June 2020

STRATEGIC FORUM
National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Senior Research
Just Another Paper Tiger?
Fellow in the Center for the Study of
Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for
Chinese Perspectives on the
National Strategic Studies, at National
Defense University. U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
Key Points By Joel Wuthnow

I
◆  Chinese officials have responded
to the U.S. “free and open Indo- n March 2018, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi responded to a question
Pacific” strategy through a re-
gional counternarrative that raises about the Donald Trump administration’s new “free and open Indo-Pacific”
doubts about the motives and strategy by comparing it to “sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean” that

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS

sustainability of U.S. leadership in
Asia while presenting China as a might get some attention, “but soon will dissipate.”1 Wang’s remarks raise an
partner of choice. important question for U.S. policymakers: Is Beijing so confident in its own
◆  Chinese analysts perceive the influence, and doubtful of U.S. commitments in the region, that it perceives a
Indo-Pacific strategy as a form of
green light to continue or expand the kinds of behavior Washington is trying to
containment based on stronger
U.S. relations with Japan, India, discourage, such as coercion of China’s territorial rivals and “predatory” lending?
and Australia. They assess that, The question takes on added significance in the context of Chinese percep-
if left unchecked, the strategy
will reduce China’s influence and tions of a United States in relative decline following the 2008 global financial
increase regional tensions. crisis. The view that Washington was no longer able or willing to stand up to
◆  Chinese observers identify weak China may have contributed to more assertive Chinese policies over the last
regional support as the primary
decade. For instance, Beijing’s discounting of some U.S. commitments under the
constraint on U.S. strategy in
Asia and advocate responding by Barack Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia” strategy may have contrib-
improving China’s own relations
uted to China’s controversial land reclamation program in the South China Sea.2
throughout the neighborhood.
Some regional observers are now concerned that Beijing will exploit Washing-
◆ U.S. messaging needs to offer
assurances of U.S. commitments ton’s lackluster response to the 2019–20 novel coronavirus to further expand its
and evidence of regional contribu- influence across Asia.3
tions. These messages should be
regularly reinforced in regional Nevertheless, a review of Chinese assessments of the Trump administra-
gatherings, even those hosted by tion’s Indo-Pacific strategy over the last 3 years reveals that Beijing is not as dis-
China.
missive of U.S. prospects in the region as Wang’s comments suggest. After a brief
◆ Washington needs to maintain review of the origins and contents of the strategy, this paper discusses Chinese
key relationships in the region but
need not respond in kind to every perspectives on two levels. At the official level, Beijing has already developed
Chinese overture. The strategy a counternarrative that raises doubts about U.S. motives and portrays China
may also create new opportunities
to negotiate with China on certain as more in tune with the region’s interests and sensibilities. At the unofficial
issues from a position of strength. level, influential Chinese civilian and military analysts have focused greatly on

ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 1

the quadrilateral dialogue and U.S. relations with India, ministration continued this approach, which it relabeled
Japan, and Australia, confirming prior Chinese concerns as the Asian “rebalance” or “pivot.”5 Some of the unique
about strategic encirclement; expressed deep concerns achievements of the rebalance included signing an en-
about the motives and ramifications of the strategy for hanced defense cooperation agreement with the Philip-
Chinese interests; and identified regional ambivalence pines, dispatching a U.S. Ambassador to the Association
toward U.S. objectives as the main constraint that may be of Southeast Asian Nations for the first time, and in-
exploited to minimize risks. Their conclusion is that Chi- creasing U.S. aid to Southeast Asia through the Lower
na should take advantage of that weakness by redoubling Mekong Initiative.6
its own regional economic and diplomatic initiatives. The Trump administration’s approach is largely con-
The final section of this paper argues that U.S. poli- sistent with this reweighting of the region’s importance
cymakers will have to contend with all aspects of China’s for U.S. interests. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
response: regional countermessaging, additional invest- eration CEO summit in Da Nang, Vietnam, in Novem-
ments in programs such as Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road ber 2017, President Trump identified the United States
Initiative (BRI), and China’s changing relations with as a Pacific power and discussed the need to uphold the
other pivotal countries, including India, Japan, and Aus- principles of a “free and open” regional order, such as
tralia. It is also possible—though far from a foregone the rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navi-
conclusion—that Beijing’s refocusing on neighbor- gation, which have supported economic growth, while
hood diplomacy as a way to prevent the emergence of also renegotiating free trade agreements to reflect the
an anti-China balancing coalition could imply a modest, principles of “fairness and reciprocity.”7 U.S. officials, in-
if temporary, reduction in overt Chinese saber-rattling cluding Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, also
and predatory lending. Such moves, if they occur, would highlighted India’s role in promoting regional growth
be evidence that the U.S. strategy is achieving some of and advancing democratic norms.8 This contributed to
its near-term objectives. Nevertheless, Washington will the adoption of the term Indo-Pacific (which originated
have to consider the implications of China’s responses to among Australian scholars earlier in the century) rather
U.S. influence in the region and be clear-eyed about the than the narrower Asia-Pacific, but reflected consistency
limits of Chinese restraint. in U.S. policy: both Bush and Obama courted India as a
valued partner.9
An Evolving U.S. Strategy in the Trump coupled his positive vision for regional order
Indo-Pacific Region with a diagnosis of the problem that emphasized Chi-
A renewal of U.S. strategic focus on Asia dates to nese policies and actions, including intellectual property
the mid-2000s, with the George W. Bush administra- theft, massive industrial subsidies, and corporate espio-
tion’s pursuit of bilateral free trade agreements, initial ne- nage, which reduced U.S. competitiveness. His admin-
gotiations on a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a shift istration’s National Security Strategy, released in De-
of military assets to the region, and attempts to encour- cember 2017, followed by the Department of Defense’s
age stronger collaboration between U.S. allies (depart- 2018 National Defense Strategy, put more weight on
ing from the “hub-and-spokes” alliance model inherited strategic competition with China, in contrast with the
from the Cold War). These policies were designed to previous two administrations that had emphasized a
strengthen the pillars of regional order, prevent China mix of balancing and cooperation to steer Beijing in a
from “making a bid for hegemony,” and address other
4
more positive direction.10 In various speeches through-
challenges, such as terrorism and North Korea’s nuclear out 2018 and 2019, U.S. officials expanded their critique
development. Driven by similar goals, the Obama ad- of China’s behavior, focusing on region-wide problems

2 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

associated with Xi’s BRI, such as “debt trap diplomacy,” A more complete view of the Indo-Pacific strategy
the use of Chinese labor in building overseas infrastruc- appeared in 2019 when both the Defense and State de-
ture projects, and perceived exporting of authoritarian partments detailed their approaches to the region (see
ideology. 11
table). The Defense Department’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
The primary tools associated with the strategy re- Report, which was released in June to coincide with the
flect both continuity with and change from the Indo- annual Shangri-La Dialogue, illuminated how the ac-
Pacific strategy of previous administrations. Concluding quisition and deployment of advanced capabilities, new
free trade agreements with countries such as Japan and operational concepts, and initiatives to strengthen secu-
South Korea continued a long-term pattern, but aban- rity partnerships (highlighting Taiwan, New Zealand,
doning the TPP was a major deviation. U.S. officials and Mongolia) would contribute to the preservation of
reaffirmed the importance of treaty alliances and part- a “free and open” region and dissuade Chinese adven-
nerships with Southeast Asian countries, while placing turism.18 In November, the State Department issued A
more attention on states such as Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which documented a wide
and the Federated States of Micronesia. Trump also re-
12
range of diplomatic, economic, and security programs.19
vived the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral dia- In short, U.S. speeches and official documents gradu-
logue, which was originally held in 2007, expanding its ally articulated an interagency strategy to strengthen the
focus and upgrading it to ministerial status. In addition,
13
regional order and respond to challenges from China,
his administration continued U.S. Navy–led freedom of largely continuing goals from previous administrations
navigation operations in the South China Sea that previ- while adding in some unique elements.
ous administrations had used to challenge China’s exces- U.S. scholars have paid close attention to the dip-
sive territorial claims, but reportedly granted the military lomatic and resource limitations that may constrain the
more authority to determine how, when, and where those Indo-Pacific strategy, including the Trump administra-
operations would be conducted. 14
tion’s withdrawal from the TPP, contentious cost-sharing
Given concerns about the BRI, a hallmark of the negotiations with allies, inadequate reallocation of U.S.
new U.S. strategy was identifying alternative forms of financial resources to the region, proposed cuts to State
infrastructure assistance. In July 2018, Secretary of State Department and U.S. Agency for International Develop-
Michael Pompeo announced a $113 million “down pay- ment funding, and a force structure that has remained
ment” on U.S. investments in the digital economy, ener- static in some ways despite a gradual shifting of air and
gy, and infrastructure sectors. In October 2018, Trump
15
naval assets to the region.20 Nevertheless, U.S. observers
signed the BUILD Act, which raised the ceiling on U.S. have paid less attention to China’s perspectives.21 This is
development financing from $29 billion to $60 billion. a notable gap because Chinese concerns may influence
The U.S. International Development Finance Corpora- responses that demand further U.S. resource commit-
tion was established at the end of 2019 to manage these ments or reduce the strategy’s effectiveness. The follow-
funds, a large (but unstated) share of which would be de- ing discussions probe Chinese views at both the official
voted to Indo-Pacific projects. Moreover, in November
16
and unofficial levels.
2018, the U.S. Government signed a memorandum with
its Japanese and Australian counterparts to create a new China’s Regional Counternarrative
partnership designed to provide financing for projects Since the end of 2017, Chinese Foreign Ministry
that “adhere to international standards and principles for and Ministry of National Defense spokespersons, along
development,” an implicit critique of Chinese projects with senior Chinese officials, have addressed the Indo-
viewed as falling short of those standards. 17
Pacific strategy on several occasions.22 The tone of these

ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 3

Table. Indo-Pacific Strategy Lines of Effort: State Department vs. Defense Department
State Department, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific Defense Department, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

Line of Effort Examples Line of Effort Examples

Engaging Partners and Pacific Pledge ($100M), Preparedness Purchases of fifth-
Regional Institutions Lower Mekong Initiative generation aircraft,
($3.8B), Taiwan Arms Sales long-range anti-ship
($10B), India Defense missiles, offensive
Sales ($16B) cyber capabilities, new
operating concepts
Enhancing Economic International Partnerships Strengthen five treaty
Prosperity Development Finance alliances, expand
Corporation ($60B), partnerships with Taiwan,
Millennium Challenge New Zealand, Mongolia;
Corporation ($2.3B), emerging partnerships
U.S.-Japan Free Trade with South Asia/Pacific
Agreement, Blue Dot Island nations
Network
Championing Good Transparency Initiative Promoting a Networked Quad, trilateral
Governance ($600M), Myanmar Region partnerships, ASEAN
Humanitarian Assistance engagement, support for
($669M) intra-Asian partnerships

Ensuring Peace and Southeast Asia Maritime

Stability Security Initiative
($356M), Bay of Bengal
Initiative, U.S. Coast Guard
Engagement, Explosives
removal in Vietnam
($340M)
Investing in Human Fulbright Fellowships,
Capital Young Southeast Asian
Leaders Initiative, Food
for Peace Program
($500M)

responses has been low key, except for contentious re- Four themes in Chinese messaging support this
buttals to direct U.S. criticisms of Chinese policies, such larger regional counternarrative. First are accusations of
as those contained in the National Defense Strategy or U.S. ulterior motives. In September 2018, Vice Foreign
comments by senior U.S. military officials. The lack of
23
Minister Le Yucheng stated that China is “firmly against
more provocative statements in most cases suggests that [U.S.] attempts to use the Indo-Pacific strategy as a tool
Chinese officials are seeking to avoid a rhetorical con- to counter the BRI or even contain China.”26 In June 2019,
frontation with the United States that would not be well the Chinese ambassador to India similarly argued that the
received in the region, where appetite for an escalating Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’s labeling of China as a “revi-
U.S.-China rivalry is low. Instead, Chinese messaging
24
sionist power . . . can hardly stop people from concluding
has attempted to create fissures between Washington that the real agenda of the [United States] is to contain
and its allies and partners by raising doubts about U.S. the rise of China.”27 In August 2019, a Foreign Ministry
motives and commitments while positioning China as a spokesman accused the United States of promoting the
partner of choice.25
strategy to “drive a wedge” between China and its neigh-

4 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

bors through a “selfish beggar-thy-neighbor approach in Third are allusions to the inability of the U.S. Govern-
economic affairs while making military deployments and ment to fully resource its strategy. In August 2018, Wang
strengthening military allies in the region.” 28
Yi responded to a question about Pompeo’s announce-
Second is discounting regional support for U.S. ment of a $113 million down payment on Indo-Pacific
goals and policies. This is evident in Wang Yi’s March development by stating that “when I first heard this fig-
2018 comparison of the purported attempts by the ure of $113 million I thought I heard wrong. At least it
United States and its Quad partners to “contain” China should be 10 times higher, for a superpower with a $16
to “sea foam in the Pacific or Indian oceans” that would trillion [gross domestic product].”35 A Foreign Ministry
soon dissipate because “stoking a new Cold War is out spokesman also raised implicit doubts about the strength
of sync with the times and inciting bloc confrontation of U.S. commitments to the region’s future by comment-
will find no market.” In June 2019, a Foreign Min-
29
ing, “We hope that they can make substantial financial
istry spokesman responded to Acting Secretary of De- contributions and take more concrete steps to truly con-
fense Patrick Shanahan’s Shangri-La Dialogue speech tribute to the welfare of the people in the region.”36
by stating that “development and win-win cooperation Fourth is portraying China as a magnanimous power
is an unstoppable trend of the times and the shared as- willing to support policies that advance regional develop-
piration of people all over the world. . . . [B]y hyping ment. Commenting on the quadrilateral dialogue, a For-
up military undertones and confrontation, a country eign Ministry spokesman stated in November 2017 that
will only end up hurting itself.” The Defense Ministry
30
China is “glad to see relevant countries develop friendly
spokesman’s response to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report and cooperative relations,” as long as they do not tar-
likewise stated that “any strategy that only satisfies the get “a third country.”37 In August 2018, Wang Yi stated,
interests of one party will have little support and will “If the [United States] wants to help regional countries
hurt the interests of all in the end.” 31
with faster development and enhanced security, I think
Supporting this theme, Chinese officials have con- these moves should be welcomed.”38 On another occa-
strued the policies of other states as out of step with the sion, a Foreign Ministry spokesman likewise stated that
competitive nature of the U.S. strategy. In September if the United States and its partners are able to increase
2018, Le Yucheng stated that “there are various versions spending on regional infrastructure, “we welcome that
of [an] Indo-Pacific strategy,” and China is open to any with an open and inclusive attitude.”39 Part of the De-
that “will help regional development and cooperation.”32 fense Ministry spokesman’s response to the Indo-Pacific
The next month, China’s ambassador to India charac- Strategy Report was to note that “China upholds that all
terized Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Shangri-La countries, while seeking their own interests, should also
Dialogue speech as constituting a separate “Indo-Pacific pursue common benefits and jointly build a community
policy” that is “not aimed at any country,” but rather of shared future.”40
“advocates open, inclusive, and rule-based cooperation, In sum, Chinese statements on the Indo-Pacific
with which the Chinese side also agrees.” In September
33
strategy do not support an interpretation of Beijing as
2019, Wang Yi met with the co-chair of Nepal’s Com- “nonchalant” about the direction of U.S. strategy, as one
munist Party, who—likely at China’s behest—stated that Australian-Chinese scholar argued in a Survival article.41
Nepal “firmly disagrees with the so-called Indo-Pacific Rather, Wang Yi’s “sea foam” remarks and other official
Strategy, and opposes any attempt to contain or thwart statements can be seen as part of a larger counternarra-
China’s development.” This appears to have been the
34
tive raising questions about the motives, sustainability,
first attempt by China to enlist proxies to validate its and implications of the U.S. strategy, while positioning
own arguments against the U.S. strategy. China as more in tune with the region’s sensibilities.

ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 5

Communicating this message to a regional audience in ing strategic cooperation between those states.43 Most
different venues over 2 years constitutes an active at- Chinese sources contend that Washington is driving the
tempt to weaken support for U.S. policy and justify Chi- dialogue, but a minority hold that Japan and Australia
na’s own initiatives. This could signal a concern that, if are using it to keep the United States actively involved
successful, the Indo-Pacific strategy will undermine Chi- in Asia.44 At the trilateral level, Ye notes that coordina-
nese interests, in particular by strengthening the resolve tion among U.S., Japanese, and Australian development
of states to join with the United States to oppose China finance institutions represents a nascent attempt to coun-
on the BRI, reject China’s territorial claims, or advance ter the BRI.45 He also assesses the annual U.S.-Japan-
other unwanted policies. India Malabar military exercise as increasingly combat-
focused, with participating forces standard for “a low
China’s Strategic Discourse on intensity war.”46
U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Chinese sources also highlight bilateral develop-
At the unofficial level, Chinese scholars have as- ments between the United States and its Quad partners.
sessed the Indo-Pacific strategy from many angles and References to the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Australia allianc-
have deliberated on how China should respond. The es and the U.S.-India partnership appear more frequently
following review of 30 Chinese assessments published than references to the other three U.S. alliances (with the
between 2018 and 2019 demonstrates a common narra- Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand). Of
tive among influential government think tank analysts these, the greatest attention has been on U.S.-India re-
and university scholars, who focus much of their atten- lations, appearing in 19 sources (63 percent). Chinese
tion on the Quad countries, with some attention to U.S. analysts are especially focused on developments in mili-
partnerships with Southeast Asia and Taiwan and U.S. tary cooperation between Washington and New Delhi,
infrastructure assistance; assert that the main purposes including the U.S. sale to India of 22 Sky Guardian un-
of the Indo-Pacific strategy are to contain China and op- manned aerial vehicles in June 2017, the first to a non-
pose the BRI; and identify weaknesses affecting the U.S. ally;47 pledges to increase defense cooperation during
ability to execute the strategy, most notably lukewarm Modi’s July 2017 U.S. visit;48 and frequent exchanges
support among regional countries. This narrative leads to between the two countries’ defense ministers.49 People’s
prescriptions that focus on enhancing China’s attractive- Liberation Army (PLA) interlocutors were also inter-
ness as a partner of choice via BRI investments and other ested in the September 2018 U.S.-India Communica-
regional outreach.42
tions Compatibility and Security Agreement, which will
A Heavy “Quad” Focus. Compared with the broad provide New Delhi with greater access to U.S. defense
scope of the Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in U.S. Gov- items and could permit greater interoperability between
ernment sources, Chinese analysts myopically focus on U.S. and Indian forces.50
the quadrilateral dialogue and various tri- and bilateral Some analysts expand their view of the Indo-Pacif-
interactions involving the United States, Japan, Austra- ic strategy to include other issues. U.S. Navy freedom of
lia, and India (see figure 1). The dialogue itself was the navigation operations in the South China Sea are among
most common attribute associated with the strategy, ap- the most commonly cited military features of the strat-
pearing in 26 sources (87 percent). Ye Hailin, director egy, appearing in almost half of the articles.51 Scholars
of South Asian studies at the Chinese Academy of So- argue that their increasing frequency, occurrence near
cial Sciences, describes a November 2017 quadrilateral Chinese-occupied features, and greater authority grant-
meeting in Manila as a “significant event” in the Indo- ed to military officials under Trump reflect a bolder use
Pacific strategy and “pre-production work” in develop- of this tool.52 U.S. partnerships in Southeast Asia are

6 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

Figure 1. Perceived Geographic Focus of Strategy (n=30)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
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nc

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In

tA
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Ph

S.-
S.-
ril

as

U.
U.
S.-
U.
ad

he
U.
Qu

ut
So
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U. % of Articles

discussed in nine sources (30 percent). An article by two the BUILD Act.55 Interviews with Chinese civilian ana-
PLA scholars, for instance, argues that the weakening lysts at the end of 2018 suggested that these initiatives—
of the U.S.-Philippine alliance under President Rodrigo more so than the $113 million “down payment” earlier
Duterte has led the Trump administration to cultivate announced by Pompeo—were regarded as key parts of
Hanoi as a new “regional thug” (地区打手) to confront the U.S. strategy; one interlocutor stated this signaled
Beijing in the South China Sea. Taiwan also appears in
53
that Washington was “serious in developing a whole-of-
a few sources (5, 17 percent) that associate recent con- government strategy.”56
gressional legislation such as the Taiwan Travel Act and Causes for Concern. Despite protestations of U.S.
the Taiwan-related language in the 2019 National De- officials to the contrary, containment is the motive that
fense Authorization Act with the strategy. 54
Chinese strategists most frequently ascribe to the Indo-
While Chinese assessments typically focus on the Pacific strategy.57 Of the 26 articles that provide a view
political and military features of the Indo-Pacific strate- on this topic, 22 (85 percent) use some version of the
gy, analysts have also paid increasing attention to its eco- argument that the United States is harnessing its mili-
nomic contours. Aspects of the strategy related to infra- tary deployments and relations with countries around
structure development appear in 17 articles (57 percent), China’s periphery to limit China’s economic growth
while other economic tools such as free trade agreements and military options, thereby preserving its own hege-
appear in 12 (40 percent). Some discussions, as noted, monic status in the regional order.58 There is often lit-
reference economic coordination within the quadrilateral tle elaboration of this perspective, suggesting that the
dialogue or between the United States and its Quad part- argument is so widely accepted that none is required.
ners. More recent assessments discuss the restructuring Closely associated is the perception that U.S. strategy
of the U.S. development finance bureaucracy and the al- under Trump has been redesigned to constrain the BRI
location of $60 billion in infrastructure financing under by circulating an “anti-BRI” message and identifying

ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 7

alternative sources of infrastructure financing. This ar- is very obvious. . . . [O]bjectively, China’s external envi-
gument appears in some form in 16 articles (62 percent). ronment has undergone important changes.”65 A majority
By contrast, only a small group of scholars (23 percent) of the 12 authors who evaluate the strategy’s impact (9,
acknowledge that there are also significant domestic 75 percent) argue that it could increase regional tensions,
economic goals motivating U.S. strategy. 59
thus threatening China’s economic development. Specific
The quadrilateral dialogue and U.S. relations with predictions include a looming arms race in the region,66
Japan, Australia, and India figure prominently in Chi- bolder Japanese and Indian foreign policies,67 and insta-
nese characterizations of U.S. strategy as a containment bility in the South China Sea.68 Some authors (5, 42 per-
plot.60 Geographically, it is not lost on Chinese observ- cent) also argue that the strategy could weaken Chinese
ers that the Quad countries occupy important positions influence by reducing support for China’s BRI invest-
across China’s eastern, southern, and western flanks or ments.69 One PLA scholar contends that greater interop-
that these countries tend to align with the United States erability between U.S. and allied forces will “weaken our
on matters such as opposing China’s expansive territorial influence and capabilities in the region and counter our
claims, confirming prior narratives about U.S. attempts to antiaccess/area-denial capabilities.”70
orchestrate an Asian North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Seams and Weaknesses. Concerns about these kinds
One article even suggests that the United States is build- of outcomes are tempered by a careful examination of a
ing a “strategic linkage” (战略联动) between the Quad range of obstacles that could weaken the U.S. strategy
and U.S. allies in the North Atlantic region to jointly con- (see figure 2). Fifteen of the 17 articles (88 percent) that
tain both China and Russia. 61
discuss U.S. weaknesses focus on weak regional support
Slightly deviating from the conventional wisdom, for a hawkish U.S. strategy. Much of this analysis is fo-
several authors argue that instead of trying to retain a cused on the three Quad partners. For example, Ye Hailin
dominant position in the regional order, Washington argues that Japan has a “different concept” of the Indo-
is pursuing a narrower “offshore balancing” strategy. 62
Pacific at odds with Washington; Australia has no terri-
Drawing from U.S. scholar John Mearsheimer, Zhang torial disputes with China and has only a limited ability
Jiadong, a professor at Fudan University, contends that a to project power near China’s territory; and India has to
decline in U.S. national power relative to China and the consider its competing obligations as a new Shanghai Co-
other major powers has led the United States to shift from operation Organization member.71 Indeed, several schol-
its postwar hegemonic strategy to an approach based on ars portray India as the weakest link in the Quad, arguing
its maritime power, reminiscent of Britain’s strategy in that New Delhi’s aversion to alliances and policy differ-
the 18 and 19 centuries. The Quad countries are also
th th 63
ences with the United States on matters such as India’s
highlighted in this perspective. Zhang writes that, con- arms relations with Russia, energy ties to Iran, and U.S.
fronted with China’s rise, Washington cannot rely com- visa restrictions would prevent India from siding with the
pletely on its alliances with Japan and Australia to bal- United States.72
ance China, and has thus sought to pull New Delhi into Closely associated with this viewpoint is the argu-
its strategic orbit. 64
ment that the Quad states are unlikely to lean too closely
For Chinese scholars, the implication is that, if left to the United States due to their dependence on China as
unchecked, the strategy could damage China’s interests a top export market.73 In the Indian case, Ye Hailin argues
in various ways. In a rare rebuke, two scholars from the that a key intervening variable will be Modi’s domestic
PLA Strategic Support Force explicitly reject Wang Yi’s political strength: a stronger Modi will be more likely
dismissal of U.S. strategy as “sea foam,” arguing that to look after India’s long-term interests in developing
Washington’s attitude is “very serious and its investment economic links with China, but a weaker prime minister

8 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

Figure 2. Perceived Constraints on U.S. Strategy

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Lack of U.S. China Factor America First U.S. U.S. Staffing
Ally/Partner Philosophy Debt/Financial Challenges
Support Constraints

% of Articles

would prioritize relations with Washington for domestic First” philosophy. Specific irritants discussed under this
political gain. Some Chinese scholars also cite China’s
74
heading include U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, the un-
attractiveness as a reason for lukewarm support for U.S. popular U.S. trade war with China, the threat or impo-
goals from Southeast Asian states 75
and Pacific Island sition of tariffs, and contentious burden-sharing negotia-
countries, many of which are recipients of BRI financ-
76
tions with states such as South Korea.82 As two scholars
ing and other Chinese assistance. A handful of scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences suggest,
also note that the United States itself could be self-con- the “stick of trade” and other measures have left “many
strained due to the need for China’s assistance on North allies and partners feeling at a loss.”83
Korea and other issues.77 China’s Response: A Stronger Neighborhood Di-
At a domestic level, six articles (35 percent) refer- plomacy. Depictions of lackluster regional support for
ence financial challenges, such as Budget Control Act U.S. policies lead Chinese scholars to consider what
requirements that will limit the growth of the U.S. de- tools Beijing can use to exacerbate those weaknesses.
fense budget after 2020, a U.S. national debt of more
78
Among the 16 articles that discuss responses, 15 (94 per-
than $21 trillion that could also constrain future U.S. cent) contend that China should strengthen its regional
military spending, 79
and U.S. global commitments that diplomatic and economic outreach. Expanding BRI fi-
intrinsically limit the amount of spending on Indo-Pacific nancing to neighboring countries is the most commonly
priorities. Moreover, seven articles (41 percent) men-
80
cited tool for preserving China’s regional influence.84
tion bureaucratic challenges such as interbureaucratic While this argument might be dismissed as simply par-
disputes, frequent policy reversals, and a lack of perma- roting the current party line, advancing the BRI is still
nent appointees in relevant posts. Bridging the domestic
81
meaningful in the context of skepticism in some Chinse
and external constraints is the view that the Indo-Pacific quarters about spending massive sums on foreign devel-
strategy is fundamentally at odds with Trump’s “America opment, indicating that foreign policy elites might be

ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 9

relatively supportive of continuing this policy if it can are unlikely due to Chinese budget constraints, or a tacit
be framed as a tool of strategic competition. Other tools recognition that assertive Chinese policies are creating
referenced in the literature include building stronger demand for U.S. military presence and assistance in the
party-party relations with Vietnam, building trade defi-
85
region. However, there are no signs that Chinese scholars
cits as leverage with the Association of Southeast Asian favor a fundamental reevaluation of China’s territorial or
Nations, 86
strengthening cooperation with Myanmar, 87
resource ambitions.
and supporting ASEAN’s Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership.88 Implications for the United States
Several Chinese analyses focus specifically on how There was little evidence in this review of two of the
Beijing can drive wedges between the United States and most concerning potential misperceptions. First, there
its Quad partners. India, often seen as the weakest link,
89
was little overconfidence or “triumphalism” about China’s
has received perhaps the most attention. Hu Shisheng, di- own capabilities that would lead to a conclusion that Bei-
rector of South Asia studies at the Chinese Institutes of jing may simply ignore the U.S. strategy and proceed with
Contemporary International Relations, argues that China the kinds of activities it is designed to discourage. Second,
should strengthen ties by supporting Modi’s “Act East” there was no alarmism that would support a dramatic
policy and undertaking joint projects in places such as response, such as a major increase in military spending,
Myanmar, while recognizing India’s aversion to the BRI alliances with other countries, or the use of force. Rather,
label. Ye Hailin argues instead that a solicitous approach
90
evidence at both the official and unofficial levels suggest
would be interpreted in Indian circles as a form of “black- that Beijing is concerned about the motives and impli-
mail.” His solution is for China to build relations with cations of the strategy and will respond by targeting the
smaller South Asian nations such as Sri Lanka or Bangla- links between Washington and its regional supporters
desh in order to “force India to acknowledge the reality of through countermessaging, expanded economic and dip-
China’s entrance into the Indian Ocean region.” Ye has
91
lomatic outreach, and perhaps scaling back some of its
also supported targeting Chinese investments in parts of more controversial policies.
India predisposed to welcoming them, which could help It is unclear that perceptions of a failure in U.S. lead-
in shaping Modi’s domestic calculations. 92
ership on the coronavirus will fundamentally alter Chi-
Implicit in these discussions is the perspective that nese judgments about U.S. strategy in the region. Beijing
Beijing should avoid actions that undermine China’s has already tried to deflect blame by focusing on the
regional reputation, such as a resumption of land rec- theme of U.S. mismanagement of the crisis at home and
lamation in the South China Sea or economic penalties abroad and highlighting China’s provision of aid to many
against states that run afoul of China on various issues countries.95 This fits into a larger narrative aiming to ex-
(one example being China’s heavy-handed response to ploit divisions between the United States and its regional
South Korea’s deployment of a Terminal High Altitude partners to China’s benefit. However, as Michael Green
Area Defense missile battery in 2017, which led to a ma- and Evan Medeiros point out, predictions in the middle
jor decrease in China’s favorability ratings among South of crises are often perilous.96 It is entirely possible that
Koreans).93 Moreover, few Chinese sources, including Chinese analysts will conclude that the crisis has actually
PLA officers, argue that a military buildup or the use of done little to fundamentally shake U.S. advantages—or to
military (or paramilitary) tools should be at the forefront reduce regional concerns about Chinese leadership.
of China’s response. This gap could have several ex-
94
One implication for U.S. policymakers concerns stra-
planations: hesitance to discuss coercive tools in open tegic messaging to China and the region. There is clearly a
sources, acceptance that much higher military budgets gap between Chinese and U.S. perceptions on the intent

10 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

and focus of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Chinese officials undermine their collective impact. U.S. officials should
and scholars have both discussed the strategy as a way thus consider a common branding for U.S. initiatives in
to contain China and frustrate the BRI, diverging from security assistance, educational initiatives, infrastructure
U.S. perceptions that the strategy is designed, in part, to financing, overseas development assistance, and other
dissuade China from conducting policies that undermine programs. This messaging should be reinforced by con-
the regional order, but not to stunt China’s growth or sistent, high-level U.S. participation in regional conclaves
overturn its political system. Chinese observers are also such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summits.
intensely focused on the quadrilateral dialogue and rela- U.S. policymakers should also find ways to advance an
tions among the Quad countries, which support the larger attractive message in China-led meetings, such as the
containment narrative, while U.S. sources portray a much Xiangshan Forum, or else risk losing this opportunity.100
wider, whole-of government strategy, with key initiatives Another set of implications concerns the possibility
in all of Asia’s subregions. that China will strengthen its neighborhood diplomacy
There is probably nothing that U.S. officials can do to avoid a U.S.-led balancing coalition. Greater Chinese
to influence these perceptions. Chinese interpretations financial commitments to smaller countries in South-
of U.S. strategy in Asia as a containment plot are deep- east Asia, Central and South Asia, or the Pacific Islands
ly rooted and have persisted across recent U.S. strategic could increase Beijing’s ability to influence those states’
adjustments, including the rebalance to Asia. Specific
97
decisionmaking on issues of concern to U.S. policymak-
concerns about U.S. trilateral initiatives and the Quad ers, such as access for U.S. firms or reliable basing for fu-
reflect growing anxieties that Washington is trying to ture U.S. military operations. However, U.S. decisions on
orchestrate an “Asian NATO” around China’s borders. 98
whether, and in what cases, to respond to Chinese eco-
These views continue to circulate widely among Chinese nomic inducements should take into account that most
analysts, even if some are beginning to doubt whether the states do not appear to be at serious risk of falling into a
United States has the resources needed to execute a con- Chinese “debt trap”;101 many are, instead, carefully hedg-
tainment strategy.99 U.S. assurances to Chinese interlocu- ing their bets with strong ties to the United States, Japan,
tors will not change those attitudes, but should continue South Korea, and other partners.102 Rather than seeking
to the extent that others in the region—few of whom to respond in kind to every Chinese overture, U.S. finan-
support an escalating competition between the two states cial assistance should focus on states that are most critical
in which they would have to choose sides—pay attention to U.S. interests and most at risk of exploitation.
to such messaging. Given its concerns about a nascent “Asian NATO,”
U.S. officials will also have to contend with China’s China will likely seek to weaken the alignment between
regional counternarrative, which focuses on raising doubts the United States and its Quad partners. One element is
about U.S. motives and commitments while presenting high-level diplomacy, demonstrated by Xi Jinping’s Octo-
China as the more attractive partner. While avoiding ber 2019 visit to New Delhi and planned visit to Tokyo
over-the-top rhetoric that would alienate its supporters, in 2020.103 China might also solidify its influence in these
Washington should continue to point out areas where countries by granting preferential access to BRI projects,
Chinese policies are harming regional interests and show- media engagements focused on shifting popular opinion,
case examples where the United States is actively con- or through influence operations targeting the elite. In this
tributing to regional development. A comparative U.S. competitive environment, Washington should continue to
disadvantage is that while China has subsumed much expand robust high-level engagement with Asia’s pivotal
of its regional diplomacy under the BRI label, U.S. pro- states at all levels (bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral)
grams are carried out under many different labels, which in areas such as high-tech development, infrastructure

ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 11

investment, maritime domain awareness, and support for Finally, there may be some implications for U.S.-
democratic institutions, and support stronger interactions China relations. While the focus of Chinese analysts has
among these states even if the United States is not directly been on strengthening relations with neighboring states,
involved. some also worry about a deterioration of relations with
While predictions of a decline in Chinese “asser- Washington.107 These authors encourage steps to main-
tiveness” remain tentative, Washington should welcome tain stability between the two dominant countries in the
any evidence of Chinese restraint with its rivals. While region, such as joint infrastructure projects,108 pursuing
Chinese analysts do not explicitly advocate such an competition in a “friendly” manner,109 and strengthening
adjustment—which would require them to admit that military-to-military communications to avoid a direct
Beijing had been “assertive” in the first place, leading clash.110 This reflects similar Chinese prescriptions dur-
to a deterioration of China’s reputation in many coun- ing the U.S. rebalance to Asia.111 Although Beijing will
tries—China could still exercise restraint in some areas still oppose aspects of the U.S. approach that it disagrees
in order to prevent states such as Vietnam, India, and In- with, such as freedom of navigation operations and U.S.
donesia from seeking a closer alignment with the United arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing might be willing to reach a
States. Evidence that Beijing has shifted toward a more consensus on other issues, one example being in military
restrained regional posture, which might include a reluc- crisis communications. If the United States has achieved
tance to conduct aggressive enforcement actions in the this effect through the Indo-Pacific strategy, the time
South China Sea or avoidance of a future Doklam-like might be right to negotiate on these or other issues from
incident with New Delhi, would be a sign that the U.S. a position of strength.
strategy has paid dividends. Beijing should be similarly
encouraged if it recalibrates BRI policies to accord with Notes
international norms, responding to widespread concerns 1
“Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” People’s Republic
of China (PRC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 9, 2018, available
about predatory lending.104 at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1540928.shtml>.
Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers should understand 2
Ely Ratner, who served as a key Asia advisor to Vice Presi-
dent Joe Biden, has suggested that President Barack Obama’s “desire
the limits of China’s forbearance in regional disputes. to avoid conflict” with China allowed Beijing to make “incremental
gains” in the South China Sea. See Ely Ratner, “Course Correction:
First, Chinese leaders remain committed to the goal of
How to Stop China’s Maritime Advance,” Foreign Affairs, July/August
defending “every inch” of Chinese territory and must not 2017, 64–72. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, who served as chief of naval
operations during this period, reported that his counterpart, Admiral
appear overly weak in front of a nationalistic domestic Wu Shengli, “made clear that he thought the United States would have
audience. There is no reason to suspect that Beijing would a more forceful reaction when China began its island-building.” See
Jonathan W. Greenert, Tenets of a Regional Defense Strategy (Washing-
not react strongly if confronted by a perceived provocation ton, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2018), 19n100. Thanks to
Lyle Morris for this observation.
by another territorial or resource claimant; as in the past, 3
William Choong, “U.S. Regional Leadership: A Shot Across the
China would justify its responses as defensive.105 Second, Bow,” The Interpreter, April 7, 2020, available at <https://www.lowyin-
stitute.org/the-interpreter/us-regional-leadership-shot-across-bow>.
Chinese restraint on sensitive issues may not apply equal- 4
Nina Silove, “The Pivot Before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to
ly to all parties, and recent military and economic coer- Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,” International Security 40, no. 4
(Spring 2016), 46.
cion targeted at Taiwan suggests a different approach.106 5
Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Affairs,
Third, over the long run, Beijing’s perception that it has October 11, 2011, available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/
americas-pacific-century/>; Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of
successfully consolidated its regional influence—and thus American Statecraft in Asia (New York: Twelve, 2016).
6
“Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific,”
defused the main threat posed by the Indo-Pacific strat- The White House, November 16, 2015, available at <https://obam-
egy—could usher in a new round of aggressive policies. awhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-
advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific>.
This means that constant pressure is required to ensure 7
“Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit, Da
that the shaping goals of the strategy are achieved. Nang, Vietnam,” The White House, November 10, 2017, available at

12 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

<www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump- 16
Ben O. de Vera, “DFC Eyes Big Investments in Indo-Pacific
apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/>. Countries,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 9, 2020, available at
8
Ibid.; “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next <https://business.inquirer.net/286798/dfc-eyes-big-investments-in-
Century: An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,” Center indo-pacific-countries>.
for Strategic and International Studies, October 18, 2017, available at 17
“Joint Statement of the Governments of the United States
<www.csis.org/analysis/defining-our-relationship-india-next-century- of America, Australia, and Japan,” The White House, November 17,
address-us-secretary-state-rex-tillerson>. 2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-
9
On the broader “Indo-Pacific” concept, see Rory Medcalf, statement-governments-united-states-america-australia-japan/>.
“Indo-Pacific Visions: Giving Solidarity a Chance,” Asia Policy 14, no. 18
Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (Washington, DC: Department of
3 ( July 2019), 79–95. Defense, 2019).
10
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Wash- 19
A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision (Wash-
ington, DC: The White House, December 2017); Summary of the 2018 ington, DC: Department of State, 2019).
National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the 20
A number of these critiques have appeared in the pages of
American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department War on the Rocks. See, for example, Eric Sayers, “Assessing America’s
of Defense, January 2018). Indo-Pacific Budget Shortfall,” War on the Rocks, November 15,
11
See, for example, “Vice President Mike Pence’s Remarks on the 2018, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/assessing-
Administration’s Policy Towards China,” The Hudson Institute, video, americas-indo-pacific-budget-shortfall/>; Mark Montgomery and Eric
43:09, October 4, 2018, available at <www.hudson.org/events/1610- Sayers, “Addressing America’s Operational Shortfall in the Pacific,”
vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy- War on the Rocks, June 18, 2019, available at <https://warontherocks.
towards-china102018>; Phil Davidson, “Halifax International Security com/2019/06/addressing-americas-operational-shortfall-in-the-
Forum 2018: Introduction to Indo-Pacific Security Challenges,” U.S. pacific/>; Gregory B. Poling, “For Lack of a Strategy: The Free and
Indo-Pacific Command, November 17, 2018, available at <www. Open Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, November 13, 2019, available at
pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1693325/halifax-inter- <https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/for-lack-of-a-strategy-the-free-
national-security-forum-2018-introduction-to-indo-pacific-security/>; and-open-indo-pacific/>; Randy Schriver and Eric Sayers, “The Case
Michael R. Pompeo, “The Lessons of 1989: Freedom and Our Future,” for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative,” War on the Rocks, March 10, 2020,
Department of State, video, 16:27, November 8, 2019, available at available at <https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/the-case-for-a-pa-
<www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-at-koerber- cific-deterrence-initiative/>. For an Indian view, see Brahma Chellaney,
stiftung-axica-the-lessons-of-1989-freedom-and-our-future/>. “America’s Feeble Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Japan Times, November 14,
12
“Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 2019, available at <www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/14/com-
Shangri-La Dialogue,” Department of Defense,” June 2, 2018, avail- mentary/world-commentary/americas-feeble-indo-pacific-strategy/>.
able at <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/ 21
Two recent articles by foreign scholars do cover Chinese
Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of- perceptions, but with only limited reference to the significant volume
the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/>; “Millennium Challenge Corporation of Chinese sources available. See Feng Zhang, “China’s Curious Non-
Official Visits Sri Lanka to Continue Progress on Compact,” Millen- chalance Towards the Indo-Pacific,” Survival 61, no. 3 (May 2019),
nium Challenge Corporation, September 20, 2018, available at <www. 187–212; and Feng Liu, “The Recalibration of Chinese Assertiveness:
mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/release-092018-mcc-official-visits- China’s Responses to the Indo-Pacific Challenge,” International Affairs
sri-lanka>; “Secretary of State Michael Pompeo Makes First Historic 96, no. 1 ( January 2020), 9–27.
Visit to the FSM,” U.S. Embassy in the Federated States of Microne- 22
This review assesses only responses that specifically character-
sia, August 27, 2019, available at <https://fm.usembassy.gov/17874/>; ized the “Indo-Pacific strategy” and not specific elements associated
Lara Seligman, “In Rare Mongolia Stop, U.S. Defense Secretary Gets with it, such as arms sales to Taiwan. For a Japanese scholar’s assess-
an Unusual Gift,” Foreign Policy, August 8, 2019, available at <https:// ment of Chinese public statements on the Indo-Pacific strategy, see
foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/08/in-rare-mongolia-stop-u-s-defense- Yamazaki Amane, “The PRC’s Cautious Stance on the U.S. Indo-
secretary-gets-an-unusual-gift-military-pentagon-russia-china-asia/>. Pacific Strategy,” China Brief 20, no. 4 (February 28, 2020), available at
Moreover, in December 2018, Donald Trump signed the Asia Reassur- <https://jamestown.org/program/the-prcs-cautious-stance-on-the-u-
ance Initiative Act, which contained $1.5 billion in annual appropria- s-indo-pacific-strategy/>.
tions for regional security assistance programs and funded other efforts, 23
This includes China’s more assertive responses to the
such as democracy promotion and cyber defense initiatives. For an China-related language in the National Security Strategy, National
overview, see “The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) of 2018,” Defense Strategy, and 2019 National Defense Authorization Act.
IF11148, Congressional Research Service, updated April 4, 2019. See, respectively, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s
13
Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad,’” War Regular Press Conference on December 19, 2017,” PRC Ministry of
on the Rocks, November 16, 2017, available at <https://warontherocks. Foreign Affairs, December 19, 2017, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/
com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/>; “Secretary Pompeo’s Meet- mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1520766.shtml>; “Foreign
ing with Quad Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan,” Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference
Department of State, September 27, 2019, available at <www.state.gov/ on January 22, 2018,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January
secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-quad-foreign-ministers-of-australia- 22, 2018, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/
india-and-japan/>. s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1527756.shtml>; “Chinese Defense
14
Laura Zhou, “Trump Signs Off on Plan to Allow U.S. Navy Ministry Opposes China-Related Contents in U.S. Defense Act,” Xin-
More Freedom to Patrol in South China Sea, Report Says,” South hua, August 14, 2018, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 22, 2017, available at <www. 08/14/c_137390012.htm>.
scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2103718/trump- 24
See, for example, Jonathan Stromseth, “Don’t Make Us
signs-plan-allow-us-navy-more-freedom-patrol>. Choose: Southeast Asia in the Throes of U.S.-China Rivalry,” Brook-
15
Michael R. Pompeo, “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic ings Institution, October 2019.
Vision,” speech, Indo-Pacific Business Forum, U.S. Chamber of 25
This is consistent with one of China’s main global narratives.
Commerce, video, 20:50, July 30, 2018, available at <www.state.gov/ See Hedi Holz, China’s Playbook for Shaping the Global Media Environ-
remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/>. ment (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2020), 7.

ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 13

 26
“Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng: Parties Should Work ars to probe whether there are any differences across bureaucratic lines.
Together in Concert Instead of in Contest,” PRC Ministry of Foreign These sources are supplemented with the author’s interviews with more
Affairs, September 26, 2018, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ than a dozen Chinese civilian and military analysts.
wjbxw/t1599075.shtml>. 43
Ye Hailin, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and
27
“Ambassador Hong Xiaoyong Has a Signed Article ‘What China’s Countermeasures” [“印太” 概念的前景与中国的应对策
U.S.-China Trade War Is Really About: A Chinese Perspective” 略], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review [印度洋经济体研究],
Published in The Straits Time,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June no. 2 (2018), 9.
7, 2019, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng//wjb_663304/ 44
Liu Fugui and Li Qianqian, “Analysis of the Implementation
zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1670460.shtml>. of the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy” [试论特朗普政
28
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks 府印太战略的实施], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review [印
on August 5, 2019,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 5, 度洋经济体研究], no. 5 (2019), 70.
2018, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ 45
Ye, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and China’s
s2510_665401/t1686226.shtml>. Countermeasures,” 6.
29
“Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press.” 46
He notes, in particular, that all three countries dispatched
30
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press aircraft carriers to the 2017 version of the event, held in the Indian
Conference on June 3, 2019,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June Ocean. Ye Hailin, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Response to the U.S.
3, 2019, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept” [中国应对美国再版“印太”概念的策略
s2510_665401/t1669120.shtml>. 性思考], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review [印度洋经济体
31
“Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on June 27,” 研究], no. 5 (2019), 132. Ye also describes the exercise “Northern-19,”
China Military Online, June 27, 2019, available at <http://eng.mod. including U.S., Japanese, and Australian forces operating off Guam, as
gov.cn/news/2019-06/27/content_4844628.htm>. a key event. Ibid.
47
32
“Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng.” Chen Jimin, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strat-
33
“Ambassador Luo Zhaohui Interviewed by The Tribune,” PRC egy’: Policy and Limitations” [特朗普政府 “印太战略”: 政策与
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2018, available at <www.fmprc. 限度], Peace and Development [和平与发展], no. 1 (2018), 31–32.
48
gov.cn/ce/cein/eng/embassy_news/t1601467.htm>. Wu Shengqi and Tao Wenzhao, “The Prospects of the Trump
34
“Wang Yi Meets with Co-Chairman of the Nepal Communist Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy” [特朗普政府 ‘印太战略’
Party Puspa Kamal Dahal September 10, 2019,” PRC Ministry of 前瞻], International Forum [国际论坛], 20, no. 5 (2018), 34.
49
Foreign Affairs, September 12, 2019, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/ Ibid., 33; Ye, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and
mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1697106.shtml>. China’s Countermeasures,” 5.
50
35
Charissa Yong, “U.S. Announces US$300 Million to Fund Interviews, 2018. For background, see Manu Pubby, “India,
Security Cooperation in Indo-Pacific Region,” Straits Times (Singa- U.S. Ink Comcasa Deal at 2+2 Dialogue,” Economic Times (Mumbai),
pore), August 4, 2018, available at <www.straitstimes.com/politics/us- September 7, 2018, available at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.
pledges-nearly-us300-million-security-funding-for-south-east-asia>. com/news/defence/comcasa-india-to-get-access-to-real-time-encrypt-
36
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press ed-information-from-us/articleshow/65710975.cms>.
51
Conference on July 31, 2018,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July Many articles also note the name change from U.S. Pacific
31, 2018, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ Command to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Notably, there is almost
s2510_665401/t1581940.shtml>. no discussion of specific U.S. military systems allocated to the theater,
37
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular even though acquisition of advanced technology and concepts rep-
Press Conference on November 13, 2017,” PRC Ministry of Foreign resents one plank in the Defense Department’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
Affairs, November 14, 2017, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ Report.
52
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1510216.shtml>. See, for example, Li Daguang, “Clues to Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific
38
Yong, “U.S. Announces US$300 Million to Fund Security Strategy’ from the National Defense Strategy Report” [从国防战略报
Cooperation in Indo-Pacific Region.” 告看特朗普“印太战略”端倪], China Economic and Trade Guide [中
39 国经贸导刊], March 2018, 75; Wu Xinbo, “A New Era of the Trump
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press
Administration and U.S. China Policy” [特朗普执政与美国对华政策
Conference on July 31, 2018.”
40
的新阶段], China International Studies [国际问题研究], no. 3 (2018),
“Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on June 27.” 85–86; Zhu Feng, “Great Power Contest in the South China Sea Un-
41
Feng, “China’s Curious Nonchalance Towards the Indo- der the Backdrop of the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ [“印太战略”阴影下
Pacific.” 的南海大国较量], World Affairs [世界知识], no. 1 (2018), 20.
42
Government think tank analysts and prominent university 53
Cheng Hanping and Qu Junfeng, “Intentions of Strengthening
scholars were prioritized over the larger academic community because U.S.-Vietnam Strategic Cooperation Under the Background of the
they are more likely to be familiar with internal government thinking, Indo-Pacific Strategy” [印太战略背景下越美两国深化战略合作意
and in some cases might even be contributing to official views and 在何方], Wei Shi [唯实], no. 7 (2018), 91. Another scholar writes that
responses. For overviews of the links between China’s analytic commu- Secretary of Defense James Mattis traveled to Indonesia and Vietnam
nities and policymaking, see, for example, Pascal Abb, “China’s Foreign early in his tenure to push those countries to serve as “pivotal players”
Policy Think Tanks: Institutional Evolution and Changing Roles,” in the region. See Zhang Ling, “An Analysis of the Initial Practice of
Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 3 (October 2015), 531–553; Lin- the U.S. National Security Strategy,” International Strategic Studies, vol.
da Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI 2 (2018), 46.
Policy Paper 26 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research 54
Wu, “A New Era of the Trump Administration and U.S. China
Institute, September 2010), 34–40; Xuanli Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy Policy,” 86; Chen, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strat-
Think Tanks and China’s Policy Towards Japan (Hong Kong: Chinese egy,’” 13. Fewer articles still reference U.S. relations with small South
University Press, 2006); Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, Asian or Pacific Island nations, or Mongolia, as central to the strategy.
“Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles 55
See, for example, Ye Hailin, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s
and Increasing Influence,” China Quarterly, vol. 171 (September 2002),
Response to the U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept,” 6; Gu Guoli, “The Trump
597–616. The review also incorporates both civilian and military schol-
Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and Its Progress” [特朗普政府

14 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

的“印太战略”及其进展], International Studies Reference [国际研究 Zhang Jiadong, “Trump Cranks Up Pressure on India by Rejecting In-
参考], no. 9 (2019), 6. vitation,” Global Times (Beijing), November 4, 2018, available at <www.
56
Interviews, November 2018. globaltimes.cn/content/1125760.shtml>.
73
57
Lee Jeong-ho, “U.S. Has No Desire to Contain China, U.S. See, for example, Chen, “Preliminary Analysis of the Trump
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Tells Chinese Foreign Ministry Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 42.
74
Wang Yi in Bangkok,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), Ye, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Response to the U.S. ‘Indo-
August 2, 2019, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/ Pacific Concept,” 13–14.
article/3021012/us-has-no-desire-contain-china-us-secretary-state- 75
Chen, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’”
mike-pompeo>. 39–40.
58
Several terms are often used interchangeably in these assess- 76
Qin Sheng, “Policy Implements of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Strategy
ments, including 遏制, 牵制, and 包围. in the South Pacific; Status, Dynamics, and Prospects” [“印太”战略
59
See, for example, Xia Liping and Zhong Qi, “Analysis of the 的南太平洋攻势:现状,动力与前景], Asia-Pacific Security and Ocean
Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Concept’” [特朗普政 Studies [亚太安全与海洋研究], no. 6 (2019), 94.
府“印太战略构想”评析], Contemporary International Relations [ 77
Chen, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’”
现代国际关系], no. 1 (2018), 25; Chen, “Preliminary Analysis of the 42; Xi and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-
Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 37–38; Chen, “The Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 26.
Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 40–41. One might ex- 78
Xu Nanfeng, “Trump’s ‘America First’ Overdrafts American
pect this view to prevail among civilians, but in fact half of those who National Power and Credit,” International Strategic Studies, vol. 3
acknowledge this motive are People’s Liberation Army scholars. (2018), 16.
60
See, for example, Chen Jimin, “The Trump Administration’s 79
Zhang, “An Analysis of the Initial Phase of the U.S. National
‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’: Policy and Limitations” [特朗普政府“印太 Security Strategy,” 47.
战略”:政策与限度], Peace and Development [和平与发展], no. 1 80
Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-
(2018), 31–32; Hu Shisheng, “Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ Concept
Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 26.
and Prospects for China-India Interactions” [特朗普的“因太战略” 81
构想与中印互动前景], World Affairs [世界知识], no. 5 (2018), 28. Wu and Tao, “The Prospects of the Trump Administration’s
61 Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 34; Hu Bo, “Trends and Prospects of the U.S.
Chen Fangming, “Preliminary Analysis of the Trump Admin-
‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’” [美国“印太战略”趋势与前景], Pacific
istration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” [特朗普政府“印太战略”初析],
Journal [太平洋学报], no. 10 (2019), 29.
Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Studies [亚太安全与海洋研究], no. 82
4 (2018), 39. See, for example, Xu, “Trump’s ‘America First’ Overdrafts
62 American National Power and Credit,” 12; Ge and Shen, “‘Indo-Pacif-
See, for example, Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump
ic Strategy’ from U.S. and Indian Perspectives,” 49; Chen, “Preliminary
Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 25; Ge Cheng and
Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 40.
Shen Minghui, “‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from U.S. and Indian Perspec- 83
tives: Policy Limitations and China’s Responses” [美印视角下的“印 Lu Hong and Sun Xihui, “‘Structural Dilemma’ and ‘Trump-
太战略”:政策限度及中国的应对], Yunnan Social Sciences [云南社会 ism’: Dual Motives of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific
科学], no. 5 (2018), 49. Strategy’” [“结构性矛盾”与“特朗普主义”:特朗普政府“印太
63 战略”的双重动因], Forum of World Economics & Politics [世界经济与
Zhang Jiadong, “The U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and Its
政治论坛], no. 6 (2018), 25.
Influence on China” [美国 “印太” 倡议及其对中国的影响], 84
Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review [印度洋经济体研究], no. See, for example, Chen, “The Trump Administration’s
3 (2018), 14. “Offshore balancing” has been discussed by many U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 45; Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump
strategists over the past 25 years, but Chinese authors appear most Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 28; Wu Zhaoli,
influenced by John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics “The Indo-Pacific Strategy’s Development, Limitations, and China’s
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2011). Response” [印太战略的发展,局限及中国应对], Journal of Xinjiang
64 Normal University [新疆师范大学学报], no. 5 (2018), 88–89. One
Ibid.
65
scholar even argues that China should study the U.S. Overseas Private
Cai Zebin and Li Demu, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Strategy: Retro- Investment Corporation model in order to make the BRI more effec-
spect and Prospect” [“印太”战略的缘起,本质及前景], Strategy and tive. Gu, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and Its
Policy Studies [战略决策研究], no. 5 (2019), 73. Progress,” 8.
66
Chen, “Preliminary Analysis of the Trump Administration’s 85
Cheng and Qu, “Intentions of Strengthening U.S.-Vietnam
‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 43. Strategic Cooperation Under the Background of the Indo-Pacific
67
Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo- Strategy,” 94.
Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 28. 86
Ibid.
68
Wei Zongyou, “The Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific 87
Hu Zhiyong, “Direction and Geographical Impact of the
Strategic Concept and Its Impact on Regional Order” [特朗普政府的 Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Security System” [特朗普政府
印太战略构想及其对地区秩序的影响], Contemporary World [当代世 ‘印太’安全体系走向及其地缘影响], Journal of Guizhou Provincial
界], no. 12 (2018), 22. Party School [贵州省党校学报], no. 4 (2019), 110.
69
See, for example, Zhang, “The U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept 88
Gu, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and
and Its Influence on China,” 22; Chen, “The Trump Administration’s Its Progress,” 7.
‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 14. 89
70
See, for example, Ge and Shen, “‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from
Li, “Clues to Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from the National U.S. and Indian Perspectives,’” 49–50; Chen, “Preliminary Analysis
Defense Strategy Report,” 73. of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 45; and Wang
71
Ye, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and China’s Peng, “‘Hedging’ and ‘Wedging’: Internal Logic of the U.S. ‘Indo-
Countermeasures,” 7–13. Pacific’ Strategy” [“对冲”与“楔子”:美国“印太”战略的内生
72
See, for example, Wu and Tao, “The Prospects of the Trump 逻辑], Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies [当代亚太], vol. 3
Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 33; Xia and Zhong, “Analysis (2018), 51.
of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 26. See also

ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 15

 90 102
Hu, “Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ Concept and Prospects for See, for example, Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge:
China-India Interactions,” 30. The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies (Washington,
91
Ye, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and China’s DC: East-West Center, 2005); Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian Strate-
Countermeasures,” 14. gies toward the Great Powers: Still Hedging after All These Years?”
92
For instance, Ye writes that officials in Assam have expressed The Asan Forum, February 22, 2016, available at <www.theasanforum.
an interest in pursuing the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar org/southeast-asian-strategies-toward-the-great-powers-still-hedging-
economic corridor. Ye, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Response to the after-all-these-years/>; G. John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the
U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific Concept,’” 14. Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia,”
93 Political Science Quarterly 20, no. 20 (2017).
For a discussion, see Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and 103
Edoardo Saravalle, China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures (Wash- Feng, “The Recalibration of Chinese Assertiveness,” 23–24.
104
ington, DC: CNAS, 2018). There is some evidence that China has already begun to re-
94
An exception is advocacy in one article, written by two People’s calibrate its Belt and Road Initiative lending to focus more on quality.
Liberation Army analysts, that China should rely on maritime law en- See, for example, Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s in China’s New
forcement to draw “red lines” around Vietnamese developments in the Belt and Road Recalibration?” The Diplomat, May 7, 2019, available
South China Sea. However, the same authors focus more on building at <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/whats-in-chinas-new-belt-
strong party-party relations with Vietnam. Cheng and Qu, “Inten- and-road-recalibration/>; BRI Update 2019—Recalibration and New
tions of Strengthening U.S.-Vietnam Strategic Cooperation under the Opportunities (Beijing: Deloitte, 2019).
105
Background of the Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 94. Some of China’s “assertive” behavior in the South and East
95
Kurt M. Campbell and Rushi Doshi, “The Coronavirus Could China seas has been explained as responses to provocations by others.
Reshape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2020, available See Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Be-
at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus- havior Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor,
could-reshape-global-order>. no. 35 (Summer 2011), available at <www.hoover.org/research/chinas-
96 assertive-behavior-part-two-maritime-periphery>.
Michael Green and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Pandemic Won’t 106
Make China the World’s Leader,” Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2020, avail- See, for example, Richard C. Bush, “From Persuasion to Coer-
able at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-15/ cion: Beijing’s Approach to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Response,” Brookings
pandemic-wont-make-china-worlds-leader>. Institution, November 2019.
107
97
Adam P. Liff, “China and the U.S. Alliance System,” China Wu, “A New Era of the Trump Administration and U.S.
Quarterly, vol. 223 (2018), 137–165; John Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, China Policy,” 86–87; Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Admin-
“China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle,” Asian Security 6, no. 3 (2010), istration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 27.
108
238–261; Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Gu, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and
the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, no. 4 Its Progress,” 8.
109
(1999), 49–80. Xi and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-
98
For a discussion, see Joel Wuthnow, “U.S. ‘Minilateralism’ in Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 28.
110
Asia and China’s Responses: A New Security Dilemma?” Journal of Li Bin, “‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and the South China Sea:
Contemporary China, vol. 115 (2019), 133–150. Focus of the Focus” [“印太战略” 与南海: 焦点中的焦点], World
99
A limited measure of success, however, is the acknowledgment Affairs [世界知识], no. 13 (2018), 21.
111
of some Chinese scholars that the United States is pursuing domestic Phillip C. Saunders, The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Rela-
economic motives. tions and Regional Security, INSS Strategic Forum 281 (Washington,
100
The Department of Defense made a positive step in dispatch- DC: NDU Press, August 2013), 10, available at <https://ndupress.ndu.
ing Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China Chad Sbragia to edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-281.pdf>.
the 2019 Xiangshan Forum. Sending a higher level official to a future
iteration, however, could guarantee a more central speaking role in
front of a broad regional audience. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, the author
101
According to one analysis, the Indo-Pacific countries at seri- thanks Phillip C. Saunders and Jonah Langan-
ous risk of debt distress include Laos, Maldives, Kyrgyzstan, Mongo-
lia, and Pakistan. John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, Marmur. Ian Burns McCaslin and Melodie Ha
Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a
Policy Perspective (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development,
provided valuable research assistance.
2018), 12.

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