SMALL UNIT

ACTIONS
France: 2d Ranger Battalion at Pointe du Hoe
Saipan: 27th Division on T anapag Plain
Italy: 3JISt Infantry at Santa Maria Infante
France: 4th Armored Division at Singling

American Forces in Action Series

Historical Division
WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
 Fascimilie Reprint, 1982, 1986, 1991

CMH Pub 100-14

Center of Military History

United States Army
Washington, DC

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.s. Government Printing Office

Washington. D.C. 2Q402

ii
 FOREWORD

In a nation at //Jar. teamwork by the whole people is necessary for victory.

But the issue is decided on the battlefield, toward which all national effort
leads. The country's fate lies in the hands of its soldier citizens; in the clash
of battle is found the final test of plans, training, equipment, and-above
all-the fighting spirit of tlnits mld individuals.

AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES presents detailed accounts

of particlllar com bat operations of United States forces . To the American
public, this record of high acllievement by men who served their nation well
is presented as a preface to the full military history of World War fl. To
the soldiers who took part in the operations concerned, these narratives
//Jill give the opportunity to see more clearly the results of orders
which they obeyed, and of sacrifices which they and their comrades
made, in performance of missions that find their meaning in the
outcome of a larger plan of battle.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Chief of Staff·

III
 WAR DEPARTMENT
Historical Division
Washington 25, D. C.
4 April 1946

Small Unit Actions. eleventh in the series of monographs on American operations in World
War Il, marks :1 departure from earlier numbers in that series. 1t presents, instead of a coor·
dina ted treatment of :1 larger operation, four detailed narratives dealing with small units w hich
took part in suc h operat ions. Each narrative has a unity of its own, but the actions dealt with
are sepa rate and distinct, relating to four campaigns in three main theaters of war.

There are several reasons that justify such a publication. The most important IS to give
both the military reader and the American public solid, uncolored material for a better under-
standing of the real nature o( modern banle. Military operations on the scale of this war if
treated, as they must usually be, in terms of arm ies and corps, can give only an outline account
of the fortunes of units smalle r than a battal ion, and very often the battalion is treated as the
small est counter in the moves described on a battlefield. This tends to be misleading; :l hatul-
ion has no such unity as a battleship, but is a complex organism that maneuvers ordinarily on
a front half a mile or more in width, includes a vari ety of specialized weapons, and ohen has
attachments of engineers or tanks to provide greater tactical flexibility. In jungle or hedgerow
coumry. the baualion frequently exists only as a mechanism to coordi nate, perhaps with the
greatest difficulty , the separate cngagcmems of companies, platoons, or even squads. When the
record (or the military history) sums up an action by saying, "The 3d Battalion fought its way
forward against heavy resistance for 500 yards," only the mall who has himself experie nced com-
bat is likely to realize what this can involve, and what the phrase conceals. It does not give the
story of the front line action as experienced by the combat soldier. That story, hardest of all
military operations to recapt ure and make clear, lies in detail such as that offered by the narea·
ti ves prese nted here.

A further reaso n for such a publication has been recognized in the past by American mili-
tary leaders, as by others. In training for modern war, particularly in armies largely officen:d in
lower units by men taken from civilian life, there is much need for concrete, case.history mate·
rial whi ch company and field·grade officers can use to find out what actually happens in battle.
Manuals must deal with doctrines and theory; their material is gene ralized. There has always
been need for factual supplement, to show how tactical doctrines, good and bad, actually work
under the stress of battle conditions. But military literature has tended to leave this field of
research to the novelists, and military records have not in the past been designed to furnish an
adequate basis for study of small-unit actions. Aher the First World War, the American Army
endeavored to collect such materials, and found them hard to get and difficult to eva luate. The
best were included in a useful and interesting volume, fn/a"ntry in Battle~ prepared under the
auspices of The Infant ry School, Fort Benning.

FreIn its inception in 1943, the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, had as
one of its aims the securi ng of sufficient data to support future work of this type. For obtain-
ing this data, as wel l as information at higher levels and on other phases of operations. the
Information and Historical Units, attached to field armies, conducted extensive interviews with
pe rsonnel of units engaged in typical, unusual, or critical actions. The interviews were accom·
panied by terrain study of the battlefield, sometimes conducted with members of the units being
interviewed. Every effort was made, by careful checking and rechecking, to obtain a full and
accurate :1ecount- not for the sake of a colorful sto ry, but to have a trustworthy record for

v
whatever use it afforded. Sometimes (as in the case of two at the actions publi shed here)
practicall y aU survivors of participat ing units were involved in group interv iews that might
last two or three days for a si ngle group. The sca le of the dTort is suggested by the fact that
some 2.000 indexed inter views have come back to the War Department archives irom one
theater.

The four narratives given here will serve as samples of the sauro: materials thus oht;lil1l;:d.
containing in ve ry large measure data which are not to he found in unit record s. Thl' latter
were used in every case, however, to check and sllpple:menl inlen·iews.

The actions chosen fo r this publi ca tio n illustra te widel y varyi ng tactical problcms :lnd
methods. Only one (Pointe du Hoe ) represents a highly speciali 7.ed fo rm of acti on; the others
are typica l of sco res of battles in their respecti ve theate rs of ope rat ions. ;\11 are :\\'cragt' in the:
sense that they are not "success" sto ries, but cross sections of a war whit'h irwolvcu rnc rses as
well as victories. This fact will be obscured in hi stories of ca mlxligns ~tn<.l maior b~lttlc s. tor. in
these, U.S. forces were alm ost uniformly successfu l. But thc larger successes we re won by anions
like those recorded here: in every phase of the wa r hattalion s and companies we nt throug h a
daily fare of experience that was never uniform , that nearly always included somt.' measure
of trial and even defeat as part of the fu ll er pattern which, o\'e r a longer pe riod. al.i<b l up to
victory.

The interviews for, and preparation of, the fo ur narrative:s shou ld ht: cre:Ji te:d as full ows:
Poin/(' du H o~, Hi stori cal Section. European Theater of Ope r:Hions: The Fight on Tunllpag
Plain, 1st Information and HistoriGl1 Service: Santa Maria Inlanlt', 7th Information and Hi s-
torical Se rvice (Fifth Army): Singling, 3d In fo rm ation :Itld Hi storical Sc: rvicc (Third Army).

Small Unit Actiom is based on the be.st mil itary reco rd s availahle: ..-\s far as possihk. names
and ranks of personnel we re checked wit h records in The Adjutant General's Office. HOSlcr of
the enlisted men who parti cipated in the Sanla Maria Infantt' Operation and Tht' Fight on
Tunapag Plain we re not accessible . It was impossihle to obtain full names of all men mentioned
in the ope ration s and to check last names, so it is expeclcd that some errors occu r in spell ing: of
names and in grad e desig nations.

Fivc photographs (pp. 9, 13.37,75.9 1) ar(: by Ihe U.S. Navy: Ih rcc (pp. 79. 87. 107) were laken by
the U.S. Marine Corps: dC\len (pp. I. 8. 10, 20. 32, 42. '19. 126. 130. 160. a12) arc from the U.S. Army Air
Forces: three (pp. 92. I DS. 109) are br the 1st In fo rmation and HiSlOril'al SCf\'ice; tWf l\lc (pp. 176. JlH. 1~2.
193. 194. 198. 199, 200. 202. 203 . 204, 2 10) w(:re taken b) the .\(1 In formalion and HislOrical s..:rvi(l': fnur
(pp. 11 6. 123. 142. 2 12) were taken by thc ,oinl In lelli~('ncc ('.nllt·c lin),! A),!cnq. All others were furni shed by
the U.S. Army Signa l Corps.

DISTRI I:I UTloN:

AC of 5(2); WDSS Di\l(2); WDGS(2): T ( Hist Scc)(20), ( I&:E Off)( I ): BaS(' Comd( I&:F. Off)( I ):
Def Comd(Hist Sec)(20)j FC( I&:E Off)( I ); Class III Insll s( I&:E Off)( I ): GH ca 25 beds(I): CH
ea 25 bcds(I): RH ea 25 bcds(l): SH ca 25 bros( I ): Sp 5\1 Sch 3- 6, R- II. 17(10).2.7(20): USMA
(80); A(I&E 011)(1 ): CHQ( I&F. 011)(1) ; D(I&E 011)( 1): R(I&E 011)(1 ): Sllo (l&E 011)(1).
T/O &: E: 1\- 5'50. (; H ca 25 beds(!): R- 5f'iO. SH ea 2') hcds(I) ; Special Distribution.

Refer to FM 2 1-6 for explanation of distribution form ul a.

AFA- ll

VI
 CONTENTS
Pag~
POINTE DU HOE (2D RANGER BA'TTALION, 6 JUNE (944)
Assault Pians 4
The Landing 5
The Cliff Assault 9
Capture of the Point 19
Advance to the Highway 26
Moming at the Point: Action on the Left Flank 34
Moming at the Point: The CP Group 36
Afternoon Counterattacks 43
The Advance Group During D Day 45
The German Night Attack: First Phase 48
Nigllt Attack: Second Phase 56
Night Attack: Finale 57

THE FIGHT ON TANAPAG PLAIN (27T H DIVISION, 6 JULY (944)

Background: Th e Attack on 5 July 69
Morn ing of 6 July : Attack on the Plain 74
Change in Attack PlallS 81
The Momin g Attack at H arakiri Gulell 86
The Afternoon Attack at H arakiri GlIlch 89
Afternoon: Plans for a New Attack (105th Infantry) 100
Advance of the I st Battalion (105 th Infantry) 102

SANTA MARIA INFANTE (351ST INFANTRY, ll - 14 MAY (944)

Task of the 351 st Infantry 119
The Night Attack: Jump-Off 128
Sergeant Pyenta's Group at H ill 103 13l
Lieutenant Panich's Group at Hill 103 132
Sergeant Eddy's Group at Hill 103 135
Advance to the Tame Road 137
Company E at The Spur: 1st Platoo11 143
Company E at The Spur: The Main Body 145
Company G is Stopped at The Spur 149
The 3d Battalion is Stopped at Hill I 03 ( 12May ) 151
Capture of Company F (12 Ma y) ... ...... ..... 154
Pians for Renewed Attack (13 Mav) 158
The Enemy Holds Out on The Spur ( 13 May ) ... ............ 161
Hill 103 Again Stops the 3d Battalion 163
1st Battalioll Gains at the S-Ridge 165
Capture of Sallta Maria Infante (14 May) 170

VII
 Page
SINGLING (4TH ARMORED DIVISION, 6 DECEMBER 1944)
Background of the Attack 179
A Change in Plan 183
The Infantry Attack 188
Stalemate in Singling 200
Relief 0/ Team B . 206
ANNEX: Abbreviations . 212

III ustrations
Pointe du Hoe Page
Poitlte det Hoe CliUs .. 1
Tip of Pointe du Hoe . 3
Western Half of Fortified Area ... 8
Bomb and Shell Holes.. . .. ............... . 9
Last Lap of the Climb .. 13
Cratered Ground . 17
Wrecked Emplacements 18
Wreckage on the Point . 19
Top of German OP Position 22
Ruins on Exit Road . 25
Farm Buildings on Exit Road 27
Lane Leading South . 31
Col. Rudder's CP .. 37
After Relief .. 41
Orchard South of Rangers' Position 47
Area of Highway Positions . 49
Typical Norman Orchard 53
Hedgerows . 60
Preparing to Leave the Point 61
Men of 2d and 5th Rangers 62
The Fight on Tanapag Plain
T anapag Plain . 71
Aerial Photo of Tanapag Plain Battle Zone 75
Infantry and Medium Tanks . 79
Paradise Valley . 87
Aerial Photo of Harakiri Gulch Sector .... 91
Capt. Lawrence J. O'Brien .. 92
A Pause in the Battle . 101
CP of the 1st Battalion, 105 th Infantry 103
The Ditch that Dorey Cleaned Up ... 104
VIII
 Page
Capt. Louis F. Ackerman . lOS
Cliff Walls .. 106
T I Sgt. Charles Gannaway .. 109
Santa Maria bifatlte
Terrain of Fifth Arm y's Battle 116
The Ob;ective of the 351st Infantry 121
Terrain of the [tlitial Attack 123
The Ridge Road . 124
Terrain of Opming Attack 126
Minturno . 128
Tame 141
Mitlturtlo-Santa Maria Itlfanle Ridge 142
The Bare Slopes of the S-Ridge 157
Terrain of Later Attacks, 13 May 1944 160
Satlta Maria Infante . 170
Returning to Ruined Homes 172
Panorama .... opposite page 175
Singlitlg
Church at Singlitlg . 176
Aerial View of Singlitlg ... 182
Enemy Sdf-propelled GU1lS .... 186
Sitlgling Main Square . 190
Garden 192
Main Street in Singling 193
View Northeast from Singling 194
Courtyard .. 198
Opm Yard . 199
Hauptman's Destroyed T ank 200
Fitzgerald's Firing Position 202
Mark V T a1l k . 203
Lt. Goble's Tank . 204
Sce1le Near Bitling .. 211

Maps
Pointe du Hoe
No. Page
1 Assault at Omaha Beach 2
2 Plan for Assault at Pointe du H oe 6
3 The Assault La1ldings at Pointe du Hoe 10
4 Advance to the Highway. 21
5 Morning Near the Point . 32

IX
 No. Page
6 Aftemoon Cou11Ierattacks 42
7 Highway Position, 0830-2000 61une 46
8 The Germa11 Night Attack, 6/7 IliIle 1944 50
The Fight 011 Tanapag Plaill
No.
V Amphibious Corps on Saipa11, Mornillg 5 luly 1944 66
2 27th Divisioll ZOl1e, Morn illg 5 lull' 1944 68
3 Night Positions, 5 lull' , 105th /11la11try 70
4 V Amphibious Corps, Mornil1g 6 Jttly 1944 72
5 105th Infantry Attack, M orniug 6 /lIl y 1944 74
6 The New Attack ZOlles 82
7 Harakiri Gulch 90
8 Final Attack all the Plaill 99
9 V Amphibious Corps, Night 01 Ballzai Attack, 6 7 Jllly 1944 11 2
Santa Mllt-itl Injante
No.
Fifth Arm)1 Objectives 118
2 Mt. Bracchi Hills, II May 1944 120
3 Plall 0/ Opening Attack, 351 st 111/alltry 122
4 2d Battalioll, 351 st Infalltr y 130
5 CompallY F, Sgt. Pyellta's Grollp at H ill . I 0.\ 132
6 Compa11Y F, Lt. Pallich's Group at Hill 103 133
7 CompallY F, S/ Sgt. Eddy's Group at Hill 103 136
8 CompallY F, Advance to the Tame Road 138
9 Company F, Position at the Culvert 140
10 Compa'IY E, I st and 2d PlatoOIlS at Th e Spur 143
11 Compall), E, 3d aud 4th Platoom at The Spllr 144
12 CompallY E, the Assauit of the Crest 146
13 Company G at The Spur. 148
14 Situatioll at Dawn, 12 May 1944 150
15 3d Battalion Attack all Hill 103 152
16 New Plall of Attack, 351st Ill/antry 156
17 The Attack on The Spur 161
18 The Attack all Hill 103 164
19 The Attack all the S-Ridge 166
20 The Elld of the Battle all Mt . Bracchi H ills 171

Singlillg
No.
I Third Army Fr.ont, 5 December 1944 178
24th Armored Division, Plall lor 6 December 1944 180
3 The Attack all Singling . 184
4 The Fight in the Village opposite page 21 2

x
SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

POINTE DU HOE
POINTE DU HOE CLIFFS before bombardment show as almost
vertical walls. Composiu photo, taken 1943, marks enemy gun positions .

xu
O n 6 June 1944 the V Corps of u.s. two were casemated, with further construc-
First Army assaulted German coastal de- tion work on casemates reported under way
fenses on a 6,OOO-yard stretch ("Omaha" in April and May. This oattery w.as one of
Beach) between Vierville and Coll ev ille. the most dangerous elements in the German
Their aim was to establish, on D Day, a coastal defenses of the assault area. With a
beachhead three to four miles deep extend- 2S,000-yard range, the I S5's could put fire
ing from the Drame River to the vicinity of on the approaches to Omaha Beach and on
Isigny. The attack was made by two divi- the transport area of V Corps; in addition
sions, the 1st and 29th , with strong attach- they could reach the transport area from
ments of armor and artillery. On their right which VII Corps, to the west, would unload
Rank, a separate mission of unusual difficulty for assault at the base of the Cotentin Penin-
was assigned to a special assault force (Map su la ("Utah" Beach).
No. I , page 2) . The position at Pointe du Hoe was
At Pointe du Hoe, four miles west of strongly protected from attack by sea. Be-
Omaha Beach, the Germans had constructed tween Grandcamp and the Omaha sector, the
a fortified position for a coastal battery of Rat Norman tableland terminates abruptly in
six 15S-mm howitzers of French make; rocky cliffs. At Pointe du Hoe, these are 85
four guns were in open emplacements and to 100 feet high , sheer to overhanging; be-

1
 \. ""'1$

ASSAULT AT OMAHA BEACH

(~ral P1an)
6 JIIII. 1944
[Ill.' ... _ n _ , '''u uJ/
., OM"" "."'J
• 5," III• • ,"" LUD aT YIl .... ~Ll
I. N.YUUTI ...... I. uN.

MAP NO. I

low them is a narrow strip of beach, without tack. Enemy troops at Pointe du Hoe were
the slightest cover for assaulting troops. estimated at 125 infantry and 85 artillery-
Aerial photographs indicated what was later men, included in the sector of enemy coastal
confirmed by French civilians: that the en- defenses, from the Vire to the Orne, held by
emy regarded the position as nearly impreg- the 716th Infantry Division . This unit con-
nable from seaward attack and were more tained a high percentage of non-German
<:oncerned with defending it against an en- troops, and was regarded as of limited fight-
emy coming from inland. The battery was ing value. Elements of the 726th Infantry
part of a seU-contained fortress area, mined Regiment held the sector from Vierville to
and wired on the landward side (Map No. Grandcamp, in which, because of the con-
2, page 6) . Its flanks were protected by two tinuous stretch of cliffs, coastal strongpoints
supporting smaller positions mounting ma- were widel y spaced. Those nearest Pointe du
chi ne guns and, on the west, an antiaircraft Hoe were one mile distant on the west and
gun . These positions were sited to put en- two miles to the east. The Germans ·had
filade fire on the beaches under the Point, made no preparations to defend this part of
and to aid its defe!lse against any inland at- the coast in depth. The 716th Division was

2
 °
stretched thinly along 3 miles of shore; be-
hind it, but believed 10 to 12 hours away, the
by H + 30, of success in the attack on the
cliffs at Pointe du Hoe. In this event, the
352d Infantry Di()ision in the St-LO--Cau- larger Ranger force would land on the west-
mont area was the nearest mobile reserve. ern end of Omaha Beach (Vierville sector)
The Ranger Group, attached to the behind the I I 6th Infantry and proceed over-
I 16th Infantry and commanded by Lt. Col. land toward the Point, avoiding all unneces-
James E. Rudder, was given the mission of sary action en route to its objective.
capturing Pointe du Hoe and neutralizing Cumpany C, 2d Rangers, had a separate
the dangerous German coastal battery. The mission of its own a t Omaha Beach. It was
Group was made up of two battalions: the ordered to land with the first assault wave
2d Rangers, under direct command of Colo- of the I I 6th and knock out German strong-
nel Rudder, and the 5th Rangers, under Lt. points near Pointe de la Percee, immediately
Col. Max F. Schneider. Three companies flanking the Omaha landing beaches.
(D, E, and F) of the 2d Battalion were to Special attention was given the Pointe
land from the sea at H Hour and assault the d u Hoe battery in the preparatory air and
cliff position at Pointe du Hoe. The main naval bombardments. As early as 15 April,
Ranger force (5 th Battalion and Companies medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force had
A and B of the 2d) would wait off shore for begun attacks to soften up the position and
signal of success, then land at the Point. The to slow enemy efforts to construct further
Ranger Group would then move inland, cut casemates. In order not to tip off the invasion
the coastal highway connecting Grandcamp plans, these early attacks could not be made
and Vierville, and await the arrival of the too often and were combined with wide-
I 16th Infantry from Vierville before push- ranging missions directed at other points on
ing west toward Grandcamp and Maisy. the French coast from Brittany to Belgium.
An alternate plan was ready if the sup- On 22 May and 4 June, Ninth Air Force
port force of Rangers had not received word, bombers struck again, and on the night of
TIP OF POINTE DU HOE. Photo tak .. from ,as! sid, (1945).

3
5/ 6 June RAF heavies included the Point in Ten LCA's would be sufficient to boat
a major attack on batteries along the whole the three small Ranger companies and head-
invasion coast. Naval bombardment of the quarters party, including signal and medical
Omaha sector and its Hanks began at 0550 personnel, with an average of 21-22 men on
on 6 June; particular attention, especially by a craft. Each LCA was fitted with three pairs
the main batteries of the battleship Texas of rocket mounts, at bow, amid ship, and
(14-inch guns), was paid to Pointe du Hoe stern, wired so that they could be fired in
in this fire. At H - 20 minutes (0610), 18 series of pairs from one control point at the
medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force stern. Plain %-inch ropes were carried by
made a last strike on the Point. one pair of rockets, affixed to the rocket's
At H Hour, 0630, the three companies base by a connecting wire. A second pair was
of the 2d Rangers, led by Colonel Rudder, rigged for rope of the same size fitted with
were scheduled to touch down at the foot of toggles, small wooden crossbars a few inches
the cliffs and deliver their assault. They ta- long inserted at about one-foot intervals (see
taled about 225 men,' including a headquar- illustration, page I 3); the third pair of rock-
ters detachment. ets was attached to light rope ladders with
rungs every two feet. The rockets were
headed by grapnels. The rope or ladder for
Assamt Plans
each rocket was coiled in a box directly be-
The three companies sele"t~cl for the hind the rocket mount. Each craft carried,
mission at Pninte du Hoe had received inten- in addition to the six mounted rockets, a
sive training and had developed special equip- pair of small, hand-projector-type rockets at-
ment for the operation. During April and tached to plain ropes. These could be easily
May, at Swanage on the Isle of Wight. the carried ashore if necessary.
personnel had been condi tioned by hard prac- Extension ladders were of two types.
tice in rope and ladder work on cliffs like One, carried by each LCA, consisted of I 12
those of the French coast, combined with feet of tubular -steel, 4-foot sections weighing
landing exercises in difficult waters. Person- 4 pounds each; these ladders were partly as-
nel of British Commando units gave all pos- sembled in advance in 16-foot lengths. For
sible help, based on their experience in coastal mou nting the whole ladder in escalade work,
raids. As a result of experiment with all types a man would climb to the top of a leng th,
of equipment for escalade, main reliance was haul up and attach the next 16-foot section,
placed on ropes to be carried over the cliff and repeat this process until the necessary
tops by rockets; in addition, the assault wave height was reached. As a final auxiliary for
would take along extension ladders. British climbing, four dukws would come in close
landing craft (LCA's) with British crews behind the first wave, each carrying a 100-
were used both in the training and in the foot extension ladder, fire-depart men t type,
actual operation. with three folding sections. Two Lewis ma-
1 The Ranger companies avc:raged 65 men. chine guns were mounted at the top of each

4
of these ladders, which would be particularly to strengthen the foothold won by the initial
useful for getting up supplies. assault.
Speed was essential for this operation, As a final feature of the plans, fire su p-
and the small assault force was equipped for port after the landing would be available on
shock action of limited duration, with a call from supporting naval craft and from ar-
minimum load of supplies and weapons. tillery landing after 0800 near Vierville. A
Dressed in fatigue uniform, each Ranger car- Naval Shore Fire Control Party (12 men )
ried a D- bar for rations, two grenades, and and a forward observer of the 58th Armored
his weapon, normally the M-I rifle. A few Field Artillery Battalion were attached to
of the men selected for going first up the Colonel Rudder's headquarters, which was
ropes carried pistols or carbines. Heavier distributed among the four LCA's carrying
weapons were limited to four BAR's and two Company E.
light mortars per company. T en thermite
grenades, for demolition, were distributed The Landing
within each company. Two supply boats
(LCA's) would come in a few minutes after D-Day weather was unfavorable for a
the assault wave, with packs, extra rations landing assault, with rough seas that im-
and ammunition, two 8 1-mm mortars, dem- periled small landing craft during their ap-
olitions, and equipment for hauling supplies proach to the beaches. Early visibility along
up the cliff. the coast was poor, and an eastward-setting
The tactical plan provided for Compa- tidal current helped to produce errors in navi-
nies E and F to assau lt on the east side of the gation. The results, on the Omaha Beach
Point, and Company D on the west (Map sectors, were delays in reaching shore and
No.2, page 6). On reaching the cliff top, enough mislanding of assault craft to inter-
each boat team had a series of specific objec- fere seriously with the early schedule for the
tives, beginning with the gun emplacements attack. The Ranger force did not escape these
and other fortifications on the Point. With difficulties.
these first objectives taken, most of the force Shortly after leaving their transports
was to push out immediately to the south, (the LSI's Ben Machree and Amsterdam),
reach the coastal highway which was a main the craft began to suffer from the results of
communications lateral for German defenses the heavy going.' Eight miles from shore
of the Grandcamp-Vierville coast, and hold LCA 860 , carrying Capt. Harold K. Slater
a position controlling that road to the west and 20 men of Company D, swamped in the
until the arrival of the 1 16th Infantry from 4-foot choppy waves. The personnel were
Vierville. If the assault at Omaha went ac- picked up by rescue craft and carried to
cording to schedule, the 116th would be at England, eventually to rej oin their unit on
Pointe du Hoe before noon. Long before 1 The LeA's had ~ n designed with shallow draft and for

then, the main body of Rangers (eight com- rdativd )· slow slXcds; under D-Day conditions they proved less
seaworthy than the LCVP's. although their draft IXrmitted them to
panies) should have followed in at the Point make drier landing.

5
 PLAN FOR ASSAUII If.r POINTE DU HOE
2d RANGERS BATTAUON
6 JUNE 1944

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MAP NO.2

6
D+ 19. Ten minutes later one of the supply no message or signal had come, Colonel
craft sank, with onl y one survivor. The other Schneider's force was scheduled to adopt the
supply craft was soon in trouble and had to alternate plan of action and land at the Vier-
jettison all the packs of Companies D and E ville beach. They waited ten minutes beyond
in order to stay afloat. The other craft sur- the time limit and then received by radio the
vived, with varying degrees of trouble; sev- code word TILT, prearranged signal to fol -
eral shipped so much water that the men had low the alternative plan. So Colonel Schneider
to bail with their helmets to help the pumps. turned in toward Vierville, where the 5 th
From the start, all the Rangers were soaked Rangers and A and B of the 2d landed at
with spray. In one respect they enjoyed ex- 0745. Pending the outcome at Omaha Beach,
ceptional luck: there were very few cases of and the success of Colonel Schneider's force
seasickness, in contrast to the general record in fighting cross country to the Point, Colonel
at Omaha. D espite being wet, cold, and Rudder's three companies would fight alone.
cramped by the three-hour trip, personnel of The error in direction had further con-
the three Ranger companies reached the sequences. The correction headed Colonel
shore in good shape for immediate and stren- Rudder's column of LCA's back toward
uous action. The most serious effect of the Pointe du Hoe, but now on a westerly course,
wetting was to soak the climbing ropes and roughly paralleling the cliffs and only :1 few
rope ladders, making them heavier. hundred yards offshore. The flotilla thus had
The leading group of nine surv iving to run the gauntlet of fire from German
LCA's kept good formation , in a double col- strongpoints along three miles of coast. For-
umn ready to fan out as they neared shore. tunatel y these were few, and their fire was
Unfortunately, the guide craft lost its bear- wild and intermittent. The only serious casu-
ings as the coast line came in sight, and alty was a dukw, hit by 20-mm fire as it
headed straigh t for Pointe de la Percce, three neared the target area. Five of the nine men
miles east of the target. When Colonel Rud- aboard were killed or wounded.
der, in the lead LCA, realized the error he The plan for landings had to be changed
intervened and turned the column westward. as a result of the misdirected approach. Since
But the damage had been done. The mistake the column of LCA's was now coming at the
cost more than 30 minutes in reaching Pointe Point from east instead of north , Company
du Hoe; instead of landing at H H our, the D's craft would not be able to swing out of
first Ranger craft touched down about column and reach the west side of the prom-
+
H 3 8, a delay that determined the whole ontory in time to assault with the other units.
course of action at the Point for the next two Therefore, to effect synchronized attack, the
days. The main Ranger flotilla, eight com- nine assault craft deployed and ca me in on
panies strong, was following in from the line together at the east side (Map No. 3).
transports, watching anxiously for the signal A final result of th e delay was apparent
of success at Pointe du Hoe (two successive as they reached the goal. Naval fire had
flares shot by 60-ml11 mortars). By 0700, if halted just before H Hour, and the enemy on

7
 WESTERN HALF OF FORTIFIED AREA. photographed ;"
February 1943 by aerial J"uonn aiuance. The larm lane inland is tht·
route' followed by Company F group to reach the highway on D Day.

Pointe du Hoe had 40 minutes to recover British destroyer Talybont, which had taken
from the effects of the bombardment. As the part in the early bombardment of Pointe du
LCA's neared the Point, they received scat- Hoe at range of 2.7 miles, saw the flotilla
tered small-arms and automatic fire, and en- heading in on a wrong course, and found it
emy troops were observed moving near the difficult to understand, "as Texas' fall of shot
edge of the cliff. There was, however, no in- on Pointe du Hoe was obvious." As the Rang-
dication of artillery in action from the enemy ers corrected course and came under fire from
positions. the cliff positions, the Talybont closed range
At 0710, as the first craft were ground- and for 15 minutes (0645-0700) raked en-
ing under the cliffs, radio silence was broken emy firing positions with 4-inch and 2-
to send Colonel Schneider the order for land- pounder shells. Meantime, the U .S. de-
ing at Vierville. The message was acknowl- stroyer Satterlee, 2,500 yards from Pointe du
edged. Hoe, could see enemy troops assembling on
The small assault force was not entirely the cliff, and opened with main battery and
alone as it came in to a hostile shore. The machine-gun fire.

8
 lems were similar. The 30-yard strip of
The Cliff Assault
beach between water and cliff had been com-
The nine LeA's touched down on a pletel y cratered by bombs. The craters were
front of abou t 500 yards, the right-hand to handicap the unloading of men and sup-
craft just un der the tip of Pointe du H oe, and plies and were to render the dukws useless
the others spaced fair! y evenl y. No great di s- after landing, for these craft were nowhere
tance separated some of the boat teams, bu t able to cross the sand and get close enough to
accordin g to plan th ey went into action as the cliff to reach it with their extension lad-
separate units, each facing its particular prob- ders. The cliff face showed extensive marks
lems of escalade and opposition. of the naval and air bombardment; huge
In certain general respects, their prob- chun ks of the top had been torn out, forming

BOMB AND SHELL H OLES ;n the narrolU SI"·p 0/ rock y

b~ach, at th~ /00/ 0/ th e cliOs, slowed the Rangus in getting to
th e ,hater o/the chO' alter land;ng. Th;, photo, taken on D + J,
shows a boat bringing in first iupplies for the hdeaguered Rangers .

9
talus mounds at the base. A few gre nades the cliff the Rangers were better off, for the
were thrown down or rolled over the edge piles of debris gave partial defilade from the
as the first Rangers crossed the sand, and en- flanking fires, and the enemy directly above
emy small-arms fire came from scattered would have to expose themselves in order to
points along the cliff edge. Particular! y dan- place observed fire or to aim their grenades.
gerous was enfilade fire , including automatic 1 aval support came to the aid of the
weapons, from the German position on the Rangers at this critical moment. The de-
left flank of the beach. Once at the foot of stroyer Satterlee watched the craft reach

.HAP .VO. ~ - Th (' Assault LondinCJ ((/ Poin/(' du /-I oc

10
shore, and saw the enemy fir ing trom the teams will be given in order trol11 right to
cliff above. The Satterlee il11mediatdy took left, roughly the order of lan ding.
the cliff tops under fire trom its 5-in ch guns
and 40 -mm machine guns. Fire control was LeA 861. Ca rrying a boat team of Com-
excdknt, despite atte mpts ot enemy !113chine pany E, commanded by 1st Lt. Theodore E .
gun s and a heavier gun to counter the de- Lapres, Jr. , this craft grounded about 25
stroyer's effort. Comdr. J. W. Marshall , com- yards from the bottom of the cliff. Three or
mandi ng th e Satterlee, believed thi s fire was four Germans were standing on the cliff
dec isive in enabling the Rangers to get up the edge, shooting down at the craft. Rangers
cliff. H owever, hi s impress ion that the as- ncar the ste rn took th ese enemy under fire
sault torce "was pinned under the cliff and and drove them out of sight. At the instant
being rapidly cu t to pieces by enemy fire" is at touchdow n the rear pair of rockets was
not conlinned by the speed with which the fired, then the other two pairs in succession.
escalade gOt under way, or by other details All the ropes fe ll short of the cl iff edge, as a
ot th e landin g. Cu ri ously enough, onl y three result of being thoroughly soaked. In so me
or tour men out ot 120 sur vivors interviewed cases not more than half the length of rope or
reme mbered noticing nava l fire after touch- ladder was lifted from the co ntaining box.
down . One ot th ese was Colonel Rudder, As th e Rangers crossed the strip of cra-
who " had the li ving hell scared out of him " tered sa nd , grenades were thrown dow n from
by explosions whi ch brought down a section above them, or rolled over the cliff edge.
of cl iff just over his head, and which came These were at the "potato-masher" type, with
from a n unknown source. Both impressions heavy concussion effects but small fragmenta-
- the Rangers', that there was no fire support tion. They caused two casual tics. The hand-
worth men tion ing, and the Satterlee's, that rockets were carried ashore, and the first one
th e Rangers were pi nn ed down- arc easily was fired at 15 yards from the cliff. It went
understandable under th e circu mstances ot over th e top and caught. Pk Harry W .
battl e and the difficulties of observation. The Roberts started up the hand-lin e, bracing his
probab ili ty is that the destroyer's fire on the feet aga in st th e 80-degree slope. H e made
cliff top, at the 1110ment when th e Rangers about 25 feet; the rope sli pped or was cut,
were starting their assa ult, did a great deal to and Roberts slithered dow n. The second
preve nt effecti ve enem y oppositio n at th e de- rocket was fired and the grapnel caught.
cisive moment. Roberts went up again, made the top (he
In any event, the assau lt went torward esti mated hi s climbing time at 4 0 seconds),
without check. Ran ger casua lties on the and pulled into a small cratered niche just
beach totaled about 15 , most of them trom under the edge. As he arri ved, th e rope was
th e raking fire to their left. In someth ing cut. Roberts tied it to a picket. This pulled
less than ten min utes trom landing, the fi rst out under the weight of th e nex t man , and
Ranger parties were getting ove r the crate red the rope fell off the cliff, maroo ning Roberts.
edges ot the cliff top. Th e story of th e boat H owever, a 20-foot mou nd of cl ay knocked

11
off the cliff enabled Roberts' team to get far LCA 862. This craft, carrying 15 Rang-
enough up the side to throw him a rope. This ers and NSFC personnel, landed about 100
time he lay across it, and five men, including yards left of the flank LCA. The men had
Lieutenant Lapres, came up. Roberts had not no trouble in disembarking, but once on the
yet seen an enemy and had not been under sand they found themsel ves exposed to ma-
fire. Without waiting for further arrivals, chine-gun fire from eastward of the landing
the six Rangers started for their objective, the area. One man was killed and one wounded
heavily constructed or at the north tip of by this fire; two more injured by grenade
the fortified area. About ten minutes had fragments.
elapsed since touchdown. The forward pair of rockets had been
Just after Lapres' group got up, a heavy fired immediately on touchdown, followed
explosion occurred above the rest of 86 I ' s by all four others together. One plain and
team, waiting their turn on the rope. Pfc. two toggle ropes reached the top, but one
Paul L. Medeiros was half buried under de- toggle rope pulled out. Tech. 5 Victor J.
bris from the cliff. None of the men knew Aguzzi, 1st Lt. Joseph E. Leagans (com-
what caused the explosion, whether a naval manding the team), and S/ Sgt. Joseph J.
shell, or the detonation of a German mine of Cleaves went up the two remaining ropes,
a peculiar type found later at one or two arrived at the top almost together, and fell
places along the cliff edge. The enemy had into a convenient shell hole just beyond the
hung naval shells (ZOO-mm or larger) over edge. There they paused only long enough
the edge, attached by wire to a pull-type fir- for two more men to join; then, following
ing device and fitted with a short-delay time standard Ranger tactics, the five moved off
fuze.' The explosion had no effect on the without waiting for the rest of the team, who
escalade. Medeiros and four more Rangers came up a few minutes later.
came up quickly, found Roberts' party al-
ready gone and out of sight, and followed LCA 888. Colonel Rudder's craft, first
from the cliff edge toward the same objec- to hit the beach, had 15 men of Company E
2
tive. and 6 headquarters personnel, including Lt.
1 If, as F rench civilians later reported , many such shells had
J. W. Eikner, communications officer. A few
been hung, they were probably neutralized by naval fire. No o ther enemy troops were seen on the cliff edge as
Ranger party saw them. They may have been planned for dropping
to the heach rather than for explosion at the cl iff edge. the LCA neared shore, but, when Sgt. Dom-
2 The photograph on page 13, taken a year later, shows the
cliff at the point where R61's men cl imbed. Two ropc::s, onc of them
inick B. Boggetto shot one German off the
a ladder typc=, are sti ll in place, This suggests that later climbers edge with a BAR, the others disappeared.
brought up a rope laddt·( to supplement the first ropo=. but the point
can not be settled by 3v3ilahlc ev idence. The Rangers had trouble in getting through

LAST LAP OF THE CLIMB. This may be the area where the men
from LeA 888 managed to get up by usc 0/ an erlemion laddn-,
placed on a great mound 0/ d ebris knocked out of cliO top. This
photo was probably taken on D +
2, when route tUas being used for
surplies. A loggle ropt: and two plain ropes art: sun below ladder.

12
the beach craters; neck deep in water, they landed. Five minutes later he sent out the
found it hard to climb out because of the slick code word indicating "men up the cliff"; dIe
clay bottom. A few grenades came over the "Roger" that receipted for this message, again
cliff without causing casualties. on SCR 300, was Eikner's last communica-
The rockets were fired in series, at 35 tion of D Dayan the Ranger command net.
yards from the cliff base. None of the water- When he sent the message PRAISE THE
logged ropes reached the top. When two LORD ("all men up cliff") at 0745, no re-
Rangers, best of the group at free-climbing, sponse was forthcoming.
tried to work up the smashed cliff face with-
ou t ropes, they were balked by the slipp~ry LeA 722. Twenty yards left of Colonel
clay surface, which gave way too easily to Rudder's craft, LCA 722 hit shore with 15
permit knife-holds. Bombs or shells had Company E Rangers, 5 headquarters men,
brought down a mass of wet clay from the a Stars and Stripes photographer, and a Com-
cliff top, forming a mound 35 to 40 feet high mando officer who had assisted the Rangers
against the cliff. A 16-foot section of the ex- in training. T ouchdown was made at the
ten sion ladder, with a toggle rope attached, edge of a crater, and the men could not avoid
was ca rried to the top of the mound and set it in debarking. Enemy grenades were in-
up. A Ranger cl imbed the ladder, cut a foot- effectual, and the craters and debris on the
hold in the cliff, and stood in this to hold beach gave sufficient cover from enfilading
the ladder while a second man climbed it for fire from the left. The only casualty was p£c.
another 16 feet. The top man repeated the John J. Sillman, wounded three times as the
process, and thi s time T ech. 5 George J. craft came in, hit twice on the beach, and
Putzek reached the edge. Lying flat, with destined to survive. A good deal of assorted
the ladder on hi s arms, he held on while a equipment came on this craft, including th e
man below climbed the toggle rope, then the SCR 284, two pigeons, a 60-mm mortar with
ladder. ammunition, and some demolitions. All
From there on it was easy. As the first were got ashore without loss, though it took
men up moved a few yards from the cliff edge maneuvering to avoid the deep water in the
to protect the climbers, they found plenty of crater. T ech. 4 C. S. Parker and two other
cover in bomb craters, and no sign of an en- communi cations men hefted the big radio
emy. In 15 minutes from landing, all the set on a pack board, and managed to get it in
Company E men from LCA 888 were up and working before the first climbers from
and ready to move on. Colonel Rudder and 722 reached the top.
headquarters personnel remained for the mo- The rockets had been fired just before
ment below, finding shelter from enfilade landing. One ladder and one plain rope got
fire in a shallow cave at the bottom of the up and held (LCA 722 had experienced no
cliff. By 0725, 1st Lt. James W . Eikner had trouble with water, and the ropes were com-
his equ ipment set up and fla shed word by paratively dry). The single rope lay in a
SCR 300 that Colonel Rudder's force had slight crevice, but the ladder came down on

14
an overhang where it seemed exposed to the shore and kept going. Despite the unusual
flanking fire and would be hard to climb. distance from the cliff, and the very wet ropes,
Tech. 5 Edward P. Smith tried the plain three rockets had carr ied the cliff edge with
rope and found he could easily "walk it up." a toggle rope and the two rope ladders. How-
On top three or four minutes after landing, ever, the grapnels on the ladders just made
he saw a group of Germans to his right throw- the top; since the lead rope connecting grap-
ing grenades over the cl iff. Sgt. Hayward A. nels wi th the top of the ladders was 40 feet
Robey joined Smith with a BAR. Robey lay long, the Rangers had, in effect, two plain
in a shallow niche at the cliff edge and ropes and a toggle. Sergeant LomelI put his
sprayed the grenadi ers with 40 or 50 rounds, best climber on the toggle while he tried one
fa st tire. Three of the enemy dropped and of the ladders. A 11 ropes were on an over-
the rest disappeared into shelters. Pfe. Frank hang, and only the toggle line proved prac-
H . Peterson, lightly wounded on th e beach ticable. Even on it, climbing would be slow,
by a grenade, joined up and the three Rang- so Lomell called for the extension ladders.
ers went off on their mi ssion without waiting Picking a spot high on the talus, his men
for the next climbers. found that one 16-foot section added to a
The mortar section in this boat team re- 20-foot section reached the top of the vertical
mained below, according to plan, with the stretch, beyond which a slide of debris had
purpose of setting up their 60-mm on th e reduced the slope enough to make it negoti-
beach to deliver supporting fires. But the able without ropes. Two men had got up by
beach was too exposed to make this prac- the toggle rope; the rest used the ladder and
ticable, and time was consumed in getting inade the top quickly. Grenades caused some
ammunition from the one surv iving supply annoyance until the first men up could cove··
craft. About 0745 the mortar team went on the rest of the party. Twelve men moved off
top without having yet fired. from the edge with Sergeant LomelI and 1st
Lt. George F . Kerchner.
LCA 668. Company D's craft had been
scheduled to land on the west side of the LCA 858. Shipping enough water all
Point. As a result of the change in angle of the way in to keep the Rangers busy, this
approach, the two surviving LCA's came in craft nevertheless kept up fairly well and was
to the left of Company E, and in the center only a minute or two behind the others at
of the Ranger line. the beach. The men were put out into a
LCA 668 grou nded short of the beach crater and went over their heads in muddy
strip, as a result of boulders knocked from the water. Despite the wetting, a bazooka was
cliff by bombardment. The men had to swim the only piece of equipment put out of action.
in about 20 feet. While 1st Sgt. Leonard G. Three men were hit by machine-gun fire
Lomell was bringing in a box of rope and a from the east flank .
hand-projector rocket, he was wounded in The rockets were fired in senes, the
the side by a machine-gun bullet but reached plain ropes first. All the ropes were wet, and

15
only one hand-line got over the cliff. It lay Arman, commanding the team, figured the
in a crevice that would give some protection heavier ropes had no chance. So, all four of
from enemy flanking fire, but the direct ap- the mounted rockets, together with tile boxes
proach to the foot of the rope was exposed. carrying toggle ropes and ladders, were taken
The Company D Rangers worked their way out on the sand-a matter of ten minutes'
to the rope through the piles of debris at heavy work, while the coxswain of the LCA
the cliff base. While one man helped the did a notable job of holding the craft in at
wounded get to Colonel Rudder's CP, where the beach edge. When the rockets were set
the medics had set up, all the party went up up for firing, the lead wire for making the
this one rope and found it not too hard going. firing connection was missing. Tech/ Sgt.
They could get footholds in the cliff face, and John l. Cripps fired all four in turn by touch-
a big crater reduced the steepness of the climb ing the short connection, three feet from the
near the top. The group was up within 15 rocket base, with his "hot-box." Each time,
minutes. As in most other cases, the first few the flashback blinded Cripps and blew sand
men on top had moved off together, and the and mud all over him. The other Rangers
boat team did not operate as a unit after the saw him clean his eyes, shake his head, and
escalade. go after the next rocket: "he was the hell-of-
a-looking mess." But all the ropes went up,
LCA 887. As a result of Company D's and made it possible for the party to make
unscheduled landing in the center of the line the top. Sergeant Petty and some other ex-
of craft, the three LCA's carrying Company pert climbers had already tried the plain rope
F were crowded eastward, all of them touch- and failed; it was on a straight fall, requiring
ing down beyond the area originally assigned hand-aver-hand work with no footholds pos-
them. Few of the Rangers realized this at sible, and the men had trouble with their
the time. muddy hands and clothes on the wet rope.
LCA 887 had not been much bothered Sergeant Petty started up one of the lad -
by either water or enemy action on the trip ders, got 30 feet up, and then slid all the way
in. The craft grounded five yards out from back on the cliff face when the grapnel pulled
dry beach, and the shorter men got a duck- out. Tech. 5 Carl Winsch was going up the
ing in the inevitable crater. No equipment other ladder when fire from somewhere on
trouble resulted; even Sgt. William L. Petty's the flanks began to chip the cliff all around
BAR, wet here and muddied later when he him. Petty went up after Winsch, and found
slipped on the cliff, fired perfectly when first him, unwounded, in a shell hole at the top.
needed. Some enemy fire, including auto- Here Petty waited for two more Rangers and
matic weapons, came from either flank. Two then they set out for their objective.
Rangers were wounded.
Just before hitting the beach the two for- LCA 884. This craft, the target for con-
ward rockets were fired. Only one of the siderable enemy fire from cliff positions on
plain lines carried, and 1st Lt. Robert C. the way to the Point, had replied with its

16
Lewis guns and the BAR's ot the Rangers. LeA 883. Last in the column ot ap-
Touchdown was made on the edge ot a shell proach, this craft was last to reach shore,
hole, in water shoulder-high. Three Rangers nearly 300 yards left of its planned position
were hit by fire coming trom the left Rank. and considerably beyond the edge ot the main
When rockets were fired in series, tront to tortified area on Pointe du Hoe. Just to their
rear, tour got over the cliff, but every rope left, a jut in the cliff protected the boat team
lay in such position as to be tully exposed to trom the Ranking fire that caused so much
the continuing enemy small-arms fire . More- trouble tor the other landing parties. They
over, the Rangers were so muddied in getting made a dry landing, and had a perfect score
through the craters on the beach that the with the six rockets. This gave an oppor-
plain ropes would have been unusable after tunity to use the climbing assignments on a
the first climber went up. The only rope tull schedule, using every rope. Nevertheless
ladder that reached the top was caught below the going was hard , even on the ladders. 1st
on beach boulders and hung at an awkward Lt. Richard A. Wintz, on a plain rope, tound
angle. Several men tried the other ropes it impossible to get any footholds on the slip-
without success, and Pvt. William E. Ander- pery cliff. The wet and muddy rope made it
son got only part way up in his attempt at difficult for hand-over -hand pulling, and at
tree-climbing. 1st Lt. Jacob J. Hill finally the top Wintz was "never so tired in his life."
took the group over to the left, where they He found six men together and started them
used the ladders of 883's boat team. out immediately.
CRATERED GROUND hampered the Rangers in moving cross coun~
try through the fortified area, and made it difficult to spot enemy
snipas. This photo, looking inland, was probably taken on D + I.

17
 WRECKED EMPLACEME T5 on the PO;1It. Photo taken June 19~4.

Summary. The first great difficulty, The assault met unforeseen circum-
landing and getting up the cliff, had been sur- stances, but their effects were not always to
mounted. Enemy resistance, despite the de- the disadvantage of the enterprise. Craters
layed landing, had been weak and ineffective in the beach had made the landings slower
except for the enfilade fire from the machine- and wetter than expected, had neutralized
gun position just east of Pointe du Hoe. The the dukws, and had impeded unloading of
equipment and training for escalade had met ammunition and supplies; on the other hand,
the test. On only two craft had the mounted they gave some cover from enemy fire. Dam-
rockets failed to get at least one rope over the age done to the cliff face by bombardment
cliff top. The hand-projectors and extension seems, on the whole, to have helped the es-
ladders had been useful as supplementary calade work, for the piles of debris not only
equipment where the ropes failed, and only gave cover from the enfilade fire but reduced
one boat team found it necessary to use the the height of the climb, particularly for use
ropes of .another party. The three dukws, of extension ladders. The top of the cliff was
stopped at the water's edge by craters, could much cut back by craters, further reducing
not bring their mechanically operated exten- the areas of sheer slope and providing cover
sion ladders into play. One of them made the for the first arrivals at the top.
trial, only to have the ladder rest on the cliff The climbing parties had gone ahead
side at a considerable angle, short of the top with speed, determination, and resourceful-
and unbalanced by the motion of the surf. ness, ready to improvise when necessary.

18
This was the main reason for their success, they found themselves in a bewildering
and for the fact that within 30 minutes from wasteland of ground literally torn to pieces
touchdown all the attacking force was on top by bombs and heavy naval shells. Expected
except for casualties, headquarters personnel, landmarks were gone; craters and mounds
and some mortar men (30 to 40 Rangers out of wreckage were everywhere, obscuring
of about 190) . remnants of paths and trenches. The Rang-
ers had studied these few acres for months,
Capture of the Point using excellent photographs and large-scale
maps that showed every slight feature of ter-
Troops landing at Omaha Beach on D rain and fortifi cations. Now, they found
Day have frequently registered, in records themselves in danger of losing their way as
and interviews, their disappointment at find- soon as they made a few steps from the
ing little visible evidence of the preliminary ragged cliff edge into the chaos of holes and
bombardment, which was expected to "make debris. Obtaining cover was no problem, but
the beach a shambles." No such complaint maintaining contact within groups as large
could be made by the 2d Rangers at Pointe as a sq uad would be almost impossible during
du Hoe. As they came up from the ropes move men t.

WRECKAGE ON THE POINT caused by bombs and naval gun

!hells. Photo taken February 1945, looking i nland toward cascmalu

19
20
 There were other causes for the .. con- clear pattern in detail, but with very clearly
fused" nature of the action that took place defined results.
on the Point, characterized as it was by in- The first and chief objectives were the
filtration of many and separate groups of gun emplacements and the OP near the end
Rangers through all parts of the enemy de- of the Point. Company E had the OP and
fenses. The prearranged tactics of the Ranger No. 3 position as its assignment; Company
force emphasized movement with the great- D, the western gun emplacements (4,5, and
est speed and by small groups. As the first 6); Company F, guns I and 2 and the ma-
few men on a rope reached the top at any chine-gun position at the edge of the cliff, just
point, they moved off at once for their objec- east of the main fortified area. Once these
tives, without waiting for the rest of their objectives were taken, the plan had been to
boat group, and without taking time to form assemble at a phase line near the south edge
an organized section or platoon, or attempt- of the fortified area. From here, D, F, and
ing to make contact with neighboring parties. most of E would strike inland for the coastal
In the climbing phase, so intent were the highway about 1,000 yards south, cross it,
men on their own work that only in excep- and establish a road block against enemy
tional cases was any Ranger party aware of movement from the west. A platoon of Com-
what other boat groups were doing, or even pany E was to remain on the Point with the
that other boat teams were on the beach. As headquarters group and arrange for perim-
the later climbers gained the cliff top, they eter defense of the captured fortifications.
too went off in small groups; over a period There were, inevitably, deviations from
of 15 to 30 minutes a series of these parties this plan. Some Rangers of Companies D
was forming at the cliff edge and fanning and E failed to reach the assembly area in
out in all directions. At least 20 of them time for the next phase of movement, or were
could be distinguished, but it is as impossible kept on the Point to meet unexpected devel-
to trace their movements in exact order or opments. On the eastern flank, two boat
timing as it must have been difficult for the teams of Company F became involved in an
Germans to spot the lines of the attack and action that lasted most of the day. But, by and
organize to meet it. large, movement went very nearly according
Yet in essence the attack followed a defi- to plan, a plan based on confidence in the
nite plan and order. As first objectives, each ability of small, pick-up groups to work in-
platoon (whatever number of groups it split dependently toward main objectives. This
into) had a limited part of the enemy defen- confidence was rewarded by success.
sive system to reach and deal with. Every As the first Ranger elements left the cliff
man knew what this mission was, and where and started for their objectives, they met no
to go. The outcome was an action without opposition except near the OP. Most of the
Rangers saw no enemy, and were hardly
aware of sporadic fire coming from along the
MAP NO . 4-Advance to the Highway cliff to the west of the Point. Their mall1

21
 TOP OF GERMAN OP POSITION,looking toward sea (1 2 /"'1< 1944).

trouble was in finding and identifying the Private Roberts crawled five feet toward a
gun positions in the wreckage of the fortified trench, small-arms fire , including machine
area. One party after another reached its guns, started up from slits in the OP. The
allotted emplacement, to make the same dis- Rangers threw four grenades at the slits, and
covery : the open gun positions were pulver- three went in. The machine gun stopped fir-
ized, the casemates were heavily damaged, ing, but Denbo was wounded by a riRe bullet.
but there was no sign of the guns or of artil- Lieutenant Lapres, Sgt. Andrew J. Yardley,
lery equipment. Evidently, the ISS's had Pfc. William D. Bell, and Tech/ Sgt. Harold
been removed from the Point before the pe- W. Gunther joined up in the trench. Yardley
riod of major bombardments. The advance had a bazooka, and his first rollnd hit the
groups moved on inland toward the assembly edge of the firing slit; the second went
area (Map No.4, page 20). through. Taking advantage of this, the
The only fighting took place at the tip group left Yardley to watch the embrasure
of the Point. Here, the first men up from and dashed aroLlnd the OP without drawing
LCA 861 found themselves about 20 feet to enemy fire. On the other side of the strucnue
seaward of the massive and undamaged con- they found Corporal Aguzzi, watching the
crete OP. As S/Sgt. Charles H. Denbo and mall1 entrance from the landward side.

22
Lapres' party pushed on toward gun posi tion trench facing the embrasure, enemy small-
No.4 and points inland. arms fire opened up again. The five Rangers
Aguzzi had come up from LCA 862, talked it over. They had further missions on
southeast of the OP, with Lieutenant Lea- the other side of the OP, but there were still
gans and Sergeant Cleaves. As they started enemy in the structure, who could not be
away from the edge, joined by Tech. 5 LeRoy left free to bring fire on the men still down
J. Thompson and Pfc. Charles H. Bellows, on the beach. Medeiros and Yardley con-
Jr., they saw a German close to the OP, sidered going down to get demolitions, but
throwing grenades over the cliff from shelter decided they couldn't give enough covering
of a trench. The OP was not their job, but fire to get a Ranger close to the embrasure
the party decided to go after the grenadier. with the explosive. Finally, it was decided
Bellows crawled over to No. 3 gun position to leave Yardley and Medeiros in position to
to cover the advance of the party. They "button-up" the seaward side of the OP while
threw grenades at the German and moved the others went past. With Yardley and
into the trench when he ducked under the Medeiros watching to cover their movement
entrance to the 01'. Aguzzi found a shell with fire, the three Rangers went along the
hole from which he could watch the main trench to pass the OP on the west side. Near
entrance, while three Rangers tried to skirt the end of the trench, small-arms fire came
the OP on the east and get at it from the at them from some position on the top of the
rear. Cleaves was wounded by a mine - the OP which Medeiros could not spot, and Pfc.
only casualty from this cause during the day. George W. Mackey was killed; the two
Thompson got close enough to hea r a radio others made it safely to the inland side.
working inside the OP, looked for the aerial For the rest of D Day and through
on top, and shot it off. After throwing a the following night, Yardley and Medeiros
grenade through the entrance Lieutenant stayed in their trench on one side of the OP
Leagans and Thompson decided to let the while Aguzzi watched the main entrance.
OP wait for demolitions, and went off on Neither guard knew the other was there.
their original mission farther inland. Aguzzi, Demolitions could have been used on Aguz-
staying to watch the entrance, was surprised zi's side, but nobody bothered to bring them
a few minutes later by the appearance of up for use; there was no sign of action from
Lieutenant Lapres' party, coming from the the enemy in the OP.'
rear of the OP. Two small groups of Rang-
1 On the afternoon of 0+ 1 the ncst was finally cleaned out.
ers had been attacking the 01' from opposite
Two satchel charges of C-2 were thrown in the entrance, and
sides, neither aware of the other's presence. Aguzzi. still on g uard , figurcd the enemy must be wiJX:d out. But
eig ht unwounded Germans swarmed out with thdr hands up, and
This was not the last group to pass onl y one body was found inside. The Rangers were never 5U(e how
Aguzzi from the tip of the Point. After many enemy had been in the post, for the OP. like mo~t positions
in the fortified area, was connected with unduground passages
Lapres' men had moved past the OP, four which the: Rangers had neither numbers nor time to investigate
fully. These undergrou nd routes, connecting shelters with each
more Rangers from LCA 861 came up the other and with a maze o f ruined trenches, probably contributed to
single rope. As they joined Yardley in the troublcs on the Point durinlit' D Day.

23
 Except at the OP, the first Ranger and mortar shells began to search the area.
groups had crossed through the fortified area Bunched too closely in a row of shell holes,
without seeing an enemy. The last parties to the Company D party took off in all direc-
arrive from the beach began to get some evi- tions to spread out.
dence that there were still Germans close by. Private Cruz moved back toward No. 6
The antiaircraft position just west of the emplacement, and found himself completely
Point put bursts of automatic fire on any alone in the maze of craters. Yelling to locate
Rangers who exposed themselves, and snip- the others, he heard Sergeant Mains call
ing started from the area near gun position "OK." After a IS-minute wait, with enemy
No.6. A group from Company D (LCA fire diminishing, Cruz began to crawl back
858) was working through that vicinity; toward the Point. Just as he reached a ruined
their story is known only from the one sur- trench near No. 6 position, he saw Sergeant
vivor of the action. Spleen and two other Rangers disappear
Pfc. William Cruz, slightly wounded on around the corner of a connecting trench.
the beach, came up just after Colonel Rudder Without warning, intense small-arms fire
had moved his CP to the cliff top (about started up, not only from the antiaircraft
0745), and Cruz was assigned to guard the position to the west but from German ma-
CPo He and Ranger Eberle went after a chine pistols close by. As he hugged the bot-
sniper near gun position No.4, and in doing tom of the trench, Cruz could hear men mov-
so drew machine-gun fire from the antiair- ing. A few Germans passed by on his limited
craft position to the west. Somebody ordered horizon, but without noticing him. Then,
them to "go after it." When they started out, only a few yards from his hole, guns were
sliding from cover of one crater to another, thrown into the air; Cruz thought they came
they came up with Tech/Sgt. Richard J. up from the trench where Spleen's party had
Spleen, Tech/Sgt. Clifton E. Mains, and a been. Cruz kept quiet, the burst of firing
group of eight or ten Rangers, in cover just died away quickly, and no one else came
west of No.6 position. This party was con- in sight. After a considerable wait, Cruz
sidering an attack on the antiaircraft posi- crawled back toward the CP, only 200 yards
tion, but hesitated to open fire for fear of away. Near the wrecked No. 6 emplace-
drawing German artillery shells, which were ment, he passed a pile of American weapons
beginning to hit near the fortified area from lying on the ground-8 or 9 rifles, and some
positions somewhere inland. After a time revolvers and Tommy guns. He figured these
the Rangers started to crawl through shell were left there when the Rangers surren-
holes toward the antiaircraft position, slowed dered.
by fear of mines. A German helmet came Observation on the Point was so limited
up out of a crater ahead; the Rangers near that no one else had seen the action or any
Cruz saw the stick under it and knew enough part of it. Ten Rangers had simply disap-
to avoid fire, but somebody just behind them peared, with Cruz's report and the aban-
took the bait. Almost immediately, artillery doned weapons as the only indication of their

24
RU INS ON EXIT ROAD, hal/way tram the Point to the highway.
Ranger advance parties began here to encounter scattered opposition from
enemy groups near the next farmhouses . (Photo taken June 1945.)

25
fate. The best guess was that the Germans after some delay, on extension ladders and
had attacked by filtering into the area started out with 15 men under 1st Sgt. Robert
through wrecked trenches connecting the W . Lang. After finding No. 3 casemate a
fortified zone with the antiaircraft gun; as junk-pile of broken steel and concrete, Lang's
another possibility, they may have emerged group moved south. They began to meet ar-
from underground shelters on the Point. tillery fire, coming in salvos of three, and
Cruz's report served notice at Colonel shifting toward the Point with each salvo.
Rudder's CP that trouble could be expected Lang stopped for a moment to try for a con-
from the west flank of the Point. In fact, tact on his 536 radio, with the idea of warn-
enemy opposition based on the antiaircraft ing the fire-support party that his men were
position was to be a source of serious difficulty moving out of the fortified area. He could
for the next two days. not make his connection. When he started
forward again, artillery fire was falling be-
Advance to the Highway tween him and his men ahead, so Lang
turned left into the torn-up fields, where he
The revival of German resistance at the picked up three stray Rangers of Company E,
Point was unknown to the Ranger parties and then joined a group under Lieutenant
which had been first to cross it, drawing only Arman of Company F.
scattered fire from the western flank. As they The Company E Rangers meanwhile
passed beyond the fortified area, some artil- were reaching the assembly area, near the
lery and mortar shells began to drop near start of the exit road. Here they met up with
them, and they were aware of light small- a dozen men of Company D, who had
arms fire from ahead (south). This slowed checked gun positions Nos. 4 and 5 and had
down the leaders, and the original parties of left Sergeant Spleen with a few men near
two and three men began to merge in larger No.6 to deal with enemy who were firing
groups. The Rangers from Companies E and from the antiaircraft position.
D (less elements detained on the Point) The D and E group now amounted to
tended to come together on an axis of ad- about 30 men. Without waiting for others
vance along the north-south exit road from to arrive, they started along the exit road,
the Point to the highway. Somewhat to their taking as much cover as possible in a com-
east, the one boat team of Company F that munications trench along its edge, and keep-
left the Point area struck south on a course ing in a single file. German artillery, esti-
through fields. The early advance inland can mated as light guns (75's or 88's), were
best be followed in terms of these two main searching the area with time fire, and from
groups (Map No. 4, page 20). the assembly area onward the Rangers began
The bulk of the group that started down to meet machine-gun fire from the righ t
the exit road was made up of Rangers from flank, and small-arms fire to their left front.
LCA's 888 (Company E) and 858 (Com- They suffered serious casualties in the next
pany D). The party from 888 had come up, few hundred yards: seven killed and eight

26
wounded. Despite these losses, the total size got there. Fire from destroyers' guns as well
of the force was increasing as it caught up as enemy shells was hitting around the farm,
wi th small advance parties who had left the and the Rangers made no pause. Ahead, the
Point earlier, or as latecomers tagged on to ground was open, and the trench used thus
the rear of the file. far in the advance came to an end at the
The first objective was a group of ruined buildings. The next cover, 35 to 40 yards
farm buildings, almost halfway to the high- south, was a communications trench that
way. German snipers who had been using crossed the exit road. To reach it, men were
the building pulled out before the Rangers sent out one or two at a time, moving fast

FARM BUILDINGS ON EXIT ROAD about 200 yards from the

highway, reached by Rangers about 0800 on D Day. Opposition
ceased beyo nd this point. (Photo, looking south, taken June 1945 .)

27
and taking different routes across an area ex- Most of Company F's parties had stayed
posed to machine-gun fire. The only casualty near the Point, drawn successively into a fight
was a Ranger who fell on a comrade's bayonet on the eastern flank. The party that reached
as he jumped into the trench. the highway was from LCA 887, led by
Beyond the trench a pair of concrete Lieutenant Arman and Sergeant Petty. Petty
pillars flanked the exit road, with a crude and three men had left the cliff edge first,
roadblock between the pillars. Three Ger- found No. 2 gun position destroyed and
mans came straight down the road toward empty, and then started south on a course
the Point, spotted the Rangers, and ducked about 200 yards east of the exit road. When
behind the block. BAR fire failed to flush they reached the ou tskirts of the fortified
them out, but after one round (a dud) from area, Lieutenant Arman joined them with
a bazooka the Germans fled. The Rangers five more Rangers, and decided to push to-
resumed their advance down the exit road. ward the blacktop without waiting for the
Some machine-gun fire had been coming rest of his platoon.
from the next farm; Lapres reached it with Their course led through what had been
his four men to find the enemy had left. marked on their maps as a mined area, wired
For a few minutes Lapres was isolated there, and dotted with posts set against air land-
as machine-gun fire from the flanks pinned ings. The bombardment, which had churned
down the main Ranger party. Some friendly up the ground even this far from the Point,
support fire, which the Rangers could not may have detonated the mines or buried them
trace, apparently silenced the machine guns. in debris, for they gave the Rangers no
This was the last of German resistance, trouble. Lieutenant Arman's men could see
and Lapres' advance party made the final shells hit along the exit road to their right;
stretch to the blacktop 1 without any trouble. for their own part, they saw no enemy. En-
As they came to it they saw Tech. 5 Davis of emy mortars somewhere to the south put
Company F coming through the fields on down pattern fire in fields near them, but
their left, and a few minutes later a larger the fire was apparently unobserved and
party of Company F men came along the caused no casualties. The group of a dozen
highway from the east. At 0815, barely an men worked forward in squad column, cov-
hour since the landing, the Rangers had ering the distance from crater to crater in
reached their final objective-good time, short bounds. As they came to the ruins of
even though enemy opposition had clear! y a farm lane, running north-south between
suffered from disorganization. As the sur- hedgerows, Sergeant Lang and three Com-
vivors of the group put it later, the reason pany E men came over from the east and
for the speed of their advance was simple: joined the advance.
enemy artillery fire seemed to be "tailing Lieutenant Arman led the party straight
them all the way," and this discouraged any down the lane, while Petty went left acress
delay. fields to scout toward the Chateau. There
1 Th~ Rangc=rs' term for the p2ved highway. was no sign of enemy on this flank and Petty

28
rejoined at the intersection of the lane with were unaware that some of 883's men had
the blacktop highway, where the Rangers already started on the same mission, nor did
turned west, moving along the edges. As they see them during their own effort.)
they reached the cluster of houses forming Moving fast along a hedgerow that skirted
the hamlet of Au Guay, a machine gun the cliff, they got to within a hundred yards
opened up about 100 yards ahead, some- of the enemy emplacement, could not locate
where near the road. The enemy had deliv- the position of the guns, and decided these
ered his fire too soon; the Rangers scattered must be out of reach below the cliff top.
without suffering casualties and began to Reversing course back to the ladders,
work around the south edge of the hamlet to Anderson left the other two Rangers and
reach the enemy gun. Sergeant Petty, with joined Pfc. John Bacho and S/ Sgt. James E.
two men, was startled by the sudden appear- Fulton, who were just starting south through
ance of two Germans apparently rising out the fields to make the blacktop. The three
of the ground, not ten feet away. Petty men followed along hedgerow lines, using
dropped flat and fired his BAR as he fell. the "Buddy" system, one man covering as
The burst missed, but the Germans were al- two moved, in a leap-frogging advance.
ready shouting "Kamerad." They had come Within a hundred yards they caught up with
out of a deep shelter hole which Petty's men Lieutenant Hill and two other Rangers from
had not spotted. The Rangers found no 884, going in the same direction. The only
other enemy at Au Guay, and the machine sign of enemy was occasional sniper fire. At
gun had disappeared when they reached the the first lateral hedgerow they turned west;
west side of the hamlet. Within a few min- Bacho and Fulton went through the hedge-
utes Arman's party met the Rangers who had row to guard the flanks and lost touch with
come out to the highway along the exit road. the others, eventually joining Lieutenant
Beside the two main groups whose Arman's group near the highway.
course has been followed to the highway, Hill's party, now four men, worked west
several smaller parties reached the same ob- to reach the double-hedgerowed lane, pick-
jective on their own. One of these can be ing up a willing prisoner from the field on
followed in detail; this is worthwhile as il- their right. Machine-gun fire to the west,
lustrating other aspects of a "confused" ac- near the exit road, drew their attention, and
~ion . The continuity in this story is furnished the four Rangers started angling in that di-
by Private Anderson. Landing in LeA 884, rection. As they were passing through a field
he went up on the ladders of the next craft of stubble wheat, automatic fire came at them
to his left, at the extreme left of the landing from the direction of Pointe du Hoe, and
zone. On top, he and two other 884 men forced them to crawl. So far the gun they
decided on their own to go after the German were after had not spotted them and was not
emplacement, somewhere near the cliff edge firing in their direction. About 25 feet from
to their east, which was still raking the land- the exit road, Lieutenant Hill and Anderson
ing beach with automatic weapons. (They reached the cover of a low embankment. The

29
machine gun was just beyond the road ahead Company E and Company F occupied this
of them. Hill stood up to look at the position line for a distance of four fields, two to each
and to Anderson's amazement shouted, "You side of a lane that ran from the highway
., you couldn't hit a bull in the down to the creek. An outpost of Company
ass with a bass fiddle!" This drew enemy F men went down the gentle slope toward
fire; as Hill dropped back into cover, An- the creek and took position where they could
derson tossed him a grenade, Hill threw it, watch the farther side of the little valley. A
and the machine-gun fire stopped. A few German dugout near the lane was picked for
minutes later, Lieutenant Lapres came down a CP, used by Lieutenant Arman (Company
the exit road with the advance group of Com- F) and Lieutenants Lapres and Leagans of
pany E, and Hill's action may have saved Company E. Except for two stragglers
this party from surprise fire. The four Com- picked up in the fields, there was no sign of
pany F men now served as flank patrol for enemy in the neighborhood.
the further advance along the exit road, mov- The 20 men of Company D were given
ing one hedgerow to the left of Lapres. An- the assignment of covering the west flank
derson, as he neared the blacktop, fired at toward Grandcamp. Sergeant Lomeli placed
somebody to the west near the road intersec- his men along both edges of the highway,
tion, but was not sure (later) whether it was with a combat outpost at the western end of
a German or Sergeant Lang. his line consisting of a BAR man and six
The Rangers at the highway numbered riflemen with a grenade launcher. This out-
about 50 men, with all three companies rep- post could cover the road and had good ob-
resented. Their mission was to block move- servation toward the valley between the
ment along the coastal highway; expecting Rangers and Grandcamp. The rest of the
to see the 116th Infantry and the 5th Rang- Company D men could watch the fields
ers arrive at any moment on the Vier ville north and south of the highway. Toward
road, their main concern was the highway the sea, the fields were believed to be mined,
west, toward Grandcamp. Such enemy re- and this would simplify defense on that side.
sistance as had been met seemed to come Active patrolling was started at once on
from west and south, so they made their dis- all sides of the thinly-held positions. About
positions accordingly (Map No.7, page 46). 0900, a two-man patrol from D went down
Bordering the south side of the highway near the double-hedgerowed lane that ran south
its junction with the exit road, a series of from the highway near Company D's out-
narrow fields ended in a hedgerow that ran post. About 250 yards along the lane, Ser-
east-west, overlooked orchards sloping down geant Lomeli and S/Sgt. Jack E. Kuhn
to a creek, and gave some observation across walked into a camouflaged gun position;
the small valley of the creek. Along the there, set up in battery, were five of the en-
hedgerow they found enemy dugouts and emy ISS's missing from the Point. They
fox holes conveniently prepared on the north were in posi tion to fire toward Utah Beach,
side of the hedge. The contingents from but could easily have been switched for use

30
against Omaha. Piles of ammunition were With Kuhn covering him against pos-
at hand, points on the shell s and charges sible defenders, Sergeant Lomell went into
ready, but there was no indication of recent the battery and set off thermite grenades in
firing. Not a German was in sight, and occa- the recoil mechanism of two guns, effectively
sional sniper fire from a distance could hardly disabling them. After bashing in the sights
be intended as a defense of the battery. So of a third gun, he went back for more gren-
effective was the camouflage that Lomell and ades. Before he could return, another patrol
Kuhn , though they could later spot the guns from Company E had finished the job. This
from the highway, had seen nothing until patrol, led by S/ Sgt. Frank A. Rupinski, had
they were right in the position. come through the fields and (like Lomell

LANE LEADING SOUTH from h;ghway, along ,ost s;d, of fidds

held by advona group of Rangers during D Day . CP of this group
tUas about 300 yards down this trail. (Photo taken Jun e 1945.)
MAP NO.5-Mortling Near the Point

32
33
and Kuhn) were in the gun position be- the three boat teams of Company F were
fore they saw it. Failing to notice the fact stopped by this resistance in carrying out their
that some disabling work had already been first assignments, becoming involved in a
done, Rupinski's patrol dropped a thermite series of actions that held them all day near
grenade down each barrel, and removed the cliffs just east of the fortified zone (Map
some of the sights. After throwing grenades No.5, page 32).
into the powder charg~s and starting a fire, LCA's 883 and 884 had beached on this
the patrol decided the guns were out of ac- flank, several hundred yards to left of their
lion and withdrew. A runner was sent off planned touchdown. Lieutenant Wintz, in
:at once to the Point, bearing word that the command of 883, failed at first to realize that
missing guns, primary objective at the Point, he was facing the cliffs outside the fortified
had been found and neutralized. area, and thought bomb damage must be the
Just why the German guns were thus reason for the unfamiliar look of the terrain.
left completely undefended and unused is When the first half-dozen men were up the
still a mystery. One theory, based on the fact ropes, Wintz sent them out to occupy hedge-
that some artillerymen were capmred that rows meeting at the southeast corner of the
day on the Point, was that bombardment first field inland. Ducking in and out of
caugh t them there in quarters, and they were craters, the men reached the ruined hedge-
unable to get back to their position. All that rows without drawing fire; Wintz sent out
can be stated with assurance is that the Ger- the rest of the boat team as they came up,
mans were put off balance and disorganized except for the mortarmen. Men from LCA
by the combined effects of bombardment and 884 were beginning to come up on 883's
assault, to such an extent that they never used ladders, as Wintz went along the cliffs to the
the most dangerous battery near the assault west looking for the company commander,
beaches but left it in condition to be destroyed Capt. Otto Masny. But Masny had gone over
by weak patrols. to the Point, and Wintz was not to see him
until the end of the day.
Mllrning at the Point: Action on Lieutenant Wintz had now oriented
the Left Flank himself. His men, plus some from 884 (a
few others from 884 went off on their own,
The D-Day fighting at Pointe du Hoe inland), were just east of the base of the
can be followed in terms of two main groups: Point. South of them were shell-ploughed
the force that reached the highway and took fields stretching toward St-Pierre-du-Mont
positions there, and the Rangers who stayed and crossed by only a few hedgerows. Occa-
in or near the fortified area at the Point itself. sional artillery fire and some sniping began
Some stayed according to plan; others were from this direction, forcing the Rangers into
diverted from going inland by circumstance cover and costing them one rifleman. To the
and, above all, by the revival of German re- east, about 200 yards along the cliffs from the
sistance near or in the fortified area. Two of Company F position, the German automatic

34
weapon (variously described as a machine other two for the first move. Someone
gun or a light antiaircraft gun) which had brought up an order for Frederick to report
caused so much trouble during the landing back to Captain Masny; the other two went
was now firing toward the Point over the on, thinking Frederick was following. They
heads of Wintz's men. Except that the gun got to within 20 yards of where they thought
was somewhere close to the cliff, its position the gun position must be, and as Youso half
could not be located. rose to throw a grenade he was shot by a
This enemy emplacement, sited to cause German riReman. Kiihnl went back to find
trouble for the Rangers still along the beach, Frederick, while Youso crawled toward
was included in the original Company F safety on the seaward side of the cliff-skirting
objectives, and Lieutenant Wintz decided to hedgerow. The two leading Rangers of
"go after it" with five men. Sgt. Charles F. Wintz's party met him there after he had
Weilage had set up his mortar in a crater made about 75 yards.
near the cliff, ready to fire once the enemy's Wintz's small attacking force was strung
position was fixed. A hedgerow skirted the out along 200 yards of the cliff hedgerow,
cliff edge eastward; using a drainage ditch with Wintz near the rear, bringing up four
on the inland side of this hedgerow, the party more riRemen and an observer for the mortar.
worked slowly along, making every effort to The enemy had spotted their movement, and
stay under cover. small-arms fire was covering an open space
As far as Wintz knew, this was the first along the route, wounding one man and
attempt to get at the troublesome gun east of slowing progress. Nevertheless, the advance
the Point. Actually, it was the third-a fact was still continuing when an order came
that brings out again the scattered and im- from the rear to pull back.
promptu nature of the early fighting near the The order had come from some distance
Point, and the difficulties of maintaining con- and was based on a misapprehension. Ser-
trol or observation in the cut-up terrain. geant Frederick, called back earlier to report
By the time Wintz started (somewhere to Captain Masny, had gone as far as No. I
between 0800 and 0830), two other groups gun position without locating him. Here,
had gone east to reach the German gun posi- Frederick received the order by word of
tion. Almost immediate! y after getting up, mouth for bringing Wintz back. Frederick
Private Anderson and two other Company F relayed the message, but was worried by it
Rangers had started out, failed to locate the and went further into the fortified area to
gun, and returned (see above, page 29). Cap- find Masny and verify the order. When
tain Masny, before he went over to the Point, Frederick located his captain, Masny ex-
had sent out a three-man patrol consisting of plained that he thought Wintz's party was
1st Sgt. Charles E. Frede~ick, S/ Sgt. Robert starting south toward the highway, and the
G. Youso, and Pfc. Herman W. Kiihnl. purpose of his order had been to keep them
They started along an east-west hedgerow near the Point. Captain Masny did want the
one field inland, with Frederick covering the German machine gun neutralized, so Ser-

35
geant Frederick sent a messenger at once, re- Morni11g at the Poiut: The CP Group
voking the recall order and telling Wintz to
Colonel Rudder had gone on top at
push the attack. It was too late; Wintz and
0745, and established his CP in a crater be-
his party were back in their starting positions,
tween the cliff and a destroyed antiaircraft
having brought their two wounded in.
gun emplacement. Most of the assault parties
Lieutenant Wintz reorganized for an-
had left the fortified area on their several mis-
other effort, again along the cliff edge. It
sions, and Colonel Rudder could only wait
was the fourth attempt at the flanking gun
for reports. Observation in the churned-up
position. Just after movement started, orders
wasteland left by the bombardment was very
came to halt the attack. The message came
limited, and for the moment there was little
on SCR 300, one ofthefew times that a radio
that he could do to exercise control. How-
order got through from the CP on the Point
ever, there was some work to do near at hand ,
to any of the scattered Ranger parties. Colo-
as the enemy gave disturbing signs of re-
nel Rudder had decided to try naval fire on
viving his resistance close to the Point.
the cliff strongpoint. Wintz's men were well
situated to observe (and enjoy) the results.
A destroyer pulled close in/ and, according
to the Rangers' recollection, seven salvos were
used: they blew the top of the cliff into the
sea, and that ended the Rangers' troubles
with automatic fire from the eastern cliff
position, though German snipers continued
to operate from that sector.
It was now well along in the morning
(time estimates vary from 1100 to 1200).
Before naval fire solved the worst difficulty
on the east flank, several hours had been
spent in action which illustrated the difficul-
ties of coordinating action among the scat-
tered Ranger parties. Most of the troops from
LCA's 883 and 884, originally scheduled to
move on to the highway, had become thor-
oughly involved near the Point and were now
kept in the right-angle hedgerow position
selected by Lieutenant Wintz at the start of
his action. It was suitable for protecting the
east side of the Rangers' position from attack.
1 According to test imony by the communic:ltions s«tion , this
British dcsuoyc=r, with spotting donC' by Lieutenant Johnson ,
W:lS :l
Qb~rvcr of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion:

36
: OL. RUDDER'S CP was set in a cratered niche at the edge 0/
:he cliO. Guman artillery se:al'chcd lor it, but most oj the enemy
.hdls were "ovas" into the sea. Lt. Eikner, in charge 0/ the com~
rnunications secrion, is near the center, drinking from his cantan.

37
Enemy snipers were active, some of them op- impressed into service at headquarters. He
erating inside the fortified area, and steps were was given the mission of forming a perim-
immediately taken to eradicate them. Some eter defense for the CP, using headquarters
of the last parties up the cliff, together with personnel and any Rangers who had not gone
headquarters personnel, were sent out to inland. As he was organizing this defense,
hunt them down. These efforts, repeated fire opened up again from the antiaircraft
many times, were never entirely successful. position. Like Sergeant Spleen earlier, Masny
Through the rest of D Day, the CP and the collected the nearest men at hand and went
whole Point area were harassed by snipers out to attack. Starting with eight men, the
who came out of tunnels and trenches, to group picked up a few more Rangers as it
find plenty of cover in the cratered debris. went through the fortified area toward the
Patrols combed over the maze of under- exit road, planning to swing west. Among
ground positions, but it seemed impossible to the additions was a mortar section from LCA
clean them out with the small force available. 722. Much earlier, this mortar had been set
At no time were the snipers numerous, and up to deliver supporting fire for the Company
there were periods when the Rangers could E group moving inland under Lieutenant
move in the open with impunity, anywhere Lapres. S/ Sgt. Millard W . Hayden had ac-
on the Point. But these intervals of calm companied the group, taking with him a
would be broken at any time by scattered sound power phone and half a mile of wire.
small-arms fire from every direction, or by No calls for fire had come, and communica-
bursts of automatic fire from the German tion had been broken off, so the mortar sec-
antiaireraft position, 300 yards west on the tion decided to move inland and join Hay-
edge of the cliff. Colonel Rudder sustained den. Before they had gone far, they were re-
a thigh wound from this fire during the called for support of Masny's group, which
mormng. also had a 3a-cal. machine gun, taken off a
Within a half hour after Colonel Rud- dukw.
der's arrival on top, a first attempt to knock Masny's force turned west where the
out this western strongpoint had ended with exit road met the remains of a lane that led
the destruction of Sergeant Spleen's small toward the enemy strongpoint. They had
attacking force (see above, page 24). This made only a hundred yards progress when
made it clear that the antiaircraft position rifle, machine-gun, and mortar fire opened
was the main center of enemy resistance near up, from their left flank as well as from the
the Point, and the most dangerous because it strongpoint. Scattered among craters, the
afforded a base either for attack into the Rangers started a fire fight, the mortar set
Rangers' foothold on the Point or for efforts up in a hole about 5 a yards to the rear of the
to cut off the parties that had gone inland. riflemen where Masny directed its fire. When
Captain Masny, after helping to set up a white flag showed over the German em-
Company F's positions on the left flank, had placement, the men with Masny were wary
come over to find Colonel Rudder and was and stayed under cover. But two Rangers

38
on the right of the skirmish line, near gun Fire Control Party, and was immediarely
position No.6, stood up in the open. Masny's given target requests followed by spotting
yell of warning was too late to save them reports from the shore observers. However,
from a burst of machine-gun bullets, and the radio transmission was uncertain (SCR 284),
fire fight resumed. German artillery came and a new difficulty arose when the signals
into action, from somewhere inland. The party moved to the CP on top of the cliff. At-
first rounds were over; the next rounds be- tempts to communicate by radio drew enemy
gan to "creep" back until they bracketed the artillery fire immediately, suggesting that the
hedgerow-marked lane which was the axis Germans were picking up the transmission
of the Rangers' attack. There the fire held, and using it to register on the CPo Lieutenant
right on the lane, "the prettiest fire I ever Eikner then turned to other means, and made
saw" (Captain Masny ). His attack was successful contact by signal lamps. These
smashed in short order; four men were killed were used with good results during the rest
and near! y ever), Ranger in the group was of the day, though radio transmission for
hit. Masny, wounded in the arm, shouted fire control was resumed in the afternoon.'
"Withdraw! Every man for himself!" after Personnel of the fire control party observed
the second burst, and the remnants crawled results not merely from the Point but from
back to the exit road and over to the CP, with positions inland, sending spotting data back
snipers killing two more on the way. All its to the Point by SCR 536 for relay to the
ammunition shot away, the mortar was aban- ships. Targets given the Satterlee included
doned at its firing position. inland assembly areas at St-Pierre and Au
That was the last effort of the day to Guay, road junctions, strongpoints toward
assault the antiaircraft emplacement; the Grandcamp, and, especially, the antiaircraft
two ill-fated attempts had cost 15 to 20 casu- position west of the Point. By 172 3 the Sat-
alties. Several attempts were made to knock terlee had expended 70 percent (the pre-
out the antiaircraft position by naval fire, scribed maximum) of her ammunition, hav-
with the Satterlee expending many rounds ing fired 164 salvos, plus six minutes of fire
in futile bombardment. The position was for effect, in support of the Rangers since H
just too far from the edge of the cliff to be Hour. The Barton and Thompson moved in
blasted off by undercutting fire (such as near the Point to relieve the Satterlee, and
destroyed the emplacement on the other side before dark the NSFCP transmitted data for
of the Point), and yet was too close to the night fire on road junctions and other targets.
cliff to be reached directly by the Rat trajec- Little success was had in communicating
tory of the destroyer's guns, from their lower with friendly ground forces, either the 5th
firing level. Rangers or 29th Division units. Apparently
Naval supporting fires nevertheless gave
1 The Sall~rlu , in its report, placed special emphasis on the
the Rangers inestimable aid, and from very excellence of its communica tion with the:: shore part)', and the d Ice-
early in the assault. At 0728 , the Satterlee tivcncu o f the system of fire contro l. The N SFCP had been on
board the dcstrorcr and worked with it in seve ral drills and an
made its first contact with the Naval Shore exercise. bc-forc 0 Day.

39
 the SOl had been changed just before D Day
without notification to Colonel Rudder's
communications section; though Lieutenant
Eikner more than once contacted friendly
units ashore at the main landing beaches, he
was unable to get any answers or to stay in
touch. He attributed this to his inability to
give proper authentication to his messages.
Colonel Rudder thus was in complete ig-
norance of the progress of the great assault
at Omaha Beach, for the naval vessels, if they
had any information, did not send it to the
Point. Between noon and 1300 Colonel
Rudder sent out a message by all available
means, SCR 300, SCR 284 (through the
Satterlee), and pigeon: "Located Pointe du
Hoe-mission accomplished- need ammuni-
tion and reinforcements-many casualties."
By 1500 the 116th Infantry replied, stating
its inability to decipher the message, which
was repeated. About the same time, the de-
stroyer relayed in reply a brief message from
the 1st Division commander, General Hueb-
ner: "No reinforcements available." The
Rangers' noon message was the only word
received from Pointe du Hoe on D Day by
higher headquarters (V Corps had it by mid-
afternoon), and was the cause for consider-
able anxiety as to the Rangers' situation.
The medical section with the Ranger as-
sault force passed a busy morning. Capt.
Walter E. Block and two of his enlisted per-
sonnel came in on LCA 722; three aid men
were distributed in other craft. The aid men

AFTER RELIEF ON D + 2, when A mer;can flag had

bun spread out to stop fire of friendly tanks coming from
inland. Some German prisoners are being moved in after
capture by the rdieving forces .

41
MAP NO. 6- A/tcrnoon Counterattacks
X- Area reached by German counterattacks.
Y- Enemy resistance areas.

had pack carriers with 50 feet of rope coiled and Block himself lugged an 81-mm mortar
on top, so that if enemy fire made necessary shell case, waterproofed to serve as a con-
a quick crossing of the beach the packs could tainer for medical supplies. All the equip-
be left behind and pulled over later. The ment was got to the cliff base in good condi-
two men with Captain Block carried aid kits, tion. When the CP moved to the top, Block

42
left one man to care for some seriously and started a fire fight that went on for an
wounded Rangers who could not be moved hour. Some artillery and mortar fire sup-
from the beach. Later in the morning one of ported the effort, but most of the enemy shells
the aid men and Lt. Col. Trevor, British went over into the Point area. Company F
Commando officer who had accompanied the had a mortar in position, but it was short of
assault, assembled sections of an extension ammunition and held its fire. They had no
ladder on the beach and got it mounted con- BAR's on the flank facing the attack, and
veniently for service in moving wounded and naval fire could not be called on against the
getting supplies up the cliff. Germans so close to the Ranger lines. The
Colonel Rudder and Captain Block were attack was met and stopped by well-sustained
concerned over the problem of caring for the rifle fire; after a time the German fire weak-
considerable number of wounded, many of ened and men could be seen drifting back.
whom needed to be evacuated. At 1350, by Wintz's force sustained no casualties.
signal light communication, the destroyer The next German effort came shortly
Barton was asked to send in a boat to take after 1600 and was much more dangerous.
off the casualties. At 14 30, a small motor boat It hit the right end of Company F's thin line.
from the Barton made the attempt, towing a Two BAR's as well as the mortar section were
rubber boat astern. Enemy machine-gun fire on this wing, but only a few riflemen, and the
from along the cliffs east of Pointe du Hoe right flank (toward the antiaircraft position)
harassed the Barton's motorboat, wounding was "in the air." Moving near the exit road,
one of the crew and preventing a landing. the Germans were close in on this flank be-
Block had to leave several of the seriously fore they were observed. S/ Sgt. Herman E.
wounded Rangers overnight on the beach, in Stein and Pfc. Cloise A. Manning were near
a cave at the base of the cliff. gun position No. I, changing craters after a
close burst of enemy shells, when they saw a
dozen Germans, with a machine gun, almost
Afternoon Coullterattacks due west and moving fast toward the Point.'
About the same time S/ Sgt. Eugene E. Elder,
The Germans made two efforts against at the mortar, spotted some enemy to the
the Point during the afternoon, both of them south, close by and crawling through craters.
hitting Lieutenant Wintz's force from south Sergeant Stein opened with surprise fire from
and west (Map No. 6, page 42). his BAR at 40 yards, hit a couple of men in
The first attack came over the fields that the group to the west, and scared the others
stretched toward St-Pierre-du-Mont, where into a short withdrawal.
Lieutenant Wintz's Rangers spotted riflemen
coming through the craters, with at least one I From the positions indicated. it is probabl e this group came
from the antiaircraft position to thc west, rather than up the road .
machine-gun section. When the enemy A wounded Ranger, Idt behind for dead afu:r Masny's abortive
reached the hedgerow one field south of morning attack on the antiaircraft posit ion, sa w ~rmans pass by
from the west for an attack that (as he later reported) was stopped
Wintz's line, they set up the machine gun by mortar fire .

43
 Thi s check disorganized the attack for a posItIon. The enemy seemed to be trying to
few valuable mome nts ; when the Germans feel out the Ranger streng th on the cast Aank ,
rallied, their firing line extended well beyo nd but no more attacks developed . T oward
Company F's Aank, but their fire was hig h nig htfall , Lieutenant Wintz drew in hi s
and wild. The few Rangers on that wing forces toward the Point to form a closer per-
took hurried measures to meet the danger. imeter defense. The men were scattered
Stein sent a message over to the morta r posi- through convenient shell holes, close enoug h
tion, warning of the enemy's location, and to ca ll to each other. Wintz took a patrol
eig ht riAemcn ca me over from the left to through the whole Point area, including the
help defend against any thrust behind Com- g un positions, to search out th e snipers who
pany F and onto the [)oint. With Sgt. Mur- were still appeari ng behind the perimeter.
rell F. Stinette obsen ·i ng and relaying cor- He failed to locate a single enemy.
rections by call to Serge:lI1t Elder, the Rang- The Company F men from L CA's 883
ers' mortar ope ned at 60-yard range. The and 88 4, numbering originally about +0,
first shells burst right on the advance group had suffered casualties of 5 killed a nd 10
of enemy, driving them Oll! of their holes wounded during the day's fi ghting on and
into a ha sty withdrawal. Shifting its fire a near the Point. Among the killed were
littl e south . thc mortar Aushed another Ger- Lieu tenant Hill , who had gone out beyond
man party, who suffered casualties from the the hig hway in the morning with th e ad-
BAR's as they ran for cm·er. vance parties. (See page 30.) T oward after-
That was the end of an attack that had noon, Hill started back to the Point, to report
got in very close to the I'oint and threate ned to to the CP o On the way in, Lieutenant Hill
cut off vVi ntz's group. Quick reaction by the and Private Bacho heard machine-gun fire in
Rangers. and very rapid and accura te mortar- the fields east of the exit road and went over
ing, had knocked the enemy off balance and to investiga te. About 300 ya rds away from
given them no time to recover. r\ mortar in the Company F line, they started across a
the attack ing force was never used; their two hedgerow to get at a machin e g un which Hill
machine gu ns were set up a few times, only had spotted two field s over to the cast. Bacho
to be cha sed into new cover by Sergeant El - looked over the hedgerow and saw a dozen
der's mortar. Elder fired about 75 round s Germans lying on the open ground in a field
during the actio n, all without in cremen ts, co rner, talking. Hill decided to g renade
which had been wetted in landing. H e th em. H e and Bacho threw their first two
fou nd that the mortars could be used effec- over the hedge, th en jumped into a ditch.
tivel y at the short range, makin g the range The g renades misfired and stirred up a hor-
changes accurately enough by calling for net's nest. The startled Germans began to
turns o n the elevation and traversing handles. throw their "potato-mashers"; o ne exploded
Until darkness fell , there were occa- harmlessly right between Hill Jnd Bacho, but
sionallight skirmi shes with German riAemen in the nex t instant Hill was shot through the
still in the fields beyond Lieutenant Wintz's ehest by a machine-pistol bullet. Bacho threw

44
over his remaining grenades, including one were killed or captured. Patrols rounded up
with thermite charge which "seemed to con- other scattered enemy groups.
fuse the enemy," and inflicted some casual- Typical of the way men on both sides
ties. When a rifle bullet went through the were cut off and isolated during the first two
top of Bacho's helmet he decided to play days was a capture within the Ranger lines.
dead. The Germans came up to the hedgerow About noon Sergeant Petty came back to the
and looked over, but concluded the Rangers CP to get a rifle for one of his men. Just as
were finished. Some time later Bacho was he arri ved, Sgt. James R. Alexander fired his
able to crawl away to a crater. He spent the BAR back toward the highway at two Ger-
afternoon in the general area through which mans who appeared by a gate, halfway down
the first German attacks were coming, but, the lane. One German fell, and Petty and
though he heard shots fired around him, Alexander went over to examine the body,
Bacho saw no Germans and had no idea that three other Rangers tagging along for no
an enemy counterattack was under way. At particular reason. Petty was sitting astride
dark, he was able to get back to the Point. the gate, looking at the dead German, when
somebody yelled "Kamerad" from the ditch
The Advance Group During D Day bordering the lane. Three Germans were
coming out of the ditch. Sgt. Walter J. Bor-
For some time after the highway was owski fired some shots into the hedgerow on
reached, small parties of Rangers drifted in the chance that there might be more men
to join their platoons, so that by noon there hiding. Two more Germans came out. Then
were over 60 men to hold the forward posi- the hedgerow was searched in earnest, but
tion, a half mile inland from the Point (Map without further results. Two of the prison-
No.7, page 46). Among the arrivals were ers, a captain and a noncom, said they had
three paratroopers ot the 101 st Airborne had a machine gun, which the Rangers were
Division, scheduled to drop eady that morn- unable to find. Altogether, about 40 prison-
ing north of Carentan, IS miles away, but ers were taken in by Ranger patrols and out-
dropped instead near Pointe du Hoe. posts, to be grouped under guard in the field
The main action of the day was vigor- near the CPo
ous and continued patrolling, undertaken by Sergeant Petty also figured in a good
combat patrols ot six or seven men who went deal of shooting that took place at the out-
out on the flanks of the highway position, post south of the CP and near the creek. He
and particularly to the south into the small and his nine men were well situated to watch
valley. The patrols found no organized en- movement across the valley. At intervals dur-
emy positions and encountered no strong ing the day small groups of enemy came into
forces. A number of Germans who had evi- easy range, moving west along the country
dently been bypassed near the Point and were road towatd Grandcamp. Perhaps fleeing
trying to work south straggled into the from the Omaha area, these parties seemed
Rangers' positions from the seaward side and to be disorganized, and put up no fight when

45
 \
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r.
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~:,

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Oi.ilj:los( :
HIGHWAY POSITION
0830 - 2000 6 June

C;
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c=J Ot!cHARD$ , eR~wOOD
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TAROS

M A P N O. 7

Petty opened fire with his BAR. Using sur- highway, near Company D's roadblock.
prise fire, Petty inflicted some 30 casualties About 1600 Sergeant Lomell, near his CP
during the afternoon, including 2 of a party hole where the highway was joined by the
of 7 Poles, shot at before the Rangers realized lane containing the Gerl1lan battery, hap-
they were coming forward to surrender. pened to glance over the 5-foot stone wall
Patrols found evidence late in the day edging the highway and saw a German force
that the Germans were present in some of about 50 men coming through an orchard
strength south and southwest of the Rang- from the direction of the Point. The enemy
ers' highway positions, but there was no sign was moving in well-organized fashion , with
of preparation for counterattack. The near- scouts out ahead, and Lomell could see two
est approach to trouble came north of the machine-gun sections and a mortar. There

46
was no time to make any preparation, or wall the column turned westward and moved
even to pass word down the Ranger line. parallel to the highway beyond the road-
Lomeli could only hope that the enemy block position, then south across the blacktop
would pass by and that his own men would and out of sight. Showing excellent control,
have the sense to hold their fire, for the 20 the Rangers had made no move that would
Rangers of Company D, scattered along 150 betray their location.
yards of highway, would have had little Intermittent harassing fire fell near the
chance against a force this size. But the Ger- Rangers during the day, but the air and tree
mans were not attacking, nor, as their course bursts caused only one casualty, a paratrooper
soon made clear, were they aware of the who got tired of ducking into his fox hole
Rangers' position. About 30 feet from the and was hit by the next shell. From the sea,

ORCHARD SOUTH OF RANGERS' POSITION,iook;ng toward

the small valley. Sgt. Petty's BAR outpost was in position near hue
to interdict enemy movement along the volley during daylight.

47
friendly destroyer fire was being directed two hot actions, one of which netted a score
from the Point at inland targets. Occasion- of prisoners, while the other nearly trapped
ally rounds fell short or uncomfortably close; his platoon, Parker got cross country all the
little could be done about this as communica- way to St-Pierre-du-Mont and walked into
tion from the forward group to the Point the 2d Ranger position at the highway. He
depended on runners and patrols, and no was surpri sed to learn that the 5 th Rangers
member of the Naval Shore Fire Co ntrol had not arrived, but was sure they must be
Party was available for the highway group. close behind him on another route. A patrol
Men going back to the Point were nearly was sent in at once to Colonel Rudder with
always engaged by snipers, and sometimes this heartening news. Parker's men stayed
had to fight their way on both trips as Ger- with the forward group at the highway as
man resistance revived nea r the Point. Lieu- they prepared their night defenses.
tenant Lapres twice went back to Colonel
Rudder's CP, getting ammunition and, on The Ger11lau Night Attack: First Phase
one trip, a radio which failed to work. On
his morning passage, Lapres drew heavy fire Twilight in early June, on reckoning by
from west of the exit road; his attempts in British War Time, lasted until 2300. As
the afternoon were entirely blocked oft by night approached, and still no word came
Germans who had infiltrated between the from Omaha Beach, Colonel Rudder faced
two Ranger Groups.' a difficult command decision with regard to
About 2100, still two hours before dark, disposition of his limited forces. Of his ori-
a party of 23 men from Company A, 5th ginal 200 men over a third were casualties,
Ranger Battalion came into the Ranger lines though many of the lightly wounded (in-
from the east. Led by 1st Lt. Charles H. cluding Colonel Rudder) were staying in ac-
Parker, Jr. , this force was the I st Platoon of tion. Ammunition was low, especially in
Company A. The record of its fight from grenades and mortar shells. The Germans
Omaha Beach to the Poin t is one of the sagas were still holding the antiaircraft position
of D Day. Parker's platoon became sepa- close to the Point on the west, and had shown
rated from the 5th Ranger Battalion during themselves in some force on the eastern flank
the fir st penetration of the German beach as well. Communications between the Point
defenses between Vierville and St-Laurent, and the highway group had always been
about 0815 . Unaware that the battalion had precarious, and the latter force, numbering
become involved in a fire fight just inland more than half of the Rangers, would be
from the beach, the platoon had made its particularl y exposed to counterattack that
way south of Vierville to the battalion as-
sembly area. Finding no friendly troops
there, Parker concluded they must have pre-
ceded him and set out west. After fighting AREA OF HI G HWAY POSIT IONS (photo taken
1 Probably during the period of counleratucks. May 194-1) .

48
49
 () r,:, ':1 n () ',' ~} ",
~~
THE GERMAN NIGHT ATTACK
. ., .-:; i;' :~, () ~; f.: t} () {~
617 July 1944
... ,',
t; ~-
'"Cre ek" ••• RANGERS' POSITIONS
BAR POSI nON

MAP NO.8

50
might cut it off from the shore. Either of eluding Lieutenant Parker's platoon of 5th
the two Ranger positions was in danger; Rangers) were disposed to guard against at-
Colonel Trevor, the Commando officer, re- tacks from those quarters.
marked casually in the CP that "never have The day positions of Company D were
I been so convinced of anything as that I will obviously too extended for safety, and its
be either a prisoner of war or a casualty by 20 men were drawn in to form the right
mormng.. " flank of the main Ranger position, on a
Colonel Rudder decided to leave the hedgerow that ran south from the high-
highway force in place. He was still expect- way to Company E's fox holes. Lieutenant
ing the arrival of the 5th Rangers and 116th Kerchner and a BAR man were at the angle
Infantry units along the Vierville road, carry- formed by intersecting, hedgerows where E
ing out the D-Day program, and this expecta- and D joined; Sergeant Lomeli was near the
tion had been strengthened when Colonel center of D's line. Two men were put out
Rudder heard that Parker's platoon had ac- west of Kerchner's post, about half way to
tually arrived, reporting (erroneously) that the lane bordering the next field. Another
the rest of the 5 th Rangers were probably outpost of two Rangers, one with a BAR,
just behind them. It was important, Colonel was in the angle where that lane met the
Rudder thought, to maintain the block on blacktop. The rest of Kerchner's men were
the Grandcamp highway and so deny that strung out at wide intervals along the 300
vital road to the enemy. Even though Ger- yards of hedgerow, in a ditch running along
man resistance had stiffened during the day, the embankment.
their counterattacks against the weaker force Company E's 30 men held their day
on the Point had been ineffective, and they positions on the hedgeline running east to-
had made no efforts against the highway po- ward the main CPo Some half dozen of the
sition. As a final consideration, Colonel Rud- 5 th Ranger men were distributed along their
der and his staff had very strong fears front. A few yards south of the angle where
(proved by the next day's experience to be E and D connected, two riflemen were
unfounded) of the danger from German ar- posted in the orchard that sloped away gently
tillery if his force were concentrated in a re- toward the creek; two more Rangers, one a
stricted area at the Point. Lieutenant Lapres, BAR man, were 75 yards further out. The
who had reached the Point with a patrol just post of Lieutenant Leagans (2d Platoon)
before dark, went back inland with orders to was in a German-prepared dugout near the
hold the position. middle of E's hedgerow, with a BAR man
Out beyond the highway, the Rangers and a rifleman in the corner of the orchard
made a few alterations in their positions to on the other side of the hedgerow, and an-
get ready for night defense (Map No.8, otller rifleman 50 yards south on the boun-
page 50). The main indications of enemy dary between the orchard and a wheatfield.
strength were to the south and west, and the A third BAR man was 20 yards west of
greater number of the 85 men at hand (in- Leagans' station. Between Leagans and the

51
angle where Company D's line began, about man prisoners were put in fox holes in these
I 0 riflemen occupied fox holes north of the fields, not far from the CP, and two Rangers
hedge, one group fairly close to the angle and were regarded as sufficient guard. Little con-
the rest bunched near Leagans, an C1rrange- cern was felt for the open flank to the east,
ment though t better for purposes of com- protected by three men with a BAR near the
munication. From east of Leagans' post over highway, and by a half dozen of Parker's
to the main CP on the lane, the I st Platoon 5 th Rangers along tlle lane between the CP
of Company E and some 5th Rangers con- and the road.
tinued the hedgerow line, with main strength Certain features of the night arrange-
ncar the CP, where the Rangers were placed ments are worth noting, in view of later
two to a fo x hole for greater safety in night developments. The 5th Ranger platoon of
fighting. Sergeant Robey with a BAR was 23 men had been scattered in small batches
in the corner of the wheatfield just south of at various points and did not operate as a
the CP, with a good field of fire to the south- tactical unit under Lieutenant Parker. He
west. In addition to their own four BAR's, and his assistant, 1st Lt. Stanley D. Zelepsky,
Company E platoons had found and set up were at the main CP with Arman and
three German machine guns (two model Lapres. Command functions in the Ranger
'34's and one '42), for which ammunition force, made up of elements ot four compa-
was avai lable. nies, were not centralized. During the day,
East from the CP, the line that Com- the D, E, and F parties had cooperated on a
pany F had held in daylight was shortened more or less informal basis, with coordina-
to 100 yards. Near the lane that ran back tion secured by consultation of the four offi-
from CP to highway, three Rangers with a cers, Lieutenants Kerchner (D), Leagans
BAR were placed in a trench that gave them and Lapres (E), and Arman (F). When
a field of fire through a gateway into the or- plans had to be made in the mormng as to
chard sou theast of the CP. Beyond them positions for the day, Lieutenant Arman was
were two men of Company F and some 5 th the senior officer at hand and seems to have
Battalion Rangers. Sergeant Petty and seven made the decisions. After that he did not
men, including some 5th Rangers, still held consider himself in command in any formal
an outpost along the stone wall at the foot of sense. The decision to shorten up and tighten
the wheatfield. Their advantages of observa- the defenses for the night was taken when
tion from this position would be sharply re- Lieutenant Kerchner came over to Arman's
duced at night, and Petty was under orders post and reported seeing Germans 111 some
to withdraw if an attack developed in his strength to the southwest. Arman, Lapres,
vicinity. and Kerchner talked it over and agreed as
The main Ranger position thus formed to readjustment of positions.
a right angle, facing southwest, with equal As they settled in for night defense, the
sides about 300 yards long on two fields that main worry of the Rangers was their am-
ran back to the highway. The 30 or 40 Ger- munition supply, now running short, espe-

52
 TYPICAL NORMAN ORCHARD. Th is on< was on th < south edg<
0/ the 2d Rangers' position, the night of 6 Jun e, TIcal' coastal highway.
Gamans approaching the position th ro ugh th e orchard were able
to get close be/ore th ey were spotted. (Photo taken June 1945 .)

cially for the BAR's. Very few U.S. grenades few Rangers had lost their rifles and were
were left; although a plentiful supply of using German weapons, for which ammuni-
Germa n " potato-mash ers" were f oun d'111 pre- tion was in good supply. Companies D and
pared positions around the CP, the Ran gers E had three Tommy guns each, and E had
had a poor opinion of their effectiveness. A three German machine guns. The Rangers

53
had had nothing to eat since leaving ship ex- gun to the west, about 50 yards from Com-
cept the individual D -bars, but in the excite- pany E's defensive line. Neither outpost had
ment and activity of the day few men had seen or heard the enemy approach through
felt the need for food. the orchard. At the angle, and along E's front,
Even before Lieutenant Kerchner's re- the Rangers returned the enemy fire at once,
port, the officers had felt particularly a ppre- the BAR's firing in full bursts. Carty and
hensive about the area southwest of their Branley started back toward the corner to
angle position. At the bottom of the little get better firing positions; Carty was killed
valley to the south, a country road ran more by a grenade, and his companion, hit in the
or less parallel to the Ranger lines, west from shoulder by a bullet, managed to crawl to the
a bridge close by Sergeant Petty's outpost and hedgerow.
then northwest toward the highway. From In the Company E outpost, Corporal
their higher ground, the Rangers could watch Thompson and Hornhardt were almost
this road during daylight, but at night it was walked oVer by a group of Germans who
too far away for good observation. Houses, came suddenly around a hump in the
hedgerows, and orchards along it would give north-south hedgerow dividing the orchard.
cover for assembly of troops. It was in this Thompson saw their silhouettes against the
area, a few hundred yards southwest of the sky, so the Rangers got in their fire first at
angle in the Rangers' right position, that point-blank range and knocked down three
Lieutenant Kerchner had observed German of the enemy. The others went flat and
activity at dusk. threw grenades, one of them exploding in
Despite a moon nearly full and only Thompson's face and cutting him badly. He
partl y obscured by clouds, the Rangers found gave his BAR to Hornhardt and they started
visibility poor in front of their angle, particu- back for the corner.
larly into the orchards on the south. Here Only a few minutes after the firing be-
the: ground sloped off 30 feet in 300 yards, gan, an immense sheet of flame shot up over
and the fields of fire had been good for a day- to the west, near the position of the aban-
light action. doned German guns. (The Rangers' guess
About 2330 the Rangers posted in front was that, somehow, more powder charges
of the D-E corner were startled by a general had been set off in the ammunition dump.)
outburst of whistles and shouts, close by on The orchard slopes were fully lit up, and
the orchard slope. Enemy fire opened im- many Germans could be seen outlined against
mediately and in considerable volume. Sgt. the glare. The flare died almost at once,
Michael J. Branley and Pfc. Robert D. Carty, and the firing ended at the same time. It is
in position west of the corner, saw tracer fire possible that the powder explosion had dis-
from a machine gun to their right and only concerted the Germans and ended their effort,
2S yards from Company D's side of the but more probably the attack was only a pre-
angle. South of the corner, in Company E's liminary probe by combat patrols, trying to
outpost, the men spotted another machine locate Ranger positions by drawing their fire.

54
 This brief action brought about a few The net result of these shifts was to
changes in the Ranger positions, affecting the weaken the angle position toward which the
outposts and the west side of the angle (Com- German attack had come. Both outposts to
pany D). Certain things that happened be- south of it had come in, the two 5th Ranger
gan to show some of the difficulties of night men appearing at the main CP and telling
fighting. Thompson and Hornhardt got Lieutenant Arman that they had been or-
back to the corner and found nobody at that dered to withdraw. (There is no way of
position ; when they called for Sergeant tracing whether, why, or by whom such an
Rupinski there was no answer. (He was 20 order was given.) Two Rangers who had
yards away, to the east, but did not hear been near the angle were casualties; six
them; there were two Company D men close others, including a BAR man and the only
by with a BAR, but Thompson missed see- officer at that sector (Kerchner), had gone
ing them too.) The outpost pair decided to other parts of the line. No information on
everybody must have pulled back across the these changes in strength at the angle seems
field, so they started north along Company to have reached Lieutenant Arman's CPo
D's hedgerow and finally encountered Rang- Neither Lieutenant Kerchner on D's thinly
ers in position near the highway end of the held front, nor (apparently) Lieutenant
hedgerow. (They had passed others on the Leagans in Company E made any move to
way without spotting them in their holes strengthen the corner position. So far as can
under the hedgerow.) be determined no one visited the corner to
Lieutenant Kerchner and Sgt. Harry J. see what the situation was.
Fate were now at this end of the Company D On the east wing of the Rangers' posi-
line. When the firing began, with greatest tion there had been no firing. Neither the
concentration near Kerchner's post at the first platoon of E (Lieutenant Lapres) nor
angle, he had the impression that the attack the Company F men had been involved so
was going to roll right over them. So he and far. Down near the creek, in Sergeant Petty's
Fate went north along the hedgerow; as exposed outpost, the men were alarmed by
they started, Kerchner told Fate his plan. He the fire but couldn't locate it; they thought
would collect the D platoon near the high- it was back near the highway, and some even
way, circle west and then south, and hit the believed it was the 116th pushing along the
German attack in the flank. Kerchner called blacktop to relieve the Rangers at the Point.
to his men to follow as he ran along the Petty, a little after the skirmish ended and
hedgerow, but in the general uproar of the quiet had settled down again, heard "clink-
fire they failed to hear him. On reaching the ing" sounds over toward the farm buildings
highway he found only two men had joined west of his post. He put it down to noise
up; the fire fight was already dying out, and made by farm animals. But after another
the plan for a counterattack was given up. short spell of quiet, a machine gun opened
Lieutenant Kerchner decided to stay near the up from that flank, some of the shots ricochet-
highway. ing off a farm roller which Petty had placed

55
against the stone wall for cover to his right. through the fields and orchard to within SO
Petty's men stayed quiet, and after two short yards of the Rangers without being spotted.
bursts the enemy fire stopped. Petty decided, The attack opened with whistles, followed by
in accordance with earlier instructions, that what seemed to be shouting of names up and
he should pull back up the slope to the CPo down the front-a sort of "roll call." (Some
His group made the trip without drawing Rangers believed the Germans were locating
enemy fire. Petty with his BAR and Dix their men in relation to each other for begin-
with a machine gun reinforced the CP posi- ning the assault, but the general view was
tion, while the rest of his men were put on that the enemy was trying to scare the de-
the Company F line farther east. fense.) The shouting was followed immedi-
At the CP, where Lieutenant Arman ately by heavy firing, including machine
was stationed and to which other officers guns and machine pistols. Much of the fire
came occasionally, everything was quiet. Af- was tracer, somewhat high and inaccurate,
ter the fire fight ended, one or two Rangers designed for moral effect, but ball ammuni-
from E's line reported in, and Lieutenant tion was spraying the hedgerow eastward
Lapres went over to the west to see what had from the angle. Wild mortar fire was put
happened. Two noncoms went along the E into the field behind the hedgerow, and some
front to see if there were any casualties and Rangers reported the enemy threw in a few
if weapons were working properly. They mortar shells by hand. The Germans also
passed word to expect more attacks. Lieuten- used grenades.
ant Arman was not informed in any detail of Beyond this general characterization of
Company E's situation, and knew nothing the attack, the survivors' recollections of this
about D. As far as Company F was con- action are confused and hard to fit into any
cerned, he thought for a time of moving it clear pattern. Lieutenant Arman, at the CP
south toward the creek, to bring flanking fire to the east of the main fighting, had the im-
on any further German attack toward the pression of two distinct stages in the attack:
angle, but decided against this idea because first, a period of intense but wild fire; then,
of the danger of firing on friendly positions. after a short pause, another burst of whistlc5
The group of German prisoners near the CP and shouts followed by an assault. The mai l":
was moved farther out, into the middle of weight of the attack certainly came near the
the field, and ordered to dig in for their own angle in the Rangers' lines, but- and this is
protection. a measure of the lack of communications dur-
ing this night action-nobody knew then, 0 :·
Night Attack: Second Phase was sure later, what happened at the corner
position. Of the survivors interviewed, Tech.
About 0100 the Germans came in with 5 John S. Burnett was about 25 yards east
a stronger effort, hitting again from the south of the angle and Branley (wounded) had
and southwest against the right of Company crawled about 30 yards north of it, along
E's line. Once again. the Germans had got Company D's hedgerow. Branley reports

56
hearing Tech. 5 Henry S. Stecki's BAR open drawal if the Germans made another attack.
up from the corner (other Rangers, farther They had no communication with Company
away, confirm this) and fire almost continu- D, and did not try to send it word of their
ously for about two minutes. Then grenades plan. The officers of the 5 th Ranger platoon
exploded near the corner; after a short lull, (Parker and Zelepsky) were supposedly told
the BAR fired again, there were some more of the plan, but they do not recall hearing
grenades, and then Germans could be heard about it before it was carried out.
talking near the position. Near the middle of Company E's line,
Burnett at first made the same report, a Ranger remembers that worcl was passed
pointing to the conclusion that the Germans down the line to avoid wild firing. Am-
had occupied the corner. Later, he changed munition was running low.
his story and insisted that the Ranger's BAR
(Stecki) was still in action after the second Night Attack: Finale
German attack. Lieutenant Zelepsky (5th
Ranger officer at Arman's CP) remembers The third German attack came at some
being told that the enemy had broken into time near 0300. In general character, this
the Ranger lines, and recalls the impression one developed like the second: the same
of men at the CP that the angle was lost and whistles and roll calling to start with, then
the Germans were in the field. Lieutenant heavy and inaccurate fire, involving several
Arman has the same recollection, and thinks machine guns and burp guns which sprayed
the BAR fire at the corner was not heard after the hedgerow and the fields beyond. Mortar
the opening of the second attack. The weight fire, somewhat increased in volume, was
of the evidence, pending information from falling in the area where the prisoners were
Rangers who were later taken prisoner, sug- grouped.
gests that the enemy had captured the angle, This time the enemy pressure extended
held only by a BAR man and one rifleman. farther east, reaching into the wheatfield
It is much more clear that, whatever south of the CPo From different accounts, ma-
happened at the angle, nobody at any dis- chine guns were spotted in the orchard below
tance north or east of that position knew, the 2d Platoon of E and also directly south
after the attack, just what the situation was. of the CPo An officer at the CP had the im-
North of the corner, Company D's men pression that machine-gun fire also came
(who had so far not taken part in the fire from the field inside the Rangers' positions,
fight) lay quiet and did not investigate. near the angle. This observation fits the the-
Twenty-five yards eastward, Burnett and ory that the Germans had captured the angle
Sergeant Rupinski made no move to find out earlier, but the report might be based on high
what had taken place. Over at the main CP, fire from a gun west of the angle, in the
Lieutenant Lapres and Lieutenant Arman orchard where one was spotted in the first
had agreed that Company D's"hedgerow was attack. The only certainty is that there was
overrun; they were discussing plans for with- a great deal of fire, much of it indirect, and

57
that it had the result of confusing the de- Rangers, and their automatic fi.re ripped
fense; some Rangers even believed that the through the hedgerow, keeping the defend-
enemy were in the rear of their position, near ers down. The Rangers had plenty of Ger-
the blacktop. man grenades and used them freely in a
Lieutenant Arman reports that (as in close-range exchange. To Burnett, the fight
the second attack) the preliminary burst of seemed to go on an hour (it can only have
shooting was followed by a brief pause, pre- been minutes). He became aware that Ser-
ceding the real assault. Whatever the se- geant Boggetto's BAR, to the left, had
quence, the western half of 'Company E's stopped firing; then a burst of German fire
line was overrun in a short time after the began to sweep along the Ranger side of the
attack began. Only a few incidents of the hedge, coming from the east and enfilading
action can be recovered from survivors who the 2d Platoon's fox holes. Burnett and the
were in or near that area. There is enough man next to him were wounded. The enemy
evidence to suggest that, even if the angle had evidently broken into the field to their
had been taken earlier, the main penetration left. Burnett could also spot them to his right
now came near the middle of E's hedgerow in the angle. He heard Sergeant Rupinski
and rolled up the Ranger positions west from arguing with a few Rangers, trying to decide
there to the angle. whether they could fight it out. The talk
One fox hole east of Lieutenant Leagans' ended by Rupinski shouting "Kamerad."
post at the junction of the two platoons, Pfc. The Germans moved in and rounded up the
Harold D. Main (who had been wounded survivors, many of them wounded, including
by a grenade) heard the Germans coming up Burnett. Lieutenant Leagans was dead.
close in the wheat just beyond the hedgerow. About 20 Rangers were taken off the field,
After a pause following the heavy opening nearl y all from Leagans' pia toon of E, and
fire, they rushed the hedgerow to Main's moved to a German CP a mile to the sou tho
right, and Crook's BAR went silent. Minutes Here, Burnett 1 saw a force, estimated at a
later, Main could hear Germans talking on company, coming by the CP from the south,
his side of the hedge and knew what had and judged the post was a battalion CP be-
happened. He crawled under the thick tangle cause of the presence nearby of an aid station.
of vines and briars into the middle of the From the varied and sometimes irrecon-
hedgerow. Hidden there, he heard S/ Sgt. cilable stories of the Rangers who were near
Curtis A. Simmons surrender, only 15 feet Lieutenant Arman's CP, one gets a fair re-
away, but the Germans came no farther east. flection of the confusion that existed under
Burnett, still in his fox hole 25 yards the difficulties of this last phase in a night
east of the corner, confirms the impression battle. Arman reports that after the opening
that the decisive action was not on his right, fire he, Lapres, and the 5 th Ranger officers
toward the angle, but left, toward Lieutenant
1 Burnett escaped a few days later by killing a guard, was
Leagans' post. Near Burnett the Germans helped by the French Underground. and succeeded in getting back
had worked through the orchard close to the to the Allied lines after they rcached Rouen in August.

58
went ahead with the plan to withdraw, al- captured machine gun. It jammed on the
ready agreed on. Arman had no idea whether first round, and a rifle bullet from some
Leagans of Company D knew the plan. Ac- Ranger firing down the lane behind Dix hit
cording to Lieutenant Zelepsky (5 th Rang- a glancing blow on his helmet, stunning him.
ers) , there was little or no prearranged plan: Recovering, and starting to crawl along the
men began to come in from E's line to the hedgerow ditch back to the CP, Dix heard
west, reporting the Germans had broken the Petty yell "Down!" just before opening with
position, and the report was confirmed by en- his BAR on Germans coming up the lane.
emy fire that seemed to come from the field Sergeant Robey's BAR joined in, and this
inside the angle. This led to a hasty decision fire broke up the only attack that came close
to withdraw. Sgt. Lawrence Lare remembers to the CPo One German was caught crawling
a man running across the field from the west along the hedgerow into the CP area, and
to report that Company D was wiped out. was killed by a grenade that landed directly
Smith and Tech. 5 Charles H. Dunlap, who under his chest. Plenty of fire was coming
had been near Main's fox hole, came in to the across the wheatfield from the west, but no
CP (because their guns had jammed) to re- assault was tried from that quarter.
port that there were no Rangers left between As the volume of enemy fire built up
their former position and the CPo Some of the again from south and west, indicating a new
5th Ranger men who had been in the Com- rush was at hand, hasty and informal meas-
pany E line later said that the 2d Rangers ures were taken to pass the word around for
"pulled out and left them there." withdrawal back to the highway and the
According to plan or not, a withdrawal Point. Some Rangers failed to get the notice
took place from the CP area. Just before it and were temporarily left behind. Petty and
started, that wing of the Ranger line saw Robey were told to bring up the rear and
some action for the first time that night. Fol- cover the withdrawal with their BAR's.
lowing the first burst of German fire, which Noncommissioned officers tried hurriedly to
indicated the enemy were now south of the round up their men. Once started, move-
CP in the wheatfield, some more Rangers ment was fast. S/ Sgt. Richard N. Hathaway
were put into the northeast corner of that of the 5 th Rangers had been posted halfway
field to strengthen the group already there. back to the highway, along the lane. His
The reinforcements included Sergeant Petty first notice of what was happening came
with his BAR, S/ Sgt. Frederick A. Dix with when men ran by toward the north. Hatha-
a German machine gun, and some Company way stuck his head through the hedgerow
F riflemen. A German party came east- and shouted "Hey! What's up? Where you
ward crossing the upper end of the wheat- going?" The nearest man stopped running,
field; they were starting through the hedge- put his rifle in Hathaway's face, and de-
row embankment into the lane when Dix manded the password. Hathaway was so
saw them only a few feet away from his post rattled that he could just remember the word
in the lane. He turned around to use the in time. Told "the Germans are right be-

59
 HEDGEROvVS sudl as this one: enabfed RangtTs left behind after
the night attack to hide until relieving forces reached the area Of]
D + 2. This photo, taken June /9-/5 , shows the lane that leaves
highway just cast of Au Cuay and runs toward the cliO;.

hind us-get out quick to the Point!" he of E and none from D. Lieutenant Arman
collected part of his group (he couldn't find figured that the Germans might have infil-
some, but they came in later) , and went trated between the highway and the Point,
north. There could be no question of bring- so sent one party over to the east and then
ing back the prisoners. into the Point across fields. Lieutenant Ar-
As the parties arrived at the blacktop, man and a second party, including some of
there was no sign of any pursuit, and an ef- Company E, went back by the exit road. The
fort was made to reorgani ze those Rangers at 5th Ranger men made their way through the
hand and to see that none were left. A hasty completely unfamiliar terrain in scattered
check-up showed that the Company F men parties (and were afterward resentful of their
were nearly all there, but only a scattering having been cast adrift, though what hap-

60
pc ned was probably inevitable under the cir- included in tlle disaster. But from about 30
cumstances of night withdrawal). All told, yards north of the angle and on to the high-
about 50 men got back to th e Point, shortly way, the rest of D's contingent (some dozen
after 0400, and were put at once into an men) were still in their original positions,
improvised defensive line from gun position scattered along 250 yards of hedgerow. They
No. 5 to gun position No. 3. Very little had no notice of a withdrawal. When they
could be done to organ ize the position before realized it was under way, they had no
daylight. chance to move, with Germans in the fields
Colonel Rudder was told that the rest of to their rear and Aanks. Daylight was near,
tlle force had been destroyed. "Neutralized" and the 12 men stayed in the deep drainage
would have been a more exact word. All ditch , overhung with the heavy vegetation
Company E Rangers from Main's fox hole of the hedgerow. They had delivered no fire
to the angle had been killed or captured, and during the attacks and could only hope the
a few men of D near the corner had been Germans had not spotted their positions.

PREPAR ING TO LEAVE THE POINT 0 D + 2. The relief ac-

complished, 2d Rangers joined in drive toward Grandcamp. Col. Rudder
(arrow) had been wounded 3 limes, but accompanied his lora.

61
 MEN OF 20 AND 5TH RANGERS at a religious service held
in a Norman hedgerow field by the chaplain of Ranger Fora .

On the east-west hedgerow, between had been only a few yards off, Wadsworth
the breakthrough area and the CP, three got no answer, and stayed put under a tangle
more Rangers had been left behind in the of briars.
confusion of withdrawal. Main was one. Both Theobald and Wadsworth were
Another was Tech. 5 Earl Theobold, who caught during the next two days. Wads-
had been in the field guarding prisoners. worth was spotted earl y in the morning.
During the final attack he came over to the Theobald lay quiet for most of the day, then
hedgerow near Main "to help out." He thought he was seen by a passing German
could find no Rangers, and soon heard Ger- and bolted out toward the highway, without
man voices near the CP, so he hid in the drawing fire. He hid again in a ditch near
ditch. Pfc. Loring L. Wadsworth, in the the highway, for the night. On the morning
same sector and about 75 yards from Main, of D+ 2 firing came close to his hideout
had missed the word of withdrawal. When along the road. It was the 116th Infantry,
he finally called to his nearest neighbor, who attacking to relieve the Point, but Theobald

62
could not know that. Leaving the highway off eastwa rd. Germans reappeared in the
and cutt ing south , he was captured by a ma- field at dusk and set up machine-gun posi-
chine-gun post near the creek. Main spen t tions; the isolated Ranger group settled in
D+ I watching German patrols go by, and for another night. They were freed next
a machine gun being set up in the field near morning by the 1 16th Infantry.
his hedgerow. That night he crawled out, On D+ 1 Colonel Rudder's force at
threw a grenade in the general direction of Pointe du Hoe consisted of about 90 men
the machine gun, and "lit out for the Point" able to bea r arms. Restricted to a few acres,
without drawing enemy fire. including only a part of th e fortified area,
The Company D men lay hidden all the th ey expected to be the target for heavy con-
next da y under their hedgerow. No enemy centrations of artillery, and for assault by
search of the area was made, and they saw enemy ground forces. With the support of
onl y a few Germans during the period. Their strong naval fire the Rangers held out during
main cause of worry was fire from naval the day, and that afternoon their situation
guns, supporting the beleaguered Point; was improved by the landing of a craft with
from time to time, fri endly shells came close food, ammunition, and a platoon of rein-
enough to "bounce the men around" in their forcements. By night they were in touch
holes, but there were no losses. Late in the with patrols of a relief force that had reached
day th eir hopes were raised and then dashed. St-Pierre-du-Mont, only 1,000 yards away.
Four Sherman tanks rolled down the high- The relief of the Point came next morning,
way toward G randcamp within sight of the on D+Z .I
Rangers. But no infantry followed, and in
I For :I n outlinl' a..:..:oun t of the rdid of Pointe du Iloc , SC:C
a short while the tanks came back and went 0","1111 Bt'uddu'lif/, in thi~ l>(:rin"

63
SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

THE FIGHT ON
TANAPAG PLAIN
 :l[ AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
on SAIPAN
Morning 5 July 1944

= FRONT LIN E
-+--+--+- NARROW GAUGE RAILWAY
ROCKY BLUFFS
"""'""'"
COCONUT GROVE
r=:::::::J
CONTOUR INTERVAL 100 FEET

1000 o '000
YAROS

MAP NO.1

66
 SAlFilN ISLAND

I'

o 2 3 4 ,
NAUTICAL MILES

67
 27 TH DIVISION ZONE
Mornino 5 J uIy 1944

05 1000
- - FRONT liNE.
11111111111111 DEPARTURE (FOIl 051200)
- lD- lIH£ OF
~ CocONU T 6ROY f

CoNrO(lR
t.;....:..:...: /NTC/MAL KJ() FECT

o '000,

MA P NO . 2

68
O n 5 July the battle for Saipan was end- Holland M. Smith, USMC, commanding V
ing its third week. Since the initial landings Amphibious Corps, was preparing for the as-
on Saipan, 15 June, the three divisions of sault on Tinian Island and wanted the 2d
the V Amphibious Corps had been in almost Marine Division to be rested for this action.
continuous and very bloody action. Though The 27th Division, commanded by Maj.
their losses had been high and the troops Gen. George W. Griner, held the western
were tired, the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions end of the front with two regiments on line
and the 27th Division had kept plugging; in a zone one and a half miles wide. The
the close of their task was now in sight. The I 06th Infantry was in divisional reserve. On
Japanese forces were penned in the northern 5 July his two forward regiments were to at-
end of the island, and out of 30,000 enemy tack abreast from a line of departure (shown
troops, it was estimated that only 5,000 to on Map No.2, opposite), with objectives
7,000 were left, supported by one battalion 4,000 yards to the northeast. The terrain
of 77 -mm guns and perhaps 20 of an original difIered greatly in the two regimental zones.
100 tanks. Every indication, including the To the right, the 165th Infantry was ad-
testimony of prisoners, pointed to a complete vancing in the rugged hills that characterize
breakdown of enemy communications and the interior of Saipan Island. These hills
to his serious difficulties with respect to food, terminate sharply in an escarpment marked
water, and hospital facilities. The Japanese by frequent stretches of cliff. Below the steep
faced also a shortage of small-arms weapons. wall paralleling the shoreline an 800-yard
Many of their remaining units were disor- strip of coastal plain, flat or slightly rolling,
ganized by losses of officers, and the state of bordered the Saipan beach. This coastal
their morale was questionable. Information plain, and the edge of the hills that dominate
found in documents captured on 4 July con- it, fell in the zone of the 105th Infantry.
firmed other evidence that there were two
principal centers of resistance in the area, five Background: The Attack on 5 July
miles deep, still held by the enemy: near the
Marpi airfield, zone of the 4th Marine Divi- Neither attacking regiment of the 27th
sion, and at Paradise Valley, facing the 27th Division made much headway on 5 July. At
Division (Map No. I). the day's end the 105th, with which this ac-
These two divisions held the U.S. line count is mainly concerned, was still short of
on 5 July, the 2d Marine Division having the planned line of departure, although the
been pinched out the day before. Lt. Gen. left-wing units along the beach had advanced

69
 NIGHT POSITIONS 5 JULY
I05th INFANTRY
r:=::::J CocoNuT GROVE

FORM LINES OM.Y. NOT CONTOVIfS

INrERVAL 50 FEET

o ...
,

""'"

-- .......
F,on' Lint "
\
\

MAP NO.3

some 1,500 yards. This move had been made A main road ran northeast along' the
through terrain not previousl y reconnoi tered, beach, leading from Tanapag to the north of
in which the Japanese had constructed ex- Saipan. Almost paralleling it was a narrow-
tensive defenses to resist landings on the gauge railroad, single-tracked, for service of
beach. Almost no opposition was encoun- the sugar plantation industry. Close to the
tered in these emplacements, but each in turn line of departure, at Road Junction 2, a main
had to be carefully worked through, and this road branched off east, into the hills and
took time. As the line of departure was across the island. Just south of this junction
neared, some fighting began to develop all was the most prominent landmark on the al-
along the line, particularly to the right on the most bare coastal plain: a large coconut grove,
hills that walled the coastal plain. with tall grass beneath the trees.

70
 The 2d Battalion, I 05 th Infantry, moved stead il y increasing volume, hamFering rescue
up into this area on the afternoon of 5 July, of the tankers and stopping any furth er ad-
working along the coastal plain with E and vance. Despite every effort to locate positions,
F Companies abreast (Map No. 3, opposite). the source of the fire was not determined by
Com pany E, mopping lip enem y defensive the end of the day, except that the enemy had
positions in a series of platoon actions, had put antitank gun s somewhere in the cliffs
finally pllshed almost to Road Junction 2 ahead. Company E stopped to organ ize a
when the advance stalled under intense ina- night position south of and near Road Junc-
chine-gun fire. Patrols decided th at the en- tion 2. To th e right of the railroad, Company
emy had set up one or two gun s in an old F had almost reached the coconut grove late
landing barge which was beached on the left in the afternoon , mopping up small groups of
Rank . Two tanks were sent along the coastal Japa nese. Lea rning that E was digging in to
highwa y beyond the road junction, and their the left, Company F pulled over near it to
fire apparently silenced the enemy mach ine establish its night perimeter.
gun s. Returning, the tanks pulled off the The 3d Battalion of the 105 th had a
road to the south and ran into a minefield zone that included the escarpment edging
which compl etely wrecked one of the vehi- the coastal plain; therefore, its units moved
cles. Enemy fire immediately reopened in northeast straddling the plain and the rough

TANAPAG PLAIN had milch open ground like this, looking

toward the coconut grove from the west . I-iiI/sides on right . back-
ground . BodiN o/ Japanese killed in th e banzai attack litter th e field ..
(I) july) (Ii Marines go into the grove in mopping-up operations.
 Y AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
' MQrp' I'I)o nl
Mornu19 6 July 1944

--- ""ONT L'II( 5 .IU~'

!I'm\'Imm 1'_1 LINt 6 All'

MAP NO . 4

hillside. Company K, on the low ground, the escarpment. On the spur between them,
reached the southeast side of the coconut the cross-island road zigzagged up from Road
grove in the early afternoon, and there came Junction 2. A rough trail branched off this
under considerable fire both from the grove road at the edge of the plain and followed the
and from the hillside to its right. Tanks second of the two draws. It was this second
worked through the trees without finding draw, to be known later as Harakiri Gulch,
enemy positions, and K made no further that showed signs on 5 July of being a center
progress. It dug in for the night south of the of enemy resistance. Fire from the mouth of
coconut plantation, at the foot of the hill. the draw had contributed to the troubles of
Just ahead of K's position, two steep- Company K on the plain, but it was Com-
sided, narrow draws broke the long wall of pany L (and, farther inland, the 165 th In-

72
fantry) that made the real test of enemy plain, the 165th's flank would be exposed.
strength in Harakiri Gulch. But at 0905 on the 6th, when the action had
Company L on 5 July faced the difficult already begun, General Griner received or-
ground on the hillside, its right flank in con- ders from Corps that appeared to simplify the
tact with the 3d Battalion of the 165th. To- 27th Division's mission.
ward the middle of the morning, L had The 4th Marine Division on the right
passed the first (western) gulch and was had found the going easier and was well
crossing the spur used by the road on its way ahead in its zone. Further unequal advance
into the upland. But when L's men reached by the two divisions, along the northeast axis
the crest looking down into Harakiri Gulch, of attack, would expose the flank of the 4th
they were caught by heavy fire from cliff Marine Division. Enemy resistance appeared
positions on the far side of the ravine. For to be heaviest toward the west coast, so that
the rest of the day, Company L was held on the 27th could not be expected to catch up
the spur. Despite every effort to neutralize easily. General Holland Smith decided to
enemy opposition by building up strong fire continue the sweep to the northeast with
support, including antitank guns and artil- the 4th Marines, while the 27th Division
lery, any attempt at advance was stopped at mopped up the enemy in a more limited zone
the edge of Harakiri Gulch by a hail of fire. on the left flank. Di vision zones were there-
On the right, higher up the draw and beyond fore radically altered; the 4th Marine Divi-
it, the 165th Infantry was meeting the same sion, reinforced, would extend its front to
fierce resistance and was making no better the northwest, pinching out the 27th zone
progress. Company L dug in for the night on beyond Makunsha, and continue toward the
this spur, with I to its left rear on the hill end of the island (Map No. 6, page 82).
slope. All that remained for General Griner's divi-
The results of the day's actIOn had been sion was to push about 2,500 yards further
disappointing for the I05th Infantry. The through hills and along the coastal plain.
lead units were still short of the line of de- Division Headquarters was optimistic about
parture, and, except on the right, they had completing this job quickly. Except for the
not yet developed the enemy's positions. It G-2, and for the company commanders who
was known in the 3d Battalion that Hara- had been in contact with the enemy at Hara-
kiri Gulch was strongly held, but no one yet kiri Gulch, everyone regarded the Japanese
realized how much this could affect the strength at that point as amounting to little
105th's advance along the coastal plain be- more than a minor pocket. Main enemy
low. strength was still believed concentrated far-
Plans for 6 July called for pressing the ther northeast, in Paradise Valley. General
attack that had barely got under wayan the Griner had been on the point of relieving
previous day (Map No.4, opposite). The the battle-weary 165th Infantry with the
main effort was scheduled to come in the I 06th, but now decided to let the front-line
105th's zone; failing better progress on the units finish the job.

73
 105 th INFANTRY ATTACK
McM'ninv 6 July 1944

MAP NO.5

By the time this new order had been re- road, was the extensive minefield which had
ceived and digested by Division, the 105th stopped his tanks the day before and which
Infantry was already in trouble, both on the was in an area effectively interdicted by in-
edge of the hills and below in the plain. tense enemy fire. The mines occupied virtu-
ally the whole space between highway and
Morning of 6 July: Attack on the Plain railroad tracks, to an estimated depth of 100
yards. A little beyond this minefield a deep
Under pressure from Division to move ditch ran from the base of the cliffs to the
promptly and reach their objectives, both bat- sea, providing perfect cover for enemy move-
talions of the 105 th were ready to attack at ment and also constituting a possible tank
0700 on 6 July (Map No.5, above). trap. South of the minefield, toward the co-
Maj . Edward A. McCarthy, command- conut grove, the ground was open and could
ing the 2d Battalion of the 105th, planned be easily covered by fire from any Japanese
his attack with an eye to avoiding the sector positions along the cliffs. McCarthy decided
where he had met trouble on the previous to bypass this whole zone by slipping his bat-
afternoon. Ahead of his night position, talion to the left, along the narrow .strip of
beyond the first stretch of the cross-island beach between the water and the coastal high-
74
way. That route would bring the 2d Bat- up enemy elements that might have infil-
talion into a zone of prepared beach defenses, trated during the night. A patrol of E was
made up mainly of pillboxes emplaced for sent to the right to locate Company K, which
defense against landings from the sea. In was thought to be pushing through the coco-
order to eliminate them, McCarthy decided nut grove, so that E after deploying beyond
on an old-fash ioned rolling barrage which th e minefield could tie in with K. The patrol,
would force the Japanese to hole up in their three men under Sgt. Carlos A. Harris, left
shelters. The infantry, following close be- promptly at 0700.
hind this fire, would catch the enemy in their The battalion attack moved off on sched-
holes before they could emerge to man the ule, with the 249th Field Artillery Battalion
firing positions. putting heavy, concentrated fire on the whole
The assault would be made in column of area beyond the minefield. In Company F,
companies, with F leading. Company E was I st Lt. John E. Titterington had placed his
to follow and fan out to the right of the beach left platoon (3d) between the road and the
as soon as the minefield was passed. Com- water's edge, while the 2d Platoon moved
pany G, in reserve, was ordered to move back just right of the highway, skirting the edge
over the ground covered on 5 Jul y, mopping of the minefield.

AERIAL PHOTO OF TANAPAG PLAIN BATTLE ZONE

 The advance of F Company was well emergency he sent his runner back to order
coordinated and rapid, the men moving out up the vehicles, a mission which turned out
all along the line in a series of rushes. Within to be a particularly slow and tedious task.
a few minutes of the jump-off, both assault By this time anyone wbo lifted up his head
platoons had almost passed beyond the north- would draw heavy and accurate fire on him-
ern limits of the minefield, a gain of approxi- self, so that the runner had to crawl slowly
mately 100 yards. This brought them to a and carefully back a distance of 150 yards
point about 150 yards short of the ditch that before he could move rapidly. When he did
crossed the coastal plain at right angles to the get to the battalion CP, the tanks were not
axis of advance. Company E, following close there and he had to go along the road all
behind, was almost in position to fan out to the way to Regiment on the far side of Tana-
the right. At this point the artillery fire pag before he was able to get the tank platoon
shifted on up the road to the east and left leader and bring him up. It was 1000 before
the ditch area. Almost at once there was a the tanks came rumbling up the road to
heavy burst of enemy machine-gun fire, fol- Road Junction 2.
lowed by a fusillade of small arms. All of The period between approximately
the men were forced to go to earth, but they 0730, when the attack had bogged down,
were in an extremely exposed position and and the arrival of the tanks, was not entirely
began to suffer casualties. The plain was cov- lost. Major McCarthy spent the first part of
ered with foot-high grass that offered little that time in maneuvering his men to prevent
concealment. Major McCarthy, who was any possibility of a successful Japanese coun-
with Company E, tried to get the men to terattack. Company E, by crawling and wrig-
start forward, moving up and down the line gling ahead, managed to deploy itself on a
yelling "Up and at 'em," but the first two three-platoon front between the road and a
men in Company E who tried to get up and point about 75 yards to the south. From this
move were hit and killed immediately. The ground, just east of the minefield, the men
fire had now become intense and the whole spent the rest of the morning trying to lo-
area was alive with bullets. The supporting cate the source of the fire that was causing the
artillery fire was falling some distance away delay. Slowly but surely the men inched for-
and had no effect on the immediate situation. ward, a little at a time. By noon they were
So well concealed were the Japanese that only 100 yards short of the ditch. About
none of the men along the narrow battalion 0900, Major McCarthy decided to withdraw
front could locate the enemy fire positions. Company F from their cramped area be-
Major McCarthy now began to try to tween the road and the beach. He had re-
bring up tanks or SPM's to lay down some ceived word from Sergeant Harris' patrol
direct fire support along the front, but when regarding the movement of Company K and
he tried to get hold of his CP by radio there now, with Company E operating along the
was no answer. His own radio was out, and railroad track and the road, he resolved to
so was Capt. Clinton F. Smith's. In this use Company F between E and K. He trans-

76
mitted the orders to 1st Lieutenant Titter- reconnaissance had crept out along the rail-
ington, and Company F had moved back road track for some distance and had ascer-
out of the beach corridor at about the time tained the fact that it was not mined, so Major
the tanks arrived at Road Junction 2. Within McCarthy determined to send his tanks
an hour F had marched some distance around along the right of way.
the rear of the line and was moving into posi- The tank force consisted of five medi-
tion in the gap between the 2d and 3d Bat- ums under the command of 1st Lt. Dudley
talions. Carried out with caution, the move- A. Williams of the 762d Tank Battalion.
ment was accomplished without casualties. The narrowness of the right of way made it
The 2d Battalion commander had also necessary for these vehicles to proceed in
given his attention to the minefield that was single file along the roadbed. Williams sent
causing so much trouble. Shortly before them out about 20 yards apart. The lead
0900 he called up his battalion engineer tank crept along almost to the north edge
officer, 1st Lt. Richard M. Hughes, and or- of the minefield. There its tracks picked
dered him to make a reconnaissance of the up one of the thin steel rails, and within a
mined area. Hughes had to crawl through few seconds was unable to move in any direc-
the minefield on his stomach because of the tion. The tank was still far short of a point
intense fire, but before I 000 had reported where it could do any good with its guns;
back that the field was about 50 by 100 yards tangled up as it was in the now twisted rails
and was composed of upended aerial bombs, and ties of the cane railroad, it effecti vel y
fused as mines. He volunteered to begin re- blocked the path of the next tank behind it.
moval at once and brought up his platoon Lieutenant Hughes was called over and was
from Company A, 102d Engineer Combat put to work with his men in an effort to
Battalion, to begin the job. This platoon had clear a path through the minefield so that
to work while lying flat and under constant the second tank could be worked around the
heavy fire, a situation which made their task disabled one. While this work was in prog-
extremel y slow. ress, the enemy brought antitank guns to bear
With the arrival of the tanks, Major along the railroad track; on the first two
McCarthy was faced with the problem of shots, both tanks were hit, although neither
getting them into position to lay down cover- was put out of action. The crews reported
ing and supporting fire. The road was a that they "could see daylight through their
questionable route of approach because of the tanks." Lieutenant Williams immediately
interdicting fire. Furthermore, the road asked for permission to get the vehicles out
crossed the ditch ahead over a narrow bridge, of the danger area until a route of approach
which was almost certain to be mined. The could be laid out which would enable his
beach could be used only with difficulty, and tanks to keep moving. Major McCarthy
houses, trees, and shrubbery along the north agreeing, a cable was hooked onto the lead
side of the road cut down the fields of fire tank and both vehicles were hauled loose and
considerably. But Lieutenant Hughes in his clear of the area.

77
 It was now after 1100, and the attack aboard and the vehicle started out, but be-
of the 2d Battalion had shown little or no fore it had gone ten yards the same antitank
progress. Company E was effectively pinned fire which damaged Lieutenant Williams'
down between the minefield and the ditch two tanks began landing in the area. In view
°
across the front, about IS yards north of of this fire, the SPM commander decided to
Road Junction 2 where they had started. pull back out of the exposed area. The proj-
Company F had taken up a line behind the ect was abandoned for the time being.
road that ran from Road Junction 2 to the Sergeant Nicolette was still convinced
coconut grove, holding there until the situa- that he could get rid of this one position at
tion cleared up to the front. As yet no one least. After some discussion with Captain
had been able to locate accurately the source Smith, he got permission to withdraw his
of the Japanese fire. Intelligence on this platoon from the area along the beach and,
problem was achieved quite by accident, moving around and up the railroad track, to
shortly after the tanks were pulled back out see if he could bring fire on the ditch from
of danger. there. The men had to move the whole dis-
While the two tanks were trying to move tance by crawling, so that it was past noon
along the railroad track, the left platoon (I st) before they reached a place from which they
of Company E had been drawn up between could bring weapons to bear. I t cost Com-
the road and the beach. Extending from the pany E one more man wounded, and after
road to the railroad track was the 3d Platoon. the platoon had reached its new position it
Both of these units were laying down a cover- found itself still unable to do anything about
ing fire to the front, when one of the men, the enemy gun in the ditch.
Pfc. Edwin J. Kula, happened to notice move- S/ Sgt. William H. Allen, one of the
ment in the ditch close ahead. He called the squad leaders, now asked permission to take
attention of S/ Sgt. Angelo D . Nicolette, his his squad, rush the ditch, and try to knock
platoon sergeant, to the possibility that one out the position in that manner. After care-
of the enemy machine guns was located in fully organizing his men, Sergeant Allen
the gully, and Nicolette immediately called started out in a swift dash toward the trench.
for 60-mm mortar fire to be directed into the Almost immediately the enemy fire resumed
ditch. He was notified, in return, that the in full strength, and most of Allen's men had
mortar section was out of ammunition and to duck for cover. The sergeant, who was
did not expect a resupply for some time. He first up and running, made a jump for the
crawled back, then, to Road Junction 2 and ditch and landed there, only to find himself
talked with the driver of an SPM of the sprawling in the midst of about eight enemy
105th Cannon Company, which had just soldiers. Allen reacted automatically, shoot-
come up the road. The driver agreed to work ing two of the Japanese and bayoneting a
up the coastal road as far as he could in an third. I n the melee that followed he was shot
effort to put fire into the spot which Pri- in the leg by a bullet that wounded him in
vate Kula had suspected. Nicolette climbed four different places. Up to that moment,

78
 INFANTRY AND MEDIUM TANKS 0/ Mar;'" units advance into
coconut grove on 8 July, mopping up after Japanese banzai attack .

the squad leader had not realized he was 1300 and the 2d Battalion still had not been
without support, but now he looked around able to get going.
and decided that he was outnumbered. In The battle on the Tanapag Plain had
one dive he was out of the ditch and crawl- been just as bitter in front of Company K,
ing back toward his company. Although which started the day facing the coconut
wounded painfully, Allen insisted that he be grove. This company, like the 2d Battalion,
allowed to take his squad back to clean out was ready to move off in the attack at 0700,
the remaining enemy soldiers. He thought accompanied by a platoon of light tanks un-
there were only five left. However, the vol- der 1st Lt. Willis K. Dorey. 1st Lt. Roger
ume of fire that was directed at him after he P. Peyre, profiting by the experience of his
came back out of the gully had, for the first company on the previous afternoon, ordered
time, given Major McCarthy and his com- K's men to move up along a deep gully that
pany commanders some idea as to where the circled along the southwest edge of tlle grove,
main enemy strength lay. Clearly the Japa- making use of the cover and concealment that
nese held the ditch in large numbers, and it offered. Stealing along this trench, the
most of the terrible and intense fire that was men were able to get almost into the grove
keeping the men down was coming from this itself before they were detected, but as they
source, not more than 100 yards away. Allen emerged from defilade they were taken under
was not permitted to return to the ditch to fire by at least two machine guns firing from
"clean it out." It was now approximately deep within the grove. For a short time the

79
whole company was pinned down, unable to For over an hour Company K worked their
locate the source of fire. way among tremendous stock piles of sup-
It was at this point that Sergeant Harris plies, mostly foodstuffs, poking around in
and his patrol from Company E blundered these piles in search of stray enemy soldiers.
into the coconut grove from the west. Ser- By 08 15 they were through. to the north
geant Harris had been told that he would edge of the trees, facing the open ground
probably find Lieutenant Peyre in the grove, beyond the cross-island road.
and had worked his way directly there with- Not all of Company K had taken part
out realizing that it was still in the hands of in the advance through the grove. Lieutenant
the enemy. He and his two men, Pfc. John Peyre had placed his 3d Platoon on the right
Lopez and Pvt. Keith M. Jarrell, had no of his line with instructions to keep in sight
sooner entered the trees than a machine gun of Company L on the hills south of Harakiri
opened up from 25 yards' distance, wound- Gulch. Shortly after the rest of the company
ing Harris seriously in the back. Private began to pull through the grove, this platoon
Lopez spotted the gun at once in a small, was forced to draw to the right to maintain
criblike building. He told Private Jarrell to their contact with Company L; as. a result
crawl back out of the grove and get back to they soon became completely separated from
Captain Smith with the information that the remainder of their own uni t. Their move
Harris had been wounded. He himself brought the platoon out into the open ground
would stay with the wounded sergeant to just south of the grove and almost directly
guard him u:::til Jarrell could get back with beneath the hills. From the very first they
help. For several minutes Lopez lay on the began drawing heavy fire from the cliffs to
ground with his charge, and in that period their right front, particularly from the north
was able to spot and accurately mark the nose of the entrance to Harakiri Gulch. Us-
Japanese machine-gun positions in the grove. ing cover as much as possible the platoon
While thus engaged he noticed Company K managed to reach the turn in the road where
trying to work forward against this fire and it began its ascent of the hills. There fire be-
without hesitation got to his knees, endeavor- came so intense that further movement was
ing to attract attention to himself and to point impossible. Lieutenant Peyre immediately
out the gun positions. When this failed, ordered Dorey to take his tanks and move
Lopez made his way by short rushes to a along the cross-island road until he reached a
point at the rear of the grove where he could position from which he could put effective
see Dorey's tanks. It took him only a few fire on the cliff positions to the right front.
moments to orient the tank commander on This was at 0830.
the Japanese positions, and Dorey immedi- Dorey's fire worked particularly well
ately waded into the grove with his guns blaz- against the enemy positions along the cliffs.
ing. Ten minutes later two machine-gun It was only a matter of a few minutes before
positions had been completely destroyed and the Japanese had been driven off their guns
Peyre's men were moving up into the grove. all along the line and the fire died down. As

80
long as Dorey fired, the men of Company K tion, most of the cave positions in the side of
were able to move about at will, but the mo- the cliff above the ditch had been spotted and
ment there was any lull the soldiers could see interdicted. As long as the enemy eQuId be
the enemy coming back toward their guns. kept from using these weapons, Peyre's posi-
As a result, Dorey had to keep up a constant tion was quite secure and tenable. Advance
fire. Lieutenant Peyre was trying to coor- was another question; any forward move
dinate this fire so that his infantrymen could would carry Company K opposite the mouth
advance under its support, but tank-infantry of Harakiri Gulch, and, unless Company L
communications failed at this critical point. on the right made a move down through the
Peyre could neither reach Dorey on the radio Gulch, Company K's whole flank would be
nor make any impression on him with hand exposed and their rear uncovered to enemy
and arm signals. As a result Dorey simply emerging from the stronghold in the draw.
kept patrolling up and down the road, laying For these reasons Peyre elected to stand
down a blanket of fire on the cliffs which and hold his ground until the tanks came
kept the enemy from firing, but which also back. He brought up his machine guns and
kept Company K from advancing through carefull y instructed his platoon leaders to
his line of fire. Suddenly, at about 1000, place rifle fire on the already interdicted en-
Dorey pulled his tanks over to where Lieu- emy positions. When this had been accom-
tenant Peyre had established his CP, just in- plished, he released the tanks and Dorey went
side the cover of the grove, and informed him off after his resupply. Peyre's men took over
that he was almost out of ammunition and the task of keeping the Japanese off the guns
would have to return to the dumps for a re- and had no trouble at all.
supply. He would be gone for approximately The tanks had no more than disap-
half an hour. Peyre could do nothing but let peared (lOIS) when Peyre got word from
the tankers go. Battalion that he would shortly receive new
His situation was not too critical. On orders.
this section of the front, in contrast to what
McCarthy was facing, the Japanese positions Change in Attack Plans
had been accurately located. A hundred
yards ahead of Com pan y K, in the open ter- General Griner, upon hearing at 0915
rain north of the grove, a small rise in the of the change in divisional zones from Corps,
ground forming a knoll extended part way had immediately notified his regimental com-
across Peyre's zone of action. Company K manders that there would be a new division
had now definitely located three enemy ma- order. Through the 5th of July, the main
chine-gun positions behind this rise, near the effort had been made on the left and had
same ditch that extended in front of the 2d brought little resul t. The new division boun-
Battalion, and all morning Dorey's tanks had daries and objectives handed down by the
put enough fire into the area to keep the Corps would have the effect of shifting the
Japanese from manning the guns. In addi- weight of the 27th's attack from left to right,

81
 THE NEW ATTACK ZONES
7ll1HlllTI. FRONT LINE. NOON • • JULY
- - - OLD I!IOUtiDAR1E$

- - NEW looNO"RIES EFFECTIYE

__ •• 1200, II JULT

::::::::::-:. CoCOANUT COROVE

CoNrOlJR INTCRYAL 100 FeCT

o !>OQ: " 1000

MAP NO.6

as the axis of advance swung from northeast 165th Infantry and, on the edge of the hills,
to due north (Map No.6, above). This by the 3d Battalion of the 105th.
change of direction involved pivoting on the This plan involved some shifting in the
left wing while the 165 th Infantry pressed units of the 105th, notably with respect to
through the hills inland to reach the coastal the 3d Battalion. Realizing that the Hara-
plain. Some time would be required to kiri Gulch position was an extremely strong
mount the attack on the new axis, but the one and that Company L had experienced
battalion commanders of the 165th reported little success in penetrating it thus far (see
their readiness by 1 13 O. King Hour for the next section, page 86), Lt. Col. Edward T.
27th Division's attack was then set for 1200, Bradt, in command of the 3d Battalion, de-
when the main effort would be made by the cided to bolster his right flank for the main

82
effort by inserting his reserve, Company I, land road, take the trail that led up into Hara-
on the right of his line, between L and the kiri Gulch, and go into the gulch delivering
left wing company of the 165th Infantry. fire on the cliffs, thus neutralizing the enemy
With his reserve committed and the main cave positions as much as possible.
effort of the 105 th now in his zone of action, With these plans laid, Company K made
Colonel Bradt had asked that he be allowed ready to move off in attack between 1045
to withdraw Company K from the line, to and 1100. There followed a sequence of
use on his right if such a move became neces- events in such rapid order that it was difficult
sary. Col. Leonard A. Bishop agreed to this, for the men to keep them straight in re-
stipulating that when the emphasis of the counting the action.
attack changed from left to right, Major When Company K's 3d Platoon moved
McCarthy and the 2d Battalion would as- out, the men were under orders to cover the
sume responsibility for all of the Tanapag ground to the rise as rapidly as possible; here
Plain zone. The 2d Battalion commander the red earth had been ploughed, and there
therefore ordered his Company G, which was not even the low grass present elsewhere
had previously been mopping up in the rear on the coastal plain. With every man on his
areas, to prepare to relieve Company K be- feet at the signal, the platoon jumped up
yond the coconut grove at 1200. Peyre was from behind the road and began running at
then to withdraw Company K to the 3d Bat- full speed across the open ground. The Japa-
talion CP in reserve, and be ready on call to nese within Harakiri Gulch and from the
reinforce the effort up on the hill to the right. cliffs along the axis of the advance had evi-
Pending the relief, Company K was to dent! y been waiting for just such a move. Al-
limit its action to capturing the knoll in front most at once a deadly hail of small-arms and
of the coconut grove. This assignment did machine-gun fire was laid across the whole
hot seem too difficult to accomplish in the space of open ground. Most of the Company
two hours before noon. Lieutenant Peyre's K men were forced to take to the earth almost
men had been successful in keeping the Ja pa- at once, but one man, Pvt. Herman C. Pat-
nese away from their machine-gun positions ron, kept on running and managed to get all
along the little ridge, and armored support the way to the crest of the little knoll before
would again be available. Lieutenant Dorey he was hit through the chest by a bullet. Sgt.
had returned with his tanks at approximately John A. Monaco, seeing Patron hit, got to his
1030, and the Company K commander dis- feet and ran out to where the wounded man
cussed M'ith him a plan for neutralizing the lay. He was joined there a moment later
enemy fire both in Harakiri Gulch and along by Tech/Sgt. Arthur A. Gilman. Together
the cliffs. Peyre had decided to send his right the two sergeants tried to get Patron back out
platoon, the 3d, out ahead to capture the rise, of the fire, and within a few minutes had
while the left platoon remained on the fringe managed to drag him back behind the rest
of the grove, delivering covering fire. Dorey, of the platoon. They called for an aid man,
with his tanks, was to move up the cross-is- but while they waited Sergeant Monaco was

83
shot and killed. When the aid man reached that had been placed in the ground in this
their side, he was wounded. general area. Bits of the debris that fell
Meanwhile, Peyre, seeing the right pla- within our lines consisted of parts of one of
toon stalled, had ordered his left platoon to these mines, and demolition and mine-de-
make a try for the rise, and this platoon now tector squads who worked in the area later
ventured out of the coconut grove, laying found a minefield had bern placed there.
down covering fire as they came. The com- Whatever the cause of this gigantic ex-
pany commander had also directed that his plosion, which evidently involved a number
light machine guns and one section of heav- of ht::avy mines if not the whole minefield,
ies from Company M should move forward its effect was devastating. Within the J apa-
with the advancing riflemen. Lieutenant nese lines it created havoc. Crews were hurled
Peyre had his orders to capnlre the rise, and away from their weapons, and the counter-
was making every effort to do so. attack which had started was literally blown
The Japanese had picked this precise to pieces. For some time afterwards our
moment to launch a counterattack on their troops could see random Japanese soldiers
own part, in an effort to get back to the gun picking themselves up off the ground and
positions along the ditch before the American wandering back up into the cliffs in a dazed
attack could reach them. The men of Com- manner. All firing from the enemy virtually
pany K could plainly see the enemy soldiers ceased and, for over an hour afterwards,
running down from the cliffs on paths that American troops wandered around in the
led to the ditch just behind the rise. Ser- open without having a shot fired at them.
geant Gilman, wpo was a few yards from the Company K, which bore the brunt of the
knoll at the time, with Sergeant Monaco and concussion on our side of the lines, did not
the two wounded men, looked up to see two suffer quite as much, although several freak
Japanese running directly towards him at accidents occurred. Nearly every man was
full speed. Just exactly what happened next blown from his feet. One soldier involun-
has never been established, but there was a tarily squeezed the trigger on his gun and
terrific explosion not more than 50 yards shot himself through the hand. Another
from the little ridge. Gilman saw the two man was hit twice by flying debris, with a
leading Japanese fly up into the air. He de- distinct interval between the blows, and suf-
scribed it later as a tremendous geyser of dirt fered a broken arm and a broken leg. Three
and debris. Before he was knocked from his men were wounded by fragments, and nearly
feet by the concussion, Gilman swears he saw all of the company were dazed and be-
parts of the first Japanese soldier's body fly- wildered by the force of the blast. Reactions
ing at least a hundred feet in the air. It ap- were confused and for a moment all organ-
pears from all the testimony received that ization was lost. Lieutenant Peyre, who had
this explosion was caused when the leading just called for artillery support a moment
Japanese inadvertently stepped on the horn before, thought that the explosion was from
of one of a series of large, spherical, sea mines our own artillery shells landing short. He

84
consequently yelled for the men to get back reorganization Capt. Frank H . Olander of
to the edge of the grove to cover. One squad Company G came up to report his readiness
of the 2d Platoon, on the left, did not hear to assume responsibility for the zone of ac-
this order and remained sprawled out on the tion, and Lieutenant Dorey came down the
ground near the top of the rise. The ma- road with his tanks from the hillside. Under
chine-gun squad from Company M, which the circumstances Lieutenant Peyre decided
had been displacing forward and had almost not to try to take the rise again, but to have
reached the top of the ridge when the explo- Company G effect its relief in the relative
sion occurred, misunderstood the order, set security of the grove.
up their machine gun, and then walked down It was while the conferences were going
off the hill, leaving it in plain view of the en- on relative to the relief that everyone sud-
emy while they waited for another explosion. denly became conscious of tlle Company M
To add to all the confusion, Lieutenant machine gun sitting unattended on the top
Dorey's tanks just at this moment became in- of the hill. The Japanese seemed to have dis-
vol ved in a fight in front of Harakiri Gulch. covered it at the same time, and the Com-
These vehicles had been slowly moving up pany K men could see one or two enemy sol-
in single file behind the infantry at the time diers running along the base of the cliff ta-
of the explosion, and the blast shook up the ward it. Sergeant Gilman and one of his
men in the tanks quite severely. While they men, Pfc. Rayburn E. Harlan, made a mad
were trying to get their bearings in the dis- dash for the rise, almost I 50 yards away. By
order that followed , two Japanese soldiers hard running Private Harlan managed to get
ran out of the mouth of Harakiri Gulch, at- there first, dove behind the gun, and got off a
tached a magnetic mine to the lead tank, and burst at the Japanese who were almost on
threw a Molotov cocktail at another. Both him. This burst killed both enemy soldiers,
vehicles were put out of action and Lieu- but in a moment or two Harlan himself was
tenant Dorey hurnedly withdrew his remain- hit in the hands by enemy rifle fire; both he
ing tanks. The crews of the disabled vehicles and Gilman, who had come up, had to try
got out and "ran for it." to find cover from concentrated fire. An-
Lieutenant Peyre quickly took hold other of Peyre's men was hit in the face by
again in an effort to get his men back in a random bullet.
hand. He soon realized that it was not our In this situation, one of the Company M
own artillery that had caused the explosion, machine gunners, pfc. Wong, comman-
and ordered his two platoons to recross the deered one of Lieutenant Dorey's tanks and
open ground and retake the rise that they got aboard. From this exposed position he
had held so briefly. While the majority of directed the vehicle out across the open
the company were reorganizing, those men ground to the man with the broken arm and
who had been left behind on the knoll came leg and lifted him aboard. Then he very
to, and ran back to rejoin the rest of the unit calmly walked over to the machine gun,
in the coconut grove. In the midst of this picked it up and put it aboard the tank. As

85
he finished this task, he himself received a yards and then dwindled into a ravine that
serious head wound, but managed to make curved east around a plateau of rocky waste-
his way back to the safety of the grove along lands. Near the mouth on the plain both
with Harlan and Gilman, beside the tank. sides of the draw presented steep rock faces,
It was now nearly 1230 and Company almost cliffs, 50 to 60 feet high. Enemy fir-
K's line was still on the north edge of the ing positions, dug in, or using caves on the
coconut grove. The next hour was spent in steep eastern wall, could sweep the floor and
relieving K. with Company G. Lieutenant the west side of the gulch from end to end.
Peyre moved his men back to the battalion By grazing fire they could also control the
CP behind the grove and Captain Olander crest of the nose over which Company L must
began to organize his company preparatory attack, and make it difficult for Captain
to making, in his turn, an assault on the dis- Spaulding's supporting weapons to get direct
puted rise beyond the grove. As the morn- fields of fire or even observation. Artillery
ing's action ended on the Tanapag Plain, the could not be used effectively to get. at the
2d Battalion was taking over the whole zone enemy cliff positions without endangering
as far as the edge of the hills. No appreciable Company L itself. Nevertheless, supporting
advance had yet been made beyond the posi- fire was the key to any successful advance,
tions reached the day before. and Spaulding proposed to get it in two ways.
He had asked for a platoon of tanks;
The MOrl/iJlg Athlck at Har<lkiri Gulch these he planned to send down near the plain,
around the nose of high ground on his side
Under the original plans for 6 July, the of the gulch, and up into the draw. Tanks
3d Battalion of the 105th was responsible had tried to work down the gulch from its
for the hillslopes along the coastal plain. upper end on 4 July and two had been
Here, Company L had reached the edge of knocked out. Spaulding thought approach
Harakiri Gulch the day before, and then had from below, along the short trail, would give
been stopped by strong Japanese resistance. the tanks better ground, and that he could
On the morning of the 6th, with Company help them somewhat by covering fire.
K fighting to move past the foot of the gulch His other device for building fire sup-
on the plain, Company L had renewed its port involved use of the little secondary draw
effort to cross the draw itself, near the lower that ran beside Company L's position down
end. into the main gulch; deep, curving, narrow,
In view of experience gained on the pre- and covered with foliage, the route promised
vious day, Capt. Robert J. Spaulding planned protection until it reached the floor of the
carefully for what promised to be a most main draw. Beyond that point, there was no
difficult attack. Narrow and canyonlike at solution to the problem of finding cover; the
the mouth, the draw forked into two smaller brush on the floor of the gulch would give no
draws as it met the long hillslopes; the larger protection against plunging fire. But Captain
of the two ran south, still steepsided, for 400 Spaulding thought his I st Platoon could get

86
as far as the mouth of the ravine and there set the enemy began to return the fire with .50-
up machine guns to control enemy positions cal. and the 37 -mm guns aboard the disabled
along the gulch and on its opposite sides. American tanks in the gulch.' These tanks
Under covering fire from the machine guns they had clever! y camouflaged. The fire drove
and the tanks, Spaulding proposed to send L's machine gunners off their weapons, and
his 2d Platoon straight down and across the when two men were brought up with rifle
gulch. grenades in an effort to put the tanks out of
Timed to start with the attack in the action, both were seriously wounded. The in-
plain below, Spaulding's effort began at tense Japanese fire continued, and finally
0700. His I st Platoon crawled up over the Tech/ Sgt. Siegbert S. Heidelberger, in com·
ridge and down into the tributary ravine mand of the platoon, went back to Captain
without drawing any fire. Moving stealthily Spaulding and described his situation. Inas-
in single file along this narrow corridor, the much as he was no longer doing any good in
platoon escaped detection until they reached the valley, the company commander ordered
its mouth. There they set up two light ma- a withdrawal. Sergeant Heidelberger's pla-
chine guns and began firing at the caves in toon then laboriously made their way back
the face of the opposite wall of Harakiri up the ravine and climbed out to their
Gulch . Only a few bursts got away bebre I Tht'SC were Ins! hi,ght·r up the gulch in attack on 4 Jul y.

PARADISE VALLEY, near its northern end, had cliDs with cave
positions like those in Harakiri Gulch. (Photo taken after 8 July.)

87
original starting position. This futile attempt the vehicles that had been assigned to him.
against the enemy had consumed most of the After a sharp argument between the two rifle
forenoon. company commanders, Spaulding finally
The effort to bring tank fire into play convinced both Ganio and Peyre that the
at the lower end of the gulch was equally un- tanks were meant for him. He then took the
successful. The tanks assigned to the 3d Bat- platoon on up the hill and showed Ganio
talion, I OSth Infantry, consisted of two pla- what he wanted done and where he wanted
toons of lights under the command of Lieu- him to work. It was already nearly 1000.
tenant Dorey and 2d Lt. Gino Ganio. Ganio's Captain Spaulding had not changed his
platoon, which Company L expected to use, original plan. He told the tank platoon
consisted of four lights instead of five, the leader that he wanted him to go up the trail
state of tank casualties on Saipan having re- that forked left from the main road into the
duced almost the whole provisional tank bat- middle of the gulch, and take the enemy in
talion to skeleton platoons, scraped together the cliff face under fire. Ganio told Spauld-
from whatever was at hand . Ganio's instruc- ing that unless he remained buttoned up he
tions on the morning of 6 July were not too could not move into the area, on account of
explicit. He was to proceed up the coast road heavy small-arms fire, and that if he did go
to Road Junction 2 and report to the 3d Bat- in buttoned up, his work would be of little
talion near the coconut grove. Delay in mov- use without men on the phones to call tar-
ing up to the front lines was caused by con- gets. At this point Pfc. James R. Boyles vol-
gestion of supply traffic on the narrow thor- unteered to go along with the lead tank if
oughfare up the coast; when Ganio reached the others would cover him. This was agreed
Road Junction 2, it was to find that no one upon and Ganio's tanks moved back down
knew exactly where the 3d Battalion CP the road to the trail, made the turn around
really was.' After moving up the inland road the end of the nose, and started to move up
haltingly for some little time, Ganio finally into the draw. Almost at once Boyles was
met Lieutenant Peyre of Company K on the shot and mortally wounded. For over half
road in front of the grove. At that time, the an hour Ganio worked to get him back out of
Company K commander was in the midst of the gulch, but by the time Boyles was brought
his attempts to neutralize his right flank back to the aid station he was dead.
troubles, and Dorey had just reported that he Ganio now reorganized his tanks and
was running low on ammunition. Peyre, decided to make a try at the gulch without.
thinking that these tanks of Ganio's had been any infantry help. Leaving the road again,
sent up to take over while Dorey resupplied, his column had no sooner begun to nose up
tried to put the new platoon to work. He was into the valley than three enemy soldiers
about to give. them targets when Captain jumped out of the bushes and clapped a mag-
Spaulding came down the hill looking for netic mine onto the side of the third tank in
1 Lieutenant Darc}'. t ak in~ a different route, had arriv('d right line. The gunner in the vehicle behind shot
on time. He was helped, to some ex tent. by knowing where he had
ldt K Company on the preceding afternoon. down the three Japanese, but the damage

88
had already been done. The mine exploded
The Afternoon Attack at Harakiri Gulch
and the disabled tank slid into the ditch
minus a track. Lieutenant Ganio, with the With the shift of weight in effort to the
help of Lieutenant Dorey, whose vehicles had right, at noon six rifle companies of the 27th
now returned, helped to evacuate the crew Division were poised to attack abreast in the
from the crippled tank; upon completion of hills, from the edge of the plain to the new
that task, he again organized for a drive up division boundary. If their attack succeeded,
into the valley. Using one vehicle to cover they would drive the Japanese out of the high-
the others, he managed to get well up into ground positions which could put domi-
the gulch and sprayed the walls thoroughly nating fire on the Tanapag Plain (Map No.
but without noticeable effects. At the time 7, page 90).
of the explosion north of the valley, he with- The basic plan of movement called for
drew to the mouth and the road, and while the 3d Battalion, 105 th Infantry and the I st
sitting there he began to receive fire from the Battalion, 165th Infantry to attack across
guns of the two American tanks which the Harakiri Gulch and up onto the high, almost
Japanese had taken over within the gulch. level plateau that . covered the area between
He withdrew altogether from the area. there and Paradise Valley. The companies
Failure of the efforts to build up support- of these two battalions would then wheel left,
ing fires had made impossible any direct at- go down the face of the cliffs from above, and
tack by movement of infantry into the gulch. sweep out across the Tanapag Plain to the
On the left of Spaulding's company front sea, each arriving on the plain at a point pro-
the 2d and 3d Platoons were behind the gressively farth er east toward Makunsha.
ridge, ready to take advantage of any break The 2d Battalion, 165th would proceed
in the enemy fire. But no such chance north down Paradise Valley, cleaning out
came during the morning: whenever a man this strongpoint, and reaching the beach just
showed his head at the crest, he immediately above Makunsha. While this operation was
drew a heavy concentration of grazing fire going on in the hills, the 2d Battalion, 10 5 th
that swept the length of the ridge line. As Infantry, on the division's left wing, was to
a result of the morning's trials, Spaulding make a limited attack northeast along the
and hi s platoon leaders were more convinced beach.
than ever that, until the enemy firing posi- Of the four companies attacking in
tions on the opposite side of the draw were zones that crossed Harakiri Gulch, two were
neutralized, no attempt to get into the center to bear the brunt of the afternoon's battle:
of resistance would succeed. Company L of the 105 th, near the lower end
Meanwhile, as a result of the change in of the draw, and Company A of the 165th,
Division's plans during the forenoon, the further up in the hill mass. Company I,
gulch promised to become a main zone in 105th was between L and A at the start, but
the 27th's battle, and on a more extended was destined to be pinched out as the attack
front. moved into the gulch. Beyond A, the gulch

89
narrowed into the ravine curving off to the draw on 5 July, to find it as heavily defended
east. This upper arm of the draw, Company as the lower stretch. No troops had been able
C's zone, can be regarded as part of the to get into the valley and stay there. Captain
action on the higher ground, which will not O'Brien knew where the trouble lay; he be-
be considered here. lieved, nevertheless, that the new azimuth of
The heaviest fighting fell to Company attack would favor his effort. It meant, in-
A, 165th, commanded by Capt. Lawrence stead of crossing the gulch at right angles to
J. O'Brien. His unit faced the upper end of its axis, approaching from the higher hill
the main part of the draw, just where it began slopes above the main draw, and crossing it
to angle southeast and grow smaller. The on a long diagonal. This route had not been
3d Battalion, 165th had tried this end of the tried before, and it might avoid the fields of

HARAK IRI GULCH

Co A 165th Inf
Afternoon 6 July 1944
o
-+
POSITIO~
POllHS OF
AT THE

fARTHEST
START

ADVANCE
Of' ATTAC!(

100 o
I
100
I .
'00
YARDS
(APPROXIMATE)

HI\.\.. 1!..' _ _ -
___ _ - - (;ooYAROS

MAP N O.7

90
 AERIAL PHOTO OF HARAKIRI GULCH SECTOR

fire of some of the Japanese positions along Platoon was near the bend of the draw, and
the cliffs in the eastern wall. its advance, if successful, would carryon to
Company A's formation was in three the high ground north of H arakiri Gulch
platoons abreast on a long skirmish line. The and come on the enemy's cave positions from
3d platoon on the left was near the trail in the rear and above.
the gulch; the I st Platoon would operate The company faced, in its immediate
almost down the center of the draw; the 2d front, certain unusual terrain features. The

91
 enemy rifllemen to sit cross-legged in them.
Another distinguishing feature of the
approaches to the draw was the occasional
large-trunked trees, having enough foliage
above to conceal riflemen. Among the trees
were little straw shacks, scattered along the
slopes above tlle gulch at intervals of 30 or
40 yards. They were not arranged in any
symmetrical pa ttern ; had there not been so
many of tllem, about 15, they might have
been taken for the buildings of a farm.
From the south rim of the gulch, Com-
pany A proceeded cautiously down the steep
slopes of the hill. Captain O'Brien had
called for an intense mortar barrage with his
own 60-mm tubes and with the SI-mm mor-
tars of Company D . This lasted for ten min-
utes before tlle actual attack began. As the
CAPT. LAWRENCE J. O'BRIEN
Command" 0/ Company A , 165th In/antry
men moved forward there was almost a dead
silence in the valley below. Moving from
cover to cover and taking advantage of every
first, on the hill slope funneling down to the little hillock and bush, the whole company
gulch, was a series of ditches that looked al- reached a line almost 200 yards from the
most as though they had been dug in prepara- jump-off point atop the high ground. This
tion for piping a water supply into a house. brought them 20 or 30 yards into the valley
On each side of these ditches were the little itself. Then, suddenly, came a strange inter-
mounds of earth which had been excavated ruption, as a series of explosions shook the
from them, now hardened from long ex- little shacks. Most of A's men dove for the
posure to the weather. The ditches ran from ditches and took cover. The explosions con-
north to south, giving the gulch the appear- tinued over a period of I 5 minutes and then
ance of a washboard. Company A, by virtue ceased. Infantrymen edged forwa rd and
of the direction of its attack, would work all peered into the first of the buildings. Inside,
the way through them. Interspersed in these three Japanese soldiers had committed suicide
ditches were numerous spider holes of the by holding grenades to their abdomens. In
type which the Japanese like so well to con- the next hut there were four more and in the
struct and which American troops had come next, two. Altogether, later investigation
across before on Kwajalein and Eniwetok. showed that 60 enemy soldiers had unac-
Round and covered by cleverly camouflaged cou ntably committed suicide in these little
nets, they were deep enough for one or two houses over a period of a few minutes. This

92
was the incident that gave the valley its name canteen came from somewhere behind him.
of Harakiri Gulch. Lieutenant Masem was very worried
The suicides became all the more mys- about the situation. The fire was so intense
terious in the light of events that soon fol- that neither he nor any of his men could risk
lowed. The men of Company A continued movement without being reasonably certain
to move ahead cautiously for a few more of being hit. He decided to pull back to the
yards. 2d Lt. Matthew C. Masem, com- base of the slope at the top of the draw, where
mander of O'Brien's I st Platoon, had jumped the ditches were deeper and where no one
into one of the ditches and from there was would be behind him, until he could locate
looking cautiously around when he was the source of all this fire and do something
joined by three other men from his platoon. about it. He called over to Kice and asked
Just as they jumped into the ditch, a rifle shot him if Anderson could be removed from the
rang out ahead and a bullet thudded into the hole to a safer place. Anderson answered,
earth near Masem's head. S/ Sgt. Clarence "Kice is dead." The aid man had been hit in
L. Anderson, one of the men who had just the head while bending over the wounded
jumped into the hole, poked his head up over man. Sergeant Murphy, the platoon leader,
the mound of earth and spotted something now called over to Pfc. Shires, acting platoon
moving in one of the trees a short distance sergeant of the 3d Platoon on his left, and
ahead. It looked like a rope that might have asked Shires if he could borrow his aid man
been used by a Japanese soldier to climb up to help take care of Anderson. Shires sent
into the heavy foliage and it was still swing- Pfc. Standlee Morgan over to the I st Platoon
ing as though, whatever it was, it had been area, and the aid man ran down one of the
used very recently. Anderson rose up to take ditches to where Masem was. However, just
a shot at the tree and, as he did so, received as he tried to scramble across the hump of
a serious wound that felled him. One of the dirt to where the wounded man lay, he was
other men in the ditch with Masem and his hit in the ankle and tumbled back into the
group was Tech. 4 Kice, the company aid ditch behind. Shires himself came crawling
man. Kice immediately told the others to over to where Morgan lay and, together with
"get the hell out of the hole so I can work on Pfc. Arthur Coats, he managed to work the
him." All of the little group except Kice and wounded Morgan back out of the fire to
Anderson immediately scrambled for cover safety. When Shires attempted to get back
somewhere else. Masem and S/ Sgt. Joseph to his own platoon, he was trapped in a hole
R. Murphy tumbled back into a ditch behind in the I st Platoon area and couldn't move.
them, and two other men, including Pfc. New complications had now arisen in
John Sekula, jumped behind a tree a few feet the valley. The shacks which had been occu-
away. Sekula received one shot which ripped pied by the suiciding Japanese had caught
away his canteen, and then the men suddenly fire and were burning merrily. Most of
realized that the whole area was literally Masem's men, lying in the ditches, were so
alive with bullets. The one that hit Sekula's close at hand that the heat was unbearable.

93
It was imperative that the platoon get back, toon's situation. The company commander or-
but the problem of the wounded Anderson dered the men to pull back out of the heat
was still to be solved. Masem, in radio to the slopes above the valley. Before they
contact with Captain O'Brien, was trying to could execute this maneuver two morc men
control his platoon and direct their fire. received bullet wounds.
Shortly after Shires had crawled back with Captain O'Brien had been trying fran-
Morgan, Masem again asked if anyone would tically to keep his company moving ahead by
volunteer to try to get Anderson out of the getting men around the Ranks of the hidden
hole. Pfc. Joseph Becay and Pfc. George Japanese. His own 2d Platoon, on his right,
Brieling volunteered. When they were given and Company I, 105th Infantry, on his left,
permission to go ahead, Becay yelled over to could not make much progress in spite of the
Anderson and told him to take off all of his company commander's pleading.
equipment. After Anderson called back that The 2d Platoon, which was advancing
this had been done, the two men made half in the gulch and half on tlle high ground
one dive and landed in the hole squarely on beyond it, was under the command of 1st Lt.
top of Kice and Anderson. Without wasting George E. Martin, O'Brien's executive officer.
time, they picked the wounded man up by Martin was with the lower half of his pla-
the head and heels and threw him bodily into toon, the part in the draw, and with them
the ditch behind. They then dove over after had advanced out across the Roor in con-
him. After that Becay dragged Anderson junction with the units on his left. When
back alolJg the trenches to the edge of the the shooting started in the 1st Platoon area,
gulch and carried him up the hill. Martin was hit almost as soon as Anderson,
During this time, the 3d Platoon on going down with a serious bullet wound in
Masem's left had become badly disorganized the shoulder. The platoon was then in com-
They had run into the same accurate grazing mand of Tech/ Sgt. Medina, over on the
fire that had caused so much trouble in the other end of the platoon, who described the
1st Platoon. Almost in the center of the 3d action of the afternoon as follows:
there was a little stretch of open ground that The 2d Platoon jumped off with Company C
offered no cover w ha tsoever, so tha t Sh ires tied into our right squad, commanded by Sgt.
had to split his platoon around it. Leaving Frank Destefano, and the 1st Platoon of Company
A was on our left. We moved about 200 yards
a BAR man to cover the open space, Shires
downhill and the 1st Platoon beg,n to get some
stayed with the right squad of his platoon; sniper fire. After IS minutes, our whole line moved
during the attempt to get back to them after forward again and this time Charlie Company I
the rescue of Morgan, he was cut off alto- got pinned down . After waiting several minutes,
gether. When the fire broke out among the Charlie Company asked for help and Lieutenant
shacks, the 3d Platoon was in the most dan- Martin sent me and Tech. 4 Cantrell, (our fight-
ger and suffered the most from the intense ing cook), to see if a tank could come down the
hill and give support to Charlie Company. The
heat. Three of the men made their way back
to Captain O'Brien and explained the pla- IOn his ri~ hl (c:ast) faced with cross in ~ the ravine:.

94
tank came halfway down the hill and that was all. Martin was hit and had gone back. The place
It didn't do any good. By this time the line is where I am now is worse than the first place ami
ready to move forward again. So we resume the is getting hotter, so I again dodge bullets and
advance. (All this time there hasn't been a shot moved. The next thing I know, Sharkey is hit on
fired from the enemy, only one or two over in the the left flank, next to the 1st Platoon. I called Cap-
1st Platoon area, plus some shacks which are blow- tain O'Brien and asked for two litters. The situa-
ing up with Japs inside of them.) But to our sur- tion is really getting bad now. Captain O'Brien
prise the Japs are entrenched in a large trench at tells me to withdraw my platoon. But first I got
the bottom of the hill, and the Sons of Heaven, casualties to get out of the line of fire. 1 brought
they let us come within 2S or 30 yards of the trench. my light machine gun up and placed it and told
They are looking up at us and we cannot see them. the gunner to fire along the crest of the ridge we
At this time, all hell broke loose. are on and down 'towards the trenches below.
The 2d Platoon's sector extends from a little Overhead fire it was. Then I coordinated this fire
gully, or ditch on the left, where the left squad by radio with D Company's heavies which were
under S/ Sgt. J. R. Murphy is anchored, to a point high up on the hill behind us, and tried to evacu-
over on the ridge 1 where I am with Sergeant ate Pfc. Lees. Now I cannot get to Destafano, who
Destafano's squad. On our right rear is another is with Lees, because of the heavy fire which is
deep draw 2 and that is where Charlie Company coming all around, but I hear Destafano ask for a
ties in with us. volunteer from his squad. Pfc. James Fitzpatrick
volunteered and together he and Destafano get
The Japs open up first with machine-gun fire
Lees out of that spot and start back towards me,
from the ridge to our front and with a lot of rifle
about ten yards away, but just when they get to
fire from the ditches below us. I could hear Lieu-
tenant Martin yell, "Keep going men," but we did the spot where my CP is now, a bullet goes clean
through Lees' arm, which is around Fitzpatrick's
not go very far as the fire was tremendous. The
shoulder, and goes through Fitz' chest, killing him
first man [ saw go down was Pfe. Harold Lees, the
instantly. By this time the litter bearers (damned
scout of Destafano's squad. He got hit in the leg,
good men) are crawling up behind and they
and [ saw Sergeant Destafano reach out and pull
evacuate Lees. Charlie Company has now drawn
him in and give him first aid. [ordered everybody
back on our rear. My next move is to get my pla-
to get in as good a position as they could, as the
toon back. God only knows how I did it. I asked
squad area had no cover and we were more or less
for a tank. No soap. Then, again, I placed fire all
at the mercy of the Japs. All this time I am only
along the front to keep the Nips' heads down.
about ten yards from Lees, but I cannot move as
the minute I do, a sniper puts two or three shots First, I told my platoon guide, S/ Sgt. Claude
right in front of my eyes. I hadn't heard from Browne, to withdraw the support squad under Ser-
Lieutenant Martin for some time, so I yell, but he geant Mogalski. This was accomplished. Then I
does not answer. After hesitating a few minutes I signaled the 1st squad on my left to move all at
decide I better take a chance and find out what once, through a ditch, to a point out of the line of
has happened. I took a dive and somehow or an- fire. I also signaled Destafano's squad, on the front
other I got back about ten yards to a hole where of me, to move, but they didn't make it. Only the
the radio man was. I asked him where Martin is, left squad 1 accomplished the move.
but he don't know. I took the radio and contacted During the heat of the battle I had got sepa-
Captain O'Brien. He told me that Lieutenant rated from most of Dest"fano's squad and a gap
had come to exist between the 1st and 2d squads.
1 That is. the nose of hi1o:h R"round . north of the draw. as this
..: urvcd eastward and dwindled to a ravine.
2 This draw is the ravine running east. 1 That is, the part of the platoon on lower ground , in the draw.

9S
I attempted four times to get to them, but I could forward, he stopped and ordered two of his
not make it and I could not get to Murphy (De- men, Pfc. William Drew and Pvt. Raymond
stafano's second in command), because the enemy
Johnson, to creep up to the crest of the ridge
fire was out in front of me. Everywhere I go they
shoot. I believe Tokio designated this particular and look over into the valley to see what the
sniper just to shoot at me that day. I yelled my situation was below. By this time the five
brains off at Murphy ; no soap. Finally I got back men had moved out far enough so that they
to my little CP and called Captain O'Brien on the were well along the high ground, which
radio to tell him that I could not withdraw Ser- dropped off into Harakiri Gulch on their
geant Murphy's squad because I could not get to
immediate left in a system of ledges that went
him. Little did I know that Murph V was having
one hell of a time in the sector where he was. almost straight down. When Drew and
Captain O'Brien told me to stay put till Murphy Johnson had managed to creep up to the crest
got out. From there on it is Murphy's story. of this ridge and look over, they found them-
selves staring down at 30 or 40 Japanese in
Murphy was Sgt. James R. Murphy, one trenches below them. These enemy soldiers
of several men by that name in the company. were armed with machine guns and rifles and
He was called "Spanish" Murphy due to the were very methodically firing at the rest of
fact that he was born in Los Angeles of Company A further up the valley. Drew and
Spanish parents who, several generations be- Johnson pulled out grenades and rolled them
fore, had somewhere adopted the Irish name. down the hill, but in both cases the missiles
Murphy was a wiry, dark-skinned little man were caught in the folds of the ground and
who spoke in a strongly accented tongue and exploded harmlessly. The two men next
in moments of excitement was more than tried throwing them, but this did no good
likely to lapse into fluent Spanish. either. By this time the enemy had become
Sergeant Murphy was with Destafano's aware of their presence and had taken the
squad. As originally constituted at the time skyline under fire. Neither of the two men
of the attack on the afternoon of 6 July, this could lift his head.
squad was composed of nine men, of whom Farther back, near Murphy, was Pvt.
three, Destafano, Lees, and Fitzpatrick, were John Shuart, rifle grenadier of the platoon.
now casualties. One of the other six, the Pri- Shuart had evidently been watching the two
vate Sharkey mentioned by Medina, had been men up forward with their grenades because,
wounded early and was lying helpless. The when they were pinned down by the fire, he
five men remaining were far enough over the moved forward. He talked briefly with Drew
crest of the north wall of Harakiri Gulch to be and Johnson, found out the situation below,
out of the line of fire of the enemy in the and then moved out into the fire to the rim
trenches below. As a resuit, Sergeant Murphy of the gorge where he could see what was
had kept pushing his men forward without going on below. Shuart moved very deliber-
realizing that the rest of the platoon on his ately, crawling along the edge of the hill until
left, and Company C on his right, had been he came to a tree. He turned to Drew and
pinned down. After moving 40 to 50 yards Johnson and yelled that he'd found a place

96
from -which his grenade discharger would be Neither Drew nor Murphy knew exactly
elfecti ve. He loaded his piece and got to his where the company commander was and
knee, taking aim. At that moment an enemy neither knew of any safe route to the rear,
bullet hit him squarely in the heart and he having been out of sight of the rest of the
dropped over dead. company when they pulled back. Aftel a
It was during this time that Sergeant careful consultation between the two, they
Medina attempted to tell Murphy to with- both decided that Drew should go back into
draw his squad, but without success. When the ravine where Company C was supposed
Medina reported his failure to the company to be, work through it, and out the other side.
commander, Captain O'Brien had finished This meant that Drew would come out into
talking with members of the 1st and 3d Pla- open ground for about 100 yards, but both
toons who were withdrawing under his or- men thought he could make it by running
ders. One of these men, Sergeant St. John, hard.
had seen where Sergeant Murphy and his Drew did get through the ravine all
men were and thought that perhaps he could right, but he had no sooner emerged into the
reach them by using a route along the ditches open ground, running up the slope towards
and thence up over the ridge through some Hill 72 1, than he was felled by a shot in the
bushes that grew there. Captain O'Brien gave side and mortally wounded. Only one man
him permission to try it, and St. John took saw him go down and this was Sgt. Lonnie
two men, Pvt. Peter Bolger and Pfc. Harold McIntyre of Company D who had a section
Brewer, and started out. Using the route of machine guns sitting back up -under Hill
that St. John had previously marked out, 721 . McIntyre got to his feet and ran down
these men finally reached Murphy almost a the slope to Drew's aid, but when he got to
half hour later. the wounded man's side, he, too, was seri-
In the meantime, however, Murphy had ously hit. Murphy did not know of the loss
discovered the situation he was in. He real- of his messenger, but kept waiting for some-
ized that he and his five men, one wounded one to come back from Captain O'Brien.
(Sharkey), were isolated and that two of the When St. John and his party arrived some
five, Drew and Johnson, were trapped well time later, Murphy assumed that they were
out in front of him. He turned his attention the result of his message and asked no ques-
first to getting Drew and Johnson in. He tions. With the help of St. John's three men,
sent his one remaining unwounded man out Sharkey was dragged down the hill to the
with a BAR to lay down fire on the Jap posi- trench system and Murphy's little party was
tions so that they would have to keep their withdrawn. By the time that Company A
heads down long enough for the two trapped was all reassembled at the entrance to the
men to get out. The plan worked, and now gulch it was well after 1500, and not until
Murphy asked for volunteers to go back to an hour later did Murphy realize that Dre",
Captain O'Brien with word on his situa- had been hit. At almost the same time, Com-
tion. Private Drew volunteered immediately. pany D reported that Sergeant McIntyre had

97
not returned after his dash down the hill . By the gulch began recelvlllg sniper fire that
that time the situation in front of the bat- pinned most of the company down on the
talion was well known, and Captain O'Brien hillside unable to move. Capt. Ashley W.
would not risk losing more men in a search Brown, in command of the company, tried
for the two wounded men. He did authorize to work small patrols forward to locate the
a night patrol of volunteers, and shortly after source of this fire, but before the patrols
dark eight men under Lieutenant Masem got back Company A, 165th Infantry on
and 2d Lt. Robert W. Chester of Company Brown's immediate right, had become in-
D moved some 6llll yards back down into volved in the full-scale battle already de-
Harakiri Gulch. They found Drew and scribed. Brown held his men on the hillside
Mclntyre still alive and huddled in the with no further attempts to descend further
bushes. Both men had given up hope of be- into the gulch. At 1600, he withdrew his
ing rescued and were in bad condition. Drew company to the top of the hill and dug in for
died just after he reached the aid station, the night, tied in with Company A on the
but Mclntyre lived. right and Company L, 105th Infantry on
One factor contributing to the troubles the left.
of Company A was its lack of support on Company L had not moved a yard all
either Rank. To its right, C (l65th) had to afternoon. All of his efforts to penetrate
approach the narrow ravine (running east Harakiri Gulch during the morning having
from the main draw) over down-hill ground failed, Captain Spaulding decided that it
without any cover from enemy fire on the would be a useless waste of men to attempt
plateau. Only one of C's platoons was in again to push through the gulch until he had
position to help Company A, and this platoon accurately located and eliminated the source
was delayed in starting until after A had been of fire that caught his men coming down over
repulsed. As a result, the platoon made what the nose. Furthermore, h is tan ks had left
amounted to a lone effort and was shot to him just before the attack was scheduled to
pieces on the open hillside. Further north- move off, and without their mobile fire sup-
east, the 2d Battalion of the 165th found it port he could do little. He did, however, or-
impossible to get into Paradise Valley in their der several small patrols to creep up to the
own zone, received permission to use the 1st edge of the gulch and take points of observa-
Battalion's zone, and (since the I st had made tion from which they were to see if they
no progress) was stalled the rest of the day. could locate some of the enemy positions.
Lower down Harakiri Gulch, the 3d One of these patrols was just starting out
Battalion of the 105 th failed to get into the when the gigantic explosion occurred in front
draw, or even to get enough pressure on the of Company K, and, although they were al-
enemy to help A's attack at the head of the most 300 yards away and behind a hill, two
draw. Company T, next to O'Brien, moved Company L men were wounded seriously
off at 1200 when the whole line made its by falling debris. A little later, at approxi-
attack, but after moving 75 yards down into mately the time Company A, 165th Infantry

98
was running into their trouble below, Ser- Shifting the Division's effort to the h ills
geant Heidelberger, who was manning one of III the afternoon attack had thus failed to

the observation posts, was killed by the in- accomplish any gains. Two battalions of the
tense rifle fire that still continued to pour I 06th (I st and 3d) had moved up behind
over the south wall of the canyon. Only a the 165th, and spent the day near Hill 767
few minutes later Pfc. Herman C. Kutch was waiting for possible employment. There was
killed in the same fashion. At the close of no chance for their use until too late in the
the afternoon, Company L was still waiting day to be worth-while.
for a chJncc to move.

MAP NO . 8

FINAL ATTACK ON THE PLAIN

lsi and 2d 8ns 1051h Inf
1700, 6 July 1944

o SUIITING POSIT10tlS
() NI~T PEIIIMETERS

,....
~~~--~.~~~'~~~~~-
(APPROX, ....T£)

.. '\

000('10<)
(,'/00<>0<>
OO{)O{)

99
 tive on the beach 1,200 yards beyond Road
Afteruoon: Plans for a New Attack Junction 2 (Map No.8, page 99).
(105th Infantry) Lt. Col. Wm. J. O'Brien, commanding
the 1st Battalion, received orders to report
After Company K was relieved at the to the regimental CP at 1530; he alerted his
coconut grove and went into reserve for the battalion for movement, and the executive
3d Battalion's effort at the gulch, the 2d Bat- officer was ordered to get the men under way
talion of the 105th held the Tanapag Plain, toward the front. They had 2,000 yards to
all three companies in line. Company G was cover before they could reach their position
at the grove, F was on the open ground to the in line. At Regiment, Colonel O'Brien was
left, and E was just south of the railroad
track. The zone from the rail line to the
beach had been left unoccupied as Major
McCarthy shifted his forces to the right. Two
BAR teams covered this flank, al1d there was
little danger that enemy forces could infil-
trate through the narrow gap. Companies E
and F still faced the ditch that ran across
their front and was now known to be
strongly held. Company G had completed
its relief of K by 1340, and was confronted
by the same problem K had faced: passing
the li ttle rise, some 200 yards to the fron t
and dominated by Japanese positions on tht:
cliffs. While waiting for G to get in line,
Major McCarthy had bent every effort to
getting the minefield cleared up so that tanks
could reach the ditch; at the same time E
and F were inching their way forward on
their stomachs in an effort to come clost:
enough for a direct assault. They had been
able to make about 25 yards by 1400.
After another hour brought no changt:
on the plain, Division Headquarters inter-
vened. At 1520 General Griner issued an
order by telephone to Colonel Bishop, com-
manding the 105th. He was directed to com-
mit his reserve battalion, the 1st, on the right
of the 2d. It was to attack toward an objec-

100
told to move into line with all three compa- company across the mouth of Harakiri
nies abreast, but with the right company (C) Gulch, pivoting on his right wing, to contain
echeloned to the rear. The 2d Battalion the enemy in the gulch and protect the rear
would shift its units north to make room on of the I st Battalion's advance. Next day, the
the right of the plain. This was to be accom- isolated Japanese in the gulch were to be
plished by moving Company F back around mopped up by the 3d Battalion.
E to the beach strip, while Company G, at The 2d Battalion, in its narrowed zone,
the coconut grove, would be attached to the was reorganizing to take part in the new at-
3d Battalion to carry out a most important tack on the plain. Before it was ready to go,
mission. Captain Olander was to swing this a small tank action took place that was to
A PAUSE IN THE BATTLE north of the coco nut grove. Men
of the 3 d Battalion, I05 1h Infantry are waiting lor resumption
of the attack (afternoon, 6/u/y) . The view is taken toward the
:;nore. Japanese fire from hillside (00 to right) was evidently
under control, as crews are bringing up 37-m m antitank guns
foJ' lHi' against cliO pmiliom, ond soldiers are sitting in the open.

101
 have a considerable effect on the afternoon's Allow and his assistant driver were killed,
battle. and the light tank had to be destroyed.
At 1530, Lieutenant Dorey returned to But the enemy positions in the northern
the 2d Battalion front with three vehicles; he and deeper end of the ditch had been, to all
had spent the early afternoon back at the intents and purposes, wiped out. When Com-
maintenance dump, refueling and resupply- panies E and F were finally ready to go, at
ing. Reporting at the coconut grove, Dorey 1700, they were able to stand up and walk
found that Company G would not be ready forward for the first time since they had
to use the vehicles for some time. On his started past Road Junction 2. They found
own initiative, Lieutenant Dorey moved the trench littered with dead Japanese, and
down toward Road Junction 2 in search of credited Dorey with wiping out 100 to 150
a mission. When he arrived at Company E, enemy. Those left were disorganized and
the minefield had at last been cleared up on demoralized by the time the infantry attack
that sector and the way was open to the was launched .
ditch line which had stopped the morn ing
attack. Dorey decided to wander out and
Advallce of the First Battalion (I05th
see what he could find in the lower end of
Infantry)
the ditch facing the 2d Battalion. He dis-
covered on approaching it that the ditch was Colonel O'Brien, commander of the 1st
literally full of Japanese, and returned at once Battalion, was a notably aggressive officer and
to report to Captain Smith of Company E. had twice led his battalion in rapid and im-
Smith wasn't ready yet to start his attack, so portant advances during the Saipan battle.
Dorey went back with his three tanks. For On 6 July, characteristically, he had his bat-
over half an hour, Dorey's vehicles moved up talion under way before he knew its mission,
and down the ditch, as far east as the cliffs, so that by the time his orders were defined
driving the enemy into corners and then the men were well up toward the front.
slaughtering them with canister and ma- O'Brien had then picked up his company
chine-gun fire. commanders and driven them forward to
Enemy opposition was ineffective after the coconut grove for a briefing on the
one attempt to knock out the tanks by mag- ground. As he outlined to them his plans for
netic mines. During the first turn up the the attack, O'Brien stressed the necessity of
ditch, some Japanese infantry managed to "keeping going. The Old Man wants us on
get a mine against a light tank, commanded the beach for the night, and we will be there."
by Sergeant Alloco, and blew off its track. The 1st Battalion was in line before
Dorey tried to combine the job of evacuating 1645, and, with the 2d on its left, spent 30
Alloco's crew with the attack on the trench. minutes in resupplying and reorganizing. At
Leaving his third tank to cover Alloco, Dorey 171 5 the two battalions moved off in a coor-
went on alone with the offensive along the dinated attack, with the main effort in the
ditch. In the end, despite Dorey's effort, 15t Battalion's zone. The 1st Battalion's left

102
boundary angled on a long diagonal toward distance up the plain. Lieutenant Dorey's
the beach, pinching out the 2d Battalion and two tanks were still tied up in the attempt to
leaving it a rdatively small zone to advance rescue Alloco's vehicle. No other tanks were
through. The going, for the units on line, present, although shortly after the jump-off
was to be progressively tougher from left to a platoon of self-propelled guns came up
right. from the Cannon Company to the coconut
Company A was O'Brien's left wing and grove, and later gave direct fire support to
moved out rapidl y with two platoons abreast Company C.
from the road in front of the coconut grove. Company A's attack progressed rapidly
Mortar fire had preceded the attack, but ar- for the first 150-200 yards, against the light-
tillery was used only lightly, on points some est kind of opposition. An occasional shot

CP OF THE 1ST BATTALION, IOSTH INFANTRY. Lt. Col.

William f. O'Bri(n (center) is issuing orders to his staD and com ~
pony commanders just belore the attack 0/ 1st Bn . (afternoon 01
6 July). The place is Tanapag village, beside an enemy Iud lank .
rang out from the hil!s on the extreme right knives. For 20 minutes a sharp hand-to-
and one or two came from directly forward. hand fight ensued, and then the pocket had
The men were practical! y running across the been cleaned out. The men of Company A
open ground, although Capt. Louis F. Acker- moved on forward , across the ditch, and on
man had ordered them to move by bounds. a diagonal toward tlle beach. Japanese fire
The first halt in the company's advance came from the hill s on the right was becoming
at the ditch which had caused so much more serious, machine gun s having taken up
trouble all day. H ere, the right platoo n en- the fire, but the compan y commander urged
countered a nest of 15 to 20 Japanese. Some his men ahead. Spectators in the 165th In-
of these were wounded and some were try- fantry 01' on Hill 721 could look down on
ing to hide from Dorey's tank fire by hug- the plain and see a rapidly advancing wave
ging the walls of the trench on the near side. of men in one long skirmish line pushing
These enemy were surprised by the sudden across the level ground. Lt. Col. Leslie R.
appearance of the infantry. Ackerman's men Rock of the 4th Marine Division, who was
waded into the ditch with bayonets and attached to the 165th Infantry as liaison offi-

THE DITCH THAT DOREY CLEANED UP ran from Ihe edge

of Ihe hill (background) down 10 Ihe sea. Lt. Dorey, wilh a light
tank. enfiladed the enemy in this position, which had hdd up the
2d Battalion , JOSth Infantry during morning 0/ 6 July. Ph oto,
taken 8 July , near the narrow-gauge railroad, shoUJs bodies still th ere.
cer, was moved to remark to his superiors at
the time, "The 105 th has broken through.
They're going a mile a minute up the island
and if they go as fast as they are now, they'll
be in Makunsha in about twenty minutes.
They're all over the place. This looks like
the end."
The headlong rush of Company A con-
tinued for 500 yards beyond the ditch. Then
fire again began coming from the front. Cap-
tain Ackerman halted his men and waited to
see where the fire was coming from. Directly
ahead there was a small house and a little
stone building that might have been a cis-
tern or a stable. There were snipers in the
hou se. Two men, Pfc. Joseph S. Jarosewicz
and Pfc. Frank N. Saetes, moved on to try
to rout out the enemy riRemen, while the
rest of the company waited. Saetes turned CAPT. LOUIS F. ACKERMAN
Commander of Company A, J05th Infantry
his BAR on the under part of the house while
Jarosewicz crept forward and slipped a gren-
ade under the Roar. The grenade came Ry- wounding Saetes again while he was being
ing back out and landed at Saetes' feet where carried back out of the way. Throughout
it exploded, wounding Saetes severely in the this whole episode the fire from the side of
legs. While Jarosewicz had been looking for the hill had been getting heavier. It was now
the place to tlHOw the grenade, Saetes had almost 1800, less than an hour to darkness.
cautiously approached the house and was While Ackerman and Company A were
holding his BAR in one hand while he tried busy trying to burn down the house, Com-
to light the straw of the roof with a match pany B came abreast on the right and took
he held in the other. cover on the ground to wait, trying to find
Captain Ackerman now ordered two some protection from the machine guns in
more men forward, and Sgt. Cleo B. Dickey the cliff. This company had advanced almost
moved up and walked boldly in the front as rapidly as Company A, but being closer
door. A moment later he had killed at least to the cliffs had suffered more from the
one of the snipers and wounded another. harassing fire which landed in their zone of
While he was doing this, Tech. 4 Hermans, action in some volume. Capt. Richard F.
tlle company cook, stepped up and set the Ryan had finally been forced to move his
house on fire. This time it burned. The one men by short bounds, but by constant en-
live Japanese in the house got off a last shot, couragement and urging he had managed to

105
keep the company well abreast of Ackerman . to move forward. Colonel O'Brien had
Only one man had been wounded during the brought an SPM forward with him and this
advance. was used to demolish the concrete building.
When Company A had been held up the An advance of another 100 yards was then
second time, Ryan ordered his men to dig in made before the battalion commander called
as well as they could and then ordered his a halt for the day.
1st Platoon, accompanied by two light ma- While Companies A and B had pushed
chine guns, out to his extreme right flank. home their assault with rapidity, Company
Here they built up a defensive line facing the C, following along behind Company B's
cliffs, and the machine guns began laying right rear, had run into considerable trouble.
down fire all along the hillside. This seemed Their route of approach led this unit directly
to stimulate the Japanese, for within a few along beneath the cliffs where the enemy
minutes the enemy fire had doubled in in- were holed up. Almost from the time he
tensity. Two of Ryan's machine gunners pushed off from the road, 1st Lt. Bernard
were wounded in the new and heavier fire. A. Tougaw's unit was under direct, heavy,
In view of this increased enemy activity, small-arms fire, but mi ndful of Colonel
which was becoming serious, Captain Ryan O'Brien's instructions he ordered his men to
went over to Company A and talked with keep moving. The company commander
Captain Ackerman. Both company com- was using a peculiar formation to execute his
manders decided to send out a strong patrol, mission. Each rifle squad was deployed as
composed of members of both companies, in skirmishers, but each platoon was formed
an effort to knock out at least the nearest ma- into a triangle. The company itself formed
chine gun . Just after this decision was made, a huge diamond, with the 1st platoon at the
however, Colonel O'Brien came running up leading point of the diamond, the 2d on the
from the coconut grove to find Gut what was right side, the 3d on the left, and the Weap-
holding up the advance. He sympathized ons bringing up the rear. Just as the com-
with the two men, but insisted that the bat- pany moved out from the road one man was
talion should move forward. He had no wounded by the heavy fire which came from
sooner given this order than a shot killed the northeast nose of the entrance to Hara-
Captain Ryan at his side. 1st Lt. Hugh P. kiri Gulch. They also received fire from
King now assumed command of Company the machine guns atop the little knoll to their
B and, acting in accordance with O'Brien's direct front. These were the same guns that
orders, canceled the patrol and made ready Dorey's tank fire had driven the Japanese

CLJFF WALLS at loot of hill bordaing coastal plain, between

Harakiri Gulch and Poradiu Valley. Marines are blasting out
enemy snipers from a cave position (8 July). From such positions,
up and down the hillside, th e J05th In/antry rueived flanking fire
in its atUmpts to drive along the Tanapag Plain (5 and 6 July).

106
107
 from earlier in the day, and the same guns fire into me cave. However, me SPM fired
Lieutenant Peyre had worked so diligently to only one round, which scored a direct hit on
keep tlle enemy from using before K was one of the Japanese coming at the guns. This
relieved at noon. The men of Company C evidently satisfied the vehicle crew and they
could plainly see the Japanese soldiers man- moved off up the same plain toward which
ning the positions. The American fire was Companies A and B had gone. Lieutenant
fairly heavy on me area, but the Japanese had Dorey and his tank also took a hand in the
evidently formed relays to serve me guns, out proceedings, from farmer down the ditch,
of a group of about 30 men. These enemy but with little effectiveness.
soldiers were hiding in a cave in the cliff, When the Japanese stopped coming to-
connected with me ditch running down to- ward the gun, Gannaway decided that it
ward the beach and passing just behind me would be safe to assault me position. Three
knoll. The men of Company C would sec men, Pfc. Irvin A. George, Pvt. Harold L.
one of the Japanese run pell-mell out of the Peterson, and Pfc. Robert L. Jones, volun-
cave, and do a beautiful baseball slide that teered to rush the guns. All three got up and
ended up under the gun. Then he would ran full speed up the little knoll to a point
squeeze off one or two short bursts at the where mey could look directly down into
leading platoon and roll down the knoll in me ditch, almost at tlle point where it con-
back, out of sight. Here they may have nected with me cave. They found several
picked themselves up and crawled back into Japanese trying to hide in the ditch. For the
the cave to await their turn again. This sys- next two or three minutes mese three men
tem was so arranged mat they did not use me engaged in a fire fight at point-blank range.
two guns in any regular order; it was impos- But they were heavily outnumbered, and
sible to tell just which of the two weapons when Jones received a face wound Ganna-
they would run for. Tech/ Sgt. Ralph N. way ordered them to get back to the platoon.
Gannaway, in command of the I st Platoon, Shortly after this move was accomplished,
ordered his men to lie prone on the ground, me Japanese from the caves loosed a shower
and assigned half the platoon to watching of grenades into the midst of me platoon.
each gun. In this manner, every time a Japa- Gannaway ordered the men to withdrav' out
nese popped over the horizon, one of Ganna- of range. Leaving S/ Sgt. Raymond G. Nor-
way's men picked him off. Gannaway said den in charge, he told Norden to hold while
later the Japanese "just couldn't seem to real- he went back to the battalion CP and tried to
ize what was happening. They kept right get an SPM to come up and help.
on coming at the guns until they were all While Gannaway and the I st Platoon
dead." Colonel O'Brien, who at the time had been engaged with the Japanese in the
was in me coconut grove not far away, ditch, Lieutenant Tougaw with the 3d Pla-
watched the whole spectacle, and about half- toon, the Weapons, and Company Head-
way through it he sent over one of his SPM's quarters had been moving on forward. Tou-
that had just come up and ordered them to gaw had been following O'Brien's orders to

108
 keep moving no matter what happened;
when Gannaway had stopped to take care of
the knoll, the company commander had
taken the left platoon and the trailing ele-
ments, sideslipped to the left, and bypassed
the knoll to follow the battalion assault. The
2d Platoon, which was echeloned to Ganna-
way's right rear, was even closer to the cliffs
than the I st Platoon, but took no part in the
action at the knoll. When the 1st Platoon
stopped, they also halted. This left Ganna-
way with two platoons at the rear, while
Tougaw with the rest of the company had
pushed on forward.
Gannaway had no sooner given SergeaI1l
Norden charge of the platooa than Norden
received a radio call from Tougaw, who
wanted to know where the other platoons
were and why they weren't moving. Lieu- T j SGT. CHARLES GANNAWAY
tenant Tougaw was extremely put out about 0/ Company C, l05th Infantry

the failure of Gannaway to move forward.

It was now 1830 and the rest of the battalion
was already digging in for the night, with the ground, engaged in a VICIOUS fire figh t
darkness only half an hour away. Norden with the enemy in the trench not 30 yards
tried to explain the situation to the company away. Darkness came and the fight con-
commander, but, when Tougaw asked what tinued, with both sides using every possible
the 2d Platoon was doing, Norden didn't weapon, grenades, rifles, and machine guns.
know . Tougaw thereupon ordered Norden to Three of the Americans were hit, two by
bring the 2d Platoon and come forward at grenade fragments. One of them was an act-
once. The 1st Platoon could move up as soon ing staff sergeant, the other a squad leader
as they cleaned up the pocket they were fac- who was knocked unconscious and caused a
ing at the knoll. Norden did as he was or- good deal of trouble in the efforts to evacuate
dered, moving the 2d Platoon back and him.
around the 1st. A few minutes after dark, Gannaway's
This left the 1st Platoon by itself to efforts to get an SPM bore frui t; one of the
face a strong enemy group. The Japanese vehicles reported to the platoon and from 40
were very obviously getting added strength, yards away proceeded to pour howitzer shells
but no one knew from where. For the next into the Japanese positions. While the SPM
45 minutes all Gannaway's men, lying on was at work, Gannaway had taken a small

109
patrol forward to look for Lieutenant T ou- nut grove, where they hailed a passing medi-
gaw, explain what was happening, and calm cal jeep and got French aboard and out of
the company commander's ire, but in the the way. Westlake, then , after all this delay,
darkness the platoon sergeant was unable to ordered his platoon to move up in the dark-
find anyone. While he was gone, S/Sgt. ness and join the rest of the company. By
Frederick A. Westlake, whom he had left in moving all the way over to the railroad tracks
charge of the platoon, received another irate and following them north, the platoon man -
call on the radio from Tougaw who told him aged to find Tougaw and the rest of the com-
in no uncertain terms to get forward. West- pany by 2100. Before they left the pocket
lake assured him he would just as soon as he which had caused them so much trouble, it
could get his wounded men evacuated. Tou- had bee n virtually wiped out by the action
gaw called the Battalion CP and asked that of the SPM.
aid men be sent over to help in this evacua- It will be remembered that Company
tion.' At the time the battalion aid station G, attached to the 3d Battalion, had the mis-
received this call, they were in the process of sion of guarding the flank facing Harakiri
moving forward from the coconut grove to Gulch during the attack. Captain Olander's
the new battalion perimeter, and the carrying task was to swing his unit across the mouth
party that went out looking for Westlake of the gulch, and so bottle up the Japanese
could not find him. After waiting some time in that corridor.
for this party to come, Westlake finally gave Olander's men were in the coconut grove
up. He talked with the driver of the SPM at the opening of the attack; he moved them
and finally got a ride for Jones back as far as out in single file to the cross-island highway ,
the Regimental CPo Pvt. Paul A. Flessen- in the shelter of the ridge on which Company
kemper, who had suffered multiple wounds L was still immobilized. Around the corner
in the legs from grenade fragments during of this ridge was the entrance to the gulch.
the fire fight, voluntarily walked all the way Olander assembled the company near the
back through the coconut grove in the dark- sharp hairpin turn in the highway, estab-
ness to the 3d Battalion aid station, where he lished contact with L, above, and set out
managed to hitch a ride on a medical jeep to alone to make a personal reconnaissance of
the regimental aid station. Westlake and one the mouth of the draw. Ahead of him, the
of his men carried French back to the coco- nearer leg of the hairpin curve skirted the
lit may be well at this poi nt to call attentio n to a feature of
nose of sloping ground that marked the end
this action which is characteristic of fi).:"htin~ in the Pacific; as this of the west wall of the gulch; from this leg,
day's story shows at several poi nts, evacuation of the wounded often
c:Juscd serious delays during attacks. Unit command:- rs were :l.warc the trail branched off the road and led up
of. and disturbed by. the tendency of men to hall an advance to sec
that woun ded were safely take n back. Measures to prcv('nI this
into the draw. Just short of the junction was
were d ifficult to enforce. Two features of Paci fi c fight ing differe n- the tank lost by Lieutenant Ganio earlier in
tiated it from that in Europe: the Japant's(: fnu,I!ht on in suicidal
fashion if bypassed. even vcry small groups o r indi\'id ual ~: :md they
the day, tipped over in the ditch. Within the
killed wounded men without mercy. U.S. ~ol(liers were aware of U of the hairpin turn was a small pocket of
this and felt strongl y about leaving wounded comrades in the wake
of an advance. to fall victims to any bypasSl'd enemy snipers. extremely rough terrain, covered with brush

110
and bushes, and somewhat lower, perhaps by where the enemy were. (The men in his
five feet, than the little shelf which supported company thought this was very foolish, a
the highway. sure invitation to suicide.)
When Olander started out on his recon- S/ Sgt. Edward J. Wojcicki, platoon ser-
naissance he sneaked along the ditch edging geant of the 3d Platoon, below the road, had
the highway, and got as far as the tank. Fol- been working his men forward along the
lowing him at a short interval were his radio- lower ditch and had gotten about halfway to
man and one rifleman. Olander saw nothing where Captain Olander was visible in the
to indicate the presence of the enemy and told dusk, beating the bushes. At that point, the
his radioman to move up the I st Platoon. company commander ordered Wojcicki to
This platoon moved out immediately, com- halt the platoon and come forward with a
ing down the edge of the road where they six-man patrol through the brush to where
could jump into the ditch, if necessary. The he was. Wojcicki knew that there were Japa-
leaders had not reached a point more than nese in the area and he said later that he was
halfway to the crippled tank when the Japa- sure Olander was crazy, but he followed or-
nese opened up on them with rifle and ma- ders. The men had no sooner stepped out
chine-gun fire from the bushes in the pocket of the ditch than they found themselves
of the U and from the nose of ground on the squarely in the middle of a large Japanese
right front. Two men were hit almost at patrol or outpost which had been lying
once and the whole platoon was pinned to quietly in the bushes. Wojcicki later said
the ground. that the first thing he knew he had stepped
Captain Olander appeared to be for- squarely on one of the enemy soldiers; then
ward of the fire that was coming from the the ground seemed to erupt. Machine guns
left, behind the fire on the right, and in the opened up, grenades began, going off , men
midst of the enemy. He very calmly called started running in all directions. Captain
back on his radio and told his 2d Platoon Olander, a short distance away, fired his car-
to move up on the high ground and his 3d bine, then used it as a club until he broke it,
Platoon to move into the area below the hair- and finally picked up a saber which he
pin. From there they were to be prepared to wielded to good effect. Near! y everyone of
support the advance of the I st Platoon by fire Wojcicki's men were engaged in wrestling
on the suspected areas. or kicking their opponents as well as shooting
The execution of this order consumed and bayoneting them. The rest of Company
approximately 20 minutes; it was now after G, who could barely see what was going on
1800 and darkness was rapidly approaching. in the darkness, did not dare to shoot for fear
The enemy fire had died down completely of hitting their own men. In the furious
as soon as the 1st Platoon ga'{e evidence that melee that raged for the next few minutes,
they were not trying to move. Captain Olan- two of Wojcicki's men, pfc. James Messer
der had used the time to poke around in the and Pfc. Vernon Bug, were killed. Another,
bushes below the road, trying to find out Sgt. Benjamin J. Drenzek, was wounded four

III
 Y AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
Evening. 6 July 1944 "''''I" Po,n'

___ fR<)N1 L.II[ MOftll' NG 6 .JULy

"""""'" f _ 1 LINE [YE III" G 6 JULY

M AP NO.9

different times. On three occasions Wojcic- him that he didn't think it was possible for
ki's men killed Japanese who were trying to him to build the line across the mouth of the
carry Drenzek away, up into the gulch. Af- gulch, but that he thought he could control
ter the last attempt to kidnap the wounded it from the nose of ground overlooking Road
man, Olander told Woj cicki to get back out Junction 64. He was given permission to dig
of the area. A few minutes later, after he re- in up on this nose, and moved his company
joined the company himself, he ordered all across the road and up onto the higher
the platoons to pull back to the starting point ground. During the establishment of the
near the bend in the road. perimeter, the company was constantly har-
Once here, the company commander assed by machine-gun fire from across the
called Colonel Bradt on the radio and told gulch. During this time, Captain Olander
112
made another personal reconnaissance and minutes were spent in mopping up remain-
spotted an enemy gun in a cave in the oppo- ing enemy in the ditch, and then the company
site wall. He called up a volunteer, Pvt. Jo- pushed rapidly on to the north. By 1800
seph F. Kinyone, to fire a bazooka at this they had advanced several hundred yards,
position, but as Kinyone moved up to posi- and there held up to tie in with the I st Bat-
tion he was hit by a bullet and killed. talion on the right and Company F on the
This ended the day's activity for Com- left. Company F had almost as easy an ad-
pany G. Once again, no impression had been vance, although they were delayed by pass-
made on the enemy stronghold in the gulch, ing a series of pillboxes and dugouts that
and, although the mouth of the canyon was dotted the beach. No Japanese were encoun-
covered by the fire of Company G, there was tered in most of these, but each one had to
no solid stopgap to keep the enemy from be carefully investigated. Just before reach-
emerging there in force. ing the objective, the 3d Platoon, next to the
The remainder of the 2d Battalion, road, did find a shelter occupied by three
Companies E and F, together with most of Japanese. The platoon sergeant and another
H and Headquarters Companies, had moved man were wounded by a grenade which they
forward in the assault at 1715 with the 1st threw into the shelter and the Japanese threw
Battalion. Major McCarthy had placed his back out.
Company F on the battalion left, between the The 2d Battalion (less Company G)
beach and the road. Company E had ex- dug in for the night between the railroad
tended from there to the left flank of Com- track and the beach. The 1st Battalion was
pany A, across the railroad tracks. The work south across the rail line, with a considerable
of Lieutenant Dorey's tanks had had its great- gap on its right flank separating it from Com-
est effect in front of the 2d Battalion. The pany G at the gulch.
ditch position which had been the enemy's The day had ended in a success for the
main strongpoint all across the 2d Battalion 27th Division, but the night was to bring
front, and which had held up Major McCar- disaster. Gathering the bulk of their remain-
thy's advance since he arrived at Road Junc- ing troops, the Japanese launched their great-
tion 2, had been very effectively reduced not est suicidal attack of the war. The banzai
30 minutes previous to the time set for the charge hit with particular force on the two
attack. When Company E moved off in the battalions of the 105th, left by their very ad-
attack it was, therefore, with surprising ease. vance in an exposed advance position. The
The men simply got up and walked forward . enemy's main assault struck along the coastal
Within minutes they were at the ditch, and plain, and it also used Harakiri Gulch as a
hardly a shot had bee n fired. At the ditch corridor to hit the gap between Companies C
the men could see without much trouble that and G. In a matter of a few hours the 1st
Dorey had done effective work. In the words and 2d Battalions of the I 05th, suffering 900
of Sergeant Nicolette, "We had to walk casualties out of 1100-1200 effectives, had
across that ditch on dead Japs." About 20 virtuall y ceased to exist as combat units.

113
SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

SANTA MARIA
INFANTE
 TERRAIN OF FIFTH ARMY'S BATTLE, looking norlh
toward the Liri Val/ey. The importance 0/ the MI. BrauM
hill mass is c1~arly shoUln, in rela/ion to the valley leading
north to the Liri through Ausonia. (Photo taken Ap,.il 1946.)

IRUNeI MOUNTAINS

LIlU VAl.l.EY
 T he batde for Santa Maria Infante was
important in the opening of the Allied offen-
sive toward Rome on II May 1944. Strong
Allied forces were concentrated on the west
side of the Italian peninsula to renew an ef-
fort stopped by the winter and heavy Ger-
man resistance. Eighth Army was poised for
attack through the Liri Valley along the axis
of Highway No.6; main Fifth Army faced
a chain of mountains, in a 13-mile zone from
the Liri River to the sea. The forces in the
Anzio Beachhead were ready to strike when
their opportunity came as a result of progress
on the other fronts.
Although Fifth Army's bridgehead
across the Garigliano made a dangerous river
crossing unnecessary, the Aurunci Mountains,
fortified by positions that were part of the en-
emy's Gustav Line, formed a difficult bar-
rier. On the right were the highest peaks,
topped by Mount Majo (940 meters). The
Ausonia Valley lying west of this group sepa-
rates it from another steep mass of mountains,
dominated by Mt. Petrella (1,533 meters) .
Lower hills fronted the army's left wing, but
these were known to be heavily defended.
The most important form ed a triangular
wedge at the southern end of the Ausonia
Valley; if the Minturno ridge (in our pos-
session) is considered as the base, the hill tri-
angle narrows north ward to the highest hill
of the feature, Mt. dei Bracchi (205 meters).
To judge by the disposition of their
troops, the Germans considered the higher

117
en
LLI •
> ••
i= •
..,!i3 •»>
[[)
0 .
>- ,.;• >
i
•
:::;;: > >
II:: •
0
2
~
« •
~ w
,-,,
:I:
l-
u.
J I

0
ii:

-
118
mountains too formidable for a main attack 35 Oth Infantry was ordered to break resist-
by Fifth Army. Therefore, Fifth Army's ance in the hills southwest of Castelforte.
plan was for the French Expeditionary The most diflicult terrain on Fifth Ar-
Corps, employing highly trained mountain my's front confronted the French forces, but
troops and elements of foor divisions, to at- the battle in the smaller hills facing II Corps
tack Mt. Majo, where enemy defenses were could be slow and bloody. In the past cam-
not extensive and where tactical surprise paigns, Fifth Army had often found it easier
might be obtained. Simultaneously with the to advance in mountainous terrain, where en-
French attack to the north, two fresh divi- emy observation and fields of fire had numer-
sions of II Corps, the 88th and 85th, would ous blind spots. In the lower hills, rolling
attack the well-defended hills making up the countryside and even slopes afforded superb
Mt. Bracchi triangle, as well as San Martino positions for German machine guns, sited to
Hill to the left of the feature and Hill 413 cover all avenues of approach.
on the right. Capture of Mt. Bracchi in Phase
I of the offensive was essential to protect the Task of the 35151 Infantry
flank of French units when they crossed the
Ausonia Valley after capture of Mt. Majo To reach its objective, Santa Maria, near
(Map No.1, opposite). the north tip of the Bracchi triangle, the
On II Corps' right wing, the 88th Divi- 351 st Infantry had to attack over difficult
sion was to carry the main effort of the corps terrain (Map No.2, page 120 and Map No.
attack against the wedge of hills dominated 3, page 122). From east-west Cemetery
by Mt. Bracchi. (See the panorama of the Ridge, rising above Min'turno and forming
battlefield, page 116.) The 35 1st Infantry the base of the triangle, a connecting ridge
would fight the most important battle in this extends 1,950 yards north to Santa Maria
zone, with its main objective Santa Maria In- and then on to the apex of the triangle at
fante, a small town near the top of the hill Mt. Bracchi. This connecting ridge, run-
triangle, which would undoubtedly be tena- ning through the whole hill mass parallel to
ciously held. Santa Maria Infante com- its western edge, was to be the axis of attack
manded the main German lateral route of for the 351 st. The crest averages a little more
communications in the Ausonia Valley, and than 125 meters and is followed by the Min-
once our troops gained the town they could turno-Santa Maria road; beyond a double
easily advance north to Mt. Bracchi and make curve at the Minturno cemetery the road
untenable all the enemy's positions in the winds along the ridge line to a fork a few
valley to the east. The 88th would be as- yards south of Santa Maria, where one branch
sisted on the left by the 85th Division, which goes northeast through the town and then
was assigned a few hill objectives on the west- into Pulcherini, and the other runs northwest
ern edge of the Bracchi triangle, as well as through the tiny hamlet of Tame and down
San Martino Hill lying in the valley west of the hills to a junction with the Ausonia-For-
the feature. On the right of the 351 st, the mia highway. The sides of the north-south

119
 MT. BRACCHI HILLS
II MAY 1944
e::<! (Non UNITS

.J,.-I......(. EN(MT MLR

'000

MAP NO.2
120
 THE OBJECTIVE OF THE 35 1ST INFANTRY was Santa Maria
Infante, sun on the hill in foreground. T he road from Minturno
alo11g the ridge comes in from the lower left . Beyond the imme·
diau batleground is th e valley leading (upper right) through Auson;a
to the Lir; Va/ltoy. The Aurunci Mountains dominate this plain.

ridge are cut by draws into small spurs, known as the Right and Left Tits, IS O and
which, stubbornly held by the enemy, turned 146 meters high, jut out on either side of the
out to be the most troublesome obstacles to road. Three hundred yards beyon d the Right
the 35 1st's advance. Six hundred and fifty Tit the steeply sloped side-hill called The
yards beyond the cemetery, small knolls Spur extends 750 yards east from the road.

121
 PLAN OF OPENING ATTACK
351., INFANTRY

-
" May 1944
AlliS OF MOVEMENTS, 1st PHASE
--+ AXIS OF IoIOVEMENTS.20 PHASE
FIRE SUPPORT ,1ST PHA SE
ENEMY MlR

MAP NO .3

122
 'l'R 'J H CI

TERRAIN OF THE INITIAL ATTACK, looking along the Santa

Maria "oad from edge of cemct<ry. (Photo taken April 1946.)

From its slightly curved crest (157 and 146 with a long saddle separating the fir st two.
meters at the highest points) The Spur com- Its steep slopes reaching a gradient of 33 per-
mands both the ridge road and the valley to cent at places, the S-Ridge was key tactical
its east. West of The Spur, Hill 103 dom- ground in the coming battle, for it com-.
inates the slope on the left side of the road. manded the main advance along the Min-
East of the main ridge, Reali Creek had tumo-Santa Maria road as well as the lower
cut a small valley along its course east through end of the Ausonia-Formia road. Its cap-
the hill mass. North-south spurs with sharp ture would pave the way for a breakthrough
slopes jut into this valley on both sides, and into the Fonnia corridor and an advance to-
made any flanking attack toward Santa ward the Aurunci Mountains.
Maria more difficult than a direct approach The ridges in the hilI triangle are ex-
along the road. West of the road, a much tensively cultivated by use of terraces. At the
more narrow valley formed by the Perlgia time of the attack, vegetation was sparse and
Creek separates the Santa Maria ridge from what there was stood less than ankle-high.
the feature forming the west side of the hill Some of the hills, notably the forward slope
triangle, the S-Ridge running northeast from of The Spur, are almost bare. Even where
Solacciano to Tame. Its crest is marked by there are scattered trees, by I I May most of
a series ofknobs (131, 109, 126, and 128), them had been sheared off at half length by

123
artillery fire. Sunken roads that are little east-west ridge at the base of the triangle.
more than farm trails wind their way across After this the enemy's main line of resistance
the ridges; the most important was the ran from Hill I 3 I to Hill 103, across the
sunken road which branches off from the road to The Spur, and thence to Pulcherini.
Santa Maria highway, then winds across the South of this line the enemy had scattered
forward slope of The Spur and northeast to machine-gun and sniper positions, sometimes
Pulcherini. in the houses along the road. On the high
Less than three miles north of Santa ground north and east of Santa Maria (Hills
Maria and across the Ausonia Valley, the main 153, 172 north, 172 south and 170) were
Aurunci range rises high above the small other strongpoints.
hills of the Mt. Bracchi triangle and afforded Despite the efforts of patrols and aerial
the enemy observation over the entire area. reconnaissance, the full extent of enemy de-
In the lower reaches of the mountains lie the fenses was not determined. Although in some
town of Spigno and Mt. Civita, 900 and cases machine-gun emplacements, minefield s,
1,800 feet, respectively, above the level of the and barbed-wire entanglements were accu-
Ausonia Valley. rately located before the action, many ele-
The Germans had held the Bracchi hills ments of the deeply organized defenses
for months; as part of their Gustav Line de- would be revealed only in the battle. Clev-
fen ses from the Apennines to the sea. In the erly located automatic weapons, which cov-
offensive that began on 18 January and ered extensive minefields and were in turn
netted only minor Allied gains, British 56 supported by mortars and light artillery,
Division had captured Minturno and the made up the principal defenses. Our troops

THE RIDGE ROAD, axis for the 351st Infantry', altdck, fol.
lowed the crest and dipped betwun small knolls. oOering good posi.
lions for enemy de/emes. Exact localion of th is vietti is flot known.

124
would discover that the machine guns were WIre. The approaches to the S-Ridge, Tame,
so placed on forward and reverse slopes of Santa Maria and the high ground west of it,
the spurs and flanking ridges that they could and Pulcherini all were covered by fields of
bring a grazing cross fire on infantrymen ad- antipersonnel mines and in many cases by
vancing along either side of the road, as well concertina wire. Yet, on the slopes south of
as in the draws between the hills. Hill 103 and The Spur, where the enemy
Pillbox shelters supporting the machine had set up a strong belt of machine-gun and
guns consisted of two main types. The first sniper positions, mines and barbed wire were
was a rectangular excavation, five feet by used sparingly and were found to present no
three feet, with pillars in each corner. Across serious obstacle to the advance of the 351 st
the pillars were large wooden beams topped Infantry. Fields of antitank mines were
with three layers of railroad ties and a layer placed along the Minturno-Santa Maria road
of stone and earth. The second type of pill- between the Tits and The Spur, around Reali
box was built into houses by digging three to Creek in front of Santa Maria and Pulcherini,
four feet into the floor and reinforcing the and along each side of the creek bed that runs
dugout in a manner similar to the first type, east of the S-Ridge.
except that only wooden beams and earth Defending the sector facing the 351 st
were used as reinforcement. Holding about Infantry was the 94th Fusilier Reconnais-
five men, each type of pillbox furnished pro- sance Battalion (71st Infantry Division)
tection against shell fragments and served as with an estimated strength of 400-500 men.
a defensive base against infantry attacks. At the time the Allied drive began, the 94th
Most of the German emplacements housing consisted of four companies and held a front
automatic weapons also had some form of of approximately 1,200 yards, stretching
overhead cover. At many points communi- from just west of Santa Maria to the eastern
cations trenches ran from machine-gun posi- slope of Pulcherini. Elements of the 267 th
tions to individual dugouts and fox holes Grenadier Regiment (94th Infantry Divi-
where snipers were concealed. In some in- sion), the strength of which probably did not
stances the Germans had alternate machine- exceed 300-400 men, defended the S-Ridge.
gun positions to which they could retreat if Both infantry units had heavy fire support.
forced out of the bunkers that formed the first Several 88-mm cannon and self-propelled
line of defense. A sufficient supply of am- guns were situated along the road from
munition was on hand at the front-line posi- Spigno to the Ausonia-Formia highway.
tions, from four to six boxes being available Emplaced behind Mt. Civita was a battery of
at each machine gun.' pack howitzers. The major portion of heav-
The Germans often protected their ma- ier artillery was located west and north of
chine-gun positions with mines and barbed Spigno.
Two regiments were committed in the
1 Much of this information on Gc=rroan positions was acquired American attack in the Bracchi hills. The
dunng and after the attack . In main features, the defenses were
characteristic o f other sectors on the Fifth Army front. 351 st Infantry would attack along a narrow

125
126
front, 100-200 yards wide, astride the Min- port. After the mine platoon of the Antitank
turno-Santa Maria road. On the 351 st's Company had removed mines, the I st Pla-
right Rank, the 88th Division's reserve regi- toon, Company C, 760th Tank Battalion
ment, the 349th Infantry, would support the would fire and maneuver along the Min-
attack by fire of its heavy weapons. On the tumo-Santa Maria road. From positions in
left of the 351 st, the S-Ridge was the objec- the Tufo area, the 2d Chemical Weapons
tive of the 338th Infantry, 85th Division. Battalion and Company C, 804th Tank De-
The two regiments attacking in the Bracchi stroyer Battalion would render fire suppor-t;
triangle were to maintain contact by use of 913th Field Artillery Battalion (l05-mm
a patrol of one officer and two squads of riRe- howitzer), the Cannon Company, 351 st In-
men; an SCR 300 radio would be used for fantry from the area south of the Minturno-
communication, as well as a lateral telephone Tufo road, and the 3 39th Field Artillery Bat-
line between adjacent battalions of the two talion ( 15 5 -mm howitzer) near the coast,
regiments. would also be ready to fire.
The 351 st Infantry's plan of attack The plan for the 2d Battalion, carrying
(Map No.3, page 122) provided that the the main assault, provided that two compa-
2d Battalion, making the main effort, would nies would jump off from the forward slope
seize and hold the high ground to the north of Cemetery Ridge. Company F on the left
and east of Santa Maria, then reorganize to of the Minturno-Santa Maria road and Com-
beat off counterattacks. The 3d Battalion pany E on the right would advance in a for-
would support the attack of the 2d Battalion mation of two platoons abreast with the third
by machine-gun and mortar fire from posi- in reserve following closely. Each leading
tions on Hills 130 and 132, about 800 yards platoon would lay a white tape line as it
east of the road. After the capture of Santa moved forward. Company E's initial objec-
Maria it would pass through the 2d Battalion tives were Hill 130 and the Right Tit; Com-
and seize the portion of Mt. Bracchi within pany F's, the Left Tit. Once these were
the regimental zone of action . From Hill secured Company E would move ahead to
135, on the ridge east of the 3d Battalion's capture The Spur and occupy the high
supporting position, the I st Battalion was to ground east of Santa Maria, while Company
give supporting fire and to maintain contact F took Tame, and then went after the high
with the 349th Infantry on the next ridge ground north of Santa Maria. Following one
to its right. When the 3d Battalion was ready objective behind Company E, Company G
to move down the Minturno-Santa Maria would go to the Y-junction south of Santa
road, the I st Battalion would follow and seize Maria and advance along the road through
Pulcherini. the town , closing the gap between Companies
The 2d Battalion's attack would be E and F and mopping up pockets of enemy
aided by tanks and by normal artillery sup- resistance left by the assault companies. In

TERRAIN OF OPENING ATTACK

127
MINTURNO was th~ bau for th~ 351st Infantry's attack. This
photograph, token from th~ ruins of a hous~ just ..south of th~
ccmt:tery, shows th ~ osumbly area for th~ 2d Battalion's attack·

the opinion of Lt. Col. Raymond E. Kendall, night action, therefore, has to be considered
2d Battalion commander, and Capt. Carl W. from the level of small groups and told in
Nelson, Company F commander, only visual separate stories, out of which the larger pic-
contact and radio communication would be ture can be reconstructed. During most of
required to keep E and F in touch with each the night, all anyone knew was what was
other. The time schedule called for the happening a few feet away.
troops to reach Santa Maria less than two Company F moved off from Cemetery
hours after the jump-off. Ridge before 2300 in order to pass through
the cemetery, a fa vorite target of German ar-
The Night Attack: jump-Off tillery, before the enemy could detect our in-
tentions (Map No. 4). At 2240 Company
To ach ieve tactical surprise the attack F crossed the Minturno-Santa Maria road,
was scheduled to begin in darkness, with no poked through a hole in th e south wall of
artillery preparation before H Hour, set for the cemetery, and marched silentl y across the
2300 . As it turned out, the advantages gained cemetery with only one or two casualties,
by surprise were balanced by the difficulties from mines. The 3d Platoon, led by 1st Lt.
of attacking almost blind over hilly terrain. Jack L. Panich, led off on the right, moving
Confusion became the dominan t fea ture of forward 25 yards from the road. AbreJst of
the battle for any group larger than a sq uad. it at 25 yards' interval tlle 2d Platoon, under
Platoons were separated and companies had Tech/ Sgt. Robert A. Casey, was farther
very little idea what was happening in their down the ridge slope, followed by the 1st
own zone, let alone on their flanks. The Platoon in support, keeping visual contact.

128
Each platoon was echeloned in a column of light. In many cases, squads or platoons fight
squads, about two arms' lengths apart. On over the same terrain, without making
the right the company commander, Captain friend Iy contact-an indication that these
Nelson, with his command group and the actions must have taken place at different
4th Platoon (Weapons Platoon), moved be- times during the hours of darkness.
hind the 3d Platoon by the road; the 4th Company F will be the first unit traced
Platoon was ordered to proceed by bounds through the attack, beginning with the 3d
approximately one terrain feature behind the Platoon. But the story of that platoon quickly
3d Platoon. Following to the rear of each of becomes the several stories of its squads.
the platoon columns, a section of heavy .30 According to schedule, the Left Tit was
cal. machine gu ns from Company H was taken under fire by machine guns, mortars,
directed to leapfrog forward from successive and artillery. Holding up for 20 minutes for
terrain features, one section at a time. our barrage to lift, Lieutenant Panich decided
Progress was relatively fast, and the pla- to deploy the 3d Platoon from a column of
toons aroused no enemy resistance. Leading squads to a formation of two squads up and
elements of the 2d Platoon became entangled abreast, and two in the rear in a skirmish line
in some concertina wire, but were freed by (Map No.5) .' In the first wave were the
Lieutenant Panich, only a few yards away, I st Squad on the left, commanded by Cpl.
who took a wirecutter from one of his men Robert F. Tyler, and on the right the 2d
and severed the strands. Just before both Squad under S/ Sgt. Charles Spero. Eche-
platoons reached the base of the Left Tit, the loned to the right rear were the 3d Squad
deafening sound of the supporting barrage of under Sgt. Peter Pyenta and the 4th Squad,
mortars, machine guns, and artillery opened led by S/ Sgt. Edmond B. Hoppes. But the
up all along the Allied front. The men 4th Squad had already become detached in
stopped, according to plan. On the other side the dense smoke and heavy fire, and was out
of the road Company E moved up abreast of of contact. (See later, page 138.)
Company F through the no man's land that After our barrage was lifted from the
lay between Cemetery Ridge and the Tits, Left Tit, the 3d Platoon, less the 4th Squad,
while Company G, in reserve in a forward pushed up the southern slope. Nearing the
assembly area below the crest of Hill 156, crest, the I st and 3d Squads veered to the
waited for the signal to join the battle. Over right, struck the road, and moved along it for
the heads of the infantry, streams of 40-mm a few yards until the platoon leader, Lieu-
tracers marked out routes of advance. tenant Panich, intercepted them. He warned
From this point on, the account of the the 1st and 3d Squad leaders of mines on the
night's battle must follow the separate actions
of small groups of the 2d Battalion. No times I To show morC' clearly the formation it adopted at this paiod
of the assault. the 3d Platoon is pr('scnted on this map in a general-
are definite enough to permit any attempt at iZe'd manner. Actually, it occupied a much small er aru than this
giving a situation report for the battalion map suggests\ and it began the :usauh from positions just west of
the' road bctw('cn Point 130 and the' Left Tit. All routes o f adva nce
or for companies at any periods before day- in this and late:r sketches for the night action arc appro ximations.

129
 20 BATTALION 351ST INF.
2230. II MAY 1944
..J.,...I,.",& ENEMY MLR

MAP NO.4 and aerial photograph taken 11 November 1943

130
road and steered them back to the slope west the wire because no wirecutters were at hand.
of it; then Panich went back to the Left Tit The 3d Squad's assistant leader, who carried
where the 2d Squad, under Sergeant Spero, a wirecutter, had become detached from the
had waited. Led by Sergeant Pyenta , the 1st squad. Unable to move ahead, Sergeant
and 3d Squads were off alone on one of the Pyenta and Corporal Tyler decided to bypass
adventures of the night attack. the wire, go up toward the road, and follow
it until they contacted other elements of
SergearJt PyelJta's Group at Hill 103 Company F, who were thought to be some-
where ahead toward Tame. Turning away
Moving west from the road, the 1st and from the wire, Corporal Tyler and the sur-
3d Squads, 3d Platoon moved down the vivors of his squad started off, racing over the
ridge slope beyond the Left Tit and swung terrace as fa st-as they could make it. As he
west of house No.2. Here they turned east passed from view above the first terrace, Cor-
again and moved up along the terraces below poral Tyler called back to Sergeant Pyenta,
Hill 103 at a fast trot.' A mine exploded, "The road's up here!" The words were
killing one man and wounding two more in scarcely out of his mouth before bursts of
the 3d Squad, but the squads stopped only machine-gun fire silenced him and mowed
briefly for the determination of casualties, down the rest of his squad. The fire came
then continued to push up the rising ground from two automatic weapons, one in house
near Hill 103 to a point south of house No.6 No. 7 on the road, the other in a dugout be-
and west of the big house No. 7 on the road. hind the barbed wire and on the left flank of
There two explosions, caused either by demo- the 1st Squad. It was the latter gun, firing
lition charges or by artillery shells hitting in at point-blank range, which did most of the
the dirt and driving it skyward, rocked the damage. Along with the two machine guns,
earth near the two squads and knocked them a machine pistol fired into the I st Squad from
to the ground. Picking themselves up, the a few yards to the left of the dugout.
men started for the road , or for where they One rifleman in the 3d Squad unloaded
guessed it to be. Climbing up over the next eight shots in the direction from which the
terrace, they followed it for about 15 yards machine pistol had fired. The rest of the 3d
until they hit a double strand of concertina Squad opened up on the two German ma-
wire. It was then about 0100 and the moon chine guns with everything they had, shoot-
had come out, although smoke and fog ob- ing rifle grenades and throwing hand gren-
scured it. ades at the two positions. When the shower
Corporal Tyler, still in the lead of the of explosives was over, the machine guns were
1st and 3d Squads, came back to Sergeant silent; the enemy had either been knocked
Pyenta to report that he could not get through out or had retreated to other positions. But
during the fight the 1st and 3d Squads were
1 Hill 103 is only a small knoll at the end of a \'cry minor spur reduced to nine men, including the 3d Squad
west of the road, a ri~ in no way comparable to The Spur just
on the other side of the ridge. leader, Sergeant Pyenta.

131
 As he had no idea where to find other
COMPANY F
troops of Company F, believed to be ahead,
SGT PVENTA'S GROUP AT HILL 103
11/12 May 1944
Sergeant Pyenta decided to withdraw with
the few remaining men to try to contact
ENEMY MG
other elements of the company in the rear.
9 '00
Walking along the slope near the road, but
dropping to the ground whenever artillery
shells came close, Sergeant Pyenta and his
eight men moved back toward the rear.'
When they reached the slope of a little knoll
situated between Hill 10 3 and the Left Tit,
they saw a man outlined against the crest.
Thinking that he was from Company F, Ser-
geant Pyenta called out, "Hey, is that the 3d
Platoon up there?" The man dropped from
view, and a grenade, which exploded harm-
lessly above the 3d Squad, answered the ques-
tion. The 3d Squad did not return the fire.
Picking up a tape line left by some other unit
in advance, the men followed the marker
until they reached a shell hole 150 yards
north of the cemetery. Here they found Lieu-
tenant Panich and a handful of men who had
pulled back, after troubles of their own, on
a similar search for other elements of Com-
pany F. Lieutenant Panich's story is next.

Lieutenant Panich's Group at Hill 103

In the advance of the 1st and 3d Squads

of the 3d Platoon beyond the Left Tit, the
2d Squad had fallen behind and lost contact
with them as well as with the 4th Squad.

1 Tn doing so, they apparently sk irted the enemy positions just

west of house No.5, where Panich's group fought their action (see
next section), but without see ing the enemy or drawing fire. That
this could happen in night fighting is possible, but it is also con-
ceivabl e that the mr-n interviewed were mistaken as to their exact
locations ncar Hill 103. and that the Pycnta and Panich groups mal"
have fought the same enemy positions, at different times. The maner
MAP NO .5
could not be settled by interview on the ground .

132
 Lieutenant Panich was with the 2d Squad;
COMPANY F
informed that neither the rest of his platoon
~T. PANICH'S GROUP AT HILL
11/12 May 1944
nor the other platoons of Company F were
behind him, Panich set out to catch up with
- . ENEMY MG
the advance and soon ran into Sergeant
o
Casey, the acting leader of the 2d Platoon
(Map No.6). This platoon had led off the
left column of Company F's advance. Ser-
geant Casey was in a situation like that of
Lieutenant Panich. He had lost contact with
most of his platoon and had decided to look
for the 3d Platoon. Meeting on the slope
beyond the Left Tit, Panich and Casey con-
solidated the remnants of two squads which
they had with them: six men with Sergeant
Casey from the 1st Squad of the 2d Platoon
and five men, including Lieutenant Panich,
The SptJr
from the 3d Platoon.
Ignorant of Captain Nelson's where-
abouts, Lieutenant Panich decided to push
on until he caught up with the other squads
of the 3d Platoon, which he judged were all
ahead of him. The makeshift force walked
fast up the forward slopes of Hill 103 under
cover of an ascending row of terraces, which
protected them from the machine guns on
the crest of the hill. In the lead of the group
was Sergeant Spero, who took off from the
Left Tit and across to Hill 103 like a wild
Indian, yelling and running with his tommy
gun at his hip. With mortar shells falling
all around them, Panich's group arrived at
the highest terrace on the slope, which was
the last line of protective cover against ma-
chine-gun fire. Here they dropped in a big
shell hole to explore the situation and decide
what to do. Thirty-five yards beyond the
terrace, over which concertina wire was
MAP NO.6 strung, there were two dugouts on the crest

133
from which machine guns were firing. Above There he saw a dozen men dash across the
them and near the road was a house, No.5. road, but could not tell whether they were
Since the top of the terrace was in the direct friendly or enemy. Before long a hand gren-
line of enemy machine-gun fire, rifles were ade landing near Panich's shell hole resolved
useless and hand grenades had to be thrown at his doubts and sent him scurrying back
the dugouts. to the communications trench, where he
When this tactic produced no visible re- jumped in on top of Sergeant Casey.
sults, Lieutenant Panich left a few men in the Still undecided what they should do,
big shell hole and led the rest, with Sergeant Sergeant Casey and Lieutenant Panich had
Spero in the van, over the terrace toward the their minds made up by a succession of events
machine-gun emplacements. They burst into that cut the strength of their force sharply
the barbed wire and pulled themselves and led them to believe that they were sur-
through without injury except to their pants. rounded. Repeated efforts to contact Captain
Under heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, Nelson by radio had produced no results:
they crawled forward until they reached an every time Pvts. Warner W. Ogden and
open communications trench into which they Richard C. Pelham tuned in on their SCR
dropped for protection. They were a little 536's they could hear only their own voices.
beyond the enemy machine guns. The trench In the meantime word was passed from the
connected the two machine-gun dugouts rear to the front of the communications
with sleeping quarters and other enemy posi- trench that Sgt. Frederick H. Neddo, who
tions on the reverse slope of Hill 103; it was had been left with a handful of men in a
from 30-50 yards long and 5-6 feet deep, shell hole below the terrace, had been shot
but was barely wide enough for one man and that Lieutenant Panich's whole group
to wriggle through. Between the south end was surrounded. After Sergeant Neddo was
of the communications trench and the two hit, Sergeant Casey saw a man about 10 yards
machine-gun dugouts ran small covered pas- away to the left walking toward him and
sageways. Protected from machine-gun fire called out, "Who is that?" The reply came
as long as they kept their heads below the sur- back from a German "zipper" pistol; I the
face, Lieutenant Panich's men threw hand shots knocked Sergeant Casey's rifle out of
grenades at the German positions until they his hand and damaged Lieutenant Panich's
exhausted their supply. carbine. Nothing more was needed to make
At this point Lieutenant Panich and Lieutenant Panich and Sergeant Casey decide
Sergeant Casey decided that they could not it was high time to vacate their spot. With all
remain much longer in the trench, chiefly but two men along, they piled out of the
because of our own mortar fire which had trench, dove over the terrace below it, and
begun to plaster the whole crest of the hill. wriggled into the big shell hole where the
Climbing out of the trench, Lieutenant wounded Sergeant Neddo was lying.
Panich crawled to a shell hole only a few
lOne of the common soldier terms for the m3chine pistol. An-
yards away from the house near the road. other was "burp" gun.

134
 Private Ogden and Sergeant Spero re- started back for Company F's assembly area
mained behind in the communications behind Cemetery Ridge. Crawling, walk-
trench. Ogden traded shots with the Ger- ing, or running as the occasion demanded,
man who was using the machine pistol and, they moved along close to the road, meeting
though wounded in the exchange, killed the no Germans but now and then coming under
German, who toppled headlong into the machine-gun fire. Finally Lieutenant Panich
trench. Sergeant Spero then crawled toward and Sergeant Casey reached a big shell hole
the southern end of the trench. On the way along the slope near the road 150 yards north
back, as Sergeant Spero stuck his leg in the of the Minturno cemetery, where Sergeant
underground passageway to the left-hand Pyenta and his eight men soon joined them.
machine-gun dugout, he was shot by a Ger- All then went back to the jump-off point,
man crouched inside it. Wounded but still reaching it before daylight; they took no
very much alive, Sergeant Spero edged further part in the ba ttle.
around the corner of the passageway and The two groups of the 3d Platoon dur-
tommy-gunned his assailant. ing the fighting on Hill 103 had been com-
The other men in the shell hole below pletely out of contact, and neither group had
the terrace waited while Sergeant Spero and knowledge that any friendly troops were
Ogden were fighting with Germans in and close by. Actually, since the times cannot be
around the machine-gun positions. Lieuten- fixed, their separate battles may well have
ant Panich organized security around the shell taken place at considerable intervals. Nor
hole, putting four men in front on the bank were they the only forces of Company F en-
before the terrace, one on the right flank, and gaged at Hill I 03; a group of the 2d Platoon,
himself and another man on the left flank led by SjSgt. Paul M. Eddy, reached that
and rear. For what seemed like ages, but same area during the night fighting.
really was a little less than an hour, Panich
waited for Ogden and Spero to come down,
Sergeant Eddy's Group
while German shells poured in on the south
at Hill 103
slope of Hill 103 and killed two more of
his dwindling force. Finally, when the two The 2d Platoon had become disorgan-
men failed to show up, Lieutenant Panich ized and scattered early in the attack. At
sent his three remaining men to report what jump-off time the 2d Platoon had started out
had happened to battalion headquarters. He in column of squads, each squad in single file,
and Sergeant Casey stayed 15 minutes the 1st Squad leading. They got as far as the
longer, hoping against hope that Ogden and base of the Left Tit in this formation (Map
Spero would join them. At the end of this No.7). Here the 2d and 3d Squads came
time, when they still had not come, Panich under heavy fire from our own machine
and Casey gave them up for dead 1 and guns, which were supposed to be firing on
the Tit and over the heads of our men but
10gdc:n and S~ro later returned unassisted to the 2d Battalion
:lid st.ation. were dropping some rounds short. A bullet

135
 smashed through the mouth of the 2d
COMPANY F
Squad leader, disabling him; other casualties
s/SGT EDDY'S GROUP AT- HILL 103
111/2 Moy 1944
were suffered in the 3d Squad. The assistant
o
leader of the 2d Squad then took command,
but the five or six men whom he had left
refused to follow. It was during this con-
fusion that the 2d and 3d Squads lost con-
tact with the I st, elements of which, under
Sergeant Casey, were to join up with Lieu-
tenant Panich.
After the 2d Squad's assistant leader had
tried vainly to move his men out, Sergeant
Eddy consolidated what was left of the two
squads and led them around to the east of
the Left Tit, crawling under our machine-
gun fire and meeting some German artillery
fire. As shells and bullets started hitting all
The Spur
around, the men in the rear stopped. Only
a few men kept up with Sergeant Eddy, who
thought that his whole force was close behind
him. After crawling a few yards, they saw
several figures moving around a nearby
house, No. I. Sergeant Eddy called to them,
asking if they were from the 2d Platoon .
When hand grenades answered the query,
Sergeant Eddy sent a messenger back to the
rest of the 2d and 3d Squads, ordering them
to come up. Eight or nine men responded,
but by that time the enemy opposition had
disappeared.
Following terraces, the remnants of the
2d and 3d Squads then moved out again close
to the road. They got as far as the start of
the gentle rise in ground toward Hill I 0 3 ;
then artillery shells hit squarely in their
midst, killing a BAR man and wounding
several others. When the fire was over, only
MAP NO.7
five men, including Sergeant Eddy, were left.
In addition to the enemy artillery, machine

136
guns on the crest of Hill 103 as well as By dawn these men were joined by the 4th
snipers along the road placed fire on the small Platoon, remnants of the 1st Platoon, three
group. After firing antitank grenades at the machine-gun squads from Company H, and
machine guns, Sergeant Eddy and his men Company F J:Ieadquarters (Map No.8).
decided to wait for reinforcements from the During the initial advance, the 4th
1st Platoon, which was supposed to be fol- Squad of the 3d Platoon had lost contact
lowing the 2d Platoon. with the 3d Squad some 50 yards beyond
A few minutes later some men came the cemetery and within 25 yards of the road.
down the road from the direction of Min- At that time heavy smoke and fog made it
turno: the much needed reinforcements, so hard to see even ten yards away. Machine-
Sergeant Eddy thought. He called out to gun fire from the eastern slope of the S-Ridge
them, but was answered by rifles and machine at Hill 1 3 1, as well as mortar and artillery
guns. Sergeant Eddy's force tossed hand fire which seemed to come from all direc-
grenades, then shot an antitank grenade that tions, pinned down the 4th Squad where the
landed in the enemy group, dispersing the ground sloped into a small saddle between
Germans and putting an end to the fire the cemetery and Hill 1 30.
fight. The handful of men from the 2d and When the squad lost contact with the
3d Squads, 2d Platoon dug in where they rest of the 3d Platoon, word was passed back
were, west of the road facing the slopes to- to Captain Nelson, who was in the middle
ward Hill 103. By the time they had finished of the right column with the 4th Platoon, to
dawn was breaking. All day long on 12 May, come up and take charge. Before the 4th
under heavy fire, they waited there vainly Squad reached the bottom of the saddle, Cap-
for the 3d Battalion to reach them. Just be- tain Nelson caught up with it. When he
fore midnight, 12 hours after the jump-off, arrived, the squad was receiving fire from a
they returned to Cemetery Ridge. machine gun on the higher ground toward
Hill 130. For some reason, whether because
Advance to the Tame Road they had not &een the leading rifle squads of
the 2d and 3d Platoons, or had moved into
Other elements of Company F had kept positions on the knoll after Company F's ele-
together more successfully than the assault ments passed by, or had planned an ambush,
squads of the 2d and 3d Platoons. By sepa- the German machine gunners had not pre-
rate routes of advance, two main groups suc- viously fired. To knock out the enemy posi-
ceeded in reaching a culvert on the Santa tion Captain Nelson called for the light ma-
Maria-Tame road, only a few yards from chine guns and mortars from the 4th Pla-
the company objective, house No. 12 at the toon. They were brought forward promptly
inverted V-bend. The first group to reach and placed in the saddle. At that range, the
this most advanced position, 2,500 yards mortars fired almost straight up in the air,
from the line of departure, was the 4th but neither they nor the machine guns could
Squad, 3d Platoon led by Captain Nelson. drive the enemy from his position. These

137
 means failing, Captain Nelson grabbed an
COMPANY F
M-I rifle from one of his men and fired a
""'/INC£. TO THE TAME ROAD
grenade point-blank at the machine gun,
11/12 May 1944

knocking it out and killing the two gunners.

After the enemy gun was silenced, the
4th Squad, 3d Platoon under Captain Nel-
son's leadership progressed so rapidly over
the ridge slopes west of the Minturno-Santa
Maria road that it lost contact with the fol-
low-up units: the 4th Platoon, the I st Pla-
toon, headquarters command group, and the
machine gunners from Company H. During
their advance the men of the 4th Squad ran
fast in a half-crouch, using the terraces and
the shell holes that pockmarked the route of
advance for protection against machine-gun
The SeNr
fire which was coming over their heads from
the northern end of the creek valley toward
the S-Ridge. In contrast to the routes used by
other elements, the 4th Squad seems to have
kept on the lower slopes of the ridge, well
away from the road. Moving past the small
spur made by the Left Tit and Hill 103,
they reached a point 300 yards beyond 103
before encountering enemy; here they cap-
tured 2 mortars and I 5 Germans in dugouts,
half-dressed and completely taken by sur-
prise. After a brief exchange of fire with an-
other small group of the enemy who were
using machine pistols from the left front,
near the bottom of the creek valley, the 4th
Squad pushed on without meeting further
resistance until it came to the culvert near
the inverted V -bend on the Tame-Santa
Maria road. Dawn was just breaking, but the
smoke and haze were so dense that visibility
was nearly zero. In a short while, stronger
elements of Company F joined up at the cul-
MAP NO. 8
vert position.

138
 Just behind the 4th Squad, 3d Platoon house, No.4, on the left side of the road.
at the saddle north of the cemetery, the 4th Here the 4th Platoon veered northwest down
Platoon (Weapons), led by 1st Lt. Robert into the creek valley below the ridge. After
C. Kozuch, was soon outdistanced. One ma- climbing over a terrace, the platoon had gone
chine-gun section from Company H followed only a few yards when heavy mortar fire
this platoon. After being slowed down by pinned it down five to ten minutes.
barbed wire beyond the cemetery, the group 1st Lt. John M. Weston, company execu-
moved across the higher ground beyond the tive officer, called for the 1st Platoon to come
saddle without meeting resistance and went up as reinforcements. The men trickled up,
around the western slope of the Left Tit. By a few at a time, but only the equivalent of
that time one squad of the machine-gun sec- a squad reached the 4th Platoon. Arriving
tion had become separated in the darkness. soon after the mortar fire ceased, this handful
As soon as the loss was discovered 2d Lt. from the 1st Platoon, as well as the 4th Pla-
Eugene Loper, platoon leader of Company toon, moved along a ditch leading toward
H, united the remaining squad with another the creek and then swung around the western
machine-gun section that had drifted off slope of Hill 103. When the mortar fire was
from the right column at Company F's as- over the column of men from the 4th and
sault force. Meanwhile the I st Platoon, 1st Platoons and Company Headquarters had
which was supposed to advance behind the deployed in a staggered, spread formation.
2d Platoon but had been unable to keep in Without meeting further resistance they
contact with it, caught up and fell in behind pushed on north until they reached a point
the 4th Platoon. near house No. 11, which was on the Tame-
Halfway across the Left Tit the 4th Pla- Santa Maria road between the Y-junction
toon received fire from a machine gun on and the cui vert. Here they were stopped by
Hill I 0 I. The machine guns and mortars a voice which called to them in perfect Eng-
of the 4th Platoon were set up in a shallow lish, "Headquarters this way." After a si-
ditch on the reverse slope of the Ti t, returned lence, the German discharged a machine pis-
the fire for a short time, and apparently dis- tol straight up in the air. The men of the
posed of the enemy gun. When it became 4th and 1st Platoons lined up against a ter-
silent, the men of the 4th Platoon again race near the house and waited for the Ger-
moved forward. They had advanced only man to come closer in order to get him from
15 yards when a machine gun or machine point-blank range. They heard him coming,
pistol-it was hard to tell which-began fir- but before they could bring him in their
ing down their backs from the crest of the sights, he about-faced and went off in the
Left Tit. Hugging the side of a terrace wall, dark. After this incident, the group pushed
the 4th Platoon passed out of range and then on to the culvert and joined forces with Cap-
walked across a shallow draw beyond the tain Nelson's party. The three squads from
Left Tit. The platoon continued to follow the machine-gun platoon of Company H had
terraces along the slope until it approached a managed to keep up with the advance.

139
 slope below the road. To wipe out resistance
COMPANY F
POSITION AT THE CULVERT in Tame and reduce the pressure against his
Mornin~. 12 Mo)' 1944
force, Captain Nelson sent a squad of five
- DIRECTION OF ENEMY Flltl:
men with a light machine gun to a house in
the northeastern part of the village. After
harassing the enemy for several hours, the
squad was captured.
While Captain Nelson's men were dig-
ging in at the culvert, the Germans opened
up from all directions. They fired from the
S-Ridge and Tame on the rear and left flank
of the positions at the culvert, and from the
high ground north of Santa Maria. If the
UIIDS
Germans had ever withdrawn or been driven
MAP NO.9
from Hill 103, they now returned. The:r
used their automatic weapons on Hill 103
and in a house at the head of the creek valley.
Just as this reinforcement reached Cap- German mortars in a haystack on the eastern
tain Nelson at the culvert, American artillery slope of Hill 126 (on the S-Ridge) and
shells as well as German machine-gun and in well concealed positions north of Tame
mortar fire from the S-Ridge began to fall lobbed shells into the area held by Company
on the area. Although our shelling ceased F. About 0800 a group of snipers armed
after word went back by radio for the artillery with machine pistols and rifles came down
to lift, the German fire made the draw a dan- from Hill 126 toward the draw between that
gerous place. Only the stoned-in culvert, hill and the Santa Maria-Tame road. Ob·
which ran under the road 150 yards south serving them move up, Company F opened
of the inverted V-bend, offered much pro- fire, and the Germans had to run for the cover
tection from this fire. About 20 men jammed of the creek bed. But they reached it, and
into the small passageway until they were throughout the day exchanged fire with
packed in like sardines; those who could not Company F. Neither force caused the other
use the culvert dug in against terraces close many casualties, but the enemy in the valley
by (Map No.9). West of the road, machine formed a serious threat to any withdrawal of
guns from Company H were emplaced on a Company F . In fact, with Hill 103 in enemy
flat surface below the road and the highest hands, Captain Nelson's small force was now
terrace. One light machine gun was put in a practically cut off.
drainage hole through the top and far end The defending group at the culvert, 400
of the culvert tunnel. The 60-mm mortars yards beyond Hill 103, was me only sizable
were placed in defiladed positions from 15 force of Company F which was able to hold
to 30 yards to the right of the culvert on the ground beyond the line of departure through-

140
out 12 May. Sergeant Eddy's handful from SCR 536 radios were out of COlnrnlSSlOn
the 2d Platoon held out near Hill 103 most of the time, or unable to reach adjacent
through the day and until midnight, but the units, Company Headquarters with Captain
rest of the units (Sergeant Pyenta with the Nelson could scarcely ever find out what his
renmants of the 3d Platoon, and Lieutenant lead platoons were doing. During the attack
Panich and Sergeant Casey with survivors the flank patrol of the 33 8th Infantry was
from the 2d and 3d Platoons) had been dis- unable to keep in touch with Company F,
integrated by casualties and had pulled back nor was visual contact ever established be-
to Cemetery Ridge. Company F's attack had tween Companies E and F.
met unexpectedly strong enemy resistance, As it happened, Company E, over on
but had suffered also through the failure of the right wing, was having as little success
communications and the lack of coordina- as did the Company F's attack west of the
tion between units in the darkness. As the Minturno-Santa Maria road.

TAME was a small cluster 01 buildings w est of Santa Maria. From it,
Germans fired at members of Compan y F that hat! r~(J.Ch ed culvcrt.
Ph oto is from high ground near Santa Maria, looking across the Tame
road. Cultlcrt area is either at left edge or just beyond it. Th e large
house at right is on the V~turn 0/ th e road leading to Tame.

141
MINTURNO-SANTA MARIA INFANTE RIDGE, looking
north from the a nglery. (This aerial oblique taken April 1946.)

142
 Company E at The Spur: 1st Platoon
COMPANY E
lsI AND 2d PLATOONS AT THE SPUR Jumping off at 2300, Company E had
11/12 Moy 1944
swift! y advanced along the east side of the
- ENEMY MG
road. In a box formation of two columns, the
1st Platoon on the right and the 2d Platoon
on the left led the advance. The 3d Platoon
followed the 1st, and the 4th Platoon fol-
lowed the 2d at a distance of 100 yards. The
left-hand column was 75 yards from the road
and the right column 75 yards farther east
along the slope (Map No.1 0).
Leading the right column, the 1st and
2d Squads of the I st Platoon, abreast, moved
so fast that they soon lost contact with the
3d Squad following in reserve. Before reach-
ing the Right Tit the I st Platoon mistakenly
veered from its predetermined route of ad-
vance and swung hard toward the road be-
hind the 2d Platoon. After walking in that
direction for some distance, 2d Lt. William
K. Stauss, the platoon leader, realized his er-
ror and cut back sharply to the right away
from the road. While they were making this
unintentional detour the 2d Platoon had out-
distanced the I st Platoon, which was ordered
by Capt. Robert K. Carlstone, the company
commander, to close the gap and come up
abreast.
North of the Right Tit machine-gun fire
held up the 1st and 2d Squads, still leading
the 1st Platoon, for about ten minutes. As
they crossed the shallow draw north of the
Tit and pushed up the southern slope of The
Spur, machine guns on its crest were firing
over their heads. To reorganize and get their
bearing the squads stopped briefly at the
sunken road which runs across the forward
MAP NO. 10
slope. After the 3d Squad caught up with

143
 the men at the sunken road, the platoon
COMPANY E
rushed toward the top of the eastern end of
3d AND 4th PLATOONS AT THE 'SPUR
11/12 May 1944 The Spur. As the men reached a ledge just
V ENEMY STRONGPOIHT
below the crest, a machine gun from Pulche-
rini started firing over their heads. The fire
was high, but the I st Platoon deployed in a
skirr~ish line and waited until the machine
gun stopped firing.
The 1st Platoon then pushed across the
top of The Spur to the north slope; there,
fire from three machine guns pinned it down.
One enemy gun was on the left front of the
1st Platoon, across the next draw north of
The Spur, and about halfway down the slope.
The other two, also on the left flank of the
1st Platoon, were on the crest of The Spur,
one close to the road and one farther east.
The 1st Platoon briefly returned the fire of
the nearest machine gun. Cpt. Ora Gregg,
assistant leader of the 2d Squad, pumped 16
rifle shots at it, Lieutenant Stauss emptied
his carbine, and Pvt. John Rocke fired sev-
eral rifle grenades. Their efforts or those of
adjacent or supporting units must have been
effective, for the fire from the nearest gun
stopped.
But the other machine guns on and be-
yond The Spur continued to fire in the direc-
tion of the 1st Platoon, and our own artillery
shells were landing close by. In addition to
this heavy fire, support was lacking on either
flank, so Lieutenant Stauss ordered his men
back to the crest where the 1st and 2d Squads
dug in and put out flank security. Pinned
down, the 3d Squad was unable to withdraw
at the same time as the others. It dug in on
the north slope of The Spur, where it was to
MAP NO . 11
remain until it rejoined the main body of
Company E at the sunken road a day and a

144
half later. The platoon's SCR 536, which Captain Carlstone led the 3d Squad over the
had not worked all night, was put back into crest. This time the squad had just cleared
operation and was instrumental in getting it when mortar fire wounded Captain Carl-
our artillery fire lifted. But neither the radio stone in the hand. Ordering the squad to
nor patrols from the 1st Platoon had been move on across the northern slope of the
able to maintain contact with the 2d Platoon Right Tit, Captain Carlstone dropped back
on the left, which had been expected to meet to the ditch on the southern slope. He called
much stiffer resistance near the road. for artillery fire on The Spur, from which
our artillery had lifted thei r fires, according
Company E at The Spur: The Mahl Body to schedule, at H+60.
After the 3d Squad, 2d Platoon had
On the left flank of Company E the two moved out beyond the Right Tit, the 4th
lead squads of the 2d Platoon had moved Platoon led by 1st Lt. Harold V. McSwain
swiftly along the slope of the central ridge, came up on that hill, accompanied by most of
meeting no resistance except sniper and ar- the 3d Platoon (Map No. 11). This unit
tillery fire. With the left squad in sight of was to have followed the 1st Platoon in the
the road, the two squads moved over the right column, but somehow got lost and be-
Right Tit, crossed the draw at the base of The came sandwiched in with the 4th Platoon on
Spur, and went up its southern slope until the left. Informed that enemy snipers and
they struck the sunken road. Here the 2d machine guns were on the northern slope of
Platoon turned right along the sunken road the Right Tit near the road, Lieutenant
for about 100 yards and then branched off, McSwain sent Sgt. Earl Le Beau, machine-
heading up the slope. It had reached a point gun section leader, with three gunners to lo-
75 yards south of the second house from the cate and wipe out the German positions. At
road, No.9, when machine guns from the the crest of the hill, the gunners found no
crest pinned it down. machine guns and only one rifleman, whom
During the advance of the 2d Platoon, they swiftly dispatched.
the 3d Squad in reserve had become sepa- The wounded company commander put
rated from the two leading squads. By the Lieutenant McSwain in charge of Company
time the 3d Squad reached the Right Tit, ar- E, since his executive officer, 1st Lt. Harold
tillery and mortar fire was so heavy that fur- W. Moore, was 1,500 yards away on the re-
ther advance seemed out of the question. verse slope of Cemetery Ridge. The 2d Bat-
Before the squad had been on the Tit long, talion commander, Colonel Kendall, had
Captain Carlstone with his company head- come up on the Right Tit; disturbed because
quarters group came up and led the men over the company was lagging behind its time
the crest. Then, more heavy mortar and ar- schedule, he pushed McSwain and his men
tillery fire forced them back to the compara- of the 3d and 4th Platoons forward from
tive safety of shell holes and a big ditch on the hill, tapping the men with his stick and
the southern slope of the Right Tit. Again urging them forward. As they moved off,

145
 COMPANY E
Elements of the 2d Platoon, about 150
THE ASSAULT Of THE CREST yards farther to the east on the slope above the
About 0300. 12 MO)' 1944
sunken road, were also pinned down. They
~ EHan STRONGPOINT
were joined by Lieutenant McSwain, acting
company commander.
r' In the face of this heavy fire, all the ele-
\.)
3d""
1st Plot ments of Company E except the I st Platoon
(isolated at the east end of The Spur) dug
in along the forward slope, above and below
the sunken road. Tech/ Sgt. Theodore J.
Kerey of the 4th Platoon reported the grave
o
JaROS
..
, situation to Colonel Kendall, who was lo-
cated 5 a yards to the rear with a command
MAP NO. 12 group of wiremen, radio operators, and liai-
son officers. From this report Colonel Ken-
Colonel Kendall and Captain Car!stone re- dall realized that taking The Spur would re-
mained in a ditch on the southern slope of quire the reduction of enemy strongpoints
the Tit and kept on calling for artillery fire on the crest. It was soon discovered that this
until it was placed on The Spur. To speed would be no easy undertaking: the Germans
up the advance of Company E, the battalion were installed in clever! y concealed and well-
commander also asked for tank support and constructed emplacements. As found later,
ordered Company G to move up to the Right there were at least 4 strongpoin ts, with an
Tit, ready for lISe when needed. estimated 12 machine guns. Three of these
After blasting a path through a barbed- positions were in houses 8, 9, and 10 along
wire entanglement with a bangalore torpedo, the crest of The Spur ; the other was a dug-
Lieutenant McSwain led the men over the out between the two westernmost houses. In
Tit toward the road. Crossing the draw be- these covered fortifications, machine guns
yond the Tit, the group hacked its way with overlapping fields of fire completely
through more barbed wire, and in the face commanded the forward slope of The Spur.
of heavy artillery and mortar fire pushed on Approaches around the eastern extremity
without respite to a point just below the west- were also covered (Map No. 12).
ernmost turn of the sunken road on The Using the only effective means at hand,
Spur. There the mortar fire increased, and Colonel Kendall set out to bring direct fire
a stream of hand grenades and flares poured on these positions. He sent one squad from
down on them from the western end of The Company E, led by an officer, over to wipe
Spur's crest. As the flares lit up the area, out the machine-gun nest at the west end of
machine guns opened up from houses and The Spur's crest. In order to rush the em-
dugouts near the crest on both flanks, 111- placement the men of this squad had to climb
flicting many casualties on Company E. over a terrace on the forward slope. As they

146
came into view over the terrace, the German tack he had almost single-handedly knocked
machine gunners opened up with a murder- the Germans from their strongpoint, Colonel
ous fire, mowing down nine men. Only the Kendall pulled his arm back to throw
officer and two men got back alive. another grenade and jerked out the pin.
While the western position was under Crouched in a half-erect position and bend-
attack, Colonel Kendall led a small command ing around the corner of the house he made
group and a handful of men from the 2d and a perfect silhouette in the bright moonlight.
4th Platoons against a machine-gun emplace- In tlle last split second before Colonel Kell-
ment in house No. 9. Advancing from the dall tossed the grenade, a machine gun
sunken road where he left the bulk of Com- opened up from a position not more than 75
pany E, the battalion commander moved up yards away. The bullets struck him full in
the forward slope of The Spur, urging his the face. As he fell to the ground, the gren-
men forward by injunction and example. ade exploded against his body.
Before rushing the machine-gun nest, he Colonel Kendall's death, occurring
built up his maximum squad fire power and sometime between 0300 and 0330, brought
himself shot every weapon he could lay his a temporary stop to the attack on the enemy
hands on. Grabbing a BAR from a soldier strongpoints. Assuming command of the
who was not using it, Colonel Kendall emp- group which Colonel Kendall had led up the
tied it at the machine-gun emplacement in hill, Lieutenant McSwain ordered them to dig
the house. He then successi vel y fired a car- in around the house, No.9, and he posted
bine until he had used up all its ammunition, a handful of men in the building itself.
an M-I rifle, and antitank rifle grenades. While they were digging in, a machine-gun
After that he seized a bazooka (rocket squad of the 4th Platoon, which had set up
launcher), which was being loaded by an ar- in front of the sunken road, opened fire on
tillery observer, and directed three rounds at the men arouhd the house. One burst
the pillbox. The first two shots sailed over knocked the shovel from the hands of Ser-
the target, but the third struck it squarely. geant Kerey, who was digging in on the crest.
He then sent three men around the house to The machine guns got off a few more bursts
envelop the position. They did not go far before Cpl. Joseph Murray, the squad leader,
before machine-gun fire pinned them down identified the men on the crest as our own
in a shell crater on top of The Spur. Mean- troops and stopped the fire.
while, calling on his other men to follow him, Company E was in a precarious position.
Colonel Kendall rushed toward the house. Its men were scattered over The Spur: the
As he approached it, he stood up and threw remnants of the I st Platoon, a handful from
two grenades at the enemy machine gunners, the 2d and 4th Platoons, and Colonel Ken-
killing some of them and driving the rest dall's command group were on the crest; and
across the top of The Spur to alternate posi- the larger part, cQnsisting of skeleton squads
tions about 50 to 100 yards away. Ap- of the 2d, 3d, and 4th Platoons, was dug in
parently not realizing that by his inspired at- against terraces above and below the sunken

147
 COMPANY G AT THE SPUR ••••
near the Tits had forced the platoon into a
ditch. A stretch of Teller mines about 75
yards long, located between the Tits, re-
mained untouched.
At 0300, in response to Colonel Ken-
dall's request, five medium tanks from Com-
pany C, 760th Tank Battalion under I st Lt.
Eugene E. Gleissner, moved down the Min-
turno-Santa Maria road. Two of them re-
mained out of the enemy's sight along the
step of the stairway curve at the cemetery,

... while the other three pushed forward. At the

Left Tit the leading tank, carrying the pla-
MAP NO. 13 toon leader, was hit by a mine and disabled,
and Lieutenant Gleissner was so dazed by the
road. The Germans had not been dislodged explosion that he returned to the regimental
from their strongpoints and the effective command post. The advance of the armored
strength of Company E had been whittled column came to a standstill.
down considerably. During the first eight Spurred by the infantry's calls for as-
hours 89 men from the company had been sistance, I st Lt. Paul F. Scholer and 1st Lt.
killed or wounded. Its repeated appeals for Wilbur R. Crowley, tank liaison officers with
tank assistance against the pillboxes had ap- the 35 I st Infantry, went up in a half-track to
parently gone unanswered. the stalled vehicles. By dint of their efforts
Actually, Company E's request for tanks the second tank moved forward. Before ad-
had not brought help because the tanks had vancing more than a few yards it, too, hit a
run into so much opposition they could not mine which disabled it and injured Lieuten-
reach The Spur. As soon as Colonel Kendall ant Scholer, Lieutenant Crowley, and S/Sgt.
had reached the base of The Spur he had Pinckney D. Upchurch. The explosion put
called for armor to blast the machine-gun the tank squarely astride the road, blocking
positions in the houses and bunkers along the the way to a further advance.
road. With that opposition neutralized, Com- The failure of this second attempt brought
pany G and the tanks could move up swiftly Col. Arthur S. Champeny, the regimental
and aid the disorganized group on The Spur. commander, up to supervise the tanks and
Some hours before this request for tanks reorganize the attack. The ranking sergeant
the 20-man mine platoon of the Antitank in the tank detachment refused to try to push
Company, under the command of Capt. forward again, so another sergeant assumed
Clarence R. Meeks, had gone out, according command. He attempted to move the third
to the initial plan, to demine the ridge road. tank up; this tank hit another mine. It was
Heavy fire from machine guns and snipers then about 0500, and Colonel Champeny

148
sent a call to the 88th Division for another pany G reached the southern slope of The
platoon of tanks to come up and wipe out the Spur near its western end before machine-
machine-gun nests. The requested reinforce- gun fire from house No.8, dead ahead and
ments did not arrive for several hours; mean- close to the road, stopped the advance. Dawn
while Company G, which with the aid of the was breaking when Company G reached this
tanks was to have wiped out the enemy's point, which was protected from frontal fire
strong positions on The Spur, became pinned by terraces (Map No. I 3).
down. Lieutenant Noon ordered the 2d Pla-
toon to come up on the left of the I st Pla-
CompauJ G is Stopped at The Spur toon. Trying to advance under heavy ma-
chine-gun fire, the 2d Platoon could not get
At the time Company E reached The up. As the fire continued, the I st and 2d
Spur, Colonel Champeny had ordered Com- Platoons sheltered in a ditch four feet deep
pany G forward from Hill 130 where Colo- and eight yards wide near the westernmost
nel Kendall left it in reserve. As soon as bend of the sunken road. Deciding to reduce
Company G, marching single file in a column the position by a flanking movement, Lieu-
of platoons, reached the southern base of the tenant Noon sent the 2d Platoon to the right
Right T it, a German machine gun opened of the I st. The 3d Platoon remained in the
fire from a bunker near the crest or from draw at the base of The Spur where mortars
across the road on the left. It was another of the 4th Platoon had been set up. Light
case of a bypassed enemy position reserving machine guns were called up but were not
its fire for later use against support elements able to get in a position from which they
of the 35 I st. The column stopped and the could effectively support the attack.
men jumped in shell holes and flopped be- The 2d Platoon moved out from the
hind terraces. Colonel Champeny sent a ditch and around toward the right of the
squad to wipe out the enemy machine gun house in a formation of two squads abreast
and Pvt. Harold W. Saager knocked it out and one in reserve. It managed to cross a
wi th a rifle grenade. couple of terraces and get within 30 yards of
Scarcely had this mission been carried the building. There, with only open ground
out when Company G received word that in front of it, the platoon was pinned down
Colonel Kendall had been killed and that the by fire from its objective and from another
tanks were stopped on the road. The com- machine gun northeast of the house. Seeing
pany had suffered only light casualties and that the 2d Platoon could not advance, Lieu-
was ordered forward to assist Company E. tenant Noon decided to assault this position
As the men pushed down the slope of the himself. Followed by two enlisted men, he
Right Tit, the company commander, 1st Lt. crawled out of the trench where the I st Pla-
Theodore W . Noon, Jr., could see his men toon was crouched. As the attacking party
as far as 50 yards away in the bright moon- advanced, the machine gun under attack
light. With the I st Platoon leading, Com- fired high, but Germans in a communication

149
 trench which ran from the house to other
SITUATION AT DAWN 12 MAY 1944
and 3rd Battalion Objectives machine-gun positions on The Spur killed
.u..... EH[M" MLR the two enlisted men. Lieutenant Noon's
...... luck held out. Closing in on the house, he
knocked out the machine gun with a hand
grenade and pistol fire and then returned to
the ditch.
Despite this success Company G con-
tinued to be held down by heavy machine-
gun and sniper fire from other enemy posi-
tions on the crest of The Spur. At about
0700, the daring action of S/ Sgt. Richard
G . Brine removed some of the active Ger-
mans. Several enemy snipers had been caus-
ing trouble from the same house where Lieu-
tenant Noon had knocked out the machine
gun. Sergeant Brine and two other men
crawled forward to deal with the snipers.
Both of the men with Sergeant Brine were
severely wounded by machine guns which
ope ned up on the right and left of the snipers'
position. Under thi s heavy fire Sergeant
Brine kept firing on the snipers, killing sev-
eral and forcing the remainder to withdraw.
Observing that the compa ny was now under
fire from the machine gu ns on either side of
the house and that the W eapons Platoon was
pinned down in the open and suffering heavy
losses, he crawled into an ope ning in the rear
of the building from which vantage point he
fired hi s rifle at both the machine gun s. This
action drew the enemy's fire and allowed the
W eapons Platoon to take cover.
In spite of the heroic efforts of many
men , th e night attack of the 2d Battalion had
not achieved any of its objectives. On the
battalion left, elements of Company F had
adva nced almost to its objective at the cul-
MAP NO. 14 vert, but were there pinned down and en-

150
circled by enemy forces. The battalion's The 3d Battalion is Stopped at
greatest danger was that its left flank was
Hill 103 (12 May)
exposed: on the west slopes of the central
ridge, no effective strength remained between To carryon the unfinished mission of
the surrounded Company F force and the the weakened and helpless 2d Battalion, the
cemetery. During the night, troops of the 3d Battalion, under Maj. Charles P. Furr,
3 38th Infantry had driven across the crest was ordered forward by Colonel Champeny
of Hill 13 1 into the village of Solacciano, at 0420. This fresh unit was to break
but were pushed back to the base of the S- through to the remnants of Company
Ridge. With the German main line of re- F at the culvert near Tame, pass through
sistance there still intact, machine guns on them, and envelop Santa Maria from the
the crest and eastern slope of the S-Ridge left flank by seizing the high ground
could bring devastating fire on the Min- north of the town. Four companies would
turno-Santa Maria road and all routes of ap- be used to overcome the positions that had
proach to Company F's beleaguered group impeded the advance of Company F (Map
at the culvert. No. 14).
On the right of the ridge road to Santa Starting at dawn, the 3d Battalion, in
Maria, things were not much better. By 0900 two columns 25-30 yards apart, turned off
Company G, which had attempted to wipe the road just west of the cemetery and fol-
out resistance and relieve Company E, had lowed the tapeline laid down by Company
been able to move only one-third of the way F. Company K led off, marching in a box
up the southern slope of The Spur, where it formation with the 1st and 2d Platoons
was dug in against the side of a terrace. Those abreast, each in single file, foliowed by the
few men who got north of the sunken road 3d and the Weapons Platoons. As the ridge-
had to withdraw in the face of heavy enemy line rose toward Hill 130, Major Furr held
fire; all the platoons of the company had up Companies I and L and ordered Company
suffered casualties and were in some con- K to move forward to the Left Tit. Company
fusion. Elements of Company E were still I stopped just behind the first rise and Com-
dug in on the crest of The Spur, over 1,500 pany L halted in the saddle south of it.
yards beyond the line of departure, but these Moving west of the road, Company K
men could not move. The bulk of that com- (less the mortar section which was left in
pany was pinned down on the forward slope, defiladed positions in the saddle) advanced
and the company had suffered so many casu- across the Left Tit without meeting resistance
alties that its effective strength was insuffi- (Map No. 15). It reached a little knoll be-
cient to regain the initiative. Although the tween the Left Tit and Hill 103 before being
efforts of both companies on the battalion's stopped by machine-gun fire. Snipers and at
right flank had reduced some enemy posi- least three machine guns to the left, right, and
tions, those which remained were strong immediate front of the 2d Platoon halted it
enough to frustrate further advance. just south of house No.2 at 0900. For over

151
 3rd BATTAUON ATTACK ON HILL 103
two hours the 2d Platoon stayed there. Dur-
12 May 1944 ing the halt it deployed in a staggered line
and built up defensive positions to the left
Rank of the I st Platoon, which was on the
Q '00
company's right. Fire from another house,
No. 3, stopped the I st Platoon. The 3d
Squad was sent out to wipe out the position,
Gnd their fire forced the Germans to with-
draw (as events later proved ) to an alternate
position down the slope of the li ttle knoll.
Major Furr ordered Compan y I, under
Capt. Glenn H . Erickson, to come up on the
". left Rank to help Com pan y K push forward.
While Company K, with its right Rank on
the road, made a frontal assault on Hill 103,
Company I would envelop the enemy posi-
The Spur tions from the west. Each company was to
attack in forma tion of two riRe platoons
abreast and one in support. The Weapons
Platoon would support the attack from the

~"~".. . crest and southern slope of the little knoll.

Company L was still in reserve. Company
M's machine guns were ordered to displace
Rigl'lt
forward to the knoli, there to support the
TIl
attack by fire on Hill 103 and the S-Ridge.
One section of heavy machine guns set up
west of house No.2, the other section moved
forward and set up behind Company K.
About I I 15 Compa nies K and I
jumped off toward Hill 103. On the bat-
talion right Rank the I st Platoo n of Com-
pany K- its three squads abreast and de-
ployed in a skirmish line- pushed down the
northern slope of th e knoll in the face of
heavy machine-gun fire from the S-Ridge as
well as from the forward slope of Hill 103.
On the platoon's left, the 2d Squad advanced
MA l' NO. 15
under partial cover of terraces across the
draw and a short distance up the southern

152
slope of Hill 103, where it was stopped by good observation, he fired so effectively that
machine-gun fire from the crest and from both machine guns were silenced. Freed
the rear. The 1st and 3d Squads on the right from the menace of this fire, the platoon then
could advance only to the draw at the base of maneuvered into covered positions. The 1st
the hill before fire pinned them down. Platoon, Company I, advancing on the right,
On the left the 2d Platoon of Company also reached the western slope of Hill 103
K pushed on down the knoll to the draw and suffered much heavier casualties than the
south of Hill 103. Hardly had the platoon other assault platoon. By the time the platoon
reached the draw when a machine gun on reached Hill 103 it had barely the strength
the northern slope of the knoll started firing of one squad.
on the platoon from the right rear, forcing Half an hour after both companies had
the men to seek cover. The Gennans who begun their attack against Hill 103 they
had been driven out of the house near the were stopped cold. For the rest of the day
road by the 1st Platoon had waited until both Companies K and I remained dug in at the
platoons got past them before they began to base and on the lower slope of Hill 103,
fire. Machine guns on Hill 103 and the S- where they had to depend on the inadequate
Ridge sprayed the area where the men of cover provided by shallow ditches and shell-
Company K hugged the ground. Well- holes. Their only action the rest of the day
placed snipers on Hill 103 also trained their was to put bazooka and small-arms fire at
rifles on Company K. enemy positions on Hill 103 and the S-Ridge.
In visual contact with Company K and The supporting fire of mortars, artillery,
on its left, the two leading assault platoons of tanks, and tank destroyers had proved disap-
Company I moved up the western slope of pointing during the 3d Battalion's attack.
Hill 103 a few yards beyond the farthest Enemy pillboxes in the Santa Maria-Mt.
advance of Company K; then, enemy fire Bracchi-Pulcherini area were not appreciably
from mortars, artillery, and machine guns weakened by fire from all these weapons in
halted their attack. Company1's 3d Platoon the morning of 12 May. Even a direct hit
was in a very exposed spot near the western by a I OS-mm howitzer or heavy mortar shell
base of Hill 10 3, receiving casualties from did little damage to the well-protected over-
two machine guns and a few riflemen. Only head covers of the machine-gun dugouts. To
the resourceful action of Pvt. Walker C. knock them out, a shell had to hit squarely
Lopez enabled the platoon to reach positions in the narrow embrasures where the guns
sheltered from enemy fire. Taking a BAR looked out.
from an automatic rifleman who had been so The armored support was held up by
severely wounded that he could not operate problems of mine clearance, swampy terrain,
his weapon, Private Lopez, though not a and poor visibility. The mine platoon of the
member of the BAR team, crawled forward Antitank Company, which had failed in its
about 20 yards. From a position which was mission due to enemy fire , had bee n able to
in full view of the enemy, but which offered come out of its shelter at about 0600 and had

153
begun removing the mines in the road be- Maria. Under an order from the 88th Divi-
tween the Tits and The Spur. When the sion, tanks from Company B, 760th Tank
morning haze lifted, toward noon, a platoon Battalion were to move from Tufa Ridge to
of five tanks got underway and advanced to Hills 132 and 130, follow the jeep trail down
a point beyond the Tits. With 1st Lt. Fil- the slope to the draw in front of Pulcherini,
more W. McAbee, liaison officer, riding in cross Reali Creek, and fan out in the direc-
the tank and pointing out targets along the tion of Mount Cerreto, Pulcherini, and the
road, the platoon knocked out two machine- high ground east and north of Santa Maria.
gun nests. Before the action was over, how- Starting out from an assembly area near Tufo,
ever, the enemy inflicted heavy damage on Company B moved forward only a short dis-
the armored column, putting three of our tance before it bogged down in a marshy area
tanks out of action. north of the town.
Another tan k effort was made along the
road in the afternoon. At 1500, after being Capture of Company F (12 May)
held up by mud at a culvert, one platoon of
Company A, 760 th Tank Battalion, com- All through the day of the 12th, Com-
manded by I st Lt. Clinton F. Des Jardins, pany F at the culvert was in a state of siege.
cleared the way and moved down the road From all sides mortar, artillery, and machine-
toward Santa Maria. Advancing past the gun fire fell near the group dug in around
Minturno cemetery it drew up just short the culvert. Air bursts splattered the area.
of the Tits at 1545 . With the assistance of A mortar, tucked away in a haystack on the
infantrymen who crawled up to the tanks eastern slope of Hill 126, lobbed shells near
and pointed out the strongpoints along the the culvert. From Santa Maria and the S-
road, the tanks went on beyond the Right Ridge, machine guns kept up harassing fire
Tit and knocked out an enemy self-propelled on Company F; from the rear along the Min-
gun as well as approximately 20 sniper and turno-Santa Maria road, other automatic
machine-gun positions. After moving a few weapons were trained on our embattled
yards farther down the road toward The troops; and German snipers in the creek bed
Spur, Lieutenant Des Jardins' tank was hit took pot shots whenever a head poked above
by an armor-piercing shell from another Ger- a fox hole or the sligh test movement was de-
man self-propelled gun. As it started to burn, tected around the culvert. The heaviest fire
the crew jumped out and hid in a nearby wall came from Tame. Machine gunners and
where they remained for more than 24 hours snipers in the hamlet, less than 200 yards
until they were picked up by troops of the away, fired at the culvert and the half-circle
35 1st Infantry. Two more tanks were put of fox holes around it. The men of Company
out of action and the rest pulled back behind F fired back, but their force was small and
the cemetery. their ammunition stocks dwindling. During
On the right flank of the 35 I st Infantry the afternoon enemy tanks added to Com-
another group of tanks tried to reach Santa pany F's troubles. They came along the

154
Spigno road to Tame, from which they har- set, six Germans came across the Tame-Santa
assed Company F with point-blank fire. Our Maria road, a few yards southeast of the in-
artillery finally dispersed them, knocking out verted V -bend, calling uKamerad." As the
two. men of Company F scrambled from fox holes
Communication between Company F and the culvert to capture them, other Ger-
and the 2d Battalion was maintained by mans closed in from all sides. Some rushed
Capt. Edward J. Church, commanding Com- from the draw east of Hill 126, others from
pany H, who operated an SCR 300 on Hill the Y-junction across the slope on the left-
130, 800 yards west of the Minturno-Santa hand side of the road; most of them came
Maria road. But after dawn on 12 May, only straight down the road from Tame around
four radio messages were received from Com- the inverted V-bend. As the Germans spilled
pany F. Since morning the Company's situa- out of their hiding places and streamed down
tion had seriously deteriorated. It was on Company F, one of our machine gunners
hemmed in on all sides and pressed into a let loose a short, harmless burst before an
tiny pocket. Food and ammunition were offi cer ordered him to cease firing. Company
running low, and litter bearers were sorely F and half a platoon from Company H sur-
needed to evacuate the wounded. If the feeble rendered without further struggle. The only
batteries of the company's SCR 300 went out ones to escape were five enlisted men who
the sole means of communication with the played dead in their fox holes and were
battalion would be cut off. picked up by the 3d Battalion on the morn-
During the last conversation, at 2015, ing of 14 May. The enemy's bag of prison-
Captain Church relayed an order from Maj. ers included the 2d Battalion S-2, 4 officers
Edwin L. Shull, acting battalion commander, and about 60 enlisted men from Company
which directed Captain Nelson to withdraw F, a Cannon Company liaison officer, and 1
the company under cover of darkness to the officer and approximately 20 men from
assembly area behind Cemetery Ridge. When Company H. The capture was as swift as it
he heard the order, Captain Nelson expressed was unexpected: it took exactly five minutes.
his doubts that it could be carried out, and The 3d Battalion's failure to move be-
reiterated his company's plight. u. . . Some- yond Hill 103 and rescue Company F was
body had better do something. I have lots of partly due to the lack of progress by adjacent
casualties. I need supplies." A moment later units. The tanks had not completely wiped
Company F tried to get through again, but out the enemy on the 3d Battalion's right
what came over the air was unintelligible. flank, and the S-Ridge was still in enemy
Men who were with Company F at the time hands. This key terrain had been assaulted
stated later that Captain Nelson had declared again and again during 12 May, but the en-
he would bring Company F back to Cemetery emy inflicted such losses on the 33 8th In-
Ridge that night. fantry that it gained little ground. By the
If that was his intention, the enemy afternoon of 13 May the 338th Infantry had
never allowed him to carry it out. After sun- suffered 50 percent casualties.

155
 NEW PLAN OF A
351s1
~:-I--=7==;::=;::==-
INFANTR~TACK
13 May 1944 ____- -

--to-
~ AXIS
E Of' MOVE MENTS
N(MY ML R

.00
~-==-::,O"-~'OO
YAROS

.'

MAP NO. 16

156
 THE BAHE SLOPES OF THE S-HIDGE gllve lillie cover lor 'roop,
01 'he 351 It attacking Irom the creek valley (lelt). T hi, vielV, taken
from th~ norlheoJ"1 on the Minzurno-Santa Maria road, looks
across th e S~Ridgt: to the Tyr,.h~nian Sea in the background.

During the night of 12/ 13 May the were about half their original size. The 3d
resumption of the offensive was postponed. Battalion's assaulting companies, K and I,
The 88th Division had received information had fared little better. Altogether the regi-
at noon on 12 May that a major counter- ment had sustained 36 1 casualties during
attack was forming for that night, preceded 11-12 May, including 68 killed, 191
by a minor one during the last hour of day- wounded, and 92 missing in action. During
light. To meet the threat the 35 1st Infantry the night 125 replacements, who had been
was alerted, and the 91 3 th Field Artillery trained by the regiment, were sent up to the
Battalion was ordered to adjust fire on the rifle companies with gu ides. Tills intended
enemy. The artillery fire failed to upset the relief turned out to be a minor catastrophe.
enemy plan of attack, and it was only after Many of the new men were killed or
stiff fighting that the 3d Battalion managed wounded by enemy fire on the way; others
to beat off th e waves of enemy infantry. On straggled or took shelter in shell holes; only
the other side of the Minturno-Santa Maria a few reached the forward positions.
road, tank destroyers firing from Tufo Ridge Evacuating the wounded and bringing
tried to soften up the enemy positions along up supplies under heavy and constant shell-
the crest of The Spur, without success. fire were dangerous operations. Of 60 Italian
Fresh troops and suppl ies were urgentlv civilian carriers used in the Santa Maria bat-
needed to reinforce the depleted 2d and 3d tle, 23 were killed. Ammunition and rations
Battalions. In the 2d Battalion, Company F were brought by jeep from the regimental
had ceased to exist; Companies E and G had dump east of Minturno to the battalion
lost so many killed and wounded that they dumps established along the Santa Maria

157
road. From these points battalion ammuni- the commanding generals of the 88th and
tion and pioneer platoons and the Italian 85 th Divisions, with their subordinate com-
civilians packed the supplies up to the front- manders, Colonel Champeny of the 35 1st
line troops. Three regular Ii tter teams from and Col. Fred A. Safa y of the 338th Infantry,
each battalion and the cooks from the com- met at the 88th Di vision CP in Minturno to
pany kitchens did yeoman service in bearing draw up plans. They decided that the 33 8th
the wounded back to evacuation points south and 35 I st Infantry would again attack simul-
of the Tits. There jeep ambulances, which taneously against the twin objectives, the S-
could take four litter cases each, picked them Ridge and Santa Maria. But because the
up and delivered them post haste to battalion 338 th Infantry had been so weakened in its
aid stations. attack against the stubbornly held S-Ridge,
Poor communications among units of fresh troops from the 35 1st Infantry would
the 351 st Infantry were still causing trouble take responsibility for seizing a part of this
for the attacking forces. Keeping contact key ridge, and the divisional boundaries were
proved a hard task both day and night, with shifted west to place Hills 109, 126, and 128
mechanical difficulties and hill contours in- in the zone of the 35 1st.
terfering with transmission and reception of Under this plan the 35 1st Infantry
the 536 radios. The new SCR 300 radio, would make thrusts on each side of the ridge
however, used in company, battalion, and road to take the high ground east and north
regimental headquarters stood up well under of Santa Maria. In addition it would drive
the most trying combat conditions. Mortar the Germans from the S-Ridge at Hill 109,
and artillery fire wreaked havoc with the tele- then swing north on that ridge line and take
phone lines. Although wiremen, creeping Hills 126, 128, and Tame. The 338th In-
and crawling to escape small-arms fire, laid fantry on the left would push across the S-
as many as 12 lines, they were never able to Ridge to seize Hill 1 3 1. The 35 1st Infan-
keep more than 5 in operation at one time. try's right boundary was shifted to the west
Frequently all of them were out of commis- so that the 349th Infantry could take over the
sion. Jeeps carried the wire up the Min- zone of the 1st Battalion, 35 1st Infantry,
turno-Santa Maria road as far as possible; which would be used to attack the S-Ridge.
the rest of the way it was laid by hand. Mes- Colonel Champeny drew up an assault
sengers, who were used when other means plan for the 35 1st Infantry which provided
failed, found the going tough at all times. for use of all three battalions. The 2d and
3d Battalions would push forward from their
Plans for Renewed Attack (13 May) positions on each side of the ridge road, with
their left flank protected by the 1st Battalion's
The failure to reach Santa Maria after attack aga inst the S-Ridge. From their hard-
repeated efforts during 1 1- 12 May neces- won fox holes on The Spur, Company E on
sitated new plans for a coordinated attack the left and Company G on the right would
(Map No. 16, page 156). At 11 00, 13 May advance across the crest and around the east-

158
ern edge of the hill, follow the slope along Field Artillery Battalion, assisted by the
the east side of the road, and take the high corps artillery, laid down a preparation of
grou nd east of Santa Maria. A t the same time several hundred rounds of smoke, white phos-
Companies I and L, jumping off from the phorus, and high explosive shells on Santa
forward slope of Hill 10 3, would move along Maria and Pulcherini. The concentrations
the western side of the road and seize the began at 1825; they were heavy and prop-
high ground north of the town. The 1st er! y placed.
Battalion was to advance from the draw be- The time for the attack of the 33 8th
tween the S-Ridge and the high ground along Infantry and the 351 st Infantry was origin-
the road, take Hill 109, then swing north on ally set for ' 1600. As the 1st Battalion could
the S-Ridge to Tame. not reach its jump-off position in time, Colo-
Enemy positions were softened up be- nel Champeny requested the commander of
fore the attack. At 1225 three American the 88th Division to postpone the attack half
fighter-bombers dropped six or seven bombs an hour. Even this stay was not sufficient and
on Santa Maria and strafed enemy positions Colonel Champeny then asked that the time
in the town. A few minutes later, 3 of 22 for the attack be pushed back to 1830. The
attacking FW-190's broke through a cordon request was granted, but the delay was to
of Spitfires and P-40's to drop a few bombs apply only to the 35 1st Infantry. On the left
between The Spur and Minturno. The only flank the 3 38 th Infantry was to jump off at
one that caused damage hit the 3d Battalion 1630, in accordance with the original half-
aid station on the trail back of Cemetery hour postponement.
Ridge, wounding several men. Although The eastern posi tions on the crest of The
not without harassing and morale value, Spur would be attacked by Company G.
neither the German nor the American air From its dug-in positions along the sunken
attacks substantially influenced the course of road, Company G would wheel past Com-
the battle for Santa Maria. pany E toward the eastern end of The Spur,
At 1415, tank destroyers from T ufo then cut back sharply along the crest. Oc-
Ridge and Casale Hill opened up on the cupying positions on the crest, Company G
dugouts and houses on The Spur. This fire would wait until it got word to push on into
fell uncomfortably close to Company E, but Santa Maria. Company E, attacking at the
because of its effectiveness it was continued same time, would move out from the sunken
for 45 minutes. Using information furni shed road over the western end of The Spur, knock
by Capt. Gilmer M. Heitman, Jr., 2d Bat- out the machine-gun nests there, and take
talion adjutant who had located the enemy the high ground east of Santa Maria. Al-
strong points, and rel ying on .50-cal. tracers though the two units were operating close to
to identify them, the tank destroyers scored each other, various difficulties, including fail-
two or perhaps three direct hits on the tar- ure to get word of the postponed hour of at-
gets. T o cover the attack of the 35 1st Infan- tack, were to upset the coordination of the
try, the 2d Chemical Battalion and the 913th 2d Battalion attack.

159
 TERRAIN OF LATER ATTACKS, 13 May 1944

160
 The E1Iemy Holds Out 011 The Spur two rifle pl atoons abreast and forward , and
one in the rea r, each platoon deployed in a
(13 May)
wedge with two squads fo rward and one in
Company G received its orders to attack support. When fire was fi rst received, the
sufficient! y ahead of time to allow a brief forward squads in the platoons built up in a
reconnaissa nce of its obj ectives. A t about skirmish line. The mortar section of the
1530 Lieutenant Noon, the compan y com- W eapons Platoo n supported the attack from
mander, and his offi ce rs went around the east- de fil aded positions in the draw south of The
ern ex tremity of The Spur. N o sooner had Spur, and the machine-gun section followed
they reached the reverse slope than th ey were t!1e I st Platoon at supporti ng distance.
caught in a heavy mortar barrage. Lieute nant The 3d Platoon on the right adva nced
Noo n, in adva nce of the other offi cers, was across the eastern prong of The Spur and
wounded severcl y in both legs. Hi s fellow th en half way over the northern slope toward
officers were unable to reach him and re- the road. Here it was pinned dow n by ma-
turned to the company to launch the attack chine-gun fire fro m positions at the western
at 1630. end of the crest. On the left of the 3d Pla-
The company moved out in a column of toon, the I st had cut straight up along the
platoons, 3d, 1st, 2d, and 4th in th at order, crest of the eastern slope. Almost to the top,
from its dug-in positions one-third of the th e I st Platoon was stopped by machine-
way up the forward slope of The Spur (Map gun fire from the same positions that checked
N o. 17) . After double-timing to the eastern the advance of the 3d Platoon. Just ahead of
slope, Company G changed its formation to the I st Platoon was a little dip in the ground
at the eastern end of the crest. E very time
the men stuck their hea ds over the edge of
the dip, grazing machine-gun fire met them.
THE ATTACK ON THE SPUR H aving lost contact with th e 3d Platoon
2d BATTALION 351st INF
13 Moy 19 44 on th e right, 1st Lt. William G. H ohenadel ,
\..../
I st Platoon leader, call ed up the 2d Platoon,
which moved up swiftl y on the right of the
I st Platoon. It ca me under the machine-gun
fi re covering th e backbone of The Spur. Un-
able to adva nce frontally across the little dip
(where the 2d Platoon dug in), the I st Pla-

".'.'. "
toon swung to the left and fired on some men
it saw in fox holes around house No. 9 whom
" '., , ____-1
.........,~~ .... it took to be Germans. The presumed enemy
o .. was the group from Compa ny E, under Lieu-
tenant McSwain, who had dug in near house
M A P NO. 17 No. 9 after Colonel K endall was killed.

161
These men had received orders to join the rest end of The Spur's crest. As soon as Captain
of Company E at the sunken road and were Heitman and Pfcs. Earl R. Baish and Joseph
trying to do so when caught in the mistaken C. Stockmal following just behind him
fire from Company G. To stop this fire 1st turned off from the sunken road, they came
Lt. Pat G. Combs, artillery liaison officer under heavy fire from the machine guns on
with McSwain's group, held up his helmet the crest. At the sound of the fire, the rest of
on a riRe. When the I st Platoon continued Company E, which had not yet rounded the
to take pot shots at him, he stood upright. bend, stopped dead in its tracks.
The men from Company G then recognized The two leading men and Captain Heit-
him and ceased firing, though not before they man jumped into a ditch that crossed the
had seriously wounded Lieutenant McSwain. sunken road. From the direction of the ma-
After the Company E men, who had chine-gun fire, Heitman located the enemy
held out on the crest of The Spur for a day position and threw three grenades at it. In re-
and a half, rolled and crawled down to their sponse German machine guns opened up from
comrades at the sunken road, the I st Platoon, new positions on the crest at the men in the
Company G dug in around house No. 9. ditch, forcing Captain Heitman and Privates
Farther to the east, the 2d Platoon was dug Baish and Stockmal to dig in against a 4-foot
in at the military crest on the end of The bank below the sunken road. Captain Heit-
Spur. The 3d Platoon had dug in on the man then crawled up to the bank and with
northern slope. single shots picked off three men who were
On the 2d Battalion's left Rank, Com- manning one machine gun while other Ger-
pany E had even less success than Company mans from the same or nearby positions
G. At 1530, Captain Heitman, now in com- heaved grenade after grenade at the group.
mand of Company E, received an order from Only one of the grenades struck home, but
Colonel Champeny over the SCR 300 radio, it hit all three men. Although wounded the
giving the plan of the company attack with men were still able to move. At about 1800,
the jump-off time as 1630. Receiving no after locating at least three enemy machine-
word of the postponement to 1830, Captain gun nests, they crawled back down the
Heitman began his attack at 1630, not wait- sunken trail to where the rest of Company E
ing for Lieutenant McSwain's group on the had stopped. Captain Heitman then reported
crest who had been ordered to join the com- the location of the enemy strong points to
pany at the sunken road. Captain Heitman Major Shull, the acting battalion com-
led the men from their dug-in positions west mander, who ordered him to hold fast until
along the road in single file. After moving the next morning. Although some positions
toward the central ridge a few yards beyond on The Spur had been knocked out by the
a bend in the road, Captain Heitman, at the well-directed fire from tank destroyers, posi-
head of the column, cut back sharply toward tions still held by the enemy at the western
the immediate objectives of Company E, the end prevented further attack by the 2d Bat-
German machine-gun nest on the western talion on 13 May.

162
 left, the 2d on the right, each with two squads
Hill 103 Ag<li11 Stops the 3d B<ltt<llion
forward and one in support. For flank pro-
At least three dugouts with one or more tection, the support squads of each platoon
machine guns in each faced the troops of the followed to the outside and rear. The 1st
3d Battalion from the crest of Hill 103. In Platoon remained in reserve. The machine
addition to the machine-gun positions on the guns of the 4th Platoon remained along the
crest, snipers posted in houses along the road slope near the road on the little knob between
and on Hill 103 were a threat to advancing the Left Tit and Hill 103, and the light mor-
troops. To attack the hill the same general tars were in the draw south of the little knob.
plan as was used the day before would be Advancing up the slope of Hill 103,
followed. With Company K forming a base the men from the 2d and 3d Platoons used
of fire , Company L would pass through Com- two steep terraces for protection against ma-
pany K and assault Hill 10 3 frontally. Com- chine-gun fire from the crest. As they
pany I would simultaneously make an end reached the unterraced space toward the top,
run around the west of the hill to envelop about 200 yards from the jump-off point,
the strongpoint from the rear. It was hoped they began to be hit by heavy fire from a
that the I st Battalion attack against the S- machine gun direct! y in front of the 2d Pla-
Ridge would progress swiftly enough to re- toon. The troops were pinned down and
move the danger of heavy fire from the 3d most of them were wounded by the direct
Battalion's left flank (Map No. 18) . fire.
Between 1300 and 1400 1st Lt. Ed- Crawling forward toward the dugout,
ward G. Sautter, who the day before had as- Tech/ Sgt. Floyd P. Loterbaugh, 2d Platoon
sumed command of Company L after Capt. sergeant, emptied his carbine at the position,
Harold B. Ayres was wounded by shell frag- then picked up a rifle from one of his
ments, was ordered to move into position for wounded men and fired it until ammunition
the attack at 1630. At 1530 Company L ran out. During this time the Germans in
began to infiltrate, a few men at a time, the dugout fired clip after clip at Sergeant
through Company K. In the meantime word Loterbaugh. When they had used up their
reached Companies I and L that the attack entire stock, they ran out of the entrenchment
had been postponed to 18 30. Presumabl y in an attempt to escape. Seeing them break
through an intercepted radio message, the out of the dugout, Sergeant Loterbaugh
enemy heard the news at the same time, for snatched up an abandoned BAR and
beginning exactly at 1830, from 300 to 400 crawled forward where he could observe the
artillery shells fell in the sector held by the fast-moving Germans. By accurate fire, he
3d Battalion. killed at least three of them.
After the barrage had subsided some- Although Sergeant Loterbaugh had
what, Company L moved up the southern neutralized the troublesome position, the 2d
slope of Hill 103 beyond Company K. Two Platoon was still unable to advance across the
platoons were abreast: the 3d Platoon on the crest of Hill 103 because of heavy fire from

163
 of automatic weapons. One of the machine
THE ATTACK ON HILL 10 3
guns was located in a house near the crest.
3d BATTALION 351s1 INF
13 May 1944 Sizing up the situation, Pvts. Henry Dom-
uJ..'.I,u EHEMY POSITIOftS browski and Richard Zippel crawled for-
----- MULE TRAILS

o
ward toward the enemy gun. As they entered
the building, two Germans fired on them
with machine pistol s, one of the shots wound-
ing Zippel. Undaunted they both charged,
killed the Germans with rifle fire, and put
the mach ine gun out of action. Although
this action removed one of the troublesome
guns, the 3d Platoon found its situation on
the bare crest untenable and withdrew at
dark down the southern slope of Hill 103.
Company 1's attempt to flank Hill 10 3
around the left was abortive. The heavy con-
centration of German artillery fire south of
Hill 103 at jump-off time prevented the men
from moving out as scheduled. Continuing
for several hours, the barrage made it ex-
tremely hazardous to move. When the men
did get going, machine-gun and mortar fire,
some coming from Hill 103, but principally
from the S-Ridge, forced Company 1 to
abandon its advance for the night.
MAP .vU. 18
Enemy artillery fire, as well as the ma-
chine guns and mortars on Hill 103 and the
other machine gun s on the right and left S-Ridge, had caused many casualties in the
flanks. The men stayed where they were and 3d Battalion. Company K , which had re-
waited for the 1st Platoon to come up and ceived much of the artillery fire at its support-
join them. As darkness came on and the rein- ing position sou th of Hill 10 3, was down to
forcements did not show up, Sergeant Loter- one-half its original strength. Company I
baugh ordered his platoon, which had suf- was at two-thirds strength and Company L
fered many casualties, to withdraw to the had lost many men from its rifle platoons.
lower part of the southern slope below the rust before midnight Capt. Howard E. Mil-
first terrace, just in front of the line where ler, the 3d Battalion S-3, reported, "I just
Company K was dug in. saw two years of training go up in smoke-
On the left, the 3d Platoon had also my men-about half of.them-almost all the
been stopped near the crest, in the cross fire leaders." Part of the failure of the 3d Bat-

164
talion attack was due to the slow progress on group reached Mt. Natale, they were pinned
the left flank, where coordination troubles be- down by artillery fire. Capt. Herbert D.
tween the 1st Battalion and the 338th Infan-, Shoemaker, the heavy weapons company
try prevented the swift accomplishment of commander, was killed, and the battalion
the vital mission of ca pturing the S-Ridge, commander was not able to return to his
troops for several hours.
1st Battalioll Gains at the S-Ridge Because of the urgency of the 1st Bat-
talion's mission, Colonel Champeny decided
The 2d and 3d Battalions had jumped that Captain Williams should lead the attack
off immediately to th e front of their forward on schedule without Maj or Brown. After
positions, but the 1st Battalion had to move briefing the company commanders on their
a long distance forward from the center of mission Captain Williams moved the 1st Bat-
Cemetery Ridge to be in position for its at- talion out of the assembly area on Cemetery
tack against the S-Ridge. Consequently the Ridge and down the Minturno-Santa Maria
. attack on the 35 1st Infantry's left wing got road in a column of companies: C, B, Head-
off to a much slower start than had been quarters, A, and D . As the troops reached
hoped for. Difficulties of coord ination with the road, tanks passed near them. Coming
the 33 8th Infantry, attacking the southern- under th e hea vy shell fire directed by the en-
most knob of the S-Ridge at a different time, emy at our tanks, the troops of the 1st Bat-
also upset the 1st Battalion's attack. In addi- talion suffered some casual ties.
tion, enemy fire separated the battalion com- After turning off the road, the 1st Bat-
mander from his unit before the jump-off talion waded in a single column through the
and held up the troops before they reached knee-deep mud and water of the creek bed
their jump-off position (Map No. 19). that lay in the narrow valley between the S-
After receiving the regimental attack or- Ridge and the Minturno-Santa Maria road.
der at noon on 13 May, Maj. Harold McV. Companies C and B reached the jump-off
Brown, 1st Battalion commander, accompa- point at the base of Hill 109 without inci-
nied by the battalion S-3, artillery liaison dent, but somewhere along the way they lost
officer, and heavy weapons company com- contact with Company A and the two ma-
mander, left the battalion CP to reconnoiter chine-gun platoons of Company D which
his assigned objectives from Mt. Natale, had been following them. This rear group
westernmost hill on Cemetery Ridge. His wandered to Mt. Natale before 1st Lt.
executive officer, Capt. Trevor E. Williams, George D. Schaffer, 1st Battalion S-3, found
had assured Major Brown that the battalion it and led it back to the forward elements of
would be ready to attack at 1630. In addi- the battalion. Sfowed up by the uncertain
tion to choosing a suitable route of advance, footing and the burden of ca rrying heavy
Major Brown planned to coordinate tightly machine guns, the troops of the 1st Battalion
with the 338th Infantry, which was to attack moved at such a snail's pace that they could
Hill 131 at 1630, After Major Brown's not jump off at the scheduled time, and the

165
attack was postponed to 1830. Word had
also been received from tbe battalion com- THE ATTACK ON THE S-RIDGE
3rd BATTAUON 351s1 INF
mander to delay tbe attack until he arrived. 13/14 Moy 1'344

It was already dark before Major Brown, ac- ~ ENEMY POSITIONS

------ MuLE T""ll
companied by Colonel Champeny, reached Note : Form lin.s, ;nf.r~tli ro m",rs
Tim.s or. opprox;mol.
the battalion CP in the creek bed east of the o , ..
YAJtos
S-Ridge. Upon arriving, the battalion com-
mander made a brief reconnaissance, issued
attack orders to his company commanders,
and gave them a chance to make their own
reconnaIssance.
Under Major Brown's plan of attack,
Company C was to move from tbe jump-off
point in the creek bed straight up Hill 109
to take it by frontal assault. After tbe 33 8th
Infantry captured Hill 131, Company A
would pass through Company C and attack
along a mule trail on the S-Ridge crest
against knobs 126 and 128 at the northeast-
ern extremity of the S-Ridge. Company B
would remain in the creek bed, in reserve.
All night the machine-gun platoon of Com-
pany D stayed there too, while the heavy
mortars were in position behind Hill 101.
During tbe I st Battalion's attack neither the
heavy machine guns nor the 81-mm mortars MAP NO. /9

were fired because, like the lighter weapons

of Companies Band C, they could be used emplaced in eartben dugouts. About 5 [)
only at the risk of inflicting casualties among yards below the concertina wire the terraces
our own attacking troops. began, rising in tiers to the crest. In attack-
Company C's objective, Hill 109, like ing thi s difficult objective Company C was
Hill 131 under attack by the 3 38th Infantry hindered by ignorance of the progress of
just to tbe south, was terraced on the upper 338th Infantry troops against Hill 13 I, far-
half of the southeastern slope. The slightly tber south on the ridge. The 338 th had
flattened crest of Hill 109 was about 70 jumped off at 1630, about six and a half
yards wide and 300 yards long. Along the hours before Company C was ready to go
soutbeastern edge lay a minefield and behind against Hill 109.
it concertina barbed wire. Covering the mine- A ten-minute artillery concentration on
field and the wire were two machine guns Hill 109 preceded Company C's jump-off.

166
After tiring only a few rounds, the artillery C. Therefore no supporting fire was used
received a report that its shells were falling during the attack.
on 33 8th Infantry troops, who, unknown to Once out of the creek bed, the leading
the 35 I st Infantry, had dug in about half- platoons of Company C raced up the hill.
way up the southeastern slope of Hill 109. Halfway up the slope, the two leading squads
When the artillery barrage lifted at about of the 3d Platoon on the right saw 15 to 20
2200, Company C moved out from the creek men rush out of house No. 13, a few yards
bed in single file, one platoon behind the away. Thinking that the men were Ger-
other. The moon had not yet come up and mans, the 3d Platoon fired, wounding sev-
the hill was shrouded in darkness. A man eral of them. The rest hastened to identify
could see barely ten yards ahead of him un- themsel ves as troops of the 3 38th Infantry.
less his eyes focused on outlined objects or These men explained that, after clearing out
figures. After climbing Ollt of the creek bed, enemy resistance on the crest of 109 (they
Company C advanced up the slope of Hill evidently mistook this knob for their objec-
109 with the 3d and 2d Platoons abreast, tive, 131), they had returned halfway down
the 3d Pia toon on the righ t. The two pla- the hill and dug in around the building to
toons were about 15 yards apart in a fonna- set up a rear-slope defense against counter-
tion of two squads abreast and forward and attacks. At the time the 3d Platoon arrived,
one in support. The I st Platoon, in reserve, the men from the 33 8th Infantry had been in
followed the leading platoons at a connecting position for two hours. Communication fail -
distance until it reached a point about 100 ure prevented the 3d Platoon from knowing
yards up the slope, where it dug in and waited that friendly troops were on 109. Dur-
for the go-ahead signal. ing the course of this exchange of informa-
The Weapons Platoon followed the rifle tion , 1st Lt. Garvin C. McMakin, the com-
platoons up the slope of Hill 109 about 50 pany commander, came up and ordered the
yards from the creek bed and there emplaced 3d Platoon and the 2d Platoon to dig in. But
its machine guns and mortars. Six .50-cal. the 2d Platoon was not in contact.
machine guns of the I st Battalion's Antitank On the left, the 2d Platoon of Company
Platoon set up in the creek bed to support C had moved forward on the run until it
Company C, and later moved to the draw at reached the steepest part of the slope, and then
the foot of Hill 109, 25 yards beyond the changed to a fast walk. During the advance
creek. Because of intervening terraces, how- three machine guns fired from the crest of
ever, our machine guns could not bring ef- the ridge over the heads of the 2d Platoon,
fective fire on the German positions along which was protected from fire by terraces
the crest of Hill 109. Also, the close-in na- that ringed the upper half of the slope. One
ture of the fighting for the hill made it diffi- machine gun was in a dugout on the left in
cult for mortars and machine guns to fire on the saddle between Hills 109 and 131, the
the enemy without at the same time risking other two were on the crest of Hill 109. Be-
casualties among the riflemen of Company tween them they established interlocking

167
bands of fire which covered the approaches terrace behind the 2d Platoon and called out
to the crest. Coming up against a strand of for Sergeant Adams to pull his men down
concertina wire about 15-20 yards from the the slope abreast of the 3d Platoon. The 2d
crest, Techj Sgt. Joseph W. Adams, platoon Platoon, minus the supporting squad which
sergeant, pulled his men back about 10 yards, was below on the slope, then crawled down
deployed them in a skirmish line with the over the terrace. Protected from machine-
3d Squad 5 yards to the right of the 2d gun fire by this and the other terraces neal
squad, and directed them to dig in. the crest, the 2d Platoon walked halfway
Before jumping off the 2d Platoon had down the slope of Hill 109. After the 2d
been instructed by Lieutenant McMakin that, Platoon had withdrawn down the hill, Ger-
after reaching the crest, it would contact the mans on the crest continued to pour searching
3d Platoon. Accordingly, when the 2d Pla- machine-gun fire over the heads of the men
toon reached the concertina wire, the two and to throw flares to spot them.
scouts of the 3d Squad, pfc. Phillips Soto When word reached Lieutenant McMa-
and Pfc. Daniel B. Van Wickler, were sent kin of the casualties suffered by the 2d Pla-
over to the right to make contact with the toon, he promptly called up the I st Platoon
3d Platoon. They crawled over the ground which was still in its reserve positions. While
for 50 yards until they found themselves un- waiting for it to arrive, 1st Lt. Donald
der the very nose of the enemy machine gun- S. Rocke, executive officer of Company C,
ners. Fortunately the two scouts were not decided that the weapon which had been fir-
detected. They searched for the 3d Platoon, ing from the crest of Hill 109 was an Ameri-
but seeing no trace of it crawled back to the can light machine gun and that it was prob-
point where the rest of their platoon were ably manned by elements of the 338th In-
digging in. fantry who did not know our troops were on
The Germans on the crest eviden tl y the southeastern slope. Contrary to advice
heard the 2d Platoon digging in, because from the other officers and from Sergeant
they threw flares at them and pulled an ig- Adams that the American-sounding machine
niter which set off antipersonnel mines in the gun was man ned by Germans, Lieutenant
area. At the same time an enemy machine Rocke went up the hill by himself to stop it
gun concealed in an earthen dugout covered from firing. He started off walking but, as
with chicken wire began firing at them. Five he came closer to his objective, broke into
men in the 2d Platoon were wounded or a run. As he approached the machine gun
killed by the machine gun; three more fell he called out: "Identify yourself or we will
victim to the mines. At that time the 3d throw the kitchen sink at you!" The Ger-
Squad of the platoon was in support about mans in the dugout allowed Lieutenant
200 yards down the slope of Hill 109. Rocke to get within ten yards before they
Soon after the machine gun opened fire opened fire and killed him.
and the mines went off, a runner from Lieu- Hearing the machine gun open up at
tenant McMakin worked his way up to the Lieutenant Rocke and suspecting what had

168
happened , Lieutenant McMakin led Com- he could get artillery fire placed on Hill I 3 1.
pany C forward from its position midway A t about 0400, when it was still dark, Cap-
up the slope. [n this attack two platoons were tain Jones led Company B up the northeast
abreast and about +0 yards apart, with the 3d slope of Hill 13 1, two platoons abreast and
on the left al1(l the I st Platoon on the right. in squad column. The right assault platoon
The 2d Platoon. which had suffered the went up the nose of the slope; the other pla-
hea viest casua lties. had dropped back into toon advanced 75 yards to the left. Though
reserve. not used during Company B's advan ce up
All th e way up the hill rifle grenadiers Hill 13 1, the mortars and machine guns
of the I st and .i d Platoon s fired grenades at were held rcady in the draw on call. Shortly
the German machine-gun positions. About after the jump-off, Company B received some
60 yards from the crest the riflemen also machine-gun fire, but it soon ceased. Ap-
opened up. and the German s replied with parently the Germans abandoned their posi-
hand grenades and machine-gun fire. Unable tions on the crest, and with no more inter-
to see their targets. the men of Company C ference Company B marched straight up the
directed arc i fire at the crest. j ust before hill. At the crest it struck a minefield which
reaching th e crest Lieutenant Mel\hk in was surrounded by concertina wire and had
knocked out th e machine gun on th e rig ht been covered by a German machine g un . Al-
side of the crest. vVh en Company C rcached though the mines killed or wounded several
the top of Hill 109. the other machine guns men, Company B's total casua lties in the at-
ceased firing and between 0300 and ()400 tack were comparativel y sma ll: five killed
the enemy withdrew down the northwest and seven wounded. At daybreak Company
slope. H eavy artillery and mortar fire th en B 111Qved back down to the creek bed, having
began to fall on th e crest. Outposting the been relieved by elements of the 338th In-
tip of the hill with BAR men and one squad fantry.
from each of the 1st and 3d Platoons, Lieu- Hills 1 3 1 and 109 were now securely
tenant McMakin withdrew th e remainder of in the hands of the 33 8th and 35 1st Infan-
the company down the sou theastern slope, try, but these points were the only objectives
where they dug in and remained throughout which had been taken during the costly 13
th e night. May attack. The 35 1st Infantry's carefully
Shortly before Company C jumped off , planned assault had been thrown off by sev-
machin e-gun fi re began coming from Hill era l unforeseen circumstances: the slow ap-
131. obj ective of the 338 th Infantry. After proach of the I st Battalion to its jump-off
co ntinuin g to receive thi s fire , Major Brown point; the delay in its commander's return
decided that Germans still held the position from his reconnaissa nce which made post-
and se nt Company B up to silen ce the un- ponement necessary; the failure of this in -
expected opposition. Before tack ling the job, formation to get through in time to Compa-
Capt. David R. Jones, commanding Com- nies E and G; and the enemy's heavy artillery
pany B, asked for a little more time so that barrage near Hill 103.

169
 Capture of Santa Maria Illfallte 109, its hard-won objective on the S-Ridge,
the I st Battalion prepared to push north
(14 May)
again on 14 May (Map No. 20).
Two and a half days of bitter fighting At 0800 the 3d Battalion attacked from
had apparently not yielded more than a few Hill 103 toward Santa Maria along the west
enemy strongpoints to the depleted battalions slope of the road, with Company I on the
of the 35 1st Infantry. The 2d Battalion was left and Company L on the right. Before
still dug in on The Spur and the 3d had re- entering the town, Company L was diverted
organized at the base of Hill 103. Both units to the right at the order of Major Furr to
were ready to renew the effort, and on Hill avoid the minefields on the left side of the

SANTA MARIA INFANTE was enured on 14 May. The small

hill IOfl'n hod hun demolished by air and artillery bombol'dmt'nts.

170
road west of the Y-junction. Company I
swung around and cleared out the houses in THE END OF THE BATTLE
ON MT BRACCHI HILLS
the western part of Santa Maria, where the 351" INFANTRY
:4 Moy 1944
enemy had posted a suicide group of snipers. --. AXIS OF MOVEMENTS

Company L meanwhile crossed the road and CoNrOlJR INTERVAL 25 METERS

cleared the houses on the right side of the o .00

YARDS
town, killing and capturing a handhll of rifle-
men. The two companies reached the town
about 0900 and spent a couple of hours mop-
ping up last pockets of enemy resistance. The

MAP NO . 20

2d Battalion followed the 3d Battalion into

Santa Maria; the enemy had also withdrawn
from his excellent positions on The Spur.
Enemy defense weaker than the resist-
ance of previous days, the northern half of
S-Ridge was captured by the I st Battalion. At
0800 Company A, commanded by Capt.
John C. Reid, moved out of the creek bed
below the S-Ridge and passed through Com-
pany C, which was on the southeast slope and

171
 RETURNING TO RUINED HOMES, a month after the battle,
these Itolian peasants are photographed in a characuristic sane. They
ore on the ridge road, moving south toward town 0/ Minturno.

crest of Hill 109. Striking the mule trail that junction of the Santa Maria- Tame road with
winds along the top of the S-Ridge, Com- the Ausonia-Formia highway.
pany A went along it to Hill 126, following Thus, on 14 May, the 351st reached its
the fire of the 913th Field Artillery Battalion objectives in a way that seemed an anticlimax
at the close-in distance of 50 yards. No re- after the earlier efforts. The 71 st Infantry
sistance was met. A few Germans were dis- Division, exhausted by three days of battle in
covered in a dugout on Hill 126. They re- which it lost upwards of 5,000 men, found
fused to come out of their hiding place, and, itself unable to check the progress of French
when words failed, Company A threw gren- units in the Castelforte-Mt. Majo sector. Be-
ades into the dugout, killing several of the cause of the terrain lost in that area, the whole
enemy. The others surrendered. There was German line to the coast was threatened. On
no resistance on Hill 128 and Company A 13 May, XIV Panzer Corps ordered a with-
pushed on to Mt. Bracchi, while Company B drawal to a new defense line anchored on the
and Company C moved up and occupied Aurunci Mountains. According to reports
Hills 126, 128, and Tame. Company C sent from captured Germans, what was left of the
a contingent to Hill 80 to gain control of the force in the Pulcherini-Santa Maria-S-Ridge

172
sector retreated north the next morning, be- 3d Battalions' riRe companies, each of which
tween 0130 and 0230, to Spigno over the had started with 170 men, was as follows:
mule trails that run into the Ausonia-Spigno Company E, 90; Company G, 86; Com-
road. Only a small rear-guard force of pany I, 74; Company K, 68; and Company
snipers was left to cover the retreat. L, 118. Company F no longer existed.
The 35 I st Infantry could be proud of The efforts of the 35 1st Infantry against
its record in the three-day battle for Santa some of the strongest positions in the II
Maria Infante. The attack was the first of- Corps sector contributed greatly to the suc-
fensive action undertaken by the regiments cess of the first phase of Fifth Army's drive
of the 88th Division, first American draft to Rome. The constant pressure of the in-
division to go into combat. Veteran units fantry attacks in the Bracchi triangle, and the
could not have shown a more aggressive spirit threat to the enemy's lateral supply route by
against the extremely difficult, well-placed the 339th Infantry's capture (13 May) of
enemy positions covering the hills and ap- San Martino Hill, which commanded the
proaches to the regi men tal objective. The Spigno road junction, had prevented the en-
351st suffered over 500 casualties in the three emy from shifting any troops to meet the
days. On 12 and 13 May, the only days dur- French drive through the rugged country
ing the battle on which an accurate break- farther north. Holding Mt. dei Bracchi, II
down of losses can be made, 84 men were Corps guarded the Ausonia Valley from the
killed, 284 wounded, and 93 missing-a south, helping the French to push swiftly
total of 46 1 casualties. On the morning of across the valley on 14-1 5 May after their
14 May the effective strength of the 2d and brilliant success in the Mt. Majo hills.

173
PANORAMA
(F.ee p. 114)
SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

SINGLING

~
~~W4th ARMORED DIVISION
6 December 1944
CHURCH AT SINGLING, looking east up the main street which
was in ankle-dup mud when picture was taken. (All photos for
this action, unless otherwise stated, were taken 12 Decemba 1944.)
Figure in centc:r is th e combat historian who studied this action.

176
 L t. Gen. F ritz Bayerlein, Commanding
General of the crack Panzer Lehr Division,
was on a hill north of Singling on 6 D ecem-
ber 1944, when tanks of the 4th Armored
D ivision broke across the open hills to the
south in a frontal attack on the town. After
the war ended he remembered that sight and
spoke of it with professional enthusiasm as
"an outstanding tank attack, such as I have
rarely seen, over ideal tank terrain."
General Bayerlein could afford a de-
tached appreciation. A t the moment when
he saw the A merica n tanks in motion, the
attack was not his problem. His division, af-
ter ten costly days of trying to drive south to
cut off the rear of advancing A merican forces,
had just been withdrawn, relieved by the
11 tlz Panzer Division. Bayerlein himself had
remained behind only because some of his
tan k destroyer units had been attached tem-
poraril y to the rel ieving forces.
The attacks on Singling and Bining
which General Bayerlein so admired were
the last actions in Lorraine of the 4th Ar-
mored Division commanded (after 3 D ecem-
ber ) by Maj. Gen. Hugh 1. Gaffey. For
nea rl y a month th e divi sion had been fight-
ing in the most difficult terrain and under
the most trying weath er conditions of its
entire ca mpaign in France. Casualties in
men and materiel had bee n very heavy,
large! y because constant rains prevented air
cove r and beca use swampy ground either con-
fin ed the tanks to the roads or so reduced

177
 THIRD ARMY FRONT
5 DECEMBER 1944

~ FRONT LINE
r-' ENEMY
'-_J UNITS

~ "SIEGFRIED LINE " FORTIFlEO .I.I'IE.

MAP NO.1

their maneuverability in cross-country attack formed at need by the task force commander
that they fell an easy prey to the enemy's pre- to deal with a strongpoint of enemy resistance
pared defenses. which was holding up the advance of the
Throughout the Lorraine campaign the main body, or to clean out a village or hold
division practice was to operate in small, flex- high ground to safeguard such advance. In
ible task forces (generally two to a combat this sense, the attack on Singling, though
command) which themselves were con- inconclusive, was typical of the campaign
stantly broken up into smaller forces of com- tactics. It shows some of the difficulties of
pany strength of tanks or infantry or the use of armor in terrain which naturally
both. These smaller "teams" were generally favored the defense, and which the Germans

178
knew thoroughly and had ample time to and, finally, no elements of Combat Com-
fortify. In respect to weather, however, which mand A ever reached Rohrbach.
all the tankers said was their toughest and
most memorable enemy during the cam- Ba~kground of the Atta~k
paign, Singling was not typical. The day of
the battle was overcast, but there was no rain. The impromptu attack on Singling, 6
Mud, except during the assembling stage, had December 1944, by Company B of the 37th
no influence on the course of the action. Tank Battalion and Company B of the 51st
One feature of interest in the detailed Armored Infantry Battalion represented the
narrative of the action lies in the picture of farthest advance northeast of the 4th Ar-
battle confusion, which extends to higher mored Division in its slow, difficult drive
headquarters. At Corps nothing at all was toward the German border which began 10
known of the engagement described in the November from assembly areas just east of
following pages, and the day's events were Nancy. From the military standpoint, Sing-
represented to the higher command substan- ling is important not as a town but as a ter-
tially as the realization of the original plan. rain feature. An agricultural village of some
The G-3 Periodic Report (XII Corps) Num- SO squat stone houses, it is strung along about
ber I 15,071200 December 1944, reads: half a mile of the highway from Achen (near
4th Armored Division - Combat Command the Sarre River) east to Bitche and the Ger-
A began their attack on Bining around noon. The man border. Around the simple square
38th (sic) Tank Battalion and 53d Infantry formed church, the brown stone schoolhouse, the
a base of fire to the south of town and the 37th Tank market square, cluster the houses whose con-
Battalion hit Bining from the west. As the attack creted walls are painted white, red, yellow,
on Bining (Q6549) progressed, Combat Command blue, pink, and roofed with red tile. As in
B passed Combat Command A and attacked Sing-
most Lorraine villages, the stables are on the
ling (Q6249). The opposition here consisted of in-
fantry, tanks, and antitank fire from numerous pill- main street and the manure piled in the front
boxes, and artillery fire which came in 30- to 40- yards. But the picturesque insignificance of
round concentrations. The fighting at Singling and Singling conceals a military reality. Some of
Bining was very difficult, but by night fall Combat these farm houses have 3-foot reinforced con-
Command A was in Bining and Rohrbach crete walls; the garden walls are high and
(Q6549). Singling was not clear as of 1730.... thick; concrete pillboxes stand guard at the
In actual fact, as the narrative will show, entrances to town east and west, on the hills
Combat Command A attacked Singling and and in the valley north, and on the ridge
secured the southern and eastern portion of south. For Singling is in the Maginot Line,
the town before Combat Command B came and its position along a southwest-northeast
up; the attack on Bining did not begin until ridge is tactical! y important. In the Maginot
late in the afternoon and was made by only fortification scheme, oriented north and east,
the light tanks of the 37th Tank Battalion Singling was a focal point in the secondary
supporting a battalion of the 328th Infantry; system of forts. For the Germans defending

179
 4TH ARMORED DIVISION
PLAN FOR 6 DECEMBER 1944

CONTOUR INTE"YAL IS METERS

MllU
•

MAP NO.2

180
south and west, it was admirably placed as a that control the Rohrbach road. The west
fortified outpost for the defense against at- side, on the other hand, comes under direct
tack from the southwest toward the cities of frontal fire from Singling, which, by reason
Rohrbach, an important rail and road center of a few feet additional elevation, and its
and military barracks area, and Bining, position on the curving nose of the ridge,
which controls the approaches to Rohrbach commands this approach route for three or
from the south. four kilometers to the south. Neither route,
Rohrbach and Bining, both located in therefore, was satisfactory, since tanks on
the valleys dominated on three sides by high both would come under enemy observation
ground, are themselves tactical liabilities. But before they were within range to attack, but
control of the cities through occupation of the west side of the ridge with comparative
the ridge to the north was especially im- freedom from flanking fire seemed to offer
portant at this time both to XII Corps, which the best hope for success. To use it for attack-
ordered the attack, and to Seventh Army (XV ing Bining, however, it was first necessary
Corps), which was on the 4th Armored Divi- either to take or to neutralize Singling. The
sion's right flank (Map No. I, page 178). ridge configuration and the impassability of
The principal objective of the XII Corps was flooded terrain in the Vallee d' Altkirch com-
Sarreguemines, an important city on the pelled the attacking force to come up east of
Sarre River and the German border. Singling and then make a ninety-degree turn
Through Rohrbach pass a railroad and one southeast on the high ground into Bining.
of the main highways east out of Sarregue- Assault of Singling was rendered di£licult not
mines to Germany. The 4th Armored Divi- only by the canalized approach but also by
sion was to seize this escape route while the the fact that the heights it occupies are
35th Infantry Division attacked Sarregue- themselves dominated by a ridge 1,200 yards
mines. Rohrbach had an additional impor- to the north which is in the main defenses of
tance as an objective at the time, because it the Maginot Line.
was a focus for roads north out of the large Just how difficult the task was had been
forest area (includil1g the For~t-de-Lemberg discovered on 5 December by the 37th Tank
and For~t-de-Montbronn) then under attack Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Creighton
by XV Corps units. W. Abrams, when it attacked from Schmitt-
But Rohrbach as an objective could not viller under orders to advance as far as pos-
be separated from Singling (Map No.2, sible, with Rimling as a limiting objective.
opposite, and Map No.3, 184). The main In fact, the attack carried only to within
road into Rohrbach from the south follows I ,000 yards of Singling and was there
high ground, but passes by a series of small stopped by difficult terrain and by heavy ar-
knobs which makes it unusable for attack. tillery and direct fire from Singling and be-
The alternative is the ridge west of the Val- yond. Fourteen medium tanks were lost to
lee d' Altkirch. The east slopes of this ridge mud and enemy guns. Five were hit almost
are, of course, enfiladed by the same hills simultaneously on topping a ridge south of

181
town; others bogged in the sticky ground principal combat elements were the 37th
and were destroyed by artillery or tempo- Tank Battalion, 51st Armored Infantry Bat-
raril y disabled. The battalion, reduced in talion, 94th Field Artillery Battalion (105-
effective strength to two medium companies mm howitzers), and Company B of the
and unable to advance, reassembled north- 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one
west of Hill 349. That night (5/6 Decem- platoon), was to attack Bining and Rohrbach
ber), Combat Command A Headquarters re- and reconnoi ter the high ground to the north.
ceived from Division the plan of attack for Task Force Oden (of Combat Command A)
the next day. Combat Command B was to meanwhile would push on from the Eichel
advance from Schmittviller to take Singling River bridgehead at Domfessel to take Dehl-
and the high ground to the east. Task Force ingen and Rahling, and be in a position to
Abrams (of Combat Command A), whose support Abrams (Map No.2, page 180) .

AERIAL VIEW OF SINGLING; photo taken 10 September f9.14

\ 82
 Colonel Abrams recommended to Com- ling) . In the detailed plan, the assault team
bat Command A that he be allowed to attack composed of the B Companies ot the 37th
Singling first. Combat Command B was still Tank Battalion and of the 51st Armored In-
in the vicinity of Voellerdingen and Schmitt- fantry Battalion was selected to make the
viller, and, though they could march as far sweep in to the town of Bining. Capt. James
as Abrams' assembly area without opposition, H. Leach and 1st Lt. Daniel M. Belden, the
he knew that they would be unable to come respective company commanders, therefore
up in time to jump off abreast with Combat met with their platoon leaders to study a
Command A in the attack. This would mean town plan of Bining and map out detailed
that Abrams would have to turn his flank routes and dispositions for their troops. No
to Singling in attacking east. If that turning one paid any attention to Singling, which
had to be made, he asked Combat Command they were to bypass under cover of the sup-
A for the support of at least six battalions of porting fires.
artillery. (In fact, when he attacked the next Both tank and infantry battalions were
morning, all artillery battalions except the far below strength ; the 37 th had only the
94th were, unknown to him, on the road.) equivalent ot two medium tank companies;
Abrams sent his recommendations as to ob- the 5 1st had about 180 combat effectives.
jectives and artillery support to Combat Com- Team B had 14 tanks, of which one was a
mand A by Ii~ison officer, along with a plan Headquarters 105 assault gun attached,' and
for attack on Bining it his preferred plan was 57 infantrymen.
not accepted.
But Colonel Abrams heard noth ing fur- A Change irl Platt
ther trom Combat Command A, and as-
sumed that they desired the original scheme The 51 st Armored Infantry Battalion
ot attack carried out, as ordered. commanded by Maj. Dan C. Alanis, at 0700,
This called for advance north to the high 6 December, left bivouac areas in the vicinity
ground south ot Singling, then east to the of Schmittviller to meet the tanks for the
trail fork and along the axis of the main road jump-off at 0800. The plan, as far as it con-
into Bining (shown on Map No.3, page .cerned Team B, was to advance in column of
184). Like-lettered infantry and tank com- alternating tanks and infantry carriers up to
panies were to be paired off, the two pla- the outskirts of Bining. But the soaked
toons ot tank destroyers to be used tor direct ground even on the hills proved too sticky
fire support. The turning movement south for the half-tracks, and they were left in the
of Singling, compelled by the terrain, was to bivouac area with their drivers while the rifle-
be covered not only by the artillery fire but by men rode the rear decks of the tanks. When
the assault guns and mortars of the 37 th they mounted at 0835 (Lieutenant Belden
Tank Battalion, firing smoke and HE into looked at his watch and was worried because
the town and adjacent high ground from po- 1 An M- 4 tank mounting a IOS -mm howitzer in stead of a 75-
sitions near Hill 356 (southwest of Sing- or 76.2-mm gun.

183
 THE ATTACK ON SINGLING
TASK FORCE ABRAMS
6 December 1944

_____ AxIS OF ATTActC AH[IIl 1015

r- , EH£MY UNITS

MAP N O. 3

184
they were late in starting), the plan still Captain Leach was given the order to
called for Team B to attack Bining. They attack; he informed Lieutenant Belden but,
were then just west of the Roman Way, still as the infantry was already mounted, Lieuten-
in the immediate vicinity of the battalion as- ant Belden could not pass the word on even to
sembly area, 3,000 yards from Singling. his platoon leaders. (One of them thought
Company A of the 37th Tank Battalion at until that night that he h'ld been in Bining.
the head of the column was a mile to the The tank commanders were so sure of it that
north, and had been stopped by direct and in- they mistook Welschoff Farm north of Sing-
direct fire from Singling as heavy as that of ling for the barracks they had expected to
the day before. At 0830, Batteries Band C find at Bining.) Captain Leach deployed his
of the 94th Armored Field Artillery Bat- tanks, putting the 2d Platoon under 2d Lt.
talion began firing smoke concentrations James N. Farese on the left; the 1st Platoon,
north and east of Singling. On 6 contiguous commanded by 1st Lt. William F. Goble, on
target areas they fired 13 1 rounds, but, al- the right; and the 3d Platoon, under 1st Lt.
though a gentle southwesterly breeze drifted Robert M. Cook, in support. The command
the smoke perfectly across Singling, enemy tank moved between the 2d and 1st Platoons
fire continued heavy, and for the next hour in front of the 3d. As the 2d Platoon tanks
or so the column made no attempt to ad- carried no infantry, the three infantry pla-
vance. Company A, 37th Tank Battalion toons were mounted on the remaining 1 1
fired into the town, although targets were tanks (5 in the 1st Platoon, 4 in the 3d, the
seldom visible. Company B of the same bat- commanding officer's tank, and the artillery
talion shot occasionally a t targets of oppor- observer's). The infantry platoons were
tunity at extreme range and without ob- widely dispersed; the 11 men of the 2d rode
served effect. Of the enemy ahead in Sing- on four tanks. Before the attack at 1015,
ling, Company B observed two tanks in the Batteries A and B of the 94th Field Artillery
orchards west and east and a gun firing from Battalion put 107 rounds of HE on Singling,
the center of town. This turned out to be a of which 3 rounds were time-fuzed, the rest
self-propelled gun which later engaged the impact. The assault guns of the 37th Tank
attention of the assaulting companies most Battalion took up the smoke mission and con-
of the day. tinued to fire north of the town until the
Convinced that enemy guns in Singling tanks got on their objective. Company A of
could not be neutralized by a fire fight, Colo- the battalion turned east and throughout the
nel Abrams decided on his own initiative to day fired on the Singling-Bining road and
attack the town and attempt to hold it with to the north. One platoon of tank destroyers,
one tank company and infantry, while the in position to support the attack, actually did
remainder of his force turned east into Bin- little effective firing during the day because
ing. He assigned the mission of taking the heavy enemy artillery forced the guns back.
town to Team B (Map No.3, opposite), The other platoon remained in assembly area
which had no time to make detailed plans. and was moved into Bining the next day.

185
 ENEMY SELF·PROPELLED GUNS w,,", located at the fa, end of
Ihe main st l'ut (this vi,'1V looks northwut) so that th~y could com
mOlld the whole length o/the strut . Third Platoon tanks were in
position in th~ IVaI/cd ga;'den jUiI behind first hOllse on the Ie/I.

Company B tanks advanced rapidly to- lead tanks, and they were ordered to stop
ward Singling, immediately after the artil- shooting. As far as the tankers noticed, there
lery preparation, and fired as they moved. was no appreciable return fire from the en-
But the planned formation was soon broken. emy. As the company approached the town ,
Sgt. Joseph Hauptman's tank (2d Platoon) the 1st and 2d Platoons swung east and west
developed engine trouble, ran only in first respectively, and the 3d Platoon moved in
gear, and so lagged behind; Sj Sgt. Max V. through the gap to come up substantially on
Morphew's (3d Platoon) radio failed and he a line. The effect then was of an advancing
did not bring hi s tank up at all. The other line of 13 tanks on a front a little less than
three tanks of the 3d Pia toon crowded the the length of Singling, or about 600 to 700
first two until their firing endangered the yards. Only Lieutenant Farese's tank was

186
notably in advance. Leading the tanks of is thin, the slope of the hill gentle, so that the
S/ Sgt. Bernard K. Sowers and Sgt. John H. turrets of tanks attacking from that direction
Parks by ahout 50 yards, Lieutenant Farese are enfiladed from the pillbox position at 150
moved up the hillside south of Singling and yards. The other pillbox is much smaller, de-
turned left into an orchard (Map No.4, in- signed probably as a machine-gun outpost to
side back cover). As his tank topped the ~over the main road. It juts out into the road
crest of a slight rise just south of a stone farm- and, together with tlle high walls of the farm
yard wall, it was hit three times by armor- buildings to the east, provides cover from the
piercing shells and immediate!y was set on town square for a tank parked behind it on
fire. Lieutenant Farese and his loader, Pfc. the south side of the road. The main street
William J. Bradley, were killed. The gun- of town makes a broad S-curve which serves
ner, Cpl. Hulmer C. Miller, was slightly to conceal guns on the south side from ob-
wounded. The rest of the crew got out. Sow- servation of an attacking force entering the
ers and Parks backed their tanks in defilade center of town from the south, yet still per-
behind the rise and radioed Hauptman not mits those guns to command the full length
to come up. of the street to the main square.
The shells that hit Lieutenant Farese In this area at least three Mark V tanks,
were probably from a Mark V tank which two SP guns, one towed antitank, and one
was parked beside a stone barn, though they machine gun (German .42- or possibly an
may have come from a towed 75-mm anti- American. 50-cal.) successfull y blocked every
tank gun in the same general vicinity. In attempt at direct assault or envelopment, and
any case, what Lieutenant Farese had run during the day fired at will at all movements
into was a nest of enemy armor and defensive across or along the main street and to me
emplacements-a perfect defensive position soum and soumeast. Sergeant Sowers and
which the enemy used to the fullest and Sergeant Parks found that if mey moved
against which Team B fought and plotted all meir tanks only so far up the slope as to bare
day without even minor success. meir antennae masts they drew armor-
Here, just south of the main road and piercing fire.
75 yards from the thickly settled part of For some time, however, Parks and Sow-
town, are a substantial two-story stone house ers were the only ones who suspected me
and stone barn and two Maginot pillboxes. strengm of mis micket of enemy defensive
One large-domed pillbox, constructed to armor. They knew that they could not ad-
house an antitank gun defending to the vance, but they had seen only one tank and
north, is just to the west of the barn. Two one gun. The destruction of Lieutenant
concrete buttresses fanned out to the north- Farese's tank was, of course, reported to Cap-
east and southeast to form a good field em- tain Leach, but Captain Leach at me moment
placement for an antitank gun defending was preoccupied by another more immedi-
southeast. The towed antitank gun may have ate! y pressing problem, an enemy SP 50 feet
been emplaced there. The orchard southeast in fron t of him.

187
 The Infantry Attack talion of the 11th Panzer Division, and by
elements at least of the five battalions of
When two tank platoons carrying the the 20Bth Volks Artillery Corps with guns
infantry reached a hedge just south of Sing- of miscellaneous caliber from 75- to 2 I 0-
ling, they slowed up to let the infantry dis- mm. Three days before, headquarters of the
mount. Lieutenant Belden got of! ahead of 1st Battalion, 111th Panzer Grenadier Regi-
his platoon leaders. First to reach him was 2d ment had been in Singling, while the compa-
Lt. William P. Cowgill, whose platoon as- nies were committed near Hinsingen. On
sembled most rapidly because the men hap- about 4 December the companies moved via
pened to be riding on tanks relative! y close Sarralbe to Voellerdingen, where they fought
together. Lieutenant Belden told Cowgill to against elements of Combat Command B,
take the left side of town, disregard the first 4th Armored Division, and apparently re-
three houses on the south, and move in; 2d treated that day or night to the vicinity of
Lt. Theodore R. Price was ordered to take Singling. The original mission after the
the right side. Belden said to 1st Lt. Norman withdrawal was to attack Oermingen, but
C. Padgett, "Follow up after Cowgill." Pad- this mission was changed to the defense of
gett commented drily afterwards, "I was in Singling.
support." That was the plan. Neither lead- Considering its depleted strength (I 50-
ers nor men had any knowledge of the town 200 men), the enemy battalion was well
or of the enemy. They were to clean out the armed. The three companies actually in con-
houses, splitting the work as circumstances tact at Singling had one towed 75 -mm anti-
dictated. Though all the platoon leaders and tank gun, at least five 8 I-mm mortars, eight
a good percentage of the men were recent to ten light machine guns, one heavy machine
replacements, 1 they had all had combat ex- gun, three 20-mm antiaircraft guns, and a
perience and had fought in towns before. wurtgeraet, an improvised rocket launcher
The enemy they now attacked included
of steel-supported wooden frames, capable of
as the principal combat element all four com-
firing two 200-pound, 36-inch projectiles at
panies of its 1st Battalion of the 111 th Pan- a time.
zer Grenadier Regiment (armored infantry
An indication of the relative importance
of the 11th Panzer Division), with a total
of Singling and Bining in the enemy's de-
strength three or four times as great as that
fensive plan is the fact that while a battalion
of the attacking American infantry. They
with tank and artillery support held Sing-
were supported by two "tanks" (probably
ling, the defense of Bining was entrusted to
SP's) of an unknown unit, by the five bat-
a single company (the 1st) of the 61 st Anti-
teries of the 119th Artillery Battalion (three
tank Battalion (11th Panzer Division). This
or four 105-mm howitzers), organic bat-
company had about 50 men and 8 old-type
I From 9 No vember to 6 December. the: company had received
12 8 replacements and had suffered 100 ~rcent o fficer casualties. 75-mm antitank guns mounted on Mark IV
Lieutenant Bdden took command 25 November but had been in the
company before; Padgett. Price, and Cowgill were all replacements
chassis, which a prisoner of war testified
who had joined the company 13 . 16, and 21 Novem ber rcspcctivd y. could not penetrate a Sherman tank from the

188
front at more than 600 yards. Near Bining, dismounted and advanced along the street
exact location undetermined, were one or ahead of his tank. Th", SP up to this point
possibly two companies of the 2d Battalion, was apparently unaware of them, though the
111 th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, whose commander's head was out of the turret.
presence was apparently unknown to the Padgett, Leach, Cowgill, and the two men
men of the 1st Battalion of that regiment. started firing to make him button up. Then
Probably at least a company of tanks was in the SP moved. It backed across the street to
the area, though no identifications were the church preparatory to heading west. In
made. Finally, the enemy was employing the meantime more infantry had come up
Marsch Battalion B-a collection of some from the south. When Lieutenant Belden ap-
250 overaged, crippled, or otherwise unfit pro'lched, the street was crowded. Annoyed,
personnel-as labor troops to dig defenses. he shouted at the men to clear off and fan
The enemy facing Jeam B was thus out into the houses on either side. His shout
stronger and better armed (particularly in was less effective than a burst of machine-gun
respect to heavy weapons) than the attackers. fire from the SP which followed the shout by
Nevertheless, before the battle was joined a matter of seconds. The. 1st Squad of the
some of the enemy troops had been warned 3d Platoon (Lieutenant Cowgill), which, for
by their own officers that they were facing the the first half hour or so that it remained to-
4th Armored Division, "one of the best divi- gether, was under command of Cpl. Ralph R.
sions in the American Army." This they had Harrington, ducked into houses on the west
a chance to discover for themselves in both side of the street. The 2d Squad, under Sgt.
Singling and Bining as the day wore on. John McPhail, retreated hastily into No. 45
Lieutenant Cowgill (3d Infantry Pla- on the east, and the street was nearly clear.
toon) with Pfc. John T. Stanton, his radio Belden could not see the SP. He stopped
operator acting this day as runner, came into a soldier to ask what they were getting ahead.
town ahead of his platoon. They made their The answer was: "Machine gun." "If it is
way nearly up to the main square before spot- a machine-gun nest," said Belden, "we'll
ting an enemy SP parked beside No. 44. The bring up a tank." In the mysterious path-
building, burning from shell fire, clouded the ways of rumor, this remark traveled rear-
square with thick smoke. Cowgill turned ward, lost its "if," and resulted in the order-
and shouted back a warning to the tanks not ing of the last tank under Sgt. Kenneth L.
to come up. Padgett with two men of his 1st Sandrock of the 1st Tank Platoon to clean
Squad was nearby. He had not waited to out an enemy machine-gun nest. Sandrock
assemble his platoon as they were trained to moved west from his platoon which had
watch him, when they dismounted, and to driven into the orchard east of town, fired
follow. This they did, though the 2d Squad pot shots at the church steeple on the chance
was actually held up most of the morning that it might be an enemy OP, went on up
by some house-cleaning (see below) . At the south street, and found no machine-gun
Cowgill's shouted warning, Captain Leach nest. Then, meeting Captain Leach, Sand-

189
 SINGLING MAIN SQUARE looking south at Hous< No.6. Vdicle,
belong to 12th Armored Division, which relieved 4th Armored. uoch's
lank was siud during th e day in the opening between houses.

rock drove his tank in behind No.6, where be wiser to attempt to get the escaping SP
he remained separated from his platoon the from the flank by moving the 3d Platoon
rest of the day. tanks through the west end of the town. He
In the meantime the enemy SP at the therefore had his own tank back between
square had completed its turning and headed buildings No.6 and No. 7, where he was
west along the main street. Leach co ntinued covered from the west and could command
to fire his tommy gun at it. But in so doing the square, and called Lieutenant Cook.
he blocked the line of fire of his own tank Cook's three tanks, his own, the one com-
behind him, and the SP escaped. Leach dip manded by Sgt. Giles W . Hayward, and the
not ·attempt to follow . H e had received the 105 -mm assault gun, commanded by Sgt.
report about a tank that had knocked ou t Robert G. Grimm, were advancing on the
Lieutenant Farese, and decided that it would town between the two southern trails. In

190
front of them the large farm building (No. Originally, Cook had no intention of staying
II) was on fire and clouds of smoke reduced there. He plan.ned to cross the road, then
visibility to the north to a few feet. Cook led work around to the west still intent on trap-
his tanks to the right of the burning farm ping the SP which he knew was somewhere
with the idea of cutting across the main on his left. He did not know that its gun
street in pursuit of the enemy SP. As they now commanded the street, and he would
approached, Pvt. Charles R. McCreer, Cook's have found out too late if Lieutenant Cowgill
loader, saw Farese get hit in the orchard to had not appeared at that moment to warn
his left. He may have informed Cook, or him.
may have assumed that Cook had seen it too. Cowgill's platoon had set out immedi-
In any case, Cook did not absorb the informa- ately after the escape of the SP from the
tion and made his next moves in ignorance square to move into the west side of town.
of the existence of enemy tanks on his left Cowgill, himself, with two men of his 1st
Rank. He drove his tank between the corner Squad (Harrington and Pvt. Grover C. Alex-
of the burning barn and the house north of ander), moved along the south side of the
it, No.9. Between these buildings, invisible street. (The other four men of the squad
in the smoke, was a low stone retaining wall stayed behind near No.7 from which later
and about a 2-foot drop into the walled gar- on they undertook an independent mission to
den in front of No. II . Hitting this unseen the north.) Cowgill, Harrington, and Alex-
barrier at a 45-degree angle, Cook's tank ander made their way to No. 10 and from
teetered dangerously on its left tread. For a there could see two German SP's parked on
moment it threatened to overturn, then lum- either side of the street 200 yards to the west.
bered on, righting itself. Grimm and Hay- It was then that Cowgill, coming around No.
ward, following, had little trouble as the first 10 into the garden into which Cook's tanks
tank had broken down the bank. had just driven, found Cook and warned him
The garden in which the three tanks of the enemy. Cowgill said, "There is a
found themselves was inclosed on the north Kraut tank behind the third building down
and west by a 4-foot concreted stone wall, to the west." Cook got the impression that
stepped up to 6 feet high around the north- the "tank" was located behind a house which
west corner. Despite this inclosure, they felt, he could see on the north side of the street.
on emerging from the smoke pall, as naked He therefore had his tank and Grimm's 105
as if they had suddenly come up on a sky- chop down the corner of the wall in front of
line. In fact, their position was seriously ex- them. This fire probably nettled the enemy
posed from the north, for the continuous into replying, and a round of 75-mm struck
slope of the ground northward for several the northwest corner of No. 10 not far from
hundred yards canceled out the wall as a where Cowgill was standing. Cook dis-
screen. Immediately across the street were mounted and with Cowgill walked around
two smaller gardens with low stone walls, to the east side of the building which had
and a dirt trail leading down into the valley. been hit.

191
 In the meantime the 2d Squad of Cow- the front door of No. 28 and made a dash to
gill's platoon under Sergeant McPhail had the schoolhouse. A third man tried to follow
moved on from No. 45 into which the SP's but ducked back when machine-gun bullets
machine gun at the square had driven them. spattered in the front yard. Then and for
Satisfied that there were no enemy in No.4 5, the rest of the day, No. 28 was under direct
the seven men crossed the square and entered fire from the enemy tanks on the west.
No. 28, a handsome low-Lying stone house McPhail and Todd reached the school; the
set back from the street and surrounded by rest of the squad stayed in No. 28. Lieuten-
a 2-foot wall, surmounted by an iron railing. ant Cowgill, standing on the other side of
In this house McPhail and his men discov- the street, shou ted across to ask McPhail
ered twelve civilians sheltering in the cellar. whether he could see the enemy SP's. He
A few minutes were consumed in searching could. Cowgill ordered him to fire. Lieu-
them, then the squad set out to continue the ant Cook, having seen the true location of the
sweep of the north side of the street. McPhail SP's, returned to his tank and backed it into
and Tech. 4 Ben A. Todd emerged through an alley between No.9 and No. 10, just wide

GARDEN ill which Third Platoon tanks took up firing positions .

The destroyed portion of the wall (anta) ttltl'S chopped down by Sgt.
Grimm's lOS-howitur. Lt. Cowgill's men fired bazookas from the
attic 01 the house on the ft.!t, through thl' gapJ in tht' roof lilt'J',

192
 MAIN STREET IN SING LI NG, showing the schoolhouse (o ppo-
sit~ H ouu No.8) and looking northwest, where the road curves .

enough to let him through. He told Grimm the layout of the town and of the enemy
and Hayward about the enemy SP's, asked position. This Lieutenant Cowgill set out to
Grimm whether he thought he could get out remedy and, while Cook maneuvered his
of the garden if necessary, and Grimm tanks, Cowgill and his two men started on
thought he could. Cook then called Captain a devious exploratory journey through the
Leach and asked whether tanks could be sent houses to the west.
around to hit the enemy guns from the south- At the same time McPhail and Todd,
west. Leach radioed orders to Sowers (2d who had fired a few rounds at the SP's, dis-
Tank Platoon) to try to go through the covered what seemed to them more profitable
burning barn (No. 11) and find a way to targets in enemy infantry in the valley to
attack the SP's. Sowers tried, but got only a the north. This enemy was also occupying
few yards. Just beyond the wall, the nose of the attention of two other groups of men in
his tank, exposed through the gate to the town. The four men of Cowgill's 1st Squad
west, was shot at. Convinced that advance (Pvt. Joseph C. Bridges, Pvt. William M.
was impossible, Sowers returned to the or- Convery, Pfc. Frank M. O. Asplund, and
chard. pfc. L. W . Battles) who had stayed at the
Every attempt to deal with the enemy square when the squad leader, Harring-
so far had been made in ignorance both of ton, had accompanied Lieutenant Cowgill,

193
spotted 15-18 Germans near a pillbox in the over No. 35. Price with the rest of his pla-
valley. They crossed the street, took up fir- toon crossed the street to the back of the
ing positions in the yard of No. 28, and shot church, moved along the hard-surfaced alley-
into the Germans. They thought two were way between the church and No. 35. Posting
hit before the group dispersed. They con- Pvts. Rudolph Aguilar and Randall S.
tinued to fire until an officer across the street Brownrigg at the northeast corner to watch
by the church shouted at them to stop. in that direction, Price and four men fol-
The officer was Lieutenant Price (1 st lowed the alley around the north side of the
Platoon), whose men had come last into town church. At the corner they could see the
because they had stopped at two small pill- Germans at the pillbox who had already been
boxes south of Singling to take and disarm spotted by the four 3d Platoon men. A burp
11 unresisting Germans. Although Price's gun was firing from somewhere to the north-
mission had been to occupy the east end of west. The steep drop of the Singling ridge to
town, when he arrived at the square he could the north made it possible for Price's men to
see Lieutenant Padgett's (2d Platoon) men return fire over the roofs of the houses back
already moving along the houses to the east. of No. 28.
Lieutenant Cowgill's men were on the west. Under cover of this Lieutenant Price and
Price decided to go north. Tech/ Sgt. Lovell Sgt. Elmer White planned to work their way
P. Mitchell with four men cleaned out the into the valley behind the northeast row of
houses on the southeast corner of the square houses. But they were checked at the outset
while S/ Sgt. John Sayers and six men took by a heavy wire fence which, hooked to the

194
 VIEW NORTHEAST FROM SINGLING toward ridg. wh ....
Magino! Line de/ensu were. German lonks were sun on ridge during
th e battle. An artillay observer had OP on roo/ 0/ this houu (No. 33 ).

yards to the north, more to register the range

of the skyline on wl:ich German tanks were
likely to appear than to engage specific tar-
gets. The total effect, however, was to throw
a large volume of fire in the direction of a
handful of enemy, and shortly Lieutenant
Price saw white cloths wave from the pillbox.
It was then tha t he ordered the men across
the street to cease fire. Twel ve Germans
walked up the hill and surrendered to Price.
One who spoke some English reported that
there were five more in the valley who were
anxious to surrender but were afraid to come
corners of No. 34 and No. 35, inclosed the out. After all the Germans had been dis-
alleywa y. I t was a t least six feet high and armed, Price sent one back down the hill to
too exposed to enemy observation to be corral his comrades.
scaled. It would have to be cut. The platoon At that moment, however, a volley of
wirecutters, however, had been entrusted to enemy mortar and artillery struck the square.
a man who two days before had been evacu- One shell hit No. 34 and Sergeant White in-
ated, taking the cutters with him. White went side was wounded in the head by fragments
into No. 34 to look for tools. While he was and wood splinters. Sayers and Pvt. Randall
in there, the Germans in the valley were get- S. Brownrigg outside and Cpt. Frank B. Mc-
ting ready to give up. They were encouraged Elwee in No. 43 were slightly wounded.
in this not only by the co ntinuing small-arms Price and his men ducked back from the al-
fire of Price's men and the four men of the ley, and began occupying houses on the
3d Platoon, but also by machine-gu n and HE square where they were to remain all day.
fire from Lieutenant Cook's tanks. Ser- Although Price believed that enemy held
geant Grimm started it by dispatching a lone the houses to the north, he decided not to
German a few hundred yards away with 100 attack them, because by advancing north he
munds of .30-cal. Minutes later, Grimm saw would move out of contact with the platoons
six Germans jump up and run into the valley on his Ranks. No more wa-s seen of the Ger-
pillbox. In his own words, he "closed the man emissary or the five volunteers for cap-
door for them with HE." All three tanks ture. The 11 still in the possession of the 1st
also periodically fired HE at the ridge 1,200 Platoon were sent down the road south. Just

195
as these started off, two more walked up the four tanks of the I st Platoon (Lieutenant
hill to the schoolhouse and surrendered to Goble) which pulled into position in the or-
McPhail and Todd. McPhail escorted these chard opposite No. 39 about the same time
two across the square to the street south. that Padgett arrived there. The enemy armor,
There, seeing Price's II walking down the though threatening, was still too far away for
street, he motioned to his 2 to fall in with direct action. Padgett sent his runner to re-
them, and, himself, returned to the school. port the situation to Lieutenant Belden and
He and Todd then climbed to the second also to find the 2d Squad of his own platoon
story, and resumed the business of shooting and bring them up. When the runner failed
enemy in the valley. The four men of the 1st to return in what seemed to Padgett a reason-
Squad decided then to go down to the pillbox able time, he sent out another man, Pvt.
to get whatever Germans might still be in it. Lonnie G. Blevins, on the same mission.
They found none, but did draw machine- Blevins left on his run under the impres-
gun fire from the direction of Welschoff sion that the infantry company CP was at No.
Farm. Battles was wounded in the leg and 3 where it had first been set up by Belden on
the squad was pinned in place for several entering the town. Actually Belden had
hours. stayed in that house less than half an hour,
From the east end of town, Lieutenant only long enough to set up the radio and
Padgett (2d Infantry Platoon) had also seen notify the 51 st Infantry Battalion that he was
the enemy infantry in the valley, but he had in town. He then moved to No. 28. Blevins
seen two other things which worried him far reached No. 44, where he met a man of
more-a rocket launcher (wurtg~raet) fir- Price's platoon and was warned not to cross
ing from about 800 yards west of Welschoff the square which enemy guns to the west cov-
Farm, and seven enemy tanks on a ridge ered. Blevins went around No. 44 and on up
northeast. Padgett was in No. 39, which he the road south to No.3. Finding no one, he
had reached with his I st Squad without diffi- returned along the west side of the street and
culty after going through the three small got as far as No.5. A tanker, one of Sand-
houses to the west. These houses were occu- rock's or the forward observer's crew, way-
pied only by a few scared civilians who were laid Blevins and told him to take charge of
rounded up and sheltered in No. 39. House a prisoner who had just walked up to the
No. 39 was a fine place to be. Outwardly tank and surrendered. At No.7 Blevins with
just another farm house, it was actually a his prisoner met Battles who had not yet
fortress, with walls of 3-foot concrete rein- started for the valley pillbox. Battles took
forced with steel girders. Nevertheless, Pad- temporary charge of the prisoner while Blev-
gett was still worried. Protection enough ins dashed through a burst of machine-gun
from artillery and the wurtgeraet (which fire across to No. 28. In a few minutes he re-
Padgett decided was shooting short anyway), appeared in the door and motioned to Battles
the house would not be of much avail against to send the prisoner over. Half his mission
the enemy tanks. More reassuring were the accomplished, Blevins still had to find the 2d

196
Squad. By luck he met them near No. +4 dislodged plaster but there were no other
and delivered his message to Pfc. Phillip E. casualties. The fire had quite possibly been
Scharz in charge. drawn from one of the enemy SP's by the
Scharz's squad had already with little recent activity in the street. In any case the
effort accomplished one of the most notable shot decided Cannon to go west to where the
successes of the day. Investigating the south- SP's were and "get a closer look." He invited
ernmost house of town, which the rest of the McPhail who had just come over from the
infantry, entering between No.2 and No.3, school to go along. The two set out, taking
had bypassed, they found a Frenchman and almost exactly the route tllat Lieutenant Cow-
asked whether there were any Germans in- gill, unknown to them, had already followed
side. He shook his head, but Scharz's men, twice.
noticing a radio antenna thrusting out of a Sergeant Grimm had started Cowgill on
cellar window, were suspicious. Four of them his first journey from the garden, which the
surrounded the house, and Scharz and Pfc. 3d Platoon tanks occupied, by blasting open
Lewis R. Dennis went in. In the cellar they the door of No. 12 with a burst of .50-cal.
found 28 German enlisted men and 2 offi- Cowgill and his two men entered and
cers. None offered any resistance. They were climbed to the attic. They found that, al-
frisked and evacuated. A search of the house though they could see the two enemy SP's
then revealed large stores of small arms and through the damaged tiling on the roof, they
ammunition. When the squad emerged, they could not see beyond. They continued ex-
met on the road the 13 prisoners sent back by ploration westward. For one reason or an-
Lieutenant Price and McPhail. Having dis- other they were unable to reach the roofs of
covered enemy in one house, they searched the next three buildings. In the last (No. 17)
with slow caution the others along the street, they found their progress blocked by the lack
and so aaived late at the square where Blev- of openings of any kind in the west wall.
ins found them. They backtracked through the courtyard be-
When Blevins had completed his mis- tween No. 16 and No. 15 and then walked
sion of telling Sch~rz to take his squad east, through an opening in the south wall out into
the enemy artillery and mortar which had a garden-orchard walled with concreted stone
wounded four of Price's men was falling like all the Singling gardens. They crawled
around the church. Blevins crossed the street to a gap in the wall and found themselves
to No.7 to "see Battles." With Battles now within spitting distance of the two SP's.
was 1st Sgt. Dellas B. Cannon who was on Beyond, in an arc or line not more than 200
his way to the CPo Cannon sprinted across yards distant, they saw the outlines of three
to No. 28; Blevins followed, and tllen enemy tanks. They returned at once to Lieu-
worked east back to No. 39. tenant Cook's position to report. Cowgill sent
Cannon had not been in the CP long word to Lieutenant Belden that there were
before a round of 75-mm hit the building. "five enemy tanks on the west" and then he
Pfc. John E. Tsinetakes was scratched by took Lieutenant Cook back to the OP at the

197
 COURTYARD and manure pile Jor H ouses 8, 9, and 10, where Lt.
Cook parked his tank . Vietv north . Note heavy stone construct jon.

wall. Harrington and Alexander were left at for the observer, 1st Lt. Donald E. Guild.
No. 12, which Cowgill decided was the most Guild was at the infantry company CP with
suitable spot he had seen for his platoon head- Lieutenant Belden and Captain Leach. When
quarters. Cook joined them, the four officers discussed
When Cook returned from his recon- the problem. Lieutenant Guild felt that ar-
naissance, he was impressed with both the tillery could not be brought down without
strength of the German position and the diffi- unduly endangering friendly troops. Mortar
culty of dislodging them. Their command fire would be fine, but the infantry had
of the main street and of the nose of the ridge brought no mortars because they had too few
west of town made it impossible for tanks to men to man them and carry ammunition.
attack them. Artillery seemed, despite the The mortar squad, down to three men, were
proximity of our own troops, the most logi- armed with a bazooka. Lieutenant Cook
cal answer, and Cook therefore went to look suggested that the street might be smoked

198
 OPEN YARD in foreground is where Hayward and Gn'mm were:
parked. Lt. Cook backd hi; tank into alley ;hown blocked by truck.

with grenades and the tank mortars. Behind would take the SP about two minutes to ele-
that screen the tanks tuight cross the street vatl; its gun to fire, and that was considered
and attack the enemy from the northeast. ample time to launch the rockets and move
Actually he felt that the smoke alone would out. Belden sent Pfc. Kenneth L. Bangert
be enough to force the SP's to withdraw. The and Pvt. Frank LeDuc down to Cowgill with
proposal was not seriously considered because the headquarteq bazooka. Headquarters
Captain Leach preferred to try the infantry runner, Pfc. Melvin P. Flynn, went over to
bazookas. This was the decision, and the job No.7 occupied by seven men of the machine-
was given to Lieutenant Cowgill. gun and mortar squads. His message ap-
He sent back to ask Belden for a ba- parently was, "Lieutenant Cowgill wants
zooka, and riRemen to protect it. His plan some riRemen to protect his bazookamen."
was to shoot at the Germans from the attic What happened was that Sj Sgt. John W.
of his CPo Lieutenant Guild advised that it Herring, the two men of his mortar squad

199
who carried the second bazooka of the com- north were observed moving east; prepared
pany, and S/ Sgt. Patrick H. Dennis, leader artillery concentrations were laid on the
of the machine-gun squad, went down to No. town; the enemy on the west renewed his
12; the other three men of the machine-gun interest in our tanks in that sector (2d Pla-
squad remained all the rest of the day at No. toon); and f1nally tanks came into the east
7 where, having no field of fire, they were side of town.
unable to set up their gun. The enemy tanks (three to five) mov-
ing on the north apparently along a road
Stalemate in Singling were spotted and reported by Sergeant
Grimm, but as the range was extreme he did
While Cowgill's men got ready to attack not fire. Furthermore, Grimm's gun was
the German tanks on the west, a series of trained through the gap in the wall to the
incidents occurred to suggest that enemy ar- northwest against the SP threat. Sergeant
mor might be forming on the north for a Hayward had adjusted on the north ridge
counterattack on Singling. Tanks to the and Grimm left that zone of fire to him.

HAUPTMAN'S DESTROYED TANK in orchard south 0/ Houses II

and J3. Most of damage was done by Germans who set fire to the tank
be/ore our forces retired from Singling during evening of 6 December.

200
Lieutenant Cook moved his tank into the to whom Hauptman reported his loss in the
courtyard of the cluster of buildings (No. temporary absence of Captain Leach, or-
S-No. 10) where he could observe north. dered Sowers and Parks (the remaining tanks
Suddenly just west of town a white signal of the 2d Platoon) to get their tanks into
flare shot upward. Almost immediately a shelter. Both drove up behind tlle 3d Platoon
short, intense artillery concentration rocked in the lee of No. [[.
the town. Mixed with shells of light or me- They were moving when Grimm casu-
dium caliber were some rockets and some ally ulrned his field glasses to a pillbox on
mortar. The tankers' later estimate was that the ridge [,200 yards north where he had
the fire was about equivalent to a battalion seen a few enemy infantry minutes previ-
concentration of nve-minute duration, that ously. He got his glasses on the spot just in
at times as many as 20 shells hit in the same time to see the long gun tube of the German
instant. tank's 75 flame and fire directly at him.
In the 2d Tank Platoon sector the shell- The round hit nearby, and Grimm had a
ing followed by only a few minutes an inci- split second to decide whether to shoot back
dent to which the tankers paid little attention or run for it. He figured that his [05 with-
at the time. A dismounted German suddenly out power traverse could not be laid in less
appeared on the ,rise in front of them and than 20 seconds. That was too long. He
walked across the orchard less than 50 yards threw his tank in gear and backed out of
away. Before the tanks could adjust nre on the garden. He had just started when a sec-
him, he had gone. The intense shelling, ond round hit Hayward's tank on the
which started almost immediately, forced sprocket, crippling it. In the next few sec-
the tanks to back a few yards to a cabbage onds Hayward was hit four times and the
patch beside the orchard trail. When the ar- tank began to burn. Gunner Cpt. Angelo
tillery nre broke off, they stayed where they Ginoli and the bowgunner Pvt. John H. Fur-
were, and there by a curious freak Sergeant low were killed; Hayward and his loader,
Haupunan a few minutes later lost his tank. Pfc. Vern L. Thomas, were wounded. Grimm
A German AP shell hit the crest of the rise made good his escape through the opening
100 yards in front of him, ricocheted off the between No. 9 and No. [[. Outside, the
ground, and plowed into the right side of tank bogged down in the heavy mud, and
Hauptman's turret. His loader, Pfc. William the crew evacuated while Grimm got Sow-
J. McVicker, was killed. If the German ers to pull him out.
tanks west of town aimed that shell to carom The 2d and 3d Platoons, Sergeant Sand-
into the tanks parked where they had been rock of the I st Platoon, the command and
observed by the lone infantryman, the accu- the artillery observer's tanks were now all
racy of this shot was most remarkable. The bunched and immobilized in the area south-
reaction of the tankers at the time, how- west of the square which, covered on three
ever, was that they were still not defiladed sides by buildings, was the only relatively
from the enemy northwest. Lieutenant Cook, safe place in town for tanks. It was becoming

201
 FITZGERALD'S FIRING POSITION, looking north from road
between Houses 37 and 38. The Mark V lank destroyed by Fitz-
guaid is in almost the exact center of the fields beyond the road.

increasingly apparent to both infantry and ring needless casualties. Lieutenant Price,
tanks that, with the small forces at their dis- after having four men lightly wounded by
posal and against an enemy who had at least artillery, gave strict orders to his platoon to
equal strength and every terrain advantage, stay inside unless tlle Germans counterat-
they could not hope to secure their position tacked. Lieutenant Padgett's men holed up
in town by attack. They had, instead, to in the cellar of their fortress house and the
make such dispositions as would complement lieutenant himself found a bed which, as long
the enemy's stalemate and wait it out. They as there was no place to go, he made hi s per-
were expecting momentarily relief by units sonal headquarters.
of Combat Command B. Colonel Abrams While the enemy tanks, however, on the
had already called Captain Leach to tell him north still threatened to attack, Padgett was
the relieving companies were on their way. very busy trying to find ways to deal with
In the meantime there was no point in incur- them. He sent his flinn er, Blevins, across

202
the street to warn the 1st Platoon tanks (Lieu- had already spotted the enemy tanks himself
tenant Goble) in the orchard. (Goble's vision from the roof of his OP, No. 33, and had
to the northeast was obstructed by a 6-7 informed Captain Leach. Leach took the
foot bush and apple-tree hedge, and by warning personally to Lieutenant Goble.
houses and brush on the north side of the Goble, figuring that if the Germans attacked
road.) Lieutenant Padgett himself then set they would come either down the road or in
out to find the artillery observer to see back of the houses opposite, had Sgt. Robert
whether a concentration could not be put on G. Fitzgerald on the right move his tank
the enemy to discourage if not destroy him. down dIe hill to within 15 yards of the edge
H e tried four times to walk down the street of the road, where he could observe better to
to the company CP; three times he was the northeast. Fitzgerald kept his gun sights
turned back by spurts of machi ne-gun bul- at 1,+00 yards, the range to the northerly
lets on the west side of No. 37. The fourth ridge where the enemy was reported. The
time he got through to report to Lieutenant first tank to appear, however, drew up be-
Belden, but he could not find Lieutenant tween No. 37 and No. 38 less than 150
Guild. It was late in the afternoon when yards away, heading toward the church. The
Padgett returned to his own CPo enemy Mark V and Fitzgerald saw each
While Padgett had been trying to get other at about the same time, but neither
to Belden, Lieutenant Guild, the observer, could immediately fire. While the enemy

MARK V TANK destroyed by {ir< from F;t zgcrald's tank . Enemy

tank is headed southwest, and the g un has not started to swivel
.'omhu)(lrd to engage Fitzgerald. Note broken track, front bogie.

203
 LT. GOBLE'S TANK, sholl/ing the hoLes made by enemy sheLLs.

started to traverse his turret, Fitzgerald tank, but before he could adjust his sights the
brought his gun down. He shot first and, at German fired smoke and in a few seconds dis-
point-blank range, put the first round into appeared as effectively as an octopus behind its
the Mark V, setting it on fire. One man self-made cloud and escaped. Rockets then be-
jumped out and ran behind one of the houses. gan to fall close to Fitzgerald's tank. Whether
Fitzgerald fired two more rounds into the this was aimed fire from the battery near
burning tank. Welschoff Farm or simply a part of the mis-
Later, on warning by Lieutenant Pad- cellaneous area concentration on the town,
gett's infantry that more enemy tanks were Fitzgerald did not stay to find out. He retired
approaching from the northeast, he drove his westward to the concealment of the hedge,
tank through the hedge and east along the and there, leaving his tank,. crossed with
road almost to the bend where observation Lieutenant Goble to Padgett's CPo From the
north and east was clear. He saw an enemy house they could see a Mark V in the valley

204
northeast, apparently parked with its gun tlle tanks were. Directed south ward, they
covering the road east, facing, that is, at right eventually came on Sergeant Sowers' tank
angles to the tankers' observation. Fitzgerald and got inside.
went back to try a shot at it. Again he moved As soon as Lieutenant Goble was hit,
his tank east, getting a sight on the enemy Sj Sgt. John J. Fitzpatrick took command of
between two trees. The second round was a the platoon and ordered them to back over
hit; one more fired the tank. He then shot the ridge behind them into defilade from the
a round or two at another Mark V facing enemy north. As they backed, a round of
him about 800 yards away, at which Sgt. HE exploded in front of Del Vecchio's tank,
Emil Del Vecchio on the hill behind him splattering it with fragments. The enemy
was also firing. Both 75-mm and 76.2-mm continued to fire at Goble's tank, but the
shells, however, bounced off the front armor others reached the cover of the hill without
plate of the enemy. Fitzgerald decided to loss.
move back to his hedge. Back in No. 39 On the other side of town Lieutenant
again he saw an enemy SP moving east in Cowgill's bazookas in the attic of No. 12
the vicinity of Welschoff Farm. were getting ready to fire at one enemy SP.
Rather than risk exposing his tank again (One of the two guns in the street had with-
by moving it out to the east, Fitzgerald de- drawn by this time.) In the garden east of
cided to wait until the SP came around be- No. 12 Sergeant Hayward's tank was burn-
hind the farm and emerged into his field of ing. McPhail, leader of the 2d Squad, and
fire. But the SP did not emerge. Whether, Company I st Sergeant Cannon were on their
concealed among the farm buildings, it fired way westward to have a look at the SP's, un-
into the I st Platoon tanks cannot certainly be aware that the reconnaissance had already
determined. But in any case, a short while been made and action taken as a result of it.
after it had disappeared, two rounds of AP They sprinted past the burning tank, picked
hit Lieutenant Goble's tank in quick succes- up Harrington at the chapel, and followed
sion. The first round set it on fire and Lieutenant Cowgill's previous route to the
wounded Goble and his gunner, Cpt. Ther- wall beside No. 17. Through the same gap
man E. Hale. The second round penetrated Cowgill had used to observe, the three men
the turret, then apparently richocheted inside fired at Germans standing near the tanks and
until its momentum was spent, and finally pillboxes. They hi t one who rolled down the
landed in the lap of the driver, Tech. 5 John slope. After half a dozen rounds, they moved
J. Nelsen. Nelsen dropped the hot shell, back. Cannon and Harrington went to the
scrambled out, and with the loader, Pvt. Jo- basement of No. 12, where they found Sj Sgt.
seph P. Cocchiara, ran from the burning Patrick H. Dennis and Sj Sgt. Harold A.
tank. In the excitement they headed the Hollands, both with rifles, preparing to cover
wrong way and high-tailed up the main street from the basement windows the bazooka-
into the center of town. There they paused men, then getting set to fire through the roof.
long enough to ask some infantrymen where One of the two bazookas with old-type firing

205
mechanism failed to go off. From the other, tive- and without a fight." Despite constant
the three men in the attic launched five fire from the direction of Singling, the re-
rounds in turn at the SP. Only the last hit, lieving units henceforth acted on the assump-
and it did no more than knock a fragment tion tha t the town was clear.
off the right side of the turret. It did, how- Major Irzyk decided to send Company
ever, cause the crew to jump out, and two C of his battalion in with Company B of the
were shot by the four men in the basemen t. 10th Armored Infantry Battalion. The in-
Hardly had this happened when a Mark V fantry had been in assembly area 3,000 yards
drew up alongside the damaged SP and sent south of Singling for more than an hour; the
a round crashing into the side of No. 12. At tanks were moving up when orders reached
about the same time another shell from the the commander of Company C, 1st Lt. Wil-
north struck the building at its foundations, liam J. Marshall. The orders were to pick
showering the men in the cellar wi th plaster. up the infantry, go into Singling, contact the
It was a narrow escape on both scores, but commanding officer of the tank company in
no one was hurt. Cowgill moved his men to town, and take over the outposting with in-
No. 13, which turned out to be another of fantry and tanks. In addition to the outposts,
Singling's thick-walled fortress-farms. Here patrols were to be sent out north. Marshall
the 3d Platoon sat out the second of the en- was instructed to enter town "as the other
emy's short, sharp artillery concentrations, unit had done." With some of the 35-40
which scored three hits on the building but men of Company B of the 10th mounted on
did little damage, all his tanks, Marshall set off to carry out
these instructions exactly, as his tanks moved
Relief of Team B in at about 1400 following the tracks of
Company B, 37th Tank Battalion.
It was now getting late in the afternoon, At the south edge of town the I st Tank
and still the relief scheduled to take place Platoon (2d Lt. George Gray), in the lead,
an hour or more earlier had not been accom- turned northwest following the approach
plished. It was shortly past noon that Colo- route of Lieutenant Farese. Farese's two
nel Abrams had been ordered by Brig. Gen. knocked-Dut tanks were, of course, still where
Herbert L. Earnest, Combat Command A, they had been hit. Although Lieutenant Gray
to turn over Singling to Combat Command remarked that the tank hatches were open
B and get ready to move on his own objective, and there was no sign of the crew, he did not
Bining and Rohrbach. On information that suspect that the tanks were out of action. Ap-
his tanks and infantry were in town, Colonel proaching the corner of the wall at No. 14, he
Abrams told Maj. Albin F. Irzyk, command- saw ahead of him near the road a tank which
ing officer, 8th Tank Battalion, in the pres- he assumed to be American since he believed
ence of Major Alanis, commanding offi cer, no enemy were in town. When, therefore,
5 I st Armored Infantry Battalion, that he Lieu tenant Marshall called to ask how he
was "ready to turn over to them their objec- was making out, he replied, "OK, as soon as

206
I get around this corner." Then he was hit ant Lange sent a noncommissioned officer to
by two rounds of AP. The gunner, Cpl. meet his platoon leaders, inform them of the
Tauno H . Aro, was killed. Gray, seriously decision, and guide them into town, Captain
wounded, was evacuated to Lieutenant Cow- Leach went to look for Lieutenant Marshall
gill's CP at No. 13, arriving there just as and arrange for the relief of his tanks.
McPhail, Cannon, and Harrington returned The afternoon was wearing on and
from their reconnaissance trip to the west Colonel Abrams began to worry; he wanted
wall. to pull his tanks out of Singling as soon as
As soon as Gray was hit, Lieutenant possible. He called Captain Leach to find out
Marshall ordered the 2d Platoon (S/Sgt. Ed- how the relief was progressing. In Captain
win J. De Rosia) to move east and try to circle Leach's absence Lieutenant Cook took the
behind the enemy tank that had knocked out call and made a report which could not have
Gray. De Rosia, however, had not moved been very reassuring. He said that there were
far when he reported enemy direct fire from five enemy tanks west of the town and
north and east which he could not exactly that from three to five more had been ob-
locate. Marshall then ordered all tanks to served moving down the ridge to their front.
withdraw to the reverse slope of the ridge He said that one enemy tank had been
south of town. Except the men who had been knocked out by the 1st Platoon on the right.
riding Gray's tank and who dismounted He detailed the disposition of his platoons
when the tank was hit to assemble near No. and reported that they were receiving heavy
49, the infantry remained on the decks of enemy artillery fire and that the enemy was
the tanks when they withdrew. 1st Lt. Rob- laying a smoke screen on the north. (Lieu-
ert F. Lange, commanding officer of Com- tenant Cook did not know at the time that
pany B, 10th Armored Infantry Battalion, this was put down by the Mark V to cover
went into town to make contact with Lieu- its escape from Fitzgerald's fire; he believed
tenant Belden. At the same time Lieutenant that it might herald a German counterat-
Marshall returned with his tank to the 8th tack.) He told Colonel Abrams that the 51st
Tank Battalion to consult with Major Irzyk. Infantry was still outposting the town and
Lange found Captain Leach in a tank that the 10th Infantry was in process of re-
outside of town and together they went to lieving them. He added that he was not in
No. 28 to talk with Lieutenant Belden. The contact with the infantry's commanding offi-
decision agreed on by the three commanders cer; that he had not yet heard from Captain
was to relieve Lieutenant Cowgill and Lieu- Leach who was conferring with Lieutenant
tenant Padgett in place; Lieutenant Price was Marshall.
to be withdrawn first from the center of tow~ Colonel Abrams called back a little later
without relief. Company B of the 10th Ar- and told Cook to organize the company
mored Infantry Battalion had organized its tanks, pick up the 5.1 st Infantry, and move
handful of men into 2 platoons; about 15 out immediately whether he found Captain
men in one, 18 in the other. While Lieuten- Leach or not. Cook notified all tanks to

207
prepare for immediate withdrawal. In fact, available at battalion, as Lieutenant Cook as-
however, the withdrawal was delayed about certained early in the afternoon when he
half an hour to allow the relieving infantry called just after Sergeant Hayward was hit.
to consolidate their positions. Some wounded nevertheless remained to be
Lieutenant Lange made few changes in evacuated by the withdrawing infantry. Cow-
Lieutenant Belden's dispositions, except to post gill and Padgett led their men to the street
most of his men outside the buildings to guard south to a rendezvous with the tanks in the
against enemy infiltration during the night. vicinity of No.3. Price, who did not have
He established his CP at No. 45 to get away to wait for relief, moved his men out first
from the direct fire that had been harassing and met the tanks outside town beside the
No. 28 all day. two pillboxes that had been cleaned out by
Captain Leach, in the meantime, had Padgett's 2d Squad that morning. Here they
arrived at the Company C, 8th Tank Bat- picked up the last prisoner of the day, a
talion position in the absence of Lieutenant sleepy German who had to be prodded into
Marshall, but was able to talk to Marshall surrender. He was lying on the ground
over Sergeant De Rosia's radio. Leach re- swathed in a belt of .50-cal. ammunition and
ported the situation in Singling as follows: evinced no interest in his capture.
he said there were four enemy SP's in town, It was already getting dark when Cook
but he thought one had been knocked out by moved his tanks out. They collected the in-
a bazooka; some enemy infantry occupied fantry as arranged, and found Captain Leach
the northern part of the town (Lieutenant with Lieutenant Marshall about 400 yards
Lange, who put outposts to the north later, south of town. As the 2d and 3d Platoon
reported no enemy there); a Panther tank tanks moved out together and the 1st Platoon
to the northeast of town had fired on our on the right headed back to join them fur-
tanks when they exposed themselves in that ther south, another heavy enemy artillery
direction. Leach then asked Marshall how concentration fell among them, but by a
long it would be before the latter relieved miracle caused only one light casualty, Pvt.
him. Marshall, who had just been ordered Genar W. Ferguson, 2d Infantry Platoon,
by Major Irzyk to stay put, replied that he who was hit in the leg To cover the with-
would not come into town "until my orders drawal, all tanks swiveled their guns north
are changed." and fired back into Singling. The enemy
This change in plan was not known to tanks replied and the AP tracers streaked
the infantry in town, who were completing through the gathering darkness. Two rounds
the relief as scheduled. Most of the wounded landed within a few feet of Sergeant Del
had already been evacuated earlier on Ser- Vecchio's tank before the fire fight was taken
geant Morphew's tank, which due to radio up by Lieutenant Marshall's tanks and the
failure had not been in action but was enemy shifted his attention to them.
brought up expressly to take the wounded After Captain Leach's tanks had pulled
back. No regular evacuation vehicles were out, the relief infantry company in Singling

208
remained more than three hours without di- plan was to send one platoon of tanks in to
rect tank support. During this time the en- support the infantry, he reversed his decision
emy on the west crept up to the two destroyed after talking to Lange. He was already
tanks of Farese's platoon and started the bat- doubtful, because he could see no very good
tery chargers. It may be that they were going reason for holding the town when the enemy
to attempt to drive the tanks away. When occupied all the high ground north and east.
the infantry outposts at No. 14 heard the en- Lange reported that with less than 50 men
gines, they believed them to be relieving at his disposal he had had to outpost very
tanks which they were expecting. 2d Lt. thinly and that it would be easy for the enemy
Robert J. Victor, commanding the platoon to probe out these outposts during the night
which took over Lieutenant Cowgill's sector, and infiltrate through his whole position.
went out with one of his squad leaders to Major Irzyk was also impressed by an inci-
investigate. He approached one of the tanks dent which Lange related. An hour or so
to within 25 feet, then stopped. The silhou- earlier (it was now about 2000) the east pla-
ette of the three figures on top of the tank toon under 2d Lt. James W. Leach, had shot
made him suspicious; their overcoats were too up and captured a German kitchen trllck
long, their helmets too sharply beaked. As which they waylaid at the town square. The
Victor and his sergeant had only one carbine, truck was carrying hot soup, estimated to be
they returned to the CP to pick up weapons enough to feed at least a company. Major
and another man. Approaching the tank the Irzyk, taking this to indicate that the enemy
second time, they were fired on by a burp in at least that strength still held the outskirts
gun, which they answered with rifle fire and of town, west and north, figured that the
grenades. The enemy retreated but later in presence of our own troops in the center of
the night, returned to set fire to the tanks. town would only obstruct the use of artillery
Lieutenant Lange, in the meantime, against the Germans.
worried about his thinly outposted positions Major Irzyk therefore gave the order to
in town, had gone out to see Lieutenant Mar- withdraw from Singling. To cover the with-
shall and, as he said, " try to move the tanks drawal, Sergeant De Rosia jockeyed his tanks
in personally." As Lieutenant Marshall had back and forth on the reverse slope of the hill
been called back shortly after dark to bat- to make the enemy believe that they were en-
talion by Major Irzyk, commanding the 8th tering town. The infantry assembled in about
Tank Battalion, Lieutenant Lange found an hour near No. 47 and moved back to the
Sergeant De Rosia temporarily in command. tank positions 400 yards to the south. They
Major Irzyk and Capt. Abraham J. Baum, dug in and outposted the tanks for the night.
S-3 of the lOth Armored Infantry Battalion, During the few hours they had been in Sing-
were also in the company area at the time. ling they had suffered five light casualties
The question of whether to attempt to from enemy mortar fire.
hold in the town for the night or withdraw Within five minutes of the infantry re-
was discussed. Although Major Irzyk's first port that Singling was clear of friendly

209
troops, corps artillery put a heavy TOT 1 on 12th Armored Division actuall y took place
the town. The next day (7 December ) tanks that night. Singling was fin ally taken on 10
and infantry moved back up to just short of December.
the crest of the Singling ridge, but they were The fin al reckoning of the battle at Sing-
ordered not to advance as they would be re- ling reveals neither a big action nor a star-
lieved momentarily. Relief by units of the tlingly successful one. All 4th Armored Divi-
sion units directly involved suffered a total
1 A type of artill ery co nce ntration in which the shells from a
num~r of batteries are ti med to burst simultaneously on the target. of 22 casualties, of which 6 were killed; they
Such a concentration was used for its demo ralizing eflec t on the lost 5 medium tanks. Known enemy losses
enemy and also to prevent enemy observation outfits from picking
up the location of individual batteries. were 2 Mark V tanks and 56 prisoners.

210
 SCENE NEAR BINING, whue the Germans blew
out a sec/ion of road in their retreat. (Photo taken 11
December 1944.)

The attack on Singling was made against the primary objective, Bining. This was ac-
heavy odds, and attended with all the confu- complished by the I st Battalion, 328th In-
sion of a hastily improvised maneuver. In fan try, and Company D (light tanks) of the
itself, the action was a stalemate; neverthe- 37th Tank Battalion. Rohrbach, the further
less, it achieved immediate tactical success for objective, was not entered by Combat Com-
Combat Command A. With the main Ger- mand A.
man forces heavily engaged at Singling dur- By probing one of the areas in which the
ing the afternoon of 6 December, other ele- Germans had strongest prepared defenses, the
ments of Combat Command A were given action at Singling opened the way for later
the opportunity to pass Singling and reach advances by the 12th Armored Division.

211
 ANNEX: Abbreviations

AP Armor -piercing SCR S 36 A lighter version than SCR 300,

CP Com mand Post designed for similar use. The
HE High Explosive present models weigh about S
LCA Landing Craft, Assault pounds, as against 32 to 38 for
LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle, Person- the SCR 300.
nel SOl Signal Operation Instructions
LSI Landing Ship, Infantry SP Self-propelled
NSFC Naval Shore Fire Control SPM Self-propelled Mount. An open-
OP Observation Post topped tracked vehicle mount-
SCR 284 A combined receiver and trans- ing either 7 S-mm or 10S-mm
mitter for vehicular or ground howitzers, similar to a tank de-
operations with a range of 10 stroyer. This vehicle was or-
to 1S miles. This radio set ganic equipment of the infan-
weighs 108 to 110 pounds. try cannon company. The guns
SCR 300 The low power portable radio re- were not placed in turrets;
ceiver and transmitter designed therefore, whenever it became
for two-way communication necessary to bring fire to bear
over short distances (three on any given target the whole
miles pi us ), primarily for foot vehicle had to be maneuvered.
combat troops. Also called This vehicle was not armored.
"walkie-talkie." Is adaptable The crews had no protection
for fixed station use. from enemy fire.

212
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THE FIGHT IN THE VILLAGE I
6 DECEMBER 1944 I /,,'
AXIS OF MOVEMENTS:
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(Face p . 212 )