NRA Complaint

Case 1:18-cv-00566-TJM-CFH Document 203 Filed 06/02/20 Page 1 of 44
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF §

AMERICA, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§ CIVIL CASE NO. 18-CV-00566-TJM-
v. § CFH
§
ANDREW CUOMO, both individually and §
in his official capacity; MARIA T. VULLO, §
both individually and in her official §
capacity; and THE NEW YORK STATE §
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL §
SERVICES, §
§
Defendants. §
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff the National Rifle Association of America (the “NRA”) files this Second
Amended Complaint and Jury Demand (“Complaint”) against defendants New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo (“Cuomo”), both individually and in his official capacity; Maria T. Vullo
(“Vullo”), both individually and in her former official capacity; and the New York State
Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) (collectively, “Defendants”), upon personal knowledge
of its own actions, and upon information and belief as to all others matters, as follows:
I.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case is necessitated by an overt viewpoint-based discrimination campaign against the
NRA and the millions of law-abiding gun owners that it represents. Directed by Governor Andrew
Cuomo and former DFS Superintendent Maria Vullo, this campaign involves selective
prosecution, backroom exhortations, and public threats with a singular goal – to deprive the NRA

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND Page 1
and its constituents of their First Amendment rights to speak freely about gun-related issues and
defend their Second Amendment freedoms against encroachment.
Defendants’ retaliation and selective-enforcement campaign surfaced with a series of
threats to financial institutions that DFS, an agency created to ensure the integrity of financial
markets after the 2008 credit crisis, will exercise its extensive regulatory power against those
entities that have ties with the NRA. To commence their sweeping agenda, Defendants issued
public demands that put DFS-regulated institutions on notice that they should avoid “arrangements
with the NRA” and other “gun promotion organizations” if they planned to do business in New
York.
At the same time, Defendants engaged in back-channel communications to reinforce their
threats. Thus, in a stunning display of unconstitutional overreach, Defendants made it clear to
banks and insurers that it is bad business in New York to do business with the NRA. Moreover,
Defendants knowingly targeted NRA-related insurance programs for violations not regularly
enforced and not enforced against other similarly situated insurance programs.
As a direct result of this coercion, multiple financial institutions have succumbed to
Defendants’ threats and determined not to do business with the NRA. Others, who were already
doing business with the NRA yielded to Defendants’ demands and agreed to terminate
longstanding, beneficial business relationships with the NRA, in New York and elsewhere. Of
course, Defendants’ abuses were intended to deprive the NRA of basic bank-depository services,
corporate insurance coverage, and other financial services essential to the NRA’s corporate
existence and its advocacy mission.
Absent relief, Defendants’ blacklisting campaign will continue to damage the NRA and its
members, as well as endanger the free speech and association rights guaranteed by the constitutions

of the United States and the State of New York. It is well-settled that viewpoint discrimination
applied through “threat[s] of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion,
and intimidation” violates the United States Constitution where, as here, such measures chill
protected First Amendment activities.1 Defendants’ de facto censorship scheme cannot survive
judicial scrutiny. Nor should it.
II.
PARTIES
1. Plaintiff the National Rifle Association of America is a nonprofit corporation
organized under the laws of the State of New York with its principal place of business in Fairfax,
Virginia. The NRA is America’s leading provider of gun-safety and marksmanship education for
civilians and law enforcement. It is also the foremost defender of the Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The NRA has over five million members, and its programs reach
millions more.
2. Defendant New York State Department of Financial Services is an agency of the
State of New York that regulates financial services firms operating in New York in order to guard
against financial crises and to protect New York consumers and markets from fraud. DFS has a
regional office at One Commerce Plaza, Albany, New York 12257. Its main office is located at
One State Street, New York, New York 10004-1511. It regulates more than 1,400 insurance
companies with assets in excess of $4.3 trillion, including 200 life insurers, 1,100 property casualty
insurers, and 100 health insurance companies. DFS also regulates over 1,900 banking and other
financial institutions with assets over $2.9 trillion.
1
See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 72 (1963).

3. Defendant Maria T. Vullo is the former Superintendent of the New York State
Department of Financial Services and, at all times relevant to the Complaint, was acting under
color of state law. Her principal place of business is 40 West 77th Street, Apt. 16B, New York,
New York 10024. Vullo is sued in her individual and official capacities.
4. Defendant Andrew Cuomo is the Governor of the State of New York and, at all
times relevant to the Complaint, was acting under color of state law. His principal place of business
is The State Capitol Building, Albany, New York 12224. Cuomo is sued in his individual and
official capacities.
III.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims asserted in this action because this action involves claims based on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. I, XIV), and because the action
seeks to prevent state officials from interfering with federal rights. Further, subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) because this action is brought to
redress deprivations under color of state law of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the
United States Constitution. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over all state-law claims
asserted in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is properly vested in this Court because
defendant Cuomo resides in this judicial district.
7. There is a present and actual controversy between the parties.
8. The relief requested is authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (recovery of
damages or equitable relief or any other such relief for the protection of civil rights), 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a) (injunctive relief), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 (declaratory and other appropriate relief),

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution),
and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (awards of attorneys’ fees and costs).
IV.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. The NRA: History Of Dedicated Support For Gun Safety And A Commitment To
Core Political Speech.
9. After the Civil War, two Union Army officers created a private association to
promote marksmanship among the citizenry. Many officers believed that the war would have
ended significantly sooner if the Union troops had been able to shoot as well as the Confederate
soldiers. Therefore, a group of them obtained a charter from the State of New York in November
of 1871; thereafter, the National Rifle Association built a proud legacy in the State of New York.
10. From the NRA’s inception, it received praise from the State of New York for its
many public contributions. In 1872, the New York State legislature and the NRA jointly dedicated
funds for the creation of a rifle range on Creed Farm, in what is now Queens Village, Queens, New
York. For many decades, the NRA partnered with the State to advance firearms safety, education,
conservation, and other laudable public policy goals. For example, when New York City public
schools sought to educate boys in marksmanship and gun safety, NRA co-founder Gen. George
Wingate designed and headed the resulting Public Schools Athletic League (PSAL) marksmanship
program.2 Likewise, in 1949, the NRA worked with the State of New York to create the nation’s
first hunter education program. Similar courses were subsequently adopted by state fish and game
2
See, e.g., STEVEN A. RIESS, SPORTS IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 736 (Steven A. Riess ed., 2015); ROBERT PRUTER, THE RISE
OF AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS AND THE SEARCH FOR CONTROL, 1880-1930 122 (1st ed.
2013); Robert Pruter, Boys Rifle Marksmanship, ILLINOIS HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION,
http://www.ihsa.org/archive/hstoric/marksmanship_boys.htm?NOCACHE=5:53:58%20PM (last
visited May 11, 2018).

departments across the country and in Canada and help make hunting among the safest sports in
existence.
11. First among the “Purposes and Objectives” contained in the NRA’s bylaws is “[t]o
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” That is not surprising, because political
speech is a major purpose of the NRA, as it engages in extensive advocacy at all levels of
government to promote the rights of its members and all Americans.
12. The NRA spends tens of millions of dollars annually distributing pamphlets, fact
sheets, articles, electronic materials, and other literature to advocate for its views on the Second
Amendment and to assist NRA members engaging in national, state, and local firearm dialogue.
The NRA’s direct mail, television, radio, and digital communications seek to educate the public
about issues bearing on the Second Amendment, defend the NRA and its members against political
and media attacks, and galvanize participation in the political process by NRA members and
supporters.
13. To its critics, the NRA is best known as a “superlobby – one of the largest and most
truly effective lobbying organizations in the country,” able to mobilize its millions of members in
concerted efforts to protect the Second Amendment rights of all Americans.3 Of course, the NRA’s
letter-writing campaigns, peaceable public gatherings, and other grassroots “lobbying” activities
constitute precisely the type of political speech which rests “[a]t the core of the First Amendment.”4
3
CHRISTINA ROBB, HANDGUNS AND THE AMERICAN PSYCHE THE ATTEMPTED
ASSASSINATION OF A PRESIDENT BRINGS THE ISSUE INTO SHARP FOCUS ONCE AGAIN.
HANDGUNS – WHAT DO THEY MEANS TO AMERICANS? TO THE NRA, THEY ARE A
SYMBOL OF FREEDOM; TO THOSE FRIGHTENED OF CRIME, THEY REPRESENT SAFETY
– EVEN IF THE OWNER DOESN’T KNOW HOW TO USE THEM; TO GUN CONTROL
ADVOCATES, THEY ARE SYMBOLS OF ULTIMATE EVIL., BOSTON GLOBE, 1981 WLNR 68847
(June 7, 1981).
4
See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982).

B. Cuomo’s Political Vendetta Against The NRA.
14. Andrew Cuomo has criticized the political speech and influence of “Second
Amendment types”5 generally, and the NRA specifically, for decades. In fact, Cuomo has a history
of abusing his regulatory power to retaliate against his political opponents on gun control issues.
15. The son of former Governor Mario Cuomo, Cuomo is a political opportunist who
consistently seeks to gain political capital by attacking the NRA. During his tenure as Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”) Secretary in the 1990s, Cuomo famously coordinated a campaign
of lawsuits (nearly all dismissed) against gunmakers that purported to hold them liable for crimes
committed in public housing projects by criminals using illegally obtained firearms. Later, Cuomo
admitted that his real aim was to coerce, via settlement, the “voluntary” industrywide adoption of
certain equipment and sale restrictions, and warned that any manufacturer who refused to settle
would suffer “death by a thousand cuts.”6 Decried by even gun-control supporters as “wrong” and
5
On February 15, 2018, Cuomo appeared on the MSNBC program “The Beat,” where he
discussed championing legislation that some believed “trampled the Second Amendment.”
YOUTUBE, Gov. Andrew Cuomo On Background Checks: “Bunch Of Boloney” | The Beat With
Ari Melber | MSNBC, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tz8X07fZ39o (last visited May 7,
2018). However, Cuomo lamented that his “favorability rating” had thereafter dropped due to
“backlash from conservatives and Second Amendment types.” Id.
6
Bill McAllister, Gun Industry Rejects Settlement Effort, THE DENVER POST (Feb. 1, 2000),
http://www.wagc.com/gun-industry-rejects-settlement-effort/.

an abuse of agency authority,7 the HUD effort failed after the NRA and other pro-gun groups
organized legislative and grassroots opposition.8
16. Cuomo blamed “gun lobby extremists” for the collapse of his efforts at HUD.9 At
a press conference on June 20, 2000, he referred to gun-rights supporters as “the enemy,” and
announced a blueprint for defeating the NRA and its allies that would emphasize the use of state
and municipal retaliatory authority: “If we engage the enemy in Washington we will lose. They
will beat us in this town. They are too strong in this town. Their fortress is within the Beltway.
We're going to beat them state by state, community by community.”10
17. As governor of New York, Cuomo has loudly supported the enactment of some of
the nation’s harshest gun-control laws.11 But rather than debate opponents of his anti-gun
7
In an editorial dated December 17, 1999, the Washington Post described the Cuomo
campaign as “disquieting even for those who, like us, strongly support rigorous controls on
handguns.” The HUD Gun Suit, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 1999),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1999/12/17/the-hud-gun-suit/48ee0a45-18da-
4e8d-9b86-b9512172ae09/?utm_term=.9a74ce83f538. Anticipating themes that would continue
to characterize Cuomo’s gun-control efforts over the next nineteen years, the editorial board stated
that “it . . . seems wrong for an agency of the federal government” to put “pressure on an industry
. . . to achieve policy results the administration has not been able to achieve through normal
legislation or regulation.” Id.
8
See, e.g., House Blocks Money For Gun Pact, CBS NEWS (June 21, 2000, 11:58 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-blocks-money-for-gun-pact/.
9
HUD Archives: News Releases, HUD No. 00-150, COMMUNITIES FOR SAFER GUNS
COALITION JOINS CUOMO IN CRITICIZING EFFORT IN CONGRESS TO KILL THE
COALITION, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. (June 27, 2000, archived Dec. 13, 2009).
10
Remarks by Secretary Andrew Cuomo Handgun Control, Inc, Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, June 20, 2000, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. (Jan. 20, 2009),
https://archives.hud.gov/remarks/cuomo/speeches/handguncontrl.cfm.
11
See, e.g., Teri Weaver, Judge: NY must release Safe Act stats from assault weapons
registry, SYRACUSE (May 7, 2015, 9:09 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/
2015/05/judge_ny_must_release_safe_act_data_on_assault_weapons_registry.html.

initiatives, he declared that conservative firearms advocates “have no place in the state of New
York.”12 Accordingly, Cuomo has sought to banish “the enemy” from public discourse altogether,
and remains dissatisfied with what he perceives to be the excessive political influence of
“conservatives and the Second Amendment types.”13
18. In truth, Cuomo bears distinct animus toward the NRA, which he accuses of
exerting a “stifl[ing] . . . stranglehold” over national gun policy.14 For Cuomo, weakening the
political advocacy of the NRA is a career strategy.
C. Defendants Attempt To Chill The NRA’s Political Speech In Support Of Americans’

Second Amendment Rights.
19. Against the backdrop of recent tragedies and a polarized public gun-control debate,
Cuomo and the other Defendants have abused their authority in an overt effort to stifle the NRA’s
political advocacy and to retaliate against the NRA for the effectiveness of that advocacy.
20. Together with former DFS Superintendent Vullo, his longtime lieutenant,15 Cuomo
embarked on a campaign to chill the political speech of the NRA and other so-called “gun
12
Heather Long, Conservatives aren’t welcome in New York, according to Governor
Cuomo, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2014, 8:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/jan/24/governor-cuomo-conservatives-not-welcome-new-york.
13
YOUTUBE, Gov. Andrew Cuomo On Background Checks: “Bunch Of Boloney” | The
Beat With Ari Melber | MSNBC, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tz8X07fZ39o (last visited
December 9, 2019).
14
Kenneth Lovett, Exclusive: Cuomo fires back at Jeb Bush for ‘stupid’ and ‘insensitive’
gun tweet, NY DAILY NEWS (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/cuomo-
blasts-jeb-stupid-insensitive-gun-tweet-article-1.2534528.
15
Cuomo and Vullo have worked together since at least 2006 when Vullo served as a “top
aide” to Cuomo in his role as attorney general. Cuomo nominated Vullo to be DFS Superintendent
approximately ten years later. Jimmy Vielkind, Cuomo nominates ex-aide to head Department of
Financial Services, POLITICO (Jan. 21, 2016, 5:14 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-
york/albany/story/2016/01/cuomo-nominates-ex-aide-to-head-department-of-financial-services-
030286.

promotion” organizations by leveraging state power to punishing financial institutions which
maintain “business arrangements with the NRA.” To achieve this, Defendants draw upon the
formidable regulatory powers of DFS—an agency charged with ensuring the stability and integrity
of New York’s financial markets.
21. At Cuomo’s behest, Vullo and DFS have threatened regulated institutions with
costly investigations, increased regulatory scrutiny and penalties should they fail to
“discontinue[] . . . their arrangements with the NRA.”16 Many of the most pernicious of these
threats occurred privately. For example, beginning in February 2018, Vullo met personally with
executives of regulated institutions, including Lloyd’s.17 During the meetings she discussed an
array of technical regulatory infractions plaguing the affinity-insurance marketplace. Vullo made
it clear, however, that DFS was less interested in pursuing the infractions of which she spoke, so
long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA. The threat was
clear and unambiguous. Shortly thereafter, Defendants began to deliver on it. Within a single week,
DFS levied multi-million dollar fines against two insurance-industry firms that dared to do
business with the NRA. Under intense scrutiny, both firms, and later a third (together comprising
all the issuers of NRA-related policies for the NRA and its members), were coerced to terminate
their business arrangements with the NRA and its members—including arrangements having
nothing to do with the allegedly unlawful conduct cited by DFS.
16
GOVERNOR CUOMO DIRECTS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES TO
URGE COMPANIES TO WEIGH REPUTATIONAL RISK OF BUSINESS TIES TO THE NRA
AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS, N.Y. STATE GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-directs-department-financial-services-urge-
companies-weigh-reputational-risk.
17
Vullo met with, and threatened, executives of Lloyd’s of London (“Lloyd’s”) and its
United States affiliate, Lloyd’s America, Inc, (“LAI”).

22. Importantly, Defendants were fully aware by at least March 2018 (and likely
earlier) that non-NRA insurance policies exhibiting the same features were being marketed on
behalf of other affinity organizations. Defendants intentionally ignored such knowledge and did
not undertake enforcement actions relating to these other similarly constructed programs because
enforcing the Insurance Law was never their goal. Instead, as DFS explained to Lloyd’s in closed-
door meetings, the Cuomo administration sought to focus on “gun programmes” and gun advocacy
groups generally.
23. A DFS press release publicizing one enforcement action makes clear the gravamen
of Defendants’ campaign: financial institutions regulated by DFS must refrain from “[e]ntering
into any . . . agreement or arrangement,” which “involv[es] the NRA, directly or indirectly”18—or
face the consequences.
1. DFS And Its Regulatory Mission.
24. In 2011, as part of his state budget, Cuomo announced the merger of the New York
State Insurance Department and the Banking Department to create DFS. The mandate of the new
agency, which consolidated supervisory and enforcement powers previously vested in separate
departments, is to “reform the regulation of financial services in New York to keep pace with the
18
DFS FINES LOCKTON COMPANIES $7 MILLION FOR UNDERWRITING NRA-
BRANDED “CARRY GUARD” INSURANCE PROGRAM IN VIOLATION OF NEW YORK
INSURANCE LAW, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. (May 2, 2018),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1805021.htm; see also DFS FINES CHUBB
SUBSIDIARY ILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY $1.3 MILION FOR
UNDERWRITING NRA-BRANDED “CARRY GUARD” INSURANCE PROGRAM IN
VIOLATION OF NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. (May 7,
2018), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1805071.htm.

rapid and dynamic evolution of these industries, to guard against financial crises and to protect
consumers and markets from fraud.”19
25. The Superintendent of DFS has broad regulatory and enforcement powers, which
encompass the ability to initiate civil and criminal investigations and enforcement actions. In
addition, pursuant to Financial Services Law, Article 3, § 301, the DFS superintendent has the
power to refer matters to the attorney general for criminal enforcement. The creation of an agency
with such expansive prerogatives and capabilities “grab[bed] power and headlines,” and the New
York Times reported in 2015 that the first DFS superintendent, Benjamin Lawsky, was popularly
caricatured as “the new sheriff of Wall Street” and an all-powerful monarch (“King Lawsky”).20
26. New York Financial Services Law, Article 2, § 201, provides the superintendent of
DFS with formidable authority to, among other things, “ensure the continued solvency, safety,
[and] soundness” of banks and insurance companies.21 Accordingly, DFS directives regarding
“risk management” must be taken seriously by financial institutions—as risk-management
deficiencies can result in fines of hundreds of millions of dollars.
27. DFS’s regulatory mandate does not include setting gun-control policy. Nor does
any statute or other authority empower DFS to blacklist, from receipt of insurance or banking
services, speakers with political viewpoints objectionable to the governor or DFS superintendent.
In addition, DFS has no authority to engage in unlawful viewpoint discrimination.
19
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/mission.htm.
20
Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Ben Protess, Benjamin Lawsky, Sheriff of Wall Street, Is
Taking Off His Badge, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/benjamin-lawsky-to-step-down-as-
new-yorks-top-financial-regulator.html.
21
New York Financial Services Law Article 2, § 201 (“Declaration of Policy”).

2. The NRA Depends Upon Essential Financial Services to Fulfill Its Advocacy
Mission
28. The NRA’s direct-mail campaigns, digital media broadcasts, television and radio
communications, grassroots organizing, membership recruitment, and other core political speech
and associational activities are carried out by a combination of volunteers, employees, and
independent contractors engaged by the NRA and its affiliates. To meet payroll obligations,
purchase mailing materials and media airtime, maintain its Internet presence, and otherwise
continue to advocate for the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, the NRA must
have the ability to process and retain cash, check, wire-transfer, and other donations from members
and events throughout the country, as well as transmit and apply these funds to meet operational
needs. Accordingly, the NRA relies upon depository services, cash management services, lockbox
services, disbursement services, wire-transfer services, and remote banking services of the type
generally offered by major wholesale banking institutions.
29. To continue its existence as a not-for-profit organization and fulfill its advocacy
objectives, the NRA also must maintain various corporate insurance coverage. General liability
and related “umbrella” coverage allow the NRA to maintain physical premises, convene off-site
meetings and events, and operate educational programs promoting the safe use of firearms which
are vital to the NRA’s mission. For its Annual Meeting, Great American Outdoor Show, and other
major rallies, conventions and assemblies with explicitly expressive purposes, the NRA generally
must also purchase event-specific coverage. Absent such coverage, the NRA could be forced to
cease circulation of various print publications and magazines.
30. In addition, like many affinity groups and organizations nationwide, the NRA seeks
to make life, health, and other insurance coverage available to its members on affordable, tailored
terms. To this end, the NRA contracted with multiple insurance-industry firms to develop, market,

and underwrite insurance programs endorsed by the NRA. Pursuant to these arrangements, the
NRA performs none of the functions of an insurer. It does lend its valuable logos, marks, and
endorsements to insurance programs brokered and serviced by others. Such “affinity” insurance
plans are common and believed by many to be a suitable substitute for employer-based coverage.22
31. From 2000 onward, the NRA contracted with affiliates of the world’s largest
privately held insurance broker, Lockton Companies, LLC (collectively with pertinent affiliates,
“Lockton”),23 for affinity-program brokerage and administration services. Lockton has provided
services in the affinity-insurance market for decades and caters to a wide array of industries and
clients including franchises, professional and trade organizations, fraternal organizations, and
common-cause groups such as the NRA. For roughly seventeen years, Lockton entities
administered and marketed NRA-endorsed insurance in New York State and across the nation
without incident. In addition to its affinity-insurance transactions with the NRA, Lockton has also
served for decades as the NRA’s trusted insurance broker for various corporate coverage—such
as general liability, umbrella and director and officer insurance.
32. The NRA-endorsed affinity-insurance administered by Lockton consists primarily
of life, health, property, and casualty policies that mirror policies offered by Lockton to other
affinity groups. In addition, Lockton administers certain products, including a product known as
“Carry Guard,” that provide coverage for expenses arising out of the lawful self-defense use of a
22
See, e.g., Rachel Louise Ensign, Affinity-Group Plans, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Sept. 11, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904836104576563341
686006336.html.
23
In particular, the NRA contracted with Lockton Affinity Series of Lockton Affinity, LLC
(f/k/a Lockton Risk Services, Inc.) (“Lockton Affinity”) and Kansas City Series of Lockton
Companies, LLC (“Lockton KC”).

legally possessed firearm. Illinois Union Insurance Company (“Illinois Union”), a subsidiary of
Chubb Ltd., underwrote Carry Guard while doing business under the name “Chubb.”
33. The NRA has been the target of activist boycott efforts in the past, including
campaigns that urged insurance companies and other private actors to cease doing business with
the NRA. However, because these campaigns were carried out by non-governmental activist
groups who lack the government’s power to punish those who refused to join the boycott, their
methods have centered on persuasion—not coercion. Unaided by the brute force of state power,
activists never successfully persuaded the NRA’s banking or insurance partners to sever ties with
the NRA. This changed in 2017, when one activist organization successfully enlisted Defendants
in a joint effort to silence the NRA.
3. DFS Commences A Politically Motivated Investigation Focused Ostensibly on

NRA-Endorsed “Affinity” Insurance.
34. During or about September 2017, a non-governmental activist organization known
as Everytown for Gun Safety (“Everytown”) contacted the New York County District Attorney’s
Office (the “DA’s Office”), as well as state and municipal authorities in other jurisdictions, in an
effort to prompt a crackdown by sympathetic government officials that would target alleged
compliance infirmities in Carry Guard. Notably, Everytown is not an organization dedicated to
insurance compliance; instead, its explicit political mission is to oppose the NRA.24 On September
13, 2017, representatives from the DA’s Office met with DFS to effectuate Everytown’s agenda.
24
Aaron Blake, Bloomberg launches new $50 Million gun control effort, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2014/04/16/bloomberg-aims-to-spend-50-million-on-gun-
control/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.703fe67ee197 (explaining that Everytown “will attempt to
combat the vast influence of the National Rifle Association”).

35. As a result, in October 2017, DFS launched an investigation that focused ostensibly
on Carry Guard and was directed in the first instance at Lockton. On its website, Everytown took
credit for instigating the inquiry25—but even if it had not, the political underpinnings and selective
focus of the investigation were clear. The investigation was chronicled in the national media before
the NRA received official notice of it, and it targeted none of the available self-defense insurance
products except Carry Guard, which was endorsed by the NRA.
36. Of course, Carry Guard was not Defendants’ true focus, and the scope of the DFS
investigation rapidly expanded. At first, Defendants purported to target a discrete subset of so-
called “excess line” property and casualty policies relating to firearms—a category that
encompassed Carry Guard, but also included policies such as Gun Club Insurance and Hunt Club
Insurance. However, Defendants’ goal, from the outset, was to disrupt any and all business
arrangements between the NRA and any insurance administrator, broker, or underwriter—indeed,
any financial institution. Within weeks of commencing its investigation, DFS began to target
insurance programs that had nothing to do with firearms, and instead provided coverage similar or
identical to coverage endorsed by other New York affinity organizations such as the New York
State Bar Association, the New York City Bar, the National Association for the Self-Employed,
the New York Association of Professional Land Surveyors, and the New York State Psychological
Association.
37. DFS has not announced—even to this day—similar inquiries concerning any of
these other membership organizations, although their affinity programs involve most, if not all, of
25
Everytown, Moms Demand Action Statements Responding to Report That New York
Department of Financial Services is Investigating NRA Carry Guard Insurance, EVERYTOWN FOR
GUN SAFETY (Oct. 25, 2017), https://everytown.org/press/everytown-moms-demand-action-
statements-responding-to-report-that-new-york-department-of-financial-services-is-
investigating-nra-carry-guard-insurance/.

the practices and features referenced by DFS in its investigation of the NRA’s affinity programs.
Instead, Defendants selectively targeted the NRA because of the NRA’s constitutionally protected
legislative and grassroots advocacy activities. Defendants specifically intend to undermine the
NRA’s ability to conduct its affairs in New York—and to advance Cuomo’s anti-NRA political
agenda.
4. Over The Course Of The Investigation, Cuomo And DFS Exhort Firms To
Sever Ties With The NRA.
38. Throughout its purported investigation of Carry Guard in late 2017 and early 2018,
DFS communicated to banks and insurers with known or suspected ties to the NRA that they would
face regulatory action if they failed to terminate their relationships with the NRA. These
exhortations extended far beyond Carry Guard (the policy purportedly raising regulatory
concerns), indicating that any business relationship whatsoever with the NRA would invite adverse
action.
39. The impact of Defendants’ campaign on the NRA’s ability to access essential
financial services has been far greater than—and, clearly distinct from—the impact of any public
controversy relating to recent tragedies.
40. For example, during February 2018, the NRA issued a Request for Proposal
(“RFP”) to multiple banks, inviting them to submit bids to provide depository services, cash-
management services, and other basic wholesale banking services necessary to the NRA’s
advocacy. The NRA received enthusiastic responses from several banks.
41. Likewise, in early January 2018, the NRA began negotiating with a major DFS-
regulated insurance carrier (the “Corporate Carrier”) to renew its General Liability, Umbrella, and
Media Liability insurance coverage policies, which were set to expire during Spring 2018. Those

negotiations remained on-course until the final days of February 2018, when Defendants sharply
escalated their threats.
42. On or about February 25, 2018, the Chairman of Lockton Companies, placed a
distraught telephone call to the NRA. Lockton had been a close business partner of the NRA for
nearly twenty years; its commitment to the parties’ business relationship had not wavered in
connection with the Parkland tragedy, nor the prior Sandy Hook tragedy, nor any previous wave
of public controversy relating to gun control. Nonetheless, although he expressed that Lockton
privately wished to continue doing business with the NRA, the chairman confided that Lockton
would need to “drop” the NRA—entirely—for fear of “losing [our] license” to do business in New
York.
43. On February 26, 2018, Lockton publicly tweeted that it would discontinue
providing brokerage services for all NRA-endorsed insurance programs.
44. Days later, the Corporate Carrier abruptly reversed its position in its corporate-
insurance-renewal negotiations with the NRA. Although it had previously indicated it would be
willing to extend the NRA’s General Liability and Umbrella coverage on favorable terms
consistent with the NRA’s favorable claims history, the Corporate Carrier now stated that it was
unwilling to renew coverage at any price. The Corporate Carrier severed mutually beneficial
business arrangements with the NRA because it learned of Defendants’ threats directed at Lockton
and feared it would be subject to similar reprisals.
45. Defendants soon supplemented their backchannel threats with official regulatory
“guidance.” In April 2018, Cuomo directed DFS to publicly “urge insurers and bankers statewide
to determine whether any relationship they may have with the NRA or similar organizations sends

the wrong message to their clients and their communities who often look to them for guidance and
support.”26
46. On April 19, 2018, Vullo, as Superintendent of DFS, issued a pair of ominous
“guidance” letters (the “April 2018 Letters”) directed at the chief executive officers, or equivalents,
of all New York State chartered or licensed financial institutions and all insurers doing business in
New York. The April 2018 Letters urged recipients to sever ties with the NRA and other “gun
promotion organizations.”27 The directive was packaged in a sharply worded media advisory
meant to generate headlines—and apply maximum public pressure to the NRA and those with
whom it associates.
47. The April 2018 Letters are suffused with political concerns far afield from DFS’s
mandate to prevent financial crises and financial fraud. For example, they urge banks and insurers
to heed “the voices of the passionate, courageous, and articulate young people” speaking out in
favor of gun control, and to reconsider any business relationships with “the [NRA], and similar
organizations that promote guns and lead to senseless violence.” However, the April 2018 Letters
do not merely express Defendants’ own political opinions: they invoke the “risk management”
26
GOVERNOR CUOMO DIRECTS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES TO
URGE COMPANIES TO WEIGH REPUTATIONAL RISK OF BUSINESS TIES TO THE NRA
AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS, N.Y. STATE GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-directs-department-financial-services-urge-
companies-weigh-reputational-risk, attached hereto as Exhibit A (the “Cuomo Press Release”).
27
Maria T. Vullo, Guidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun
Promotion Organizations, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/dfs/DFS_Guidance_Risk_Management_NRA_Gun_Manufacturers
-Insurance.pdf (addressed to the CEOs or equivalents of insurers doing business in the State of
New York), attached hereto as Exhibit B; Maria T. Vullo, Guidance on Risk Management Relating
to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion Organizations, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. (Apr.
19, 2018), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/dfs/DFS_Guidance_Risk_Management_NRA_
Gun_Manufacturers-Banking.pdf (addressed to the CEOs or equivalents of New York State
chartered or licensed financial institutions), attached hereto as Exhibit C.

obligations of recipients, and direct banks and insurers to “take prompt actions to manage”
purported “reputational risks” arising from “dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion
organizations.”
48. Read in the context of the preceding months’ private communications—as well as
disclosures that would soon follow concerning consequences imposed on firms doing business
with the NRA—the April 2018 Letters were threats that deliberately invoked DFS’s “risk
management” authority to warn of adverse action if institutions failed to support Defendants’
efforts to stifle the NRA’s speech and to retaliate against the NRA based on its viewpoint.
49. Importantly, the April 2018 Letters contain no language clarifying that DFS would
forebear from directly enforcing the letters’ terms. Nor do the April 2018 Letters provide regulated
institutions with any objective criteria for measuring the “reputational risks” imposed by dealings
with entities that “promote guns that lead to senseless violence.” This is because Defendants
intended the April 2018 Letters to intimidate institutions into acceding to a political blacklisting
campaign and have nothing to do with the types of market “risks” properly regulated by DFS.
50. To further dispel any ambiguity surrounding the April 2018 Letters, Cuomo and
Vullo issued the contemporaneous Cuomo Press Release, containing and endorsing a statement by
Vullo that directly “urge[s] all insurance companies and banks doing business in New York to join
the companies that have already discontinued their arrangements with the NRA.”28
28
Ex. A.

51. Likewise, on April 20, 2018, Cuomo publicly tweeted: “The NRA is an extremist
organization. I urge companies in New York State to revisit any ties they have to the NRA and
consider their reputations, and responsibility to the public.”29
52. The intended and actual effect of the April 2018 Letters, and the actions by Cuomo
and Vullo, is to coerce insurance agencies, insurers, and banks into terminating business
relationships with the NRA that were necessary to the survival of the NRA as a charitable
organization.
53. Third-party commentators immediately raised concerns about the First Amendment
implications of DFS’s actions. For example, on April 22, 2018, shortly after issuance of the April
2018 Letters, Brian Knight, a Senior Research Fellow and financial regulation expert at George
Mason University, published an article expressing alarm that the April 2018 Letters “appear[ed]
to be inherently about political speech,” and should be immediately withdrawn.30 In the face of
such criticism (and this litigation), Cuomo doubled down, declaring that a lawsuit which alleges
unconstitutional censorship of the NRA’s “dangerous agenda” means “you know you’re doing
something right.”31
29
Andrew Cuomo (@NYGovCuomo), TWITTER (Apr. 20, 2018, 8:58 AM),
https://twitter.com/NYGovCuomo/status/987359763825614848.
30
Brian Knight, Is New York using bank regulation to suppress speech?, FINREGRAG (Apr.
22, 2018), https://finregrag.com/is-new-york-using-bank-regulation-to-suppress-speech-
ac61a7cb3bf.
31
Kenneth Lovett, NRA slapping Cuomo with lawsuit over blacklisting campaign,
violating First Amendment rights, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (May 11, 2018),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/nra-slapping-cuomo-lawsuit-blacklisting-campaign-
article-1.3984861#; Andrew Cuomo (@NYGovCuomo), TWITTER (May 12, 2018, 8:50 AM),
https://twitter.com/NYGovCuomo/status/995330370592632832.

D. The Damage Done.
1. DFS Permanently Restricts Lockton From Doing Business With The NRA In
New York.
54. On May 2, 2018, two weeks after Vullo issued the April 2018 Letters, Lockton
entered into a consent order Under Articles 21, 23, and 34 of the Insurance Law (the “Lockton
Consent Order”) with DFS—signed by Vullo—which imposes a civil monetary penalty of $7
million.32 Although the Lockton Consent Order ostensibly addresses discrete violations by specific
Lockton entities of New York’s Insurance Law, its provisions go much further. Most notably, the
Lockton Consent Order purports to restrict Lockton’s participation in any NRA-endorsed
insurance programs in New York State, irrespective of whether such programs comply with the
Insurance Law.
55. Specifically, the Lockton Consent Order requires that Lockton agree “not to
participate in . . . any other NRA-endorsed programs with regard to New York State.” Nor may
Lockton “enter into any agreement or program with the NRA to underwrite or participate in any
affinity-type insurance program involving any line of insurance to be issued or delivered in New
York State or to anyone known to Lockton to be a New York resident.” As a result, Lockton is
prohibited from selling NRA affinity-insurance outside New York to any individual who maintains
a New York residence.
56. DFS and Vullo have no legal basis to restrict Lockton’s involvement with insurance
programs that do not violate New York’s Insurance Law; nor do they have authority to regulate
insurance transactions outside of New York. Nevertheless, DFS mandated that Lockton never enter
32
The Lockton Consent Order is attached hereto as Exhibit D.

into any future agreements with the NRA for legitimate and fully compliant insurance programs
in New York.
57. Furthermore, Lockton would violate the Lockton Consent Order if it markets an
ordinary property, casualty, or life insurance policy in the State of New York that was accompanied
by an NRA logo or endorsement—notwithstanding that a comparable logo or endorsement
referencing any other affinity or common-cause organization is permissible. This provision of the
Lockton Consent Order is deliberate and intended to impair the NRA’s ability to negotiate
insurance benefits for its members, damage the NRA’s goodwill among its membership, and
unconstitutionally restrict the NRA’s speech on the basis of political animus.
58. Several of the purported “violations” assessed pursuant to the Lockton Consent
Order concern programs commonly engaged in by numerous additional affinity associations that
do not publicly advocate for Second Amendment rights and, therefore, are not targets of
Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct. Several such organizations are clients of Lockton—yet the
Consent Order does not compel Lockton to discontinue its purportedly unlawful conduct with
respect to these clients.
59. For example:
• DFS claims that Lockton Affinity violated Insurance Law § 2122(a)(1) by referring
to the insurer’s AM Best rating. Yet, at the time this lawsuit was filed, Lockton
Affinity’s affinity program for the American Optometric Association through
AOAExcel (“AOAExcel”) touted the “backing of a carrier that is rated A+
(Superior) by A.M. Best.33 Similarly, Lockton Affinity currently advertises that
coverage for the affinity programs designed for the Veterans of Foreign Wars
33
Questions? We have answers for you., AOAINSURANCEALLIANCE,
http://aoainsurancealliance.com/faq/ (last visited May 7, 2018).

(“VFW”) and Moose International Inc. (“Moose”) was through companies “rated
‘Excellent’ or higher by A.M. Best.”34
• DFS claims that Lockton Affinity violated Insurance Law § 2324(a) by giving or
offering to give no cost insurance to NRA members in good standing. Yet, Lockton
Affinity currently made that same offer to members of both the Professional
Photographers of America (“PPA”)35 and the VFW.36
• DFS claims that Lockton Affinity violated Insurance Law § 2116 by compensating
the NRA based on actual premiums collected. Yet, Lockton Affinity paid
AOAExcel, Moose, the VFW, the PPA, and dozens of other clients in the same or
similar manner.
60. Even if such conduct does violate insurance law, DFS’s selective enforcement of
such offenses as to NRA-endorsed policies—but not as to other policies marketed by Lockton in
an identical fashion—constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination and a denial of equal
protection under the law.
61. Despite the backlash concerning the expansive coercive scope and clear political
agenda of the April 2018 Letters, Defendants remained undaunted in their effort to deprive the
NRA of such services; as such, their overall messaging to financial institutions remained
unaffected. Indeed, the DFS press release publicizing the Lockton Consent Order trumpeted the
same concession by Lockton that had inspired its chairman’s furtive telephone call months before:
34
FVW Post Insurance Program, Program Information, VFW INSURANCE,
http://vfwinsurance.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/29/2017/12/VFW_Post_Insurance_Information_Packet.pdf (last visited
May 7, 2018); MOOSE INSURANCE PROGRAM, http://mooseinsuranceprogram.com/ (last visited
May 7, 2018).
35
INSURANCE FOR PPA, https://insuranceforppa.com/ (last visited May 7, 2018).
36
VFW INSURANCE, http://vfwinsurance.com/life-insurance/#no-cost (last visited May 7,
2018).

Lockton must “refrain from [e]ntering into any other agreement or arrangement . . . involving the
NRA, directly or indirectly”—including, but not limited to, affinity-insurance.37
2. DFS Purports To Prohibit Chubb From Doing Business With The NRA
Anywhere.
62. On May 7, 2018, Chubb Group Holdings, Inc. and Illinois Union (together,
“Chubb”) entered into a Consent Order Under Sections 1101 and 3420 of the Insurance Law (the
“Chubb Consent Order”) with DFS—signed by Vullo—which imposes a civil monetary penalty
of $1.3 million.38 Similar to the Lockton Consent Order, in the Chubb Consent Order, DFS
overextends its authority and purports to restrict Chubb’s participation in any affinity-type
insurance program with the NRA, irrespective of whether such programs comply with the
Insurance Law.
63. Although DFS restricted Lockton from participating in any affinity-type insurance
programs with the NRA in New York or with New York residents, Defendants’ restrictions in the
Chubb Consent Order contain no geographic constraint whatsoever. Instead, the Chubb Consent
Order purports to limit Chubb’s involvement with the NRA anywhere, and everywhere, in the
world.
64. Nevertheless, DFS allows Chubb to continue to underwrite affinity-type insurance
programs with other affinity or common-cause organizations that do not publicly advocate for
Americans’ Second Amendment rights, so long as Chubb undertakes “reasonable due diligence to
37
DFS FINES LOCKTON COMPANIES $7 MILLION FOR UNDERWRITING NRA-
BRANDED “CARRY GUARD” INSURANCE PROGRAM IN VIOLATION OF NEW YORK
INSURANCE LAW, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. (May 2, 2018),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1805021.htm.
38
The Chubb Consent Order is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

ensure that any entity involved . . . is acting in compliance with the Insurance Law . . . .”39 The
only plausible explanation for the DFS’s complete exclusion of NRA-endorsed policies, even those
“in compliance with the Insurance Law,” is that Defendants seek to misuse DFS’s power to deprive
the NRA of insurance and financial services, on the sole ground that Defendants disapprove of the
NRA’s viewpoint regarding gun control.
3. Ignoring Identical Features of Comparable Affinity-Insurance Programs,

Defendants Impermissibly Targeted the NRA.
65. Beginning during the Fall of 2017, including through a subpoena issued to Lockton
and research supplied by Everytown, Defendants became aware of pervasive, colorable regulatory
infirmities affecting numerous affinity-insurance programs. For example, brokers such as Lockton
frequently paid success-based royalties to their affinity clients, which DFS would later assert
violated New York Insurance Law § 2116. Insurance coverage for the cost of psychological
counseling had become increasingly pervasive outside a standard health-insurance context, yet
DFS argues that providing such insurance violates New York Insurance Law § 2117. Similarly,
DFS takes the position that the financial condition or “rating” of an out-of-state, excess-line insurer
may not be advertised as a means to promote the policy—but this practice was common in the
affinity-insurance marketplace in 2017. And although New York Insurance Law § 3420 sets forth
various minimum requirements for liability insurance which protects persons and property, many
policies failed to meet those requirements. It is clear that confusion existed among brokers
regarding the mechanics of compliance with New York Insurance Law § 2118, which requires
brokers to secure declinations from authorized insurers before placing surplus-line insurance.
39
See Ex. E at ¶ 22.

66. Confronted with a marketplace where brokerage practices frequently departed from
the regulators’ preferred reading of certain statutes, Defendants could have issued informative
guidance, or adopted an even-handed enforcement approach. Instead, Defendants selectively used
these purported infractions to target the NRA, while disregarding other instances of the same
conduct of which they were aware. (When Defendants did issue guidance letters to regulated
institutions in April 2018, the letters reflected their enforcement approach: ignore excess-line
declinations, out-of-state-carrier ratings, and other technical insurance-policy features while
“urging” financial institutions to cut ties with gun groups).
67. Although DFS’s investigation of the NRA, launched at Cuomo and Everytown’s
behest, had originally focused on Carry Guard, that changed by February 2018. In the aftermath
of the Parkland tragedy, Vullo met with senior executives of Lloyd’s and LAI, and presented
Defendants’ views on gun control and their desire to leverage their powers to combat the
availability of firearms, including specifically by weakening the NRA. These backchannel
meetings began on or about February 27, 2018, after Vullo spoke at a breakfast meeting of the
New York City Bar Association; participants included Vullo herself, along with Inga Beale of
Lloyd’s and Joseph Gunset of LAI.
68. Sometimes referred to as an insurance underwriter, Lloyd’s is actually an insurance
marketplace, composed of “members which underwrite insurance (each for their own account) as
members of syndicates.”40 Various supervisory bodies and boards within Lloyd’s set policies for
40
See Lloyd’s of London in Study for N.Y. Insurance Market, DealBook, N.Y. TIMES
(March 25, 2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/lloyds-of-london-in-study-for-n-y-
insurance-market/; see also The Lloyd’s Market, LLOYD’S, https://www.lloyds.com/about-
lloyds/what-is-lloyds/the-lloyds-market (last visited April 18, 2019),
https://www.lloyds.com/about-lloyds/what-is-lloyds/the-lloyds-market (describing the structure
of the Lloyd’s market). Entities known as “managing agents” manage the Lloyd’s syndicates on

the Lloyd’s syndicates, and can issue directives that shape the availability of different types of
insurance worldwide. Like most of the insurance industry, Lloyd’s generally does not shy away
from providing insurance that may be controversial—for example, to this day, Lloyd’s syndicates
are permitted to underwrite coverage for religious sexual abuse liability.41 However, despite being
based in London, Lloyd’s is extremely sensitive to pressure from the New York regulators, and
concerned about “reputational risks” that may incur DFS’s disfavor. Since World War II, when
Lloyd’s sought to protect policyholders from the consequences of German attacks on England, all
premiums paid by Lloyd’s policyholders have deposited into trust funds in the State of New York,
through a structure known as the Lloyd’s America Trust Fund (“LATF”). The LATF is directly
regulated by DFS, and totals tens of billions of dollars—providing massive collateral for whatever
demands DFS may impose.42
69. During her surreptitiously held meetings with Lloyd’s executives that commenced
in February 2018, Vullo acknowledged the widespread regulatory issues in the excess-line
marketplace. Vullo and DFS made clear that Lloyd’s could avoid liability for infractions relating
to other, similarly situated insurance policies, so long as it aided DFS’s campaign against gun
behalf of Lloyd’s members. The individual Lloyd’s syndicates and managing agents that served
the NRA, and were targeted by DFS are: AUW 0609; BRT 2987; CNP 0958; CNP 4444; CSL
1084; GER 1206; KLN 0510; LIB 4472; ROC 1200; SAM 0727; AmTrust Syndicates Limited;
Argo Managing Agency Limited; Atrium Underwriters Limited; Brit Syndicates Limited;
Canopius Managing Agents Limited; Chaucer Syndicates Limited; Liberty Managing Agency
Limited; S.A. Meacock & Company Limited; Tokio Marine Kiln Syndicates Limited. All are
located in the United Kingdom.
41
See, e.g., http://www.britinsurance.com/~/media/files/us%20flyers%20new/public%20
entity%20%20non%20profit%20sir%20package.ashx.
42
See In re Lloyd's Am. Tr. Fund Litig., 928 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing
the LATF structure and certain relevant regulations administered by DFS’s predecessor agency,
the New York Department of Insurance).

groups. Against the specter of this bold abuse of her position, Lloyd’s agreed that it would instruct
its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back its NRA-related
business; in exchange, DFS would focus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action
solely on those syndicates which served the NRA, and ignore other syndicates writing similar
policies. The first step of this choreographed process was a letter from DFS to Gunset, an LAI
executive, sent on April 11, 2018.43
70. On May 1, 2018, Lloyd’s held a meeting of its Board of Directors. Among the
topics discussed at the meeting were
.46
71. On May 9, 2018, Lloyd’s sent a notice to its managing agents who are responsible
for all insurance policies written through the Lloyd’s marketplace (the “May 9 Notice”). 47 The
43
Ex. F and Sealed Exhibit B.
44
Ex. G and Sealed Exhibit C.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Ex. H and Sealed Exhibit D.

May 9 Notice
48
72. Also on May 9, 2018, Lloyd’s publicly announced that it had directed its
underwriters to terminate all insurance related to the NRA and not to provide any insurance to the
NRA in the future, in the wake of DFS’s investigations into the NRA and its business partners.49
73. By June 30, 2018, the Lloyd’s managing agents and syndicates had provided
materials to DFS that DFS requested in the April 11, 2018 letter.
74. On December 20, 2018, ten Lloyd’s underwriters, acting through their managing
agents, entered into a Consent Order Under Sections 1102 and 3420 of the Insurance Law (the
“Lloyd’s Consent Order”) with DFS—signed by Vullo—which imposes a civil monetary penalty
of $5 million.50 Similar to the Lockton and Chubb Consent Orders, in the Lloyd’s Consent Order,
DFS overextends its authority and purports to restrict Lloyd’s participation in any affinity-type
insurance program with the NRA, irrespective of whether such programs comply with the
Insurance Law.51
48
Id.
49
See, e.g., Lloyd’s Underwriters Told to Stop Insurance Linked to NRA, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2018/05/09/business/09reuters-lloyds-of-
london-nra.html.
50
The Lloyd’s Consent Order is attached hereto as Exhibit I.
51
See Ex. I at ¶ 20.

75. Pursuant to the conversations between Vullo and DFS with senior officials at
Lloyd’s and LAI described above, Lloyd’s was not subjected to any enforcement action and/or
penalties for any violation of the New York Insurance Law related to affinity-insurance programs,
other than in connection with the NRA-related insurance programs.
76. Importantly, Lloyd’s was not the only entity with direct exposure to DFS’s selective
enforcement scheme. DFS also became specifically cognizant of non-NRA policies that exhibited
the same purported defects as NRA policies—and chose to ignore those violations, targeting solely
the NRA—in the context of its Lockton investigation.
DFS verbally conveyed to Lockton that it was only
interested in pursuing the NRA. Other programs exhibiting the same issues, DFS explained, could
be quietly remediated by Lockton after consent order and penalty targeting NRA programs had
been publicized.
77. Consistent with this agreement, on July 2, 2018, Lockton provided a report to DFS
regarding the status of its remediation efforts for non-NRA programs.

78.
. In
response, DFS took no action whatsoever against any of Lockton’s non-NRA clients. On January
31, 2019, almost three months after this Court had sustained the NRA’s selective-enforcement
claims and permitted discovery regarding them, DFS entered into a Supplemental Consent Order
with Lockton that purported to admonish violations of the same statutes by Lockton’s non-NRA
clients, yet did not identify the clients by name or require Lockton to cease doing business with
them.52
79. DFS’s selective enforcement continues to this day. While taking no action against
any of Lockton’s other affinity clients, or the underwriters involved in those policies, DFS recently
subpoenaed an underwriter known as AGIA which backs health-insurance policies administered
and brokered by Lockton for the NRA. These policies have nothing to do with firearms and are
identical in all material respects to policies administered and brokered by Lockton on behalf of
non-NRA clients.
52
Ex. J.

4. Defendants’ Actions Are Causing Other Financial Institutions To Re-Evaluate

Their Relationships With The NRA For Fear Of Significant Adverse Action
By Defendants.
80. Defendants’ concerted efforts to stifle the NRA’s freedom of speech and to retaliate
against the NRA based on its viewpoints are causing other insurance, banking, and financial
institutions doing business with the NRA to rethink their mutually beneficial business relationships
with the NRA for fear of monetary sanctions or expensive public investigations.
81. The NRA has encountered serious difficulties obtaining corporate insurance
coverage to replace coverage withdrawn by the Corporate Carrier. The NRA has spoken to
numerous carriers in an effort to obtain replacement corporate insurance coverage; nearly every
carrier has indicated that it fears transacting with the NRA specifically in light of DFS’s actions
against Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd’s.
82. Defendants’ threats have also imperiled the NRA’s access to basic banking
services, despite the absence of any alleged regulatory violations in connection with the NRA’s
banking activities. Multiple banks withdrew their bids in the NRA’s RFP process following the
issuance of the April 2018 Letters, based on concerns that any involvement with the NRA—even
providing the organization with basic depository services—would expose them to regulatory
reprisals.
83. Defendants’ campaign is achieving its intended chilling effect on banks throughout
DFS’s jurisdiction. Speaking “on the condition of anonymity,” one community banker from
Upstate New York told American Banker magazine that in light of the apparent “politically
motivated” nature of the DFS guidance, “[i]t’s hard to know what the rules are” or whom to do
business with, because bankers must attempt to anticipate “who is going to come into disfavor

with the New York State DFS” or other regulators.53 Other industry sources told American Banker
that, “such regulatory guidelines are frustratingly vague, and can effectively compel institutions to
cease catering to legal businesses.”54
84. The NRA has suffered tens of millions of dollars in damages based on Defendants’
conduct described above. Such damages include, without limitation, damages due to reputational
harm, increased development and marketing costs for any potential new NRA-endorsed insurance
programs, and lost royalty amounts owed to the NRA, as well as attorneys’ fees, legal expenses,
and other costs.
85. If the NRA is unable to collect donations from its members, safeguard the assets
endowed to it, apply its funds to cover media buys and other expenses integral to its political
speech, and obtain basic corporate insurance coverage, it will be unable to exist as a not-for-profit
or pursue its advocacy mission. Defendants seek to silence one of America’s oldest constitutional
rights advocates. If their abuses are not enjoined, they will soon, substantially, succeed.
V.
CLAIMS
A. Count One: Violation Of The NRA’s First And Fourteenth Amendment Rights Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, And Article 1, Section 8 Of The New York Constitution By The
Establishment Of An Implicit Censorship Regime (As To All Defendants).
86. The NRA repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in the preceding
paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
53
Neil Haggerty, Gun issue is a lose-lose for banks (whatever their stance), AMERICAN
BANKER (Apr. 26, 2018, 1:11 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/gun-issue-is-a-lose-
lose-for-banks-whatever-their-stance.
54
Id.

87. The First Amendment, which applies to Defendants by operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Section Eight of the New York Constitution secure the NRA’s right to free
speech, including its right to express its viewpoints and political beliefs regarding the
constitutionally protected right to keep and bear arms.
88. The NRA has a longstanding history of political advocacy advancing the Second
Amendment rights of all Americans. Although Cuomo and Vullo disagree with and oppose the
NRA’s political views, the NRA’s freedom to express its views with respect to the gun-control
debate is a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment.
89. Defendants have regulatory authority over financial institutions and insurance
entities that have done or are doing business with or are otherwise associated with the NRA,
including Chubb, Lockton, and Lloyd’s.
90. Defendants’ actions—including but not limited to the issuance of the April 2018
Letters and the accompanying backroom exhortations, the imposition of the Consent Orders upon
Chubb, Lockton and Lloyd’s, and the issuance of the Cuomo Press Release—established a “system
of informal censorship” designed to suppress the NRA’s speech.55
91. Defendants’ actions were for the purpose of suppressing the NRA’s pro-Second
Amendment viewpoint. Defendants undertook such unlawful conduct with the intent to obstruct,
chill, deter, and retaliate against the NRA’s core political speech.
92. Defendants’ unlawful exhortations to New York insurance companies, banks, and
financial institutions that they, among other things, “manag[e] their risks, including reputational
risks, that may arise from their dealings with the NRA . . ., as well as continued assessment of
compliance with their own codes of social responsibility[,]” as well as “review any relationships
55
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963).

they have with the NRA[,]” and “take prompt actions to managing these risks and promote public
health and safety[,]” constitute a concerted effort to deprive the NRA of its freedom of speech by
threatening with government prosecution services critical to the survival of the NRA and its ability
to disseminate its message. Far from protected government speech, Defendants’ actions constitute
an “implied threat[ ] to employ coercive state power” against entities doing business with the NRA,
and they are reasonably interpreted as such.56
93. Defendants’ concerted efforts to stifle the NRA’s freedom of speech caused
financial institutions doing business with the NRA to end their business relationships, or explore
such action, due to fear of monetary sanctions or expensive public investigations. For example,
Defendants coerced and caused Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd’s to cease their participation in NRA-
endorsed insurance programs, regardless of whether the insurance programs met all legal
qualifications under New York’s Insurance Law.
94. Defendants’ unlawful and intentional actions are not justified by a substantial or
compelling government interest and are not narrowly tailored to serve any such interest.
95. Defendants’ intentional actions resulted in significant damages to the NRA,
including but not limited to damages due to reputational harm, increased development and
marketing costs for any potential new NRA-endorsed insurance programs, and lost royalty
amounts owed to the NRA.
96. The NRA is also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 8601.
97. In addition to the above-described damages, absent an injunction against
Defendants, the NRA will suffer irrecoverable loss and irreparable harm if it is unable to acquire
56
Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 F.3d 339, 342 (2d Cir. 2003).

insurance or other banking services due to Defendants’ actions. Accordingly, the NRA seeks an
order preliminarily and permanently enjoining Cuomo and Vullo (in their official capacities) and
DFS—including its officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction—from threatening or
encouraging insurance companies, banks, or financial institutions to sever ties with or discontinue
services to the NRA.
B. Count Two: Violation Of The NRA’s First And Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 And Article 1, Section 8 Of The New York Constitution By
Retaliating Against The NRA Based On Its Speech (As To All Defendants).
99. The First Amendment, which applies to Defendants by operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Section Eight of the New York Constitution, secures the NRA’s right to free
speech, including its right to express its viewpoints and political beliefs regarding the
constitutionally protected right to keep and bear arms.
100. The NRA has a longstanding history of political advocacy advancing the Second
Amendment rights of all Americans. Although Cuomo and Vullo disagree with and oppose the
NRA’s political views, the NRA’s freedom to express its views with respect to the gun-control
debate is a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment.
101. Defendants’ actions—including but not limited to the issuance of the April 2018
Letters and the accompanying backroom exhortations, the imposition of the Consent Orders upon
Chubb, Lockton and Lloyd’s, and the issuance of the Cuomo Press Release—were in response to
and substantially caused by the NRA’s political speech regarding the right to keep and bear arms.
Defendants’ actions were for the purpose of suppressing the NRA’s pro-Second Amendment

viewpoint. Defendants undertook such unlawful conduct with the intent to obstruct, chill, deter,
and retaliate against the NRA’s core political speech.
102. Defendants’ actions have concretely harmed the NRA by causing financial
institutions doing business with the NRA to end their business relationships, or explore such
action, due to fear of monetary sanctions or expensive public investigations. For example,
Defendants coerced and caused Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd’s to cease their participation in NRA-
endorsed insurance programs in New York and elsewhere, regardless of whether the insurance
programs met all legal qualifications under New York’s Insurance Law.
103. Defendants had discretion in deciding whether and how to carry out their actions,
including but not limited to the types of demands imposed on Chubb, Lockton and Lloyd’s in the
Consent Orders, whether to issue the Cuomo Press Release, and the type of guidance provided in
the April 2018 Letters. They exercised this discretion to harm the NRA because of the NRA’s
speech regarding the Second Amendment.
104. Defendants’ unlawful and intentional actions are not justified by a substantial or
compelling government interest and are not narrowly tailored to serve any such interest.
105. Defendants’ intentional actions resulted in significant damages to the NRA,
including but not limited to damages due to reputational harm, increased development and
marketing costs for any potential new NRA-endorsed insurance programs, and lost royalty
amounts owed to the NRA.
U.S.C. § 1988 and New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 8601.
107. In addition to the above-described damages, absent an injunction against
Defendants, the NRA will suffer irrecoverable loss and irreparable harm if it is unable to acquire

insurance or other financial services due to Defendants’ actions. Accordingly, the NRA seeks an
order permanently enjoining Cuomo, Vullo, and DFS—including its officers, agents, servants,
employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice
of the injunction—from threatening or encouraging insurance companies, banks, or financial
institutions to sever ties with or discontinue services to the NRA.
C. Count Three: Violation Of The Equal Protection Clause Of The Fourteenth

Amendment Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, And Article 1, Section 11 Of The New York
Constitution (As To Vullo).
109. Vullo knowingly and willfully violated the NRA’s equal protection rights by
seeking to selectively enforce certain provisions of the Insurance Law against Lockton’s affinity-
insurance programs for the NRA. Meanwhile, other affinity-insurance programs that were
identically (or at least similarly) marketed by Lockton, but not endorsed by “gun promotion”
organizations, have not been targeted by DFS’s investigation.
110. Vullo was aware during the investigations of the NRA and its business partners that
these other identical (or at least similar in all material respects) affinity-insurance programs had
the same legal infirmities that resulted in the penalties against Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd’s related
solely to the NRA-related affinity-insurance programs. Specifically, Vullo was aware of these
comparators from her involvement in the conversations she had with senior officials of Lloyd’s in
the spring of 2018 described above.
111. Alternatively, Vullo should have known of similarly situated individuals at the time
DFS launched its investigation and any purported lack of knowledge was due to a “see-no-evil”
policy of enforcement, which Vullo and DFS abandoned solely to further their vendetta against

the NRA. The “see-no-evil” enforcement policy was confirmed by DFS’s continued ignorance
toward the violations of the similarly situated comparators.
112. By virtue of the position held by Vullo at the time DFS launched its investigation,
Vullo knew the actions taken by DFS against NRA affinity insurance programs were
unprecedented. No other similarly situated programs have faced even close to the same treatment
for analogous violations. However, Vullo and DFS failed to inquire about whether there were any
other similarly situated affinity programs when the investigation was launched.
113. There is an extremely high level of similarity between the NRA-related affinity-
insurance programs and those of the comparator affinity-insurance programs, including
AOAExcel, Moose, the VFW, and the PPA, such that no rational person would perceive the NRA-
related programs to be different enough to justify the differential treatment by Vullo and DFS.
114. Vullo and DFS discriminated against the NRA and its business partners because of
Vullo’s personal animus toward the NRA and its Second Amendment advocacy.
115. The similarity between the NRA-related programs and the comparators and the
sharp differences in Vullo’s and DFS’s treatment of them are sufficient to exclude the possibility
that Vullo and DFS acted on the basis of a mistake.
116. Alternatively, there is at least a reasonably close resemblance between the NRA-
related affinity-insurance programs and those of the comparator affinity-insurance programs,
including AOAExcel, Moose, the VFW, and the PPA.
117. The disparate treatment of the NRA-related programs and the comparators was
caused by Vullo’s intent to punish and/or inhibit the NRA because of the NRA’s constitutionally
protected speech.

118. Vullo’s selective enforcement of the Insurance Law against the NRA and its
business partners has been knowing, willful, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, discriminatory,
and undertaken in bad faith and without a rational basis. Vullo’s conduct does not further any
legitimate government interest.
119. Vullo’s selective enforcement of the Insurance Law against the NRA and its
business partners is based on the NRA’s political views and speech relating to the Second
Amendment. These considerations are impermissible bases for an enforcement action.
120. Vullo’s actions have resulted in significant damages to the NRA, including but not
limited to damages due to reputational harm, increased development and marketing costs for any
potential new NRA-endorsed insurance programs, and lost royalty amounts owed to the NRA.
U.S.C. § 1988 and New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules § 8601.
VI.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
122. The NRA hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
VII.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE the NRA respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in the NRA’s
favor and against Defendants, as follows:
a. Declaring, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that Defendants have violated the NRA’s
rights to free speech and equal protection under both the Federal and New York Constitutions;
b. Granting a preliminary and permanent injunction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ordering DFS, its agents,
representatives, employees and servants and all persons and entities in concert or participation with

it, Cuomo (in his official capacity) and the current Superintendent of DFS (in her/his official
capacity):
(1) to immediately cease and refrain from engaging in any conduct or activity
which has the purpose or effect of interfering with the NRA’s exercise of
the rights afforded to it under the First and Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Section 8 to the New York Constitution; and
(2) to immediately cease and refrain from engaging in any conduct or activity
which has the purpose or effect of interfering with, terminating, or
diminishing any of the NRA’s contracts and/or business relationships with
any organizations;
b. Granting such other injunctive relief to which the NRA is entitled;
c. Awarding the NRA actual damages, including compensatory and consequential
damages, in an amount to be determined at trial;
d. Awarding the NRA exemplary or punitive damages;
e. Awarding the NRA pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest lawful
rates;
f. Awarding the NRA such costs and disbursements as are incurred in prosecuting
this action, including reasonable attorneys’ and experts’ fees; and
g. Granting the NRA such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Sarah B. Rogers

William A. Brewer III (Bar No. 700217)
wab@brewerattorneys.com
Sarah B. Rogers (Bar No. 700207)
sbr@brewerattorneys.com

BREWER, ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS

750 Lexington Avenue, 14th Floor
New York, New York 10022
Telephone: (212) 489-1400
Facsimile: (212) 751-2849
ATTORNEYS FOR THE NATIONAL RIFLE

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 2, 2020, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be served upon the
following counsel electronically through the ECF system:
William A. Scott
Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel
New York State Attorney General’s Office
Albany Office, The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224-0341
Email: William.Scott@ag.ny.com
Debra L. Greenberger
EMERY CELLI BRINCKERHOFF & ABADY LLP
600 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York 10020
dgreenberger@ecbalaw.com
/s/ Sarah B. Rogers

Sarah B. Rogers

Case 1:18-cv-00566-TJM-CFH Document 203-1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 1 of 3
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EXHIBIT B
MEMORANDUM
TO: The Chief Executive Officers or Equivalents of All Insurers Doing Business in the State of
New York
FROM: Maria T. Vullo, Superintendent of Financial Services
DATE: April 19, 2018
RE: Guidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion
Organizations
The New York State Department of Financial Services is issuing this guidance in the wake of
several recent horrific shootings, including in Parkland, Florida that left 17 students and staff
members at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School dead. This was only one of many prior gun
violence tragedies, including those in Columbine High School, Sandy Hook, Pulse night club,
and the Las Vegas music festival, that left many innocent people dead.
While the social backlash against the National Rifle Association (the “NRA”), and similar
organizations that promote guns that lead to senseless violence, has in the past been strong, the
nature and the intensity of the voices now speaking out, including the voices of the passionate,
courageous, and articulate young people who have experienced this recent horror first hand, is a
strong reminder that such voices can no longer be ignored and that society, as a whole, has a
responsibility to act and is no longer willing to stand by and wait and witness more tragedies
caused by gun violence, but instead is demanding change now.
Our insurers are, and have been, vital to the communities they serve for generations and are
guided by their commitment to corporate social responsibility, including public safety and health.
Insurers’ engagement in communities they serve is closely tied to the business they do with their
clients and customers and its impact on such communities. Often insurers report to their
stakeholders that their performance is based on both their strategic business vision as well as on a
commitment to society as a whole. There is a fair amount of precedent in the business world
where firms have implemented measures in areas such as the environment, caring for the sick,
and civil rights in fulfilling their corporate social responsibility. The recent actions of a number
of financial institutions that severed their ties with the NRA after the AR-15 style rifle killed 17
people in the school in Parkland, Florida is an example of such a precedent.
The tragic devastation caused by gun violence that we have regrettably been increasingly
witnessing is a public safety and health issue that should no longer be tolerated by the public and
there will undoubtedly be increasing public backlash against the NRA and like organizations.
Our insurers are key players in maintaining and improving public health and safety in the
communities they serve. They are also in the business of managing risks, including their own
reputational risks, by making risk management decisions on a regular basis regarding if and how
they will do business with certain sectors or entities. In light of the above, and subject to
compliance with applicable laws, the Department encourages its insurers to continue evaluating
and managing their risks, including reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with the
NRA or similar gun promotion organizations, if any, as well as continued assessment of
compliance with their own codes of social responsibility. The Department encourages regulated
institutions to review any relationships they have with the NRA or similar gun promotion
organizations, and to take prompt actions to managing these risks and promote public health and
safety.
___________________________
Maria T. Vullo
Superintendent of Financial Services
2
EXHIBIT C
MEMORANDUM
TO: The Chief Executive Officers or Equivalents of New York State Chartered or Licensed
Financial Institutions
FROM: Maria T. Vullo, Superintendent of Financial Services
DATE: April 19, 2018
RE: Guidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion
Organizations
The New York State Department of Financial Services is issuing this guidance in the wake of
several recent horrific shootings, including in Parkland, Florida that left 17 students and staff
members at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School dead. This was only one of many prior gun
violence tragedies, including those in Columbine High School, Sandy Hook, Pulse night club,
and the Las Vegas music festival, that left many innocent people dead.
While the social backlash against the National Rifle Association (the “NRA”) and similar
organizations that promote guns that lead to senseless violence has in the past been strong, the
nature and the intensity of the voices now speaking out, including the voices of the passionate,
courageous, and articulate young people who have experienced this recent horror first hand, is a
strong reminder that such voices can no longer be ignored and that society, as a whole, has a
responsibility to act and is no longer willing to stand by and wait and witness more tragedies
caused by gun violence, but instead is demanding change now.
Our financial institutions, whether depository or non-depository, are, and have been, the
cornerstone of the communities they serve for generations and are guided by their commitment
to corporate social responsibility, including public safety and health. The manner by which
financial institutions engage in communities they serve is closely tied to the business they do
with their clients and customers and its impact on such communities. In fact, a review of
performance reports of many firms to their stakeholders demonstrates how their performance is
based on both their strategic business vision as well as on a commitment to society as a whole.
There is a fair amount of precedent in the business world where firms have implemented
measures in areas such as the environment, healthcare, and civil rights in fulfilling their
corporate social responsibility. The recent actions of a number of financial institutions that
severed their ties with the NRA and have taken other actions after the AR-15 style rifle killed 17
people in the school in Parkland, Florida is an example of such a precedent.
The tragic devastation caused by gun violence that we have regrettably been increasingly
witnessing is a public safety and health issue. Our financial institutions can play a significant
role in promoting public health and safety in the communities they serve, thereby fulfilling their
corporate social responsibility to those communities. They are also in the business of managing
risks, including their own reputational risks, by making risk management decisions on a regular
basis regarding if and how they will do business with certain sectors or entities. In light of the
above, and subject to compliance with applicable laws, the Department encourages its chartered
and licensed financial institutions to continue evaluating and managing their risks, including
reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion
organizations, if any, as well as continued assessment of compliance with their own codes of
social responsibility. The Department encourages regulated institutions to review any
relationships they have with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations, and to take
prompt actions to managing these risks and promote public health and safety.
___________________________
Maria T. Vullo
2
EXHIBIT D
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT

OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
In the Matter of
LOCKTON AFFINITY, LLC and

LOCKTON COMPANIES, LLC
CONSENT ORDER UNDER

ARTICLES 21, 23 AND 34 OF THE INSURANCE LAW
Lockton Affinity, LLC, on behalf of each of its separate operating series, one of which,
Lockton Affinity Series of Lockton Affinity, LLC, is the successor entity to Lockton Risk
Services, Inc. ("Lockton Affinity"), Lockton Companies, LLC, on behalf of each of its separate
operating series ("Lockton Companies") (together, Lockton Affinity and Lockton Companies,
"Lockton"), and the New York Department of Financial Services (the "Department")
(collectively, the "Parties") are willing to resolve the matters described herein without further
proceedings.
THE DEPARTMENT'S FINDINGS FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION
1. Lockton, together with its affiliates, is the world's largest privately owned,
independent insurance brokerage firm, offering customers risk management, insurance and
employee benefits services. At least one Lockton affiliate has been licensed by the Department
since approximately 1987, and Lockton Affinity has been licensed by the Department to act as an
insurance producer, including as an excess line broker, since at least 2013.
2. Illinois Union Insurance Company ("Illinois Union") is an unauthorized insurer
eligible to write excess lines insurance in New York State. It is a subsidiary of Chubb Ltd., and
1
in connection with the "Carry Guard" program discussed herein, Illinois Union held itself out to
the public simply as "Chubb" (hereinafter, "Chubb").
3. Lloyd's of London is an insurance market encompassing more than 50 insurance
companies, over 200 registered brokers, and global network of over 4,000 local agents who
manage these arrangements, known as "coverholders." 1 The Lloyd's market is backed by the
Lloyd's Corporation (hereinafter, together with Lloyd's of London, collectively referred to as
"Lloyd's").
4. The National Rifle Association of America ("NRA") is a New York not-for-profit
corporation incorporated in 1871. The NRA describes its mission as "firearms safety, education,
and training and advocacy on behalf of safe and responsible gun owners." The NRA is not
licensed by the Department.
The Carry Guard Program
5. From approximately April through November 2017, Lockton Affinity and the
NRA offered an insurance program to new and existing NRA members in New York and
elsewhere called "Carry Guard." During that time, the NRA's website described the program as
follows:
NRA Carry Guard is a two-pronged program. It was created to provide dynamic,

state-of-the-art insurance protection to those who legally defend themselves with a
firearm, and to offer an elite, one-stop training option. The insurance provides a
cutting edge set of features that will help gun owners mitigate the potentially costly
financial and legal consequences flowing from armed encounters, even if they did
everything right.
6. The NRA website further described the Carry Guard program as ''the only
membership carry program developed and supported by the National Rifle Association, the
1
A "coverholder" in the Lloyd's syndicate is an insurance intermediary authorized by a managing agent to enter into
contracts of insurance to be underwritten by the members of a syndicate managed by it, in accordance with the terms
of a binding authority. See https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds-around-the-world/europe/switzerland/becoming-an-
intermediary-and-coverholder.
2
most powerful civil rights organization in American history." The website further stated that
Carry Guard was "created by the NRA."
7. Additional promotional materials disseminated by the NRA stated:
Why do I need Carry Guard? Although millions of Americans are prepared to use a
firearm in self-defense, very few families can withstand the financial consequences that
may come next. The legal fees to clear your good name could be enormous. Likewise,
the costs of defending and potentially losing a civil lawsuit could cripple your finances
for the rest of your life. And many homeowners' policies have severe limitations or
exclusions related to intentional acts such as self-defense.
These materials stated at the bottom of the page: "NRA CARRY GUARD™ Insurance Program
Administered by Lockton Affinity, LLC • D/B/A/ Lockton Affinity Insurance Brokers, LLC."
8. Pursuant to written agreements with Chubb and the NRA, Lockton Affinity
served as the administrator for the Carry Guard program, carrying out such functions as
marketing the insurance, binding the insurance, collecting and distributing premiums, and
delivering policies to insureds.
9. Pursuant to written agreements with Lockton Affinity, Chubb -- through its
Illinois Union subsidiary -- served as the underwriter for the Carry Guard insurance program,
providing insurance policies to individuals who purchased Carry Guard insurance. According to
the marketing and promotion website for the Carry Guard program, www.nracarryguard.com (in
effect from April to mid-December 2017), the Carry Guard insurance program "is backed by
insurance leader Chubb" and is underwritten by a "group within Chubb the world's largest
publicly traded property and casualty insurance company." The Carry Guard insurance
program is referred to herein as the "Carry Guard Program."
10. The Carry Guard Program tied insurance to free NRA membership, in violation of
the New York Insurance Law (the "Insurance Law"). When purchasing Carry Guard insurance,
members would also receive one year of free NRA membership. The NRA membership benefit
3
was not specified in the insurance policy, and one year of membership exceeded $25 in market
value. The NRA directly managed the membership aspect of the Carry Guard program. 2
11. Lockton Affinity placed these insurance policies through New York's excess line
market. Excess line coverage offers policyholders an opportunity to obtain insurance that could
not be procured from an authorized insurer. An "authorized insurer" is an insurance company
that has received a license from the Department to provide specified types of insurance to
customers in New York. Authorized insurers are fully regulated by the Department in order to
ensure solvency and adherence to consumer protection standards.
12. Excess line insurers are not licensed or authorized by the Department, but are
permitted to do business in New York through an excess line broker. Unless another exemption
applies, an insurance policy may be procured from an excess line insurer only after an excess
line broker has obtained declinations of coverage from three authorized insurers.
13. The Carry Guard insurance program, as underwritten by Chubb and administered,
solicited and marketed by Lockton Affinity, provided insurance coverage that may not be offered
in the New York State excess line market, specifically: (a) defense coverage in a criminal
proceeding that is not permitted by law; (b) liability coverage for bodily injury or property
damage expected or intended from the insured's standpoint in an insurance policy limited to use
of firearms and that was beyond the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property; and
(c) coverage for expenses incurred by the insured for psychological counseling support.
14. Moreover, although it did not possess an insurance producer license from the
Department, the NRA nonetheless engaged in aggressive marketing of and solicitation for the
Carry Guard Program. For example (and without limitation):
2
In the event the purchaser was already an NRA member, the Carry Guard program allowed the member to carry a
credit for a free one year membership forward, or allowed a transfer of the credit to a family member for use in
obtaining NRA membership at no cost.
4
o The NRA broadcasted NRA-produced videos promoting the Carry Guard Program on
YouTube;
o The NRA solicited participation in the Carry Guard Program through mass e-mail
marketing, direct mail, banner ads, and articles in NRA publications;
o The NRA heavily promoted the Carry Guard Program at its 2017 "Carry Guard
Expo" and its annual meetings;
o The NRA operated the website "www.nracarryguard.com," which was an important

marketing portal for the Carry Guard Program and linked to a website operated by
Lockton Affinity (www. lockton.nracarryguard.com), which provided additional
information about the Carry Guard Program;
o The NRA promoted Carry Guard insurance on its main website, www .nra.org, which,
among other things, featured an NRA spokesperson making claims such as, "We're
proud to have developed the one carry membership program that stands above all
others - NRA Carry Guard"; and "I will never carry a gun without carrying this."
o "Pop-up" internet advertising for the Carry Guard Program that featured one or more
NRA spokespersons.
Other NRA-Endorsed Programs
15.. From approximately January 2000 through March 2018, Lockton Affinity and the
NRA together offered at least 11 additional insurance programs to new and existing NRA
members in New York and elsewhere, including:
a. "Retired Law Enforcement Officer Self-Defense Insurance," which provided

coverage for criminal and civil defense costs, and bodily injury and damage caused
by the use of a firearm;
b. "ArmsCare Plus Firearms Insurance," which provided coverage for legal firearms and
attached accessories against loss, damage, flood, fire, and theft (including theft from a
locked vehicle);
c. ''No Cost ArmsCare Firearms Insurance," which provided free coverage to NRA
members in good standing for legal firearms and their attached accessories, up to
$2,500 in value, against loss, damage, flood, fire, and theft (including theft from a
locked vehicle);
d. "Firearms Instructor Plus Liability Insurance," which provided coverage for injuries
or damage the insured causes while acting as an instructor during a lesson, medical
expenses up to $5,000, legal expenses from lawsuits related to the injuries or damage,
5
and professional liability coverage that protects the member from allegations of
negligent training;
e. "Personal Firearms Protection Insurance," which provided coverage for any

unintentional injuries or damage an insured causes while hunting or trapping on
public or private land, shooting in competitions, or shooting at private shooting
ranges, with a firearm, air gun, bow and arrow, or trapping equipment, and coverage
for lawsuit defense costs;
£ "Gun Collector Insurance," which provided coverage for certain firearms and their
attached accessories against loss, damage, fire, and theft (including theft from a
locked vehicle);
g. "Gun Club Insurance," which provided coverage for loss or damage to any assets the
gun club rents, leases or owns, coverage for general liability plus medical payments,
coverage for claims of false advertising, and optional coverage for business income,
boiler and machinery, glass, computers, valuable papers and records, and accounts
receivable;
h. "Hunt Club Insurance," which provided coverage for hunt clubs and the landowners
to protect against injury and damage, provides host liquor coverage, and provided
hired and non-owned auto coverage. In addition, an insured could select coverage for
"personal and advertising," products/completed operations, and medical expenses up
to $5,000 for any one person;
i. "NRA Business Alliance Insurance," which provided coverage for a firearms-related

business, including coverage for loss or damage to any assets the insured business
rents, leases or owns, coverage for general liability plus medical payments, coverage
for claims of false advertising, gunsmith coverage, and optional coverage for business
income, boiler and machinery, glass, computers, valuable papers and records, and
accounts receivable;
j. "Gun Show Insurance," which provided coverage for the insured's liability arising
out of the insured's occupation as a gun show promoter; and
k. "Home-Based Federal Firearms License Insurance" for gun dealers and gunsmiths,
which provided coverage for the insured's business location, equipment and tools,
and gear entrusted to the insured by the insured's clients, against theft, damage and
other loss, and provides general liability coverage, including products/completed
liability to insure the insured's finished work against later claims.
Together, these Lockton Affinity-administered Lloyd's insurance programs (and for a brief
period, Lockton Affmity-administered Alea London Ltd. ("Alea") insurance programs), are
referred to herein as the "Other NRA Programs."
6
16. Pursuant to written agreements with Lloyd's and the NRA, Lockton Affinity
served as the administrator for the Other NRA Programs, carrying out such functions as
marketing the insurance, binding the insurance, collecting and distributing premiums, and
delivering policies to insureds.
17. Pursuant to written agreements with Lockton Affinity, Lloyd's and Alea served as
the underwriters for the Other NRA Programs, providing insurance policies to individuals who
purchased NRA-sponsored insurance. Lockton Affinity also placed these insurance policies
through New York's excess line market.
Locldon Affinity's NRA Programs Violated New York Laws and Regulations
18. In violation of the Insurance Law, the Carry Guard Program, as brokered,
administered, solicited and marketed by Lockton Affinity, provided insurance coverage that may
not be offered in the New York State excess line market, specifically: (a) defense coverage in a
criminal proceeding that is not permitted by law; (b) liability coverage for bodily injury or
property damage expected or intended from the insured's standpoint in an insurance policy
limited to use of firearms and that was beyond the use of reasonable force to protect persons or
property; and (c) coverage for expenses incurred by the insured for psychological counseling
support.
19. Similarly, the NRA Retired Law Enforcement Officer Self-Defense Insurance
Program provided insurance coverage that may not be offered in the New York State excess line
market, specifically: (a) defense coverage in a criminal proceeding that is not permitted by law;
and (b) liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage expected or intended from the
insured's standpoint in an insurance policy limited to use of firearms and that was beyond the use
ofreasonable force to protect persons or property.
7
20. Additionally, the Carry Guard insurance program, as administered by Lockton
Affinity, failed to comply with Section 3420 of the Insurance Law, which sets forth minimum
requirements for liability insurance policies.
21. Lockton Affinity also violated the Insurance Law by giving or offering to give:
(a) the No Cost ArmsCare Firearms Insurance for free to NRA members in good standing; and
(b) free NRA membership, which the insured could use him or herself, or transfer to a family
member, if a person purchased the Carry Guard insurance, when the free NRA membership was
not specified in the insurance policy and exceeded $25 in market value.
22. Lockton has represented to the Department that, between approximately April and
November 2017, 680 Carry Guard insurance policies were issued to New York residents.
Lockton has further represented to the Department that no claims have been submitted under the
New York Carry Guard insurance policies to date.
23. Lockton has also represented to the Department that, for the period January 2000
through March 25, 2018, 28,015 insurance policies were issued to New York residents under the
Other NRA Programs.
24. Under written agreements between Lockton Affinity and the NRA, as of March
25, 2018, Lockton has represented that the NRA received royalties on the Carry Guard Program
in the amount of about $21,198, an amount based on a percentage of the actual premiums
collected by Lockton Affinity under the Carry. Guard Program from New York residents, in
violation of the Insurance Law. Similarly, under written agreements between Lockton Affinity
and the NRA, the NRA received additional royalties under the Other NRA Programs based on a
percentage of premiums collected by Lockton Affinity from New York residents, similarly
violating the Insurance Law.
8
25. Lockton has represented to the Department that revenue to the NRA from the
Carry Guard Program and the Other NRA Programs in New York totaled approximately
$1,872,737 for the period January 2000 through March 25, 2018. Under written agreements
between Lockton Affinity and the NRA, the NRA also received profit-sharing disbursements
from Lockton Affinity based on a schedule agreed to by the parties in conjunction with the Other
NRA Programs.
26. Between January 2000 and March 25, 2018, Lockton has represented to the
Department that Lockton Affinity collected premiums from the Carry Guard Program and the
Other NRA Programs in New York amounting to approximately $12,056,627. Lockton has also
represented that it collected approximately $785,460 in administrative fees from insureds under
the Carry Guard Program and the Other NRA Programs in New York during this time period.
Lockton Affinity Submitted Inaccurate Affidavits Required By the

Insurance Law Pertaining to Excess Lines Insurance Coverage
27. Lockton Affinity, through one or more of its sub licensees, submitted affidavits to
the Excess Line Association of New York ("ELANY") required by Insurance Law § 2118 in
connection with the Carry Guard Program and the Other NRA Programs. As set forth below,
those affidavits contained inaccurate information concerning compliance with the Insurance Law
and regulations promulgated thereunder.
28. As noted above, an authorized insurer is an insurance company that is licensed by
the Department to write certain kinds of insurance in New York, as specified in Insurance Law §
1113(a). Authorized insurers are fully regulated by the Department in order to ensure solvency
and adherence to consumer protection standards. An unauthorized insurer is an insurer not
licensed by the Department to write insurance in New York, and may be an insurer that provides
"excess line" insurance only under prescribed rules.
9
29. Under the Insurance Law, unless another exemption applies, an excess line broker
like Lockton Affinity that seeks to procure excess line insurance must first approach three
separate authorized insurers to determine if any one of those insurers will write coverage for the
risk. If all three authorized insurers decline to provide the requested coverage, only then may the
excess line broker place the insurance with an unauthorized insurer like Chubb. An excess line
broker must seek three declinations for each insured; the broker may not rely upon declinations
obtained with respect to other insureds.
30. In placing the Carry Guard Program and Other NRA Program insurance policies,
Lockton Affinity only obtained declinations from three authorized insurers once annually for a
single policy for each of these insurance programs, and then relied upon the single annual
declination with respect to all other insureds who received policies under these programs. At
least one Lockton Affinity sublicensee affirmed that, to the best of his knowledge and belief,
every policy procured by the sublicensee on behalf of Lockton Affinity was in full compliance
with the Insurance Law and regulations promulgated thereunder, when, in truth and in fact, the
sublicensee had not secured such declinations in compliance with the Insurance Law.
The Department's Investigation
31. Since October 2017, the Department has been conducting an investigation of the
involvement of Chubb, Lloyd's, Lockton and the NRA in the Carry Guard Program, the Other
NRA Programs, and other matters, including review of thousands of pages of documents
obtained from Chubb, Lockton and the NRA, and review of other information obtained from
investigative resources (the "DFS Investigation").
32. Lockton has represented to the Department that, following initiation of the DFS
Investigation in October 2017, which included information requests sent to Lockton in October
10
2017, Lockton Affinity suspended the Carry Guard Program on or about November 17, 2017, no
longer making Carry Guard policies available for New York residents to purchase.
33. NOW THEREFORE, to resolve this matter without further proceedings,
pursuant to Articles 21, 23 and 34 of the Insurance Law, Lockton Affinity, Lockton Companies,
and the Department hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
VIOLATIONS OF LAW AND REGULATIONS
34. Lockton Affinity compensated the NRA based on actual premium collected when
the NRA was acting as an unlicensed insurance broker by selling and soliciting insurance in New
York, in violation oflnsurance Law§ 2116.
35. Lockton Affmity acted for and aided an unauthorized Chubb insurer, Illinois
Union, in connection with Illinois Union's issuing or delivering policies in New York State, or
otherwise issuing policies covering New York State residents, which provided insurance
coverage that may not be offered in the New York State excess line market, specifically: (a)
defense coverage in a criminal proceeding that is not permitted by law; (b) liability coverage for
bodily injury or property damage expected or intended from the insured's standpoint in an
insurance policy limited to use of firearms and that was beyond the use of reasonable force to
protect persons or property; and (c) coverage for expenses incurred by the insured for
psycho logical counseling support, in violation oflnsurance Law § 2117.
36. Lockton Affmity gave, or offered to give, a free one-year NRA membership if a
person purchased the Carry Guard Program insurance policy, when the NRA membership benefit
was not specified in the policy and exceeded $25 in market value, in violation oflnsurance Law
§ 2324(a).
11
37. Lockton Affmity gave, or offered to give, the No Cost ArmsCare Firearms
Insurance at no cost to NRA members in good standing, in violation oflnsurance Law§ 2324(a).
38. Lockton Affmity advertised the financial condition of a Chubb insurer by
referring to the insurer's AM Best rating, in violation oflnsurance Law§ 2122(a)(l).
39. Lockton Affinity called attention to an unauthorized Chubb insurer by advertising
Chubb's participation in the Carry Guard Program on the Carry Guard website, in violation of
New York Insurance Law§ 2122(a)(2).
40. Lockton Affmity failed to properly secure declinations from authorized insurers
for each insured, in violation oflnsurance Law§ 2118.
SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
Civil Monetary Penalty
41. Lockton Affmity shall pay a civil monetary penalty to the Department pursuant to
Articles 21, 23 and 34 of the Insurance Law in the amount of$7,000,000. Lockton Affinity shall
pay the entire amount within ten days of executing this Consent Order. Lockton Affmity agrees
that it will not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any U.S.
federal, state, or local tax, directly or indirectly, for any portion of the civil monetary penalty
paid pursuant to this Consent Order. Lockton further agrees that it will not claim, seek, or
receive indemnification of the civil monetary penalty from any other person or entity. This
provision is not intended, and shall not be construed, to prohibit Lockton affiliates from funding
inter-company transfers to Lockton Affinity.
Prohibition on NRA-Endorsed Insurance Programs
42. Lockton agrees not to participate in the Carry Guard Program, any similar
programs, or any other NRA-endorsed programs with regard to New York State, including,
12
without limitation, (a) by agreeing not to provide Carry Guard or other insurance policies
specific to firearm usage that provides liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage
from use of a firearm, whether they are written or issued in New York State or elsewhere; and
(b) by agreeing not to provide liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage expected
or intended from the insured's standpoint in general liability policies that is not limited to those
occasions where bodily injury results from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or
property, whether they are written or issued in New York State or elsewhere; provided, however,
that Lockton Affinity may provide runoff administration for any in-force policies not cancelled
pursuant to Paragraph 46. Furthermore, Lockton agrees not to issue or deliver any Carry Guard
or similar insurance policies in New York State, regardless of the residence of the insured. For
the avoidance of doubt, Lockton shall not be prohibited from procuring homeowners, renters or
general liability insurance in New York State or for New York residents that includes personal
injury liability insurance or property damage liability insurance for loss, damage, or expense that
results from the negligent use of a firearm.
43. Lockton agrees that it shall not enter into any agreement or program with the
NRA to underwrite or participate in any affinity-type insurance program involving any line of
insurance to be issued or delivered in New York State or to anyone known to Lockton to be a
New York resident; provided, however, that Lockton may assist the NRA in procuring insurance
for the NRA's own corporate operations.
44. Lockton confirms and represents to the Department that, between approximately
April and November 2017, 680 Carry Guard insurance policies were issued to New York
residents. Lockton confirms and hereby represents to the Department that no claims have been
submitted under the New York Carry Guard insurance policies to date.
13
45. Lockton confirms and represents to the Department that:
a. for the period January 2000 through March 25, 2018, 28,015 insurance
policies were issued to New York residents under the Other NRA Programs;
b. Under written agreements between Lockton Affinity and the NRA, as of
March 25, 2018, the NRA received royalties from the Carry Guard Program in
New York in the amount of approximately $21,198;
c. Total revenue to the NRA from the Carry Guard Program and the Other NRA
Programs in New York totaled approximately $1,872,737 for the period
January 2000 through March 25, 2018;
d. Lockton Affmity collected premiums from the Carry Guard Program and the
Other NRA Programs in New York amounting to approximately $12,056,627
for the period January 2000 through March 25, 2018;
e. Lockton Affmity collected approximately $785,460 in administrative fees
from insureds under the Carry Guard Program and the Other NRA Programs
in New York during the period January 2000 through March 25, 2018.
46. Lockton agrees to fully cooperate with Chubb, Lloyd's and Alea (the
"Underwriters") to effect any cancellation initiated by an Underwriter of Carry Guard insurance
policies issued to New York residents, NRA Retired Law Enforcement Officer Self-Defense
Insurance policies issued to New York residents, and any other NRA-related insurance policies
issued to New York residents that provide coverage for intentional acts or legal services
insurance that were procured by Lockton Affinity, such cancellation to be effective 90 days from
the date of such notice. Lockton agrees to cooperate with the Underwriters in submitting any
such draft notices to the Department for the Department's review and approval prior to the
14
mailing or delivery of such notices by the Underwriters. Lockton Affinity also agrees to fully
cooperate in refunding the insurance premiums for the cancelled policies. Thereafter, Lockton
Affinity shall promptly file a certification with the Department that sets forth its compliance with
this Paragraph 46.
4 7. Lockton Affinity agrees not to procure from an unauthorized insurer any
insurance policy to be issued or delivered in New York State, or to anyone known to Lockton
Affinity to be a New York resident, in the New York State excess line market that provides: (a)
defense coverage in a criminal proceeding; (b)(i) liability coverage for bodily injury or property
damage expected or intended from the insured's standpoint in an insurance policy limited to use
of firearms and that is beyond the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property, or (ii)
liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage expected or intended from the insured's
standpoint in general liability policies that is not limited to those occasions where bodily injury
results from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property; and (c) coverage for
expenses incurred by the insured for psychological counseling support. For the avoidance of
doubt, Lockton shall not be prohibited from procuring homeowners, renters or general liability
insurance in New York State or for New York residents that includes personal injury liability
insurance or property damage liability insurance for loss, damage, or expense that results from
the negligent use of a firearm.
Full and Complete Cooperation of Lockton
48. Lockton commits and agrees to fully cooperate with the DFS Investigation and all
terms of this Consent Order. Such cooperation shall include, without limitation:
15
a. producing all non-privileged documents and other materials to the
Department, as requested, wherever located in Lockton's possession, custody,
or control;
b. requiring employees or agents to appear for interviews, at such reasonable
times and places, as requested by the Department;
c. responding fully and truthfully in a prompt manner to all inquiries when
requested to do so by the Department; and
d. testifying at hearings, trials and other judicial, administrative or other
proceedings, when requested to do so by the Department, in connection with
its investigation of matters relating to any NRA-endorsed insurance program.
Compliance Review
49. Lockton agrees to fully and completely cooperate with the DPS Investigation by
providing a truthful, accurate and complete report to the Department, within 60 days of the
execution of this Consent Order (the "Compliance Review"), that reports on:
a. any additional violations of the Insurance Law, or regulations promulgated
thereunder, that Lockton has identified;
b. any actions undertaken by Lockton to identify any violations of the Insurance
Law, or the regulations promulgated thereunder; and
c. a plan for remediation of any violation of the Insurance Law, or regulations
promulgated thereunder, identified in connection with the Carry Guard
Program, the Other NRA Programs, or any other insurance program or
conduct that violates the Insurance Law, or regulations promulgated
thereunder.
16
The Department may, in its sole regulatory discretion, accept, reject, or modify any plan of
remediation submitted by Lockton.
Breach of Consent Order
50. If the Department believes Lockton or Lockton Affinity to be in material breach
of this Consent Order, the Department will provide written notice to Lockton and/or Lockton
Affinity and Lockton and/or Lockton Affinity (as the case may be) must, within ten business
days of receiving such notice, or on a later date if so determined in the Department's sole
discretion, appear before the Department to demonstrate that no material breach has occurred or,
to the extent pertinent, that the breach is not material or has been cured.
51. The Parties understand and agree that Lockton's and/or Lockton Affinity's failure
to make the required showing within the designated time period shall be presumptive evidence of
such party's breach. Upon a finding that Lockton and/or Lockton Affinity has breached this
Consent Order, the Department has all the remedies available to it under the New York Insurance
and Financial Services Laws and may use any evidence available to the Department in any
ensuing hearings, notices, or orders.
Waiver of Rights
52. The Parties understand and agree that no provision of this Consent Order is
subject to review in any court or tribunal outside the Department.
Parties Bound by the Consent Order
53. This Consent Order is binding on the Parties, as well as any successors and
assigns. This Consent Order does not bind any federal or other state agency or any law
enforcement authority.
17
54. No further action will be taken by the Department against Lockton in connection
with the Carry Guard Program and the Other NRA Programs for the period January 1, 2000
through March 31, 2018, provided that Lockton complies fully with the terms of this Consent
Order, including Paragraphs 48 and 49 above.
55. Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Consent Order, the
Department may undertake action against Lockton for transactions or conduct that Lockton did
not disclose to the Department in the written materials that Lockton submitted to the Department
in connection with this matter, including, without limitation, any transactions or conduct that
Lockton identifies to the Department pursuant to the Compliance Review that it will undertake as
set forth in Paragraph 49 of this Consent Order.
Notices
56. All notices or communications regarding this Consent Order shall be sent to:
For the Department:
· or the Department:
Hadas Jacobi
Assistant Deputy Superintendent
for Enforcement
New York State Department of Financial Services
One State Street
New York, NY 10004
Megan Prendergast
Deputy Superintendent for Enforcement
One State Street
New York, NY 10004
Connor Mealey
Excelsior Fellow
One State Street
New York, NY 10004
18
· or Lockton Companies. LLC:
William Humphrey
Secretary
Lockton Companies
444 West 47 th Street
Kansas City, MO 64112
Scott A. Edelman
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
28 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10005
Andrew R. Holland
Sidley Austin
787 Seventh A venue
New York, NY 10019
For Lockton Affinity, LLC:
William Humphrey
Secretary
Lockton Affmity
444 West 47 th Street
Kansas City, MO 64112
Scott A. Edelman
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
28 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10005
Andrew R. Holland
Sidley Austin
787 Seventh A venue
New York, NY 10019
19
Miscellaneous.
57. Each provision of this Consent Order shall remain effective and enforceable
until stayed, modified, suspended, or tcnninated by the Department.
58. No promise, assurance, representation, or understanding other than those
contained in this Consent Order has been made to induce any party to agree to the provisions
of the Consent Order.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Consent Order to be si1ned this 2nd
day of May, 2018. •'
I·
LOCKTON COMPANIES, LLC, on NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF f
behalf or each of Its separate operating series, FINA11AI., SERVICES
t
;;~~~
Secretary
By: ~)r//4
MARIAT, VULLO
LOCKTON AFFINITY, LLC, on

behalf of each of its sea:,l!(at·e UP. f'ating series, ~
By: - - - - - - - - - -~ -
MATTHEW L. LEVJNE
Executive Deputy Superintendent for
Enforcement
Secretary
20
EXHIBIT E
EXHIBIT F
SEALED EXHIBIT B
EXHIBIT G
SEALED EXHIBIT C
EXHIBIT H
SEALED EXHIBIT D
EXHIBIT I
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT

OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
In the Matter of
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S,

LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO INSURANCE I
POLICIES ISSUED TO THE NATIONAL RIFLE JI
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
-----------~·---..---·- -------------
CONSENT ORDER UNDER
SECTIONS 1102 AND 3420 OF THE lNSURANCE LAW
The following underwriters at the Lloyd's London market, which are subject to this
Consent Order, acting through the undersigned managing agents: KLN 0510, managing agent
Tokio Marine Kiln Syndicates Limited; AUW 0609, managing agent Atrium Underwriters
Limited; SAM 0727, managing agent S.A. Meacock & Company Limited; CNP 0958, managing
agent Canopius Managing Agents Limited; CSL 1084, managing agent Chaucer Syndicates
Limited; ROC 1200, managing agent Argo Managing Agency Limited; GER 1206, managing
agent AmTrust Syndicates Limited; BRT 2987, managing agent Brit Syndicates Limited; CNP
4444, managing agent Canopius Managing Agents Limited; and LIB 4472, managing agent
Liberty Managing Agency Limited (together, the "Underwriters"), and the New York State
Department of Financial Services (the "Department") are willing to resolve the matters described
herein without further proceedings . .This Order is entered into by the undersigned managing
agents, who execute this Order on behalf of Underwriters.
THE DEPARTMENT'S FINDINGS FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION
1. Lloyd's of London is an insurance market encompassing underwriting syndicates
managed by more than 50 managing agents with whom over 200 registered brokers do business,
1
some of which involves a global network of over 4,000 local ag~nts, known as "coverholders,"
which have underwriting authority on behalf ofthe underwriting syndicates. 1 The Lloyd's market
is overseen by the U.K.-based Corporation of Lloyd's.
2. An "admitted" insurer is an insurance company that has received a license from the
Department to provide specified types of insurance to customers in New York. Admitted insurers
are fully regulated by the Department in order to ensure solvency and adherence to consumer
protection standards. A non-admitted insurer is an insurer not licensed by the Department, and
may be an insurance carrier that provides "excess line" insurance only under prescribed rules.
3. Excess line coverage offers policyholders an opportunity to obtain insurance that
could not be procured through admitted insurance carriers. Excess line carriers are not licensed
by the Department but are permitted to do business in New York through a licensed excess line
broker. Generally, an excess line policy can be written only after it has been declined by at least
three admitted carriers.
4. Lockton Companies, LLC (''Lockton") is the world's largest privately owned,
independent insurance brokerage firm, offering customers risk management, insurance and
employee benefits services. At least one of its affiliates has been licensed by the Department since
approximately 1987. Lockton Affinity, LLC ("Lockton Affinity") is an affiliate of Lockton
Companies, and has been licensed by the Department to act as an excess line insurance broker
since at least 2013.
5. The National Rifle Association of America ("NRA") is a New York not-for-profit
corporation incorporated in 1871. The NRA describes its mission as "firearms safety, education,
I
A "coverholder" in the Lloyd's market is an insurance intermediary authorized by a managing agent to enter into
contracts of insurance to be underwritten by the members of a syndicate managed by it, in accordance with the terms
of a binding authority. ee https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds-around-the-world/europe/switzerland/becoming-an
intermediary-and-coverholder.
2
and training and advocacy on behalf of safe and responsible gun owners." The NRA is not and
has never been licensed by the Department.
6. From approximately January 2000 through March 2018 (or, for certain insuring
agreements, for shorter time periods within this span), the NRA (through Lockton Affinity) offered
15 insurance programs to new and existing NRA members in New York and elsewhere that were
underwritten by Underwriters, including, inter alia:
a. "Self-Defense Insurance," which provided coverage for criminal and

civil defense costs, and bodily injury and damage caused by the use of
a firearm;
b. "Retired Law Enforcement Officer Self-Defense Insurance," which

provided coverage for criminal and civil defense costs, and bodily injury
and damage cau ed by the use of a firearm;
c. "Second-Call Defense Insurance," which provided coverage for

criminal and civil defense costs, and bodily injury and damage caused
by the use of a firearm·
d. "ArmsCare Plus Firearms Insurance," which provided coverage for

legal firearms and attached accessories against loss, damage, flood, fire,
and theft (including theft from a locked vehicle);
e. "No Cost ArmsCare Firearm To urance,' which provided free coverage

to NRA members in good standing for legal firearms and their attached
accessories, up to $2,500 in value, against loss, damage, flood, fire, and
theft (including theft from a locked vehicle);
f. "Firearms Instructor Plus Liability Insurance," which provided

coverage for injuries or damage the insured causes while acting as an
instructor during a lesson, medical expenses up to $5,000 legal
expenses from lawsuits related to the injuries or damage, and
profes ional liability coverage that protects the member from
allegations of negligent training;
g. "Personal Firearms Protection Insurance," which provided coverage for

any unintentional injuries or damage an insured causes while hunting or
trapping on public or private land shooting in competitions, or shooting
at private shooting ranges, with a firearm, air gun, bow and arrow or
trapping equipment and coverage for lawsuit defense costs;
3
h. "Gun Collector Insurance," which provided coverage for certain

firearms and their attached accessories against loss, damage, fire, and
theft (including theft from a locked vehicle);
1. "Gun Club Insurance," which provided coverage for loss or damage to

any assets the gun club rents, leases or owns, coverage for general
liability plus medical payments, coverage for claims of false
advertising, and optional coverage for business income, boiler and
machinery, glass, computers, valuable papers and records, and accounts
receivable;
j. "Hunt Club Insurance," which provided coverage for hunt clubs and the
landowners to protect against injury and damage, provided host liquor
coverage, and provides hired and non-owned auto coverage. In
addition, an insured may select coverage for "personal and advertising",
products/completed operations, and medical expenses up to $5,000 for
any one person;
k. 'NRA Bu ines Alliance lnsurance which provided coverage for a

firearms-related business, including coverage for loss or damage to any
a sets the insured business rents, lea es or owns coverage for general
liability plus medical payments coverage for claims of false
advertising, gunsmith coverage, and optional coverage for business
income, boiler and machinery glass, computers, valuable papers and
records and accounts receivable;
I. "Gun Show Insurance," which provided coverage for the insured's

liability arising out of the insured's occupation as a gun show promoter;
and
m. "Home-Based Federal Firearms License Insurance" for gun dealers and

gunsmiths, which provided coverage for the insured's business location,
equipment and tools, and gear entrusted to the insured by the insured's
clients, against theft, damage and other loss, and provided general
liability coverage, including products/completed lii;ibility to insure the
insured's finished work against later claims.
Together, these insurance programs are referred to herein as the "NRA Programs." 2
7. Pursuant to written agreements with Lockton, Underwriters served as the
underwriters for the NRA Programs, providing insurance policies to individuals and organizations
2
This paragraph includes summary descriptions obtained from the NRA website of coverage provided under the
pertinent insurance agreements. The specific operative terms and conditions of these coverages are set forth in the
actual insuring agreements identified.
4
who purchased NRA-sponsored insurance. Lockton Affinity placed coverage for individuals
whose home state is New York with Underwriters as part of a group policy issued to the NRA in
Virginia. Lockton also procured from Underwriters individual policies covering organizations,
such as gun clubs, whose home state is New York.
8. Pursuant to written agreements between Underwriters and Lockton Affinity, and
between Lockton Affinity and the NRA, Lockton Affinity served as the administrator for the NRA
Programs, carrying out such functions as marketing the insurance, binding the insurance, collecting
and distributing premiums, and delivering policy documents to insureds.
9. The NRA Programs, as underwritten by Underwriters and administered by Lockton
Affinity, unlawfully provided insurance coverage that may not be offered in the New York State
excess line market, specifically: (a) defense coverage in a criminal proceeding that is not permitted
by law; and (b) liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage expected or intended from
the insured's standpoint in an insurance policy limited to use of firearms and that was beyond the
use ofreasonable force to protect persons or property.
10. The NRA Programs, as underwritten by Underwriters and administered by Lockton
Affinity, further failed to comply with Section 3420 of the Insurance Law, which sets forth
minimum requirements for liability insurance policies.
11. Moreover, Underwriters issued to the NRA impermissible group policies covering
insureds whose home state is New York State, as neither Insurance Law Article 34 nor Insurance
Regulation 135 (11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 153) authorize Underwriters to write this type of group property
or casualty insurance.
12. Underwriters have represented to the Department that, between approximately
January 2000 and May 31, 2018, (a) 24,637 insurance policies or insuring agreements were issued
5
to persons or entities with a New York address in connection with the NRA Programs; and (b) 401
claims for payment have been filed by persons or entities whose home state is New York for the
NRA Programs as of December 18, 2018.
13. Since October 2017, the Department has been conducting an investigation of the
involvement of the Corporation of Lloyd's, Underwriters, Lockton and the NRA in the NRA
Programs and other matters, in~luding a review ofthousands of pages ofdocuments obtained from
the Corporation of Lloyd's, Underwriters, Lockton Affinity and the NRA, as well as other
information obtained from relevant sources (the "DFS Investigation").
14. Underwriters have represented to the Department that, following initiation of the
DFS Investigation, Underwriters suspended their participation in the NRA Programs as of June 1,
2018 with respect to persons or entities whose home state is New York.
15. NOW THEREFORE, to resolve this matter without further proceedings, pursuant
to Sections 1102 and 3420 of the Insurance Law, Underwriters and the Department (collectively,
the "Parties") hereby stipulate and agree as fo Hows:
VIOLATIONS OF LAW AND REGULATIONS

'
16. Underwriters engaged in the business of insurance without a license by issuing or
delivering policies in New York, or otherwise issuing policies covering insureds whose home state
is New York State, which provided insurance coverage that may not be offered in the New York
State excess line market, specifically: (a) defense coverage in a criminal proceeding that is not
permitted by law; and (b) liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage expected or
intended from t~e insured's standpoint in an insurance policy limited to use of firearms and that
was beyond the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property, in violation of Insurance
Law§ 1102.
6
17. Underwriters issued liability insurance coverage to insureds whose home state is
New York that failed to contain required liability insurance policy provisions, in violation of
Insurance Law§ 3420.
SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
Civil Monetary Penalty
18. Underwriters shall pay a civil monetary penalty to the Department pursuant to
Sections 1102 and 3420 of the Insurance Law in the amount of $5,000,000. Underwriters shall
pay the entire amount within ten days of executing this Consent Order. Underwriters agree that
they will not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any U.S. federal,
state, or local tax, directly or indirectly, for any portion ofthe civil monetary penalty paid pursuant
to this Consent Order. Underwriters further agree that they will not claim, seek, or receive
indemnification ofthe civil monetary penalty from any other person or entity.
'Prohibition on Certain Insurance Programs
19. Underwriters agree not to issue or deliver in New York State any insurance policies
specific to firearm usage that provide liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage from
use of a firearm, including, but not limited to, (a) the NRA "Self-Defense Insurance" policy, (b)
the NRA "Retired Law Enforcement Officer Self-Defense Insurance" policy and (c) the NRA
"Second-Call Defense Insurance" policy; and agree not to provide, to persons or entities whose
home state is New York, liability coverage for bodily injury or property damage expected or
intended from the insured's standpoint in general liability coverage that is not limited to those
occasions where bodily injury results from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or
property, whether they are written or issued in New York State or elsewhere including, but not
limited to, (a) the NRA "Self-Defense Insurance" policy, (b) the NRA "Retired Law Enforcement
7
Officer Self-Defense Insurance" policy and (c) the NRA "Second-Call Defense Insurance" policy.
For the avoidance of doubt, Underwriters shall not be prohibited from providing homeowners,
renters or general liability insurance in New York State, or for New York persons or entities whose
home state is New York, that includes bodily injury liability insurance or property damage liability
insurance for loss, damage, or expense that results from the negligent use of a firearm.
20. Underwriters agree that they shall not enter into any agreement or program with the
NRA to underwrite or participate in any affinity-type insurance program involving any line of
insurance covering persons or entities whose home state is New York; provided, however, that the
NRA may itself purchase insurance from Underwriters for the sole purpose of obtaining insurance
for the NRA's own corporate operations. Underwriters further agree that they shall not enter into
any affinity-type insurance program, involving any line of insurance covering persons or entities
whose home state is New York, without undertaking reasonable due diligence to ensure that any
person or entity involved in the issuance, brokering, administration or marketing of such affinity
insurance program is acting in compliance with the Insurance Law and the regulations promulgated
thereunder, including but not limited to, any licensure requirements of the Insurance Law or
regulations promulgated thereunder.
21. Underwriters agree not to issue or deliver in New York State any group insurance
policy, or issue any group insurance policy covering an insured whose home state is New York
State, unless the Insurance Law or regulations promulgated thereunder authorize the Underwriters
to write the group insurance policy in the New York State excess line market.
22. Within IO business days of the full execution of this Order, Underwriters shall
cause Lockton Affinity to mail or deliver, within 30 days ofthe full execution of this Order, to all
insureds whose home state is New York under the NRA "Self-Defense Insurance," NRA "Retired
8
Law Enforcement Officer Self-Defense Insurance," and NRA "Second-Call Defense Insurance"
programs a notice stating that Underwriters are canceling the insurance coverage provided under
these specific NRA Programs effective 90 days from the date of notice. Underwriters agree to
cause Lockton to submit the draft notices to the Department for the Department's review and
approval prior to the mailing or delivering such notices. Underwriters further agree to fully refund
the insurance premiums for the specific coverages canceled under these NRA Programs.
Thereafter, Underwriters shall promptly file a certification with the Department that sets forth their
compliance with this Paragraph 22.
23. Also within 10 business days ofthe full execution ofthis Order, Underwriters shall
cause Lockton Affinity (a) to mail or deliver, within 30 days ofthe full execution of this Order, to
the NRA a notice stating that Underwriters are cancelling the insurance coverage provided under
the NRA "No Cost ArmsCare Firearms Insurance Policy" to all insureds whose home state is New
York effective 90 days from the date of notice and (b) to direct the NRA to notify such insureds
(by the prescribed notice methods set forth in the "No Cost ArmsCare Firearms Insurance Policy")
that this coverage has been cancelled. Underwriters agree to cause Lockton Affinity to submit the
draft notice(s) required by Paragraph 23(a) to the Department for the Department's review and
approval prior to the mailing or delivering of such notices. If the NRA does not provide, by the
prescribed notice methods set forth in the "No Cost ArmsCare Firearms Insurance Policy," notice
to all insureds whose home state is New York that the "No Cost ArmsCare Firearms Insurance
Policy" coverage has been cancelled within the specified (or, if not specified, reasonable) time
period, then at the Department's direction, Underwriters shall take and/or cause Lockton Affinity
to take, such further action as reasonably may be required to notify the insureds ofthe cancellation
including, without limitation, publication of notice of cancellation in relevant newspapers,
9
periodicals or other media, subject to the Department's prior approval. Thereafter, Underwriters
shall promptly file a certification with the Department that sets forth their compliance with this
Paragraph 23.
24. Underwriters shall direct Lockton Affinity to non-renew any ofthe NRA Programs,
other than the NRA Programs specified in Paragraphs 22 and 23 of this Order, issued under the
group po Iicy to an insured whose home state is New York, at the end ofthe coverage term for that
insured. After Lockton Affinity has non-renewed all insureds whose home state is New York,
Underwriters shall promptly file a certification with the Department that sets forth their compliance
with this Paragraph 24.
25. Underwriters agree not to issue or deliver in New York State an insurance policy,
or otherwise issue an insurance policy covering an insured whose home state is New York, that
provides legal services coverage, including, but not limited to, defense coverage in a criminal
proceeding.
26. Underwriters agree not to issue or deliver in New York State an insurance policy,
or otherwise issue an insurance policy covering an insured whose home state is New York, that
compensates any broker, agent or other entity in a manner that would constitute either an illegal
inducement to the making of insurance or after insurance has been effected, an illegal rebate from
the premium which is not specified in the insurance policy, or illegal valuable consideration or
inducement of any kind, directly or indirectly, which is not specified in the insurance policy.
Full and Complete Cooperation of Undenvriters
27. Underwriters commit and agree to fully cooperate with the DFS Investigation and
all terms of this Consent Order. Such cooperation shall include, without limitation:
10
a. producing all non-privileged documents and other materials to the
Department, as requested, wherever located in the possession, custody, or
control of Underwriters;
b. requiring employees or agents to appear for interviews, at such reasonable
times and places, as requested by the Department;
c. responding fully and truthfully in a prompt manner to all inquiries when
requested to do so by the Department; and
d. testifying at hearings, trials and other judicial, administrative or other
proceedings, when requested to do so by the Department, in connection with
its investigation of matters relating to the NRA Programs.
Breach of Consent Order
28. If the Department believes Underwriters, or any individual Underwriter, to be in
material breach of this Consent Order, the Department will provide written notice to such
Underwriter or Underwriters, and such Underwriter or Underwriters must, within ten business days
of receiving such notice, or on a later date if so determined in the Department's sole discretion,
appear before the Department to demonstrate that no material breach has occurred or, to the extent
pertinent, that the breach is not material or has been cured.
29. The parties understand and agree that the failure of Underwriters or such
Underwriter to make the required showing within the designated time-period shall be presumptive
evidence of any such Underwriter's breach. Upon a finding that an Underwriter or Underwriters
have breached this Consent Order, the Department has all the remedies available to it under New
York Insurance and Financial Services Law and may use any evidence available to the Department
in any ensuing hearings, notices, or orders.
11
Waiver of Rights
30. The parties understand and agree that no provision ofthis Consent Order is subject
to review in any court or tribunal outside the Department.
Parties Bound by the Consent Order
31. This Consent Order is binding on the Department and Underwriters, as well as any
successors and assigns. This Consent Order does not bind any federal or other state agency or any
law enforcement authority.
32. No further action will be taken by the Department against Underwriters for the
specific conduct set forth in this Consent Order, provided that Underwriters comply fully with the
terms ofthis Consent Order, including Paragraph 27 above.
33. Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Consent Order, the
Department may undertake action against any Underwriter for transactions or conduct that such
Underwriter did not disclose to the Department in the written materials that such Underwriter
submitted to the Department in connection with this matter.
Notices
34. All notices or communications regarding this Consent Order shall be sent to:
For the Department:
Hadas Jacobi
Assistant Deputy Superintendent
for Enforcement
One State Street
New York, NY 10004
Connor Mealey
Excelsior Fellow
12
One State Street

New York, NY 10004
For Underwriter :
Michael P. Murphy
Partner, Global Chair, Insurance and Reinsurance
DLA Piper LLP (US)
1251 Avenue ofthe Americas
New York, NY l 0020
Catherine Marshall
Head of Compliance
Tokio Marine Kiln
20 Fenchurch Street
London, EC3M 3BY
United Kingdom
For the Members of Lloyd's Syndicate No. 0510 acting through their managing
agent, Tokio Marine Kiln Syndicates Limited.
James Cox
Compliance Director
Lloyd's Building
1 Lime Street
London, EC3M 7DQ
United Kingdom
agent, Atrium Underwriters Ltd.
David Jones
Compliance Director
Hasilwood House
60 Bishopsgate
London, EC2N 4A W
United Kingdom
agent, S.A. Meacock & Company Limited.
The Company Secretary

Gallery 9
One Lime Street
London, EC3M 7HA
13
United Kingdom
agent, Canopius Managing Agents Limited.
Paul Armfield
Compliance Manager
Chaucer Syndicates
Plantation Place
30 Frenchurch Street
London EC3M 3AD
agent, Chaucer Syndicates Limited.
Toby Mills
Head of Compliance - EMEA
ArgoGlobal
1 Fen Court
London, EC3M 5BN
United Kingdom
agent, Argo Managing Agency Limited.
General Counsel
Exchequer Court
33 St Mary Axe
London EC3A 8AA
United Kingdom
agent, AmTrust Syndicates Limited.
Tim Harmer, Group Director of Legal and Compliance

Brit Insurance
122 Leadenhall Street
London, EC3V 4AB
United Kingdom
agent, Brit Syndicates Limited.
The Company Secretary

Gallery 9
One Lime Street
London, EC3M 7HA
United Kingdom
agent, Canopius Managing Agents Limited.
14
Nigel Davenport, Group General Counsel

Liberty Specialty Markets
20 Fenchurch Street,
London, EC3M 3A W
United Kingdom
agent, Liberty Managing Agency Limited.
Miscellaneous
35. Each provision of this Consent Order shall remain effective and enforceable until
stayed, modified, suspended, or terminated by the Department.
36. No promise, assurance, representation, or understanding other than those contained
in this Consent Order has been made to induce any party to agree to the provisions ofthe Consent
Order.
[remainder ofpage intentionally left blank]
15
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Consent Order to be signed this 2. O~
day of December, 2018.
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF

LONDON FINANCIAL SERVICES
By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ By: LJUA

MARIA T. VULLO
CHARLES FRANKS Superintendent of Financial Services
Group Chief Executive Officer
For the Members of Lloyd's S ndicate No.

By:
0510 acting through their mana 0 ing agent, MAT - THEW
-- __ _ L_LEV_IN
__ __ _ E_ __
Tokio Marine Kiln Syndicates Limited. Executive Deputy Superintendent for
Enforcement
16
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Consent Order to be signed this_
day of December, 2018.
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S,
LONDO,<)
By: ~~
CHARLES FRANKS
Group Chief Executive Officer
For the Members of Lloyd's Syndicate No. By: _ _ _ __ _ __

0510 acting through their managing agent, MATTHEW L. LEVINE
Tokio Marine Kiln Syndicates Limited. Executive Deputy Superintendent for
Enforcement
16
RICHARD HARRIES
Chief Executive Officer
For the Memben of Lloyd's Syndicate No.

0609 acting through their managing agent,
Atriwn Underwriters Ltd.
17
For the Memhc,·s of Lloycl's Synclic11te No.

0727 acting thl'Ough their managing agent, S.A.
Meacock & Company Limited.
18
By: ~
~ / .Jb~.~-,,
~-'--------"- ~'\
MIKE DUFFY
For the Members of Lloyd's Syndicate No.

Canopius Managing Agents Lhnited.
19
By:
RICHARD BARNETT
Company Secretary and General Counsel

Cha.ucer Syndicates Limited.
20
By;~ --
DOMINIC KIRBY
Managing Director
For the Members of Lloyd ' s Syndicate No.

Argo Managing Agency Limited.
21
SHELDON LACY
Chief Risk Officer

AmTrust Syndicates Limited.
22
By: _/_\- --
~- -
TIM HARMER
Group Director of Legal and Compliance
For the Members of Lloyd's Syndicate, No.

2987 acting through their managing agent, Brit
Syndicates Limited.
23
By M·~
MIKE DUFFY

4444 acting through their managiog ageot,
Canopius Managing Agents Limited.
24
By: / J > ~1
NIGEL DAVENPORT
Group General Counsel

Liberty Managing Agency Limited.
25
EXHIBIT J

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Case 1:18-cv-00566-TJM-CFH Document 203 Filed 06/02/20 Page 1 of 44

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF §

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) (collectively, “Defendants”), upon personal knowledge

This case is necessitated by an overt viewpoint-based discrimination campaign against the

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

defend their Second Amendment freedoms against encroachment.

Defendants’ retaliation and selective-enforcement campaign surfaced with a series of

At the same time, Defendants engaged in back-channel communications to reinforce their

threats. Thus, in a stunning display of unconstitutional overreach, Defendants made it clear to

As a direct result of this coercion, multiple financial institutions have succumbed to

existence and its advocacy mission.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

judicial scrutiny. Nor should it.

1. Plaintiff the National Rifle Association of America is a nonprofit corporation

2. Defendant New York State Department of Financial Services is an agency of the

financial institutions with assets over $2.9 trillion.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

asserted in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is properly vested in this Court because

defendant Cuomo resides in this judicial district.

7. There is a present and actual controversy between the parties.

8. The relief requested is authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (recovery of

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (awards of attorneys’ fees and costs).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

government to promote the rights of its members and all Americans.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

B. Cuomo’s Political Vendetta Against The NRA.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

organized legislative and grassroots opposition.8

We're going to beat them state by state, community by community.”10

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

“conservatives and the Second Amendment types.”13

political advocacy of the NRA is a career strategy.

C. Defendants Attempt To Chill The NRA’s Political Speech In Support Of Americans’

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

promotion” organizations by leveraging state power to punishing financial institutions which

of New York’s financial markets.

nothing to do with the allegedly unlawful conduct cited by DFS.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

face the consequences.

1. DFS And Its Regulatory Mission.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

consumers and markets from fraud.”19

“risk management” must be taken seriously by financial institutions—as risk-management

deficiencies can result in fines of hundreds of millions of dollars.

In addition, DFS has no authority to engage in unlawful viewpoint discrimination.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

generally offered by major wholesale banking institutions.

cease circulation of various print publications and magazines.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

as general liability, umbrella and director and officer insurance.

32. The NRA-endorsed affinity-insurance administered by Lockton consists primarily

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA’S

in a joint effort to silence the NRA.