ACEBEDO, FLORO Jr. G.

Persons and Family Law

JD 2 – A October 14, 2023

1. Psychological incapacity represents a conspicuous and dynamic jurisprudential

trend within the legal sphere of the Philippines, notably in Family Law. As enshrined in
Article 36 of the Family Code, psychological incapacity serves as a viable ground for the
annulment of marriages. The judicial system of the Philippines, over time, has grappled
with the definitional and interpretational aspects surrounding psychological incapacity,
culminating in a series of landmark decisions that have significantly molded the legal
landscape pertinent to this subject matter. The ensuing discourse delves into the pivotal
jurisprudential developments regarding psychological incapacity, as espoused in
Philippine legal cases, accentuating the progressive trajectory and ramifications thereof.

In the seminal legal case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, as cited in the case of Tongol v.
Tongol, a cornerstone ruling laid the groundwork for the jurisprudential premises
surrounding psychological incapacity. Justice Sempio-Diy cites, with approval the work
of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal
of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved. This judicial pronouncement unequivocally
posited that psychological incapacity must be typified by a profound and incurable
mental disorder, effectively incapacitating one spouse from discharging the requisite
marital obligations. Of paramount significance was the underscored prerequisite for the
introduction of expert testimonies in substantiating psychological incapacity, erecting a
formidable threshold for its establishment.

The pivotal legal precedent set forth in the landmark case of Republic of the Philippines
v. Molina, furnished guiding principles for the adjudication of cases involving
psychological incapacity. The Court proffered a set of criteria, encompassing the
imperative stipulation that the incapacity be of a grave nature and in existence at the
time of marriage. The eight (8) guidelines in interpreting and applying Article 36 of the
Family Code provided by the Court are the following:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;

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 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.

Furthermore, the decision accentuated that the incapacity in question must be

intrinsically incurable and predicated upon a mental disorder, eschewing the
classification of mere personality or mood disturbances. The avowed necessity of expert
testimony to buttress the assertion of psychological incapacity was unequivocally
entrenched.

However, in the landmark case of Tan-Andal v. Andal decided by the Supreme Court,
the Court categorically abandoned the Molina guidelines which required the medical or
clinical identification of the psychological incapacity or root cause, and that the same
must be sufficiently proven by experts. The Supreme Court emphasized that the
psychological incapacity is “neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that
must be proved through expert opinion”.

The Court further said that what must be proven is the durable or enduring aspects of a
person’s personality called “personality structure”, which manifests itself through clear
acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s personality structure
must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply
with his or her essential marital obligations. Expert testimony is not required to prove
these aspects of personality, and ordinary witnesses are sufficient as long as they have
been present in the pre-married life of the spouses and can testify as to the behaviors
that they have consistently observed from the incapacitated spouse.

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The Court, in this case, provided an interpretation of what truly constitutes
psychological incapacity:

1) The first Molina guideline reiterates the fundamental rule in evidence that one
who asserts a claim must prove it Specifically, in psychological incapacity cases,
it is the plaintiff-spouse who proves the existence of psychological incapacity.
2) In the second Molina guideline, parties to a nullity case are required to present
evidence of the root cause of the psychological incapacity. In particular, this root
cause must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts.
3) The third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. The psychological incapacity
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the medical, but
in the legal sense. This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent
with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the
couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic
that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable
breakdown of the marriage. It must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a
genuinely serious psychic cause.
4) Molina provides that the essential marital obligations are "those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. This is retained by the Court.
5) The persuasive effect of the decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines on nullity cases pending before
secular courts is also retained.

In summation, the jurisprudential trajectory pertaining to psychological incapacity in the

Philippines has undergone a metamorphosis, with the courts progressively heightening
the evidentiary threshold for the substantiation of a severe and incurable mental
disorder. While the sanctity of marriage remains a sacrosanct principle, the concept of
psychological incapacity has been refined to avert its misuse as an expeditious conduit
for the dissolution of marital bonds. In litigations involving this complex matter, it is
incumbent upon parties to seek counsel from legal professionals and mental health
experts, thereby ensuring the judicious application of the law. The notable
jurisprudential decisions alluded to in this treatise have collectively contributed to the
maturation and elucidation of the legal standards underpinning psychological incapacity
in the Philippines.

2. In the case of Candelario v. Candelario, decided by the First Division of the

Supreme Court, which resolved the sole issue whether the Family Code, particularly Art.
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36 thereof, can be retroactively applied to marriages that took place before its effectivity
on August 3, 1988, including that of Arthur and Marlene's marriage, which was
solemnized on June 11, 1984. Here, the Supreme Court reiterates the ruling that the
Family Code can be applied retroactively.

The Supreme Court's First Division, under the authorship of Justice Ramon Paul L.
Hernando, rendered a Decision denying the Petition for Review on Certiorari brought by
Arthur A. Candelario. The Court affirmed the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Jose, Antique.

In 2009, Candelario initiated proceedings before the RTC by filing a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He sought the annulment of his union with Marlene E.
Candelario, solemnized via a civil ceremony on June 11, 1984, on grounds of his
psychological incapacity to fulfill marital obligations, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.

The RTC dismissed Candelario's plea, reasoning that, although his psychological
incapacity had been established, the marriage could not be nullified under Article 36 of
the Family Code, as this law only took effect on August 3, 1988, while the marriage
transpired on June 11, 1984. The RTC maintained that the applicable law during the
marriage's celebration was the Civil Code, which lacked a provision akin to Article 36 of
the Family Code.

In addressing Candelario's case, the Supreme Court initially deliberated on the

applicability of the Family Code to Candelario's marriage.

The Court invoked Article 256 of the Family Code, which dictates that the Family Code
"shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

Hence, the Family Code expressly stipulates that the law, encompassing the concept of
psychological incapacity as a basis for marriage nullification, shall be retroactively
applicable, provided no vested or acquired rights under pertinent laws are prejudiced or
impaired, as underscored by the Court.

The Court also observed that Republic Act No. 8533 had repealed the initial text of
Article 39 of the Family Code, which differentiated between marriages solemnized
before and after the law's effect. Consequently, Article 39 now reads: "The action or
defense for the declaration of nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."

Upon an extensive examination of the law, it emerged that Article 36, enunciating that
psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations shall be a ground

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for marriage nullity, lacked any explicit prohibition against retroactive application to
marriages celebrated prior to the Family Code's enactment.

The Court maintained the fundamental principle of statutory construction: when the law
is unambiguous, courts should not introduce distinctions. In the absence of ambiguity,
the Court may not introduce exceptions or conditions for reasons of convenience, public
welfare, or any commendable objective. Nor may it impose qualifications not envisioned
by the law, the Court asserted.

Furthermore, the Court underscored that the records of the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee and previous decisions, such as Valdes v. RTC (1996); Chi
Ming Tsoi v. CA (1997); Republic v. Molina (1997); Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes (2010);
Suazo v. Suazo (2010); Marable v. Marable (2011); Republic v. Enclean (2013); and
Republic v. De Gracia (2014), substantiated the retroactive application of Article 36.

The Court additionally considered the comment submitted by the Office of the Solicitor
General, highlighting that an opposing stance discriminates against married couples
solely based on the timing of their unions. There exists no rationale to justify such
discrimination, as psychological disorders potentially afflict all individuals, irrespective of
their marriage date. The relevant inquiry should focus on the actual existence of
psychological incapacity, the Court emphasized. Consequently, the Court decreed that
Article 36 of the Family Code extends to Candelario's marriage.

Nevertheless, the Court declined Candelario's request to nullify his marriage, owing to
the absence of clear and compelling evidence demonstrating that his personality
disorder constituted psychological incapacity within the purview of Article 36 of the
Family Code, justifying the dissolution of his marital bond with Marlene. In this respect,
the Court asserted the imperative duty to safeguard the sanctity of their marriage, as
mandated by the Constitution.

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