, all present-day cropping areas for maize, high interannual variability, and no clear trend in yields
millet, and sorghum in Somalia are likely to become can be derived (PIK/Adelphi 2022).
unsuitable. However, the greatest determinant of yields
CROP DI S EAS ES A N D P E STS

  $  
Crop diseases and Whole country Occasional $10–$100 million Very strong No clear trend
pests
Nature of risk There is no Somalia-specific data on fall armyworm

prevalence. However, a study of 12 major maize-producing
Climate conditions affect the prevalence and spread
countries in Africa estimated the average national pro-
of diseases, pests, vectors, and weeds, which all have
duction loss at between 11 percent and 45 percent (Day et
an impact on crop productivity (Lamboll, Stathers, and
al. 2017). Applying the same rates to the Somalia situation
Morton 2017). Extreme weather events can destabilize
suggests yield losses of between 10,491 and 42,919 metric
agricultural systems, compromising crop defenses and
tons for maize and 14,708 and 60,170 metric tons for sor-
creating niches that allow pests and weeds to establish
ghum, averaged over 10 years, meaning annual losses in
themselves (Myers et al. 2017; Rosenzweig et al. 2001).
the range of $3 million.
The fall armyworm is an invasive pest species native to

Poor households, which do not have the resources to
South America that has been found in Africa in the last
invest in effective crop protection measures, are less
decade, with major impacts on maize and sorghum pro-
able than more affluent households to manage crop
duction. In 2016, an outbreak hit Somalia after affecting
pests and diseases effectively. Crop failures (from what-
neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia. Severe outbreaks usu-
ever cause) result in severe hardship and food insecurity
ally coincide with the onset of the wet season, especially
for poor rural households, as they lack the assets and net-
when the new cropping season follows a long period of
works to diversify income and food sources.
drought (Goergen et al. 2016); there are strong indications
of the link between outbreaks and climatic changes (IPPC
Secretariat 2021). Climate drivers
Fungal infections of crops are also climate related and Projected increases in temperature, an increase in the
can produce toxins harmful to human health. A study frequency of extreme weather events, and warming
conducted by Queen’s University Belfast on Somali crops sea temperatures are likely to combine to shift weather
found that levels of aflatoxin B1, a toxin linked to develop- patterns in ways that provide suitable environments
ment of liver cancer, were over 400 times higher than the for an increasing incidence of crop pests and disease.
level permitted by the European Union. The team from This will affect agricultural livelihoods and food availabil-
Queen’s University collected 140 samples from maize, ity across the region (Richardson et al. 2022). There may
sorghum, and wheat in 2014, and found out that all of be a reduction in the prevalence of some vectors if cli-
the maize samples and almost all of the sorghum sam- matic conditions become too warm or humid for them to
ples were contaminated with various amounts of toxins thrive. At present, however, making robust predictions of
(Wielogorska et al. 2019). likely pest and disease impacts is not possible, as there
is inadequate understanding of the specific relationships
between weather events, including seasonal patterns,
Magnitude of impact and the severity of impact of individual pests and disease.
There are no systematic figures on losses due to agri-

Climate shocks may increase the levels of fungal infec-
cultural disease and pests in Somalia, but some partial
tions and toxins in the food that makes it to harvest
estimates are available.
in Somalia. There are some data to show that frequent
droughts are linked to significantly increased toxins in creating a conducive environment for bacteria to grow in
maize, sorghum, and wheat, the main staple foods in the these crops, thus damaging maize stalks and making it
country. There is a likelihood of droughts and heat stress easier for plant pathogens to thrive.
HE AT STRES S O N LIV EST O C K

  $  
Heat stress on Whole country Chronic $100 million–$1 billion Very strong Strong increase
livestock
Nature of risk (−30 percent) when exposed to higher temperatures. Heat

stress may increase the loss of body fluids due to sweat-
Physiological heat stress is caused predominantly by
ing and panting and result in an altered water balance of
the combination of temperature and relative humid-
the body and the osmolarity of cells. Heatwaves, which
ity, and affects livestock productivity and pastoralist
are projected to increase, may directly threaten livestock
livelihoods (Myers et al. 2017). Heat stress decreases
and cause higher-than-normal mortality. Heat stress can
livestock productivity through reduced food intake and
increase livestock vulnerability to disease, reduce fer-
weight loss, reduces the chances of survival, and reduces
tility, and reduce milk production. Average frequency of
fertility (Bernabucci et al. 2010; Lallo et al. 2018; Nardone
detrimental heat stress events for milk production during
et al. 2010). It reduces poultry egg production and quality
2001–20 has been estimated at 77 days per year (approx-
and has an adverse impact on goats and sheep produc-
imately 21 percent of the year), and is more frequent in
tion (Salama et al. 2014). The main response strategy to
coastal areas of the Greater Horn region, where it exceeds
livestock heat stress is higher water consumption, which
50 percent of the days in a given year (Rahimi et al. 2022).
is challenging where availability of water resources is
Over the past two decades, the frequency of heat stress
already constrained, as in much of Sub-Saharan Africa
events detrimental to milk production has significantly
(Porter et al. 2014).
increased (p ≤ 0.05) by ≥0.25 percent to ≥1.5 percent year
in Somalia.
Magnitude of impact
In sheep, there is an association of heat stress and
The frequency of severe heat stress for livestock is esti- impaired reproduction in female sheep (Romo-Barron
mated to have increased significantly within the recent et al. 2019). Heat stress decreases the duration of estrus
past in 4–19 percent of East Africa (map 3.5, map 3.6). It is in cycling ewes (by about 7.09 hours) but increases the
most pronounced for dairy cattle (26 percent of the area). length of the cycle (by about 0.5 days). Heat-stressed
Heat stress risks for sheep and goat production only ewes are 2.4 times less likely to become pregnant than
increased 4–7 percent (Rahimi et al. 2022). non–heat-stressed ewes. Ewes exposed to heat stress
during the first third of gestation are approximately 12
Heat stress will likely impair cattle and camel feed intake times more likely to have embryo mortality. Furthermore,
and performance in the lactating period. Mid-lactating if exposure to heat stress occurred for moderate periods,
dairy cows may show a higher decline in milk production
Map 3.5 Long-term average annual heat stress and regional significant trend, 2001–20
a. Annual heat stress b. Regional significant trend

Algeria Libya Saudi Arabia Algeria Libya Saudi Arabia
Oman Oman
Mauritania Mauritania
Mali Niger Yemen Mali Niger Yemen
Eritrea Eritrea
Senegal Chad Senegal Chad
Guinea-Bissau Sudan Guinea-Bissau Sudan
Burkina Faso Djibouti Burkina Faso Djibouti
Guinea Guinea
Benin Nigeria Somalia Benin Nigeria Somalia
Sierra Leone Togo Ethiopia Sierra Leone Togo Ethiopia
Ivory Coast Ivory Coast
Ghana Central African Republic Ghana Central African Republic
Liberia Liberia
Cameroon Cameroon
Average HS frequency (% yr–1)
Equatorial Guinea Significant increasing trend Equatorial Guinea
Congo Uganda Congo Uganda
São Tomé and Principe Zaire Kenya –1 São Tomé and Principe Zaire Kenya
10 –2
0
–3
0
–4
0
–5
0
>5
0 Gabon ≥0.25 ≥0.50 ≥0.75 ≥1.5 (% yr ) Gabon
0– 10 20 30 40 Rwanda Rwanda
Outside study area Tanzania Study area with no significant increasing trend Tanzania
Angola Angola
Source: Rahimi et al. 2022.

Note: The percentage of days of the year with severe/danger heat stress conditions by livestock categories are dairy cattle (6%), beef, (4%), sheep (1%), and goats (1%).
Map 3.6 Average frequency of days with severe/danger heat stress per year for dairy cattle, sheep,
poultry, beef cattle, goats, and swine, 1981–2010
Source: Rahimi et al. 2021.
the incidence of embryo mortality increases approx- Goats are considered well adapted to the tropical cli-
imately 26-fold (Romo-Barron et al. 2019). In general, mate (Sejian et al. 2018), but their adaptive responses
heat stress conditions affect sexual behavior and reduce significantly hamper their productivity. The impact of
sexual activity and sperm quality, resulting in poor con- elevated ambient temperature is 12 percent, 3–10 percent,
ception and leading to reduced lambing rates (Dwyer and 4 percent reduced growth, milk, and meat production,
2009). respectively. Goats begin experiencing heat stress when
exposed to 38°C and above with a Temperature Humid- which is accounted for by milk production. Given the
ity Index of above 75 (Aleena et al. 2018; Battini et al. 2014). high potential for heat stress impacts, current losses are
roughly estimated to lie in the range of hundreds of mil-
Camels respond to heat stress through several physio- lions of dollars.
logical processes such as decreasing dry matter intake,
milk yield, and reproduction. Heat stress thus has a con- As discussed above, sectoral impacts have strong links to
siderable influence on camels’ overall production and poverty, gender, and other forms of social vulnerability.
reproduction performance (Habte et al. 2021). Heat stress
leads to physiological change and decreased dry matter
intake, leading to reduced milk yields of around 35 per- Climate drivers
cent (Rhoads et al. 2009); it also affects milk chemical The International Livestock Research Institute proj-
composition (Pragna et al. 2017). ects a drastic increase in the number of days of extreme
heat stress per year over the coming decades, which
Cattle herd composition among Somalian lactation is expected to adversely affect livestock production
cows is as follows: dairy, 21 percent; dry cows, 56 per- and productivity in Somalia. Average maximum tem-
cent; heifers, 14 percent; and bulls, 9 percent. Among peratures and the number of very hot days each year
dairy cattle, the probability of severe/danger heat stress (daily maximum temperature above 35°C) are projected
events in any given year ranges from 40 to 50 percent in to increase with high certainty across the country, with
some areas in the southern part of Somalia to over 50 per- central Somalia—an important area for livestock—par-
cent in the northern parts. Beef cattle production is less ticularly affected. Climate projections indicate that there
sensitive to heat stress than dairy cattle production, rang- will be significant increases in the number of days with
ing from mild to no heat stress in the northern parts of dangerously high wet bulb temperatures; the greatest
Somalia to 45–50 percent in the south. increase will be at the hottest time of year—April/May (see
discussion under section 3.4 for more detail; wet bulb tem-
Mean annual production from Somalia’s livestock sector
peratures are discussed in box 3.1).
is estimated to total over $3 billion, a large majority of
FODDE R AVA ILA B ILIT Y A N D QUAL I T Y

  $  
Fodder availability Whole country Chronic $100 million–$1 billion Very strong Weak increase
and quality (given probability of
future more severe
growing conditions)
Nature of risk herders to sell more of their livestock than they would
under normal conditions, resulting in plummeting live-
Decreased rainfall and subsequent stresses on grass-
stock prices and deteriorating rural incomes. Reduced
land quality may threaten pasture and feed supplies,
availability of livestock products in local rural and urban
reducing the amount of quality forage available to graz-
markets affects food security—especially affecting the
ing livestock. Some areas in Somalia will experience
poor, who struggle to meet rising prices resulting from
longer, more intense droughts, resulting from higher
lower productivity. Decreased livestock productivity has
annual temperatures and reduced precipitation.
substantial impacts on Somalia’s wider economy, as live-
stock products represent such a sizable proportion of
Late-onset or early cessation of the rainy seasons
both internal and export markets.
can degrade pasture and force longer and further
migrations. Increasing temperatures decrease pasture
production, and result in poorer quality of forage spe- Climate drivers
cies. Similarly, higher temperatures are associated with
increased lignification in plant tissues and decreased Prolonged droughts and intense rainstorms both have
digestibility of forage, directly affecting forage supply for adverse impacts on fodder availability and quality.
livestock. All these factors combine to jeopardize livestock Current climate projections indicate increasing tem-
productivity, undermining pastoral production systems peratures; while there is high uncertainty in rainfall
and increasing the risks of poverty and displacement. projections, it is likely that water scarcity will moderately
increase in most areas. Intense rainstorms are projected
to become more frequent and severe. This will make it
Magnitude of impact increasingly difficult to raise livestock and could result
in extended areas of the country becoming unsuitable for
There are little data specifically on the impacts to
livestock production by the end of the century. Such an
Somalia’s livestock sector of climate-related impacts
outcome would be devastating for Somalia’s rural liveli-
on forage. Given the general value of the sector, recent
hoods and food security.
drying conditions, and the fact that around 30 percent
livestock mortality can typically result from drought con-
Increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide can increase
ditions, the current impact (in nondrought conditions) is
the productivity of grass species and scrubland on
still expected to fall in the range of over $100 million.
which livestock feed. However, the quality of some of
the forage found in pasturelands decreases with higher
As discussed above, sectoral impacts have strong links
carbon dioxide.
to poverty, gender, and other forms of social vulner-
ability. Widespread droughts in Somalia have caused
LI VE STOC K P ESTS A ND D I S E AS E S
  $  
Livestock pests and Livestock-raising Chronic and episodic $100 million–$1 billion Very strong No clear trend
diseases areas , particularly (depending on pest/
of southern Somalia disease)
Nature of risk Rift Valley fever (RVF), a zoonotic disease causing

destructive outbreak in livestock and humans, is pri-
Climate change shifts key environmental factors that
marily transmitted by Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. There
influence the abundance of pests, pathogens, and vectors
is some evidence that very low, undetected levels of RVF
that affect livestock.
remain circulating in livestock between outbreaks (Iacono
et al. 2018). While outbreaks are generally associated with
African animal trypanosomiasis (AAT) is one of the
heavy rainfall, they can also occur during droughts when
major constraints on the livestock industry in Africa. In
limited standing water concentrates mosquito larvae.
Somalia, Glossina pallidipes, G. austeni, G. brevipalpis, and
Somalia has suitable environments for RVF (map 3.8). In
G. longipennis have been reported; with the G. pallidipes
East Africa, over half of recent El Niño occurrences have
species being the most widely distributed Trypanosoma
been accompanied by RVF outbreaks (FAO 2017), although
species. They are vectored by various species of tsetse
outbreaks do not occur every year or even regularly. Once
fly, whose distribution is climate sensitive and shown in
an outbreak is established, it can be further spread by
map 3.7. Although Trypanosoma evansi is present through-
Culex spp. mosquitoes transmitting infected blood. Ticks
out the year—for instance, in camels—prevalence rates
and biting midges may also be able to spread the virus.
are usually higher during the rainy months than during the
Among livestock, cattle, camels, and small ruminants,
dry months. Cecchi et al. (2008) found a minimum preva-
mortality rates range from 10 to 40 percent, with young
lence of just over 5 percent during the dry season and a
animals most at risk (MAPA, n.d.).
maximum of over just over 20 percent during the wet.
Map 3.7 Predicted areas of suitability for three tsetse fly groups (subgenera) in Africa, 1999
a. Fusca group, subgenus Austenina b. Palpalis group, subgenus Nemorhina c. Morsitans group, subgenus Glossina
Source: Cecchi et al. 2008.

Map 3.8 Epidemic suitability map for Rift Valley and Mohamed 2015)—implying losses across all livestock
fever in Africa from that disease alone could be about twice as high.
Outbreaks of livestock disease can also result in signif-

icant losses of exports due to the imposition of import
bans in market countries.
As discussed above, sectoral impacts have strong links to

poverty, gender, and other forms of social vulnerability.
Climate drivers
Changes in rainfall and temperature, the interaction
between them, and their subsequent impact on the
wider natural environment all have different influences
on the spread and incidence of individual livestock pests
and diseases. Effects are species specific, and in many
cases poorly characterized. Given this fundamental lack of
knowledge, as well as the significant uncertainty around
future rainfall regimes, the overall effect of future climate
change on the incidence of livestock pests and diseases is
Source: Clements et al. 2006.
Note: Based on weighted linear combination. Suitability scores range from 0 unknown, although some predictions can be made.
(completely unsuitable) to 255 (completely suitable).
Changing rainfall patterns and rising temperatures
will affect the geographic range and incidence of
Locust outbreaks (discussed above) also have severe vector-borne diseases, increasing their incidences in
impacts on pastures and therefore the livestock sector. areas that are currently not suitable for transmission
(Richardson et al. 2022). Ae. aegypti (the vector for RVF)
Potential changes in veterinary practices, including an
is expected to be favored by temperature and rainfall
increase in the use of parasiticides and other animal
increases, hence RVF incidence is likely to increase in the
health treatments, are likely to be adopted to maintain
future (Diallo et al. 2022). Map 3.9 and map 3.10 show, respec-
livestock health in response to climate-induced changes
tively, current and projected incidence of Ae. aegypti
in pests, parasites, and microbes. This could increase the
across Africa, including Somalia. Historically, RVF out-
risk of pesticides entering the food chain or lead to evolu-
breaks have been most severe in the southern-central
tion of pesticide resistance, with subsequent implications
parts of Somalia and in future may become more common
for the safety, distribution, and consumption of livestock
in the north of the country (Diallo et al. 2022). Projected
products. This in turn can lead to a ban on Somali prod-
future increases in the frequency and severity of El Niño
ucts, especially by Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
events will pose serious challenges for managing RVF
outbreaks.6
Magnitude of impact
Predicted increases in temperature are also expected
The 2006/07 RVF outbreak in Somalia is estimated to to spread the tsetse fly, and therefore African try-
have resulted in total economic losses to the livestock panosomiasis. Highland areas that are not currently
sector of around $470 million at 2007 prices (FAO 2017). suitable for the tsetse fly are likely to grapple with African
The average annual losses to camel milk and meat produc-
tion from one species of trypanosome has been estimated
at a couple of hundred million dollars (Salah, Robertson, 6
See for example, Ying et al. (2022).
Map 3.9 Current habitat suitability in Africa Map 3.10 Future habitat suitability in Africa
for Ae. aegypti associated with dengue fever for Ae. aegypti associated with dengue fever
incidences incidences
a. RCP 4.5 by 2050 b. RCP 8.5 by 2050
c. RCP 4.5 by 2070 d. RCP 8.5 by 2070
Source: Sintayehu et al. 2020.

Note: Gray to green colors indicate the gradient of suitability from low to high.
trypanosomiasis by 2050, as projected warming and

increasing rainfall amounts force tsetse flies out of former
habitats (Nnko et al. 2021).
Increased flooding of fragile ecosystems can also lead

Source: Sintayehu et al. 2020.
to outbreaks of desert locusts, African RVF, tsetse fly, or Note: Gray to green colors indicate the gradient of suitability from low to high.
other vector-borne diseases, as well as to outbreaks of
animal diseases as berkads (water reservoirs) become
contaminated (FRS 2013).
3.3 Renewable natural resources

Climate change puts a wide variety of stresses on natu- Xagaa season: maydi from yagcar trees (Boswellia frere-
ral ecosystems, which are particularly vulnerable when ana) and beeyo from moxor trees (Bowellia sacra). These
they are already degraded and fragmented. In addition trees are mostly confined to the mountainous areas of
to the intrinsic value of Somalia’s highly endemic biodiver- northwest Somalia, although some cultivation occurs.
sity, its woodlands provide the vast majority of household Most of Somalia’s coast lies within prominent upwelling
energy and have long been renowned for production of zones; it also has important marine resources, particu-
the aromatic resins frankincense and myrrh. Two types of larly commercial stocks of tuna and lobster.
commercial frankincense are collected, usually during the
TE RRE ST RIA L EC O SYSTE M S

  $  
Terrestrial Whole country Chronic $1–$10 million Strong Weak increase

ecosystems
Nature of risk growing periods, wetlands and riverine systems are

increasingly at risk of being converted to other eco-
Higher temperatures and changing precipitation
systems with plant populations being displaced and
regimes pose a variety of risks to natural ecosystems.
animals losing their habitats. Changing climate condi-
Heat- and water-stressed ecosystems will likely lose
tions are believed to increase the threat of infestation of
diversity and become more susceptible to various pests,
bare and degraded lands in northern and southern Soma-
diseases, and invasive species. Shifts in ecological
lia by Prosopis juliflora. Prosopis has already colonized
boundaries could result in wholesale replacement of
vast swathes of land, and directly affects the livelihoods
ecosystems, and are likely to be associated with severe
of thousands of pastoralists. Its tolerance to droughts
biodiversity loss where dispersal of plants and animals is
means that it will continue its invasions into drier grass-
restricted and/or transitions occur rapidly (e.g., through
lands and rangelands.
ecological tipping points such as changes in fire regime).
Degradation of ecosystems increases the climate vul- No assessments have been made of the likely impacts
nerability of agropastoral communities by impairing of climate change on Somalia’s wetlands, but climate
environmental services that support their livelihood change is expected to fundamentally alter Sub-Saharan
systems. In return, stressed households may resort to Africa’s freshwater ecosystems. Impacts include warm-
extractive and unregulated use of biodiversity as a coping ing of surface water, changes in hydrological patterns,
mechanism in response to climate shocks. thermal stratification, eutrophication, and extreme
weather events (Harrod et al. 2019; Islam et al. 2020). In
Forests cover at least 10 percent of Somalia (Jalango et al.
response to changes in climatic conditions, changes to
2021), although most of this is classified as low-density
aquatic species’ distribution, phenology, extinctions, and
wood, with closed forest cover limited to less than 3 per-
biological adaptations (e.g., changing metabolic, growth,
cent of the country. Somalia’s forests contain 394 million
and reproduction rates) are expected (Macusi et al. 2015;
metric tons of carbon in living forest biomass.7 FAO (2015)
Muringai, Mafongoya, and Lottering 2022). Inland fish-
estimates that the annual deforestation rate in Somalia is
eries are a small, but locally important sector in Somalia,
76,757 hectares, representing more than 1 percent of the
and wetlands have a wider value through their importance
forest area, primarily due to unsustainable grazing and
in maintaining water supplies for local populations and
cutting of trees for charcoal production. Direct impacts of
livestock.
climate change are uncertain.
Climate change is expected to have a significant influ- Magnitude of impact

ence on rangeland ecosystems, even though the
magnitude and direction of these changes are very The value of Somalia’s terrestrial ecosystems has not
uncertain. Due to rising temperatures, increased fre- been systematically assessed, much less the impact cli-
quency and intensity of extreme events, and shorter mate change is having upon it. Somaliland and Puntland
account for about 90 percent of the world’s production
of frankincense, representing an annual export value of
$7.3 million (SLU 2019). The total market and nonmarket
7
Source: Mongabay Environmental News, Somalia Forest Information and
Data. value of woodfuel production must be significantly higher.
No accounting has been made of the value of environ- Climate drivers

mental services provided by Somalia’s natural habitats.
There are no reliable estimates on how climate change
Although the costs of current impacts of climate change
might affect tree cover or natural ecosystems in Soma-
are not known, it is assumed that these would be in the
lia. The largest impacts will be driven by changes in the
range of at least a few million dollars.
pattern of rainfall and soil moisture, which remain highly
Impacts on natural ecosystems will particularly affect the uncertain. Some projections for 2080 indicate that tree
rural poor, and especially women, as they are more likely cover might increase by as much as 24 percent, based on
to depend on natural resource–based livelihoods both for the possibility of increasing rainfall (PIK/Adelphi 2022).
regular income and as a coping mechanism in response Actual impacts will be determined by an interplay of cli-
to other economic shocks. mate and anthropogenic pressures; any climate-related
stress on natural ecosystems (which is inevitable) will
probably exacerbate the loss of native biodiversity overall.
MA RI NE F IS H ERIES
  $  
Marine fisheries Coastal areas Chronic $1–$10 million Strong Increase
Somalia’s offshore fisheries (beyond 24 nautical miles GDP (SomInvest 2022), make up at least 8 percent of
from the coast) are based on migratory species, such exports, and employ around 70,000 people (SATG 2018).
as oceanic tunas, with pronounced seasonal pat- Fish consumption by Somali households is reported to be
terns of abundance in Somali waters. A vast proportion one of the lowest in the world (MEP 2021b).
of the offshore fishery catch is taken by foreign-owned
fishing boats and landed elsewhere. Much of this is con- The productivity of Somalia’s fisheries is driven by cold
sidered illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing upwelling in the western Indian Ocean. This upwelling
(UNIDO 2021) and is poorly documented (FAO 2005), but it is the fifth largest in the world and very stable (figure 3.9).
is clear that very little of the value flows back to Somalia, It is seasonal rather than permanent, occurring during
although some license fees are collected. Coastal fisher- the southwest monsoon (May–September). The Somali
ies are focused on the narrow continental shelf (map 3.11), upwelling has three parts (Chatterjee et al. 2019):
and dominated by subsistence and artisanal fishers. This
is the main source of Somalia’s fisheries exports, primar- l Northern part: current-induced upwelling centered at
ily mollusks and crustaceans. approximately 10°N on the northern limb of the Great
Whirl
Despite the country ‘s substantial marine resources,
Somalia’s fisheries sector is undeveloped and/or
underperforms in relation to capturing national value.
Fisheries contribute only about 1–2 percent to Somalia’s
Map 3.11 Fishing zones in Somalia l Central part: wind-induced coastal upwelling, which is
opposed by downwelling Rossby waves8
l Southern part: current-induced upwelling centered at
approximately 4°N on the northern limb of the South-
ern Gyre.
In addition, the Findlater jet, a cross-equatorial low-level

wind that originates with the southwest monsoon, induces
strong Ekman upwelling—a coastal wind-driven upwell-
ing that brings cold water from the deep to the surface
layers along the entire eastern Somali coast.
The upwelling brings deeper, cooler water (up to 5°C

cooler) to the surface. There, its rich nutrients result in
large phytoplankton blooms that begin at the coast and
flow eastward into the open ocean, underpinning fish-
ery productivity in the western Indian Ocean. The most
productive region is the narrow strip along Somalia’s
8
Rossby waves are huge, undulating movements of the ocean that
stretch horizontally across the planet for hundreds of kilometers in a
westward direction. They are so large and massive they can change the
Earth’s climate conditions (source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Source: UNIDO 2021. Map from Project Baldwyn: Secure Fisheries. Administration, What is a Rossby wave?).
Figure 3.9 Schematic of the Somali upwelling and its associated mechanisms
Source: MEP 2021a.

Note: Data are plotted on a latitude and longitude grid, overlying the bathymetry of the region. The color bar on the right shows the bathymetry values (in meters), with light
shades indicating shallow zones and dark shades indicating deep areas.
coastline, extending out to the 200 meter (m) isobath. This To date, the Somali upwelling not only has little interan-
region also roughly aligns with Somalia’s Exclusive Eco- nual variability (unlike some other oceanic upwellings) but
nomic Zone (EEZ), extending 200 nautical miles from the also does not seem to be affected by other extreme ocean
coast, where it has rights to regulate the fishery. temperature events such El Niño and the Indian Ocean
Dipole. However, climate change is already altering ocean
conditions off Somalia’s coast, particularly water tem-
Nature of risk perature and various aspects of ocean bio-geochemistry
Climate impacts on marine fisheries are expected to be (World Bank 2021a).
mainly dependent on two processes:
A socioecological risk assessment for Somalia’s fisher-
l Climate-driven shifts in the Somali upwelling reducing ies (figure 3.10) placed Somalia in a high risk category. Its
productivity overall risk score was 68 out of 100, based primarily on its
lack of adaptive capacity, although exposure was rated
l Increases in water temperature (and therefore as low, due to the low relative importance of the fisher-
decreases in dissolved oxygen) driving away active ies industry to the country ‘s economy and use of fish as a
species that are intolerant of low oxygen levels (espe- food source in Somalia (table 3.7).
cially oceanic migrants, such as tuna).
Figure 3.10 Linked socioecological risk framework
Hazard Exposure Vulnerability ECOLOGICAL
Sensitivity
Policy feedback
Adaptation
capacity
Risk of marine
species under climate Vulnerability
impacts
Sensitivity
Hazard Exposure Adaptation

capacity
SOCIOECONOMIC
Social-Ecological risks of Policy relevant

climate change solutions
Source: World Bank 2019a.
Table 3.7 Individual component risk scores for Somalia’s fisheries within its EEZ
Hazard Adaptive capacity Exposure Sensitivity Vulnerability Risk

84 5 9 21 68 68

The Somali mangroves are important habitats to fish onshore processing and marketing jobs. Overall, impacts in
(particularly as spawning grounds for coastal species) the fisheries sector are expected to show similar patterns
and are critical for conservation of marine biodiver- of poverty and gender linkage to other rural livelihoods.
sity, as well as providing a range of other environmental
services. Somalia’s mangroves are threatened and the
current annual rate of mangrove deforestation is around Climate drivers
1 percent per year. Mangrove degradation is mostly a Recent modeling under RCP 8.5 indicates future impacts
consequence of direct human pressures on the coastal by the end of the century as follows (MEP 2021b):
and marine environment, particularly given the lack of
protected reserves in Somalia, but these pressures are l By the end of the century, the Somali upwelling
exacerbated by rising sea levels, high sea temperatures, system will persist, but will be approximately 20 per-
and other factors linked to climate change (Mumuli and cent less productive overall in the main upwelling
Oduori 2010) (figure 3.11). zone and season. The reduced primary productivity
will cascade through the food web, amplifying the loss
of food availability at each trophic level.
Magnitude of impact
Domestic (commercial) fishing has been conservatively l Localized increases in primary productivity have the
estimated at around $135 million annually (SomInvest potential to support localized fisheries throughout
2022). Future catch reductions to 2100 due to climate the century if they are not reef-dependent.
impacts range between 9.5 percent (RCP 2.5) and 60.9
l By the end of the century, an overall rise of 4°C in sea
percent (RCP 8.5) as shown in table 3.8. Interpolating from
surface temperature is projected for both monsoon
this to current impacts from historical warming of at least
seasons. During the southwest monsoon, mean sea
1°C provides the estimate given here of the magnitude of
surface temperatures are projected to reach > 28°C by
current costs.
2030, > 29°C by 2050, and > 31°C by 2100.
Many coastal communities that rely on fisheries are poor l More than a 3°C rise relative to baseline conditions
and relatively marginalized. Gender roles are also pro- is considered catastrophic for most coral species,
nounced in fisheries, with women largely restricted to which in Somalia will occur as early as the 2050s.
Some more naturally thermally tolerant corals, such as
those in the Arabian Gulf, may persist toward the end of
Figure 3.11 Conceptual framework of principal the century. The response of the reef systems in Soma-
impacting factors of climate change and how lia and the impact on the fisheries supported by these
they are likely to negatively influence mangrove habitats will therefore depend on coral diversity and
communities
density, which is not known for Somalia.
l The surface waters of the Somali EEZ and upwell-
ing region will become unsuitable thermal habitat for
adult yellowfin and bigeye, and for tuna larvae from
as early as the 2060s. Adult skipjack are more toler-
ant of higher temperatures and may persist in surface
waters in the region until the 2080s. Toward the end
of the century, skipjack and yellowfin are likely to shift
distribution to cooler surface waters (north and east),
whereas bigeye may be able to increase residency in
deeper layers and remain in the Somali region. All pro-
jections point toward tuna surface fisheries becoming
less significant in the Somali EEZ from 2080 onwards.
Source: Ward et al. 2016.
Table 3.8 Percentage changes in maximum catch potential under low and high greenhouse gas
emissions scenarios, by 2050 and 2100
Low greenhouse gas emissions scenario High greenhouse gas emissions scenario
(RCP 2.6) (RCP 8.5)
Model 2050 2100 2050 2100
Dynamic Bioclimate Envelope Model −10.30 −9.52 −22.39 −60.89
Multispecies Size Spectrum Ecological Model −15.46 −11.01 −19.06 −36.53
l The projected decline of 0.5 milligrams/liter in surface changing ocean currents, increased intensities of storms,
oxygen by the end of the century (due to increases in increased temperatures, changes in precipitation, and
temperature reducing solubility and restricting ven- increased carbon dioxide at global scales (Ward et al.
tilation from subsurface layers) during both monsoon 2016). Climatological forecasts by the Intergovernmental
seasons is not sufficiently low to become a limiting Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) show that oceanic pH may
factor for many species. decline by 0.07–0.31 and mean atmospheric carbon diox-
ide concentrations will increase to 441 parts per million
Table 3.8 summarizes projected decreases in potential (ppm) from 391 ppm with significant impacts on man-
catch for both RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 emissions scenarios. groves (Alongi 2015). In the event of negative impacts on
mangroves, economic impacts on ethnic communities
Climate change is likely to have a substantial impact on surviving on coastal biodiversity resources in Somalia are
mangrove ecosystems in Somalia. This is due to the con- expected.
sequences of the projected sea level rise of 1.1 to 3.8 m,
3.4 Health
HE AT STRES S O N H UM A N S
  $   
Heat stress on Whole country Chronic $10–$100 million 100–1,000 Very strong Strong increase
humans
Nature of risk events occur without heatstroke and, in these cases, the
mechanisms remain unclear. It is likely that heat exposure
High temperatures and humidity put physiological
increases the amount of oxygen that the heart requires to
stress on human bodies, reducing productivity and
maintain optimal function (myocardial oxygen require-
eventually leading to a range of chronic and acute health
ment) (Chaseling et al. 2021).
problems (box 3.1). Losses to human productivity due to
heat stress have the potential for significant adverse eco- Mortality rates during heatwaves can be high. For exam-
nomic impacts. ple, 70,000 deaths were attributed to the 2003 European
heatwave (Robine et al. 2008). Risk factors are not only
Cardiovascular diseases are often identified as a risk
cardiovascular disease. Old age, chronic illnesses, some
factor for heat-related hospitalization and death.
medications, social isolation, and a lack of access to
During extreme heat events, people with existing cardio-
adequate cooling are also identified as contributing to
vascular disease are at greater risk of hospitalizations
mortality during heatwaves. There are no data covering
and death. The reasons for this are not yet fully under-
the numbers affected or the economic costs explicitly
stood (figure 3.12). Some of the effects of extreme heat
related to the association between heat events and car-
on adverse cardiovascular events can been explained in
diovascular disease for Somalia or elsewhere.
the context of heatstroke. However, many cardiovascular
Very hot days, with daily maximums over 35°C, are already
common in Somalia, and show a clearly increasing trend
(figure 3.13).
Box 3.1 An explanation of heat risk and
temperature Heat stress will affect agricultural production, as
rising daytime temperatures and more frequent heat-
The physiological impact of heat is determined by
waves lower the productivity of people working on key
both temperature and humidity (as high humid-
activities such as sowing, weeding, and harvesting.
ity impedes the body ‘s ability to shed heat through
Occupational heat-related mortality is 35 times higher
sweating) and is measured by “wet bulb tem-
among agricultural workers compared to workers from
perature” (the temperature of a thermometer
other industries. Agricultural workers in Somalia are often
covered with a moist towel). Wet bulb tempera-
exposed to hot environmental conditions. Hyperthermia
ture approaches dry bulb temperature as relative
from exertion and environmental conditions during agri-
humidity rises to 100 percent, as the cooling effect
cultural work can trigger a range of symptoms and may
of evaporation is lost. Prolonged exposure to
lead to the death of workers.
wet bulb temperatures above 35°C is fatal. Sus-
tained exposure to wet bulb temperatures above
Somalia’s cities and towns are all likely to experience
32°C makes vigorous physical activity difficult and
urban heat island (UHI) effects (box 3.2; figure 3.14). The
potentially dangerous.
projected increasing frequency and severity of heatwaves
over the rest of the century (see map 3.12) will almost cer-
Heat stress is also sometimes measured by a
tainly increase the additional UHI-induced temperatures
Heat Index (sometimes referred to as “appar-
Somalia’s urban populations will experience.
ent temperature.” This measure also combines
temperature and humidity. But while wet bulb tem-
Poorer urban populations are usually the most affected
perature reflects heat in sunlight, the Heat Index
by UHI effects. This is because these populations live in
indicates shade temperatures and is more repre-
crowded conditions, with limited tree cover and open
sentative of how hot it feels indoors in a building
green areas; and their buildings are poorly constructed,
without additional cooling. A wet bulb temperature
poorly insulated, and have metal roofs (Li et al. 2021).
of 32°C is roughly equivalent to a Heat Index tem-
In Somalia, IDP settlements are also at particular risk. In
perature of 55°C.
addition, UHI can cause smog to form, trapping particulate
Figure 3.12 Association between heat events and cardiovascular events
Source: Chaseling et al. 2021.
Figure 3.13 Maximum of daily max-temperature:

annual trends and trends per decade Box 3.2 What are urban heat Islands?
a. Temperature “Heat islands are urbanized areas that experi-
38 ence higher temperatures than outlying areas.
Structures such as buildings, roads, and other infra-
37 structure absorb and re-emit the sun’s heat more
than natural landscapes such as forests, grasslands
36 and water bodies.
°C
35 “The annual mean air temperature of a city with one

million or more people can be 1 to 3°C warmer than
34 its surroundings, and on a clear, calm night, this
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 temperature difference can be as much as 12°C.
Annual daily Trend Trend Trend Even smaller cities and towns will produce heat
maximum 1951–2020 1971–2020 1991–2020 islands, though the effect often decreases as city
Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Somalia. size decreases.”
Source: U.S. EPA 2008.
matter and other urban pollutants into aerosols that harm

drainage systems are nonexistent, increased precip-
human health.
itation will exacerbate urban flooding, which in turn will
negatively affect socioeconomic aspects of urban wel-
There is a close connection between flooding and UHIs
fare. There is a growing recognition that both flooding
(Richards and Edwards 2018). The extra warming caused
and UHIs need to be tackled together and prioritized in
by a UHI may lead to upward, turbulent air motion, which
city planning.
in turn triggers precipitation. Urban surface rough-
ness, and the presence of aerosols from air pollution, can
also induce precipitation. In Somali cities where storm
Figure 3.14 Urban heat island
Source: Adapted from CUER 2017 and Government of Canada 2020.

Note: UCL = urban canopy layer, the layer of air in urban areas beneath the mean height of the buildings and trees.
Map 3.12 Projections of the annual number of very Mogadishu and Kismayo may have some UHI
hot days (daily maximum temperature above impacts mitigated due to their coastal location with
35°C) for different greenhouse gas emissions regular onshore breezes. As yet, no studies have spe-
scenarios cifically looked at the impact of UHIs in any Somali urban
settlement.
Magnitude of impact
Heat stress results in lost labor productivity as people
adapt physiologically (sweating) and behaviorally
(self-pacing). Where heat stress exceeds the body ‘s abil-
ity to maintain a comfortable core temperature, a range of
heat-related illnesses can occur (Cheung, Lee, and Oksa
2016). High temperatures can exacerbate cardiovascu-
lar disease (Cosselman, Navas-Acien, and Kaufman 2015),
stroke, renal diseases (Barraclough et al. 2017), neurode-
Source: PIK/Adelphi 2022. generative diseases (Killin et al. 2016), and type 2 diabetes
(Cook, Wellik, and Fowke 2011). Extreme temperatures can Table 3.9 Heat impacts on labor productivity, by
be fatal. sector (percentage change)
The poor are particularly vulnerable to heat stress. They Agriculture

frequently live in housing with inadequate insulation and +1°C +2°C +3°C +4°C +5°C
cooling, and lack the resources to make improvements −3.51 −7.73 −12.82 −18.21 −24.87
that would shelter them from extreme heat or allow them
Manufacturing
to move to cooler locations. Many poor peoples’ occupa-
tions add to their exposure to heat risk as they frequently +1°C +2°C +3°C +4°C +5°C
need to work outdoors regardless of the temperature −1.23 −3.14 −5.54 −8.41 −11.84
(e.g., in agriculture or construction-related activities). In Services
these situations, individuals may be reluctant to respond
+1°C +2°C +3°C +4°C +5°C
to physiological or public health warnings. Poor families
0.00 −0.11 −1.33 −2.88 −4.81
may be unable to access or pay for medical care to treat
heat-related health problems (Gronlund 2014). Source: Roson and Sartori 2016.
There are no Somalia-specific studies on the impacts cost of heat stress is conservatively estimated to lie in the
of heat on labor productivity. A recent diagnostic cover- range of $10–$100 million per year.
ing several locations in East Africa provides some insights
(Kruse et al. 2021). This study used three levels of work, Current heat-related mortality is estimated at around
each with different metabolic rates, indicated in watts (W): 2 deaths per 100,000 people (or over 300 in total) per
low intensity (200 W) such as light clerical work; medium year (PIK/Adelphi 2022). The poor are at much higher risk
intensity (300 W); and high intensity (400 W), representing of heat stress due both to exposure being most severe for
construction or agricultural labor. The analysis for Mom- those engaged in physically demanding work outdoors
basa (of the locations analyzed, the nearest in climatic (agricultural workers and construction laborers) and to
conditions to Somalia) indicated that, by end of century, lack of access to cooling solutions (air conditioners, cold
productivity losses under RCP 6.0 will exceed 13 percent water, etc.).
for 400 W, 7.7 percent for medium-intensity work, and
2.5 percent for low-intensity work. Under RCP 2.6, losses High temperatures can add to electricity demand as more
were still substantial for high-intensity work, at 5.6 per- people use air conditioning more frequently and at higher
cent; there was a 2 percent loss for medium work and a cooling rates. A study in Thailand indicates that tempera-
negligible 0.1 percent loss for light work. ture increases of 1.7°C–3.4°C by 2080 would increase peak
electricity demand by 3.7–8.3 percent in 2050, and 6.6–15.3
Another study, based on increases in temperature rather percent in 2080, even assuming no increase in air condi-
than RCPs and/or time periods, provides different levels tioning usage (Parkpoon and Harrison 2008). These figures
of impacts for Somalia (table 3.9) with considerably higher are probably conservative as, in practice, higher tempera-
productivity losses at higher temperatures—especially tures combined with economic and social development
for higher-intensity work such as agriculture (Roson and over coming decades will mean that more people use air
Sartori 2016). In this analysis, Somalia is clustered with conditioning, and electricity demand directly linked to cli-
a number of small East Africa countries, including small mate change will increase significantly.
island states, which do not necessarily share similar initial
levels of productivity or identical future climate impacts,
possibly making the specific findings less robust. Climate drivers
The number of very hot days each year (with daily max-
Based on an existing temperature rise of 1°C, and on
imum temperature above 35°C) is projected to increase
an assumption that the value of agricultural and other
with high certainty all over Somalia, with central Somalia
exposed forms of labor exceeds $1 billion, the current
being particularly affected (PIK/Adelphi 2022) (map 3.12). Figure 3.16 Projected days with Heat Index > 35°C
In addition, higher rainfall may increase humidity. Climate anomaly
projections indicate there will be dramatic increases in the
number of days with dangerously high wet bulb tempera-
tures, and the greatest increase will be at the hottest time
of year—April/May (figure 3.15 and figure 3.16).
Under RCP2.6, heat-related mortality is projected to

intensify from 1.3 deaths in 2000, to 3.2 deaths per
100,000 people per year until 2030 and to 3.6 deaths per
100,000 people per year until 2080 with high certainty
(multimodel median) (figure 3.17). Under RCP6.0, projec-
tions indicate significantly higher heat-related mortality,
though with a larger range of possible future conditions.
Projections range between 5.8 and 11.4 deaths per 100,000
people per year until 2080 (very likely range), with a median
across projections of 10 deaths per 100,000 people per Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Somalia.
year until 2080 if there is no adaptation to hotter condi-
tions (PIK/Adelphi 2022).
Figure 3.17 Impact of heatwaves on Somalia’s
population, under different climate projections—
Figure 3.15 Projected days with Heat Index > 35°C RCPs 2.6 (blue) and 6.0 (red)
a. Population exposure to heatwaves
Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Somalia. b. Heat-related mortality, assuming no adaptation
Source: PIK/Adelphi 2022.

VE CTOR-B O RNE DIS EAS E

  $   
Vector-borne Whole country Chronic $10–$100 million > 10,000 Strong No clear trend
disease
Nature of risk Table 3.10 Epidemiological profile by zone

Changing rainfall patterns and rising temperatures Zone Epidemic potential Populations at risk
will affect the geographic range and incidence of
Somaliland High All age groups
vector-borne diseases, potentially increasing incidence
of malaria, dengue, and RVF. These diseases are all trans- Puntland High All age groups
mitted by mosquitoes, whose range is largely determined Central Moderate All age groups, but particularly
by temperature, humidity, and the availability of standing Zone pregnant women and children
water. under 5
Southern Moderate–low Pregnant women and children

l Malaria is vectored by Anopheles spp. mosquitoes. Zone under 5
While the whole country is at risk, prevalence is high-
Source: Ministry of Health, n.d.
est in southern parts of the Central South Zone (map 3.13
and table 3.10).
l Dengue is mainly transmitted by the Aedes aegypti risk for dengue, but the risk is higher in the southern
mosquito and primarily associated with urban envi- half of the country. There have been large outbreaks in
ronments in East Africa. All of Somalia is considered at Somalia’s cities—for example, the 2011 epidemic cen-
tered on Mogadishu (Kyobe Bosa et al. 2014). Urban
environments appear to scale up dengue transmission
Map 3.13 Prevalence of Plasmodium falciparum because multiple sources of clean water for breeding
malaria in different regions increases the available habitat for vectors. Detailed
information on the distribution, vector competence,
and insecticide susceptibilities of Ae. aegypti and other
dengue vectors are lacking in Somalia (and the rest of
Africa).
l RVF is also primarily transmitted by Ae. aegypti. The

whole country has suitable environments for RVF. The
virus appears to survive in the dried eggs of Ae. aegypti
mosquitoes. When these mosquitoes hatch during wet
years, epidemics can occur. There is some evidence
that, very low, undetected levels of RVF remain cir-
5% culating in livestock between outbreaks (Iacono et al.
5–9% 2018). While outbreaks are generally associated with
10–39%
heavy rainfall, they can also occur during droughts
when limited standing water concentrates mosquito
larvae. In East Africa, over half of recent El Niño occur-
Source: Ministry of Health 2010, Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit surveys rences have been accompanied by RVF outbreaks (FAO
2004–07. 2017), although outbreaks do not occur every year or
even regularly. Once an outbreak is established, it can or severe. WHO data suggest that around 90 percent of
be further spread by Culex spp. mosquitoes transmit- malaria case are uncomplicated (WHO 2022).
ting infected blood. Ticks and biting midges may also
be able to spread the virus. The female Aedes spp. There have been no specific studies on the eco-
mosquito can transmit the virus directly to her off- nomic costs of malaria in Somalia. Recent research in
spring (vertical transmission) via eggs leading to new Mozambique—a country comparable for its low levels of
generations of infected mosquitoes. This is not the household income and underresourced health sector—
case for Culex spp. mosquito. found the median costs of malaria care to society (i.e.,
costs to both households and the health system) were
Although primarily seen as a livestock disease, RVF
$7.80 per uncomplicated case and $107.64 per severe
also infects humans, especially those living close
case (Alonso et al. 2019). Combining these figures with the
to livestock. Human-to-human transmission has
WHO’s current incidence figures each year and assuming
not been documented (WHO 2018), but virus titers in
10 percent of cases are severe, suggests a current total
infected humans are high enough to infect mosqui-
economic cost close to $15 million per year in Somalia.
toes and introduce RVF into new areas (NJDA 2003).
In humans, the disease usually presents with mild Poor individuals are more likely to sleep without bed
flu-like symptoms, although a significant propor- nets, are less likely to prioritize paying for insect repel-
tion (up to 8 percent) develop severe conditions which lents, and have limited access to medical care when they
can have long-lasting health impacts. Documented fall ill. They also are more likely to live in lower-quality
human death rates are usually less than 1 percent (WHO housing situated close to vector-breeding sites. These
2018), but where herders are remote from health care circumstances place them at high risk from vector-borne
facilities, mortality rates of 12 percent have been docu- diseases. High incidences of vector-borne disease can
mented (MAPA, n.d.). increase health inequities and act as a brake on socio-
economic development (Campbell-Lendrum et al. 2015).
Magnitude of impact Little is known about the level of dengue infection in

There are only limited data on malaria prevalence in Somalia because of weak surveillance and reporting
Somalia. Recent (2020) official figures indicate 57 cases systems. Dengue epidemics emerge from time to time
per 1,000 people per year (about 90,500 cases),9 but this in Somalia, but the trigger(s) is poorly understood. Public
very low figure almost certainly underestimates the health responses in affected urban areas are based on
true number significantly, as data collection and report- widespread insecticide spraying. About 5 percent of
ing faces great capacity and financial challenges. The those infected die (Guha-Sapir and Schimmer 2005).
World Health Organization (WHO) provides a much higher
median figure of 829,649 cases for 2020 (WHO 2022). All There has been no specific research into the economic
these figures are estimates, given the paucity of health costs of dengue in Somalia, nor estimates of total num-
sector data at the national level. bers infected annually. Africa has around 16 percent of all
global dengue infections, equating to around 62.4 million
The economic costs of any illness are a combination cases each year (Guo et al. 2017). Assuming dengue inci-
of household costs and health system costs associ- dence in Somalia is proportionally similar to the incidence
ated with care of infected individuals. Household costs across Africa, this implies that between 2 and 4 percent of
include direct medical expenses, transportation, and the population is infected each year—which is about half
opportunity costs of the time lost due to illness. The eco- the incidence rate for malaria. Assuming dengue has sim-
nomic costs of individual cases of malaria vary greatly, ilar economic costs to Somali society as malaria suggests
depending on whether the infection is uncomplicated an average annual economic cost of $5–$8 million a year,
and significantly more in years with severe outbreaks.
9
World Bank Open Data.
Although everyone is at risk for malaria and dengue, Map 3.15 Modeled output of malaria transmission
the burden of disease falls disproportionately on the
poor, who can least afford either avoidance or treat- a. RCP 4.5 by 2030 b. RCP 8.5 by 2030
ment measures. Research indicates that climate change
is increasing the spread of vector-borne illnesses such
as malaria, dengue fever, and Zika virus, all of which are
linked to worse maternal and neonatal outcomes (Oberg
et al. 2021).
Economic losses from RVF can be significant. While

the main losses are due to the loss of livestock and the
knock-on impacts on livestock trade, RVF epidemics
severely affect food security, especially among those
c. RCP 4.5 by 2050 d. RCP 8.5 by 2050
dependent on livestock for food and income. Long-term
illness and disability resulting from RVF infection impair
farmers’ ability to resume their normal economic activ-
ities (Peyre et al. 2015). Following the 2006–07 outbreak
across East Africa, average human health costs incurred
by Kenyan households with a reported human case were
valued at $120 for every household (Orinde et al. 2012).
Assuming a similar cost in Somalia, the estimated 30,000
human cases resulting from the 2006–07 outbreak could
amount to costs of up to $3.6 million.
e. RCP 4.5 by 2080 f. RCP 8.5 by 2080
Climate drivers
Recent modeling of malaria prevalence across Africa
suggests that the incidence of malaria in Somalia will
reduce over time (see map 3.14 and map 3.15). This is
Map 3.14 Baseline (current) malaria prevalence in

Africa
Source: Ryan, Lippi, and Zermoglio 2020.
in contrast with the rest of East Africa, where a rise in

endemic cases of malaria is projected across the region,
along with fairly constant levels of seasonal prevalence
up to midcentury. Both endemic and seasonal risk areas
are projected to shrink in Somalia—and also across a
significant area of Africa more generally—by 2080. The
projected changes are primarily driven by shifts in suit-
able habitats for Anopheles spp. mosquitoes, determined
by the interplay of both temperature and humidity, with
many areas exceeding the heat tolerance limits of Anoph-
Source: Ryan, Lippi, and Zermoglio 2020. eles spp. mosquitoes.
Conversely, Ae. aegypti is expected to be favored by the southern-central parts of Somalia and in future may
temperature increases, and hence dengue incidence is become more common in the north of the country. While
predicted to increase in the future (Diallo et al. 2022). outbreaks are generally associated with heavy rainfall,
Map 3.10 shows projected incidence across Africa, includ- they can also occur during droughts when limited stand-
ing Somalia. These projections suggest that over the ing water concentrates mosquito larvae. In East Africa,
coming decades, dengue risk may increase moderately, over half of recent El Niño occurrences have been accom-
especially in the north of the country. Somalia’s rapidly panied by RVF outbreaks (FAO 2017). Projected future
increasing urban population is also likely to fuel future increases in the frequency and severity of El Niño events
dengue incidence. (see, e.g., Ying et al. 2022) will pose serious challenges for
managing RVF outbreaks.
As Ae. aegypti is also the primary vector for RVF, rising
temperatures may see an increase in RVF outbreaks,
especially if intense rainstorms become more frequent.
Historically, RVF outbreaks have been most severe in
GASTROIN TESTIN A L DIS E AS E S

  $   
Gastrointestinal Whole country Chronic $10–$100 million 100–1,000 Strong Increasing

diseases
Nature of risk to clean water and/or large numbers of displaced people

crowded together with inadequate access to water and
There is a well-understood strong positive association
sanitation can give rise to rapid increase and spread of
between the prevalence of gastrointestinal diseases
diarrheal diseases.
and high temperatures. For example, the incidence of
salmonellosis increases with temperature. There is a
similar positive relationship between temperature and Magnitude of impact
gastrointestinal infections in children (Ghazani et al.
In Somalia, the risks of waterborne disease are high with
2018). In addition, widespread outbreaks of many water-
or without changes to the climate. Only 52 percent of the
borne diseases such as cholera, cryptosporidium, E. coli
country’s population has access to a basic water supply,
infection, giardia, shigella, typhoid, and viruses such as
and around 28 percent of the population has to defecate in
hepatitis A have strong links to extreme weather events
the open. Both short- and longer-term productivity losses
(WHO 2003).
are inevitably linked to infection with waterborne disease
Floods frequently contaminate drinking water sources in adults. Associated mortality rates are also significant.
and increase the prevalence of diarrhea and other In 2019, diarrheal diseases were one of the top five causes
waterborne diseases. During droughts, restricted access of mortality across all age groups in Somalia (Richard-
son et al. 2022). Estimates from 2016 indicate a mortality
rate attributed to unsafe water, sanitation, and hygiene Figure 3.18 Mortality rate attributed to unsafe
(WASH) of around 86 per 100,000 of Somalia’s population. water, unsafe sanitation, and lack of hygiene
This compares to around 51 per 100,000 in Kenya and 32
per 100,000 in Uganda (figure 3.18).10 Uganda
Data on the economic costs of gastrointestinal dis-

eases are sparse. There are indications that the cost Kenya
burden may be on the order of 1 percent of GDP or more: a
recent World Bank study in Tanzania found that the over-
all cost of inadequate WASH is around 3.5 percent of GDP, Somalia
with the health component of that accounting for around 0 20 40 60 80 100
1.5 percent of GDP (World Bank 2023). Mortality per 100,000
Source: World Bank Open Data.

Any increases in the number, severity, and extent of
hot days, floods, and droughts are likely to increase the
risks of gastrointestinal diseases. However, there are no
data that indicate the rate at which this risk may change survival of the common pathogens causing diarrhea is
alongside changes in climate and weather patterns. enhanced as temperatures rise (Carlton et al. 2016). Diar-
rhea and other waterborne diseases are also linked to
severe droughts when access to clean water is restricted.
Climate drivers
Figure 3.19 illustrates the links between climate change and
Waterborne disease is driven by both floods and waterborne diseases.
droughts. Floods wash fecal matter and other contami-
nants into water sources. In addition, the replication and
10
Figure 3.19 How extreme weather events impact the status of waterborne protozoa diseases
Climate change
Extreme
events
Drought
Heavy rainfall
Increased frequency Heatwaves
Flooding
Increased duration
Cyclones Increased runoff

Water scarcity
Storms Increased water
Low water pressure
El Niño turbidity
1. Wash contaminated fertilizers to

waterways
Decreased food
Dehydration 2. Extract cysts and oocysts from
supply
contaminated soil and grass
Increased patho- High food Overflowing of waste-

gen (oo)cysts loading Displacement prices/low water treatment
in rivers affordability systems
Use of alternative Excess sewage

Use of substandard
water sources for irri- evades simple filter
food
gation and domestic treatment systems
purposes
Contaminated water
Water and food Introduction of food
with infective
contamination safety hazards
(oo)cysts return to
(protozoa [oo]cysts)
waterways untreated
Poor sanitation
Malnutrition
Spread of diarrheal
diseases
Waterborne
protozoa
outbreaks
Source: Adapted from Ahmed, Guerrero, and Karanis 2018.

3.5 Infrastructure and services
D E G RA DAT IO N O F IN F RAST RU CT U R E
  $  
Degradation of Whole country Chronic $10–$100 million Neutral Increasing

infrastructure
Nature of risk Map 3.16 Somalia’s roads network

Climate change brings multiple risks to the transport
sector. Both road and air transport are particularly vul-
nerable to flooding and high temperatures. Harbors
are most vulnerable to storm surges and sea level rise.
Table 3.11 on the next page provides an overview of key cli-
mate risks for different transport subsectors.
Climate-resilient buildings need to provide, at a min-

imum, affordable homes and workplaces that are safe
from flooding, can withstand high winds and cyclones,
and provide comfortably cool working and living envi-
ronments. As Somalia rapidly urbanizes, urban growth
faces the dual challenges of low development and pov-
erty. Buildings that respond to shifts in weather patterns,
alongside people’s shelter and work needs (especially
those of people on low incomes), either do not exist, are
not affordable, or are insufficient in scale. Instead, there
is a rise in substandard buildings and slums (Del Pero et
al. 2021).
National capital Primary road
Major town Secondary road
Somalia is ranked lowest of all African countries in the Intermediate town

Small town
International boundary
Tertiary road
Track/trail
Surface waterbody
African Development Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Index

Provisional administrative line River
(AfDB 2020). Around 90 percent of the Somalia’s primary Source: World Food Programme, 2013.
roads require extensive rehabilitation: only 13 percent of
its roads are paved (2,860 km out of the total 11,434 km),
with the remaining earth or gravel (map 3.16). Poor main- inaccessible or impassable. A 2016 African Development
tenance has impaired the quality of many roads, including Bank assessment found identified 90 percent of paved
paved routes. Seasonal flooding frequently makes roads roads as deteriorated and beyond their design life. Nev-
ertheless, even though most roads are in poor condition,
Table 3.11 Potential climate impacts on Somalia’s transport subsectors
Subsector Potential impact from climate hazards
l Extreme precipitation and flooding can prevent access to roads by motorists or maintenance crews; it also poses risks to drain-
age systems by overwhelming them with water and storm debris
l Extreme temperatures can cause road buckling
l Some types of asphalt binder have exhibited sensitivity beginning at 42°C, particularly if combined with truck traffic
l There is a potential for significantly reduced operational capacity above 46°C due to impacts on both the road surface and vehi-
cle operation
Roads l Thresholds for damage to roads and drainage systems are often observed at the 50- to 100-year flood level
l Bridges, which are often designed with higher thresholds in mind, may be susceptible to 100– to 500-year floods
l Strong winds have been observed to affect road usability above 62 km/hour and pose a significant hazard above 119 km/hour
l Winds over 150 km/hour may cause damage to permanent road signage
l Winds over 225 km/hour may cause stress to bridges
l Extreme weather conditions can also affect the health and safety of transport workers and passengers
l There is an employee health and safety risk possible above 30°C and a high risk above 40°C
l Extreme temperatures can cause buckling of airport runways, pavements, and access roads
l Flooding can inundate and damage runways and parked aircraft
l Storm surge and sea level rise can inundate assets and equipment at low-lying coastal airports; Mogadishu airport is at partic-
Aviation ular risk
l Exposure to saltwater can cause short-circuiting and accelerated corrosion of electrical equipment
l Extreme temperatures can reduce aircraft lift and require longer takeoff runs
l Extreme weather conditions can affect the health and safety of aviation workers and passengers
l Storm surge and flooding can damage marine port buildings and equipment, including damage to structures from increased
wave and water loads and increased corrosion due to exposure to saltwater
l Sea defenses, breakwaters, quays, and jetties may require additional construction to raise their height as sea level rises
Marine l Extreme precipitation can increase erosion and sedimentation around harbors and access channels
Transport
l Extreme temperatures can cause buckling of ports’ paved surfaces and access roads
l Changes in extreme precipitation can result in the need for additional dredging
l Extreme weather conditions can affect the health and safety of marine transport workers and passengers
Source: Based on World Bank, Climate and Disaster Risk Screening—Sector Screening Guidance Note: Transportation Sector.
Note: Flood impacts are dealt with in the subsections on fluvial and pluvial flood and coastal flooding.
Somalia’s Rural Access Index is relatively high, at 31 per- it can soften and melt if temperatures are high enough.
cent.11 This reflects the country ‘s high level of urbanization If temperatures then cool, the tarmac becomes brittle
and a population distribution pattern whereby many and easily breaks up under heavy traffic loads. Together,
people live along a few corridors that have relatively good these effects lead to a rapid deterioration of road sur-
connectivity (World Bank 2017). faces. The temperature of paved road surfaces can be
20°C-30°C hotter than the surrounding air temperatures;
There are no available data indicating the proportion of so in a hot country like Somalia, the potential risk to paved
Somalia’s paved roads built using asphalt suited to the road surfaces is high. This risk can be mitigated if suitable
ambient temperatures. Tarmac is viscoelastic, meaning bitumen (or other modern polymer binder) is used (Jyo-
this and Sailor 2022).
11
The World Bank’s Rural Access Index measures the proportion of people
living within 2 km of an all-season road.
Before the civil war, Somalia had 15 operational ports Magnitude of impact
and facilities. However, in recent years, only four ports—
Understanding the cost of current climate conditions
Mogadishu, Bossaso, Berbera, and Kismayo—have been
on infrastructure is challenging. A robust estimate would
fully operational (MPWR&H 2019; AfDB 2016) (map 3.17).
require detailed knowledge not only of actual and/or
Sea level rise will require strengthening port’s sea opportunity costs of infrastructure maintenance within
defenses and possibly raising the heights of jetties and Somalia, but also comparator data across different loca-
quays. (See subsection on coastal flooding.) No specific tions to apportion costs attributable to climate conditions
assessments or plans have been made to adapt Somalia’s vis-à-vis usage rates (e.g., traffic volumes). This informa-
existing ports to projected rises in sea level. tion is generally lacking. Based on unit costs for different
road classes from other African countries, a ballpark
Limited connectivity has a significant impact on key figure for the cost of keeping Somalia’s current road net-
economic and social sectors, such as trade, agricul- work well maintained would be on the order of several
ture, fisheries, health, and education. Improvements in million dollars. The current cost is therefore estimated to
the road network—both as connectivity for residents and lie in the range of $10–$100 million, given that climate con-
to facilitate regional trade—have the potential to pay div- ditions are only partially responsible for these costs. That
idends for national development, but will take many years is a conservative estimate, in that it only considers one
and billions of dollars of investment (World Bank 2022a). major class of infrastructure.
Climate change impacts on infrastructure threaten the

Map 3.17 Somalia’s ports entire economy, and particularly those who rely most
on trade. It also imposes unique burdens on the urban
poor; those living in informal settlements; and vulnerable
groups such as IDPs, women, children, the elderly and dis-
abled, and minority populations. In addition, poor housing
conditions can make the inhabitants more susceptible to
climate-linked health problems (Borg et al. 2021).
Climate drivers
Increases in the frequency and intensity of floods,
storms, and heatwaves, along with sea level rise, all
create risks of damage and disruption to urban, power,
and transport infrastructure. Mitigating the potential
Source: Bhattacharjee 2022. adverse impacts of these climate-linked factors will add
to the costs of infrastructure development.
D I SRUPT IO N O F ENERGY S U P P LY
  $  
Disruption of energy Whole country Chronic > $1 million Neutral Increasing

supply
Woodfuels remain the overwhelming source of domestic between 2,900 to 3,100 hours of sunlight per year (RCREEE
energy in Somalia. Electricity supply is fragmented and 2022)—which indicates excellent photovoltaic energy
extremely limited, based on mini- and micro-grids oper- potential (map 3.19).
ated by private sector energy service providers (ESPs).
Almost all of these are currently powered solely by diesel
generators (Aynte et al. 2022), but there are a few hybrid
Map 3.19 Somalia: photovoltaic power potential
mini-grid systems that combine diesel with wind and/or
solar power.12 Overall, there is great potential for Soma-
lia to develop renewable energy resources. More than 50
percent of Somalia has wind speeds greater than 6 m per
second, which are excellent for electric energy production
(map 3.18). In addition, Somalia has one of the highest daily
averages of total solar radiation in the world—averaging
Map 3.18 Somalia: mean windspeed at 50 m (m/s)
Source: Global Wind Atlas.
There are several current approaches to developing

Somalia’s energy sector. Chief among these are prioritiz-
ing renewables that are effective in terms of both reach
Source: Global Wind Atlas. and affordability, and expanding and connecting services
offered by existing ESPs,13 including opportunities to scale
12
NESCOM, a large ESP in Garowe, and BECO, a large ESP in Mogadishu,
are two examples of successful hybrid systems. Details of these experi-
ences are documented by Aynte et al. (2014). 13
See for example World Bank (2021c).
up hybrid systems that combine solar and wind power Magnitude of impact
with diesel generators (World Bank 2022a). Building a
Current economic costs resulting from climate-linked
national grid along with interconnectors from neighbor-
damage to power generation and transmission infra-
ing Kenya and Ethiopia, are also key priorities in Somalia’s
structure are low because there is so little infrastructure.
Power Master Plan. This would result in power imports
These costs will increase as the power sector develops,
based largely on hydropower, especially any sourced
expands, and is exposed to new risks (Sieber 2013). The
from Ethiopia.
investments required to upgrade Somalia’s power sup-
plies and ensure they are resilient to climate impacts
Nature of risk run to billions of dollars. It is important that investment,
even modest investment, take account of climate risks to
Climate hazards such as droughts, floods and storms
ensure the resilience of infrastructure to weather hazards
have the potential to damage energy infrastructure
and to keep emissions in check.
and disrupt energy supply. Direct lightning strikes or
creeping currents from lightning may damage electricity Only a small proportion of the population presently has
distribution equipment. Floods and high winds can cause access to electricity; in general terms, the poor have
breaks in transmission lines, and flooding can inundate the least access. This means that the impact of failures
substations. Renewable energy sources based on fresh- in power generation, transmission, and distribution have
water flows, wind, and solar are all directly dependent less adverse poverty impacts than they would in countries
on weather patterns. High temperatures can also reduce with a more developed power sector. Nevertheless, risks
the efficiency of thermal power plants and transformers. to poor households’ short-term electricity access are not
For example, a 1°C rise in ambient air temperatures may as severe.
reduce the thermal efficiency of a thermal power plant
by 0.1–0.5 percent, with a total capacity loss, including
decreasing efficiency of cooling processes and shut- Climate drivers
downs, of between 1.0–2.0 percent for each 1°C increase
The largest increase in risk will come from the increase
in air temperatures.
in assets exposed to climate impacts as power gener-
ation and supply systems are developed. The nature of
The current relevance of these risks to Somalia is low,
those systems will determine the precise nature of the
as there are currently no large thermal power plants,
risks, and therefore climate trends. However, increasing
and very limited distribution infrastructure or power
temperature, and increasing and concentrated rainfall
generation based on renewables. Nevertheless, as
and storms, will increase general disruption; and more
Somalia develops, it will need to rely increasingly on
sporadic rains and increased evaporative losses may
renewable power generation and extensive transmission
affect the reliability of hydropower production.
infrastructure.
DISRUPTION OF WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION SERVICES

  $   
Disruption of Whole country Chronic $10–$100 million 10–100 Strong Increasing

water supply
and sanitation
services
Nature of risk supplies. However, the potential groundwater resource

is largely unmapped. While there appears to be potential
Somalia has limited water resources. The Juba and Sha-
here, groundwater quantity and quality in the north of the
belle are the country ‘s only two permanent rivers and both
country is poor. A study in Puntland and Somaliland found
are important water resources for humans and livestock,
that across all aquifers, only 30 percent of groundwater
as well as for irrigation. In the arid north of the country,
samples were below the safe standards for consumption
all rivers are ephemeral, flowing for only short periods
(SWALIM 2012). In addition, extracting deep groundwa-
after rainfall events. Around 97 percent of available water
ter will be very expensive due to significant investment
is used for livestock and agriculture, leaving just 3 per-
requirements to successfully complete drilling in a place
cent for urban and domestic use. Most of the population,
where water is scarce and then pipe the water to where it
especially in the north, depends on groundwater (mainly
will be used (Godfrey, Hailemichael, and Seerle 2019).
shallow wells and boreholes) for domestic water supply,
livestock, and small-scale irrigation. Many of these water Water and sanitation services are underdeveloped in
sources are unprotected, poorly managed, and polluted Somalia. Only 56 percent of the population has access to
(World Bank 2020b). Rising temperatures and changes a basic water supply (figure 3.20). In addition, a lack of reg-
in runoff patterns—within Somalia and also upstream in ulation means that private water suppliers charge high
Ethiopia—are expected to influence the future yield of prices, forcing families to fetch water from far and from
both groundwater and shallow water (Gökçekuş, Kassem, unsafe open wells (UNICEF and WHO 2021). Women and
and Yusuf 2022) (table 3.12). girls sometimes risk physical or sexual assault at water
points, while the time spent collecting water also limits
The current drought has dried up strategic water
possibilities for both work and school. This affects not
sources, and a lack of accessible drinking water is a
only women and girls, but also communities and the wider
major driver of internal displacement, overwhelm-
economy.
ing national response capacities. By early 2022, up to
80 percent of water sources across the country were Increasingly frequent climate change-linked droughts
drying up, including the Shabelle and Juba Rivers whose will bring added stress to this sector. The effect of the
water levels were at times below historic minimum levels current drought provides an insight on the impact of
(UNICEF and WASH Cluster 2022). generalized drought conditions on water access and
availability. A recent survey, covering 15 of Somalia’s 18
Most groundwater is highly saline and well above the
regions, found that around 65 percent of households had
accepted standard for drinking water. Only around
no access to safe drinking water, with the current ongoing
26 percent of the country ‘s population has access to safe
drought being a major reason for this (SCS 2022) (box 3.3).
drinking water; in southern parts of the country, only
20 percent have access to clean drinking water (FAO 2018). Rural areas and IDP camps have high levels of open
defecation (figure 3.21). Poor hygiene practices create a
Some preliminary survey work has been done to
considerable risk for waterborne disease outbreaks, espe-
understand the potential to exploit deep groundwater
cially cholera, as well as the risk of transmission of other
Table 3.12 Potential climate impacts on water sector
Subsector Potential impact from climate and geophysical hazards
l Water flows can be altered by increased evapotranspiration or shifts in the amount and timing of stream flow
l Heavy rainfall events can reduce the effectiveness of erosion control measures in watersheds
Land use/water-
shed management l Surface runoff may increase in volume due to higher rainfall intensities and therefore enable the collection of more
water in shallow dams and local aquifers
l Rain-fed agriculture may turn less productive due to higher evaporation losses and less runoff infiltrating the soil surface
Dams and l Heavy precipitation can cause erosion and sedimentation to occur in waterways, reducing reservoir capacity
reservoirs l Strong winds can lead to the overtopping of dams and reservoirs
l High temperatures and drought can increase water demand for industrial use, cooling in energy generation, or irrigation
l Extreme precipitation can increase runoff and introduce new contaminants into the water supply, increasing the pol-
lutant load, while low water levels as a result of drought can lead to higher concentrations of contaminants
Water supply
l Droughts can reduce recharge to surface and groundwater supplies, requiring the development of new and additional
water sources
l Sea level rise can lead to salinization of coastal groundwater resources
l High temperatures may increase algal blooms and pathogens and decrease dissolved oxygen, necessitating enhanced
wastewater treatment
Wastewater
l Heavy rainfall events can cause sewers to overflow and can result in flooding in combined sewer systems
l Strong winds can disrupt electricity supply, affecting pumping and treatment systems
Sanitation l Extreme precipitation can inundate latrines and cause overflow
Riverine flood l Flash floods can damage the structural integrity of embankments and dikes
protection
l Increased rainfall variability in upstream Ethiopia may cause both more floods and worsening dry conditions in the
basins
Juba and Shabelle
l Irrigation infrastructure systems can be damaged
basin development
l Due to worsening water scarcity, upstream Ethiopian authorities may invest in new dams, irrigation schemes, and
urban supplies, and thus reduce downstream runoff to Somalia
Source: Based on World Bank, Climate and Disaster Risk Screening—Sector Screening Guidance Note: Water Sector.
Figure 3.20 Access to potable water for households in Somalia

60
2000 2017
50
40
30
20
10
0
Population Urbanization rate Basic access to Depend on Access piped
(millions) (%) potable water unimproved water (%)
(%) water points (%)
Source: Adapted from World Bank 2020b.
Figure 3.21 Proportion of households with access

Box 3.3 Recent findings on water access to basic hygiene and sanitation in Somalia
and availability across 15 regions
Proportion using latrines (%)
l About two in every three households were unable
to collect enough water to meet their needs. Practice open defecation (%)
l The average amount of water used was 9 liters/ Access to basic sanitation (%)
person/day, which is 50 percent less than
recommended. Urbanization rate (%)
l Fifty percent of households were relying on Population (m)

unsafe sources of drinking water, and only
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
11 percent were treating their drinking water
2017 2000
before consumption. This was lowest in Galmu-
dug and Jubaland. Source: Adapted from World Bank 2020b, based on UNICEF Joint Monitoring Pro-
gram, 2019.
l The regions most affected by water shortage
were: Mudug and Woqoyi Galbed (both with
95 percent of households), Gedo (80 percent of resource development schemes are not necessarily opti-
households), and Togdher and Bakool (both with mally designed and managed (World Bank 2020b). Weak
76 percent of households). technical and institutional capacity presents a major risk
to effectively meeting additional, climate-linked chal-
l Fourteen percent of households indicated that at
lenges to water resource development. As the country
least one episode and/or at least a case of either
urbanizes rapidly, it is important to ensure that any WASH
diarrhea, dysentery, or other water-related dis-
infrastructure investment takes account of future popu-
eases in their household. In Galmudug the figure
lation needs.
was 36 percent.
l The incidence of common waterborne dis-
eases in communities increased to an average of Magnitude of impact
45 percent (52 percent in Southern State).
By late 2022, around 6.4 million Somalis required either
l Thirteen percent of households reported chil- emergency or a longer-term sustainable water supply
dren experienced cough, diarrhea, or respiratory (WASH Cluster Somalia 2022). These numbers are not
illness in the previous three weeks. only linked to the current drought, but also due to dis-
Source: SCS 2022. placement caused by insecurity. This illustrates the scale
of needs and the level of vulnerability that any future cli-
mate shocks will exacerbate. The vast majority of those
gastrointestinal, viral, and vector-borne diseases (SIWI needing WASH assistance are IDPs and other poor
2019). Nevertheless, compared with other Sub-Saharan communities in urban settings. Women and girls are par-
African countries, Somalia has relatively high access to ticularly affected because they usually have the primary
improved sanitation for its level of GDP per capita (World responsibility for collecting and using water at the house-
Bank 2018). hold level.
At present, water sector governance is generally weak, There are no detailed data on the costs of inadequate
though reportedly better in Puntland and Somalil- water supply. A recent World Bank study in Tanza-
and. There are low coverage rates for drinking water, nia found the overall cost of inadequate WASH around
particularly in rural areas. Somalia also lacks techni- 3.5 percent of GDP, with a component of that being the
cal and institutional capacity to collect and use accurate labor cost of fetching water, equivalent to around 1.9 per-
and timely hydrological information. As a result, water cent of GDP (World Bank 2023). Assuming similar figures
apply to Somalia would imply a total cost on the order of Map 3.20 Juba–Shabelle river basin average
several tens of millions of dollars per year. annual rainfall
In 2016 (most recent World Bank data), the mortality

rate attributed to unsafe water sanitation was 86.2 per
100,000—the second-highest in Africa. Over 50 percent
of WASH-linked mortality is children under two years of
age (UNICEF 2022b). There has been some improvement
in access since then to at least basic sanitation services—
at around 32 percent as of 2020, which puts Somalia in the
middle range of African countries.14
Climate drivers
The vast majority of the flow in Somalia’s main rivers
comes from rainfall in Ethiopia (map 3.20, map 3.21).
As discussed above, although there is a high degree of

uncertainty around rainfall projections, it is likely that
both surface water shortages and periodic flooding
Source: UNEP 2010.
will become more common in future. Climate models for
both Somalia and Ethiopia suggest a likelihood of a slight
increase in mean precipitation, but a high level of uncer- Map 3.21 Juba–Shabelle river basin modeled
tainty (figure 3.22, figure 3.23). available runoff
14
Source: UNEP 2010.

Figure 3.22 Somalia: projected precipitation anomalies

a. SSP2-4.5 b. SSP5-8.5
100 125
75 100
75
50
50
25
mm
mm
25
0
0
-25
-25
-50 -50
-75 -75
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal.
Figure 3.23 Ethiopia: projected precipitation anomalies
a. SSP2-4.5 b. SSP5-8.5
125 125
100 100
75 75
50 50
mm
mm
25 25
0 0
-25 -25
-50 -50
-75 -75
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Source: World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal.

Chapter 4
Prioritizing Adaptation
Action
T his chapter recaps the overall findings
across different risks and links these to
the broader development agenda within
Somalia. Broad priorities and approaches for climate
action are identified in relation to policies and institu-
tions, physical investments, and knowledge.
may include international policy and market risks, as
well as direct risks from direct climate impacts within
the country.
General economic development tends to automatically

improve methods 2 and 3, while providing additional
resources for investment in and better targeting of
methods 1 and 2. Climate-resilient growth should pursue
all three methods to enhance the robustness and sus-
4.1 Adaptation and development tainability of economic development. In Somalia, growth
is an imperative in its own right and for climate adapta-
Climate adaptation in Somalia must be rooted in its tion; proactive and science-informed adaptation is also
development and growth trajectories. Low per capita an imperative for growth.
gross domestic product (GDP) and high rates of poverty
make economic development an overriding impera- The two major pillars of the Somali economy—foreign
tive that any climate adaptation program must support. transfers and agricultural and rural production—already
Conversely, climate impacts—not just on assets and pro- face sustainability challenges, and potential path-
duction systems currently in existence, but also on future ways for further growth and diversification will have
ones—must be considered to ensure growth pathways to be considered in light of climate risks. Consumption
are climate resilient. Broadly, there are three methods to exceeds GDP by 60 percent in Somalia, with the differ-
increase economic resilience to climate change: ence primarily funded by foreign transfers—both private
remittances from the diaspora and official development
1. Reduce the biophysical impacts of climate change assistance. The other major pillar of the economy is agri-
and extremes—for example, by building protective cultural and rural production, including crops, livestock,
structures to contain floodwaters or growing crop fisheries, and forest products. Although 70 percent of GDP
varieties that are more resilient to drought. is generated in cities and 74 percent of employment is
2. Moderate the socioeconomic consequences of non-agricultural—mostly from low-value service jobs—the
those impacts through provision of alternative liveli- economic injections and primary production that support
hood options (i.e., enhancing individual or community Somalia’s GDP are likely based on foreign transfers and
coping strategies), adaptive social safety nets, insur- agricultural production (Karamba 2021). Agricultural and
ance, or other types of assistance. rural production systems face significant sustainability
challenges from inadequate natural resource manage-
3. Diversify toward production systems and eco- ment and increasing climate pressures. Remittances will
nomic sectors that are inherently less vulnerable to likely decline as first-generation diaspora reach retire-
climate change, or at least where the impacts of cli- ment age. Official development assistance would also be
mate change can be more readily addressed. Note that
climate-related risks to different sources of growth
91
expected to play a decreasing role in the economy as the

country stabilizes and develops.
4.2 Decoupling climate and
conflict
Structural change is occurring rapidly in Somalia. The
country has one of the highest population and urban As discussed in chapter 2, climate impacts in Soma-
growth rates—2.9 percent and 4.2 percent, respectively, lia are deeply and intricately intertwined with social
in 2020—across Africa. A young population (about 70 per- fragility and conflict. Climate shocks have a severe
cent of Somalia’s population is under the age of 30) and impact on natural resources and rural livelihoods, and
fast-growing cities can be powerful catalysts for eco- these are directly linked to major crises of food insecu-
nomic growth and innovation, if the challenges these pose rity and displacement. Furthermore, the cycle between
for expanding service delivery can be met, and if security resource-based conflict, weak governance, and further
constraints and exogenous shocks can be ameliorated. resource degradation exacerbating the conflict is well
established in Somalia. Exploitation of natural resources
A number of potential sources of future economic growth has also funded armed groups. Climate therefore contrib-
and diversification have been identified in Somalia, but utes to social impacts and tensions, and reinforces and
these are also associated with differing climate risks: deepens various forms of social vulnerability, weak gov-
ernance, and conflict. Efforts to tackle the climate crisis
l Development of agriculture, livestock, and fisher-
must take into account, and respond to, climate’s role in
ies value chains has considerable potential, but these
the larger complex crisis in Somalia.
value chains are based on inherently climate-sensitive
production systems. Rural labor is also exposed to The first step to disrupting the linkages and breaking
risks of heat stress, and transport of rural products is vicious cycles between climate, social fragility, and con-
highly exposed to climate extremes. The Rural Access flict is to do no harm. Interventions undertaken to address
Index for Somalia is also low, transport costs from the one dimension of the problem must not exacerbate the
countryside to cities are high, and reliability is low due other; this can be ensured by employing social safeguards
to high climate vulnerability in the rural road network. tools informed by the social and political context. Care
l Transnational trade (the entrepot economy) is already must be taken to avoid security and stabilization oper-
significant. Much of it is likely informal, as evidenced by ations undermining livelihoods and the climate coping
the fact that transshipped gold is one of Somalia’s larg- capacity of local communities—for example, by blocking
est exports but is absent from official import figures. access to markets, banning certain livelihoods, or fueling
Somalia’s ports could play a much larger role in con- displacement. Peacebuilding and mediation need to be
necting Ethiopia and other East African countries to climate security–risk informed, including through appro-
markets in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, but will need priate social and climate screening (Broek and Hodder
climate-resilient infrastructure both at the ports and in 2022; Ginnetti and Franck 2014). Similarly, implementation
their connections to overland transportation modes. of climate adaptation measures can inadvertently create
new and additional pressure on natural resources such as
l Development of low-tech manufacturing industries land or water, entrench existing inequalities in access to
will increasingly have to accommodate international
natural resources, and thereby increase livelihood insecu-
supply chain standards, including green production
rity. In Somalia, these impacts have in the past reinforced
requirements. An urban manufacturing economy is
existing grievances and compounded to create conflict
also dependent on overcoming climate risks to human
risks, as occurred under the Barre regime’s Hawl iyo Han-
capital and the livability of urban centers.
tiwadaag (Program and Resource Sharing) policy. A key
l Potentials for offshore oil and gas production will have measure to avoid such outcomes is to ensure that women,
to navigate the fundamental changes international cli- youth, disadvantaged clans, and other vulnerable groups
mate policies will exact on prices and standards, as well have full and equitable representation in the adaptation
as ensure climate-resilient port facilities. planning process.
Chapter 4: Prioritizing Adaptation Action l 93
Wherever possible, win-win solutions should be iden-

tified to address both dimensions of risk in tandem,
4.3 Prioritizing risks and
so that climate adaption efforts are pro-peace, and adaptation options
peace and security interventions are pro-adaptation.
One major win-win area is through the implementation Table 4.1 provides a summary of the results of the review of
of sustainable livelihoods and natural resource manage- climate risks in chapter 3, in the form of semiquantitative
ment programs, which strengthen local institutions and metrics characterizing the risks.
social structures that help build social and climate resil-
ience. Addressing land and resource-based conflicts, and Most climate risks faced by Somalia are either
strengthening natural resource management systems high-frequency events or chronic (continual) pro-
through building the capacity of and trust in formal and cesses. This emphasizes the importance of considering
informal institutions, would help disrupt the vicious cycle changes in general climate conditions, not just climate
around natural resource–based conflict. An internationally extremes. However, in Somalia’s already extreme climate,
renowned example of a measure taken to target and dis- even the most severe extreme events—that is, floods and
rupt specific climate-conflict linkages is when the United droughts—occur with high frequency. Almost all climate
Nations Security Council enacted a charcoal export ban risks also affect the poor disproportionately. Most—cli-
from Somalia in 2012. This was intended to cut off a key mate disasters, all impacts on rural livelihoods, and heat
funding source for al-Shabaab, but reducing forest degra- stress—are strongly linked to poverty, due to the high reli-
dation also has climate mitigation and adaptation benefits. ance of the poor on rural livelihoods and outdoor labor, and
their inability to protect themselves from extreme events.
A second key area is to ameliorate Somalia’s inter- As discussed in chapter 2, climate impacts intersect with
nal displacement crisis. Addressing the vulnerability of a variety of other social risk factors, such as gender, age,
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and expanding youth clan, and displacement, to reinforce and worsen patterns
employment disrupt the linkage between social crises and of social vulnerability.
conflict. The importance of addressing displacement in
the context of extreme weather events has been increas- A large majority of climate risks in Somalia are likely to
ingly recognized in the humanitarian aid and disaster risk increase with climate change. However, in most cases,
community to break cycles between biophysical shocks the increase in the climate drivers may not be dramatic
and famine/displacement outcomes. In Somalia, this over the coming decades, and there is significant uncer-
would involve integrating disaster risk reduction, climate tainty due to the very wide range of potential rainfall
adaptation, and sustainable development with humani- outcomes. Over the medium term, for most of these risks,
tarian assistance, human rights, and refugee protection. increases in impacts are likely to be driven by increased
With an increasing amount of the population, including exposure due to population growth and increases in
IDPs, being food insecure, safety net programs such as assets more than by intensification of climate fac-
cash-for-food initiatives must be strengthened, and made tors. Some risks, though, are likely to see very dramatic
more adaptive through incorporating weather and disas- climate-driven increases, particularly those associated
ter forecasting. To this end, strengthening preparedness with heat stress.
(including early warning systems, contingency planning,
evacuation planning, and resilience-building strategies Currently, the most critical risks—those that already
and plans) and developing innovative approaches (such have massive human and economic impacts likely to
as anticipatory action) to avert, minimize, and address persist or worsen—are the major climate disasters:
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate drought and inland flooding. These have particularly
change are crucial (Thalheimer, Simperingham, and severe impacts on rural populations, driving much of the
Jjemba 2022). internal displacement crisis affecting Somalia. They have
wide-ranging social and economic consequences on
production and exports, food security, social vulnerabil-
ity and cohesion, and ultimately help entrench Somalia’s
Table 4.1 Summary table of Somalia’s climate risks with magnitude and trend measures
Risk Frequency Economic cost Mortality Poverty linkage Climate trend

Sector   $   
Drought 3 5 5 5 4
Climate disasters
Fluvial and pluvial floods 3 4 2 5 4
 
Coastal flooding 2 3 2 5 4
Locusts 1 4 5 4
Crop stress 5 3? 5 3
Agriculture and
livestock Agricultural pests & disease 2 3 5 3

Heat stress on livestock 5 4? 5 5
Fodder availability 5 4? 5 4
Livestock pests and disease 5 4 5 3
Natural resources Terrestrial ecosystems 5 2? 5 4
 Fisheries 5 2 4 4
Heat stress 5 3 3 5 5
Health
Vector-borne disease 5 3 5 4 3
 Gastrointestinal disease 5 3? 3 4 5
Infrastructure and Degradation of infrastructure 5 3? 3 4

services
Disruption of energy supply 5 1 3 3
 Disruption of water supply 5 3? 4 4
11 Rare 11 < $1 million 11 < 10 11 Very weak 11 Strong decrease

22 Occasional 22 $1–$10 million 22 10–100 22 Weak 22 Weak decrease
KEY:
33 Frequent 33 $10–$100 million 33 100–1,000 33 Neutral or 33 No clear trend
44 Routine 4 $100 million– 44 1,000–10,000) unclear 44 Weak increase
4 4
55 Chronic $1 billion 55 > 10,000 4 Strong 55 Strong increase
55 > $1 billion 55 Very strong
Note: Impact is figured per event, or per year for routine or chronic events, for economic cost and mortality. Frequency ranges from rare (multidecadal), to occasional
(once or twice a decade); to frequent (at least 50% of years); to routine (generally every year); to chronic (constant impact, not discrete acute events). Economic cost is
figured in $ and includes damage and losses; those that are particularly uncertain are denoted with a “?” Mortality is indicated if applicable. Poverty linkage is whether
impact disproportionately affects the poor, with a very weak link meaning the poor are much less affected than others, weak less affected, neutral affected similarly to
others, strong affected more, and very strong meaning the poor are much more affected than others. Climate trend reflects strength of expected change in climate
stressors influencing risk, as well as the strength of their influence on the risk (as most risks will be complex processes involving many drivers).
governance and conflict crises. Managing these risks is Heat stress is expected to increase dramatically with pro-
imperative to stabilizing the country and facilitating its jected increases in temperature and precipitation; this
development. The potential for rural production systems could significantly reduce labor productivity not only in
to contribute significantly to future growth will depend agriculture and other rural production systems, but also
on adaptation and climate-proofing of rural livelihoods. in construction and other forms of low-paid urban labor
Flooding has wider economic impacts because of its where workers have little access to cooling. Disruption of
effects on urban populations, infrastructure networks, infrastructure and key services will also be a major drag
and the delivery of key services. Flood resilience will be on the development of trade and urban economies if not
critical to managing the risks to all other potential growth tackled in the planning and design of public and private
sources, due to the risks flooding poses to both urban pro- infrastructure. Urban water supply could become a major
duction as well as to the movement and trade of goods. challenge in future, although much of the change will be
driven by the increase in population and demand rather
A second set of risks are currently significant and have than climate. Over the longer term, coastal flooding could
the potential to increase. Climate stress on crops and pose a significant constraint to trade and urban devel-
livestock will increasingly affect rural production, unless opment if not accounted for in port infrastructure and
a significant increase in rainfall is rapidly realized (a pos- vulnerable coastal cities.
sible, but unlikely outcome, which would require reversal
of recent rainfall trends). The viability of current pasto- The tables in the appendix summarize major climate
ralism systems, which provide for the majority of rural adaptation options relevant for Somalia across key sec-
production, may be increasingly threatened. Locust out- tors. Based on the information in those tables and the
breaks are also likely to increase in frequency. Stress discussion of risk categories above, the remainder of this
on other natural resource-based systems will intensify, chapter discuses some indicative areas of adaptation pri-
with fisheries particularly affected by rising sea tem- orities. At this level of analysis, the priorities remain very
peratures. Although the current contribution of fisheries broad and, given the wide range of important climate risks
to the Somali economy is modest, they have consider- Somalia faces, the lists of relevant measures are extensive.
able potential. Current health-related burdens will also be Most are already cited in Somalia’s Nationally Determined
exacerbated by climate change. Gastrointestinal disease Contribution. More detailed work on key sectors and risk
will significantly increase. The overall effects of changing will be needed to identify and prioritize specific inter-
climate conditions on vector-borne disease and crop and ventions and investment options, and to assess their
livestock pests and diseases are much harder to predict, economic, social, and environmental feasibility.
given the specific and complex ecologies involved; it is
almost certain, however, that some pests and pathogens
4.4 Policy and institutional

will be greatly boosted by climate change. Once again,
addressing increasing stresses on rural livelihoods will
be critical to the ability of agriculture, livestock, and fish- measures
eries to ameliorate rural poverty, improve food security,
improve the balance of trade, and contribute to over- As summarized in chapter 1, Somalia has already devel-
all economic growth. Human health impacts have a set oped a set of wide-ranging climate policies, but these
of implications for human capital that affect productivity mostly remain very high level, recognizing the impor-
and growth more broadly, particularly in relation to efforts tance of climate action and identifying broad areas
to industrialize the economy or develop higher-value ser- for action. Considerable work is still required to develop
vice sectors. policy frameworks that mandate or incentivize specific
priority actions and to build institutions capable of imple-
Another set of risks are not currently very prominent menting, enforcing, and monitoring these. Almost all
but have the potential to significantly disrupt future physical adaptation interventions will require policy and
development. Designing resilience to these risks into administrative measures to support their implementation,
future development plans and investments is critical.
including provision of climate-informed technical guide- leveraging and incentivizing private investments and
lines and standards, and capacity-building within risk sharing for climate-smart investments.
government agencies to implement or promote mea- l Establishing adaptive and predictable social safety
sures. Beyond these supporting measures, policy and nets. These safety nets should be targeted to poor
institutional actions are particularly important to (1) estab- and vulnerable households and communities, and
lish core resilience measures such as the mainstreaming be able to provide rapid additional assistance in the
of climate-informed planning and design, (2) facilitate or aftermath of a disaster. This latter objective would
incentivize private action, and (3) correct perverse incen- involve linkage to a well-maintained unified social
tives that promote greenhouse gas emissions or climate registry, a mobile-based cash payment system, and a
vulnerability. community-level network to support rapid outreach
and community mobilization for social protection ser-
To help reduce and manage the current critical impacts
vice delivery.
of extreme events, improve social resilience, and pro-
l Developing a National Disaster Risk Financing Strat-
vide a foundation for resilient growth, disaster risk
egy. This strategy should be based on feasibility studies
management is a key area for policy and institutional
for a range of potential disaster and climate risk financ-
development. To this end, the following actions should
ing mechanisms and tools, ranging from sovereign risk
be taken, many of which could be outlined in the National
financing to agricultural insurance products.
Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy that is being developed:
Resilience of rural livelihoods and natural resources can

l Strengthening the national disaster preparedness
also be promoted through a range of policy and insti-
and emergency response architecture. This could
tutional measures to address the considerable current
include, for example, establishment of a National
risks, and provide a basis for further growth of rural pro-
Emergency Operations Center, and decentralization
duction systems:
of similar structures to the state and district levels, to
support preparation for and coordination of disaster
l Improving extension support for climate-smart
response; and strengthening of hydromet and climate
agricultural diversification. Topics to be addressed
information systems, including early warning systems
include the selection of more resilient crops/varieties/
and tailored information services to support planning
breeds, their effective cultivation/husbandry, pest and
and resilience in key sectors.
disease control, and improved land and water man-
l Integrating disaster risk management into strategic agement techniques. Extension support and guidance
planning for key sectors. Sectors could include inte- also should be extended to marketing and value chains,
grated water resource management, agriculture and including digital agricultural services encompassing
land management, environment, and urban devel- agri-forecasts, climate-smart practices and market
opment, among others. This integration should be information and linkages; developing feed and fodder
complemented by climate-informed spatial planning, trade to assist pastoralists in the timing of livestock
including planning for resilience of key infrastructure sales; and improved postharvest handling, processing,
networks, resilient urban planning, and rural land use and storage to improve sanitary and quality standards
planning. (and therefore export markets).
l Establishing resilient construction standards and l Establishing policy frameworks and support to local
national building codes, to eventually be linked to spa- and community institutions for natural resource man-
tial planning and zoning systems. To further support agement and sustainable resource-based livelihoods.
public investment, climate-smart public investment This support should particularly be extended for enti-
management systems should be adopted, includ- ties involved in rangeland and fisheries management.
ing tools for screening and identifying climate risk in Topics to be covered include land and resource access
investment appraisal. Developing a public-private and tenure, and seasonal and technical regulations.
partnership regulatory framework could support
l Mainstreaming forest and biodiversity concerns in transport, power supply, and urban development), where
policy development and investment planning within the primary objective will rarely be climate focused, but
key sectors. This mainstreaming would be accom- climate resilience will need to be built in, in accordance
plished through environmental risk management with climate-informed planning and design specifica-
tools (including strategic environmental assessment tions as discussed above, typically at some significant
and environmental impact assessment) and land use incremental cost. In a few cases, retrofitting existing
planning. infrastructure may be required, but the high costs of ret-
l Establishing integrated water resource management rofitting and the limited existing infrastructure assets in
planning systems and institutions. These should be Somalia mean this would rarely be needed. Rather, infra-
established for farmer-led irrigation, flood control, soil structure resilience should predominantly be built into the
and water conservation, and the management of key construction of new, and the maintenance and replace-
river basins, among other areas. ment of existing, infrastructure.
Public health policies should begin to consider climate In all cases, detailed sectoral analyses, often involving
needs. Climate stresses may not revolutionize public modeling of climate impacts, will be needed to prioritize
health priorities, but will intensify or complicate pres- adaptation investment based on the following.
sures in a number of areas where the needs are already
l Urgency. Given the high degree of uncertainty around
significant, including the following:
medium and longer-term climate outcomes in Soma-
l Health and safety regulations for public buildings and lia, it will be important to prioritize responses to current
work spaces, particularly to manage risks of heat and immediate, rather than to uncertain future condi-
stress and floods tions. This becomes more complicated in the case of
infrastructure investments that have long economic
l Postdisaster emergency health provision (e.g., mobile life spans and/or may strongly influence patterns of
clinics, screening and prevention programs) in coor- future development and vulnerability over long peri-
dination with broader disaster response architecture ods. For instance, a road surface does not have a very
and institutions long life span, and therefore the choice of surface
l Vector control programs, including active control pro- material may be determined largely by current climate
grams, infrastructure standards, and public awareness conditions, but the choice of where to place a new road
or significantly upgrade an existing road may easily
l Public health awareness campaigns on heat stress;
have multidecadal implications on wider patterns of
water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); vector-borne
economic activity and spatial development. Various
disease; and postdisaster health and safety.
tools are available to support climate investment deci-
sion making under uncertainty.
l Synergy with development objectives. Given very lim-
4.5 Physical investments ited financial resources in relation to the scale of needs,
and the imperative to prioritize inclusive growth,
Many physical investments for climate adaptation will investments that bring clear benefits for sustainable
need to be undertaken by private individuals, such as development will need to be prioritized over those
farmers and property owners, and companies. The role that competing for resources. As noted at the start of
of the state would be primarily to provide appropriate cli- this chapter, national development planning should
mate information, technical guidance, incentives, and be informed by climate risks, and adaptation planning
regulatory requirements to facilitate them to act in their needs to be focused around key growth sectors.
own best interests, as per multiple areas of the policy
measures discussed above. The largest investments by Beyond building resilience into future public infrastruc-
the state will probably be in public infrastructure (e.g., ture in general, two areas of climate-related public
investment stand out with regard to priority risks faced by

Somalia. The first area is investment in water infrastruc-
4.6 Knowledge agenda
ture aimed at improving the security of water resource
Effective adaptation in Somalia will require considerable
availability and management across multiple sectors.
effort to generate and apply knowledge to overcome
Specific studies will be required to identify appropriate
data gaps and more fundamental uncertainty. There is,
locations and types of investment, as well as to under-
for instance, huge uncertainty about the current or future
stand downstream implications of the following:
economic costs of climate change—in many cases, even
at the order-of-magnitude level. At the same time, Soma-
l Water storage and irrigation infrastructure.
lia must make the most of its limited financial and human
Small-scale schemes, such as subsurface dams and
resources through strategic investment in knowledge
farmer-led irrigation are proving effective, but consid-
management. In particular, this will mean taking oppor-
eration might also be given to the viability of options for
tunities to develop knowledge partnerships whereby the
larger schemes as well.
country can leverage international science and research,
l Flood and drought-resilient WASH infrastructure. In
particularly in fundamental areas such as hydrometeo-
the longer run, the viability of desalination to supply
rological modeling and development of drought-tolerant
water to coastal cities may also need to be assessed.
crops and livestock, and focus on applied local research
l Flood defenses for critical locations. to support their application. It will also mean investing
in information access, provision of digital information
The second area is public investment in support of natural systems, and tailoring of knowledge products to spe-
resource management, including the following: cific audiences to equip civil society with the information
resources needed to address climate challenges.
l Soil and water conservation/agroforestry/rangeland
management. Most on-farm measures would primar- Analysis and knowledge management should accom-
ily be private actions, but public funding would still be pany all areas of adaptation to identify specific
needed to facilitate large-scale uptake of adaptation interventions, review their feasibility along multiple
measures by individual farmers. This would include dimensions, evaluate their performance, and share les-
public investment in (1) demonstration sites and exten- sons. Some critical areas of knowledge to support
sion services; (2) support to community institutions; (3) investments include (1) analysis of different types and
digital and physical market access infrastructure; and scales of water infrastructure investments under a range
(4) potentially large-scale subsidy, payment for envi- of scenarios to select optimal technical options and
ronmental service, or labor-intensive public works assess trade-offs between upstream and downstream
schemes. populations; and (2) integrating hazard mapping with spa-
l Sustainable rural energy provision. This would include tial infrastructure and urban planning to identify robust
training and support for switching to alternative energy strategies for development of key services. Beyond phys-
sources, efficient stoves, and regulation and manage- ical investments, there are a wide variety of risk finance
ment of woodfuel supply chains. approaches and tools that could support Somalia, from
l Protection and management of key natural habitats. sovereign risk pools or funds, through development of
This would include the establishment and management private insurance markets, to large-scale agri-insurance
of terrestrial and coastal protected areas, and active schemes. However, their financial feasibility needs to
restoration of critical habitats, such as protective for- be carefully evaluated in relation to the climate risk and
ests, nursery grounds, wetlands, key biodiversity areas, wider socioeconomic conditions in the country.
and ecological corridors (especially across altitudinal
For some climate risks, there is pronounced uncertainty
and climate gradients).
over their future extent and severity, which may demand
more basic research as well as monitoring of actual out-
comes. For instance, there is very limited understanding
of the risks posed by a variety of human, livestock, and higher than predicted), or harmful investments (e.g., a
crop diseases and pests. Linking models to monitoring water storage structure that is causing more losses to
systems would test and improve knowledge on the scale downstream users than local benefits). In the Soma-
and distribution of risks, as well as helping to improve lia context, the risk of externalities from insufficiently
forecasting and the tailoring of climate information ser- assessed investments exacerbating social tensions and
vices for early warning of major events, such as Rift Valley conflict is a very real concern. The time frame over which
fever or locust outbreaks. uncertainty in future climate outcomes needs to be con-
sidered also depends on the expected economic life of
Given deep uncertainty in future climate trajectories, as the investment involved. A decision on the type of sur-
well as their influence on certain biophysical outcomes, face material to apply to a road may only need to consider
the risk of maladaptation must be taken seriously in the likely climate conditions over a handful or years, but
Somalia. Accordingly, this risk must be incorporated into a decision as to where to site a new road or substantial
investment analytics through sensitivity analysis for a upgrade may need to consider the climate implications
range of climate outcomes, and/or by using other tools of long-term changes to patterns of spatial development
to support decision making under uncertainty. Maladap- that may result.
tation may involve suboptimal investments (e.g., a large
water storage project when smaller distributed struc-
tures would have been more cost-effective), ineffective
investment (e.g., a water storage structure no longer fit
for purpose because the rainfall is either much lower or
Appendix
Adaptation Options
Table A.1 Disaster risk management
Scale of Uncer- Development

Adaptation option (action) Who/where investment Timing tainty synergy Comment
Disaster risk management (DRM) strategy
National and l High cost because of scale of

regional gov- ongoing and future disasters
Refine and implement exist- ernments, l Uncertainty medium due
development > $1 billion Immediate Medium High to current dependence on
ing national DRM strategy
partners external support for imple-
mentation and limited
Nationwide national capacity
Adopt and include Drought National and

Cycle Management (DCM) regional gov- l Much experience in East
approach into DRM strategy ernments, Africa in practical application
and implementation, including development > $1 billion Immediate Low High of DCM that can be drawn on
integrating disaster con- partners l High cost because of scale of
tingency planning with DCM ongoing and future disasters
approach Nationwide
National and l Less reliant on external sup-

Strengthen government’s regional gov- port for both planning and
planning and delivery capac- ernments, delivery
development < $1 million Immediate Low High
ity for disaster preparedness l Cost reflects capacity build-
and response partners ing, not ongoing response
Nationwide costs
l Local/indigenous environ-
mental skills and knowledge
can provide a strong foun-
National and $1–$10 dation for community inputs
regional gov- million into DRM
Strengthen community-based ernments, (additional Immedi-
DRM capacity through training capacity- ate to < 5 Low High l DRM capacity build-
development
and capacity building building years ing and planning can be
partners
support integrated with broader
Nationwide only) community development/
livelihood-focused sup-
port; many development
co-benefits
(continued)
101
Table A.1 Disaster risk management (continued)

DRM strategy (continued)
l Policy/directive on wom-
en’s representation and
participation in DRM
system as civil service
l Ensuring effective inclusion
staff and in governance/ National and of women and other vulner-
decision-making bodies regional gov- able groups in DRM decision
l Policy/directive to ensure ernments, making
provision of maternal and development < $1 million Immediate Low High
l Ensuring provision of post-
reproductive health care, partners disaster essential services
menstrual hygiene man-
Nationwide includes specific support for
agement, psycho-social
women
support, and gender-based
violence response as
essential services within
the overall DRM framework
Climate information systems/hydromet and early warninga
l Increase investment in hard-

l Improve the provision of
ware, software, and skills to
hydromet services by build-
build Somalia’s capacity to
ing institutional capacity
manage these systems
to provide and effectively
share both general and National and l Reduce reliance on external
sector-specific hydromet regional gov- support
forecasts (short-term ernments, Immedi-
$10–$100 l Long-term investments
and long-range/seasonal) development ate to < 5 Medium High
million needed to maintain and
including early warning partners years
modernize systems over
systems (EWS) time; will fail without this
Nationwide
l Upgrade the national l Seasonal forecasts assist
hydromet monitoring farmers and herders plan
system, including data l Delayed forecasts are not
management capabilities
useful
l Government fully committed

National and and engaged
Establishment of National
regional gov- l Reduced ability of govern-
Emergency Operations Center $50–$100
ernments, Immediate Low High ment to effectively respond,
and National Disaster and million
development leading to high impacts on
Response Systems
partners vulnerable population and
assets
National and l EWS integrated into and

regional gov- informs all sectoral planning
Integrate EWS and DCM ernments,
< $1 million Immediate Low High l Cost reflects cost of inte-
approach development
grating EWS and DCM, not
partners
the cost of implementing
Nationwide disaster response activities
(continued)
Appendix: Adaptation Options l 103

Adaptive social safety nets (postdisaster assistance)
Humanitarian assistance to
National and meet immediate postdisas-
Focus Safety Net programs/ regional gov- ter needs (such as cash and
ernments, < $100 mil- Immedi-
initiatives on activities that food for work) can combine
development lion–$1 ate to < 5 Low High
build resilience to future with longer-term actions and
partners billion years
climate-linked disasters investments that build local
Nationwide assets, capacity, and skills that
improve resilience.
Policy/directive to develop National and

a scalable model for regional gov- Ensuring the needs of women
shock-responsive safety nets ernments, and other vulnerable groups
to offset postdisaster human development < $1 million Immediate Low High are explicitly addressed in
capital losses for women, partners design of postdisaster safety
girls and other designated net programs
vulnerable groups Nationwide
Disaster risk finance
Include a climate and disaster

risk financing (CDRF) strategy National Limited capacity to implement
< $1 million Immediate Medium High
as an integral component of government a CDRF strategy
DRM plans
l Establishing a National
Drought Fund is in National
Clarify realism of/opportuni- Drought Plan (2020) but no
National detail provided on financial
ties for establishing a National < $1 million Immediate Medium High
government structure
Drought Fund
l Reduce dependence on
donor finance for DRM
Strengthen government
capacity to take informed National govern- Needs continued robust anal-
$1–$10
decisions on disaster risk ment, development Immediate Medium High ysis/information to inform
million
finance, based on sound partners decisions
financial/actuarial analysis
(continued)

Disaster risk finance (continued)
l Large costs spread

across country; can be
cost-effective compared to
National govern-
cost of long-term, repeating
ment, development $100 Immedi- humanitarian response cost
Mitigate disaster risk partners, private million– ate to < 5 Medium High
sector l Agricultural insurance prod-
$1 billion years
ucts can reduce vulnerability
Nationwide of farmers and pastoralists
l Limited insurance options at
present
Sources: OCHA 2021 (DRM strategy); Oxfam, n.d. (drought cycle management); Hydromet Working Group (hydromet).
a. The Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) coordinates an EWS primarily focused on food security. It includes global weather hazard reports, based on the
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s global weather forecasts. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation’s (FAO’s) Somalia Water and
Land Information System project (SWALIM) has developed the Flood Risk and Response Management Information System (FRRMIS), which provides data to support an EWS.
In the past this has proved difficult to implement and costly. SWALIM monitors river breakages and supports a mobile phone–based alert and EWS known as DIGNIIN. While
far from perfect, these systems have been heralded as steps in the right direction, and access and use are continually refined and improved. In 2021, FAO and the govern-
ment of Somalia agreed on a process to transfer SWALIM capabilities to the government. In 2020, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management established
the Multi-Hazard Early Warning Centre (which covers floods and drought) in Mogadishu, using remotely sensed products and improved approaches to dissemination. In
recent years, the government has been working, with support from partners including the World Bank, to improve weather, climate, and water (hydromet) services, includ-
ing early warning services. Chaired by the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, the Hydromet Working Group—which also includes the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
and Disaster Management, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, and the Somalia Civil Aviation Authority—is working to establish a unified National Meteorological and
Hydrological Service.
Table A.2 Health

Surveillance, monitoring, and early warning
MOH, regional
Enhance disease early warn- governments,
ing systems and emergency develop-
response plans based on cli- ment partners, < $1 million Immediate Low
mate and environmental NGOs; support
data for conditions that may from MOECC l Higher investment figure
increase selected diseases
Nationwide represents maintain-
ing surveillance over the
Enhance surveillance and longer term
monitoring systems to track High
MOH l Uncertainty rated
climate-related disease occur- $1–$10 million medium, as incomplete
rence, including during and Nationwide
data can undermine sur-
after an extreme event Immedi-
veillance effectiveness
ate to < 5 Medium
Improve dialogue and col- years
laboration with neighboring
countries’ health ministries MOH < $1 million
to improve monitoring of
climate-linked health risks
Controlling climate-linked vectors and pathogens
Develop and maintain effective

vector surveillance and control l Higher investment figure
Immediate
programs that incorporate cli- MOH represents maintain-
mate change concerns $1–$10 million ing surveillance over the
Nationwide
longer term
Develop more/wider use of < 5 to
Low l Investment includes con-
rapid diagnostic tests < 10 years
tinuous training cycles
Consider possible impacts of High
Immedi- l Especially important
infrastructure development, MOH, MOPWR < $1 million to
ate to < 10 in densely populated
such as water storage tanks, on Nationwide $1–$10 million locations
years
vector-borne diseases
l Higher investment cost if
Increase vaccination rates for major changes to infra-
MOH $10–$100 < 5 to
RVF and other vector-borne Medium structure needed
Nationwide million < 10 years
diseases (where vaccines exist)
Strengthening public health information
Develop public information

systems that inform public of MOH
health risks and encourage < 5 years
appropriate behavior during an Nationwide
extreme event Targeted, clear public infor-
mation can reduce health
< $1 million Low High
Public health awareness cam- Central and impacts during and after
paigns for flood-related local govern- disasters
diseases, particularly in ments, NGOs Immediate
densely populated urban areas/ All major urban
informal settlements centers
(continued)
Table A.2 Health (continued)

Postdisaster health support
MOH, regional Guidance and directions

Ensuring safe water supplies
governments for technical teams restor-
in recovery from drought and < $1 million Immediate Low High
ing water supplies after a
floods Nationwide disaster
Provide clear guidance on

Cost reflects preparation
emergency health response MOH of guidelines and develop-
priorities and reestablishing < $1 million Immediate Low High
Nationwide ing and providing training for
functioning health centers after
health sector staff
a disaster
Source: Based on UNDP 2019.

Note: MOECC + Ministry of Environment and Climate Change; MOH = Ministry of Health; MOPWR = Ministry of Public Works and Reconstruction; NGO = nongovernmental orga-
nization; RVF = Rift Valley fever.
Table A.3 Agriculture and livestock

Water storage and irrigation
l Long-term support
Invest in soil and water con- required to cover large rural
servation infrastructure such MOA, NGOs, devel- Immediate to population
> $1 billion Low High
as terraces, subsurface dams, opment partners < 10 years l Can be integrated with sup-
and rainwater harvesting port for climate-smart
agriculture
Invest in upgrading and Irrigated agriculture is a key

MOA, development Immediate to
expanding irrigation in Juba > $1 billion Low High component to ensuring national
partners < 10 years
and Shabelle river basins food security
Incorporate requirement to
World Bank, gov-
enhance rainwater harvesting l Low cost
ernment of
through water ponds for both $1–$10
Somalia, private > 20 years Low High l Requires political goodwill
livestock and wildlife in large million
sector, develop- l Has high returns
linear infrastructure projects
ment partners
(e.g., roads, fiber-optic cables)
Climate-smart agriculture
Enhance agronomic manage- l Much experience in East

ment capacity of smallholder Africa (and globally) to draw
MOA, NGOs, devel- Immediate to on
farmers climate-smart/sus- > $1 billion Low High
opment partners < 10 years
tainable practices suited to l Long-term support needed to
changing weather patterns cover large rural population
Agricultural/livestock pests and diseases
Control desert locusts, tsetse, Imme-

Requires political commitment
RVF, armyworm, etc., through MOA, development $1–$10 diate (so
Low Medium to prioritize, even when no
scaled-up surveillance, moni- partners million ready when
locust threat
toring and control needed)
Uncertainty rated medium,

as monitoring effectiveness
largely depends on efficiency of
government vet and extension
Scale up pest and disease $1–$10
MOA Immediate Medium High service in general; inadequate/
monitoring capabilities million
late response or incorrect
advice can increase rather than
decrease vulnerability to pest/
disease outbreaks
Protect lives and livelihoods l Use similar delivery mech-

by prepositioning and deliver- anism to existing Food Aid
ing supplies to food-insecure $10–$100 operations
MOA Immediate Low High
households at risk of locust million
invasion, including planting l Integrate with rural develop-
and replanting packages ment programs
Prioritize risk management MOA, MOH Requires extensive public edu-

$1–$10 Immediate to
of Aflatoxin and fumonisin Cereal production Medium High cation and considerable staff
million < 5 years
exposure areas time
(continued)
Table A.3 Agriculture and livestock (continued)

Research and technology transfer (livestock)
Research and promote animal

breed diversification to
ensure availability of livestock
suited to climatic conditions
l Draw on existing research
New interventions, such as in countries with similar
modifications of diet compo- environments
MOA
sition, to increase livestock $10–$100 < 5 to l High cost to cover combined
Livestock produc- Medium High
feed intake and compensate million < 20 years research, breeding, and
for low feed consumption due tion areas dissemination
to heat stress l Limited capacity in-country
for advanced research
Evaluate the possibilities
for improving thermal toler-
ance of Somali livestock using
genetic tools
Research and technology transfer (crops)
New investments in plant

breeding in Somalia, and High cost to cover com-
$10–$100 < 5 to < 20
especially in cultivars that can MOA Medium High bined research, breeding and
million years
withstand high levels of heat dissemination
stress
Enhance agronomic knowl- l Long-term support

edge and management required to cover large rural
capacity of smallholder farm- MOA, NGOs, devel- population
ers to use climate-smart/ opment partners l Use participatory
sustainable practices, suited approaches for extension
to changing weather patterns Immediate to
> $1 billion Low High (e.g., Farmer Field Schools)
< 10 years
l Wealth of experience on par-
Include indigenous knowl- ticipatory approaches to
edge and participatory improving crop and farm
MOA, NGOs
approaches for crop research productivity that can be
and experimentation drawn on
Note: MOA = Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation; MOH = Ministry of Health; NGO = nongovernmental organization; RVF = Rift Valley fever.
Table A.4 Biodiversity and forests

Policy mainstreaming
l Integrating biodiversity with

Use social and environmen- action on climate change
tal impact studies to screen l Utilize indigenous knowledge
new policies that include MOECC < $1 to adapt to climate change
Immediate Low High
need for land use planning Nationwide million in forests and biodiversity
to ensure biodiversity and landscapes
climate change factors l Prioritize biodiversity
hotspots
Payments for ecosystems services (PES)
Opportunities to provide added

value to biodiverse areas,
Explore opportunities to
especially standing forests,
use PES to protect forests,
and provide compensation for
watersheds, and other
improved protection of forests
biodiverse areas
as carbon reserves by local
communities
Land use planning
Participatory l Costs here are just for plan-

catchment-level planning ning processes
to ensure pastoral access MOECC, MOA $1–$10 Immediate to l Maladaptation possible with-
Medium High
to water and pasture Pastoral areas million < 5 years out good technical support
resources available in forest l To include capacity building
ecosystems in Somalia for the Somali government
Develop conservation MOECC, MOA

$10–$100 < 5 years to < Can be integrated with other
corridors to connect Nationwide in Low High
million 20 years rural development programs
fragmented forest forest areas
Alternative natural resource-based livelihoods
MOA, NGOs, devel- l Can be integrated with other

Diversify livelihoods rural development programs
with community forest opment partners $10–$100 Immediate to
Medium High l Livelihood diversification
enterprises/nontimber Nationwide in million < 20 years
forest products can be challenging in a con-
forest areas strained economy
(continued)
Table A.4 Biodiversity and forests (continued)

Sustainable rural energy
Ministry of Energy l To reduce impact on forests

Investing in alternative and Minerals Immediate to l Major health co-benefits
energy, especially 5 Medium High
Nationwide, espe- < 10 years through reducing indoor air
renewables
cially urban areas pollution
l Uptake of fuel-efficient
stoves often very slow
Support switch to l Limited availability of LPG;
$10–$100 Immediate to storage and transport facili-
alternative sources and MOECC, NGOs Medium High
million < 10 years ties inadequate; high cost for
fuel-efficient stoves
poor households to use LPG
can be barrier to entry
l Developing regulations for

of supply chains is low cost;
enforcement is long term
Regulate and license wood $1–$10 and relatively expensive
and charcoal supply chains million l Existing vested interests in
(unregulated) supply chain
are often firmly entrenched
and politically powerful
Note: MOECC = Ministry of Environment and Climate Change; MOA = Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation; NGO = nongovernmental organization.
Table A.5 Fisheries

Regulate fisheries
l Government capacity to
License and enforce fishing negotiate fishing agree-
licenses for foreign-owned National ments very low
$10–$100 Immediate to
fishing boats in Somalia’s and regional High High l Capacity to enforce agree-
million < 5 years
coastal Exclusive Economic governments ments very low
Zone l High investment in fisheries
monitoring craft required
Improve management of coastal habitats
l Ministry of Envi-
ronment and
Climate Change l Limited mangroves in
Conserve and protect l Ministry of Fish- $1–$10 Somalia
< 5 years High Medium
mangroves eries and Marine million l Limited short-term develop-
Resources ment gains
Suitable coastal
habitats
l Improve conservation and

management of sensi- Ministry of Fish- l Limited capacity to effec-
tive coastal ecosystems, eries and Marine tively protect remote coastal
such as coral reefs and Resources $10–$100 < 5 to
High Medium ecosystems
seagrasses million > 10 years
Suitable coastal l Limited short-term develop-
l Identify, establish, and reg-
habitats ment gains
ulate marine protected
areas
Source: UNIDO 2021 (licenses).

Table A.6 Transport

Transport operations (road and air travel, road construction)
Shift construction schedules to cooler Private sector l MOTCA responsi-

parts of the day to address health and ble for policy and
Nationwide
safety concerns and avoid vehicle over- contract technical
heating and deterioration specification
l Regional govern-
Monitor stream bed flow and bridge scour MOTCA
ments responsible for
$1–$10
Integrate emergency evacuation proce- MOTCA, private Immediate Low High policy and specifica-
million
dures into standard operating procedures sector tion in some regions,
depending on political
Increase payload restrictions on aircraft MOTCA settlement
at high-altitude or hot-weather airports l Private sector respon-
sible for design and
managing construction
Retreat/relocate
l Plan for community relocation in Requires further,

coastal areas location-specific,
l Convert coastal land uses to establish < 5 to < 10 assessments of flood
Local and years risk from sea level rise
natural buffer zones national $100
million— Medium High (including cost effective-
governments ness and uncertainty)
> $1 billion
Coastal zones
Relocate roads and airport runways fur- Relocation very expen-
< 5 to > 20
ther inland sive, with high additional
years
social and political costs
Strengthen policies, planning, and systems
l Identify transportation-related devel-

opment goals important to the country,
community, or sector
l Identify inputs and enabling conditions
necessary to achieving transportation-
related development goals
l Integrate climate information into
system planning to assess climate
impacts on transportation infrastruc-
ture and understanding adaptation MOTCA, other Changes to policy and
ministries/ $1–$10
needs and economic implications planning are required to
departments as million to
l Improve coordination of policies and < 5 years Low High guide climate-resilient
appropriate $10–$100
programs across government agen- transport sector
million
cies to address additional pressures Nationwide investments
imposed by climate change
l Improve finance for transportation sys-
tems that are more adaptive and better
designed for a changing climate, includ-
ing through private sector investment
and incentives; ensure consideration of
climate risk in financing approaches
l Strengthen disaster planning/response
for transportation infrastructure/services
(continued)
Table A.6 Transport (continued)

Building capacity to manage a climate-smart transport sector
l Capacity building and training to help

prepare for and cope with hazards or
build longer-term resilience Capacity strengthen-
MOTCA $1–$10 ing required to support a
l Budgeting processes that account < 5 years Low High
Nationwide million climate resilient invest-
for additional maintenance costs to ment in transport sector
address increasing damages from
hazards
Urban transport infrastructure
Central and
Investment in roads and other transporta- local govern-
ments, private $10–$100 Immedi- Significant economic
tion options for both formal and informal
sector million to ate to < 10 Low High and sustainable devel-
settlements, with a focus on green
> $1 billion years opment co-benefits
infrastructure Initially, key
routes
Source: Based on World Bank, Climate and Disaster Risk Screening—Sector Screening Guidance Note: Transportation Sector.
Note: MOTCA = Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation.
Table A.7 Energy

Transmission and distribution (T&D)
Key threats:
l High temperatures can
Specify more effective cooling reduce electricity-carrying
measures/equipment for substa- capacity of lines
tions and transformers
l Can increase losses
within substations and
Energy service transformers
$10–$100 < 5 to < 10
providers, all T&D Medium High
million years
networks Key threat:
Reinforce existing T&D struc-
tures and build underground l Strong winds can damage
distribution systems T&D lines
Build redundancy into power

systems and increase decentral-
ization of power generation
Energy supply
l Investment requirement
Government and depends on specific energy
$10–$100 investment
Invest in clean energy and energy private sector < 5 to < 10
million to Low High
efficiency years l Significant co-benefits for
All urban centers > $1 billion
economic prosperity and
green growth
Renewable energy use
Policy/directive to expand use of

small-scale off-grid solar energy Ensuring the needs of women
(cooking, heating, lighting, and Government and other vulnerable groups
water extraction) solutions, and < $1 million Immediate Low High are explicitly addressed in
implement affirmative programs Nationwide renewable energy development
for women-owned businesses to and roll-out
transition into renewable energy
Source: Based on ADB 2012.

Table A.8 Cities/urban

Climate-resilient infrastructure
l Develop and implement Key threats:

higher structural design
standards for new or ren- l Cyclones, severe lightning,
Government and Imme-
ovated buildings and $10–$100 etc., can destroy power
private sector (all diate
infrastructure million to Medium High infrastructure and disrupt
sectors) to < 10
> $1 billion supplies and any offshore
l Utilize climate-resilient years
Nationwide activities
materials and designs that
account for a changing l Possible soil erosion and
climate damage to infrastructure
Relocation of storage yards Central and local

for buses and train cars governments
out of flood-prone areas to All major urban cen-
reduce risk of damage or ters with coastal or
loss of this equipment riverine flood risk
Urban design to mitigate heat island effect
Local government, l Requires space to plant trees

NGOs, private sector < 5 to l Often difficult to iden-
Increase tree and vegeta- $10–$100
< 10 Medium High tify suitable opportunities
tion cover All major urban million
years in informal settlements or
centers established built areas
l Scaling up requires individual

household action for con-
struction and maintenance
$10–$100 l Establishment cost may be
Install green roofs
million too high for poor households
l Requires robust roof con-
struction to bear weight of
soil and vegetation
$100 million–
$1 billion l Too costly for many poor
Local government, (assumes < 10 households
Install cool roofs NGOs, private sector grant to years l Limited supply of suitable
High Neutral
All major urban householders > 20 materials/coatings
centers to install) years
l Scaling up requires local

administration to plan/manage
l Hard to estimate net costs or
benefits based on tempera-
$10–$100 ture reduction alone
Install cool pavements
million l Greatest overall value when
multiple benefits (e.g.,
improved storm water man-
agement and water quality) are
included in evaluating impact
(continued)
Table A.8 Cities/urban (continued)

Urban design to mitigate heat island effect (continued)
l Adjust building codes

toward designs with better
cooling properties
Government and < 5 to Suitable technologies/designs
l Public information cam-
private sector < $1 million < 10 Low Moderate exist, including many low-cost
paigns to promote cool
buildings, as well as ways All urban centers years options.
of adapting existing build-
ings to provide cooler
environments
Storm water infrastructure
Short-term clearance/dis-
posal of solid waste from
drains to prevent clogging Local government < 1 million
(localized
planting) to l To be effective, clearance
$10–$100 mil- < 5 to needs to be sustained over
Investment in green infra- lion < 10 Medium High time
structure and ecosystem (large-scale years l Significant economic and
planning to improve natu- infrastruc- environmental co-benefits
Central and local
ral storm water function (e.g., ture or
governments
contour planting, terrac- afforestation)
ing, afforestation for erosion
control)
Buildings
l Retrofit of old buildings

and improved design of
new buildings (if resi-
dents remain in vulnerable Central and local
location) to address governments, pri- $10–$100 mil- < 5 to Requires political and
lower structural qual- vate sector lion to < 10 Medium High staff investment for sound
ity of homes in informal > $1 billion years enforcement
All major urban
settlements
centers
l Stricter risk disclosure
requirements for housing
developers
Relocation of key infrastructure and assets out of flood-prone areas
Relocation of commercial Central and local

activities (for example, ports governments, pri-
vate sector Short– Requires effective policies and
and industry, storage yards), $100 million–
medium Medium High planning processes to be in
located in flood risk areas All major urban $1 billion
term place
of coastal cities or in river centers with flood
floodplains risk
(continued)
Table A.8 Cities/urban (continued)

Coastal infrastructure
Central and local

Build sea walls or other governments, pri- Short–
structural investments to vate sector $100 million–
medium Low High
protect against coastal $1 billion
Coastal urban cen- term
flooding
ters with flood risk
Food security
Central and local l High priority due to current

Development of city-level governments, pri- $10–$100 mil- Imme- high levels of food insecurity
food storage infrastruc- vate sector, NGOs lion to $100 diate
Medium High l Low technical capacities can
ture and promotion of urban million–$1 to < 5
agriculture All major urban billion years undermine urban agriculture
centers initiatives
Source: World Bank 2011.

Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization.
Table A.9 Water and sanitation

Water infrastructure
l Major investments required.

Central l Immediate development and
Construction of water, sanitation, and local Imme-
health co-benefits
and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure governments diate
> $1 billion l Initial investments should focus
to ensure whole population has to < 10
access to safe water supplies National/ years on densely populated loca-
regional tions (urban/IDP camps), where
cost-effectiveness is highest
Central
Strengthening/relocating/realign- and local
ing pipes for aquifers, wastewater governments Short–
$10–$100 Requires effective planning pro-
treatment plants, and other infra- All major urban medium Low High
million cesses to be in place
structure in coastal areas or river centers with term
floodplains coastal or riv-
erine flood risk
Legal and regulations
Support regulation of the Xeer (cus- $1–$10

tomary water management laws) in million
a consultative manner that allows (including <5
Government Medium High
the regulator to act as a partner, ongoing years
facilitating reaching agreements support
that ensure safe water supplies over time)
Social, economic, and political factors
Strengthen institutional capacity of Government,

managing agency to appropriately development
partners <5
utilize/expand budget, increas- $10 million Low High
years
ing funds available for operations, National and
maintenance, and repairs regional
Ensuring women’s access to and Central and

decision-making power over com- local govern-
ments, NGOs $1–$10 Immedi-
peting water resources (e.g., Medium High
million ate
women’s participation in water National and
user associations) regional
Central and
Developing and enforcing urban local gov-
planning and zoning for slums and ernments,
development $1–$10 <5
refugee camps to provide water, Medium Medium
partners million years
wastewater, and sewage services
in the future Slums and ref-
ugee camps
(continued)
Table A.9 Water and sanitation (continued)

Solid waste management
Improved solid waste–handling Central and Requires significant political and

practices (e.g., proximity to drinking local govern- staff investment—without signif-
water supply, corrosive-resistant ments, private icant political support, elites may
$10–$100 Immedi-
containers) to prevent leakage sector High High capture planning processes for
million ate
and contamination, particularly in their own advantage and under-
densely populated urban areas/ All major urban mine potential environmental
informal settlements centers benefits
Source: Based on World Bank, Climate and Disaster Risk Screening—Sector Screening Guidance Note: Water Sector.
Note: IDP = internally displaced person.
Table A.10 Societal change and development

Policy coherence
Align all government policies to Federal policy must come

Federal < $10
address the challenges of cli- Immediate Low High together and aim for managing
government million
mate change climate change risks
Population growth
Engage and educate public lead- Federal and fed- l Sensitive issue, but societal
ers (community, faith, clan) in eral member state discussion is needed. Train
< $10
addressing linkages between governments, Immediate High High and engage, e.g., imams of
million
rapid population growth and development local mosques in long-term
future food and water security partners water and food security.
l Family norms are chang-
Through public leaders, sports
ing across the world, but not
and culture stars, and govern- Governments,
< $10 in Somalia. There are many
ment, address a key driver of national NGOs, Immediate High High
million reasons for this, one of which
today ‘s rapid growth: number of clan groups, etc.
is poverty. This change
children per man (today 10–12)
needs to start with men,
rather than women. Unlike
Governments, men, women want far fewer
Support women’s groups, inter- < $10 children (today 5-6). Build
national NGOs, Immediate High High
ests, opportunities, training, etc. million on this, promote women’s
clan groups, etc.
interests.
Conflict and reconciliation
Engage clan and faith leaders Conflicts are an outcome of

Government,
in training and understand the < $5 resource scarcity (land, water,
development Immediate Medium High
future and what challenges it million food) and thus directly linked to
partners
contains managing climate change
Research and studies
Domestic food production will

Initiate comprehensive studies Government, not increase much, implying a
< $3
on how Somalia can feed itself in development Immediate Low Medium dependency on imported food—
million
a difficult future. partners from where, how to pay, how to
distribute?
Initiate comprehensive studies National financial systems will

on finance, growth, and trade; a Government, be massively affected by cli-
< $3
key issue is how to boost export development Immediate Low Medium mate change. How, what,
million
and diaspora remittances to pay partners where, why? How to counter the
for imported food effects?
(continued)
Table A.10 Societal change and development (continued)

Education and training
l Develop a range of education

and training opportunities, l Range of training materials
and appropriate curricula that need to be developed is
covering climate risk and challenging; little exists at
response, with different present
content and format to suit l Further analysis required to
different stakeholders identify priority actions to
groups (e.g., policy makers, Government,
$10 mil- Immedi- develop feasible and afford-
business owners, graduates, national NGOs,
lion– $100 ate to <10 High High able training and education
undergraduates, community development
million years materials and opportunities
leaders, women, elderly, partners
l High level of investment
schoolchildren)
required to allow provi-
l Key sectoral areas: agricul- sion of suitable extensive,
ture, forests, ecosystems and nationwide training and edu-
biodiversity, water manage- cation opportunities over the
ment, health, disaster risk medium term
management, energy, waste
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization.

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Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii governance and conflict [linkages 4, 5, 6] . . . . . . . 30

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 2.4 Vulnerability and social risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Warbixin Kooban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv Clan dynamics and marginalized groups . . . . . . . . 31

C H APT ER 2: CLI M ATE 3.2 Agriculture and livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Climate impacts on natural resources and rural 3.4 Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

3.5 Infrastructure and services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 B OX E S , F IG U R E S , M AP S , AN D

C H APT ER 4: PRI ORI TI ZI N G 3.2 What are urban heat Islands? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

AP P ENDIX: A DA PTATI ON 1.4 Proportion of Somalis reporting experiencing

A.4 Biodiversity and forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 1.7 Projected mean temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A.5 Fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 1.8 Projected precipitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A.6 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 1.9 Somalia climate projections compared to current

3.7 Predicted areas of suitability for three tsetse fly Tables

3.12 Potential climate impacts on water sector . . . . . . . . . . 85

4.1 Summary of Somalia’s climate risks with magnitude

Climate risks will multiply

socioeconomic change by climate change. Gastrointestinal disease will signifi-

Risk Frequency Economic cost Mortality Poverty linkage Climate trend

Livestock pests and disease 5 4 5 3

Natural resources Terrestrial ecosystems 5 2? 5 4

Infrastructure and Degradation of infrastructure 5 3? 3 4

11 Rare 11 < $1 million 11 < 10 11 Very weak 11 Strong decrease

links to wider social fragility,

development Climate adaptation in Somalia must be rooted in efforts

Cayayaanka iyo cudurrada

Hantida Dabiiciga Terrestrial ecosystems 5 2? 5 4

Kaabayaasha Hoos u dhaca kaabayaasha 5 3? 3 4

Dhantaalanka bixiska biyaha

isbeddelka cimilada; iyo kala duduwnaanta beerashada iyo silsilo-qiimeedka

ildayashada waxyeellooyinkiisa gaar ahaan maamulidda dhulka daaqa iyo kalluumay-

for the marginal and climate-dependent livelihood sys-

future climate will be hotter, there is profound uncertainty

over future rainfall projections. 5°N GALGUDUUD 5°N

1.1 Geography and climate

Kismaayo REGION BOUNDARIES (PRE-WAR) SOMALIA

tral and southern parts of the country are well below

map do not imply, on the part of

1,000 masl, as the land descends gradually from the

foothills of the Ethiopian highlands to the Indian Ocean,

Baki SANAAG BARI

across extensive coastal lowlands. The northern part

The north is dominated by large desert zones, with

limited upland areas experiencing cooler and wetter cli-

mainly semi-arid, with some areas reaching semi-humid

fall is under 200 millimeters (mm) in much of the country,

but is significantly higher in the northern highlands and

0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers

3 0 50 100 150 Miles

40°E 45°E 50°E

Map 1.2 Somalia rainfall and temperature

a. Total annual rainfall b. Average temperature

Source: Original calculations based on TerraClimate.

Somalia’s biodiversity is generally arid-adapted and

Despite the limited potential, agriculture remains cen-

Map 1.4 Major climate and land use zones in Somalia

a. Climate zones b. Land use systems