Deutsche Bank - Volatility Risk Premium
Deutsche Bank - Volatility Risk Premium
Deutsche Bank - Volatility Risk Premium
DO NOT REDISTRIBUTE
Deutsche Bank
Markets Research
Caio Natividade
Vivek Anand
Today's Derivatives Spotlight delves into systematic options research. It is the
vivek-v.anand@db.com
first in a series of collaborative reports between our derivatives and
quantitative research teams that aim to systematically identify and capture
value across global volatility markets. Paul Ward, Ph.D
paul.ward@db.com
This edition zooms into the volatility risk premia (VRP), one of the key sources
of return in options markets. VRP strategies are popular across the investor Simon Carter
community, but suffer from structural shortcomings. This report looks to simon-d.carter@db.com
improve on those.
Pam Finelli
Going beyond traditional methods, we introduce a P-distribution that best
represents our projected future returns and associated probabilities, based on pam.finelli@db.com
their drivers. Other topics are also highlighted as we construct our P-
distribution, namely a new multivariate volatility risk factor model, our Global Spyros Mesomeris, Ph.D
Sentiment Indicator, and the treatment of event-based versus non-event based spyros.mesomeris@db.com
returns.
+44 20 754 52198
We formulate a strategy which should improve the way in which the VRP is
harnessed. It utilizes alternative delta hedging methods and timing.
Risk Statement: while this report does not explicitly recommend specific
options, we note that there are risks to trading derivatives. The loss from long
options positions is limited to the net premium paid, but the loss from short
option positions can be unlimited.
Figure 1: Volatility Risk Premium: Thinking Outside The Box
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Deutsche Bank AG/London Distributed on: 20/04/2017
20/11/2017 13:35:00
16:58:00 GMT
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have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a
single factor in making their investment decision. DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN
APPENDIX 1.MCI (P) 083/04/2017.
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20 April 2017
Derivatives Spotlight
1. Introduction
Options trading is popular among discretionary and systematic investors, as it
serves multiple purposes in institutional investment portfolios. Today's
Derivatives Spotlight is the first in a series of collaborative reports between our
derivatives and quantitative research teams that aim to systematically identify
and capture value across global volatility markets.
Copper, 10Y US Treasuries, 10Y Bunds and 10Y JGBs. While their liquidity
characteristics are distinctly different, each should represent a regional hub
inside the asset class and allows us to understand the volatility premia more
holistically.
Most of our market data is sourced internally. We proxy variance swaps using
strike-weighted baskets of European vanilla options. In some sections we use
a purer basket comprised of puts and calls whose strikes expand up to 2.5
standard deviations away from spot. In other sections we use a more realistic
basket based on delta strikes (10-delta, 25-delta and ATM). All options are
rebalanced at expiry. All results prior to Section 6 omit costs; we only apply
them at the end as the VRP strategy gets finalized.
A/$ 0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.8 0.8 -0.2 0.6 0.6
markets outlined earlier had 48 return series: 24 for delta-hedged options, and
$/BR 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.6
24 for “naked” option returns. We used up to 12 years of returns data, where
S&P
available. 500
0.9 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.2
SXE 0.8 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 0.7 0.6 -0.2 0.3 0.4
The PCA output2 set the base for our approach to factor investing in options Nik 0.9 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 0.8 0.8 -0.1 0.2 0.4
markets. The key findings from the aggregate of all PCAs were that:
Bov 0.9 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 0.7 0.7 -0.3 0.3 0.6
Gold 0.9 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.6
Spot moves are the chief return driver of “naked” option contracts,
WTI 0.9 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.8 0.8 -0.3 0.4 0.6
explaining circa 63% of total variations in each market, on average. This is
Corn 0.9 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.3
no surprise; the delta exposure, and hence the delta return, dwarfs all
other “Greeks” in the tenors evaluated. Cop 1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.8 0.8 -0.6 0.6 0.6
UST 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7 -0.3 -0.1 0.3
Changes in volatility were the main source of delta-hedged option returns,
Bun 0.8 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.6 -0.2 0.5 0.4
causing 54% of the variations on average. This is the main source of risk
for the volatility trader. JGB 0.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.6 0.4 -0.6 0.2 0.6
E/$: EUR/USD, $/Y: USD/JPY, A/$: AUD/USD, $/BR: USD/BRL,
SXE: Eurostoxx 50, Nik: Nikkei 225, Bov: Bovespa, Cop: Copper,
Changes in volatility – implied (delta) vols, in particular – are also the Bun: 10Y Bunds. A.Ret.: annualized returns, RV: realized volatility
(1Y lookback, 3-month half-life), IV: implied volatility. Source:
second driver of naked option returns, accounting for 17% of the Deutsche Bank
variations in the sample data. Lower delta options are more sensitive to
this factor.
The shape of the volatility smile and the steepness of the term structure
explain an extra 20% of the variations in delta-hedged option returns. In
other words, the volatility trader cannot ignore skew and slope dynamics
either.
The returns from delta-hedged options are more diverse – the first 2
principal components explain 65% of the variations on average, versus
80% in the case of naked option returns.
1
We used Black & Scholes pricing as these are vanilla European options. We built each surface using SSVI
interpolation and extrapolation. SSVI stands for Surface Stochastic Volatility Inspired. We used the
approach introduced in Gatheral and Jacquier [2013].
2
We used up to 11 years of daily returns, fixed investment notionals in each option (so that return
volatilities were more similar) and estimated the principal components using a correlation matrix instead of
the covariance matrix.
Figure 3 – an aggregate of the results for all 15 markets – display our Figure 3: Explanatory power and
conclusions visually. The chart at the top shows how dominant the first factor loading by principal
principal components are in each type of return streams, while the bottom
component of option returns
chart shows how they load at each point of the volatility smile, after
Explanatory power
aggregating by expiries. The quasi-homogenous loadings per strike in the 0.70 Delta-hedged 'Naked'
delta-hedged streams, and the strong but inverse looking loadings in the 0.60
“naked” streams support the argument that the primary factor of returns 0.50
heavily affects all options in the surface. As we correlated the historical PC1 0.40
values with more tangible variables, we found an 88% average correlation3
0.30
with underlying asset returns (PC1 of “naked” options) and a 72% average
0.20
correlation with realized volatility (PC1 of delta-hedged option returns).
0.10
Confirming the points above, spot and volatility are the main drivers of
0.00
“naked” and delta-hedged option returns.4 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5
PC1 loading
0.08
Next, we analyse the historical developments of these first principal
0.06
components over time in search for potential biases. Bias is what we ultimately 0.04
look for when scrolling through markets with our “quant lenses”, as it lies at 0.02
the core of most systematic strategies. The stronger the pattern, and the more 0
that it can be validated, the more likely that we should succeed in capturing it.5 -0.02
'Naked'
-0.04
Delta-hedged
Take the PC1 of “naked” option returns, for instance. The high correlation to -0.06
its break-even at expiry, and the latter reflects a market-implied probability that
the option will expire in-the-money. As such, we should try to estimate our Figure 4: Cumulative standardised
own probabilities that the option will expire ITM, and emit signals based on PC1 values per asset class
where the probability spread is most significant. We call this the probability risk
premium (PRP), and it will be the subject of future research. FX Equities Comm. Treasuries
generally above what is realized. This bias suggests that selling delta-hedged The standardization went as follows: we took daily returns of each
option for a given market and divided by its 1-year volatility. We
options is a profitable trade over time, and we call it the volatility risk premium then estimated the PC1 loadings using a correlation matrix with 5
years of daily data, and calculated the most recent PC1 value from
(VRP). That said, the “hick-ups” in the series also show that buying options can the loadings. We repeated the exercise daily. We then averaged
the PC1 values for each asset class and plotted the cumulative
be attractive once in a while, which means our capturing process should be values. Source: Deutsche Bank
3
Monthly non-overlapping returns, 11 years of data.
4
We did not extend the study to cover, for instance, the drivers of spot returns and of spot volatility. We
recommend Natividade et al [2013] (Section 7) and Natividade et al [2014] (Section 2) for the former; for
the latter, we recommend Mccormick and Natividade [2008], Natividade [2008] and Saravelos and Grover
[2017] in FX and Corradi et al [2006] and Engle and Rangel [2005] in equities.
5
Two examples from delta-one markets illustrate our argument: the PC1 of commodity futures returns,
and the PC3 of a given yield curve. The former exhibits positive and stable autocorrelation over time, which
validates trend following strategies in commodity markets. The latter represents curvature and often
exhibits strong mean-reverting properties, which validates systematic butterfly strategies in liquid IRS
markets.
6
Assuming other theoretical conditions hold.
only positive8 in every asset class, but more expressive in markets with heavier 0.20
0.15
natural demand for crash insurance – such as equity indices.
0.10
0.05
Figure 5 shows the historical VRP distribution for the aforementioned pool of 0.00
15 assets, bucketed by asset class, using the 3-month horizon as reference and -0.05
-0.10
expressing the VRP as a ratio to implied volatility for better comparison across
-0.15
markets. While built differently, it correlates strongly to the inverse of the PC1 FX Equities Commodities Bond Futs
of delta-hedged returns as described in Section 2. And as we group all asset Up to 12 years of data. We use 15 markets (see Section 1).
Source: Deutsche Bank
classes together, we find that the VRP has been stable and positive in 61% of
the instances. It has also been more strongly pronounced in equities, which
reinforces the demand argument outlined above.
VRP strategies primarily aim to capture that difference between implied and
realized volatilities. Volatility and variance swaps are the standard instrument
of choice for the VRP harvester, though a similar P&L profile can also be
achieved through selling baskets of vanilla options with frequent delta hedging
and capital allocation that is inversely related to the strike level.9 We opt for
such baskets as they give us more delta hedging freedom, which will come
handy later. In this section, we use baskets comprised of 1-month options with
12 strikes that are equally distanced and range from -2.5 to +2.5 standard
deviations away from spot.10 All options were delta hedged daily and rolled at
maturity, and we omitted costs prior to the final section of this report.
Figure 6 shows the cumulative returns of our baskets above, standardized such
that they are equally volatile and therefore easier to visualize. As expected,
they are also similar to the inverse of the PC1s from Figure 4, even though we
used a different weighting scheme to group the individual options.
7
See Ilmanen [2011] for a general review. Other authors who defended similar arguments include Carr and
Wu [2009], Benzoni et al [2010] and Broadie and Johannes [2009].
8
That said, the VRP is far less pronounced in single stock equities than in equity indices and other asset
classes. As argued by Cosemans [2011] and Valenzuela [2014], such difference is attributed to positive
correlation risk premium - how index implied correlations over-estimate future realised correlations. Our
research also validates their argument – see Prasad et al. [2016].
9
This is, in fact, the way a market maker replicates a variance swap, as it generates a stable gamma
profile across different spot levels. For a recent reference, see Derman and Miller [2016].
10
We use the standard deviation of monthly returns as a measure. Some of these strikes may not be
tradable, but suit this exercise as we are looking for a good variance swap replication that is also
computationally efficient.
250
200
150
100
50
-50
-100
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Labels: E/$: EUR/USD, $/Y: USD/JPY, A/$: AUD/USD, $/BRL: USD/BRL, S&P: S&P 500, SX50: Eurstoxx 50, Nikkei: Nikkei 225, Bov:
IBOVESPA, UST: 10Y US Treasuries, Bund: 10Y Bunds, JGB: 10Y JGBs. Source: Deutsche Bank
In general terms, the investor who sells an option is selling some form of
insurance. By selling the whole smile, we are selling market insurance much
more broadly; significant moves in any direction are likely to hurt us. Most
assets involved fall faster than they rise, and therefore “significant moves”
typically coincide with bearish markets. In 201211 we launched the DB Global
Sentiment Indicator (GSI), a variable that captures market risk appetite and
whose details are described in Appendix II. Figure 7 shows how it relates to
our VRP baskets: irrespective of the asset class, falling VRP returns are
associated with rising GSI levels, indicating higher risk aversion.
11
See Natividade and Chen [2012b].
In essence, the VRP strategy is pro-cyclical; it underperforms when markets are Figure 7: 2M cross-asset VRP returns
risk averse – most commonly when macroeconomic volatility is high and
versus DB’s Global Sentiment
output is contracting. Needless to say, this is a shortcoming. It means that VRP
Indicator
strategies correlate positively with the static – equity, credit – premia that
dominate institutional portfolios and, as such, that they also underperform 2M VRP returns / Vol of 2M VRP
FX Equities
returns
when core portfolios are suffering. Adding insult to injury, VRP drawdowns are 2
C'dys Bond Futs
notable for their magnitude; the 4 months following the Lehman Brothers 1.5
announcement in Sep-08 wiped out the previous 6 years of returns in a typical
1
tradable S&P 500 VRP strategy12, and 8 years of returns in short USD and EUR
tradable swaption strategies.13 0.5 R² = 0.1423
There are 3 popular methods that seek to improve the profile of VRP returns: -0.5
-1.5
3.1 Cross-market Replication 2M changes in the
-2 DB GSI
-0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Cross-market replication is popular in the quantitative investment community, The 2-month VRP returns comprise all 15 markets, aggregated by
asset class. The reader may be intrigued as to why we chose the
especially when dealing with generic delta-one factors such as Momentum 2-month time window. Shorter windows produced a sparser
relationship (partly related to Footnote 15), while longer windows
and Carry. Since the number of independent trades influences the Sharpe ratio had too few datapoints. Source: Deutsche Bank
of any strategy, the quant investor will seek to maximize breadth by replicating
the same signal across a large number of markets.14
While attractive, the idea has a shortcoming when applied on the VRP. As is
often the case with other base factor strategies applied to a limited asset pool,
the VRP signal has limited breadth because it captures a “global” driver that
explains the majority of moves in all instruments available.15 Investor aversion
– the abstract risk whose premium is captured by short volatility strategies – is
common across asset classes, leading to a strong link between option returns
even in markets where spot returns are not highly correlated. Figure 8 shows
exactly that: the VRP return correlations in the bottom triangle are, on average,
stronger than the spot return correlations in the upper triangle.
12
We use a standard, tradable index for this comparison: the DB Equity US Volatility Carry Index
(DBGLSVEU Index on Bloomberg). This strategy sells 2M and 3M straddles on the S&P 500, delta-hedged
daily. Costs are included.
13
We use a standard, tradable index for this comparison: DB ImpAct (DBIP3BE Index and DBIP3BU Index
on Bloomberg). This strategy sells 3M10Y USD and EUR swaption straddles every week, delta-hedged at a
given frequency. Costs are included.
14
This follows from the Law of Fundamental Active Management,
where Sharpe IC breadth. IC, the information coefficient, represents signal forecast
accuracy and breadth stands for the number of independent investment decisions. See Grinold & Kahn
[1999].
15
See Baz et al [2015], and Natividade et al [2016a]. These references also show that in order to preserve
signal entropy, base factor strategies are best implemented in time series form - in other words, without
committing to an equal number of long and short trades.
16
We use the same VRP replicating basket described earlier in the section and data since 2002. Shortfalls
are defined as the average of monthly returns equal to or lower than the 5th percentile of monthly returns in
the sample. The average shortfall is estimated by averaging the shortfalls of all 15 VRP strategies,
weighted by volatility, whereas the shortfall of the average is estimated by grouping all VRP strategies
(weighted by volatility) and then calculating the monthly shortfall.
Figure 8: Correlations between underlying markets – VRP returns (bottom triangle) and spot returns (top triangle)
E/$ Y/$ A/$ BRL/$ S&P SX50 Nikkei Bov Gold WTI Corn Copper UST Bund JGB
E/$ 1.00 0.23 0.72 0.50 0.39 0.29 0.24 0.48 0.43 0.51 0.37 0.51 -0.14 -0.32 0.03
Y/$ 0.55 1.00 0.17 -0.09 -0.24 -0.19 -0.51 -0.10 0.37 -0.04 -0.02 -0.20 0.47 0.32 0.41
A/$ 0.73 0.63 1.00 0.76 0.60 0.49 0.39 0.72 0.46 0.60 0.55 0.66 -0.02 -0.31 -0.12
BRL/$ 0.65 0.55 0.85 1.00 0.47 0.42 0.35 0.62 0.41 0.60 0.46 0.64 -0.20 -0.37 -0.16
S&P 0.65 0.52 0.82 0.79 1.00 0.91 0.78 0.71 -0.08 0.36 0.33 0.58 -0.20 -0.40 -0.27
SX50 0.53 0.46 0.67 0.71 0.71 1.00 0.74 0.70 -0.04 0.21 0.25 0.48 -0.09 -0.35 -0.24
Nikkei 0.61 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.72 0.52 1.00 0.51 -0.24 0.22 0.12 0.47 -0.25 -0.30 -0.40
Bov 0.52 0.60 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.51 0.52 1.00 0.26 0.51 0.34 0.55 -0.13 -0.42 -0.29
Gold 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.37 0.40 0.62 1.00 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.09 -0.09 0.09
WTI 0.58 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.62 0.39 0.61 0.57 0.42 1.00 0.24 0.65 -0.28 -0.50 -0.21
Corn 0.41 0.32 0.41 0.34 0.40 0.30 0.50 0.39 0.31 0.41 1.00 0.42 0.03 -0.18 -0.03
Copper 0.42 0.31 0.61 0.60 0.71 0.51 0.49 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.26 1.00 -0.23 -0.43 -0.12
UST 0.31 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.36 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.12 0.04 1.00 0.64 0.41
Bund 0.37 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.33 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.60 1.00 0.56
JGB -0.03 0.04 -0.20 -0.25 -0.24 -0.06 -0.04 -0.28 0.10 -0.14 -0.06 -0.13 0.10 0.25 1.00
Correlation of 2-month non-overlapping returns, Note that we use FX/USD and not USD/FX to make VRP and spot market correlations more comparable. 11-year history. Source: Deutsche Bank
Timing the VRP strategy is also popular and, if the backtests serve as an
indication, it can be successful as well. The premise is that if there is a strong
relationship between strategy returns and global risk appetite, and if we can
time the latter, we should be able to reduce the drawdowns in the former.
17
Unlike in prior applications, we apply the GSI leverage on a bi-weekly basis instead of daily. We
evaluated the sensitivity to changes in leveraging frequency and found that "high" frequencies (daily) and
very low frequencies (bi-monthly) yield worse results. Daily rebalancing incurs more signal noise and factor
reversal risk: when the GSI is at extreme levels, next-day strategy returns are at greater risk of going
against the timing indicator than next-week or next-month returns. We also knew that once we attach
transaction costs to this exercise, daily rebalancing becomes unfeasible. On the other hand, very low
frequencies, such as bi-monthly, are not adaptive enough. Of the frequencies tested, the highest risk-
adjusted returns came when using monthly rebalancing. We chose bi-weekly for illustration purposes
alone. These results do not include costs - we leave that to later in this report.
History suggests this is an attractive idea. Figure 9 plots the effect from Figure 9: Backtested monthly
leveraging our strategy according to the GSI. The X-axis represents the original shortfalls – cross-market VRP
backtested monthly shortfall18 in the VRP strategy for each of our 15 markets,
strategy
labeled by asset class, while the Y-axis shows the new shortfall after applying
Shortfall without timing
the technique above. The sample covers 11 years of data. While we only -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0
0
capture a handful of crisis periods, the results are encouraging in that most of -0.2
the effect comes from taming our drawdowns. They also concur with our -0.4
-0.6
positive experience timing risk-sensitive, pro-cyclical signals in the past – -0.8
notably the FX Carry trade, as shown in Appendix II. -1
-1.2
-1.4
Timing =
3.3 Buying Tail Options No Timing -1.6
-1.8
FX Equities
-2
C'dys Bd Fut Shortfall with timing
Practitioners have also been fond of buying “tail options” to improve VRP
We define shortfall as the average monthly return using months
strategy drawdowns. The method is straight forward: sell volatility at the that qualified as 5th percentile of worst months in the sample for
each strategy. Source: Deutsche Bank
nearby strikes as per original strategy but buy volatility at distant strikes so as
to flip the gamma exposure in the event that spot moves significantly.19 Ideally,
if the spot market has fallen aggressively, and volatility has therefore risen, our
net gamma exposure should have gone from short to long. In principle,
therefore, this should improve VRP return drawdowns.
In order to test the idea, we modified our option baskets slightly. Instead of
only using 1-month options as earlier in this section, we used 4 expiries: 1, 3, 6
and 12 months. We also changed our strikes; instead of 12 fixed-percent-
distance strikes equally spaced in steps of ½ of a standard deviation, we used
6 fixed-delta strikes with distance defined in delta steps: 10-delta, 25-delta and
ATMF puts and calls. These revised maturities allow us to capture different
theta decay profiles, while using delta strikes allows us to better compare
cross-maturity strikes.
The goal of this backtest was to evaluate the sensitivity of VRP strategy returns
to using one set of specific strikes as hedge. In other words, we went short
one unit of every option described above except for those with a pre-specified
delta. In the latter case, we would go long one unit (of each) instead. The
benchmark in this case is to go short all options, with no protection. As before,
we delta hedged daily and did not include costs.
18
We define shortfall as the average monthly return using months that qualified as 5th percentile of worst
months in the sample for each strategy. In other words, the average return in the 7 worst months in the
sample.
19
A variation of this idea is to only sell delta-hedged straddles. In this case, aggressive spot moves will
also have a smaller adverse impact on the VRP strategy because much of the straddle gamma will have
been eroded.
The results here are also encouraging. Our Sharpe ratios rose and, more Figure 10: Shortfall / average returns
importantly, our drawdowns improved once we balanced our short exposures (VRP with tail options) minus
with a few long positions.
shortfall / average returns (VRP
benchmark)
But the improvement also depended on which strikes we chose to go long; in
most instances, it is only the low delta puts – the tail – that helped. Figure 10 10p 25p St'dle 25c 10c
shows the ratio of average monthly shortfall to monthly returns in each of our E/$ 0.44 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
15 markets, expressed as a difference to the ratio achieved using the Y/$* 0.7 1.3 -1.5 -0.4 0.5
benchmark strategy. The more negative the number, the better – it means that A/$ -4.9 -6.8 1.1 53.6 5.9
a typical drawdown erased less return months.
BRL/$* -2.7 -2.7 3.5 18.7 3.0
S&P -2.4 -0.1 0.1 3.1 1.2
Take the Nikkei as an example. In the benchmark strategy, the average
SX50 -2.4 -3.2 -0.7 9.6 3.2
monthly shortfall erased 25 months’ worth of average monthly returns. If we
modified the strategy so as to be long 10-delta puts in the 4 maturities while Nikkei -7.0 -6.2 -4.0 34.1 8.8
still short all the other options in the surface20, the ratio would have fallen from Bov 0.1 9.6 1.3 -2.0 -0.9
25 to 18, an improvement of 7 months (hence -7 in the table). Parallel Gold -1.7 0.2 2.8 1.2 -0.3
examples can also be made with low delta puts in most other markets, WTI -0.4 2.3 0.0 0.1 -0.3
particularly where asset returns exhibit strong negative skew.21 While one may Corn -9.0 -0.3 -4.9 7.1 23.1
argue that the return profile should improve further once we optimize our Copper -2.5 -1.2 -0.6 3.9 1.7
choices for theta decay efficiency 22 , these preliminary results are already UST 1.7 3.8 3.6 8.1 -4.5
encouraging. Bund -0.8 -0.6 3.4 2.1 -0.1
JGB -0.7 -0.9 8.9 2.0 -0.6
3.4 A New Way of Thinking * Flipped USD per unit of currency for better comparison with
other markets. Source: Deutsche Bank
These methods are encouraging, but narrow in scope. They focus mostly on
controlling strategy drawdowns, and do so by either timing risk aversion, or by
hedging or diversifying against it. In all 3 cases, we use prior knowledge and
experience to define what risk aversion means and how it manifests itself
across markets. We assume, for instance, that risk barometer (the GSI) is
accurate, and that only the left tail of asset returns should be of concern to the
VRP investor. Further, true instances of risk aversion are scarce - only a
handful in our backtest window - which makes our results even more
dependent on these priors.
20
For clarity: we went long 10-delta 1M, 3M, 6M and 1Y put options, allocating 1 JPY unit to each. At the
same time, we went short 10-delta calls, and 25-delta and ATMF calls and puts in the same maturities,
allocating 1 JPY unit to each as well. The capital allocation is therefore 4/24 into long positions, and 20/24
into short positions.
21
The versions that are long 10-delta puts outperformed except in a few instances - most notably in
Treasury futures, a typical safe haven asset, where the version long 10-delta calls outperformed. This
reinforces the idea of being long the area of the smile most likely to outperform in the case of risk
aversion. That said, a few cases are less intuitive – notably with straddles in JPY/USD and Bovespa calls.
22
We did not test theta decay optimisation thoroughly, but we tried a rough version that bought only 1Y
10-delta puts (4/24 units) and sold all other options (20/24 units). This version also outperformed the
unconstrained VRP strategy, but underperformed the version that also sold 10-delta puts of other expiries.
4. The P-Distribution
As is the case in all derivatives markets, profiting from options trading requires
taking a view (of the future) that differs from what is implied by the market
price. But options markets carry a unique advantage – their prices contain a far
more granular view of the future than futures and forward markets do. By
mapping the volatility smile into a risk neutral distribution, one can estimate
the market-implied probability that spot will be at any level by horizon date, in
addition to estimating how volatile or leptokurtic the market “expects” the
returns to be. 23
The most holistic way to identify option trading opportunities is, in our view, by
estimating a distribution of future asset returns and comparing it with the
market-implied distribution. In other words, comparing our P-distribution with
the market’s Q-distribution. This sets the base for how we will assess value
across strikes, expiries and markets. While today’s report will only focus on the
VRP – differences in the second moment of the two distributions – we will
introduce the whole approach as it serves as base for future reports. This
section, therefore, introduces our P-distribution.
The P-distribution is our subjective assessment of what future asset returns will
look like. Estimating it is a challenge. We have to account for realistic financial
market assumptions while also staying computationally efficient. With that in
mind, there are 4 aspects to our approach:
23
As with other derivatives, market-implied views are derived through arbitrage-free relationships that
most often reflect the cost of hedging the position and supply-demand dynamics, as opposed to traders’
subjective views of the future. This difference is often the source of opportunity.
Specifically to options markets, Carr and Madan [2001] argue that the optimal trade for an investor requires
3 ingredients: (1) her beliefs regarding future outcomes (the P-distribution), (2) her risk preferences (level of
risk aversion), and (3) market prices.
rt ,i t ,i Bi Ft t ,i
Et 1 rt ,i t ,i
where:
24
A necessary requirement for Et 1 rt ,i t ,i .
25
We assume the disturbance terms are uncorrelated.
26
We divide the current weight by its recently volatility. The absolute weights are bounded at 2.
27
We use an anchored long-term window to estimate the variance ratio term structure.
The variance is the second step in estimating our P-distribution. It is the main
quantity of interest for the VRP harvester and hence a key focus of this paper.
Our approach must reflect real-world characteristics, while remaining
computationally efficient.
28
The fact that financial returns are not well described by iid normal distributions has been long
documented in the literature, starting as early as 1960s – see, for example Mandelbrot [1963]. Volatility
clustering – i.e. positively autocorrelated variances – is well established. The seminal papers of Engle
[1982] and Bollerslev [1986] enable the modeling of such volatility clustering. Jumps in the price and or/
the volatility of assets (around events) is another well documented phenomenon. Furthermore, multi-
regime GARCH models have been advocated in the relatively recent academic literature – see, for
example, Haas et al.[2004a, 2004b], Marcucci [2005], Alexander and Lazar [2006, 2009]. All these features
have been incorporated in the volatility model we propose and describe below. CCC-MGARCH stands for
Constant Conditional Correlation Multivariate Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity.
Factor models for modeling the volatility of assets, particularly of large portfolios, have been long
advocated in the academic and practitioner finance literature. Here we are combining the approaches
proposed in the seminal papers of Engle et al. [1990] on factor- ARCH, and Bollerslev [1990] on the
constant conditional correlation GARCH model, later developed to allow for dynamic correlation by a series
of authors, including, for example Engle [2002] or Tse and Tsui [2002].
29
See Natividade and Chen [2012b] for the methodology behind the construction of our Global Sentiment
Indicator (GSI). According to this regime indicator, we distinguish between three risk/market sentiment
states, namely: risk-seeking, intermediate and risk aversion.
30
Another, albeit secondary advantage is that a factor model can also incorporate spill-overs between
volatilities of different assets.
where Dt diag ht ,k is a diagonal matrix of time-varying factor standard Cross-asset Carry
We use the terms “Macro” and “Investable” as per literature.
deviations and t t t , i
diagonal matrix encapsulating asset specific risk. 1i N
Step1: estimate the factor variance terms (i.e. the elements of Dt ) via a
GARCH-type model of choice – in our case, a multi-state model where the
states are exogenously given by our GSI. This is described in Section 4.3.2.
Step 2: Repeat Step 1 for the residual variances (i.e. the elements of t ).
Step 3: Estimate the correlation matrix t 32 ; in the context of a CCC
model, t , i.e. correlations are assumed constant through time.
4.3.2 The exogenously-determined multi-state GARCH model
As the seasoned investor is aware, asset volatility follows multiple regimes
over time. Capturing regime-shifts quickly enough is key. In our view, the GSI
suits that task better than other standard choices such as historical returns
alone.
31
See for example Bauwens et al. [2005] – Chapter 5 in particular and references therein – , Corradi et al.
[2006] or Engle and Rangel [2005].
32
With the sole condition that this is a positive definite matrix, such that the positive definiteness of t
is ensured (i.e. variances are guaranteed to be positive such that volatilities are defined)
The variance terms ht , k (k = 1,2…., 12) will represent the diagonal elements of
t . We also use the same specification for the idiosyncratic variances,
namely:
33
In Natividade and Chen [2012b], a Gaussian mixture of historical GSI values pointed to 3 as the optimal
number of regimes to describe the series.
34
Identification requires one of the k ,s t 1
parameters, with st-1= {1, 2, 3}, to be equal to zero (or
equivalently that α is equal to zero). In the equivalent specification used below, we implicitly assume
Our approach to forecasting the total variance of asset returns combines the
modeling of time-varying volatility from Section 4.3.2 with non-parametric,
event-driven jumps. The process involves the following steps:
37
Factor models use US events in the modeling of systematic (factor) variance, whereas events pertaining
to the other countries are used in the modeling of idiosyncratic risk.
38
We note that the most significant impact across all assets is that of NFP announcements. Using high
frequency data for EUR/USD, Chen, Natividade and Wang [2011] also found this to be one of the events
with the greatest impact, second only to FOMC announcement. We note however that the event impact
estimation framework here differs in two important ways from that in Chen, Natividade and Wang [2011]:
1) the above variance impact is computed for factor variances rather than asset variances directly, with the
events impact for the latter subsequently computed based on the former as explained in the notes to
Figure 13; 2) daily (rather than high frequency data) is used.
39
Event-adjusted returns are equal to the observed returns divided by the square root of the variance
multiplier from Step 1 on event days, and left unchanged otherwise.
1.5
1
Less volatile
during NFP
0.5
0
S&P 500 SX5E Nikkei Bovespa E/$ $/Y A/$ $/BRL Gold WTI Corn Copper UST Bund JGB
1.5
1
Less volatile
during NFP
0.5
0
Jobless Claims NFP GDP ISM Fed Min ISM Serv FOMC House Starts Home SalesCons Confidence CPI Ret. Sales
Source: Deutsche Bank; We show the US events influence on systematic asset variance. The event impact at asset class level is computed based on the events’ impact on factor variance and our factor model as
follows: for each asset and each event, we compute the sum of (squared factor beta * factor variance multiplier)/ sum of squared betas. For each event, we plot the average variance multiplier within each asset class.
40
See the seminal paper by Johnson [1949] where these distributions were introduced.
41
While the four parameters do not have an intuitive interpretation, they map explicitly into the first four
moments of any target distribution. Here we are mapping the first four moments of h-period aggregated
GARCH returns.
Although flexible, the main disadvantage of this approach is that a Johnson SU distribution is not
guaranteed to exist for any set of mean, variance, skewness and (positive) excess kurtosis. That said, other
distributions from the same family can be fit in this case.
Tuenter [2001]. Using the above relation between Z and X, the cdf of X can be
written as follows:
x JSU
F x FJSU x JSU JSU sinh1
JSU
JSU 1 x JSU
2
f x f JSU x exp JSU JSU sinh1
1
2
JSU 2 x JSU
2
JSU
1
JSU
where fJSU(x) is the Johnson SU fit to f, the pdf of h -period aggregated returns
R t+h,i.
One important advantage of our proposed modeling framework (i.e. the factor
CCC-MGARCH above) is that the higher moments of R t+h,i.- the second
ingredient in the approximation framework above – can be obtained in quasi-
analytical form for any horizon h.42 The proposed moment-based distribution
approximation method together with the computationally efficient method of
forecasting higher moments 43 for any horizon complete our P-distribution
modeling framework.
42
For certain (univariate) GARCH models, (quasi)-analytical formulae for the higher moments (of the
returns and variance processes) are already derived in the literature – see, for example, Alexander et al.
(2011). As Simonato (2013) explains, this reduces significantly the computational time. Here, we propose
applying his approach to our factor CCC-MGARCH modeling setting.
43
As specified earlier, quasi-analytical formulae for the higher moments can be derived in our framework.
These formulae will be used in our future research involving the P-distribution, but as they are outside the
scope of the present paper are skipped here.
Figure 14 plots, according to each horizon and forecast method, our aggregate Figure 14: Accuracy (%) of forecasts
hit ratio – the percentage of instances when the direction of a signal is the of the direction of future returns by
same as the direction of future asset returns. Two observations stand out:
horizon
All methods seemed to have outperformed a random walk when predicting P-distribution Naive Trend
the direction of future asset returns, regardless of the horizon, over the 53.5% Mann-Kendall Oomen-Sheph.
sample window. That said, the directional accuracy was not far distant
53.0%
from 50%, reiterating the challenges in time series forecasting.
52.5%
Our P-distribution forecasts increasingly outperformed the benchmarks as
52.0%
our horizons lengthened. This is unsurprising; most of our signals are of
51.5%
low frequency. While our Sentiment and (some of) our Value signals decay
fast,46 the Trend, Carry and Macro Factor signals target longer horizons. 51.0%
This observation also concurs with our experience trying to explain asset 50.5%
44
Each looks at trendiness from a different perspective, and the first 2 have been successfully used in our
paper trading before. For a larger set of potential benchmarks, see Natividade [2012b].
45
See Oomen and Sheppard [2014]. We added this method for completeness given that it accounts for
trend magnitude in a way that the other benchmarks do not. That said, its estimates suffer from
discretization bias as we use very few observations to estimate the signal at any point in time.
46
It is worth mentioning that weighting our signals unevenly – giving more weight to faster signals – did
not improve the forecast accuracy. We would have expected better results on 1-week forecasts had our
signals utilised intraday data as well.
47
In Natividade et al [2014] we ran panel regressions that tried to explain short, medium and long-term
contemporary returns in each asset class using a series of market, macro-economic, technical and
fundamental variables. We found that the explanatory power rose as we lowered the frequency of one-
period returns (from weekly to monthly, then to quarterly, semi-annually and annually).
As with the mean, we evaluate our forecasts under multiple horizons: 1 day, 1 Figure 15: Market turbulence periods
week, 2 weeks, 1 month and 3 months.48 All 15 markets were included. Period Event
Sep-/08 - Mar-/09 Lehman + GFC
We penalized forecasts according to the bias statistic introduced in Connor May-/10 - Sep-/10 EU Sov. Crisis
[2000] – also utilized in Alvarez et al. [2012] and Ward et al. [2016]. This metric May-/11 - Jun-/11 EU Sov. Crisis
measures the standard deviation of returns standardized by the volatility May-/13 - Jun-/13 Taper Tantrum
forecasted for the return period.49 If our forecast is accurate, this standard Sep-/14 - Mar-/15 Greek Debt Crisis
deviation should equal 1. If we have over-/under-forecasted vol, the computed May-/15 - Aug-/15 China Slowdown
measure will be less/greater than 1. Feb-/16 - Mar-/16 Oil Price Shock
Jun-/16 - Jul-/16 Brexit
We evaluated accuracy in 2 datasets: the long-term data and a subset that Source: Deutsche Bank
Within both GARCH and EWMA families, the univariate and factor versions
perform similarly.
The forecast accuracy of all methods worsens as the horizon lengthens.
48
While we used multiple forecast windows, we note that the most relevant forecasts are those up to 1
month. VRP strategies use short-dated options.
49
As the focus here is on the cross-sectional comparison between models, we used daily observed,
overlapping returns in order to improve the sample size at longer horizons, especially for our second data
sample. Furthermore, for robustness, we have also run our overall accuracy results on model rankings
using non-overlapping weekly returns and our conclusions remained unchanged.
50
We included “high frequency volatility” estimates as they are popular among market makers and have
been advocated in academia – most notably, Ait-Sahalia and Mancini [2008].
None of the methods accurately predict market shocks; they all under-
forecast volatility going into the periods outlined in Figure15. This is a key
finding, with implications for signal generation in Section 6.51
That said, implied volatility outperforms the other methods, when
forecasting 3 months ahead, during those periods. This is likely due to the
options market over-forecasting volatility, in general, relative to the other
methods. 52 Note also that such conclusion is less clear over shorter
horizons; implied volatility does not outperform in 1-month horizons, and
we did not include it for shorter horizons.
Figure 17: Long-term forecast performance across models (all horizons and underlyings)
0.9
0.6
0.3
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Forecast estimation error
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Forecast estimation error
Source: Deutsche Bank; Overall data set – Oct 2005 to Aug-2016 – used for computations. Y-axis: we show the ‘absolute bias’ (i.e. absolute value of the difference between the bias statistic and 1, which corresponds
to a perfectly accurate forecast). X: axis: we show the standard deviation of a 252- bd rolling window computation of the bias statistic.
51
The reader may rightly question what threshold distance from 1 would define statistically significant
under-forecasting. We did not delve into that topic, and therefore our statement is generic.
52
In our view, implied volatilities outperform going into turbulent periods not because the options market
is more accurate at predicting shocks, but rather because the time-homogeneous, over-forecasting bias
works in its favour in this case.
Figure 18: Forecast accuracy during crisis periods according to forecast horizon (days)
0.25
0
1 5 10 21 65 all horizons
underforecasting
1.5
Bias Test Statistic (mean)
1.25
overforecasting
0.75
0.5
1 5 10 21 65 all horizons
The X-axis shows the vol forecast horizons (in business days). Y-axis: top chart: the same absolute bias measure as defined in Figure 17 is now shown averaged across all assets, for each horizon bucket; bottom chart:
the value of our bias test statistic (averaged across assets for each horizon bucket) is shown. All computations use the turbulent market periods shown in Figure 15. Source: Deutsche Bank
Second, we favour modeling risk through factors because while it looks more
complex, portfolio risk estimation is rather simpler. It is no less accurate than
univariate modeling and has the added benefits of computational efficiency
and transparent risk attribution.
We next turn our attention to the modeling of events and regimes, zooming
into CCC-MGARCH. Figures 19 and 20 illustrate the following findings:
Natividade and Wang [2011], but these are offset by losses in Equities and
Treasuries.
Regime modeling proved somewhat more fruitful: the CCC-MGARCH
model with regimes outperforms its uni-regime counterpart during
turbulent markets, for horizons of less than 3 months. A more granular
assessment would also show that this is especially true in equity markets.
Figure 19: Event modeling – impact on forecast accuracy according to forecast horizon (days)
0.12 0.3
L ong-term (2005-2016) D u ring crisis periods
Forecast mean absolute bias
0.25
0.08 0.2
0.06
0.15
0.04
0.1
0.02
0.05
0
1 5 10 21 65 all horizons 0
1 5 10 21 65 all horizons
Factor CCC-GARCH (with events) Factor CCC-GARCH
Factor CCC-GARCH (with events) Factor CCC-GARCH
Figure 20: Regime Modeling – impact on forecast accuracy according to forecast horizon (days)
0.12 0.30
L ong-term (2005-2016) Du ring crisis periods
Forecast mean absolute bias
0.1
Forecast mean absolute bias
0.25
0.08 0.20
0.06 0.15
0.04 0.10
0.02 0.05
0 0.00
1 5 10 21 65 all horizons 1 5 10 21 65 all horizons
Factor CCC-MGARCH (with regimes) Factor CCC-GARCH Factor CCC-MGARCH (with regimes) Factor CCC-GARCH
In light of the results above, we stick to the originally proposed model: CCC-
MGARCH, with events and regimes, which will be evaluated for signal
generation in Section 6. We now move on to alternative delta hedging, the
next step in our quest to improve VRP strategy returns.
5. Alternative Delta
Hedging
Alternative delta hedging is, arguably, as ancient as option markets. Market
makers will happily deviate from their hedging template if they have an edge in
doing so, and if their risk constraints allow. A tailored delta hedging scheme, in
essence, improves the positive aspects and reduces the negative aspects of
the “textbook” delta hedging approach. For the options seller, for instance,
delta hedging is usually a loss-making spot-trading strategy: "buy high and sell
low". Foresight of future spot conditions could reduce the loss by, for instance,
under-hedging53 if the asset is expected to reverse course. For the volatility
buyer, the converse is true. It is true that alternative schemes will increase
delta risk, but this side effect should be compensated by the value-add of the
new scheme.
The schemes we introduce here utilize our subjective assessment of what the
future will look like – specifically, on future spot dynamics. 54 They either focus
on the direction of future asset returns, or on how the asset is trending. If
correct, using this extra information should give us extra gains.
53
That is, either hedging less often or hedging a level that still leaves her under-hedged.
54
The reader may question why we did not focus explicitly on volatility – including estimating the delta
according to the volatility forecasts introduced in Section 4 and delta hedging daily to it. We see the 2
topics – alternative delta hedging and hedging to realized volatility – as different in nature. The latter is
about achieving delta hedging “purity”, while the former is about adding “impurity” to achieve extra gains.
We refer the curious reader to Ahmad and Wilmott [2005] and in Derman and Miller [2016], who
thoroughly address the topic of delta hedging to “true” volatility. They show that delta hedging to the
“true” volatility may provide a terminal P&L that is already known at the start of the trade (the difference
between the premium priced using the volatility estimate and the premium currently quoted in the market).
The issues, as they partly highlight, are that (1) “true” volatility is often unknown, (2) we cannot delta
hedge continuously, and hence suffer from discretization error, and (3) the P&L variance can be quite
significant over the life of the trade.
1.5
Sections 5.1 – 5.5 introduce each scheme, while Sections 5.6 – 5.7 show our 1.4
1.3
backtest results using both simulated and real data. For completeness, we
1.2
cover both long and short option strategies. 1.1
0.9
5.1 Grid Search 0.8
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
WTI
The grid search is the "brute force" of our alternative delta hedging schemes. 160
140
Every day, it takes our options basket and calculates what the risk-adjusted
120
returns would have been, up to the day before, from delta hedging that basket
100
at the frequency stipulated by each grid-point.
80
60
This method effectively “observes” the underlying market at different
40
frequencies and infers which one would have been best for delta hedging up
to time t 1 . It then decides how to delta hedge at time t .55 Hedging to
20
0
frequencies where spot is more volatile should produce better results when we 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
S&P 500
are long options, as we are capturing more volatility. The converse is true 2300
when we are short. Gridpoints represent different frequencies, and are divided 2100
1900
into 3 domains: delta, time and spot. We describe them as follows:
1700
Delta frequencies: hedge if the delta of an option has moved by more than 1500
a fixed quantity since the last hedge. Delta anchors are popular among 1300
market makers, especially when dealing with intraday hedging, as they are 1100
akin to trading under a volume clock 56 ; this frequency domain avoids 900
700
trading during illiquid periods as both spot and delta stay constant, thereby
500
reducing market impact. The downside, however, is that option deltas can 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
be highly volatile going into expiry – an important issue in practical VRP 190
10Y UST
160
Calendar frequencies: delta hedge now if the last hedge occurred after a
150
certain number of days. The results from this domain are easier to interpret, 140
as trendiness and volatility are normally observed as a function of time. 130
Calendar frequencies do not discriminate across liquidity pockets, but 120
these are much less observable in daily data, and daily is the highest 110
trading frequency we assume in this report. The grid points used were 1, 3, 100
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
7, 11 and 20 business days.
V.Frequent: every 1 day, 3 days, 5-delta or 0.1 standard deviations
(in1M spot moves). Frequent: every 7 days, 10-delta or 0.3
Spot frequencies: delta hedge the option only if the underlying asset has standard deviations. Intermediate: 11 days, 15-delta or 0.5
standard deviations. Infrequent: 16 days, 20-delta or 0.7 standard
moved by more than a fixed quantity since the last hedge. This domain deviations. V.Infrequent: 20 days, 25-delta or 1 standard deviation.
captures the best of the previous two: it captures liquidity pockets and As an example, the grid search method recommended hedging
every 1 or 3 days, or every 0.1 s.d. changes, during time periods
does not suffer from unstable deltas near maturity. That said, it also does shaded in brown. Source: Deutsche Bank
55
We used a P&L lookback window of 250 time units – 1 year – in order for the results to be more
adaptive to changing market conditions. We used Sharpe ratios as the defining metric. As is standard with
grid search methods, we also applied nearest neighbour smoothing both historically and cross-sectionally
(within a domain) across grid points.
56
See Natividade [2013b].
Figure 21 shows the time-varying optimal delta hedging frequency when short
a basket of options57 in four markets, assuming no risk tolerance constraints,
overlaid against the futures contract. Darker colours indicate that the grid
search favours higher hedging frequencies, while lighter colours show that the
method preferred lower frequencies (in delta, calendar and spot domains) at
that time.
The results are intuitive, and similar regardless of the asset class. Lower
frequency delta hedging has been more optimal because implied volatilities
normally overshoot the empirical; the VRP harvester would have been better
off just collecting the option premium and rarely trading the (money losing)
delta hedging leg. When volatility rises and the asset is trending, however,
higher frequency delta hedging performs better as gains from the delta hedge
leg offset some of the loss from the short options position.
question is the asset price that goes into calculating delta. We hedge the delta 12
daily, but estimate it using a historical moving average price instead of what is 10
currently observed in the market as reference. In essence, this method 8
"priced in”, and that delta hedging to it will lead to better returns. 4
57
We use the baskets introduced in Section 3: 1-month rolling expiry, 12 strikes set 0.5 standard
deviations apart from one another.
58
Changes in the delta, which maps into the P&L of the delta hedge strategy, will be less significant when
we use a moving average as input compared to the current spot price.
59
The MA lookback windows range from 1 day to 1 month; we chose not to use longer windows so as
control how much our delta estimate can deviate from the benchmark. The MA strategies are signal-
weighted; in other words, the more that spot rises above the moving average, the stronger our short
position. Signal weighting is important as delta hedging strategies are gamma-weighted, and gamma
intensity relates to the size of recent moves. We use an anchored window to calculate strategy
performance, and apply nearest neighbour smoothing as is standard in grid search optimisation. We chose
an anchored window so as to capture structural patterns.
60
If the asset is mean reverting, we expect the moving average to outperform current spot at predicting
the asset price in the near future. If we are short a call, and spot has been rising, we will buy less spot in
the delta hedge than the original because we will use a lower level of spot as input. This decision to under-
hedge will be correct if spot is indeed mean reverting and therefore subsequently drops, as we will lose
less from the previous trade. If we are long a call, we will delta hedge to the current asset price. If we
instead delta hedge to a moving average, we would end up selling less than the benchmark trade and not
capitalise as much when the asset price eventually drops, which is sub-optimal. We choose the best
performing MA as we assume it is the one that spot is more likely to revert to.
using the current asset price as input. If we are long the option, we delta
hedge to the current MA level of the worst performing MA strategy.61 Figure 23: Delta hedge procedure
under the break-out method
Figure 22 plots the moving average windows chosen to estimate the level of
spot (or futures) used in our delta hedge calculator, assuming that we are short
options. If the chosen MA window was zero, it meant the asset was trending in
the short-run. In that case, we assumed that current spot would outperform a
historical average when predicting future spot, and thus chose not to under-
hedge our deltas. The opposite applied if the asset was mean-reverting, and
the length of the optimal moving average dictated how under-hedged we
were.
A key highlight from Figure 22 is the stability of our results for the S&P 500, an
asset known for its short-term mean-reverting properties. In this case, delta
hedging to a 5-10 day moving average is generally preferred.
5.3 Break Outs again. (A) Establish the break-out thresholds as asset price +/-
premium; do not delta hedge. (B) The asset price has broken to
the downside: start delta hedging daily, initiate rolling stop. (C) The
rolling stop has been triggered: establish the new thresholds and
stop delta hedging.Source: Deutsche Bank
The break-out scheme is comprised of 2 variables: the options break-even and
a rolling stop-loss on spot. Well-suited for a market maker, it sits in between
the two smart delta hedging categories described above.
It is also similar to the direction schemes we describe later because once the
asset breaks outside the aforementioned range, we assume that it will continue
moving in that direction, and therefore increase or decrease the delta hedging
frequency depending on our option position.
61
If the asset is trending, we expect the moving average to underperform the current spot level at
predicting the asset price in the near future. In reverse image to the Footnote above, if we are short a call
and delta hedge to the moving average we will end up buying less spot than the original and therefore not
capitalise enough as the asset continues to rise. In this case, therefore, we use the current asset price as
input to calculate the delta hedge. On the other hand, if we are long a call, we would prefer being under-
hedged as spot keeps rising, and delta hedging to the moving average gives us that. In other words, we
sell less spot than the benchmark delta hedge strategy suggests. We choose the worst-performing
moving average as it is the one that spot is the least likely to revert to.
62
These results are consistent with our work on impulse response functions shown in Natividade et al
[2014b].
63
See, for instance, Clenow [2013].
2. While the spot level is inside the range, if we are long the option, we delta Figure 24: Signals from the Expected
hedge daily so that the gain from our long gamma exposure provides Returns scheme: long vs short the
relief against the loss from our short theta exposure. In other words, we
underlying asset
“gamma scalp”. If we are short the option, however, we do not delta
hedge and collect the returns associated with time decay instead. Long Short EUR/USD
1.55
3. If spot breaks to the topside of the range, we initiate a rolling stop trigger 1.45
set at 0.3 standard deviations below spot and roll it daily.64 The delta 1.35
o If we are long a call or a put: stop delta hedging65 and “let the delta 1.15
run”. 1.05
0.95
o If we are short a call or a put: cover the delta exposure immediately
0.85
and start delta hedging daily. 2002 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
S&P 500
4. If spot breaks to the downside of the range instead, we also start a rolling 2250
1850
o If we are long a call or a put: stop delta hedging and “let the delta
1650
run”.
1450
o If we are short a call or a put: cover the delta exposure immediately 1250
850
5. If spot retraces and hits the rolling stop, we cover the delta exposure
650
immediately and re-start the process above. 2002 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
WTI
160
Figure 23 illustrates the process when applied to long call and short put
140
positions, under opposite market scenarios. 120
100
60
The Expected Returns (ER) scheme explicitly incorporates our return direction 40
forecasts into the delta hedging decision, more so than any other scheme that 20
we are introducing. The idea is simple: if the delta hedge trade we need to do 0
2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015
today is in line with our spot view, we delta hedge; otherwise, we do not. In
10Y UST
other words, we will stay under-hedged or over-hedged if that suits our spot 180
views. 170
160
150
The better our forecasts can predict the direction of future spot returns, the
140
more that this delta hedging approach should outperform the others. That said,
130
it also causes our VRP strategy to deviate from the benchmark, which – in
120
extreme form – may lead to a significant breakdown in correlations with pure
110
VRP returns.66
100
2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015
Our return forecasts come from the P-distribution introduced in Section 4. As Source: Deutsche Bank
described earlier, the forecasts combine all the individual signals from our
delta-one portfolios – Trend Following, Carry, Value, Sentiment and
Macroeconomic Factor investing. We are primarily interested in the direction of
64
The length used to calculate the standard deviation is equal to the number of days between the last
delta hedge date and today. The stop adjusts itself at every spot move but cannot become less stringent
than it was before. The 0.3 s.d. level was not optimised to this exercise; it was similar to a choice we used
before. See Natividade [2013c] for more details.
65
In cases where we are long the option and stop delta hedging, we do not remove the previous hedge.
We simply stay under-hedged from this point onwards.
66
In this case, we could end up capturing probability risk premium instead of the volatility risk premium.
these returns, as opposed to the magnitude, as the former suits delta hedging
best.
0.7
region for delta hedging. The costlier it is to trade the underlying, the wider the 0.6
band and therefore the lower the trading frequency. In our context, we modify 0.5
BSM delta
the model such that the delta bands reflect our views on the underlying asset 0.4
Wide bands
0.3
instead of trading costs. The bands are defined as follows: Tight bands
0.2
0.1
BSM delta
3 exp r T t S
1
0.0
2 3 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Bands BSM
2
Source: Deutsche Bank
67
To our knowledge, smart delta hedging is not a popular theme in academic circles. Delta hedging
discretization attracted a good deal of attention in previous decades, but the techniques introduced sought
to reduce trading costs as opposed to capture directional views or the non-fractality of asset returns.
The topic was initially addressed in Leland [1985], where the author revised the option’s implied volatility
to account for the costs of delta trading. Hodges and Neuberger (HN) [1989] followed through with an
optimal but computationally expensive band-like approach. Whalley and Wilmott [1997] refined the method
with an analytical formula, and Zakamouline [2006a, 2006b, 2007] further expanded on it using a double
asymptotic method that more closely resembled the optimal HN approach. We prototyped the 2 latter
methods; while the Zakamouline scheme seemed most appropriate for the cost problem, it added little
extra to WW while also costing more computational time. Sinclair [2008] provides a thorough review of the
topic.
The main references we found on smart delta hedging are Chen [2010] and Chen et al [2011], where the
author identified a jump-based delta hedging rule applicable to options on S&P 500 futures. Chen argues
that as the S&P 500 is likely to revert after large jumps, one should suspend rebalancing the hedge
portfolio after large jumps and only rebalance the next day. Finally, Sepp [2013] implemented a grid search
method similar to what we introduced in Section 5.1, but with the goal of reducing delta hedging costs as
opposed to alpha generation.
68
tc | N | S
69
Refer to Whalley and Wilmott [1997], Sinclair [2008], Chen [2010] and Chen et al [2011]for details.
Figure 25 illustrates the method in more detail, where the delta bands are
plotted against the original Black & Scholes delta.
5.6 Backtest Results – Simulated Data Figure 26: Simulated trending and
mean reverting price series – 5 paths
Having introduced our alternative delta hedging schemes, we now evaluate each
individual performances on both simulated and real market data. We are
6000
Simulated trending series
ultimately interested in the latter, but the former will be the backbone of our
5000
understanding of how different methods perform under various conditions.
4000
rt rt 1 t 0
Dec-89 Dec-93 Dec-97 Dec-01 Dec-05 Dec-09 Dec-13
(1,1) reflects the mean reversion rate. Our trending price series are set 160
140
such that annualized asset returns and volatility both average 10%, and
0.5 to indicate strong trendiness. Our mean-reverting series also have
120
100
indicate strong reversal.71 Figure 26 shows 10 runs of our simulated trend and 60
40
mean-reverting series.
20
0
As for backtesting our options strategies: Dec-89 Dec-93 Dec-97 Dec-01 Dec-05 Dec-09 Dec-13
[1] We used the same basket of options introduced at the start of Section 3:
twelve 1-month options, whose strikes are set 0.5 standard deviations
apart from one another. We assumed a flat volatility surface such that all
options were priced at 10% implied volatility. Other operational details
were standard for simulation: zero interest rates, zero transaction costs,
individual delta hedging for each contract, and roll at expiry.
70
If each time unit represents a day, this would be equivalent to 16 years of data.
71
To make it easier for the reader: A 1 2 , where A 0.1 . Further,
A 252 , where A 0.1 in the trending series and A 0 in the mean reverting
series.
[2] We evaluated 4 strategies: [a] long the options basket in a trending Figure 27: Backtest scenarios –
market, [b] short the basket in a trending market, [c] long the basket in a simulated data
mean-reverting market, and [d] short the basket in a mean-reverting
market. Figure 27 provides a sketch of that. Trending Mean-
asset reverting
[3] We also imposed delta risk thresholds so as to respect the typical Long
constraints of a market making desk. As such, the strategy automatically
gamma
[a] [c]
delta hedges the moment that our exposure exceeds the threshold,
whether or not it is in line with the candidate method. The thresholds Short
used were 5-, 10-, 20- and 100-delta, where the latter represents the gamma
[b] [d]
unconstrained version. This resulted in 80 backtests: 4 strategies, 4
Source: Deutsche Bank
tolerance thresholds and 5 candidate hedging methods.
[4] All results were ultimately compared to the benchmark: the same options
strategy but delta hedged daily instead.
We assessed 2 P&L characteristics in each backtest. Our utility metric was the
marginal Sharpe ratio gain versus the benchmark; other metrics, such as
drawdown-related performance, did not suit this controlled environment. Our
chosen risk metric was the correlation between strategy and benchmark; we
wanted to penalize strategies that captured less of the VRP phenomena but not
penalize strategies that are simply more volatile. The benchmark strategy is to
delta hedge daily.
Delta hedging strategies closer to the top left should be preferred. Our key
findings are that:
72
The correlation of daily log changes, using 4,049 units, was above +0.4 in most instances.
Figure 28: Backtested results by hedging scheme (left), delta tolerance (middle) and market environment (right)
2.5 2.5 Marginal gain/loss in Sharpe ratio vs benchmark 2.5
Marginal gain/loss in Sharpe ratio vs benchmark Marginal gain/loss in Sharpe ratio vs benchmark
2.0 2.0 2.0
1.5 1.5 1.5
1.0 1.0
1.0
0.5 0.5
0.5
0.0 0.0
5d 0.0
#1: G.Search -0.5
-0.5 10d -0.5 Trending, long
#2: M.A.
#3: B.Outs -1.0 20d Trending, short
-1.0 -1.0
#4: E.Rets -1.5 Uncon. M.R., short
-1.5 -1.5 MR, short
#5: W.W. 1 - Corr to benchmark
-2.0
-2.0 1 - Corr to benchmark -2.0
1 - Corr to benchmark
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
Now that we have an idea of how the results should look like, it is time to
evaluate how they actually look. Using up to 15 years of data, we applied all
delta hedging schemes to each of the 15 markets – in other words, the cross-
asset pool described earlier. The backtest setup was similar to the previous in
that we used the same (1-month) options basket, the same rolling frequency,
the same evaluation criteria and the same benchmark – the returns from delta
hedging the basket daily.73 As before, the delta hedge applied separately to 2
combinations: long the options basket systematically, and short the options
basket systematically. As before, we did not add costs – this will be left to
Section 6.
Our results are presented in Figures 29 and 30. Figure 29 shows the central
finding from our (near) 600 backtest iterations: on average, the Expected
Returns (5.4) and Whalley & Wilmott (5.5) schemes outperformed the others and
the benchmark, whether we were long or short options. In addition:
All schemes outperformed the benchmark when short gamma. We find
that intuitive as it resembles the results from scenario [d] in Figure 27:
short options in markets whose returns are mean-reverting – in this case,
over the short run. Here, the delta hedge strategy buys more in rising
markets and sells more in falling markets. The less we trade it, the more
under-hedged we are, and the less we lose relative to the benchmark. On
average, all schemes under-hedge the delta relative to the benchmark.
Most schemes underperformed the benchmark when long gamma. This
result is similar to that of simulated scenario [c] – long options in (short-
73
As before, we only look at the delta hedge leg of the returns, thus ignoring the option mark-to-market
leg. The latter is the same for all strategies.
Figure 29: Aggregate backtest results (short – left chart, long – right chart) according to delta hedging scheme,
expressed relative to the benchmark
Marginal gain/loss in Sharpe ratio vs benchmark Marginal gain/loss in Sharpe ratio vs benchmark
0.08
0.30 #1: G.Search #2: M.A.
0.06
#3: B.Outs #4: E.Rets
0.25 0.04
#5: W.W.
0.02
0.20
0.00
0.15 -0.02
-0.04
0.10 -0.06 #1: G.Search #2: M.A.
The more we loosened our delta tolerance thresholds, the more that the
tracking error grew irrespective of the hedging scheme. This is the most
discernible pattern, as shown by the charts on the left and in line with the
backtests on simulated data. However, we are still capturing the VRP – all
correlations to the benchmark74 remained above +0.5.
Schemes from Sections 5.4 and 5.5 are located, on average, above others
and less often below the X-axis. The charts in the middle column show
that.
The charts on the right show no obvious pattern. This is good; we do not
want our results to be biased by a small number of assets. It also shows
that we are capturing a feature of the VRP premia as a whole, and not
tailored to a specific market.
Figure 30: Aggregate backtest results according to delta hedging scheme, expressed relative to the benchmark. Y-axis:
marginal gain/loss in Sharpe ration vs benchmark. X-axis: 1 – correlation to the benchmark.
0.5
0.5 #1: G.Search #2: M.A. Equities 0.5
Equities
Equities S&P 500 Nikkei
5d 10d 20d Uncon. 0.4 #3: B.Outs #4: E.Rets
0.4 0.4 Eurostoxx
#5: W.W.
0.3
0.3 0.3
0.2
0.2 0.2
0.1
0.1 0.1
0.0
0.0 0.0
-0.1
-0.1 -0.1
-0.2
-0.2 -0.2
-0.3
-0.3 -0.3
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.45
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.45
FX FX FX
E/$ $/Y A/$ $/BRL
0.2 0.2 0.2
0.0 0.0
-0.1
-0.1 -0.1
-0.2 -0.2
-0.2
-0.3 -0.3
0.2 0.2
0.2
0.1 0.1
0.1
0.0 0.0
0.0
-0.1 -0.1
-0.1
-0.2 -0.2
Correlation of daily returns, 8-15 years of data depending on the market. Source: Deutsche Bank
74
Daily returns, 8 to 15 years of data depending on the underlying market.
1
Our tests covered the same 15 markets as before, and 1-month options. But as
0.5
this section deals with implementation, we modified the variance swap- 0
replicating options basket to be comprised of 10- and 25-delta puts and calls, -0.5
and ATMF puts and calls, all rolled at maturity. The weight of each option was -1
-1.5
inversely related to strike levels, as per standard variance swap replication. We
-2
also added transaction costs; we used our internal database to estimate -2.5
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
volatility bid-ask spreads for the key strikes, and applied linear interpolation to
Benchmark Wlsm
cover other points in the bid-ask surface. As was the case before, our 2.5
Wlsb Wsm
2 Wsb WTIUSDf (rhs)
benchmark is a strategy that sells the same basket of options every month, 1.5
delta hedged daily. 1
0.5
0
This section covers signal estimation and timing, in addition to implementation
-0.5
aspects of our alternative delta hedging (ADH) strategy and how it interacts -1
with timing. We finalise by presenting our results on selling option baskets on -1.5
-2
3 equity indices: the S&P 500, Eurostoxx 50 and the Nikkei 225.
-2.5
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
outperforms in forecasting future volatility, it may also produce better volatility 0.5
0
trading decisions than the benchmark – which always sells a constant amount.
-0.5
Here we assumed daily delta hedging but changed the size of our short (and -1
long) options positions to account for the forecasts. The weighting schemes -1.5
we tested are a function of the spread between current implied75 volatility and -2
-2.5
our forecasts of future realized volatility.76 They focused on direction (long or 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
short, short-only) and magnitude (binary weights, weight by signal intensity). Source: Deutsche Bank
I 4C
1. We took the absolute spread s and calculated the current
I
percentile relative to the past 1 year77 – our signal p.
2. We turned the signal into positions according to direction and magnitude:
75
We used variance swap strikes where available, typically sourced from the CBOE. Where unavailable,
we used a weighted average of 1-month implied volatilities across the smile so as to proxy the variance
swap strike.
76
It is worth noting that we also backtested variations where the original signal was based either on our
volatility forecast alone, or implied volatilities alone. While these schemes were more exposed to factor
momentum, the results were not significantly different in how they compared versus the benchmark.
77
We use a 1-year lookback window to make the signal more adaptive.
Short-only, binary-weighted:
if signs 0, then Wsb 0, otherwiseWsb 1.
We will use this forecast method elsewhere – it is a key input to our P- Bund 3 2 1 5 4
distribution, and as such will be used for deriving probability risk premium JGB 1 4 5 3 2
signals and any other use of our P-distribution technology. For volatility risk Rank 1 5 3 4 2
of Avg
premium, we opt instead for the original signal and therefore will hold a Sharpe ratios are ranked in descending order, while Shortfall-over-
constant short position on the options basket. returns are ranked in ascending order.LS M: long-short,
magnitude weighted. S M: short-only, magnitude-weighted. LS B:
long-short, binary weighted. S B: short-only, binary weighted.
Backtests since 2005, where available. Source: Deutsche Bank
78
We multiply the signal scores by 2 so that the absolute average historical weight is 1; this allows for
better comparison against the benchmark.
79
The 11-year correlations of daily returns versus the benchmark VRP strategy were 0.43 for the long-
short weighting schemes and 0.78 for the short-only weighting schemes.
6.2 Adding alternative delta hedging Figure 33: VRP strategy performance
– benchmark versus alternative delta
Our alternative delta hedging methods are next. The results from Sections 5.7 hedging
are encouraging, but must be understood in more detail. Given its 1.5 Sharpe ratio (new D.Hedge)
outperformance, we opt for hedging scheme from Section 5.4 (Expected
Returns) but also cap our absolute delta exposures to a maximum of 20 delta 1.2
The top chart in Figure 33 shows that a VRP strategy that delta hedges C'dys Bd Fut
according to the scheme above outperforms the benchmark in almost every 0.3
market. This had been alluded to in Section 5.7, and is attributed to the Sharpe ratio (benchmark)
predictive power of our P-distribution. 0.0
0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0
0
But the more interesting finding lies in the bottom chart: on average the Average of top 5 drawdowns (benchmark)
-1
drawdowns under the new scheme are not worse, but they are not noticeably
FX Equities -2
better either. Just as with our volatility forecasts, our spot market forecasts do C'dys Bd Fut -3
not predict upcoming shocks. Alternative delta hedging acts as an extra -4
-7
-8
We next evaluate whether these extra returns pollute our capturing of the
-9
volatility risk premia. We need to ensure that the marginal gains are not due to Average of top 5 drawdowns (new D. hedge)
-10
structural exposures to static or dynamic factors that a pure VRP strategy does Up to 15 years of returns depending on the market. Source:
not have. The long run correlations of daily returns between delta hedging Deutsche Bank
P&Ls81 are at 0.9482, which suggests we are still capturing the VRP. That said,
we need to understand what drives the difference.
80
The ratio of annualised returns to top drawdowns improved in 13 out of the 15 markets under
alternative delta hedging versus the benchmark. However, that is mostly due to an improvement in returns
and not a reduction in the drawdowns.
81
We isolated the delta hedging P&L as opposed to the full strategy P&L in our calculations so as not to
bias our correlations upwards. The options mark-to-market is the same for both alternative and benchmark
strategies, it is only the delta hedging leg that changes.
82
We use 15 years of data in FX and most equity markets, and 10-12 years in commodities and
Treasuries.
The regressors explain, on average, 30% of the variations in the residuals Figure 34: Time-varying R-squared –
over time. The residuals are not just noise.
P&L residual regressed against the 3
That said, there is no specific, time-homogenous factor exposure at the explanatory variables
aggregate level or specific to a given asset. All exposures are cyclical.
1 FX Equities
Some asset class-specific patterns have also emerged. In Treasuries, the 0.9 C'dys Treasuries
0.8
alternative delta hedge strategy had a long bias, which reflects the multi-
0.7
decade rally in the asset class. Equities and FX historically loaded
0.6
positively to asset momentum, except during highly turbulent periods and 0.5
in the past year – both being instances when markets were notably mean- 0.4
reverting. 0.3
0.2
The cyclicality and adaptivity of these results further support the use of 0.1
Figure 35: Time-varying beta exposures – P&L residual regressed against asset returns, delta one portfolios and asset
momentum
5 FX Equities 5 Beta to asset FX Equities 5 Beta to asset direction FX Equities
Beta to delta one momentum
portfolios C'dys Treasuries C'dys Treasuries 4 C'dys Treasuries
4
4
3 3
3
2 2
1 2 1
0 0
1
-1 -1
0
-2 -2
-3 -1 -3
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Timing is the final aspect we will consider in this report. 83 Section 3.2
suggested that exogenous variables may be useful for conditioning exposure
during turbulent markets – periods when neither our volatility forecasts nor
alternative delta hedging helped. We now delve deeper into this idea.
83
Cross-market diversification and modifying the VRP options basket will be addressed in future reports.
Figures 36 and 37 illustrate the results of timing the original benchmark VRP Figure 36: Sharpe ratio rankings –
strategy in each market according to the indicators above. While they VRP strategies timed according to 3
correlated heavily to one another, the GSI ranked top in most instances.84
indicators
Using the GSI timer, the drawdowns were cut by approximately 20% from the Implied Volatility GSI
original and the ratio of annualised returns to average drawdowns almost volatility forecast
doubled.85 S&P 500 3 2 1
SX5E0 3 2 1
But while these results are encouraging, they are not granular enough. In order Nikkei 3 2 1
to assess how consistent is the improvement across drawdown types, we Bovespa 3 2 1
looked at the ratio of returns between the GSI-timed VRP strategy and the E/$ 3 2 1
original benchmark in all drawdowns in the latter across all 15 markets. Such $/Y 2 1 3
analysis is important so as to reduce the sample bias highlighted in Section A/$ 2 3 1
3.4. $/BRL 3 2 1
Gold 3 2 1
Figure 38 plots the distribution of ratios across 2,185 drawdowns in the
WTI 2 3 1
aggregated benchmark VRP strategies, bucketed according to the magnitude
Corn 1 3 2
of loss. Numbers below 1 imply the GSI timer helped, whereas those above 1
Copper 3 2 1
imply the opposite. The findings are sobering: on average, timing only tames
UST 3 2 1
medium to large drawdowns – those above the 30th percentile of the aggregate
Bund 1 3 2
drawdown distribution. In other words, our proxy for global sentiment is
JGB 3 2 1
unlikely to capture smaller, idiosyncratic-driven shocks in each particular
Rank of 3 2 1
market, but it should help against stronger, macro-driven drawdowns in the Average
VRP strategy. That said, the wide variations inside each bucket also suggest Source: Deutsche Bank
1.6 -4
-5
1.4
-6
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
<10th 10-30th 30-60th 60-90th >90th
Drawdown size according to percentile buckets
Source: Deutsche Bank
84
Our volatility forecasts also outperformed the implied volatility in most instances, further confirming the
results from Section 4.5.2.
85
Average of the top 5 drawdowns in each VRP strategy.
That subsequent volatility-adjusted VRP returns are high at the top volatility
quartile is easier to understand, as the strategy is selling volatility when it is at
historical highs. But the high (future) returns when (current) volatilities are at
the bottom quartile are less intuitive. In our view, this is likely due to anecdotal
evidence that volatility stays at low levels for longer than it does at high levels.
Figure 39: Future VRP return distribution according to buckets of current implied volatility
Future 1W VRP returns over 1W 25-75% 33-67% Future 1M VRP returns over 1M 25-75% 33-67% Future 3M VRP returns over 3M 25-75% 33-67%
return volatility 50% return volatility 50% return volatility 50%
1.0 1.2 1.4
86
See for, instance, Francq and Zakoian [2010] for a recent reference.
87
In other words, we take today's implied volatility and calculate where it resides relative to the past 5
years. We do not use future data to estimate the current percentile rank.
We also looked for patterns in how VRP returns relate to changes in implied
volatility and the GSI. As before, we standardized and aggregated the changes
in future VRP returns across markets, and compared these to current
standardized and aggregated changes in the level of implied volatility and the
GSI.
Figure 40: Future VRP return distribution according to buckets of recent change in implied volatility and GSI
Future 1W VRP returns over 1W 25-75% 33-67% Future 1M VRP returns over 1M 25-75% 33-67% Future 3M VRP returns over 3M 25-75% 33-67%
return vol 50% return vol 50% return vol 50%
0.6 1.0 1.2
0.8 1.0
0.4
0.6 0.8
0.2
0.4 0.6
0.0
0.2 0.4
-0.2
0.0 0.2
Future 1W VRP returns over 1W 25-75% 33-67% Future 1M VRP returns over 1M 25-75% 33-67% Future 3M VRP returns over 3M 25-75% 33-67%
return vol 50% return vol 50% return vol 50%
0.6 0.8 1.2
0.6 1.0
0.4
0.8
0.2 0.4
0.6
0.0 0.2
-0.2
0.0
-0.4 -0.2
-0.2
returns.88 These findings indicate the need for further research, as they alone Figure 41: Performance comparison
are not enough to justify changing the format of our timing algorithm. – ADH alone versus ADH + timing
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
-1
Equities FX -2
So far we have shown two VRP-enhancing approaches: alternative delta
C'dys Bd Fut -3
hedging (ADH), introduced in Sections 5.4 and 6.2, and timing, introduced in
-4
Section 6.3. The former acts as an "income" provider, whereas the latter
-5
reduces drawdowns. A final question is whether we should combine both.
-6
-7
Average of top 5 drawdowns
Figure 41 compares the returns of the ADH strategy on its own versus the ADH (ADH + GSI) -8
strategy combined with timing. The drawdowns improved in most cases - as 1.5 ADH + GSI Sharpe
expected - but the resulting Sharpe ratios and modified Calmar ratios 89 are 1.3
better in only half of the markets. Timing mechanisms often curtail income, as 1.1
they can lead to under-leveraging during recovery periods, and timing the VRP 0.9
seems no different. 0.7
Equities FX
0.5
Figure 42 delves deeper into this topic. We zoom into the exact difference 0.3
C'dys Bd Fut
between the ADH strategy and the benchmark - the P&L difference between 0.1 ADH Sharpe
both delta hedging legs - and evaluate whether there is value in timing that
0
-0.1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2
spread.90 As the Sharpe ratios show, there is no strong evidence that timing the 2.5 ADH + GSI modified Calmar
spread adds value, just as we find no evidence that our aggregate delta one
2.0
portfolios from Section 4.1 can be timed. The results look particularly worse in
Equities, as the orange boxes in Figure 42 show. 1.5
Equities FX
In summary, these results show there exists a trade-off between income 1.0 C'dys Bd Fut
boosting and drawdown control when trying new VRP enhancement methods. 0.5
While we favour alternative delta hedging in all instances, we believe the ADH modified Calmar
decision to further apply strategy timing should be dependent on the investor’s 0.0
0 1 1 2 2 3
risk constraints.
Source: Deutsche Bank
We finalise this section by showing our results in 3 equity indices: S&P 500,
Eurostoxx 50 and Nikkei 225. In all 3 cases, we systematically sell USD 100
worth of a basket of 1-month options, rolled every month. The basket is
comprised of 10-delta, 25-delta and ATMF calls and puts, where the capital
allocated is inversely related to the strike level - as per variance swap formula.
As elsewhere in Section 6, costs are included.
88
The reader will likely see another, smaller pattern in the form of an inverted u-shape in the chart
pertaining to future 3-month returns against 1-month changes in implied volatility. It suggests that
significant drops in volatility are also detrimental to future VRP returns. It suggests, in fact, that the most
favourable environment is one where implied volatilities are not moving (the 50-67th percentile bucket).
89
Annualised strategy returns divided by the average of its 5 worst drawdowns.
90
We effectively divided the strategy P&L into 3 legs: the options P&L, the benchmark delta hedge P&L
and the additional delta hedge P&L from the ADH approach. We focus only on the third leg because we
have already shown earlier that the GSI performs well in timing the other 2.
Figure 43 and Figure 44 show our backtested results. The benchmark strategy Figure 42: ADH delta hedge spread
applies daily delta hedging, and is plotted in gray. The strategy that applies the with and without timing
GSI indicator to adjust position sizes in the benchmark strategy, as described in
Equities Sharpe ADH Delta Hedge spread + GSI
Section 6.3, is plotted in blue. The strategy that delta hedges according to our 0.9
FX
expected spot returns, as described in Section 5.4, is shown in blue. Finally, the 0.7
C'dys
strategy that uses both alternative delta hedging and timing is plotted in Bd Fut 0.5
orange.
0.3
0.1
Alternative delta hedging boosts the returns in all 3 cases; it bumps the slope
-0.5 -0.3 -0.1
-0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
of our 3 time series. The GSI timer reduces the average of the 5 worst
drawdowns in 2 out of 3 strategies. When combined, the results are also mixed -0.3 Sharpe ADH Delta Hedge
spread
– on average, we see lower risk-adjusted returns but lower drawdowns. -0.5
Figure 43: Backtested cumulative returns – VRP strategy applied to equity index options
30 ADH + GSI Timer Alt. Delta Hedging 30 ADH + GSI Timer 25 ADH + GSI Timer Alt. Delta Hedging
S&P 500_Benchmark Bmk with GSI Alt. Delta Hedging Nikkei_Benchmark Bmk with GSI
25 SXE50_Benchmark 20
25
Bmk with GSI
20
20 15
15
10
15
10
5
10
5
0
0 5
-5
-5 0
-10
-10 -5 Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan
Jan 02 Jan 04 Jan 06 Jan 08 Jan 10 Jan 12 Jan 14 Jan 16 Jan 02 Jan 04 Jan 06 Jan 08 Jan 10 Jan 12 Jan 14 Jan 16 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
7. Conclusion
This report introduces a framework for extracting value in volatility surfaces
across asset classes. It is based on comparing the market-implied distribution
of future returns - the Q-distribution - with our subjective expectations of the
same - in other words, our P-distribution. In building the latter, we use a
parametric approach to combine the information from our delta-one systematic
strategies with a regime-switching, event-calibrated multivariate risk factor
model.
The risk factors we use encompass macro drivers (inflation and growth),
market drivers (sector and asset class returns) and dynamic drivers
(Momentum and Carry). We calibrate the model to 80 assets across currencies,
equity indices, commodities and international Treasuries.92 Asset sensitivity to
our global drivers is estimated through stepwise robust regressions.
Section I.I provides a background to risk factor models. Section I.II provides the
algorithmic framework for setting up the factors and volatility forecasts. Finally,
Section I.III focuses on model estimation – in other words, how our betas are
derived.
91
See Roll and Ross [1976] and Burmeister et al [1994].
92
21 equity index futures: ASX, Bolsa, Bovespa, CAC, DAX, Eurostoxx, HSI, IBX, ISE, JSE, Kospi, Nasdaq,
Nikkei, OMX, RDX, SMI, S&P 500, TSE, TWE, FTSE and WIG. 30 USD/FX: USD/G10 + USD vs BRL, CLP,
COP, CZK, HUF, IDR, ILS, INR, KRW, MXN, MYR, PEN, PHP, PLN, RON, RUB, SGD, THB, TRY, TWD, ZAR.
20 commodity futures: brent, cocoa, coffee, corn, cotton, gasoil, heating oil, natural gas, soybeans, sugar,
wheat, WTI, silver, aluminium, gold, copper, led, nickel, platinum, zinc. 9 bond futures: 10Y government
bonds in Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, UK, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, US.
93
See Ward [2010], Ward et al [2016] and Grinold & Kahn [1999] for an in-depth overview of risk factor
models and risk modelling.
94
See Zivot [2011] and Connor [1996] for more details on these 3 types.
factor, and its loading to an asset is estimated through time series Figure 45: Correlation between
regression techniques. Macroeconomic factor models are the simplest and observed and estimated factor
most intuitive of the 3, though suffer from 2 potential drawbacks: mis-
returns
specification (when we use the wrong variable to represent the factor) and
factor omission (when we ignore a key driver).
Fundamental factor models are distinct in that we assume that the factor
loadings are pre-specified, and factor returns are estimated through cross-
sectional regressions. They are the standard followed by risk factor
providers, and use asset-specific characteristics such as industry sector,
corporate accounting metrics and other style classification measures.
While popular in the equity investment community, this type of factor
model is less applicable to markets with few observable asset-specific
characteristics. It also suffers from the same drawbacks as macro factor
models, though have the advantage of being memory-less – it allows for
Source: Deutsche Bank
point-in-time risk estimation.
Statistical factors take a completely different approach; neither the factor
returns nor their loadings are observable. Both are estimated instead
through statistical techniques – most commonly, factor or principal
component analysis. Mis-specification and factor omission are not a
concern in this approach, but statistical factors suffer from a lack of direct
economic interpretation.
Choosing from the 3 alternatives is not straight-forward; the researcher must
take a view on whether she needs the factors to be interpretable, whether
there are enough asset-specific characteristics that serve as drivers, whether
there are enough assets for cross-sectional regressions to be run efficiently,
and – ultimately – what she needs the model for.
In our case, we use it to forecast the volatility of asset returns. With that in
mind, the macro factor model approach suits us best. Our pool of assets is too
small for cross-sectional regressions to be reliable, and our assets lack enough
fundamental characteristics. At the same time, we want to be able to interpret
what each risk factor represents for future purposes. 95
Figure 45 illustrates part of our argument – that the fundamental factor model
approach does not fit our goals as well. It plots the correlation between factor
returns observed by market data – the “true” returns – and factor returns
estimated by the cross-sectional regressions defined using the fundamental
factor approach.96 The correlations are generally strong but not always; in the
case of rates markets, our estimated returns correlate little to the true factor
returns due to a lack of breadth of constituents.
As the reader may suspect, selecting the qualifying factors was the biggest
challenge we faced when creating our risk model. We first had to define how
much of the variance in our basket of assets needed to be explained by
95
Examples of future use include portfolio risk hedging and risk factor investing.
96
We classified our pool of 80 assets into 6 sub-asset class buckets: DM and EM equities, DM and EM
FX, commodities and international Treasury markets. We assigned a value of 1 or 0 to an asset depending
on whether it belonged to that bucket, in the same manner as stocks are classified into industry or sector
buckets. We also added a global market bucket which applied to all assets. We then applied constrained
OLS regressions to estimate factor returns.
common factors, and then we had to choose which factors best fit the task.
Both steps are challenging. The target explanatory power is a random variable
in itself, as the interaction between factor and idiosyncratic risk changes over
time. Choosing the actual factors is not straight forward either. We must
acknowledge our hidden bias – we know which factors explained the past –
and seek to minimize its adverse effect on future forecasts.
There are 2 aspects to this task: defining the maximum number of statistical
factors, which is defined once using a long historical window, and choosing
the optimal number of factors applicable to a given rebalancing date. We
applied the Cattell’s Scree test to define the former, choosing a maximum
number of 8 (out of 80) statistical factors. 97 As for the latter, we applied the
information criteria proposed by Bai and Ng [2002].
Next, we want to evaluate how much of the variance in each asset can be
explained by the statistical factors chosen above. We run standard time series
regressions of asset returns on principal component returns and aggregate the
R-squared output from the 80 individual regressions.98 This number, which
changes at every rebalancing date, becomes our target explanatory power. It is
the amount of variance we will try to explain using the macro factors built
below.
0.6
This choice, however, creates 2 challenges: how to capture the desired factors,
0.5
and whether we are capturing enough of them.
0.4
0.3
We started with Chen et al [1986]; as per authors, we assumed that our asset
0.2
returns should be explained by surprises in GDP, inflation and interest rates.
0.1
We tried capturing the first 2 through the nowcasting indices introduced in
0
Natividade et al [2015], and the latter through 10Y US Treasury returns. Dec-01 Dec-04 Dec-07 Dec-10 Dec-13 Dec-16
97
The Cattell’s Scree test plots the components as the X-axis and the corresponding eigenvalues as the Y-
axis. The contribution of each eigenvalue in explaining the total variance is presented in descending order
and linked with a line. Once the drop ceases and the additional eigenvalues explain little extra, we define
the cut-off. It suffers from the drawback that there is no deterministic solution as to the optimal number of
factors; the choice is subjective to the researcher. See Cattell [1978].
98
The OLS regressions were run on 2 years of daily data, rolled daily.
nowcasting indices may be of higher frequency but perhaps still too slow, and
we may be missing other relevant drivers.
Next we tackled the factor representation issue. Market returns are often cited Figure 47: Explanatory power using
as representative of macroeconomic developments99, and as such we replaced market-based macro factors versus
our growth indices with asset class returns100 in G10 equities, G10 USD/FX,
the target
commodities and global Treasuries. These should capture both the macro
0.7
picture and asset class specific innovations, and correspond to the “market” Modf. 3-factor model Benchmark
0.6
variable alluded to in the CAPM. We also replaced our inflation series with a
0.5
market-derived metric: long nominal 10Y USTs while short 10Y TIPS, as per
0.4
Podkaminer [2013]. Figure 47 shows the effect of the new set on explanatory
0.3
power; we are capturing more, but still not enough.
0.2
0.1
Our next step was to either add market-representative categories or to sub-
0
categorise our factors in search for additional entropy. This is akin to industry Dec-03 Dec-05 Dec-07 Dec-09 Dec-11 Dec-13 Dec-15
and sector classification in fundamental equity risk models. In the case of Source: Deutsche Bank
equities and FX, we added emerging market return factors by orthogonalising
EM asset returns against G10 asset returns. In commodities, we split the
market factor into 3: energy, metals 101 and agricultural asset returns.
Separating between developed and emerging markets is not uncommon – the
latter often captures stronger country risk premium – see, for instance,
Podkaminer [2013] and Greenberg et al [2016]. Figure 48 shows the pickup in
explanatory power.
Finally, for completeness, we added two dynamic factors: time series Figure 48: Explanatory power using
Momentum and Carry. While these base factors are typically classified as sub-categorised, market-based
return drivers instead of risk drivers, there will be periods when they drive
factors versus the target
portfolio losses in ways not captured by the market factors outlined earlier. The
0.7
attractive long-term returns in Carry and time series Momentum investing exist Benchmark w/ Cdty sub sectors
0.5
consistent with Ang [2014].
0.4
0.3
Figure 50 outlines our final list of risk factors.103 We acknowledge a bias; we
0.2
assume these factors, which “worked” in the past, will also “work” in the
0.1
future, but our consistency with the literature is reassuring. Figure 49 shows
0
the explanatory power of our final multi-factor risk model; it looks very similar Sep-95 Sep-99 Sep-03 Sep-07 Sep-11 Sep-15
to the original, PCA-driven target set in Section I.II.I. in other words, we can Source: Deutsche Bank
now explain the desired amount of variance in our pool of 80 markets using
“tangible” – and even hedge-able – drivers.
99
See Ang [2014] for a detailed discussion.
100
We proxied asset class returns through (first) principal component baskets. The PCs are estimated
using a 1-year lookback window of daily returns, rebalanced monthly. The factors are extracted from a
correlation matrix – i.e. we assume unit variances.
101
We chose not to separate between base and precious metals because of the limited breadth in the
latter. Had we sub-categorised, the regressions run on their 1st principal components would have over-
estimated the explanatory power of the model.
102
The “momentum crash” effect is a good example.
103
The reader may also be interested in knowing that the only additional factor considered was “crash
risk”, introduced in David and Bhansali [2014] and proxied as the returns of a short 10-delta 1-month put on
the S&P 500. We ultimately opted against it because it failed to explain much extra variance.
Figure 50: Our factors - description and how to attain exposure Figure 49: Explanatory power of our
Risk factors How to get exposure final risk factor model versus the
Inflation Return of long nominal US Treasuries, short TIPS (Treasury Inflation- target
Protected securities) portfolio
0.7 Final risk factor model Benchmark
Equity – Developed Broad-developed market equity index return. This is gained through the
Market returns of 1st principal component of our developed market indices. 0.6
Equity – Emerging Return of long EM equity index (1st principal component of emerging 0.5
Dollar – G10 countries Long 1st principal component of USD/G10 currencies. 0.3
Dollar – Emerging Return of long 1st principal component of USD/EM currencies, short 1st 0.2
Markets principal component of USD/G10 currencies portfolio 0.1
Commodities – Metals Long 1st principal component of our global metals (industrial and precious) Source: Deutsche Bank
sector basket.
Commodities – Long 1st principal component of our agriculture basket.
Agriculture sector
Rates – Global Long 1st principal component of our sovereign 10Y bond futures market.
Treasuries
Cross-asset Trend Return of our cross-asset trend strategy (Marta).
Cross-asset Carry Return of our cross-asset carry strategy (Carrie)
Source: Deutsche Bank
Having defined our ingredients in Section I.II, we now move into the final step:
how to estimate the model. Our final goal is to estimate the sensitivity of each
asset to our list of risk factors, as these factor loadings will serve as input to
how we forecast asset volatility in Section 4.
104
See Belsley and Kuh [1980] for details.
105
We used 17 years of data in total. The tests were run using 2 years of daily factor returns, rolled daily.
The test statistic did not breach the critical threshold value of 10 at any point of our sample history.
106
We also attempted more complex techniques, namely: partial least squares regressions, principal
component regressions, ridge regressions and LASSO. None showed enough improvement in our results
so as to justify the extra number of parameters required for calibration.
107
Outliers often lead to a violation of the assumption that our regression residuals are Gaussian,
prompting issues such as heteroskedastic and skewed residuals.
1. We first take the last 2 years of daily observed returns in both asset and
factor data. We de-trend and remove the outliers109 in both cases.
ii. We estimate the sensitivity of asset returns to each factor 1
using a
weighted least squares regression, i.e. X WX
T
X T WY ,
where Y is a Nx1 vector of asset returns, X is a Nx13 matrix of factor
returns (plus the intercept), and is a 13x1 vector of coefficients.
110
, MAD
constants 1
stands for mean absolute deviation and
h diag X X T X X T representing a vector of leverage values
from the current regression fit.111
108
The method is called iteratively weighted least squares. It involves iteratively re-weighting each data
observation and re-running our regressions through weighted least squares until our betas converge to a
target tolerance level. We use a bi-square weighting function to re-weight our data observations. See
DuMouchel and O’Brien [1989] for details.
109
We remove observations below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile of daily returns over the
past 2 years.
110
Setting t = 4.685 gives us coefficients that are 95% as statistically significant as the OLS estimates.
Setting c = 0.6745 makes the estimate unbiased in a normal distribution.
111
See, for instance, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leverage_(statistics)
iii. We repeat the step above until there are no qualifiers left. For every
asset, we record the qualifying factor coefficients and set the others to
zero.
The coefficients defined in Step 3 are used as input to our asset volatility
forecasts, as defined earlier in Section 4.3. This completes the estimation of
our cross-asset, macro factor risk model.
112
If the p-value of our regression F-statistic with the new explanatory variable is higher than that of
without it, we do not include the new variable. For reference, see:
https://uk.mathworks.com/help/stats/stepwiselm.html?searchHighlight=stepwiselm&s_tid=doc_srchtitle
The GSI aggregates 11 barometers of risk across asset classes. These were
Figure 52: GSI – Kernel density and
collected through a survey of our colleagues in macroeconomic research and
focused on variables that were highly adaptive and historically persistent – in Gaussian mixture decomposition
other words, they did not predict turbulent periods but adapted quickly to Kernel Density Low Risk
Medium Risk High Risk
them. They are:
Equity implied volatility: the VIX, a weighted average of implied vols which
helps gauge the market expectation of how volatile the S&P 500 will be
over the next 1 month.
Financial sector risk (equity perspective): the ratio of the MSCI Financials
Local Index over the MSCI World Index.
Financial sector risk (rates perspective): the difference between 30Y and 2Y
asset swap spreads, as the former represents possible stress in the
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
-0.1
pension fund and insurance sector while the former represents banking
sector stress. This measure of liquidity risk has been more efficient at Source: Deutsche Bank
regime and the remaining in high risk. Figure 52 plots this historical Asian
Financial May-97 Feb-98 69
distribution. Crisis
RUS default Jul-98 Sep-98 59
Figure 53 illustrates how efficient the GSI has been at capturing turbulent .COM bubble Feb-00 Jun-00 79
periods in both backtest and live history. In 13 out of the 17 stress periods (and .COM bubble Oct-00 Nov-00 65
4 out of 4 live stress periods) the indicator has been at its upper tercile, .COM bubble Feb-01 May-01 74
suggesting it adapted to high risk conditions when needed. It did not predict
2002
any particular stress period, as it is not designed to do so, but adapted quickly Jul-02 Oct-02 72
downturn
to each of the periods below. Start of US
Mar-04 Jul-04 65
hiking cycle
We have used the GSI for 2 purposes: timing risk-sensitive strategies and Start of
Jun-07 May-08 89
financial crisis
estimating regime-dependent covariance matrices:
Collapse of
Sep-08 Jan-09 88
Lehman
Timing a strategy implies increasing or decreasing the capital allocated to it
EU Sov. Debt May-10 Jul-10 82
according to an algorithm that is often based on values of an exogenous
EU Sov. Debt Jun-11 Dec-11 80
variable. In this and prior reports, we have used GSI levels to increase or
decrease exposure according to the ratio: Lt ,t h 2 I t 2 , where Taper Tantrum May-13 Sep-13 72
L [0,2] . Figure 54 shows the rolling drawdowns on a standard FX Carry Greek Debt
Sep-14 Jul-15 79
Crisis
strategy (DBHVBUSI Index) before and after we applied the algorithm
above, over the long run and since we published the idea in Anand et al. Oil Price
Feb-16 Mar-16 79
Stress
[2014]. Risk indicators, when applied to risk-sensitive strategies, provide
British EU
rare instances when timing is promising. On average, timing is a very hard Referendum
Jun-16 Jul-16 68
task.114 Source: Deutsche Bank
113
We set negative sample covariance values to zero, as per Luo et al [2009]. All data is pre-processed
such that it has the same direction to risk appetite, therefore minimising the instances where we get
negative covariances in the first place.
114
See Asness [2016] for a longer discussion of this topic.
Figure 54: Rolling FX Carry (DB Balanced Harvest) drawdowns – with and
without GSI timing, historical and since September 2014
0 0
-0.05 -0.05
-0.1 -0.1
-0.15 -0.15
-0.2 -0.2
Regime-based co-movement estimation is another area in which the GSI Figure 55: Volatility of the average
can be applied. Quantitative researchers often calculate co-variances using
pairwise correlation using different
asset returns sequenced in time. Another approach, however, is to
estimate co-movements conditioned on data of the same market regime (rolling) correlation matrices
over different – potentially non-sequential – periods in history. The premise 0.02 Time domain
Low Risk
is that asset dependencies may be better modeled as a function of risk 0.018 Med. Risk
High Risk
states; they may, for instance, be more strongly correlated in risk aversion 0.016
0.014
as one factor – “risk” – becomes the primary driver of asset returns.
0.012
Conversely, they may be less correlated under lower risk conditions as 0.01
multiple drivers affect price action. Figure 55 plots the volatility of the 0.008
bucketed according to 3 GSI states and according to time.115 It shows that 0.004
0.002
the regime-conditioned estimates are less volatile than the estimates 0
calculated in time domain; which suggests the former could potentially 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
lead to more stable and adaptive asset weights when building portfolios.116 Source: Deutsche Bank
In summary, the GSI seeks to update the investor about current market
conditions in as adaptive way as possible. It can be a powerful tool for
modeling financial data – either for timing or estimating co-movements.
115
We used 4 flagship assets in FX, commodities and global Treasuries, and 5 equity indices. In this
exercise, we effectively applied a bucketing approach to estimate joint relationships. First, we estimated
the 3 risk-state dependent correlation matrices by separating asset returns into 3 buckets based on the GSI
level at the time. In this case, we used an anchored lookback window so as to maximise the number of
data points. In the time domain, however, our correlation matrices were estimated using a lookback
window equal to the average size of 3 risk-state buckets. As such, the number of data points in each
bucket rises in time equally in both domains. Thereafter, we calculated the volatility of average pair-wise
correlation over time as a measure of the stability.
116
Researchers then control for covariance estimation error using shrinkage or factorization. For shrinkage,
see James and Stein [1961], Jorion [1986] and Frost and Savarino [1986]. For factorization, see Sharpe
[1963], Chan et al [1999] and MacKinlay and Pastor [2000].
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Appendix 1
Important Disclosures
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Analyst Certification
The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of the undersigned lead analyst(s). In addition,
the undersigned lead analyst(s) has not and will not receive any compensation for providing a specific recommendation
or view in this report. Caio Natividade/Silvia Stanescu/Vivek Anand/Paul Ward/Simon Carter/Pam Finelli/Spyros
Mesomeris
Hypothetical Disclaimer
Backtested, hypothetical or simulated performance results have inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance
record based on trading actual client portfolios, simulated results are achieved by means of the retroactive application of
a backtested model itself designed with the benefit of hindsight. Taking into account historical events the backtesting of
performance also differs from actual account performance because an actual investment strategy may be adjusted any
time, for any reason, including a response to material, economic or market factors. The backtested performance
includes hypothetical results that do not reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings or the deduction of
advisory fees, brokerage or other commissions, and any other expenses that a client would have paid or actually paid.
No representation is made that any trading strategy or account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to
those shown. Alternative modeling techniques or assumptions might produce significantly different results and prove to
be more appropriate. Past hypothetical backtest results are neither an indicator nor guarantee of future returns. Actual
results will vary, perhaps materially, from the analysis.
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